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OF THE
UNITED
STATES**

1977-1980

VOLUME VI

SOVIET UNION



**DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE**

Washington



Foreign Relations of the United States, 1977–1980

Volume VI

Soviet Union

Editor Melissa Jane Taylor

General Editor Adam M. Howard

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102-138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series, which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102-138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State's Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 U.S.C. 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government

agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Record Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the *Foreign Relations* series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department's central files for 1977–1981 are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department's decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Carter Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Editorial Methodology

The documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the *Foreign Relations* series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance

from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words and phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the number (including special designators such as *secto*) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records,

advises, and makes recommendations concerning the *Foreign Relations* series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2010 and was completed in 2012, resulted in the decision to withhold 1 document in full, excise a paragraph or more in 1 document, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 16 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable—given the limitations of space—record of the Carter administration's policy toward the Soviet Union.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
General Editor

Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
December, 2013

Preface

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a *Foreign Relations* subseries documenting the most important foreign policy issues of the Jimmy Carter administration. As with previous Soviet Union volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series, this volume provides a snapshot of the global character of Cold War politics. Therefore, this volume is best read in conjunction with other volumes in the subseries, in order to understand the breadth and scope of U.S.-Soviet relations throughout the world. The most important of these volumes include: *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume VII, Poland; *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978; *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume IX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, September 1978–December 1980; *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XII, Afghanistan; *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, volume XIII, China; and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980.

Focus of Research and Principles of Selection for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume VI

This volume documents U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union, demonstrating the growing tension between U.S. and Soviet leaders and the eventual downfall of détente. Relations with the Soviet Union remained a central element of Carter's foreign policy agenda, just as they had been for earlier administrations. However, the U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union was never simply bilateral in nature; instead, the two super powers were actively engaged politically throughout the world. Therefore, this volume includes documentation on the Middle East, China, Eastern and Western Europe, and the Horn of Africa, as well as SALT, emigration, and human rights.

Unlike the leadership of the Nixon and Ford administrations, who met regularly with the Soviet leadership, Carter conducted only one summit meeting with Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. Thus, Carter and Brezhnev communicated most frequently by letter. The majority of communication and policymaking was done at the Secretary of State/foreign minister or ambassadorial levels, and these meetings and communications are documented in cables and memoranda of conversation.

During the first years of the administration, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met with Soviet officials both in Washington, D.C. and abroad, but as the administration progressed, Assistant to the President

for National Security Affairs Zbigniew Brzezinski, a Soviet expert, played a central role in the administration's policy formulation towards the Soviet Union. Brzezinski's voice became the dominant one during the last year of the administration with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan culminating in years of increasing concern over the extension of Soviet power into Africa and Asia.

President Carter brought into office an emphasis on human rights and a determination to include this issue as a major consideration in American foreign affairs. This emphasis was not well-received by the Soviets, who saw it as an intrusion into their internal matters, especially with respect to the issue of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, which became a major issue of contention. Carter's emphasis on human rights contributed to a decline of détente by the end of his presidency. During the final year of the Carter administration, détente and the relationship with the Soviet Union withered, overshadowed by domestic economic problems and the hostage crisis in Iran, and weakened by the many areas of contention between the Soviet Union and the United States.

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of officials at the Carter Library, Atlanta, Georgia. Special thanks are due to the Historical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who were extremely helpful in arranging full access to the files of the Central Intelligence Agency. Melissa Jane Taylor collected, selected documentation, and edited the volume under the supervision of M. Todd Bennett, Chief of the Europe and General Division, and Edward C. Keefer, former General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series. Kristin L. Ahlberg, Assistant to the General Editor, reviewed the volume. Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review, under the supervision first of Susan C. Weetman and later Carl Ashley, who both served as Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Stephanie Eckroth, Vicki E. Futscher, and Erin F. Cozens did the copy and technical editing. Do Mi Stauber, Inc. prepared the index.

Melissa Jane Taylor, Ph.D.
Historian

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Sources

Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It also requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support, cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. U.S. foreign policy agencies and departments—the Department of State, National Security Council, Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, and the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library—have complied fully with this law and provided complete access to their relevant records.

Research for *Foreign Relations* volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Jimmy Carter Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

Sources for Foreign Relations, 1977–1980, Volume VI

The files at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, in Atlanta, Georgia, are the single most important source of documentation for those interested in U.S.-Soviet relations during the Carter administration. Foreign policy research in the Carter Presidential Library centers on two collections: National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, and National Security Affairs, Staff Material. In addition, Marshall Shulman's lot file at the Department of State offers a nearly complete record of U.S.-Soviet relations during the Carter administration, and should be consulted by anyone who is researching the U.S.–U.S.S.R. bilateral relationship. Additionally, the Country files in the Brzezinski Material and the Brzezinski Donated Material provided important documentation.

The editor also had access to the Carter Intelligence Files at the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. The files of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly the NIC Registry of NIE, SNIE and NIAM files, were essential

for intelligence reports and assessments on which the Carter administration based its policy decisions.

The editor made considerable use of materials already compiled for other volumes in the *Foreign Relations* series, including those of the Middle East, China, Afghanistan, Poland, SALT, and Western Europe. Readers interested in these subjects should consult the relevant volumes for further information on the specific sources used in research.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and some of these records are already available for public review at the National Archives.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Lot Files. These files have been transferred or will be transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration in College Park, Maryland.

Files of the Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Lot 91D231

Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241

Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs
Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109

Office of the Secretary, Personal Files of Secretary Cyrus R. Vance, Lot 80D135

Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Dissidents and Political Prisoner Subject Files, 1974–1988,
Lot 91D273

National Archives and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File

Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, Atlanta, Georgia

Brzezinski Donated Material

National Security Affairs

Brzezinski Material

Brzezinski Office File

Cables File

General Odom File

Name File

President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File

Subject File

Trip Files

VIP Visit File

Staff Material

- Office File
- Staff Secretary File
- Europe, USSR, and East/West
- Global Issues
- International Economics
- Defense/Security Files

National Security Council Files

- National Security Council Meetings
- Presidential Decisions
- Presidential Review Memoranda

Plains File

Central Intelligence Agency

- DCI Executive Registry Files
- Job 83T00237R

- NIC Registry of NIE and SNIE Files
- Job 79R01012A

National Security Council

- Carter Intelligence Files
- Subject Files

Published Sources

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- Carter, Jimmy. *Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President*. New York: Bantam Books, 1982.
- Congressional Quarterly. *Congress and the Nation, 1977–1980*, vol. V. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1981.
- Current Digest of the Soviet Press*
- Dobrynin, Anatoly. *In Confidence: Moscow's Ambassador to America's Six Cold War Presidents (1962–1986)*. New York: Times Books, 1995.
- Keesing's Contemporary Archives, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980, 1981*. London: Longman, 1977–1981.
- The New York Times*
- United Nations. *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1980*. New York: United Nations Office of Public Information, 1981.
- United States. Department of State. *Bulletin, 1977–1980*.
- United States. National Archives and Records Administration. *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Jimmy Carter, 1977–1980*. Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977–1982.
- Vance, Cyrus. *Hard Choices: Critical Years in America's Foreign Policy*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983.

Abbreviations and Terms

ABM, anti-ballistic missile
AC, alternating current
ACDA, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
A/DCM, Assistant Deputy Chief of Mission
AD, Anatoly F. Dobrynin
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFL-CIO, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFSSO, Air Force Special Security Office
ALCM, air-launched cruise missile
Amcit, American citizen
ANZUS, Australia, New Zealand, United States Security Treaty
APC, armored personnel carrier
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/CCA, Office of Cuban Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARPV, advanced remotely piloted vehicle
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASAT, anti-satellite
ASBM, air-to-surface ballistic missile
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASW, anti-submarine warfare
A/SY, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security
AWACS, Airborne Warning and Control System

backchannel, a method of communication outside normal bureaucratic procedure; the White House, for instance, used “backchannel” to bypass the Department of State
BW, biological weapons
BWC, Biological Weapons Convention

C, Carter; Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CCC, Commodity Credit Corporation
CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CEMA, Council for Mutual Economic Assistance
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCEUR, Commander-In-Chief, European Command
CINCLANT, Commander-In-Chief, Atlantic Command
CINCNORAD, Commander-In-Chief, North American Aerospace Defense Command
CINCPAC, Commander-In-Chief, Pacific Command
CINCSAC, Commander-In-Chief, Strategic Air Command
CM, cruise missile
COB, close of business
COCOM, Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls
CodeI, Congressional delegation
COMNAVINTCOM, Commander, Naval Intelligence Command
CONUS, Continental United States
COS, Chief of Staff
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CW, chemical weapons

XVI Abbreviations and Terms

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State

DA, David Aaron

DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary

DC, direct current

DCI, Director of Central Intelligence

DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission

DEPTOFF, Department of State Officer

DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency

DOD, Department of Defense

DRA, Democratic Republic of Afghanistan

DSB, Dresser Science Board

DUSD/PP, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy

EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State

EDT, Eastern Daylight Time.

EEC, European Economic Community

EJC3, Director for Operations Directorate, EUCOM Plans and Operations Center

EM, Edmund Muskie

EMBOFF, Embassy Officer

ER, Office of Economic Research, Central Intelligence Agency

ERW, enhanced radiation weapon

EUCOM, European Command

EUR/EE, Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/RPM, Office of NATO and Atlantic Political-Military Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

EXDIS, exclusive distribution

FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation

FBS, forward-based systems

FCO, Foreign and Commonwealth Office

FMS & ESF, Foreign Military Sale and Economic Support Fund

FONOFF, Foreign Office

FRG, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)

FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FYI, for your information

GBS, global broadcast system

GDR, German Democratic Republic (East Germany)

GLCM, ground-launched cruise missile

GNP, gross national product

GOK, Government of Kenya

GSO, General Services Officer

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State

HA, Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State

HMG, Her Majesty's Government

IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency

IBM, International Business Machines Corporation

ICA, International Communication Agency

ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile

IFI, international financial institution

INFCE, International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/PMT, Office of Research and Analysis for Politico-Military Research, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/RAR, Office of Research and Analysis for American Republics, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/RSE, Office of Research and Analysis for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INS, Immigration and Naturalization Service
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/UNP, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IOC, International Olympic Committee
IOU, I owe you

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDT, joint draft text
JFK, John F. Kennedy Airport, New York, New York

KM, kilometer
KOR, Committee in Defense of the Workers (Poland)
KTS, kilotons

LAOOC, Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee
LDC, least developed country
LDX, long distance xerography
LOU, limited official use
L/PM, Office of the Legal Adviser, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
LRTNF, long range theater nuclear force

MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MDS, Marshall Shulman
MEMCON, memorandum of conversation
MFA, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MFN, most favored nation
MHD, magnetohydrodynamic channel
MIA, missing in action
MIRV, multiple independently targeted re-entry vehicle
MIT, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
MLBM, mobile land-based missile
MPLA, Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola
MUTS, military utility tests
MW/CM, multiple warhead/cruise missile

NAM, non-aligned movement
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NCSJ, National Conference on Soviet Jewry
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/ARP, Office of Arabian Peninsula Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/IAI, Israel and Arab-Israeli Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/IWG, Interdepartmental Working Group, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

XVIII Abbreviations and Terms

NEA/PAB, Office of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State

NIACT, needs immediate action

NNFU, nuclear non-first use

NOCONTRACT, not releasable to contractors

NODIS, no distribution

NOFORN, not releasable to foreign nationals

NORAD, North American Aerospace Defense Command

NPT, Non-Proliferation Treaty

NSA, National Security Agency

NSC, National Security Council

NSS, national security strategy

NTM, national technical means

N.W., Northwest

NYT, *The New York Times*

OAS, Organization of American States

OAU, Organization of African Unity

OMB, Office of Management and Budget

OPEC, Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries

ORCON, Originator's Control

P, Bureau of Political Affairs, Department of State

PAK, Pakistan

PDRY, People's Democratic Republic of Yemen

PERMREPS, Permanent Representatives

PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization

PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PM/DCA, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

PNE, peaceful nuclear explosion

PNG, persona non grata

PRC, People's Republic of China; Policy Review Committee

PRK, Democratic People's Republic of Korea

PRM, Presidential Review Memorandum

PROPIN, proprietary information involved

R, Romeo time zone (Eastern Standard Time)

REFTEL, reference telegram

REVCON, Review Conference

RF, radio frequency

RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

RPM, regional and political memorandum

RPT, repeat

RPV, remote-piloted vehicle

RSFSR, Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic

RV, re-entry vehicle

RW, radiological warfare

S, Office of the Secretary of State

S/MS, Special Adviser to the Secretary, Department of State

S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Office of the Secretary of State, Department of State

S/S, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State

S/S-I, Information Management Section of the Office of the Secretariat Staff, Department of State

S/S-O, Department Duty Officer, Operations Center, Department of State

SAG, Saudi Arabian Government
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAR, South African Republic
SAWG, Special Actions Working Group
SC, Security Council (United Nations)
SCC, Special Coordination Committee
SEPTTEL, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SHAPE, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers, Europe
SIGINT, signals intelligence
SLCM, surfaced-launched cruise missile; submarine-launched cruise missile; and sea-launched cruise missile
SMUN, Soviet Mission at the United Nations
SNDV, strategic nuclear delivery vehicle
SPECAT, special category message
SRV, Socialist Republic of Vietnam
SSCI, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
SSOD, Special Session on Disarmament
SU, Soviet Union
SW, Office of Scientific and Weapons Research, Central Intelligence Agency
SWAPO, South West Africa People's Organization
SY, Office of Security Affairs, Department of State

TASS, official Soviet news agency
TNF, theater nuclear forces
TSO, Technical Security Officer
T.V., television

UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNK, unknown
U.S., United States
U.S.A., United States of America
USAF, United States Air Force
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USDELMC, United States Delegation to the NATO Military Committee
USEUCOM, United States European Command
USG, United States Government
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USLOACLANT, United States Liaison Officer Supreme Allied Command, Atlantic
USNATO, United States Mission at the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
USNMR, United States National Military Representative
USOC, United States Olympic Committee
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
USUN, United States Mission at the United Nations

VAC, volts of alternating current
VDC, volts of direct current
VOA, Voice of America

WH, White House

YAR, Yemen Arab Republic

Z, Zulu Time Zone (Greenwich Mean Time)

Persons

- Aaron, David L.**, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Albright, Madeline**, Congressional Relations Officer, Press and Congressional Liaison Office, National Security Council from March 1978
- Allon, Yigal**, Israeli Minister for Foreign Affairs from June 1974 until June 1977
- Amin, Hafizullah**, President of Afghanistan from September until December 1979
- Amin, Idi**, President of Uganda until 1979
- Anderson, David**, Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from 1977 until 1978; thereafter Executive Secretariat staff
- Andropov, Yuri**, Chairman of the Committee for Soviet State Security (KGB)
- Arafat, Yassir**, Chairman of the Palestinian Liberation Organization
- Arbatov, Georgiy**, Director of the Institute of U.S. and Canadian Studies, Russian Academy of Science, Moscow
- al-Asad (Assad), Hafez**, President of Syria
- Atherton, Alfred L. (Roy)**, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until April 13, 1978; Ambassador-at-Large from April 11, 1978 until May 22, 1979; Ambassador to Egypt from July 2, 1979
- Barre, Mohamed Siad**, President of Somalia
- Barry, Robert L.**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
- Bartholomew, Reginald H.**, Deputy Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, from January until November 1977; member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council, from November 1977 until April 1979; Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from 1979
- Begin, Menachem**, Israeli Prime Minister from June 1977
- Bessmertnykh, Alexander A.**, Soviet Counselor
- Blumenthal, W. Michael**, Secretary of the Treasury until August 4, 1979
- Bremont, Marshall**, Political Counselor, U.S. Embassy in Madrid from 1977 until 1979; member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council, from May 1979 until January 1981
- Bremer, L. Paul, III (Jerry)**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Oslo, until 1979; thereafter Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State
- Brezhnev, Leonid I.**, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
- Brown, Harold**, Secretary of Defense
- Brzezinski, Zbigniew K.**, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Bukovskiy, Vladimir**, Soviet dissident
- Bush, George H.W.**, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency until January 20, 1977
- Carter, James Earl, Jr. (Jimmy)**, President of the United States from January 20, 1977, until January 20, 1981
- Chernenko, Konstantin U.**, Member of the Soviet Politburo
- Chirac, Jacques**, Mayor of Paris
- Christopher, Warren M.**, Deputy Secretary of State from February 25, 1977
- Cutler, Lloyd**, Counsel to the President from 1979
- Daoud Khan, Mohammed**, President of Afghanistan until April 1978
- Dayan, Moshe**, Israeli Foreign Minister from June 1977 until October 1979
- Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p'ing)**, Chinese Vice Premier of the State Council

Dobrynin, Anatoliy, Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Earle, Ralph, II, Chief of the United States Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from January 3, 1980 until March 16, 1980

Eizenstat, Stuart, Executive Director, White House Domestic Policy Staff; Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Policy

Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States until January 20, 1977

Gelb, Leslie H., Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from February 23, 1977 until June 30, 1979

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, West German Vice-Chancellor and Foreign Minister

Gierek, Edward, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party until 1980

Ginzburg, Aleksandr, Soviet dissident and human rights activist

Giscard d'Estaing, Valéry, French President

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

Habib, Philip, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until April 1, 1978; thereafter Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State on Caribbean Issues

Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs

Hoskinson, Samuel, Intelligence Coordinator, National Security Council, from January 1977 until May 1979

Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-Feng), Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party

Huntington, Samuel, coordinator of security planning for the National Security Council from 1977 until 1978

Hussein bin Talal, King of Jordan

Hyland, William G., member, USSR/East Europe Cluster, National Security Council, from January until October 1977

Jackson, Henry M. (Scoop), Senator (D-Washington)

Kania, Stanislaw, First Secretary of the Polish United Workers' Party from September 1980

Karmal, Babrak, Prime Minister of Afghanistan from December 1979

Karpov, Victor P., Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Keeny, Spurgeon M., Jr., Assistant Director of the Science and Technology Bureau, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Kennedy, Edward M. (Ted), Senator (D-Massachusetts)

Khalid, Ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, King and Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia

Kirilenko, Andrei P., Member of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Kirchschlager, Rudolf, Austrian President

Kissinger, Henry A., Secretary of State until January 1977

Korniienko, Georgy M., Soviet first deputy to the Foreign Minister

Kosygin, Aleksey, Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Kreisky, Bruno, Austrian Chancellor

Kreps, Juanita, Secretary of Commerce until October 1979

Krimer, William D., interpreter for the Department of State

Kuznetsov, Vasili, First Deputy Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

Luers, William H., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Mathews, Jessica Tuchman, member, National Security Council Staff for Global Issues from January 1977 until June 1979

Matlock, Jack F., Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission in Moscow until September 1978

McHenry, Donald F., United States Representative to the United Nations from September 23, 1979, until January 20, 1981

McIntyre, James T., Director of the Office of Management and Budget

Medvedev, Roy, Soviet dissident historian

Mengistu Haile Miriam, Chairman of the Provisional Government of Ethiopia

Mobutu Sese Seko, President of Zaire

Muskie, Edmund S., Secretary of State from May 1980

Newsom, David D., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 19, 1978

Nimieri, Gafer, President of Sudan

Nimetz, Matthew, Counselor of the Department of State from April 8, 1977, until March 19, 1980; Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, Science, and Technology from February 21, 1980, until December 5, 1980

Nyerere, Julius, President of Tanzania

Odom, William E., Lieutenant General, USA, Military Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs

Ogarkov, Nikolai V., Chief of the General Staff of the Soviet Union

Orlov, Yuriy, Soviet nuclear physicist and dissident

Patolichev, Nikolai Semenovich, Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade

Percy, Charles Harting, Senator (R-Illinois)

Pol Pot, Prime Minister of Democratic Kampuchea (Cambodia) until January 1979

Powell, Joseph L. (Jody), Jr., Press Secretary

Quandt, William B., member, National Security Council Staff from January 1977 until August 1979

Rabin, Yitzhak, Israeli Prime Minister until May 1977

Reagan, Ronald W., Republican Presidential nominee, 1980; President of the United States from January 1981

Reinhardt, John, Director of Information Agency (renamed the International Communication Agency on April 1, 1978) from March 1977 until August 1980

Ryabov, Yakov P., Member of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until April 1979

al-Sadat, Anwar, President of Egypt

Sakharov, Andrei, Soviet dissident; Nobel Peace Prize laureate, 1975

Schlesinger, James R., Secretary of Energy from August 5, 1977 until July 20, 1979

Schmidt, Helmut, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Semenov, Vladimir S., Chief of the Soviet SALT Mission in Geneva

Shcharanskiy, Anatoliy, Soviet dissident and refusenik

Shinn, William, Director, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Shulman, Marshall, Special Advisor to the Secretary on Soviet Affairs

Sick, Gary, member, National Security Council Staff for the Middle East and North Africa from January 1977 until January 1981

Slepak, Vladimir, Soviet refusenik

Smith, Gerard, Ambassador at Large and Special Representative for Non-Proliferation Matters from July 1977 until November 1980

Solomentsev, Mikhail S., Chairman, RSFSR Council of Ministers

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., Soviet novelist and historian; awarded the Nobel Prize in Literature, 1970; forced into exile, 1974

Sparkman, John J., Senator (D-Alabama) until 1979; chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1979

Sukhodrev, Viktor M., Soviet interpreter

Suslov, Mikhail, Member of the Politburo and the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Taraki, Nur Muhammad, President of Afghanistan from April 1978 until September 1979

Tarnoff, Peter, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia until May 1980

Toon, Malcolm, Ambassador to the Soviet Union until October 1979

Troyanovsky, Oleg, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations

Turner, Stansfield M., Director of the Central Intelligence Agency

Twaddell, William H., staff, Office of the Secretary of State

Ueberroth, Peter, Executive Director of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics Organizing Committee

Ustinov, Dmitri F., Soviet Minister of Defense

Vance, Cyrus R., Secretary of State until April 1980

Vasev, Vladillen, Soviet Minister Counselor

Vorontsov, Yuli, Soviet Minister Counselor

Waldheim, Kurt, United Nations Secretary-General until December 31, 1981

Walesa, Lech, First Chairman of the National Coordination Committee of *Solidarnosc* (Solidarity) Free Trade Union

Warnke, Paul, Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from March 1977 until October 1978

Watson, Thomas J., Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from October 1979

Weizman, Ezer, Israeli Defense Minister from June 1977

Wolper, David, Associate Director of the Los Angeles 1984 Olympics Organizing Committee

Wyszynski, Cardinal Stefan, Archbishop of Warsaw and Gniezno

Young, Andrew, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations

Zahir Shah, Mohammed, King of Afghanistan from November 1933 until July 1973

Zia-ul-Haq, Mohammad, President of Pakistan

Note on U.S. Covert Actions

In compliance with the *Foreign Relations of the United States* statute that requires inclusion in the *Foreign Relations* series of comprehensive documentation on major foreign policy decisions and actions, the editors have identified key documents regarding major covert actions and intelligence activities. The following note will provide readers with some organizational context on how covert actions and special intelligence operations in support of U.S. foreign policy were planned and approved within the U.S. Government. It describes, on the basis of declassified documents, the changing and developing procedures during the Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter Presidencies.

Management of Covert Actions in the Truman Presidency

The Truman administration's concern over Soviet "psychological warfare" prompted the new National Security Council to authorize, in NSC 4-A of December 1947, the launching of peacetime covert action operations. NSC 4-A made the Director of Central Intelligence responsible for psychological warfare, establishing at the same time the principle that covert action was an exclusively Executive Branch function. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) certainly was a natural choice but it was assigned this function at least in part because the Agency controlled unvouchered funds, by which operations could be funded with minimal risk of exposure in Washington.¹

The CIA's early use of its new covert action mandate dissatisfied officials at the Departments of State and Defense. The Department of State, believing this role too important to be left to the CIA alone and concerned that the military might create a new rival covert action office in the Pentagon, pressed to reopen the issue of where responsibility for covert action activities should reside. Consequently, on June 18, 1948, a new NSC directive, NSC 10/2, superseded NSC 4-A.

NSC 10/2 directed the CIA to conduct "covert" rather than merely "psychological" operations, defining them as all activities "which are conducted or sponsored by this Government against hostile foreign states or groups or in support of friendly foreign states or groups but which are so planned and executed that any US Government responsibility for them is not evident to unauthorized persons and that if un-

¹ NSC 4-A, December 17, 1947, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1945-1950, Emergence of the Intelligence Establishment*, Document 257.

covered the US Government can plausibly disclaim any responsibility for them.”

The type of clandestine activities enumerated under the new directive included: “propaganda; economic warfare; preventive direct action, including sabotage, demolition and evacuation measures; subversion against hostile states, including assistance to underground resistance movements, guerrillas and refugee liberations [*sic*] groups, and support of indigenous anti-Communist elements in threatened countries of the free world. Such operations should not include armed conflict by recognized military forces, espionage, counter-espionage, and cover and deception for military operations.”²

The Office of Policy Coordination (OPC), newly established in the CIA on September 1, 1948, in accordance with NSC 10/2, assumed responsibility for organizing and managing covert actions. The OPC, which was to take its guidance from the Department of State in peacetime and from the military in wartime, initially had direct access to the State Department and to the military without having to proceed through the CIA’s administrative hierarchy, provided the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) was informed of all important projects and decisions.³ In 1950 this arrangement was modified to ensure that policy guidance came to the OPC through the DCI.

During the Korean conflict the OPC grew quickly. Wartime commitments and other missions soon made covert action the most expensive and bureaucratically prominent of the CIA’s activities. Concerned about this situation, DCI Walter Bedell Smith in early 1951 asked the NSC for enhanced policy guidance and a ruling on the proper “scope and magnitude” of CIA operations. The White House responded with two initiatives. In April 1951 President Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board (PSB) under the NSC to coordinate government-wide psychological warfare strategy. NSC 10/5, issued in October 1951, reaffirmed the covert action mandate given in NSC 10/2 and expanded the CIA’s authority over guerrilla warfare.⁴ The PSB was soon abolished by the incoming Eisenhower administration, but the expansion of the CIA’s covert action writ in NSC 10/5 helped ensure that covert action would remain a major function of the Agency.

As the Truman administration ended, the CIA was near the peak of its independence and authority in the field of covert action. Although the CIA continued to seek and receive advice on specific projects from the NSC, the PSB, and the departmental representatives origi-

² NSC 10/2, June 18, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 292.

³ Memorandum of conversation by Frank G. Wisner, “Implementation of NSC-10/2,” August 12, 1948, is printed *ibid.*, Document 298.

⁴ NSC 10/5, “Scope and Pace of Covert Operations,” October 23, 1951, is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 90.

nally delegated to advise the OPC, no group or officer outside of the DCI and the President himself had authority to order, approve, manage, or curtail operations.

NSC 5412 Special Group; 5412/2 Special Group; 303 Committee

The Eisenhower administration began narrowing the CIA's latitude in 1954. In accordance with a series of National Security Council directives, the responsibility of the Director of Central Intelligence for the conduct of covert operations was further clarified. President Eisenhower approved NSC 5412 on March 15, 1954, reaffirming the Central Intelligence Agency's responsibility for conducting covert actions abroad. A definition of covert actions was set forth; the DCI was made responsible for coordinating with designated representatives of the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense to ensure that covert operations were planned and conducted in a manner consistent with U.S. foreign and military policies; and the Operations Coordinating Board was designated the normal channel for coordinating support for covert operations among State, Defense, and the CIA. Representatives of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President were to be advised in advance of major covert action programs initiated by the CIA under this policy and were to give policy approval for such programs and secure coordination of support among the Departments of State and Defense and the CIA.⁵

A year later, on March 12, 1955, NSC 5412/1 was issued, identical to NSC 5412 except for designating the Planning Coordination Group as the body responsible for coordinating covert operations. NSC 5412/2 of December 28, 1955, assigned to representatives (of the rank of assistant secretary) of the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the President responsibility for coordinating covert actions. By the end of the Eisenhower administration, this group, which became known as the "NSC 5412/2 Special Group" or simply "Special Group," emerged as the executive body to review and approve covert action programs initiated by the CIA.⁶ The membership of the Special Group varied depending upon the situation faced. Meetings were infrequent until 1959 when weekly meetings began to be held. Neither the CIA nor the Special Group adopted fixed criteria for bringing projects before the group; initiative remained with the CIA, as members representing

⁵ William M. Leary, editor, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (The University of Alabama Press, 1984), p. 63; for text of NSC 5412, see *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community*, Document 171.

⁶ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, pp. 63, 147-148; *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence* (1976), pp. 50-51. For texts of NSC 5412/1 and NSC 5412/2, see *Foreign Relations, 1950-1955, The Intelligence Community*, Documents 212 and 250.

other agencies frequently were unable to judge the feasibility of particular projects.⁷

After the Bay of Pigs failure in April 1961, General Maxwell Taylor reviewed U.S. paramilitary capabilities at President Kennedy's request and submitted a report in June that recommended strengthening high-level direction of covert operations. As a result of the Taylor Report, the Special Group, chaired by the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs McGeorge Bundy, and including Deputy Under Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric, Director of Central Intelligence Allen Dulles, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Lyman Lemnitzer, assumed greater responsibility for planning and reviewing covert operations. Until 1963 the DCI determined whether a CIA-originated project was submitted to the Special Group. In 1963 the Special Group developed general but informal criteria, including risk, possibility of success, potential for exposure, political sensitivity, and cost (a threshold of \$25,000 was adopted by the CIA), for determining whether covert action projects were submitted to the Special Group.⁸

From November 1961 to October 1962 a Special Group (Augmented), whose membership was the same as the Special Group plus Attorney General Robert Kennedy and General Taylor (as Chairman), exercised responsibility for Operation Mongoose, a major covert action program aimed at overthrowing the Castro regime in Cuba. When President Kennedy authorized the program in November, he designated Brigadier General Edward G. Lansdale, Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense, to act as chief of operations, and Lansdale coordinated the Mongoose activities among the CIA and the Departments of State and Defense. The CIA units in Washington and Miami had primary responsibility for implementing Mongoose operations, which included military, sabotage, and political propaganda programs.⁹

President Kennedy also established a Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) on January 18, 1962, when he signed NSAM No. 124. The Special Group (CI), set up to coordinate counter-insurgency activities separate from the mechanism for implementing NSC 5412/2, was to confine itself to establishing broad policies aimed at preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and other forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries. In early 1966, in NSAM No. 341, President Johnson assigned responsibility for the direction and coordination of counter-insurgency activities overseas to the Secretary of State, who es-

⁷ Leary, *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents*, p. 63.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 82.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1961-1963*, volume X, Cuba, 1961-1962, Documents 270 and 278.

tablished a Senior Interdepartmental Group to assist in discharging these responsibilities.¹⁰

NSAM No. 303, June 2, 1964, from Bundy to the Secretaries of State and Defense and the DCI, changed the name of "Special Group 5412" to "303 Committee" but did not alter its composition, functions, or responsibility. Bundy was the chairman of the 303 Committee.¹¹

The Special Group and the 303 Committee approved 163 covert actions during the Kennedy administration and 142 during the Johnson administration through February 1967. The 1976 Final Report of the Church Committee, however, estimated that of the several thousand projects undertaken by the CIA since 1961, only 14 percent were considered on a case-by-case basis by the 303 Committee and its predecessors (and successors). Those not reviewed by the 303 Committee were low-risk and low-cost operations. The Final Report also cited a February 1967 CIA memorandum that included a description of the mode of policy arbitration of decisions on covert actions within the 303 Committee system. The CIA presentations were questioned, amended, and even on occasion denied, despite protests from the DCI. Department of State objections modified or nullified proposed operations, and the 303 Committee sometimes decided that some agency other than the CIA should undertake an operation or that CIA actions requested by Ambassadors on the scene should be rejected.¹²

The effectiveness of covert action has always been difficult for any administration to gauge, given concerns about security and the difficulty of judging the impact of U.S. initiatives on events. In October 1969 the new Nixon administration required annual 303 Committee reviews for all covert actions that the Committee had approved and automatic termination of any operation not reviewed after 12 months. On February 17, 1970, President Nixon signed National Security Decision Memorandum 40,¹³ which superseded NSC 5412/2 and changed the name of the covert action approval group to the 40 Committee, in part because the 303 Committee had been named in the media. The Attorney General was also added to the membership of the Committee. NSDM 40 reaffirmed the DCI's responsibility for the coordination, control, and conduct of covert operations and directed him to obtain policy approval from the 40 Committee for all major and "politically sensitive"

¹⁰ For text of NSAM No. 124, see *ibid.*, volume VIII, National Security Policy, Document 68. NSAM No. 341, March 2, 1966, is printed *ibid.*, 1964–1968, volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 56.

¹¹ For text of NSAM No. 303, see *ibid.*, Document 204.

¹² *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence*, pp. 56–57.

¹³ For text of NSDM 40, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 203.

covert operations. He was also made responsible for ensuring an annual review by the 40 Committee of all approved covert operations.

The 40 Committee met regularly early in the Nixon administration, but over time the number of formal meetings declined and business came to be conducted via couriers and telephone votes. The Committee actually met only for major new proposals. As required, the DCI submitted annual status reports to the 40 Committee for each approved operation. According to the 1976 Church Committee Final Report, the 40 Committee considered only about 25 percent of the CIA's individual covert action projects, concentrating on major projects that provided broad policy guidelines for all covert actions. Congress received briefings on only a few proposed projects. Not all major operations, moreover, were brought before the 40 Committee: President Nixon in 1970 instructed the DCI to promote a coup d'etat against Chilean President Salvador Allende without Committee coordination or approval.¹⁴

Presidential Findings Since 1974 and the Operations Advisory Group

The Hughes-Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 brought about a major change in the way the U.S. Government approved covert actions, requiring explicit approval by the President for each action and expanding Congressional oversight and control of the CIA. The CIA was authorized to spend appropriated funds on covert actions only after the President had signed a "finding" and informed Congress that the proposed operation was important to national security.¹⁵

Executive Order 11905, issued by President Ford on February 18, 1976, in the wake of major Congressional investigations of CIA activities by the Church and Pike Committees, replaced the 40 Committee with the Operations Advisory Group, composed of the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the DCI, who retained responsibility for the planning and implementation of covert operations. The OAG was required to hold formal meetings to develop recommendations for the President regarding a covert action and to conduct periodic reviews of previously-approved operations. EO 11905 also banned all U.S. Government employees from involvement in political assassinations, a prohibition that was retained in succeeding executive orders, and prohibited involvement in domestic intelligence activities.¹⁶

¹⁴ *Final Report of the Select Committee To Study Governmental Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities*, United States Senate, Book I, Foreign and Military Intelligence, pp. 54-55, 57.

¹⁵ Public Law 93-559.

¹⁶ Executive Order 11905, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976.

Approval and oversight requirements for covert action continued to be governed by the Hughes-Ryan amendment well into the Carter administration, even as the new administration made alterations to the executive branch's organizational structure for covert action. President Carter retained the NSC as the highest executive branch organization to review and guide U.S. foreign intelligence activities. As part of a broader NSC reorganization at the outset of his administration, President Carter replaced the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) with the NSC's Special Coordination Committee (SCC), which explicitly continued the same operating procedures as the former OAG.¹⁷ Membership of the SCC, when meeting for the purpose of reviewing and making recommendations on covert actions (as well as sensitive surveillance activities), replicated that of the former OAG—namely: the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Attorney General and Director of the Office of Management and Budget (the latter two as observers). The designated chairman of all SCC meetings was the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Carter formalized the SCC's replacement of the OAG in EO 11985 of May 13, 1977, which amended President Ford's EO 11905 on "United States Foreign Intelligence activities."¹⁸ In practice, the SCC for covert action and sensitive surveillance activities came to be known as the SCC (Intelligence) or the SCC-I, to distinguish it from other versions of the SCC.

The SCC's replacement of the OAG was reaffirmed in E.O. 12036 of January 24, 1978, which replaced E.O. 11905 and its amendments. E.O. 12036 also reaffirmed the same membership for the SCC-I, but identified the Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget as full members of the Committee, rather than merely observers.¹⁹

Also in the first days of the Carter administration, the SCC-I established a lower-level working group to study and review proposals for

¹⁷ The broader NSC reorganization sought to reduce the number of NSC committees to two: the Policy Review Committee (PRC) and the Special Coordination Committee (SCC). The SCC's jurisdiction included all intelligence policy issues other than annual budget and priorities reviews; the SCC also had jurisdiction over other, nonintelligence matters. Presidential Directive 2, "The National Security Council System," January 20, 1977, Carter Library, Vertical File, Presidential Directives. See also Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Advisor 1977-1981* (New York: Farrar, Strauss, Giroux, 1983), pp. 59-62.

¹⁸ Executive Order 11985, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," May 13, 1977, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 13, No. 20 (May 16, 1977), pp. 719-720.

¹⁹ Executive Order 12036, "United States Foreign Intelligence Activities," January 24, 1978, *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (January 30, 1978), pp. 194-214. Since E.O. 12036 governed foreign intelligence activities, all references in the E.O. to the "SCC" were effectively references to what was known in practice as the SCC (Intelligence), or SCC-I.

covert action and other sensitive intelligence matters and report to the SCC-I. This interagency working group was chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (David Aaron), or in his absence, the NSC Director for Intelligence Coordination. The working group was named the Special Activities Working Group (SAWG). The SAWG was active in early Carter administration reviews of ongoing covert action, and remained active through at least 1978. NSC officials in mid-1978 sought to downgrade or abolish the SAWG and replace it as needed with ad hoc working groups. Internal NSC reviews at the end of the Carter administration state that the SAWG gradually fell out of use. By late 1979, the means for debating, developing, and guiding certain covert actions was an interagency working group chaired by Aaron at the NSC. This group was referred to by several names during the late Carter administration, including the Deputy's (or Deputies) group, the Aaron group, the interagency group, the Black Chamber, and the Black Room.

The Carter administration made use of a new category of presidential findings for "world-wide" or "general" (or "generic") covert operations. This continued a practice initiated late in the Ford administration in response to the Hughes-Ryan requirement for presidential findings. The worldwide category covered lower-risk operations that were directed at broad policy goals implemented on a worldwide basis as assets allowed. These operations utilized existing assets as well as existing liaison contacts with foreign intelligence or security services, and in some cases also consisted of routine training or procurement undertaken to assist foreign intelligence partners or other agencies of the USG. A new type of document—known as "Perspectives"—provided more specific tasking guidance for these general, worldwide covert activities. Perspectives detailed the themes to be stressed in furtherance of a particular policy goal. Riskier operations required their own presidential finding or Memorandum of Notification (see below). Perspectives were drafted by the CIA and cleared by the Department of State, so that the CIA could vet the operational feasibility and risks of the program while State could assess the diplomatic risks and verify that the program was consistent with overall foreign policy goals. At least initially, Perspectives did not require further coordination with the OAG, SCC, or the President. Once an agreed-upon Perspectives document was finalized by CIA and the Department of State, it was transmitted to the field, and posts were required to make periodic reports on any achievements under the Perspectives guidelines. Beginning in 1978, actions in this worldwide category were authorized by the President as specific line-item additions to a previously existing "world-wide" finding, though Perspectives were still used to provide additional details.

Another new document used during the Carter administration was the "Memorandum of Notification" (MON). MONs were initially

used to introduce higher-risk, significantly higher-cost, or more geographically-specific operations under a previously-approved worldwide or general objective outlined in a Perspectives document. Like Perspectives, MON's had to be coordinated between the CIA and the Department of State, but they also required broader interagency coordination within the SAWG or SCC. MON's subsequently came to be used for significant changes to any type of finding, not just worldwide ones. Entirely new covert actions continued to require new presidential findings. The Hughes-Ryan amendment stipulated that Congress be notified of new findings "in a timely fashion," but did not specify how much time that meant. During the Carter administration, the CIA typically notified Congress of new covert initiatives within 48 hours, including those outlined in Perspectives or MONs.

In October 1980, the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1981—also known as the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980—scaled back the Hughes-Ryan amendment's provisions for congressional oversight of covert action. While the requirement to notify Congress about presidential findings remained in place, the new Act limited the committees of Congress that had to be briefed to the two intelligence committees, and also explicitly clarified that this requirement to keep the committees "fully and currently informed" did not constitute a requirement for congressional approval of covert action or other intelligence activities. Moreover, the new Act stipulated that if the President determined it was "essential to limit prior notice to meet extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United States," the President could limit prior notice to the chairmen and ranking minority members of the two intelligence committees, the Speaker and minority leader of the House, and the majority and minority leaders of the Senate—a group that came to be known as the "Gang of Eight." If prior notice of a covert action was withheld, the President was required to inform the two intelligence committees "in a timely fashion" and provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.²⁰

²⁰ PL 96-450, Sec. 407 (October 14, 1980). See also the description of the Hughes-Ryan amendment and its replacement by PL 96-450 in: Richard A. Best, Jr., "Covert Action: Legislative Background and Possible Policy Questions," Congressional Research Service, RL33715, December 27, 2011, pp. 1-2; and L. Britt Snider, *The Agency and the Hill: CIA's Relationship with Congress, 1946-2004*, Washington: Center for the Study of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 2008, pp. 280-81.

Soviet Union

January–May 1977

1. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, January 26, 1977

To General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev

As I take up my duties as President of the United States, I want to share with you my view on relations between our two countries.

I want to express my appreciation for the informal messages I have received from you² and in this connection I want to affirm that it is my goal to improve relations with the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity, mutual respect and benefit. That goal will have my close personal attention, as well as that of Secretary of State Vance.

I have read your public remarks with great interest, and they encourage me to believe that we share a common desire to enhance and preserve the prospect of lasting peace.

As I understood your very important speech at Tula,³ the Soviet Union will not seek superiority in arms, will oppose the concept, and will require only a defense sufficient to deter any potential adversary.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–2/77. Confidential. Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs: “Carter would be the first to admit that he came to the White House without a detailed plan for managing U.S.-Soviet relations. He was, however, determined to move on SALT, and he firmly supported the concept of detente. At the same time, Carter was critical of the way the previous Administration had allowed the Soviet Union to exploit detente, and in campaign speeches developed by me, he had stressed that detente inevitably had to involve both cooperation and competition and that it had to be both more *comprehensive* and more *reciprocal*.” (*Power and Principle*, p. 147)

² No messages were found. However, Podgorny sent Carter a letter of congratulations on January 20. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President’s Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 20, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: Chairman Nikolai V. Podgorny, 1/77)

³ In his January 18 speech in Tula, Brezhnev addressed détente and the desire for an arms agreement. See *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIX, no. 3 (February 16, 1977), pp. 1–5.

The United States seeks nothing more or less for itself. With perseverance and wisdom therefore our two countries should be in a position to avoid a new armaments race. I have said to the American people that my firm goal is to eliminate all nuclear weapons.

There are three areas where progress can be made toward this goal. A critical first step should be the achievement of a SALT II agreement without delay, and an agreement to proceed toward additional limitations and reductions in strategic weapons.⁴ Moreover, I hope we can promptly conclude an adequately verified comprehensive ban on all nuclear tests, and also strive to achieve greater openness about our respective strategic policies. It is also important to renew efforts for progress in the negotiations for a balanced reduction of forces in Central Europe.

We also have a responsibility to pursue policies that will prevent the troubled areas of the world from exploding into dangerous conflicts. The United States will work to promote a peaceful settlement in the Middle East on the basis of appropriate UN resolutions. Similarly in Southern Africa we are encouraging all parties to negotiate a peaceful settlement which promotes security and justice for all.

It is my belief that the USSR can contribute to the realization of progress toward peace in both of these critical areas.

My Administration attaches importance to the improvement of our bilateral economic relations, on the basis of mutual and equivalent benefits to the peoples of both our great countries. At the same time we cannot be indifferent to the fate of freedom and individual human rights.

We represent different social systems and our nations are different in background and experience. Competition over ideals and ideas is inevitable between our societies. But it need not prevent a common effort to shape a world that is more peaceful, just and humane. We live in a world that increasingly requires collective responses to basic human problems, and my hope is that our countries can cooperate more closely in order to promote development, better nutrition, and a more meaningful life for the less fortunate portions of mankind.

⁴SALT II negotiations began in November 1972 with the primary objective of creating a permanent strategic-weapons-reduction treaty that would replace the earlier Interim Agreement. While significant progress had been made between President Ford and Brezhnev at the 1974 Vladivostok Summit, Carter wanted to reduce the agreed upon restrictions further. For the Interim Agreement, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Documents 317 and 318. For the agreements from Vladivostok, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 91. For a brief overview of the SALT Negotiating History, see Brzezinski's memorandum for the Secretaries of State and Defense, February 2, 1977, in the Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 4, PD-08 [4].

I look forward to meeting you and to discussing with you both our differences as well as our common interests. Meanwhile I propose that we both do all that we can to further the progress of improving US-Soviet relations. I have asked Secretary Vance to prepare to meet with you, if you wish, in the spring to review the progress being made, to discuss key issues which are outstanding. At that time we will want to exchange views on a subsequent meeting between you and me.

Any specific suggestions you may wish to communicate to me on these or any other issues will be welcomed and carefully studied.

With best personal regards.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

2. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Letter to You from Andrey Sakharov

I transmit herewith Secretary Vance's memorandum regarding the handling of Sakharov's letter to you.² The Secretary recommends: (1) that a response on your behalf be conveyed by *him* through the US Embassy in Moscow; (2) that Sakharov be told that in the future he can communicate his views to us through the Embassy, thereby providing him with the channel he requested.³

I have discussed the enclosed with Cy, and I feel this matter ought to be weighed very carefully. It could establish a dangerous precedent.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Name File, Box 3, Sakharov, Andrei, 2-3/77. Confidential. Sent for action. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner, "Zbig—Where is Cy's proposed message—(att. 1)? J." Carter wrote in his memoirs, "While improving diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union was an important goal of mine, I had made it clear in the campaign that I was not going to ignore Soviet abuse of human rights, as I believed some previous administrations had done." (*Keeping Faith*, p. 146)

² Vance's memorandum, January 30, is attached at tab A but not printed.

³ Carter wrote "ok" in the margin adjacent to this paragraph then struck through it.

Moreover, consideration might be given to alternative forms of response:

1. Since Sakharov's letter was made public, our response will almost certainly become public. Because of that, perhaps less inflammatory to the Soviets would be a public release in Washington of a reply expressing your general sentiments on the issue. This avoids the problem posed by direct communication with a private citizen who is in opposition to his government.

2. There is a risk in the Secretary of State becoming too directly involved in such a communication because he will also soon be having direct negotiations with the Soviets. Thus, a general response by you, either through a public release or in the form of a private letter, might still be preferable.

Sakharov, who is a Nobel Prize Laureate, did write to *you*, and thus there is some justification for a response from you. For you not to respond might cause some to draw analogies with Ford and Solzhenitsyn.⁴

In any case, the proper channel in Moscow would be the Consul General (rather than the Ambassador), because Sakharov has been dealing with the Consul on other business which brings him to our Embassy.

RECOMMENDATION

Since all of the foregoing establishes troublesome precedents, irrespective of the nature of our response, *I would recommend that this matter be more fully discussed with Cy before proceeding.*

If, however, you wish to approve Secretary Vance's recommendation, his proposed reply is at Tab A.

If you prefer, a public response in your name, a draft based on the Vance text, is attached at Tab B.⁵

⁴ Reference is to Kissinger's advice to Ford not to meet with Solzhenitsyn in 1975 because he believed such a meeting would have a negative impact on U.S. relations with Soviet leaders. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 155.

⁵ Tab B, the undated draft, is attached but not printed.

Tab C**Letter From Professor Andrei Sakharov to President Carter⁶**

January 21, 1977

Dear Mr. Carter,

It's very important to defend those who suffer because of their un-violent struggle, for openness, for justice for destroyed rights of the other people. Our and your duty are to fight for them. I think that a lot depends from this struggle—trust between the people, trust to the high promises and in the final result—international security.

Here we have hard almost unbearable situation—not only in the USSR but also in all the countries of the Eastern Europe. Now, before the Belgrade meeting⁷ and in the conditions of the raising of the struggle for the human rights in the Western Europe and in the USSR, authorities not wishing to make any concessions towards the most necessary human rights (freedom of belief and information, freedom of conscience, freedom of the choice of the country of living etc), being not capable for the honest competition of the ideas, increase the repressions and make the attempts to compromitise (sic) the dissidents; the persecution of the members of the Group of the Assistance to the fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreement in Moscow and Ukraine, and especially the provocation in Moscow subway, which should be resisted energetically (we compare it with the Reichstag (sic) fire in 1933 and killing of Kirov in 1936).⁸

It's very important that USA President should continue the efforts for the release of those people who are already known to American public and that these efforts shouldn't be useless. It is very important to continue fight for the heavily ill and women—political prisoners. (The detailed information about all of them is in Chronica-Press (Ed Klain).

I have serious problems with the communications. Telephone communications with the West is blockaded fully and no tel. calls reach me. It's useless to go to the tel. station as I'm always told that my correspondent doesn't answer. (I'm always closely watched.) This question is principally (sic) important for my public activity and for all the human

⁶ No classification marking. Printed from a typed copy of an original English-language letter signed by Sakharov.

⁷ Reference is to the first of three CSCE follow-up meetings held in Belgrade, October 1977–March 1978.

⁸ References are to the Reichstag Fire in 1933, which resulted in greater political authority for Hitler after Communists were blamed for the incident, and Sergey Kirov's assassination in 1934, believed to be ordered by Stalin.

rights movement in this country. I ask you to take some steps on the International level in connection with this.

For the urgent circumstances it is very important that I should have an channel to contact your country and your close advisers. I'm not going to abuse it, but one can imagine the situation when such line could be the most decisive—not only for us but also for your country. It is not unmodesty from me.

With Deep Respect

Andrey Sakharov⁹

⁹ Printed from a copy that indicates Sakharov signed the original.

3. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 1, 1977, 11:30 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance
Zbigniew Brzezinski, National Security Affairs Assistant

Strategic Issues

President Carter began by stating he would like to move rapidly—aggressively—on arms control issues with the Soviet Union. He mentioned that he had been encouraged by the messages he received this summer from Secretary General Brezhnev. He would like to see Brezhnev's good wishes translated into positive results. The President

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, Chron: 2/77. Top Secret. Brackets in the original. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. In his memoirs, Dobrynin described Carter: "American historians describe his presidency as erratic, and in my country it is considered one of the unfortunate pages in Soviet-American relations, an assessment with which I am inclined to agree, although at the start he had had good intentions and wanted to develop stable relations with the Soviet Union. One of the main reasons for his failure was the incompatibility between his ideas, some of which were very good, and his ability to put them into practice. He lacked flexibility. Seeking to achieve the best, he would underestimate tangible assets. The most egregious example was in the field of disarmament. As he pursued the wonderful bird of his dream—a drastic reduction in nuclear weapons—he let go of the bird in his hand, the ratification of the SALT II treaty." (*In Confidence*, pp. 374–375)

added that his Inaugural Speech² and his recent letter to Secretary Brezhnev³ expressed his views on U.S.-Soviet relations.

SALT

Ambassador Dobrynin asked if the President had a timetable for SALT. The President was non-committal.

Cruise Missile, Backfire, and Missile Reductions

The President asked how Dobrynin felt about the cruise missile and the Backfire bomber in relation to SALT II. Dobrynin responded that the cruise missile should be included within the SALT II framework. With respect to the Backfire, Dobrynin said that the aircraft does not have a strategic capability. The President asked if the Soviet Union had tankers to refuel the Backfire. Dobrynin replied that he was not prepared to answer the question. He did, however, add that the Soviets would not go “intercontinental” with the Backfire. Secretary Vance asked if that meant the Soviets would not deploy the Backfire so that it would have a return capability. Dobrynin responded by asking “where would we put them?”

The President said that he preferred to separate the cruise missile and Backfire issues from SALT II. He indicated he wanted to confine SALT II to numbers, but that other issues would be open to negotiation later. Following a successful conclusion to SALT II, the President said, he would like to move quickly to reduce the size of our respective nuclear arsenals. The President said he would like to see the total number of nuclear missiles reduced, to several hundred. He added that we could, at that time, decide which would be sea-launched, land-based, etc.

The President stated his desire to reach a minimum number of missiles, one that would allow each nation to feel secure from a preemptive strike. He wanted the remaining missiles to be easily monitored and secure from destruction.

Dobrynin raised the question of ceilings on MIRV and the numbers of ICBMs. The President said he would like to see ICBMs reduced to 1,000 with one warhead apiece (100 kts).⁴

Dobrynin asked about range limitations for sea-based cruise missiles. The President explained that our population is located on the sea-

² For Carter’s Inaugural Address and his remarks to other nations on U.S. foreign policy, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 1–5. See also *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

³ See Document 1.

⁴ An unknown hand wrote, “emphasized—Just as one tentative possibility” immediately following this paragraph.

coast; the Soviet Union's in the interior. A 600 kilometer range is, therefore, a threat. The President said that if we could agree on a lesser range for the sea-based cruise missile . . . 300–400 kilometers instead of 600—this might alleviate our concerns.

Throw-weight and Accuracy Advantages

The President commented that the Soviets have a throw-weight advantage. Dobrynin responded that the United States has an accuracy advantage and, therefore, their throw-weight advantage is necessary.

The President asked whether the Soviets would consider reducing their throw-weight advantage if we would forego escalating our quality advantage. Dobrynin responded that this might be considered after SALT II. To include this equation in SALT II would make it more complicated, he said.

Fixed and Mobile Missiles

The President asked whether the Soviets would forego the use of mobile ICBMs. Dobrynin said the Soviets have mobile medium-range missiles because of China. The President then asked about the SS–20 and the SS–16. The SS–20 is mobile; the SS–16 is not. The SS–16 has the range to hit the United States. The President mentioned that it is difficult for us to tell the difference between the two missiles.

Dobrynin stated that he didn't see any difficulty in medium-range mobile missiles. He added that the Soviet Union has no need for long-range mobiles because it has sufficient numbers of fixed ICBM missiles. The President asked how we could confirm the difference between the two. Dobrynin said, "I will pass the question to my people."

The President suggested the Soviets might consider keeping their present SS–20s, but adding no additional ones or new types of mobile missiles. He added that he would like mobile missiles eliminated. He again asked if Dobrynin could tell us how to distinguish between the two missiles.

Advance Notice of Missile Test Firings

The President indicated that he would like to reach a formal agreement with the Soviet Union to have advance notice—at least 24 hours—of missile test firings. This, according to the President, would allow us to avoid any misunderstandings on intentions. This advance notice would include sea-launched missiles. Dobrynin responded: "that is a good idea."

Comprehensive Test Ban

The President asked about the Comprehensive Test Ban (CTB). Dobrynin raised the issue of French and PRC compliance. The Presi-

dent responded that a CTB might be initialled for a limited time, such as 2–4 years. It would be subject to renewal. Both the United States and the Soviet Union would attempt to get France and the PRC to comply with the CTB. The President said he envisioned the test ban applying to peaceful nuclear explosions. Dobrynin mentioned that the Soviets have two peaceful nuclear explosions scheduled, although the dates have not been fixed. The President said his preference would be to stop all testing.

Dobrynin asked about the two nuclear treaties pending before Senate. He asked if the President supported them. The President said he did, but as first steps. Dobrynin said that he was not prepared to offer a Soviet view on peaceful nuclear devices. The President indicated that the United States had tested peaceful devices and had not been encouraged. The President went on to say that he would be willing to include in the Comprehensive Test Ban an understanding that would allow the Soviets to conduct their two tests, if observers were present. Dobrynin responded that “this is fair enough.” The President added, “We’ll try to get France and the PRC to comply.”

Compliance and “Matters of Concern”

The President asked for some assurance of compliance. He mentioned that Gromyko has said consideration should be given to on-site inspection. The President went on to say that he would like to be able to write Secretary General Brezhnev on “matters of concern,” such as compliance and other sensitive activities which might be susceptible to misinterpretation. Dobrynin responded that this would be “a good idea.” The President added that each side would reserve the right not to reply.

Civil Defense

The President said that he had another area of concern—Soviet civil defense. He told Dobrynin that Congressional leaders argue against arms control proposals citing the Soviet’s superior civil defense capability. Dobrynin said their capability was poor. The President said ours is worse. The President asked Dobrynin to consider the question of foregoing civil defense efforts: no future construction. Dr. Brzezinski mentioned this could be seen as an extension of the ABM agreement.

Summary

The President summarized his arms control views:

- a drastic reduction in nuclear weapons;
- reduction in the possibility of a preemptive strike;
- do the above in fangible terms so that “the world can see”;
- at the same time, reduce conventional weapons;
- also, both sides should cut down on international arms sales.

Personal Correspondence

Dobrynin asked whether the President would be willing to state his arms control positions in a formal way before Secretary Vance went to Moscow. The President responded by asking whether it would be appropriate for him to put his thoughts in writing in a personal letter to Brezhnev. Secretary Vance said this letter would be a suggestion of things to be considered. Dobrynin said this would be “a good idea.” The President said that he would wait for Brezhnev to answer his first letter and then send a second letter with specific suggestions. He added that no one but Secretary Vance, Dr. Brzezinski, and Vice President Mondale would be privy to the correspondence.

Past Experience

Dobrynin mentioned that Brezhnev had raised several arms control proposals with Kissinger and others—including one on the Indian Ocean—and all had received “nos.” The President said this is a different Administration and he would like to pursue every proposal that Brezhnev initiates.

*Functional and Regional Issues**Arms Sales*

Dobrynin asked if the President had a proposal to reduce arms sales. The President said that any such proposal is complicated due to third nation involvement—France, Germany and to some extent the UK. He said that he would like to draft a specific proposal.

Europe

The President stated that our present concern is not so much a nuclear attack, but the Soviet buildup in the European theater. Dobrynin asked if the President really believed the Soviet Union would start a war in Europe. The President replied that the Soviet preponderance in Eastern Europe is not necessary merely for defense. Dobrynin said that the President should understand the psychological scars left by World War II. He said the Soviets have “no such idea” to start a war in Europe. The President said he would like to see substantial reductions in conventional arms in Europe.

The President said he would like to see the MBFR talks get off dead center and that we should make an effort to agree on force levels—minimum levels for mutual defense. Dobrynin said perhaps the Soviet Union and the United States could look at this issue on a bilateral basis. The President said we can’t conclude any MBFR agreement without full consultations with our NATO allies, but that we can, as leaders, move forcefully to reach an agreement.

The President informed Dobrynin that the United States is going to address more attention to NATO.

Middle East

The President indicated that he would like to reach a Middle East agreement this year. He added that the Israeli elections complicate the situation. He said he would like to have Soviet support in reaching a Middle East agreement. Dobrynin commented that the Soviets are co-chairmen at Geneva.⁵

Berlin

The President expressed concern over possible problems in Berlin. Vance referred to the quadripartite government in Berlin. Dobrynin said that under the quadripartite agreement,⁶ West Berlin is not a part of West Germany but Bonn apparently does not agree. Dobrynin said that that is “completely wrong.”

Africa and the Indian Ocean

The President mentioned that he is concerned about arms going to Africa and the Indian Ocean and the presence of Cuban soldiers in Africa. He said that if the Soviets would include Berbera in demilitarizing the Indian Ocean, then we could agree.

Secretary Vance said that the African situation is an explosive one and is crucial to our bilateral relations. Dobrynin said the Soviets are not interested in a confrontation in Africa. He added that the United States has connections with Mr. Smith,⁷ not the Soviets. Secretary Vance mentioned that putting conventional arms into Africa will hurt us all. Dobrynin said he would pass this word to his government.

Soviet/U.S./PRC Relations

Dobrynin asked the President to summarize his views on the present state of Soviet/U.S./PRC relations. The President responded that he was not experienced enough at this time to comment on the question but added that “we can’t ask the Chinese to do much until we [the Soviet Union and the U.S.] do.”

⁵ The Geneva Peace Conference failed to reconvene after its December 20–21, 1973, meetings. For documentation on the Geneva Peace Conference see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Documents 414–416.

⁶ Reference is to the Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed September 3, 1971, by the United States, Soviet Union, France, and the United Kingdom. The Berlin negotiations, which preceded the agreement, dealt with the status of West Berlin and access to and from the city. For more on the Berlin negotiations, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 136 and 215. For the text of the Quadripartite Agreement, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1135–1143.

⁷ Reference is to Ian Smith, member of the Rhodesian Executive Council.

Vietnam

Secretary Vance asked Dobrynin to convey to the North Vietnamese our interest in exploring relations. Secretary Vance asked Dobrynin to suggest to the North Vietnamese that they not push their admission to the UN too early and asked that the Vietnamese help us on the MIA question.

Human Rights

The President told Dobrynin that it is not his intention to interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union by making human rights statements. He said he did not want to embarrass the Soviet Union, but that he felt it was necessary for him to express human rights concerns from time to time.

The President went on to say that he would like to restore normal trade relations with the Soviet Union and it would be helpful if the Soviet Union would respond on human rights issues. He told Dobrynin this would help him in dealing with Congress. He said he was encouraged by recent Soviet emigration rates.

The President said our commitment to human rights and our necessity to make public statements—on occasion—should not be misconstrued by the Soviets. Dobrynin responded that the Soviets have an abundance of human rights in their country, such as in health and housing. He mentioned that at some time the Soviets might feel it appropriate to comment on the Equal Rights Amendment.⁸ More seriously, Dobrynin said that he was concerned that the public debate on this issue would be disadvantageous to both sides. He said he believed that Brezhnev does not want to see the human rights issue become a test of wills between the two countries because then Brezhnev would be “forced to answer.” The President said we will try to be reticent and Dobrynin asked for “quiet diplomacy.”

⁸ The Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) was first proposed in Congress in 1923. It would guarantee that one’s rights would not be denied based on sex. Although it passed both houses of Congress in 1972, the ERA was not ratified by enough states to become a constitutional amendment before the June 30, 1982, deadline mandated by Congress.

4. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

February 4, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

On behalf of my colleagues in the leadership and on my own I would like to congratulate you once again upon entering the office of the President of the United States of America.

I have carefully studied your letter of January 26² and found it on the whole constructive and encouraging. We received with satisfaction the affirmation that the goal of your policy is to improve relations with the Soviet Union and that you intend to pay personal attention to that. It is consistent with our basic approach which I have recently once again expounded publicly. Now I want to emphasize that we are prepared to make through joint efforts a new major progress in the relations between our countries.

As I see it, a business-like and confidential dialogue is being established between ourselves.

It is naturally important that from the very beginning of our contacts there were a clear and mutual understanding on issues of principle.

The main thing here—and the past experience convincingly confirms it—is the necessity to strictly observe the fundamental principles of equality, mutual consideration of legitimate interests, mutual benefit and non-interference in the internal affairs of the other side. Such and only such an approach by both sides, which fully corresponds to the Basic Principles of relations between our countries,³ signed in 1972, can provide for an even onward development of relations between the USSR and the US as well as for the possibility of finding mutually acceptable solutions for the issues that arise.

Indeed, the cooperation of our two countries to end the arms race and to achieve disarmament is, due to objective reasons, the central area of relations between the USSR and the US at the present time. Only

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/77–12/78. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner, "Zbig—They were found—J," in response to Brzezinski's covering memorandum, which reads, "These are copies." The missing originals are *somewhere* in your residence. A search is in progress! Zbig."

² See Document 1.

³ For the text of the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics," May 29, 1972, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 633–634.

in this way the main task facing our peoples and other nations—that of removing danger of war and certainly the danger of nuclear-rocket war in the first place—can be solved.

As you have also noted, it is necessary to complete without delay the working out of a new agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation. This task, as we see it, is quite attainable. Indeed, the main parameters of an agreement have been in fact already shaped up on the basis of the understanding reached in Vladivostok. Successful completion of this extremely important and necessary matter would allow [us?] to directly proceed to more far-reaching measures in this area and would undoubtedly give a new impetus to constructive development of Soviet-American relations on the whole.

It is our understanding that the questions of strategic arms limitation will occupy the main place in the talks with Secretary of State Vance when he comes to Moscow.

In our opinion, it is also necessary to put into force without further delay the Soviet-US Treaties on the limitation of underground nuclear weapon tests and on the explosions for peaceful purposes. At the same time efforts should be intensified—and we are ready to cooperate with the United States in this matter—for complete and general cessation of nuclear weapon tests and the prevention of proliferation of such weapons.

We are in favor of achieving a progress in the Vienna negotiations on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We would like the new US Government to regard with attention the proposals submitted there by the Warsaw Treaty countries last year.⁴

There are also other questions of arms limitation and disarmament which await their solution. Appropriate concrete proposals have been put forward by the Soviet Union on many of these questions and we hope that your Government would consider them in a constructive manner.

Of course, now that the arms race in the world has not yet been stopped we cannot but be concerned with the security of our country and that of our allies. Our defense capability should be sufficient so that no one would dare to launch an attack on us or to threaten us with an attack. In this sense, to borrow your expression, we seek nothing more or less for ourselves.

However, I would like to stress once again very definitely that the Soviet Union does not seek superiority in arms. We are deeply convinced that genuine security of all countries and, consequently, of each

⁴ Reference is to the MBFR talks. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Document 371.

of them individually lies not in competition in the field of armaments but on the way of disarmament and elimination of material basis of war. We shall continue to direct our efforts as well at achieving that goal.

Now I shall briefly touch upon some other issues.

An important direction of joint or parallel efforts of our countries, given their objective roles and responsibilities in world affairs, is to facilitate solution of problems causing international tensions. The task here, in our opinion, is to eliminate the initial causes producing those problems.

Of prime importance in this respect as you, Mr. President, also rightly noted, is the establishment of just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Almost ten years have elapsed since the war of 1967. This “jubilee” acutely reminds us not simply of the time wasted for the resolution of the Middle East conflict but also of the possibility of new dangerous outbreaks—as it happened in October of 1973, and quite recently in Lebanon.

Meanwhile, we are convinced that if in dealing with the Middle East problem the legitimate rights and interests of all sides—both of Arabs, including Palestinians, and of Israel—would be realistically and objectively taken into consideration, then the reliable elimination of this permanent source of international conflicts would be quite possible. Finding a necessary understanding between the USSR and the US on this matter and in particular on the resumption of the Geneva Conference will undoubtedly contribute to the success of a major undertaking which is the achievement of a political settlement in the Middle East.

Cooperation of our two countries would be of essential importance, as we believe, on other international questions as well—be it further steps to strengthen European security on the basis of decisions adopted in Helsinki,⁵ strict observance of the Quadripartite agreement on West Berlin,⁶ or, say, a settlement in Cyprus.⁷

In your letter, Mr. President, you mention the problem of Southern Africa. Our position of principle on this question is well known: we are in solidarity with the struggle of the peoples of Southern Africa for their freedom and independence. We can recognize the right of nobody

⁵ Reference is to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe Final Act or Helsinki Accords. For the text of the Final Act, see Department of State *Bulletin*, September 1, 1975, pp. 323–350.

⁶ See footnote 6, Document 3.

⁷ For information on the 1974 coup in Cyprus, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 201–207. As of February 1977, a settlement had not been reached.

but the peoples themselves to determine their own destiny. The Soviet Union does not seek any advantages for itself in that region, neither is it interested in confrontation with the United States there in spite of what sometimes is alleged on that score.

Noting great importance which you, Mr. President, attach to the improvement of trade and economic relations, I would like to stress on my part that we were and continue to be in favor of our ties in this area developing on a stable basis and becoming ever greater in scope to the mutual, I emphasize, the mutual benefit of both sides. But it requires that they be freed from all kinds of discriminatory restrictions and artificially created obstacles. Without this, without abandoning the attempts to link in some way or another the trade with questions pertaining to internal competence of states, not only our economic ties will further suffer, but damage will be caused to the relations between our countries in general.

I hope, Mr. President, that given good will and sincere readiness for constructive cooperation with one another, you and I will be able to make a good contribution to the solution of existing problems. Some of them, along with the problem of strategic arms limitation, will obviously be a subject of exchange of views already at the time of Mr. Vance's visit to Moscow.

In conclusion I want to emphasize that I attach, as you do, special importance to personal meeting between us. I will be prepared to discuss the questions related to such a meeting with Mr. Vance whom, as you wrote, you will ask to do that.

With my best wishes,
Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁸

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

5. Letter From President Carter to Professor Andrei Sakharov¹

Washington, February 5, 1977

Dear Professor Sakharov:

I received your letter of January 21,² and I want to express my appreciation to you for bringing your thoughts to my personal attention.

Human rights is a central concern of my Administration. In my inaugural address I stated: "Because we are free, we can never be indifferent to the fate of freedom elsewhere."³ You may rest assured that the American people and our government will continue our firm commitment to promote respect for human rights not only in our own country but also abroad.

We shall use our good offices to seek the release of prisoners of conscience, and we will continue our efforts to shape a world responsive to human aspirations in which nations of differing cultures and histories can live side by side in peace and justice.

I am always glad to hear from you, and I wish you well.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Department of State, Files of the Bureau of European Affairs, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Lot 91D231, Box 3, Old Sakharov Files, 1975–1978. No classification marking.

² See Document 2.

³ See footnote 2, Document 3.

6. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, February 9, 1977

SUBJECT

Luncheon with Minister Counselor Vorontsov, February 9, 1977

I had lunch at the Soviet Embassy with Yuli Vorontsov. Compared to many previous encounters in which Vorontsov spent his time probing me, this luncheon was almost entirely a monologue on the problem of human rights. What he said at great length can be reduced to two points he emphasized. First, he felt this would become a “Frankenstein”, that US policy would be dictated by the human rights monster rather than controlling it as the President had said. Second, that the cumulative effect on Brezhnev would be disastrous. He was already being told, according to Vorontsov, that after making a number of gestures to President Carter, the response was a number of “insults”. People around Brezhnev in the Politburo were saying, “Lenya, how can you meet with such a man if he continues to interfere in our affairs and make heroes out of people such as Ginzburg, Bukovsky, Solzhenitzen, etc.” (Obviously, we must take much of this with more than a grain of salt.) In elaborating on these themes he did acknowledge that the Soviet leaders would ascribe a certain amount of human rights agitation to domestic politics, but if a pattern emerged or a trend developed it would have a deep impact on Soviet-American relations. There are those, he alleged, who argued we can live without SALT. He constantly came back to the point that what was being affected was not so much the prospects for SALT or any other issue, but the “atmosphere”.

In reply I tried to make two points. First they should not interpret our stand on human rights as being pointed solely toward the Soviet Union. I assumed that they would see over time that this was a general principle of the new Administration’s policy and that we would speak out on matters concerning other countries. The fact that this was not anti-Soviet in origin or focus was something the Soviet Embassy had to impress on Moscow. Second, there was a change in approach and it was reflected in the statements by the President and the State Department. They ought to analyze very carefully what had happened in this country over the past year or so. There was definitely a resurgence of opinion that could be described as extremely conservative or hawkish. This opinion had come quite close to nominating Ronald Reagan. It had

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Name File, Hyland, William G., 2/77. Secret. Drafted by Hyland, who transmitted a copy to Brzezinski under a covering memorandum.

definitely influenced the orientation of the Ford Administration in the last year, and as a consequence it was no longer possible to conceive of Soviet-American relations as simply business as usual. There were substantial numbers of influential Americans who were concerned at the Soviet build-up in military affairs, at their intervention in Africa, and who were concerned about their treatment of political dissent. The present Administration obviously was going to speak up from time to time and this would become simply a fact of life. The Soviet leadership was certainly flexible enough and intelligent enough to deal with this new fact. Expelling an American correspondent and arresting a prominent dissident could not simply be ignored, and I speculated what the motive behind this might be in Moscow.

Vorontsov made a particular point of noting that in the President's letter the economic relationship was linked to human rights.² He said this led them to conclude in Moscow that having begun with complaints about emigration we were now linking trade with an even broader subject. I said I thought he was misreading the letter, that it did not represent an escalation but was restating what should be obvious in Moscow, that any progress on the economic side could not be totally uncoupled from emigration.

He spent a little time asking how we were organized in the NSC, who would do what, and specifically the relationship between Vance and Brzezinski. On this latter point I told him they should not assume conflict between Vance and Brzezinski or that they could play one against the other. He said specifically, however, that Dobrynin would like to talk with Brzezinski and would I inquire about a meeting. I said I would pass it on.

We also briefly discussed SALT. Vorontsov said he could not understand why the President was reverting to a position which Brezhnev had rejected last year. He said Dobrynin had explained their opposition to deferring or omitting Backfire and cruise missiles, whereupon he went through the entire argumentation about cruise missiles being tested, developed, deployed, and then becoming a strategic fact which could not be reversed.

I said in response that the situation differed from last year. First of all the new President was seriously looking beyond SALT II to SALT III, and the prospects for substantial reductions on both sides. Second, in this light, he wanted to move on as rapidly as possible, and therefore setting aside contentious issues and protracted negotiations seemed the best way to settle Vladivostok and move on to the more serious problem of reductions. Therefore, what the President was saying about

² See Document 1.

omitting cruise missiles and Backfire was quite different from the proposal put forward by President Ford in February because the overall context was different.

Introducing a personal note, Vorontsov said why had I, as a hold-over, not explained to the new Administration how close to an agreement we had come in January. He reminded me that Brezhnev's proposal at that time was obviously a bargaining offer, and he stated specifically that Brezhnev had a fallback already prepared.

I said that that had been my feeling at the time, but he understood as well as I did why we had become diverted onto a different path. I said if the Soviets had in fact a proposal along the lines of the January negotiations, they should not simply sit back but should introduce it into the dialogue while we were studying our own position. He was careful not to agree to do so.

He asked who would accompany Vance to Moscow and specifically whether Warnke would come and whether they could expect to get in advance of the meeting an outline of our SALT position. I said I assumed Warnke would go, but that I was no longer in a position to say who the Secretary of State would or would not bring, that I understood the reasons why submitting a proposal in advance would be helpful to Brezhnev in preparing for the meeting, but this would depend on the President.

He said Vance had suggested to Dobrynin that he would give the outline in advance, and I said in that case I assumed that would happen.

Comment:

My conversations with Vorontsov and Dobrynin over the years have been rather frank and straightforward. We have discussed some extremely sensitive intelligence and political and strategic issues. I assume that Vorontsov hoped I would convey the intensity of his apprehension about the effect of the human rights issue. Even though he is skilled in agitprop I conclude that he has a genuine uneasiness that Brezhnev will explode at some point. My guess is that both he and Dobrynin will be counseling Moscow to be patient and not lose their cool.

On the strategic arms control issues, they are obviously disconcerted by the fact that they have been outflanked for the first time in history by an American President. They seem to be somewhat disconcerted and unsure of how to respond. They do make a connection, however, between the new approach on human rights and a reversion to an old, rejected approach on SALT. And I suspect their fear is that they will be asked to make concessions on both accounts.

7. **Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹**

Washington, February 14, 1977

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am very pleased that our initial exchange of letters² has led us immediately into an examination of the central issues of world peace. Our two great countries share a special responsibility to do what we can, not just to reduce tensions but to create a series of understandings that can lead to a more secure and less dangerous world political climate.

I know and admire your history. As a child, I developed a literary taste by reading your classics. I know also how much, and how very recently, your people have suffered in the course of the last war. I know of your personal role in that war, and of the sacrifices that were imposed on every Soviet family. That is why I believe we are both sincere when we state our dedication to peace, and this gives me hope for the future.

The question is how to translate that dedication into reality. How can we set in motion a process that widens our collaboration as it contains and eventually narrows our competition? That competition—which is real, very expensive, and which neither of us can deny—can at some point become very dangerous, and therefore it should not go on unchecked. To me, this dictates nothing less than an effort, first, to widen where we can our collaborative efforts, especially in regard to nuclear arms limitations; and, second, the exercise of very deliberate self-restraint in regard to those trouble spots in the world which could produce a direct confrontation between us.

I welcome particularly your desire for increased cooperation looking toward an ending of the arms race and the achievement, without delay, of specific disarmament agreements.

It is in the arms control field that I feel we should place greatest emphasis. I will continue to give this my personal attention and can assure you that those who are responsible for these affairs within my administration will give any and all proposals made by you the closest and most positive examination.

Obviously, we must be mutually secure from successful attack, and we must take advantage of our roles as the most powerful nations

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–2/77. No classification marking.

² See Documents 1 and 4.

to initiate substantive reduction in the level of conventional and nuclear armaments. We need not meet deadlines as such, but we do need to make maximum progress without delay.

I agree that in our exchanges and in the conversations which Secretary Vance will have in Moscow at the end of March, we should give priority attention to obtaining a SALT II agreement, perhaps including some substantial force level reductions. It might help us to achieve a successful conclusion to these negotiations if we agree that this is but a first step in a process that may lead to much greater reductions in the size of our respective nuclear arsenals. I wonder in this respect if it might not be helpful to examine the possibility of separating the cruise missile and Backfire issues from SALT II. We could return to those issues immediately in follow-up negotiations. If our objectives are sufficiently ambitious, and particularly if our desire is to achieve real disarmament within minimum forces left which are adequate to assure security to both parties, we may be able to deal more easily later with what appear now to be significant and difficult technical issues.

I hope that our additional personal exchanges and Secretary Vance's talks in Moscow will cover the broadest range of possibilities. I can assure you that the review I am currently conducting of our policies in the arms control field will examine all relevant proposals. As I have discussed with your Ambassador,³ I hope that we may look not only at possible drastic limitations in the total number of nuclear weapons, i.e. a minimum number of missiles that would allow each nation to feel secure from a preemptive strike, but also at restrictions on throw-weight, the possibility of prohibiting all mobile missiles, foregoing any further civil defense preparations, and such additional confidence-building measures as advance notification of all missile test firings and an agreement not to arm satellites or to develop a capability to destroy observation satellites. We also need to explore practical ways to satisfy our mutual need for assuring compliance with our agreements. Such matters as on-site inspection and unrestricted surveillance from space should not become subjects for misinterpretation. They are tools that can be used to make progress and gain public support and understanding for our efforts.

In all these areas, our ultimate aim should be to do more than our technicians tell us may now be advisable. If we keep our sights set on the most ambitious goal, we will be able to achieve a significant change in the level of threat to ourselves and the rest of the world.

³ See Document 3.

It is counterproductive to attempt to negotiate an advantage over one another. We will try to consult without artifice or unnecessary delay, but without pressure or undue haste.

I welcome your willingness to intensify efforts to reach agreement on a comprehensive test ban. I recognize that there are remaining issues with respect to other countries who continue to have test programs and the possible use of peaceful nuclear explosions for mining or construction, but I believe there are satisfactory ways of dealing with these issues. I intend to ask the Congress to ratify the two existing agreements which have been negotiated between our two governments but I consider these only steps toward a common objective of a complete cessation of nuclear tests. In the meantime these unratified agreements will be honored by our government.

In the past, I know that there have been proposals for a demilitarization of the Indian Ocean and that these proposals were not seriously examined. I have asked my colleagues to look closely at the question of the Indian Ocean so that we may be prepared to comment in some detail on the possibilities for an agreement which would advance the cause of world peace. Please let me know specifically what you have in mind. I assume that in such a proposal adequate attention would have to be paid to military activities of both sides in the area. This seems to be a clear case where mutual benefit would require a balanced agreement which leads to a general lessening of military effort in the entire area.

As you know from my public statements, I intend to proceed vigorously in an attempt to reduce the sale or transfer of conventional arms to the third world and hope that you will join in this effort. It seems to me that this is a senseless competition and we, as major suppliers, have a particular responsibility to put limits on such transfers. Obviously other suppliers should be involved in such an effort and we will broaden the discussion to include them.

I also welcome your desire to proceed more vigorously with the Vienna negotiations on reducing armed forces and armaments in central Europe ultimately to minimum acceptable levels.⁴ We have been quite concerned about what seems to be an excessive increase in your military strength in Eastern Europe. We are currently reviewing our positions on this matter, while at the same time instructing our delegation to pursue the examination of data that has been submitted by both sides.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 4.

These are subjects that I hope Mr. Vance can discuss in some detail after we have completed our own review. We will, of course, conduct this particular review in complete consultations with our NATO allies.

I would like to make one remark with reference to the Quadripartite Agreement.⁵ As you know, we consider that this Agreement applies to all of Berlin and not just to West Berlin. It is very important for us to carry out the letter and the spirit of that Agreement. We will make every effort to avoid sensitive issues but we must insist that this Agreement, which is so central to our ability to develop peaceful relations in Europe, be implemented in full. Recently there seems to have been an increasing inclination to create new tensions and constraints in Berlin, which could cause deterioration in the delicate political balance there. I trust that you will help to alleviate these tensions.

We look forward to cooperation in pursuing further steps in implementation of the understandings reached in Helsinki regarding human rights.⁶ As I have said to Ambassador Dobrynin, we hope that all aspects of these understandings can be carried out. It is not our intention to interfere in the internal affairs of other nations. We do not wish to create problems with the Soviet Union but it will be necessary for our government to express publicly on occasion the sincere and deep feelings of myself and our people. Our commitment to the furtherance of human rights will not be pursued stridently or in a manner inconsistent with the achievement of reasonable results. We would also, of course, welcome private, confidential exchanges on these delicate areas.

I have noted your response to my earlier comments on the importance of improving trade and economic relations. Your frank expressions in this regard are in a spirit of candor that I admire, but we need to do something practical to bring about the removal of obstacles. For my part I intend to do what I can to achieve mutually beneficial increased trade, but you are aware of some of the Congressional inhibitions with which I must deal.

Let me say a word about our efforts to develop improvements in other areas where disharmony and potential conflicts exist. In the Middle East we are about to begin direct discussion with the parties in the area and it is then my hope to pursue with vigor the process of bringing about a just and lasting settlement. Mr. Vance will welcome the opportunity in his discussions at the end of March to obtain your views on this, including matters of direct interest to our roles as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference.⁷

⁵ See footnote 6, Document 3.

⁶ See footnote 5, Document 4.

⁷ See footnote 5, Document 3.

In Southern Africa we believe Africans should resolve their problems without outside interference. It is to this end that we have been urging peaceful solutions responsive to majority desires and have restricted taking actions that add to the potential for violence.

We have moved to open a dialogue with the Socialist Republic of Viet-Nam, to establish a basis for normal relations with that country. Elsewhere, we will also be guided by our commitment to true freedom, self-determination and economic progress.

I hope that we can continue these written exchanges in order to clarify our thinking and to engage in the widest possible examination of matters which are of such fundamental importance to our two peoples and to the peace of the world. From these frank communications we can evolve clear and concise bases on which to prepare for our discussions in person, a prospect which I await with great anticipation.

With best personal regards,
Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

8. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 15, 1977, 1655Z

2181. For the Secretary from Toon. Subject: Letter to Sakharov. Ref: Moscow 2124.²

1. Sakharov telephoned EmbOff (Combs) at Embassy afternoon of Feb 15 to ask if “we had any news”. He clearly was asking if we had received the original of the President’s letter.³ When EmbOff said we had no news as yet, Sakharov asked when we thought we would, adding

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 28, Human Rights: 2-4/77. Confidential; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In the upper right-hand corner, an unknown hand wrote, “WH Eyes Only Brzezinski.”

² Telegram 2124 from Moscow, February 14, addressed how Carter’s letter to Sakharov would be interpreted as an endorsement of Soviet dissidents. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-1029; N770001-0526) It is one of the first indicators that Soviets would view Carter’s human rights agenda as blatant interference in Soviet internal matters.

³ See Document 5.

that he intended “to make a public statement as soon as it arrived”.⁴ EmbOff said we might have something by Thursday, although it was impossible to say for sure. Sakharov replied he would “tentatively plan on Thursday”. EmbOff undertook to call him when “news” had arrived.

2. If, as we assume, President’s letter was pouched from Department on or about Feb 9, we should receive it in classified pouch arriving Moscow this evening (Feb 15). We could then plan to telephone Sakharov on Thursday. We presume he would immediately come to the Embassy to receive the letter. He probably would arrange a press conference Thursday evening or as soon as possible thereafter. Alternatively, we could, if the Department wishes, delay delivering the letter for three or four days in order to accomplish a scenario along the lines set forth in Moscow’s 2124.

3. In any event, as I have indicated in Moscow 2124, I consider it important that we give the Soviets advance warning of the President’s letter. If a high-level demarche on the general matter of human rights, which I have recommended, cannot be done by the time we deliver the letter to Sakharov, then I recommend a specific demarche on the letter, either in Washington to Dobrynin or in Moscow to First Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov (assuming that Gromyko is still out of action). I would suggest demarche be on following lines:

—The Soviet side is undoubtedly well aware of the position of the United States Government regarding human rights; we have carefully studied the *Pravda* editorial of Feb 12, which we take as an authoritative reflection of the Soviet position;

—Our interpretations of human rights and what constitutes interference in each other’s internal affairs obviously differ fundamentally;

—We approach this, as other issues that divide us, in a spirit of mutual understanding rather than public confrontation;

—We anticipate that the highest levels of the U.S. Government will soon be in touch privately with the Soviet side regarding this difficult and fundamental question;

—In the meantime, we are instructed to inform the Soviet side that on Feb 5 the President wrote a brief letter to Sakharov, setting forth the President’s general philosophy on the question of human rights. While we do not intend to publicize this letter, Sakharov may do so;

—We are making this demarche because we feel it is in our mutual interests to minimize the impact of our disparate views on human rights upon bilateral relations.

⁴ Sakharov held a press conference on February 17 when the letter arrived. See Christopher S. Wren, “Sakharov Receives Carter Letter Affirming Commitment on Rights,” *The New York Times*, February 18, 1977, p. 3.

4. Please let me know whether you would prefer us to deliver the letter upon receipt this week or delay several days.

Toon

9. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 17, 1977, 1450Z

2280. For Secretary from Ambassador Toon. Subject: President's Letter to Sakharov.² Ref: Secto 2016.³

1. In accord with reftel, EmbOff (Combs) telephoned Sakharov morning of February 17 and suggested he might wish to come to Embassy later that day: Sakharov agreed to come at 3:30 p.m.

2. Upon his arrival we delivered President's letter. Sakharov expressed thanks and said he planned to hold a press conference at 7:00 p.m. that evening, February 17, at which he would announce full text of President's letter.⁴ He said he would also release text of a new letter, dated February 17, which formally responds to President's letter. Text of Sakharov's new letter follows. Substance of other comments Sakharov made during February 17 meeting reported septel.

3. Regarding line to be taken with press, if Sakharov reveals that he received the letter via Embassy, we plan only to confirm that Embassy transmitted letter. We will not comment further. If Sakharov reveals that he gave Embassy his reply to President, we will merely confirm. We plan to answer any other questions with no comment.

4. Begin text: Dear Mr. President: Your letter of February 6 (sic), which I received today, represents a great honor for me and support for the single movement for human rights in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe, a movement in which we consider ourselves to be a

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 78, USSR: 1–2/77. Confidential; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. In the upper right-hand corner, an unknown hand wrote, "LDX E[yes] O[nly] Brzezinski." A handwritten notation on the last page reads: "OCT did not pass Secretary."

² See Document 5.

³ Telegram Secto 2016 from Vance in Jerusalem, February 17, directed Toon to deliver Carter's letter to Sakharov. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0301; N770001–0575)

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 8.

part. You affirmed in this letter, just as you had done earlier, in your inaugural address⁵ and other statements, the devotion of the new U.S. administration to the principles of defense of human rights throughout the world. Of particular significance is your striving to facilitate the release of prisoners of conscience.

I wrote, in my congratulatory telegram on the occasion of your election, of the deep respect which your position evokes in us. I have frequently written and said that the defense of fundamental human rights is not interference in the internal affairs of other countries, but is one of the most central elements in international affairs, inseparable from the basic problems of peace and progress. Today, having received your letter, the exceptional nature of which I clearly understand, I can only once again repeat this.

I would like to take this occasion to refer to concrete cases, in particular the fate of those prisoners of conscience about which I wrote you in January.⁶ One of them, Sergey Kovalev, has a dangerous tumor. I ask you to intervene on behalf of his immediate transfer to the prison hospital in Leningrad. I once again underscore the arbitrary nature of singling out names of prisoners of conscience. I feel I do not have the right to make such a selection. The fate of many, many political prisoners requires the same kind of close attention.

Four members of the group to facilitate fulfillment of the Helsinki Agreement were arrested in February—Aleksandr Ginzburg, Mikola Rudenko, Oleksa Tikhiy, and the group's leader, Yuriy Orlov. Their arrest is a challenge to all governments that participated in the Helsinki Meeting. I ask that you intercede for the release on bail or under guarantee of Ginsburg and Rudenko, both of whom are ill. The active efforts of the heads of state of all Helsinki-signatory countries are required so that all members of the group can be freed, so as to enable it to continue its important work.

From foreign radio broadcasts I learned that you have expressed a wish to meet with me, if I travel to the U.S.A. I appreciate very much this invitation. I have no doubt that such a trip and such personal contacts could have extraordinary significance. Unfortunately, however, at the present time I see no possibility for a trip of this sort.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 3.

⁶ See Document 2.

I would like to express the hope that the efforts of people of good will, your personal efforts, Mr. President, will assist in the realization of those high aims about which you wrote in your letter to me.

With deep respect, Sincerely, Andrey Sakharov

Moscow, February 17, 1977

Moscow, UL. Chkaldva no. 48 Apt: 68: 227–27–20; 561–70–17.

End text.⁷

Toon

⁷ In telegram 49989 to the White House, March 7, the Department transmitted the text of another letter from Sakharov. Sakharov pled on behalf of the Helsinki Group's families that all four men and their families be allowed to immigrate to a western country. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770001–0773)

10. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in the Middle East¹

Washington, February 18, 1977, 0257Z

Tosec 20106/37513. Subject: Soviet Oral Statement on Human Rights.

1. Following is text of oral statement delivered by Dobrynin to Hartman at 6:30 pm Feb 17. Our comments follow.

2. Begin text.

I am instructed to bring the following to the attention of President Carter and the Secretary of State.

The placing before us by the US side of the question of releasing Ginzburg,² a Soviet citizen brought to justice for actions criminally punishable in accordance with our legislation, has caused extreme bewilderment in Moscow.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject File, Box 11, Human Rights: USSR, Eastern Europe, Helsinki: 12/76–4/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Mark Garrison (EUR/SOV); cleared by Lynn Pascoe (D) and Robert Perito (S/S); approved by Hartman. Sent for information Immediate to Moscow and the White House. Vance was in the Middle East, February 15–21 to meet with leaders and review the Middle East peace process.

² See Document 9. Also see Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Again Comments on Soviet Dissident: State Department Says Ginzburg Case is Being Watched," *The New York Times*, February 8, 1977, p. 1.

The fact that such interference in our internal affairs is undertaken under the pretext of concern for “human rights” does not change the substance of the matter.

Of course, everyone is free to have one’s own view of things including the question of how things stand with freedom and human rights in one or another country. We also have our interpretation of how these matters stand in the United States.

But it is quite a different thing to extend such views to the sphere of relations between states and thus to complicate them. Indeed, one cannot regard otherwise the position of the representatives of the US administration when they try to make questions which fall entirely within the internal competence of the Soviet state a subject of discussion. This touches upon an aspect of principle in our relations and here full clarity is required from the very beginning. Such a position is categorically unacceptable to us.

Both you and we realize that we have different ideologies and socio-political systems. And, of course, as a result we are far from having a similar approach to this or that question.

We in the Soviet Union are proud of the fact that the Socialist Revolution and our system not only proclaimed but also actually provided to all Soviet people the right to work, education, social security, free medical care, leisure—and really guarantee these rights.

At the same time Soviet laws protect our people against such anti-social phenomena as war propaganda in every possible form, dissemination of the idea of racial inequality and national discord or attempts at moral and ethical corruption of people. And with us no one has the right to violate laws which are equally obligatory for all.

We do not seek to impose upon anyone our concept of human rights and freedoms, though much of what is happening [omission is in original], the other social system seems unacceptable to our people!

It is not difficult to imagine what would happen if we, proceeding from our moral values, began to link the development of state to state relations with the US and other capitalist countries with problems really existing in those countries such as unemployment of millions, infringement of the rights of ethnic minorities, racial discrimination, inequality of women, violation of rights of citizens by administrative organs of the state, persecution of persons with progressive convictions etc.

Incidentally, if one is to speak about concern over human rights, then how, for example, does systematic US supporting for dictatorial, antipopular regimes appear in a number of countries where the most basic human rights and freedoms are constantly and brazenly trodden on?

If we began raising all these issues to the level of our state to state relations then, obviously, there could be only one result: it could only complicate all relations between our countries, lead us far from the solution of issues which really can and must be the subject of interaction and cooperation of our states. Besides, efforts to ensure the right of man to live in a world free from war and the burden of the arms races under conditions of security and friendly contacts among peoples would also suffer.

Therefore we firmly adhere to the position that matters of internal development, reflecting differences in ideology and socio-political systems, should not be made a subject of dealings between states.

It is not accidental that it was that very principle, together with other fundamental provisions, that was clearly started in the Basic Principles of Relations between the USSR and the USA, signed in 1972.³ It is relevant to recall also that as far back as the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933 our countries committed themselves to strictly respect the undeniable right of each other to organize their lives as they wish and refrain from interference in any way in the internal affairs of the other side.

However, the statements and actions of the US side do not correspond with that always or in all aspects. In effect the statements of “concern” about human rights in the USSR amount to support and direct incitement of individuals who oppose Soviet society. It is not that the administration simply adopts a demonstratively approving attitude toward some American correspondents in the Soviet Union who do nothing but search out and publicize so-called “dissidents”. Some members of the staff of the US Embassy in Moscow are also directly involved in such activities. We could say specifically who they are.

And when the Soviet authorities resort to the measures which are a prerogative of any state when Soviet citizens violate laws, this is used actively by the US side to the detriment of the relations between our countries.

Besides, it is known that the representatives of the US Embassy in Moscow meet secretly with Sakharov who possesses state secrets affecting the defense of our country. The most recent of these meetings was held on February 8 at the initiative of the Embassy. This is an outrageous fact and no reference to “human rights” will conceal that here we are dealing with direct activity of US special services against the USSR and the Soviet social system.

As far as references to the American public opinion, the mood in Congress etc. are concerned, there is public opinion in the USSR too

³ See footnote 3, Document 4.

which resolutely rejects any attempts to impose upon US rules inconsistent with the Socialist democracy and law. End text.

3. Comment and recommendations (Prepared with Marshall Shulman):

A. We read this demarche as an indication that the Soviets may be approaching the threshold where Brezhnev himself would feel obliged to take a stand. The involvement of the President pushes him in this direction. Everything considered, however, it is relatively mildly worded. It may have been intended as the prelude to some public statement or action on the Soviet side, but publicity on the Sakharov letter may alter their original intentions.

B. We do not believe any immediate response is required. We need to wait and see what develops further regarding Sakharov, and whether further actions are taken against Ginzburg and Orlov. We suggest that since the document is addressed to the President, as well as you, it would be useful on your return to get together with those concerned in the White House to discuss the problem and seek to arrive at an agreed strategy for dealing with these matters. Marshall and I are having a preliminary talk with Zbig Friday.

Hartman

11. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 18, 1977

SUBJECT

Lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin February 18, 1977

At the lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin, to which he invited me, much of the time was spent on social conversation and reminiscences, especially wartime. However, the Ambassador was armed with a copy of the President's letter² which he said he wished to discuss.

He specifically raised the following issues: he stressed that it would be easier to conclude a SALT 2 agreement on the basis of the Jan-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, Chron: 2/77. Secret. Drafted by Brzezinski.

² See Document 7.

uary 1976 proposals,³ in which context some accommodation on Backfire could surely be reached. He stressed again the Soviet willingness to give us additional assurances, even though the weapon, in his view, is clearly not a strategic one.

In addition, he asked for clarification as to the implications of a deferral of an agreement on cruise missiles and on the Backfire beyond the SALT 2 agreement. He specifically wished to know how much later thereafter, in our judgment, would such an agreement then follow.

He stressed that a proposal for a SALT 2 agreement on lower levels than those envisaged in Vladivostok would in all likelihood benefit the U.S. much more than the Soviet Union, and hence some additional U.S. accommodation should be necessary. He stressed that on the Soviet side, particularly the military would be against such an agreement since the tangible concessions would in effect be Soviet.

He was curious to know why so many new issues were being introduced by the U.S. side and whether this was not in effect an effort to delay a SALT 2 agreement.

He was also curious to know what was meant by the reference to minimum strategic forces on both sides and wished to know what levels and what composition of strategic forces this might entail.

It was obvious from the foregoing that the President's letter was being subjected to extremely detailed scrutiny before a reply would be forthcoming. I stressed to Dobrynin that I was not in a position to discuss the letter from the President to the General Secretary, since the letter was a highly personal one and meant for the Secretary himself. Moreover, it should not be viewed as a negotiating document, to be subjected to the critical exegesis to which a negotiating document is normally subjected. Dobrynin, in response, indicated that it was important for the Soviet leaders to understand what was the meaning and the intention of the letter and this is why he was making these inquiries; in effect, he indicated he was trying to facilitate the process of communication and attempting to limit misunderstanding. It was obvious from his comments that the Soviets were seeking to establish the nature of our likely position at the forthcoming SALT discussion and the degree to which the President's letter was foreshadowing a new position.

Finally, and at the very end of the lunch, he brought up the issue of the President's letter to Sakharov,⁴ saying that Brezhnev noted that correspondence was being conducted on two levels at the same time. Dobrynin said he was doing his best to make the Soviet leaders understand the reasons why the President was taking the stand that he was

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 120.

⁴ See Document 5.

on human rights, but he was fearful that it would be very difficult for the Soviet leaders not to become highly upset and not to view this as an attempt to interfere in their domestic affairs. He quickly dropped the subject, indicating that he was not instructed to discuss it with me, that he preferred not to do so, and that he had already communicated yesterday to the State Department all that he was instructed to communicate on that subject.⁵ He merely added that he hoped that the atmospherics in the U.S.-Soviet relationship would not be adversely affected with negative effects on such tangibles as the SALT negotiations.

⁵ See Document 10.

12. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

February 25, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

I have carefully studied your letter dated February 14, 1977.² I want to talk bluntly about our impression and thoughts it evoked. As I understand, you are for such straightforward talk.

The statements of a general nature in support of peace and curbing arms race contained in the letter are certainly consonant with our own aspirations. We are definitely for working towards the ultimate elimination of nuclear weapons, and even more, towards general and complete disarmament under an effective international control.

However, the movement toward these lofty goals will by no means be expedited but on the contrary it will be hindered if we, first of all, do not treasure what has already been achieved in that direction over re-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–2/77. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. Carter recalled in his memoirs, “Brezhnev’s tone changed to harshness in his second message on February 25. His primary objection was to my aggressive proposals on nuclear arms limitations—advocating much deeper cuts than had been discussed at Vladivostok in 1975—but he also expressed strong opposition to our human-rights policy. He seemed especially provoked by my corresponding with him and at the same time sending a letter to Sakharov, who was considered by the Soviet leader to be ‘a renegade who proclaimed himself an enemy of the Soviet state.’” (*Keeping Faith*, p. 146)

² See Document 7.

cent years and, secondly, if we supplant a balanced and realistic approach to the definition of further specific steps with putting forward deliberately unacceptable proposals.

Looking at your considerations from this very angle, we unfortunately did not see in many of them a striving for a constructive approach, a readiness for seeking mutually acceptable solutions to the problems which are the subject of our exchange of views.

As I have already written to you, we firmly proceed from the premise that it is necessary in the first place to complete the working out of a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms on the basis that was agreed upon in Vladivostok. It is a fact that the basic parameters of the agreement which were put down there, as well as additional provisions specifying those parameters which were agreed on during later negotiations, were the product of enormous efforts. On a number of occasions not easy decisions were required indeed for finding a mutually acceptable way out of the situations which seemed deadlocked. And to the extent that the agreement has already been completed, all its elements are interconnected, i.e. it is impossible to remove any important element from it without destroying its whole foundation.

It is sufficient to remind, for example—and it should be known to you, Mr. President, from the documents on the negotiations—that the method of counting the missiles equipped with MIRVs was clearly conditioned by achievement of agreement on the whole complex of cruise missiles. The US side not only agreed with that in principle, but in January last year a concrete formula for the accounting of air-to-surface cruise missiles within the aggregate of strategic arms was practically agreed upon. It remained to agree on concrete formulation regarding sea-based and land-based cruise missiles. True, the US side did try later to propose to leave the issue of sea-based and land-based cruise missiles outside the main agreement, but we categorically rejected such an attempt to depart from the agreement reached earlier.

Now we are invited to leave altogether outside the agreement the whole question of cruise missiles. How should we understand that return to the stage left far behind, to a completely non-perspective raising of the question? To agree with this proposal would mean that by closing one channel of the strategic arms race we open right away still another channel. And what is the difference indeed for people what kind of missile will kill them—a cruise missile or a non-cruise missile? There is no basis whatsoever also to think that it will be easier to resolve the question of cruise missiles later when the sides start deploying them, if we fail to do it now when they are still at the stage of development. The experience testifies convincingly to the contrary.

The continued intention, as is seen from your letter, to artificially retain the question of the Soviet medium-range bomber code-named Backfire in the US does not correspond in any way to what was agreed. Let be no doubts to this effect: we resolutely reject such an approach as not in keeping with the aims and the subject of negotiations and as pursuing only one thing—to complicate deliberately and even generally to cast a doubt upon the conclusion of an agreement.

And is the United States less interested than the Soviet Union in this agreement? We do not believe it and if someone thinks otherwise then it is a serious delusion.

In connection with the question you raised on a possibility of substantial reduction of levels of strategic forces agreed in Vladivostok it is appropriate to remind that we, on our part, have been and are in favor of ending the arms race and for the reduction of strategic forces as well. Agreement reached in Vladivostok testifies to that which for the USSR means a unilateral reduction of strategic delivery vehicles. This is a strive in deeds and not in words for reduction of armaments.

We are for confirming the results achieved in Vladivostok in an agreement without further delay and for moving on ahead. As it was agreed, we are ready immediately after the conclusion of the said agreement to proceed to talks about next steps and to discuss also possible reductions in the future.

However, there should be full clarity: any such steps should be first of all and in full degree in conformity with the principle of equality and equal security of the sides. I think, Mr. President, that no one can challenge the legitimacy of such a position.

Then, how does the idea of drastic reduction of the nuclear and missile forces of the USSR and US look like in that light? In your letter it is advanced separately from all the other aspects of the existing situation. Meanwhile it is evident that in that case there would be an immeasurable increase of importance—and to the unilateral benefit of the US—of such factors as differences in geographic positions of the sides, the presence of the US forward based nuclear systems and aircraft carrier aviation in the proximity of the USSR territory, the possession of nuclear weapons by the US NATO allies and other circumstances which cannot be discarded. The impossibility to ignore all these factors in considering the question of reducing the nuclear missile forces of the USSR and the US is so evident that we cannot fail to raise the question what is the true goal of putting forward proposals of that kind—which outwardly may be appealing to laymen but in fact are aimed at gaining unilateral advantages. You yourself justly note that attempts to seek at negotiations advantages for one side over the other can only be counterproductive.

The same one-sidedness can be discerned in proposals about prohibiting all mobile missiles (meaning also intermediate missiles which have nothing to do with the subject matter of the Soviet-American negotiations), limiting throw weight, on-site inspections.

You know better, of course, the reason for presenting all those questions in such an unconstructive way. We, on our part, are in favour of having from the very beginning a business-like talk, for seeking mutually acceptable—I stress mutually acceptable—agreements. The Soviet Union will henceforth defend firmly its own interests in all issues while a realistic and constructive approach by the US side will always be met with our understanding and readiness to reach agreement. It is that balanced approach that we hope to see when Secretary Vance comes to Moscow.

It applies both to the problem of the limitation of strategic arms and other questions related to ending the arms race. We definitely expect that the US side will support our appropriate proposals including those on banning the development of new types and systems of weapons of mass annihilation, on banning chemical weapons, on concluding world treaty on non-use of force. Our proposals on those and a number of other questions, including the one of the Indian Ocean were expounded not once and in detail particularly in the UN. We could discuss as well such issues mentioned in your letter as notification of missile test firings, reduction of sales and transfer of conventional weapons to the third world countries etc., being guided by the interests of international security and strengthening peace.

We attach great importance to an agreement on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe without prejudice to the security of any of the sides.

However, in your letter a onesided approach is clearly seen with regard to the negotiations in Vienna as well. Only in this way one can judge, for example, the words to the effect that the US side is viewing its position in connection with the negotiations in Vienna in the light of some “concern” about “an excessive increase” in the military strength in Eastern Europe. Not only an objective estimate of the actual situation is absent here, but the constructive proposals of the USSR and other socialist countries—participants in the negotiations aimed at achieving progress at the Vienna negotiations are totally ignored as well. We are also prepared henceforth to seek solutions and decisions, and we are ready for endeavours which do not imply acquiring by anyone unilateral advantages. But if we are expected to reduce unilaterally our defensive capabilities and thus to put ourselves and our allies in an unequal position, then nothing will come out of it.

It is impossible to agree with the evaluation given in the letter, of the situation regarding the carrying out of the Quadripartite Agree-

ment. The USSR has not and does not infringe on a special status of West Berlin and the appeal to facilitate alleviating the tensions in that area is sent to a wrong address. The fact that there still appear complications is connected with a quite definite policy of the FRG, which is pursued with the connivance of the three Western powers and in fact is aimed at eroding the Quadripartite Agreement and its corner stone provision that West Berlin does not belong to the FRG and cannot be governed by it. And the attempts to violate that provision constitute a very slippery way leading to the exacerbation of the situation. We proceed from the fact that the Quadripartite Agreement is to be observed strictly and steadfastly by all parties concerned. We shall strive in every possible way not to allow a return to the period when West Berlin served as a constant source of dangerous frictions and conflicts.

Without going now deeper into the details I shall say that your letter does not indicate at all any changes also in the US approach to such issues as the settlement in the Middle East or the correcting of the situation in the field of trade and economic relations between our countries, which would testify to an intention to really move to their successful solution.

And now the last thing. A so called question of "human rights" is raised again in the letter. The way we qualify the essence of this question and US administration's behavior in this connection was recently communicated through our Ambassador.³ This is our position of principle. We do not intend to impose upon your country or upon other countries our rules but neither shall we allow interference in our internal affairs, whatever pseudo-humanitarian slogans are used to present it. We shall resolutely respond to any attempts of this kind.

And how in general should we regard the situation when the US President sends messages to the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU and at the same time enters into correspondence with a renegade⁴ who proclaimed himself an enemy of the Soviet state and speaks out against normal, good relations between the USSR and the US. We would not like to have our patience tested in any matters of international policy including the questions of Soviet-American relations. This is not the way to deal with the Soviet Union.

Those are the thoughts, Mr. President, which occurred to my colleagues and to myself in connection with your letter. I did not choose rounded phrases, though they might have been more pleasant. The question is about too serious things to leave a room for any ambiguities or understatements.

³ See Documents 10 and 11.

⁴ Reference is to Sakharov.

My letter is warranted by the sincere concern about today and tomorrow of our relations and it is this main thought that I want to bring to you in all directness and confidentiality.

I hope that with the understanding of that high responsibility which is placed on the leadership of our two countries, we shall be able to insure progressive development of Soviet-American relations along the road of peace in the interests of our and all other peoples.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

13. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, March 4, 1977

To General Secretary Brezhnev

Your letter of February 25th² caused me some concern because of its somewhat harsh tone, because it failed to assume good faith on my part, and because there was no positive response to specific suggestions contained in my previous letter. The differences between our countries are deep enough, and I hope that you and I never compound them by doubts about our respective personal motives.

The fact is that no final agreement was ever reached at Vladivostok nor in the subsequent negotiations regarding cruise missiles or the Backfire bomber. I am confident that such agreements can be attained in the future, and I am eager to seek them. I appreciate your concerns regarding the deferral of these issues to later negotiations but I do believe that something is to be gained from generating momentum through a more rapid agreement and I want to emphasize that a deferral of these two contentious issues would be designed only to facilitate a more rapid agreement, with all its positive political conse-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–2/77. No classification marking. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote, “Zbig—O.K. to transmit as amended. J.C.”

² See Document 12.

quences. I am also confident that with mutual good will, we should be able to reach agreement regarding such matters as conventional armaments, tactical nuclear weapons, and throw weight.

I do not underestimate for a moment the difficulties that stand in our way. The resolution of these issues will require perseverance, patience, and determination. It is with that consideration in mind that I would like to make two further suggestions, both designed to help in resolving the differences between us.

First of all, I think it would be extremely useful if you were to indicate to us your views regarding greatly reduced strategic force levels which we might reach four or five years from now. In previous strategic arms limitation talks, we have tended to take small steps toward an uncertain future. I am suggesting that instead we seek to define a specific longer-term objective which we can then approach step-by-step with more assurance of success.

Secondly, our search for a stable accommodation would be enhanced by the rapid conclusion of a formal agreement between us on those issues on which both of us seem predisposed to agree.³ We should exploit the fact that we are in agreement or might reach an early agreement on such issues as:

- a) a limit of 2400 (or a mutually agreeable lower limit) on strategic delivery vehicles;
- b) a limit of 1320 (or a mutually agreeable lower limit) on launchers with multiple independent warheads;
- c) provisions for mutually satisfactory verification;
- d) prior notification of missile test launchings;
- e) a comprehensive test ban, including a temporary provision for the conclusion of ongoing peaceful programs;
- f) agreement not to arm satellites nor to develop the ability to destroy or damage satellites;
- g) the demilitarization of the Indian Ocean;
- h) a limit on civil defense efforts;
- i) mutual restraints on arms sales to Third World countries;
- j) elimination of mobile intercontinental ballistic missiles.

The above list is certainly not all-inclusive, and other relatively noncontroversial matters could easily be added to it. The point is to move forward without delay on those issues on which we are able to agree, thereby generating the needed momentum for coping immediately thereafter with more intractable questions.

³ The end of this sentence originally read "substantial consensus already exists." Carter struck through these words and substituted "both of us seem predisposed to agree."

We are working on these problems with the greatest possible effort, preparing for Secretary Vance's discussions with you in Moscow.

I hope you will⁴ not predicate your future correspondence on the erroneous assumption that we lack sincerity, integrity, or the will to make rapid progress toward mutually advantageous agreements. I do not underestimate the difficulty of the substantive issues or the technical details, but I am determined to succeed in laying the foundation for a stable and peaceful relationship between our two countries. We do not seek any one-sided advantage.

I do not think of our letters as official negotiating documents, but if exchanged on a personal and completely confidential basis they may very well help us both to chart the needed sense of historical direction. It is in this spirit that this correspondence was initiated, and I want you to know that I am committed to arms reduction as a matter of personal belief and because it represents the desire of the people of my country. I hope and believe that you and your people have the same commitment.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter⁵

⁴ This sentence originally began "Please do." Carter struck through these words and substituted "I hope you will."

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

14. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

March 15, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

Having studied your letter of March 4,² I would like to set forth once more the substance of our understanding of the way the things are with the working out of an agreement on strategic offensive arms limitation (to be effective till 1985), as well as to state in more detail our position on specific questions which are still outstanding.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 3–5/77. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation.

² See Document 13.

Here are some general observations to start with. We are naturally in favor of concluding an agreement as soon as possible, without delay. However, an attempt to do it on the basis of some artificially simplified version does not by any means expedite the matter if we keep in view the aim we place before us, namely, to really limit strategic arms, being guided by the principle of undiminished security for either of the contracting parties. Just the same, the preparation of an agreement would in no way be expedited if, putting aside some questions which, for that matter, have been worked up in many respects, we would start attaching to it some new issues which, besides, have no direct relation to the subject matter of the agreement.

Conclusion of a new agreement between our countries on limiting strategic arms would certainly have great political significance both for Soviet-US relations and on a broader plane. However, it will be feasible only if the agreement constitutes a real step in the direction of limiting strategic arms. Otherwise, it would be counterproductive.

That would be precisely the case if the question of cruise missiles were left outside the agreement. That question is not only most directly related to the core of the new agreement but it also—which is essential—has been worked up in many respects. Even some specific formulas have been agreed upon. To propose now to put cruise missiles outside the framework of the agreement would mean not only a step back to the initial positions but would also leave a way open for expanding the arms race to a new dangerous direction.

That, we think, corresponds in no way to the goals of rapid conclusion of an agreement on limiting strategic arms. Therefore we confirm our concrete proposals on the whole complex of cruise missiles, namely:

—To consider heavy bombers when equipped with cruise missiles capable of a range of 600 to 2500 kilometers as delivery vehicles equipped with MIRVs and to count them correspondingly in a certain ratio (depending upon the type of a heavy bomber) against the agreed level for such delivery vehicles—1320; air-to-surface cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 2500 kilometers should be completely banned; the equipping with cruise missiles capable of a range of 600 to 2500 kilometers of other aircraft except heavy bombers, should be also banned;

—All sea-based and land-based cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 kilometers should be completely banned.

I would like to remind once again that our agreement to include into the aggregate number of the missiles equipped with MIRVs (1320) all the missiles of the types, of which even one has been tested with MIRVs, was and remains conditioned upon reaching a final agreement on the questions of cruise missiles.

As for the Soviet medium bomber code-named by you Backfire, we have given official data about the range of this aircraft (2200 km) and expressed readiness to enter into the records of the negotiations this data as well as our intention not to provide this aircraft with capabilities to operate at intercontinental distances—all this on the condition that the issue of Backfire is completely and totally withdrawn from further negotiations. We confirm that position of ours.

The issue of mobile launchers for ballistic missiles of intercontinental range naturally should find its solution in the agreement in question. Earlier we proposed to agree that over the period that agreement remains in force the sides should refrain from deploying land-based mobile ICBM launchers.

Our approach to the question of a possibility for subsequent reductions of the USSR and US strategic forces is set forth in my letter of February 25.³ I repeat that we shall be ready to proceed to the discussions of this issue immediately after the signing of the agreement. However, it is necessary that account should be taken here of those factors which I already wrote you about on February 25, i.e. such factors as differences in geographic positions of the sides, the presence of the US forward based nuclear systems and aircraft carrier aviation in the proximity of the USSR territory, the possession of nuclear weapons by the US NATO allies and other circumstances which cannot be discarded.

Having in mind these factors and the above mentioned considerations regarding cruise missiles, it could be possible not only to limit the levels of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles for the sides (2400 and 1320) but also to consider the number of such delivery vehicles to be reduced even before the expiration of the agreement being worked out.

The above considerations represent our position of principle which we intend to adhere to in the forthcoming talks with Secretary Vance. The additional questions which are mentioned in your letter, Mr. President, also undoubtedly deserve attention. We shall be prepared to set forth our preliminary considerations on those matters. On those of them, where a prospect appears for finding mutually acceptable solutions special negotiations would be conducted. If progress is achieved, appropriate agreements could be signed simultaneously with the strategic arms limitation agreement.

In conclusion I would like to note, Mr. President, that I do not quite understand the meaning of your reference to the tone of my letter of February 25. Its tone is usual—business-like and considerate. If you have in mind the direct and frank way in which it expounds our views, then I proceeded and do now from the premise that a dialogue of that

³ See Document 12.

very nature is in the interests of the matter. If you yet have in mind our attitude of principle toward the attempts to raise issues which go beyond the relations between states, and in general are far-fetched, then no other reaction from our side can be expected.

I assume that our personal correspondence will serve the interests of constructive development of the relations between our countries.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

15. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, March 24, 1977

To General Secretary Brezhnev

The substantive answer to your recent letter² will be presented in person by Secretary Vance. However, I wish to express my hope that his visit to Moscow will result in substantial general agreements regarding arms reduction and the enhancement of cooperation between our two countries as we search together for a more peaceful and friendly world.

I hope to continue our correspondence after Mr. Vance's return, and look forward to an early meeting with you. The Secretary of State has my complete confidence, he and I have spent hours together preparing for this important trip, and he is qualified to speak authoritatively on my behalf.

You have my personal good wishes.

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 3–5/77. No classification marking. The letter is handwritten. In a March 24 covering memorandum to Carter, Brzezinski commented, "It seems to Cy [Vance] and to me that it might be a nice gesture if you were to write a brief (perhaps hand-written) personal note to Brezhnev." Brzezinski also provided three points for Carter to consider including, all of which are in Carter's hand-written letter.

² See Document 14.

16. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House¹

Washington, March 27, 1977, 1024Z

68027. For the President and Dr. Brzezinski only. Following telegram Secto 03009 dated March 27, 1977 is repeated to you.

Quote. Secto 3009. Dept pass White House for the President from the Secretary. Subject: Moscow Reception

My reception on arrival Moscow was most cordial. Gromyko was warm and gracious, and agreed readily on a businesslike work schedule to begin March 28 with a meeting with Brezhnev. On the way into town, Brezhnev phoned on the car radio, extended a cordial welcome and sent you and me his best wishes. That is about the sum total of initial impressions, as we get down to business tomorrow.

Vance

Unquote

Christopher

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Vance, Europe and Moscow, 3/27/77–4/4/77: Cables and Memos, 3/15–31/77. Secret; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Brzezinski forwarded Vance's cable to Carter under a covering memorandum that read in part, "Brezhnev's phone call a nice & clearly *deliberate* gesture." In a March 24 letter, Carter provided Vance with pre-Moscow meeting instructions. (Ibid.)

17. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 28, 1977, 11 a.m.–1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon
 Mr. Paul Warnke
 Mr. Phillip Habib
 Mr. William Hyland
 Mr. William D. Krimer,
 Interpreter

USSR

General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev
 Minister A.A. Gromyko
 Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
 Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
 Mr. G.M. Korniyenko
 Mr. O.M. Sokolov
 Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Following an exchange of pleasantries, *General Secretary Brezhnev* expressed his condolences to the United States on the occasion of the tragic crash of two aircraft in the Canary Islands, which resulted in a large loss of life.² Among those killed in the crash were some 300 Americans. Brezhnev expressed condolences on his own behalf and on behalf of his colleagues, and took this occasion to note that the complexity of technology was another argument against armaments.

Secretary Vance expressed his appreciation for Brezhnev's words.

Brezhnev thought that now that the photographers had left, the two sides could begin business-like discussions. He did not want to repeat the questions he had dealt with in his recent foreign policy speeches in Tula³ and at the 26th Trade Union Congress in Moscow.⁴ He was saying this because he was convinced that the leaders of the United States were well acquainted with these speeches. President Carter himself had commented that he agreed with the constructive proposals "Comrade Brezhnev" had made at Tula and at the Trade Union

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place in the Kremlin.

² Reference is to the two 747 jets that collided on a runway in the Canary Islands on March 27. See Robert D. McFadden, "550 Feared Killed on Two 747's in Canary Islands Runway Crash; Some on Los Angeles Jet Survive," *The New York Times*, March 28, 1977, p. 1.

³ See footnote 3, Document 1.

⁴ On March 21, Brezhnev delivered his address to the Trade Union Congress. See "Excerpts from Brezhnev's Speech at Labor Congress," *The New York Times*, March 22, 1977, p. 14.

Congress in Moscow. Thus he would not repeat what he had said on those two occasions. It seemed to him that first of all, the two sides at this meeting should exchange views on the general state of relations between our two countries, and discuss prospects of their future development. It was his hope that he and his colleagues could have a chance to hear at first hand how the new U.S. Government approached the question of relations with the Soviet Union. He was saying this because he considered these relations to be the most important thing to be discussed. When someone had an objective, he was determined to move toward it, without turning aside. There had been many contacts between Soviet and American leaders before the Secretary's arrival and many inter-relationships between our two countries, which had emerged in recent years, and had played an important role in working out major understandings and agreements between the Soviet Union and the United States in the course of the past several years.

Referring to the present stage of relations between our two countries, Brezhnev said that they had acquired certain specific distinctive features. On the whole, these relations continued to develop under the impact of those efforts which were quite justifiably made to introduce positive changes. Truly great, and he would even say titantic, efforts had been required at times in order to arrive at very complex decisions.

Brezhnev wanted to draw the Secretary's attention to the fact that one could approach the process of relaxation of tensions and improvement of Soviet-American relations in different ways. The two sides might agree on some things and disagree on others. However, if one were to take a look at the work that had been accomplished in recent years without bias (he repeated "without bias"), if one were to take a look at the foundations of that process which undoubtedly was furthered by the steps the two sides had taken to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, one could arrive at only one conclusion: the work accomplished, and what had been achieved as a result of that work, was equally important and beneficial, not only for our two countries, but objectively for all the peoples of the world. In brief, this represented a gain for all those who not only in words but in deeds desired peace and wanted to see fruitful cooperation develop between our two countries and peoples. At this point Brezhnev deviated from his prepared text to stress that whenever he talked to someone, he always did so in a frank and sincere manner, and he wanted to be sure that his partner in a conversation realized this well. In saying that the developments in recent years represented a gain for all those who desired peace not only in words, but in deeds, he would have to add quite directly that during the past twelve to eighteen months the further development of our bilateral relations had slowed down to a certain extent, and in some sectors had come to a complete halt. There was no need to dwell on the

reasons for this, but it was essential that we knew where we stood now in terms of Soviet-American relations.

Brezhnev saw the principal purpose of the discussions here in Moscow in a realistic (he repeated the word “realistic”) and carefully weighed appraisal of the present situation, in order to identify priorities that would give a new impulse to the relations between our two countries, because without mapping out such priorities, without an orderly manner of proceeding, we would not be able to move ahead. Quite naturally, in this connection the Soviet leadership proceeded from the premise that both sides should have an absolute interest in furthering the development of our bilateral relations. Here he would use a rather contentful and weighty expression, but one that was absolutely true, because it was based on the realities of today’s world. The question could be looked at in the following manner: either we continue to move ahead along the chartered path, or our relations would find themselves thrown backward, whether we wanted to see this or not. The alternative was all too clear. In the latter case both our countries and the cause of peace as a whole would stand to lose in the future. Such was the true situation, even if only because of the objective role and weight of the Soviet Union and the United States in the world in general and in world affairs. Of course, Secretary Vance would be interested in the position of the Soviet Union with respect to these two alternatives. Brezhnev wanted to say quite clearly that as far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it had no doubt at all as to the choice to be made. Its course was clear. The Soviet Union was resolutely determined to make use of recent achievements in Soviet-American relations in order to move forward undeviatingly toward constructive cooperation and interaction with the United States. He was in favor of resolving the problems arising in our bilateral relations, and in favor of cooperating in the settlement of international problems. The faster we would move ahead, the better. He wanted to repeat that our two countries had gained considerable positive experience. We had achieved fundamental agreements and understandings, we had formulated agreed principles, consistent implementation of which, he was convinced, can and must ensure forward development of Soviet-American relations.

Secretary Vance would realize that the Soviets, too, listened to U.S. radio broadcasts, that many of Brezhnev’s colleagues read U.S. newspapers and speeches by U.S. leaders. On the basis of recent pronouncements it was not at all clear to him whether or not the United States intended to abide by the various understandings achieved. He wanted to state quite clearly that it was the intention of the Soviet Union firmly to adhere to the agreements concluded, and to proceed in our relations on the basis of the principles that had been mutually agreed; it stood to reason that the Soviet leaders expected the United States to act in the

same manner. They had no illusions at all about the complexities and problems which existed and would continue to exist in our relations. But, in his view all this led to one conclusion—that we should set ourselves specific and realistic objectives, and that we should not permit any abatement in the effort to resolve problems that arise. Of course, just as the United States, the Soviet Union would never submit to duress and would never permit its interests to be harmed. However, to the extent that the other side was prepared to do so, the Soviet Union was prepared to seek and find mutually acceptable agreements. The main thing was that there be a common positive attitude and a practical willingness on both sides to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions. In this connection Brezhnev wanted especially to address the current status of detente, both in the relations between our two countries and on an international scale. He believed that the turnabout toward detente, which had occurred in recent years, was the most important trend in the development of international relations. Deviating once again, he wanted to say something very frankly. The Soviet leadership could not fail to be concerned over the fact that in Western countries opponents of detente had once again become very active. Those who wanted to return the world to the time of the cold war had stepped up their activities. The range of means they used was rather extensive: there were statements to the effect that detente had been beneficial to the Soviet Union only; there were fabrications to the effect that under cover of detente the Soviet Union was getting ready to carry out a first strike against the United States. This was not a joking matter. Here Brezhnev saw an attempt to distort and make acceptable an understanding of detente, which could allegedly allow interference in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union and other socialist countries under the false pretense, and he stressed “false pretense”, of concern for human rights. Brezhnev noted that Secretary Vance, visiting here in Moscow, (he expressed regret that the Secretary would not have a chance to visit Leningrad), could travel throughout the entire country, since no restrictions applied to him in this respect, and he could see for himself what rights were enjoyed by people in the Soviet Union. The Secretary would see what might distress a Soviet citizen and whether or not anyone was oppressing him, and yet, a hullabaloo had started in the United States and a great deal of anti-Soviet agitation. He was saying this quite openly and frankly, and would ask the Secretary to convey his views to President Carter. Never before had such a ruckus over human rights been raised in the United States. Of course, he could and intended to provide an answer on the human rights question, and with respect not only to the Soviet Union but to the whole world. He would provide a response—let America first take a look at human rights in its own country. He added that this was a topic he would return to later. Meanwhile he would like to touch on the theoretical aspect of these

questions. There were some in the West who tried to present things in such a way as if what we were dealing with in this case was ideological struggle; it was pointed out that in the view of the Russians themselves the ideological struggle did not in any way stop under detente conditions. Brezhnev would indeed say that he took this view when it was really a matter of a clash between ideologies, a matter of differences in philosophical views, a matter of different ways of looking at the development of human society. However, such a struggle could not in any way be dragged into relations between states. Otherwise we would be dealing not with an ideological struggle but in fact, with psychological warfare. These were two entirely different things in principle. To view detente in this way would mean purposely or inevitably to distort it, and ultimately to undermine it. The Soviet Union believed that detente meant above all liquidation of the cold war and transition to normal and smooth relations between states. This was clearly expressed in Soviet readiness to resolve disagreements and disputes not by force, not by means of threats, let alone the use of arms, but by peaceful means, by negotiation. Finally, detente implied a certain degree of trust and a willingness to take into account each other's legitimate interests. He was convinced that detente viewed in this way met the interests of not simply one country, but had universal significance. It was obvious, for example, that if the United States would not take into account the legitimate (he repeated the word "legitimate") interests of the Soviet Union, if the United States tried to interfere in Soviet domestic affairs, it would be unreasonable for anyone to expect the Soviet Union to take into account the interests of the United States. The realities of our times were such that without due mutual consideration of the legitimate interests of our two countries, without a certain degree of trust and concern for strengthening that trust, it would be impossible to halt the arms race or to achieve settlements of international conflicts or resolution of the global problems facing mankind. For understandable reasons, problems could arise in the relations between our two countries, as well as with other countries, but the Soviet Union has always believed and continued to believe that Soviet-American relations must develop without prejudice to the interests of third countries, and not at their expense. At the same time, he knew that it was not in our mutual interest to tolerate attempts by third countries to undermine the relations between us, or to play on the differences that inevitably arose between us.

(Gromyko remarked in an aside that there were those who loved to try it).

Addressing the Secretary and his colleagues directly, Brezhnev concluded by saying that such were the thoughts he had wanted to express on the general state of Soviet-American relations as of now, without at this time going into specific questions. He gathered that

there was a vast number, hundreds of specific questions that would have to be addressed subsequently. For now he would prefer to stop here, and would ask for the views of the U.S. side. He also acknowledged that he had received the last communication.

Secretary Vance first wanted to thank the General Secretary for the frankness and openness with which he had addressed the various important questions before us. He, too, would try to speak frankly and openly, because he believed this to be the best way of achieving results. First, before beginning to set forth the views of the United States regarding the relations between our two countries, the Secretary wanted to transmit to Mr. Brezhnev a letter from President Carter.⁵

(Brezhnev took a few minutes to read the translation of the President's letter and passed it on to Minister Gromyko).

The Secretary said that all of us were heartened by Brezhnev's foreign policy remarks in his recent speeches. Last winter, as Governor Carter⁶ prepared to assume the presidency, he had been impressed and gratified by Brezhnev's public statement on the importance of good relations between our two countries. In particular, he was encouraged by Brezhnev's statement at Tula that detente meant a willingness to resolve differences and disputes by peaceful means, at conference tables. The President's deep conviction, which the Secretary shared and, in his judgment, was shared by a majority of the American people, was that our two countries must do everything they could to reduce the danger of war. The President, like Brezhnev, was a practical man and realized that the overall state of our relations would be determined largely by the specifics of the issues on our agenda. These were the "objective realities" of detente which determined where we were going.

The President, like Brezhnev, had been an officer in the armed forces of his country, and had a deep determination to do all he could to work toward a reasonable and fair regulation of military competition.

The Secretary well knew that Brezhnev had lived through the devastation of war, and knew the sorrow and suffering it would bring to all of our people, the young and the old. The Secretary, too, had experienced the horrors of war, had seen his friends and comrades die, and had lived with the responsibility for nuclear weapons for many years. It was his fervent hope that our children and Brezhnev's children would be spared the incalculable horror of a nuclear holocaust. At this point *Brezhnev* interrupted to tell a story in connection with alleged Soviet intentions to attack or threaten the United States. An Oriental tale related that at a bazaar a man had purposely started the rumor that at

⁵ See Document 15.

⁶ Carter served as Governor of Georgia from January 1971 until January 1975.

the far end of that bazaar someone was giving away pillows free of charge. As people heard him, they began running toward that part of the bazaar, until the man was left all alone. At that moment he began to wonder whether there might not be something to the rumor that he himself had started, and he thought that, just in case, he, too, should start running; who knows, maybe they were indeed giving out free pillows. Brezhnev said he knew that Americans liked anecdotes, and that is why he told this story by way of an analogy to those who started rumors about Soviet-war-like intentions.

The Secretary continued by saying that recently, Brezhnev had noted that there were objective possibilities for developing equal and mutually advantageous cooperation in various spheres for the good of both countries and universal peace. He heartily agreed with such a view of the situation.

Brezhnev had further said that the question was how soon such a development would begin. He was firmly convinced that we could begin that process now. We had an unparalleled opportunity to set our relations on a fresh course.

At Tula Brezhnev had also said that detente meant an ability to take into consideration each other's legitimate interests. The two sides were realistic enough to know that we would have differences. But we shared a fundamental interest in improving our mutual understanding. Our differences must not distract us from working for peace. They also must not divide us.

The Secretary wanted to give Brezhnev a sense of developments in our country which had affected our national outlook. We have come through a hotly contested national election which was a process of renewal and of developing a new policy consensus in the country. Now a new government had taken office in Washington, but we were dealing with the same currents of opinion that had shaped our election debates. There was support for detente among the American people, but there were also concerns and apprehensions which had to be overcome.

At this point *Brezhnev* interrupted again and recalled how at the very beginning of the "Great Patriotic War", at the time Hitler had attacked Czechoslovakia and had allied himself with Mussolini, he had come home from work one day to the place where he lived in rather humble conditions together with his father. His father was a simple man, a steel worker, and this story, which Brezhnev was sure his colleagues on the Politburo had heard more than once, was well-suited to illustrate a simple working man's approach to the psychological questions of war. His father had asked him "Lyonya, which is the highest mountain in the world"? He had responded that it was Mt. Everest. His father then asked how tall was the Eiffel Tower in Paris? He had replied that it was some 300 meters tall. His father then said that if he and his

friends had been authorized to do so, they would have built a tower twice as tall as the Eiffel Tower, would have hauled it up to Mt. Everest and topped it off with a gallows. There they would hang Hitler, and would instruct everybody to view this scene through a telescope. His father was obviously unaware of the fact that the curvature of the earth would make such viewing impossible. His father went on to say they would then declare that this would be the fate of not only the first instigator of war, but of any other war-monger. After hanging five, six, or seven such criminals the world would be rid of war. Much later, during the Nuremberg Trial, when the prosecutor there pronounced the words “instigator of War,” Brezhnev recalled this heart-to-heart conversation between a father and a son. It was a true story and, while Brezhnev apologized for having interrupted, he felt it was a useful story, because it emphasized the need to defend peace.

The Secretary acknowledged that it was indeed a very useful story. He continued by saying that President Carter enjoyed the support of the vast majority of the American people—more so than any President for many years—and therefore he could get support for arms control agreements. The point he wanted to make was of critical importance, because it meant that any agreements we could reach here the President could get ratified by Congress.

The Secretary said that what we wanted to set in motion during our talks was a process of improvement in key arms control issues, in our bilateral relations, and in international relations. The President had spoken of his belief that we were all here in good faith to pursue a more stable peace through new arms limitation negotiations. He felt that we must be bold and vigorous in achieving control over nuclear weapons. We were prepared to go far in this joint endeavor and explore new ideas. The positions the President advocated were an advance over the past—not only in the strategic arms area, but in stopping all nuclear testing, and moving ahead on a broad range of other arms control issues.

Our present talks were a crucial step in demonstrating that detente was a dynamic, long-term process. It was not static. We, like the Soviet Union, must give it new meaning, if it were truly to reflect greater mutual understanding. The Secretary would suggest that we begin regeneration of detente.

Without going into details now, the Secretary wanted to sketch out those areas which we would want to explore with the Soviet side. We will explore ways to address the Backfire and Cruise missile issues, we will make a comprehensive proposal which would enhance strategic stability and mutual confidence, we will discuss advance notification of missile test firings, averting military competition in space, and concerns that certain forms of civil defense can be destabilizing. We also

hoped that our discussions will make a turning point in the long effort to achieve a total cessation of nuclear testing, a subject in which, the Secretary knew, the Soviet Union had deep concerns. Conditions may be right for the United States and the Soviet Union to exercise unique leadership in getting this process moving. We were moving promptly to secure Congressional ratification of the Treaty on the Threshold Test Ban and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions. What we accomplish during our meetings here would help us in the ratification of those treaties. Another area where we could work together to move forward was the Indian Ocean. We wanted to explore Soviet interest in mutual restraint in that area.

The Secretary pointed out that conventional arms exports were dangerous and wasted vast and increasingly scarce resources. Our two countries have accounted for a large proportion of such trade. In fact, the United States occupied first place in the export trade of conventional arms, and the Soviet Union second place. Competition between us in the export of arms placed stress on our bilateral relations. It should in any event be a matter of principle for advanced countries to make a serious effort to restrain and reduce this trade. We would welcome an expression of interest on the part of the Soviet side in an exchange of views on this subject. In this connection, we believed that the best way to begin was with suppliers. The United States was ready to exercise restraint in its own activities. We would be talking to our allies. The President was interested in Soviet views on prospects for cooperation. In the area of non-proliferation we were gratified by progress in the London Suppliers' Group, and in particular with very solid Soviet participation. These were important problems, and we hoped to continue in close cooperation.

The Secretary wanted to inform Brezhnev today that in the very near future we would announce certain policy decisions concerning nuclear non-proliferation. They will include the indefinite deferral of commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium in the United States, and the restructuring of the U.S. breeder reactor program to emphasize designs other than the plutonium breeder. The Secretary had instructed our Embassy to inform Minister Gromyko in detail of these policy decisions. We shared Soviet concern about the dangers of proliferation of nuclear weapons, and we believed that the actions which we are about to take would constitute a major step forward toward this end.

We had reviewed the Vienna MBFR negotiations and our MBFR policy. The Carter Administration strongly supported these negotiations. A satisfactory agreement could enhance the security of both sides equally. The West had shown its will to move toward agreement. The December 1975 Western proposal to reduce U.S. nuclear weapons was

a substantial step.⁷ We hoped that the East would agree to the two basic objectives involved in these negotiations, which were parity in the form of equal military manpower in the area, and collectivity of limitations. If the East showed serious willingness to reach an agreement based on parity and collectivity, the way for movement on both sides would be open.

Brezhnev interrupted to say that he wanted to present the following statement. He said there could be different approaches to the relations between us. When something had happened to President Nixon, the Soviet side had not mentioned one word about it, neither in the press nor in other communications. The Soviet leadership regarded this as a purely domestic matter for the United States. When Nixon had come to the Soviet Union the first time, he went directly by car to the Residence and had come to see *Brezhnev*. They had a one-on-one conversation only *Sukhodrev* present to interpret.⁸ Nixon had said that our two countries had such quantities of arms that we could destroy each other seven times over. Therefore he suggested that we approach this question realistically. This was a very difficult time in our relations, because the United States had just bombed some Soviet vessels in Haiphong harbor in Viet Nam.⁹ Nevertheless, the Soviet leadership had decided to receive Nixon to see what could be done. Nixon had pointed out that he was trying to withdraw troops from Viet Nam, that it was not he who had started the war. The Soviet Union, a great power with a vast territory and a population of almost 260 million, and the United States, the other great power, could not permit the Viet Nam situation to be an obstacle to their mutual relations. Finally the Viet Nam war was extinguished, and that was good. Nixon had suggested that we take up specific issues between us, and one could see how productive that was, in what a short period of time the SALT agreements were concluded, among them the Interim Agreement which expires in October of this year. A number of other agreements were concluded, basic principles of relations between us were worked out,¹⁰ an agreement was concluded on the prevention of nuclear war.¹¹ All this had been accomplished during a very brief period of time. Since then much time has elapsed. Nothing is being said about the Vladivostok understanding,

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Documents 365 and 367.

⁸ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 257.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 271.

¹⁰ See footnote 3, Document 4.

¹¹ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 122.

quite the contrary; Brezhnev had read that allegedly Vladivostok was not binding on Mr. Carter, and yet that agreement had not been an agreement between Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Ford, but an agreement between the Soviet Union and the United States. If any audience were convened in the Palace of Congresses here in Moscow—it holds 5,000 people—and Brezhnev were to ask “Comrades, do you want good relations with the United States?”, the answer would be a resounding yes.

Brezhnev did not know what authority the U.S. delegation had, but he believed that things must be addressed in specifics.

President Carter had spoken of personal freedom in the Soviet Union. In that case Brezhnev would want to list what has to be done in the United States to ensure human rights. The U.S. Constitution did not provide for the right of people to work, neither did it provide for equal rights for women. Brezhnev hoped that Mr. Vance would not take offense, this was just a matter of Brezhnev’s natural approach to things.

Secretary Vance said that he would be very happy at this time to discuss a proposal that we wanted to table in order to lay the framework for forward movement in the negotiations on strategic arms limitation.

Brezhnev said that when he had spoken of specifics he did not have in mind that we should now discuss SALT questions, because that would involve technical considerations. He thought it would be advisable to do this later.

The Secretary said that in that case he would very briefly discuss our relations in the international sphere. In that respect he would note that there was need for us to consult earlier and more intensively about potential trouble spots so that we could avoid the dangers of sudden confrontation and avoid competing militarily all over the world. It was in this spirit that we wished to discuss the international issues on our agenda—the Middle East, Africa and Cyprus.

Brezhnev interrupted to ask if it was intended to take up the question of the Middle East Geneva Conference.

Minister Gromyko interrupted to point out that there had been some discussion of the possibility of his taking up Middle East questions at a meeting with Secretary Vance in Geneva during the month of May.

The Secretary said that he wanted to make some brief comments on our economic relations.

At this point *Brezhnev* asked if the Secretary was referring to the MFN issue.

The Secretary replied that the Carter Administration was taking up that issue with Congress and working in that direction, but that this would require some time. In this connection resolution of the MFN

issue would be facilitated by the arms control agreement we might achieve here.

Brezhnev remarked that he had now heard about that issue from three U.S. Presidents, and yet nothing has been accomplished.

The Secretary repeated that we were working with Congress in that direction, but some time would be required to achieve its resolution.

Turning to our economic relations, the Secretary expressed the hope that the Joint Commercial Commission could become more active. Secretary Blumenthal was ready to discuss dates with Soviet representatives for reconvening the Commission soon in Washington. The Secretary said we were pleased that scientific/technical and cultural/educational cooperation was going forward in many fields. These provided both immediate benefits to both sides and a favorable climate for improved relations. We were ready, if the Soviet side was, to agree in principle on the extension of two cooperative agreements which were signed in 1972 and which expire in May of this year—Space and Science/Technology.¹² The Secretary said that he had to say one word on the human rights issue which had been raised by Brezhnev. He had listened carefully to what Brezhnev had said and would point out that we had not in any way embarked on an anti-Soviet campaign. Our stand involved matters of principle, and we had no intention of taking advantage of the situation to single out the Soviet Union. The Secretary would simply suggest that we agree to disagree on our respective values, and then go on to discuss the urgent problems before us.

Brezhnev pointed out that President Carter had written a kind letter to Sakharov, praising him in every way, etc., encouraging and embracing him, without knowing what Sakharov was doing in the Soviet Union, with whom he was connected. Or, another example—he had received Bukovskiy, a man who was a crook, a thorough crook. Was this really suitable?

Gromyko interrupted to remark that if the Secretary were to run into Bukovskiy, he better put his watch in a safe place.

Secretary Vance said he did not think it would be useful to debate this issue, but recalled that there had been times in the past when people who had attacked the U.S. government had been received and honored in the Soviet Union.

Gromyko said he would point out the simple circumstance that President Carter had sent a letter to Sakharov at the same time that he had also sent a letter to General Secretary Brezhnev. This was a disturbing event.

¹² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 227.

Brezhnev went on to say that people like Sakharov were traitors to their country, were linked with espionage organizations, and at meetings in his home Sakharov had received outright criminals. There were some stories about some illegal currency operations they had been involved in. As for the United States, he would note that the U.S. Constitution did not provide for the right to work, the right to education and the right to social welfare. Up to now, there was no equality for women in the United States. He had read in the *New York Times* of January 9 of this year that U.S. economists proceeded from the premise that the United States would have full employment if it were able to reduce unemployment to the level of four percent of the labor force;¹³ in other words, according to the *New York Times*, millions of people would still be unemployed, and yet U.S. economists considered that full employment. In February of this year the United States had 7 million unemployed, among whom there were twice as many blacks as whites. 48 percent of young people in the U.S. under 24 years of age were unemployed. These were data of the U.S. Department of Labor. *Gromyko* added that this represented "discrimination within discrimination."

Brezhnev said that between the years 1960 and 1974 the FBI had carried on surveillance on 500,000 citizens accused of subversive activities, although their actions did not go beyond lawful activities. According to a Congressional report on intelligence activities,¹⁴ the CIA had unlawfully opened 250,000 letters from abroad between the years of 1953 and 1973. *Brezhnev* further cited an open letter by James Baldwin, addressed to President Carter, in which he wrote "too many of us are in prison, too many of us go hungry, for too many of us the doors are closed."¹⁵ That letter had been published in the *New York Times* and Baldwin spoke of the stepsons of America who were being persecuted because they refused to acquiesce in racial discrimination. Baldwin had also mentioned the Wilmington Ten—nine blacks and one woman—who had received sentences totalling 282 years in prison, only because they had protested against discrimination in the schools. Baldwin wrote about a trial in Charleston, North Carolina, where three blacks faced the same prospect as the Wilmington Ten. They were accused of arson as a pretext for imprisoning them for protesting. In conclusion, Baldwin had called on the President to correct this situation. So far he had received no response to his open letter to President Carter.

¹³ Article not found.

¹⁴ See *Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities of the United States Senate*, vol. 4. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976)

¹⁵ See James Baldwin, "An Open Letter to Mr. Carter," *The New York Times*, January 23, 1977, p. 153.

Secretary Vance said he wanted to respond briefly. He pointed out to Brezhnev that we lived in different countries with different systems. We were not insisting that we were free from all criticism. He would suggest that neither of our countries was immune from criticism. However, we also have common interests and common objectives. Our key objective was to lessen the risk of nuclear confrontation and nuclear war. Perhaps in working toward this goal we would gain greater appreciation of one another.

At this point *Brezhnev* suggested that the meeting recess because the U.S. delegates had been invited to a lunch given by Minister Gromyko. He said he was very pleased that he and Secretary Vance had had such a frank and open exchange of views. Each of them felt free to criticize the other, had done so, and, taking into account today's talk, we now had to take up SALT and other matters. Brezhnev ended the conversation on a friendly and cheerful note.¹⁶

¹⁶ In Secto 3019 from Moscow, March 28, Vance summarized his meeting for Carter and Christopher, who was serving as acting Secretary in Vance's absence. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box 17, 3/25–4/2/77 Vance Trip to Moscow: 3/28–31/1977)

18. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 28, 1977, 5:30–7:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

US PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Paul Warnke
Mr. William Hyland
Mr. Leslie H. Gelb
Mr. William D. Krimer, (Interpreter)

USSR PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. Smirnov
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Mr. V.G. Komplektov
Mr. O.M. Sokolov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, (Interpreter)

SALT

Foreign Minister Gromyko opened the meeting by saying that there were many questions to discuss, but he would suggest now to take up SALT. Secretary Vance agreed.

Gromyko wanted to say a few words by way of introduction. If we wanted to waste no time in taking the bull by the horns, we should continue to discuss the subject in further development of the discussions with General Secretary Brezhnev. For objective reasons, the question of curbing and putting an end to the arms race and thereby reducing the risk of outbreak of nuclear war is the pivotal direction of Soviet-American relations. While this might be repetition, Gromyko thought it should be repeated each day in each city, each village, and at every crossroads. Within the framework of this direction, a central place was held, and understandably so, by the problem of limiting strategic arms. This had been quite correctly stressed at the meeting this morning, and again during his and the Secretary's conversation at lunch. There was

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place in the Kremlin. In Secto 3022 from Moscow, March 28, Vance summarized his meeting for Carter and Christopher. The telegram is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box 17, 3/25–4/2/77 Vance Trip to Moscow: 3/28–31/1977.

evidently no need to speak at length of the great importance of this problem, and of the fact that both sides, that is the Soviet Union and the United States, must be interested in a solution to this problem in an equal degree. There cannot be a situation where one side would be interested more than the other. In the Soviet view this was the crucial factor that made it possible and necessary to resolve the problem of limiting strategic arms.

It was not fortuitous that the two sides had recognized and adopted the principal of equality and equal security (Gromyko repeated and stressed “equality and *equal* security”). Furthermore, it would be inadmissible for either side to seek unilateral advantages in this area. It was no accident that this formulation had become part and parcel of the very fabric of the Soviet-American SALT negotiations at all levels, the highest as well as the lowest. All involved in SALT literally lived with this formula. Indeed, any other approach would be nothing but an illusion and fantasy, and a waste of time. Gromyko could use even stronger words, but he was sure that neither side was interested in a different approach. He wanted to emphasize these facts at the very outset of the discussions aimed at accomplishing the task at hand, i.e., limiting strategic arms.

Of course, the very fact that our two countries had engaged in negotiations on a new agreement limiting strategic offensive arms was in itself a significant and important achievement. It might have been conceivable that the two sides, while desiring agreement, had not engaged in appropriate discussions. However, one could hardly conceive of anything like that, because the alternative would have been simply to use our respective mass media to scold each other. That would indeed have been a very gloomy prospect. The fact that we were now engaged in trying to work out a new agreement proved that the first SALT agreements were viable and had proved their practical value. If this were otherwise, both sides would have drawn quite different conclusions.

Gromyko thought the Secretary would recall that in 1974 the Soviet Union and the United States had reached an understanding regarding conclusion of a new long-term agreement limiting strategic offensive arms, and had practically agreed upon the parameters of such a new agreement. The Soviet side believed that what had been agreed upon reflected a mutually acceptable balance of the interests of the two sides, and was fully in accord with the objective of curbing the strategic arms race. It would be hard to find a more precise formulation than the words “mutually acceptable balance of the interests of the two sides.”

Gromyko thought Secretary Vance would agree that an enormous volume of energy, resources and labor had been expended to achieve what had been achieved. The Vladivostok understanding, as well as

the subsequent working out of its specific provisions had required enormous efforts in Moscow, Washington, and then Geneva. He wondered how many people had been involved in these efforts, and how many times the highest leadership of our respective countries had been involved in hammering out agreement.

Gromyko said it would not be out of order to recall that both in Vladivostok and during subsequent negotiations the Soviet Union, in a search for mutually acceptable solutions, had taken serious and important steps to meet the US side halfway. If necessary, he could mention some of these steps now. In response the Soviet side had heard statements to the effect that these steps were indeed helpful, and Secretary General Brezhnev had been told that these were major steps toward resolving the problem. After hearing that, the Soviet side believed that things were moving toward conclusion of the new agreement. He could tell the Secretary a great deal about the conversations held between our respective representatives on this subject. He could tell a great deal about the concessions the Soviet side had made in order to meet the US position, concessions within the framework of the governing agreed principles. Much could also be said about all the things the Soviet side had heard about the obstacles in the way of reaching agreement. He would prefer to emphasize, however, that the road traveled was indeed a long one. Of course, Secretary Vance was new to these negotiations; they had been conducted by the previous Administration, by the former Secretary of State and by the former President. But he would ask the Secretary to look at the situation from the viewpoint of the Soviet side. How should it be assessed? Should everything that had been achieved be thrown away? Now the Soviet leadership was talking with Secretary Vance; should it assume that when another new Administration came into office the results of these talks would be discarded? What was needed here was a maximum degree of stability and reciprocity. At the theater last evening Gromyko had said to the Secretary that there were many keys to resolving numerous other world problems, but they were all locked in a box to which there were only two keys, and we could lay our hands on those many keys only by opening the box with these two keys, keys of keys as it were. He would point out that the Soviet leadership had remained the same, it had not changed; neither had the Leninist foreign policy of the USSR changed in the meanwhile. In fact, however, he thought that people on the US side had not really changed either. He did not believe those who would assert that the best thing the United States could hope for was a nuclear war. That was completely out of the question. But, he would also have to note that the recent period had been marked by no headway at all, by something one might call a freeze. General Secretary Brezhnev had spoken about that quite unambiguously. The Soviet leadership was

convinced that in the absence of such a freeze the new agreement could have been achieved at least a year ago; he repeated “at least a year ago.”

Gromyko pointed out that, surely, no one could comment on Soviet foreign policy better than the Soviet leadership itself. There was surely no need to rely on newspapers, magazines or the radio for information about that policy. The Soviet leadership had stated repeatedly, and Gromyko wanted to state this once again right now, and most emphatically emphasize, that the Soviet Union wanted to conclude a new agreement. Given a mutual desire to do so, this could be done, especially since the questions remaining unresolved so far had already been very carefully discussed, and in some cases formulated most specifically. Secretary Vance would know the formulations Gromyko was referring to. There were serious people here who had taken part in the work and were well acquainted with the specific formulations and various legal clauses, as well as the additional fundamental understandings, which had been reached as a result of discussions at the highest level, and between the delegations in Geneva. Successful conclusion of this work and conclusion of the new agreement would not only constitute an important step forward in itself, but would also open up possibilities for working out more far-reaching measures to limit strategic arms. After all, the understanding reached in Vladivostok would clearly show anyone who took a look at it that it contained some bridges leading to negotiations on follow-on agreements: these bridges were not bad at all.

At this time Gromyko felt he had to tell Secretary Vance that what was needed now was for the sides to try and implement the understandings already reached, and not at all to narrow the framework of the new agreement being worked out, or to add new issues which would only cause additional complications. He thought the Secretary might already have drawn that conclusion from what had been said this morning.

How should the task of limiting strategic offensive arms be accomplished? Gromyko thought it was clear that US authorities were well aware of what work still had to be accomplished, and of the fact that time was short.

In recent letters to President Carter² the Soviet leadership had once again set forth in detail its position on the questions remaining unresolved so far. The Soviet side therefore proceeded from the premise that the present discussions would proceed in a specific manner, and that efforts should be focused above all on finding mutually acceptable solutions to these unresolved issues.

² See Documents 12 and 14.

This was the preliminary statement Gromyko had wanted to present with regard to these issues; he would now propose to give the floor to Secretary Vance and would be pleased to hear US considerations.

Secretary Vance thanked Gromyko for his remarks and said that at the outset he would like to indicate his agreement with what Gromyko had described as central to the relations between our two countries. He would also agree that he shared Gromyko's view about both countries being equally interested in achieving a new strategic arms limitation agreement. Further, he would also state that we believed the principle of equality and equal security to be fundamental to our task, and that it had to form the basis for our strategic arms limitation talks.

The Secretary wanted to take a minute or two to review the history of our efforts on strategic arms limitation, and then he would go on to the specific question of the Vladivostok understanding. When we began the process of negotiating strategic arms limitation a number of years ago, we had several purposes in mind: to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, to enhance strategic stability, and to reduce the level of arms on each side so as to build up confidence between our states. We had made progress toward achievement of this goal. We had concluded the ABM Treaty, the Interim Agreement, and had also reached an understanding at Vladivostok in 1974. It was quite true that the principle of parity had been established in that understanding. Since that time a great deal of useful work had been accomplished in Geneva. At the same time, we had to recognize that over the past two and a half years two important problems had emerged, which had not yet been resolved. These were the Backfire and the Cruise Missile issues. Neither of these had been resolved in the Vladivostok understanding, nor had they been resolved since that time. It was precisely for this reason that US President Carter had proposed, as a method of most rapidly resolving the problem before us for the immediate future, that these two issues be set aside, and that agreement be reached on the basis of the aggregate numbers agreed upon in Vladivostok, at the same time resolving other issues, such as MIRV verification, data base and concealment. Such an agreement would be wholly consistent with the Vladivostok understanding. The Secretary had read the history of the negotiations and had also consulted with the former Secretary of State. On the other hand, President Carter felt that there was another alternative, a bold one to be sure, that would achieve significant further progress along the lines of the real substance of arms control. This alternative the Secretary would call a comprehensive approach. It had several significant advantages which he would like to sketch out for Gromyko, after which he would hand him the proposal briefly summarized on one piece of paper. First, it would provide for significant arms

reduction for both sides. Second, it would be a genuine step in setting limits on the quantitative and qualitative aspects of armaments. Third, it would represent a major political achievement and would provide for new formulations improving Soviet/American relations. In the eyes of the whole world it would be regarded as an exercise in political wisdom by both sides. Now the Secretary proposed to run through the details of this Comprehensive proposal (see Attachment I).³ Having done so, Secretary Vance handed Gromyko the comprehensive proposal in both languages and said he would be prepared to answer any questions and to discuss its provisions in any way.

Gromyko said that as far as this new proposal was concerned, having just now received it from the US side, he would have to defer his response to one of our subsequent meetings during these talks. Since it had been presented as an official proposal of the US, he would provide an official response during the Secretary's stay in Moscow.

On a separate piece of paper *the Secretary* also presented the details of President's Carter alternative idea of setting aside the unresolved issues and concluding the new agreement on the basis of the Vladivostok understanding (see Attachment II).⁴

Gromyko said that he would like to address the Cruise Missile issue in specifics. We had a document which had been signed by both sides and registered agreement in the form of an Aide-Memoire dated December 10, 1974.⁵ No indulgences of any kind had been provided there for cruise missiles. When discussing the issues at Vladivostok, no distinction had been made between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Indeed, it would make no difference to people whether they died as a result of a cruise missile attack or a ballistic missile attack. After the Vladivostok meeting some people had tried to draw a distinction between these types of missiles. The Soviet side had pointed out that it would be inconsistent to pose the question in that fashion. On his side there was no need to study the history of the negotiations leading to the Vladivostok understanding, because he and others were living participants in those negotiations. Thus, both he and Brezhnev were quite certain about how things were discussed and accomplished there. Neither Brezhnev nor Gromyko, nor other Soviet participants, needed to be reminded by reading briefs, about how things were resolved in Vladivostok. Anyone who tried to adjust this matter retroactively would find that such attempts would hardly strengthen his position. Furthermore,

³ Attached but not printed is an undated document entitled "Comprehensive Proposal." See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 157.

⁴ Attached but not printed is an undated document entitled "Deferral Proposal." See *ibid.*

⁵ See footnote 4, Document 1.

he would point out that in a message to President Carter the Soviet leadership had set out its positions quite concretely and very carefully on the whole complex of questions related to cruise missiles. Gromyko said he would have to repeat that the Soviet Union could not agree to exclusion of these missiles from the Agreement which was now in process of being worked out; in other words, that cruise missiles should remain outside of limitations. In effect, what would be the practical value of any agreement if cruise missiles remain outside restraints? There could only be one answer to this question: the new agreement would continue to exist by itself, while the race in strategic arms would continue in a new channel. Such an agreement would in effect sanctify the further development of the arms race and would in no way be conducive to finding a solution to the task at hand, i.e., the task of limiting strategic arms. Finally, in purely practical terms there were no grounds whatsoever to believe that, if we deferred the cruise missile issue for the time being, it would lend itself to easier solution at some time in the future.

Quite the contrary would be the case. Experience showed, and as a practical politician, Secretary Vance would realize this, that when a new type of weapon was developed, and particularly deployed, it was by no means easier to limit that type. It was more difficult, and sometimes quite impossible. If we looked back a few years, we could see that at that time it would certainly have been easier to ban both conventional and nuclear arms, it would have been easier to resolve the matter then, rather than now, when the whole problem had become much bulkier. He would even say that it was now ten times or even a hundred times more difficult to ban nuclear weapons than would have been the case thirty years ago. The same thing would happen with cruise missiles. Taking into account what has been said, and earlier detailed discussions between the two sides, in the course of which outlines for a possible solution to this problem could be discerned, the Soviet position on cruise missiles was as follows:

Air-to-surface-cruise missiles—heavy bombers when equipped with air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range between 600 and 2500 kilometers should be regarded as strategic delivery vehicles equipped with MIRVs and should accordingly be counted within the 1320 ceiling established for such vehicles. That ceiling had been agreed upon by both sides in Vladivostok. In this connection, a B-52 carrying such cruise missiles would be counted as one missile equipped with MIRVs, while a B-1 would equal three missiles equipped with MIRVs. In an aside Gromyko commented that he was talking about the US side's beloved B-1.

The Secretary asked why the B-1 would count as three missiles equipped with MIRV's.

Gromyko explained that this was due to the qualitative difference between the B-1 and the B-52. This fact had been widely written about in the US press, and was no big secret. At the same time, the new agreement should provide a full ban on air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 km, and there should be a ban on air-to-surface cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km carried by aircraft other than heavy bombers.

Gromyko went on to say that the agreement should also ban submarine-launched cruise missiles and cruise missiles on surface ships, as well as land-based cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km. In the Soviet view the solution of the cruise missile problem on this basis would promote more effective limitations of strategic offensive arms and would create good prerequisites for their subsequent reduction.

Gromyko wanted especially to emphasize once again the readiness of the Soviet side, expressed in the course of previous negotiations, to count among the numbers of missiles equipped with MIRV's, i.e., within the 1320 aggregate, all intercontinental ballistic missiles of those types which had been tested with MIRVs even just once. (*Gromyko* emphasized "even just once"). He added, however, that this was conditional upon satisfactory resolution of the cruise missile and Backfire issues, as well as the other major items in this context. This was precisely what *Gromyko* had told Kissinger in Geneva,⁶ and Kissinger had appeared to have been interested. In fact, he had said that this presented a major concession on the part of the Soviet Union, one that would be duly appreciated. Unfortunately, the Soviets had yet to see the day when this concession was taken into account. *Gromyko* would say something to the Secretary that he had also said to Kissinger: it was not an easy matter for the Soviet side to go along with such a definition of MIRVed ICBMs, because there was a great difference between testing a missile once or 100 times. Still the Soviet leadership had decided to go along with this and to regard each missile which had been tested just once with MIRVs as falling within the 1320 aggregate.

Gromyko turned to the Backfire bomber issue. If one were to formulate politically what the US had proposed, he would say that the US wanted to give the Soviets something that did not belong to the US in the first place. In elaborating the deferral proposal the Secretary had said that the US was prepared not to discuss the Backfire at all provided, etc.

Secretary Vance remarked that the Backfire constituted a serious problem.

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 159.

Gromyko said that Soviet side viewed this quite differently. He had been present in Helsinki when General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford had a conversation. He thought Kissinger had been there too. Brezhnev had asked President Ford who it was in the United States that kept giving the President deliberately falsified characteristics regarding the Backfire. Moreover, when Kissinger had been in Moscow in January 1976, Brezhnev had given him some data regarding this bomber, that is official data characterizing various parameters, particularly range.⁷ Brezhnev had at that time said that he was presenting the data on an official basis, and that Kissinger could so refer to them in this record. *Gromyko* could clearly state that the Soviet Union had no intention of using the Backfire as a strategic bomber. It certainly must have taken a great deal of inventiveness to come up with the reaction that the US had come up with. The Soviet side was now told that the Backfire had in-air refueling capabilities and, therefore, could reach the territory of the United States, although it might have to refuel more than once. Well, in that case all American Phantoms and other planes could also be regarded as strategic weapons. This single counter-argument alone makes present US arguments completely untenable. And yet, the US position has remained unchanged. Was the new Administration trying to uphold the honor of those who had misinformed it in the first place? If someone had given the US Government information to the effect that the Backfire bomber was a strategic bomber, he was completely mistaken. The Soviet Union certainly denied that the Backfire bomber was a strategic weapon. It had no strategic capabilities, nor did the Soviet Union intend to give it strategic capabilities. On more than one occasion the US side had been informed that the Backfire was a medium range bomber. This fact was also well-known to the US side. The fact that this question had been raised again was, in the Soviet view, simply the result of the unwillingness of the United States to move forward in the strategic arms negotiations toward a successful outcome. Repetition of incorrect facts even 100 or 1000 times would not change the situation one iota. Therefore, it was now necessary to do away with this issue once and for all, and to remove it from the agenda. (*Gromyko* emphasized “once and for all”).

Gromyko now turned to the question of mobile missiles, in part because Secretary Vance had raised it, and in part quite independently. In July 1975 the Soviet side had proposed that the sides refrain from the deployment of mobile missiles for the term of the new agreement. This was intended to apply to mobile land-based ICBM launchers as well as to ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of more than 600 km on all aerial systems except heavy bombers, and on all sea-based systems ex-

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 117.

cept ballistic missiles on submarines. The Soviet Union was prepared to consider the US proposal on mobile ICBM's, but Gromyko would say in advance that he would categorically object to discussing this ban in the context of the missile complex which the US side called SS-20. The SS-20 complex was not a strategic one. It had been developed and was being deployed to carry out missions of medium range and to replace other systems. A problem could arise in the view of the US side as to the difference between the SS-16 ICBM launchers and the SS-20 MRBM launchers. Gromyko would tell the Secretary at once that SS-16's were not being deployed, and that the Soviet Union did not intend to deploy them provided, of course, that a new strategic arms limitation agreement was achieved. Gromyko wanted to put the Secretary's mind at ease; the question of the difference between SS-16's and SS-20's should not arise at all.

Gromyko said that he now wanted to turn to another issue which was of exceptional importance. This was the requirement that the new agreement include provisions on non-transfer of strategic arms to third countries and non-circumvention of the agreement through third countries or in any other manner. Secretary Vance would certainly be well aware that the Soviet side attached a great importance to inclusion in the agreement of an obligation not to take any actions which would result in the provisions of the agreement being weakened or circumvented or reduced to zero through third states or in any other manner, and also an obligation not to transfer strategic offensive arms to third states.

Furthermore, the Soviet Union proceeded from the premise that for the duration of the new agreement the US side would not only not build up forward-based systems which, due to their geographic location were capable of reaching the territory of the Soviet Union, but would also take steps to reduce them. As far as Gromyko knew, and he would wish that he was mistaken, every time that this issue had been raised, US representatives would make no comment and would provide no indication of the possibility of solving the question in this way. He had to tell the Secretary quite frankly that the question did arise in the minds of the Soviet leadership, and that perhaps it should be reviewed in terms of including in the new SALT II agreement an obligation to that effect, that would be imposed on the US side. The Soviet leadership was now asking itself whether in proposing that the United States merely make a statement to the effect of not building up forward-based systems the Soviet Union had not asked too low a price.

Gromyko now wanted to say a few words on the subject of reduction of strategic offensive arms. Secretary Vance had mentioned it in his presentation. However, even if he had not mentioned it, the Soviet side had intended to present its position. The Soviet position on the reduc-

tion of strategic offensive arms was crystal clear. He could not say that during the talks in Vladivostok or immediately afterwards either side had suddenly seen in a crystal ball how this question could be resolved in a way that would be acceptable to both sides. The Soviet Union was in favor of beginning discussions on the reduction of strategic offensive arms quite promptly after conclusion of the SALT II agreement; (he repeated “after conclusion of SALT II”). This position had been communicated to President Carter, to the Delegation in Geneva, and at meetings here in Moscow. The Soviet side had said that it would be possible to reduce the aggregate number of strategic weapon delivery vehicles on each side after entry into force of the SALT II Agreement and on condition that the SALT II Agreement resolved the cruise missile issue. The Soviet side had not completely precluded the possibility of discussing and realistically considering such reductions even before expiration of the Interim Agreement. Of course, this referred to reasonable and acceptable reductions, and not to such as might be announced for the sake of public opinion or a section of public opinion. It was quite obvious, however, that to reduce, and especially to establish sublimits for, numbers of landbased strategic ballistic missiles and sea-based strategic ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, without taking into account strategic stability, would result in infringement of the principle of equality and equal security. Factors influencing stability included the difference in the geographical situation of the two sides. Gromyko doubted that anyone could deny this fact. The existence of US forward-based nuclear systems and of US aircraft carriers based near Soviet territory, the existence of nuclear arms in the hands of US allies, were other such factors. Gromyko would ask the Secretary not to assume that the Soviet side could ignore or overlook them. They were there and they caused concern. Gromyko said that both he and the Secretary were alive today, but they must know that in time other people would take their places. We had to provide for the future today. Therefore, the time would inevitably come when these questions would have to be taken up, especially in the light of the new proposals the US side had tabled today.

Secretary Vance said he had a few comments to offer. First on cruise missiles: He would note that cruise missiles were not included in the Vladivostok accord. He had read the record of the negotiations there and had also spoken to some people who had been present, including the former Secretary of State. As a result, he concluded that the question of cruise missiles was not included in the Vladivostok understanding; it had dealt with air-launched ballistic missiles only, which had also been referred to in the Communique. He also concluded that it was only after Vladivostok that the cruise missile issue had been raised. Nonetheless, we had taken care of Soviet concerns by including a ban on cruise missiles with a range of more than 2500 km in our compre-

hensive proposal. In addition, a part of the overall package we had proposed, and it was a package, took into account Soviet views on the Backfire bomber. The Backfire bomber represented a serious problem for the United States. Its range and bomb load were substantially greater than those of medium bombers. The Secretary wanted to assure Gromyko that the Backfire represented a most serious problem in the US. Therefore, what we had suggested in the package proposal represented a substantial move on our part. As for mobile missiles, there remained the question of how we could confirm the fact that SS-20 missiles could not be converted to intercontinental range by adding a third stage. On the question of non-circumvention and non-transfer to third countries, the Secretary understood that this was one of the remaining items to be resolved at SALT II negotiations. Other such items were the problems of MIRV verification and data base. Concerning our proposal to reduce the numbers of aggregates for both sides, the Secretary did not think that this was an infringement of the principle of equality and equal security. He intended to speak further on this subject at tomorrow's meeting. He noted that Gromyko had raised the question of forward-based nuclear systems. He would point out that such systems were not an appropriate subject for negotiation within the SALT framework, any more than were Soviet IRMB's or MRBM's. These were all European weapons which had not been considered at SALT to date.

Gromyko said that if he were to comment on all of the comments the Secretary had made, he would probably be repeating himself in large measure. He did not want to lose time needlessly. There was no need for him to read the record in order to answer the question whether or not cruise missiles were singled out as an exception to the limitations provided for at Vladivostok⁸ for the simple reason that he had been present there and knew what had gone on. The discussions there were held in a very narrow composition with only President Ford and Secretary Kissinger on the US side, and Brezhnev and Gromyko plus Mr. Sukhodrev, the interpreter, on the Soviet side. Therefore, he would reaffirm the statement he had made a little while ago, i.e., that there was no basis for singling out cruise missiles in a separate category. In fact, we had two documents which had come out of that meeting, the two Aide-Memoires dated December 10, 1974, which had been exchanged between the US and the USSR and indicated that cruise missiles had not been singled out for an exception. Gromyko suggested that the meeting now be recessed until the following morning.

Secretary Vance agreed, but had one comment: The December 10, 1974 Aides-Memoire referred to air-to-surface missiles and not to

⁸ For the memoranda of conversation from the Vladivostok meetings, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Documents 90–93.

cruise missiles.⁹ Such was his understanding on the basis of his conversation with the former Secretary of State.

Gromyko pointed out that former Secretary of State was not the only person who had been present at Vladivostok; others had been there too.

⁹ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 97.

19. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 29, 1977, 11 a.m.–1:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

MBFR; Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

US PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Paul Warnke
Mr. William Hyland
LTG Edward Rowny
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers L.V. Smirnov
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Mr. V.G. Komplektov
Mr. O.M. Sokolov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Gromyko opened the meeting by recalling that yesterday the two sides had set forth their positions on the preparation of a

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on April 4; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place at the Kremlin. In Secto 3030 from Moscow, March 29, Vance summarized his meeting for Carter, Brzezinski, and Christopher. The telegram is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box 17, 3/25–4/2/77 Vance Trip to Moscow: 3/28–31/1977.

new SALT Agreement.² Today, if this suited Secretary Vance, and if the Secretary had no additional considerations to add to what he had said yesterday, Gromyko would suggest that they take up other political questions which in their common opinion required discussion. These were the Vienna negotiations and the Middle East. He would suggest to take up the Vienna negotiations first, because the exchange of views would undoubtedly be shorter than on the Middle East problem. In suggesting that the Middle East problem be discussed here in Moscow, he did not intend to preclude the special meeting that he and the Secretary had agreed upon, to be held in Geneva for the specific purpose of discussing the Middle East. In this connection, they could perhaps take up other disarmament issues and questions of mutual interest.

The Secretary said that would be fine with us; he would be happy to discuss these two items and thought it was appropriate to take up the Vienna talks first. He suggested that Gromyko start off.

MBFR Vienna Negotiations

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union continued to believe that it would be useful to reach agreement on an equal reduction by both sides of their armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. A successful solution to this problem would constitute a major contribution to achievement of military detente on the European continent, and would be an important component of the efforts aimed at strengthening peace and security.

Gromyko wished to point out directly and clearly that throughout the more than three-year history of the Vienna negotiations³ the East had done a great deal and had gone a long way to bring them to a positive result. The principal factor in the Soviet approach, and this pervaded all the specific proposals tabled in Vienna by the socialist countries, was that reductions should not harm the security of either party. Any agreement reached must not give either side any unilateral advantage. In other words, what was to be accomplished was a reduction of the levels of military confrontation in Central Europe, but without disturbing the correlation of forces in that area. The level would be reduced, but the existing correlation of forces would remain the same; that was the only solution to this question. Naturally, it would please either side in the negotiations if the other were to give up some of its forces, but this would not be a realistic approach. Gromyko did not really believe that those responsible for preparation of these negotia-

² See Document 18.

³ See Department of State *Bulletin*, November 26, 1973, pp. 657–661, and *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, European Security, Documents 346, 348, 351, 357, 365 and 367.

tions had harbored any illusions about one-sided concessions. At least, there were no such illusions on the Soviet side. Their Western partners at the negotiations, however, were obstinately trying to get the Soviet Union and its allies to accept so-called “asymmetric” reductions, in other words expected the Eastern powers to reduce their forces to a far greater extent than the other side, and in effect weaken their defensive posture vis-a-vis NATO. This will not succeed; it cannot serve as a basis for agreement.

Gromyko thought the Secretary and his colleagues would be well acquainted with the latest proposal, in fact all the proposals the Eastern powers had tabled at the conference; thus there was no need to repeat them. Gromyko said that he would characterize the situation of the negotiations in Vienna as follows: the Western powers said to the Eastern powers, “We don’t like the fact that you have so many tanks; why don’t you reduce their numbers unilaterally, and then we will talk.” Well, that was some position! Did the other side really believe that the Eastern powers did not have the necessary intellectual resources to make similar proposals about U.S. forces in Central Europe? They could say: “We don’t like the fact that the United States has forces in Europe, reduce them unilaterally, and then we will talk.” No such proposal had ever been tabled by the Eastern powers, however. The Soviet Union and its allies were ready to continue the negotiations in a search for a solution to this problem, but only on a basis of equality in a search for solutions which would take into account the security interests of all the parties concerned. Gromyko felt that, given exactly such an approach by the Soviet Union and the United States, because of their weight and the role they played in the world, the Vienna negotiations could be moved out of their present stagnation, and real progress could be achieved. Gromyko pointed out that he had already said to the previous Administration and perhaps even to representatives of the new Administration (he did not recall) that he did not believe that this problem could be resolved at one fell swoop, that it was not an easy one, that it would require time and patience. The Soviet side had sufficient patience and was prepared to continue the discussions. Roughly the same thing was said by US representatives, and that was good. Without both sides manifesting the necessary degree of patience it would be difficult to resolve issues, particularly complex issues, such as the ones discussed in Vienna. But one should not forget the time factor. Other things being equal, the sooner this problem was resolved the better. He would ask the Secretary to take a fresh look at this problem. In particular, he would like to draw his attention to the last proposal the East submitted in Vienna. He and his colleagues had heard some preliminary reactions to that proposal, but had not yet received an official response. He would ask the Secretary to take a look at it and see what it was in the latest Soviet proposal that did not suit the

United States. He was at a loss to understand that. Could this proposal for a symbolic initial reduction of Soviet and US forces really undermine the security of the United States, or that of the Soviet Union? Was this really such a terrible thing? He would also ask whether the Secretary would not agree that actual achievement of progress on the basis of that last Soviet proposal for a token, symbolic, reduction of US and Soviet forces would create favorable conditions for the solution of other questions that needed to be resolved? It would be hard to say to just what extent such progress would facilitate resolution of other questions, but it would undoubtedly work in the direction of creating a climate of detente. This concluded what he wanted to say about the Vienna negotiations.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for his remarks and said that in response he would first say that in our view the present situation did call for serious steps in order to move forward the Vienna negotiations which were unfortunately in a state of stagnation. In order to make progress, in our judgment two key principles would have to be recognized by both sides. The first accurately reflected the real objective of both sides in these negotiations, and that was to achieve parity, equal military manpower in this area. Gromyko had talked of equal reductions. We insist that there be equal results—overall parity—just as in the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks. What we sought as an ultimate goal in both negotiations was rough parity. The proposal Gromyko had referred to, providing for equal reductions, would contractualize inequality. Our purpose was to seek an even balance on the basis of agreed data. That in our judgment was a proper basis for seeking agreement in this field. The other key principle was collectivity of manpower limitations. This was an essential condition for any agreement in the Vienna negotiations. We would agree that subceilings were justified for US and Soviet forces, only because the territories of our countries were outside the area covered by the negotiations, and because we were the two most important powers involved in them. On the other hand, to establish subceilings for the forces of the other countries involved would seriously disrupt collective defense arrangements. If the other side was ready to negotiate on the basis of such collectivity, we would regard it as an important step forward. As for the matter of symbolic cuts, we believed this would be a mistake, because it would mislead not only peoples in our two countries, but all peoples. The Secretary would add, however, that we would agree to US and Soviet cuts, but we would need better data for analysis and for arriving at conclusions.

Gromyko asked if the Secretary believed that the data already submitted were not sufficient?

The Secretary replied that they were not sufficient. We would discuss with our allies whether additional amplification of the data we

had provided was required. We now believed that there was a large disparity between Eastern and Western forces, but we would need better data to arrive at correct conclusions. In sum, if we could agree on the two principles the Secretary had described, and could have reliable data, we could promptly achieve the positive results that both our countries wanted. He would point out that the data presented so far showed 150,000 fewer troops on the side of the Eastern powers than our estimates indicated. We needed a breakdown of the data in order to find out where differences existed and how they could be reconciled.

Gromyko thought that if some additional data were indeed required this could be done, but it would have to be done on a bilateral basis. On their side, too, they might require additional data. He would have to further reflect on this matter.

The Secretary said that if the Soviet side needed additional data, they should let us know, and we would take it up with our allies.

Gromyko said the situation was such that since the West had raised this matter of data, obviously the Soviet Union and its allies would be equally entitled to additional data.

Smirnov added that one would have to give some further thought to this direction. *Gromyko* acknowledged this, but said that it would be wrong if the question of data were to turn into an obstacle to resolving this major issue in substance.

The Secretary once again stressed that if agreement could be reached on the two principles he had mentioned, there was reason to believe that progress could be made in Vienna. He added that we were prepared to consider requests for additional data, and believed the Soviet side should approach the question in this manner. He hoped that *Gromyko* could reflect on the matter of agreeing on the two principles.

Gromyko said that we should not permit really insignificant discrepancies in the data each side had stand in the way of progress in resolving what was indeed a most important political issue. He would repeat that he was in favor of negotiating further. The Soviet Union and its allies would never be the first to break off these negotiations.

The Secretary said that was good.

Gromyko said that there were some problems that required not just a few years, but in some cases even decades to be resolved. This did not mean he was in favor of dragging the Vienna talks out for decades. It sometimes happened that a sudden breakthrough occurs which moves the negotiations forward. A good example of that could be seen in Soviet relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. For many years the Soviet Union and the FRG did not even have diplomatic relations. Then suddenly diplomatic relations were established and even a treaty

signed.⁴ Both sides had gained from this, as had the cause of peace. He hoped that the Secretary, too, would stock up on patience.

The Secretary said he would, and would continue to hope for a breakthrough.

Middle East

Gromyko said that there were a number of disarmament matters he thought it would be useful to discuss, but now he would take up the Middle East because this problem was most acute. The situation in the Middle East had been the subject of discussions between the two countries for many years now, including some at the highest level. It was discussed when President Johnson was in office, later on with President Nixon and then with President Ford. It was also discussed with the Carter Administration, although not too deeply. (*Gromyko* regarded this as the first small step taken.) However, we still had no solution to the Middle East problem. If the Secretary believes that peace in the East could be bought for 1 million or 1 billion dollars, he would be sure that the Secretary was deeply mistaken.

The Secretary said we did not believe that peace could be bought.

Gromyko said that was good. What the Secretary had just said was encouraging. If this was indeed so, we must jointly look for a political solution. He did not know whether the Secretary was aware of the fact that at one point the Soviet Union had agreed with the United States that both countries would coordinate their activities in the Middle East. But, what had happened then? Nothing serious had happened. There was no coordination, not even a more or less regular exchange of information. This understanding had been suspended in mid-air and demonstratively not carried out. Unfortunately, this situation prevailed to the present day and, as he had told the Secretary before and during today's lunch, the Soviet Union regarded the present situation in the Middle East as fraught with much explosive potential. It was true that for the moment the cannons were silent, but this did not prove anything. Both our countries had witnessed a variety of surprises in that region. In 1973, toward the end of that year, there was a moment when through the joint efforts of our two countries it had seemed that a beginning could be made in the process of settling the conflict between the Arab countries and Israel. There was an unofficial understanding to continue acting jointly in the interests of establishing a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Unfortunately, however, very soon after that the United States chose a separatist way of proceeding. It was quite evident that in so doing, the US was not guided by long-term consider-

⁴ For the text of the treaty, signed August 12, 1970, see *Documents on Germany, 1944–1985*, pp. 1103–1105.

ations, but by the prospects of gaining purely temporary advantages. The short-sightedness and erroneousness of that mode of action by the United States appeared to him to be quite obvious. Gromyko wanted to say outright that the Soviet Union had not sought and was not now seeking any special rights or advantages for itself, but, neither should anyone else. The only desire the USSR had for that area, which is situated in direct proximity to the borders of the Soviet Union, was peace. But peace could only be based on taking account of the legitimate interests and legitimate rights of all the parties concerned, above all those states which were directly involved in the conflict.

Gromyko said that three key elements were of importance for real cooperation between our countries to promote settlement of this problem. What he was saying now would perhaps also be useful to bear in mind in future discussions between him and the Secretary later this year, but he would set forth these key elements now. First, he was deeply convinced that the starting point of any settlement was agreement on the principle that was codified in a well-known resolution of the UN Security Council—the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war. In other words, this meant that the result of a settlement should be that Israel remove its forces from all the Arab territories it had occupied in 1967. In this connection, Gromyko reminded the Secretary that he had headed the Soviet delegation at the Special Session of the General Assembly, which had discussed a Soviet and an American proposal to establish a state of Israel. Our two delegations had tabled corresponding proposals almost simultaneously. The Soviet Union had firmly favored the establishment of a Jewish state in the Middle East. By the way, Israel should really be grateful to the Soviet Union for such a way of looking at the situation. After all, the 1967 borders represented a considerable increase in the size of the Israeli state when compared to the borders established by the United Nations in 1947.

But it seemed to be forgotten now that at that time not only an independent Jewish state was established in that area, but also an independent Arab state, which had simply disappeared because part of it was later seized by Israel and another part by Jordan. Thus, when he talked about a return to the 1967 borders, that would already represent a considerable expansion of Israeli territory by comparison with the 1947 borders. The fact that Tel Aviv resisted a return to the 1967 borders could not be explained as anything other than the result of having completely lost a feeling for reality. He thought the Israelis probably reasoned that since a rifle was more effective today than the rule of law, they should rely on the rifle. All this, however, produced a very unstable situation in the area.

Now Gromyko wanted to tell the Secretary something very unpleasant, but he felt he would be remiss if he failed to do so: those who

encourage Israel in territorial annexations instead of acting to bring it to its senses were only rendering a disservice to the cause of peace in the Middle East and, he would say, to Israel itself. “Defensible borders”—how many wise men did it take working day and night to come up with that euphemism? If Israel, Israeli leaders, those who determined its policy believed that they could indefinitely live under conditions of war with the Arabs, they were deeply mistaken. It would require a major miracle indeed for this to be possible. Although the Middle East was known as an area that had produced some major miracles, this one would have to be even larger than any previous miracle. Attempts to acquire ownership of Arab lands could only multiply the hatred of Arabs toward Israel. In this connection, Gromyko referred to Sadat and said that anyone who wanted to base his long-term policy on all sorts of memoirs that were published would find himself in a very complex situation. Quite recently Prime Minister Rabin had made a statement couched in aggressive terms. It had amounted to saying that even if agreement was reached, Israel would in any case retain a portion of the Arab lands it had occupied in 1967 in the form of Israeli military bases. This was the road toward unceasing enmity between Israel and the Arabs. Was that the road Israel wanted to take, or did it want peace? If it wanted peace it could get peace. If that was so, he would suggest that the Soviet Union and the United States help them achieve it, and reinforce Israel’s right to exist as a sovereign, independent state. The Soviet Union was firmly for that, and had indeed never deviated from that stand. In fact, the Israelis should have said “thank you” to the Soviet Union for such a policy but, in Israel they don’t know how to pronounce these words. The Soviet Union was deeply convinced that it would be much more promising for the United States and the Soviet Union to take a joint action to promote peace. It would be much more promising and might even be cheaper. What was missing now was our common and weighty word. Let President Carter resolutely say that there must be peace, and the Soviet Union would add its words to the same effect immediately.

Gromyko said that another element concerned the legitimate rights of the Arab people in Palestine. There would be no peace in the Middle East if the legitimate rights of Palestinians were not satisfied. What this really required was a very small piece of territory for the Palestinians. They were not asking for much. Looking at a map recently, Gromyko found that the eraser part of his pencil was larger than the territory involved. Providing that territory would bring about a great and most significant change in the situation. Among other things it would also stop promoting certain activities that were undesirable for the Soviet Union, for the United States, and for Israel, i.e., the various terrorist and extremist tendencies among Palestinians. Such undesirable phenomena would then be undercut. Actually, in terms of spe-

cifics, when Gromyko spoke of a small piece of land, he was referring to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. What the relationship of such a state would be with neighboring Arab states, particularly Jordan, was something the Palestinians and the Arab states themselves could decide. It could perhaps take the form of close-knit economic ties, perhaps even economic ties with Israel.

Now on the matter of Palestinian participation in the Geneva conference to settle this problem. What form that participation should take should be decided by the Arabs themselves. Whom else could we ask about that? President Amin, perhaps? He knew, of course, that the US had cordial relations with Amin, but the Palestinians themselves would have to decide this issue. Perhaps the Arabs would decide to go to Geneva in one single delegation including Palestinians. Why should we, the Soviet Union or the United States, object to this? The Soviet position on this matter was anything but rigid.

Finally, Gromyko wanted to repeat again that if necessary, political guarantees should be provided for the independent, sovereign existence and development of all states in the Middle East. The Soviet Union was prepared to affix its signature to a solemn document to that effect, along with the signature of the United States. Perhaps other major powers, such as France or Britain, might want to join in providing guarantees if they shared the same goal of peace and fairness. Of course, it goes without saying that the result of such a radical settlement must be a cessation (Gromyko repeated "cessation") of the state of war, as Israel itself had insisted all along. After that, let anyone try to open fire in that region. It would be sufficient for either of us to just wag a finger to put a stop to it.

There were other issues in the Middle East that required discussion. Gromyko would prefer to leave these for the future. Notable among them was the question of timing and organizing the Geneva Conference. Now Gromyko would like to hear from the Secretary whether or not the new Carter Administration was prepared to act in concert and coordination with the Soviet Union, to implement in practice the statements already made by President Carter and by the Secretary. Major international issues cannot be resolved without the active participation of the Soviet Union and the United States. Gromyko regarded that as an axiom.

The Secretary said that he welcomed the opportunity to talk about the Middle East, because he believed that this was one of the three or four most important issues facing us today. He believed that the danger to peace in this region, but also to world peace, was very great indeed because of the lack of a just and lasting settlement to the conflict there. He also believed that we, the United States and Soviet Union, as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference, had the solemn obligation to

see to it that the necessary steps were taken to bring this conflict to a final and just conclusion. That could only be accomplished by cooperation between our two countries. The Secretary would point out that he had said on many occasions that we could cooperate with the Soviet Union in discharging this responsibility. President Carter shared that view. The Carter Administration had acted accordingly since coming into office. Immediately after returning from his Middle East trip⁵ the Secretary had informed the Soviet leadership through Ambassador Dobrynin of his discussions there. We had also informed the Soviets about the discussions with Prime Minister Rabin after the latter's visit to Washington, and intended to keep the Soviet Union informed of the results of discussions with Arab leaders after their visits to the United States. The Secretary had also already indicated to Gromyko that he looked forward to meeting him in Geneva later this year in order to agree on steps to reconvene the Geneva conference. Thus, Gromyko could see that we were serious in our desire to cooperate in these areas.

The Secretary now wanted to turn to the key issues before us. First, the question of boundaries, the question Gromyko had raised in his principle number 1—the inadmissibility of territorial acquisition by war. Our position on this was well-known. We strongly supported Resolution 242⁶ of the UN General Assembly and reaffirmed it today. Nothing said by President Carter goes counter to that resolution. On defensible borders, when the President had been asked to amplify his views he had said that we had not changed our views about Resolution 242. Indeed, he had specifically talked of Israel's 1967 borders with minor changes. When President Carter had spoken about defensible borders, what he had in mind were defense arrangements primarily. It seemed to the Secretary that it would be necessary for a period of time to make certain defense arrangements in order to insure that the borders were inviolable. The exact framework of such arrangements might include such things as demilitarized zones, patrols, reconnaissance, a "black box" perhaps, possibly UN troops in demilitarized zones. This would have to be discussed at the Geneva Conference.

As for the legitimate interests of the Palestinian people, the Secretary said it was our view that the question of how these interests were to be taken care of was primarily a question for the Arabs to resolve. During his recent trip to the Middle East, he had put this question to various Arab leaders. Each held a different view. He had urged them to try and coordinate their views so that we could better understand how

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, Documents 6–8.

⁶ Reference is to U.N. Security Council Resolution 242, which calls for a lasting peace in the Middle East. For the text see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1967*, pp. 257–258.

best to proceed. He hoped that he would get further clarification on that next Monday, when President Sadat came to Washington.

Gromyko asked if the Secretary could be sure that he would obtain further clarification.

The Secretary said that we would keep the Soviet Union informed. He would mention, however, that there was a fundamental question that both of us had to consider and see if a solution could be found to it, and that was the current refusal of the Palestinians to recognize the right of Israel to exist as a nation. Such refusal was completely contrary to our views and indeed Soviet views. The Secretary expressed the hope that *Gromyko* could use his influence with the PLO to eliminate the corresponding provision from its Charter.

Gromyko asked whether in that case the United States and Israel would be ready to recognize the right of the Palestinians to an independent and separate state entity. Obviously these two matters were closely related.

The Secretary replied that, of course, he could not speak for Israel but, removal of that provision from the PLO Charter would create a different situation; at this time it was a stumbling block.

Gromyko said that he could say the same for the Palestinians, although he could not speak on their behalf. It was surely important that Israel state that it was ready to recognize the rights of the Palestinians. As to who would be the first to say "A," that should not be a difficult matter to resolve, that was precisely what diplomacy was all about.

The Secretary agreed. As for PLO participation at the Geneva conference, he agreed that in the final analysis this was in large part a question the Arabs themselves should decide. However, he had found that Arab leaders were split right down the middle on this issue. President Assad had said that unless the Arabs came to Geneva as one delegation, he would not participate. On the other hand, President Sadat had said that he would not come to Geneva if the Arabs came as a single delegation. The Secretary had urged them to make an effort to see if they could not agree on what form their participation would take in Geneva.

Gromyko said that things would be considerably easier if the Secretary could say whether the United States today held to its old position, or whether it had a new position regarding the possibility of the Palestinians participating in Geneva, regardless of whether it was in the form of a single delegation or a separate delegation.

The Secretary said that we wished to discuss this matter with the Arab leaders he was expecting in Washington. Our discussions with the Arabs would be concluded by the middle of May, by the time he and *Gromyko* would meet in Geneva.

Gromyko said that we must not permit questions of substance to flounder in matters of procedure, organization, minor secondary matters, because the fundamental issues of war and peace far outweighed the minor issues in importance.

The Secretary said that he agreed in part, but had to point out that the question of Palestinian participation was a question of both substance and procedure, because it involved what was going to be resolved in the future.

Gromyko said it did not matter what we called it, it was his only desire that we not lose substance over procedure.

20. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 29, 1977, 4:30–7:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Middle East, Arms Control

PARTICIPANTS

UNITED STATES

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Paul Warnke
Assistant Secretary
Arthur Hartman
Mr. William Hyland
Mr. Leslie Gelb
Mr. William D. Krimer,
Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers L.V. Smirnov
Deputy Foreign Minister
G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Notetaker—Name Unknown
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; approved in draft by Hyland; approved by Twadell on May 9. The meeting took place at the Kremlin. Sent to Schulman under a covering memorandum which read: “Attached is an advance copy of the March 29 afternoon meeting. This document has not been officially distributed yet because S/S is waiting for the completion of page 1. FYI—apparently the interpreter arrived late. Hyland will be providing notes for the beginning of the discussion.” None of the memoranda of this conversation found include the Middle East portion on page 1. Another copy is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box 17, 3/25/77–4/2/77, Vance Trip to Moscow: 3/28–31/77. In Secto 3033 from Moscow, March 29, Vance summarized his meeting for Carter, Brzezinski, and Christopher. The telegram is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box 17, 3/25–4/2/77 Vance Trip to Moscow: 3/28–31/1977.

MIDDLE EAST²

The Secretary agreed that an end to the state of war was most important; establishment of normal relations was no less important, however.

Gromyko said this did not contradict what he had said. He would say that they understood each other on this question.

The Secretary said he understood what *Gromyko* had said on this score, except that the Secretary would put more emphasis on the importance of normal relations.

Gromyko said that the Soviet side emphasized the importance and significance of peace, which includes normal relations. He did not want to belittle the importance of normal relations; the Soviet Union might even trade with Israel; it was his understanding that the Israelis produced good oranges and, given normal relations, the Soviet Union would buy some.

The Secretary asked why they didn't buy them.

Gromyko said that right now the Soviet Union had neither diplomatic nor commercial relations with Israel, and answered the Secretary's question if it would not be good for the Soviet Union to reestablish such relations by saying that some preliminary movement in Israeli policy would have to be made before relations could be resumed. Otherwise Soviet people would not understand. He thought the Secretary knew that he had conveyed this to Allon when he had met him in New York. If the Soviet Union were to start trading with Israel, literally thousands of questions would be asked. How could one explain normal trade while a state of war existed in the Middle East, while Israel occupied Arab territory? All these questions would have to be resolved before the Soviet Union could establish normal relations, but there had to be some substantial forward movement in Israeli policy. He hoped this would occur, but he was careful in terms of predicting the timing. He thought that in this respect Israel appeared to live according to its own calendar.

The Secretary wanted to bring up one or two items. Although they were of a procedural nature, they would have to be faced before too long. One such question was how the delegations at the Geneva Conference could be divided and organized to deal with the various issues on the agenda. This was not a simple matter, because the Arabs were divided on how to proceed. The sooner *Gromyko* and the Secretary knew how to resolve this issue, the better.

Gromyko agreed to discuss this. He said that not only the Secretary was going to see the Arab leaders; he also intended to see them, and

² A blank half page follows this heading; see footnote 1 above.

then the two of them could discuss this issue during their special meeting on the Middle East in May. There were evidently differences on this procedural question between the various Arab leaders. But it would be up to the Soviet Union and the United States to steer a true course, and not allow questions of substance to flounder in procedural matters.

The Secretary agreed that our two countries would have to exercise leadership in order not to get bogged down.

Gromyko said that the Soviets were not afraid of these matters. He was sure we would survive these procedural difficulties. He would point out that it sometimes happened in the United States that people preferred to look at very major issues through very small ones, with the result that minor issues were assigned a significance one million times more than they were worth. He believed that procedural difficulties would not be hard to overcome.

The Secretary hoped *Gromyko* was correct. He had seen too many conferences spend months and months on procedure, when they should have been discussing substance.

Gromyko said he was afraid that in that respect he had set a record at one conference, but the real reason for that only appeared to be procedural, while in fact it had been a matter of policy.

Secretary Vance recalled that it was only with *Gromyko's* good help that we had managed to settle the question of the shape of the table in Paris.

Gromyko demonstrated how he had done this, using pencils. *The Secretary* was right; such situations did arise. Translating this into serious language, if our two countries pursued a policy aimed at peace, a really bold policy, then this kind of thorn, the Middle East problem, impeding the development of our bilateral relations, simply could not exist. The situation there was not of Soviet creation, and it seemed to be disturbing not only the Soviet policy, but also US policy as well. However, *The Secretary* would be the better judge of US policy.

The Secretary thought that this concluded the Middle East discussion. He and *Gromyko* would pick it up again in the not too distant future.

Gromyko agreed, and hoped this could be done with a view to settling the issues on the basis of a general settlement. Perhaps he was anticipating events, but he thought he could say that the United States would also be interested in a general settlement. After such settlement, it should also be possible to resolve the question of arms deliveries, arms sales to the Middle East. Without a general settlement, it was not possible to do so. If another war broke out, how could our countries possibly resolve this question? That would be fantasy. But if there was

an overall settlement, the question of arms deliveries could be solved, given a desire on both sides to do so. He had explained Soviet policy in this regard. It was an important question in itself, and he would not deny its significance, providing, of course, it was viewed in a correct perspective.

The Secretary said he would like to say a lot on the broader question of arms sales.

Gromyko agreed to discuss it on the basis of President Carter's statements that the US was the number one exporter of arms to foreign countries.

The Secretary reminded him that the Soviet Union held second place.

Gromyko said this certainly was true. It meant that theirs was a backward country.

CTB

Gromyko said that, as the Secretary would know, the Soviet Union was in favor of resolving the problem of completely stopping nuclear weapon testing. The USSR had proposed that all nuclear powers, without exception, enter into discussions as soon as possible, with the participation of non-nuclear states, with a view to conclusion of a treaty on this subject, providing for a complete and universal ban on testing nuclear weapons. In connection with that proposal, the question of verification would arise, and the Soviet Union had taken it into account, although he was convinced that given today's level of technology, verification by national technical means should be sufficient. Still, the Soviet Union was prepared to go further and find mutually acceptable understandings that would preserve the framework of voluntary decisions in the context of on-site investigation of certain phenomena. This should be aimed at providing assurances for all parties to the treaty that obligations under the treaty were being complied with. Something of this kind had been suggested by the Swedes. The Soviets would suggest that our two countries act promptly, considering the fact that this issue was currently under discussion in the Disarmament Committee. To translate these considerations into the text of a mutually acceptable treaty would be a major step forward.

Gromyko wanted to suggest an idea that the Secretary might not be able to answer now. Perhaps he could reflect on it, and reply after he returned to Washington. Such a treaty could initially be signed by our two countries, and be accompanied by a simultaneous appeal to other nuclear states, and even to non-industrial countries, to accede to it. When signing the treaty, the United States and Soviet Union could declare that for a specified period of time, say one and a half to two years, they would refrain from testing nuclear weapons; in other words, they

would declare a moratorium on their own testing. If other nuclear powers did not accede to the treaty within that period of time, the Soviet Union and the United States would be released from their obligations under such a moratorium. Gromyko believed that such a step would impel certain powers to take positive action and would, in general, favorably influence the whole international situation. That would be a good thing. It was hard to imagine who could criticize the new Administration for taking such a step. In the Soviet Union, and he was quite sure in saying this, such a step would meet with understanding; people would regard it as positive. However, one could not consider peaceful nuclear explosions in one and the same category with the testing of nuclear weapons. Peaceful nuclear explosions were used in the Soviet Union to accomplish major economic tasks. Certain plans had been made involving PNEs. He would point out that, taking into account US views, the Soviet Union had agreed to limit the yield of such explosions under an agreement signed last year. At the same time, that agreement provided that nuclear explosions for solely peaceful purposes would be subject to a system of verification that would be worked out in detail, envisioning in certain cases access by the representatives of one side to the explosion site of the other. It would represent a substantial step forward, a radical solution to the problem of ending nuclear testing, curbing the arms race, and protecting people against the harmful consequences of such tests, if ratification of the Threshold and PNE agreements already signed by our two countries were completed. The Soviets did not lack readiness to do so. They were waiting to see when the new Administration in Washington would become more active in this area. Who could deny the positive significance of the agreements already on the table in signed form? He thought that each member of the US Senate and House of Representatives would approve. The US could take this important step toward strengthening peace and security, strengthening Soviet-American relations, and thus reinforce some of the positive statements made in the US. It seemed to the Soviets that the Carter Administration could do this if it wished.

The Soviet Union had tabled a draft treaty banning all nuclear weapon testing. Surely the Secretary was aware of it, and Gromyko would not repeat its provisions. It was now before the appropriate international organizations.

The Secretary said with respect to the two treaties we had already signed, that, as he had indicated yesterday, he had urged the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to take positive action to ratify these treaties. The Chairman had indicated that he would take the necessary steps to move Congress to act. In addition, the Administration will indicate its support for this ratification, so as to assist in urging that Congress take prompt action in the near future. The Secre-

tary said he would be less than frank if he did not tell Gromyko that there will be some in Congress who will ask why these treaties should be signed, in view of the fact that a comprehensive test ban treaty was being urged by the Administration. The comprehensive test ban could be strongly supported by the administration and he believed that this would be an indication of our wish to cooperate with the Soviet Union and strengthen our bilateral relations.

Gromyko suggested that the Secretary explain to those who do not understand that these agreements do not run counter or contradict the other one.

The Secretary said that we will argue that these agreements are steps on the way to a comprehensive test ban.

Gromyko said it would be good if progress were achieved. He would also point out that their own instruments (national means) here in Moscow had so far registered even weak explosions.

The Secretary was sure that our efforts to get ratification would be aided if both our countries were clearly cooperating toward achievement of a comprehensive test ban.

Gromyko suggested that we not only cooperate on the technical aspects of verifying peaceful nuclear explosions, but also make the cooperative work much more intensive than it was now.

The Secretary said he found this idea very interesting. He would point out, however, that we had grave concerns for allowing exceptions for peaceful nuclear explosions. The reason for that was that it was almost impossible to conduct peaceful explosions without weapons-related benefits. Therefore, we favored elimination of all nuclear explosions.

Gromyko asked what exceptions the Secretary had in mind. After all, there were provisions for verification. He would suggest that those who shouted the loudest in the US be sent along as observers on PNE verification assignments.

The Secretary agreed that verification was one of the matters that needed to be pursued further. However, experts in the area said that even with verification it would be possible to develop information that was contrary to a comprehensive test ban. Therefore, he would suggest that we have our respective experts get together for bilateral discussion of this subject in the near future.

Gromyko did not believe there would be any insuperable obstacles in the way of resolving this problem. One should not forget that all along in the course of discussing these matters on a bilateral basis the Soviets had proceeded from the premise that there was a significant difference between weapons testing and PNE. It was for this reason that they had signed the two treaties. He would suggest to the Secretary

that we should avoid taking any step that would turn us backward. One could find skeptics on any question. He supposed one could even find someone who would maintain that Earth was not turning around the sun, but that it was the other way around.

Smirnov said that this was probably asserted by those experts who did not want to see that kind of treaty signed. He pointed out that this was a specific technical problem. "Let your experts come and see, they could even take the top off the cylinder of the explosive device to make sure that it was not a weapon." (The Secretary asked Gromyko if he agreed; Gromyko did not reply.)

Gromyko said that, put in other words, the sooner the US Government obtained ratification of these treaties, the better. If that were done, there would be nothing but applause for both sides.

The Secretary said he would be happy to respond. If we could agree upon a satisfactory CTB treaty, we would be very much in favor of signing it with the Soviet Union, even though others did not sign it initially.

Gromyko said that if the US was ready to accept the idea in principle, he would suggest that the two sides agree to hold bilateral discussions at the level of experts. He asked when the US would be prepared to begin.

The Secretary consulted with Mr. Warnke, who informed him that we could do so very rapidly. He would accordingly inform Gromyko and would assure him that it could be soon.

Gromyko said that Mr. Warnke had given the Secretary good advice. The Soviet side would await advice as to when the experts would be ready.

NON-PROLIFERATION

Gromyko suggested that the subject of non-proliferation required some discussion.

The Secretary said he would be happy to start. As he had indicated the other day, the question of non-proliferation was a matter of major concern for our government, for the Carter Administration. As a consequence of the priority we attached to this issue, we had begun a study immediately upon taking office. That study was about to be completed. We would be prepared to discuss such things as international fuel assurance arrangements, international spent fuel storage and strengthening IAEA safeguard arrangements. As a result of the study, we had come to the following conclusions, which would be announced very shortly: First, we would indefinitely defer commercial fuel reprocessing; Secondly, we intended to restructure our breeder reactor program in such a way as to stress designs other than plutonium-related; Third, we would redirect the funding of nuclear research and develop-

ment programs in such a way as to concentrate on alternative nuclear fuel cycles that would not involve materials that could be used for weapons purposes; Fourth, we planned to increase US production of nuclear fuels. We believed that these steps will be constructive and that they should be discussed in international fora, to see whether international action could be taken to strengthen control on sensitive technology with the objective of stopping further proliferation. That in brief was where we stood today. We would, of course, continue to urge those who had not signed the NPT to sign and ratify the treaty in view of its great importance. We would continue to encourage widest possible use and adherence to the treaty and urge strengthening and improving safeguards for enforcing sanctions against violators of such a treaty.

Gromyko said that he had listened to the Secretary's communication on this issue with interest, and so had his colleagues. Soviet views on this issue were as follows: the task of preventing nuclear war demanded most insistently that insuperable obstacles be placed in the path of the spread of nuclear weapons. Above all, this was the task of making the NPT, already in effect, truly all-embracing and universal. It was well-known fact that countries such as the People's Republic of China and France were outside the treaty; so were a significant number of other countries. The Secretary knew this well and also surely knew that there were some countries that were very close to starting the building of their own nuclear weapons. The Soviet Union was prepared, together with the United States, to continue efforts aimed at insuring that these and all other states so far outside the treaty become parties to the treaty. Why could not our two countries think of some new forms of influencing them, perhaps even on a trilateral basis (i.e., the US, the USSR, and UK) or on a bilateral basis only, with the Soviet and US governments approaching the governments of non-participating countries to speed up adherence to the treaty. Speaking quite frankly, *Gromyko* would say that the Soviet side had not yet observed any energetic measures on the part of the United States to exert its influence in the right direction. It was quite true that occasionally some statements were made urging adherence, but this was only a small part of what could be done. He would not say that the United States had acted wholeheartedly in this matter so far. The danger remained that non-nuclear countries which received nuclear materials from other countries would utilize such materials for purposes of weapons development. The Soviet Union was resolved to make sure that international cooperation in this field and in the field of peaceful nuclear explosions not become another channel for nuclear weapons proliferation. He was convinced that this was not a commercial question, but a major question of policy.

By way of example, Gromyko thought it would be appropriate to mention the current nuclear deliveries by the FRG to Brazil and by France to Pakistan, deliveries that could not but give rise to concern. In the Soviet view, what was needed was effective nuclear control over any receiving country. The Soviet Union had advocated and now advocates all-embracing improvement of the system of control in this field, and was prepared to cooperate with the United States and others.

The Secretary interrupted to say he appreciated hearing this from Gromyko. As Gromyko would know, we had worked with Brazil, Germany, France and Pakistan to see to it that sensitive materials and information transfers through creating processing plants not be brought to fruition, and that other measures be taken to guarantee fuel supply so as to eliminate the danger in this area.

Gromyko said it would be hard for the Soviets to believe that the United States was not able to bring greater pressure to bear on Brazil in these matters. Had the Brazilian leaders really come to the conclusion that they could not live without nuclear weapons? He thought the Brazilians must be fully aware of the fact that their action might set off a chain of events, thereby worsening the situation. Of course, he knew that some positive statements were being made in the US from time to time, say every six months or so, but it seemed to him that the United States was not fully using its options to bring pressure to bear. Perhaps the new Administration would need some time before it could do more in this respect.

The Secretary said he disagreed with the Minister. His deputy had gone to Brazil to discuss this issue. We had asked Brazilian leaders to stop their arrangement with Germany and find an alternate solution. We had told them we would guarantee fuel supply. As a result of this maximum pressure, Brazilian-US relations had become quite strained. It was difficult to see how we could have done more.

Gromyko said that, of course, the Secretary was a better judge of what could be done. He would suggest that in addition to the contacts we had on this subject within the framework of international organizations, it would be useful to hold Soviet-American consultations on the whole complex of the problem of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. It was true that we had not had too much contact in this respect. Some meetings were held a long time ago and at infrequent intervals. In the course of such consultations, the Soviet Union and the United States could agree on joint action in the direction of improving the already operating London understanding between the exporting countries, in which the Soviet Union, the United States and others were active. In the course of such consultations we could also review the effectiveness of IAEA functions, and discuss the question of sanctions. We had a great deal to do.

The Secretary said that he would welcome that.

Gromyko said that was very good. He would ask that both sides specifically reflect on when they could consult on setting a specific schedule.

The Secretary agreed to do that.

Gromyko said he wanted the US Government and President Carter to know that the Soviet Union attached signal importance to the entire issue of non-proliferation. The Soviet leadership liked it when the President, or the Secretary, or others, stressed the importance of this issue in the view of the United States.

The Secretary said that was very good. The President will be very pleased to hear of this Soviet position.

BAN ON NEW WEAPONS SYSTEMS

Gromyko said he would briefly touch upon a question the Secretary would be familiar with—possible conclusion of a treaty or agreement on banning new types of weapons or weapons systems of mass destruction. The Soviet Union had raised this question in all seriousness some time ago. It had hoped that the US would also emphasize the importance of this question and would join in working on the problem. From time to time, representatives of past administrations had sporadically touched on this subject, perhaps sometimes at Soviet initiative, at other times on their own accord, and had told the Soviet Union of their views in this regard. An exchange of views had taken place in the CCD in Geneva and in the United Nations in New York, but these discussions had been of a very general nature. At the same time, some serious discussions were held in Geneva. At first, the US reaction had consisted in asking the Soviets question after question and in evading discussion of specifics. *Gromyko* noticed that and had been amazed at such an approach. Then, probably after those who had asked the questions realized that this could not go on endlessly, another question was asked—what was meant by new types of weapons systems? Soviet representatives found themselves forced to name several such types, stating that theirs was by no means an exhaustive list, and that representatives of all other countries were equally free to name what they felt could be weapons of mass destruction. What serious man could deny the existence of this serious problem? Should we simply permit rocks to roll down the mountain without our doing anything to stop them? Surely we should attempt to take steps to restrain all countries from developing new types of weapons of mass destruction; otherwise, everything that had been accomplished, most notably in the field of strategic arms limitation, would become worthless. If we were on the one hand to attempt to limit strategic arms, while others produced new types of weapons of mass destruction, this would be tantamount to the right

hand not knowing what the left hand was doing. He did not know whether he had expressed his thoughts clearly, but it should be clear that the United States and the Soviet Union should combine their efforts. If that were done, other nations would join in, and that would benefit the general cause of world peace and the peoples of our countries. Gromyko hoped the Secretary would not think that the Soviet Union was pursuing some sort of advantage or political capital in this. He thought that a solution that would benefit all would be facilitated by developing cooperation between our two countries, provided, of course, that the United States was interested and willing. The Soviets would even be prepared to consider the question of concluding separate agreements banning the development and manufacture of radiological weapons, taking into account the interest in this question which was displayed by the US side. Repeated contacts on this matter had already taken place. It had also been discussed in the UN General Assembly. This was a major question, one that had significance not only for today, but also for the future.

The Secretary said he would respond briefly by saying that we had found on the basis of experience that for arms control agreements to be effective, they had to be precisely defined and capable of verification. Quite frankly, we had problems with the Soviet proposal because of its broad and general nature. It would be difficult to deal with. However, we continued to be interested in banning specific weapons categories, such as the radiological weapons Gromyko had mentioned.

Gromyko said that when the US was ready to engage in specific discussion of this concrete issue, it should inform the Soviets accordingly. As for the Soviet draft treaty which appeared to the Secretary to be general in nature, in the context of exchanges of views already held at the level of experts, some specific information was developed. He would suggest that the Secretary take a look at these materials. Soviet experts had named some very specific weapons categories. He would ask the Secretary to signal him when the specialists were ready to exchange views.

PEACEFUL NUCLEAR EXPLOSIONS

The Secretary agreed. He wanted to say before we got too far away from the issues of non-proliferation and CTB, that agreement on a comprehensive test ban without an exception for peaceful nuclear explosions would do much to stop proliferation and discourage others from following India's example. He feared that if an exception were permitted for PNE, we would soon find other threshold countries.

Gromyko said the new treaty would require careful discussion and drafting but, completely to preclude PNE—could that really be done?

Smirnov said the time would someday come when Americans, too, would realize the benefits of PNE for national economic purposes.

Soviet scientists had suggested using PNE to provide storage space for wastes and for other purposes. He repeated his suggestion that an expert be assigned to monitor a peaceful explosion for verification purposes. An expert could always determine by examining the explosive device whether it was a weapon or not. He pointed out that the Soviet Union had also made use of conventional explosives for peaceful purposes. There were no technical difficulties here, only a desire was needed for verification to be effective.

Gromyko recalled some films that had shown PNEs. Any expert who could not assure himself that an explosion was not carried out for weapons purposes either did not understand the subject or did not wish to see an agreement of this sort. He recalled that a few years ago a representative of the United States had talked with him about the possibility of using PNEs to dig a new Panama Canal. He asked if the US did not expect that PNEs might be very advantageous in the future.

The Secretary responded that he was familiar with the suggestion for construction of a new Panama Canal. The project had been examined in great detail and we had come to the conclusion that the results of digging a canal in this manner would be unacceptable—PNEs would produce fallout dangerous to people in the area. Consequently, the plans had been abandoned. We also had acquired a great deal of experience in testing PNEs, but had concluded that such explosions presented environmental dangers. We had also concluded that the problem of weapons-related information were quite real. One of the problems that arises with the weapons aspect was the fact that it would be necessary closely to examine the explosive device itself. This created many problems.

Gromyko suggested that the Secretary inform him when the US side would be prepared to enter into discussions of all the questions arising in this connection.

The Secretary agreed.

Gromyko suggested that several groups of experts could examine the non-political questions involved.

INDIAN OCEAN

The Secretary took up the problem of demilitarizing the Indian Ocean. In this question, we would be interested in exploring the subject with the Soviets. We believed that if we could have some ideas on how one could proceed to demilitarize the Indian Ocean, it would help us understand the Soviet position and to decide how one could develop further discussions on this subject. There were a number of items that logically came to mind. First—elimination of naval bases in the area. Another item was the possibility of agreeing on limiting the number of ship-days for warships in the area. Of course, one would have to define

the geographic boundaries and a number of similar items. We would be very interested in pursuing the matter further. Therefore, he would like to hear Gromyko's views.

Gromyko thought the Secretary would know the Soviet Union attached importance to this question. The problem had become more acute when the United States started construction of the Diego Garcia base in the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Union, of course, understood the purpose of that base and at whom it was aimed, and had vigorously condemned the US action. In the Soviet view, it had not been dictated by the security interests of the United States. The Soviet Union was against military confrontation involving the coastal states, and against military bases in that area. The Soviet leadership believed that this had been a badly mistaken and harmful decision on the part of the United States—to establish the base at Diego Garcia. It knew and understood very well that it was aimed at the Soviet Union. If that were not so, it could only be the product of the sick imagination of the American military. The Soviet Union had resolutely condemned it and, in fact, that decision had injected a negative element into the relations between our countries. The only military activity permitted in that area should be innocent passage by warships, as provided by international law.

The Secretary inquired about the Soviet base at Berbera. He said the Soviet Union had facilities there that could be used for military purposes.

Gromyko said that Berbera was a rest base for Soviet personnel and a place for taking on food and water. There were no military facilities at Berbera, and the Soviet Union did not plan to construct any such facilities there. If the United States had received information that was not in accord with what *Gromyko* was now saying, it had been simply misled. In fact, he did not believe that the United States had any such information. The Soviet Union did not have a military base there or anywhere else in the Indian Ocean. That was his reply—an official reply—and a categorical one. In fact, the Soviet Union would not accept an invitation to build a military base there if it were offered.

The Secretary said that we had information to the contrary. He would be happy to present it to *Gromyko*. Perhaps it was erroneous, but in any case we were ready to present it to the Soviet side.

Gromyko remarked that what had happened here was somewhat similar to what had happened with the Backfire bomber, which had suddenly become a "strategic" aircraft.

The Secretary continued by pointing out that we had information that there were missile handling facilities at Berbera that quite obviously were not required by the Somalis.

Gromyko said that the equipment there was for handling the loading of food and water. He repeated that even if the Soviets were of-

ferred a naval base there, they would not accept, simply because they knew that if they accepted, they would be facing many more negative consequences than positive ones. That was contrary to their policy. In any case, whether the Secretary believed it or not, he had provided an official, categorical answer to the question asked. He trusted that the Secretary would treat it with respect.

The Secretary asked whether he would be correct to say that he understood the Soviet position to be that the Soviet Union would be willing to forego all military bases in the Indian Ocean.

Gromyko said: “We have none there, and we have no intention to set up bases there.” He only wished that the United States not have any bases in that area either.

The Secretary asked for *Gromyko’s* views on warship stationing in the Indian Ocean area.

Gromyko said he had already told the Secretary that the Soviets proceeded from the premise that innocent passage according to international law had always applied in the Indian Ocean, and should continue to apply.

The Secretary said he certainly agreed to maintenance of the right of free passage. His question had referred to limiting numbers of ship-days in this area.

Gromyko said this question had not been raised before. It was separate and distinct from the question of naval bases, and was one that should be looked into. Perhaps the two sides could exchange views and look into the possibility of reaching agreement.

The Secretary said it was certainly a question that needed to be considered if we talked about a demilitarized area.

Gromyko, replying to the Secretary’s question as to definition of the Indian Ocean area and whether it extended as far as the Philippines, said that he was not a geographer and would not want to be one.

The Secretary said that certainly if we wanted to talk seriously about it, we would have to define the area.

Gromyko thought that if a geographer were present now, he would have an answer. He would ask a counter question: where did the Atlantic begin and end? Did it reach as far as the Arctic, and where was the boundary? *Gromyko* asked how the Secretary proposed to explore the second aspect—limits on ship-days.

The Secretary thought it should be done at less than the ministerial level, and he would have to see if it might best be done on a bilateral basis.

Gromyko said he was prepared to listen to considerations on this score, and would himself reflect on the appropriate level.

The Secretary thought it would be good if Gromyko could give it further thought.

Gromyko asked if he would be correct in assuming that President Carter and his Administration attached importance to this question and were prepared to pursue it further.

The Secretary said Gromyko could assume that President Carter was interested in pursuing this matter further and discussing it with the Soviets.

Gromyko said that was good, but we should not lose time on this issue. It would be good to have one problem less.

ARMS TRANSFERS

The Secretary suggested they now take up the question of arms transfers to third world countries. He said that we were concerned that arms transfers by the US and USSR to other countries, into the third world, could in the long run only lead to misunderstandings and difficulties. In our judgement, we had to find a way to exercise restraint in transferring arms to third world countries. Our restraint would depend on restraint by the Soviet Union, and it seemed to us that we should also enlist the cooperation of other sellers of weapons. As President Carter had said, we would be prepared to take unilateral steps in this direction. But in the long run, unilateral action could not succeed without the cooperation of other countries supplying arms. He proposed to use a specific example. In our judgement, providing arms to countries in southern Africa would fuel the flames and possibly lead to a broad conflict. We believed that this was not in the interest of either our two countries nor in the interest of people in the area. We believed that such actions could only strain relations between our two countries, which was not in our mutual interest. Therefore, we wanted to get the situation under control, either on a multilateral or bilateral basis. The United States would like to begin a serious dialogue on the question of arms transfers. He would appreciate learning Gromyko's thoughts on how we could exchange views on this subject. We would emphasize our interest in how one might reach a multilateral agreement among arms suppliers, and how one might best proceed to organize such an accord. We had already raised our concerns with the Federal Republic of Germany, Great Britain and France.

Gromyko acknowledged that the problem did exist. No one could deny that. Much weaponry was supplied to many countries. The biggest arms supplier, as President Carter has said on various occasions, was the United States, and had been for some time. In this connection, he would ask a specific question by way of example. Who was it that forced the United States to supply billions of dollars worth of armaments to Iran—was it any action on the part of the Soviet Union or

some other country? Was this really indicative of any desire to exercise restraint? The Soviet leadership had been surprised and concerned when it learned of these massive arms sales. In effect, these sales had aggravated the problem. That was his first remark. Secondly, it was obvious that this question should be posed within the context of the military clashes that were taking place in the world. There were some countries that, whether we wanted it or not, were involved in military conflicts, and this fact was greatly related to the question of arms transfers. Only on paper could these two questions be separated. In any case, very frequently this linkage was obvious. Thirdly, the Soviet Union would be prepared to consider any concrete proposal the US Government wanted to table with a view to resolving this problem. Whenever the United States was ready, the USSR would be happy to take a look at it. The more specific, the better. Before involving others, it would perhaps be better to talk between our two countries; otherwise, third parties might ask for our own joint views, which might not exist.

The Secretary said that one of the problems one faces in the area of arms transfers was that it was often said that should we not sell arms to some country or another, the Soviet Union, or France, or Germany, would certainly jump in and do so. As a result, arms sales continued. One simply had to find a way to cut the Gordian Knot.

Gromyko said he realized the problem did exist and it was necessary to take a look at it.

The Secretary asked if it might be looked at in the context of the Middle East, perhaps.

Gromyko said that if it were done in the context of a peaceful settlement in that area, the Soviet Union would be in favor of it.

The Secretary asked: "Why not before?"

Gromyko said that it could not be done before, simply because it would be wrong from a political, factual, or any other aspect now. For example, on February 18, 1977, Reuters reported a statement by Prime Minister Rabin of Israel that Israel had received 1½ billion dollars worth of weapons since the 1973 war, as against 300 million before that. *Gromyko* thought the Secretary would agree that arms transfers and conflicts were interrelated.

The Secretary pointed out that this was certainly not a one-sided issue. The Minister would know that the Soviet Union had supplied massive arms to Middle East countries.

Gromyko said he would not deny that, and suggested our two countries find ways to do something about it.

The Secretary asked: "What about Africa?"

Gromyko said the same thing applied there, except that in that whole area there were 100 times more American weapons than Soviet.

The Secretary suggested that was something that we must jointly examine in the future.

21. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 30, 1977, 11:15 a.m.–2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Berlin, Cyprus, Arms Control, CSCE, Bilateral Matters

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Paul Warnke
Assistant Secretary
Arthur Hartman
Mr. William Hyland
Deputy Assistant Secretary
Slocombe
Mr. William D. Krimer,
Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Deputy Chairman of the Council
of Ministers L.V. Smirnov
Deputy Foreign Minister
Georgiy Korniyenko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Mr. O. Sokolov
Mr. V.F. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

BERLIN

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that if the Secretary had no objections, he would like to say a few words on the subject of West Berlin. He said the Quadripartite Agreement on West Berlin had been well received in his country. The subsequent agreement concluded between the two German states had been in accord with the spirit of the Quadripartite Agreement. All this had created additional detente elements in European affairs, particularly Central European affairs. But the Soviet side had noted one thing that was probably obvious to the US side as well. Seen from Moscow, for a long time now it had been clear that there were circles in West Germany who would like effectively to nullify the accord on West Berlin. After all, the Quadripartite Agreement stated directly that West Berlin did not belong to the Federal Republic of Germany, and that it was not governed by the FRG. And yet, West

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on April 12; reviewed by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 12. The meeting took place at the Kremlin.

German authorities, the West German Government, and West Berlin as well, appeared to act as if West Berlin was some sort of a Land of the FRG. In fact, there was some legislation adopted in which West Berlin was directly referred to as a *Land*. The Soviet Union had protested against this. The Soviet leadership did not believe that the United States had anything to gain from such a state of affairs, either, although, of course, the Secretary was a better judge of US actions and policy. Gromyko would merely state the Soviet view. He had brought with him a document, translated from German, which was a certificate issued pursuant to an order by members of EEC countries regulating employment rights on the sovereign territory of the Federal Republic of Germany, including the *Land* Berlin. This particular document was dated October 15, 1968. What was this if not a travesty on the Quadripartite Agreement? How many West German institutions and organizations have established unlawful branches in West Berlin? The Soviet Union had more than once drawn the attention of the US Government, and the governments of other parties to the Quadripartite Agreement, to this situation, but, to its great regret, without any result whatsoever. In some individual cases the Soviet Government had been told that the situation would be studied, examined, etc., but no real steps had been taken. Of course, the Secretary might say that this occurred before the new Administration took office, and that the point of view of the new Administration was different. If the Secretary could say that, Gromyko would take note of it with satisfaction. Up to now, however, nothing new had been said on this subject. What seems to be taking place here, in his view, was some sort of preference in favor of NATO solidarity, over improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. He would ask—was it justified to provide certain West German circles with the opportunity to drive a wedge between our states, and to poison the relations between us? Was this sufficiently justified. The Soviet answer was a clear no. There were higher interests which quite definitely spoke in favor of our doing all we could not to permit anyone to poison relations between us from this West German direction. He would repeat—the Soviet Union stood for strictest compliance with the Quadripartite Accord. No one should be permitted to violate that agreement. This is what he wanted to say to the Secretary on West Berlin.

The Secretary said that he would also like to talk on the Berlin question in general. We believed in general that East-West relations had been improved by the West Berlin accord and by the agreement between the two German states. We would like to see that balance maintained. We believed that both sides should avoid doing anything to disturb that balance. We further believed that Four Power status applied to all of Berlin, not only West Berlin.

The Secretary then raised recent GDR actions aimed at attempting to alter the status of the city.

The Secretary pointed out that the document Gromyko had brought with him was dated 1968, whereas the Quadripartite Agreement had been concluded in 1971. In sum, he believed that both our countries had to see to it that the Quadripartite Agreement was complied with in full measure by all interested parties.

Gromyko said that the same kind of document was being issued today as well. He would ask the Secretary to take note of this fact.

The Secretary said he would take note of it, and hoped that Gromyko would also note the instances the Secretary had raised concerning East Berlin.

Gromyko said that, of course, there were some questions the West Berlin authorities were competent enough to resolve on the basis of the authority they possessed, which would not conflict with the Quadripartite Agreement; similarly there were some questions that could be resolved by East Berlin (as the Secretary had called it), the capital of the GDR, without coming into conflict with the Quadripartite Agreement, and the Soviet Union would certainly not object to such acts. Neither should there be any objections on the part of the Western powers and the US to such acts by the capital of the GDR. The instances Gromyko had cited, however, represented gross violations of the Quadripartite Agreement. He would repeat that there were numerous West German legislative acts which referred to Berlin as a *Land* of the Federal Republic. He had provided only one example; this situation was not improving. He would hope that the new Administration and the Secretary, personally, would reflect on whether it was really worthwhile to play into the hands of those circles that wanted to inject as much poison as possible into the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States in connection with the question of West Berlin. The Soviet Union favored complete implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement. Gromyko welcomed the Secretary's words to the effect that he took a similar attitude, but this also should be implemented in practice. This concluded his statement on the subject of West Berlin.

The Secretary said that the US took its responsibilities in West Berlin very seriously, and had given great attention to the Quadripartite Agreement and would continue to do so in the future.

Gromyko said that practice would show whether this was indeed the case.

The Secretary hoped the same would apply to East Berlin.

CYPRUS

Gromyko suggested to take up the question of Cyprus. He asked if the Secretary would like to be first to speak. How did he assess the present situation? The Soviet Union did not want to see any hostilities in that area, and therefore hoped the US position was similar.

The Secretary said he would be happy to take up the Cyprus question. He personally had been involved in Cyprus problems over the years, particularly during the period of time in 1967 when he, together with others from the United Nations, was involved in resolving the dispute that existed at the time, in order to avoid a conflict between Greeks and Turks. It was with concern and sadness that he had seen the conflict break out in the early 70's. Since then a number of efforts by various countries and by the United Nations were made to try and find a way to resolve such conflicts. Recently, in an effort to offer our good offices and help the United Nations in their efforts to resolve the dispute, we had sent a mission to Cyprus headed by Mr. Clifford.² Mr. Clifford had discussed the issues that divide the Greeks and Turks, in particular with the Archbishop and Mr. Denktash,³ to see whether or not common ground that would settle the dispute could be found. In so doing, he had indicated that he had no wish to do anything that would not be helpful to UN Secretary General Waldheim's efforts to settle the intra-communal dispute. Clifford had reported the results of his discussions with Cyprus leaders to Waldheim and had offered our assistance. As Gromyko undoubtedly knew, the intra-communal talks were about to begin in Vienna today,⁴ and it was the Secretary's understanding that the parties had new proposals on the table that would be helpful. As he understood it, one side would put forward a new proposal to resolve the territorial question, and the other a proposal to resolve the question of governmental structure. If these proposals were actually discussed, then perhaps we would see progress. This was in the hands of the Secretary General, as an overseeing party to the discussion. We believed we should leave matters in his hands, while supporting his efforts.

Gromyko remarked that while Waldheim was overseeing matters he was, of course, in no position to decide anything.

The Secretary agreed that that was correct. The ultimate solutions should be worked out by the parties. Therefore, he thought we should see what comes out of the Vienna talks and then decide.

Gromyko asked if he could take it that it would be correct to state that the new Administration in the US favored preservation of Cyprus as an independent, sovereign, and integrated state.

The Secretary answered: "You can."

Gromyko took that to be a very good response; it indicated that our positions had much in common. He would ask another question—

² Clark Clifford, special envoy to the eastern Mediterranean.

³ Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus, and Rauf Denktash, Vice President of Cyprus.

⁴ Reference is to intracommunal talks between Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

would the US Government agree that no foreign troops should be based in Cyprus, that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots live in peace, that they maintain order with their own small forces, or was its position that foreign troops should be retained there indefinitely.

The Secretary said that the first was our view. However, the question of British bases on Cyprus would have to be worked out between Britain and Cyprus.

Gromyko said that that was another question. He had asked whether the US believed that ultimately there should be no foreign troops in Cyprus.

The Secretary said he clearly agreed that there should be no Greek or Turkish forces in Cyprus. That had been our position from the beginning.

Gromyko said that this response drew our positions closer together. By way of information, he told the Secretary that recently Foreign Minister Caglayangil of Turkey had visited Moscow. He had touched on the Cyprus question. Gromyko did not know where he had obtained that information, but on the territorial question he had said that in general Greek Cypriots—Archbishop Makarios—were closer to accepting the idea of 30%–31% of territory for the Turks. If that was really so, the Turkish Foreign Minister had said, then the Greek and Turkish positions on the territorial question were not all that far apart. Gromyko was saying this to the Secretary for the sake of information, but could not go into further detail, since this was not a subject for discussion between Turkey and the Soviet Union. He felt it would not be out of place if our two countries could assist and advise the two communities, although it would be they who would have to arrive at a final settlement.

The Secretary said it was his understanding that the Turkish Cypriots' position was that they wanted to get 30%–31% of the territory, while the Greeks were prepared to give something closer to 20%. He would predict that they would finally compromise on 26%–27%.

Gromyko said that had also been his impression after his talk with the Turkish Foreign Minister. He had suspected that 30%–31% was more wishful thinking than reality.

To finish up with the Cyprus question, *Gromyko* said the Soviet Union would hope that the question would be settled and would no longer be a problem. He felt that, in general, the Turks were inclined to take the road toward solution. He believed that if both sides were flexible, we could be optimistic about the future. However, no one should interfere with them, although the US and the Soviet Union should assist and prevent any outside interference. As for military bases, and foreign troops, ultimately these should leave.

NUCLEAR NON-FIRST-USE

Gromyko wanted to say a few words regarding the Non-First-Use proposal. Why had the US Government (the Ford Administration) so quickly declined the Warsaw Pact proposal that an attempt be made to reach agreement between the participants in CSCE, which included Warsaw Pact countries, NATO, the US, and Canada, not to be the first to use nuclear weapons? What was the explanation for such haste and a lackadaisical response? It was no secret, of course, that it was the US that insisted that NATO take this attitude.⁵ Not even the proposal to discuss this question thoroughly in a group of experts had been accepted. After all, both of us had followed similar procedures in the past. This had been the case when the NPT was discussed between our two states for approximately four years before it finally came to drafting. *Gromyko* had taken part in these discussions. He would ask the Secretary to take a further look at this problem.

The Secretary replied that it was his understanding that what had happened when this proposal was rejected last year had not been a US decision, but one taken at a Ministerial meeting of NATO member countries after thorough discussion in that group. As he understood it, the decision to reject was based on the grounds that NATO was not prepared to renounce use of any means to repel an attack upon one member of NATO. This was his understanding of what had happened.

Gromyko said that the Warsaw Pact proposal was aimed precisely at preventing a nuclear attack on any country. Would it really have been harmful if a preliminary meeting of experts, including representatives of NATO and the US and representatives of the Warsaw Pact powers, had met for the purpose of a preliminary study? Perhaps some sort of variant might have emerged that could have been useful. After all, should the Warsaw Pact powers also follow such a practice when NATO had a proposal to make—reject it out of hand and allow NATO to learn about that from a radio broadcast? Was this really the best way to proceed? He did not think so. There had to be some degree of responsibility.

The Secretary said that rather than single out one single weapon as a subject of focus, it would make much more sense to reduce forces across the board, in order to increase overall security. This was precisely the purpose of the Vienna MBFR negotiations. It would seem to him that there were items of greater priority, for example, real progress in the strategic arms talks and at the ongoing discussions in Vienna. He would put that ahead of attempts to resolve the more abstruse question

⁵ See Flora Lewis, "NATO Bars Reds' Bid to Ban Atom Strike," *The New York Times*, December 10, 1976, p. 1.

of Non-First-Use. The other negotiations dealt with tangible matters, proposals at the table, and they should be brought to fruition.

Gromyko wondered why the Secretary would call that proposal abstruse. After all, we were negotiating on specific types of arms, such as chemical weapons, bacteriological weapons, environmental modification for military purposes. Just yesterday, he and the Secretary had talked about banning weapons of mass destruction. If we did not at least try to look at these things, what would diplomats be doing? Would some just drink coffee, some others tea, and all of them eat caviar, if any remained; was that all? These were not very strong arguments. He said he would conclude from the Secretary's words that he stood on the same position as his predecessor. He was saying this with sadness and regret. The problem remained, and we might perhaps be forced to return to it some day. He would like to hope that this was not the Secretary's final word on this subject.

The Secretary said he would only note that there were already obligations under the UN Charter not to use force. Why, then, should these obligations be brought into question by a new document limited to CSCE participants? However, he would reflect on it.

Gromyko wanted to refer to conclusion of an international treaty on non-first use. A majority in the United Nations favored conclusion of such a treaty, and this was not fortuitous. It was an expression of a general yearning of people for a true and lasting peace. He would ask the Secretary if that proposal would not be in accord with the interests of peace, with the interests of those governments that wanted peace? This was a proposal not to use force under any circumstances. In other words, it would provide for an obligation of states in treaty form to resolve disputes by peaceful means only. The Secretary might say that the UN Charter already contained such obligations. There was a great deal in the UN Charter, but all of it in general terms only. The only thing missing from the Charter was a mention of God, and *Gromyko* recalled a fervent plea in favor of such mention by one of the representatives. After all, treaties existed in order to make more specific the obligations arising out of the Charter, and to translate Charter provisions into specific undertakings by states. Would it not have been useful to have experts examine the question? Would the United States be poorer if it had sent some people to Moscow, Geneva or Washington to discuss the proposal? As things stood now, the whole world agrees, but the government of the United States says no. There are other countries that follow US lead. The Secretary was a member of a new government. Would he not agree that there was something here to think about, to take a look at? He called upon the Secretary to do so.

The Secretary said he would be happy to give new thought to this matter, because he preferred to negotiate rather than reject. He would see if further discussions could be productive.

Gromyko asked that the Secretary's representatives at whatever level was appropriate inform the Soviet Union when the time came.

ANTI-SATELLITE CAPABILITIES

The Secretary said that in this connection he wanted to raise the issue of placing limits on the anti-satellite capabilities of both sides. We had noted that such capabilities were in the process of being developed. We firmly believed that an attempt should be made to stabilize the strategic situation by discussing such capabilities, and were prepared to enter into discussions with the Soviet Union concerning their limitation. In the interim, he would suggest that it would be useful to exercise restraint in testing anti-satellite systems.

Gromyko said he could not say that no problem existed in this area. He would be prepared to examine any proposal the United States could submit.

The Secretary thought that was good, because he believed it important that we do this.

CIVIL DEFENSE

The Secretary raised the question of civil defense preparations. As *Gromyko* knew, there was concern in the United States over what appeared to be a civil defense program in the Soviet Union. It would be constructive to exchange information and see if we could not reach agreement on mutual restraint in this area in the future. At SALT both sides had acknowledged that limitation on active ABM defense of the territory of a country was a substantial factor in curbing the race in strategic offensive arms and reducing the risk of nuclear war. The Secretary thought that the same logic may apply to a broad expansion in the field of civil defense. Therefore, we should discuss this question.

Gromyko asked whether Mr. Schlesinger,⁶ upon returning from China, had not tried to scare public opinion in the United States on the basis of a civil defense program in China?

The Secretary said that Schlesinger had not tried to do that, but that he had seen the preparations there.

Gromyko asked if that meant the United States was afraid only of the Soviet Union.

The Secretary said the United States had not expressed fear in the sense in which *Gromyko* used that word, but we did believe this to be an important aspect of strategic equality. We should not ignore such a factor and discuss limitations that would be in our mutual interests.

⁶ Schlesinger traveled to China in September 1976 to meet with Chinese leaders.

Gromyko said that in his view activities in the field of civil defense were not a problem of first-rate importance. In terms of strategic stability they were not significant. He did not think that anyone would deny the truth of such a view. Pursuing the question in these terms might complicate the process of reaching agreement on really important problems—the number one problem—limitation of strategic arms. This did not mean that the Soviet side would be afraid to discuss this question. If the United States attached importance to it, Soviet and American specialists might be instructed to consider specific proposals.

The Secretary said that was good and very productive. He recalled that when we had suggested discussing ABM limitations, it was said that they were defensive weapons and did not affect the strategic balance. It developed, however, that both sides later agreed that ABMs had an impact on that balance. Therefore, it would be useful to discuss civil defense and its effect on the strategic balance.

WORLD DISARMAMENT CONFERENCE

Gromyko said that for a long time now discussions in the United Nations and elsewhere had dealt with the possibility of convening a World Disarmament Conference.⁷ The Secretary should not believe that the Soviet Union alone was interested in convening such a conference; it did not expect any profit out of such discussions. The Soviet Union had favored this idea for a long time because it believed that implementation could be an important landmark on the road toward disarmament. First of all, he would have to explain that it often happened that people mixed up two things—a World Disarmament Conference and a Special Session of the UN General Assembly to discuss disarmament. It might be asked what was the difference? The Soviet Union was not opposed to holding such a session, and in fact had voted for the corresponding resolution, but it believed that this would not remove the question of convening a World Disarmament Conference. What could a General Assembly session accomplish, even with the best intentions? It could adopt recommendations and pass resolutions but, according to the UN Charter, the nature of such recommendations and resolutions was that a government might accept them, or might not, or might simply pigeonhole them. *Gromyko* was afraid that such would be the result of a special General Assembly Session on Disarmament; already the Soviet Union had voted for it. A World Disarmament Conference was quite another thing. It would be held on an entirely different basis from the standpoint of organization and procedure for taking decisions. The juridical effect of decisions adopted would also be different.

⁷ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-2, Documents on Arms Control and Non-proliferation, 1969–1972, Document 321.

At a special conference, decisions could be worked out by minorities as well, including the major powers, and then converted into an international agreement. Success at such a conference would be determined simply by the wishes of the parties, and not by the number of votes in favor. The procedure for taking decisions at a conference would be totally different. Often people did not understand this difference, but the difference was great indeed. It should not be precluded that at a conference a limited number of states could take a position to conclude an agreement, and such an agreement would become an effective international document, whether or not a majority of states signed. Gromyko did not want to prejudge the special General Assembly session, but would ask the Secretary to reflect on the possibility of convening a World Disarmament Conference following the special General Assembly session. It could not possibly be detrimental to the United States or the Soviet Union, since no one could impose anything on anyone else by a majority of votes.

The Secretary quite agreed that a World Disarmament Conference was a noble objective for the future. On the other hand, there were so many pressing things now, that it was above all necessary to show the world that we could make progress on such practical things as strategic arms limitations and in the Vienna MBFR talks. We should deal with things on the table before talking about a disarmament conference. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had stated that they would actively participate in the special General Assembly session, but it was our view that we should give priority to the things already on the table and before us.

Gromyko believed that efforts to convene a World Disarmament Conference would not in the least degree interfere with efforts to resolve other disarmament problems. He also thought the world was entering a phase where we had to take up many things in several arenas, because now the world had become so complex that we had a good one hundred years of work ahead of us. In any case, parallel efforts would have to be applied. That was all he had to say on the World Disarmament Conference.

CHEMICAL WEAPONS

Gromyko said that he would like to instruct his representatives in Geneva to suggest that the CCD start drafting the text of an agreement on chemical weapons, provided the United States agreed of course. In the process of drafting, some problems might simply disappear. So far the CCD had indulged in philosophical discussions. This is all he had to say on the subject. (He remarked that this was the briefest statement he had ever made on any issue.)

The Secretary agreed that some progress had been made through discussions between technical people in this area. We were ready and

willing to join with the Soviet Union in this initiative. We would see if working on the text of an agreement might not change our respective stand on issues on which we had different views, although our goals were the same.

Gromyko said we should instruct our representatives to get to work.

BELGRADE

Gromyko wanted to present a brief formulation of the Soviet position with regard to the forthcoming Belgrade Conference.⁸ The Soviet Union believed that it was necessary to gather in Belgrade not in order to quarrel, not to launch all sorts of allegations against each other, not to present lists of alleged unlawful activities or crimes of one state against another, or lists of violations of some sort of provisions. It was necessary to gather in Belgrade in order to demonstrate a positive spirit of cooperation and detente, to promote implementation of all the obligations of the Final Act of the CSCE, and to table appropriate proposals toward that goal. This was the Soviet view of the purpose of the Belgrade meeting. He would like to hear US views on this score.

The Secretary replied that our view was also that we should not go there to quarrel, or for purposes of confrontation. We should review how well the Final Act was being implemented, what was being done on Baskets I, II and III⁹ viewed in that light. A limited number of new proposals might also be considered, but our emphasis should be on how well the Final Act commitments were being implemented.

Gromyko asked if it would not be good to take all the Baskets out and burn them before Belgrade so that they not stand in the way. Otherwise, we might run the danger that these Baskets would be the most popular items. He had taken note of the Secretary's statement regarding the review. Of course, it would be difficult to object to the Secretary's views, because each participant was free to act as he wished, but the important thing was how this should be done. A review might take the form of sharp criticisms of the other side, which then would not remain in debt, and then this might be followed by the third, fourth, or fifth and finally thirty-fifth party to the Final Act. Was this really needed? The Soviet side saw the major purpose of the conference in carrying out the review in such a way as to consider the future. If constructive proposals were made that are in accord with the spirit of the Final Act, this would impart a constructive character to the conference.

⁸ See footnote 7, Document 2.

⁹ Basket I dealt with European security; Basket II, cooperation in economics, science, technology and the environment; and Basket III, cooperation in humanitarian affairs. See footnote 5, Document 4.

The Soviet Union, for its part, intended to raise certain matters, some new and some already mentioned. It would act fully in accord with the spirit of detente and in the direction of improving Soviet-American relations.

The Secretary said that we also wished very much for a constructive intent and purpose. He said we would conduct ourselves consistent with that purpose.

MARITIME AGREEMENT

Gromyko took note of the fact that the protocol on maritime shipping had finally been agreed upon. That was a positive fact.

The Secretary said he, too, was pleased that the maritime agreement had finally been concluded.¹⁰

CIVIL AVIATION

Gromyko noted with regret that the aviation question so far had not been resolved. However, it was necessary to apply further efforts to finding a solution to this matter, too.

The Secretary thought that some progress had been made on civil aviation and looked forward to resuming negotiations in the near future to bring this matter to a satisfactory conclusion that would be acceptable to both sides. He would suggest that in the meantime the status quo of scheduled service be maintained, and that discussions be picked up as soon as possible, to reach a final agreement.

Korniyenko asked the Secretary to explain the meaning of the status quo. Some discussion followed as to whether this meant to maintain two scheduled flights a week for each airline, or whether the normal April 1 schedule of four weekly flights each would go into effect. The problem was not resolved and remained to be taken up at another level.

CONSTRUCTION OF EMBASSIES

Gromyko noted with satisfaction that agreement had been reached on the construction of the respective embassies.

The Secretary said he, too, was pleased.

SOVIET MIG-25 DEFECTION¹¹

Gromyko said the Soviet leadership had been very much affected and even hurt by the US Government's direct attitude in connection

¹⁰ Reference is to the Agreement Regarding Certain Maritime Matters between the United States and the Soviet Union, January 1, 1976. The Agreement dealt primarily with shipping concerns.

¹¹ For an overview of the Soviet defection, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974–December 1976, Document 290.

with the well-known incident involving the Soviet aircraft in Japan. This was not even a matter of the pilot, although they did not believe one word of the version spread in the West about the pilot. It was a question of the aircraft itself. Did the strategic services of the United States think they would improve their strategic situation by disassembling the aircraft? Did they really see an advantage to be gained here? Their actions were a blow at the spirit of confidence and trust in the relations between our respective governments, and had poisoned the general climate. Gromyko would tell the Secretary directly that the Soviet leadership had been amazed and surprised how these two factors could be likened. Could familiarization with this aircraft by the Japanese and Americans change the strategic situation between our countries? “Nonsense. Utter nonsense.” Supposing the Soviet Union had an opportunity to dismantle a US plane, say a Phantom, could dismantling it and crawling all over it improve the strategic situation of the Soviet Union? “Nonsense.” In that case, why was it necessary to poison the relationship between us? It had seemed like a small matter, but in fact it was a major one. This was what the Soviets wanted the new US Administration to know, as something to be borne in mind in the future. He did not think that this had increased confidence.

The Secretary said he had taken note of the Minister’s statement. He understood that this matter had been raised with President Ford, and followed by a subsequent exchange of correspondence between the President and General Secretary Brezhnev.

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

The Secretary said that, as Gromyko knew, President Carter had communicated to General Secretary Brezhnev his desire to see if we could enter into an agreement about advance notification of missile firings. The object of this was to be a confidence-building arrangement. It would further the objectives of the Measures Agreement¹² and would be a simple and constructive move. What we had in mind was notification, some 24 hours in advance, of dates and times and places of ICBM launchings. We believe this would prevent misinterpretation of test launches during periods of tension.

Gromyko said he had asked his colleagues whether this question had been raised earlier. He ascertained that it had not been discussed with US representatives previously. The USSR announces all launches which land in areas outside of its territory. The Secretary knew this, surely. As for launches of strategic missiles within limits of national ter-

¹² The Accidents Measures Agreement of September 30, 1971, provided that the “Hot Line” would be used for urgent communication pertaining to nuclear weapons. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXII, SALT I, 1969–1972, Document 197, footnote 3.

ritory, there was no need to announce them, since such launches are carried out into areas that could not cause concern to the United States. The regions where they landed were known. At the same time, he would make the additional point that the Soviet side would be prepared to consider notification in individual cases, when launches made even within national territories might, in the view of the launching side, be misinterpreted by the other. He would suggest that this question could be considered in more specifics within the framework of the Standing Consultative Commission which was meeting in Geneva now.

22. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 30, 1977, 4–4:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Emigration Lists; Radiation; Trade

PARTICIPANTS

US PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance

Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR PARTICIPANTS

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

At the Secretary's initiative a private meeting was held with Foreign Minister Gromyko immediately after the Secretary's luncheon at Spasso House.

The Secretary told Gromyko that he had two or three issues he wanted to raise privately with Gromyko. First, he wanted to deal with the question of divided families. He had two lists: one he would hand Gromyko, listing people who wanted to emigrate to the United States; the other consists of people who wanted to emigrate to Israel. He would appreciate it if Gromyko would have someone take a look at what could be done.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; approved by Twaddell on April 13. The meeting took place at Spaso House.

Gromyko said (facetiously) that he was really overenthusiastic, but since this was a “hot question” and “a hot list”, he would not even touch it but would ask Mr. Sukhodrev to take it along. What could he tell the Secretary in this regard? The Soviet authorities would consider the information contained in the lists in accordance with Soviet legislation. He would have to refrain from giving any promises in this regard. He thought he knew how these things were eventually resolved. He also knew that it happened sometimes that police organs, when they started to look into the persons concerned, found that in some instances these persons were not at all interested in leaving the Soviet Union. In one instance he knew of, one of these told the police that he had just been married, and asked them to leave him alone.

The Secretary repeated that he would appreciate it if *Gromyko* had someone look at the list.

The second issue the Secretary wanted to raise with *Gromyko* concerned radiation. He knew that the levels of radiation affecting our Embassy had been reduced, but they were still a matter of concern to the people working in our Embassy here. We would indeed be pleased if such radiation could be stopped completely.

Gromyko said that he was really getting tired of this question. He had thought that this issue was some sort of joke, but then he had noticed that from time to time someone would raise it again. Apart from the reply he had repeatedly given the Secretary earlier, he could not say anything else. Who was he to accuse the city of Moscow or the city authorities in this regard? He knew that there were certain conditions here that did not exist in Washington due to the fact that the city here contained so many industrial enterprises. Some had already been taken out of Moscow, but some still remained. He would bear in mind what the Secretary had said, but, quite honestly, he knew that there were some in the United States who loved to raise this issue again and again.

The Secretary said that the problem was that a number of people had become ill in ways somehow associated with radiation. It was for this reason that he had raised the issue with *Gromyko*.

Gromyko replied that since he and the Secretary were discussing this, he would point out that he could provide some statistics showing how many Soviets returning from the United States had been taken ill. Among them were even some important officials; for example, one of his deputies had died of leukemia after returning from the United States. All he could tell the Secretary was that he would keep this in mind. Whether or not he would be able to say something new on the subject, he could not determine now. However, he knew that some people in the US liked to blow up these matters; of that he was firmly convinced. He also thought there was no question that Soviets living in the United States were actually exposed to higher levels of radiation

than Americans here. More than that the Secretary would not be able to get out of him on the subject. After all, he, too, lived near the center of the city together with his family, although he spent the summers at his dacha. Still, no one in his family had experienced any such difficulty.

The Secretary thanked Gromyko for taking these matters into account. Another issue had been entrusted to him by President Carter, to be conveyed to Gromyko. The Secretary had touched on it briefly the other day, but wanted to be sure that Gromyko knew that this Administration would like to see trade between our countries increased, and would like to see the Soviet Union accorded most favored nations status in the US. We wanted to work toward this end, but it would take awhile to get Congress to move. We continued to move in that direction, and the problem had already been raised with Congressional leaders. We would hope to continue pressing Congress on this, and obtain satisfactory results. In this connection, we realized that it was not only a matter of the Jackson-Vanik Amendment,² but also the Stevenson Amendment³ which affected credit arrangements. He had conveyed this to Gromyko, because the President was interested in making progress.

Gromyko said he took note of the Secretary's statement. The Secretary would know that if a satisfactory solution could be found, it would be given a very positive assessment by the Soviet Union. General Secretary Brezhnev had talked about this, because the Soviet leadership considered it to be of mutual benefit to both countries to remove the present obstacles to increased trade. He would point out that a positive solution would also play a certain role in our bilateral relations.⁴

² The Jackson-Vanik amendment, part of the Trade Act of 1974 (H.R. 10710—P.L. 93-618), necessitated the relaxation of Soviet emigration restrictions before MFN status for the Soviet Union would be considered. See *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. XVI, Soviet Union, August 1974-December 1976, Document 5.

³ The Stevenson amendment, part of the Export-Import Bank provisions outlined in H.R. 15977—P.L. 93-646, set a \$300 million limit on loans for exports to the Soviet Union. See *Congress and the Nation*, vol. IV, 1973-1976, pp. 134-135.

⁴ In Secto 3044 from Moscow, March 30, Vance summarized his meeting for Carter, Brzezinski, and Christopher. The telegram is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Vance, Europe and Moscow, 3/27/77-4/4/77: Cables and Memos, 3/15-31/77.

23. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, March 30, 1977, 5:40–6:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT

PARTICIPANTS

US PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon
 Mr. Paul Warnke
 Mr. Philip C. Habib
 Mr. William G. Hyland
 Mr. William D. Krimer, (Interpreter)

USSR PARTICIPANTS

General Secretary L.I. Brezhnev
 Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
 Ambassador Dobrynin
 Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
 Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko
 Mr. O.M. Sokolov
 Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, (Interpreter)

General Secretary Brezhnev opened the meeting and said to Secretary Vance that it was now time again to talk about business. Foreign Minister Gromyko had kept him fully informed of the current talks on SALT, as well as a number of other issues. Secretary Vance had given the Soviet side quite a long list of things to be discussed.

Turning to SALT, Brezhnev rhetorically asked what he could tell the Secretary on this subject. To his regret it was necessary to recognize that the discussion of this most important issue had so far not been very satisfactory.

The main reason for that was the unconstructive, one sided and, he would even say, non-objective nature of the position taken by the

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 3/28–30, 1977. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer; reviewed in draft by Hyland; approved by Twaddell on April 16. The meeting took place at the Kremlin. Vance described this meeting in his memoirs: "I expected that after a day of study and discussions in the Politburo, the Soviets would come back with objections to specific aspects of our proposal and to our numbers and possible with counterproposals. This could provide a basis for serious negotiations. Consequently, when I next met with Brezhnev on the evening of March 30, I was angered at the vehemence and finality with which he rejected our SALT proposals. There was not even a hint of a counterproposal. He called our position 'unconstructive and one-sided,' and 'harmful to Soviet security.' It was evident there was no point in attempting to pursue serious negotiations on this trip." (*Hard Choices*, p. 54)

United States. Brezhnev had to tell the Secretary that the considerations the US side had set forth had been very carefully considered by him and his colleagues, and what he had to say here represented their common opinion.

That which Secretary Vance had set forth in his talks with Foreign Minister Gromyko was a repetition of a previous US proposal, regarding which the Soviet side had already informed President Carter and the Secretary that it was completely unacceptable; as for the new variant presented by the US side, it was equally unacceptable for the Soviet Union because of its one-sided nature. The United States was proposing things which, if one got to the bottom of them, objectively, and without indulging in propaganda were advantageous to one side only, i.e., the United States, and would harm the security of the USSR.

Brezhnev said that he had carefully followed the entire course of the current talks, and he had to point out that, just as earlier, we were here witnessing manifestation of a desire to pretend that there was no Vladivostok understanding; and yet, that understanding had been achieved as a result of the immense efforts of both sides, involving a great deal of hard work. How could one discard that to which the United States had given its consent at the very highest level? The Soviet leaders had wanted to believe the word of the United States as a state.

By way of another example of a one-sided, non-objective position at the talks, Brezhnev wanted to refer to the course taken by the United States and its NATO Allies at the Vienna negotiations on the Mutual Reduction of Armed Forces and Armaments in Central Europe. He knew that the Secretary and Gromyko had discussed this question as well. Indeed, the NATO countries did not even try to conceal the fact that they wanted to use these negotiations to improve their military positions in Europe, to the detriment of the Soviet Union and its allies. Did the US side really consider the Soviet leaders to be naive simpletons? Had the Secretary believed that the Soviet Union would agree to this? The answer was no; no indeed. It would be much better in a business-like way to consider the possibilities of reducing the armed forces of the two sides, while still retaining the existing correlation of forces. This was the only reasonable and realistic way out of the present situation, and was in fact why these negotiations had been started in the first place. Brezhnev would most sincerely and insistently call upon Secretary Vance and President Carter to approach the major and important issues being discussed here, above all the problem of limiting strategic arms, in a less one-sided manner, and with an account for the legitimate interest of both sides, so as not to discard what had already been achieved.

Naturally, the Soviet leadership did not believe that, because the two sides had not been able to agree on the question of strategic arms

limitation this time, the negotiations were doomed to failure altogether. There was still time to reconsider, and once again to talk. Brezhnev would like to hope that in time, in particular by the time of the Secretary's forthcoming meeting with Gromyko in May, reflection might produce a wiser course.

At the same time, Brezhnev noted with satisfaction that on some of the specific issues discussed during the talks, as he saw it, some favorable prospects for further constructive discussions had emerged, and he wanted to express the hope that such discussions would lead to good results. He felt that objective possibilities were present, notably to reach an understanding on joint action on the Middle East problem where, as he understood it, both our countries were interested in seeing a lasting settlement achieved. As he understood it, Secretary Vance, too, had expressed the view that without inter-action (*vzaimodeystviye*) between the US and the USSR there could not be an effective settlement in the Middle East.

On the whole, Brezhnev thought that the talks had been useful in terms of enabling the two sides to understand each other's views, but that was not enough. If we wanted to move further in developing our relations and strengthening peace it was necessary to bring these views closer together, and that required new efforts by politicians and diplomats, as well as an appropriate psychological climate in the relations between our two states. Brezhnev wanted to call upon the leadership of the United States to promote such efforts and create an appropriate climate.

Brezhnev wanted briefly to address two more questions to which the Soviet side attached great importance, and which had already been touched upon in the course of the current talks. The first question concerned the transfer of strategic arms to third countries and non-circumvention of agreements through third states or in any other manner. This was not a new question. From the very outset the Soviet side had assumed, and had said so to the US, that without including appropriate provisions on non-transfer and non-circumvention in an arms limitation agreement, that agreement would lose its meaning to a significant degree. In the Soviet draft of the new agreement specific wording had been proposed to deal with these matters. He wanted to emphasize once again that the Soviet Union could not contemplate any agreement not containing such provisions. The other question concerned nuclear forward-based systems. Before Vladivostok and after Vladivostok the Soviet side had stated clearly that it did not regard the forward-based nuclear weapons issue as having been removed from the agenda. Moreover, as he had already stated, the Soviet side had proceeded from the premise that the US side would, at the time of signature of the new agreement, state that during the term of the new

agreement it would not only not build up forward-based nuclear systems which, due to their geographical location were capable of reaching the Soviet Union, but would take steps to reduce them. The current position of the United States completely ignored this issue, once again confirming that Soviet concerns on this score were well grounded. In addition, this led the Soviet side to conclude that the question of US forward-based nuclear systems (the Soviet Union had no such systems) would have to be resolved within the framework of the agreement currently under preparation. Such were the thoughts that inevitably arose during an analysis of the current US proposals.

In conclusion, Brezhnev would ask Secretary Vance to transmit his greetings to President Carter, and to tell him of Brezhnev's sincere conviction that an improvement in relations between the Soviet Union and the United States, establishment of good-neighborly cooperation between the two countries, was entirely possible, given the necessary effort.

Secretary Vance said that he concurred with Brezhnev that the results reached in the current talks with respect to strategic arms were not satisfactory. Indeed, we were deeply disappointed that no progress had been made in our discussions of this subject, which was important not only for our two nations but also for world peace. The proposals we had presented had been prepared with seriousness and good will, and no intention at all to try and enforce a one-sided approach. We believed that the two proposals we had presented were fair and equitable to both sides. The proposal about deferral, we believed, was fully consistent with the accord reached in Vladivostok. The Secretary recognized that Brezhnev held a contrary view, but he would tell Brezhnev that we held our views with all seriousness. He said that he could not accept the suggestion that we had gone back on the word of the United States, and that we had cast it aside or had suggested matters that were inconsistent with the Vladivostok accord in our proposal to defer. In so far as our comprehensive proposal was concerned, we had indeed suggested steps that did go beyond the agreement reached previously, but this had been done with the objective of moving boldly toward true arms reduction in a fashion that would result in a balance fair to both sides, and in greater stability in the area of nuclear weapons. Brezhnev would note, of course, that our comprehensive proposal contained restrictions on cruise missiles, and that it also accepted as part of the package the earlier Soviet proposal regarding the Backfire bomber. The Secretary looked forward to meeting Foreign Minister Gromyko in May. At such time, they would be discussing questions relating to the Middle East, as well as any other subject that either party would choose to raise.

Referring to the Vienna talks on Mutual Balanced Force Reductions, the Secretary said that we had not asked the Soviet side to be

naive. We were suggesting that the guiding principle at these talks be parity of manpower in the area, in other words, equality; equality had been the guiding principle in the strategic arms limitation talks from the very beginning, and should also be the guiding principle at the Vienna talks on conventional arms in Central Europe. According to our estimates, there was currently a difference of more than 150,000 in the land forces of the two sides in Central Europe. We believed that there should be an exchange of data to ascertain if our estimates were correct. If they were correct, or if they needed correction, then necessary steps could be taken to reduce manpower to equal numbers for both sides.

The Secretary also wanted to note with satisfaction that progress had been made on some matters, and a basis laid for further work which would advance our common interests in some areas. As he had already said, he looked forward to meeting Mr. Gromyko in Geneva to discuss how to proceed and work in order to achieve a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. We had common interests and a common responsibility as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference to bring about reconvening of that conference and to see to it that the Geneva Conference produced a solution that would give a just and lasting peace to this troubled area.

The Secretary noted that Brezhnev had asked two questions, the first concerning non-transfer and non-circumvention, and the second concerning forward-based systems. As for non-transfer and non-circumvention, the Secretary had already said, as Brezhnev knew, that this was one of the remaining issues to be resolved at the strategic arms talks in Geneva. That was one of the issues that could be addressed once the basic provisions of the new agreement had been determined. As for forward based systems, it was our view that they were not an appropriate subject for SALT, because these negotiations dealt with intercontinental ballistic missile launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missile launchers, and heavy bombers. These negotiations did not involve our forward-based systems any more than they involved Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles or intermediate range ballistic missiles, such as the SS-20. If forward-based systems were to be included in the strategic arms talks, then obviously the Backfire bomber would also be covered, even though not deployed for intercontinental ranges. We believed that we should stick to our task, i.e., control strategic intercontinental nuclear weapons, and not theater weapons. Finally, the Secretary would point out that the Vladivostok Aide-Memoire contained no mention of forward-based systems.

Brezhnev said that in his remarks he had referred to many questions that had been the subject of discussion. He did not think there was any need to repeat what had already been said. He only wanted to say that he had listened very attentively to what the Secretary had said, and

wanted to say again that the Soviet position was set forth very firmly in his concluding statement. He would ask the Secretary to convey these remarks to President Carter. He also suggested that the two sides issue a brief joint press communique regarding these talks.

Secretary Vance said he agreed. He had also listened very carefully to Mr. Brezhnev's remarks, and would convey his message to President Carter.²

² In Secto 3053 from Moscow, March 30, Vance summarized his meeting for Carter, Brzezinski, and Christopher. The telegram is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 41, Vance, Europe and Moscow, 3/27/77–4/4/77: Cables and Memos, 3/15–31/77.

24. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

April 4, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance has handed over to me your letter of March 24.²

I think there is no need at the present moment to say something on the substance of the talks just concluded in Moscow.³

We shall be expecting from you concrete considerations on the questions of strategic arms limitation, which you may have, taking into account the exchange of views on these issues we had with Mr. Vance in Moscow. We have stated to him our concrete positions on the issues of completing the work on a new SALT agreement.

I would like to stress that the USSR policy in relations with the US has been and remains aimed at a steady advance—proceeding on existing experience—in developing constructive cooperation and interaction to solve the questions of bilateral relations and to settle international problems on the basis of mutual regard for legitimate interests

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, USSR (Brezhnev Drafts/Letters), 4/77–9/80. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. The initial "C" is written in the upper right corner of the letter, indicating that Carter saw it.

² See Document 15.

³ See Documents 17–23.

of each other, strengthening confidence between our countries, the principles of equality, equal security and non-interference in internal affairs.

On our part, we are ready as before to do everything in our power to make things go precisely that way. Otherwise it is hardly possible to expect the cessation of the arms race, achievement of a settlement of acute international problems. We are deeply convinced that, given a similar approach on the part of the US, there can be no insurmountable obstacles for the solution of even the most complex issues in the relations between our countries.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

25. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 8, 1977, 2:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Jewry and Secretary's Trip to Moscow

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary

Eugene Gold, Chairman, National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ)

Rabbi Alexander Schindler, Chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations

Yehuda Hellman, Executive Director, Conference of Presidents

Jerry Goodman, Executive Director, NCSJ

Dr. Marshall Shulman, Special Consultant

Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Leonard F. Willems, EUR:SOV (notetaker)

SUMMARY: The Secretary met with leaders of two major American Jewish organizations concerned with Soviet Jewry to report to

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Leonard F. Willems (EUR/SOV) on April 11; cleared in draft by Shulman; approved by Twaddell on April 19. Willems initialed for Schulman. The meeting took place in Vance's office.

them on his recent trip to Moscow² with regard to matters concerning Soviet Jewry. He had met with the same group prior to the trip on March 24.³ At the April 8 meeting he told them he had given Gromyko a list of Soviet Jews refused exit visas for Israel as well as the US Exit Visa Representation List.⁴ He had not presented any list of prisoners, or raised any individual cases. During the visit the Soviets were told that what happens with regard to Soviet-American trade will be affected by what happens in arms control and emigration. The “drop-out” phenomenon of Soviet emigrants to Israel not going to Israel did not come up in any way during the visit. The Secretary described the Soviets’ sensitivity about the coming Belgrade CSCE Conference. He said there had been a general review of the Middle East, and Gromyko had confirmed to him that the Soviets had not changed their positions. The Jewish organizations leaders seemed genuinely very appreciative of the Secretary’s efforts on behalf of Soviet Jewry. *END SUMMARY.*

Moscow Trip

Secretary Vance reported that he had personally delivered to Foreign Minister Gromyko both the US Government Exit Visa Representation List of Soviet citizens refused exit visas to join relatives in the United States, and a list of Soviet Jews refused exit visas for Israel. Gromyko received the lists and indicated he would look into the matter, but made no promises. Gromyko had accepted them, though, and not rejected them. The Secretary had not felt it advisable to present any lists of prisoners. He had discussed in general terms with Gromyko the effect of the emigration issue on our bilateral relations, but could not predict what would happen in the emigration area in the future. The Secretary said his guess was that the Soviets will act with a degree of caution. It had been made clear to the Soviets that what happens with regard to trade will be affected by what happens or does not happen in arms control and emigration.

Schindler asked whether the Soviets linked the human rights and emigration issues. The Secretary replied that at the first meeting Brezhnev read a long paper admonishing the US on the human rights issue. The Secretary said he had responded that we were from different societies and different systems with different values which produced some inevitable conflicts, but we were not focusing any attack on the USSR in our human rights efforts, which reflect universal principles. After that exchange at the first meeting, human rights had not been dis-

² See Documents 17–23.

³ The memorandum of conversation from the March 24 meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS Memcons, 1977.

⁴ See Document 22

cussed at the formal sessions, but the subject had come up in the private talks.

Schindler asked whether the Soviets had given any indication of distinguishing between direct emigration to the US and emigration to Israel, and the Secretary replied, "No".

Anti-Semitism

Schindler asked whether they had given any clues about the apparent upsurge in anti-Semitism, and the Secretary said there had been "no clues". Shulman commented that it was questionable how much recent developments were caused by anti-Semitism and how much they reflected suppression of dissidents. He was inclined to doubt they were caused by anti-Semitism. Goodman replied that Soviet Jews see it as anti-Semitism. For example, the anti-Semitic television film "Traders of Souls" has been shown on national television twice. Shulman said anti-Semitism is a latent phenomenon which surfaces from time to time in Russia. He cited as an example of official anti-Semitism the fact that two years ago Academy of Sciences institutes had been directed by the Academy Presidium to refer all decisions to employ Jews to the Academy Presidium. Quotas for Jews had existed sporadically in the past in some Academy of Sciences institutes, but had never been applied across-the-board until the decree two years ago. Gold and Goodman noted that Jewish quotas had also been instituted in certain university faculties. Shulman agreed that was true, at Moscow State University for example. Gold noted that imposition of such Jewish quotas encourages Jewish emigration. Shulman agreed, but pointed out that the quotas are also an effect of Jewish emigration. Shulman and the Jewish leaders agreed it was a cause-and-effect, self-reinforcing phenomenon.

Trade

Goodman asked the Secretary to elaborate on his earlier comment that in Moscow he had told the Soviets that progress in trade would be related to progress in SALT and emigration. The Secretary said the Soviets had been told that all were related in the eyes of the American people. He said the Soviets did not respond directly to that idea. They had countered that the US Government promised them MFN and then reneged. The Secretary said he had pointed out to the Soviets that as practical people they must take into account the trade-and-emigration connection, recognizing that Jackson-Vanik is an enacted statute.⁵ To remove the statute there must be progress in the emigration area.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 22.

Drop Outs

Alluding to their March 24 meeting, Gold mentioned the “drop-out” phenomenon (i.e., the high rate of Soviet Jews who leave the USSR with exit visas for Israel but settle in the US and other third countries instead of proceeding to Israel). Shulman interjected that he hoped the American Jewish organizations would not put emigrants in a straight-jacket which would compel them to go to Israel. It is important the emigrants be given a choice. So far the American people were responding very well to Soviet emigration and assisting and welcoming Soviet emigrants. For example, Mrs. Shulman works for the Council on Emigrés in the Professions, trying to raise funds to assist and place Soviet emigrant professionals. Gold and Schindler asked what the Secretary thought was the potential impact of the drop-out phenomenon—what he sensed in Moscow was the Soviet reaction.

The Secretary and Shulman indicated the drop-out phenomenon had not come up in any way during the Moscow trip. Schindler said all American Jews want to get as many Jews as possible out of the USSR, but there are signs the Soviets are manipulating the emigration flow to increase the drop-out rate, by increasing the proportion of urban Jews and professionals who tend to drop out. Schindler asked whether the Soviets discuss the drop-out rate in the CSCE context. Hartman answered that they sometimes cite it as a debating point.

Belgrade Conference

The Secretary noted that the Soviets are very sensitive about the approaching Belgrade CSCE Conference. They are very concerned, and fear a confrontation. During the Moscow visit the Secretary had discussed Belgrade in general terms with Gromyko. The Secretary had told Gromyko that we were not seeking a confrontation. Our position is that the Conference will be to review the progress or lack of progress in implementation of the Final Act, rather than to consider new proposals as the Soviets would prefer. Hartman commented that the Soviets would try to have only brief discussion of implementation, preferably outside the human rights area. The Secretary commented that the Soviets always ask why we emphasize Basket III.⁶

Gold asked whether the Secretary shared the concern of some observers, including some on the Hill, that if we take a strong position at Belgrade the Soviets might walk out. “Or downgrade the Conference”, Goodman suggested. The Secretary observed that the Soviets would like to downgrade the Conference if they could, but that would be hard to do. Hartman noted that the level of representation for the Belgrade

⁶ See footnote 9, Document 21.

Conference—below the Foreign Minister—was specified in the Final Act. All the European countries have agreed that representation should be just below the Foreign Minister.

Secretary Vance said that he had established a group to deal with the Belgrade Conference, and named Warren Christopher as Chairman. Schindler asked whether Jewish organizations should direct information about non-compliance to Christopher. The Secretary replied that such material could be directed to Christopher or Hartman. Gold commented that the NCSJ had been sending such information to Congressman Fascell⁷ as Chairman of the CSCE Commission. The Secretary and Hartman commented that the Department receives information from the Commission, so sending it to Congressman Fascell was an acceptable way to forward it. The Secretary commented that the Department is trying to work closer with Congressman Fascell's Commission. Gold commented that Fascell and Spencer Oliver⁸ feel they have a good relationship with the Department under the new Administration.

Middle East

Schindler asked what had been said about the Middle East during the Moscow trip. The Secretary said the Soviets had stressed the importance of their position as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference. There has been no change in the Soviet position. The newspapers misrepresented Gromyko's brief comments about the PLO during a toast. The Secretary specifically asked Gromyko whether there was any change in their position, and Gromyko replied that there was not. Gold commented that the April 8 newspaper photos of Brezhnev and Arafat embracing showed there had been no change. The Secretary said there had been a general review of the Middle East issues during the Moscow visit. He said he believed the Soviets could not affect the substance of any settlement but could be spoilers. For that reason it is essential not to humiliate them or cause them to lose face. If they are allowed to continue to carry out their role as Co-Chairman they are less likely "to throw a spanner in the works".

Trade

Turning back to the subject of Soviet-American trade, Goodman and Gold cited a recent *Washington Post* article about the need of the East to convert to Western technology through trade. They asked the Secretary if he thought there was anything they should do as a community or Conference in the trade area. They observed that the Soviets'

⁷ Representative Dante Bruno Fascell (D-Florida).

⁸ Chief Counsel of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs from 1976.

main objective in trade seemed to be the acquisition of Western technology.

The Secretary commented that Shulman had been telling him that for months. Shulman observed that the Department of Commerce has an advisory committee on East-West trade. The meetings are open, and the NCSJ could attend. There will be a meeting in May or June.

Secretary Vance commented that there is also a Joint Economic Committee chaired by Treasury. Shulman said that technology transfer will become a more prominent issue. There is sharp division of opinion within industry over this issue. Hartman observed that technology transfer is only an issue in the very advanced high technology areas, not in other areas of Soviet-American trade.

Individual Cases

Goodman asked if any specific cases such as Anatoliy Shcharanskiy had been raised in Moscow, and whether there had been any feedback. The Secretary indicated that specific cases had not been discussed. Gold and Goodman reported that the NCSJ had just received word that Naum Salanskiy⁹ had been told he may leave the USSR. Hellman asked whether Shcharanskiy's case will be raised. Gold suggested that perhaps Ambassador Toon could raise it. The Secretary replied that he had thought about that, but was not sure such a representation would be a help or a hindrance to Shcharanskiy. Shulman indicated he shared the Secretary's doubts. He commented that he thought it was probably helpful for the Jewish organizations to continue to publicize the case.

The Secretary said he thought it better for the Department to advance the causes of the dissidents and Soviet Jewry in general terms rather than by raising specific cases. With regard to cases such as Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and Aleksandr Ginzburg, Shulman saw three general approaches open to the Soviets—1) crack down; 2) to mend their relations with the US, take favorable action in symbolic cases; and 3) take a mixed approach as with Dr. Shtern and Shcharanskiy¹⁰—arrest some while letting others out. Shulman said he thought the third was more likely. Shulman continued that he thought it would be easier for the Soviets to let Shcharanskiy out rather than try him, but easier for them to try Ginzburg. In that case they have specific charges involving currency transgressions.

⁹ Soviet physicist.

¹⁰ Reference is to Mikhail Shtern, a refusenik released from a Soviet prison in mid-March 1977, about the same time Anatoli Shcharanskiy, a Soviet dissident, was imprisoned.

Gold commented that interpreting the Soviet situation is fascinating business. Shulman observed that it is not a science.

The Secretary said he hoped the Administration's efforts in these areas help. Gold said he agreed completely with the Secretary's approach, and described the Secretary's efforts as "marvelous".

Goodman asked if there would be any follow-up on the lists presented in Moscow.

The Secretary replied that he personally follows up on such matters from time to time, usually with Ambassador Dobrynin.

The visitors thanked the Secretary for the meeting and for his efforts on behalf of Soviet Jews.

26. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, April 10, 1977

SUBJECT

SALT Negotiations

PARTICIPANTS

US

Marshall Shulman, S/MS

USSR

Georgiy A. Arbatov, Director of
the Institute on USA
and Canada

SUMMARY: At a dinner meeting in New York, Giorgi A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute on USA and Canada, filled in some background on Soviet reactions during and following our Moscow meetings and discussed some possible terms for future SALT negotiations.

I had dinner with Giorgi A. Arbatov, Director of the Institute on USA and Canada, on April 10. His account of the reaction in Moscow to our meetings largely confirmed information received from other sources, but in some respects went further.

The main elements of a common reaction of anger and puzzlement, Arbatov said, were:

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 39, SALT—Chronology: (1/24/77–5/9/77: Tabs 11–19). Secret. Drafted by Shulman. A "C" in the upper right-hand corner indicates Carter saw it.

1. Disbelief that the US would cast aside the Vladivostok + January terms² that had been reached with so much difficulty on their side. He said they kept waiting until the third day of the meetings to see whether “Vance had not brought something more.”

2. What loomed largest in the comprehensive proposal was the proposed cut in their ICBM force, which seemed transparently one-sided in its effect. If the intention was to encourage a shift to a more stable sea-based force on both sides, this could have been understood if we had not tried to accomplish it so fast.

3. From the Soviet point of view, the absence of proposals for ground and sea based cruise missiles seemed cavalier, and not even in the US interests, taking into account the situation that would exist in a few years in the absence of such limitations.

4. Brezhnev felt he had gone to great length to explain candidly the Backfire limitations and was angered that his efforts seemed to be ignored.

5. The Soviet intention had been to reject the two US proposals, not to close off negotiations or to create a crisis in Soviet-American relations, but they felt the President’s press statements immediately after the meetings’ close³ seemed to suggest that the US proposals had been deliberately intended to evoke a Soviet rejection for propaganda purposes. These statements contributed to Soviet uncertainties about the intentions of the US Administration. Background factors, he said, were the human rights campaign and the request for funds for VOA and Radio Liberty timed to coincide with the beginning of the Moscow talks.

Arbatov said he and his colleagues had debated two main theories about US intentions:

1. That the President may have genuinely wanted a substantial agreement, but because of inexperience tried to move too fast and ignored the logical starting point of the discussion as of January 1976, and may have been encouraged in this by people who did not want an agreement; or

2. That the President wished to produce a Soviet rejection that would justify further US military buildup and a general return to a confrontation relationship.

In discussing possible ground for future negotiations, Arbatov thought some elements of the US comprehensive proposal could be ac-

² Reference is to the SALT terms discussed by Kissinger and Brezhnev in January 1976. These are outlined in Brzezinski’s memorandum on SALT Negotiating History, February 2, 1977; see footnote 4, Document 1.

³ See the March 30 press briefing, “President Carter Discusses Strategic Arms Limitation Proposals,” in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 25, 1977, pp. 409–414.

cepted, if the negotiations started from Vladivostok + January. As long as cruise limitations, ground and sea based, along with air launched, were included, he thought the Soviet Union could accept some reductions in the aggregates. He thought it possible that some parts of the comprehensive plan could be accepted in principle (on the Vladivostok model) at the time of the signing of SALT II, and other parts could be accepted for negotiation in SALT III. Speaking personally, he thought the Soviet side might consider limitations on flight testing, although with different numbers, and might be willing to consider limitation on mobile launchers, although he said some Soviet advisors thought mobiles could be stabilizing and could be made verifiable.⁴ (He added that they had not been inclined to consider separate elements of the comprehensive proposal at Moscow because they understood it was being presented as an integral package.)

With regard to procedure for the next steps, he was concerned that the May meeting with Gromyko was not the best forum, since people who knew more about SALT details needed to be involved, but he thought the process could at least be started through Dobrynin. He hoped the US would take the initiative and he thought it unlikely that the Soviet Union could or would.

He expressed personal regret that the circumstances were such that a warmer reception could not have been given to the Secretary, who was held in general high regard.

Arbatov will make what he describes as a “dull speech” at MIT this week, and will come to Washington April 16 for two weeks, during which period he mainly wishes to form a judgment about the intentions of the Administration.

⁴ Carter underlined “limitations on flight testing” and “limitation on mobile launchers” in this sentence.

27. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 12, 1977, 4–4:40 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting in the Oval Office, 4:00–4:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President	Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin
The Vice President	
Secretary Vance	
Dr. Brzezinski	
Robert Hunter (NSC Notetaker)	

The meeting began with an exchange of pleasantries concerning the Ambassador's trip to Moscow.

The President said he was looking forward to the next few months, and hoped that the two sides could work out difficulties on SALT. He had been disappointed at the Soviet reaction to the US proposal. We had gotten together our position, and put it forward for Soviet reaction. He hoped he would not be permanently disappointed. He felt that with over a month's work, with the exchange of letters with Brezhnev,² and the Secretary's talks with the Ambassador³—in which the US had put forward its position—it was hard to understand Soviet concerns, expressed both publicly by Gromyko and also in their abrupt and surprising rejection of the U.S. proposal.

The Ambassador asked if the President was surprised by the Gromyko press conference.⁴

The President joked that it was Gromyko's first in a long time. *Dobrynin* joked that he was just following the trend in the US Administration,⁵ and *the President* countered that that would be great.

The Ambassador said that it was important (at SALT) to begin with something.

The President asked what we should do now. Discussions would continue in May in Geneva between Secretary Vance and Gromyko. We

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Hunter/Rentschler Trips/Visits File, Box 18, 4/12/77 Dobrynin (USSR) Visit: 4/77. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Hunter. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² See Documents 4, 7, 12–15, and 24.

³ See Documents 17–23.

⁴ For the text of Gromyko's March 31 press conference, see *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIX, no. 13, (April 27, 1977), pp. 5–9.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 26.

had gone back and assessed the relative strength of the two nations, from our viewpoint, in 1985. We felt that our proposal was equitable, but we couldn't know Soviet plans. Where should we go from here? If we relegate the matter to technicians, there will be no progress. We are not in a great hurry, but we do want progress.

The Ambassador said that when there was a framework for negotiating, then experience shows that it is necessary to agree at the President's level—or the Secretary's—otherwise there would be no agreement.

The President asked if it would be all right at the level of Secretary Vance.

The Ambassador said that the decision ultimately rests with the President. In the Soviet Union, it is Brezhnev. As long as the decision is at the top level, working through the Secretary's level would be all right. Though he (Dobrynin) could pass comments back and forth to Brezhnev, as before.

The President asked whether Brezhnev is considering making other proposals, other than seeking agreement on the basis of ratifying Vladivostok agreement.

The Ambassador replied that Brezhnev is waiting for new ideas from the President. He had pointed this out in his letter,⁶ he waits to see if we have changes (?) to the Vladivostok agreement. He wants an agreement. Dobrynin is 100% sure of that. But what basis should it be on? The Soviet Union did not feel capable of accepting the comprehensive proposal as the basis for agreement. It was so different from what had been agreed and negotiated for more than two years. This was a matter of deep conviction, that after that something new should not just be brought up.

The President said we had proposed two options, one of which (the second one) was very close to Vladivostok.

The Ambassador said that it put cruise missiles aside altogether. He understood that the US is for reductions, but SALT is about "Limitations". The second US proposal would permit cruise missiles to go unchecked. The US proposed to permit this fourth dimension to be developed without checks. How could this be explained to the Soviet people?—that here was a wonderful SALT II agreement, but it permitted a new strategic system? What kind of agreement would that be?

The President asked if Brezhnev did not consider our second proposal worthy of discussion.

The Ambassador said that if cruise missiles were ignored in it, then it was not. They had never decided to let cruise missiles go unchecked.

⁶ See Document 24.

The President said there seemed to be a difference of opinion between Soviet negotiators and Secretary Kissinger. Kissinger said that cruise missiles were never discussed at Vladivostok. Subsequently there had been talks on it, but there had never been an agreement shared by both sides.

The Ambassador replied that a green light had never been given to cruise missiles at Vladivostok. *The President* agreed. *The Ambassador* continued that there was already agreement on ALCMs, which if on bombers would mean that the bombers would be counted under the 1320 MIRV limit. The only disagreements remaining were on SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles.

Secretary Vance said this was in January 1976⁷ and (in response to a question from the President) that the range was 2500 kilometers.

The President indicated that Kissinger had agreed to this. *Secretary Vance* added that this had been subject to working out all other aspects of the agreement; it was only part of a package. Dr. Brzezinski added that having an agreed package meant agreement on Backfire, as well.

The President indicated that there was a basis for negotiation here.

The Ambassador said they were prepared to accept an approach whereby cruise missiles were counted as MIRVs (i.e. the bomber approach).

The President said, assuming that negotiations went forward on the second US proposal, we would have no objection to negotiating with cruise missiles involved, and with (the?) assurances from Brezhnev on Backfire. Then we could both go on to ratify the agreement. Would the Ambassador be frank, and tell what position the Soviet Union would take on lower levels as goals for later. He would be happy to have a letter from Brezhnev saying that here are some divisions of numbers with regard to submarines, ICBMs, bombers, and MIRVed missiles, for 1985 or for 1982. This would be welcome as a basis for negotiations. What bothered the President was the position and attitude taken by the Soviet government. It has made no proposals. He would welcome some as a basis for negotiating.

The Ambassador answered that there was a Soviet proverb about taking the bird one has, instead of looking for another in the sky. There had been three years of negotiating on SALT II. The small differences that still existed were less than those in the new US proposal (i.e. comprehensive proposal). It would take years to negotiate. Inside the Soviet Union there would be real problems. He could state definitively that there would be no agreement on that basis this year; the issues were simply too complex. It was important to finish first things first. When

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 26.

October comes, it should be possible to reach agreement: ALCMs had been done, land and sea-based cruise missiles could be deferred to SALT III provided there were agreement not to test them. And mobile missiles could be put in or left out. The Soviet Union is prepared to go forward on this basis.

He continued that this agreement would be worthwhile now. On the idea of levels of weapons and MIRVs, there could be a declaration. Brezhnev would be willing to sign one, or this could be done in any other way that the President would decide with Brezhnev: to the effect that negotiations would begin immediately (after SALT II) on lower levels. It could say now that reductions agreed in SALT III could go into effect in SALT II. They were already (set?) to go down, though not immediately to 1800. To some people in the Soviet Union, that proposal seemed suspicious. The cuts would be too deep into the Soviet forces, but little for the United States. There were too many questions. The political atmosphere between the two countries was not as good as he wanted to have in the future. If that went unresolved, it could lead to other difficulties.

There had been nearly three years of negotiating on SALT II, and it was 90% or so completed. So let's discuss the two or three issues that are left. The Soviet Union is prepared to include a statement, regarding negotiations of actual reductions, which could take place in the time period of SALT II.

Secretary Vance asked if it could be said under the SALT II agreement that numbers would be less than 2400 (missiles and bombers) and 1320 (MIRVs)? *Dr. Brzezinski* added that a deadline for reductions was also important.

The Ambassador replied that negotiations on SALT III could go forward as soon as SALT II was signed. SALT III could negotiate a particular figure, which would be put into effect in the SALT II period, without waiting until it expired.

Dr. Brzezinski said that to create mutual confidence, this would need to be rapid. It was also desirable in a continuing process to deal with those weapons causing the greatest anxieties. Therefore there were both reductions and a freeze in the US proposal. It was also important that both sides show restraint while moving to reductions.

The Ambassador replied that within the framework agreed upon, this (reductions) couldn't be done if the US got an advantage.

The President indicated that it was not our intention to do that. *The Ambassador* said it looked that way to the Soviet Union. *The President* said he understood that that was their reaction. But he hoped that if they saw something that they thought was not equitable, they would say so. On the SS-17s, 18s, and 19s, we thought in putting together our

proposal they might want to go up to 550—maybe they would want to go to 1000, though we hoped not.

He hoped they would be willing to accept the 1800 level (?). We were not trying to get an unfair position, after the stability point were reached. He had no objection to negotiating reductions in two stages.

The Ambassador asked what the President meant. Finishing SALT II, followed by the reductions in SALT III (as discussed)? *The President* agreed. He said we would set down, after talking with them, what we think we could accept. Any why not, before either of us tests missiles, let one another know about it? This doesn't need to be a complicated matter; the Soviet Union could define the limits. If there were some missiles that would be launched in the Soviet Union and come down there, they might not want to have us know about them. Our society is more open.

Secretary Vance said he would provide a memo on this.⁸

The President continued that we would list things we are interested on negotiating in SALT II. If Brezhnev doesn't want them, he can cross them out. We should then go on with as many issues as possible that are not controversial. This is our idea for SALT II. He would welcome, if they agree, including what is possible immediately, or to go to SALT III for reductions.

The Ambassador said that this was in the Brezhnev letter. *The President* said he did not question that. He had put in a lot of time on this issue.

The Ambassador said that the first US proposal had seemed one-sided, a matter of politics and propaganda. Why, they asked in Moscow, had the United States put in its (first) proposal? He had been asked to explain. The leaders in Moscow had been unanimous on rejecting this proposal, since it was so one-sided. The Soviet point on this had been so clear, why had the United States laid this proposal before them?

The President said that if the proposal appeared one-sided, it was inadvertant. We had tried to estimate their programs for SS-17s, 18s, and 19s. We thought they were shifting to the modern large ballistic missiles. We have 550 Minuteman IIIs, and thought they might want that figure for (MIRVs?). We used our best judgment of what the Soviet Union would want. There was no desire to put it at a disadvantage. The President was not about to waste two months of his life on that kind of approach.

⁸ No such memorandum has been found.

Fishing

The President then raised the issue of Soviet fishing boats. He said that he had tried to wait before acting, and at first only citations were issued. Now it was necessary to enforce the law. He asked the Soviet government's help in stopping these violations.

The Ambassador said that the first incident happened when he was out of the country. But the instructions given by the Soviet government to the fishing boat captains had been to obey the law and the agreement the Soviet Union had with the United States. Two ships had been seized.⁹ Maybe they were in violation, maybe not—he did not know, though his consul in Boston would report. One of the boats is a refrigerator ship—and is not large—he hoped that it could be let go.

The President said he had no authority to release any boats. The issue was with the courts, and it would not be proper for him to interfere. He had some latitude when they were at sea, but not after they had been seized.

The Ambassador said he understood. The State Department had raised this yesterday. They were ready to pay (?). He could assure the President there would be no excuses, and that they would fulfill their obligations. He was concerned, however, about all the unfriendly talk in the United States.

The President suggested that the Soviet government put out a statement, indicating what the instructions to the captains had been. This might help.

The Ambassador said why not? He would ask. *Secretary Vance* added that a third boat had been seized. *Dr. Brzezinski* added that these were being treated on an individual basis; it was not part of any conflict, and this had been told to the press.

SOVIET COMMENTS

The President introduced the subject of commentary in the Soviet press. He indicated that in the first month of his Administration, the Soviet press had been reticent about personal attacks against him. That had changed, and he wanted to raise it—though these attacks did not hurt him. He was careful not to say anything about Brezhnev that was not complimentary. If their earlier attitude had changed, he wanted to help restore it, and create an atmosphere here of a desire for friendship with the Soviet Union.

⁹ In an April 4 memorandum to Brzezinski and Aaron, Odom provided information on Soviet fishing violations, specifically related to the *Sovrenennyi*, which had been boarded by the U.S. Coast Guard. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 78, USSR: 4-5/77)

The Ambassador said he understood, and asked if he could be undiplomatic. *The President* joked that he hoped Dobrynin would not be too undiplomatic. *The Ambassador* continued that the psychological atmosphere had become bad—because of initiatives on the part of the United States. Two or three years ago—and this had nothing to do with personalities—there had been a sense in the Soviet Union that relations were improving, and this feeling had become quite strong. Now this was not the case.

The President said he would try to change that.

The Ambassador continued that if the improvement of atmosphere were mutual, it would be good. They had been impressed that this Administration—though not deliberately, but for some reasons—had been trying to push the Soviet Union, and had been engaging in anti-Soviet propaganda. This was the impression they had reluctantly come to. In November and December, the Soviet press had been positive. Then some issues—and some actions in the White House—had created a bad impression, as though we were starting psychological warfare (not ideological struggle, which was good). This had led to a spoiling of the atmosphere. The atmosphere in the Soviet Union was strained with regard to the United States. He could say this was something to be worked on together; they are prepared to move their half of the way.

The President said that we should do what we can, on both sides.

SALT

The Ambassador returned the conversation to SALT. He summarized that the US should be prepared to look at the Vladivostok Agreement as it is, with the levels as they were agreed, with cruise missiles subject to negotiation in SALT II. Therefore, this would be the number two US proposal, with cruise missiles.

The President said that we would prepare a draft on it, including what we wanted to say on this. *Secretary Vance* said it should be informal, sort of thinking out loud.

The Ambassador said it was clear that they did not want to talk about the comprehensive US proposal. Both would be talking about Vladivostok, though each side could call it what it wanted. The only difference is on cruise missiles. On mobile missiles, that could be negotiated—and could be prohibited or counted. The real issues that are left are cruise missiles: with ALCMs, there was a preliminary understanding. Sea and land-based cruise missiles were left.

Secretary Vance said that we would think out other issues. *The President* said that this was a good start, and that the Secretary would provide our views (?).

The Ambassador said it would be good to have them before the meeting with Gromyko, instead of trying to do it in two days in Geneva.

The President said it would be helpful if the Soviet Union would let us have a picture—in general terms, not a negotiating position yet—of what their thinking might be on the lowest levels of nuclear forces they could accept for 1982 or 1985.

The Ambassador suggested that this would be difficult, and that negotiations should go forward for a while first; *the President* agreed. *The Ambassador* said it would be better to get a feeling that something was going to come out of the current round, then it would be all right to provide the thinking the President had suggested.

The President said that just going on to ratify Vladivostok, on the basis of ideas worked out by Kissinger, wouldn't be very much. *The Ambassador* said it was something. *The President* agreed, but said that we really wanted to go farther. We need an understanding that Brezhnev will help us to get lower levels. *The Ambassador* said that was no obstacle, and *the President* said that would be helpful.

The Ambassador repeated that we would be moving on something. Working in parallel would be acceptable. They couldn't deceive the United States: if a treaty was no good, the United States would not negotiate it. Therefore, the Soviet Union was also interested in moving towards greater security which would be better than nothing. And a treaty would have to be measured against each other's views.

The two sides need a minimum (?) psychological understanding of each other. If we have something, we can then build little by little.

The President asked how much reductions in SALT II from the 2400 and 1320 levels would they consider. *The Ambassador* said he couldn't say. *The President* asked whether it could be 10 or 15%. *The Ambassador* urged the President not to press on this point. *The President* asked the Ambassador to speak personally, not as an official of the Soviet Union. *The Ambassador* replied that he didn't know.

The President asked how far down, in their view, would be in the mutual advantage of both sides. Was 1800 too low?

The Ambassador replied that it was, in 1985 (?) It seemed that the United States was trying to freeze Soviet forces, or get them to cut their heavy missiles. But they were prepared to look into a total package (?).

The President asked if there could be some reductions in SALT II? *The Ambassador* replied that Brezhnev was ready to put in a statement in SALT II, within a treaty.

Dr. Brzezinski mentioned having targets for reductions. *The Ambassador* replied that a treaty could provide for SALT II implementation of SALT III agreements. *Dr. Brzezinski* asked if in the summer there could

be some definite targets to be reached before 1985. *The Ambassador* said he doubted it, but some initial reductions could come before SALT III.

Secretary Vance said that Brezhnev told him that presenting as a fact that Backfire was not an intercontinental weapon was saying enough. We need better assurances, and the ability to verify. Brezhnev sees the problem differently; it is important for the Ambassador to get the US view over to him.

The Ambassador said it was first a psychological matter. If the President were to make a similar statement, he would be believed. His sincerity would be enough for Brezhnev. It would be clear that the President would not cheat. Even more, trying to cheat on such a small thing would be worthless. The United States can also check. The Soviet Union could not have 200 to 400 intercontinental bombers without testing them. He was speaking as an engineer. It was not possible that they would suddenly have 1000 of them. Besides, Brezhnev as chairman of their defense council personally approves all these programs. He knows that this is a medium bomber. If these points need strengthening, however, the US should raise them.

Secretary Vance said we would do so.

CHINA

The meeting concluded with an exchange on a State Department press announcement yesterday, in which it was noted that the Secretary had met with the head of the Chinese Liaison Office to discuss the Secretary's visit to Moscow. *Ambassador Dobrynin* asked if this meant that every time there was a negotiation between the United States and the Soviet Union, the Chinese would be involved. *The Secretary* said no; and that a lot of other items had been covered. *The President* joked that if we were revealing all the proposals the Soviet Union had made, then there wouldn't have been much to talk about.

28. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met May 18–20, 1977, in Geneva to discuss SALT II and the Middle East. Four of the five meetings addressed SALT and especially how the United States and Union of Soviet Socialist Republics could reach an agreement despite differing goals and objectives following the Vladivostok negotiations. For a summary of those meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 167.

June–December 1977

29. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, June 9, 1977

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I am taking advantage of Ambassador Toon's return to Moscow for him to convey to you my personal greetings and to deliver this letter.

I would like to share with you my feeling of encouragement at the more constructive spirit that prevailed during the recent meeting between Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko.² The understanding reached by them regarding the format of the next SALT agreement was a small but useful and welcome step forward. I was also gratified by the preliminary decision regarding the non-testing and non-deployment of new missiles.

I realize, of course, that we are a long way from a comprehensive agreement. The differences between our respective positions are substantive and wide. I am aware that you and your colleagues have special concerns regarding some of our strategic weapons, and I am eager to find a solution that provides equal security to both sides.

At the same time, I would like you to understand that our concern with respect to the new Soviet ICBMs, and especially the MLBMs, is motivated by our belief that the full deployment of these missiles, with their potential for numerous large reentry vehicles, could prove excessively threatening to our land-based ICBMs tending to destabilize the balance of nuclear deterrent capability.

I hope that our negotiators can make progress toward resolving these issues—as well as our differing positions on cruise missiles. My own preference—which I have stated before—is to move more rapidly toward truly significant reductions in the nuclear arsenals that we both control, for I strongly believe that such a step would open up many new opportunities for constructive American-Soviet cooperation. This is why I am eager to cut through existing obstacles, and I have the impression that you share the same desire.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 5, USSR (SALT), 2-12/77. No classification marking.

² See Documents 17-23.

I also feel that our two countries should soon undertake cooperative efforts in dealing with the global challenges confronting all of mankind: poverty, nutrition, health, and economic development. Closer US-Soviet cooperation on such matters would not only help other peoples but would also widen the scope of collaboration between our two countries, and thus be a positive step toward peace.

It is my hope that I can welcome you to our nation at an early date so that you and I can pursue personally our goals of disarmament, peace, trade, and increasing cooperation and friendship. If a formal visit to Washington should prove inconvenient to you, we might consider a less formal meeting, perhaps in Alaska, somewhat similar to your previous meeting in Vladivostok.

Sincerely,³

³ Printed from an unsigned copy.

30. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 17, 1977, 1514Z

8749. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Appointment With Brezhnev.

1. Upon arrival in Moscow I requested appointment with Brezhnev to deliver message from President.² We reminded Foreign Ministry of request this morning, stressing that President had specifically asked me to request meeting. We were informed this afternoon that Brezhnev is not available, but that Gromyko could see me in 25 minutes. I sent reply that my instructions are to deliver message to Brezhnev, and if this impossible I must report fact to you and request further instructions.

2. I see no point in discussing letter with Gromyko—particularly since a principal purpose of exercise was to facilitate access to

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Brezhnev–Carter, 6/30/77. Confidential; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 29.

Brezhnev—and therefore recommend that I reiterate original request to Foreign Ministry.

3. Frankly, I have been puzzled by delay in according me appointment with Brezhnev. I would have thought that the General Secretary—especially on eve of his visit to France would have been keenly interested in what President had to say. Fact that he has had a full week in which to arrange to receive me—and that during this period he managed to find time to see Indian Ambassador who passed message from Desai leads me to conclude that Brezhnev must be privy to contents of President's message through other channels. Perhaps you can shed light on this for me.

Toon

31. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 23, 1977, 12:40–2:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Zbigniew Brzezinski, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Soviet Union

I had lunch today (12:40–2:50) with Ambassador Dobrynin, on his initiative. The luncheon was a compromise-picnic: I provided the White House meal and he provided vodka and caviar, a bargain that I felt was equitable to both sides.

After usual preliminaries, we agreed that we would not talk about specific issues in any negotiating fashion but would simply discuss in broad terms the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. He asked me for my opinion and in my opening comments, I essentially suggested the following:

1. Our relationship is approaching a key phase in regards to some central issues, notably SALT, and, in some measure also, the Middle East. On SALT, I expressed concern that the pace of negotiations may not be rapid enough and that we may be faced by early fall with a situation which at least our publics will interpret as involving a crisis. This

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 6/77. Top Secret. The meeting took place at the White House.

could have an inhibiting effect on further progress. I stressed to him that this concern was not derived from any feeling that our public opinion or that our Congress would not support the U.S. negotiating position; rather it was derived from my concern that we do not put ourselves into a position in which neither side has sufficient flexibility to conclude an effective agreement.

Secondly, in regards to the foregoing, I also suggested that the Middle East is coming to a phase in which we will need to be very sensitive to each other's concerns. The Soviets have to realize that while they will need to be engaged in any formal negotiating process, at this stage it is in everyone's interest—including the Soviets'—for the United States to play a special role in encouraging the parties towards genuine negotiations.

In addition to these two key issues, I commented that other issues are surfacing as potential sources of difficulty: I noted that developments in Africa are such that they may well be interpreted in significantly different ways by Washington and Moscow, and that Soviet actions are likely to generate increasing anxiety here. I noted that the situation in Eastern Europe could conceivably become unstable if economic difficulties in one or another East European country were to become linked with political difficulties. This could precipitate some eruptions, the consequences of which could also adversely affect the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I also noted that at this stage it was too early for us to judge how genuinely interested the Soviets were in reaching an agreement on the CTB and the Indian Ocean, and that progress on these issues would be desirable. Finally, I noted that there are also specific irritants to be taken into account: The Toth incident had a negative impact on U.S. public opinion,² and so do the continued Soviet press attacks on the President personally, the Soviet crackdown on the dissidents, and—last but not least—the failure of Brezhnev to receive Ambassador Toon,³ who was carrying a friendly message to Brezhnev, especially in view of the fact that Dobrynin has already twice seen (and for lengthy sessions) the U.S. President.

In the light of the foregoing, I noted that we still hope very much that a Carter-Brezhnev meeting can be held, and that it can be held in an atmosphere which would be conducive to further progress in U.S.-Soviet relations. Accordingly, it might be important to reflect on ways which can be helpful to move SALT forward, to help contain

² Robert Toth, a reporter for *The Los Angeles Times* stationed in Moscow, was detained by Soviet authorities on June 11, reportedly for acquiring Soviet state secrets from a Soviet scientist. See "U.S. Reporter Detained in Soviet," *The New York Times*, June 12, 1977, p. 16.

³ See Document 30.

some of the negative tendencies noted in regards to the other major issues, and on how we can deal with the irritants that have emerged in our relations.

The foregoing was answered by Dobrynin who spoke at great length and with considerable feeling about his sense of grave concern regarding the state of U.S.-Soviet relations. He emphasized to me that he wanted to give me as accurate a feel for the atmosphere in Moscow as he can conceivably convey. He stressed that the Soviet leaders are very perplexed about what it is that the Carter Administration is trying to do. He stated that Brezhnev recently asked him to provide one concrete example of the new Administration's willingness to improve U.S.-Soviet relations and that Dobrynin was at a loss as to how to answer. Dobrynin specifically mentioned a number of examples which in his view were counterproductive: the negative decision on the Cyber computer;⁴ the publicity given to new weapons systems which seem to be designed to put the Soviet Union under pressure; the President's use of the word "aggressively" when the President recently spoke of the U.S. desire to pursue policies designed to diminish Soviet influence in certain friendly countries.

Dobrynin stated that all of the foregoing is creating the impression in Moscow that we are more interested in competition than in cooperation and that this necessarily affects the Soviet attitude on specific issues. In addition to the foregoing, he noted the following minor specific points, which strike me as worthy of note:

- a. He said he was surprised that lower level State Department officials seem to be familiar with the fact as well as with the content of the President's correspondence with Brezhnev;
- b. That U.S. delegations to recent bilateral U.S.-Soviet talks on nuclear and other issues did not seem to be well prepared and not ready to negotiate in detail.

Turning to SALT, Dobrynin emphasized that the Soviet position is that the United States is deliberately attempting to significantly affect the central component of the Soviet nuclear force, namely ground-based missiles. This he feels is unequal and one-sided. He also stressed that the Soviet Union made a deliberate bow to the President by proposing recently that both sides reduce their arsenals to 2250; he emphasized this point, stressing that this had not been the Soviet intention but that it was a goodwill gesture aimed at the President personally.

⁴ Reference is to the Carter administration's refusal to sell the Soviet Union a Cyber 76 computer, which would reportedly be used for meteorological study. See Jack Anderson and Les Whitten, "Carter Blocks Sale of Computer," *The Washington Post*, June 13, 1977, p. B13.

I stressed to Dobrynin that he should make it clear to his Soviet colleagues that there are certain things which the U.S. President can and cannot control. I cited the example of the Concorde as something which foreigners find very difficult to comprehend,⁵ and I emphasized that it is important for him to stress to Brezhnev that the Congressional defense budget process, and statements by legislators, are not under executive control in this country. Moreover, I indicated to him that the President's desire to decrease nuclear weaponry is a very genuine one, and that it had been counterproductive for the Soviet side to misconstrue it as an attempt to gain a unilateral advantage. He acknowledged this point and stated that he was trying to convince his colleagues back home of this fact.

He became somewhat indignant when I cited to him the fact that some Soviet spokesmen had spoken of deeper cuts than those proposed by Gromyko, involving at least 10%. He spoke with some vehemence to the effect that we make a mistake in taking seriously Soviet academicians who pretend to speak for the top Soviet leadership. He pointed out that the most prominent one of them has seen Brezhnev only once a year and that it is really a figment of our own imaginations to consider them as serious spokesmen for the Soviet government. He noted, for example, that the Soviet academic who publicly proposed in Moscow a mutual 10% cut was reprimanded and will not make such proposals again.

While generally concerned with the nature of the U.S.-Soviet relationship, he was unwilling to be specific as to what ought to be done about it. He was rather inclined to press me for my views, which I did not elaborate beyond those summarized earlier. He agreed that it might be useful to try to see whether a more concerted effort could not be made in SALT in order to make certain that there is more definite progress by September; that it might be useful to take a closer look at some of the issues that provoked the greatest degree of sensitivity on both sides, differentiating between those which cannot be subject to governmental control and those which perhaps can be ameliorated by initiatives taken by the leaders; and that more thought ought to be given to the possibility of a Carter-Brezhnev meeting. We further agreed that it might be useful to have again a talk focusing not so much on specific issues but on the larger dimensions of the Soviet-American relationship, and that he would pursue this subject also in his conversations with the Secretary of State.

⁵ The Concorde was an Anglo-French supersonic passenger aircraft undergoing a 16-month trial for trans-Atlantic flights and encountering opposition from those in its flight path because of its sonic boom. See Albert R. Karr, "The Sticky Concorde Issue," *The Wall Street Journal*, June 23, 1977, p. 20.

On leaving, I assured him that I would summarize his views as best I can to both the President and the Secretary, and I expressed the hope that Ambassador Toon will be in a position to hold a similar conversation soon with top Soviet leaders. He explained to me that he was surprised that Toon delayed so long his request to deliver the letter to Brezhnev and that under the circumstances the Soviet side had no choice but to decline the request since Brezhnev was about to leave for Paris. He agreed that it would be useful for Toon to meet with Chairman Brezhnev, although he also noted that Brezhnev tends to be somewhat more volatile than the President and that there might be some risks in a discussion at this stage of the relationship.

An incidental footnote: He told me that the Soviets are from now on officially translating Brezhnev's title not as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (the traditional way of translation), but as the President of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. In brief, Brezhnev is also Mr. President.

32. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, June 24, 1977

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #18

1. *Opinions*

The opinion piece this week is written by William Hyland of the NSC Staff. Hyland, as you know, went with Vance to both Moscow and Geneva and is probably this government's top Soviet expert. He argues that we should be sensitive to the permanent problems confronting the Soviet Union and that we should not overestimate the significance of the temporary coolness in US-Soviet relations. It thus presents a somewhat different perspective than the one developed by Shulman² and

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 41, Weekly Reports (to the President), 16-30: (6/77-9/77). Top Secret; Sensitive. Carter wrote, "Good. C" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² Reference is presumably to Shulman's June 16 memorandum to Vice President Mondale, which outlines current trends in U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. (Department of State, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Dissidents and Political Prisoner Subject Files, 1974-1988, Lot 91D273, Box 9, Shcharanskiy, Anatoliy 1977)

implies that a steady policy course by the United States would be most productive.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

It is risky to try to characterize Soviet-American relations at any given point. In August 1968 at the time of the Czech invasion,³ it would have seemed that there would be a sharp deterioration. In fact, there was little change. In 1972–73 optimistic projections were made, but by 1976 relations were stagnating.

Thus, it is misleading now to characterize relations as caught up in a “downward spiral.” The relationship is much more of a mix of transitory facts and more basic and permanent elements. Too much of the current analysis focuses on the transitory, while disregarding the permanent problems confronting the USSR.

First, *the transitory factors*:

—there seems little doubt that the Soviets made a positive judgment about the President [1 line not declassified] He was portrayed as changing the style but not the substance of his predecessors’ policy and generally inclined to do business with the Soviet Union. This analysis, [less than 1 line not declassified] was reflected in the conciliatory tone of Brezhnev’s speech at Tula on January 18. [6 lines not declassified]

Thus, we are dealing to some extent with a crisis of Soviet expectations. This may have been aggravated by the fact that Brezhnev personally put himself too far out in front—in conversations with Bill Simon and Averill Harriman,⁴ and in his public speeches. Since Brezhnev was already vulnerable, over President Ford’s abandonment of “detente,”⁵ he now may be exceptionally defensive about the failure of his relations with the Carter Administration to proceed along a smoother path.

But this is not a permanent state of affairs. Whatever criticism Brezhnev has had to endure, it has obviously not affected his power position. Nor has it necessarily affected his ability to adjust (and his visit to France represents a rehabilitation of “detente”).

Another temporary factor is the fate of the Soviet leadership. In retrospect, we know that the past few months have led to the downfall of Podgorny,⁶ and the consequent strengthening of Brezhnev’s position.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80 and 81.

⁴ William Simon, Secretary of the Treasury from 1974 until 1976 and Averell Harriman, Ambassador to the Soviet Union from 1943 until 1946. Simon had multiple conversations with Brezhnev including ones in April 1975 and November 1976; Harriman spoke with Brezhnev in September and December 1976.

⁵ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 69.

⁶ Podgorny was forced out of his position as Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet by Brezhnev, who replaced him in June 1977.

What we cannot be sure of is how much this internal conflict may have shaped Soviet policy during the interim. Certainly, if Brezhnev was engaged in a struggle, he might have overreacted to current events. His behavior since the Central Committee meetings does not suggest a hardening of his foreign policy line.

The outcome seems to be a temporary confusion. Brezhnev is reaching out to various visitors—Genscher and Giscard—to establish a better understanding of Jimmy Carter. This is typical because Brezhnev tends to personalize relations. So, we can expect that this period, which could last for some time, will be followed by one in which the main features of Soviet policy will be more certain and fixed. And as this confusion is cleared up, it is worth remembering that the Soviets do not have a free hand. They are constrained by *long term trends* that affect any Soviet leader, be it Brezhnev or his successor.

First of all, there is the nightmare of Soviet policy: two front hostility.⁷ If the Soviets misjudged the Administration of Jimmy Carter, they also misjudged the Administration of Hua Kuo-feng. Their frustrations have been surfaced in a series of authoritative and harsh attacks on China. The Soviet note of mid-May was the most ominous threat since the crisis of 1969. This rather significant turn of events has received less attention in the West because of our preoccupation with SALT and other matters.

One is forced to conclude, however, that the Soviets now foresee a period of rising tensions with China. Thus, unless Brezhnev wants to justify hostility on two fronts, he is compelled to look for ways to soften the conflict with the West, including with the United States.

Second, there is the SALT problem and its alternative. Despite harsh words, the Soviets have in fact moved in their substantive position, if only slightly. The lapse of the present agreement is more of a symbol of failure for Brezhnev than for the United States. And, the consequences of a new round of competition cannot be all that attractive to Brezhnev. A cruise missile race without an agreement is not in the Soviet interest. Moreover, the United States is on the upswing of the curve with B-1, Trident I and II, MK-12A and cruise missiles. The Soviets are on a plateau filling out the deployment of five years ago.⁸

And there is the economic problem. While it is always dangerous to project Soviet restraint because of their economic dilemma, it may be

⁷ Carter underlined "two front hostility."

⁸ Carter placed a parallel line next to the last two sentences of this paragraph.

true for the first time that long-term problems will impinge on foreign policy decisions. A CIA study still in the works suggests this.⁹

The problem of dissent is a difficult one. The Soviets have applied varying tactics to neutralize it, but it continues. The most significant change has been that what used to be an interesting phenomena for Soviet specialists has gradually emerged as an international issue. This is reflected in Solzhenitsyn's stature throughout the world and awarding of a Nobel prize to Sakharov. The Soviets, always inordinately suspicious, may see the U.S. as engaged in a political offensive, but they are nevertheless caught up in the dilemma: to repress their dissidents actually aggravates the problem abroad. It is therefore an interesting fact, that despite some noisy propaganda, the Soviets have behaved very cautiously since the round of quick arrests in early February. Tactically, the Soviets may be seeking a period of quiet.

But the basic fact is that the West in general, and the U.S. in particular, has the power to greatly aggravate the Soviet dilemma. And it is this consciousness that, in the end, will bring Brezhnev back to a foreign policy of moderation.

Brezhnev also knows better than we do that the situation in Eastern Europe is not good, and that he may face an explosion in Poland. That possibility is the more likely if repression is intensified, but perhaps less likely if tensions seem to be receding.

One last factor that is the most difficult to take into account is Brezhnev's personal situation. It is a reasonable guess that he wishes to end his career on a high point.¹⁰ The new constitution is a testament of sorts. Assuming the Presidency goes along with the same syndrome. But since he is associated with detente, and particularly with SALT, then it must be agonizing for him to contemplate that this status as a "peace champion" will elude him in his relations with the United States. He is a hardened old veteran, and could absorb this setback, but it is a good bet that he is obsessed with restoring "detente" by the 60th Bolshevik Anniversary this November.

In sum, many of the permanent factors seem to point to an eventual turn in Soviet policy back toward something resembling "detente". Obviously, as pointed out by Marshal Shulman, the U.S. could inadvertently or deliberately forestall such a turn. But we have the capabilities,

⁹ In the margin at the end of this paragraph, Carter wrote, "may be most important of all." The July 1977 CIA study, entitled "Soviet Economic Problems and Prospects," is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, International Economics, Tim Deal File, Box 10, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR): 3/76-8/77.

¹⁰ Carter underlined the phrase "he wishes to end his career on a high point."

provided that we carefully monitor each major issue (SALT, CTB, Indian Ocean, CSCE, the Middle East, and human rights),¹¹ to shape Soviet policy at a time of uncertainty. We still have most of the high cards.

[Omitted here is information on the Quadripartite Meeting on Conventional Arms Restraint.]

US–USSR Working Group on Proliferation

The first session of the US–USSR working group on proliferation was recently held in Washington. Morokhov,¹² who led the Soviet delegation, had an hour long opening statement full of substance, including: (1) they agree, without reservation, to participate in our INFCE program (fuel cycle evaluation); (2) expansion of NPT membership should be our most important goal, and we should concentrate on Brazil, Argentina, Spain, South Africa, Israel and South Korea (we came back at them with Cuba, North Korea and Vietnam); (3) a proposal for a joint US–USSR statement signed “at the highest level” outlining nine points for a “universal non-proliferation regime.” In response to a point we raised, they said that they were reconsidering their position on signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco¹³ but that it was difficult for them. With regard to India, they agreed that the first step should be to get them to agree to full scope safeguards and they would exercise their influence in that direction. All in all, a very encouraging beginning to these exchanges.

Initial Soviet Views on Indian Ocean Arms Limitations.

In the first two meetings of the US–USSR working group on arms limitations, the Soviets focused their approach on three subjects:

—Elimination of “foreign” military bases, both the US bases and those of US allies; the Soviets stated that neither they nor their allies have bases. They do not, therefore, define Berbera as a base. The Soviets said that bases are “the key issue.”

—Reciprocal reduction of military activities—not only freezing the present level but decreasing it, as well as a total prohibition on nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines and on aircraft carriers.

—The definition of the area: the Soviets argued that a strict geographic definition is not proper because the US has permanent bases in adjacent areas while Soviet home ports are thousands of miles away.

¹¹ Carter underlined each of the items in parentheses.

¹² Igor Morokhov, Deputy First Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy.

¹³ The Treaty of Tlatelolco came into force in April 1969 and prohibited nuclear weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Soviets also proposed an exchange of data on military presence, including specifically ship-days and ton-days; said the talks are bilateral but that the forces and bases of allied countries must be taken into account; and pointed out the importance of the Indian Ocean to Soviet interests as the only year-round sea route connecting the European to the Far Eastern USSR.

Brezhnev in Paris

You will soon be receiving from Cy a report on the conversations between Brezhnev and Giscard.¹⁴ Here is a report on his behavior in Paris.¹⁵ According to our embassy:

“Brezhnev’s brusque personal behavior was reflected, in first instance, in frequent abrupt changes of visit’s protocol at his request. Tete-a-tete meetings which were foreseen were peremptorily transformed into large plenaries where Brezhnev was not at pains to give Giscard equal time. Similarly, Soviet agreement to sudden Brezhnev visit at City Hall to see Chirac was hardly gesture likely to please Giscard. Brusqueness also marked certain substantive exchanges. Finally, the curious manners of France’s latest guest were brought home to public by Brezhnev’s now widely publicized refusal to accept the second car—the Matra Rancho—which Giscard had given him because it was painted green! Brezhnev wanted it blue! Car was rushed back to factory and was repainted. This capriciousness made an impression.”

[Omitted here is information on West Bank attitudes.]

¹⁴ Not found.

¹⁵ The complete text of telegram 18438 from Paris, June 22, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770223–0699.

33. **Memorandum From Robert Hunter of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, June 27, 1977

SUBJECT

Brezhnev's Health

At the Political Directors' meeting last Wednesday,² both de Laboulaye and Andreani³ commented at length on Brezhnev's health (they both sat in on two meetings and the official functions), and the Elysee provided Embassy Paris with further details.

Their views take the Brezhnev health situation farther than our people reported from the Vance Moscow trip.

Brezhnev was "painted"—i.e., heavily made up—and seemed to be wearing a corset. He had trouble enunciating, and particular difficulty at the ends of sentences. He had trouble following the discussion, and needed constant prompting from Gromyko, who seemed to be "in control." There was one exchange on Berlin where Brezhnev seemed bewildered about the facts (though an alternative interpretation held that the Russians were confusing the facts—about *East* German encroachment in West Berlin—to tease the French). He acted as though he had never heard of Djibouti.

At the official dinner, Brezhnev had the toasts at the beginning, ate and drank nothing, and departed at 10:05. He walked out "unseeing", and stopped only to say hello to his grandson.

The French were told that the hour's delay in the start of the final meeting for an hour was due to Brezhnev's lengthy daily treatments on his jaw, and his desire not to get up too early.

Throughout, Brezhnev spoke almost entirely in generalities, and stayed away from details.

(Another observation, which Bill Hyland says is not out of the ordinary: during the reading of his long speech in the first meeting, Brezhnev kept making asides to Gromyko in Russian that "I really believe in this" or "yes, disarmament, disarmament;" and the French seriously wondered whether he had read the statement before giving it.)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 78, USSR: 6/77. Secret; Outside the System. Sent for information.

² June 22.

³ François de Laboulaye, French Ambassador to the United States and Jacques Andreani, Director for Europe, French Foreign Ministry.

De Laboulaye's summary: we might conclude that the succession process has already begun.

Other Items:

You have probably seen reporting that Brezhnev expanded the first meeting at the last moment, to include the two retinues; cancelled the second *tete-a-tete*; and had one of the cars given him sent back to be repainted blue.

The French were puzzled by this slipshod performance in contrast to the business-like preparatory visit of de Guiringaud⁴ to Moscow. At that meeting the French rejected a Soviet draft on *detente*, and read out an alternative. Gromyko noted some places in the document as it was being read, then instantly accepted it as the basic text. It changed little in negotiation.

The consensus in Paris is that Marchais⁵ was neither helped nor hurt very much by not seeing Brezhnev—and if anything he was helped slightly, in terms of his “independence” from Moscow. The Brezhnev-Chirac meeting was put on at the last minute, following a further round of pettiness on the part of both Giscard and Chirac, who no longer bother to disguise their mutual distaste (a point to be borne in mind if the President decides to go to France in the autumn).

The Elysee wanted us to know that Giscard had used the President's suggestions in his presentation to Brezhnev at the second meeting (which he made tougher than he would have otherwise, in response to Brezhnev's monopolizing the first meeting).

⁴ Louis de Guiringaud, French Foreign Minister.

⁵ Georges René Louis Marchais, head of the French Communist Party.

34. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 5, 1977, 1405Z

9564. For the Secretary from Toon. Subject: Appointment With Brezhnev.

1. Following are principal points made by Brezhnev in his prepared statement to me at 100-minute meeting in Kremlin this morning:

A. While Geneva meeting² had been useful Soviet side was disappointed at lack of progress in resolution substantive differences on SALT—which in Soviet view largely the fault of US which continued insist on one-sided approach;

B. US human rights campaign and particularly President's report to the Congress on CSCE compliance³ condemned as blatant interference in Soviet internal affairs;

C. Progress on removal of trade barriers stymied;

D. Despite Soviet understanding that Washington discussions re possible summit meeting would at US insistence remain confidential, matter had been unilaterally publicized, much to Brezhnev's annoyance;

E. Although Vance-Gromyko agreements on desirability of reconvening Geneva Conference this year was step forward, movement now seems bogged down.

2. While I will be sending full report later in day⁴ I thought that you and the President would wish to have this briefest of summaries soonest, particularly in view of fact that news of my meeting with Brezhnev is already on tickers. Brezhnev incidentally seemed in good form and while his speech was somewhat slurred it was intelligible. He did not visibly tire during our extended meeting and his attention span seemed normal.

Toon

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Brezhnev/Toon Meeting, 7/5/77. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 28

³ Not found.

⁴ In telegram 9615, July 5, the Embassy transmitted Toon's full report. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Brezhnev/Toon Meeting, 7/5/77)

35. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 5, 1977, 1420Z

9580. For the Secretary from Toon. Subject: Appointment With Brezhnev.

1. Following is my translation of letter for President handed me by Brezhnev at meeting in Kremlin this morning lasting one hour and forty minutes on which full report will be cabled soonest:²

Begin text.

Esteemed Mr. President:

I have received your letter conveyed by the American Ambassador to Moscow³ and for my part I would like to express the following thoughts.

I think that the conversations between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the Secretary of State of the USA in May of this year in Geneva⁴ were in fact useful and in a practical way a necessary step toward working out a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms.

However, as you yourself note, the differences between the positions of the sides still remain substantial. In this sense the discussions in Geneva did not lead to a solution of a number of principal questions. From our side and in the course of these discussions steps have been taken which offer a possibility of a way to fair mutually acceptable solutions, but from the American side such equivalent steps up until the present time have not followed.

Noting the desire to overcome existing obstacles which you expressed in your letter, I would like to hope that in the development of this the American side will react in a constructive way to our proposals. Indeed in the final analysis the conclusion of a new agreement is necessary not only for the Soviet Union. To an equal extent—we are deeply convinced of this—it is necessary for both of our countries, for both of our peoples, as well as for all other countries and peoples.

It is possible and necessary to find solutions to the remaining questions which stand in the path to agreement. For this, as we have several

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Brezhnev/Toon Meeting, 7/5/77. Secret; Cherokee; Niacet Immediate; Nodis.

² See footnote 4, Document 34.

³ See Document 29.

⁴ See Document 28.

times stressed, it is important at the outset to be guided in this matter by the principle of equality and equal security, to realize an identified mutually acceptable balance of interests, not trying to extract from the matter any sort of unilateral advantage. Only in this way is it possible to prevent a new spiral in the arms race with all the dangerous consequences flowing from this and with the inevitable political and other costs. It is also clear that any other development of events would remove us far from the goal of radical limitation and reduction of arms. I therefore call upon you once again to weigh the state of affairs with the conclusion of a new agreement and to apply the necessary efforts for the resolution of the remaining questions. For our part we as before wish and we are ready to bring the matter to the speediest working out of an agreement and its signature.

According to the mutual understanding which we have achieved we are ready to turn over for further discussion by the delegations in negotiations at Geneva a number of questions which have become ripe for this and will give appropriate instructions to our delegation on this account. The exchange of opinions on questions which will remain unresolved, as we have already agreed, will be continued in the course of meetings between A.A. Gromyko and C. Vance slated for September.

Now with regard to our meeting with you. We have already brought our considerations on this matter to your attention. Evidently therefore there is no need to repeat them here. I wish only to confirm my agreement that this question should be more concretely discussed by our two ministers in September.

Respectfully,
Moscow, The Kremlin
30 June 1977
L. Brezhnev
End text.

Toon

36. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 8, 1977

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

US

Marshall D. Shulman,
Special Consultant

USSR

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

SUMMARY: Dobrynin stressed the need for a quiet period in US-Soviet relations. SALT was the touchstone for progress in the relationship, and downgraded other issues as secondary in importance.

Ambassador Dobrynin came to see me at his request, following the signing ceremony of the US-USSR Science and Technology Agreement.² He appeared to have two missions in mind: to review current US-Soviet relations, and to discuss possible measures for their improvement.

Administration Intentions

On the first score, Dobrynin quite obviously was occupied with gathering material to answer queries from Moscow about the President and his intentions. "Does he really want a SALT treaty, or is he using the issue for political and propaganda purposes? Does he really want to improve relations? If so, why does he repeatedly violate our sensitivities, and particularly, Brezhnev's?" He added, "I don't want to make invidious comparisons, but although Henry [Kissinger] was as strong an anti-communist as anyone, he understood and observed the civilities of the relationship, whereas it is hard to know whether this Administration deliberately violates them, or does so out of inexperience."

I replied first by affirming that it was my impression that the President was strongly committed to serious arms control negotiations, and to an improvement in relations. I said that we are also puzzled about Soviet actions. I cited the negative Soviet reaction to the President's B-1 decision,³ and the overreaction to the CSCE monitoring report. On the

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, MDS–Dobrynin, 7/8/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

² For the text of the US-USSR Science and Technology Agreement, signed July 8, 1977, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 8, 1977, p. 190.

³ On June 30, President Carter announced his decision to cancel the B-1 bomber program. Carter's statement and the Soviet reaction are summarized in *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1977, pp. 28591–28594.

B-1 issue, he said that what caused the negative Soviet reaction was the way Secretary Brown treated the cruise missile issue. "Why did he have to say that the US will proceed to develop the 1500-mile air-launched cruise missile, SALT or no SALT, when this is not an issue in SALT? I had difficulty in restraining my military attaches from reporting that SALT was dead." On the CSCE monitoring report, he said he had reported that the President and the Secretary had made efforts with the leadership on the Hill to handle the report quietly, but what created the difficulty in Moscow were the two personal references to Brezhnev in the report. (COMMENT: This is puzzling, because the references to Brezhnev are minor and neutral) and because any document signed by the President is assumed in Moscow to carry his personal views.

Moscow Atmospherics

"You must understand," he said, "that the atmosphere in Moscow at the top is as emotionally wrought up as I have ever known it to be. It is, however, better than it was a month ago, when Brezhnev was close to saying, 'the hell with them, we'll go our own way without them!'"

He said that there had been a strong debate in Moscow about whether to send Patolichev on his recent visit to Washington, and that his own cabled recommendation had swung the decision. "I told them that there could be no movement on the trade issue right now, but that the visit could be useful anyway in improving the atmosphere."

A Quiet Period

In turning to the future, he urged that we try for a month or two of quiet relations, damping down the public statements and counterstatements (he emphasized that all the Soviet statements had been reactions to things said in this country) to let the feelings in Moscow subside. He urged us not to take TASS statements as necessarily representing the views of the Soviet leadership.

The Summit

He thought the prospects for a summit meeting were good, that both sides wanted it, and expressed personal conviction that it would be useful. He reiterated the familiar Soviet position that Brezhnev would want documents (presumably SALT-related) to sign at a summit. He hoped that he could have a *tete-a-tete* with the President before a summit, to give him a feeling for Brezhnev's personality and ensure that the two men bring a reasonably light touch to the discussion of their differences.

Future Moves

I asked what measures he thought the two countries could take now that would have a useful effect. He tended to dismiss the CTB and

Indian Ocean negotiations as not very promising, because the United States, in his view, did not seem prepared to make any substantive movement. "It appeared to us that in the case of the Indian Ocean, the US only wished to ratify the status quo." Movement on MBFR negotiations could be a useful step, he said, but again the US was too concerned with building up Germany to respond to the fact that the Soviet Union had "indicated its willingness to accept the Western first-phase proposal."

I asked whether some measures of cooperation on global and North-South relations could be possible. He said that it was his personal view that in Moscow this would be regarded as an effort to create minor diversions from the main business of SALT.

We discussed a number of other possible measures to improve relations, one of which seemed to have some tentative enthusiasm behind it—an exchange of interviews by the President with a Soviet newsman, and by Brezhnev with an American newsman—which he thought might help to dispel current misapprehensions on both sides.

The most important measure, he emphasized again at the conclusion of our conversation, was to have a period of quiescence in the relationship for the next month or two.

37. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 9, 1977, 0050Z

159579. For the Ambassador: White House for Brzezinski. Subject: Comments on Brezhnev's Health, and Questions for Ambassador Toon. Ref: (A) Moscow 9621.²

1. We very much appreciate the detail of ref report. Brezhnev was apparently in better form during your visit than on any previously reported visit over the past 4 months. The overall pattern remains one of ups and downs, although recent reporting strongly suggests a significant net decline during 1977. There have been more profound and fre-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 107, 7/77. Secret; Sensitive; Priority; Nodis; Noform. Sent for information Priority to the White House for Brzezinski.

² Telegram 9621 from Moscow, July 5, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840081–2339.

quent “downs”, during which Brezhnev on occasion has been described as “in a daze” and out of touch with his surroundings. On other occasions he has been very mechanical in his presentations, and appeared to be heavily dependent on those around him in getting through his audiences.

2. The reported health pattern is strongly suggestive of an aging individual whose reserve strength is essentially depleted, and who therefore tolerates very poorly the recurrent onslaughts of a host of medical ailments. Occurring alone, or in a younger stronger individual, such ailments would usually not lead to the erratic performance pattern apparent in Brezhnev’s case. Ultimately, however, and as is apparently the case with Brezhnev, even non-life threatening conditions can lead to rather profound short-term functional incapacitation. Brezhnev probably continues to be plagued with intermittent facial neuralgia which may now be associated with more prolonged episodes of severe pain requiring strong medications for control. Recent reporting also raises the possibility that he has early pulmonary problems. These are all in addition to his more well known and long standing problems—most notably heart disease.

3. The prognosis associated with this view of Brezhnev’s health is that it remains statistically unlikely that he will suffer a fatal episode within the next year or so. His performance, however, will continue to be as uneven—occasionally alarmingly so—as it has been this past spring. His multiple health problems will continue to require continuous treatment. He will require considerable rest, but following extended breaks will probably appear vigorous and to be in relatively good health. Sustained periods without a break will probably lead to a rapid—but reversible—decline in his performance to the marginal levels reported several times this spring. This general pattern is expected to continue, with a slow overall decline, for the next few years or until some acute episode such as a heart attack or stroke proves fatal or totally incapacitating.

4. Medical analysts would appreciate your observations on several points related to recent collateral reporting: (A). Did Brezhnev show any signs of a pulmonary problem, such as labored or deep breathing, cough, expectoration, etc.? (B). Did he eat or drink anything during the one hour forty minute session? (C). What time of the day was the meeting? (D). Was there any suggestion of a tremor in Brezhnev’s hands? Particularly, we are interested in a tremor that gives the appearance of rapidly rolling a small pill between the thumb and index finger (associated with Parkinson’s disease). (E). Brezhnev was recently reported to be wearing make-up. Was any of this in evidence? Where?

Vance

38. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale¹

Washington, July 19, 1977

SUBJECT

Origins of Soviet Campaign Against Dissidents

Attached is a memorandum prepared by CIA/INR at our request on the origins of the current soviet campaign against dissidents. It is a good job, although the statement on page 7 that the current campaign is "the toughest of the decade" is overstated.

Attachment

Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Directorate of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency²

RPM 77–10184

Washington, July 15, 1977

The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent

Summary

After the signing of the Helsinki accords,³ several developments converged to heighten the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent in their society.

—The human rights provisions of Basket III⁴ became a rallying point for Soviet and East European dissidents.

—The Eurocommunists became much more critical of Soviet internal repression.

—Persistent food shortages in the Soviet Union resulted in isolated instances of active protest on a mass level.

The current crackdown against dissidents is the end-product of a gradual growth in the Soviet regime's anxiety over these related pressures. The initiation of the crackdown, although not its present scope,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 78, USSR: 7/77. Secret. In the upper right corner, an unknown hand wrote, "dispatched 7/19 10:30."

² Secret; [handling restriction not declassified]. Drafted in the USSR Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, Central Intelligence Agency.

³ See footnote 5, Document 4.

⁴ See footnote 9, Document 21.

predates the change in US administrations. The initial impulse for it was probably the desire to silence the dissidents before the Belgrade review conference.⁵ The new US administration's public defense of Soviet dissidents apparently did reinforce and intensify Soviet anxieties. The net effect was to impel the leadership increasingly to conclude that harsher measures against dissidents were required.

The current campaign against dissidents is in part related to irritation over the lack of progress in other areas of US-Soviet relations, as well as to the Soviets' desire to keep dissent closely controlled during the Belgrade conference. At the same time, the more defensive and pugnacious tone of Soviet policy, both externally and internally, may also reflect aggravated tensions within the Soviet leadership. Recent policy difficulties may have strengthened the arguments of those leaders somewhat less inclined to conciliate the regime's opponents, both at home and abroad.

The Evolution of Soviet Reaction to Dissent

When the Soviets signed the CSCE accords in August 1975, they took a calculated risk that their acceptance of the human rights provisions of Basket III would not create serious internal difficulties for them. After Helsinki and especially during the last year, however, several developments heightened the concern of Soviet authorities about dissent in their society. This increased anxiety has been gradually translated into increasingly tough stands on issues of ideology and social control, and has produced the current crackdown on internal dissent.

[Omitted here is a chronology of interactions between the Soviet Government and dissidents, August 1975–July 1977.]

I. The Dissident Problem

A. CSCE: A Rallying Point for Soviet Dissidents

The human rights provisions of Basket III provided a common ground for Soviet dissidents with a wide range of views and concerns, thus raising the specter for the first time in many years of a unified "opposition." The CSCE monitoring group, the most important dissident group to emerge in the Soviet Union since Helsinki, was organized by physicist Yury Orlov in Moscow in May 1976, and soon sprouted regional branches in the Ukraine, Lithuania, Armenia, Georgia, and Leningrad. These branches were tiny and the degree of actual coordination that existed between them is not known, but the emergence of a dissident organization with links throughout the country was unique in re-

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 2.

cent Soviet history. More important, the CSCE monitoring group, by espousing the causes of a wide variety of aggrieved religious and national minorities, established some claim to being the center of a broader protest movement.

Although this incipient support of religious and national minorities in itself potentially provided a mass base for human rights activism, the intellectual dissidents remain estranged from the bulk of the working class population. Working class discontent, which has basically economic rather than political objectives, thus did not converge with intellectual dissent.

B. Food Shortages and Unrest

Nonetheless, official apprehension that such a convergence could take place has evidently grown since the bad harvest of 1975. Although consumerism is not a potent political force in the Soviet Union, as it is in some East European countries, the Soviet population has come to expect a gradual improvement in the standard of living. The food shortages caused widespread grumbling, and over the last year and a half there have been reports and rumors of a number of instances of active unrest and protest.

We know that last winter the Soviet leadership was quite worried about the mood in the country. In early 1977, for example, Foreign Minister Gromyko—who was definitely not speaking for US consumption—privately indicated that the Soviet leadership was “acutely aware” of countrywide criticism of food shortages.

Although the recent instances of violence, some of them related to food shortages, were not perpetrated by human rights activists, the Soviet leadership may not always distinguish clearly between different sources of protest. Some reporting suggests that Soviet officials may vaguely sense some connection between intellectual dissent and popular discontent. According to the report on Gromyko, in early 1977 the Soviet leadership feared that easing restrictions on dissidents could abet a trend of criticism in the country that could create an “explosive” climate.

C. Under Attack From the Eurocommunists

Since early 1976, the Eurocommunists, including the once docile French Communist Party, became more openly critical of the Soviet Union than at any time since the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia. The Spanish Party has gone furthest, but the larger French and Italian parties pose the more serious problem for the Soviets. From the Soviet perspective, the *chief* danger implicit in Eurocommunism is not that it has diminished Soviet influence in West European Commu-

nist parties, but that it offers a Marxist alternative to the Soviet model in Eastern Europe, and perhaps ultimately within the Soviet Union itself.

Moscow has thus been upset by Eurocommunist support to dissidents in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Particularly annoying to the Soviets in this regard was an unprecedented visit in late December of an Italian Communist delegation to dissident Soviet Marxist Roy Medvedev in Moscow. The Italians presented Medvedev with an Italian edition of one of his books and reportedly asked him to write articles for an Italian party historical journal.

D. Unrest in Eastern Europe

At the same time, CSCE had a catalytic effect on East European dissent, which became a movement cutting across national borders. Dissidents from different East European countries have reportedly coordinated their activities to a limited degree. Last winter some Soviet leaders were evidently genuinely alarmed that post-Helsinki conditions were creating an unstable situation in Eastern Europe, especially in Poland, and to a lesser degree in East Germany and Czechoslovakia.

The growth of unrest in Eastern Europe increased chronic Soviet fears of a spillover into the Soviet Union itself. Soviet authorities have always been alert to the danger of a political “virus” from Eastern Europe spreading into the polyglot borderlands of the Soviet Union, which have historically been susceptible to influences from that quarter. The fear of such a domino-effect was evidently a factor in the Soviet decision to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968.⁶

E. The US Human Rights Initiative

The new US administration’s human rights “campaign,” and especially the personal involvement of President Carter in public appeals on behalf of Soviet dissidents, further disturbed Soviet authorities. Many Soviet officials, already fearful of being put in the dock at Belgrade, reportedly regarded the campaign as a deliberate attempt at subversion by the US. At the same time, US protests about Soviet repressions temporarily emboldened Soviet dissidents to make more vigorous protests and to channel their appeals directly to the US administration.

II. *The Soviet Response*

It is largely as a response to all these related pressures that the current crackdown against dissidents must be seen. It is clear that at least the initiation of the crackdown, although not its present scope, predates the change in US administrations. The original factor of greatest impor-

⁶ See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Documents 80 and 81.

tance in the minds of the Soviet leaders at the outset of the crackdown was probably the desire to clean house and silence the dissidents before the Belgrade review conference was convened. Indeed, some dissidents have charged that the climate in the Soviet Union deteriorated immediately after, and as a direct result of, the signing of the Helsinki accords. Recent emigre Bukovsky,⁷ among others, claimed that conditions in his prison “tangibly worsened” after Helsinki. In 1976 there were a few trials of dissidents, balanced by occasional regime conciliatory gestures.

The first clear evidence that a crackdown might be underway did not come, however, until late December 1976, seven months after the formation of the Orlov group in Moscow. In December Soviet authorities moved in a limited way against the CSCE monitoring group, by conducting searches of apartments of the members of its subgroup in the Ukraine. But there is no evidence to indicate that at this early date the Soviets intended the crackdown to assume the major proportions it did in the spring. Rather, it seems likely that they intended to continue “carrot and stick” tactics aimed at controlling dissent by a careful combination of coercive and conciliatory measures, while holding in reserve the option of intensifying repression if circumstances warranted.

The new US administration’s public defense of Soviet dissidents apparently was a major factor which reinforced and exacerbated the related Soviet anxieties about the coming Belgrade CSCE meeting, the situation in Eastern Europe, the behavior of the Eurocommunists, and the food situation at home. The net effect was to impel the leadership increasingly to conclude that harsher measures against the dissidents were required. Since February the Soviets have moved to suppress the Orlov group and its regional subgroups, by arresting leading members and encouraging others to emigrate. Moreover, in the spring the Soviets began to make greater and greater efforts to limit the access of Westerners in Moscow to the dissident community, and to link the dissidents with espionage activities.

Two incidents in June were particularly indicative of the changed atmosphere in Moscow: the interrogation of newsman Robert Toth⁸ (the first such case in the detente era), and the surfacing of further suggestions that dissident Shcharansky is under investigation for treason. If Soviet authorities do charge him with treason, Shcharansky may become the first intellectual dissident since Stalin’s day to be tried for this

⁷ Vladimir Bukovsky was exchanged in December 1976 for imprisoned Chilean Communist leader, Luis Corvalán Lepe. (Christopher S. Wren, “Soviet to Free Leading Dissident in Trade for Chilean Communist,” *The New York Times*, December 18, 1976, p. 49)

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 31.

serious crime. Meanwhile, since Toth's departure, the Soviet media have expanded insinuations that he was engaged in espionage.

Conclusions

The Soviets originally believed that they could afford to permit their citizens greater contact with the West, or they would never have signed the Helsinki accords, allowed greater movement between East and West Germany, or stopped jamming some Western broadcasts to the Soviet Union in 1973. The events of the last year, however, have given them pause and reason to reassess their policies. Many Soviet officials have probably decided that acquiescence on Basket III was a mistake.

Objectively, Soviet dissent does not appear to pose a serious threat to the Soviet system, but Soviet officials evidently perceive a greater danger than exists in fact. Both Russian history and Leninist ideology impel them to exaggerate the potential importance of opposing groups, however small. They have always been preoccupied with problems of control. The importance that the leadership attaches to dissent can be seen by the fact that decisions about individual dissidents are sometimes made at the Politburo level.

It is not merely intellectual dissent that disturbs the Soviets. They fear that the "freer movement of people and ideas" which they conceded on paper at Helsinki, and which to a certain extent the circumstances of a modern technological world force upon them, will open their society to a whole host of ideas and influences from the West that are, in their view, not only politically subversive but socially disruptive and morally unhealthy. Identifying Western concepts of liberty with license, they are apprehensive that extensive contact with the "decadent" West will expose the Soviet people not only to alien political ideas but also to crime, terrorism, pornography, and drugs, which could combine to produce a general breakdown of order and discipline. To the extent that they are concerned about the stagnation of their economy, the Soviets may also fear that consumer dissatisfaction will become a more serious political problem in future years.

In view of the problems the Soviets confronted in the winter and early spring, some sort of domestic crackdown was to be expected. The intensity and duration of the Soviet response, however, is not entirely explained by objective circumstances. Some of the pressures on the Soviets in fact seem to have diminished since the February–March period. The tense situation in Eastern Europe has eased, and the food supply in the Soviet Union itself, while still a subject of considerable concern, seems to have improved somewhat. Meanwhile, Soviet attempts to muffle internal and external criticism have paid off to a considerable

extent. Although occasional outbursts of protest continue to take place, the more prominent dissidents have been effectively silenced. Nevertheless, Soviet repression of dissent continues to intensify.

It is true that even now the picture is not one of unrelieved repression. Two prominent Jewish activists, for example, were recently allowed to emigrate. And Orlov, the key figure in post-Helsinki dissent, has been charged with the relatively minor offense of anti-Soviet activity. There are still some restraints on Soviet behavior toward dissidents; the Soviet leadership has no desire, if indeed it has the power, to move in the direction of reinstating the Stalinist terror apparatus. Nevertheless, the current campaign against dissent in the Soviet Union has become the toughest of this decade.

This increase in the relative harshness of Soviet policy is to some extent a natural partner of the more defensive and pugnacious tone the Soviets have displayed recently in many facets of foreign policy—particularly regarding the Eurocommunists and the United States. The recent expansion of Soviet actions against dissidents is doubtless thus partially related to irritation over the lack of progress in other areas of US-Soviet relations, as well as to the Soviets' desire to keep dissent closely controlled during the Belgrade review conference. At the same time, the exaggerated sensitivity of Soviet policy, both externally and internally, may also reflect aggravated leadership tensions. A confluence of policy difficulties, coming at a time when Brezhnev's health is uncertain, may have strengthened the arguments of those within the leadership somewhat less inclined to conciliate the regime's opponents, both at home and abroad.

39. Memorandum Prepared in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State¹

Washington, undated

SOVIET-US RELATIONS: A SIX-MONTH TRACK RECORD

Despite six month's trying, the Soviets have as yet failed to come to grips with the Carter administration. Their perplexity centers on what

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 12, US-Soviet Relations, 1977. Secret. Prepared by Isabel Kulski and approved by Martha Mautner, both of INR. In the upper right corner of the first page, an unknown hand wrote, "Advance copy from INR, 8/77."

they see as a dichotomy between administration policies and actions. For Moscow, the main issue is whether the US adheres to the detente formulas which shaped relations over the preceding five-year period—acceptance of parity, moderation of differences, etc.—or whether the US's numerous foreign policy initiatives, especially in the realm of arms control and human rights, signify a new set of priorities, with the US attempting to impose its view of these issues on the Soviets.

Whether or not the Soviets have now concluded that the latter actually is the case, their suspicions and doubts about Carter policies explain to a large extent the defensive—and relatively stand-pat—positions they have adopted during this period. With progress in SALT their measure of the political temperature, they consistently blame Washington for the present deterioration in relations and, conversely, look to Washington to reverse the trend. Yet they may still anticipate a turning point ahead; the virtual cessation of personal criticism of the President following his Charleston speech seemed such a signal;² it has not, however, been matched as yet by any restraint in criticism of administration policies.

Officials Claim Perplexity

How far and how fast the Soviets originally expected to move with the Carter administration is open to question, but there is no doubt as to their dismay and disappointment over the record of the administration's first six months in US–USSR relations. Private observations on the President by Soviet officialdom, though few and generally modulated, have reflected perplexity or puzzlement, mainly about his stand on human rights, which according to the Soviets, does not betoken a forthcoming attitude toward the Soviet Union.

—In an unusually frank statement, Politburo candidate member Solomentsev told a visiting Canadian official in June that the Soviet leaders gave President Carter the benefit of the doubt the first few months but could not understand how it was possible for a President of the United States after only a few weeks in office to try to humiliate the Soviet government by receiving Bukovskiy in the White House.³ How, Solomentsev asked rhetorically, could Carter reconcile his statements about wanting good relations with the USSR with his “constant interference” in Soviet internal affairs? The Soviets, he said, wanted to trust the President but could not because he was using human rights as a “weapon” to attack the USSR.

² Carter delivered a speech in Charleston, South Carolina on July 21. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book II, pp. 1309–1315.

³ According to the President's Daily Diary, the President met with Bukovskiy on March 1 from 3:30 to 3:37 p.m. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

—Without directly mentioning the President, Politburo member Romanov reportedly also mentioned to a visiting West European that the US SALT proposals were “the greatest display of cynicism imaginable” because they traded on European nuclear vulnerability while guaranteeing the US immunity.

—At a Bastille Day reception in Moscow, senior Soviet military officers complained about the administration and one contrasted President Carter unfavorably with his last four predecessors, saying the President did not seem to want to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union.

—A Soviet Foreign Ministry official complained to a visiting American that President Carter is not prepared to deal with the Soviets as equals and termed his stance on human rights as “a well-thought-out, well-planned campaign of psychological warfare, as a special instrument to be employed in the struggle against the socialist countries.”

Early Hopes and Doubts in Perspective

The Soviets apparently calculated initially that the President would move quickly to revive detente momentum which they viewed as having slowed to a virtual standstill during the US election campaign. To this end, Brezhnev on the eve of the inauguration volunteered assurance to the new President that the Soviets would not put him to a “test of nerves.” In his January 18 speech at Tula, Brezhnev expressed the mood of the moment when he said: “We are prepared jointly with the new administration in the United States to accomplish a new major advance in relations between our two countries.”

Nonetheless, Soviet apprehensions about the new administration were evident. President Podgorny told Ambassador Toon two days before the inauguration that while he was hopeful the President would move quickly to strengthen ties with the Soviet Union, he and his colleagues were somewhat disturbed at the “negative noises” of the election campaign. He made clear “negative noises” meant how much influence proponents of a harder policy toward the Soviet Union would have on the new President. *Pravda* January 15, for example, had accused President Ford in his last days in office of yielding to pressures from the military-industrial complex in approving higher military spending and in trying to saddle the new administration with this policy. Similar wariness was reflected in *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* (signed to press January 19) which warned that toughness, “haggling stubbornly” or exerting pressure on the Soviet Union “to obtain the maximum from it” was an approach without prospects, and that “any attempts to exert pressure and to test our country’s will and the stability of its positions on particular questions will be resolutely rebuffed.”

Moreover, Brezhnev's Tula speech, besides offering an olive branch, identified some sore points in the new relationship:

—"adding new questions to those that are currently being discussed in SALT";

—"attempting to teach us how to live according to rules that are incompatible with socialist democracy, with socialist law and order."

Assurances of cordiality notwithstanding, it was clear the Kremlin anticipated difficulties even before the SALT negotiations resumed and before human rights took on an entirely unexpected (for the Soviets) aspect outside the CSCE context.

SALT: A Consistent Public Stance

Actual Soviet expectations about the prospects for achieving a SALT II agreement expeditiously with the new administration may have been less optimistic than the media or Soviet spokesmen generally implied. Brezhnev had placed SALT at the head of his list of priorities in relations with the US in the Tula call for an agreement "on the basis that we had reached in Vladivostok . . . in the nearest future." These two caveats—on the basis of Vladivostok, and in the nearest future—were also stressed in the media. The *Mezhdunarodnaya Zhizn* piece noted that "the Soviet Union is ready to go even further in the fields of strategic arms limitation but it is first necessary to implement what was agreed in Vladivostok." And *Izvestiya* January 21 made the identical point.

Thus, the arguments following the Vance visit in March had already been aired,⁴ at least in their essential outlines, weeks beforehand; from Moscow's viewpoint, the US had clearly been put on notice long before March about the basic Soviet position.

In any event, the guarded optimism expressed about SALT in January cooled considerably during February and March. USA Institute head Arbatov, a chief advocate of Soviet-US rapprochement, warned in *Pravda* February 5 of a US "psychosis" about a Soviet military threat, denied the Soviets were seeking more than strategic parity, and stressed the negative consequences of failure to achieve an agreement before expiration of the interim accord in October 1977.

A few days later, February 9, on Moscow TV, Arbatov worried more specifically about the cruise missile as:

"a weapons system on its way which is very dangerous from the point of destabilizing the situation, not to mention that it will be a new

⁴ For the disagreements regarding SALT after Vance's March visit, see Documents 24 and 26.

factor in the arms race, and will lead to political consequences such as a deterioration of the international situation.”

By mid-March, against the background of the swelling human rights dispute, the Soviets were airing in greater detail the problems they foresaw for the upcoming negotiations on SALT with Secretary Vance, whose late March visit they had announced without fanfare early in the month. *Pravda* March 13 observed that the President’s statement of March 9 allowing for deferral of cruise missile limits from the new agreement was “a certain departure from the previous US stand,” saw a contradiction in US words about “mutual trust” and the “hullabaloo” it had raised on human rights, and interpreted the latter as an attempt to exert pressure on the Soviet Union and “bargain for concessions,” implicitly on SALT.

Brezhnev’s March 21 trade unions speech threw an early pall of pessimism over prospects for the Vance meeting. Avoiding substantive comments on SALT (he referred only to the 1974 agreements, not to Vladivostok), Brezhnev observed that the new administration’s first two months in power did not “seem to show a striving to overcome” the stagnation in relations with the Soviet Union. And in his stark warning that the USSR would “not tolerate interference in our internal affairs by anyone and under any pretext—a normal development of relations on such a basis is of course unthinkable,” he expressed the prevailing mood of irritation in Moscow toward the administration.

Watershed in March

Secretary Vance’s trip to Moscow marked something of a watershed in US-Soviet relations. Up to that point, the Soviets, despite evident misgivings and doubts, at least appeared to be acting on the assumption that an agreement before October was in prospect. Their attitude toward the Carter administration, while soured compared to January, was still relatively punctilious. And they gave the impression that while it was up to the US to take the initiative to improve relations, they themselves would be responsive, or at least not totally unresponsive.

Gromyko’s unprecedented press conference of March 31 at the conclusion of the talks with the Secretary revealed a far greater chasm in the relationship than the Soviets had disclosed publicly up to that point. Obviously peeved at the White House statement on the talks⁵ “even before the Secretary returned to Washington,” Gromyko sought to set aright what he called “distortions” of the Soviet position. Gro-

⁵ For information regarding Gromyko’s press conference, see footnote 4, Document 27. Carter’s remarks about SALT and the negotiations, March 30, 1977, are in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 538–544.

myko ranged over the whole gamut of disarmament questions, but focused his animus on US motives and intentions in offering the USSR alternative SALT packages which it supposedly knew could only be rejected. He charged, in essence, that the US was trying unilaterally to revise agreed Vladivostok formulas; equating the cruise missile with the “non-strategic” Backfire bomber and then claiming that the cruise missile had not been covered at Vladivostok; and attempting to gain strategic advantage for itself by proposing limits on ICBM’s, an area of Soviet strength.

Gromyko, to be sure, did not close the door to future bargaining but warned pointedly that any change in the basic Vladivostok framework—an obvious reference to the US proposal for significant reductions—would reopen the whole question of the US Forward Base System in Europe. His statements suggested, however, that the Soviets had concluded the new administration was out for tactical leverage in its approach and indicated their response would be to hunker down. “The more attempts there are to play a game in this matter, to tread on the foot of the partner,” he declared, “the more difficulties there will be.”

Gromyko’s arguments set the stage for a spate of public statements on SALT and relations with the US. *Pravda*’s lengthy April 14 editorial argued Gromyko’s main contentions even more pointedly, denying they were merely an excuse to gain time to study the American proposals because of their “drastic character.” *Pravda* also charged that if the US, as some contended, knew its proposals were not going to be accepted, then they were made “only to create a pretext for talking about Soviet intransigence.”

Subsequent commentators, in “clarifying” and justifying the Soviet position, took a multifaceted approach, which, however, seemed to grow increasingly defensive as time went on. They:

- intensified attacks on the specifics of the US proposals, stressing the need to observe the “main parameters” of Vladivostok (but subsequently hinting at flexibility on certain points);

- publicized various long-standing Soviet initiatives on other disarmament issues;

- stressed “equality and equal security” and US “realism” as requirements for any agreement; and

- attacked US military spending and new arms programs.

But they also began to give increasing weight to the President’s domestic problems, picturing him as under heavy pressure from the military-industrial complex and its supporters in Congress. In effect, they gradually began blaming the March SALT results on these forces, and on Senator Jackson in particular, who purportedly had “a great, if

not a decisive" voice in formulating the US package and in advising the administration to "take a hard line."

As the date for the next Vance-Gromyko meeting in Geneva approached, the coverage took on a more optimistic cast. A *Pravda* May 7 editorial, apparently aimed at countering impressions abroad that rejection of the US March proposals implied a Soviet unwillingness to consider substantial arms reductions, argued the USSR had always been the prime mover in international disarmament endeavors. And as the Soviet-US SALT delegations resumed talks, media and spokesmen once again began to stress Soviet willingness to seek agreement, pledging that the USSR would respond to a "realistic attitude" on the part of the US.

When Gromyko and Vance met in Geneva May 18–20 the atmosphere was definitely less charged. The signing ceremony for the agreement on the use of outer space for peaceful purposes was cordial, and the "Joint Report" issued May 20⁶ spoke of a "businesslike" forum. Following the meeting, TASS reported Secretary Vance's statement that "full agreement" had been reached on the general framework for a SALT II accord even though substantial differences remained to be negotiated. The Soviet press also underscored the Joint Report's conclusion that the talks had achieved "progress" on a general framework for further talks.

But Gromyko, while acknowledging "some progress" on "certain problems," made the point in leaving Geneva that "this does not mean a solution of the main questions is close in sight. . . . The conclusion of the work of drafting the agreement is still a long way off."

In keeping with Gromyko's thrust, Moscow then continued to play up alleged US obstinacy on SALT affairs, and minimized prospects for quick progress. Soviet media accused the President of "skating around" SALT in his May 24 speech at Notre Dame,⁷ contrasting his tone with Brezhnev's somber evaluation to French TV May 29: "The positions have drawn closer to a certain degree . . . yet it must be said frankly that there has been no serious progress so far because of the unconstructive line pursued by the US." This line, Brezhnev said, did not promote the conclusion of an agreement.

Brezhnev also privately told the French in late June of his concern over the way the SALT negotiations were going, and after his trip to France stated flatly that "no progress" had been achieved. He capped

⁶ The Geneva meetings specifically addressed SALT issues. A copy of the May 20 "Joint Report" was not found.

⁷ The text of Carter's May 22 Notre Dame commencement speech is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, Book I, pp. 954–962.

this off with a letter to President Carter July 5 [*June 30*],⁸ replying to one of the President's in June, throwing cold water on a summit unless there were some agreements to sign, a line Arbatov reiterated to US officials in early August.

Meanwhile, attacks against US military programs proliferated, ranging from accusations that US foreign policy was being militarized to charges that the US was using the stalemate in SALT to advance new weapons development and using the latter in turn to pressure the USSR. The President's July 1 announcement of his decision on the B-1 bomber/cruise missile evidently caught the Soviets by surprise; in response they downgraded the B-1, one of their prime targets in the past, to a propaganda ploy, and concentrated instead on the cruise missile. US statements on the neutron bomb then replaced the cruise missile as a prime propaganda target, and the TASS statement of July 30 on that subject signaled another mass media/communist-front campaign against the US.

Moscow's record of public adamancy on SALT remained unaffected by the President's July 21 speech in Charleston; Arbatov in his August 3 *Pravda* unofficial response to that speech merely reiterated basic Soviet arguments. The regime at that point had, however, still not given an official response to the President's overture.

Criticism of President Carter

While the Soviets traditionally give a new US President a honeymoon period before resuming the inevitable attacks on US policies, President Carter's emphasis on human rights quickly diverted Moscow from its customary approach. The sharpest and most direct criticism of the President has invariably been pegged to some element of his stance on human rights. Although the media ignored the issue in reporting the President's inaugural address, it was barely a month before the administration was accused of playing an ill-intentioned role in its human rights "campaign." The President's letter to Andrei Sakharov⁹ struck a particularly sensitive nerve, and although the Soviets did not publicize it domestically they in effect answered the President officially with the February 17 letter by Deputy Prosecutor General Gusev to the *New York Times*¹⁰ warning against outside interference in Soviet domestic affairs. The March Vance visit and its aftermath briefly distracted attention from the theme, but in mid-April Soviet media linked the administration's decision to expand Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty activities

⁸ See Document 35.

⁹ See Document 5.

¹⁰ The letter is described in Sergei I. Gusev, "Moscow, On Sakharov," *The New York Times*, February 23, 1977, p. 19.

directly to its actions on human rights. And on April 9, TASS director general Zamyatin and CPSU Central Committee International Department head Zagladin¹¹ described the Carter human rights position to TV audiences as an “acute anti-Soviet campaign,” Zagladin charging that support for dissidents was in effect the same as encouraging “appeals for the overthrow of the existing system in the Soviet Union.”

The “First Hundred Days” served as the occasion for other unflattering comments as well. One commentator May 18 claimed the President was still conducting an election campaign instead of solving problems—this time with his eye on 1980—and sarcastically chided him by name for delivering “moralistic homilies” to the American people. Another equally negative assessment observed that in 15 weeks the “administration” had not managed to accomplish anything substantial.

The President’s report to the Congressional CSCE Commission in June generated a torrent of criticism.¹² TASS veteran Kornilov, in perhaps the sharpest language to date, charged the President with using the “most absurd and wild concoctions” from “reactionary bourgeois propaganda” in the report and “openly” encouraging a “malicious” publicity campaign over alleged Soviet violations of the Helsinki agreements.

Brezhnev’s *Le Monde* interview of mid-June was evidently meant in part to answer the President’s CSCE report, as well as to warn that the then convening Belgrade preparatory meeting on CSCE would be difficult if the US persisted in its human rights stand. Brezhnev did not mention the President by name but left no doubt as to his target when he said “the ideological struggle should not grow into psychological war” and warned that if it did, the dispute might “develop into a catastrophe in which . . . along with millions of people their concepts will perish as well.”

Perhaps in deference to private US complaints, and in any event under cover of a shift of media emphasis to US military policy, the personal association of the President with critiques of US policy subsequently began to diminish gradually. Six-month assessments by such veteran propagandists as Valentin Zorin and Yuriy Kornilov, while critical of the administration, were more moderate in tone than earlier pieces by these same critics, and not noticeably focused on the President personally. As on the occasion of the 100-day benchmark, however, their conclusions both in the domestic and foreign policy spheres were largely negative.

¹¹ Leonid Mitrofanovich Zamyatin and Vadim Zagladin.

¹² Not found.

Reporting on President Carter's July 21 Charleston speech was virtually free of personal criticism. Almost simultaneously, a *New Times* editorial asserted that in the current difficult phase of US-Soviet relations the correct policy is "not to dramatize this but to display reserve and patience";¹³ *New Times* was optimistic that Washington would eventually return to a "constructive" line. Arbatov's August 3 *Pravda* piece, while critical of policies (but not the President), reflected the same upbeat theme.

Other Bilateral Activities

The decline in the general atmosphere did not have an immediately measurable impact on day-to-day US-Soviet bilateral contacts, which in general continued to move along established patterns. On the whole the Soviets seemed eager to build up further the network of activities under the various bilateral agreements, some of which are now in their fifth year or going into a renewal phase. In response to US demands for greater reciprocity, the Soviets were cooperative in some areas; in others they pleaded bureaucratic difficulties or continued their less-than-forthcoming positions.

Since January, agreements have been reached on further cooperation in manned space flight and in the exploration and use of outer space for peaceful purposes; the bilateral science and technology agreement¹⁴ has been renewed for another five-year period; and an accord reached on correcting certain imbalances favoring the USSR in the maritime shipping field. The Soviets also showed some flexibility on certain civil air matters long under negotiation, and assigned a top civil air ministry official as their permanent representative in the US, signifying interest in solution of other issues. The two sides also reached agreement on beginning construction of the Washington-Moscow embassy complexes, and several of the working groups established by the Vance-Gromyko meeting got underway, that on the Indian Ocean completing its first round successfully in June.

On the long-standing trade/MFN/credits stalemate, the Soviets have scaled down, if not written off, expectations for any improvement in the foreseeable future. They had evidently originally anticipated the Carter administration would bring Congress around to rescinding the 1974 restrictions, but that hope has now been all but abandoned. The trade issue is no longer a bellwether of the relationship with the US, although the Soviets continue at every opportunity to stress the need for normalization in this area.

¹³ Not found.

¹⁴ See footnote 2, Document 36.

40. Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

ER M 77–10525

Washington, August 1977

*The Value to the USSR of Economic Relations with the US**Foreword*

The attached paper examines key elements of the US-Soviet economic relationship—in technology, energy, credit, grain, and MFN—and concludes that, in the current context, and taken individually, these elements do not provide the US or the West with policy levers that could be used to exert significant influence upon Soviet behavior.

But the assessment is focused narrowly on the current situation and on specific economic instruments. To do justice to the potential for leverage and influence in the East-West relationship, the problem should be considered in a more dynamic and comprehensive context of a long term political-economic-military competition. An assessment in those terms would place far more emphasis on the deepening economic problems and resource stringencies facing the Soviet economy over the next five to ten years, and the strains and pressures these will increasingly place on the Soviet resource allocation process, particularly in the military sphere. In the context of such deepening problems, the potential for using East-West economic relations for political influence might be much larger, particularly if conceived as part of a broader strategy for long-term competition. These possibilities deserve far more attention and analytic effort than they have so far received.

CONCLUSIONS

The importance of Western technology, credit, and grain to Soviet economy has increased in recent years, and will increase further during the next decade. Moscow is determined to avoid exploitable dependence, however, and expects to be able to do so.

—In the great majority of instances, alternatives to US sources are available.

—Other Western countries have shown little willingness to sacrifice economic gains for a concerted, sustained policy of using East-West

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 2, Brzezinski, Zbigniew: 6/77–12/78. Secret. The paper's forward and conclusions are printed; its main text was not found attached. This paper is included in an overview prepared by the NSC and distributed to select Cabinet members on August 26, along with briefing papers prepared by the Departments of State and Treasury and the Central Intelligence Agency, for the August 31 meeting with the Policy Review Committee (see Document 46). A copy of the complete paper is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Institutional File, Box 29, INT Documents: #5600s: 8–9/77.

economic relations for purposes of exerting influence upon Soviet behavior.

—The Soviets believe that, in the US itself, conflicting domestic interests place severe limits on the US ability to use its policy instruments for these same purposes.

The growing dependence of Soviet economic growth on a rising productivity of labor and capital will put an increasing premium on Western capital goods and technology during the next decade. In addition, Moscow will need vast amounts of Western equipment to sustain production of oil in some fields, minimize declines in others, and develop new sources of oil and gas. Some of this equipment will have to come from the United States.

Technology

In importing Western technology and equipment, the USSR is playing “catch-up.” Specific sectors of Soviet industry—such as the fertilizer and automotive industries—are being helped greatly by Western technology and equipment, increasing the quality and quantity of output and reducing costs. The Soviets will be especially dependent on Western energy technology in the future, such as high capacity oil lifting equipment discussed separately below. The magnitude of Soviet imports of Western equipment, however, is too small to have much impact on overall economic growth.

In only a few areas is the United States the sole supplier of the most advanced technology of interest to the Soviets. In many of these fields, US pre-eminence is being increasingly challenged by technological advances in Western Europe and Japan. Moreover, less advanced technology is often sufficiently good to satisfy immediate Soviet needs. In the many instances where US technology is available from US licensees or subsidiaries abroad, the Soviets can turn to these.

The United States must rely primarily on persuasion in marshaling effective support from its allies for control of technology exports. The record on this score is disappointing at best. Our allies see little or no need to limit Soviet acquisition of technology unrelated to items on the COCOM List. Even in COCOM, they have shown a tendency to push for relaxation of definitions to permit the sale of their own goods while supporting the embargo on those higher technology goods produced only in the United States. Their reluctance in the past to go along with the United States in controlling anything but the most sensitive technology and equipment affords little hope for consent to broader vigilance now.

Energy

The supply of oil in the USSR will become a critical problem in the next few years, with production peaking perhaps as early as next year

but not later than the early 1980s before declining. To stave off or slow the expected production decline, the Soviets will need substantial amounts of Western oil field technology and equipment. Because of its superior technology, the United States is the most logical source of much of this equipment and know-how. Without assistance in the form of Western technology and equipment—especially high capacity lifting equipment involving US technology—gas lift and electric submersible pumps—Soviet oil production will fall sooner and more sharply than would otherwise be the case.

Although the USSR and some West European countries produce low capacity oil well pumps, the only pumps adequate to deal with the Soviet lifting problem are produced in the United States. The USSR has been buying several hundred annually in the US and recently sought a turnkey plant for their manufacture. Thus far neither of the two US producers has been interested in supplying the production technology.

The US is the preferred source of other equipment and technology such as drill pipe, rock bits and rotary drilling rigs, none of which is under export control restrictions, as well as certain COCOM-controlled items, e.g., seismic and gravimetric measuring and recording instruments. There are close substitutes for these in other Western countries, however.

Credit

The Soviet hard currency debt increased from only \$5 billion at the end of 1974 to \$14 billion at the end of 1976, and it will probably grow to about \$17 billion by the end of this year. What pushed up the debt was mainly the Western economic recession, which nearly halted the growth of Soviet hard currency exports and the massive Soviet grain imports in 1975 and 1976 following the disastrous 1975 harvest.

The USSR's hard currency trade deficit reached a record \$6.3 billion in 1975 and \$5 billion in 1976. The traditional means of financing deficits—Western government-backed credits and gold—were no longer adequate, and the Soviets had to borrow heavily on the Euro-dollar market at higher interest rates including a substantial amount on short term.

As a result of heavy Soviet borrowing, many major banks reached or at least approached their legal or self-imposed ceilings on credit to the USSR. Moreover, the international banking community has grown concerned about the growth of the Soviet debt and the persistence of large trade deficits. Although bankers remain confident about the USSR ability to repay its debt, they feel that additional credits require higher interest rates.

Moscow's stubborn stance on terms is hampering progress in negotiations for government-backed export credit lines. The "gentlemen's

agreement" on export credit terms is now in effect, and the Soviets are unwilling to pay the higher interest rates required. Soviet negotiations with Italy have dragged on since May 1976, with France, Japan, and the United Kingdom watching closely to see whether the Italians can withstand Soviet pressure to break the agreement by offering better terms. The betting is that Italy will cave in.

A reduction in the trade deficit is expected in 1977 with continued—if sluggish—Western growth leading to expansion of Soviet exports; a sharply lower grain bill will reduce imports. A deficit of \$4 billion or less and a \$3 billion increase in debt is anticipated. A further decline in the deficit is likely in 1978, given continued economic growth in the West and the bumper grain crop Moscow expects this year. Oil exports could fall, but probably not enough to prevent an increase in total exports while imports should be stable or lower.

Prospects in the longer run, however, are much dimmer because the expected decline in Soviet oil production and exports will seriously aggravate the Soviet hard currency position. Western bankers will probably have increasing doubts about Moscow's ability to maintain its foreign exchange earnings and manage its debts in the 1980s. Substantial new credits are likely to depend upon Soviet willingness to undertake large compensation deals, particularly for development of energy resources, that provide assurances of export capacity.

Grain

Even with normal harvests, Moscow will need to import 10–20 million tons of grain annually to support announced livestock expansion programs during the next several years. If past practice holds, about half of Soviet import requirements would be filled by the United States. The need for US supplies obviously depends both on the size of Soviet requirements and on production and stocks in other supplier countries. Attempts to apply US leverage on the grain issue might lead to minor concessions in the short run but would carry longer run costs. The threat of withholding grain, even if not exercised, would compromise US reliability as a supplier and lead the Soviets to pursue alternatives.

Our leverage is lessened by the wide range of options available to the Soviets in the event of a moratorium on US grain shipments.

—In the short run, other countries would be able to provide additional grain, especially at premium prices.

—Over the longer run, the USSR could probably arrange for alternative supplies, perhaps with the aid of long-term contracts.

—Domestic demand for grain could be substantially reduced by (1) rationing and other conservation measures, (2) export cuts, and (3) further slaughtering of livestock if need be.

—In dire circumstances, Moscow could fall back on strategic grain stocks.

MFN

Soviet exports would be little affected by the granting of most-favored-nation status. Most Soviet exports to the United States either enter tariff free or carry tariffs little higher than MFN rates. A few million dollars' worth of manufactured goods would benefit from MFN treatment, particularly if quality and servicing deficiencies were overcome. MFN is a relatively minor issue in the broad context of US economic relations with the USSR. The restrictions of the Trade Act of 1974,² in any case, blunt the effectiveness of using MFN as a bargaining tool.

² For a summary of the act and its restrictions, see *Congress and the Nation*, vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 131–134.

41. Memorandum From William Hyland of the National Security Council Staff to President Carter¹

Washington, August 6, 1977

SUBJECT

Oral Message from Brezhnev to You

The Soviet Minister delivered an “oral” message from Brezhnev to you concerning South African nuclear weapons. The burden of the message is that the Soviets believe the South Africans are building nuclear weapons and preparing to conduct underground tests and are practically ready to begin. Brezhnev emphasizes that should this occur it would do great damage to the Non-proliferation Treaty² and weaken international efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and reduce the danger of nuclear war. The Soviet statement also emphasizes that all countries should undertake extraordinary, urgent efforts to prevent South Africa from conducting nuclear tests and building nuclear

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 48, Chron: 8/77. Secret; Sensitive.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 122.

weapons. The message concludes by noting your personal interest in non-proliferation and asking for your views on what effective measures might be taken.

The Minister added that a public statement, roughly along the same lines, will be issued in Moscow on Monday³ and that similar messages from Brezhnev had been sent to London, Paris and Bonn. The Soviets do not plan to announce the fact of these messages, however. I told the Minister that I would relay the message immediately to you and that you would consider how and when to reply. I did note to the Minister that the Soviet information did not seem to be in accord with our own information on the imminence of the South African test but this was not my area of expertise.

I have informed Warren Christopher of this message and I will send you the full text as soon as it is translated. We will also send you a draft reply, though it is obvious that the Russians intend this primarily for propaganda since they intend a public statement on Monday.

Attachment

Oral Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter⁴

undated

We would like to draw your attention to a matter which in our opinion is of quite considerable importance from the point of view of its consequences to the development of the international situation and furtherance of detente. This matter concerns our countries as Permanent Security Council Members which carry a special responsibility for the maintenance of peace and international security.

According to incoming data on the South African Republic, they are completing work on building nuclear weapons and on carrying out the first nuclear test. In the desert of Calabari they have built a testing site which is practically ready for such tests underground.

These facts testifying to the possibility of building nuclear weapons in South Africa could not but cause us a grave apprehension. Naturally if this state, which carries out a policy of apartheid with regard to the African population of their land and does not take into account United Nations decisions, acquired nuclear weapons then this

³ August 8.

⁴ Secret; Sensitive.

would sharply aggravate the situation on the African Continent and would as a whole increase the danger of the use of nuclear weapons.

The emergence of such weapons in the hand of the SAR would certainly be used by some other countries to justify the building of their own nuclear devices. It is easy to see what a damage this would cause to the treaty on non-proliferation and how considerably it would weaken the framework of non-proliferation, to strengthen which joint efforts of the USSR and the USA are directed. No one has the slightest doubt that the SAR is in a position to build nuclear weapons only through the help of other states. One also knows that the SAR has access to the latest research in the nuclear field, that it received and continues to receive nuclear equipment and materials. "The London Understandings"⁵ demand, as we know, fulfillment of a number of conditions aimed at preventing the use of materials, equipment and technology to build nuclear devices. The world public will be justified in asking this question: since these understandings failed to prevent the emergence of nuclear weapons in the SAR, then what are they worth?

We in the Soviet Union consider it a matter of extraordinary and urgent importance to make all efforts to prevent the SAR from conducting nuclear tests and building nuclear weapons. On our part we have in mind publishing in the nearest future an appropriate statement, having in view drawing the attention of the governments and the public to the dangerous plans of the SAR. As to the USA we understand that you have at your disposal the necessary channels and probabilities to render directly a holding influence on this state.

Addressing ourselves directly to you, Mr. President, we take into account the great attention which you personally pay to the problem of non-proliferation. Cooperation between our two countries along the lines of strengthening the Treaty on Non-proliferation is developing. Our states have taken on themselves certain obligations on the prevention of a nuclear war. Now a situation has developed where it is quite necessary and urgently at that to undertake energetic efforts to prevent the emergence of new nuclear powers and holding at bay the growth of nuclear danger.

I hope that this appeal of mine would meet with your, Mr. President, understanding and from the US part appropriate and effective measures would be taken.

On our part we would like to learn what are your views on the above-mentioned matter.

⁵ Reference is to the Nuclear Suppliers Group guidelines, first published in 1978. The Nuclear Suppliers Group, established in 1975, was initially composed of seven nuclear supplier states that limited their export of nuclear materials to non-nuclear states.

42. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 15, 1977, 2011Z

192990. Subject: Reply to Soviet Demarche on South African Nuclear Program.

1. The Deputy Secretary called in the Soviet Charge, Vasev, August 15 and gave him as a non-paper the text of the President's reply to Brezhnev's message on South African nuclear programs delivered by Vasev on August 6.² In receiving the reply Vasev commented that it appeared to be very constructive and in the same spirit the Soviet side approached this problem. Text follows for your information.

2. Begin text. I wish to thank you, Mr. President, for bringing to my attention information you have that the Republic of South Africa is completing work on a nuclear explosive device and is preparing to test such a device. I am replying in like spirit, out of the deep concern I share with you to halt the spread of nuclear weapons.

We are addressing this matter on a serious and urgent basis since we view such a development in the Republic of South Africa or elsewhere with the utmost gravity. The United States has long been concerned over South Africa's operation of a pilot enrichment facility which is not under the safeguards system of the IAEA, and over the repeated refusal of the South Africans, despite our urgings, to join the NPT.

Upon receipt of your information about the existence of a test site in the Kalahari Desert, I directed my experts to investigate the situation, utilizing our national technical and other means. I am also instructing my representative in Pretoria to emphasize to the Government of South Africa in the clearest terms that the testing of a nuclear device would have the gravest consequences. I am pursuing this with the Government of South Africa.

It is my hope and my intention to work closely with you and other concerned countries in the immediate period ahead, so that by our respective efforts we can successfully resolve this serious situation. End text.

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D840076–0457. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Mark Garrison (EUR/SOV); cleared by Tarnoff; approved by Christopher.

² See Document 41.

43. Telegram From the Department of State to the White House¹

Washington, August 20, 1977, 1000Z

197920. For Dr. Brzezinski only. Quote. Eyes only for Ambassador from Secretary. Subject: My Meeting With Dobrynin August 18.²

1. Dobrynin, newly arrived from Moscow, told me that Brezhnev intended his comment in his recent speech on the Charleston speech³ to be “constructive.” But he added that Brezhnev’s charge that the human rights campaign was simply a “smokescreen” to cover a continued arms buildup—for example, the neutron bomb—correctly reflected the Soviet leadership’s opinion. Dobrynin cautioned that if the aim of this “buildup” is to pressure the Soviet leadership in current negotiations, the US will find it counter-productive.

2. However, Dobrynin was clearly under instruction to put a good face on US-Soviet relations, and to signal continued Soviet interest in SALT. Significantly, he agreed with me on the need to extend the Interim Agreement, and agreed as well that that would best be accomplished through informal parallel statements, or by an exchange of letters. I told him we would discuss the matter further.

3. I gave Dobrynin a comprehensive briefing on the Middle East trip, expressing at the same time displeasure at Soviet readiness to accept interpretations that we were attempting to exclude them from the peaceseeing process. Dobrynin agreed that the Soviet reaction had come about as a result of a misunderstanding. I said we would be working closely with them as co-chairmen and looked forward to seeing Gromyko when he arrived in the U.S. I informed Dobrynin frankly that prospects for a Geneva conference convening before December were not likely, as the Arabs feel much more remains to be done. Dobrynin expressed thanks for the fulness of the briefing and seemed satisfied.

I also briefed Dobrynin on my upcoming China trip,⁴ and expressed US appreciation for Brezhnev’s information on the possible South African nuclear weapon test site. I told him we would keep in touch on this matter and asked him to do the same.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 107, 8/16–20/77. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Eyes Only; Nodis. This telegram was sent for “action Moscow from State Aug 19.”

² The memorandum of conversation for this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 8/18/77.

³ See footnote 2, Document 39.

⁴ Vance traveled to the People’s Republic of China, August 20–26. He then traveled to Japan, August 26–27.

Dobrynin suggested that Gromyko come to Washington September 22–23, during the first week of the UNGA, for a meeting with the President. I replied that I would check the schedule.

Vance
Unquote

Vance

44. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 23, 1977

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

US—Dr. Marshall Shulman, S/MS
USSR—Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

At his request, I had lunch with Dobrynin August 23. His main purpose appeared to be to get an additional reading on the Administration's approach to the forthcoming negotiations on SALT, and to the general relationship.

Dobrynin first asked whether the dates he proposed to Secretary Vance for Gromyko's visit to Washington (September 22–23) would be convenient for the President. I said that I would try to find out.

Later in the conversation, Dobrynin came back several times to the question of what the President really wants of the Soviet-American relationship, and of a SALT agreement. Although I repeated the strong impression I had several times expressed to him before that the President seriously desired a stabilization of the strategic military competition, and an improvement in Soviet-American relations, it was clear that this question remains a continuing uncertainty in his mind.

In the discussion of SALT, Dobrynin opened by asking my impression of the prospects. I said that from the American point of view, it was discouraging that the Soviet Union had been negative and uncre-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, SALT—(3/77–8/77). Secret. Drafted by Shulman on August 23. An unknown hand wrote, "W. Hyland FYI." in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

ative; that we had no sense of feedback to our ideas. I had the impression that the Soviet Union was hoping that public pressure would bring about a shift in the American positions, but if this is so, it represented a serious misreading of US public opinion, the main force of which was in the other direction. I expressed the hope that at Vienna Gromyko would address Soviet concerns and American concerns in a forthcoming spirit, with ideas of how we might find common ground on the main issues. If this were done, I expressed confidence that he would be met by the same spirit on the American side.

In reply, Dobrynin emphasized that we must understand the psychology of Brezhnev's situation. He had invested a great deal of effort, and against substantial opposition, to reach the Vladivostok agreements and, said Dobrynin, he simply could not go to the Politburo and say: "Well, the Americans have rejected the agreement we reached. What other ideas shall we put forward?" The only chance of forward movement, Dobrynin thought, would be for the US to say to Brezhnev: "We understand your commitment to Vladivostok, and we start from there. But there have been changes in technology and other factors in the three years since Vladivostok, and this is how we propose to take account of those changes." I said this was essentially what the framework agreed upon at Geneva sought to do, but he replied that our proposals, to have a reasonable chance of acceptance, had to reflect a willingness to accept parity, whereas it appeared to the Soviet leadership that what we sought, in our effort to reduce the Soviet heavy missiles, was to prevent the Soviet Union from attaining a strategic capability equal to ours.

We then reviewed the American concerns centering on Soviet heavy missiles and the Soviet unwillingness to consider a reduction in the MIRV aggregate. Dobrynin's response covered familiar ground: the US had at first agreed to count the air-launched cruise missiles individually against the MIRV aggregate, and now were unwilling even to count a plane-load of them as one MIRV against the total, etc., etc. Dobrynin also covered Soviet concerns about GLCMs as a problem exacerbated by the way the B-1 decision was handled.

Dobrynin expressed the hope that the US could transmit its proposals through him in ample time so that Gromyko could have them studied in advance, if we wanted the Vienna meetings to be productive.

He also inquired whether the Panama, Taiwan and Cuba issues would make the President's problem with domestic public opinion on SALT more complicated. At this point, we broke off to watch the President's press conference on television.²

² The text of the President's August 23 news conference, which covered the Panama Canal, Israel, Rhodesia, and the People's Republic of China, is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II*, pp. 1486–1494

45. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 29, 1977

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
 Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS
 Paul C. Warnke, ACDA

USSR

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

1. *Middle East.* Dobrynin opened by conveying Gromyko's thanks for the comprehensive briefing on the Secretary's Middle East trip received on August 18.² Gromyko will be ready by the Vienna meeting³ to convey his consideration of related questions. Among other things, he will discuss the possibility of preparing, perhaps by the time of the Washington meeting, a joint US-Soviet co-chairmen's statement about some basic principles of a settlement, including the rights of Palestinian self-determination and statehood, as well as the order and time for the resumption of a Middle East conference. The Secretary gave his reply later in the conversation, saying that he would be glad to have Gromyko bring with him or to send ahead his thoughts about a statement of principles. The Secretary expressed the feeling that it should be possible, before Gromyko left Washington, to settle on a date or at least a month for the Geneva meeting, and said he thought December would be a realistic possibility.

Dobrynin asked about the situation in southern Lebanon, and expressed concern lest the Israelis take military action. The Secretary replied that we had gone over this issue with the Israelis, and had received commitments that they would not take military action. The Secretary then reviewed the main elements of the most recent plan proposed by Boutros, the Foreign Minister of Lebanon. In addition to the Shtaura agreement,⁴ it would include the following steps: (1) remove the Palestinian fighters to camps at Tyre; (2) allow some armed Palestinians in the Arqub area and in the vicinity of Bint Jubayl (3) deploy

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Dobrynin–Vance, 8/29/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on August 29.

² See Document 43.

³ Vance and Gromyko were scheduled to meet in Vienna during the first week of September to discuss SALT. The meeting was cancelled, and SALT discussions between the two resumed when Gromyko traveled to the United States in late September. (Bernard Gwertzman, "This Week's Meeting is Canceled, and the Old Pact May be Extended: SALT Just Isn't Going Anywhere," *The New York Times*, September 4, 1977, p. 110)

⁴ For information on the Shtaura Agreement see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. VIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, January 1977–August 1978, footnote 2, Document 76.

1,000 armed Lebanese soldiers in the southern area (Dobrynin: Do they have that many? The Secretary: Yes, they do now, and they hope to build this up to 1,400); (4) Those Palestinians who entered Lebanon since 1969 would be transferred to Syria. Boutros believed the Syrians, Palestinians and the Lebanese government were close to agreement in principle along these lines, but did not yet have a definite agreement.

Dobrynin said he would keep us informed on the results of the current Arafat visit to Moscow.

2. *China Trip*. In reporting on his trip to China,⁵ the Secretary said that it had been particularly interesting to arrive following the Party Congress. He observed that a new sense of self-confidence could be felt, following the several trying years that had preceded it. This was now behind them, and the leaders appeared to be of one mind on how to attack the problems of the future, to which they looked forward with optimism, in the light of their support from the country. One could feel even in the street impressions a sense of a more open situation. In a pragmatic and less ideological spirit, the leaders will concentrate on internal goals in the next decade or so, rather than on foreign policy.

The Secretary reported that he had discussed with the Chinese some international issues, including the recovery of confidence in the United States; a region-by-region review, beginning with Asia (largely on Japan and Korea), the Middle East (where the Chinese knowledge had been sketchy, and some misunderstandings were dispelled), political, economic and security aspects of Europe (where Chinese information also appeared to be fragmented), Africa (particularly Namibia and Rhodesia, describing our joint efforts with the British, and our shift to greater cooperation with the Africans—the Chinese asked many questions and showed special interest in the subject).

Among non-regional issues, the Secretary reported he had described US efforts to widen normal relations with as many countries as possible, including North Vietnam, Cuba, etc. On the issue of nuclear proliferation, he said, the Chinese took the same position they had taken during his previous visit two years ago. He had spoken also of the human rights issue and other global aspects of US policy.

Among bilateral issues, the Secretary said he had discussed normalization of relations, trade, and cultural relations, claim assets, etc. No decisions were made on the matter of normalization, he reported, but the discussion was good and contributed to a better understanding of each other's position. It was agreed to continue our consultations in the future on this subject.

⁵ August 20–26; for memoranda of conversations from these meetings, see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XIII, China, Documents 47–51.

Dobrynin asked for the Secretary's impressions of Teng Hsiao-Ping and Hua Kuo Feng. The Secretary replied that Teng seemed bubbling and vigorous, expressing satisfaction with his having been resurrected three times; Hua seemed thoughtful, quiet, well-suited for his role as Chairman. Dobrynin said this corresponded with Soviet impressions.

3. *Embassy Fire*. At the Secretary's request, Shulman expressed appreciation for the Soviet cooperation in dealing with the problems raised by the fire in our Moscow embassy.⁶ He said that we would be preparing a list of matters on which further cooperation would be appreciated, and expressed hope that we would not again have the airport clearance delay which had marred an otherwise splendid record of cooperation. Dobrynin gave assurances that he would be ready to help in any way we required.

4. *SALT*. The Secretary then turned to a discussion of the plans for the next round of strategic arms limitation negotiations. He said that he had read with care the reports of the conversations between Dobrynin, Warnke and Brzezinski last week, and also of the interview between Gromyko and Senator McGovern, and these had all reenforced his concern that the two sides were still so far apart that the progress we both hoped to make at Vienna did not yet seem within reach. He therefore suggested for Soviet consideration the possibility that we both give ourselves more time, and that we postpone the meeting of the Foreign Ministers until Gromyko comes to Washington September 22–23. Speaking personally, said the Secretary, he felt that an unproductive meeting in Vienna would not be good for either side, and that with more time, it might be possible for the Soviet side to reflect on matters that had been discussed, and for us to be able to put into Dobrynin's hands well in advance of the next meeting for staff study the results of our own reflections.

Dobrynin said he would have to consult his government, but expressed the personal view that he felt a sense of relief. Although the interim conversations had helped explicate our position, he had intended to say to the Secretary that he had not noted any significant developments since Geneva that would lead to a productive meeting. Although he was not authorized to say so, he said he felt impelled to express his personal feeling that we were headed for a deadlock in the negotiations, and that the postponement was a good idea.

The Secretary gave Dobrynin a draft of a press statement on the possible postponement and on the intent of the two governments to

⁶ The fire was on August 26. For more information on the fire, see telegram Tosec 90191/205090 to the Secretary's Delegation, August 26, in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770309–1260.

continue to observe the terms of the Interim Agreement, which might be issued simultaneously in Moscow and Washington. Dobrynin raised some question initially about the Interim Agreement announcement, fearing that it would convey a sense of fatalism about the September meeting, but after discussion and reflection, expressed willingness to convey the draft to Moscow for consideration. The Secretary asked Dobrynin to convey to Gromyko his strong feeling that it would be useful to say something now about the Interim Agreement, to ward off negative interpretations of the postponement. It was agreed that, subject to Soviet concurrence, the press statement would be released Thursday, September 1, at noon Washington time, 7 p.m. Moscow time.⁷

It was further agreed that the two Foreign Ministers would meet on September 22, and that Gromyko's meeting with the President would follow on the 23rd.

Dobrynin said he would seek a response from Moscow as soon as possible on the proposal for postponement and the press statement.

There followed a brief review of selected SALT issues. In the course of a summation of his impression of the US position, Dobrynin made it clear that he had not clearly understood some figures mentioned by Brzezinski at their last meeting. The point at issue appeared to be that if the ALCMed bombers were to be counted under the MIRV aggregate, as the Soviet Union now wished, the US would in practice be limited to a SNDV aggregate of 2080, while the Soviet Union would have an aggregate of 2250. Dobrynin asked if it were the US intention to propose that the Soviet Union reduce its aggregate to 2080. Warnke said that he would supply Dobrynin with a paper clarifying the point.

Dobrynin restated the Soviet preference for including limitations on air-to-surface missiles in the treaty rather than in the protocol, and also the Soviet position that a reduction in the MIRV aggregate without the inclusion of ALCMed bombers would have the practical effect of giving the US a MIRV advantage.

⁷ No press statement was found.

46. Summary of Conclusions and Minutes of a Policy Review Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 31, 1977, 3–4:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Economic Relations

PARTICIPANTS

White House

Vice President

Denis Clift

Domestic Policy Staff

Stu Eizenstat

Robert Ginsburg

State

Richard Cooper

Richard Vine

Marshall Shulman

Treasury

Sec. Blumenthal (Chairman)

Anthony Solomon

Marjorie Searing

Defense

Charles Duncan

JCS

Gen. Smith

CIA

Adm. Turner

Robert Bowie

Energy

Harry Bergold

Commerce

Sec. Kreps

Frank Weil

NSC

Zbigniew Brzezinski

Samuel Huntington

William Hyland

Robert Hormats

Timothy Deal

The group agreed that trade was an important aspect of overall US-Soviet political relations even though the volume of trade was small relative to the size of the two economies. MFN and credits clearly mean more to the Soviets than to us, primarily because of their political symbolism. MFN would not result in substantially greater Soviet exports to the US.

The Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments² have largely failed in their principal objective, that is, to put pressure on the Soviets to permit increased emigration of Jews and other minorities. The Jewish community in the US has begun to understand this and now may be amenable to some change in the legislation if that would facilitate emigration. Some participants doubted, however, that the Con-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Institutional File, Box 29, INT Documents: #5800s: 9/77. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 22.

gressional sponsors and supporters of the legislation are willing to consider amending the legislation, at least at this time.

The group agreed that timing was crucial. Presently, we have a number of major policy initiatives that are or will shortly come before the Congress (e.g. Canal treaty, SALT, energy program). We will need the full support of Jackson and other key senators. Thus it would be a major tactical mistake to launch an Administration initiative to repeal or modify the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments now. But this would not rule out low-key, exploratory discussions with Jackson and others about the desirability of revised legislation, the best means to effect such a change, and what we want from the Soviets in return for modification in our policy.

Present restrictions in the Trade Act deny the President adequate flexibility in dealing with the Soviets. The ability to offer MFN and, perhaps, credits could be a valuable tool. We should be able to use that tool to our advantage, but that will not be possible without a change in the law.

However, before deciding on Congressional tactics, we should first attempt to develop a coherent East-West trade policy. We need answers to some basic questions. What are we trying to accomplish through expanded trade? Is increased trade a goal in itself? Should we attempt to link movement in the trade area to progress on other issues? Should the linkages be to internal issues in the Soviet Union (e.g. emigration, human rights) or to Soviet external behavior (e.g. their policies and actions in the Middle East, Africa, etc.). Some participants expressed concern about “overloading the circuits”, that is, asking too much from the Soviets in return for MFN and credits.

The papers prepared for the meeting³ outlined four strategies for dealing with the Soviets: (1) *reduced engagement*—a more restricted approach to trade relations designed to increase Soviet isolation from the West, slow Soviet economic growth, and put pressure on their resources; (2) *status quo*; (3) *limited new engagement*—an approach emphasizing use of “carrots” and “sticks” to control the pace of Soviet interaction with the US and world economy; and (4) *enthusiastic engagement*—a forthcoming approach intended to lead to full normalization of economic ties. The Chairman (Sec. Blumenthal) pointed out that the status quo (2) and limited new engagement (3) options were the only realistic alternatives. He suggested, as a working hypotheses, that we seek to define more closely what we mean by limited new engagement leaving aside, for the moment, questions on timing and tactics.

³ See footnote 1, Document 40.

There is an important difference between giving the President tools which enable him to be more flexible in his dealings with the Soviets and actually *using* those tools. Under Jackson-Vanik, he has no flexibility. Any proposal for limited new engagement must address this issue. As a first step, we should let the Soviets know what we want from them in the way of a down payment. We would make it understood that we would work for a change in US legislation, but they, in turn, would have to take steps to improve the atmosphere. If, as a result, the Soviets liberalize their policies, we will then be in a better position to go before the Congress and seek a change in the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments.

It was agreed that we need to study this question further to establish what we can reasonably expect to obtain from the Soviets in return for MFN and/or credits. On the other hand, we should avoid making the linkages between specific economic and political issues too explicit. That would surely backfire, as did Jackson-Vanik.

It was pointed out that generally our analysis of US-Soviet economic relations and, in particular, the question whether the US has economic leverage or influence over the Soviets was narrowly focused on the current situation. At the present time, we cannot exert significant influence upon Soviet behavior by economic means, and to be effective what leverage we do have would have to be used in a coordinated Western effort. However, our allies are more reluctant than we to use trade policy to achieve political ends. Yet, we may be missing an important point. If economic growth in the Soviet Union slows as projected, the Soviets will face difficult choices in the 1980's regarding the allocation of resources. Does this have implications for US policy? Conceivably, our economic leverage may be much stronger than now, and we may have a unique opportunity to use it. Some concern was expressed, however, that it was difficult to see where an economic crisis, or more likely, a slowdown in the Soviet economy, would necessarily be to our advantage.

Similarly, with respect to energy, we should begin to think now whether it is in our long-term interest to help the Soviets develop and expand their energy production, in order to avoid the crisis suggested in the CIA's recent paper on Soviet oil.⁴ In that regard, we must decide whether we are justified in basing our policies in this area on the CIA study. We need a critical assessment of the paper.

Regarding technology transfer, it was agreed that our primary concern was peaceful, non-strategic trade. Granting MFN and credits to the Soviets would not necessarily mean any loosening of controls on

⁴ See Document 40.

the export of strategic goods and technologies, particularly those with potential military application.

On other East-West matters, the group agreed that the Administration should not support the Humphrey bill which, like the Dole amendment proposed earlier this year, would permit the extension of CCC credits to non-market economies not otherwise eligible under the Trade Act. It was also reported that Romania was anxious to obtain an extended (e.g. three year) Jackson-Vanik waiver and had approached US officials in that regard. The group decided that it would be a tactical mistake for the Administration to undertake Congressional consultations on this issue at the present time. To obtain an extended waiver for a single country, we would have to use up valuable bargaining chips with the Congress which could undermine the prospects for a broader change in Title IV of the Trade Act.

Next Steps

It was agreed that we are not in a position now to undertake any major new initiatives in US-Soviet economic relations. Further work must be done in the following areas:

1. Studies should be initiated on the implications for US policy of (a) a slowdown in economic growth during the 1980s and (b) a projected decline in Soviet energy output and its shift from net exporter to net importer.

2. There should also be a study of what we would realistically expect to obtain from the Soviets in return for MFN and/or USG credits. This would include an examination of alternate packages, i.e. tradeoffs on both Soviet internal (e.g. emigration, human rights) and foreign policy issues (e.g. Soviet restraint in the Middle East, Africa).

3. We should undertake low-key, exploratory discussions with key Senators and Congressmen to evaluate the prospects for a change in the Jackson-Vanik and Stevenson amendments and to review the best legislative means to effect such a change.

Sec. Blumenthal will meet with Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Paltichev in November, and it was agreed that we should have answers to these questions before that meeting. The studies and our Congressional soundings will be reviewed by the PRC at a later date.

47. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 10, 1977, 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
 The Secretary
 Mr. Paul Warnke
 Mr. Marshall Shulman

USSR
 Ambassador Dobrynin

In the course of a luncheon meeting, September 10, held at our request, the following subjects were covered:

1. *Aeroflot Office Bombing*. In response to Dobrynin's protest of September 7 regarding explosion damage to Aeroflot Washington office earlier that day, the Secretary reported measures taken to seek to apprehend the persons responsible and to prevent further such occurrences. Dobrynin indicated satisfaction with the report.

2. *Brezhnev remarks to Justice Burger*.² The Secretary expressed surprise at the tenor of the reported remarks of Brezhnev concerning the US attitudes toward SALT and other matters, and said he hoped this did not represent his actual perception of our position. Dobrynin sought to explain the intensity of Brezhnev's feelings about the departure from the Vladivostok agreement and the disappointment of his hopes for this Administration. He emphasized that Brezhnev's remarks reflected his genuine emotional outlook and should not be regarded as a tactical move. In a personal statement, Dobrynin discussed at length the effect in Moscow of leaks and statements in the US—usually not denied—which emphasized our contingency plans for fighting the Russians in the Middle East and elsewhere, built on US estimates (which he said were erroneous) of putative Soviet reactions to shortages of oil, etc., all of which appeared to maintain an impression of the Soviet Union as “the number one enemy.” TASS reported this daily fare to Moscow, he said, and he could refute it only when there were official denials of such stories, which was not often.

3. *Arrangements for Gromyko's visit*. Dobrynin opened by saying he hoped there would be no change in the usual arrangements for Gromyko's plane to arrive at Andrews and remain there during his visit.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, SALT—(9/1/77–9/15/77). Secret. Drafted by Shulman. Brzezinski wrote in the upper-right corner, “DA Your info. ZB.” The luncheon meeting took place in the Secretary's Dining Room on the 8th floor of the Department of State.

² Chief Justice Warren Burger. For a summary of Brezhnev and Burger's discussion, which focused on SALT, see “Brezhnev Confers with Burger,” *The New York Times*, September 10, 1977, p. 2.

The Secretary assured him that this would be handled as usual. The Secretary then sketched plans for meetings on SALT on the morning and afternoon of the 22nd, and asked whether Gromyko would prefer to have luncheon time free or to have lunch at the Department. Dobrynin indicated a preference for the latter, and this was agreed upon, with the understanding that it would be an unstructured working lunch, following the morning session which would start at 10:00. It was also agreed that another session would be held on SALT on the morning of the 23rd, to be followed by a meeting with the President that afternoon, and by another meeting with the Secretary later that afternoon on the Middle East and other subjects, which would also be continued in New York during the following week. Dobrynin indicated that Gromyko would be in New York until September 30. It was agreed that Shulman would discuss with Dobrynin arrangements for the Gromyko visit in further detail on September 12.

4. *Middle East*. Dobrynin transmitted to the Secretary a proposed joint statement³ which he hoped could be issued by the US and the USSR as co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference following Gromyko's conversations in Washington. He stressed that it contained some softened language on two points: the withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from occupied areas and the establishment of a Palestinian state. He implied that these reflected the discussions with Arafat in Moscow, and said that Gromyko would be reporting on these discussions in fuller detail when he came. The Secretary said that the draft joint statement would be studied, and that Dobrynin would be given our reaction before Gromyko's arrival. In any case, he said, he hoped that it would be possible before Gromyko's departure from New York to announce a specific date for the resumption of the Geneva Conference, preferably in December.

5. *SALT*. Following an introductory statement stressing the US concern about achieving reductions in strategic delivery vehicles, MIRV aggregates and Soviet MLBMs, the Secretary gave Dobrynin a non-note summarizing some principles which could meet both Soviet and US concerns,⁴ and expressed the hope that Dobrynin could elicit a reaction from Moscow as soon as possible, so that these responses could be taken into account in the discussions with Gromyko. Dobrynin agreed to try to do so, although he cautioned that the Politburo would not ordinarily meet before Thursday or Friday, and things might not move that quickly. There followed a lengthy discussion of the major issues in dispute, in the course of which the Secretary and Warnke sought to explain the rationale for the positions taken by the

³ Not found attached.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

US in the negotiations, and also expressed hope that Gromyko would be prepared to be forthcoming in his responses.

6. *Extension of the Interim Agreement.* In response to the Soviet draft joint statement previously received, the Secretary explained that the language of the Arms Control Act would require Congressional action if a joint statement were issued. He also made it clear that the US preferred not to include a reference to the time period for the extension, and that the sentence in the Soviet draft statement which would ban testing and deployment of weapons under negotiation was in our view not appropriate for inclusion. The Secretary gave Dobrynin language for a proposed unilateral US statement on its intention to continue to observe the restraints of the Interim Agreement,⁵ and expressed the hope that the Soviet Union would issue a similar unilateral statement. Dobrynin said he would communicate our position to Moscow.

7. *Reaffirmation of the ABM Treaty.* The Secretary said he thought it would be desirable for both of us to make a statement during Gromyko's visit reaffirming the ABM Treaty, subject only to minor modifications following a review by the SCC after its scheduled meeting in November. Dobrynin will communicate our view to Moscow.

8. *China.* The Secretary told Dobrynin that, despite erroneous press reports to the contrary, the United States did not discuss military assistance to the PRC during his visit.

9. *Visas to Soviet Trade Unionists.* In a private comment to Shulman, Dobrynin expressed satisfaction with the US issuance of visas to the four Soviet trade unionists, and made the purely personal observation that the US had missed an opportunity in not giving the Soviet Union advance word of this action as a goodwill gesture, even though the action, as he understood it, was really motivated by a desire to improve our position at Belgrade. Every positive gesture could help at this moment, he said, to help dispel misimpressions of US attitudes.

10. *French Participation in the CCD.* Warnke communicated to Dobrynin our response to the Soviet paper concerning the Giscard-Brezhnev conversation on French participation in the CCD. While agreeing to a receptive attitude to the French initiative, Warnke suggested that we should not press the French at this time, and that we should leave the question of the co-chairmanship in abeyance for the time being.

⁵ Attached but not printed.

48. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 13, 1977, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Richard Moose—part time

Paul Warnke—part time

Marshall Shulman

USSR

Amb. Dobrynin

At a two-hour meeting held at our request September 13, the following subjects were covered:

1. *Rhodesia*. Moose and the Secretary reviewed in detail our plans on Rhodesia, including our intention to seek a Security Council resolution next week. Dobrynin expressed the opinion that if the Africans involved accepted the proposal, he did not think the Soviet Union would oppose it. In response to Dobrynin's request, Moose agreed to supply the details in writing.

2. *Middle East*. The Secretary gave Dobrynin a preliminary review of some problems we have with language in the Soviet draft of the proposed joint statement, but indicated he would communicate a fuller response later in the week after consultation with the President. A general problem in the discussions appeared to arise from the Soviet disinclination to refer specifically to Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338,² but to mention Security Council and General Assembly Resolutions or United Nations Resolutions, or to incorporate language from the resolutions without naming them. The Secretary suggested that the joint statement might better be issued at the conclusion of the New York meetings toward the end of the month, rather than during Gromyko's visit to Washington. Dobrynin seemed to have no difficulty with this suggestion. Incidentally, Dobrynin commented favorably on the statement on the Middle East issued by the State Department on

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Dobrynin–Vance, 9/13/77. Secret. Drafted by Shulman on September 14. The meeting took place in Vance's office at the Department of State.

² Security Council Resolution 338, sponsored by the United States and Soviet Union and adopted on October 22, 1973, called for a cease-fire between Arab and Israeli forces in the October War. The resolution had three parts, which called for: 1) the cease-fire to begin twelve hours after the adoption of the resolution, 2) full implementation of Resolution 242, and 3) negotiations to begin immediately to bring peace to the Middle East. (*Yearbook of the United Nations, 1973*, p. 213)

September 12,³ he thought it usefully clarified our position on the Palestinian problem, and called attention to Arafat's favorable reaction.

3. *SALT*. In commenting on the possibility of a sublimit on MIRVd ICBMs, Dobrynin observed that this would be likely to evoke an immediate and unfavorable reaction in Moscow, as a step backward from our May position. The equity of this sublimit was discussed, against the background of the number of Soviet missiles at Pervomaisk and Derzhnaya. Dobrynin repeated his understanding of the importance of getting a response from Moscow to the illustrative principles discussed at the meeting on September 10.⁴

4. *ABM Treaty Reaffirmation*. In response to Dobrynin's request to Shulman on September 12⁵ for clarification of the time intended for the SCC review and the nature of the clarifications and modifications mentioned in our previous draft, Dobrynin was given a statement indicating that the review was intended to follow immediately after the November meeting, and that the clarifications and modifications were minor. Dobrynin made it clear that references to clarifications and modifications might raise questions in the public minds over the extent of the changes proposed. The statement was thereupon redrafted. The present text is attached as Tab A.⁶

5. *Moscow Embassy Roof Materials*. The Secretary made strong representations to Dobrynin requesting that the lumber required for the repair of the roof of the US Embassy in Moscow be granted prompt clearance by Soviet Customs. Dobrynin said he had no knowledge of the problem, but promised to seek expeditious handling of the matter. He added, however, that our Embassy was using the occasion of the fire to seek action on many unrelated requests.

6. *Gromyko Visit*.

a. The Secretary indicated that Gromyko's meeting with the President would be at 10:30 a.m. on September 23. It was agreed that Gromyko and the Secretary might meet together earlier that morning. Dobrynin suggested that Gromyko might wish to mention the Middle East in his talk with the President, and it was therefore agreed that a

³ *The New York Times* reported: "The State Department said today in a new policy statement on the Middle East that 'the Palestinians must be involved in the peacemaking process' to insure a successful settlement. Palestinian representatives 'will have to be at Geneva for the Palestinian questions to be solved.'" (Bernard Gwertzman, "U.S. Asserts Need for Palestinian Role at Geneva Meeting," September 13, 1977, p. 1)

⁴ See Document 47.

⁵ The September 12 memorandum of conversation between Shulman and Dobrynin is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77—Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, MDS–Dobrynin, 9/12/77.

⁶ Attached but not printed is the "Revised (9/13/77) Draft Joint Statement."

half-hour would be set aside on the afternoon of the 22nd for a brief preliminary discussion of the Middle East between Gromyko and the Secretary.

b. The Secretary indicated that Mrs. Vance would be pleased to give a tea for Mrs. Gromyko if she should accompany the Foreign Minister to Washington.

c. Dobrynin suggested that Gromyko might wish to have an opportunity to talk with the Secretary alone, following the luncheon on the 22nd. The possibility was kept open that Gromyko might wish to return to the Soviet Embassy for a brief period thereafter, and before the start of the afternoon session.

d. Dobrynin inquired who would be present at the meeting with the President. The Secretary replied that, in addition to himself, there would be the Vice President, Dr. Brzezinski and a notetaker. Dobrynin said that Gromyko would be accompanied at the meeting by himself, Kornienko and Sukhadrov, the interpreter.

e. The Secretary suggested the possibility that in the course of the meetings, it would be useful to review the status of the various working groups set up following the Moscow meeting, and that the communique might include a reference to this review. Dobrynin concurred in the suggestion.

7. Miscellany.

a. Dobrynin asked the Secretary whether there was any possibility of a favorable US response to the Soviet suggestions of a declaration on the non-use of force, and on no first-use of nuclear weapons in Europe. The Secretary indicated that the former did not appear to have practical value, but that we still had the latter suggestion under study.

b. The Secretary asked Dobrynin about the Soviet view of developments in the Horn of Africa. Dobrynin indicated that the matter was a delicate one, but he went on to say that the Soviet Union had done its best to stop the fighting in the area, and was trying to hold arms shipments to a minimum. However, he added, irrationality on both sides made the situation difficult.

c. Dobrynin inquired conversationally about the composition of the US Delegation to the United Nations, and to the Belgrade CSCE Conference. When these had been answered, Dobrynin indicated an interest in whether the appointment of Justice Goldberg⁷ to the CSCE meeting implied a change of policy. He also inquired whether the Secretary as well as the President would be speaking at the General Assembly. The Secretary said this had not been decided.

⁷ Carter appointed Arthur Goldberg, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court from October 1962 until July 1965, as U.S. Ambassador to the Belgrade Conference (CSCE).

49. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 15, 1977, 5–6:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall Shulman

USSR
Amb. Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in September 15 at his request to report on replies received from Moscow to several points discussed with him at previous meetings,² related to the forthcoming discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko. The meeting lasted from 5 p.m. until 6:40 p.m.

He transmitted the text of the Soviet unilateral statement regarding the Soviet intention to take no actions inconsistent with the Interim Agreement after its expiration and while SALT negotiations are proceeding, provided that the United States exercises similar restraints. Statement would be issued during Gromyko visit. (Text of statement at Tab 1, in Russian and English translation as provided by Dobrynin.)³

Dobrynin also transmitted language for a joint US-Soviet statement expressing determination to conclude a new SALT agreement, which could either be issued separately or as part of a communique at the conclusion of the Gromyko visit to Washington. (Texts of Russian and English translation as provided at Tab 2.)

Dobrynin then transmitted a non-paper indicating a negative Moscow reaction to the proposal to limit Soviet MLBMs to 220, and to limit the number of bombers carrying ALCMs to 250. The statement also repeated the charge that the United States is striving for unilateral advantages, and expressed the hope that the US would approach the talks with Gromyko with “more realistic positions.” (Text of non-paper, as supplied in English handwriting, at Tab C [3].) In transmitting the message, Dobrynin observed: “This is something we will both regret.”

In the discussion that followed, Dobrynin expressed the view that further efforts to elicit counter-proposals to the points raised would not

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, SALT—9/1/77–9/15/77. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Shulman on September 16. The meeting took place in Vance’s office at the Department of State.

² See Documents 45, 47, and 48

³ Three tabs were attached but not printed.

be likely to be productive, since the Soviet commitment to “the Vladivostok agreements” (and by extension to the negotiations of January and February, 1976) was a matter of principle, and was accompanied by strong emotion. It was clear from the lengthy discussion following that fundamental differences of recollection and interpretation remained on what was agreed to by the United States at Vladivostok and the subsequent negotiations. Dobrynin insisted that Secretary Kissinger had agreed, and President Ford had affirmed in writing, on aggregate ceilings, on counting ALCMs as MIRVs and on a 2500 km range limit on ALCMs. He also thought, but less certainly, that agreement had been reached on a 600 km range limit on SLCMs and GLCMs. He insisted that the language used at Vladivostok had referred to “air to surface missiles,” and had not, in a number of specific instances, included the adjective “ballistic.”

Moreover, Dobrynin added, the Soviet leadership was uncertain until April or May where the present Administration stood on these points, since they had been repeated by Brezhnev in his letters to President Carter, and had not been specifically rejected in the President’s responses. He also cited the Brzezinski press conference of April 1⁴ as evidence that the US administration still held to the position that bombers carrying ALCMs would be counted under the MIRV aggregate. The Secretary refuted this interpretation of the Vladivostok agreement, and said that the press conference referred to did not constitute a formal statement of the Administration’s diplomatic position. He added that further arguments about Vladivostok would be sterile, and could not lead to productive discussions when Gromyko came.

Dobrynin responded by saying that the essence of the matter, as he saw it, was that the negotiations were premised upon the acceptance by both sides of a rough strategic equivalence, and that the US efforts to limit Soviet ICBMs, their principal reliance in that equivalence, appeared to them as an effort to gain a strategic superiority through negotiations, since US advantages in submarines, bombers and now cruise missiles, would not be equally limited. “As they see it in Moscow, you here think we are weak economically and have other problems, and expect us to yield to your demands for superiority, but we won’t. We are prepared to make any sacrifices necessary, and our people will, when they understand that the US is unwilling to accept parity.”

There followed some inconclusive discussion whether it would be useful, in the absence of other agreement, to conclude an agreement on the Vladivostok ceilings on delivery vehicles and MIRVs, perhaps with

⁴ For a summary of Brzezinski’s April 1 press conference, see Don Oberdorfer, “Brzezinski: Hopes for the Future,” *The Washington Post*, April 2, 1977, p. A1.

some projected reductions, and continue to work on the unresolved issues.

It was agreed to meet again September 16.⁵

⁵No record of the meeting was found.

50. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko visited Washington on September 22 and 23, 1977, to meet with Secretary of State Cyrus Vance and President Jimmy Carter. Gromyko's visit to Washington was in conjunction with his trip to New York for the United Nations General Assembly. The six meetings with Vance and/or Carter dealt primarily with SALT, but also addressed issues in the Middle East.

The first meeting, held between Gromyko and Vance on September 22 from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. focused exclusively on SALT. Vance reiterated the use of the three-part framework, which he had introduced at the Geneva meetings. (See Document 28.) The discussion revolved around negotiations dealing with specific missiles and the limitations that would be imposed. Both Gromyko and Vance stressed that there should be equality for both countries in the limitations. (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1977)

On September 22, from 5 to 6:30 p.m., the second meeting between Vance and Gromyko took place and dealt with territorial issues in the Middle East. Vance discussed his recent talks with Israeli and Egyptian representatives. Gromyko proposed a joint statement that addressed reconvening the Geneva Conference. Vance indicated that the Lebanese should be included, but this proved to be a point of contention between the United States and the Soviets. (Memorandum of conversation, September 22, Department of State, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, NODIS MemCons, 1977)

Later that evening, Gromyko and Vance met a third time to discuss SALT. Gromyko addressed the proposed limitations on land-based MIRVed missiles. He also assured Vance that the radius of the Backfire would not be increased. Vance assured Gromyko that he would share this information with the President. The memorandum of conversation

is printed as Document 182 in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980.

On the morning of September 23, Gromyko met with Carter and Vance. During this meeting Carter provided an overview of U.S.-Soviet relations, to which Gromyko responded. While a variety of topics were discussed, including the Middle East and Africa, the discussion dealt primarily with SALT and missile limitations. Regarding the Middle East, it was determined that the Geneva Conference should be reconvened. The discussions on Africa addressed white versus black rule. Gromyko reiterated that in order to convene a summit between Carter and Brezhnev, a major step must be on the horizon. Carter complained about Soviet press criticism of him. Additionally, he criticized the Soviet leadership for its inflexibility and unresponsiveness to several proposals made by the United States. He reiterated that the United States would remain flexible, but the Soviet Union must be so as well. For the record of the meeting on SALT, see *ibid.*, Document 183.

On the afternoon of September 23, Gromyko and Vance held their fifth meeting. They discussed the communiqué and continued their previous discussions regarding the limitations on MIRVed and non-MIRVed missiles. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 23, 4:30–6:30 p.m.; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, 9/77) For the text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, November 7, 1977, pages 643–644. Later that evening, they met again to discuss a variety of subjects. MBFR was discussed and its lack of progress was attributed to differences in data. Vance and Gromyko next turned to the political situation in Rhodesia. Both expressed the desire to see majority rule in Rhodesia and other nations in southern Africa, in addition to United Nations support in this regard. Gromyko then complained about U.S. press coverage, stating that the press actively insisted that the Soviets were increasing their conventional and nuclear arms, and as a result forcing the United States to increase its arms supply. Finally, their discussion turned to the Comprehensive Test Ban, specifically the date the treaty would enter into force, and peaceful explosions, as opposed to those that were weapons-related. (Memorandum of Conversation, September 23, 6:40–8:00 p.m.; Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, 9/77)

51. Editorial Note

On September 27, 1977, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko returned to Washington from New York, where he was attending the United Nations General Assembly meeting, for an evening meeting with President Jimmy Carter and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. Gromyko presented Soviet responses to the earlier SALT discussions with the United States, addressing specifically the earlier negotiations pertaining to MIRVed missiles. The memorandum of conversation is printed as Document 184 in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980.

52. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1977, 4–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Middle East
No. I of IV

PARTICIPANTS

<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Marshall D. Shulman	

Dobrynin came in Monday afternoon, October 17, 1977, at the Secretary's request. The meeting lasted from 4:00 to approximately 6:15.

I. *Middle East*—The Secretary asked Ambassador Dobrynin whether there was any Soviet reaction to the US/Israeli working paper. Dobrynin said that he had gone over the text. He asked if it was really necessary to have this paper and said it made matters more difficult with the PLO. He said the PLO had inquired whether the working draft superseded the joint Soviet/American declaration² and had been told

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Dobrynin–Vance, 10/17/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on October 18; approved by Anderson on October 31. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Part I of IV; parts II and III are printed as Documents 53 and 54. Part IV is not printed; see footnote 1, Document 54.

² See "U.S., U.S.S.R. Issue Statement on the Middle East," October 1, 1977, in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 7, 1977, pp. 639–640.

that it did not. The Secretary reported that the preliminary response from Egypt and Jordan had been positive and from Syria “reserved”—a word suggested by Dobrynin. The Secretary said there were two main questions: How the Palestinians were to be represented and how the working groups were to be organized. Dobrynin asked what role the Soviet Union would have in the six working groups listed in the working paper. The Secretary said that he had recommended that the two co-chairmen participate in each of the working groups and Dobrynin seemed reassured on this point. The Secretary recalled that in 1974 both the US and the Soviet Union had participated in the military working group and that we could build on this precedent. (The Secretary noted that in 1975 the Soviets had not participated in the military working group at their own choosing.)

The chairmanship of the conference was discussed;³ it was agreed that it would be better to have the co-chairmen rotate in the chair than to have the Secretary General preside.

Returning to the Israeli statement, Dobrynin asked whether it implied that only West Bank Palestinians would be represented. The Secretary replied that the question of Palestinian representation should be solved in a practical way and should be developed with specific names. We should work together with the parties to find names that would be acceptable both to the Arabs and the Israelis.

The Secretary then raised the question of how to go about initiating a public call for the convening of the conference. Provisionally, it was agreed that it should be done the same way as last time, with identical letters from the co-chairmen to the Secretary General requesting that he convene the conference, and that one possibility would be one invitation to the Arab League for the Arab participants. The Secretary noted that Lebanon had asked to participate and that the other parties had expressed no objection to this.

The Secretary said that there could be no guarantees at this point on the outcome of the conference on specific substantive matters such as a Palestinian state. Dobrynin probed about the extent of the US determination, despite acute domestic pressure, to see that the legitimate interests of the Palestinians were met. The Secretary replied that this was the American determination and he had, in his nationwide television program the preceding day, repeated the US commitment to a Palestinian homeland, but he said the first step is to get the people to the table and other matters can follow. He thought that once the conference began, world pressure would help to bring about a resolution of the Palestinian problem. Dobrynin said the Soviet Union did not yet have a

³ Reference is to the proposed Geneva Conference on the Middle East.

full indication of the Syrian attitude, but would keep the US advised. The Secretary expressed the hope that if the Syrians come along, the other two Arab states would also come along. Dobrynin expressed the opinion that the Syrians are feeling a little guilty about the events in Lebanon.

Dobrynin then inquired about the possibility of an Arab summit in November and the Secretary replied that there would be a meeting on November 12. It was not yet definite if this would include the heads of state, but the Secretary thought that there might be a mini-summit of the confrontation states within the next ten days.

53. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1977, 4–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Arms Control Issues: SALT, ASAT, Conventional Arms
No. II of IV

PARTICIPANTS

<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Marshall D. Shulman	

Dobrynin came in Monday afternoon, October 17, at the Secretary's request. The meeting lasted from 4:00 to approximately 6:15.

1. *SALT*—Dobrynin wanted to know whether the ratification of the Panama treaty would interfere with *SALT* negotiations or ratification and expressed the hope that early progress could be made at Geneva. He hoped that Warnke would stay in Geneva until agreement was reached. The Secretary replied that it was the President's desire to have *SALT* proceed on its own two feet and that, although Warnke would be coming home for consultation, he would stay on duty as long as necessary. Dobrynin said that he had received a copy of the instructions issued to Semenov and that they called for the speediest possible conclu-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Dobrynin–Vance, 10/17/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; approved by Anderson on October 31. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Part II of IV; parts I and III are printed as Documents 52 and 54. Part IV is not printed; see footnote 1, Document 54.

sion. He thought only one or two difficult questions remained and that these could be dealt with promptly and flexibly.

On Backfire, the Secretary mentioned the questions being raised in the Congress and stressed the importance of having the clarification from the Soviet side. He cited the questions raised by Senator Stevens of Alaska about whether Alaska would be within Backfire range. Dobrynin replied that Alaska was almost within rifle range. The Secretary said he understood Gromyko to say that Backfire's current radius of 2200 km would not last indefinitely, but that it would never be given a range that would enable it to attack the US. The Secretary said there is still a general question as to what "intercontinental range" means. Dobrynin replied that in the Geneva discussions it had been generally agreed that intercontinental range meant 5500 kms.

The Secretary also pointed out that there had been discussions in the Congress of the Backfire's retractable refuelling capability and that this would present a verification problem. Dobrynin said he did not know how this would be handled, but he left the impression that he was expecting to receive some additional explanations on this and other Backfire questions. He added that there could not be 100 percent verification on either side, but that it would be stupid for the Soviet Union to cheat on Backfires. He was sure that specialists could find a way to deal with the verification problem. He cited the Soviet Union's willingness to accept a radical solution to the Derazhnya and Pervomaisk problem, even though it would cost the Soviet Union quite a bit of money to get another site, but they had decided it was worth it.

With regard to the discussion of the differences between the American proposal for banning the testing of all new missiles, and the Soviet proposal that only MIRVs be banned, the Secretary asked if this issue was understood and what the Soviet problem was on this point. Dobrynin first said, "Some of our missiles are old fashioned," but then went on to make the argument that it would be technically difficult to substitute a whole new MIRV system for a "mono-block" that had been tested only with a single warhead. On the differences between the 1200 and 1250 figure for the MIRVed subceiling, Dobrynin said that this was not only a question of the US getting 120 as against 70 ALCM bombers, but that the US would be getting a double bonus, since the Soviet Union would not be deploying any ALCM bombers.

2. *Anti-Satellite Systems*—The Secretary said he wanted to let Dobrynin know that a proposal would soon be transmitted to the Soviet Union regarding limitations on ASAT systems. He underlined the importance of the subject, saying that in his recent testimony before the Congress on SALT, he had been interrogated at length about the continuing capability of the US to monitor compliance with the SALT agreement by satellite observation. He had replied that this was very

important and this had led to the question of the effect on satellite monitoring of the development of an ASAT system. Dobrynin asked whether the American communication would add further concrete thoughts and suggestions. The Secretary replied in the affirmative and said that this would have a significant bearing on the ratification of the SALT agreement.

3. *Conventional Arms Transfers and Sales*—The Secretary noted that Gelb had raised this point with Bessmertnykh and that Bessmertnykh had said that it might be a long time before a reply was received from Moscow. The Secretary said the President attaches considerable importance to this subject and urged Dobrynin to do everything possible to speed up a reply. Dobrynin replied that he would do so, but he went on to say, in what he described as an unofficial reaction, that the US was selling more and more arms around the world, including to some of the neighbors of the Soviet Union. In this connection, he cited sales to Iran. He noted the Administration's declared intent to reduce arms sales and asked why the US had been speeding up the process. The Secretary said that many items had been in the pipeline, but an effort was being made to hold sales and transfers down. This was reflected in the fact that the total would come to about \$9.8 billion this year, instead of the \$11 billion originally projected. This includes some very expensive items, such as AWACS. There would be further reductions next year, he said. Dobrynin asked why not show some restraint as a good will gesture. The Secretary replied that restraint was being shown and that AWACS, for example, had a purely defensive function.

54. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 17, 1977, 4–6:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

INFCE; South Africa, Horn of Africa, Rhodesia
No. III of IV

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. ShulmanUSSR
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

Dobrynin came in Monday afternoon, October 17, 1977, at the Secretary's request. The meeting lasted approximately two hours.

1. *International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation Conference*—The Secretary asked Dobrynin if he knew who the Soviet delegate would be to the INFCE Conference beginning October 19. Dobrynin did not know (but later Bessmertnykh called with the name). The Secretary informed Dobrynin he was planning to add three more countries to the list: Algeria, Saudi Arabia, and South Africa. Dobrynin inquired whether there would be any African objection to these additions, to which the Secretary replied that the participants were coming in as experts and it was necessary to include the threshold countries.

2. *South Africa*—The Secretary said that we were continuing satellite monitoring of the nuclear sites and nothing new had been reported. He said the South Africans had given their commitment not to explode any nuclear devices, whether peaceful or military; not to acquire nuclear capabilities, except for the purpose of nuclear power; and that they were not planning an explosion at the Kalahari test site. It was agreed that the two countries would keep each other informed on this subject.

3. *Horn of Africa*—The Secretary inquired how the Soviet Union saw the problems in the Horn of Africa developing. Dobrynin said, "We are more eager to end the fighting there than you are," but he indicated a reluctance to shut off supplies to the Ethiopians, which had not yet reached the level previously supplied to the Somalis. The Secretary

¹ Source: Department of State, Office Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Dobrynin–Vance, 10/17/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on October 18; approved by Anderson on October 31. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Part III of IV; parts I and II are printed as Documents 52 and 53. Part IV, which addresses the Governors' Exchange, is in Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Dobrynin–Vance Meeting, 10/17/77.

raised the question of the OAU's seeking to mediate and whether there was anything that anyone could do with Ethiopia that would be helpful. He also raised the question of how the Nigerians could be helpful in working out a ceasefire acceptable to both sides. Dobrynin did not think that any outside intervention would be useful. He said that although an autonomous solution for the Ogaden was a reasonable basis for a settlement, the Somalis want to remain in place and the Ethiopians' position was that Somalia should first withdraw. The Secretary asked about the possibility of greater restraint on what is furnished to the Ethiopians. Dobrynin replied that the level of supplies had not reached the level formerly supplied to the Somalis. He said that the problem was that the Ethiopians did not have enough trained people to use the material they had received. Dobrynin made it clear that, in his opinion at least, it would be shortsighted for the Soviet Union to send technicians or military advisers. He cited the experience of the Soviet Union and Egypt as a case in point.

4. *Rhodesia*—The Secretary filled in Dobrynin on the Anglo-American initiative on Rhodesia, saying that the UN representative might go to London first and then to Africa to consult about internal security problems and what should be done during the transition period with the Rhodesian army and the Liberation Forces in setting up a security force.

55. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 22, 1977

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman

[USSR]
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at his request, saying he had something to present which would be useful. It turned out to be a non-paper

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 10/22/77. Secret. Drafted by Shulman on October 25. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

informing us of a series of planned ICBM test launches the last few days of this month and in November (see text attached).²

The following subjects were also discussed:

1. *Middle East*. The Secretary recalled that the letter from the co-chairmen of the Geneva Conference went to the Security Council, and recommended that this precedent be followed again, as well as in the matter of having the working groups report to the plenary conference, without having this specified in the working paper.

On the subject of Palestinian representation, the Secretary said he had the impression that Arafat was showing signs of beginning to move toward presenting names which could then be checked out with the other participants; Dobrynin said, however, that this was not his impression.

2. *SALT*. The Secretary reviewed his recent testimony and consultations with the Congress, including the information that had been provided to the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees on a confidential basis. He said that every effort was being made to avoid leaks, but that leaks might nevertheless occur. He indicated that the Congress was raising very serious questions about the issues under negotiation, and stressed the importance of having more specific assurances on Backfire range and production rates. Dobrynin said that Moscow was aware of our concern, since the matter had been raised with Gromyko. The Secretary also stressed the interest expressed by Senator McIntyre,³ among others, in an agreement limiting new missile systems, reflecting the view, which he shared, that significant arms limitations would be achieved when this kind of agreement was combined with an agreement limiting numbers.

Dobrynin remarked that Semenov, the chief of the Soviet delegation in Geneva, thinks things are moving fairly well.

3. *Radiation*. The Secretary informed Dobrynin that a book would be published during the coming week on the subject of the Soviet radiation of the US Embassy in Moscow. Dobrynin said he could not understand why the US was raising the issue, since Deputy Undersecretary Read⁴ had been able to cite only one instance in the preceding week in which this radiation had been observed. Shulman pointed out that at least a dozen bursts of radiation had been recorded in recent weeks, and said that information underlining the seriousness of the matter would be put before Dobrynin.

² Not attached and not found.

³ Senator Thomas James McIntyre, (D-New Hampshire).

⁴ Ben Read, Deputy Under Secretary for Management.

4. *CSCE*. Dobrynin, saying he was speaking on his own personal initiative and not under instructions, said the Soviet Union had received the impression from Western delegations at Belgrade that Goldberg⁵ had received new instructions recently, to raise the level of attack on human rights issues, and to discuss specific issues. The Secretary said that Goldberg had been authorized to mention specific countries, as, for example, the recent egregious trials in Czechoslovakia, but he said the main intention remained to develop the broad sweep of the issue, and to avoid confrontation. He added that Goldberg would be coming home in the near future for consultations.

5. *Soviet UNGA Detente Resolution*. Dobrynin asked why the US had not given support to this omnibus proposal to the UNGA on strengthening detente.⁶ The Secretary said he would examine the resolution, but as a general proposition, he urged that advance consultation before resolutions were introduced would help to eliminate some problems.

6. *Lithuanian Hijackers*. Dobrynin raised the question of the two Lithuanian hijackers now in the United States,⁷ and urged their extradition, relating the matter to the recent hijacking episode. The Secretary said in the discussion which followed that early action by the UN on the hijacking resolution would be important.

7. *Patolichev*. Dobrynin said in response to a question that travel plans for Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev were not yet firm, but the Minister would probably prefer to stop in Washington before proceeding to Los Angeles for the Joint Trade and Economic Council meetings in November.

8. *Trade Relations*. In the course of the earlier discussion of Congressional attitudes toward SALT, Dobrynin mentioned that Senator Jackson had expressed an interest in addressing the meeting of the Trade and Economic Council in Los Angeles, and wondered what he might say. There then followed a discussion of recent exploratory conversations with members of Congress on the possibility of resolution that would provisionally extend MFN and Ex-Im Bank Credits, subject to Presidential finding that this action would be in the national interest. Dobrynin, asked about the Soviet attitude toward this approach, shrugged and indicated that it would be better than no action at all.

⁵ See footnote 7, Document 48.

⁶ For the text of the "Declaration on the Deepening and Consolidation of International Détente" and the resolution's history, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977*, pp. 120–126.

⁷ In 1970, two Lithuanians hijacked a Soviet airplane. After having entered the United States illegally, they were denied political asylum and deportation seemed likely. ("U.S. to Deport 2 Jet Hijackers," *Chicago Tribune*, May 14, 1977, p. 5)

56. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 31, 1977

SUBJECT

Lithuanian Governor; Middle East; Non-First Use
Part I of II

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. ShulmanUSSR
Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in on the afternoon of October 31 for a meeting which lasted an hour and 10 minutes, at which the following items were discussed:

1. *Governors' Conference Delegation*: Dobrynin informed us that the Chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers had been taken ill and would not be able to be a member of the delegation. The Secretary said that this fortunately resolved a problem that he would otherwise have had to raise.

Later, Dobrynin asked who in the Administration would be receiving the Soviet delegation or the chairman, Solomentsev. The Secretary said it was not definite, but perhaps it would be the Vice President. Dobrynin replied that this would be a good idea.

2. *Middle East*: The Secretary reported to Dobrynin that the US had now heard from all the Arab states. It was now clear that Egypt, Israel and Jordan are prepared to go to Geneva and are willing to be flexible. The Syrians, he said, are somewhat more rigid, although they are now willing, after the debate on substantive matters in the plenary, to enter into bilateral discussions afterwards.

On the Palestinian representation issue, the Secretary continued, everyone is agreed that there should be a united Arab delegation with some kind of Palestinian representation. The question has been: which Palestinians? The US suggestion has been that the Arabs should indicate privately whom they would like to see in the delegation, and we would make sure that this would not create any difficulties. Indications so far are, he said, that this would be agreeable to a number of the parties, but it is not yet clear that Syria is among them. Also, it is not

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 10/31/77. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Part II is Document 57.

known what the PLO will do. There are some indications that Arafat would look upon this procedure favorably, if he can be sure that the Palestinian question will be discussed. He appears to feel that the question of who represents the Palestinians is not of crucial importance. The Israelis are still strongly maintaining that Palestinians drawn from the West Bank and from Gaza should be the representatives, but this is still being discussed with them.

Our suggestion, said the Secretary, is that we follow the 1973 model. At that time, there were identical letters from the US and Soviet Union to the Secretary General saying that the parties had agreed to meet. The letters could indicate that the Arabs are willing for the United Arab delegation to include Palestinians. They would further state that the 1973 procedures would govern the conference, unless the parties should agree otherwise. The letters might also make it clear that after the opening plenary session, there would be both bilateral and multilateral working groups. The Secretary pointed out that it should help with the Syrians that under the 1973 procedures, the working group was required to report back to the plenary.

The Secretary went on to report that the US had just sent letters to Sadat, Hussein and Assad suggesting these procedures, and information along these lines had also been sent to Saud, since there was to be a meeting of some or all of the Arab principal states in Saudi Arabia on November 2.

Dobrynin said that Gromyko had the intention of sending in the near future information on Soviet contacts with the PLO, and of consulting about conference procedure.

The Secretary advised against too precise language on conference procedure at this time.

Dobrynin said he had been doing research on the 1973 arrangements, and said he had been unable to determine whether the Secretary General had sent a letter to the participants. The Secretary replied that he had sent a letter to the Security Council but not to the participants.

Dobrynin asked what the Israelis might object to. The Secretary replied that one of the issues of concern to Israel was the reporting by working groups to the plenary.

The Secretary informed Dobrynin that the US would take an early opportunity to restate its position on the importance of dealing with the Palestinian issue. Dobrynin asked if this should be done by the two co-chairmen together, and the Secretary suggested at this stage it had better be done unilaterally.

3. *Soviet Non-First Use Proposal.* Dobrynin asked whether it might not be possible to work together on this subject, since he felt the President's statement had been basically the same as the one proposed by

the Soviet Union. The Secretary remarked that if we really were talking about the same thing, we could explore the possibility of a common position, but this remained to be examined.

57. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 31, 1977

SUBJECT

Bilateral US-Soviet Issues; UN Issues
Part II of II

PARTICIPANTS

US	USSR
The Secretary	Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin
Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS	

Ambassador Dobrynin came in on the afternoon of October 31 for a meeting which lasted an hour and 10 minutes, at which the following items were discussed:

1. *Warvariv Case*.² Although the United States had already formally protested the matter, the Secretary said, he wanted to express his strong disapproval of the fact that representatives of the Soviet Union had first tried to recruit Warvariv and, having failed, then publicly sought to discredit him, forcing us to respond. He added that this activity would not help to advance the improvement of relations between our countries.

Dobrynin said he had no information beyond a TASS despatch; he offered, however, to supply documents that would demonstrate completely that Warvariv had been a Nazi collaborator. The Secretary repeated his point that these charges in no way excused the Soviet effort to recruit Warvariv by blackmailing him.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 10/31/77. Secret. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Part I is Document 56.

² Constantine Warvariv, an American diplomat, was accused by a KGB agent of having collaborated with the Nazis. The agent then tried to blackmail Warvariv into working for Soviet intelligence. (David K. Shipler, "U.S. Accuses Soviet of Plot to Blackmail State Dept. Official," *The New York Times*, October 30, 1977, p. 1) Telegram 252327 to Moscow, October 21, contains a formal protest. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770386–0919)

2. *Patolichev Visit*. Dobrynin asked about arrangements for the Patolichev visit. The Secretary said he would meet with the President, but the time of the meeting was not yet definite. Dobrynin asked if the day of the meeting was known, since it would help to plan Patolichev's flight to this country. He was told that it was understood that November 10 was under consideration.

Dobrynin then asked who would be present at the opening of the Soviet exhibition in Los Angeles. The Secretary said it was not definite, but he was considering Warren Christopher or Philip Habib, together with John Reinhardt. Dobrynin said this would be very good. It was agreed to firm matters up in a few days.

Dobrynin inquired who would be meeting Patolichev at the airport. The Secretary said that it would be someone of cabinet rank—either Secretary Blumenthal or Secretary Kreps. Dobrynin indicated his satisfaction, and added that the Soviet Union had invited Secretary Kreps to visit Moscow—originally after her Warsaw trip—but now for some later time, preferably in the spring, or whenever convenient to her.

5. *Soviet UNGA Detente Resolution*.³ Dobrynin asked again, as he had done during his previous visit, about the possibility of US support for this resolution. The Secretary pointed out that Ambassadors Leonard and Troyanovsky⁴ had discussed this in New York. Dobrynin replied that Troyanovsky was told it was up to the State Department to authorize the exploration of a possible mutual text. The Secretary answered that our Delegation has all the authority it needs to continue the discussions.

6. *Sixtieth Anniversary Greetings*. Dobrynin inquired whether the US would be sending greetings to Brezhnev on the occasion of the Sixtieth Anniversary celebration. He said the celebration would start on November 2 with a speech by Brezhnev (at which he would have “something positive” to say), but that greetings could be received any-time up to the 7th.

7. *Glagolev Letter*. Dobrynin then handed a Shulman an oral “non-note,”⁵ transmitting a letter received by the Consular Division of the Soviet Embassy from Igor S. Glagolev, a Soviet citizen now resident in the United States, threatening to publish a book in which will appear previously secret information detrimental to the Soviet Union, but inviting the Soviet Embassy to be in touch with him through the State Department. The Soviet note expresses the belief that Glagolev is acting in

³ See footnote 6, Document 55.

⁴ James Leonard, U.S. Deputy Representative to the United Nations, and Oleg Troyanovsky, Soviet Ambassador to the United Nations.

⁵ Not found attached.

behalf of “American special services,” and asks the United States to prevent the publication of the book. Shulman agreed to look into the matter.

8. *Shcharansky*. The Secretary observed that accusations of Shcharansky’s alleged contacts with the United States government had again appeared in the Soviet press that morning, and recalled the President’s categorical denial to Foreign Minister Gromyko that there had been any connections between the CIA and Shcharansky. He reminded Dobrynin of the serious effect a trial of Shcharansky would have on relations between the two countries. Dobrynin inquired whether the President had examined the evidence lately. The Secretary said that the President had checked with the Director of the CIA. Dobrynin said that the Soviet officials in charge of the judicial process say there were such connections, and that he had the impression the trial would go forward, although he did not know when it would be. He added that the campaign against the trial by Jewish groups and others made the matter more difficult; that resentment at high levels—including the Central Committee—had been building up over what they saw as a challenging demand not to touch a dissident because he was Jewish, and that this resentment “by people who are not directly involved in Soviet-American relations” had led to a determination not to yield to this dictation from abroad. Dobrynin ventured the personal opinion that the President’s statement may have delayed the trial, but now pressure had been building up as a result of the clearly organized campaign of letters from Jewish communities all over the United States, and the matter had become a domestic issue within the government and the party, and the investigation and preparations for the court were still continuing.

9. *UN Hijacking Resolution*.⁶ The Secretary expressed the hope that the Soviet Union and its colleagues would support this measure actively. Dobrynin inquired whether there had been any trouble about this with the Soviet delegation. The Secretary said that some of the East European countries had been dragging their feet. Dobrynin suggested that the matter be discussed with the Soviet delegation in New York, which the Secretary said would be done.

10. *South African Issue in Security Council*. The Secretary reviewed the action anticipated later that day on the several resolutions on the subject and indicated how the United States would vote on them. Referring to the anticipated United States vetoes, Dobrynin observed that Ambassador Young had said he was obliged to follow instructions, to

⁶U.N. Resolution 32/8 condemned hijacking and encouraged countries to strengthen security measures in an effort to prevent hijacking. For the text of the resolution, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1977*, pp. 374–375.

which the Secretary replied that the positions were in accordance with the Ambassador's own judgment of the situation.

58. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, November 4, 1977

Dear Mr. President:

On the eve of the 60th anniversary of the Soviet Union, I want to extend to you privately, as I will be doing more formally in a separate public message, my warm congratulations. I wish you and the Soviet people every success in the efforts to enhance the peaceful well-being of your country.

Let me also take advantage of this opportunity to share with you my thoughts about our joint pursuit of better relations between our two countries.

We still have some distance to go to achieve an agreement on strategic arms that would be mutually satisfactory. I hope that our negotiators will soon be able to resolve the outstanding issues. Otherwise, unnecessary delay—as was the case after February 1976—may make it increasingly difficult for us to reach accommodation. Our own major goal in seeking an agreement is to achieve the sharpest mutual reductions and to insure balanced forces, with adequate verification of compliance with agreements.

I hope that as we move forward on questions of limiting and reducing strategic arms we can at the same time take useful steps in other aspects of our relations. A comprehensive ban on all nuclear testing will slow the nuclear arms race, and will also have a highly beneficial impact on opinion in my country and in the world at large. I am gratified by your statement of November 2nd.² It is an important and constructive step which brings us closer to agreement. I would also wel-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 6–12/77. No classification marking. In telegram 264784, November 5, the Department transmitted the text of the President's letter.

² For text of Brezhnev's speech on the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Union, see *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXIX, no. 44 (November 30, 1977), pp. 1–6, 11.

come your suggestions about how we might implement and verify your proposal that no more nuclear weapons be produced.

One issue is of increasing concern to us. The continuing tests in space of anti-satellite devices by the Soviet Union have been carefully noted in our country. This concern has emerged in our efforts to build support in the U.S. Senate for a SALT agreement. This is a seriously destabilizing development which we have voluntarily foregone, although we would have the technical capability to build similar systems. A very early joint agreement not to conduct further tests and to forego this capability would be helpful.

As you know, we are making some progress in the Middle East under difficult circumstances and, with your help, there is a good prospect that the parties will agree to go to Geneva this year under mutually proposed procedures, and in the proper spirit of compromise. The United States has been exerting much effort to that end with all the nations involved, and I hope that the Soviet Union will also use its influence on Syria and the other nations in a positive and forceful manner.

Let me also draw your personal attention to certain conditions which adversely affect the well-being of the U.S. Embassy's personnel in Moscow from their repeated exposure to unwarranted doses of directed radiation. I do not wish to raise this issue publicly into a source of difficulty between our governments but you can well understand the reason for our deep concern.

Finally, I would like to take advantage of this private communication to express the hope that the events in your country commemorating sixty years of Soviet power will, in addition to reflecting the successes and aspirations of the Soviet people, also contribute positively to our mutual relations. Should the spirit of magnanimity expressed in such acts as you may take in connection with the anniversary extend to individuals whose situation is closely followed here, I assure you such a step would contribute greatly to the improving atmosphere in our relations.

Mr. President, my overall assessment is that progress is being made toward a more cooperative and harmonious relationship between our countries. This is one of my major goals, and I know that you share this desire. Despite difficult obstacles, I believe that together we can resolve other remaining problems which derive, perhaps inevitably, from our different societal systems and varying points of view.

You have my best personal wishes.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

59. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 9, 1977, 1603Z

16276. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Message to Brezhnev. Ref: State 264784.²

1. With one hour's advance notice I was received by Brezhnev in his Kremlin office at 1230 on November 9 for a 65-minute conversation. Also present were Brezhnev's aide A.M. Aleksandrov and his interpreter Sukhadrev. (It is noteworthy that no representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs attended.) I was accompanied by my political counselor.

2. After the usual opening courtesies I presented Brezhnev with the text of President Carter's letter (reftel). Brezhnev informed me that he was already familiar with the contents since Secy Vance had given the text to Dobrynin. This enabled him to make some preliminary considerations which he would ask me to transmit to President Carter.

—First he wished to express his gratitude for the President's congratulatory message on the sixtieth anniversary of the Soviet state and for the best wishes which the President had expressed both in his official message and in this letter

—He would of course carefully consider the contents of the President's letter and will soon give an official reply.

3. Reading from a typed statement of 7–8 pages Brezhnev said he noted with satisfaction that one of President Carter's main goals was for greater cooperation. "We welcome this positive shift in Soviet-US relations during the recent period." He also took satisfaction from the fact that agreement on a series of mutually acceptable principled understandings was found in the recent meetings which Gromyko had with the U.S. side in Washington and New York.³ As for the Soviet Union, its line vis-a-vis the U.S. remains consistent and unchanging: "We want these relations to be good, more friendly and hallmarked by the spirit of cooperation" regarding bilateral questions and important international problems. This Brezhnev had restated in his (November 2) speech marking the sixtieth anniversary celebration.⁴ The Soviets are ready to maintain and improve relations so as to meet the aspirations of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0378. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent by the Department of State to the White House.

² See Document 58.

³ See Documents 50 and 51.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 58.

both peoples, for reduction of international tensions and strengthening of world peace.

4. SALT—Today, said Brezhnev, there are difficult tasks for both sides to work out. Re SALT, he considered that Gromyko's recent meetings on major unresolved questions with Pres. Carter and Secy Vance had opened the path to complete success, to the signing of a SALT agreement and on this the Soviet side wanted to [*accept?*] without delay or procrastination. "Our delegation in Geneva has been given instructions to discuss and coordinate all remaining questions and we hope similar instructions have been given to the American delegation." The main thing now was to abide by the understandings of principles already achieved and not to alter them. He was sure that in the nearest future there could be the complete preparation of a SALT agreement. In this connection Brezhnev noted that the two sides were also discussing a number of other questions related to arms limitation and disarmament. In all of these talks the Soviet side stood for mutually acceptable, practical solutions.

5. CTB–PNE's—Brezhnev said he wanted to call special attention to his Nov. 2 statement of readiness to reach agreement on CTB including a moratorium of PNE's. "Speaking directly, it was not easy for us to take such a decision, as it directly affects our national economic plan; and we expect that the U.S. and the U.K. as participants in the talks which are underway will in the end respond with appropriate reciprocity" so as to achieve agreement on this major issue.

6. Anti-satellite—Referring to the paragraph of the President's [letter] dealing with anti-satellite developments, Brezhnev said he did not wish to dwell at length on this. Claiming that the Soviet side was "strictly adhering to the provision of existing agreements" and acting in accordance with the principles of the SALT negotiations which were underway, he stressed that the Soviets were not doing anything to destabilize the situation. "I emphasize that the Soviet Union is not seeking unilateral military advantage for itself."

7. NUF and NNFU—in his Nov. 2 speech, Brezhnev said he had re-emphasized the Soviet goal of promoting and strengthening international peace and security by practical measures. He had in mind such measures as

—a world treaty on non-use of force

—an agreement by all participants of the European (Helsinki) Conference on non first use of nuclear weapons.

These were part of the Soviet objectives in the consolidating military detente. "We expect that the U.S. will give positive consideration to these proposals" whose implementation would serve to avoid a nuclear war and to further the interests of universal peace.

8. Geneva conference—Of late, Brezhnev noted, there had been considerable movement toward reconvening a Geneva Middle East conference thanks in large part to joint efforts by the USSR and US as Geneva co-chairmen. “We proceed from the assumption that, as agreed, it should be reconvened before the end of this year.” Of course in seeking agreement on practical matters related to the preparation and conduct of the conference “we act so as to assure the legitimate rights and interests of all, I emphasize all, parties without exception. No one has the right to dictate conditions to others and this applies to Israel as well.” Only on this basis could the Geneva conference attain its objective—the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East. Our two countries should continue to coordinate their efforts in this direction.

9. Microwave radiation—Regarding certain other matters in the President’s message, Brezhnev declared he’d merely like to say the following: Concerning the allegations of certain “ill-disposed” people about supposed unfavorable working conditions of U.S. Embassy personnel, “you live here and it’s for you to judge” Embassy working conditions. For some reason this matter had been raised four or five times (Aleksandrov intervened to claim that each time the Soviet side had given an answer). “Let me just say that we have set forth our position exhaustively and there’s no need to return to this.” The question was being used, claimed Brezhnev by “certain agencies for unseemly purposes” which are very remote from improvement of relations.

10. Amnesty for dissidents—Lastly, remarked Brezhnev, he wanted to refer to one question in the President’s letter the very posing of which was incomprehensible and unfounded. “I must emphasize that if we want our relations to develop normally there must be no attempts to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. As experience shows, only when both sides really follow this principle can we avoid needless friction and find solutions to questions, including those which are most important to the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

11. Repeating that he would give President Carter’s message additional consideration and communicate a reply, Brezhnev requested that I transmit greetings and best wishes to the President from him and his colleagues.

12. After a brief exchange of quips on the toasts we both had consumed at his Nov. 7 reception, I thanked Brezhnev for receiving me and for giving me the opportunity to hear his views. These and his best wishes I would transmit to the President promptly. With his permission I then said I wanted to comment briefly on a few of his remarks and to ask a few questions:

(A) Gromyko talks—Recalling that I had attended Gromyko’s talks in Washington, I said I thought they were very useful and I knew that the President did as well;

(B) SALT—I assured Brezhnev that before I left Washington Warnke had been given instructions similar to those given the Soviet delegation and we could both therefore hope for an early agreement (Brezhnev interjected “Good”);

(C) CTB, and Brezhnev’s desire for peace—We recognize, I said that Brezhnev’s Nov. 2 proposal for a moratorium on PNE’s was not easy and we believe that it will be of great help in reaching agreement on unresolved questions. As I started to mention the anti-satellite issue, Brezhnev turned to Aleksandrov and in an aside said the sooner we could agree on such matters “the sooner we (meaning President Carter and himself) can meet each other.” He then turned to me and said somewhat emotionally that as I could see from the media coverage of the sixtieth anniversary celebrations the people want “peace, peace, peace, peace, peace. Down with the neutron bomb and other things like that. It wasn’t I who arranged all this—truly this is what the people of the whole world including Asia and Africa want. What does this mean? My fervant hope is that President Carter will understand what guides me”. (In an aside to Aleksandrov: “What do we say to the people?”) I reminded Brezhnev that I had told him on Nov. 7 that I was sure Pres. Carter shares his desire to establish a permanent and just peace in the world. There were some at this table (meaning my political counselor and Sukhadrev) who were too young to experience World War II. But Brezhnev had played an active part as had I, and we both knew what world war meant. (At this point, 1310 hours, Brezhnev was seized by heavy coughing for about a minute.);

(D) Anti-satellite—I said I was somewhat puzzled by Brezhnev’s remarks on this score. It seemed clear from the President’s letter that we have firm evidence that the USSR has tested anti-satellite devices in outer space. Was I to understand from Brezhnev’s remarks that this was not the case? (Brezhnev replied “this is not the case at all. I’ll reply in detail to Pres. Carter.”)

(E) PLO position—referring to Brezhnev’s remarks on the Geneva conference and the need to exchange views, I noted press reports that PLO official Qaddumi had recently visited Moscow for talks with Gromyko and others. I wondered if Brezhnev could tell me something on the current attitude of the PLO as revealed by Qaddumi which I could pass on to the President? (Brezhnev was genuinely unknowledgable. “Gromyko hasn’t told me anything. My honest word.” In an aside Aleksandrov explained to Brezhnev that Qaddumi was “The Palestinian”);

(F) Microwave radiation—I said I found my life in Moscow to be comfortable and I was proud to be Ambassador here but I did not like to be the target of microwave radiation. Brezhnev was right in noting that we had raised the question before and that the Soviet side had

given replies but I must state in all frankness that these replies had not been satisfactory. (Thumping the table, Brezhnev interjected: "Excuse me. Your own specialists came here to test. They came to the conclusion that your radiation dosage is higher in the U.S. than here." Aleksandrov added that our dosage here was below the "sanitary norms" of both the U.S. and USSR. Drawing a rectangle on paper Brezhnev said he couldn't understand the U.S. position. Radiation could not be (merely) aimed at a particular object for it also affected the people living around that area. "This is stupidity.") I said that in view of his further remarks I was compelled to show some evidence. Presenting photographs of the Soviet microwave radiation projection both east and south of the Embassy, I said I was not complaining about the general level of radiation in the general vicinity: I was complaining about radiation beams specifically aimed at the Embassy from these two sources. I hoped he would examine the evidences for the issue was of great importance not only to me but to all in the Embassy. (Pointing at the photos Brezhnev exclaimed: "To be silent is to indicate tacit consent? This is just not true. Your former Ambassador—what's his name? (Aleksandrov: "Stoessel")—also participated in these studies and he said it was not true. Now there's a new Ambassador and the same old story. Not one person has fallen sick or will fall sick. You should heed us, heed me, heed the facts of the matter. These stories are put about by ill wishers who want to worsen relations.") I said that I must take issue. These were not put out by ill wishers. They were a fact of life. I could not believe that Stoessel had made the statements attributed to him and I hoped Brezhnev would study the matter. (Brezhnev: "All right, I'll study it.")

(G) Amnesty for dissidents—Regarding that portion of President's letter implicitly touching on this subject (Note: The words amnesty and dissident were never mentioned in the entire conversation) I said I could assure Brezhnev that the President has no intention of interfering in Soviet internal affairs. He simply wanted to call attention to the fact that certain developments here have a bearing on our bilateral relations and give rise to considerable concern in the U.S. This question had been discussed at length when Gromyko was in the U.S. (At this point Aleksandrov remarked that Brezhnev had exchanged letters with many heads of state but none of these had ever raised a question pertaining purely to Soviet domestic matters "and that is why this evokes such a reaction").

13. In closing I again thanked Brezhnev for receiving me and for the frankness of such exchanges which can only lead to better understanding, not to misunderstanding. Brezhnev said he agreed. Asking me to convey best regards to the Pres. he said he hoped we could accelerate steps toward greater peace and security throughout the world

which met the interests of billions of people. After side prompting by Aleksandrov he noted that Patolichev was leaving for the U.S. today (I interjected I had seen him off at airport this morning) and hoped that he could “do big business there.” When I said I hoped to see Brezhnev himself soon visit the U.S. he replied that “the sooner we prepare materials for agreements” the sooner such a meeting could take place.

14. As we stood up Brezhnev said that TASS would put out a brief account of our meeting and that I was free to do the same.

15. Comment: Apart from his rather emotional words on the need for peace and security, Brezhnev was visibly angry and disturbed in his interventions on the radiation and amnesty issues. After a tough week of anniversary celebrations he seemed physically fit; his speech was no more slurred than usual; he read his text well and his ad hoc remarks were lucid, cogent. Sometimes he thumped the table with the fingers of his right hand to drive a point home. Three times during the conversation he coughed heavily, once bringing a handkerchief to his mouth. Again, I saw no evidence of an incision on his left cheek or any sign of makeup.

16. I was also struck by several cases of prompting from Aleksandrov but these in no way indicated that Brezhnev had lost track; rather they were supportive of points he was already in the process of making.

Toon

60. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

November 15, 1977

Dear Mr. President,

The US Ambassador has delivered to me your message.² In conversation with him I set forth,³ in a preliminary way, my considerations on the questions you touched upon. Additionally I would like to say the following.

We are also satisfied with the advance forward which was achieved of late in the relations between our countries. The task now is to carry it further on, to realize it in practical actions. Between us there is an understanding that first of all it relates to the earliest completion of the work on a new strategic arms limitation agreement.

The solutions of principle, found in the course of recent talks with you in Washington⁴ on the remaining outstanding questions have opened the way for an agreement to be prepared without delay for signing. Our Delegation in Geneva is thus instructed. I believe that you know about the constructive line which we follow at the negotiations. The main thing is to adhere to the already achieved mutual understanding of principle, not to try to touch up or erode what has been agreed upon. In one word, we are for the conclusion of the agreement at the earliest possible date and we hope that the U.S., on its part, will also do all necessary for it.

As is evident from the message you assess properly the readiness expressed by us to agree that, along with a ban for a definite period on all nuclear weapon tests, a moratorium on nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes would be declared. We expect that the U.S. and the United Kingdom would take at the negotiations such position which would permit in the near future to agree on the complete cessation of nuclear weapon tests.

¹ Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, USSR (Brezhnev Drafts/Letters), 4/77–9/80. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation.

² See Document 58.

³ See Document 59.

⁴ See Documents 50 and 51.

Our countries are also discussing other specific questions related to arms limitation and disarmament. We count on achieving in the course of these negotiations practical results.

I would also like to draw your attention, Mr. President, to the important proposals in the field of reducing the danger of war which were put forward by the Soviet Union. Among them are: concluding World Treaty on the non-use of force; achieving an agreement to the effect that the States-Participants of All-European Conference are not to be first to use against each other nuclear weapons; measures on consolidating military relaxation in Europe. The imperative need of solving these matters is obvious and we call upon the U.S. to discuss them.

You are interested in our conception of carrying out the proposal on a simultaneous halt in the production of nuclear weapons by all states and a commitment of the nuclear powers to start the gradual reduction of stockpiles of such weapons up to their total destruction. In my view, now it is first of all important that the nuclear powers would express their positive attitude to this idea as a matter of principle. Of course, it is hard to name right away ready-made recipes of carrying it out into practice. But if there is consent of all nuclear powers then they all could be gathered together and think over as to specific means and ways of realization of this proposal.

We would be ready to hold consultations on the question, you raised, concerning means of anti-satellite devices in space. Such discussion would include, of course, all the systems and means which possess such potential capability including manned space shuttles.

In our view it is important to continue joint efforts of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S. for the resumption by the end of this year, as it was agreed between us, of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. We have been working in this direction and intend to continue to be in contact with the U.S. In settling practical issues it is necessary to have the legitimate rights and interests of all the parties involved into the conflict, without exclusion, ensured. Only such an approach can guarantee a just and lasting peace in that area.

As for the so called question of "adverse" conditions for the U.S. Embassy's personnel in Moscow the Soviet side has repeatedly given exhaustive explanation on this matter.

In conclusion I wish to lay emphasis on the following: the change for the better in our relations serves in equal degree the interests of both countries, opens a possibility to move further along the way of relaxation of tensions, consolidation of peace and cooperation. It is important to regard with care to what has been achieved, be guided by long-term perspectives of Soviet-American relations, which can fully be and

should be developing progressively, on a wide front, on a constructive basis.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

61. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 18, 1977, 1:30–1:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

Brezhnev Letter and the Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The President

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Reginald Bartholomew, NSC Staff

Dobrynin presented the President coins commemorating the 60th Anniversary of the Soviet Revolution and commemorating the 1980 Olympics in Moscow.

Dobrynin said that he wished to present Brezhnev's letter in response to President Carter's earlier letter.² Before doing so, Brezhnev had asked him to say the following. First, Brezhnev extends his best personal wishes to the President. He was pleased to resume the exchange of personal letters since it had been some time since the last exchange.³ Second, on Senator Jackson's possible visit to the Soviet Union,⁴ a Soviet Parliamentarians group will invite the Senator to

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 36, Memcons: President: 11–12/77. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Oval Office. Drafted by Bartholomew on November 21.

² For Brezhnev's letter, see Document 60; for Carter's letter, see Document 58.

³ See Documents 29 and 35.

⁴ Jackson was scheduled to visit the Soviet Union in March 1978. As a condition of the visit, Jackson wanted to meet with Sakharov and other prominent dissidents. The Soviet Government denied this request, and the trip was cancelled.

Moscow. The Senator could come either before or after the New Year—the time would be left to him. As for whether the Senator would see Brezhnev, Dobrynin had to say that was not a good possibility. *Dobrynin* asked whether in extending the invitation to Jackson he should mention the Administration's role in it. The *President* thought it would be better to have it be an invitation from the Soviets. *Dobrynin* said that he would follow this and extend the invitation to Jackson on Tuesday morning. The *President* said that he thought the visit will help Senator Jackson's understanding of the Soviets and that he knows the Senator wants to go to the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin then presented the Brezhnev letter, which the *President* read.

The *President* said that he appreciated the letter—it was positive and constructive. He had also found Brezhnev's oral response to Toon encouraging.⁵ He felt that there was increasing ease of communication and mutual trust, and that this was developing at an increasing rate. He thought that it was especially useful to have private communication on important questions before taking public positions.

The *President* said that the Middle East was the most immediate question. He was discouraged by the delay of a reply from Brezhnev on convening the Geneva Conference. (In response to *Dobrynin's* query, *Secretary Vance* specified that the *President* was speaking of the request relayed to Gromyko.) The *President* said that the Soviets had not even answered. He said that if Brezhnev would look into this and let us hear, it would be very helpful. Delay would mean problems in keeping the parties together on track toward Geneva. The *President* said that he did not know about Sadat's visit to Israel beforehand, but that he favored the visit and had told Sadat and Begin this. It would be very helpful if the Soviet government took a positive position on the visit so that if it were fruitful, the world would know that both we and the Soviets hope Israeli/Egyptian talks can be productive.

The *President* said he thought it important for the US within the bounds of our influence to encourage the parties to go to Geneva without delay and that he thought it important for the Soviet Union to use its influence to encourage the parties to go to Geneva without delay. It would be valuable to have the Middle East nations and the rest of the world recognize that the US and the Soviet Union are acting in concert on this and that there are no differences between them. (*Dobrynin* agreed.) The *President* said that he thought this was an accurate description (of US and Soviet agreement) but that the public was uncertain about it. The *President* said that the PLO and the Syrians looked to

⁵ See Document 59.

the Soviets for guidance. Soviet support and encouragement of them to go to Geneva is important to us.

The *President* said that Brezhnev has his personal good wishes. The letters between them were helpful. As he had told Patolichev,⁶ movement on SALT, CTB, and the Indian Ocean, and possible talks on anti-satellites, cooperation in the Middle East, and enhancing trade relations, all go hand in hand and we are making good progress. The President was eager to get Brezhnev's advice on how we go on from here. Congress and the American public support this. The President said that the most immediate concern is the Middle East—a reply from the Soviet Union on convening the Geneva Conference, support for the Sadat visit, and help with the PLO and Syrian response.

Dobrynin said that one cannot know the results of the Sadat visit. Some Arabs welcomed it (Morocco and others); others such as the PLO and the Syrians had made strong statements. Secretary *Vance* said this is why it is important to make it clear that both the US and the Soviet Union think the Sadat visit is a constructive step toward Geneva. If others see us talking and agreeing, this has its effect.

Dobrynin agreed and said that that was Soviet policy as Gromyko had discussed with Secretary *Vance* and the President and as reflected in the Joint Statement.⁷ The Soviet Union had consistently supported the Joint Statement and had never criticized it. But the Soviets were uncertain about Sadat's visit: will it lead to Geneva or away from it. Dr. *Brzezinski* said that we want to avoid a polarization of opinion around the visit that would lead away from Geneva. *Dobrynin* reiterated that the question was whether the Sadat visit was a plus or minus for Geneva. Dr. *Brzezinski* said that we should try to exercise influence on how it is played.

Secretary *Vance* said that even if the Sadat visit does not help, it is still important to go to Geneva. *Dobrynin* agreed and said that was the Soviet belief as well.

The *President* said we have been holding up on steps to Geneva until we hear from the Soviets. We do not want to act unilaterally.

⁶ The meeting between Carter and Patolichev took place on November 10, during which they discussed U.S.-Soviet relations and the Jackson-Vanik amendment. The memorandum of conversation is in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Trilateral Commission File, Box 6.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 52.

62. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 28, 1977

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS

USSR

Amb. Anatoly Dobrynin

After Dobrynin came in at the Secretary's request to discuss the forthcoming meeting in Cairo, in reviewing the present situation, the Secretary made the following points:

1. The US proposes to send someone to the meeting to talk to the parties and to stay in touch with developments.

2. We would make an effort to get a delay in the time for the Cairo meeting in order to allow more time for preparations.

3. It had not been decided whom we would send, but our intention was to send someone at the expert level. We felt that it would be a bad move if we sent no one, that it would allow the situation to drift and we would lose an opportunity to move the developments into a Geneva context. We would hope the Soviet Union would do the same. The President had asked that Dobrynin pass along his personal hope that the Soviet Union would send someone at the expert level to the Cairo meeting. He and the Secretary were concerned that unless the US and USSR keep their hands in developments at this state, it could drift into a bilateral rather than into the broader framework that could lead to a solution of the Middle East problem.

Dobrynin asked whether it was necessary to send someone when we have an embassy there.

The Secretary replied that we had been thinking about it in these terms but had also weighed the possibility of sending Assistant Secretary Atherton.

Dobrynin commented that Atherton would be regarded as a high-ranking representative, the Secretary's deputy, in the Russian sense, rather than as an expert. *The Secretary* made it clear that if this were done it would be with the thought that Atherton would bring the appropriate level of expertise to the meeting, rather than the symbolism of high office.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin 11/28/77. Secret. Drafted by Shulman on November 30; approved by Anderson on December 6. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

Dobrynin then prefaced his reply by saying that he had not yet received any official reaction or instruction, which he was expecting at any moment, and for the time being would be communicating only his own thinking. He stressed the importance of having joint Soviet-American action, consistent with the Vance/Gromyko statement committing the two countries to support of a comprehensive agreement. Recent developments were leading to a split in the Arab world which would threaten the idea of the Geneva Conference. Our feeling, he said, is that we should try to restore the movement toward Geneva and not encourage this separate development. If the US should send an expert at the level of an assistant secretary it would encourage an adverse trend. "I may be wrong, but I doubt that we will send such a person. I doubt that we will send anyone; maybe we will use our embassy." ("In any case," *Dobrynin* observed in an aside to Shulman, "our Ambassador would, of course, be reporting on the meeting, but this is not the same thing as designating him as a representative.") We feel that this is a distinctive departure from the movement toward Geneva and that all of us, including the Secretary General, should now be working to try to get the process back on the rails and not be giving these developments our blessing. We feel it doesn't help Geneva to be moving toward a split among the participants. This weakens what the Soviet Union and US have been trying to do to get the parties to Geneva. We were quite close before this move; now if we give our blessing to this kind of policy, it will encourage the split in the Arab ranks which will make it more difficult to convene Geneva.

The Secretary responded by saying that the other side of the problem was that if we did not participate it could have the effect of letting the two parties break out on their own and making a separate peace settlement, which would then make it more difficult to fit it into the Geneva framework. We should take at face value Sadat's statement that this was intended to be a preparation for Geneva.

Dobrynin responded by saying that when we discussed the Geneva meeting, neither of our two countries ever had objected to any contact between the parties. If the Egyptians and Israelies had met quietly, that would be their business, but the glare of present publicity changes the prospects for moving from a broad settlement to a narrow one, without the other parties.

The Secretary inquired whether it was *Dobrynin's* judgement that the effect would be appreciably different if we were to be represented by our embassy in Cairo.

Dobrynin thought that this would be preferable, but still thought that our designation of anyone to be a representative would lead to a split—not only within the Arab world but also between the co-chairmen. Our concern is not with public pride about our role as co-

chairman and it is not that we have objection to Sadat's talking to the Israelis, but we feel that this will lead to a separate agreement which will undermine prospects for Geneva. Dobrynin added he didn't know yet what the Syrians would do, whatever they may be saying publicly. The Syrian Foreign Minister is now in Moscow and he hoped to have a report on these conferences soon. He felt sure that if we supported Sadat this would serve to inflame the rest of the Arab world. He felt that it would have been difficult for Assad to refuse to go to Geneva but now Sadat had made it easier for him to do so, and he called attention to the emotionalism of Assad's statements. He said that the Soviet feeling has been that only a united Arab front could make Israel yield on the territorial and Palestinian issues and that the split in Arab ranks therefore made this kind of settlement less possible. Under pressure to prove that his moves were successful, Sadat, he thought, would be forced to make concessions in order to survive, and this would further split Arab ranks. He also felt that these developments would lead to the appearance to the world that the US and the Soviet Union were also splitting on the Middle East, and he warned of the serious consequences of this development.

Marshall Shulman observed that one effect of the Sadat initiative was to encourage movement in the political debates within Israel which might result in more flexibility in Israeli policy, and that this could be a constructive development.

Dobrynin, in conclusion, pressed for a joint statement by the two co-chairmen, reemphasizing their desire for convocation of the Geneva meeting before the end of December, together with renewed efforts to work out the PLO representation problem, and said that if we did so, "at least our conscience will be clear." If the Sadat initiatives could be brought within this framework, we would not object. It would then give some alternative to the moderate Arabs.

63. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 29, 1977

SUBJECT

Middle East

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman

USSR

Mikhail Solomentsev, Chairman
of RSFSR Council of
Ministers, Candidate Member
of CPSU Politburo
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin

Meeting in the Secretary's office before a luncheon in honor of Solomentsev, *Dobrynin* expressed the hope that the US would not take unilateral action with respect to developments in the Middle East; rather he hoped the US and USSR could move ahead together. He said the Soviet Union would welcome a US representative in Moscow on December 5 to discuss future courses of action in the Middle East. He informed the Secretary that he had not yet received any definite word on how the Soviets would respond to the invitation to the talks being organized in Cairo.

The Secretary told *Dobrynin* that we had delayed our announcement of US participation in the Cairo meeting, but that we would now proceed to do so. He proposed to indicate that we would have a representative at the expert level. We are weighing the intention of having our ambassador in Cairo serve in this capacity, although this would not be announced at the present time. The UN Secretary General had informed us that he would name Gen. Siilasvuo² as an observer at the Cairo meeting.

(In translating the foregoing for Solomentsev, *Dobrynin* commented favorably on the fact that both the US and the UN might be represented by people who are already in the area.) *Dobrynin* acknowledged that the Soviets had recently held talks with a PLO official and with the Syrian Foreign Minister; he said he hoped to have further information to report on these talks soon.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Solomentsev, *Dobrynin*, 11/29/77. Secret. Drafted by Shulman; approved by Anderson on December 6. The meeting took place in Vance's office.

² Ensio Siilasvuo, Finnish general and former Commander of the Finnish contingent to the U.N. peace-keeping force in Cyprus.

After the luncheon, Dobrynin and Solomentsev returned briefly to the Secretary's office. Dobrynin reported on the basis of a cable from Moscow telephoned to him at the Department that neither Syria, the PLO, Lebanon, nor Jordan would attend the Cairo meeting. Thus the Soviet Union would not attend; he added in an aside to Shulman that of course Moscow would nevertheless receive reports from the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo. He reconfirmed that a US representative would still be welcome to discuss the Middle East in Moscow on December 5. He indicated that, after meeting with this representative, the Soviet Union would like to issue a joint call for the reconvening of the Geneva Conference in January.

64. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Cairo¹

Washington, December 9, 1977, 0128Z

Tosec 120067/293775. Subject: Soviet Trends, December 1–7, 1977. For the Secretary from INR-Kirk and EUR-Vine² through S/MS-Shulman.

1. A number of current developments suggest that US-Soviet relations are approaching a more difficult period in which the prospect of a SALT agreement will carry the main burden of maintaining a positive balance in the relationship.

2. Habib's talks with Gromyko and others in Moscow³ revealed the bitterness of Soviet belief that the United States was responsible for Sadat's initiatives toward the Jerusalem visit and the calling of the Cairo conference. The conversations surfaced Soviet anxieties that these developments threaten to elbow them effectively out of the action in the Middle East. Their own insensitivity and short-sightedness have contributed to their problem, but they tend to hold us responsible for

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0735. Secret; Cherokee; Priority; Nodis. Drafted by Paul Cook (INR/RSE) and Mark Garrison (EUR/SOV); cleared by Shulman, Luers, Roger Kirk (INR), and Anderson; approved by Shulman. Sent to the White House at 2005Z, with the notation "Eyes Only for Brzezinski." Vance was in the Middle East December 9–15.

² Richard Vine, Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of European Affairs.

³ Habib met with Gromyko on December 6 to discuss the Middle East. In telegram 17644 from Moscow, December 6, the Embassy transmitted a record of this meeting. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076–0331)

undermining the collaborative relationship they felt they had established in the joint statement.⁴ They may have been influenced by Sadat's statement that a letter from the President inspired his initiative. His closing of Soviet cultural and consular centers will deepen their suspicion that we are prodding him into anti-Soviet actions. Their reaction is likely to be virulent.

3. The Kremlin probably sees the Secretary's visit to the area—with its implication of a new US role as mediator between Sadat and his Arab critics—as indicating US willingness, if not intent, to leave the Soviets on the sidelines. Recent US statements putting Cairo rather than Geneva at the center of the peace process at present, probably strengthens this view. Meanwhile they continue their efforts to discredit next week's meeting, though they are keeping their options open to see what emerges.

4. In their present state of mind the Soviets also might read into our handling of the Indian Ocean and CTB talks a belief that we are dragging our feet and backing off agreed positions. So far, however, we have not encountered such a reaction. Their approach at this resumption of both talks was businesslike. The Soviets in fact initially responded positively to Paul Warnke's presentation on CTB.

5. Of perhaps more immediate concern is academician Sakharov's hard-hitting speech to be read to the AFL–CIO convention which opened December 8. In it he praises George Meany and the philosophy behind Jackson-Vanik, calls for a more militant VOA policy, and castigates Soviet observance of Helsinki Basket III. Were he someone else these statements would be grounds for immediate incarceration or dramatic expulsion. Embassy Moscow's obvious role as his communication link to the AFL–CIO will undoubtedly be protested once the speech is read.

6. We have many programs going forward with the Soviets which they regard as useful, such as cooperation under our agreements on space and agriculture. But their main criterion for assessing the relationship continues to be SALT. Continued progress toward a SALT agreement should be an important stabilizing factor.

7. There are unpredictable elements however, including Brezhnev's own amour-propre. There is a danger that he will add up a number of these current developments and take them as a signal that the Carter Administration has demonstratively brushed aside his offer of "friendly relations" made in his November 2 speech⁵ and reiterated here by his colleague Solomontsev.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 52.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 58.

8. In sum, we are experiencing some strains in certain aspects of the relationship. But major spillover of the Middle East tensions into other key aspects of our relationship such as SALT does not seem likely at this time.

Christopher

65. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in the Middle East¹

Washington, December 12, 1977, 2000Z

Tosec 120139/296012. For Dr Brzezinski. Following repeat Moscow 17909 Action SecState 12 Dec 77.

Quote. Moscow 17909. For USDel Secretary. Subject: Soviet Actions in the Horn of Africa. Ref: (A) State 295721 Tosec 120122, (B) Secto 12063.²

1. During my December 12 meeting with Gromyko I made the talking points set forth in Ref A as amended by Ref B.

2. During a twenty minute discussion Gromyko made the following points:

—There was one “very good thesis” in my presentation: The US had warned Siad Barre that there was no possible military solution to the problem. “This is true and we so warned Siad Barre when he was in Moscow and even before that, at the very outset of the conflict when the winds of war began to blow.”

—The main difference in US and Soviet position on this thesis is that Moscow states it both privately and in public whereas to the best of Gromyko’s recollection the US has not publicly stated that the war should be stopped, Somali troops should be withdrawn from Ethiopian territory and that a political resolution should be sought at the negotia-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 7, SCC Meeting: #45 Held 12/12/77, 12/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate to the White House for Brzezinski. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted and approved by Sydney Goldsmith (S/S-O). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N770009-0109) Vance was in the Middle East, December 9–15; he was in Jerusalem and Amman on December 12.

² Telegram 295721 to Moscow, December 11, and Secto 12063 from Vance in Jerusalem, December 11, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840076-0690 and D770461-0145 respectively.

ting table. If the US would publicly announce such a position its influence would have a telling effect.

—Soviets arms supply to Ethiopia is insignificant (Neznachitel' niy—Sukhedrev translated this as “not considerable”) although Western commentators, especially in the US, exaggerate “tens of times.” Similarly the Soviet airlift is by no means “huge” for it is simply impossible to airlift large quantities of heavy equipment. Ethiopia was much larger in population and size than Somalia. Yet it was Somalia which had invaded Ethiopia and had its troops in Ethiopian territory. How could this have happened if the Soviet Union had supplied Ethiopia with “huge” amounts of weapons, or even with as much as Somalia had?

—He didn't know about US arms supply policy but when Moscow supplies arms it attaches official provision forbidding their use against a third country; they must be used only for self defense. Somalia, however, had violated this agreement and had invaded Ethiopia in a manner of which the US was well aware.

—He seemed to discern in our presentation concern over an alleged Ethiopian threat to invade Somalia. “As far as we know that is totally excluded. We talked about that at a sufficiently high level with the Ethiopians. They don't have any plan to invade Somalia.”

—The US and USSR could cooperate productively by their joint action to bring about an end to the armed conflict, the withdrawal of Somali troops and negotiation on a peaceful political solution. If we could pool our efforts this would be a good example of US-Soviet cooperation.

—The USSR is far behind the US in arms supply. Moreover in many cases US supplied arms have been used for purposes which were very remote from defensive.

—On Dec. 14 we will begin bilateral discussions on (conventional) arms supply to third countries. If we could reach a mutually acceptable position this would indeed be a major step forward with positive effect on our bilateral relations and on the general world scene.

3. In response I said:

—It was wrong to say that we had made no public statement on the desirability of ending the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. (Gromyko intervened to insist that we had not called for withdrawal of Somali troops from Ethiopian territory.)

—When the Somalis had approached us for arms we had made clear that we would not provide them as long as the present conflict in Ogaden lasted.

—We have strict provision for arms supply prohibiting the use of US supplied arms in third countries. Applying this rule to present case,

we had specifically stipulated that US origin arms must not be transferred to Somalia by third countries.

—As to the resolution of this conflict I emphasized that the African countries considered this an African problem and wanted the major powers to disengage. We support the OAU's initiatives and it would be useful if the USSR did too.

—While I was glad to hear Gromyko's assertion that Soviet arms supply to Ethiopia was insignificant or not considerable, that assertion did not seem to match our information but I would certainly report it to Washington.

—I was glad to hear that Ethiopia did not want to go beyond its borders. (Gromyko intervened to say that earlier Siad Barre had voiced his fear of an Ethiopian invasion to the Soviets who had in turn assured him on the basis of an official statement by Mengistu that he had no intention of attacking Somalia. Siad Barre knows this to be true, said Gromyko, but continues his misinformation campaign in furtherance of his own goals.

—I would also report his suggestion for US and Soviet action to alleviate the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and we would be willing to listen to specific recommendations. Meanwhile it would be best for the big powers to stay out and let the OAU play a mediatory role.

4. In closing Gromyko said the USSR was not involved in the conflict. Its only desire was for a peaceful settlement which might be obstructed if "some of your friends get involved and involve you."

5. Comment: I find Gromyko's reference to the upcoming conventional arms talks in Washington rather intriguing. We had suspected that the Soviets might be reluctant to discuss arms transfers in the Horn (septel)³ for fear that to do so would limit their policy options in this contested area. Gromyko's remarks may indicate otherwise. But if Sovs should be prepared to discuss the Horn, we can be sure they will also wish to discuss Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Israel.

Toon.

Unquote

Christopher

³ Telegram 17909 from Moscow, December 12; see Document 65.

66. Central Intelligence Agency Information Cable¹

December 14, 1977

[*cable number not declassified*] Country: USSR/Cuba/Ethiopia.

DOI: Late November through early December 1977.

Subject: Increased Support for Ethiopia by the USSR and Cuba; Arrival by Air of Additional Soviet and Cuban Military Personnel and Military Supplies.

ACQ: [*less than 2 lines not declassified*]

Source: [*2½ lines not declassified*]

1. The Soviet airlift of men and material to Ethiopia that has been underway since late November 1977 is a direct result of the very strong recommendations made by Soviet General V.I. Petrov who has himself remained in Ethiopia to direct the massive speed-up of Soviet assistance. The earlier arrival of Petrov and his Soviet Military Study Group was in turn a direct result of the plea for increased assistance made by Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC) Chairman Lt Col Mengistu Haile-Mariam during his visit to Cuba, the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union in late October. [*3 lines not declassified*]

2. The Soviet airlift, operating both from the Soviet Union and Angola and within Ethiopia, has as its main purpose the early delivery and distribution of weapons, military vehicles, ammunition, and other supplies that the USSR had agreed to sell Ethiopia under the December 1976 and May 1977 sales agreements; however, more than 400 additional Cuban military advisor/instructor personnel and about 250 new Soviet military advisor personnel have also arrived on the airlift since the end of November. The total number of Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia is now more than 1,000 plus about 150–200 medical personnel and there are now slightly more than 500 Soviet military advisor personnel in country. (Source comment: Additional Cubans and Soviets are expected to arrive in the next months, raising the totals to as many as 2,000 Cubans and 1,000 Soviet military personnel.)

3. Based on the recommendations of General Petrov and the findings of his study group and those of the PMAC defense committee the PMAC Chairman has agreed to the need for an increased Cuban military role in Ethiopia. Planning therefore is now underway for the employment of Cuban troops in a combat role, operating both artillery, rocket and conventional and anti-aircraft weapons and piloting combat

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 5, Evening Reports File: 11/77–1/78. Secret; [*handling restriction not declassified*].

aircraft. No such role is envisioned for Soviet personnel at this point. Presently, neither Cuban nor Soviet personnel are flying combat operational missions in Ethiopia, although Soviet instructor pilots are flying training missions from Harar Meda Airbase at Debre Zeit.

4. Seventeen MIG–21 aircraft have so far arrived at Bole Airfield in Addis Ababa, where they are now being assembled. It is likely that Cuban pilots will begin flying some of these aircraft in the next 2–3 weeks. (Source comment: Only MIG–21 aircraft are currently arriving by the airlift from the Soviet Union since Ethiopian Air Force personnel are not sufficiently trained on the MIG–23's to justify advanced delivery of this aircraft, the first of which will probably not arrive before January 1978.)

5. [1 paragraph (7 lines) not declassified]

67. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Toon)¹

Washington, December 21, 1977, 2133Z

WH72665. Moscow: Please deliver this message to Ambassador Toon immediately upon opening of business.

Please convey the following to Brezhnev personally or, failing that, to Gromyko.

Begin text:

Dear Mr. President:

With the approaching holidays, I wish to take advantage of our correspondence to wish you personally, your family, and the Soviet people the very best for the coming year. Let us hope that it will bring us all closer to the goal that we share: a genuine peace and closer friendship between our peoples, and all the peoples of the world.

I was encouraged by your letter of November 14 [15],² and I am hopeful that before too long we will be reaching agreement in a number of areas of importance to our two countries. Our delegations are

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 18, U.S.S.R.—Carter/Brezhnev Correspondence: [6/77–12/77]. Secret. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 60.

making good progress in regards to strategic arms limitations and the Comprehensive Test Ban; I am also encouraged by the fact that we have opened new discussions regarding arms transfers, and that our delegations are fruitfully pursuing reciprocal arms restraint in the Indian Ocean. In spite of continuing differences between our two countries, and these differences admittedly are deep-rooted and will take time to fade, we are making steady progress in widening the scope of our collaboration.

I was especially gratified by your comments regarding nuclear weapons. It is my fervent hope that you and I will succeed in significantly reducing, and perhaps even eliminating, the dependence of our countries on these terrible weapons of mass destruction. I am—as you are—deeply dedicated to that goal.

At the same time, I would be less than candid if I did not register some concern over recent developments in two important regions. I was disappointed to learn that Minister Gromyko feels that the recent peace initiatives by President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin were somehow contrived by the United States, in part in order to move away from the principles to which we jointly subscribed earlier in the year. As Secretary Vance has already stated, these events were not initiated by the United States; nonetheless, we do welcome them as potentially positive steps toward peace, and we hope that both the United States and the Soviet Union can continue to encourage all of the parties to reach a comprehensive settlement. Such a settlement will have to be negotiated finally at Geneva, and we count on collaborating closely with you in making these negotiations as fruitful as possible. In our view, present trends in the Middle East do involve an increasing willingness on the part of the parties concerned to adopt positions which make a compromise solution more likely. We would hope that the Soviet Union would be party to that process and would help to discourage the extremist positions of some of the Arab parties. Without such Soviet help, it might prove difficult to reach the common goals of a comprehensive settlement negotiated in Geneva, as emphasized in your letter of December 15.

Also in your letter, you make the point that the representative of the Palestinian people is a necessary element in the Geneva Conference, with which I agree, but I confess to a sense of disappointment that the leadership of the PLO has not been more helpful to our efforts to work out a formula for Palestinian representation at the conference acceptable to the parties.

In response to the questions you raise about the procedures to be followed at the Geneva Conference, I am inclined to feel that these matters can best be settled in consultations with the parties to the conference. I understand your concerns, and I am confident that these

matters can be satisfactorily resolved when the conference is reconvened.

During the past several days, I have had conversations with Prime Minister Begin and by telephone and cable with President Sadat. I continue to find both of them committed to a comprehensive peace, and I have stressed that this is our goal as well. While Prime Minister Begin has developed tentative proposals on the Sinai and the West Bank and Gaza, I have not endorsed these proposals but have made clear that the ultimate judgment on their acceptability must be made by those who will sign the peace treaties. It is my belief, however, that they in no way preclude moving negotiations at an appropriate time to a broader forum or discussing other fronts.

I would also hope that the United States and the Soviet Union could collaborate in making certain that regional African disputes do not escalate into major international conflicts. The fighting that has developed between Ethiopia and Somalia is a regrettable development, one which should be contained and terminated before it spreads further. We are encouraging the parties to accept mediation, we are refraining from the export of arms to any of the parties involved in this struggle, and we are urging the other African states to take an active role in the early resolution of the conflict. We hope very much that you will adopt a similar position, and we would be glad to work closely with you to attain these goals.

I mention these concerns because I deeply believe that it is important for us, to the extent that it is possible, to avoid becoming involved in regional conflicts either as direct protagonists or through proxies. We know from recent history that such involvement stimulates additional tensions and tends to paralyze progress towards wider cooperation, which we both desire. I write about this because it is my determination to do my utmost to improve the American-Soviet relationship. Precisely because we live in a turbulent world, it is incumbent upon us to reach the greatest degree of mutual understanding regarding regional disputes and to exercise the greatest degree of self-restraint.

I value our correspondence highly for it gives us both an opportunity to speak frankly about the obstacles we encounter on the road to the objectives of peace and friendship that we both share.

We still await your visit when it is convenient for you.

With best personal wishes,

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

January–June 1978

68. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, January 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Anticipated Soviet Moves in the Shcharanskiy Case

1. Although the Soviets on 15 December extended the investigative period on Shcharanskiy for up to another six months, they clearly intend to put him on trial, possibly soon, and probably on severe (treason) rather than lesser (anti-Soviet activities) charges.

—Arbatov communicated to Marshall Shulman on 26 December that he had seen part of the evidence against Shcharanskiy,² and it contains “clear-cut evidence of CIA involvement.”

—the Soviet central press (*Literaturnaya Gazeta*) on 28 December explicitly asserted that Shcharanskiy’s innocence or guilt, and if the latter his degree of guilt, would be decided in a Soviet court on the basis of evidence.

—last Friday Soviet authorities told Shcharanskiy’s mother and brother to find him a Soviet defense lawyer by 13 January since the investigation would be completed by then. The authorities said that charges will be brought under Article 64–A of the Soviet criminal code which includes treason and espionage.

2. CIA’s assurance last June that the Agency had nothing whatever to do with Shcharanskiy is correct. However, the Soviets have been laying publicly and privately a trail of innuendo and guilt by association. Specifically, we think the Soviets intend to tar Shcharanskiy with the charge [1 line not declassified]

3. On 5 March 1977 Sanya Lipavskiy, a self-styled Soviet dissident, publicly confessed to having been a CIA agent, and along with other prominent dissidents accused Shcharanskiy, his former room-mate, of similar involvement with American intelligence.

4. [1 paragraph (15½ lines) not declassified]

5. [1 paragraph (15 lines) not declassified]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: USSR: 7/77–5/79. Secret; Sensitive.

² A brief memorandum from Shulman to Vance describing his communication with Arbatov, December 26, 1977, is in Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 6, Memoranda of Conversation—1977.

6. Shcharanskiy himself was arrested two weeks after Lipavskiy's March 1977 public confession and has, as you know, been held incommunicado ever since. We presume that part of Lipavskiy's deal with the KGB has involved extensive testimony against Shcharanskiy. We do not know any specifics of this testimony.

7. Valentin Turchin, another prominent Soviet dissident who has since emigrated, told Embassy Moscow in late May 1977 of another possible basis for a Soviet charge of espionage against Shcharanskiy. Some time before, Shcharanskiy had compiled a list of refuseniks whose exit visas were denied on grounds they had done classified work in Soviet institutes. The specific institutes were listed. While Shcharanskiy did not use classified information in drawing up his list, Turchin felt he could be accused of espionage because he had shown the list to Westerners as well as Soviets. Shcharanskiy, of course, had extensive contacts with Western diplomats and correspondents during his two years of active campaigning for Jewish emigration and broader human rights concerns prior to his arrest.

8. One of Shcharanskiy's many correspondent contacts, Bob Toth of the *Los Angeles Times*, was interrogated extensively by the KGB in June 1977 as a "witness" in connection with his relations with Shcharanskiy. Toth admitted to his interrogators that Shcharanskiy had given him lists of refuseniks, their places of employment, reasons for their visa denials, and information about alleged violations by Soviet authorities of Soviet law and the Helsinki accords. Toth signed the protocols drawn up after each interrogation, and was permitted to leave the USSR on 16 June. Embassy Moscow concluded (in EXDIS Moscow 8811 [8677], 16 June 1977)³ that "Toth's interrogation was clearly aimed primarily at Anatoliy Shcharanskiy . . . The clear intent . . . is to show that Shcharanskiy is guilty of passing information—written and oral—in violation of Article 64 (treason) and perhaps Article 70 (anti-Soviet slander and activities) of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Criminal Code."

9. A further Soviet effort to link Toth, (and presumably Shcharanskiy thus indirectly,) to American intelligence surfaced in a 31 August 1977 *Literaturnaya Gazeta* article, which chronicled Toth's alleged working relationship with DIA and the Pentagon, quoting from the alleged contents of a letter Toth received in Moscow in December 1976 from [2½ lines not declassified]

—[6 lines not declassified] Then, after a long and convoluted paragraph on General Haig's concern with the balance of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, *Litgaz* again quotes from the alleged [less than 1 line

³In telegram 8677 from Moscow, June 16, 1977, the Embassy described the Toth case in full. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D770215-0455)

not declassified] letter: “This theme is of great interest to General Haig, and you will be able to have a fruitful discussion about it next time you see him.”

When asked by a State Department official about his correspondence with Toth, [*9½ lines not declassified*]

10. In his 5 March and 6 May 1977 public confessions, covered in *Izvestiya*, Lipavskiy named both his original FSO contact, Levitsky, and Levitsky’s FSO replacement, Joseph Presel, as “CIA agents”, as well as Allyn Nathanson, who has since resigned from the Foreign Service. All three charges are of course false. All three officers had Embassy contact and reporting responsibilities for the Soviet dissident community. Lipavskiy, however, told *Izvestiya* that Levitsky had recruited him for CIA; he demonstrated the spy gear he had received during his recruitment meeting with Levitsky and from later deaddrop contacts. The *Izvestiya* coverage of Lipavskiy’s confession clearly implied that the Soviets also regarded Presel as one of the “Westerners” conspiring with Shcharanskiy.

11. We must anticipate from all of this that the Soviets can probably put together a circumstantially plausible case against Shcharanskiy. They would seem to have several options for trying and disposing of this case:

- (a) a treason charge, conviction, and a death sentence;
 - (b) a treason charge, conviction, and a long prison term;
 - (c) a treason charge, conviction, a long prison sentence, but deportation after a face-saving interval;
 - (d) a charge and conviction on anti-Soviet slander, and a prison sentence;
 - (e) a charge and conviction on anti-Soviet slander, and a prison sentence, but with deportation after a face-saving interval;
- (In any of the preceding trial alternatives, of course, the Soviets will have various options on how much to implicate US intelligence specifically in the charges.)
- (f) deportation without trial.

We consider (f) quite unlikely at this point. Options (d) and (e) are possible, but growing increasingly doubtful given recent Soviet signals. Any of options (a) through (c) are more likely, with option (c) probably the best that can be hoped for.

69. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, January 10, 1978, 1600Z

422. Subject: Letter for President Carter From Vladimir Slepak.

Summary: Embassy has received letter for President Carter from Moscow human rights activist and refusenik Vladimir Slepak. Letter recounts plight of Slepak family and requests President's assistance. We are forwarding it to EUR/SOV for disposition. English language copy we have received (which is being pouched to EUR/SOV) is signed carbon and we assume Slepak is sending original, and perhaps other copies, by other means. Slepak believes his son may have appointment with President on January 29 and is obviously trying to get letter to President before that date. Slepak says he does not plan to release letter to press, but there is no assurance that someone else will not if, as we suspect, he is having other copies carried out by tourists. Text of letter follows. End summary.

2. Begin Quote: Moscow. January 6, 1978. President Jimmy Carter, The White House, Washington, DC, U.S.A., Dear Sir: You are known as a man thanks to whom human rights have become the basis of trust between peoples, thanks to whom the civilized nations seek to one degree or another to see human rights observed the world over.

During your election campaign and now as President, you have repeatedly raised the issue of violations of human rights in the USSR.

This stand of the President of one of the great powers of the world has added strength and hope, both to fighters for human rights in the Soviet Union and to anyone else who seeks to enjoy those rights. In one of your election speeches in 1976, you cited the condition of my family as an example of violation of human rights in the USSR.² For many years we have been deprived of the chance to enjoy our right to emigrate to Israel. You said at the time that you would never give up till families like the Slepaks got the chance to emigrate from the USSR.

After a group of Jews seeking to go to Israel was beaten up by KGB agents in October 1976,³ I received your message expressing concern

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Mathews Subject Files, Box 10, Human Rights: Slepak Family: 12/77-7/78. Confidential; Exdis.

² Reference is to Carter's September 8, 1976, speech to B'nai B'rith in Washington. For the text of the speech, see *The Presidential Campaign, 1976*, vol. I, part II, Jimmy Carter (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 709–714.

³ See David K. Shipler, "30 Jews in Moscow Seized in Protests: Men are Given 15 Days for Visa Sit-Ins Last Week—Women Released After Paying Fine," *The New York Times*, October 26, 1976, p. 16.

over what had happened and your deep personal interest in our fate. We realized that we not [*now?*] had a strong ally in our difficult struggle.

Meanwhile, the Soviet authorities took a stiff course towards defenders of justice in the USSR. They followed with the arrests of Alexander Ginzburg, Yuri Orlov, Anatoly Shcharansky, Joseph Begun, and many other fighters for human rights in the USSR.

This is a difficult time for us now. It is adversely affecting my family. Let me remind you of my family's story in brief.

We were invited to go to Israel in March 1969. In April 1969 I had to give up my job as a chief of a laboratory in the Television Research Institute. I have never worked in my specialty since then. I managed to get various jobs at different times, but had to leave them every time my chief was informed about my intentions to emigrate. I have not been working at all since September 1974. We were able to apply to emigrate only one year after receiving our invitation to Israel. The five members of my family, my wife, her mother, our two sons, and I, applied together. That was in April 1970. Two months later we were refused permission. In March 1971 my mother-in-law was allowed to go, and went to Jerusalem. Old and sick, she has since then been living alone, with the one dream of seeing us again.

Last October the Soviet authorities had to release our older son Alexander from the USSR, since he was married to an American.

All these years my family has been subjected to various forms of harassment and persecution, from house raids, arrests and imprisonments, to beatings, dismissals from work, and so on.

Another horror came creeping up on us when our younger son Leonid approached the military conscription age. Ever since he was ten years old, Leonid grew up in a family fighting to leave the Soviet Union. He was persecuted along with the rest of the family. He had already been honored with Israeli citizenship. Our family had rejected its Soviet citizenship (but has never received any answer to our rejection). How could he possibly swear allegiance and loyalty to the Soviet Government, as all soldiers most?

We decided on a desperate step. In January 1976, my wife and I officially divorced so that she and our son could apply to leave separately. They were refused on the grounds that the authorities did not regard that as a reunification of a family. They said, "You and your son are one family, and your mother is another."

When Leonid reached the military conscription age of 18, last year, he was called in and told he would have to serve in the Soviet Army. He refused. He sent the Minister of Defense a statement pointing out that he is a citizen of Israel, and considers Israel his only homeland. He

can therefore, he said, not swear allegiance to the Soviet Government and consequently serve in the Soviet Army. Leonid is now threatened with legal prosecution. A court can sentence him to three years in a prison camp. This, then, is the current situation of my family: we are divided, my mother-in-law and one son, Alexander, living abroad. Our younger son, Leonid, is threatened with arrest any day, to face a three-year term in a prison camp. My wife Maria cannot go to her mother since the Soviet authorities refuse to regard that as the reunification of a family. I am not released and do not know why, since it is absurd to talk of secret work after not having worked in my specialty at all for nearly nine years.

In the name of goodness and justice, in the name of humanity, please help my family reunite in Israel. Respectfully Yours. Vladimir Slepak. End quote.

Matlock

70. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

January 12, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

I have carefully studied your letter of December 22.² First of all I wish to thank you for your New Year greetings and good wishes to the Soviet People and to me personally. On my own part, I sincerely wish you, Mr. President, your family and the American people peace and well-being in this year.

Our point of view on a number of specific questions raised in your letter has already been brought to your attention lately. Recently I considered it necessary to address you specially on the question of neutron

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. Found attached to a translated note from Dobrynin transmitting a message from Brezhnev to Carter regarding the characteristics of the Soviet satellite Cosmos-954. Brezhnev's message, apparently transmitted by Dobrynin, is not printed.

² Carter's backchannel message, sent just before midnight on December 21, is Document 67.

weapons,³ to the solutions of which in the interests of peace we attach most serious importance.

Now, that we stepped over the threshold of the new year, I think, it would be timely to share with you some thoughts of a broader context as well—on how relations between our countries are developing in general.

Looking at the general results of the past year one may note with satisfaction that—although not without stallings—predominant in Soviet-US relations remained the trend to their constructive development on the basis laid down by joint efforts of both sides.

Of special importance seems to be the fact that general understanding has been reached between us concerning main directions of mutual action and application of joint efforts of the USSR and the US. Those are measures to reduce the danger of war, to limit and subsequently reduce armaments, to prevent and eliminate dangerous hotbeds of international tensions. It is an undisputable positive that on these and other questions a dialogue between our countries at various levels continues and further develops.

But one cannot fail mentioning something else. A situation can hardly be considered satisfactory when negotiations on problems which are indeed urgent and acute are being conducted for protracted periods of time, in some cases for more than one year, and so far there have been no practical results.

I am sure that such state of affairs meets neither the interests of our two countries nor the broader interests of international peace. And here the task, as we see it, is to exert energetic efforts to achieve already in the near future significant specific agreements.

This relates above all to the problem of strategic offensive arms limitation. There is mutual understanding between us as to the direction of a new agreement and its main components. Nevertheless, the preparation of the agreement has not yet been completed. As is known, Mr. President, taking into account your wishes we moved last fall to meet the US position on a number of important questions. A certain flexibility on some questions was also displayed on your part. In the course of subsequent negotiations we again showed readiness to seek mutually acceptable solutions to the outstanding questions. Unfortunately, in all candor, we do not see equivalent steps from the US side towards us.

Naturally, we took note of recent remarks by US representatives regarding the possibility of completing the work on the agreement next March. As to us, we are prepared to complete the working out of the

³ See Document 76.

agreement even earlier. But since the US side thinks in terms of that timing it is necessary in any case to do everything possible to keep to this schedule.

It is evident that concluding a new strategic offensive arms limitation agreement remains for both sides the number one task.

These same ends would be served by achieving practical agreements also in the ongoing negotiations, in which our two countries take part, on other issues of disarmament—such as comprehensive cessation of nuclear weapon tests, prohibition of chemical weapons, banning new types and systems of the weapons of mass destruction, limiting military activities in the Indian Ocean. There is no lack of readiness on our part to seek agreements on this set of questions and you are aware of the constructive steps taken by the Soviet Union for finding appropriate solutions. Here again we would like to count on a higher degree of reciprocity, on a constructive approach of the US side. We also expect a positive response to those of our proposals on which the US has not yet given us any reply at all.

Quite a lot is to be done this year also in the domain of international problems. Time and again experience confirms that practical solutions to these problems cannot be found without close interaction and cooperation between the USSR and the US. On the other hand, the efforts of our countries aiming in the same direction, undoubtedly, help the development of Soviet-US relations to have a beneficial influence upon the world situation.

Recently I already expounded to you in detail our attitude toward the developments in the Middle East and there is no need to go into that again now. I would like only to say that the course of the latest events in the area fully confirms the correctness of our appraisal of the situation, i.e. the policy aimed at separate deals in no way brings closer, but on the contrary, puts off the achievement of an effective comprehensive settlement. This policy is directed at circumventing key problems without the solution of which there cannot be a just and, consequently, a lasting peace in the Middle East. Therefore a sharply negative reaction of the majority of the Arabs to those deals is quite understandable. It cannot be any different. And the matter is not at all of their extremism of some kind but of the policy and designs of those who retain the occupied Arab lands.

In your letter you express disagreement with the point of view that the latest US actions in the Middle East are in contravention with the principles set forth in the Joint Soviet-US Statement of October 1, 1977.⁴

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 52.

But to get convinced that it is indeed so, suffice it to refer to the text of the said document. It explicitly sets down agreement between the Soviet and the US sides that *the only right and effective way for achieving a fundamental solution to all aspects of the Middle East problem in its entirety is negotiations within the framework of the Geneva Peace Conference, specially convened for these purposes, with participation in its work of the representatives of all the parties involved in the conflict, including those of the Palestinian people.*

The argument to the effect that a settlement in the Middle East should ultimately be achieved within the framework of the Geneva Conference with cooperation of our two countries does not change the heart of the matter. I must say it straight: the calculations to use the Geneva Conference as a cover for separate deals, as a kind of a parade-like forum are groundless.

We are convinced that there can be only one way out from this situation: it is necessary to put negotiations back on the track of a comprehensive settlement within the framework of the Geneva Conference with the participation of all the parties concerned, on the basis of respect for their legitimate rights and interests. The sooner it is done, the better. If the US is ready to follow this path, which is the only right one, then it will find in the Soviet Union a solid partner.

As to the conflict in the Horn of Africa which you also mention in your letter, Mr. President, I want to stress once again that we are for having peace restored in that area of Africa. The USSR does not seek any advantages there for itself, it does its best to avoid the escalation of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. A really just solution should, of course, provide first of all for cessation of hostilities and for withdrawal of Somali troops from Ethiopia.

I would like to express the hope that the year we just entered will see the continuation, also through joint efforts of our countries, of the process of consolidating the relaxation of tensions and developing peaceful cooperation in Europe. The immediate goal in that regard is to conclude constructively the meeting in Belgrade.

Still a lot can and should be done in a number of practical spheres of our bilateral relations. Here, there continue to exist obstacles and artificial hindrances—for example, in the field of trade and economic ties—which it is high time to remove. There are potentials for more active cooperation in the field of science and technology, parliamentary and other contacts called to serve the cause of strengthening mutual understanding and trust between our countries and peoples.

To say it short, not a small work lies ahead. And it is important for us to move steadily forward building upon what has already been achieved in our relations.

Those are, speaking about the main things in Soviet-US relations, the thoughts and wishes which I would like to express in connection with your letter of December 22 and which come to mind when we are summing up the year just passed and want to visualize what the new year of 1978 will bring.

We sincerely hope that this year will be marked by important achievements on the road toward consolidation of peace and cooperation between peoples, will become a year of significant development of the relations between the USSR and the USA.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

71. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 14, 1978

SUBJECT

The Middle East
Part I of III

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS

USSR
Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin

Dobrynin asked when the Secretary was leaving for the Middle East. The Secretary said he planned to leave that evening,² but he did not want to go unless there could be advance agreement on the agenda. He said that he had sent word to the parties that he would not go unless the agenda were agreed upon before his departure. He said that he proposed to talk about three things at the Jerusalem meeting. The first and

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 1/14/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on January 16; approved by Anderson on January 26. The meeting took place in the Department of State. Parts II and III are Documents 72 and 73.

² Vance traveled to, and met with leaders in, Israel, Egypt, Turkey, and Greece, January 16 to 22.

most important was a broad statement of principles, which would be a framework for Geneva. The second would be a discussion of possible guidelines for the West Bank/Gaza matters. The third, of minor importance, was a discussion of the essential elements for a treaty, which would include, for example, a definition of peace and what would flow from that. It would also include the provisions for withdrawal from the occupied territories.

Dobrynin asked if this were just a treaty between Egypt and Israel. The Secretary replied that yes, it would be in the first instance, but that it would be essentially the same as in any of the peace treaties. Dobrynin asked what kind of principles would be specified regarding Palestinian representation. The Secretary replied that the Palestinians must be enabled to participate in the determination of their own future. Dobrynin asked what principle would be advanced regarding troop withdrawal. He commented that as of now Israel claimed that no troops would be withdrawn for several years. He said that if this kind of principle were applied elsewhere, for example in regard to Syria, it would be difficult to accept. The Secretary observed that this was an opening bargaining position. He thought that in the negotiations it would come down to perhaps one year. He said that the principle of 242 would prevail,³ that Israel must withdraw from occupied territories, and that this would be part of establishing “secure and recognized borders.” The details, as for example, when the withdrawal should take place, would be up to the negotiating parties.

Dobrynin returned to the question of what kind of principles would be established regarding the Palestinian questions. The Secretary replied that if agreement could be reached on self-determination, this would be a break-through. Dobrynin observed that as of now the position was “self rule.” The Secretary replied it was unclear for what period this would be, whether it would be just for the interim period. Dobrynin said that in general he was worried that in their dealings with the Palestinians, it looked as if there would be no clear end in sight beyond the interim solutions. The Secretary replied that we would have to see if we can get a solution, and an element involved in this would be how long the interim period should be. Dobrynin asked if you could get a solution without the presence of the Palestinians. He also asked what kind of guidelines would be established—would this provide for self rule in five years or ten years? The Secretary replied that self rule would apply in the immediate future, leading up to a final role in which the Palestinians would participate in determining what kind of homeland would be established. Dobrynin thought this would still be unclear. The Secretary replied that this was why we need the

³ Reference is to U.N. Resolution 242.

Geneva conference, to work out the details. Dobrynin objected that this would be a pre-determined framework, already established before a Geneva meeting were convened. The Secretary answered that these questions cannot be determined without the involvement of the Palestinians. Dobrynin objected and asked what kind of a framework would be established if there were only three parties negotiating it.

The Secretary said, in further explanation, that these principles would cover:

- the nature of peace, not only an end of the war but the establishment of normal relations;
- the withdrawal from occupied territories and the establishment of secure and recognized borders;
- the Palestinian question must be resolved in all of its aspects, with the Palestinians themselves as full participants in the solution, taking account of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.

The Secretary said that this was essentially what the US and the USSR had agreed in the joint statement, and if we could get Israel to accept these points it would be a step forward. Dobrynin said, with regard to the Palestinian question, that there was a difference between the “interim” and the “ultimate” solutions. (There was a bit of by-play at this point about the Aswan dam. The Secretary observed that it was a fine dam and Dobrynin acknowledged that it was because he knew the chief engineer who built it.)

Dobrynin repeated his concern about the Palestinian representation issue, and the Secretary again repeated that this was why the Geneva conference was needed, to work out these details. Dobrynin referred to two statements, by the President and by Begin, opposed to the Palestinian state. He said this prejudged the issue. The Secretary replied that the President said his preference was that there should not be an independent Palestinian state, but if the parties decided otherwise, we would accept it. He added that he did not believe the people there believed in an independent state. Dobrynin asked what parties—the Palestinians? The Secretary replied that some Palestinians don’t want an independent state; they prefer one that would be affiliated with Jordan. Dobrynin asked if the Secretary would stop in Cairo and the Secretary replied that he probably would. In reply to a further question, he said that he expected to be back either Wednesday or Thursday. The Secretary added that he wanted to see the negotiations broadened as soon as possible to bring in all parties, including the Soviet Union. Dobrynin replied that the Soviet Union was prepared now to participate fully, that it did not like to have one of the co-chairmen determining the future.

Dobrynin asked what the position of the Syrians was. The Secretary replied that the Syrians would sit on the sidelines and see what

happens. If we were able to come up with an appropriate framework, the Syrians would consider whether to participate, but would not do so now.

72. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 14, 1978

SUBJECT

The Horn of Africa
Part II of III

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS

USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

The Secretary noted that he had received the Soviet message on this point,² but he had noted with concern that aircraft were flying over Somalia and were conducting operations in Somalia, contrary to the Ethiopian pledge conveyed by the USSR. The Secretary said he would appreciate the assurances of the Soviet Union that there would be no combat role for the Soviet personnel and he urged that the same assurance be given regarding the Cubans present. He noted that we were not supplying arms to either side, and were seeking a negotiated solution. He handed Dobrynin an oral statement embodying these points (attached).

Dobrynin asked why there had not been a clear statement from the US condemning the clear act of aggression by the Somalis against the territory of another state, and calling for the beginning of negotiations. The Secretary replied that we have stated repeatedly that we support Ethiopian territorial integrity. Dobrynin objected that we had done so in “such a whisper.” He noted that Western countries—Iran, etc.—by proxy, were supporting the violation of the territory of Ethiopia.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 1/14/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on January 16; approved by Anderson on January 26. The meeting took place in the Department of State. Parts I and III are Documents 71 and 73.

² See Document 70.

The Secretary responded that it was important to stop fighting and get a peace settlement. He thought this was a common objective. He said the situation was increasing in importance and in public attention and it would have a bad effect on our bilateral relations. Therefore, he said, there should be a diplomatic initiative by both countries to try to resolve the issues. Dobrynin asked if we had any suggestions. The Secretary replied that we had been working on it and would make specific proposals. He said that we would sit down with the USSR and talk them out when this was done, and he asked Dobrynin to think about what suggestions the Soviet side might also make. The Secretary said, for example, that it might be possible to resolve the problem between Kenya and Somalia, which might lead to a treaty of peace and friendship between the two countries. This would then leave the problem of getting a ceasefire in the Ogaden. Dobrynin said this was the Soviet position, too, to try to get a ceasefire, but it would be possible only if the Somalis would withdraw their troops. He stressed that the Ethiopians would only accept a ceasefire if the Somalis withdrew.

The Secretary said that meanwhile there were very heavy Soviet shipments, military advisers, and Cubans already in a military role, and this was having a bad effect and should stop. Dobrynin said that it is not right to assume that the Cubans are doing what the USSR tells them to do.

In closing, the Secretary said there was already so much of a military presence in Ethiopia that it was going to sink the place. Dobrynin acknowledged that they had enough, in his personal opinion, and he added some personal remarks to the effect that some American officials seem to be saying that the USSR is starting this conflict, and is responsible for it, but he exempted the Secretary from this charge.

Attachment

Oral Statement From the U.S. Leadership to the Soviet Leadership³

Washington, January 14, 1978

We appreciate your statement on December 28⁴ of the pledge by Ethiopia not to use Soviet military supplies outside its own territory.

³ No classification marking.

⁴ Vance and Shulman met with Dobrynin on December 28, 1977. Shulman's memorandum for the files is in Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77—Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV—Dobrynin, 12/28/77.

We would appreciate receiving assurances that there will be no Soviet involvement in combat, and we would urge the USSR to discourage Cuba from any such combat role.

US spokesmen have repeatedly stated publicly, as did the President in his January 12 press conference,⁵ that we are not supplying arms to either side or injecting ourselves into the Ogaden conflict. This self-imposed prohibition specifically applies to both direct and indirect supplies of US arms. We find it thoroughly unhelpful, therefore, for the official Soviet news agency to make the charge, which the Soviet government must know to be false, that Middle Eastern countries are delivering American arms to Somalia “in unmarked crates.”

We have also repeatedly stated that we support Ethiopia’s territorial integrity, which is also true of Somalia’s.

Our objection to the Soviet supply of arms on a massive scale to Ethiopia stems from our conviction that no lasting solution to the Ogaden problem can come from military means, but can only come from negotiation. The supply of arms encourages continued recourse to armed conflict and therefore undermines efforts to secure a negotiated settlement.

Given the obvious importance the USSR attaches to its position in Ethiopia, it seems to us that it is very much in the Soviet interest to have a peaceful settlement and that therefore the Soviet Union should be prepared to take steps which will facilitate a settlement.

For our part, we have approached the Somalis and urged them to start thinking of the compromises they would have to make for negotiations to lead to a settlement. We urge the Soviet Union to make a similar approach to the Ethiopians.

We would hope to hear if the USSR is prepared to make the effort to persuade the Ethiopians to proceed to negotiations without preconditions as we have with the Somalis.

Meanwhile, we would hope to see some evidence that the Soviet Union is prepared to exercise restraint in order to promote a negotiating atmosphere rather than further recourse to armed conflict.

The US does not have the same leverage with Somalia that the USSR has with Ethiopia, but we would be prepared to work with Somalia and her friends to develop a negotiating atmosphere.

⁵ For the text of Carter’s January 12 news conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, February 1978, pp. 21–22.

73. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 14, 1978

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Bilateral Issues; MBFR
Part III of III

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS

USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

Secretary's Speech: Ambassador Dobrynin commented favorably on the Secretary's speech in Los Angeles.² He characterized it as a constructive speech.

PNG Exchange: The Secretary expressed concern that the US and the USSR might be headed toward a serious spiral of actions which could affect our general relationship, and reviewed the steps we would be obliged to take if the Soviets did not reconsider their action against our number three man in the commercial office in Moscow. The Secretary generally followed the talking points (attached)³ and added with some feeling that it was unfortunate that both countries were getting involved in a series of steps which were disturbing. This was childish and would not be conducive to good relations. He said he would like to see us "knock it off." Relations were too important to have endangered. Dobrynin began his reply by referring to the two cases in Moscow. He said the USSR didn't want to make a public fuss about it, but they were good cases. At the time of the first one, he was in Moscow and saw the documentations and he also was well informed of the second one. He said that it related to very sensitive matters in the foreign ministry itself

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 1/14/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on January 16; approved by Anderson on January 26. The meeting took place in the Department of State. Parts I and II are Documents 71 and 72.

² Vance delivered a speech in Los Angeles on January 13; see *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy.

³ Attached but not printed.

and it led directly to the CIA. He then went on to characterize the Avdyunin expulsion as a clear case of fabrication to even the score.⁴

Dobrynin said that his Minister, Vasev, would be coming in this afternoon to see Marshall Shulman to transmit a note which would: (a) call for Kursch's immediate departure; (b) protest the provocation against Avdyunin; and (c) point out that our commercial representatives outnumbered theirs if the representatives of private firms were taken into account. The Secretary pointed out that if this note were delivered, there would be no turning back from our retaliatory action against them. Therefore, it was arranged that Vasev would limit himself to an oral communication, and that Dobrynin would recommend to Moscow that action be suspended until next week, by which time he or his representative could review the evidence against their man and judge whether this was, as we maintain, not a fabrication.

Cosmos 954: The Secretary inquired if Dobrynin had received any information from Moscow on this, in response to our query.⁵ He said that a message had just begun to come in to the Embassy, and that he would telephone the Secretary this afternoon to report on its contents.

MBFR: The Secretary expressed regret that the data exchange had not gone forward during the recent meeting, and urged that it be made the first item of business at the next meeting. He stressed the importance of progress on MBFR.

List of Outstanding Issues: Dobrynin handed the Secretary a list of four questions in the disarmament field to which he is awaiting responses from the US: (a) world treaty on non-use of force in international relations; (b) non-first-use of nuclear weapons by Helsinki participants; (c) world disarmament conference; and (d) an agreement on ban on neutron weapons.

Brezhnev's Health: In response to the Secretary's inquiry on this subject, Dobrynin said that Brezhnev had experienced a rather serious bout of the flu, but was now recovered.

⁴ Retaliatory diplomatic expulsions were acknowledged on January 19. The United States expelled a member of the Soviet trade mission for improper activities, which in turn led to the expulsion of Donald Kursch, U.S. first secretary in Moscow in retaliation. The United States responded by expelling a Soviet official equal to Kursch's rank, apparently Avdyunin. ("Retaliatory Ousters of Aides by Soviet and U.S. Disclosed," *The New York Times*, January 20, 1978, p. A3)

⁵ The response to the U.S. query was provided on January 15. In telegram 11050 to Moscow, the Department indicated that the Soviets had provided information about the projected reentry of *Cosmos 954* and their response if the satellite was outside Soviet territory. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840148–1459)

74. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 19, 1978, 12:40–2:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Dobrynin

While a great deal of the conversation was purely social, during the more serious part of the lunch the following points were made:

1. Ethiopia: I pointed out to Dobrynin that I see clouds on the horizon insofar as U.S.-Soviet relations are concerned. The biggest cloud is Ethiopia. I do not wish to debate the rights and wrongs of the situation, but simply to stress that the scale and intensity of the Soviet/Cuban involvement is going to produce a domestic feedback in this country, affecting our relations. It is neither in their nor in our interest for this to happen. Dobrynin made the usual arguments, invoking even our military presence in Iran as a justification, but ultimately agreed that it is important somehow to terminate this issue as a danger to our relations. He said that he has already made that point to Moscow. Basically, he agreed that the best solution would be an immediate termination of the conflict, based on the principle of territorial integrity, accompanied by the pull-out of the Soviets and perhaps Cubans. However, on the latter point he was rather vague.

2. Nuclear Weapons: He urged a positive U.S. initiative regarding earlier overtures by Brezhnev about non-first use. He thought that this would have a more desirable psychological impact. He added that he thought that the Soviet leaders feel that by and large our attitude throughout the year has been negative.

3. Carter-Brezhnev Meeting: I suggested to Dobrynin that some of the difficulties in our relations could perhaps be overcome if our two leaders could *consult* with each other. I told him that it is a mistake for them to insist on tying a meeting to major agreements, because we could wait for such a meeting too long and it could finally come at a time when the relationship had gravely deteriorated. Dobrynin made the usual argument about the press misconstruing a meeting without major agreements as a failure. I told him that in my judgment we could have three kinds of a meeting: (1) a meeting linked to major agreements—in which case we may have to wait a long time; (2) a meeting tied to seeming agreements, as for example on the Indian Ocean, in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 49, Chron: 1/78. Secret. The initial C is written in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicating that Carter saw it.

which case the press will consider that to be a subterfuge; (3) or a working meeting, advertised in advance as consultative and not designed to achieve any accommodation on any issue. That might be the most desirable and useful at this stage. Dobrynin seemed to agree, asked how such a meeting could be arranged, and what would be its circumstances. I responded by indicating either Camp David or perhaps even a place in Alaska. He said he would pursue this matter further but also urged me to have the President bring it up with Ponomarev,² whom he very much hoped the President would see.

4. Other High-Level Meetings: Dobrynin suggested that either Vance or I pay a visit to Moscow. Alternatively, Gromyko might come here to continue the dialogue. This, too, was an issue he thought it might be useful for the President to discuss with Ponomarev.

² Boris Ponomarev, chief of the International Department of the CPSU Central Committee.

75. **Non-Note From the Soviet Leadership to the U.S. Leadership**¹

January 24, 1978

Moscow has considered with attention the remarks of the Secretary of State regarding the situation in the Horn of Africa, made in the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on January 14.²

The statement by the Secretary to the effect that the US side has no intention of interfering in the Somali-Ethiopian conflict and that it took decision not to provide arms, directly or indirectly, to either side in the conflict, could only be welcomed. However, the very next day after that conversation an official of the Department of State said publicly something quite different, namely, that the US “decided to provide Somalia with defensive weapons”. Naturally, we cannot help asking the question: what is the real state of affairs?

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Bessmertnykh–Shulman, 1/24/78. No classification marking. A handwritten notation in the upper right-hand corner of the document indicates that Bessmertnykh delivered the non-note during his meeting with Shulman on January 24. A brief summary of the meeting is *ibid*.

² See Document 72.

Public statements of the US officials, including those at the highest level, misrepresenting the position and actions of the Soviet Union in connection with the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, are also in no way helpful but only aggravate the situation.

Meanwhile, the US government is, undoubtedly, well aware of the fact that even before the start of the conflict we urged the Somali side to give up the attempts to solve its problems with Ethiopia by force. And when the Somali leadership, nevertheless, resorted to military operations in Ogaden we made great efforts aimed at the cessation of that conflict and its settlement through negotiations on the basis of mutual respect by the sides for the sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. And it is by no means the Soviet Union's fault that Somalia continues its military interference in Ethiopia, trying to retain by force a considerable part of the territory of that country.

The material and technical assistance that we render Ethiopia at its request has the only purpose of halting the aggression and eliminating its consequences. The Soviet Union does its utmost to prevent further escalation of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. There are no, for that matter, reasons for such apprehensions unless, naturally, those who are on the side of Somalia now take a hand in that. On its part the government of Ethiopia clearly stated that its aim is only the repulse of the Somali aggression and restoration of its territory, and by no means the invasion of Somalia.

The US side as it follows from the Secretary's remarks, favors negotiation between Somalia and Ethiopia "without preconditions". But thus the substance of the question is missed: that it is Somalia that has seized and occupies the Ethiopian territory.

Thus a necessary prerequisite of peaceful settlement of the conflict should be not simply a termination of military operations but an immediate withdrawal of Somali troops from Ethiopia, about which the US side for some reasons prefers to keep silent. Any other approach to this question, which would fail to discriminate between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, would in fact lead to the protraction of the conflict, the creation of a new permanent source of tensions. Suffice it to recall what did happen in the Middle East when, in 1967, a cease-fire was not followed by the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from the occupied Arab territories. These forces still continue to be there and, as a result, the Middle East crisis can explode anew at any moment as it was already the case in 1973.

As to the Soviet Union, we would like to stress once again that we do not seek in the Horn of Africa or anywhere else any advantages for ourselves including those at the expense of the US or along the line of confrontation with the US. If the US side also supports the territorial in-

tegrity of Ethiopia, as it was stated by the Secretary, then we would like to hope that it will act as well in that direction exercising appropriate influence with Somalia and other countries, for example, Saudi Arabia and Iran which have close ties with the US. If the US acts in such way and does not turn this conflict into a source of disagreement between our countries it will always find in the Soviet Union a solid partner.

76. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, January 25, 1978, 2156Z

20409. Exdis—Belgrade for USDel CSCE. Subject: Brezhnev Letter to President on ER. Refs: (A) USNATO 00545 (DTG 181414Z Jan 78); (B) State 011768 (DTG 170019Z Jan 78); (C) USNATO 00626 (DTG 191803Z Jan 78); (D) State 018345 (DTG 240054Z Jan 78).²

1. Following is unofficial translation of Brezhnev letter to President on enhanced radiation weapons. Mission is authorized to provide text to SPC for analysis and comparison with other letters as discussed Ref (C).

2. FYI, Soviets initially gave us only English-language version.³ We now have Russian-language text, and it is evident Soviet English translation was inaccurate in several places, including phrase “respond in kind” quoted Ref (B). This phrase does not repeat not appear in the Russian text.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780037–1136. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Lyall Breckon and Donald McConnell (EUR/RPM); cleared by Gregory Treverton (NSC), John Hawes (PM/ISA), James Thyden (S/S-O), Kent Brown (EUR/SOV), Stephen Ledogar (EUR/RPM), and Shinn; approved by James Goodby (EUR). Sent for information to all NATO capitals; Moscow; Belgrade for the U.S. CSCE delegation; USNMR SHAPE; and USLO SAACLANT.

² All reference telegrams are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780026–1104; D780023–0896; D780029–0168; and D780034–0775.

³ The original Russian letter and a provisional English translation are in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. In the upper corner of that English translation Carter wrote, “Zbig—Apparently our Polish interpreter did Brezhnev’s letter also—Let someone redo it other than in Pidgin English—consult with Harold on reply. JC.” Carter was on an official visit to Europe at the time that the letter was sent.

Begin text. January 5, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

—This time I am addressing you on only a single question, but one which assumes significant acuteness, both in the relations between our two countries, and from the point of view of the development of the international situation as a whole. What I have in mind are the plans to produce neutron weapons and to deploy them in Western Europe. The seriousness of the subject demands that talk be candid.

—You know our position regarding these plans. It is sharply negative. As for the gist of the matter, a new direction of the arms race is being opened with all the dangerous consequences flowing from it, a severe blow is being dealt to peoples' hopes to eliminate the threat of nuclear war. This is seen not only by us but by many other states and broad masses of people in different countries of the world as well.

—I will say it frankly. We view attempts to belittle the threat which has arisen as a desire to confuse those in the world who now feel a rising alarm, and who are raising ever louder a voice of protest against the neutron bomb. Can it indeed be possible to believe that neutron weapons, if they are used, will be used on a limited scale, only on the battlefield and only against one or another type of forces? If one thinks in military terms, it is clear that in the case of such a conflict circumstances will dictate their own logic to the actions of one side or the other.

—By their nature and their destructive characteristics neutron weapons can strike not only people wearing military uniforms but also huge masses of the population. These are inhuman weapons of mass destruction; they are directed against people. Their appearance will not diminish the likelihood of nuclear conflict but enhance it. The reality is that if neutron weapons are ever used, a devastating scythe will sweep across the territories of entire countries, probably not leaving a single inch untouched.

—Perhaps the calculation is made that neutron weapons will be used only where they are to be deployed—that is in Europe. Perhaps some entertain the hope to stay on the sidelines if and when the point is reached that neutron weapons are killing Europeans. This calculation is illusory in substance. Today neutron weapons are thought of in connection with one means of delivery, but tomorrow, or the day after they may be attached to other vehicles of a completely different range—not of hundreds but of thousands of kilometers. Today these weapons have one yield, but tomorrow—it could be ten or a hundred times greater. Such is the law of the arms race once one side begins a new spiral.

—Plans connected with neutron weapons, are already having a dangerous effect on the world political atmosphere and their realization would entail even greater costs. In what light would the negotia-

tions currently underway between the USSR and the US on a series of major issues for arresting the arms race appear if simultaneously the deployment of neutron weapons was forced? Not much would be left of people's trust in solving the problem of disarmament, in the success of ongoing negotiations. Moreover, the negotiations themselves, at least in some cases, would face the threat of being broken off.

—What mutual trust, what cooperation between the USSR and the US in solving the great task of freeing peoples from nuclear danger can there be if the U.S. side puts its stake on new sophisticated weapons aimed—and this is not being concealed—against the Soviet Union.

—It is no secret that the decision whether to start production and deployment of neutron weapons depends now above all upon the US Government, upon you, personally, Mr. President. But this decision is of the kind that a chain of events is put into motion which in the last analysis is connected with the risk of devastation of whole countries, and the loss of millions of people. The responsibility here is exceptionally great and it is this that prompts me to address you. Since, if the choice of the United States is in favor of the neutron bomb this will put the Soviet Union before the necessity to meet the challenge, that is to act in the same way as we were forced to act when atomic weapons came into being.

We have simply no right to forgo the security of our people and the security of our allies.

—But it is still not too late to stop. There exists an alternative to the dangerous aggravation of the arms race and we propose it. You of course know that in my public address at the end of the last year I proposed that agreement be reached on the mutual repudiation of production of neutron weapons. I now confirm this proposal. We are prepared to conclude an appropriate agreement with the United States and other states. We are prepared to enter into negotiations on this matter at any moment. Such an agreement would respond to the spirit of the times, to the interests of strengthening peace and detente, to peoples' aspirations.

—I would like to hope, Mr. President, that you will treat the above considerations with full attention, and that the Soviet Union and the US will be able before irreversible steps are taken to reach mutual understanding concerning the repudiation of neutron weapons.

—At the same time I am addressing the leaders of a series of other states—participants of the all-European conference—on this issue.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev [End text.]

77. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, January 25, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I was pleased to receive your letter of January 12.² I was particularly gratified by your view—which I share—that the predominant trend in U.S.-Soviet relations is a constructive one, based on our jointly shared determination “to reduce the danger of war, to limit and subsequently reduce armaments, to prevent and eliminate dangerous hotbeds of international tensions.” Our personal dialogue is dedicated to these ends.

Let me add that I am also gratified by the progress that we made in 1977. Despite the complexities inherent in SALT, our delegations have moved forward—and Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to Washington was particularly helpful in overcoming some obstacles. We also initiated a wide range of additional negotiations, all of which have the purpose of shaping a more stable and cooperative U.S.-Soviet relationship, an objective that I consider essential.

I hope, therefore, that we can move expeditiously toward a SALT II agreement. I have so instructed the U.S. delegation. At the same time, I am sure that Ambassador Dobrynin keeps you fully informed regarding the strong domestic opposition already generated by the concessions we have made. U.S. willingness to count heavy bombers with air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) within the 1320 total for both MIRVs and ALCMs and to limit cruise missiles has been perceived by many Americans as insufficiently offset by Soviet concessions, complicating the eventual process of ratification. This is why I hope that the Soviet side will adopt a very positive attitude regarding the outstanding issues, notably on the questions pertaining to MIRV sublimits, modernization, and the Backfire bomber.

Agreement in SALT would doubtless help us both generate a wider movement in many of the other negotiations between our two governments.

I am concerned that several developments may already be generating needless complications in our relations:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. No classification marking.

² See Document 70.

The first involves the Soviet propaganda campaign directed at the United States and its Allies against the defensive tactical nuclear weapon called by you "the Neutron Bomb." That particular weapon is defensive; it is a tactical weapon of limited range; it is designed against concentrated tank formations; it is meant to be used primarily against military targets; and it is not even being produced. In every respect, it contrasts vividly with the Soviet SS-20, which can be used in an offensive attack; which has extensive range; which can be targeted against industrial and urban centers in Western Europe; which generates three times as much radiation and more than ten times the blast damage; and which is already being deployed. I am quite prepared to discuss the issue in a serious and thorough manner, but I do not believe that public campaigns, designed to inflame emotions, are helpful to a constructive dialogue on as complicated a matter as theater or tactical nuclear weapons of either NATO or the Warsaw Pact.

Secondly, I am concerned that our respective policies in the Middle East may be pointing in different directions. We are not promoting "separate deals." We are seeking a comprehensive settlement, to be worked out within the Geneva framework. We believe the current Egyptian-Israeli negotiations can be channeled in that direction and enlarged in their scope to embrace, as you say, "all the parties," including moderate Palestinians prepared to accept the existence of Israel. This is why we have kept you fully informed regarding our initiatives and attitudes, and we continue to hope that the Soviet Union will use its good offices to encourage Syria and the Palestinians to adopt a moderate and constructive attitude. Such a development would make the holding of an early Geneva conference more likely.

Finally, let me turn to the most worrisome concern: the Horn of Africa. The United States is not supplying arms to either side, nor have I been exaggerating when I expressed U.S. reservations regarding Soviet and Cuban involvement. That involvement is a fact, and is very troubling to us.

At the same time, the United States has abstained from becoming involved and has not encouraged concerned neighboring states to become involved. We do not wish either to intensify nor to perpetuate the Ethiopian-Somali conflict. Our preference is an early and peaceful settlement respecting the territorial integrity of the African states, and the complete removal of all foreign military personnel from both Ethiopia and Somalia. We intend to promote such a peaceful resolution of the conflict—and I think it would be a most constructive development if our two countries could join in proclaiming the need for a negotiated solution, based on respect for the territorial integrity of both Ethiopia and Somalia, accompanied by the immediate recall of both Soviet and Cuban military personnel from Ethiopia.

Otherwise, I fear that it can give rise not only to additional tensions in the region but adversely affect our relations more generally. Let me be quite direct: I believe it essential that our two countries continue to widen our collaboration—but that collaboration is not compatible with the unilateral use of force, direct or through proxy, designed to exploit local turbulence or local conflicts for ideological or other purposes. Such one-sided actions can only breed similar counter-reactions, with unavoidably negative effects on our bilateral relations.

I discuss these difficult matters frankly in the earnest desire for a more cooperative relationship between our two countries. That relationship will not be easy to establish and to maintain. It will take consistent and continued efforts to avoid needless friction, and it will require the generation of mutual confidence.

You put it well in the concluding paragraphs of your recent letter: “. . . it is important for us to move steadily forward, building upon what has already been achieved in our relations.”

I wish you an early and complete recovery from your recent illness.

With best wishes,

Jimmy Carter

78. Paper Prepared by Professor William E. Griffith¹

undated

THE HORN AND U.S. POLICY

For a situation as complex and fluid as the Horn of Africa, correct categories of analysis are absolutely necessary, both in general and because the current crisis in the Horn is a classic example of the interaction between global (Soviet/U.S.) and regional issues.

CATEGORIES OF ANALYSIS

1. While the origins of the crisis are primarily regional, and it did not begin as a “Soviet expansionist plot,” its primary significance for U.S. policy is the Soviet involvement. This is true because of:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 1, Chron File: 1/78. Secret. Henze sent the paper to Brzezinski under a January 28 covering memorandum. A handwritten notation on the memorandum indicates that copies were sent to Huntington, Quandt, and Sick on January 31. Griffith, a professor at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, later became an adviser to Brzezinski.

- a. the questions it raises about U.S.-Soviet relations in general;
- b. it follows, and the Soviets were stimulated by, the Soviet-Cuban victory in Angola;
- c. it is another example of Soviet-Cuban collaboration where Cuban troops are politically less unacceptable than Soviet, while the West, unlike the Shaba, has so far no equivalent for the Cubans;
- d. in Angola several thousand Cubans can make the difference between victory and defeat;
- e. the Horn is geopolitically far more important for the West than Angola; and
- f. Soviet bases in the Horn would be very useful for future Soviet involvement in southern Africa.

2. However, the U.S. faces major regional obstacles to checking expansion of Soviet influence in the Horn: Ethiopia's Soviet-supported struggle against the Somali invasion of the Ogaden is a position which the OAU unanimously supports, and which the U.S. can hardly contest, while the U.S.'s principal Arab allies support Somalia. Kenya fears both Soviet influence in Ethiopia and Somali irredentism in northern Kenya.

3. In domestic U.S. politics, the "Vietnam syndrome" generally inhibits U.S. action. However, U.S. opinion on the Soviet Union is increasingly negative, and Ethiopian-Soviet-Cuban victories in the Horn could merge with a worsening Middle Eastern situation (at least very possible) to endanger any SALT agreement and destabilize U.S. relations with the Soviet Union and the whole international situation.

4. How to influence the Soviet Union to limit or reverse its intervention in the Horn requires a global and regional analysis of available "pressure points" on the Soviet Union and the degree of priority for their use for this purpose as compared to other Soviet-U.S. issues which these points involve.

5. The Horn suffers, from the U.S. viewpoint, from a very high level of unpredictability, for the combatants involved are not subject to decisive Soviet influence and certainly not to U.S. influence, and the military outcome will be the major factor in determining the future.

6. No matter what the military and political outcome is in the near future, U.S. planning should assume that the Horn will be an intermittent crisis area over the next decade or two.

7. Even if the Ethiopians, Soviets, and Cubans do win a military victory, and *particularly* if they do, conservative Arabs and the Shah will be the more anti-Soviet for Moscow's expansion of its influence and support of Ethiopian "ex-Christian communists."

8. If the U.S. does not check the Soviets in the Horn, they and the Cubans are more likely to become involved in southern Africa, particularly if a black civil war breaks out in Zimbabwe.

9. Moreover, the Saudis and Sadat will feel that if the U.S. cannot be counted on to counter the Soviets in the Horn, it also cannot be counted on to bring about a Middle Eastern settlement. Both will therefore be more likely to anticipate a breakdown and another Middle Eastern war and therefore be less willing to compromise with Israel. U.S. inaction in the Horn would thus worsen the Middle Eastern situation and U.S. influence there.

U.S. POLICY

1. Because without massive Soviet and Cuban assistance the Ethiopians cannot reconquer the Ogaden or crush the Eritrean rebellion and, because as long as they cannot, they are unlikely to begin negotiations, and because the U.S. has no significant pressure points vis-a-vis the Cubans, who will not quit on their own, the U.S. must find and use pressure points on the Soviets. I suggest three, listed in graduated order of importance and to be used in flexible escalation.

a. *The Indian Ocean Negotiations.* The Soviets should be informed privately that if they continue their present level of involvement in Ethiopia, we will break them off; and if they do, we should.

b. *The Chinese.* The Soviets clearly fear more extensive U.S. involvement with the Chinese. To prevent this has been one of Moscow's main motives for Soviet-U.S. detente. The U.S. objective, therefore, should be to make the Soviets believe that if they continue in the Horn, we will move farther toward Peking. This should initially involve expanded U.S. consultations with the Chinese on the Horn to convince the Soviets of their menace. The U.S. should end its attempt to normalize relations with Hanoi, which Moscow supports, and improve U.S. relations with Laos. Steps like this are necessary to convince the Chinese that we mean business (including in the Horn) for otherwise the Soviets will not be convinced themselves that we do and will work with the Chinese on this problem.

c. *SALT.* Whether or not a SALT II agreement can be produced which will be satisfactory to the Soviets and two-thirds of the U.S. Senate (which at the moment seems far from certain), the Senate will hardly ratify SALT II if the Soviets and the Cubans are still moving forward in the Horn. For the Soviets SALT is the core of Soviet-U.S. detente, and therefore their most vulnerable pressure point, the more so because they fear U.S. deployment of MaRV and cruise missiles and, perhaps most of all, U.S. technological assistance to its allies (and perhaps eventually even to the Chinese) in deployment of cruise missiles as well. Since it is not in our interest to deny our allies access to cruise missile technology in any case, there is all the more reason, if necessary, to indicate to the Soviets that we will speed it up if they continue to act as they have been doing in the Horn.

2. Informing U.S. public opinion. This is a major problem and requires more effort than it has been given, for without it no U.S. policy in the Horn can be effective. Exactly because the Horn is so complicated, a major program for this should be set up, with journalists, opinion leaders, and academics.

3. The U.S. should continue to advocate withdrawal of the Somalis from the Ogaden plus negotiations, withdrawal of foreign forces from the Horn, OAU mediation, etc.

4. Contacts with Mengistu should be continued and if possible intensified, both directly and via the Sudan and other regional powers.

5. In view of the present rapid buildup of Cuban military forces in Ethiopia, and considering the present high level of Soviet ships in the Red Sea, the U.S. should immediately send a naval task force to patrol in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. In order to demonstrate U.S. naval mobility, these destroyers should be detached from the Seventh as well as the Sixth Fleet. The primary purpose of this would be to demonstrate to the Soviets and the Arabs U.S. concern and determination. [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

79. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, January 31, 1978

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS

USSR

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

The Secretary transmitted to Dobrynin a copy of the President's letter to Brezhnev of January 25, the original of which had been delivered in Moscow yesterday.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 1/31/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; approved by Anderson on February 13. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

² See Document 77.

PNG Exchange: The Secretary noted that Dobrynin has preferred not to accept our offer to show him the film on the Avdyunin case,³ expressing instead a desire to talk privately about our mutual understanding on how such cases are handled. Dobrynin said he understood from Vasev that the movie made it clear that the episode was set up for the purpose of making the movie, that the questions asked were leading and insinuating and that, in short, there was no doubt in their minds that this entrapment was arranged in retaliation against the Moscow cases.

The Secretary said there was no question in our minds about the man's guilt, that the film was merely confirmatory of what he had been doing. Shulman added details in support of this point.

(Although Dobrynin had earlier expressed a desire to talk over the "rules of the game," he now fenced and asked if the Secretary or Shulman had anything to suggest, showing reluctance to initiate discussion.)

After a further repetition of the contradictory views of the Avdyunin case, it was agreed by both Dobrynin and the Secretary that the matter should be "cooled down." It was also agreed that it would be desirable to avoid publicity, although Dobrynin protested that the US sometimes engaged in one-sided publicity. He warned that this would create a temptation to Moscow to publicize matters that had previously been handled with restraint.

Ponomarev Group: The Secretary expressed sadness over the episode in Los Angeles in which a member of the group had been splattered with salad thrown by a demonstrator.⁴ He added that additional security would be provided at subsequent stops. Dobrynin expressed appreciation for the Secretary's sentiments, which he said he would transmit to Ponomarev when he saw him in New York February 1. In general, Dobrynin said, the trip had been successful.

Middle East: The Secretary said that he would give Dobrynin a report on the results of the Sadat visit during the coming weekend. He said, in response to questions, that the Political Committee was considering resumption of its activities, with Atherton serving as a go-between, that the main issue involved concerned Palestinian repre-

³ See footnote 4, Document 73.

⁴ Boris Ponomarev, Candidate Member of the Politburo of the CPSU and Secretary of the Central Committee, met with Vance on January 26. Ponomarev headed the Supreme Soviet Delegation that visited the United States. The two memoranda of conversation are in Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77—Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Supreme Soviet Visit, January 22—February 2, 1978, and Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978.

sentation, and that the Sinai settlements issue was being handled in the Military Committee, in which we were not involved.

SALT Ratification: Dobrynin observed that during the meetings between the Ponomarev delegation and the Congress, there had been some mention that SALT might be referred to both Houses of Congress for a simple majority vote. The Secretary said that this procedure, while it would relieve the necessity of having a two-thirds vote in the Senate, would raise other risks in involving the House.

Belgrade: Dobrynin asked the Secretary to take under consideration the situation at Belgrade, where he felt the draft text submitted by the Soviet Union, although admittedly imperfect, had not received fair attention. He expressed concern that the situation at Belgrade had degenerated into polemical exchanges, and that the opportunity for constructive agreement was being lost. The Secretary agreed to examine the various draft proposals.

The Horn: The Secretary referred to the principles he had discussed with Ponomarev, in the hope that the Soviet side would examine them and present any ideas it might have for moving toward a negotiated solution to the problem. Dobrynin said that he would be discussing the subject with Ponomarev in New York on February 1. The Secretary then went on to make the point that the increase in Soviet ships in the Red Sea, including landing ships, and the Indian Ocean, was having a negative effect, would make negotiations and a solution to the problem more difficult, and would have a provocative effect. He stressed the seriousness with which such steps were regarded here, and said we ought to be moving in the other direction, toward establishing the conditions for a negotiated solution. Dobrynin said he understood, and would pass on the message.

At a subsequent point, the discussion returned to this subject, and Dobrynin said a crucial consideration for the start of negotiations was to get Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden. The Secretary said he agreed, but it was necessary to work out the timing of the withdrawal, and an agreement on what should take place after the withdrawal, leading to some form of self-determination and autonomy.

SALT and Miscellany: Dobrynin observed that Brezhnev was back on the job, and that Gromyko was now away on a two-week vacation, although not far from Moscow. He thought that ultimately a meeting between Gromyko and the Secretary might be required to work out the final unresolved issues in the SALT negotiations. In this connection, the Secretary said that he would soon be giving Dobrynin a list of matters concerning Backfire which remained to be worked out. Dobrynin said: "Fair enough."

80. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, February 1, 1978, 2156Z

27089. Subject: Letter to President From Vladimir Slepak; Slepak Family Case. Ref; Moscow 422.²

1. Please inform Vladimir Slepak at appropriate occasion that his letter to the President was received with sympathy and concern. Please tell him that we have his case very much in mind and that we will try to assist Slepak family's effort to emigrate.

2. Vladimir Slepak's son, Alexander, and his Amcit wife, Elaine, had meetings recently in Washington with Assistant Secretary Derian³ and with officers from HA and EUR/SOV. In discussing case with Slepaks, we agreed that expression of interest in cases of mother and son, who have applied for emigration to U.S., would be useful.

3. Unless Embassy feels it would be counterproductive, Embassy is authorized to make inquiry at MFA in U.S. emigration case of Mrs. Slepak and son, Leonid, referring to their application for exit visa to U.S. based on invitation sent by Mrs. Slepak's U.S. citizen daughter-in-law, Elaine Marie Slepak (Burrell) of 226 Verano Drive, Los Altos, California. Embassy may wish to check with Slepaks in Moscow prior to approach to MFA.

4. Please report MFA reaction to approach and continue to keep Department informed of developments in Slepak family's case.

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780049–0946. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Melvyn Levitsky (EUR/SOV); cleared by McCall, Curtis Kamman (S/MS), Clifford Brody (HA), King and Mathews (NSC), and Thomas G. Martin (S/S–O); approved by Luers.

² See Document 69.

³ Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs. No record of the meeting was found.

81. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 14, 1978

SUBJECT

Middle East, Horn, Belgrade CSCE, SALT

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Marshall D. Shulman

USSR

Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at our request February 14. The discussion covered the following matters:

1. *Middle East.* The Secretary reported that the Sadat visit² had been useful and that agreement had been reached to continue the negotiations, with an effort in the first instance to reach agreement on a statement of general principles, and then to bring others into the discussions.

In his meeting with Dayan on Thursday,³ the Secretary said, he proposed to review the statement of general principles, the question of Israeli settlements, and the West Bank/Gaza/Palestinian issues. On the latter cluster of issues, we would maintain our preference for a Palestinian homeland linked to Jordan, but a number of problems would need to be resolved beforehand, including Palestinian participation in the determination of their own future, and the conditions for an interim arrangement. Although the Israelis had manifested their unhappiness with some of our recent statements, the Secretary said it was evident that these statements were not new, and that the Israelis were prepared to have the US continue to perform a facilitating role. After the meeting with Dayan, he said, Atherton would be leaving for the Middle East, to move as necessary between the capitals to seek acceptance of the declaration of general principles as a first step in the process.

The Secretary gave Dobrynin advance notice of an announcement to be made later in the day concerning the US intention to permit the sale of specified aircraft to Israel, Egypt and Saudi Arabia.

2. *Horn.* The Secretary spoke of the mounting US concern over the course of events, and the need for prompt movement toward a cease-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 2/14/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

² Sadat met with Vance on January 20.

³ February 16.

fire and a negotiated settlement. He expressed the belief that the time had come to work through the UN Security Council, and reported that he had asked Andrew Young to talk about this with Ambassador Troyanovsky in New York. In response to a question from Dobrynin about the results expected from a Security Council discussion, the Secretary listed the following: ceasefire; recognition of international boundaries; withdrawal of the Somalis from the Ogaden; withdrawal of all foreign troops, including Soviet and Cuban, from Ethiopia and Somalia; and the beginning of steps leading toward a negotiated solution. Dobrynin expressed the view that there should be an immediate appeal for a Somali withdrawal, since this was, in the Soviet view, a precondition for the other steps. Dobrynin asked who should take the initiatives in calling for an SC meeting. The Secretary said it would be best if Nigeria or Gabon did so, since an African initiative would not make it appear that the UN was taking matters out of OAU hands, but that we would do so if necessary. Dobrynin said it should not appear to be a Soviet-American confrontation, and the Secretary agreed that an African initiative would be better from this point of view as well.

The Secretary emphasized the importance of a firm commitment that the Ethiopians and the Cubans would not cross into Somali territory, and the serious consequences that would follow if they did. Dobrynin repeated the assurances of the Ethiopians on this point, and added that Raul Castro⁴ had also made it clear during his visit to Moscow that the Cuban forces had no intention of moving into Somali territory. Dobrynin did not dispute the assertion that the Cubans were participating in the fighting, but insisted that Soviet personnel were not doing so.

Dobrynin said he would transmit the message to Moscow, and could not anticipate what its reaction would be to the Security Council move. He pointed out, however, that it had been negative up to this point and the USSR had insisted upon prior Somali withdrawal as a prerequisite to negotiations. He ventured his own opinion that a declaration of Somali intention to withdraw might suffice to start the process, if it were given without conditions, and if the withdrawal were to be completed within a definite time period, such as two weeks.

3. *Belgrade CSCE*. The Secretary expressed concern that Vorontsov had not been negotiating seriously on the neutral/non-aligned draft, and said that while the draft was not altogether to our liking, it offered an opportunity to move forward in a constructive way. Dobrynin replied that Moscow was determined not to have any language that changed the emphasis of the Helsinki accord, with its distribution of at-

⁴ Cuban First Vice President of the Councils of State and Ministers.

tion to all three baskets; the West was now seeking to put all the emphasis upon Basket III, which would simply produce a new peg for future “propaganda warfare” against the Soviet Union on human rights issues. It would, he said, prefer a simple communique referring to the time and place of the next meeting. “Our experience shows how dangerous it is to provide pretexts for interference in our domestic affairs.”

4. *SALT*. Dobrynin referred to the recent *Pravda* editorial on SALT. He said it was not intended to be an attack on the US Administration, but on those who had been opposing a SALT agreement. Another reason for it, he said, was that some people in the Soviet Union had been expressing concern that the provision against modernization and new systems would work unfairly against the Soviet Union if it permitted the US to build new elements of the triad but did not allow the Soviet Union to build the single warhead land-based missile system it had projected. He also pointed out the concerns expressed regarding clear and unambiguous language on non-transfer of cruise missiles, and on the use of air transports to carry large numbers of cruise missiles. In response to a question about disparities between the editorial and some positions taken by the Soviet delegation at Geneva, it became clear that there is a misunderstanding, at least in Dobrynin’s mind, whether Gromyko assented to the provision regarding GLCM and SLCM testing. He said he would check on this and report back. Dobrynin asked whether, if the treaty were completed by spring, the Administration would be prepared to move toward ratification without waiting. The Secretary reaffirmed the President’s determination to do so. Both expressed the opinion that progress was being made at Geneva.

82. **Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹**

Washington, February 18, 1978, 0108Z

43255. For the Charge from the Secretary. Subject: Meeting With Dobrynin.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 2/18/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; approved by Tarnoff.

1. Ambassador Dobrynin came in this morning at his request.

2. He delivered a non paper in response to our inquiries on February 14² about the Soviet attitude toward bringing the question of the Horn to the Security Council. In brief, the Soviet position is that they prefer that we try first to ascertain fully whether there is any possibility of OAU action. He said that they had checked with most of the African states at the UN and found them to be opposed to raising the matter in the Security Council. It was agreed that we would talk again next week, after further soundings. I informed Dobrynin that we had made representations to the Somalis urging the withdrawal of their troops.

3. I reported to Dobrynin that we would have a low-level U.S. delegation going to South Africa on February 20 to continue our efforts to gain South African agreement to adhere to the NPT and also to seek further information on the Kalahari test site [*site?*].

4. We discussed again briefly the discrepancies between the *Pravda* editorial on SALT and the Soviet position at Geneva. Dobrynin said that he had checked his own files and did not find adequate information on this point. We agreed to supply information, particularly concerning the two disparities on cruise testing and on wide-bodied aircraft.

5. Text of Soviet non paper:

We have already more than once exchanged opinions at various levels concerning the Somali-Ethiopian conflict. The U.S. side could not help noticing that the Soviet Union from the very beginning consistently pursues a principled line in this matter. It is known that in this conflict there is one side which unleashed it and the other side which is a victim of an aggressive action. There was no lack in the efforts by the Soviet Union to prevent the Somali-Ethiopian conflict, to induce both sides to search for peaceful ways of solving problems existing between them.

And the U.S. side is well aware of that.

To face the truth, it is obvious that the Somali leadership, encouraged by certain forces from outside and counting on their help, has embarked on the path which cannot be regarded otherwise than that of aggression.

Moscow would like to draw the attention of the U.S. side to the positions of the majority of African states which did not and do not support the expansionist policy of the Somali leadership. We are getting an impression that neither the organization of African unity nor its appropriate bodies have so far exhausted all possibilities to obtain a settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict on a just basis. Therefore Moscow

² See Document 81.

expresses great doubt with regard not only to the advisability but also to the usefulness of submitting this question to the UN Security Council for consideration. What is at the basis of this approach?

Firstly, the parties to the conflict themselves—Somalia and Ethiopia—did not and do not put forward such a proposal. Moreover, Ethiopia pronounces itself against the discussion of this question in the UN Security Council in order not to internationalize the conflict.

Secondly, as it has been already mentioned, the Organization of African Unity and its committee established specifically for the purpose of mediation in a settlement of the conflict, continue their efforts, which is in keeping with the position of the majority of member states of that organization. And the consideration of the question in the Security Council would be detrimental to the efforts of the OAU, would depreciate its importance and could lead to differences among its members.

Thirdly, we proceed from the necessity to prevent further aggravation of the situation around the Horn of Africa. If our understanding is correct the U.S. side also proceeds from this. Whereas the consideration of this question within the framework of the Security Council would rather aggravate the situation, would cause between the sides in the conflict undesirable polemics which would also inevitably involve Security Council members themselves.

Finally, the specific questions mentioned by the Secretary of State as a possible subject of discussion in the Security Council, are obviously unbalanced and provide evident advantages to the side that unleashed aggression, i.e. to Somalia which could use the presence of its troops in the territory of Ethiopia for bargaining from the position of force.

As we have already stated on more than one occasion the Soviet Union is always prepared to cooperate with the United States, in the United Nations as well, but, naturally, not at the expense of the interests of third countries. Moscow continues to believe that an effective settlement of the conflict in the Horn of Africa may be achieved on the basis of the proposals we have already set forth which, as we understand, coincide to some extent also with your proposals, namely, not only by way of the cessation of hostilities but also through a complete and immediate withdrawal of the Somali forces from the seized areas of Ethiopia and through negotiations between the parties on the basis of the principles of mutual respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of frontiers and non-interference into each other's internal affairs.

As for the apprehensions concerning possibilities of crossing the border of Somalia by the Ethiopian troops after the liberation of the Ogaden is completed, we, as it has been already repeatedly stated to the U.S. side, continue to regard with full confidence the well-known

statements by the leaders of Ethiopia to the effect that they have no intentions to invade the territory of Somalia.

We would like to hope that the efforts by the states interested in an early settlement of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict on the basis of the above-mentioned principles will find understanding also on the part of the U.S. side. End text.

Vance

83. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 21, 1978

SUBJECT

Horn, Arms Control, Middle East, Misc.

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Marshall D. Shulman, S/MS

USSR

Amb. Anatoly F. Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at our request. We discussed the following matters:

1. *Horn*. The Secretary reviewed the results of Aaron's meetings with Mengistu. He indicated that Mengistu had repeated his assurance that Ethiopia had no territorial ambitions beyond its own border, but was determined to have the Somalis withdrawn from the Ogaden. Mengistu also indicated that any initiative at the present time would have to come through the OAU, and that emissaries had been sent to see Garba in Lagos.² The Secretary reported that Mengistu had agreed to receive an Ambassador from the U.S. The supply of non-lethal equipment was also discussed. On the whole, the conversations had been successful in keeping the channels of communication open.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Shulman on February 22; approved by Anderson on March 3. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

² Joseph Garba, Nigerian Commissioner for External Affairs.

The Secretary reported that the Somalis had been urged to withdraw from the Ogaden. He expressed his concern that the conflict could go on, and could spill across the border, creating great complications. The Secretary urged that the Soviet Union join with us in putting maximum efforts behind the OAU initiative for a ceasefire and mediation.

Dobrynin replied that the Soviet Union is prepared to do this, particularly because it believes that nothing useful can be achieved at the UN Security Council at the present juncture. He said that the Soviet Union had learned two days ago from the Nigerian Foreign Minister that he believed it possible to accomplish something useful, and that his complaints at this point were directed more against the Somalis than against the Ethiopians.

Dobrynin referred to a previous inquiry about a report that the Ethiopians might be contemplating an effort to take the town of Hargeisa as a hostage against Somali evacuation of the Ogaden. He said he was personally skeptical about the report, but that he had forwarded the inquiry to Moscow, without any response so far.

The Secretary observed that he had, in testimony that morning, asserted his belief that the Soviet Union had no aspirations against Somalia. Dobrynin replied that this was a safe statement.

2. *ASAT*. The Secretary mentioned that he would be presenting a paper to the Soviet Union,³ probably sometime next week, with specific suggestions for a meeting on this subject.

3. *Israeli Nuclear Weapons*. Dobrynin gave the Secretary a non-paper asking for clarifications of CIA press reports that Israel possessed nuclear weapons,⁴ and urging US influence to gain Israeli accession to the non-proliferation treaty. The Secretary said that the Israelis had denied the possession of nuclear weapons; that the CIA had indicated that Israel had the capability of producing them, but was divided on the question of whether it had already done so. He said that he would study the paper and reply.

4. *UN Charter Revision*. Dobrynin also gave the Secretary a paper, in Russian, agreeing with the US position on not undertaking a revision of the UN Charter at the present time.⁵ (A similar paper is apparently being presented to other capitals.)

5. *Indian Ocean*. Dobrynin said conversationally that Mendeleovich⁶ was disappointed at the small progress achieved in the Indian Ocean

³ No record of a paper or its delivery was found.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

⁵ Not found attached.

⁶ Not further identified.

negotiations, and the unwillingness of Warnke even to set a date for the next meeting.

6. *Gromyko's Health*. In answer to a question, Dobrynin said that Gromyko had been operated on for prostate two days before, and that it would be several days before it was known how serious the effects would be.

7. *Asad in Moscow*. The Secretary inquired about the conversations with Asad in Moscow. Dobrynin said he had not yet received information, but would report on the conversations later.

8. *Congressional Committee Visit to Moscow*. Dobrynin mentioned that his military attache, at a Pentagon lunch, was told that the House Armed Services Committee had expressed an interest in visiting Moscow, and asked for guidance. The Secretary expressed the view that it might be useful to have some selected members of that Committee make such a visit.

9. *Soviet SALT Compliance*. In a separate conversation, Shulman told Dobrynin that a report was being prepared for presentation to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a few days that would answer charges of Soviet non-compliance with the SALT I agreement. Shulman explained that the US was sensitive to the confidentiality of SCC proceedings, in which these issues were resolved, and while the paper would draw upon the SCC proceedings, it would avoid unnecessary detail about them. Dobrynin said this sounded fine to him, and that he would inform Moscow, but he anticipated no objections. Shulman said that he would send Dobrynin a copy of the paper when it was ready for presentation to the Congress.

84. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

February 27, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

Your latest letter transmitted through the US Embassy in Moscow on January 30,² has evoked, I will put it straight, mixed feelings and some reflections which I consider necessary to share with you in the spirit of frankness inherent in our correspondence.

As it follows from the letter, you share our assessment of the predominant trend and main direction of Soviet-US relations at present and for the future. This cannot but cause satisfaction. Agreement on the basic approach, it would seem, should facilitate to a considerable extent the solution of specific issues which are on the agenda of our relations. In its turn, an active advance in those issues would not only be a logical continuation of all the positive things that have already been done through efforts of both sides in recent years, but would also open new prospects for fruitful cooperation in the interests of both our countries and the entire world.

We generally consider that the central task of international relations of today—if we do not want the world to be again overflowed by the wave of mutual fears, suspicions, by uncurbed arms race—is exactly to take, and without any delay, practical steps which would deepen emerging relaxation of international tension, consolidate what is new in relationship among nations, which constitutes the only alternative to returning to the “cold war”.

For understandable reasons the most important role here belongs to our two countries, to their ability to find mutually acceptable solutions based on the account of each other’s legitimate interests, on the understanding of actual realities of the developments. This, of course, requires constructive political will, determination to act proceeding from broad interests and long-term perspective of the world development, and not under the influence of some or other momentary factors.

I say all this only because the current situation in relations between our countries prompts me to do so. Indeed, one cannot fail to see that in specific and, for that matter, major problems of these relations a progress is either hardly noticeable or is not there at all.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. Carter initialed the letter indicating he saw it. Dobrynin delivered the letter to Vance on February 28; see Document 85.

² See Document 77.

Let us take the main problem—the state of affairs with the preparation of the strategic offensive arms limitation agreement. In my previous letters I have already noted that after agreement of principle on a number of major issues was achieved during the meetings with you of the USSR Minister of Foreign Affairs last September, from the US side, notwithstanding the readiness we showed to seek mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding questions, there followed no equivalent steps towards the Soviet position.

Moreover, judging by your letter, now an attempt is made to introduce into the preparation of the agreement, as a new factor, references to the domestic opposition in the US, for the satisfaction of which we are called upon to make further concessions. And among unsolved issues such questions are again mentioned (as the Backfire, for example) which should have been closed long ago. Such approach is in no way helpful. It is easy to imagine what would happen if the Soviet side acted in a similar manner.

We, of course, are prepared to continue to seek mutually acceptable solutions to outstanding problems. We are also ready to contribute—to the extent it depends on us—to creating a favorable atmosphere in the US around the future agreement. But successful completion of the agreement, in which objectively both our countries are equally interested, requires that the US side also make its part of the road. And, of course, our efforts in favor of the approval of the agreement in the US can by no means be regarded as a substitute for efforts in the said direction by the Administration itself which, naturally, is fully responsible for that.

Frankly speaking, I also expected a more constructive reply to the letter I had sent to you specifically on the question of neutron weapons.³ I shall not repeat now our stated assessment of this new variety of weapons of mass annihilation. I wish, however, to stress again one aspect of principle. If we take purely military characteristics of that weapon, to which the matter is actually reduced in your letter, even then such an approach clearly shows its pernicious consequences for international peace and security. In fact, the production and deployment of that weapon would inevitably lead to reducing the so called nuclear threshold, to a temptation to use it at earlier stages of a conflict and, consequently, to increasing the risk of a nuclear war. Is this alone not sufficient to cause concern that prompted the proposal I put forward? And it is not the matter of propaganda here at all.

We confirm our proposal to agree on a mutual refusal to produce neutron weapons and we would like to hope that this proposal will be

³ See Document 76.

considered by the US side with due attention, impartially and without attempts to link it with other questions.

A few words concerning other issues of disarmament which are the subject of negotiations between our countries. In addition to the agreement on strategic armaments which is under preparation, the achievement of practical results at these negotiations would in itself mean a step forward towards restraining the arms race. This has been recognized more than once also by the US side. The more unjustified are its attempts lately to link in some way or other the solution of these questions with the development of the situation in various parts of the world. Artificial linkage of such kind has never brought about anything good in the past, nor will it be of any benefit now. There may be only one result—complication, delay in negotiations. But is this what our countries should strive for?

No less puzzling is the attempt to represent the Soviet Union as allegedly trying to get some advantages from the conflict in the Horn of Africa, and even to speak of a possibility of negative consequences for Soviet-US relations. We have already on more than one occasion brought to your personal attention, Mr. President, as well as to the attention of the US Secretary of State, that our policy in the questions related to the Somali-Ethiopian conflict pursues the sole purpose of restoring justice and peace in that region. It is precisely for that reason only that we are helping Ethiopia as a victim of aggression on the part of Somalia. If Somalia withdraws its troops from Ethiopia—and the sooner outside support of Somali aggressive actions is discontinued the earlier such withdrawal would occur—then the cause of the conflict would cease to exist.

A settlement in the Middle East undoubtedly remains an important question urgently requiring mutual efforts of our countries. In your letter you would seem to reproach us for the fact that actions of the USSR and the US go in different directions. And this is said despite the fact that it is the United States and not the Soviet Union that has departed from the Statement jointly adopted on October 1, 1977,⁴ has embarked upon the path of encouraging separate negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Can this be regarded as an objective approach to the issue? Of course, not.

Whatever is said in an attempt to justify those separate actions it is perfectly obvious that the present course of events seriously complicates the achievement of a genuine peace in the Middle East. Even if the negotiations of Egypt with Israel deal not only with working out a separate agreement on Sinai but also with some general “principles of a

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 52.

settlement” this does not in any way change the substance of the matter. Besides, it is well known that other Arab sides in the conflict on whose behalf Sadat is trying to act not only have not authorized him to do so but clearly state that they will not agree to any arrangements worked out without their participation.

For our part, we continue to believe that a way out of the present situation is to be sought on the road of returning to a comprehensive Middle East settlement within the framework of the Geneva Conference with the participation of all parties concerned, that is on the road agreed upon between us last fall.

I have considered it necessary to address the questions raised by you, Mr. President, not for the sake of polemics, of course. I have done this because, in our opinion, the necessity of practical constructive measures in Soviet-US relations is becoming ever more urgent, and I would like to hope that the exchange of views between us on the most pressing issues of these relations will help to make steps in right direction.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

85. **Informal Notes on a Meeting Between Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin¹**

Washington, February 28, 1978

1. Dobrynin came in at his request for the purpose of delivering a letter from Brezhnev to the President.² He presented the Russian text and an unofficial translation prepared in the Soviet Embassy. (He commented as he did so that he was doing our work for us, and that we did not generally prepare a Russian translation of our letters to Brezhnev.)

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 2/28/78. Secret. Drafted by Shulman on March 1.

² See Document 84.

2. *The Brezhnev letter* is a reply to the President's letter of January _____,³ and matches the President's letter in its blunt tone, and round-up coverage of a number of issues. However, it is in line with recent Brezhnev speeches that express concern about the state of US-Soviet relations and a desire to seek an improvement. It probably was written before the Brezhnev speeches of last week, and lacks the upbeat suggestion of steps to infuse a new dynamism in the relationship.

The letter expresses disappointment at the lack of progress in the SALT negotiations since the Gromyko visit to Washington last September, and protests what he sees as our use of domestic opposition to SALT to gain bargaining advantages.

On the neutron bomb, the letter also expresses disappointment with the President's reply, and repeats the concern that the neutron bomb would lower the nuclear threshold.

He remonstrates US linkage of arms control negotiations with other issues, particularly the Horn, and repeats that Soviet objectives in the Horn are limited to helping Ethiopia resist Somali aggression.

On the Middle East, the letter responds by saying that it is the US, not the SU, that has departed from the common approach agreed upon in the joint statement of October 1, and has encouraged separate negotiations between Egypt and Israel. Other Arab states will not participate even if these bilateral negotiations succeed, he says, and therefore only a comprehensive settlement at Geneva can resolve the situation.

3. The Secretary asked if Dobrynin had a report on the *Assad conversations in Moscow*. Dobrynin said he had not yet received the information, but would hope to be able to convey a report shortly.

4. *ASAT*. The Secretary informed Dobrynin that the US is prepared to begin discussions on this subject in April at Geneva, and covered the other points set forth in the agreed talking points.

Dobrynin replied that, as Brezhnev had said in a previous letter, the ASAT discussions should cover not only the satellite versus satellite problem, but also the shuttle system versus satellite situation.

5. *Sparkman Letter on Compliance*. The Secretary then conveyed to Dobrynin excerpts from a statement made 2/28 by Senator Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, in putting into the Congressional Record the paper prepared by the State Department on the record of compliance with the SALT I agreement. Dobrynin replied with satisfaction to Sparkman's statement absolving the Soviet Union of the charge of cheating on the agreement.

³ Omission is in the original. Carter's January 25 letter is Document 77.

6. *Matzoh Packages*. The Secretary raised with Dobrynin the question of the Soviet postal ban against the shipment of matzohs for the Passover, and said a repeal of the ban would be welcomed here. If this were not possible, at least it would help if the Soviet authorities would make a sufficient quantity of flour available for matzoh production by the Jewish communities in the larger cities.

Dobrynin at first replied with a diversion about how many dissidents, most of them Jews, received certificates from abroad which enabled them to purchase whiskey at the dollar shops. When he was brought back to the matzoh issue, he suggested that Toon should raise the matter in Moscow. He then added more seriously that when relations were good, such small issues could be more easily resolved, but when relations were bad, people in Moscow tended to respond by asking why they should accommodate us.

7. *SALT*. In a brief exchange, Dobrynin expressed concern about reports that the US did not intend to proceed with the Treaty and its ratification this year. He said the Soviet side had made all the concessions since the Washington meeting, but there had not been a corresponding action on the US side, and reports, including a conversation with Senator Cranston,⁴ indicated that ratification was not likely this year. The Secretary replied that it was the President's intention to proceed expeditiously with the negotiation of the Treaty (which could be possible by the end of May), and to send it to the Senate for ratification soon thereafter. Dobrynin commented that it would depend upon whether the President chose to exert his leadership strongly on this issue. The Secretary said he would do so.

8. *Horn*. Dobrynin made a side comment expressing regret that in the State Department's statement on 2/25 [27],⁵ responding positively to the Brezhnev speeches, the effect was spoiled by appending a warning on the Horn.

In the subsequent discussion of the Horn, Dobrynin asked: "What else could we do? We have transmitted assurances from the Ethiopians and the Cubans that they will not invade Somali territory." He also asked: "Why are the Somalis so resisting the idea of withdrawing from the Ogaden?"

The Secretary pointed out that the large number of Cubans transported to Ethiopia and participating in combat was troubling to many Americans. To this, Dobrynin answered by comparing the situation in Ethiopia with the situation in Angola, where nothing had prevented

⁴ Senator Alan Cranston (D-California).

⁵ The text of press release 95 of February 27 is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 1978, p. 43.

the US from entering into a relationship with the MPLA when the SU did so. He also made the point that the Soviet Union broke with Somalia not to achieve military/strategic advantage, but because the Somalis wanted to launch an aggressive attack. Anyway, he added, it made no sense to cry alarm, as many people in this country did, about the danger of Soviet forces cutting the oil line of communications. "How could we do it?" he asked. "This would clearly be an act of war and, in case of war, such actions would be dwarfed in significance." The concept of lines of communication, as through the Suez Canal and the Red Sea, he argued, were anachronisms in the present period.

The discussion then turned to the US supply of weapons to Iran and Saudi Arabia which, Dobrynin said, was a matter of concerned discussion even up to the Politburo level. The Secretary referred to Soviet shipment of weapons to Iraq as a source of concern to Iran and Saudi Arabia, but Dobrynin argued these concerns were not proportionate to Iraq's capabilities.

86. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, March 1, 1978

SUBJECT

Possible Actions to Drive Home to the Soviets and Cubans the Need to Moderate their Intervention in the Horn

If we respond to the Soviet and Cuban intervention in the Horn *only in the Horn area itself*, we run the risk of negative and counterproductive entanglement and Soviet counteractions which could prove embarrassing. If we encourage friendly Muslim countries to place troops in Somalia, e.g., and these are attacked by the Ethiopians/Soviets/Cubans, we will have some obligation to come to their defense. If Congressional restraints prevent us from doing so, or if the prospect of escalating involvement forces us to reconsider after we have launched an action, we and our friends could suffer a political and psychological defeat of some magnitude. The same could prove true in Eritrea if we

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 3/78. Secret. Sent for information. Sent outside the system.

were to insert ourselves into that conflict in support of Muslim countries who support the rebellion.

The Soviets and Cubans have legality and African sentiment on their side in Ethiopia—they are helping an African country defend its territorial integrity and countering aggression. They can monopolize this position only if we permit them to do so. Our recent actions and policy statements have placed us firmly behind these principles, too, and we should not waver from them. We should, in fact, be very careful to avoid any appearance of a persisting sentimental tilt toward Somalia, because the Soviets will exploit this against us in Ethiopia and in Kenya. If Somalia is invaded and we do back some counteraction, we must be very clear about the circumstances. The wily Somalis already know that it is in their interest to claim and appear that they are being invaded—and they may well work out a scenario that achieves this aim.

The way to bring home to the Soviets and Cubans the high cost of further consolidation of their position in the Horn is to cool relations in other areas and take steps that force them to weigh the costs of Horn intervention against gains they have been expecting from other aspects of their relations with us. Possibilities include:

- Straightforward abandonment of Indian Ocean Talks.
- Abandonment of talks on limiting conventional arms transfers.
- Suspension of SALT.
- Limitations on economic relations, transfer of technology, etc.—announced or unannounced.
- A more active program of challenging, critiquing and countering Soviet initiatives elsewhere in Africa and in the Third World.
- Abandonment of joint space ventures.
- Demonstrative efforts to consult with the Chinese—without specifying the exact purpose of the consultations.
- Selective restriction of those cultural exchange activities which are, on balance, more advantageous to the Soviets than to us.

In respect to Cuba, I find the suggestions Bob Pastor makes in his memorandum to you of 28 February appealing. Perhaps we should broaden our consideration of possible efforts against the Cubans and systematically review every aspect of our present relationship from the viewpoint of how adjustments disadvantageous to the Cubans could be made.

We must not neglect the public relations/propaganda dimension of the problem. So far, I fear, the U.S. Government has provided the world a spectacle of being rather undifferentiatedly fussed up about the Horn but incapable of doing much except sputtering and denouncing. When we take any of the actions listed above, we should give advance thought to how we announce and explain them. Our statements and backgrounders to the media and our broadcasts over

VOA should be more carefully thought through with the aim of sustaining themes and pressures over time and generating complementary initiatives in various parts of the world.

There is also a covert dimension which could be more systematically developed. We need to lift restrictions on CIA's worldwide exploitation of this issue. In the Horn area itself, and particularly in Ethiopia, we need to counter the systematic distortion and disinformation efforts the Soviets are maintaining against us. They are well on their way to presenting the Somali invasion of Ethiopia as a U.S.-inspired action sustained by inflow of arms from reactionary Muslim countries who are acting as surrogates for the United States. When the Soviets lie, they lie big and they repeat their lies over and over again. We cannot assume that truth and virtue will prevail because of their own intrinsic weight. Truth needs help.

87. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 6, 1978

SUBJECT

South African Nuclear Developments, Horn of Africa
SALT, Other Arms Control Matters

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman

USSR
Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin

SUMMARY: In a personal message from Brezhnev to President Carter, the Soviets voice concern about evidence of further South African steps toward developing and testing nuclear weapons. The Soviets are agreeable to consulting with us in New York on forthcoming US Special Session on Disarmament issues. They also propose resuming consultations on conventional arms transfers in Moscow in later March or early April. Dobrynin said the Somalis had approached the USSR for assistance in bringing about a mediation effort in the Horn. He asked whether Warnke was returning to SALT with new in-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 3/6/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; approved by Anderson on March 16. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

structions. Dobrynin said he is being called to Moscow for consultations on US-Soviet relations, leaving Washington about March 16.

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at his request March 6, and the following subjects were covered:

1. Dobrynin delivered an oral note (in Russian, with translation attached) from Brezhnev to President Carter on the subject of South African nuclear weapon capabilities. The note cites new Soviet data that work is continuing in South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and prepare test explosions. It asserts that one test site is being completed and another has been started; that an industrial reactor is being built to produce weapons-grade plutonium, and a facility is being planned for the production of enriched uranium.

2. A second oral note² (in Russian) conveyed Soviet agreement to engage in consultations on the UN Special Session on Disarmament, offering to meet in New York either in the course of the preparatory meeting, April 4–21, or immediately afterwards.

3. A third oral note³ (also in Russian) proposed to continue the consultations on the international sale and transfer of conventional weapons. It proposes the meeting be in Moscow at the end of March or the beginning of April, but expresses willingness to meet at any other place of mutual convenience. The note adds that there will be a change in leadership of the Soviet side; it will be headed by Lev Mendelevich, and his assistant will be P. I. Galkin.

4. Dobrynin informed the Secretary that he was being recalled to Moscow for consultations on the state of US-Soviet relations, and will leave on or about March 16.

5. On the subject of the Horn, Dobrynin said that the Somalis had approached the Soviet Union for assistance in bringing about a mediation effort, but had been told that no negotiations were possible until there had been a Somali withdrawal from the Ogaden. He added that he hoped the Horn problem would soon be over, and that this would help to improve Soviet-American relations. In his side comments, Dobrynin said the Soviet side was by no means happy with the course of events in the Horn, but also made the point that people who thought everything was done in accordance with a master strategic design in Moscow tended to underestimate the degree of improvisation involved. He added that the US seemed to be much more ideologically-inclined than the Soviet Union these days.

6. On SALT, Dobrynin inquired whether Warnke was returning to Geneva with new instructions, and was told that the matter was being

² Not found attached.

³ Not found attached.

considered at a meeting to be held shortly. In response to a further question about current newspaper stories on differences within the Administration on the subject of linkage, the Secretary reaffirmed the President's intention to move ahead without delay in the SALT negotiations. Dobrynin was cautioned not to put undue emphasis on newspaper reports.

Attachment

Oral Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter⁴

undated

We would like to draw your attention once again to the question on which we already had a frank and useful exchange of opinions last August,⁵ namely, to the question of preventing the realization by the authorities of South Africa of their plans to develop nuclear weapons.

We met with satisfaction your communication concerning steps taken by the United States to exert restraining influence on the government of South Africa. As you have informed us, South African authorities gave assurances to the US government that South Africa would not conduct any nuclear test explosions. It is also known that South African authorities made public statements to that effect. However, competent Soviet organizations have data that work is continued in South Africa to develop nuclear weapons and prepare test explosions. Equipping is being completed of one test site, and construction of another is under way. Information is also available that an industrial reactor is being built in South Africa for producing weapon-type plutonium and, in addition to a small facility already in operation, a new large factory for the production of enriched uranium is planned. Its construction will enhance to a considerable extent the potential of that country to produce nuclear weapons.

In view of the above, a question arises regarding further actions to prevent conducting nuclear tests and developing nuclear weapons by South Africa.

As we understand, possibilities of the United States to exert direct restraining influence upon that country are far from being exhausted. Naturally, the possibilities of the UN Security Council should also be used in this regard. We, of course, would be prepared to consider also

⁴ No classification marking.

⁵ See Document 41.

other possible steps which, in the opinion of the US government, could bar the access of South Africa to nuclear weapons.

It is obvious that this question is a matter of immediate concern to our countries as permanent members of the Security Council which bear special responsibility for maintaining peace and international security.

It is necessary to take all possible measures in order to prevent the development of nuclear weapons by South Africa, to induce it to accede to the Treaty on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and to place all its nuclear activities under the control of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will consider my communication with understanding and, on your part, will share with me your thoughts on this question which, as you understand, becomes a matter of urgency.

88. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, March 9, 1978, 0811Z

60448. Subject: Horn of Africa: Somali Withdrawal.

1. Secretary sent oral message to Siad Barre March 8 strongly urging Somali announcement of withdrawal from all of Ogaden. Siad informed our Ambassador Loughran² late that same day he accepted President's appeal and would be making announcement of all Somali troop withdrawal shortly. Announcement has not been made at this point.

2. Deputy Secretary informed Dobrynin at midnight tonight of Siad's decision and appealed to Soviets to take steps to urge prompt ceasefire on Ethiopians in order to facilitate peaceful withdrawal and avoid further bloodshed. Dobrynin made no substantive comment but indicated he would inform Moscow immediately.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1381. Secret; Niact; Exdis; Distribute as Nodis. Sent Niact Immediate to U.S. Interest Section, Havana. Drafted by Paul Kreisberg (S/P); cleared by Shulman, Anthony Lake (S/P), and Sydney Goldsmith (S/S–O); approved by William C. Harrop (AF).

² John Lewis Loughran, U.S. Ambassador to Somalia.

3. We expect to be in touch with Dobrynin again during the day on March 9 to pursue this line, as well as seeking Soviet cooperation in obtaining Ethiopian agreement to outside observers to supervise cease-fire, help forestall any reprisals against ethnic Somalis in the Ogaden, and ensure the integrity of the Somali-Ethiopian border. Should Soviet officials take the initiative to raise this issue with you, you may draw on above information.

Vance

89. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 11, 1978

SUBJECT

Horn of Africa, Rhodesia (Part 1 of 2)

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Deputy Secretary

Marshall D. Shulman

USSR

Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin

Summary: Dobrynin came in at the Secretary's request, primarily to discuss the Horn. In response to the Secretary, he indicated some Soviet willingness to influence Ethiopia against reprisals, but he maintained that outside observers and Soviet/Cuban withdrawal were matters for internal Ethiopian jurisdiction.

The Horn:

The Secretary began with an expression of appreciation for Dobrynin's telephoned response on March 10 to our approach to him during the night of March 8.² (The Secretary had recorded Dobrynin's response as positive in tone, indicating that the Soviet government had communicated to the Ethiopians the US desire that the Ethiopians not exact reprisals in the Ogaden and not "butcher" the withdrawing So-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin/Christopher, 3/11/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on March 13. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Part 1 of 2; part 2 is printed as Document 90.

² See Document 88.

mali troops. He also recorded Dobrynin's expression of the Soviet government's positive reaction to the consultation, and readiness to reciprocate.)

The Secretary suggested further measures of cooperation that would be useful: 1) that the Soviet Union use its influence with Addis to moderate its reported unrealistic conditions for a ceasefire and settlement; 2) that the Soviet Union cooperate in making it possible for an outside observer group to be sent to the area as soon as possible, with the support of African countries; [3)] that Soviet and Cuban troops begin the process of withdrawal from the area promptly, and that the introduction of additional Soviet or Cuban soldiers be prevented; 4) that foreign advisers not be introduced into Eritrea; and 5) that consultations be held to prevent the introduction of foreign troops into Southern Africa.

Dobrynin said the Soviet government had given him no instructions on the questions of an observer group or on reductions in Soviet or Cuban forces in Ethiopia, but he reaffirmed that it had urged the Ethiopian government to avoid any reprisal action in the Ogaden. He asked if it was the intention to post observers in the Ogaden or only along the border, and expressed the personal opinion that it would be more difficult to get Ethiopian agreement to the presence of such a group on Ethiopian territory. On both this issue and the Cuban-Soviet troop withdrawal, he took the position that these were matters within the internal jurisdiction of the Ethiopian government.

In response to the Secretary's repeated stress on the importance of prompt action on these points to prevent further bloodshed, and on preventing the arrival of additional Cuban troops reportedly on the way, Dobrynin said that he would communicate these concerns to Gromyko promptly.

With regard to a reported hardening of Ethiopian conditions for a ceasefire, Dobrynin said he was only aware of press reports from Kenya on this point, which he was inclined to discount.

(Comment: Despite the foregoing disavowal, it seems likely that Dobrynin's back-peddalling reflected an awareness of the substance of the Ethiopian position, made public in a communique issued by the Ethiopian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on March 11, hardening its conditions for the acceptance of a ceasefire, and rejecting the demand for the withdrawal of foreign troops as "an unacceptable interference in Ethiopia's domestic affairs.")

Rhodesia:

Flowing out of the discussion above, on the question of consultations to avoid a similar confrontation on the Rhodesian issue, Dobrynin said that both he and his government regarded this as a good idea. In

response to the Secretary's description of efforts to compose differences between the internal settlement and Nkomo and Mugabe, Dobrynin said that this would not solve the problem, and he pointed out caustically that the Security Council had refused to hear Muzorewa.³ He added, however, that if they agreed (presumably meaning Nkomo and Mugabe), the Soviet government would then also agree.

³ Joshua Nkomo, Robert Mugabe, and Abel Muzorewa were all fighting for black-majority rule in Rhodesia.

90. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 11, 1978

SUBJECT

SALT; South African Nuclear Test; Middle East; Yugoslavia; China;
Environmental Modification (Part 2 of 2)

PARTICIPANTS

<i>US</i>	<i>USSR</i>
The Secretary	Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin
Deputy Secretary	
Marshall D. Shulman	

Following a discussion of the Horn of Africa, Dobrynin raised several other topics.

1. *SALT*. Dobrynin asked if there had been any developments in the U.S. position on SALT issues. The Secretary said these matters had been worked on, and were still in the decision process. Dobrynin said that he had tried to be of help at a recent dinner given by the British Ambassador which was attended by many prominent Senators and Congressmen, most of whom were opponents of the SALT treaty. He expressed surprise that the opponents seemed to know so little about what had been going on at the Geneva talks, and gave his impression, which he said was shared by Senator McIntyre, that if the Administration vigorously campaigned for SALT, there would be public and Con-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin/Christopher, 3/11/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman on March 13; approved by Anderson on March 17. The meeting took place at the Department of State. Part 2 of 2; part 1 is printed as Document 89.

gressional acceptance of the treaty, although he agreed that the Administration should not “expend its ammunition now.”

2. *South African nuclear test site.* Dobrynin said that he would like to have a response to the Soviet communication of last week on this subject,² and the Secretary replied that this would be ready when Dobrynin came in on March 16.

3. Dobrynin said he would also like a response to the Soviet oral note on *Israeli nuclear weapon capabilities*.³ The Secretary said he would have a reply ready, but he added that while our intelligence community agreed that Israel had the capability to make nuclear weapons, it was split on the question of whether it had already done so. Dobrynin observed that he had a “higher opinion of the US intelligence people” than this answer implied.

4. *Middle East.* Dobrynin asked what was expected of the Begin visit. The Secretary sketched briefly the issues of the interpretation of Resolution 242, and whether it applied to all fronts, the settlements, and how to deal with the Palestinian question. He said, in response to a question, that he did not know what position Begin would take on these issues.

In response to a question, Dobrynin said he did not have any information about the current Arafat visit to Moscow, but that he would bring in at the time of his next visit whatever information he could get.

Dobrynin asked if the Administration were willing to split up its proposal for arms to Israel, Saudi Arabia and Jordan, and was given a negative reply. Dobrynin quoted Senator Jackson as saying that the Congress and the “Israeli lobby in the U.S.” were split on this issue, and that he was not sure which way the Congress would vote on it.

Dobrynin expressed the opinion that Begin could get a majority from his parliament for a more flexible policy, since in his opinion it was “the best deal Israel could get now.”

5. *Tito visit.* Dobrynin asked how the visit had gone, and was told it had been a good visit. Dobrynin observed that Tito’s views had more in common with those of the Soviet Union than with those of the U.S. He noted that Tito had received “royal treatment,” and said that Tito “liked these things.” He said there was not now any trouble between the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, and he made a point of asking if Tito had raised any question about Yugoslavia’s future independence, as had been mentioned in the American press so prominently. He was told that the question had not been raised, and that Tito seemed self-

² See Document 87 and the attachment thereto.

³ See footnote 4, Document 83.

confident. Dobrynin observed: “nobody knows what could happen afterwards.”

6. *China*. Dobrynin asked how the U.S. evaluated recent developments in China, and expressed agreement with the view that Teng had come out less well than might have been expected. He added that Teng was not liked because of his excessive ambition.

In response to a question, Dobrynin said he thought the treaty between China and Japan would be signed, but that it would be made clear that the anti-hegemony clause was not intended to refer to any particular country. He expressed the personal view that he didn’t see why the Soviet Union should be so edgy about the anti-hegemony clause, any more than the U.S. should be.

7. *Environmental Modification*. Dobrynin transmitted an oral note⁴ (in Russian, with an unofficial English translation) expressing the hope that the U.S. and the Soviet Union could ratify the Convention on Environmental Modification before the US [U.N.] Special Session on Disarmament. (Copies attached.)

⁴ Attached but not printed.

91. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 15, 1978, 12:30–2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Anatoliy Dobrynin

During a prolonged and quite candid lunch with Ambassador Dobrynin, the following points were made:

1. Ambassador Dobrynin enumerated examples of what he considered to be either the hostility or excessive hardness of the Carter Administration. He mentioned specifically human rights, the Middle East and particularly U.S. unwillingness to make further concessions in SALT after Gromyko’s visit here. He particularly stressed the proposition that in a collective leadership, such as the Soviet, U.S. hardness

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 50, Chron: 3/78. Secret.

tends to produce rigidity on the part of the Soviets and an inclination to be equally hard.

2. In my response I indicated to him that he ought to be aware of our concerns. I suggested to him that Soviet behavior in the Horn, even if that was subjectively motivated by concerns for territorial integrity, objectively creates consequences which we cannot entirely dismiss. I mentioned in this connection our concern for Southern Africa, as well as the fact that they should be aware that any Cuban deployment into Yemen would precipitate the most serious reactions from the Saudis and that we could not be indifferent in that context. This point was clearly registered with him. I also mentioned the Soviet campaign regarding human rights, the neutron bomb, and lack of genuine cooperation in the Middle East. Finally, I mentioned that it might be useful for the top leaders to talk about these matters in a purely consultative setting; if that is not possible because of the Soviet desire to tie meetings to major agreements, perhaps some thought should be given to top level officials of the two countries engaging in such discussions. I stressed that this was purely an informal thought which I was presenting to him in the context of this discussion.

3. Dobrynin rebutted the above analyses but showed considerable interest in the idea of such consultative meetings. At the same time, he indicated that it would be useful to tie such a consultative meeting to at least one positive item, which would be concrete and which would indicate a spirit of accommodation on the part of the United States.

4. On leaving, he again returned to the idea of such a meeting and wanted to know whether I might be in a position to pursue it further with him before he leaves this Friday.² I made no promises and I did not respond to that any further.

5. Additional points of interest. He mentioned in passing that the American agent detained some time ago by the Soviets—in the case involving a female CIA operative—passed his poison to a girlfriend of his who used it (the friend was apparently implicated in his activity); Soviet leaders have no way of discriminating intended targets for U.S. missiles in the event of a U.S. missile attack; he rejected any linkage between the neutron bomb and the SS–20.

² March 17.

92. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 16, 1978

SUBJECT

Middle East, Horn of Africa, SALT, Other Multilateral Matters

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Marshall Shulman, S/MS

Gerard Smith, S/AS (Portions)

USSR

Amb. Anatoliy Dobrynin

SUMMARY: During a tour d'horizon at a luncheon prior to Dobrynin's return to Moscow on consultations, the Secretary handed Dobrynin oral notes² responding to previous Soviet inquiries about South African nuclear test plans and Israeli possession of nuclear weapons.³ Dobrynin presented an oral note⁴ deploring the Israeli military action in southern Lebanon and urging the US to use its influence to induce Israeli withdrawal. The Secretary said we would call for Israeli withdrawal and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force. On the Horn of Africa, the Secretary expressed satisfaction that the Ethiopians had not crossed the border into Somalia but indicated concern about reports of reprisals in the Ogaden. Dobrynin said the Ethiopians had been told that the Soviets and Cubans "did not intend to and preferred not to" become involved in Eritrea.

MIDDLE EAST: Dobrynin handed over an oral note on the Israel-Lebanon situation. The note asserted that Israel's military action is dangerous and that the risk of involvement by other Middle East states cannot be ruled out. It said Israeli military intervention in Lebanon could set back by many years the possibility of a Middle East settlement and urged the US to exert influence on Israel to halt the intervention and withdraw.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 3/16/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman. The meeting took place at the Department of State. An unknown hand struck through the typed date of March 21 on the original and wrote March 16 above it. The March 11 memorandum of conversation (Document 90), indicates that Dobrynin was scheduled to meet with Vance on March 16.

² Not found attached.

³ For earlier Soviet inquiries about South African and Israeli nuclear capabilities, see Documents 83, 87, and 90.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

The Secretary told Dobrynin that we would call for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon and the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force in the area to stabilize the situation. He said we hoped the Lebanese would bring the matter to the Security Council, but that we would consider doing so if they did not.

Dobrynin replied that the Soviet position was simply to call for Israeli withdrawal without conditions. He expressed the opinion that the Lebanese would agree to a peacekeeping force only if it had the concurrence of the Syrians. He said that he would keep us informed of any development in the Soviet position, and the Secretary said that we would keep the Soviet Union informed of our plans with regard to the Security Council.

On the topic of a comprehensive Middle East settlement, Dobrynin explained why the Soviets reacted so strongly to the Sadat initiative. He said they had just succeeded in obtaining Syrian agreement to go to a Geneva conference when Sadat announced his trip.

HORN OF AFRICA: The Secretary told Dobrynin we were pleased the Somalis had withdrawn, and that the Ethiopian forces and those fighting with them had respected the border, but he expressed concern at recent reports of reprisals in the Ogaden. Dobrynin expressed the personal view that this might be because of Siad Barre's support of irregular forces left behind. The Secretary said we were planning to give support to the UN High Commissioner's efforts to deal with human needs in the area, and hoped the Soviets would cooperate. He also informed Dobrynin that the President would be sending Moose as emissary to Siad Barre.

Dobrynin implied that the reduction or withdrawal of Soviet forces from the area would be less difficult if there were not public statements to make it seem that this was being done under pressure. Dobrynin said the Ethiopians had been informed that the Soviets and Cubans would be very careful not to be involved in Eritrea. When questioned about the Cuban and Soviet presence on the coast around Assab, Dobrynin said he had no information, but that he would find out when he got to Moscow.

Dobrynin made the familiar point about the presence of US forces in Iran in justifying a Soviet case for a presence in Ethiopia, adding that the Administration had testified before the Congress that the US military presence would go as high as 40,000. The Secretary corrected him and pointed out that the US has about 1200 uniformed personnel plus about 6000 civilian contract employees connected with sales of military equipment. He said that the total US community, including the above, their dependents, and businessmen, is about 40,000.

In the course of the conversation on the Horn, Dobrynin mentioned that the Somalis had recently raised with the Soviet Union the

question of whether the idea of a federation in the Horn (discussed by Castro during his visit last year) could be revived, but he said they were not given any encouragement.

SOUTH AFRICAN NUCLEAR TEST SITE: Ambassador Gerard Smith joined the conversation during discussion of this subject. The Secretary gave Dobrynin an oral note⁵ in response to the Soviet message of March 6.⁶ In the discussion, the Secretary and Smith made the points that we had no information about the additional sites mentioned by the Soviets and that we would be glad to have any further information the Soviet Union wished to make available. We did not think a Security Council discussion of the subject would be useful at this time, and we would hope the USSR would consult with us before going to the Council.

Dobrynin asked Smith whether our observers had visited the site and was told that they had not. Smith also referred to a *Pravda* story on March 8 that claimed NATO was giving South Africa nuclear assistance; he emphasized that this was in error—it was completely wrong.

ISRAELI NUCLEAR CAPABILITY: In response to a recent Soviet message on this subject, the Secretary gave Dobrynin an oral note⁷ saying that we accepted Israeli assurances that they had not produced nuclear weapons. Dobrynin rather persistently questioned whether we really believed what the Israelis said. The Secretary said there was no evidence that Israeli assurances were untrue.

ENVIRONMENTAL MODIFICATION TREATY: The Secretary referred to a recent Soviet message on this subject,⁸ explaining that it would not be feasible for us to present this treaty to the Senate for ratifi-

⁵ Not found attached. An unknown hand underlined the words “oral note” and wrote above the paragraph “See cable to Moscow for text.” Telegram 68704 to Moscow, March 17, transmitted the text of the non-paper given to Dobrynin by Vance, which indicated that the United States had no knowledge of new test sites or new testing activities. The U.S. Government had encouraged the South African Government to adhere to the nonproliferation treaty and institute international safeguards to be overseen by the IAEA. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 3/16/78)

⁶ See Document 87 and the attachment thereto.

⁷ Not found attached. An unknown hand underlined the words “oral note” and wrote above the paragraph “See cable to Moscow for text.” Telegram 68706 to Moscow, March 17, outlined U.S. acceptance of Israeli assurances that it did not possess nuclear capabilities. The non-paper reiterated the U.S. belief that nuclear weapons production should be contained and requested that Israel sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 3/16/78)

⁸ See footnote 4, Document 90.

cation before the UN Special Session on Disarmament, as the Soviet Union had requested.

SALT: The Secretary stressed our determination to press ahead, and took note of the most recent Soviet steps at Geneva. Dobrynin said they were trying to clear away the underbrush. The Secretary told Dobrynin we would soon be communicating with the Soviet Union on the Backfire problem, and stressed its importance.

Dobrynin expressed the view that only small differences exist between the numbers of strategic forces given by the Soviet side and the US estimates, bearing on the launching pad test sites. The Secretary said that so far as he knew there was no major disagreement on this point and pointed out that the Administration had sought to correct a press story that had said that two additional Soviet nuclear subs had been permitted. We had pointed out that these had not yet had sea trials and there had been no action contrary to the Interim Agreement.

93. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, March 18, 1978, 2210Z

70455. Subject: Bessmertnykh Call on Shulman March 18.

1. Summary. At his request Bessmertnykh came in March 18 to deliver response to the points made by the Secretary to Dobrynin on the Horn in their meeting of March 11.² He also delivered a non-paper on the Arafat visit.³ Shulman took advantage of the meeting to stress the pro-SALT intentions behind the President's speech at Wake Forest.⁴ End summary.

2. The non-paper Bessmertnykh brought in on the Horn makes the following points:

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1265. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; cleared by Tarnoff; approved by Shulman.

² See Document 89.

³ The text of the non-paper on the Arafat visit was not found. In telegram 74592 to Moscow, March 22, the Department transmitted the text of the non-paper on the Horn of Africa. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1291)

⁴ For the text of Carter's Wake Forest speech, March 16, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 529–538. In this speech Carter focused on strategic nuclear capabilities, especially in comparison with the Soviet Union. He argued that U.S. forces must match those of the Soviets, in order to continue to protect U.S. interests.

—Somali withdrawal has not been a gesture of good will, but rather a step forced on it;

—and “the Ethiopian leadership” rejects the idea of foreign observers in the Ogaden because of the implicit support for Somali territorial claims which would result.

Non-paper goes on to claim absence of Ethiopian aggressive intentions vis-a-vis Somali, though implicitly links it with withdrawal of Somali irregular units and renunciation of territorial claims. It praises President Carter’s call for Somali commitments not to “dishonor” the Ethiopian and Kenyan borders, but again reiterates, at length and in usual terms, rejection of U.S. claims that Soviet and Cuban motives in their intervention are anything but the purest.

3. Non-paper asserts that to let events in the Horn further burden our bilateral relationship will do neither side any good, and calls for rapid implementation of U.S. alleged interest in early elimination of negative consequences and early progress in other practical aspects of the relationship.

4. Non-paper also rather sharply chastises U.S. for claiming, in “press reports attributed to official sources,” Soviet agreement to stationing of foreign observers in the Ogaden and to reductions in Cuban forces, adding that such “misrepresentations” do not contribute to a resolution of the matter and reduce the effectiveness of the exchange of opinions with the U.S. on the question.

5. Non-paper on the Arafat visit offered nothing new and included following standard points:

—Separate negotiations between Egypt and Israel have, in effect, cancelled positive movement toward comprehensive Middle East settlement as mutually expressed in joint US-Soviet statement of Oct 1, 1977.

—PLO leadership views negatively efforts supported by US to work out a so-called “Declaration of Principles” and PLO disapproves of attempts to hold any preliminary conference under aegis of UN.

—In Moscow discussions, Arafat confirmed readiness of PLO to take part in achieving comprehensive Middle East settlement if it is returned to channel of collective efforts, with PLO participation and a clear turning away from separate agreements.

6. Shulman, under instructions from the Secretary, passed the following non-paper to Bessmertnykh on the President’s March 16 speech, and orally further reinforced its main points. Bessmertnykh said he would send “private message” relaying the non-paper and sense of the discussion to Dobrynin immediately.

Begin text: President Carter’s address at Wake Forest University on March 16 should be read as emphasizing to the American public and

its decision-makers our confidence in our defensive potential, and our determination to maintain that confidence in the future. When our public is reassured that our armed forces are sufficiently strong to carry out their responsibilities, it will support further arms control agreements. If it is uncertain, its acceptance of such agreements is put in doubt. President Carter's speech should thus be interpreted as supporting a SALT II agreement, and further progress beyond that to even more comprehensive arms limitation agreements.

We are confident that a careful reading of the entire text of the President's address, rather than reliance on excerpts which the media may choose to publicize, will make this point clear. End text.

Vance

94. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, April 9, 1978, 0056Z

91104. For the Ambassador from the Secretary. Subject: Meeting With Dobrynin.

1. I met with Dobrynin today following his return from consultations.

2. On the basis of his several hours of discussion with Brezhnev, and lengthy consultations with Gromyko and other authorities, Dobrynin emphasized the crucial importance of my trip to Moscow as a possible turning point in US-Soviet relations. He said that Brezhnev is expecting to meet with me, and urgently hopes that I will be able to bring him evidence of our serious commitment to move forward on SALT. This is in his view the key issue. "He does not ask that the American side make all the concessions," Dobrynin reported, "but only that it show that it is willing to negotiate seriously to clear away the remaining issues." There should be no doubt, he said, that Brezhnev would like to meet with the President, if there is a prospect of a successful outcome, following the Moscow talks, and, if necessary, the talks with Gromyko back here in May.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 4/9/78. Confidential; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; cleared by James Thyden (S/S–O); approved by Vance.

3. We found that his list of the principal issues to be resolved in SALT corresponded with our own.

4. In the course of our general discussion of US-Soviet relations, I emphasized the importance of the factor of Soviet arming and transport of Cuban troops to Africa in contributing to the deterioration in Soviet-American relations. Although he argued about the justification of this reaction, he recognized that it was a fact, and said in response that in the present climate, in which there was anger among the Soviet leaders about the “pin-pricks” and “propaganda warfare” from the US side, when the air was filled with “threats” and there was an absence of any positive steps in the relationship, it was difficult to get support in Moscow for any measures to accommodate American sensibilities on this or any other points, large or small. In this climate, he said, the propagandists felt free to respond to US attacks on a tit-for-tat basis, though there was a taboo against personal attacks on the President. He expressed the hope that, if the Moscow talks succeed and this was followed by a successful summit, there would be a disposition to try to be more responsive to American concerns in Africa and elsewhere.

Vance

95. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 12, 1978

SUBJECT

SALT, Moscow Visit, Shevchenko,² Moscow Accommodations

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman
Paul Warnke

USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin Meet-ing, 4/12/78. Secret. Drafted by Shulman. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

² Soviet Under Secretary General to the United Nations, Arkady Shevchenko, who the Soviets accused of defection, refused to return to Moscow, but did not seek political asylum in the United States. See Kathleen Teltsch, “Soviet Accuses U.S. of Coercing U.N. Aide,” *The New York Times*, April 12, 1978, p. NJ 17.

SUMMARY: During a brief meeting on April 12, the Secretary and Dobrynin discussed SALT and other matters that will come up during the Secretary's visit to Moscow; the Shevchenko case; and the problem of delays in providing accommodations for our Embassy personnel in Moscow

Ambassador Dobrynin came to the Department April 12 to discuss subjects related to the Secretary's trip to Moscow April 20–22.

I. *SALT*: The Secretary told Dobrynin that the President would be signing instructions for the trip within the next 24 hours, and that Warnke would convey to Dobrynin elements of the positions to be discussed that would help Soviet authorities to prepare for the meeting. Warnke said he would also be sending information to the SALT delegation at Geneva, and Dobrynin replied that this would be good; Semenov, he said, was fully *au courant*.

The Secretary said that the President wished him to stress the need for Soviet understanding of the political importance of bridging the gap on the Backfire issue. Dobrynin replied that it was not a problem of understanding, but the unacceptability to the Soviet Union of the repeated new demands since Gromyko's efforts to meet US needs last September. At that time, he said, Gromyko had gotten approval from the Politburo to go as far as he did on the strength of his assurance that this would remove the Backfire obstacle to a SALT agreement.

In the course of the discussion, Dobrynin agreed that new systems and modernization would be the key issue. In response to a question, the Secretary said that he proposed to start with a discussion of SALT, and then take up the Middle East (at Soviet request) and Africa, and then return to SALT, CTB, and MBFR. Dobrynin agreed, and asked if the Secretary were prepared to continue the discussions into Saturday if necessary. The Secretary replied affirmatively. It was agreed that social functions should be held to a minimum, in order to maximize working time during the visit.

II. *Shevchenko*: The Secretary told Dobrynin we had no objection to Soviet doctors examining Shevchenko if he agreed. He added that we had passed the Soviet request to his attorney. Dobrynin asked if we would compel him to submit to examination, and the Secretary said no. The Secretary said we had also passed on Dobrynin's request for another meeting with Shevchenko. The Secretary and Shulman then took Dobrynin to task for the intemperate statement issued by the Soviet UN Mission yesterday. Dobrynin disclaimed responsibility for it.

III. *Embassy Moscow Housing*: Dobrynin raised the question of apartments for Embassy Moscow and our decision to close the construction site of the Soviet Embassy at Mt. Alto, stating that he understood the housing problem was starting to be solved. He was told that pending clarification of discussions on housing in Moscow, we were

suspending the deadline for closing the construction site. Shulman emphasized the serious housing problems faced by Embassy Moscow, particularly after the fire last year.³ The Secretary pointed out that this problem goes back to his trip to Moscow in March 1977 and urged that the Soviets meet their obligations.

³ See footnote 6, Document 45.

96. Letter From President Carter to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, April 14, 1978

Dear Cy:

Your visit to Moscow can be an important step towards our major foreign policy objectives: a more peaceful world based on the reduction and control of arms; a deeper understanding with the Soviet Union; a resolution of regional conflicts and restraint on the part of the major powers. For this reason your visit requires that we address the entire scope of our relationship with the Soviet Union, including particularly those issues which are the source of deep concern to me and to the American public at large.

It is in the interest of both countries that SALT succeed. However, I am concerned that Soviet strategy is to focus attention on SALT as proof of progress in U.S.-Soviet relations while the Soviet Union pursues its political objectives elsewhere by military means. Therefore, you should begin the discussions with a broad review of U.S.-Soviet relations, emphasizing that the U.S. seeks a detente that is increasingly comprehensive and genuinely reciprocal. Unless this happens, some of the central factors of our relationship, including SALT, will be adversely affected by the consequent deterioration in the political environment. It is for this reason that you should stress that detente cannot be compartmentalized and that mutual restraint lies at the core of a detente relationship.

You should make clear that we regard the U.S.-Soviet relationship as central to world peace and global stability. This relationship must

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 50, Chron: 4/78. Top Secret. A draft copy of the letter is *ibid.* Vance traveled to Moscow April 19–23.

therefore be one of mutual restraint. In this connection, specific reference should be made to the Brezhnev/Nixon Communiqué² in which the joint rules of restraint by the U.S. and Soviet Union were explicitly defined. The Soviet Union should understand that we would have no choice but to compete in all areas of our relationship if these rules are not observed.

In this connection, you should seek Soviet clarification as to their objectives in Africa, in particular Southern Africa. You should emphasize that this is required in order to provide a positive political framework for pursuing other issues of importance to both our countries.

You should caution the Soviets against being drawn into an effort to resolve the Eritrean issue by violence. You should make clear that continued Soviet/Cuban combat presence in the Horn of Africa will provoke a reaction from Ethiopia's neighbors—our friends—that can only lead to further tension and possible conflict. You should explain to the Soviets that their military intervention in Africa is becoming intolerable, and ask when Soviet/Cuban forces will be withdrawn from Ethiopia.

You should indicate that, while we have no objection to Soviet cooperation with the Patriotic Front and Frontline countries in Southern Africa, Soviet/Cuban military intrusion into Southern Africa will jeopardize detente as a whole and the U.S. will react strongly. This should be stated at the highest levels directly, unambiguously, and forcefully.

You can make clear my personal view that the depth of our feeling concerning developments in Africa derives not only from our national interests but from our entire national experience. Efforts to fan the flames of a major racial war in Southern Africa can only provoke the most profound and adverse reaction on the part of the American people.

For this reason you should explain to the Soviets that we believe our relationship is now at a watershed. We are willing, anxious and ready to try to improve it, to widen the scope of cooperation to other areas, and to work together on the widest possible range of issues; but we cannot accept a selective detente. Decisions made in the near future on SALT as well as other issues such as Africa will affect our relationship for many years to come.

On SALT you will receive separate instructions. You should make clear we are willing to negotiate SALT on its own terms but that it cannot of course be pursued in isolation from the rest of our relation-

² Reference is presumably to the "Basic Principles of Relations Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics." See footnote 3, Document 4.

ship. Also emphasize the importance to us of a comprehensive test ban agreement.

On European security issues, you should point to our initiative on MBFR and say that we expect commensurate concessions on the part of the Warsaw Pact.

You should tell the Soviets that I have taken a politically difficult decision to defer production of the enhanced radiation weapon in the face of considerable support for going ahead here and in Europe, support which was stimulated rather than weakened by the Soviet propaganda campaign. You should add that I was personally offended by the campaign. My future consideration of the enhanced radiation weapon will be strongly influenced by signs of Soviet restraint in their military programs—particularly as they relate to Europe—and by constructive and tangible Soviet arms control initiatives.

On human rights, you should make clear to Gromyko our continuing interest in the Scharanskiy case, stating that a trial which sought to connect Scharanskiy to the U.S. Government would lead to a serious adverse reaction on the part of the American people and on my part personally.

It is my hope that you can achieve progress in SALT and a deeper understanding concerning a broader detente and a more meaningful measure of reciprocal restraint. You should underscore that the political significance of SALT lies not so much in the technical limitations on strategic arms, as important as these may be, but in the joint commitment to reduce the military dimensions of U.S. and Soviet competition. We cannot permit the agreement in this area to transform itself into Soviet efforts to pursue military advantage in other areas and regions of the world. This is the real importance of SALT and the reason why detente must be seen as an indivisible objective.

You should also emphasize to the Soviet leaders that the United States would welcome closer cooperation with the Soviet Union in dealing with the many global problems that mankind today confronts. The North-South relationship would become more constructive if the Communist countries were prepared to cooperate more closely with other developed countries in helping the developing countries overcome the many difficulties that they confront. It is our view that such cooperation would benefit not only mankind but would provide additional opportunities for closer friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union. Indeed, we would prefer to cooperate in this manner rather than to confront each other politically or militarily in the Third World. In making this point you could cite specific examples of ways in which our two countries could cooperate more closely (agricultural development, trade, a common fund, technology transfer, etc.).

Finally, you may reiterate to the Soviet leaders my willingness to invite President Brezhnev to the United States at a mutually convenient time to pursue these issues further and to solidify a more cooperative relationship.³

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

³ Below his signature Carter wrote, “Cy, good luck! This is another difficult assignment for you. You have my complete confidence and support. J.”

97. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance in Tanzania¹

Washington, April 14, 1978, 2031Z

WH80506. Subject: Conversation With Dobrynin.

Dobrynin called yesterday asking to have lunch with me prior to his trip to Moscow. Lunch was held today. We talked for about an hour or so. His first and immediate concern was to know whether you were coming to Moscow with specific proposals, designed to accomplish at least as much progress as—in his words—was accomplished during Gromyko’s visit here. I told him that you were going to Moscow in a constructive spirit to move forward the SALT negotiating process and to review the overall nature of our relationship. However, I indicated that I was not in a position to discuss the nature of the U.S. SALT position, though some elements of that may be conveyed to him by Warnke. He was scheduled to see Warnke afterwards. The conversation then focused on broader aspects of U.S.-Soviet relations. Dobrynin stressed that the Soviet leadership feels rather “emotional” about the relationship. He expressed the view that it is important for us to try to develop political understanding and that this requires more regular consultations. He agreed with me that the correspondence between the two leaders has not filled the void and he repeatedly inquired as to

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 6, U.S.S.R.—U.S.-Soviet Relations: 2/77–6/78. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent to the Embassy in Tanzania with instructions to deliver at the opening of business. Vance arrived in Dar es Salaam on April 13, the first leg of a trip that would take him to South Africa, Rhodesia, the United Kingdom, and, April 19–23, the Soviet Union.

whether I had any ideas as to how we might enhance our “consultative” relationship. Without being specific, I did indicate to him that it is very important that we not only negotiate specific issues but that we periodically review the wider pattern of our relationship, discussing candidly those issues regarding which we have conflicting viewpoints. In this connection I explicitly mentioned the Middle East and Africa as examples of areas regarding which each of us seems to have different perceptions. I also added that in our view their recent conduct in Africa was not compatible with a stable and increasingly cooperative relationship. Dobrynin did not try to rebut me on that specific point but kept pursuing the question as to how we could best enhance our communications so as to narrow down such differences.

I believe that his concerns will provide a useful opening for some of the points that you intend to make in your general opening presentation. I told him that I would report on our conversation to the President and that I would inform you fully. Finally, towards the end he again inquired whether you would be coming with forthcoming proposals and expressed eagerness to learn more about them from Warnke. When asked if the Soviet side was also planning to make constructive proposals, he indicated that he at this time did not know.

98. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 19, 1978

SUBJECT

Soviet Criticism of US Foreign Policy and Leadership

1. [1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]
2. [1 line not declassified] characterized his wide-ranging conversation with Kirilenko as one in which the latter was extremely critical and deprecatory of US foreign policy, including Washington’s approach to the SALT negotiations. The initial target of Kirilenko’s criticism was Dr.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 79, USSR: 2–4/78. Secret; Sensitive. Brzezinski underlined numerous passages, including the portion of paragraph 6 that described the United States as a “paper tiger.” An unknown hand made checkmarks in the margin next to the passages.

Brzezinski whom he described as viscerally anti-Soviet and particularly dangerous because of his high level of intelligence. Kirilenko charged that Brzezinski was a “dangerous influence” over President Carter and that this influence would lead to some serious US-Soviet crises.

3. Kirilenko insisted that the Soviet Government does not trust any of the statements or declarations made to them privately or publicly by President Carter, largely because of the influence of Brzezinski. The Kremlin simply does not believe anything Carter says and has no confidence in whatever negotiations the US might enter into vis-a-vis the USSR.

4. Kirilenko stated that the Soviet Government does not feel the need to deal with the Carter Government because Moscow assumes it will disappear in 1980. He commented that there is a world of difference between visits to Moscow of former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and those of Secretary Cyrus Vance. The latter, according to Kirilenko, simply carries out instructions. Kirilenko reminisced that Kissinger and former President Richard Nixon had real credibility with the Kremlin because they had demonstrated their willingness to engage the US militarily, rather than merely moralizing.

5. Kirilenko pointed to the US Government’s willingness to compromise even its moralizing principles during the session of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) then underway in Belgrade as an example of the lack of credibility which the Kremlin attributes to Washington.

6. Otherwise in the conversation, Kirilenko also discussed Africa. The Soviet Government was using the Somali-Ethiopian situation to prove its hypothesis that the US has now become a “paper tiger”. The USSR would continue testing the US in Africa, next in the Moroccan-Algerian context, picking up whatever gains it could until it meets effective US-backed resistance, after which it would reconsider its hypothesis.

7. *Comment: [1 paragraph (5 lines) not declassified]*

8. The above memorandum is being made available to the Acting Secretary of State as well as to Secretary Vance in Moscow.²

Stansfield Turner³

² Beneath Turner’s signature Brzezinski wrote, “Kirilenko may not like me but he sure as hell agrees with me! ZB.”

³ Turner signed “Stan” above this typed signature.

99. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 20, 1978, 2135Z

Secto 4122. For Christopher from the Secretary. Department pass White House for the President and Brzezinski and DOD for Secretary Brown. Subject: Private Discussion With Gromyko April 20.

1. After morning and afternoon sessions with our full delegations,² he and I had a productive private meeting this evening.³ We covered the following points:

2. Non-circumvention: Gromyko agreed to our fall back language. To his argument that we must agree on the meaning of the language, I replied only that the language speaks for itself and that we will not circumvent the agreement.

3. Aggregates: Gromyko agreed to the 1200 limit on MIRVed ballistic missiles provided we accept the 2250 SNDV level. (Incidentally Gromyko seemed confused on how the 1320/1200/820 numbers worked, e.g., whether they were compelled to build up to the various levels.) I finally straightened him out on this.

4. New types: He delayed any response on our revised definition of “new type” until tomorrow. I made clear that our discussion of other new types issues proceeded on the assumption that we would reach a satisfactory agreement on definitions. On the exception, he tentatively agreed that the excepted ICBM would be either MIRVed or not but he said he would have to consult with his colleagues before he could respond to my proposal that the new types limits would apply for the full period of the agreement through 1985. He promised to give me a position in our next meeting. The question of SLBMs new types did not come up; I will seek to clarify the issue tomorrow.

5. Backfire: This was hard going indeed. The Soviets suggest in their position that the Backfire lacks the range for CONUS missions. (Ogarkov wanted Rowney⁴ to try to fly a Backfire from the USSR to Cuba without refueling and promised flowers for the widow.) They in-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 4/20–22/78. Secret; Cherokee; Flash; Nodis.

² See Document 100.

³ The memorandum of conversation prepared following this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 4/20–22/78.

⁴ Edward Rowney, JCS representative to the SALT II negotiations in Geneva.

sist they will not go beyond their “good will” unilateral statement—though they accepted our proposal for an oral response stating that we are signing the SALT agreement in part in reliance on the Soviets’ Backfire statement, and recognized that it would be given to Congress. However, in the text of the statement as they read it to us, they said they were giving us the production rate assurance only “as a matter of information.” They insist that phrase was in their September statement, but it is not in our memcons. As to the rate itself, Gromyko refused to offer a number, but proposed that we state the rate in our oral response and they would not contradict it.

6. On the whole, I am convinced they want an agreement, that we can solve the numbers/duration issue and that we cannot settle the Backfire question here. We may know their reaction to the conclusion of the new ICBM ban in the treaty tomorrow.

7. My next private meeting with Gromyko is at 11 a.m. Moscow time Friday⁵ (3 a.m. Washington time).

8. Action requested:

A. I recommend that you authorize me to accept the 2250/1200 package,⁶ if it includes a Soviet agreement to the duration/timing position I presented this morning, that is reductions beginning January 1, 1980 and proceeding at a steady pace to completion not later than Dec 31, 1980, on which date the protocol would expire.

B. Dismantling and reduction of excess systems:

Gromyko has indicated a Soviet willingness to consider an arrangement whereby systems to be dismantled or destroyed might be rendered inoperable before the end of the protocol period if we could accept a longer period for complete dismantling or destruction. Should we indicate an interest in extending the period for complete dismantling or destruction beyond Dec 31, 1980, in the context of such earlier “deactivation?” This is clearly a political decision, particularly if we were to get responsible, verifiable assurances regarding early deactivation of systems to be destroyed at the outset of the period. I recommend I be given authority to exercise my judgment in light of the then existing circumstances.

Vance

⁵ April 21.

⁶ In Secto 4132 from Moscow, April 21, the Embassy noted that Vance had received a message from Brzezinski, which contained Carter’s response. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1717)

100. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 20, 1978, 2215Z

Secto 4123. For Christopher and Brzezinski from the Secretary. Pass DOD for Secretary Brown. Subject: April 20 Meetings With Gromyko.

1. I met for three hours with Gromyko this morning and one hour this afternoon with our full delegations.² Participants on the Soviet side included First Deputy Defense Minister and Chief of Staff Ogarkov, his Deputy Koslov, Korniyenko, Dobrynin and Semenov. Following the afternoon session he and I met privately, accompanied only by interpreters.³

2. During the morning session I gave an overview and then presented our positions on aggregates, duration/dismantling, new types and principles. I suggested that we discuss Backfire privately. Lacking any response to Warnke's Washington presentation on non-circumvention, I made only a brief reference to our previous position. I did not initially go into the exemption question.

3. Gromyko's response in the morning session was a dusty replay of previous Soviet positions. He complained at length about U.S. positions and public statements. A few points were of interest:

A. He warned that the Soviets have to take decisions on "new programs" in the immediate future which depend on whether there is to be a new agreement, noted calls in the U.S. for new (military) appropriations, warned that for their delay in agreeing on SALT II could jeopardize arms control accomplishments already achieved, and urged that we should take account of each other's interest.

B. On duration of the protocol and duration of the dismantling period, Gromyko after recapitulating their position said nevertheless that, provided agreement were reached on overall time limits for reducing aggregates, "thought could be given" to ways to give confidence in the early stages that systems to be dismantled and destroyed would be ruled out of operational employment. When I sought to clarify whether the systems would be rendered inoperable he was vague, saying that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153-1726. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Memoranda of conversation for the 10:30-11:25 a.m. and 5:30-6:30 p.m. meetings, are in Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77—Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 4/20-22, 1978.

³ See Document 99.

since by the end of the period the systems would be destroyed thought could be given to ways to provide confidence that that was being done.

C. He was firm on exception for single warhead RV, and Korniyenko told Warnke privately that there can be no agreement without such an exception.

D. He was also firm on range definition for cruise missiles, no use of transports for cruise missiles, and a bomber-type rule for counting ALCM-equipped heavy bombers.

E. He reiterated the Soviet position on Backfire despite my suggestion we discuss it privately.

F. He did not react to our new types definition proposal.

4. In view of the fact that he confined himself to going over old ground in the morning session and did not react to our movement, in the afternoon session I treated him to a lengthy recapitulation of the negotiations on some key issues in order to clarify the record. At the end he complained that he had heard nothing new and brushed aside our new types proposal. I pointed out that we had presented several new proposals but had heard nothing new from them, and said that I would respond to their exceptions proposal when they responded to my new types proposal. He quarrelled with our position on cruise missile carriers, to which I responded. He then asked whether I would be prepared to discuss levels in the context of a discussion of an exception from the new types rule. I said I would. At that point Gromyko proposed that we meet in private. That meeting is reported separately.

Vance

101. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Moscow, April 21, 1978, 1915Z

Secto 4131. For Christopher from the Secretary. Dept pass White House for the President and Mr. Brzezinski. Pass DOD for Secretary Brown. Subject: SALT Meetings With Gromyko, April 21.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 152, [USSR]: 1/77–4/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

1. In a two-hour private meeting with Gromyko this morning, we covered the following ground.²

2. On the new ICBM types issue, he did not give a substantive reaction, but suggested the definition be handled in Geneva. He said the Soviet Union is prepared to include the ban on new ICBM types in the treaty, but only if the exempt type is required to be non-MIRVed. I repeated that any exception and any settlement of the ICBM new types issue depends on satisfactory resolution of the definition issue, and that our proposal for an exception required that each side have a choice of whether the new ICBM would be MIRVed or not.

3. I reviewed our position on an SLBM new types ban and we agreed to refer the issue (including exceptions from the ban) to Geneva.

4. On aggregates, he reiterated his offer of yesterday to accept 2250/1320/1200/820. On the related issue of duration of the protocol, they continued to object to the principle of a fixed date.

5. On timing for reductions, Gromyko stressed again the practical obstacles to completing dismantling and destruction in less than 18 months. He said, however, that they will offer us specifics on his concept, first advanced yesterday, of measures to increase confidence that launchers on which dismantling and destruction has been started will be ruled out for combat use.

6. He reaffirmed our agreement on the non-circumvention fall-back language.

7. We agreed that the Statement of Principles will be handled urgently in Geneva, within the agreed concept of a more general approach. (While I was meeting with Gromyko, Korniyenko and Ogarkov took up this issue with Warnke and others, and agreed to proceed in Geneva; the Soviets declined to discuss principles language in Moscow, and reiterated their desire for a reference to GBS.)

8. On Backfire, Gromyko was slightly more forthcoming than yesterday, agreeing to give a flight profile for their radius claim and to consider modifying the phrase “for your information” which they inserted into their production rate statement yesterday.

9. On procedure, we agreed that the remaining issues would be addressed urgently in Geneva, with the objective of resolving as many as possible prior to Gromyko’s SSOD visit. As many as possible of those still unresolved then will be settled at that time in Washington, with the goal of positioning us for a summit to settle one or two remaining questions.

² The memorandum of conversation prepared following this meeting is in Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 4/20–22, 1978.

10. SALT came up only briefly in the afternoon session, but a very critical point was underlined. In all my sessions with Gromyko, I stressed that the positions advanced are an integrated whole, with no one point to be considered agreed until all are agreed. Gromyko stressed the same point with special force this afternoon. He said that the issues have been discussed as a complex, thus we have not repeat not yet reached new agreements.

11. Gromyko went on to say that, if there is any inaccuracy about this in reporting by the U.S. press, his government will feel compelled to correct it publicly. In this regard, he stressed the discussions on the exception for a new ICBM.

12. I feel very strongly that we should say nothing beyond that the Moscow talks were helpful and that some progress was made, any statement beyond this, public or private, would put every step the Soviets have taken into jeopardy.

13. Non-SALT issues in afternoon session reported septel.³

Vance

³ Secto 4135 from Moscow, April 21. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1715, D780171–0758)

102. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 21, 1978, 6:30–8 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vance–Gromyko Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State Vance
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon
 Ambassador Paul C. Warnke
 Ambassador Ralph Earle, II
 Mr. Leslie H. Gelb
 Ambassador Marshall D. Shulman
 Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
 Lt. Gen. Edward L. Rowney
 DAS of Def. Walter B. Slocomb
 Mr. Mark Garrison
 Mr. William D. Krimer
 (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister Gromyko
 First Deputy Foreign Minister
 Korniyenko
 Dep. Foreign Minister Semenov
 Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
 Marshal N.V. Ogarkov
 Col.-Gen. M.M. Kozlov
 Mr. V.G. Makarov
 Mr. N. Detinov
 Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter
 Mr. A.A. Obukhov, Note Taker
 Mr. V.F. Isakov, Note Taker

Before proceeding to substantive matters, Minister *Gromyko* informed Secretary Vance that Brezhnev would like to see him tomorrow at noon.

Middle East

The Secretary said he wanted to discuss the Middle East situation and asked Gromyko how they should proceed.

Gromyko agreed that this question required discussion, but suggested they be economical in words since they had a number of other questions to discuss as well.

The Secretary said that insofar as the current situation in the Middle East was concerned, the positions today were stalemated. Discussions between Israel and Egypt continued on a sporadic basis but no progress was being made. The last visit of Defense Minister Weizmann to Cairo had produced no new results. On his way back from Africa to London, the Secretary had stopped and met with Foreign Minister Kamel for 45 minutes. The Foreign Minister's impression was the same as the Secretary had just described. As Gromyko knew, several weeks ago Prime Minister Begin had come to the United States for a set of meetings that lasted two days. As a result of these meetings, sharp dif-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 4/20–22/78. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in the Kremlin.

ferences on a number of items emerged and were made public. These differences were three in number:

1. The meaning of UN Resolution 242. The position of the present Israeli Government is that 242 does not necessarily cover withdrawal from the West Bank. This is contrary to our view that 242 applies on all fronts. It had also been the constant position of all Israeli Governments since 1967 that 242 applied to all fronts. Thus, the position of the present Israeli Government had changed from that of previous governments. If Israel adhered to the position that Resolution 242 did not apply to the West Bank, then in the Secretary's view no solution is possible. We had reaffirmed our position to this effect publicly on a number of occasions. The Secretary knew that the Soviet Union held the same view; in fact, it was a view almost universally held by world public opinion.

2. The second area of difference concerned the Palestinian question and how to resolve it. We believe, as we indicated in the Joint Statement issued with the Soviet Union, that the Palestinian question had to be resolved in all its aspects, that the legitimate fights of the Palestinian people had to be recognized, and that the Palestinians have the right to participate in determining their own future. There is a difference of views between us and Israel on this question. That difference appears in two respects:

- a. our reference to legitimate rights; and
- b. the question of whether or not the Palestinians are entitled to participate in determining their own future.

3. The question of settlements. Our view is that settlements in the Sinai, the West Bank and Golan are contrary to international law as reflected in the Geneva 4 Conference, that all further work on settlements must stop, and that there should be no new settlements. The Israelis take a different view of the legality of the settlements. They say that they will not stop all construction on existing settlements and will not agree to refrain from starting new ones. When Begin was in the United States, he had said that in the future, insofar as the West Bank was concerned, no new settlements would be started without a Cabinet decision. Since that time he has changed his position, no longer requiring a Cabinet decision, but merely a decision by the Defense Council. Israel has informed us that it would refrain from establishing new settlements in the Sinai, but would continue work on expanding existing settlements.

The Secretary said that these three differences were fundamental, had surfaced and were now known in our country, in Israel, and, in fact, throughout the world. We supported the principle of reaching agreement on a Declaration of Principles to create the framework for reconvening a conference of all the parties in order to achieve a compre-

hensive settlement. We continued to believe that the only true and lasting solution to the Middle East situation was a comprehensive settlement.

Gromyko asked what were the principles in the declaration.

The Secretary said the declaration would deal with the nature of the peace, resolution of the Palestinian question, and the principle of withdrawal from occupied territories on all fronts in accordance with 242 and 338,² as the basis of reconvening the Geneva Conference. This was the same position we had held all along. Finally, as *Gromyko* knew, in the so-called political meeting in Jerusalem several months ago in which we participated, the subject of discussions between Israel and Egypt had been the attempt to draft an agreed Statement of General Principles. Further work has been continued, but it has not proved possible to reach agreement. The Secretary had kept Ambassador Dobrynin informed of the various meetings.

Gromyko had the following question to ask and would ask the Secretary to reply if he felt it advisable to do so. How did he see the Middle East situation in the immediate future? What steps was the Secretary thinking of in terms of normalizing the situation there?

The Secretary said that he would, of course, reply. Our own feeling was that for the present one should let the intellectual ferment in Israel continue. A real debate was going on in Israel regarding the three key points he had mentioned. We felt it better to let discussions in Israel mature for a few weeks before taking the next step.

Gromyko remarked that in Israel they loved to discuss things, preferably for years rather than weeks.

The *Secretary* expressed his belief that one could not let things drift much more than a few weeks. He had one more point to make. Since he had left on his trip to Africa and Moscow, he had received a request from Foreign Minister Dayan to meet with him on April 26 and 27. He said he had some new ideas to present. The Secretary had replied that he would be happy to listen. After that meeting he intended to communicate with *Gromyko* about the results, if any. He came back to his point that the only ultimate solution is a comprehensive one, which can only come out of a meeting of all the parties.

Gromyko asked what forum the Secretary had in mind, the Geneva Conference or something else.

The Secretary replied that he meant the Geneva Conference, if all the interested parties could be persuaded to attend. A declaration of general principles would serve as a framework for the Conference. This was the subject of discussions between Egypt, Israel and ourselves.

² See footnote 2, Document 48.

Such a framework would be wholly consistent with the joint Soviet-American statement.

Gromyko said he would be brief in his reply, because there was not much time.

First, *Gromyko* wanted to present a complaint, a serious complaint. This was occasioned by the fact that the U.S. side had violated the Joint Statement he and the Secretary had worked out together toward the end of last year. Only a little time had passed after that Statement was issued, weeks or even days, before the United States had overturned that Statement. As he saw it, the U.S. side was taking a rather lackadaisical attitude toward such a document. The Soviet leadership would have to take that into account in the future.

Last fall events had been moving toward reconvening the Geneva Conference, where all the aspects of a Middle East settlement would be considered. The only thing lacking at that time was a firm and consistent policy on the part of the United States and firm efforts by the United States to bring a strong influence to bear on Israel. Now *Gromyko* did not know how a Geneva Conference could be convened without a sharp turnabout in the policies of the United States, Israel and, of course, Sadat. He would say that the Geneva Conference was now “paralyzed”, not to say “buried.”

Gromyko said that it was quite understandable that the Secretary did not agree with some of the extremist positions Israel had taken. What needed to be done was to give some thought to how the situation could be rectified. Without the participation of all interested parties, and without the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union, it would be impossible to secure a lasting peace settlement in the region. The Secretary had mentioned a Declaration of Principles as a first step, and envisaged the authorship of that Declaration to consist of Egypt, Israel and the United States. Was the Secretary sure that all the parties concerned in that region would accept the idea that the United States, Egypt and Israel prepare a Declaration of Principles, and then everybody had to sit down at a table and sign it? Was he not being excessively optimistic?

Gromyko would say further that the Secretary had, of course, acted correctly in objecting to Israel’s position on U.N. Resolutions 242 and 338. On the other hand, he was not overly inclined to praise the Secretary for this, because he did not believe that the United States and the Soviet Union had the same position with regard to either Resolution. The Soviet Union believed that Israel should withdraw from all occupied territories. The U.S. position was somewhat different. As for the Palestinians, the Soviet Union not only held that the Palestinians must participate in a Middle East settlement in order to be in a position to defend their legitimate rights, but also that the Palestinians had the

right to establish an independent state, albeit a small one. The question of legitimate rights could be understood in different ways. The United States had mentioned this in terms of representation in some form or other, but not in terms of independent Palestinian representation as such. Evidently the United States wanted to hitch the Palestinians onto somebody rather than ensure their independence.

On the whole, Gromyko could not recall any occasion when he and the Secretary had had the opportunity of discussing Middle East matters in detail. They were always touching upon them in some hurried fashion, in passing as it were. He hoped that they would find the time to have a thorough discussion if the United States was willing. He repeated that the Soviet Union wanted the Palestinian people to enjoy its legitimate rights, including the right to establish an independent state. Such a state would certainly not be a threat to anyone. He thought that all concerned knew this very well. He did not know if the Secretary had ever had occasion to see how the Palestinians lived. As for himself, he had seen that in refugee camps in Syria—they lived in almost inhuman conditions. The U.S. press frequently voiced apprehensions to the effect that if a small Palestinian state were established, it would become a Soviet base, even a Soviet satellite. Where did such nightmares come from? He would say that a person must have spent many sleepless nights to come up with such nightmares. This particular idea was a pure concoction. The Soviet Union had no special ties with the Palestinians. If anyone did, it was perhaps France, Great Britain, other Arab states, even the United States, but certainly not the Soviet Union.

Gromyko said it was necessary to reflect on how a broad forum could now be revived. The Soviet Union was very much in favor of reconvening the Geneva conference with all interested parties participating, including the Palestinians. If that were done, there should be no concern about anyone's attempting to "bite off" the U.S. position. The U.S. would certainly participate in the Conference, which would be a forum for serious discussions. It was better to be discussing problems for six months or even for a year than to fight a war for just one day. As matters stood now, each passing day increased the potential for violence.

The Secretary said he would respond. First, he had to take issue with Gromyko's saying that he had reasons to complain about U.S. policy. Gromyko had said that things last fall had been proceeding satisfactorily toward reconvening the Geneva conference. The Secretary, too, had thought for a while that this was the case. However, the Syrians had refused to discuss details concerning the Geneva Conference. Thus, matters had dragged on. In order to get things moving and resolve the question of Palestinian representation at the Geneva Conference, we had suggested a Pan-Arab Delegation in which the Pales-

tinians would be represented. We believed that this was a realistic and practical way to proceed, because Israel had stated that it would not sit down at a negotiating table with a separate Palestinian Delegation. The Secretary had thought that we were making some progress to resolve this problem, but the Syrians had not agreed. As a result of lack of progress President Sadat had taken the initiative of going to Jerusalem. Since the Secretary had informed Ambassador Dobrynin, Gromyko surely knew that we had not known in advance that Sadat would take this step. He had taken it because he had become fed up with waiting for the Geneva Conference, since the parties involved could not agree on procedures and a framework for that Conference. President Sadat had made it very clear by his statements that he reaffirmed his advocacy of a comprehensive solution. As the Secretary had said before, the objective we had been pursuing since Sadat's initiative was to develop a declaration of principles and guidelines for negotiations with Resolution 242, so as to make possible a comprehensive meeting and a comprehensive settlement. We continue to recognize the importance of Syrian and Palestinian participation in negotiations. It is our hope that if a suitable framework can be developed, they would join in the negotiations.

Regarding Gromyko's question as to acceptance of such a declaration of principles by others, the Secretary believed that others will accept the resolution if Israel does. The problem now was to get Israel to sign it.

On another point, he knew that there was a difference between us regarding one aspect of Resolution 242. He knew that the Soviet position was that 242 applies to "all the territories" occupied during the 1967 war. As Gromyko knew, our position was somewhat different. We believed that it applied to "territories" occupied in 1967. The question of what these territories are is a subject for negotiations between the parties. This question of different interpretations, of whether or not 242 applied to all territories or merely territories goes back, as Gromyko would recall, to the discussions in the Security Council in 1967. The Soviet proposal to say "all territories" had not been accepted by the Security Council and finally the word "territories" was included in 242.

Another difference between us concerned the view of whether there should be an independent Palestinian state as opposed to a Palestinian state affiliated with Jordan, for example. Finally, regarding Palestinian representation in the Geneva Conference, he still believed that the practical way to solve this problem is to include the Palestinians in a Pan-Arab delegation. We believe this is the only practical way to overcome the hurdles in the way of the Geneva Conference. The Secretary would quite agree with Gromyko that the situation of the people living in camps is sad and serious. He had seen this personally in both Syria

and Lebanon. Therefore it is essential that we resolve the Palestinian question in all its aspects and find a way to take care of Palestinian refugees no matter where they are. This could best be done at a broad international conference.

The Secretary had one final point. He would be happy to have a full discussion of Middle East problems with Gromyko at some suitable time. Perhaps this could be done when Gromyko comes to the United States to attend the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament. Perhaps they could then set aside the time required to have a full discussion of the Middle East which would not merely be a part of discussions of other problems.

Gromyko said that while he did not want to repeat himself, he did want to draw the Secretary's attention to the fact that when our two countries had adopted the Joint Statement last year, the chances for convening the Geneva Conference were better than at any other time except the time when it had actually been first convened. The question of a Pan-Arab Delegation had indeed been discussed between various Arab countries, and the Soviet Union had also discussed it with a number of Arab countries, coming out in favor of that solution as facilitating overall resolution of the Middle East problem. The Arabs were at one time inclined to accept such a solution; he would not say all the Arabs, but the overwhelming majority. Then a strange situation had developed: if Syria took one position, Egypt immediately took an opposite position, and that had gone on and on. After a relatively short time had come Sadat's trip to Jerusalem. Then it became quite clear why Egypt had been acting in that manner. In words Sadat was for reconvening the Geneva Conference, but in actual fact he was against it. The United States, too, had not been too much in favor of reconvening the Conference once it found out what was going on, not to mention Israel. Thus he would suggest that it was not necessary retroactively to belittle the chances existing last fall for reconvening the Geneva Conference.

The Secretary said that was not true.

Gromyko asked what had happened to the Joint Statement of last year. Was it still alive?

The Secretary said it was alive, and he had said so publicly. He had to take exception to what *Gromyko* had said about U.S. attitudes. We had really been trying hard to get the Conference going, but the Arabs could not themselves agree on the necessary framework.

Gromyko said that the U.S. did, however, know what Sadat had done. He suggested that he and the Secretary find the necessary time to discuss this subject from a practical point of view and in a businesslike manner. *The Secretary* agreed.

MBFR

Gromyko said that just a few days ago the Soviets had received the new proposal of the Western Powers at the Vienna negotiations. That

proposal contained some new elements and was currently under study here. Once the Soviet position had been determined, the United States and others would be informed accordingly. The only thing he could say in this regard today was that the Soviet side was getting the impression that these new proposals, too, were not free of a one-sided approach. That was all he was going to say at this time.

The Secretary wanted to say briefly that he had been glad to see the question of data exchange settled. It was essential for forward movement. That having been done, the Western Powers had taken their new initiative. He would like the Soviet side to give that proposal serious consideration, and was confident that it would do so.

SSOD

Gromyko noted that the U.N. Special Session on Disarmament would be convened shortly. He did not know how the Secretary viewed it, and what he thought the prospects were for a successful outcome. If the Secretary had any ideas on this score, he would be pleased to hear them. The Soviet side regarded the SSOD as a broad worldwide forum, and would, of course, set forth its views on disarmament in that forum. It would be very good if the countries of the West as well as the East approached the SSOD in a serious and businesslike manner and adopted positive decisions on the questions involved. The important thing, of course, was not just to adopt decisions but also to implement them. The U.N. adopts quite a few good decisions, but subsequently, when the Secretary General circulates them to member governments, all too often they pile up on desks in various government offices and nothing much happens. He was not trying to reproach anyone in this regard, but simply would not like to see this happen in the case of the SSOD. As he had said, the Soviet side attached great importance to the SSOD and believed that it should in no way be used to belittle a subsequent World Disarmament Conference.

The Secretary said that he felt very strongly that the SSOD was of great importance. We very much hoped that somehow positive and concrete decisions can come out of the SSOD and that it not simply end up in general statements that had no flesh and bone. Some other unnamed countries have submitted proposals that could not be understood. However, he believed it possible to make real progress at that conference. Ambassador Leonard³ would be coming to Moscow on the 27th of this month in order to talk to *Gromyko's* people about the SSOD. At the United Nations he is working on our preparations for the Special Session.

³ See footnote 4, Document 57.

Gromyko said that Soviet representatives would be prepared to discuss the various issues with Ambassador Leonard.

Press Reports

Gromyko wanted to touch on a matter he believed to be important. The Secretary would soon return to the United States and the press will be speculating about the success or non-success or half success, or even one-quarter success, of the present talks. He thought the Secretary himself could not determine now just how the press would describe what had been done here in Moscow. He sincerely hoped that the situation at these talks would be presented in an objective light. The Secretary was surely aware that a number of questions here had been discussed in complex, i.e., in combination with certain others; this was true, for example, of the question of providing an exemption for one new type of missile, which was discussed in the context of the levels and sublevels for MIRVed missiles. The main thing was that no one should present the situation in such a way as to say that one issue had been settled while the other remained unagreed, when both sides clearly knew that the two issues were linked. After all, they had not been able to reach agreement on providing an exemption for a new missile with a single reentry vehicle; therefore it should not be said that the other elements, i.e., the levels, were agreed. He would hope that no such imprecision would be permitted. Should such inaccuracies appear, however, particularly concerning major issues, the Soviet side would be forced to restore the truth and accordingly inform its own public opinion and the public opinion of other countries. He hoped that the Secretary had understood him correctly, because such a way of proceeding was consistent with our mutual interests.

The Secretary said he understood exactly what *Gromyko* had said. He would himself describe the current talks as having been helpful and useful. He would say that we have made some progress without going into detail of what had been done on the various issues. It will be better to say simply that as a whole the talks had been helpful.

Gromyko agreed this was the best way to proceed.

103. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Moscow, April 22, 1978, noon–2 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vance/Brezhnev Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State Vance
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon
 William D. Krimer (Interpreter)

U.S.S.R.

General Secretary Brezhnev
 Foreign Minister Gromyko
 Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
 A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
 V.M. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

General Secretary *Brezhnev* opened by saying he had been informed that Secretary Vance and Gromyko had held some hard discussions. This is natural because the subject was very serious indeed—nuclear weapons. It was not important whether one talked of reduction or limitation or shortening or shrinking weapons. The important thing was that they were nuclear weapons and that in the absence of a treaty on this matter, war was not precluded. He thought the Secretary would understand why people throughout the world were demanding that nuclear war be made impossible.

Brezhnev apologized for having started in this way and said first of all he was pleased to welcome the Secretary in Moscow. Quite a few things had happened since the Secretary's last visit, in the life of our two countries and throughout the world. He would speak with the same frankness with which he had set forth his thoughts last year. The past year had not given us any cause for joy as concerns Soviet-U.S. relations. They were developing rather unevenly and, on the whole, their present state did not correspond to the wishes of either of our countries as they had been expressed in the past.

Digressing from his typed notes, Brezhnev recalled that when President Nixon had first come to visit Moscow, he had come to Brezhnev's office directly from the airport and just the two of them, plus one interpreter, had held their first conversation.² President Nixon had pointed out that both our countries had amassed so many nuclear

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance to Moscow, 4/20–22, 1978. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in Brezhnev's office in the Kremlin.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 257.

weapons that they were able to destroy each other seven times over. These were his very words, every comma. He was recalling this not in order to defend Nixon, but to emphasize that due to actions of the United States the arms race had escalated even further since that time. Each of us now had larger quantities of weapons and each could destroy the other ten times over. In a very short period of time the two of them had succeeded in concluding and signing an agreement on nuclear weapons that was still in effect today (Brezhnev first said the agreement expired in October, but corrected himself after prompting by Gromyko).

Brezhnev said that it was no accident that he referred to the complexity of our negotiations. There was so much talk in the world today about nuclear weapons, about war, about the neutron bomb. It was even difficult to tell sometimes where the truth was to be found.

Referring to his notes again, Brezhnev said there is no doubt that the main obstacle in the way of developing better Soviet/American relations is the continuing arms race. Unless the arms race is stopped and, indeed, reversed, neither of our two peoples would be able to sleep quietly. He was deeply convinced that nothing would contribute as much to better relations between us and to a more peaceful world than conclusion of a new agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union on limitation of strategic offensive arms. He would say quite frankly that preparation of that agreement had somehow been dragged out "to an ungodly extent". He had been informed by Gromyko and Marshal Ogarkov that in the course of the present talks it had proved possible to reach agreement on one (he emphasized: "only one") basic outstanding issue, while some headway had been made toward resolution of others. The one question that had been resolved was the understanding on the text of the treaty article on non-circumvention, which would read as follows:

"In order to ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party undertakes not to circumvent the provisions of this Treaty through any other state or states, or in any other manner."

Secondly, he understood that the U.S. side had agreed in principle that the treaty would provide for the right of each side to test and deploy one new type of ICBM, on the understanding that the aggregate number of ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVs would be limited to 1200. However, the Soviet side had always spoken of a new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle, while the U.S. side now wanted to have the opportunity to develop a new ICBM with MIRVs. The Soviet side could in no way agree to such a solution because, after all, these were qualitatively different categories of missiles, notably from the standpoint of their impact upon strategic stability.

Third, Brezhnev noted that the positions of the two sides had come closer together on the scope of possible reductions in the aggregate level of SNDVs. The Soviet side had agreed to reduction of that level during the terms of the treaty from 2400 to 2250 over an 18-month period beginning December 1980. As for the time period for completion of reductions, which had been proposed by the U.S. side—12 months beginning January 1980—it was completely unrealistic for the reasons repeatedly explained to the Secretary by the Soviet representatives.

Brezhnev had also been informed that an understanding had been reached on how to resolve the remaining differences in the text of the Joint Statement of Principles. It was now necessary for the two delegations in Geneva to complete that work as quickly as possible, thereby putting another question to rest.

Brezhnev said he would not address the question of the so-called Backfire bomber. Gromyko had set forth the Soviet position repeatedly; it was that the Backfire was completely unrelated to the treaty under negotiation, and Brezhnev had nothing to add to Gromyko's statement.

It was important now to apply strenuous efforts on both sides to find mutually acceptable solutions for those issues which still remained unagreed or not completely agreed. He would hope that the U.S. side would display the necessary realism, just as the Soviet side was doing, and that this would at last make it possible to complete work on the treaty.

Brezhnev said it would also be of great importance if our two countries could join efforts in other directions as well, particularly in putting an end to the arms race. The Soviet Union regretted that the United States had not agreed to the Soviet proposal for mutual, complete and unconditional renunciation of the production of neutron weapons. In advancing that proposal, the Soviet side had not proceeded and was not proceeding from unilateral interests but with the sole objective of ridding mankind of still another weapon of mass annihilation, a particularly inhumane weapon, and of preventing a new spiral in the arms race. Recent statements by President Carter concerning deferral of a final decision regarding the production of neutron weapons³ could not, of course, be regarded as settling this matter. Nevertheless, taking into account President Carter's statement, the Soviet Union was now weighing the possibility of refraining from producing neutron weapons unless the United States began to produce them first. He was informing the Secretary of this in a strictly confidential manner, but the Soviet Union would probably soon announce its decision on this score.

³ For the text of Carter's April 7 statement, see Department of State *Bulletin*, May 1978, p. 31.

Brezhnev said he would not address the other specific matters the Secretary had discussed with Gromyko. He merely wanted to emphasize the most important factors needed to ensure a positive trend in the relations between our two countries: reciprocity in taking into account the legitimate interests of the other side, strict observance of the principle of equality and mutual benefit, and non-interference in each other's internal affairs. Without that, it would not be possible to advance our bilateral relations or to achieve satisfactory solutions to major international problems.

In conclusion, Brezhnev wanted to touch on one more matter. Representatives of the United States side and President Carter personally had stressed the desirability of a meeting between him and President Carter. As for the Soviet side and himself personally, he would welcome such a meeting; there should be no doubt whatsoever on this score. In this connection, they were only concerned that a meeting might be held without producing the kind of results that people throughout the world had every right to expect from the meeting of the heads of two such countries as the United States and the Soviet Union. In other words, such a meeting should be well prepared and productive. He would be pleased if the Secretary could convey this to President Carter.

Departing from his text, Brezhnev said that those who wrote articles, delivered speeches and traveled a great deal should never forget that if only one bomb should go off, there would as a consequence be nothing left on the face of the earth. The leaders themselves might perhaps find a safe place to hide, but what about nations, peoples, cities and industrial plants? And yet, people keep on writing reports, paper after paper, and each author probably congratulates himself for having found a happy phrase. Brezhnev was fully prepared to meet President Carter for the purpose of declaring that both are against war, against nuclear weapons, and for disarmament. They could sign a paper to that effect, a document that could be exhibited to the whole world. That would represent true courage and genuine action.

The Secretary said that the President had asked him to convey his warm personal regards to Brezhnev, and to express his strong determination to do everything in his power that this meeting should be as productive as possible.⁴

Brezhnev interrupted, thanking him for the President's good wishes and said he welcomed the statement that we are all human. He noted the President's public statements to the effect that he was for developing good relations with the Soviet Union, that he would seek to

⁴ For Carter's instructions to Vance, see Document 96.

improve them, and that he was against the arms race.⁵ Nevertheless, a couple of days later at some university the President had delivered another speech. The Soviet leadership had read both statements and was asking itself: Where is the truth?

The Secretary said that President Carter shared Brezhnev's concerns and views about the danger of a world overloaded with nuclear weapons. As Brezhnev had pointed out, each of us had many times more weapons than either of us wished to have.

Brezhnev (interrupting) said the trouble was that when it came to nuclear weapons, including silo launchers and MIRVs, the important thing was not just to look at their numbers, whether such numbers were 2400 or 2250. He would ask what would happen if just one bomb were to be dropped on a major city, for example a bomb with a yield of 3 million tons. There would be nothing left of that city, and yet here we were talking about 2400 or 2250.

The Secretary continued that President Carter believed that this meeting could be an important step toward the realization of the foreign policy objectives to which he is committed: namely, a more peaceful world based on the reduction and control of arms; a deeper understanding with the Soviet Union; a resolution of regional conflicts; and restraint on the part of the major powers. President Carter shared the general views Brezhnev had expressed a moment ago, the views Brezhnev had said he would like to see stated in a joint paper.

The Secretary said that the President shared Brezhnev's vision of a world without nuclear weapons. In his Inaugural Address, President Carter had emphasized his commitment to working for a world without nuclear weapons.⁶ The President believed deeply that a SALT II agreement should be completed and signed as soon as feasible.

The Secretary said that with respect to the SALT II issues he agreed generally with Brezhnev's summary of the positions discussed. He pointed out that there was another important issue that had to be resolved—it was necessary to agree first on the definition of new types of

⁵ In a March 3 interview, when discussing SALT negotiations, Carter indicated that progress was being made and that there was no competition between the two countries in an arms race. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 4, 1978, pp. 459–460) However, in his speech at Wake Forest University on March 17, Carter insisted that there was an arms race and that the United States should remain competitive. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 17, 1978, pp. 529–538)

⁶ In his inaugural address, Carter stated: "The world is still engaged in a massive armaments race designed to ensure continuing equivalent strength among potential adversaries. We pledge perseverance and wisdom in our efforts to limit the world's armaments to those necessary for each nation's own domestic safety. And we will move this year a step toward our ultimate goal—the elimination of all nuclear weapons from this Earth. We urge all other people to join us, for success can mean life instead of death." (*Public Papers: Carter, 1977*, vol. I, p. 3)

missiles. However, he believed that the two delegations in Geneva should be able to work on this matter and resolve it promptly. Of course, there were also other matters which had to be resolved by the two delegations in Geneva, such as the bomber counting rule, the definition of cruise missile range, etc. Some of these were technical matters and the delegations should be instructed to resolve them promptly.

The Secretary said that President Carter had asked him to present a broad review of the present state of relations between our two countries, and to express to Brezhnev frankly those issues which were the source of deep concern to him and to the American public at large. He had asked the Secretary to stress that the United States seeks a detente that is increasingly comprehensive and genuinely reciprocal. Unless we can move in this direction, some of the central factors in the relationship, including the successful ratification of SALT, would be adversely affected by the consequent deterioration in the political environment. Therefore, he wished to stress that mutual restraint lies at the core of a detente relationship. We regard the US-Soviet relationship as central to world peace and global stability. This relationship must, therefore, be one of mutual restraint, in accordance with the Basic Principles of Relations signed between our two countries in May 1972. If these principles are not observed, it will lead to an unregulated and increasingly dangerous competition.

Brezhnev interrupted to ask what sort of restraint the Secretary had in mind.

The Secretary said he would come to that, but in that connection wished to have a clarification of Soviet objectives in Africa, and in particular southern Africa. This is needed in order to provide a positive political framework for pursuing other issues of importance to both our countries. We would regard it as a matter of importance that the Soviet Union not be drawn into an effort to resolve the Eritrean issue by force. It is clear that the continued presence of Soviet military and Cuban combat personnel in the Horn of Africa will provoke a reaction from Ethiopia's neighbors that could only lead to further tension and conflict. We strongly believe that the early withdrawal of all external forces from Ethiopia would avert the dangerous trends now building up in Africa. We would hope that the Soviet Union would use its influence to this end. While we had no objection to Soviet cooperation with the Patriotic Front and the Front Line countries in southern Africa, the Secretary wished to make it clear beyond any doubt that intrusion of external forces into southern Africa will jeopardize detente as a whole, and seriously fray the relationship between our two countries.

Brezhnev interrupted to say that he would respond.

The Secretary said it might be helpful if he were to outline our objectives in southern Africa, particularly in Rhodesia and Namibia. We had

been working together with the British trying to bring about a situation in which there would be a peaceful transition to majority rule in the near future, hopefully before the end of this current year, a transition that would result in an independent Zimbabwe. We know that for this to be successful, for a lasting peace to be established there, the Patriotic Front must play a role in the transition process, and be given the opportunity along with others to put their candidacy before the people of Zimbabwe. We believe that in a free election Joshua Nkomo would probably be elected President of Zimbabwe. We recognize that Bishop Muzorewa⁷ enjoyed considerable support, but believe that Nkomo had a stronger political base and, therefore, would win in a free election. In short, with reference to Zimbabwe, we recognize that the people there had to make their own choice, and what we were trying to do was to help see to it that there be a peaceful transition and that the people of Zimbabwe be free to express their will in an election before the end of this year.

Brezhnev, interrupting, said that is correct.

The Secretary continued that as for Namibia, here, too, our only objective is for the people of Namibia to decide their own future and choose their own leaders. The Secretary believed, and he understood that the Soviet side also believed, that free elections must be held in accordance with UN Resolution 385.⁸ We oppose a so-called internal solution in Namibia, and believe that the transition period and the election must be under the supervision of the United Nations, to make sure that it would be fair and free. The Secretary wanted to conclude this point by saying that there could not be a lasting solution to the Namibian problem unless SWAPO played a full part in the political process. He had recently talked with Nujoma⁹ about his concerns and how they could be met. The Secretary concluded by saying that he had made this digression to explain our views with regard to southern Africa, and he hoped that this would help give the Soviet Union a better understanding of our objectives in that area.

Brezhnev stated his belief that African affairs and the relations of the Soviet Union with African countries had no bearing on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union, no more bearing than, for example, the relations of the United States with Chile or Iran or any other country. Attempts to create an artificial linkage could only interfere with the development of good relations between our two coun-

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 89.

⁸ U.N. Resolution 385 condemned South African occupation of Namibia and its treatment of Namibians. It also called for free, democratic elections in Namibia. For the complete text, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1976, pp. 782–783.

⁹ Sam Nujoma, President of SWAPO.

tries. If such an intention did indeed exist, then, of course, one could link anything with anything else. But, in general, the Soviet leadership did not understand how anyone could discern a cause for alarm in the relations between the Soviet Union and African countries, nor why all sorts of pernicious plans were ascribed to the Soviet Union for the sole reason that at the request of friendly Ethiopia the Soviet Union had helped that country defend itself against the aggression to which it had been subjected. From the point of view of international law and from the point of view of morality, the Soviet actions there had been fully justified. No Soviet military forces had been in that area, and none were there now. The Soviet Union did not want to get something for itself there. As for the Cubans, Cuba and Ethiopia were sovereign states. The Soviet leadership could not speak for them and did not want to do so. He would only say that he saw nothing threatening anyone in the actions of the Cubans in Africa. In the United States, things had progressed so far that all sorts of apprehensions were now being voiced, to the effect that the Cubans and the Russians would penetrate even countries like Rhodesia and Namibia in order there to concoct some sort of intrigue against the Western powers. He would say that this was totally in the realm of fantasy. In the meanwhile, he would also note that it was not Gromyko or Ustinov who were traveling to these countries, but Secretary Vance and the British Foreign Secretary.¹⁰ He would suggest, therefore, that there was no need to pile up artificial difficulties in the path of developing our bilateral relations. There were so many complex questions involved in them already that God's help would be needed to cope with the real problems we had.

The Secretary said it was the view of the President and himself that the depth of our feeling concerning developments in Africa derived not only from our national interests but from our entire national experience. Any efforts that resulted in fanning the flames of a major racial war in southern Africa would only provoke the most profound and adverse reaction on the part of the American people. It was for this reason that we believe the relationship between our two countries is at a watershed. We are willing and ready to try to improve our relations, to widen the scope of cooperation to other areas, and to work together on the widest possible range of issues; but progress in this direction was more difficult, if not *impossible*, by a selective detente.

Brezhnev interrupted to say that most-favored-nation treatment had not yet been accorded the Soviet Union. The Soviet Government had heard promises and words, but nothing had been done. Senators like Jackson (Brezhnev forgot the name and had to be prompted by Dobrynin) were visiting China and praising China to the skies. They were

¹⁰ See footnote 1, Document 97.

saying that the United States must cooperate with China and must be on China's side. That was the business of the United States and the Soviet Union would not interfere. But, it would express its own views on these matters. He had not wanted to say that, but it seemed to him that eventually the United States would turn over Taiwan to the Chinese. It would turn over its own allies, sell them down the river. Well, there is nothing eternal under the moon.

The Secretary said we had made it very clear that the security of the people of Taiwan was of critical importance to the United States. We had told this to the Chinese so they would have no illusions on this score. In fact, it was the Secretary's frankness in discussing this and making our position clear to the Chinese that had made his visit to China a few months ago difficult.

The Secretary wanted to say one more word regarding the African situation. It was true that he had traveled to Rhodesia and Namibia, but the purpose of his trip had been to bring about peaceful transition and free elections. Not a single US soldier was involved in that area.

Brezhnev said that lots of questions remained unanswered, nevertheless. There were no US soldiers there, the people there were trying to settle their own affairs, and yet the American Secretary of State was traveling to that region for reasons no one could understand. Since he was traveling there, that meant that he was interfering in some way in internal matters; the Secretary would know best what these matters were.

The Secretary replied that President Brezhnev would know that he had gone to Rhodesia at the invitation of the Front Line states after their consultations with the Patriotic Front. He had been asked to help in bringing about a peaceful transition and free elections.

Brezhnev said that might very well be so, but he would advise the Secretary to focus his attention first of all on the question of nuclear weapons, on banning the production of all types of new weapons. He would advise him not just to travel around the various countries, but to focus his attention on questions of paramount importance. Otherwise, they could simply have a pleasant talk here, drink some tea, but what would the Secretary be leaving with; and, for that matter, what had he brought with him?

Brezhnev said he had been given a piece of paper which was the draft announcement concerning the meeting today. It mentioned Secretary Vance being received by Brezhnev and not much more. Not much more could be said because the Secretary had not brought enough with him. Day in and day out the Soviet leadership read statements made by various US officials, sometimes by Brzezinski and sometimes by others, and many of these were contradictory. He would ask the Secretary to tell President Carter the terms on which Brezhnev would be prepared

to meet with the President. If President Carter really wants to preserve mankind from the threat of nuclear war, Brezhnev would be prepared to meet with him anywhere—in Washington, Moscow, or Geneva, or even Minsk. They could work out a joint statement along the lines of renouncing nuclear war and nuclear weapons, and publish it immediately for all the world to read. That would really contribute to good relations between our two countries. Otherwise, with the arms race going on and Senator Jackson walking about yelling his head off on all sorts of subjects, nothing much would result. Brezhnev did not want to talk about petty matters in his talk with Secretary Vance. He wanted to talk on a broad scale. He was convinced that the Secretary thought just as he did in this respect.

The Secretary said he did agree that it was necessary for us to focus on the major issues. He was sure that President Carter would welcome a meeting with Brezhnev. It was not clear to him, however, whether Brezhnev was suggesting that such a meeting be held before conclusion of a SALT agreement, if the general kind of agreement Brezhnev had referred to could be the result of such a meeting.

Brezhnev hesitated, turned to Gromyko, and then said he believed the meeting should be held in connection with signing of the SALT agreement.

The Secretary wanted to offer some further comments on another matter involving nuclear weapons. He wanted to stress the importance we attached to concluding an agreement on a comprehensive test ban. Early next month we would resume negotiations on this subject in Geneva. The Secretary would hope that progress could be achieved, since it would enable us to reach a durable and comprehensive test ban.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union wanted to achieve the same thing.

The Secretary said that the United States would like the comprehensive test ban negotiations to be completed as soon as possible. If completed, perhaps it could be signed by President Carter and by Brezhnev at the same time as the SALT agreement.

Gromyko interjected that two agreements were better than one.

The Secretary turned to the important question of European security. He wanted to express the hope that the recent Western initiatives in the Vienna negotiations on mutual and balanced force reductions would be met by a commensurate response from the Warsaw Pact side. He hoped that the recent Western initiative, which he had discussed with Gromyko yesterday, would be seriously studied by the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, and it was his understanding that this was now being done and that a response would be provided as soon as possible.

Reading from a paper, *Brezhnev* replied that the NATO countries had recently tabled an updated proposal which was now being carefully studied and would be answered in due time. The first impression of the Soviet side was that this proposal of the Western countries contained some elements which took into account certain considerations of the socialist states, although it clearly retained the overall nature of a one-sided approach, and still manifested a desire to use the Vienna talks not so much to lower the overall level of the opposing military forces, as to change the ratio between them in favor of the Western countries, to the detriment of the socialist countries. They would certainly continue to work and do all within their power, within reasonable limits, to reach an understanding and to reduce military tensions in Europe.

Brezhnev said that all that was left to do now was to convey his best wishes to President Carter, to express his hope for detente and for improvement of the relations between our two countries. This was certainly feasible and he was certain it would be supported by the people of the United States.

Brezhnev had his interpreter read the text of a unilateral statement he proposed to release to the press.¹¹

The Secretary said it sounded all right to him. He would add a few words, realising that the hour was late. (Brezhnev was beginning visibly to tire.) The Secretary said we realized the importance the Soviet Union attached to the question of an exception in the new missile category. We have discussed this issue at length and have made some progress in the direction of a solution to this issue. We had also resolved the non-circumvention question, and had thus laid the basis for agreement on the text of the Joint Statement of Principles. He would point out that we had come here with serious intent, had made some progress, and now faced the task of completing work on the remaining issues.

With reference to SALT, *the Secretary* wanted to stress that SALT did not exist in a vacuum. The ratification process in Congress was bound to be affected by the general political atmosphere and by public opinion in the United States. These would be affected by Soviet actions.

(Brezhnev appeared to be getting tired and his attention began to wander.)

The Secretary said he wanted to make another point. In place of an unrestrained political and military competition, the United States would prefer and would welcome closer cooperation with the Soviet Union in dealing with the many global problems that confront man-

¹¹ The joint communiqué, released on April 22, dealt primarily with arms limitation issues. For text of the communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1978, p. 26.

kind in the Third World. The North/South relationship would become more constructive if the Communist countries were prepared to cooperate more closely with other developed countries in helping the developing countries overcome the many difficulties they faced, such as in agricultural development, the expansion of trade, the establishment of a common fund, and the development of useful forms of technology. It is our view that such cooperation would not only provide additional opportunities for closer friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union, but would defuse tensions in the world and benefit mankind as a whole.

Brezhnev remarked that questions such as these could be discussed for many months.

The Secretary agreed that they would take a lot of time and was suggesting this for future consideration.

(Because of the fact that *Brezhnev* was obviously tiring, the Secretary decided to pursue the issue of the Soviet's unacceptable position on the neutron bomb with Minister Gromyko. This was done in a subsequent conversation with Gromyko.)

104. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 28, 1978

SUBJECT

Secretary's Meeting with Amb. Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Marshall D. Shulman

USSR

Amb. Anatoly Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came to the Department at the Secretary's invitation on April 28 for a follow-up on a number of points regarding SALT and the Moscow visit. There was also a discussion of the South

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1978. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Shulman on April 29. The meeting took place at the Department of State.

African nuclear question and of Namibia. A non paper on the Law of the Sea was transmitted.²

I. Moscow Meeting Follow-Up

1. Tentatively, the following dates were discussed for a possible Gromyko visit to Washington, prior to his appearance at the SSOD: arrival Sunday night, May 21; meetings May 22 and 23. Dobrynin said he would check Moscow and confirm. He believed Gromyko was scheduled to speak at the SSOD May 25.

2. The Secretary expressed appreciation for the hospitality and courtesies extended to him and to his party in Moscow.

3. Dobrynin said that Brezhnev's speech to the Komsomols was intended to register a positive reaction to the Moscow meetings; he said there was surprise in Moscow that the only comment made by the President at his press conference³ was so sharply negative. The Secretary explained that the only question asked of the President concerned Brezhnev's position on ERW, and he did not have an opportunity to respond to other aspects of the Brezhnev speech. These were covered, he said, in the response to questions by the State Department spokesman on April 26,⁴ the transcript of which was given to Dobrynin.

4. The Secretary reminded Dobrynin that Gromyko had offered to supply the flight profile of the Backfire. Dobrynin said he would follow up the matter.

5. The Secretary asked if Dobrynin had further information on Gromyko's suggestion that preliminary steps could be taken to make missiles inoperable prior to complete dismantling, and in particular whether such steps would be subject to verification. Dobrynin said he thought the steps could be verifiable, but that he would try to get additional information.

6. The Secretary said, with reference to New Types, that although the US preferred position was to have no exceptions, it had made an effort to take account of the Soviet desire by offering to accept one exception for each side; if this were to be accepted, he stressed, each side would have to be free to make the exception MIRVed or SRV, according to its own preference. Dobrynin indicated some resistance to this point, on the ground that a MIRVed exception would be more destabilizing, but did not say that this was a final Soviet position.

² Not found.

³ Carter stated at his April 25 news conference that the Soviets had spent years building up their tank forces and as a result, had no need for a neutron bomb. For the text of the news conference, see Department of State *Bulletin*, June 1978, pp. 12–13.

⁴ Not found.

II. South African Nuclear Question

The Secretary said that Ambassador Gerard Smith would be going to South Africa in the near future, to discuss its adherence to the NPT and acceptance of interim safeguards on the Valindaba enrichment plant. He expressed the conviction that diplomatic negotiations could be more effective than public pressures at this point, and hoped that the Soviet Union would not support action of discussion by the UN Security Council at the present time. He said we did not have information that indicated another test site was under construction, and that we would welcome any supporting evidence on this point the Soviet Union would provide. He also said that the US appreciated the serious treatment with which this issue was being handled, and hoped that constructive cooperation could continue.

III. Namibia

Recalling the discussions in Moscow on African issues, the Secretary reviewed with Dobrynin current negotiations on Namibia. He said that the Contact Group proposals had now been accepted by South Africa, and that acceptance by SWAPO was now the critical next step required. He asked Dobrynin to forward to Moscow our request that the Soviet Union use its influence to bring about SWAPO acceptance of the proposals, and said that this would open the way to a prompt and fair transition to independence and majority rule. This result, he said, should be a matter of common interest and cooperation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The alternative would be bad for everyone concerned. The Secretary reviewed in detail the major points raised by Nujoma as conditions for his acceptance.

IV. Middle East

Dobrynin asked whether anything new had emerged from the discussions with Moshe Dayan. The Secretary replied not much and that it appeared useful to try to get the discussion focussed now on concrete next steps on the West Bank/Gaza and the Palestinian questions which would lead to a declaration of principles.

V. Law of the Sea

Following the meeting with the Secretary, Shulman transmitted to Dobrynin a non paper requesting Soviet cooperation in an effort to remedy deficiencies in the environmental provisions of the negotiating text before the Law of the Sea Conference. Dobrynin said he would cable a summary of the matter immediately, and pouch the full text of the non paper after the weekend.

105. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 3, 1978, 2:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

Moscow Trip, Soviet Jewish Emigration, Shcharanskiy Case,
Humphrey-Findley Bill

PARTICIPANTS

Eugene Gold, Chairman, National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ)
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, Chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major
American Jewish Organizations
Jerry Goodman, Executive Director, NCSJ
Marina Wallach, Washington Representative, NCSJ
Yehuda Hellman, Executive Director, Conference of Presidents
The Secretary
Patricia Derian, Assistant Secretary, HA
William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Melvyn Levitsky, EUR/SOV (notetaker)

The Secretary began by briefing the group on the results of his trip to Moscow. He said the general atmosphere was somewhat better this time. He informed Gold that during the visit we had given the Soviets the list of hardship emigration cases which was prepared by the NCSJ. We had received no immediate response, but the Secretary noted that the Soviets in such cases never go beyond saying they will study the matter. In this context, the Secretary referred to the fact that the emigration figures were substantially up from 1977. Gold said the NCSJ was aware of this approximate 40 percent increase.

The Secretary stated that the Soviets are well aware of our concerns in the Shcharanskiy case. His impression was that the Soviets are still struggling over the question of what to do and how to proceed on the case. He was convinced that it is being handled at the highest level in Moscow. There were no new developments to report, however. He said we would keep after the Soviets and continue to press them on the Shcharanskiy case.

Gold asked how the Secretary saw the situation playing out.

The Secretary responded that we had done a good deal of advance planning so that we could handle any contingency promptly. He felt

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1978. Confidential; Nodis. Drafted by Levitsky on May 4; cleared by Luers, Derian, and Shulman; approved by Anderson on May 9. Levitsky initialed for Luers, Derian, and Shulman. The meeting took place in Vance's office.

the best way for the Government to act was to continue to exert pressure quietly while private organizations kept up public pressure.

Gold asked for the Secretary's opinion on possible prisoners exchanges involving Shcharanskiy, a subject which had appeared in the press.

The Secretary replied that there was nothing to report with regard to an exchange for Shcharanskiy. We had no proposals from the Soviets on which to act. The Secretary asked Luers to comment on Gold's question about the potential for an exchange in the future.

Luers said we felt the Soviets were still deciding what to do on the case and might be trying to find a way out. We continue to believe that they will have a trial and convict Shcharanskiy but they may be thinking of a post-trial expulsion or an exchange. Either of these could take place, even after Shcharanskiy was imprisoned. Luers noted that we were treating the exchange issue very delicately now, since we do not want to close off options for the future.

In response to Gold's and Schindler's questions about how we follow up on the lists we present to the Soviets, the Secretary said that we keep track of progress on these cases here and in Moscow. Our impression is that there has been some progress. Luers remarked that we were considering, along with Ms. Derian's office, following up with the Soviets on CSCE matters and that emigration and family reunification were subjects which could be covered.

Goodman said the NCSJ's records show that the list of refused Jewish emigrants remains about the same in size, but that the people on it change. Some are allowed out but others receive new refusals and take their places.

The Secretary said we felt the presentation of a list was a prodding factor which had a positive effect in general. Gold and Schindler agreed with this assessment.

Goodman asked the Secretary if he felt the relatively better emigration flow in recent months would continue. The Secretary said he wanted to be cautious in making predictions, but that he guessed that the improved situation would continue.

Gold mentioned that the NCSJ had shown some flexibility in testifying on the Humphrey-Findley Bill which would exempt CCC credits from the Jackson-Vanik restrictions. Congressman Findley had told them that he was interested in helping American farmers, but that he felt China was more important in this regard. He therefore said he would be willing to consider any proposal by the NCSJ which would exclude the Soviet Union from the Bill. Gold and Goodman pointed out that the NCSJ had decided not to present such a proposal and that while they did not support the Bill, neither had they tried to institute a

massive campaign against it. They wanted to show a reasonable attitude and that American Jews were not just nay-sayers. They asked the Secretary if he thought this should be pointed out to the Soviets as a way of encouraging them to continue their better performance in emigration. Schindler felt that this should be made explicit, that the message on the Jewish community's flexibility should be imparted to the Soviets directly by the Administration. Gold said this reasonable attitude would be clear from the legislative history of the Humphrey-Findley Bill and that perhaps this could be pointed out to the Soviets.

The Secretary said he thought the NCSJ's policy of demonstrating flexibility was a good one. Holding out a carrot and showing that positive developments in the emigration field could produce movement in the future could be useful. While the Administration could not take too much of a forward position on the Bill, he said we would be glad to make the Soviets aware of the more flexible stance by American Jewish organizations on the CCC issue if Gold and Schindler wanted us to do so. Both felt this was a good idea and said they would stay in touch with the Department on this.

Goodman said the NCSJ appreciated what the Administration had done on the Shcharanskiy case and on the general Soviet Jewry issue. He noted, however, that although the emigration figures were up, the overall picture (i.e. harassment of Soviet Jews, arbitrary treatment, etc.) was more troubling. The level was now about 2,000 per month. Did we have any assurances that this would continue?

The Secretary said that he could not give such assurances. He had a "gut feeling" that the trend would continue, but nothing more than that. The Secretary said that if we get a SALT agreement with the Soviets this would improve the overall atmosphere considerably. SALT was the litmus test of the relationship. He said he thought we would have a good agreement eventually but that he could not predict when.

106. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 25, 1978, 1407Z

11713. Subject: Probable Penetration. Ref: Moscow 11684.²

1. Antenna appears to be a modified 3 element Yagi (similar to Soviet TV antennae) directed in a north easterly direction. Polarization is vertical.

2. Antenna is located approximately at the top of the seventh floor inside the chimney.

3. Antenna feeds a white box about 4" x 2" x 10" that is probably a preamp since "12V" is clearly visible.

4. Second white box about 3" x 1½" x 6" is taped to above box and may be a combining network.

5. Other writing visible is "1361XOJ" and "N003."

6. Antenna has been left in place and cables are intact. It has been secured by lines and steel bars to preclude attempt at recovery by opposition.

7. Chimney shaft may include multiple cables at lower levels that appear to enter both the Embassy and Soviet building. Cables continue down shaft and enter Soviet building at basement level.

8. We will soon enter shaft to inspect lower suspected cabling.

Matlock

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 152, USSR: Technical Penetration of US Embassy in Moscow: 5–6/78. Secret; Immediate. Sent via the SY Channel.

² Telegram 11684 from Moscow, May 25, describing the technical penetration, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number].

107. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 25, 1978, 1502Z

11720. Subject: Technical Penetration of U.S. Embassy Moscow. Ref: (A) Moscow 11684, (B) Moscow 11713.²

1. We have entered the chimney and found a tunnel at the bottom. Tunnel heads 30 feet north and then turns west. Hatch entrance appears to enter Soviet changing room in Embassy.

2. Listening post located at bottom of shaft with headset and microphone. Line box with 8 dual pin jacks also found. Headset plugged in and appears dead.

3. We will enter tunnel at this time.

4. Still possible that opposition has not been alerted.

Matlock

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Secret; Immediate. Sent via the SY channel.

² See Document 106 and footnote 2 thereto.

108. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 25, 1978, 1933Z

11770. Subject: Technical Penetration of US Embassy Moscow. Ref: (A) Moscow 11684, (B) Moscow 11713 (C) Moscow 11720.²

1. We have entered and explored tunnel. It heads about 25 feet due north then makes a gradual left turn and further progress is blocked

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 152, USSR: Technical Penetration of US Embassy in Moscow: 5–6/78. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent via the SY Channel.

² See Document 106 and footnote 2 thereto and Document 107.

about 40 feet further on by a sheet metal barrier. Barrier appears to definitely be off the Embassy compound.

2. There are four cables exiting the chimney that head down the tunnel. One services the antenna, two go into the back of the line box mentioned in reftel C, and one connects to a Uher microphone with a switch encased in a plastic bag. All four cables terminate in a jumble of cable located about two feet in front of the sheet metal.

3. About ten feet beyond the bend three heavy black cables enter what appears to be the basement of the Soviet apartment building. These cables continue down the tunnel and enter the jumble in front of the sheet metal.

4. Two heavy black cables exit the jumble and go through the roof of the tunnel.

5. Tunnel ceiling turns from brick to sheet steel beyond point where three cables enter building basement.

6. Small opening (two foot square) is located to the south just in front of sheet metal barrier. This opening is blocked off by loose brick.

7. There appears to be five trip wires connected to the loose brick fill. These wires are soldered to heavier gauge wires that either enter the wire jumble or a plastic wrapped object about the size of a transistor radio.

8. Two tunnel accesses are in the Soviet changing room as reported in reftel C.

9. We are now trying to trace all cables without disturbing trip wires.

10. Since opposition will definitely be alerted at 8:00 a.m. when Soviet workers will be denied access to changing room, we request immediate Departmental guidance.

11. Once opposition is alerted, we suspect they will enter tunnel from the far end and seal off access or remove as much cabling as possible.

12. Photographic documentation continues.

Matlock

109. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, May 25, 1978, 4:15–6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vance-Gromyko Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

US

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Mr. Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Minister Gromyko welcomed the Secretary at the Soviet Mission and asked him how he wanted to proceed.

The Secretary first wanted to convey to Gromyko President Carter's personal regards, and tell him that the President looked forward to their scheduled meeting Saturday morning.² That meeting would take about 2 hours, or however long might be necessary, and the Secretary would suggest that after that he and Gromyko go back to discuss the matters remaining after the meeting with the President. Tonight the Secretary planned to return to Washington and would come out to the airport to meet Gromyko at 5 p.m. tomorrow.

Gromyko said he planned to arrive about that time unless the skies cracked open or something else happened.

The Secretary pointed out that the meeting on Saturday was planned for the ungodly hour of 8 a.m. in view of the President's plans to leave town immediately after their meeting.

Gromyko agreed and said he would plan to meet with the President for two hours or more and then with the Secretary. He would want to discuss the main question between our two countries, the one he and the Secretary had discussed in Moscow and earlier in Washington. There would not be much time to discuss other matters, although he supposed that the President or the Secretary would have some general remarks bearing on Soviet-American relations, and he would also have a few words on that subject. He asked the Secretary who would start off the conversation on Saturday.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, 5/26–27, 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

² May 27; see Document 115.

The Secretary replied that he had not discussed this with the President, but would find out after returning to Washington. Did Gromyko have any preference?

Gromyko said he had no preference, but it should be borne in mind that in Moscow the Secretary had spoken first. This time Gromyko might express a few considerations to which the President might want to reply.

The Secretary said that would be a good way to proceed.

SALT

Gromyko said he did not want to discuss substantive matters today, since he would get to them on Saturday. However, he did want to tell the Secretary now in a preliminary way that unless a solution was found to the question of one new type of missile for each side, on the basis his government had suggested, there would be no agreement. If the Soviet side were to accept the US proposal in this matter, the two countries would find themselves in entirely different situations in terms of their respective security. He was not saying this as a bargaining point. It was the objective situation of the Soviet Union that compelled his authorities persistently to advance their proposal that each side be permitted to develop, test and deploy one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle.

As for the Backfire issue, Gromyko would have some considerations to express when the two sides got down to substance in Washington, in view of the fact that in Moscow the Secretary had emphasized that for the United States this was a question of major importance.³ He could not help noting, however, that in terms of substance this was not an issue at all. In fact, the Soviet Union had probably been wrong to engage in discussion of this subject. That had been a mistake from the very beginning. While he did not want to discuss the substance of this matter now, he simply wanted to put the Secretary on notice on this score. The Soviet side had stated that the Backfire was not a strategic weapons system, and as he had said before, this system should not have been discussed at all. Nevertheless, he had told the Secretary in Washington and in Moscow that the Soviet Union was prepared to make a unilateral statement regarding the Backfire. After that, Soviet authorities had thought that reason would prevail. Unfortunately this had not been the case, and in the US Congress the question had escalated and become over-emphasized. It seemed that one Congressman had said something, a second one took up where the first left off, etc., until the issue had been blown up out of proportion. Now he

³ For the memoranda of conversation covering the SALT discussions in Moscow, see Documents 99–101.

and the Secretary would have to sit down and try to unravel this knot, although he felt there should have been no need to do that at all.

Further, he and his authorities in Moscow had noted that the US Government recently appeared to be of two minds about the very idea of a new accord. Sometimes, it seemed, the US Government simply left matters to drift, to be driven by the wind. Some sort of a passive attitude was displayed toward the new agreement. At times it was difficult to understand whether a statement by a US official spoke in favor of the new agreement or against it. When he and the Secretary had discussed SALT matters in Moscow, it had appeared that the United States was in favor of concluding a new agreement, and the same had been true last year in Washington, when President Carter had spoken in favor of doing so. On the other hand, it was very difficult to regard recent official statements of the US as arguing in favor of the new agreement.⁴ He would ask the Secretary to clarify the true position of the US Government. In this connection, he would note that Vice President Mondale's speech in the General Assembly yesterday⁵ had caused some dismay on the Soviet side. He did not want to go into detail now, since he would speak in the General Assembly tomorrow, and would take into account the Vice President's speech, but without indulging in emotions, unlike yesterday's speaker. Our two countries had interests that were much more important than some of the issues mentioned yesterday. These interests had to be taken into consideration, applying logic and reason. Surely the Secretary understood that peace could not be built without the participation of the United States and the Soviet Union. Gromyko's authorities understood very well that ensuring genuine world peace and security required the participation of both our countries. As for war, neither of our nations wanted or needed a war. Both sides realized full well what a war would mean today, taking into account the development of modern technology. Therefore, it was quite unnecessary to build up some sort of artificial myths and fears and then put stock in them. What was needed was a calm, considered and thoughtful approach, one that applied reason. He would point out, therefore, that if yesterday's speech had been aimed at putting pressure on the Soviet Union, and if some other statements pursued the same objective, nothing would come of it. Attempts had been made many

⁴ During Carter's May 4 news conference, he indicated that a new SALT treaty was not imminent. For the text, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, p. 852.

⁵ On May 24 Mondale addressed the U.N. Disarmament Sessions and outlined what he hoped would be the future of arms limitation. For the text of his speech, see "Excerpts From Vice President Mondale's Address to the U.N. Disarmament Session," *The New York Times*, May 25, 1978, p. A16. For more information on the decisions made at the special session of the General Assembly, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1978*, pp. 17–49.

times before to frighten the Soviet Union with speeches of this kind, but they never had any effect. Nor had the Soviet Union engaged in attempts to frighten anyone; the Soviet authorities did not like to pursue their objectives by such methods. What was essential was reason, a calm and patient approach, and complete awareness of the fact that the kind of peace that would prevail in the world depended on our two countries, as did the question of whether there would be peace at all.

The Secretary said he would respond very briefly. First, he wanted to make clear that, as he had indicated in Moscow and on many other occasions, we believed deeply that it was in the best interests of our two nations and in the best interest of the world that a SALT TWO agreement be reached as soon as possible. What we were both seeking was an agreement that would enhance the security of each of us by limiting and subsequently reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons, and by putting constraints on the qualitative improvement of strategic nuclear weapons. What we were both seeking was equal security, and we were seeking to move toward equal security by stopping the arms spiral and by reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons which, as President Brezhnev had said, were now many times more than was needed to destroy the whole world. Therefore, there should be no question at all that we have the same objective: i.e. to achieve a SALT TWO agreement at an early date and then move on to discussions on how to achieve further reductions at SALT III negotiations. That was clearly the view of President Carter, the Secretary himself, and the US Government. He was sure that President Carter would make this clear to Gromyko on Saturday.

The Secretary would agree that peace in the world was in the hands of our two countries. We had the awesome responsibility to see to it that we reached the kind of agreement that would ensure peace and would give us, our children and our grandchildren prospects of a better life in a peaceful world.

Not wishing to go into substance, the Secretary nevertheless wanted to touch briefly on the two questions to which Gromyko had referred. As far as the question of new missiles was concerned, as Gromyko knew, it had been our belief that there should be no new ICBM's for the period of the Protocol to the Treaty. At the same time, we recognized the importance to the Soviet Union of one exemption to the ban on new types of ICBM's. For that reason we had indicated that we would be willing to agree to one exemption for each side, provided it was an exemption for the period of the Treaty and that each side could make its own determination of whether the new missile that each would be permitted to develop and test would have a single reentry vehicle or MIRVs, depending on the needs of each side. We felt that we had made a major move in agreeing to consider the exemption to the

ban on new types, but in so doing we felt it essential that each side have the right to determine, if we went along that route, whether or not the new type of missile was to be MIRVed.

Insofar as the Backfire was concerned, the Secretary would prefer to leave that issue for the discussion on Saturday.

African Affairs

Speaking off the record and instructing his interpreter to stop taking notes, the Secretary expressed to Gromyko the concerns felt in the United States, among the general public and in Congress, over Soviet and Cuban activities in Africa. He pointed out that while we recognized that Soviet and Cuban assistance to Ethiopia had initially been caused by the Somali invasion of Ogaden, once this situation no longer existed, it was difficult for us to regard the continued presence of large numbers of Cuban troops in Ethiopia as anything other than cause for serious concern. Recognizing that Cuba was a sovereign state, it was felt nevertheless that the Soviet Union was in a position to exert appropriate influence upon the Cubans. Failure to do so had led to the perception that the involvement of the Cubans in Ethiopia was a joint undertaking by the Soviet Union and Cuba.

After the Secretary's off-the-record remarks, Gromyko suggested they join their two SSOD Delegations for a short period of time, and subsequently return to the issue the Secretary had raised. Gromyko, too, had something to say on African affairs.

The Secretary and Gromyko joined their two Delegations to the SSOD and introduced their members to each other. They then returned to their private discussion.

Gromyko told the Secretary that, as seen from Moscow, recent American behavior in African affairs was bringing the Soviet leadership to the conclusion that the United States was getting more and more involved in African affairs, either directly or through other states. Speaking frankly, this was viewed by the Soviet authorities as direct interference in the internal affairs of countries in that part of the world. What he had in mind in this connection was US participation in the airlift of troops, certain landing operations, and certain things being done in Zaire. At the same time, attempts were made to cast a shadow on the Soviet Union in this connection. He would point out that the Soviet Union did not have a single soldier or rifle in that area, and had no intention of sending any there.

As for Ogaden, Gromyko would point out that the matter there was not entirely settled. He did not know what President Siad Barre of Somalia had told the United States. He had told the Soviet Union, however, that he had made a mistake with regard to Ogaden. The Soviets had told him that in that case he should sit down at a negotiating table

and sign an agreement to close the matter. The trouble was that he had not done so, and did not want to do so. He had gone to China instead, although Gromyko did not know for what purpose. The truth of the matter was that the Soviet Government had persuaded the Ethiopians not to invade Somalia. (The Secretary acknowledged that he was aware of this.) In connection with the Secretary's remarks about Cuban forces in the area, Gromyko would say that their numbers, as reported in the US press, had been grossly exaggerated. He repeated that the Ogaden matter was not yet closed. For his part, he would not preclude the possibility of further bloodshed there.

As for Eritrea, he would point out that if the Soviet Union had not restrained the Ethiopians in that regard, blood would have flowed in veritable rivers. The Soviet Union was in favor of Eritrea receiving the broadest possible autonomy; however, that autonomy should be within the framework of a unified and sovereign Ethiopian state. (Gromyko asked the US interpreter to be sure that he had this last sentence down verbatim.) The Soviet Government had informed Mengistu that it favored a very broad autonomy for Eritrea, and had also accordingly informed the Revolutionary Council headed by Mengistu. In fact, the Soviet Government was still continuing to impress this idea upon the Ethiopians. It would be hard to say what might have happened if the Soviet Government had not done so. If anyone had told the Secretary that there were Cubans in Eritrea, Gromyko could only point out that this was pure fabrication. The Soviet leadership had talked to the Cubans in terms of the broad autonomy of which Gromyko had just spoken, and the Cubans had refused to get involved and had said so officially to Mengistu and the Revolutionary Council. They did not have military forces in Eritrea and did not intend to send a single soldier there. Such was the true situation.

Gromyko said that with regard to the African question, the Soviet leadership was getting the impression that some artificial pretexts were being established, perhaps not by the United States but by its Allies, to do certain things in Africa that should not be done. With regard to Namibia and Rhodesia, as he had told the Secretary earlier, there was not a single Soviet representative in those countries, not even a news correspondent. As for the fact of arms travelling, he would ask the Secretary if he could vouch for every single machine gun or rifle that had been sold by the United States to someone or other perhaps years ago? He was sure that the US could not account for many of these arms, any more than the Soviet Union could. That was an entirely different matter, however, one that had recently been the subject of initial discussions between our two countries, discussions Gromyko welcomed.

Summing up, Gromyko asked the Secretary not to link the African situation with SALT. To do so could only degrade the general situation, "both yours and ours."

Espionage Case

Gromyko wanted to say a couple of words regarding two of his people held in custody in the United States.⁶ He would ask the Secretary if they could be released as requested by the Soviet Government, or did the US really intend to unleash a new kind of war between intelligence services? The Soviet Union was asking the United States to release these men; they had not been caught red-handed and no one would be in a position to charge them with anything specific. If there were anyone wanting to throw charges at these men, Gromyko would only point out that any country could find ways of fabricating such charges. He hoped the Secretary would approach this from the standpoint of good common sense, realistically and objectively, and would not compel the Soviet Union to take measures in response, measures that would certainly not be to the liking of the United States. The Soviet Union had not taken such measures so far, displaying the utmost restraint in this matter. He asked the Secretary to inform President Carter accordingly.

The Secretary said he would do so, and would discuss this matter with Gromyko when they met in Washington.

⁶ Reference is to Rudolf Chernyayev and Valdik Enger, employees of the U.N. Secretariat who were arrested on May 20 on espionage charges. See David Binder, "2 Russians Arrested by FBI for Spying," *The New York Times*, May 21, 1978, p. 1.

110. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 25, 1978, 2304Z

11786. Subject: Technical Penetration of U.S. Embassy Moscow. Ref: (A) Moscow 11684 (B) Moscow 11713 (C) Moscow 11770.²

1. We believe we are faced with a decision in the next few hours of whether or not we should attempt to remove cables described in para 3

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files Box 152, USSR: Technical Penetration of US Embassy in Moscow: 5–6/78. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent via the SY Channel. Although the cable is dated May 26, it was actually sent just before midnight, Zulu time, on May 25.

² See footnote 2 to Document 106 and Documents 106–108.

of Moscow 11770. We are certain that this cable and the materials described in paras 4, 5, 6 and 7 are located in Soviet repeat Soviet territory.

2. While we do not repeat not know whether or not the Soviets are aware of our discovery, they will certainly learn of it by tomorrow morning (about 6 hours hence) when we deny Soviet workers the use of their changing rooms. By then it will probably be unsafe for us to go beyond the Embassy's territorial limits. If the Department believes the materials in Soviet territory would be useful in determining the extent and type of system, we believe we can still safely attach hooks and ropes to the cables and equipment in Soviet territory and drag parts of it back into U.S. territory from a position of safety. We must however, have the Department's instructions in the next few hours if this is to be done.

3. Any decision to remove equipment from tunnel under Soviet territory should of course have high-level political approval, including that of Ambassador Toon.

Matlock

111. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, May 26, 1978, 0019Z

134109. Subject: Technical Penetration. Refs: Moscow 11770, Moscow 11786.²

1. Do not repeat not attempt to penetrate any barriers. We believe risks of such attempts outweigh potential gains.

2. In order to hold detailed discussions with other agencies we would like to leave all discovered equipment in place for additional 24 hours if post can devise means of protecting all devices which would not further alert Soviets. This would preclude barring Soviets from change room.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 152, USSR: Technical Penetration of US Embassy in Moscow, 5–6/78. Secret; Niact Immediate. Sent via the SY Channel. Drafted by Maelyn Musser (A/SY/OPS/T); cleared by McCall and in substance by Shulman and Luers; approved by Musser.

² Telegram 11770 from Moscow, May 25, is Document 108. Telegram 11786 from Moscow, May 25, is Document 110.

3. If such means cannot be devised all discovered equipment on our territory should be removed and secured with as much of the cabling on our territory as possible. Before cutting cables perform tests to detect DC voltages, audio or RF on cables as time permits before Soviets are additionally alerted. This has been cleared at policy level in Department but not with Ambassador Toon, who is unavailable.

4. Advise us of all actions taken by the close of business in Moscow on Friday.³

5. Please include comments on apparent usage of tunnel or equipment, i.e. any indications of frequent and recent use or disuse. Also indicate if possible use could be determined for three cables entering tunnel beyond bend, i.e. multiple pair cables suitable for microphone system, power cables, coax cables, etc.

6. Based on your actions we will further advise by the COB in Washington on Friday.

7. Assume you will take whatever measures are possible to preclude inadvertent publicity.

8. Would appreciate Embassy recommendation on protest.

Christopher

³ May 26.

112. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 26, 1978, 1428Z

11855. Subject: Technical Penetration of United States Embassy Moscow. Ref: (A) Moscow 11792, (B) Moscow 11720, (C) Moscow 11770 (D) State 134109.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Moscow Embassy Security, 5/26/78. Secret; Niact Immediate.

² Telegram 11792 from Moscow, May 27 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number]. Telegrams 11720 and 11770 from Moscow, and 134109 to Moscow, are printed as Documents 107, 108, and 111.

1. Penetration appears to be limited to an antenna located in the south wing chimney that can be lowered or raised by a pulley system at the bottom of the chimney shaft. Listening post reported in para 2 of reftel B appears now to be a two way communications link between the antenna operator and monitoring site. Detailed inspection of line box and connections will be needed to verify this hypothesis. Only the four cables reported in reftel C, para 2, are in American territory.

2. Per para three of reftel D, voltage and audio checks were performed on the four cables which service the chimney.

A. The Uher microphone was found to be passing audio. The cable was cut at this time. DC and AC voltages were found on the mike cable.

B. The antenna cable was spliced without breaking the conductor paths to the antenna and a DC voltmeter was applied. At 0705 hours, plus 12 VDC and 25 VAC power was applied from the opposition end of the cable. At 0715, the voltage fell to zero, at 0733 12 VDC returned, 0743 off again, and at 0855 on again until we cut the cable at 1304 hours. Several frequency scans were conducted from 20–1000 megacycles while voltage was applied and before the cable was severed.

C. Cables three and four were also checked for voltage and impedance data. The smaller of the two cables registered 1000 ohms of impedance for the section leading back to the chimney and an open circuit for the oppositions cable end. The larger cable also read an open circuit for the oppositions segment of cable and one ohm for the chimney section.

3. Significant events in chronological order which occurred Friday:

- 0600–0700 — Cable voltage and impedance measurements conducted.
- 0640 — First char force personnel was refused permission to enter south wing char force change room.
- 0710–0855 — B plus applied repeatedly by opposition to the antenna cable.
- 0855–1205 — B plus remained steady.
- 1015–1205 — Frequency spectrum scans of antenna cable conducted.
- 1240 — Pounding sounds emanating from opposition end of tunnel.
- 1245 — Light coming from opposite end of tunnel first observed.
- 1255 — Visual sighting occurred approximately halfway down tunnel between resident Seabee and opposition.
- 1305 — Antenna cable cut to pressure antenna electronics.

- 1320 — Watch posted by opposition at point where three large cables enter the tunnel.
Observation post was basement area of adjoining apartment building controlled by opposition.
- 1326 — Four cables retrieved at demarcation between opposition and Embassy grounds.

4. At 1400 hours work commenced to gain access to the second tunnel entrance hidden under the char room subflooring. This entrance will be enlarged to permit the materials required for a barrier wall to be erected at the Embassy grounds boundary in the tunnel proper.

5. Once chimney and char room tunnel are secure from further compromise work will commence on analyzing the antenna array assembly. Departmental guidance is requested soonest regarding antenna disassembly and/or retrieval.

Matlock

113. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 26, 1978, 1445Z

11859. Subject: Technical Penetration. Ref: State 134109.²

1. Subject to Ambassador Toon's concurrence, Embassy recommends strongly that vigorous protest be lodged with Soviets regarding major physical penetration of Embassy premises, in total violation of all principles of extra-territoriality and international agreements guaranteeing it. Pertinent facts which might be mentioned include:

A. Construction and maintenance of surreptitious access to Embassy property.

B. Evidence of systematic and repeated violation of Embassy premises by Soviet personnel.

C. Installation and operation of electronic devices on Embassy property.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Moscow Embassy Security, 5/26/78. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 111.

2. Consideration might be given to delivering protest to Gromyko during weekend meetings, particularly if he weighs in heavily on Chernyayev and Enger arrest.³

3. This would seem appropriate opportunity to reiterate at high level our standing demand that microwave signals directed at Embassy be shut off forthwith. (Although final judgment must await full technical assessment, it is quite possible that the devices we discovered are associated with microwaves.)

Matlock

³ See footnote 6, Document 109.

114. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 26, 1978, 2352Z

11787. For Deputy Undersecretary Read from Charge. Subject: Major Technical Penetration of Embassy Moscow.

1. Assume SY has briefed you on details of major penetration of Embassy premises discovered today. We face urgent and critical decision whether to attempt to remove cabling and other equipment from portion of tunnel which is outside the bounds of Embassy territory. We consider it probable, but not absolutely certain, that the Soviets are aware of our discovery. Nevertheless, our people are confident that they can retrieve much of the cabling without major physical danger (there is without question some danger involved) if they do so tonight.

2. Technicians consider it important to retrieve following from Soviet end of tunnel to determine purpose and characteristics of surveillance system:

A. Section of each of 3 cables which run from metal plate up tunnel, and into Soviet apartment house. These are believed to be RF cables but may conceivably be power cables.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Moscow Embassy Security, 5/26/78. Secret; Niacr Immediate; Exdis Handle as Nodis.

B. Device (probably coupler) in plastic bag where trip wires and some cabling terminate.

C. Section of each of two cables exiting tunnel roof several feet in front of metal barrier.

3. I am informed that the cable can be cut without danger to person cutting. Retrieval of plastic bag would be accomplished by attaching rope and pulling from our end when all personnel are outside tunnel, in case the trip wire should activate explosive or gas.

4. Aside from physical risk, which is probably acceptable if recovery of items is considered crucial, there is of course the political risk involved in removing objects from Soviet territory. Inasmuch as all of this equipment appears to be a part of a system which has flagrantly violated Embassy territory, a decision to remove would probably be defensible, if the Soviets should complain. However, this is a question of sufficient gravity that I believe it should be decided at a high political level. If it were my decision, I would give it a try.

5. If we are to proceed, we must have instructions no later than 6:00 a.m. Moscow time (11:00 p.m. EST).²

Matlock

² Telegram 135571 to Moscow, May 27, outlined the actions to be taken and the information that should be sent to the Department of State. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780223–1015)

115. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 27, 1978, 8 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECTS

SALT, CTB, Africa, Human Rights

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

President Jimmy Carter
 Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
 Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
 Ambassador Paul C. Warnke
 Ambassador Malcolm Toon
 Mr. David Aaron
 Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
 Mr. Hamilton Jordan
 Mr. Jody Powell
 Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko²
 Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
 Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
 Ambassador V. Makarov
 Minister Counselor A.A. Bessmerinykh
 Mr. V.G. Komplektov
 Mr. N.N. Detinov
 Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

[Omitted here is discussion of SALT; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 204.]

CTB

As for CTB, the President did not see any need for detailed discussion here of verification and other matters. He believed that one primary issue he and Gromyko might discuss was the duration of the agreement being negotiated. We would like to see it have a five-year term, and then renegotiate the agreement if both sides considered it advisable to enter into a new agreement. To be perfectly frank, we had

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 50, Chron: 5/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Printed from a draft that bears numerous handwritten edits. Bartholomew noted on the first page: "ZB: Krimer memcon with RB fixes. Reg."

² Bartholomew underlined "Gromyko."

concerns with our own nuclear arsenal which required³ occasional testing in order to assure us that its capabilities were intact. We believed that five years was the maximum period of time we could go without some testing. He hoped that this would be satisfactory to the Soviet Union. As for the details,⁴ they could be left up to the negotiating teams.

Gromyko said that in the course of the negotiations encouraging progress had been achieved on this issue. There were still some unagreed questions—not many—including the question the President had just mentioned, i.e., the duration of a possible accord. He would ask the President to take into consideration some of the other outstanding matters involved in the CTB negotiations. Immediately prior to his departure from Moscow Gromyko had looked into the status of those negotiations and could say now that if the other issues can be resolved—and on some of them U.S. representatives had taken a very hard position—he believed that a positive solution could be found to the question of duration of the agreement.

The President asked Ambassador Warnke to touch on the other issues involved.

Ambassador Warnke said there appeared to be agreement in principle on the concepts of authenticated national seismic installations and on on-site inspections. Considerable differences still existed on the extent to which specific equipment to be used would be agreed upon at the present stage of the negotiations. There were also differences on the question of how on-site inspection would be carried out and what equipment would be permitted for that purpose.

The President said there was no need this morning to discuss the technical questions involved. He believed that one political question could be resolved, i.e., the length of the agreement. He thought that as termination of the agreement approached, negotiations could be held regarding extension of the agreement.⁵ His position was that five years was a reasonable term. As termination approached, negotiations could be resumed.

Gromyko repeated that if the other questions could be resolved in a positive manner, if the President's negotiators would manifest greater flexibility, he did not think a five-year term would present any difficulties.

³ Bartholomew put brackets around "which required" and wrote "and" in the margin above it.

⁴ Bartholomew added "on compliance," after "details."

⁵ Bartholomew added "or a new agreement" after "extension of the agreement."

The President noted that there were still differences between the United States and the Soviet Union at the SALT negotiations and at the CTB negotiations. He believed, however, that they could be resolved. There were two other items, however, which had now reached serious proportions and were tearing apart the mutual trust and friendship between our two countries which he believed were necessary to assure detente and future peace.⁶ These two items were⁷ different in nature, but equally⁸ important.

Africa

The first of these items concerned Soviet-Cuban intrusion⁹ and adventurism in Africa. We were refraining from having a military presence in Africa, but the Soviet presence there had increased to alarming proportions. We knew that the Soviet Union was in a position to exert a strong influence on the Cubans. The Soviets usually claimed that Cuba was an independent country that made its own decisions; we knew, however, of the enormous economic support the Soviet Union was rendering Cuba and could not believe that the Cubans could put 40 or 50 or 60 thousand men into Africa without the Soviet Union's tacit approval or encouragement.¹⁰ Referring to Zaire and the Katangans' invasion into that country, the President said we did not believe it to have been possible without Cuban assistance.¹¹ As for Eritrea, he hoped that the dispute there could be resolved without Soviet or Cuban presence or involvement.¹² With the United Nations we were trying to resolve the difficult questions involving Rhodesia and Namibia, and were doing so without any support on the part of the Soviet Union. He believed that it would be to the advantage of the Soviet Union and of our country to see all the parties involved come together in order to resolve the Rhodesian dispute by peaceful means. In this regard we were also consulting with Britain and other nations. If the Cubans were to refrain from interfering and if the Soviet Union were to lend its active support to our efforts, the Rhodesian problem could be resolved by peaceful means. Namibia was another instance requiring peaceful resolution. The Soviet Union did have an influence it could exert, all the way from

⁶ Bartholomew added "and the support of the US people" after "future peace."

⁷ Bartholomew added "very" after "items were."

⁸ Bartholomew put brackets around "equally" and wrote "both" in the margin above it.

⁹ Bartholomew added "presence," after "Soviet-Cuban."

¹⁰ Bartholomew put brackets around "tacit" and "encouragement." In the margin above "encouragement," he wrote "support."

¹¹ Bartholomew added "and Soviet knowledge and approval" after "assistance."

¹² Bartholomew put brackets around "involvement" and wrote "intrusion" in the margin above it.

public support of our efforts in Rhodesia and Namibia to exercising restraint in the Horn of Africa. He believed that elimination of Soviet-Cuban involvement in Africa would be a contributing factor to the¹³ improvement¹⁴ of Soviet-American relations. We were quite concerned and believed the Soviet Union knew that many other nations were equally concerned over Soviet efforts¹⁵ to increase Soviet influence in Africa by supply of weapons and by encouragement of Cuban involvement. The President wanted to express this concern to Gromyko and ask him to report to President Brezhnev that we considered this to be an alarming development, one that was¹⁶ still in progress.

Gromyko said that the Soviet leadership had certainly noted¹⁷ some of the President's recent statements on African matters, which, whether the President liked¹⁸ it or not, also somewhat exacerbated and heated up the atmosphere as regards relations between our two countries. In this connection he was now talking about the specific matters the President had raised in connection with Africa.¹⁹ There was no increasing Soviet presence in Africa. The Soviet Union did not have a single soldier with a rifle in Africa and did not intend to send any to²⁰ that area. The Soviet Union had indeed sent some quantities of arms to some African countries, as well as a very small number of experts who were helping the Africans master the use of the arms supplied. Not a single Soviet individual had fired a single shot in the course of the latest clashes in Africa, and not a single Soviet individual had taken part in any operation in that part of the world.²¹ The Soviet Union had condemned the Somali invasion of Ethiopia, had called it open aggression and had said so directly to the President of Somalia during his visit to Moscow. Later on President Siad Barre had acknowledged that he had committed aggression. He had asked the Soviet Union to help him extricate himself from that dirty war. The Soviets had told him by way of

¹³ Bartholomew put brackets around "involvement" and "would be a contributing factor to the." In the margin above "involvement," he wrote "intrusion." In the margin above "would be a contributing factor to the" he wrote "could alleviate the tensions and solve a major problem."

¹⁴ Bartholomew added "for" before "improvement."

¹⁵ Bartholomew put "efforts" in brackets and wrote "campaign" in the margin above it and added "the" before "Soviet," recommending that "Soviet efforts" be changed to read "the Soviet campaign."

¹⁶ Bartholomew added "apparently" after "one that was."

¹⁷ Bartholomew added "and paid attention to" after "noted."

¹⁸ Bartholomew put brackets around "liked" and wrote "wished" in the margin above it.

¹⁹ Bartholomew added the sentence "He was discussing Africa quite separately from SALT."

²⁰ Bartholomew added "a single African country in" after "send any to."

²¹ Bartholomew added "in any other manner" after "world."

advice to withdraw all his personnel from Ethiopia and to settle his dispute with Ethiopia by peaceful means. Quite recently, virtually several days ago, he had admitted that his invasion of Ethiopia had been a mistake and had asked the Soviet Union for help.²² The Soviet Union had given him some good advice—to withdraw all his personnel and arms from Ethiopian territory.²³ Further, Gromyko had already told Secretary Vance that the Soviet Union had insistently advised the Ethiopians, including Mengistu, to refrain²⁴ from having Ethiopian troops invade Somali territory. The Soviet Union had indeed supplied weapons to Ethiopia since Ethiopia had been a victim of aggression. Frankly speaking, he felt the United States, too, would have been fully justified if it had helped Ethiopia, since under the U.N. Charter a victim of aggression is entitled to receive assistance on an individual as well as a collective basis. That would have been up to the United States, of course, he was just mentioning this in passing.

Gromyko expressed the hope that the President was in possession of authentic information regarding the role of the Cubans in Ethiopia. The Ethiopians had asked Cuba for assistance just as they had asked the Soviet Union and other countries for assistance. It was very hard indeed to speak of numbers, because the numbers of Cubans involved there, as mentioned by the President, were exaggerated at least tenfold. He believed that the Somalis were deliberately exaggerating these numbers and that the United States was not sufficiently critical of the information it received from the Somalis. Incidentally, the Cubans, like the Soviets, had advised the Ethiopians not to cross the border into Somalia. The Soviet Union was indeed consulting with Cuba from time to time, but to speak of some sort of coordinated Cuban-Soviet²⁵ plan, etc., was absolutely wrong.²⁶

As for Eritrea, Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet position was that Eritrea should enjoy a broad autonomy within a united and sovereign Ethiopian state. The Soviets had said this many times to the Ethiopian leadership. This was not the same situation as had been the case with Ogaden. Each of these issues had its own specific aspects which were quite different from case to case. The Soviet Union had called upon the Ethiopian leaders not to permit any bloodshed in Eritrea and to settle the dispute there by peaceful means. The Soviet Union had ex-

²² Bartholomew added "again" after "help."

²³ Bartholomew added "and to sign peace with Ethiopia" after "Ethiopian territory."

²⁴ Bartholomew added "on any account" after "refrain."

²⁵ Bartholomew added "master" before "plan."

²⁶ Bartholomew noted in parentheses following this sentence, "Gromyko said in English, 'Absolutely, I deny it.'"

pressed this position to the Cubans as well, and they in turn had told the Soviets that their position in this respect was identical. There was not a single Cuban soldier fighting in Eritrea today. The Soviet leadership had been informed that this was Fidel Castro's firm position. As for further developments in that area, he was not at all sure that there would not be further bloodshed there. After all, there were certain circles outside that area, who urged the Eritreans to resist a peaceful settlement. What was more, Ethiopia, too, was not totally in sympathy with arriving at a peaceful settlement. If the Ethiopians had not been restrained by the Soviets and by the Cubans, blood would have flowed there long ago. Whether or not one could succeed in restraining them over a period of time, Gromyko did not know, but the Soviet Union was working in that direction. In Ethiopia the Soviet Union was a factor restraining hostilities rather than a factor prodding military action. To what extent this would be successful in the future he could not now predict. The Soviets had learned that one could not rely on the word of Siad Barre.²⁷ If the United States had not learned that lesson yet, he was sure it would reach that conclusion soon. At the time when the Soviet Union had supplied weapons to Somalia, it had been done on the condition that these weapons would not be used against third countries, but only for self-defense. Siad Barre had given the Soviet Union a pledge to that effect, but everyone knew what had happened subsequently.

As for Rhodesia, Namibia and Zaire, he could tell the President firmly that the Soviet Union had²⁸ no representatives in that area, not even news correspondents, and did not intend to send any representatives there. The Soviet Union knew absolutely nothing about the recent actions of the so-called gendarmes of Katanga. The very word brought back memories of the period when Tshombe had been in charge.

Gromyko noted that the President had spoken of the influence the Soviet Union had in Rhodesia and Namibia. If he had referred to ideological influence, he might have been right, because for many years the Soviet Union had argued against colonialism and racism. That was no secret. He would only point out that ideological influence knew no barriers at all. As for anything else, absolutely nothing was being done. He would guess that the President had received reports to the effect that the Soviet Union wanted to lay its hands on the entire area; he would tell the President, however, that the Soviet Union was doing absolutely nothing in that area, and knew nothing of the developments there except what was reported in the press. The Soviet Union was not sending

²⁷ Bartholomew added "on how he will use arms" after "Siad Barre."

²⁸ Bartholomew added "not one soldier," after "Soviet Union had."

any people to that area. He could imagine the hue and cry throughout the world that would be raised if any Soviets or Cubans travelled to Rhodesia or Namibia. They did not have a single representative there, unlike the United States.

Gromyko wanted to say a few words about Zaire. Whatever he knew about the recent invasion there, he knew from the reports of various press agencies and the reports of the Soviet representative in Zaire. The Soviet chargé d'affaires had been called in to see Mobutu recently and had been informed that some Katangan gendarmes had invaded the territory of Zaire from Angola. The Soviet Union had not even known of their presence in Angola. As for the Cubans, not a single Cuban had been caught or even seen in that invasion. Yet, for some reason people had started to blame first the Soviet Union and then the Cubans.²⁹ He had questioned the Cubans at a very high level about this invasion³⁰ and had been told that Cuba had absolutely nothing to do with the whole matter.³¹ The Soviet Union wanted to maintain good relations with Zaire and the Soviet chargé had said so to Mobutu. After all, what would President Carter want done? If there were some refugees in Angola who subsequently crossed the border into their own country, what should be done with them—should they be shot? They seemed to be running from repression. So much for the situation in Zaire. The President would note that Gromyko had said quite a few things about all these areas. As for Namibia, the Soviet Union was not looking for anything at all in that country and it had accordingly informed the British. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was totally against keeping the blacks in Rhodesia in bondage. 24 out of 25 people there were black, and the Soviet Union had stated that it was in favor of the majority of the people themselves deciding what kind of a government they should have. He could not agree with the thesis that foreigners would know best what should be done in Rhodesia. The Soviet Union was saying this, and that was no secret. That was its position of principle, based on its ideology. Soviet policy throughout the world was based on the premise that people were their own best masters.

In conclusion, Gromyko wanted to thank the President for the great patience he had displayed. Knowing how busy the President was, Gromyko had nevertheless taken a great deal of his time, but this was so because the questions they had discussed were very important. The President had made some statements, as had others, reflecting on the

²⁹ Bartholomew put "first" and "then" in brackets and wrote "move" in the margin above the bracketed "then."

³⁰ Bartholomew added "when the fighting started" after "this invasion."

³¹ Bartholomew added "there were no Cubans there or helping. The Angolans said the same and denied any involvement" after "the whole matter."

state of our bilateral relations. That, too, was important and therefore Gromyko had provided appropriate explanations. The Soviet Union had no designs on Africa at all. The President could rest assured that the Soviets did not want to lay their hands on Africa,³² the Soviet Union had a large enough territory of its own with much to do there. He would draw the conclusion that it was necessary for our two countries to consult with each other more frequently,³³ and to explain our respective views of the situation to each other. That should be done in person rather than just by written communications.

The President said he would respond briefly. U.S. assessment of the same situation was quite different from the assessment Gromyko had provided. We looked at the Horn of Africa with a great deal of concern. From our perspective, the Somalis had invaded Ogaden using Soviet weapons. We understood that the Ethiopian response there had been directed by a Soviet general. While the Soviet Union had not sent troops to the area, the Cubans had sent more than 15,000 men. We recognized that the Soviet Union and the United States had persuaded the Ethiopians not to cross the Somali border once the Somalis had been pushed out of Ogaden. However, Soviet generals and Cuban officers remained,³⁴ perhaps directing combat³⁵ against Eritrea. The Cubans had said that they were not involved directly, that they had no troops in combat status in Eritrea. We certainly hoped that was the case. In Angola the Cuban presence had recently³⁶ increased to 20,000 troops plus service personnel.³⁷ The Katangans, to whom Gromyko had referred as refugees, had certainly been trained and supported by the Cubans in Angola and perhaps by some East Germans. In Zaire a major military force had appeared, well supplied with Soviet weapons. It had destroyed Kolwezi with major loss of life. The President had no doubt that the Soviet Union could have prevented that if it had used its³⁸ influence with the Angolans, the Cubans and the East Germans, all of whom³⁹ depended upon the Soviet Union to a great extent. The President had not claimed that the Cubans had troops in Zaire, but he did

³² Bartholomew added "or doing anything there even if invited" after "hands on Africa."

³³ Bartholomew added "'(at different levels' interjected in English)" after "more frequently."

³⁴ Bartholomew added "planning and" after "remained."

³⁵ Bartholomew put brackets around "combat" and wrote "a campaign" in the margin above it.

³⁶ Bartholomew put brackets around "recently" and wrote "substantially" in the margin above it.

³⁷ Bartholomew added "in the last 12 months." after "service personnel."

³⁸ Bartholomew added "full" after "its."

³⁹ Bartholomew added "heavily" after "all of whom."

not doubt that the invaders had been encouraged and supplied by those allies of the Soviet Union.

The President said there were also some other concerns in Africa which he would not have time to discuss now. The Libyans, allies of⁴⁰ the Soviet Union, had moved into Chad. We had no interests in the area except that we did not want to see borders violated by military action. There was a broad pattern emerging⁴¹ of Soviet supply of military weapons, some of which Cubans used, to train⁴² black troops to⁴³ keep military action going in many African areas. This situation had escalated⁴⁴ in scope and intensity, and we were very concerned about it, as the President had said earlier. In addition to refraining from⁴⁵ military action, we would like to have the Soviet Union's positive support for our efforts in Rhodesia and Namibia. The President had understood the statements Gromyko had made, and hoped that Gromyko understood the seriousness with which we viewed these developments.

Human Rights

There was one more item on which the President wanted to put great emphasis—that was the question of human rights.⁴⁶ Trials were underway in the Soviet Union against people who had organized to monitor compliance with the Helsinki agreement. We did indeed look on this as an internal matter for the Soviet Union, and recognized that we had no authority to intercede. However, the President felt that he had the duty to express concern⁴⁷ when the people tried were given maximum sentences, in violation⁴⁸ of even Soviet laws.⁴⁹ He was quite concerned over future plans in the Soviet Union to repeat the circum-

⁴⁰ Bartholomew put brackets around "allies of" and wrote "supplied by" in the margin above it.

⁴¹ Bartholomew put brackets around "emerging" and wrote "spreading" in the margin above it. He also added "military aid and economic aid and" after "emerging of Soviet" and "advanced" before "military weapons."

⁴² Bartholomew put brackets around "to" and wrote "and" in the margin above it. He also changed "train" to "trained" indicating he wanted the phrase to read "used and trained black troops."

⁴³ Bartholomew added "use to" after "troops to."

⁴⁴ Bartholomew put brackets around "had escalated" and wrote "was increasingly growing" in the margin above it.

⁴⁵ Bartholomew put brackets around "refraining from" and wrote "not encouraging" in the margin above it.

⁴⁶ Bartholomew added "We had perhaps an even greater difference of opinion here."

⁴⁷ Bartholomew added "deep" before "concern."

⁴⁸ Bartholomew put "violation" in brackets and wrote "contravention" in the margin above it.

⁴⁹ Bartholomew added "forsaking compliance with Helsinki" after "Soviet laws."

stances of the Orlov trial in the cases of Shcharansky and Ginzburg.⁵⁰ These were matters of intense interest in the United States. The President was not questioning the right of the Soviet Union to act in these matters as it saw fit, but he did have to point out what detriment⁵¹ to mutual trust and respect between our countries and to certain other matters such as⁵² trade and scientific and cultural exchanges⁵³ would come as a result of these trials. The President recognized the sensitivity of these matters for the Soviet Union, but wanted to be sure that Gromyko understood their sensitivity in the United States. The Soviet Union never refrained from criticizing us when it felt that we were acting improperly toward our own citizens. The President felt no restraint,⁵⁴ therefore, in expressing the⁵⁵ concerns he had just expressed.⁵⁶

Africa

Gromyko continued his response to the President on African matters. He called the presence of a Soviet general in Ethiopia a myth.⁵⁷ Had the Soviet Union been invited to send a general there, it would have refused.⁵⁸ There was no Soviet Napoleon in Africa. Evidently the President was being fed completely fantastic information. As for the Cuban presence, the Soviet Union had information that in Angola the number of Cubans was being reduced rather than increased. The President's reference to GDR personnel in connection with Kolwezi could not be regarded as authentic.⁵⁹ Even the U.S. press had not alleged anything of the sort.⁶⁰ As for the invasion into Zaire, the press had first reported that Mobutu's soldiers in the area were shooting blacks, then that blacks were shooting whites, whites were shooting blacks, and had spoken of certain rebels. The situation appeared to be totally confused, but there was certainly no Soviet or Cuban involvement there.

⁵⁰ Bartholomew added "and others" after "Ginzburg."

⁵¹ Bartholomew put brackets around "what detriment" and wrote "the destruction" in the margin above it. After "to mutual" Bartholomew put "trust and" in brackets and added "and friendship" after "respect."

⁵² Bartholomew put "certain other matters such as" in brackets and wrote in the margin above "possible better relations in."

⁵³ Bartholomew added "that" after "exchanges."

⁵⁴ Bartholomew put one bracket in front of "restraint," and wrote "constraint" in the margin above it.

⁵⁵ Bartholomew put "the" in brackets and wrote "his own" in the margin above it.

⁵⁶ Bartholomew put "he had just expressed" in brackets.

⁵⁷ Bartholomew added "and wrong information" after "Ethiopia a myth."

⁵⁸ Bartholomew added "it did not interfere" after "refused."

⁵⁹ Bartholomew added the sentence "The GDR had nothing to do with it and this was the first time we ever heard of this."

⁶⁰ Bartholomew put brackets around "anything of the sort" and wrote "that the Angolans and Cubans were involved" in the margin above it.

Human Rights

Turning to the question of human rights, Gromyko wanted to tell the President quite frankly that no matter how close to the President's heart were his feelings about these matters, he would ask him to realize that these were internal affairs of the Soviet Union, and that they would be decided in accordance with Soviet laws. No one else could tell the Soviet Union how to resolve these matters. Gromyko asked the President not to regard this statement of his as being directed at the President personally or at his concept of human rights. Human rights was a general concept, while what the President had been talking about involved domestic affairs. Throughout the entire world international law, as well as the Helsinki Final Act recognized that internal matters were resolved in each country internally, on the basis of its own domestic laws. With all due respect for the President, Gromyko felt he would be wrong if he failed to tell him this. No one in the Soviet Union was now being condemned or would be condemned in the future for something that he was not guilty of. That was not part of Soviet practice.⁶¹

The President thought that the exchange he and Gromyko had today had been constructive in that he now understood the Soviet position better, and that Gromyko understood the concerns on our side. He knew that there were serious⁶² differences between us, but firmly⁶³ believed that we had every opportunity to resolve them.⁶⁴ Both our countries stood for peace and for reducing the level⁶⁵ of⁶⁶ destruction and loss of life throughout the world. We both wanted to have better trade relations with each other and greater friendship between our peoples. The President's total commitment as President was to realize these objectives. He would ask Gromyko to convey his best wishes to President Brezhnev and express the hope that within the next few weeks we would be able to resolve the remaining issues at SALT and perhaps those concerning the test ban, leading to a personal meeting between Brezhnev and the President. He wanted to express the good will of the American people to the people of Gromyko's country. Their hope was

⁶¹ Bartholomew added this sentence: "He wanted to thank the President once again for his time."

⁶² Bartholomew put brackets around "serious" and wrote "still" in the margin above it.

⁶³ Bartholomew put brackets around "firmly."

⁶⁴ Bartholomew added "in the future" after "resolve them."

⁶⁵ Bartholomew put brackets around "level" and wrote "chance" in the margin above it.

⁶⁶ Bartholomew added "nuclear" before "destruction."

for improved relations between us, for resolution⁶⁷ of differences and for⁶⁸ conclusion of a SALT agreement as soon as possible.⁶⁹ In closing, the President would promise Gromyko that their next meeting would be scheduled for a later hour.

⁶⁷ Bartholomew put brackets around “resolution” and wrote “reduction” in the margin above it.

⁶⁸ Bartholomew added “successful” before “conclusion.”

⁶⁹ Bartholomew put brackets around “as soon as possible.”

116. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 27, 1978, 1516Z

11950. Subject: Technical Penetration of US Embassy Moscow. Ref: State 135571.²

1. Physical barrier was erected early this morning. Barrier is brick, reinforced concrete, and sheet steel and located approximately two feet within Embassy property. Barrier erected at north edge of second hatch entrance in Soviet change room. This is about 18 feet down tunnel from chimney entrance.

2. We attempted to erect barrier at Embassy property line, but efforts were thwarted by Soviet harassment (pounding on wall, erection of trip line in tunnel, prodding into tunnel with steel bars from Soviet basement, and verbal abuse).

3. [1 line not declassified] A 24 hour Marine post remains at Soviet change room.

4. Per para 1 of reftel we have barred all Soviets and chars from the chancery. It would be impractical to bar chars from all areas of building (apartments, basement, first floor) and would probably alert press.

5. Resident TSOs will survey building for other chimneys and shafts that might possibly be used for similar installations.

6. Equipment is on site to conduct limited non-destructive tests of antenna. We have leveled generators, calibrated dipoles, receivers,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780224–1250. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.

² See footnote 2, Document 114.

spectrum analyzers, and preamp power supply. First priority will be to determine bandwidth of system.

7. Test procedures suggested in para 4 of reftel will be carried out to extent possible.

8. Extensive photographic documentation is being maintained.

9. Per para 7 of reftel, access at seven level and Soviet change room will be preserved.

10. MUTS monitoring continues as before. No changes in time of activity or general spectral shape has been observed.

11. Per para 10 of reftel:

(A) General appearance of antenna indicates recent (past year or so) installation. General appearance of machinery and electronics at bottom of shaft indicates much older installation. Grill installed at top of chimney also appears to be of recent vintage. Please note that close visual inspection of antenna or grill would require disturbing antenna.

(B) Antenna can be hoisted several feet above south wing roof level. Confirmation of this fact will require actual movement of antenna.

(C) As very rough estimate:

(1) front element is 4 foot long.

(2) middle element is 5 foot long.

(3) end element is 6 foot long.

(4) element spacing is 18 inches and 24 inches reading front to back.

12. When can we expect arrival of analysis group? Unless specifically directed otherwise we will undertake no task that has the slightest chance of changing antenna position or orientation or damaging electronics. All technicians concur that we have seized a device in current operational configuration and recommend against any measures that would alter this configuration.

Matlock

117. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, May 27, 1978, 1951Z

135977. Subject: Technical Penetration Protest. Ref: Moscow 11859.²

1. The Secretary May 26 orally protested penetration to Gromyko,³ who said he had no information but would look into the matter. We plan to hold off on a formal protest until you have developed information on the scale of the penetration.

2. Ambassador Toon concurs.

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–1033. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by McCall; cleared by Shulman, Luers, Toon, Richard Castrodale (S/S), and Victor Dikeos (A/SY); approved by Christopher.

² Telegram 11859 from Moscow, May 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–1035.

³ No record of the protest was found.

118. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 29, 1978, 7 p.m.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Cases; Jailed Soviets and Embassy Penetration; U.S.-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Dr. Marshall D. Shulman
Sherrod McCall, Acting Director,
EUR/SOV

U.S.S.R.

Minister-Counselor Alexander A.
Bessmertnykh

Bessmertnykh came in at his request on instructions from Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. He opened by saying

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, Shulman/Bessmertnykh, 5/29/78. Secret. Drafted by McCall; cleared by Shulman. The meeting took place in Shulman's office.

that the matters he had to discuss were potentially explosive for the relationship. The fate of the two Soviet UN employees arrested and jailed had started it,² but the Secretary had then raised the matter of listening devices in the U.S. Embassy in Moscow. Firyubin³ in Moscow had given the Soviet part of the story and view of the matter, which was quite different from the U.S. assertion of the case.

Bessmertnykh stressed, and returned to the point several times, that there should be no linkage of the matter in the Embassy and the two jailed Soviets. He wanted first to discuss the Embassy matter. Gromyko had promised some information on U.S. acts of the same calibre against the Soviets here in Washington, New York and San Francisco, and Bessmertnykh was instructed to give some brief information on that subject. Reading from a Russian language nonpaper, which he did not hand over, Bessmertnykh said:

Begin Quote. In the last several years there were found in Soviet installations in the U.S. more than 50 various special electronic devices which were used for listening to conversations held in buildings and over telephones.

—1977: a special cable was discovered, and a special device, which was connected to the internal telephone system at the country residence of the Ambassador at Pioneer Point.

—1975: in the building occupied by the Soviet Trade Mission in the U.S., on Connecticut Avenue, several radio transmitters were discovered, designed for listening to conversations in working offices, including the office of the Trade Representative himself. Earlier, several special preamplified microphones were found in the former trade office building at 1511 16th Street, N.W. (these were found when the Soviets were moving out of that building).

—1973 and 1974: in the building of the Soviet Consulate General at San Francisco, there were found several radio transmitters, preamplified microphones and two cables used for listening to conversations in the offices and living quarters.

We informed U.S. authorities and the U.S. side requested no publicity. This is the same way we have proceeded in cases of agents, acting at the specific request of the U.S. side in giving no publicity. End Quote.

Turning to the two jailed Soviets, and reiterating the hope that the U.S. side would separate that case from the matter he had just addressed, Bessmertnykh said the Soviet side was very much concerned. As Gromyko had said, it was potentially very dangerous for the relationship. If not handled in a mutually acceptable way, the Soviets

² See footnote 6, Document 109.

³ Not further identified.

would be forced to make public what the U.S. special services were doing in Moscow.

Bessmertnykh urged that account be taken of what Gromyko had said. Gromyko would expect the Secretary to have a response from the U.S. side when they met on Wednesday.⁴ Any attempt to connect the two arrested Soviets with the matter at the U.S. Embassy was unnecessary and would complicate the whole thing. On May 26, Bessmertnykh said, two U.S. personnel had been caught in a closed zone of East Germany using spying devices to spy on a training activity. This was just an illustration that we should act responsibly in matters. He hoped the U.S. side would close the whole thing.

Dr. Shulman said that the two incidents were not linked, but separate and only by chance of discovery had they occurred in near proximity of time. We were frankly astonished by the report we had of Firyubin's remarks to Charge Matlock,⁵ and Shulman thought Bessmertnykh would be, too. Firyubin had said the Embassy's actions violated health and fire codes affecting a neighboring Soviet building. This was not true. The chimney was wholly within the U.S. Embassy property and did not touch the Soviet building.

Shulman showed a copy of a Soviet drawing of the Embassy floor plan and located the chimney for Bessmertnykh to see. Looking up from the drawing, Bessmertnykh grinned and said he understood that, indeed, some protective system had been located in the chimney by the Soviet side. Nothing directed at the Ambassador's office—something—a protective device on the Soviet side. Gromyko had some more information on this; it was not at all a device to listen into the U.S. building, but maybe to follow what was going out from there.

Shulman said we had to reject what Firyubin said as being ridiculous. We are taking the matter seriously and considering what to do. The tunnel, which runs for 20 and more feet on our property, was clearly a serious intrusion. We have not wanted to act hastily, and we wanted to have the facts before expressing ourselves. But we would have to express ourselves, and forcefully. We would do so at the proper time.

Turning to the two jailed Soviets, Shulman reiterated that there was no connection with the Embassy matter. The Secretary and the Deputy Secretary had responded to Dobrynin's request and had the Grand Jury arraignment postponed until May 30. The U.S. position was that while Soviet UN Mission personnel were immune, these two UN

⁴ May 31.

⁵ Transmitted in telegram 11987 from Moscow, May 28. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–1028)

headquarters men were not covered for activities which were not part of their UN duties. The two were engaged in espionage, for which they were not exempt from action under the law. The USG cannot countenance this kind of use of the UN. Matters could become much worse if the practice continued. This was the broader issue: the use of UN-based spies could create an episode and exacerbate relations in a way neither of us wanted, creating strong feelings.

Bessmertnykh replied that there were differences on the definition of diplomatic immunity. Regarding use of that cover, Dobrynin had mentioned five Americans who had used diplomatic cover in Moscow, and Bessmertnykh believed some names could be provided. If it came to publication, which he hoped it would not, the U.S. intelligence services would not look so nice. He mentioned the case of a Soviet named Ogorodnik⁶ which he said was very dirty. He had just seen the file on that case and, boy, was it unpleasant. Given the current situation in the U.S., the publication of the whole thing in that case could be very damaging to the U.S. intelligence services.

In concluding Bessmertnykh returned to the two jailed Soviets. They were in a difficult and worrisome position being in jail. But their bail had been set at \$2 million, which in itself was a provocation, for which the USG was responsible. Unofficially Bessmertnykh wanted to ask if something could be done to lower the bail. That however, was not the key question, which was to have the two released at once and proceedings against them dropped.

Shulman said he noted what Bessmertnykh had said, and he would pass it along and see if anything were possible. The matter was in the hands of the court, and he could not say what the situation with regard to posting bond might be. We were watching it closely and would continue to watch it closely at various junctures in the proceedings.

⁶ Reference is presumably to Aleksandr Ogorodnik, a Soviet diplomat.

119. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, May 31, 1978, 0010Z

136975. Subject: Technical Penetration: Protest. Ref: Moscow 12011.²

1. The Charge should seek an immediate appointment at an appropriate level in MFA and deliver the following note. Charge is authorized if necessary to correct the facts if they do not accurately state the case locally.

2. Begin text. The Embassy of the United States of America informs the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that the Embassy has uncovered a secret listening post and electronic spying devices within its chancery building and an underground tunnel extending a considerable distance through the Embassy's property connecting this installation with a neighboring Soviet apartment building. Following discovery of this installation, the electronic cables operating the post were found to be energized. Moreover, Soviet personnel have been observed to enter and occupy the tunnel from the end connecting to the Soviet apartment building. Thus there can be absolutely no doubt that this listening post has been actively operated by the Soviet side.

The Embassy is instructed to protest this crude intrusion into its chancery. It is totally unacceptable and runs counter to efforts to improve relations between our two countries.

The Embassy demands in the strongest possible terms that the Ministry take immediate measures to put an end to such intrusions into the Embassy's diplomatic premises. Responsibility for the consequences of this action rest fully with the Soviet side.

The United States reserves the right to return to this matter and to take actions it deems necessary when it has completed its investigation. End text.

3. The Charge may state orally that this event has aroused a strong negative reaction in Washington where Soviet espionage activities

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 5/26–31/78. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sherrod McCall (EUR/SOV); cleared by Shulman, Lee R.L. Marks (L), Luers, Bartholomew, and Richard Castrodale (S/S-O); approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–1014)

² Telegram 12011 from Moscow, May 29, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–1026.

against the United States have already become a cause of increasing concern. Charge should, in delivering the note, also present photographs of the eavesdropping equipment and related installation.

4. Charge should state orally that the Ministry's note of May 28³ is so patently false and so absurd as to be insulting, and that he is instructed not to reply but to orally reject it out of hand. Charge may make points and show documents as suggested in reftel, but should avoid letting point of demarche appear to be reply to Soviet note. Point should be our protest of their intrusion into and spying on our property.

5. Ambassador Toon concurs.

Vance

³Not found.

120. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, May 31, 1978, 2:40–5:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vance-Gromyko Private Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance

Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, 5/26–27, 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 1. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. An unknown hand made minor edits to this version of the memorandum.

“Woodbridge Two”

Foreign Minister Gromyko asked the Secretary if he could tell him anything regarding the small delicate matter he had raised with him last week.²

Secretary Vance said that he had looked into this matter and that there was nothing he could do at this time regarding the two individuals in question. He was afraid that the trial would have to go forward. As to the matter of reducing bail, Marshall Shulman had been in touch with the Soviet Mission to indicate that the Mission’s lawyers would know best how to go about getting the bail reduced.

Gromyko said that he certainly regretted this answer by the Secretary. What were the prospects for the future?

The Secretary expected that the trial would have to go forward, and then, after completion of the trial, we would see what would be possible at that time.

Gromyko said that he would not repeat to the Secretary what he had said when they last discussed this matter, because he did not want to get into an argument and lose time. The Secretary would be aware of how such a turn of events would be evaluated on the Soviet side and the consequences that might follow.

Penetration

In the meanwhile Gromyko wanted to inform the Secretary that his people had discovered more than 50 listening devices installed in various Soviet premises in Washington, San Francisco and New York. He would give the Secretary three packages of photographs, together with a list referenced to the photographs, containing a brief description of each. The information sheet was in Russian, but he was sure the Secretary would get it translated. Of course, his people had many more photographs of the same kind in their possession, and they might have made them public long ago if they had wanted to. However, proceeding from a broader approach to Soviet-American relations, they had refrained from doing so, especially since the U.S. side, too, had intimated that it would not like to see matters of this kind made public.

In addition, Gromyko wanted to draw the Secretary’s attention to the fact that Soviet nationals working in the U.N. General Secretariat had been the targets of numerous approaches by agents of the U.S. side. By Soviet count, at least 200 U.S. citizens in the Secretariat had links to the special services of the United States. He repeated that the Soviet side had many such photographs at its disposal, some of which were

² Reference is to Rudolf Chernyayev and Valdik Enger. See Document 109 and footnote 6 thereto.

quite interesting and “spicy.” They would make quite an exhibit, for which a large hall would be required. As for the two individuals they had discussed, much would depend on the turn of events that this case would take. He noted the Secretary’s statement to the effect that after the trial he would be in a position to see what could be done. The Soviet side would therefore wait and see, and then decide what response might be appropriate.

The Secretary told Gromyko that we did not want to engage in an intelligence war with the Soviet Union. We were, however, concerned over the case of the two individuals referred to, particularly since they had worked for the U.N. Secretariat. In addition, there was serious concern over the recent case involving our Chancery in Moscow, a case the Secretary had brought to Gromyko’s attention.³ Our investigation of the circumstances there was continuing, and a matter of particular concern to us was the Soviet tunnel which crossed our property for 20 feet or more. This represented a gross intrusion upon the property of our Chancery, and we were continuing to look into that matter. As he had already indicated, he would be in touch with Gromyko about the two individuals after their trial.

Gromyko said he would wait and see. As for the incident mentioned by the Secretary, he had already informed him that according to the information Gromyko had received, things appeared in quite a different light. Indeed, what the Secretary had described appeared to distort the facts of the matter. He would ask the Secretary to have someone on the U.S. side take an objective look at these things. After all, neither side was interested in distorting that kind of information. The purposes of the things to which the Secretary had referred were totally different—he would describe them as having a protective nature, among other things aimed at fire prevention. No spying of any kind had been involved there. It would have been primitive indeed in this day and age of electronic equipment to try and dig a tunnel for intelligence purposes. Modern technology simply made such things unnecessary. This was not the immediate post-war period of 1945/47 when the Soviets had discovered a western tunnel on the territory of East Berlin, which had been dug for intelligence purposes. Gromyko concluded this subject on the note of saying he would be in touch with the Secretary and would see what happened.

Soviet-American Relations

Now Gromyko wanted to ask the Secretary a question that went far beyond the framework of the issues they had just finished discussing. Those issues were minor indeed in terms of their importance,

³ See Document 117.

except that unfortunately people's freedom was involved. He wanted to ask the Secretary how one could explain the veritable explosion of anti-Soviet propaganda, of statements hostile to the Soviet Union, that was now in process here in the United States. Until now the Soviet side had believed that the U.S. Administration was not taking an active part in this respect. While this had not been quite clear, the Soviets had tended to emphasize the constructive aspects of statements by the President and by the Secretary and by other political leaders. Lately, however, they could not but note that the Administration, beginning with the President, had indulged in vehement statements aimed at returning to the atmosphere of the cold war or something similar. Indeed, Mr. Brzezinski had surpassed himself in this respect. How could this be explained? While still in Washington, Gromyko had reached the conclusion on the basis of his discussion of African matters with President Carter⁴ that a role of prime importance in determining the nature of the President's statement was the fact that he had been given imprecise, incorrect and distorted information about the situation in Africa and about the role played by the Soviets and the Cubans there. After that meeting Gromyko had made a public statement using the words "inaccurate and incorrect" to characterize the information the President had been given. If he were talking to correspondents today, he would use much stronger words. Someone in the United States, certain circles, were deliberately creating myths and subsequently referred to them as proof, placing them on the President's desk and perhaps on the Secretary's desk. Someone appeared to be doing this quite deliberately. Gromyko's question was—what was the true policy of the United States? Was it aimed at furthering the relations between us, at searching for agreements that might possibly be concluded between our two countries on the basis of mutual respect for each other's sovereignty and non-interference in each other's affairs? Or was it a policy aimed at whipping up tensions and exacerbating relations between our two countries? Both of them were surely well aware of the consequences of such worsening of relations for the entire world. It was for this reason that Gromyko was asking this question today, and he would report the answer the Secretary might give him to his colleagues on the Politburo and the Central Committee, and to L.I. Brezhnev himself. In this same context he would point out just in passing that the more than 50 listening devices he had referred to earlier had been installed during the Carter Administration, not earlier. That was his question, and he would ask the Secretary to answer it if he could. Of course, he would proceed from the premise that the Secretary would inform President Carter of this conversation.

⁴ See Document 115.

The Secretary wanted to say first that he would, of course, inform the President about this discussion in great detail. Secondly, he would point out that he knew absolutely nothing about the 50 devices Gromyko had mentioned; he had no information about them and did not know if there were any such devices. He would look at the material Gromyko had just handed him, but did not want his silence to indicate that he was accepting the facts as described.

The Secretary pointed out that Gromyko had actually asked him two questions. The first was how one could explain what Gromyko saw as an explosion of anti-Soviet propaganda in the United States. He would respond to this question quite frankly. There were several factors which had given rise to concern about the Soviet Union as reflected in articles in newspapers, magazines and on television. He would name three principal areas of concern as he saw them, which, as he had been able to determine, were the basis for the development Gromyko had mentioned. The first was the very deep concern among many Americans and among people in other countries apart from the United States, particularly in the West, over the fact that during the last several years the Soviet Union had been building up its military forces, in particular its military forces in the European area, to an extent far exceeding the needs of deterrence in that area. As people took a look at Soviet expenditures for conventional forces, they saw a constantly rising line, rising steeply over the past 8–10 years. At the same time, in terms of real growth the United States and other western countries had kept military expenditures at a stable level. This had raised genuine concerns in the minds of many Americans with respect to the intentions of the Soviet Union in the military area. The question was asked whether the Soviet Union merely intended to maintain a military balance. In that case, why these massive expenditures? This also led to the second question—whether or not these expenditures indicated aggressive intent as opposed to reduction of military confrontation and military forces. There was another point the Secretary wanted to make: to be fair, if we looked at the strategic side, some progress had indeed been achieved, progress in concluding the ABM Treaty and the Interim Agreement, and progress toward a SALT TWO agreement. These were positive developments. However, the problem of ever increasing forces, increasing sophistication of weapons on the conventional side, had raised great concerns in the minds of many people. The second major area which had given rise to concern among many people was the question of African affairs which had been discussed in great detail with Gromyko by the President and by the Secretary. He thought that all recognized that there were elements of competition in the relations between us, but recently it appeared when looking at the African situation that competition had transcended normal bounds and had resulted in military conflicts fueled by Soviet equipment and by Cuban

combat forces. The Secretary was familiar with the reasons and explanations Gromyko had provided in connection with Soviet activities in various areas in Africa. He did not want to get into detail now, but did want to answer Gromyko's question. The appearance of Soviet actions as seen by many people in the United States and by people in other countries, and not only European countries, was giving the impression that the Soviet Union was going around and crudely lighting fires in that area, preventing settlement by peaceful means. A third area which the Secretary believed was one of major concern was the problem arising in connection with human rights, as recently reflected in such incidents as the trial of Mr. Orlov. (Gromyko interjected, "you mean *our* Mr. Orlov.") In the Secretary's view these were the three main areas which gave rise to what Gromyko had called the explosion of concern over the Soviet Union.

The Secretary now wanted to address the second big question, the last question Gromyko had asked—what did the United States really want? Did it want to build up good relations with the Soviet Union or did it want a return to the period of the cold war? The Secretary could answer this question unequivocally with clarity and simplicity. The United States did not want to return to a period of tensions and confrontations. We wanted to get the relations between us back on track again and return to better, stronger and closer ties between our two countries. We wanted to see a reduction of tensions, and not only in the military sphere, but in others as well. We wanted to continue building common ground between us. In the Secretary's view there were a number of ways to move in that direction. Most importantly, it was necessary to make progress on the central issue between us—SALT. He believed that there were many other things which, if brought about, would put both sides in a better position, i. e., if we could move to a better common understanding of the fact that detente had to be a two-way street. If we could find ways to move toward closer relations in trade, in developing cultural exchanges and the like, that would be very important from the standpoint of improving the atmosphere. This was an area in which we had made progress in the past, but had unfortunately been slipping recently. The Secretary would specify certain steps that would be important from this standpoint: (1) progress on SALT; (2) progress in the Vienna MBFR negotiations; (3) progress in other arms limitations on which we were working together; (4) achievement of a better understanding that detente had to be a two-way street, and on how to make it a two-way street; and (5) determination of what other steps could be taken to bring about better exchanges between our people in cultural activities, scientific activities and trade. Finally, in terms of detente being a two-way street, the Secretary believed we would have to come to grips with the African problems and get a better understanding of how to deal with them in such a way as to avoid con-

frontations. The Secretary concluded by saying that he had tried in perhaps an oversimplified way to lay out some of the issues and problems and some of the steps that might be taken to move our relations to a better level.

Gromyko said he would try very briefly to react to the Secretary's statement, avoiding repetition of what had already been said in his talks with the Secretary and with the President in Washington. Naturally, he perceived positively the Secretary's statement to the effect that the United States will seek to conduct affairs in such a way as to find solutions to the problems before us and not to permit the development of tensions in Soviet-American relations that could return our two countries to the atmosphere of the cold war. In this connection he could only say that he shared the wishes the Secretary had expressed and knew that the entire Soviet leadership, including Brezhnev personally, would agree with the sentiment expressed. He could say this because he was fully aware of their views in this respect. This constituted his reply to the first part of the Secretary's statement, the constructive part. It would be very good indeed if words here were accompanied by deeds, if the U.S. Administration did indeed conduct affairs in the manner the Secretary had described.

His second comment would deal with the thought expressed by the Secretary that one of the reasons why there was such an upsurge of propaganda that was hostile to the Soviet Union was that the Soviet Union had allegedly been engaged in an intensive arms buildup over the past several years. This, as the Secretary had said, worried the United States and the other Western countries. Gromyko could only say that he categorically rejected such an assertion. In fact, that had also been most categorically rejected at the very highest level quite recently by L.I. Brezhnev himself. This was simply not so. There was no such arms buildup. An artificial myth had been created in the West, pursuing a certain objective—to cover up the expanded arms programs of the Western powers themselves. Of course, the Soviet Union did have competent armed forces that were adequate to ensure the peaceful life of its people in the face of the constant buildup by NATO countries. However, the Soviet Union was not so foolish as to spend more on arms than was absolutely necessary to ensure the security of its people. One might ask why, in the face of such a policy by the Soviet Union, did the Western countries continue to build up their arsenals and military forces? The Soviet Union had constantly emphasized the need to take genuine steps toward disarmament, including ultimately steps aimed all the way toward general and complete disarmament. In this connection he would mention the proposal Brezhnev had recently made in his speech before the Komsomol, to halt the production of nuclear weapons and to conduct a policy that would ultimately lead toward

complete elimination of nuclear weapons and to using nuclear energy for peaceful purposes exclusively. The program adopted by the XXVth Congress of the CPSU, a program the Soviet Union was constantly striving to implement, was also aimed at disarmament and peace. In fact, the Soviet side referred to it as the "Program of Peace." Still, no matter what proposal was advanced by the Soviet Union to further these aims, these proposals were invariably rejected out of hand, including proposals to put a halt to the arms race. Surely this policy pursued by the Soviet Union was completely contrary to the allegation of an arms buildup to which the Secretary had referred. Even in the face of the ring of military bases surrounding the Soviet Union and aimed against its territory the Soviet Union was ready and willing to take appropriate steps toward disarmament. However, it could not agree to unilateral disarmament. Its leadership was not so naive or myopic as to accept the possibility of unilateral disarmament. It was necessary to ensure the security of all countries in an identical degree and not to harm the security of any one of them.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had also mentioned the question of military expenditures and budgets.

The Secretary interrupted at this point to say that no one was suggesting that the Soviet Union take unilateral disarmament measures. He thought both of them were pragmatic enough to recognize that unilateral disarmament made no sense. Disarmament measures had to be such as to benefit both sides, such as could be negotiated together. The proof of the pudding was in the eating—if we could demonstrate by joint deeds that we can sit down together and conclude arms control agreements, it would prove to the world that we were setting an example for others to follow.

Gromyko referred back to the question of military budgets. He had to tell the Secretary categorically that the Soviet Union had numerous times proposed reductions in military budgets, first naming specific percentages, then altering the percentages to meet the wishes of the Western powers, etc. The Soviet leadership was struck, however, that there had not been a single occasion when these proposals were taken seriously. They had always been rejected out of hand. The Soviet Union had proposed an arms freeze in order to begin the process of arms control. That, too, had been rejected. Now, at the current U.N. Special Session on Disarmament the Soviet Union had suggested a new method for dealing with this problem. When it had proposed certain percentage reductions in the past, it had been told that since force structures were different, all this was very complicated indeed. In the Soviet view, such responses were not sincere, because all these problems and objections could easily be overcome. At the current SSOD the Soviet proposal was stated not in terms of a percentage, but in absolute

figures. The Soviet Union proposed that military budgets be reduced in terms of specific figures. These would not necessarily have to be identical, but obviously should be of the same order of magnitude. The Secretary would understand, of course, that it would be ridiculous for one nation to reduce its military budget by one billion dollars, while another reduced it by one million dollars. The present proposal completely eliminated the question of differences in the structure of armed forces. He would ask the Secretary to look into the new proposal in detail. (The Secretary said he would look into it.)

Gromyko continued, saying that if one listened to the statements on the Western side, one heard that military budgets had not been increased at all. In actual fact they had increased by leaps and bounds to their present astronomical proportions.

The Secretary pointed out that they had not increased in real terms. He was speaking of the U.S. military budget not in terms of dollars, but, in view of inflation, of arms expenditures in real terms.

Gromyko remarked that next the Secretary would blame the Soviet Union for not having an inflation. He was sure that Western military budgets had increased in real terms as well.

Now Gromyko wanted to turn to the fourth item the Secretary had mentioned African affairs. Here he had to point out that the actual situation had been grossly distorted. If he were to take a cue from the statements of some of the responsible officials in the United States who sometimes made statements bordering on insults aimed at representatives of foreign powers, he would not use the word "distortion," but something much stronger. Incidentally, he would note that officials inclined to be insulting toward representatives of foreign states should really be sent back to school to be taught what was proper in normal human behavior, particularly behavior toward representatives of foreign states. What we were witnessing here was a gross distortion of the facts. He could not believe that the United States with its broad intelligence gathering facilities was not aware of the fact that the Soviet Union had absolutely nothing to do with the situation in Rhodesia or Namibia or Zaire. As for Ethiopia, when Somalia had attacked that country, the Soviet Union had come to the assistance of a victim of aggression at the request of that country by supplying arms and a certain number of experts as instructors in the use of such arms. At that time the Soviet Union had felt that it would have been good if the United States had supplied Ethiopia with similar assistance. The myth about a Soviet commander in Ethiopia was pure invention. It had been surreptitiously fed to the President and to the Secretary. The Soviet leadership had been dismayed by all these accusations and myths. After all, they were not only realists, but also Marxists, and as such they wanted to get to the bottom of things and find the reasons underlying these accusa-

tions. Looking at the situation today, they could not help but come to the conclusion that someone evidently needed to lay down an artificial smokescreen that would make it more difficult for people to see through and would thereby conceal unjustified activities by those who laid down the smokescreen. A good illustration of that was the carnage that had been arranged in Zaire; as for who was its author, the Secretary would know that better than he. Neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba had anything to do with that carnage. This was an emphatic statement Gromyko could make to President Carter and to the Secretary. If he did not have a completely accurate knowledge of the Cuban views in this matter, he would not be making such a categorical statement. The Soviet Union, too, had stated its indignation at the slaughter that took place in Zaire. Summing up, Gromyko said that not a single Soviet representative had set foot in Rhodesia or Namibia. The only Soviets in Zaire were the diplomatic representatives of the Soviet Union. He would ask the Secretary to convey to President Carter that all these accusations and charges had dismayed the Soviet leadership, that they were nothing but inventions, chemically pure inventions. Someone had thrown out these accusations and like ball lightning they were now circling around. The Soviet Union did not intend to take responsibility for someone else's sins, and would categorically reject any attempt to place such responsibility on it.

Gromyko took up another point mentioned by the Secretary—human rights. The Secretary had mentioned Orlov. Gromyko was not going to discuss Orlov or any other Soviet citizen because these matters were solely within the competence of the Soviet Union.

Gromyko said it was true that occasionally the two sides had a difference between them or a different perception of a set of facts. Such differences should be the subject of discussion and negotiation. The trouble was that all too often the other side refused to discuss proposals made by the Soviet Union. Sometimes, without even having the full text of a Soviet proposal, the other side would reject it out of hand. A good illustration of that was what had happened at the CSCE, when the socialist countries had advanced a proposal to renounce first use of nuclear weapons. Literally just a few hours later, and before anyone had received the full text of the Soviet proposal, it had been rejected out of hand. And yet, the Soviet Union had proposed to hold a preparatory session precisely for the purpose of discussing that proposal, where questions could be asked about it and replies provided. The Western countries had not wanted to do so and had rejected the proposal without even seeing its full text. Suppose the Soviet Union were to act in that manner, to reject a proposal out of hand right after it had been tabled by the other side, and without careful study? Even elementary correctness of behavior would have required an examination of that proposal, but this had not happened.

The Secretary said he would agree that there was a need to develop better understanding and more extensive discussion of matters where there were differences, to discuss them in detail and seriously face the issues. Sometimes the sides had different perceptions of things where further discussions could clarify the reasons for the difference in perceptions and perhaps eliminate them if they understood how things appeared to the other side. He suggested that both of them give thought to finding better ways to manage the relations between our two countries and to deal with differences. Perhaps more frequent meetings between the two of them would be helpful in this respect, perhaps meetings at other levels as well. He believed it very important that something be done to change the confrontational nature of the relationship between us.

Gromyko acknowledged that this was indeed very important.

The Secretary now wanted to digress and respond to Gromyko's remarks about Cuban matters and the information we had received regarding Cuban participation in Zaire. The intelligence we had received clearly indicated that the Cubans had indeed been involved in training the personnel and planning the military operation for the invasion of Zaire. [3 lines not declassified]

Gromyko with some feeling said that here was where the Secretary and the President had become victims of disinformation. If the Soviets were not sure of what they were telling the United States in this connection, they would not have said so, because in so doing they were assuming a grave responsibility. Gromyko would not repeat what he had said.

[1½ lines not declassified] When information came to us based on good evidence, we had no choice but to take it into account.

Gromyko asked: "Who the devil knows anything about that general? This is the first time I have heard of him." The United States now had different information at its disposal and would have to sort out bad sources from good. Gromyko felt strongly that untruth had been presented as truth and had been placed on the Secretary's desk and on the President's desk. What hell did this general come from? Or, did he just drop down from heaven like Jesus Christ in the Bible? The Secretary would know very well that not everything should be believed and that the human brain and human reason were quite capable of analyzing information and separating truth from untruth. In any case, he had told the Secretary the truth, in spite of frivolous statements made by certain highly placed officials of the United States who had referred to truth as untruth. What he had in mind in saying this was what had been reported in the U.S. press—statements by high officials made with virginal frivolity. Serious policy could not be built on the kind of information the Secretary was being fed.

The Secretary said he accepted what Gromyko had said, but would point out that when one gets what appears to be realistic information, because it comes from a good source, one had a tendency to accept it as valid.

Gromyko thought that the general mentioned was perhaps simply trying to save his own skin. He would also ask what motivated him in his actions and for whom he was working. Many questions immediately arose in that connection.

The Secretary said he did not want to argue further regarding this matter. The problem involved in evaluating information from different sources was not an easy one. Therefore it was important that we have an opportunity to exchange views with the Soviet side and get a better understanding of how it perceives the facts in any given situation.

Gromyko said the Secretary was quite correct in saying this. However, when a broad campaign was unleashed throughout the United States, based on such information, and the U.S. Government took part in such a campaign, that was quite another matter. He would ask the Secretary to try and understand what situation the Soviet side now found itself in. What conclusions could the Soviets come to? After all, these statements were not made within four walls.

Senior Military Exchanges

The Secretary said that President Carter had asked him to check with Gromyko to find out if he thought it might be a good idea to exchange visits between senior military officers.

Gromyko asked at what level such exchanges would take place and what problems were to be dealt with.

The Secretary said that, for example, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff might invite his counterpart, Marshall Ogarkov, to visit the United States.

Gromyko said: "Or vice versa?"

The Secretary replied in the affirmative, and said that they might agree ahead of time what questions were to be discussed.

Gromyko said he would take this under advisement and consult with the military leadership. He would let the Secretary know in due course.

The Secretary thought it would be a good idea to exchange views on all levels of our respective governments, thus lessening the impression that our relations were of a confrontational nature.

Non-Circumvention, Non-Transfer

The Secretary recalled that the other day Gromyko had mentioned that Article XII of the Draft Treaty, dealing with non-circumvention, had been discussed and settled in Moscow. The Secretary wanted to re-

view this article with Gromyko in order to be sure that there was no misunderstanding between the two sides. He had told Gromyko at the outset of the discussion of this issue that we were not going to circumvent the provisions of the Treaty. The Secretary had stated that several times. Gromyko had stated his views and had asked the Secretary if the views of the two sides on this issue were identical. In the context of everything the Secretary had said he did believe that the views were identical, namely: (1) there would be no clause prohibiting transfers to our allies; (2) we would undertake not to circumvent the provisions of the Treaty through a third state or third states or in any other manner. (The Secretary repeated and stressed the words "or in any other manner.")

Gromyko believed that everything had been recorded in this respect. He thought it was absolutely clear that the sides would not circumvent the provisions of the Treaty through a third state or states or in any other manner, among other things by the transfer of weapons or transfer of know-how, or in any other manner. All this was recorded in the record of their conversations in Moscow. He recalled that the Secretary had said that in this respect the two sides had an identical understanding.

The Secretary wanted to make clear that, as he had said then, the sides could transfer weapons as long as such transfer did not constitute circumvention of the provisions of the Treaty.

Gromyko said that this seemed to be on the threshold of some sort of mental gymnastics. He believed it to be absolutely clear that non-transfer meant non-transfer and non-circumvention meant non-circumvention in whatever form, not necessarily in the form of fully produced weapons systems, but also in the form of know-how; all this, naturally, within the framework of the Treaty. In the Soviet view transfers would constitute circumvention if they involved types of weapons dealt with in the Treaty in the broadest sense.

The Secretary again wanted to make clear that we had refused to include a non-transfer clause in the Treaty, because it was clear to us that we could transfer as long as this did not constitute circumvention of the Treaty.

Gromyko said he did not understand. From the Soviet standpoint non-transfer was non-circumvention, just as transfer was circumvention. Thus, if the U.S. really intended to transfer weapons, that would be circumvention of the Treaty. On the other hand, if the U.S. intended to transfer weapons not covered by the Treaty, that would not constitute circumvention thereof. But, if the transfer concerned, for example, a missile covered by the Treaty, to a third state, would this not constitute circumvention? He wanted to understand whether the two sides were attaching different meanings to this provision, or was it simply a matter of semantics? Should the United States, however, really intend

to transfer weapons covered by the Treaty, to other states, then the whole non-circumvention clause would be deprived of all meaning and would be simply an empty barrel.

The Secretary said it was obvious to him that matters relating to transfers which we have made to our allies and continued to make to our allies should not be changed by the provisions of a SALT Treaty. Clearly, however, if we transferred something that was prohibited by the Treaty, that would be improper. He would suggest that this matter be further discussed between Ambassador Warnke and Minister Semenov in Geneva. He wanted to be sure that there was no misunderstanding here.

Gromyko said that right now he was not at all sure that the two sides had an identical understanding of the non-circumvention provision. Any particular past practice of the U.S. side was not in any way binding on the Soviet Union. If the United States had transferred strategic arms such as strategic bombers, for example, to its allies, and if strategic bombers were now covered by the Treaty, it should be obvious that they should not be transferred to other countries. To be specific, if, e.g., the U.S. was thinking of transferring a missile or a strategic bomber that were limited by the Treaty, to Britain, for example, or any of the other strategic arms covered by the Treaty, these transferred arms would increase the overall number of missiles in the hands of the Western powers. That would be a clear circumvention of the provisions of the Treaty. There was no question in his mind that in that case the United States would have violated the Treaty.

The Secretary by way of an example pointed out that we were prohibited by the terms of the Protocol from developing or testing mobile systems other than launchers, except for one such system. Obviously, if we transferred a banned system to our allies, that would constitute circumvention. On the other hand, if we transferred one strategic bomber, for example, he was not sure that this would constitute circumvention since it would not in any way change the strategic balance.

Gromyko objected and said that that would be circumvention in any case. Where would the boundary be set as to what did and what did not change the strategic balance? He felt that here it was necessary to have an identical understanding and to abide by mathematical rules, because if the United States were to do something in one area and the Soviet Union do something in another area, that would raise all sorts of suspicions and doubts, and this must not be allowed to happen. He would ask the Secretary to explain this to U.S. allies. Incidentally, the thought had occurred to him in the course of this discussion that the delay at the SALT negotiations might be caused by the fact that the U.S. needed time to transfer to its allies some of the arms that would be limited by the Treaty. He believed that could only complicate matters. He

added by way of an aside that he should not be blamed for that thought occurring to him; it had occurred to him, and he simply wanted to get it out.

The Secretary suggested that they ask Warnke and Semenov to clarify the matter further.

Gromyko said, "Let them talk," but wanted to repeat that the Soviet position could not be any different. Should the two sides indulge in chasing after mosquitoes, they might lose a whole trainload of baggage.

The Secretary said he certainly did not want to see that happen, and wanted to make sure there would be no misunderstanding between the two sides on this score.

Next Vance-Gromyko Meeting

The Secretary suggested that he and Gromyko plan to meet again soon, perhaps somewhere in Europe. He asked if two weeks into July might be an appropriate time.

Gromyko agreed to such a meeting in principle, but would prefer to leave the date open, to allow him to consult his calendar. He thought that July might not be altogether convenient.

Replying to the Secretary's question of whether the end of June might be more appropriate, Gromyko said it might, but would prefer that the specific date be agreed upon through their respective Embassies.

The Secretary agreed and said he believed it important to hold such a meeting in order not simply to let things drift on their own.

121. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, May 31, 1978, 5:20–7:35 p.m.

SUBJECT

SALT, Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Ambassador Paul C. Warnke
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Ambassador V.G. Makarov
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

SALT

The Secretary led off the conversation by addressing the issue of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs. He said that we had reviewed the three variants contained in the paper Gromyko had given President Carter. None of those variants was acceptable to us. As the President had indicated in his response, we believed that there were two valid alternative proposals on the negotiating table concerning this issue, between which a choice should be made. The first alternative applied to the Protocol which, as the President had indicated, is of relatively brief duration. Under that proposal there would be a ban on the deployment and testing of any new type of ICBM during that relatively brief period. The other alternative provided for one exemption from that ban for each side for the period of the entire Treaty through 1985, rather than the term of the Protocol. We believed, however, that if this alternative was followed, then it should be such that either side would have a choice in determining whether it wanted to test and deploy a new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle or with MIRVs. We believed that these were the two alternatives between which a choice should be made.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko to US, 5/26–27, 1978. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 2. The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. An unknown hand made minor edits to this version of the memorandum.

Minister Gromyko asked if he was correct in understanding the Secretary to say that the United States insisted on the proposal the Secretary had advanced in Moscow, in its pure, unchanged form.

The Secretary replied in the affirmative.

Gromyko said that that proposal was unacceptable to the Soviet Union. Everyone would clearly understand that a free choice between a new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle and a new type of ICBM with MIRVs would provide an advantage to one side—the side that would choose the MIRVed missile. Superficially the U.S. position sounded as if it was in accord with the principle of equality of rights. In actual fact, however, under either of those alternatives the United States would have an advantage for a long period of time. He said that the Soviet side had emphasized this fact a number of times. Such a situation would thus be totally contrary to the principle of equality, equal security and inadmissibility of unilateral advantage. On this basis we cannot reach agreement. He would add that the U.S. side seemed to have treated the Soviet-proposed variants very lightly. He would remind the Secretary that three variants had been proposed.

The Secretary noted that in the third variant the Soviet side had proposed that the flight testing and deployment of all new types of ICBMs, without exception, whether or not they were MIRVed, be banned for the duration of the Treaty, i. e., through 1985. Our first alternative suggested that this be limited for the period of the Protocol. If time was of concern in this respect, why not accept this ban for the period of the Protocol? The Secretary would ask Ambassador Warnke to say a few words on this subject.

Ambassador Warnke pointed out that, as the Secretary had said, the Soviet third variant was essentially like ours with respect to ICBMs, except that we were suggesting that the ban last for the period of the Protocol, and that it be determined in the course of the SALT III negotiations whether it would be continued. If the Soviet side was willing to accept a ban for the period of the Treaty, we could see no reason why it should not also accept it for the period of the Protocol. As for our two alternatives, we felt that they were indeed in accord with the principle of equal security, because each recognized that our force structures were different. Today the Soviet side felt that its force structure required it to modernize ICBMs with a single reentry vehicle. We, on the other hand, were not interested in modernization of non-MIRVed ICBMs. Therefore, the exception suggested by the Soviet side would not ensure equal security.

The Secretary added that we would in any case have to operate within the sub-level of 820 MIRVed ICBMs.

Gromyko said it was obvious that the sides would have to remain within the 820 sub-level. That question did not arise at all.

Warnke pointed out that the actual constraint on the United States would be greater because we would also have to operate within the sub-ceiling of 1,200 for all ballistic missiles equipped with MIRVs, ICBMs as well as SLBMs. Because of the fact that we would be limited by the 1,200 ceiling and because we had more MIRVed SLBMs, we would not be able to deploy more than 500 MIRVed ICBMs in any case. The balance of roughly 700 would have to be applied to MIRVed SLBMs. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, had more ICBMs than we did, and therefore felt the need for one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. For the above reasons the exception suggested by the Soviet side was of no interest to us, and this was why we had suggested the other alternative.

Gromyko said that what had just been said had added absolutely nothing to the rationale advanced in Moscow earlier this year. The U.S. side had evidently decided to go around in circles. Since there were no new elements in what had just been said, he did not believe we should go all over the detailed rationale again. The Secretary of State had set forth all this during his visit to Moscow. He was sure that the U.S. side realized full well that if the Soviet Union were to accept either of the U.S.-proposed alternatives the United States would have an advantage for a long period of time, not just months but years.

Warnke said that he could not see that at all. The different needs of the two sides ensued from the fact that their force structures were different. The Soviet Union claimed that it needed a new ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. We did not need that kind of a missile. The fact was that the Soviet Union did not need any new MIRVed ICBMs, because it already had three types of new ICBMs—SS-17s, SS-18s and SS-19s. The fact that the Soviet Union did not need new MIRVed ICBMs was no reason that we should forego that option in the event that the Soviet Union insisted on modernization of its forces.

Gromyko asked how anyone could assert that the United States would not have an advantage, when it was certainly a fact that a MIRVed missile was a far more threatening weapon than a missile with a single reentry vehicle. If the U.S. side were to argue that the Soviet-proposed exception would give the Soviet Union the possibility to deploy a missile with a single reentry vehicle of such tremendous yield that it would surpass any MIRVed missile in destructive capability, that would be one thing. But that was out of the question in any case, because we already had agreed criteria beyond which neither side could go in respect of any missile. These were the criteria of throw-weight and launch-weight as specified in the Draft Treaty. He would ask the U.S. side not to compel the Soviet side to harden its position. (Ambassador Warnke interjected that that alternative was open to both of us.) Gromyko said that the United States was trying to get an advan-

tage over the Soviet Union in connection with this issue for several years. He could not in any way agree to such a possibility.

Warnke wanted to point out what the situation would be if the Soviet proposal were accepted. The Soviet Union would still have its SS-17, SS-18 and SS-19 MIRVed missiles, among them 308 SS-18s that were bigger than anything we were allowed to build. We, on the other hand, would retain the same 450 Minuteman II, 550 Minuteman III and 54 Titan missiles. Thus we would not have a single new type in our arsenal, while the Soviet Union would have four new types. That was completely unacceptable to us. The exception proposed by the Soviet side would allow the Soviet Union to modernize its ICBM force, which was already more modern than ours. There was nothing for us in the Soviet-proposed variants which thus were not in accord with the principle of equality and equal security.

Gromyko said that the number of new types was not really relevant in this context. One had to take a look at the overall balance resulting from acceptance of either of the U.S. alternatives—within agreed ceilings, of course. Which side would have an overall advantage as a result of these alternatives? He was sure that the experts of the United States could provide the Secretary with the correct answer to this question. That answer was clear—the United States would have a major advantage if either of its alternatives were accepted. He noted that Warnke had mentioned SS-18 heavy missiles when talking about various types. He certainly knew, however, that when the question of heavy missiles had been settled, all sorts of other factors had been taken into account in reaching agreement, factors that both sides were clearly aware of. Quite some time ago in Geneva the Soviet side had accepted the principle that if at least one missile of a type had been tested with MIRVs, all missiles of that type would be considered and counted as MIRVed. How had this Soviet move affected the situation at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk? The actual situation there differed from the theoretical type rule, and that difference was not in favor of the Soviet Union. The principle adopted in Geneva was in effect, and yet most of the missiles at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk remained non-MIRVed. How much time would the Soviet Union require to MIRV all the missiles at Derazhnya and Pervomaysk? U.S. experts probably had made appropriate calculations of the time required. It was clearly necessary to take into consideration the final balance resulting from any of the proposed alternatives or variants, and only such an approach would provide a scientific answer to the problem. All sorts of contrived arguments could not change anything in fact. The Soviet Union wanted to conclude an honest agreement. It was not claiming the right to deploy a new type of missile with a single reentry vehicle that would equal the

destructive power of the SS–18 heavy missiles; nor was it claiming the right to add to its arsenal of heavy missiles by calling some of them new. The Soviet Union had not suggested that, because agreement had been reached on heavy missiles, an agreement that was fair and mutually acceptable. If one were to put the advantages each side enjoyed on a scale and compare them, the advantages enjoyed by the United States would outweigh Soviet advantages several times over. He would suggest that just one factor operating here be looked at—the geographic factor.

The Secretary asked what bearing the geographic factor had on this situation.

Gromyko replied: “Forward-based systems.”

Gromyko asked if the Secretary had something to say on the second question they had talked about—the question of Soviet medium range bombers. He was asking this not because he wanted to talk about it, but because the U.S. side had talked about it. If the Secretary could address this question now, Gromyko could then provide a response on both issues.

The Secretary said that he frankly did not understand the meaning of the words contained in the statement concerning the Backfire Gromyko had suggested, where reference was made to in-flight refueling. The statement said that in this connection the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States, and that the Soviet side does not intend to give this aircraft such capability in any other manner, including by means of in-flight refueling. The Secretary said he did not understand the precise meaning of these words.

Gromyko said that the Secretary would surely recognize the fact that any aircraft can be modified to take aboard larger quantities of fuel by adding certain devices. If he recognized this, and he surely could not but recognize it, then it can certainly be said that he understands the meaning of these words. If an aircraft required only one or two refuelings to reach a certain area, that was one thing. But if it had to be refueled five or six times to reach that same area, that was something else again. Furthermore, such refuelings could certainly not be concealed. All these facts had to be taken into account. When the Soviet side had changed the wording of its unilateral statement, it had done so for the purpose of accommodating the U.S. side to a greater extent by saying that nothing would be done to give this aircraft the capability of reaching the territory of the United States in any manner, including by in-flight refueling. If everything Gromyko had said on this score was nothing but “small change” in the view of the United States, he would suggest a return to the old language. The Soviet side had acted on the

basis of good intentions in wording the unilateral statement, but it seemed that these good intentions had boomeranged against the Soviet side, or at the very least had produced nothing at all. If that was so, the Soviet side would simply have to revert to its original language. The same thing applied to the question of the flight profile, the question the Secretary had raised in Moscow toward the end of their discussion. Furthermore, they had deleted the words to which the Secretary had taken such great dislike—"by way of information."

The Secretary said he would start with the assumption that the language of the unilateral statement was intended to be helpful in terms of resolving the Backfire issue. However, when we tried to understand the meaning of that language, we were at a loss. When the Secretary had been asked what it meant, he had not been able to explain it. To us it seemed to say that no structural changes would be introduced and no wing tanks added to enable the aircraft to take on more fuel than it could take on now. The second thing seemed to be that there would be no intent to refuel the aircraft more than once. He was not sure of that, but that is what the statement seemed to be saying. However, he did not know whether it also covered such things as not holding training exercises involving refueling and not creating a tanker force to support this aircraft. He was trying to understand what was included in the statement.

Gromyko replied that training exercises and maneuvers would have to remain at the discretion of the Soviet side. As for refueling, it was entirely possible that the Soviet side may want to refuel it five or six times for purposes other than intercontinental missions. The Secretary had mentioned two things—wing tanks and structural changes. But these were not the only things, they had only been cited as examples and did not exhaust all possibilities. Gromyko said that this aircraft's being in the air would not disturb the sleep of the Secretary or any other American.

Gromyko now proposed that this question not be discussed any further. He could not make any further concessions on this issue because it was impossible to do so. This was a medium range weapons system and it was not strategic. Otherwise the Soviet side would be compelled to table an official proposal to consider certain types of U.S. aircraft, including Phantoms, in order to ensure that equivalent aircraft be discussed on a par basis. The Secretary could judge for himself—would this ease the situation? That should be explained to the U.S. Congress and to others talking about the Backfire. Would it be to their liking if the Soviet Union officially raised this question at the next meeting and threw even more questions at the U.S. side about refueling exercises, deployment, etc.? As for the Phantom, there were good

grounds why it was of a hundred times greater concern to the Soviet Union than the Backfire to the United States.

Gromyko asked if the Secretary had something else to address today. If so, he would ask him to tell Gromyko; if not, Gromyko would propose to make a brief statement summing up the discussions. He suggested a short recess.

The Secretary said he had nothing further at this moment.

(The discussion was recessed for a few minutes.)

After the recess Gromyko wanted to tell the Secretary very frankly that the Soviet leadership had not at all been pleased by the fact that simultaneously with conducting negotiations with the Soviet Union the U.S. side had set everything out in detail to the Chinese leadership. This had made an exceptionally negative impression upon the Soviet leadership. Had that been done simply to bring pressure on the Soviet Union?

The Secretary said that we had provided general descriptions rather than detailed information about the Soviet-American negotiations.

Gromyko noted that the U.S. press had reported that China had been given detailed information. In this connection he wanted to register the vigorous objection of the Soviet Union against such a practice.

The Secretary said he had not seen anything about detailed information.

Gromyko repeated that the Soviet side objected resolutely, and he could say that quite officially.

Cyprus

Before presenting his concluding statement, Gromyko wanted to address an entirely different subject "for the purpose of relaxation." He had a conversation with the President of Cyprus, and he understood that the Secretary had also talked with him. He had told Gromyko that his discussions with Turkey had apparently reached a dead end, and that he would not object to the United States and the Soviet Union taking matters into their own hands. Gromyko had replied that he did not quite know how that could be done. He would ask the Secretary what role the two of them could play in this respect. Should they act as intermediaries? The Soviet Union had good relations with both sides and would not be averse to rendering its assistance provided the United States cooperated. He would like to learn the Secretary's views in this regard. He was fully prepared to consider the request of the President of Cyprus, although he was not at all sure that this would help matters.

The Secretary wanted to tell Gromyko what the President of Cyprus had asked us to do. He had asked if we could arrange for him to

meet with Ecevit.² The Secretary had met with Ecevit this morning and had passed on the message. Ecevit had said that he would consider the request and then decide if he would meet with Kyprianou. Perhaps he might prefer a meeting between Caramanlis, Kyprianou, Denktash and himself.³ The Secretary would not rule out a possible meeting between Ecevit, Kyprianou and Denktash, provided the latter two agreed. An approach had been made to the Secretary General in these terms. That was where matters stood now, and the Secretary would suggest to wait and see what would happen.

Gromyko agreed and said they might return to this matter subsequently.

SALT

Gromyko said that he had listened attentively to everything the Secretary had said. He had to tell the Secretary directly that the U.S. position as set forth by the President and restated by the Secretary today left him with an ambivalent impression. He would even go further and say that now he had greater doubts than ever about the direction in which the United States was moving with respect to the new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. President Carter and the Secretary had both assured the Soviet side that the United States wanted to conclude the new agreement, and wanted this to be done at an early date. Gromyko and the Soviet leadership had duly appreciated these assurances and had proceeded from that premise when working out their positions on specific matters in preparation for the current discussions. For their part they had once again displayed their readiness to take into account the wishes of the U.S. side as far as possible, in order to find mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining questions. He wanted to remind the Secretary briefly what proposals he had brought to these discussions. The Soviet side had proposed three variants for resolving the outstanding question of new types of ICBMs. These provided for a ban on the flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs for the term of the three-year Protocol, or for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, except that each side could flight-test and deploy only one new type of ICBM equipped with only a single reentry vehicle. Alternatively the flight testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs could be banned for the term of the Treaty, i.e., through 1985, without exception, i.e., the ban would apply to ICBMs with a single reentry vehicle as well as to MIRVed ICBMs. The Soviet side had also expressed its readiness to reach agreement on not increasing the

² Bülent Ecevit, Prime Minister of Turkey.

³ Constantine Caramanlis, Prime Minister of Greece; Spyros Kyprianou, President of Cyprus; and Rauf Denktash, President of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (recognized only by Turkey).

number of reentry vehicles on existing types of ICBMs. He recalled that the United States had attached exceptional importance to such a limitation, and the Soviet side had accepted that. Its acceptance was contingent on finding a solution to the question of new types on the basis of one of the three variants proposed by the Soviet side. In this connection, it was also necessary, of course, to find a mutually acceptable solution to limits on the modernization of existing types of ICBMs and to the question of limiting the number of cruise missiles which could be installed on a heavy bomber to no more than 20. This had been emphasized on a number of occasions. Gromyko wanted to confirm that if a mutually acceptable solution was found for the new types issue, the Soviet side could agree to establish a ceiling of 1,200 instead of 1,250 for the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs and ASBMs equipped with MIRVs. He emphasized that the Soviet Union would agree to the 1,200 level only in the event a mutually acceptable solution was found to the question of new types of ballistic missiles. He pointed out that in effect he was replying here to what Warnke had said. This was another example of Soviet Union's taking into account the insistent requests of the U.S. side. Further, the Soviet Union had amplified substantially its unilateral statement regarding the Soviet TU-22-M medium range bomber. It had done so, being guided by good will and in a desire to reach agreement, although this bomber had no bearing at all on the subject matter of our negotiations.

Thus, Gromyko said, the Soviet Union once again made some new, major and constructive proposals moving toward the position of the U.S. side, thereby reaffirming its determination to bring the SALT II negotiations to a successful conclusion. In so doing the Soviet Union had taken into account the firm intention expressed by the U.S. leadership in the course of recent discussions in Moscow to act in a similar manner in order to reach agreement. The Soviet side had been assured that the U.S., too, believed that both sides had to undertake vigorous effort to arrive at mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding questions. He would ask, however, what had he found in reality? If one examined the position taken by the U.S. side on specific issues during the current talks, it became clear immediately that the U.S. position on any of the issues under discussion had not changed from the position stated in Moscow. Furthermore, on the very next day after his meeting with the President in Washington he had been astounded to hear a high official of the U.S. Administration state publicly that the United States had put forward a good and balanced proposal, and now would simply wait for the Soviet Union to accept it. It must be clear that an approach of this kind, one that was not far away from an ultimatum, could hardly be accepted. People who talked that way in reality are not unaware of how the U.S. side would look if the Soviet side were to make public the actual proposals it had tabled and if it were to state its views regarding

the proposals made by the United States. Did the Soviet side have the moral right to react or to respond officially to such a statement by a high U.S. official? There was no question about it at all, it did have the right to do so, at least to explain the true state of affairs to its own public opinion. Such a way of proceeding could only dismay the Soviet side. It was not at all in line with the assurances that had been given by President Carter and by Secretary Vance. After all, negotiations were negotiations. He, too, could say: "Here are our proposals and there is no need to discuss them. Accept them and we will have an agreement; do not accept them and we will not have an agreement." He found himself compelled to state that due to such an approach the two sides had not moved forward in preparation of the agreement.

Gromyko said that he might now talk to the Secretary about what to say in public about what had happened here. Of course, usually the two sides did not state the complete truth; they usually "spoke around the truth," softening things here and there. He was not saying that this was wrong, but if the two sides were to tell the truth now, many people in both our countries would be shocked indeed to find out where we stood. And to all this another complicating factor had been added—the information provided to the Chinese. During the negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union the U.S. side had decided to provide detailed information regarding these negotiations to the Chinese leadership. He would ask: "On what grounds?" This had never been discussed with the Soviet side, and he simply did not know how to understand such a manner of proceeding.

Furthermore, instead of engaging in businesslike discussions, attempts were made to impose so-called solutions on the Soviet side, and in so doing a knowingly incorrect interpretation of Soviet policy was used in order to substantiate these solutions. He would say that the atmosphere was being charged with tension, and this becomes a heavy burden and has a negative effect on the negotiations. He had simply wanted to touch on this point without going into detail.

Returning to the question under discussion, i.e., SALT, he wanted to emphasize again that the Soviet Union was prepared to move toward rapid conclusion of the work on the new agreement so as to sign it in the near future. The Soviets had not lost interest in concluding an agreement, but what was required now, of course, was a similar approach by the United States. In spite of the situation that had now emerged, he still wanted to express his hope that the U.S. side would find it possible to take another look at the proposals he had tabled. It would go without saying that it would be very bad indeed if at the next meeting the same kind of an atmosphere were to prevail and the same kind of positions were to be restated. That would be bad indeed and, who knows, it might lead to complete loss of the opportunity of

reaching a new accord. But, as he had said, the Soviet Union was still determined to continue the negotiations and apply further efforts.

Displaying some emotion, Gromyko said he had been asking himself what interests the Chinese might be pursuing with regard to these negotiations and what sort of advice they could give the United States in this connection. He had come to the conclusion that the Chinese could only advise the U.S. as follows: "To the devil with this new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms."

Gromyko said that quite frequently he had heard from the Secretary and from other representatives of the Administration that many representatives in the Congress of the United States and many people in the United States opposed conclusion of the SALT II agreement. Was this really so surprising when the U.S. Government had not taken any substantive steps to defend the new agreement and to speak out in its favor? He and the Soviet leadership were struck by the timidity displayed by the U.S. Administration in SALT matters. Everyone in his country knew that these negotiations were of prime importance. Virtually every statement at the Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly had referred to the enormous importance of this matter and he was personally convinced that it was indeed enormously important. But, he would ask, what about the U.S. Administration? Why does it not speak out in a bold voice, and clearly state that this agreement is in the interests of both our countries and in the interests of world peace? That was a very valid question, one that he as Foreign Minister had been asked by many people. Indeed, no such firm voice had been heard in defense of the agreement in the United States. When he was asked this question he could only shrug his shoulders in bewilderment. He was genuinely astounded by the absence of a firm stand in defense of the agreement on the part of the U.S. Administration. Voices were heard in the Congress of the United States to the effect that it was a risky thing to conclude an agreement with the Soviet Union, because the Soviet Union might violate the agreement. But, he would point out, people on his side could say the same thing about the United States. A firm reply should be provided. It should be said that the agreement being worked out would be based on the ability of each side to verify compliance with complete reliability. Under those conditions it surely must be made known to the public at large that violation of the agreement was ruled out by all the verification arrangements contained therein and by our extensive experience of implementing the SALT I agreements. That experience had surely been most positive. Whenever misunderstandings had arisen, they had been promptly resolved by appropriate discussions and explanations between the two sides.

Gromyko repeated that no firm voice had been raised on the part of the U.S. Government. For the sake of truth it should be said that the

State Department had indeed provided some explanations, that Ambassador Warnke had publicly taken a positive stand, and that this had had some effect. But, what he was talking about now was that it was necessary for the U.S. Administration to speak out in a firm and determined voice to put things into the right perspective. Soft spoken statements were not enough.

It was being asked: "Suppose the Soviet Union violates the Treaty? What then?" One could not base policy on that kind of an argument. One might just as well ask: "What if an earthquake were suddenly to occur and everything come tumbling down?" He was reminded of a couple of characters in one of Gogol's⁴ stories called "Old World Landowners." In that story there is a conversation between an old couple where one asks the other: "What if our house should burn down?" The other replied, "Well, in that case we shall move into the storehouse." The first continues, "What if the storehouse should burn down?" The other replies, "In that case we shall move into the barn," and so on and so forth. It must be pointed out firmly that both sides have experience in implementing bilateral agreements between us and are fully resolved to use the positive experience of SALT I to move on to SALT II.

The Secretary said that, while he would not try to respond to all the statements Gromyko had made, he would like to say a few words. First, it was correct that the President and the Secretary himself had said on numerous occasions that they wanted to see an early conclusion of the negotiations, conclusion of the new agreement, and that they were doing all in their power to bring this about. He would stand on this statement. Just two days ago he had made a statement to that effect in Congress. As far as defending the ultimate agreement was concerned, perhaps Gromyko's information was not very good. The Secretary had said countless times that the agreement that would be achieved would be fair to both sides and was essential for stability not only between our two sides, but also for general stability and peace throughout the world. Mr. Warnke had also said so on numerous occasions, and not just last week or two weeks ago, but on countless other occasions. After his return from Moscow the Secretary had called on all but one of the leaders of Congress, and had talked to each privately regarding the importance of reaching agreement and his belief that the agreement that will be achieved will be very much in the interests of the United States, the interests of the Soviet Union and the interests of world peace. As recently as last Friday, Warnke and he had testified at length in a positive fashion before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and had expressed their hope that the negotiations would be brought to a successful conclusion. Therefore, he simply could not accept the sugges-

⁴ Nikolai Gogol, Ukrainian author.

tion Gromyko had made to the effect that we were not willing to speak out about the importance of concluding the SALT II agreement at an early date. There were indeed those in the United States who did not want to see us reach agreement, and they did speak out. It would be impossible to answer every allegation made. However, he believed that we were doing a good job of speaking in favor of the agreement. Finally, we were engaged in organizing a major effort that would be launched soon, in which a large number of Senators and of people outside the Government would come out with statements speaking in favor of the SALT agreement. As for the exact timing of that effort, that was a delicate matter, and we would have to decide.

Coming back to our own SALT negotiations, the Secretary would say that the suggestions we had made in Moscow had displayed flexibility, had taken into account the views expressed on the Soviet side, and were constructive. He would tell Gromyko that we had very carefully studied the three variants Gromyko had proposed in his discussions with President Carter, and as he and Warnke had pointed out, we did not believe that any one of them provided for equality and equal security, which were necessary if we were to reach agreement. We felt that our proposals as outlined by the President did meet, in a fair and equitable way, the requirements of both sides, and he would hope that the Soviet side would continue consideration of these proposals. On the definition of new missiles, we had taken note of what Gromyko had said the other day and recognized that this was conditional upon a number of matters that were now the subject of discussions. As for the 1,200 sub-level as opposed to 1,250, Gromyko had correctly stated that this was conditioned on a number of other matters. The Secretary wanted to point out that our agreement to the 2,250 overall aggregate was contingent upon agreement on the definition of new missiles, as well as agreement on the timing of the dismantling or destruction that will be required.

On the matter of the Backfire bomber the President had outlined our views and concerns and our position, and the Secretary had nothing to add to that.

Having commented on those matters, the Secretary now wanted to turn to the general proposition of where we would move from here. He would also say that we believed that both sides should strive to achieve a fair and equitable agreement that would be acceptable and fair to both sides. We were ready to move in that direction and bend every effort to achieve that goal at an early date. He would agree with Gromyko that in any negotiations it was necessary for each side to listen to the other and to take into account its positions. We had done so all along and would continue to do so. Finally, on the question of our bilateral relations, certain comments Gromyko had made had been dis-

cussed at great length at the private meeting between himself and Gromyko today, and there was no need to return to that question now.

In conclusion, the Secretary wanted to say that our task now was to see how we could move forward toward successful conclusion of the negotiations. He believed that we had made a great deal of progress when one looked back at the questions that had been resolved. We would bend all efforts to resolve the remaining difficult questions before us.

The Secretary also noted that he and Gromyko had agreed to meet again fairly soon on a mutually convenient date which would be arranged through their respective Embassies.

Gromyko agreed and thought they could now in good conscience conclude their current meeting, having met for more than five hours. But then again, he noted, that five hours was nothing as compared to eternity.

122. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 1, 1978

SUBJECT

Weekly Report

How Not to Deal with the Russians

State learned of the "technical penetration" of our Moscow Embassy in the early morning hours on Thursday, at 11:00 AM² Moscow time. All that day and throughout the night until about 6:00 AM Friday in Moscow, the embassy had the opportunity to pursue the cables through the tunnel to their source on Soviet territory. The embassy leadership took no initiative and the desk at State did not encourage initiative and counter aggressiveness. They did not even alert Vance.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 152, USSR: Technical Penetration of the US Embassy in Moscow: 5–6/78. Secret.

² May 25. See footnote 2, Document 106.

Instead, in the name of moderation and “legality” the time was wasted and the cables cut, clearly inside our grounds.³

Once the “opposition” (as the embassy referred to the KGB personnel) was alerted, the value of moderation and passivity proved small, perhaps even a handicap.

—Soviet personnel violated our tunnel aggressively, even making a hole in the wall we built to close off the tunnel, cursing our workman, and physically trying to block our effort on our grounds.

—While we worried about what this might do to our bilateral relations, the Soviets seized the initiative and protested that we had engaged in illegal work in our chimney which in fact belongs to the Soviet Union! Our surprised DCM called this a “classic in the annals of Soviet chutzpah.”⁴

—*Three days* after this “chutzpah,” State pulled itself together to respond⁵ to the Embassy’s request of *six days* earlier for the authority to “protest”⁶ the Soviet placement of “spying devices” on our grounds and for repeated violations of our grounds.

—Meanwhile, back in the US, Gromyko sent Bessmertnykh to intimidate Shulman with a list of alleged US technical penetrations of Soviet installations.⁷ Moreover, the Soviets took the initiative against “linkage” of this Moscow affair with any other, vaguely suggesting that it could be “explosive for the relationship.”

These few points merely give a brief sense of tactics and style of US-Soviet diplomatic relations at the cutting edge in Moscow and back-stopped by State. They reveal the fecklessness of our approach. Had State looked into the record, or had they even asked some old hands, they could have predicted the Soviet behavior with incredible accuracy. Aggressive false accusations were precisely to be expected, not something to be surprised at as a “classic in the annals.”

First principle: *Always attack when guilty*. Several times in the past the Soviets have delivered pre-emptive protests wholly at odds with the facts (i.e., bald lies) when caught in crimes. For example, in 1959 in Prague, in a similar “technical penetration” case, the British were accused of “breaking and entering” when in fact the reverse was true.

Second principle: *Intimidate the opponent*. Strike a grave pose and sadly predict disastrous consequences (“explosive for the relationship”) so that one’s opponent is put off balance. It is more than a week

³ See Documents 108, 110–112.

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 118.

⁵ See Document 119.

⁶ See Document 113.

⁷ See Document 118.

since this began in Moscow, and we still are not on the offensive in an effective way.

Third principle: *Make things so outrageous that the opponent is afraid to go public with it.* The Norwegian Prime Minister in 1974 went to Moscow with agreed conditions that the Spitzbergen issue would not be discussed. Kuznetsov, an hour before the meeting in Moscow, announced that it would be discussed. When the Norwegians tried to resist, Kuznetsov cursed them in “the vilest language” and told them they had no choice. Reportedly the Norwegians did not give in, but they were afraid to tell anyone, even the home office, of this treatment because it would make them look impotent. Even today this incident is virtually unknown because the Soviets clearly understood how an outrageous tactic can trap an opponent with what Stalin called the “dilemma of one alternative.” When we let the Soviets put us off balance in this episode for a week, we look as helpless as the Norwegians.

123. Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 9, 1978

SUBJECT

Moscow Chimney Affairs

The Soviets are stepping up their campaign to put us on the defensive in the “Moscow Chimney” affairs while continuing to physically violate our embassy property. Yesterday the Soviets went public with their outrageous charge in TASS that we are making unlawful alterations to the heating facility of the neighboring Soviet building, charges that we are making unfounded and provocative allegations about Soviet electronic surveillance of the embassy, and threatening to reveal “subversive activities” conducted from the U.S. embassy building. At the same time, the Soviets are continuing to physically penetrate the chimney—U.S. sovereign territory—to the extent that we have been

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Unfiled Files, Box 152, USSR: Technical Penetration of US Embassy in Moscow: 5–6/78. Secret. Sent for action. Inderfurth and Aaron also initialed the memorandum.

forced to erect a second barrier to keep them out. In a word, this is “outrageous.”

State proposes to release the text of our original diplomatic protest as a rebuttal. *I believe we should go one step further and document our case, at least on deep background, to a few responsible journalists.* The basis for this “factual” briefing would be the just completed “Preliminary Find Report” [2 lines not declassified] Just to prove our point we could run them through the history of this incident and show the pictures.

RECOMMENDATION: That you authorize me, working through Jerry Schecter, to provide a few key journalists with a deep background factual briefing on the Moscow chimney affairs.²

Tab A

Preliminary Find Report Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency³

Washington, undated

TECHNICAL PENETRATION, U.S. EMBASSY MOSCOW
25 May 1978

SUMMARY

On 25 May 1978 at 11:00 a.m. Moscow time during an audio countermeasures investigation of a 7th floor apartment on the west side of the south wing of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, a [text not declassified] antenna was found abutting a chimney. The antenna [4 lines not declassified]

[3 paragraphs (13 lines) not declassified]

A wall was built in the tunnel on U.S. property and all equipment and cables on our property have been secured.

As of this time, 7 June, on-site analysis is in progress. We do not know the purpose of the equipment. We know that it is a receiving antenna, but we do not know what it may be picking up. It offers the threat of listening to conversations in apartments near the chimney and in official offices of the Embassy.

² Brzezinski indicated his approval of this recommendation. In the margin he wrote, “JS [Jerry Schecter] to coordinate with State. ZB.”

³ Secret.

1. PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF THE BUILDING

The U.S. Embassy in Moscow is composed of three connected buildings oriented north and south. The center building is the Chancery. The north and south buildings are primarily residential apartments.

a. *South Building*: This structure has seven floors, an attic, a basement and a subbasement. It is made primarily of brick. It matches floor-to-floor the floor levels in the Chancery for the seven floors of its height. The Chancery has 10 floors. It is a corner structure, so it has no adjoining buildings to the south or east. To the west, it adjoins a Soviet apartment building up to approximately the fifth floor.

b. *Chimney*: There is a chimney which (above the fifth floor south wing) protrudes from the west side of the south wing. It seems to come from the Soviet apartment roof (two floors below the south wing roof), is attached to our south wing west wall, and terminates in a standard chimney cap about 15 feet above the south wing roof (on the west edge). The outside dimensions of this chimney are roughly five feet square. The inside dimensions are roughly four feet square (as will be seen below).

c. *Soviet Apartment Complex*: This exists to the west of our south wing complex described above. There are five stories plus an attic. Their fifth story, however, does not seem to correspond directly to ours. The attic peak seems to come to our fifth or sixth floor level. Their first floor (or basement?) is slightly below ground level. The windows are much smaller (like what you would have in the basement of some American homes). We have never noticed any lights on in these windows at night.

d. Below the fifth floor, the chimney structure is inside our building. There is a small room approximately six by fifteen feet in each apartment that abuts the chimney on the six foot side (to the south) and the Soviet apartment on the fifteen foot side (to the west). On the ground floor of the south wing is the charwomen's changing room.

2. On 25 May, a hole (1) (2) was made in the seventh floor wall of the chimney in apartment 7A. (Numbers in brackets are keyed to attached photographs.)⁴ [7 lines not declassified]

[4 pages (30 paragraphs) not declassified]

17. We are continuing tests of the antenna.

[1 paragraph (19 lines) not declassified]

19. ANTENNA DIMENSIONS ARE:

[1 page (8 paragraphs) not declassified]

⁴Not found attached.

124. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 10, 1978

SUBJECT

Counterintelligence: Embassy Moscow

Sam Hoskinson asked me to set down some points on Embassy Moscow for the SCC agenda² on counterintelligence.

The Problem

The embassy in Moscow has traditionally been neglected and made an easy target for the Soviets. Moreover, its potential as a training and reporting outpost has been woefully unexploited, a point made by George Kennan in his recent book.³ The general management policy and the budget level for that embassy are not greatly different from those for our embassies in other countries. That means hiring of as many local nationals as possible. It means very little in the way of selective recruiting for assignment to Moscow. And it does not allow the rigorous interagency indoctrination for new staff personnel before they depart the U.S. for Moscow. As a consequence, we look and act very amateurishly as an embassy in Moscow. Even the best professionals on the staff have no option but to go along because the resources are not available for changing the situation.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

Toward a Solution

We are now in the early stages of building a new embassy in Moscow. That is the occasion for rectifying the situation if we choose to exploit it. To do so would require the following:

—An SCC decision to implement an upgrading program during the construction phase.

—An interagency backstopping group (CIA, State, DOD, and NSC) for providing the coordination and the level of emphasis necessary to break the old habits and policies, [1 line not declassified]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 32, Moscow Embassy: 3/77–8/79. Top Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Sent totally outside the system. A copy was sent to Hoskinson. Inderfurth also initialed the memorandum. An unknown hand drew an arrow to the subject line on the front of the memorandum and wrote: "Included in briefing book."

² The agenda for this meeting was not found.

³ Reference is presumably to *The Cloud of Danger*.

—An additional Congressional appropriation of funds to carry the greater costs of construction and staffing. (Zablocki and Slack would probably be very cooperative on this.)

—[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (3½ lines) not declassified]

Benefits and Consequences

—[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (13 lines) not declassified]

—[1 paragraph (6 lines) not declassified]

—We would give the impression to other countries, not least the Chinese, that we are serious in Moscow. Many of my diplomatic acquaintances in Moscow used to reveal despair over learning how amateurishly we go about our business there.

—This is the natural underpinning for the efforts you have made to force the Soviets to give Mack Toon greater access to the Soviet leadership in Moscow.⁴

⁴ Bartholomew wrote below this paragraph, “Sam Hoskinson & I agree completely with this. Reg.”

125. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, June 13, 1978, 1729Z

149573. Subject: Chernyayev and Enger Cases: Soviet Nonpaper.

Following is text of nonpaper given to the Secretary by Dobrynin June 5.

Begin quote. We are concerned about the situation around Chernyaev and Enger in connection with the so called “case” when they are

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 6/1–15/78. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Sherrod McCall (EUR/SOV); cleared by Curtis Kamman (S/MS), Luers, and in S/S–O; approved by Anderson. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840128–2186)

charged with espionage.² Their indictment in the court of Newark has shown that we deal here with a judicial farce the outcome of which is predetermined. Charges against them are unfounded and the facts cited in the indictment cannot serve even as circumstantial evidence of their guilt. Some facts given in the indictment, which under certain circumstances could be regarded as evidence, are obviously invented.

The US side should, in particular, be well aware of the facts that on May 20 Ziniakin³ did not receive any materials from anybody. The assertion itself that a damage was caused to the security of the United States cannot stand any criticism because according to American press reports actions of the so called “naval officer” were directed by the FBI. The fact should be also noted that the US press is fanning anti-Soviet campaign around this “case,” thus exerting influence on its outcome.

These and other circumstances give reason to state that in this case the trial is being staged for political motives. In this connection attention should be drawn to the attacks on the Soviet Embassy and the Ambassador personally which the judge permitted himself during the hearing of the case on June 6.

Besides, in spite of the promises from the Department of State to try to obtain the reduction of the bail the judge confirmed the unprecedented amount of 4 million dollars set earlier.

The Soviet side continues to insist on a significant reduction of the bail, the release of Chernyaev and Enger on bail with the subsequent termination of the prosecution against them. Otherwise the Soviet side will be compelled to take appropriate measures in response. End quote.

Christopher

² See footnote 6, Document 109.

³ Vladimir Zinyakin, attaché to Soviet Mission at the United Nations.

126. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 21, 1978, 1423Z

14313. CINCEUR for ECJ3 to be passed urgently to Amb Toon only. Urgent eyes only for Ambassador Toon scheduled to be at EURCOM flight operations. Subject: Technical Penetration—Opposition Activities.

1. At approximately 1000 this morning, jack-hammer type noises were heard which emanated from behind the walls at the base of the chimney shaft in the Soviet change room. It was suspected that the opposition was attempting to break into the shaft from the basement of the building which adjoins the Embassy's south wing. Consequently, a partial demolition of the north wall of the shaft from within the change room was conducted in an effort to determine what the opposition was attempting to do. No technical penetration was discovered as a result of this demo.

2. Below the floor of the change room along the west wall which adjoins the Soviet building, there is located an approximate 12" × 12" light concrete ventilation shaft which runs in a north-south direction. We broke into this shaft and discovered a penetration from the basement of the apartment building which measures approximately 18" square. This penetration is not the location from where the original jack-hammer noises came from. Once the opposition learned that we were aware of their activities all jack-hammering ceased. [2½ lines not declassified] We are maintaining surveillance in the change room.

3. At 1445 the Charge and counselor for administration were called into UPDK (the diplomatic service agency). The results of this meeting and post's recommendations are being transmitted by septel.²

Matlock

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–0986. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis; Handle as Nodis. Sent to CINCEUR in Vaihingen, Germany.

² In telegram 14311 from Moscow, June 21, the Embassy reported that the UPDK demanded that the chimney be restored to its original condition. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–0988)

127. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, June 21, 1978, 2344Z

158602. Subject: Technical Penetration Protest. Ref: Moscow 14311, 14313.²

1. Secretary raised latest chimney developments with Dobrynin June 21 (septel).³ Embassy should seek immediate appointment at appropriate high level in MFA and state that Embassy is under instructions to protest what can only be viewed here as a serious provocation against the Embassy. In addition to reiterating the facts about the location of the chimney, Embassy should point out the absurdity of any attempt to assert that the chimney and tunnel have had in recent times a function, heating, ventilation, or whatever, other than as a penetration of our Embassy.

2. Embassy should say that the U.S. is totally unable to comprehend what the Soviet side has in mind and hopes to accomplish. But if this provocation continues it can only add further strain to relations. The U.S. has no desire to see this happen. But if the provocation continues, and those responsible for it on the Soviet side are not restrained, then responsibility for the consequences shall rest fully with the Soviet side.

Vance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–0984. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by McCall; cleared by Shulman in substance and by Thomas Martin (S/S–O); approved by Luers.

² See Document 126 and footnote 2 thereto.

³ In telegram 158439 to Moscow, June 21, the Department summarized Vance's protest to Dobrynin regarding the Soviet penetration of the Embassy's chimney. Dobrynin denied any knowledge of the events. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840163–0075)

128. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 22, 1978, 1544Z

14472. Subject: Technical Penetration Protest. Ref: State 158602.²

1. Charge delivered protest, as outlined in reftel, to First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko afternoon of June 22. In addition to making points suggested in reftel, Charge referred to his June 21 meeting with Ambassador Kuznetsov³ on same subject, and also showed Korniyenko official copy of Soviet ground plan of Embassy building which clearly included chimney as part of Embassy property.

2. Korniyenko responded along familiar lines, “most decisively” rejecting assertion that USSR was involved in any sort of provocation against Embassy, and arguing that chimney had no connection to Embassy and indeed was an “essential part” of the heating system of the neighboring building. The occupants of that building demand restoration of damage caused by Embassy, and if Embassy does not comply they have the right to repair the damage themselves. Perhaps the heating system had not been used for a while, but the chimney had to be useable in case the furnace were fired up.

3. Charge said he could only reiterate the Embassy’s protest, stress that the facts were clear and our position was firm, and express his hope that the Soviet Government would take note of U.S. position and avoid further exacerbation of situation.

4. As reported septel,⁴ there has been no discernible Soviet activity around chimney today.

Matlock

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890106–0981. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House.

² See Document 127.

³ In telegram 14311 from Moscow, June 21, the Embassy reported that Kuznetsov demanded that the chimney be returned to its original condition; see footnote 2, Document 126.

⁴ Not found.

July–December 1978

129. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 3, 1978, 0825Z

5415. For the Secretary from Ambassador. Subject: Message for Foreign Minister Gromyko. Ref: State 167936.²

1. I delivered your letter to Gromyko at 9:55 a.m. Sunday, July 3.

2. Gromyko, accompanied by First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, clearly had been given advance warning by Dobrynin of a possible demarche on the correspondents. After Gromyko read the letter, I added that this case was causing a storm in the US and that it would be useful if the case could be removed from the books. Gromyko responded firmly that this was "impossible," that the trial would take place. But, he added, it could be delayed. Now scheduled for July 7, it could be postponed until Monday, July 17.

3. I said that would be helpful, but it would be much better if the case could be dropped. I also briefly explained our understanding of the substance of the case, noting in particular that Piper and Whitney themselves did not say that the TV confession of Gamsakhurdia³ was fake. They only quoted sources to this effect; and the stories did not appear in the USSR.

4. Gromyko reiterated that it would be impossible to eliminate the case. It made no difference where the stories appeared. Korniyenko added that Piper and Whitney had after all spread lies about the Soviet Union. You do not resort to this method in the US, he said, and we do not here. This case was part of a chain of events which was set into motion by the US side (Gromyko clearly had in mind the arrest in Woodbridge of Chernyayev and Enger).⁴ It is a matter of reciprocity. The So-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 52, USSR: 7/78. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Vance's message to Gromyko, transmitted in telegram 167936 to Moscow, July 1, regarding the case of Craig Whitney and Harold Piper is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840172-2667. Whitney of *The New York Times* and Piper of *The Baltimore Sun* were reporters summoned to Soviet courts on June 27 and charged with libel against Soviet state television. See David K. Shipler, "2 U.S. Newsmen Get Soviet Libel Charge," *The New York Times*, June 28, 1978, p. NJ19.

³ Zviad Gamsakhurdia, a Georgian novelist and dissident; see *ibid.*

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 109.

viet side had “overlooked a great deal” with respect to the conduct of US citizens in the USSR. But when “you take such a line, we also must do so. You speak of concern, but we have the same concern expressed to us from our people in New York. It would be better to remove the source of such concern. This is all very bad, as I told Secretary Vance.”

5. I said I was sorry Gromyko could not do more to alleviate this very serious problem, but would relay his response to you along with his offer to delay the Piper-Whitney trial until the 17th.

6. As the meeting concluded, Gromyko repeated his familiar line about the forthcoming Geneva meeting: he hoped the meeting would be useful, but it all depended upon the positions of the US side.

Toon

130. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 7, 1978, 1:15–2:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Zbigniew Brzezinski
Anatoliy Dobrynin

1. Dobrynin brought up the question of the Woodbridge Two.² He asked if there is any way in which the issue could be terminated and the two men released. I made it clear that we regard the use of spies without diplomatic immunity as not covered by previous rules of the game. Thus we cannot release them without some quid pro quo. Dobrynin asked what kind of a quid pro quo could be arranged, and I told them that we would submit some names to the Soviets.

2. I suggested also that both sides might find it useful to have an informal understanding regarding the restriction of intelligence activity to personnel covered by diplomatic immunity. Dobrynin expressed an interest in exploring this matter further.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—U.S.-Soviet Relations: 7/78–3/80. Secret. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, which he received under a July 7 covering memorandum, from Brzezinski.

² Reference is to Enger and Chernyayev; see footnote 6, Document 109.

3. Dobrynin expressed an explicit preference for dealing on such matters with the White House.³

4. Dobrynin and I discussed ways in which the Carter-Brezhnev dialogue could be resumed even before the Summit. Dobrynin indicated he would discuss this matter with Brezhnev and he expressed the view that resumption in direct contact would be beneficial. He also asked if the President might have any oral message⁴ for Brezhnev for Dobrynin to communicate. Dobrynin is leaving Monday night.

5. We also discussed the African situation, and I pointed out to Dobrynin that Soviet insensitivity to our concerns has contributed to the present deterioration in the atmosphere of our relationships. Dobrynin countered by claiming that our human rights campaign also contributed to this situation, though he conceded perhaps the Soviets did underestimate the depth of our concern over Soviet/Cuban activity in Africa. I stressed to him the need for both sides to develop better understanding of the “rules of the game” in the Third World, along the lines of the reciprocal restraint that has developed over the years in Europe and regarding strategic issues.

³ Carter wrote “no” beside this paragraph.

⁴ Carter underlined “oral message” and wrote in the margin, “Yes—release Shcharanskiy.”

131. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Secretary of State Vance¹

Washington, July 11, 1978

The President has approved the following oral message to Brezhnev:

BEGIN TEXT:

The President has asked me to convey the following message to you for President Brezhnev.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 18, U.S.S.R.—Carter–Brezhnev Correspondence (1/78–12/78). Secret; Nodis. An unknown hand wrote, “Send to Vance on aircraft 8:30 a.m.” in the upper right-hand corner of the message. Vance was in Geneva, July 11–13, to meet with Gromyko.

The President is deeply concerned about the significant unfavorable effect of the trials of dissidents² taking place in the Soviet Union on the entire climate of US-Soviet relations.

His personal and official interest in these cases arises not from any desire to interfere in your internal affairs or to frustrate your legal and judicial process. Rather, it is an objective fact that the international consequences of your government's decisions on the treatment of Anatoly Shcharanskiy and others who have supported the Helsinki Final Act can impede the efforts we have made and are still making to preserve stability in other aspects of our relations.

The President, believing fully that you share with him a strong desire to put the relationship between our two countries onto a more positive footing, wishes to convey his hope that you will do everything within your power to avoid such actions which will inevitably create barriers to the development of our cooperative relations.

END TEXT

² See Vance's July 8 statement about the Shcharanskiy and Ginzburg trials transmitted in telegram 172828 to multiple diplomatic and consular posts, July 8. (Department of State, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Dissidents and Political Prisoner Subject Files 1974–1988, Lot 91D273, Box 9, Shcharanskiy, Anatoliy, 1978)

132. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 12, 1978, 1448Z

Secto 8019/10615. Subject: Vance-Gromyko Meeting Morning Session July 12.

Secretary Vance made a formal presentation on SALT at the opening session, the text of which follows below. Gromyko asked for a recess until 3:30 this afternoon to consider the new U.S. proposal. We will meet with the Soviet delegation again at that time. Quote.

This morning I propose that we focus on one of the most important issues remaining to be resolved in the agreement: limitations on the in-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance/Gromyko: Geneva, 7/12–13, 1978. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shinn; cleared by Shulman; approved by Vance. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is *ibid.* Vance was in Geneva, July 11–13, to meet with Gromyko.

roduction of new types of strategic missiles and on modernization of existing types of strategic missiles.

I would first like to review where we stand on the issues of new types of ICBMs and SLBMs and of modernization of existing types.

In previous discussions we have proposed a ban on testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs in the protocol. This would prohibit introduction of new types of ICBMs through 1980 while we discuss how to deal with this issue in SALT III.

We have also indicated that we could accept a ban on testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that either side could test and deploy one new ICBM, MIRVed, or non-MIRVed. This would permit you to go ahead with the new, single RV ICBM, which fits your force structure, and would permit us to proceed with a new MIRVed ICBM, which would fit into our force structure. This would provide for equality and equal security on both sides.

Either of these proposals would represent a satisfactory solution of the ICBM new types issue.

In the context of a protocol ban on new types of ICBMs, we could agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs, allowing for continued testing and deployment of Trident I and for the SS-N-18.

In the context of a ban on new types of ICBMs through 1985 with one exemption, MIRVed or non-MIRVed, for each side, we could agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs for the same period, with one exemption. In our case this would be the Trident II, and in your case this would be the Typhoon (RSM-52). Under this proposal, Trident I and the SS-N-18 would be considered existing types.

You have proposed a ban on new types of ICBMs for the protocol period, except that each side would be permitted to test and deploy one new type of ICBM with a single reentry vehicle. This proposal would prevent us from testing any new missile, while allowing you to go ahead with a new single RV ICBM for which we have no program and no need. This is inequitable and unacceptable to us.

You have also proposed a ban on new types through 1985, with the same exemption for a new single RV ICBM. This is even more one-sided:

—The U.S. would have no new ICBM for the duration of the 1985 agreement, since we have no program or requirement for a new single RV ICBM.

—The Soviet Union would, however, be able to deploy its entirely new type of single RV ICBM.

Finally, you have proposed a ban on the testing and deployment of new types of ICBMs through 1985, without exception. This proposal indicates that you can forego a new single RV ICBM. In that sense, it rep-

resents a constructive step to which we have given consideration in our own thinking. The logic of this proposal argues that you should be able to accept our proposal for a protocol ban on all new types, which would impose equal constraints on both sides.

As for SLBM new types, your proposal is the same for all variants: a ban on flight testing and deployment for either the protocol or the 1985 period, with an exception for Trident I and the Typhoon. This is not equitable. Trident I has already begun flight-testing and should be treated the same as SS–N–18. Soviet rights to a new, untested SLBM must be balanced by equal rights for the US. This means that Trident II and Typhoon must be treated comparably. Either they must both be banned or both be exempted.

There is also the question of how to define a new type of ICBM, which is being addressed by the delegations. The US has made a major move in the direction of the Soviet side, so we are closer to agreement on this issue. However, significant differences remain.

I want to emphasize the importance of a prohibition on an increase in the number of reentry vehicles on existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs. The US side notes the Soviet inclusion in its May 1978 proposal² of the rule that in the course of modernization of an existing type, the number of RVs on that type should not be increased. We welcome this indication that you agree that fractionation limits for ballistic missiles are a valuable part of dealing meaningfully with the new types issue.

In this connection, we believe each side should specify how many RVs have been tested on existing types.

The US also regards as important the elements of our definition of new types about restricting changes in individual stages and in the relevant characteristics of what we call the post-boost vehicle for current missiles.

We also believe that an exempted new type of ICBM should not have more than 10 reentry vehicles, which is the maximum number tested to date on an ICBM on either side. Similarly, if we agree to exempt a new type of SLBM, there should be a limit on the number of reentry vehicles at 14, the maximum number tested by either side to date on an SLBM.

It is clearly important to limit the number of reentry vehicles on exempted missiles. This provision, along with the ban on increasing the number of reentry vehicles on existing ballistic missiles, would make a significant contribution to the effectiveness of a new types ban and to the stability of the strategic balance.

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 204.

We have explained the rationale for the two alternatives for a ban on new types of ICBMs we have offered, and I continue to believe that either would lead to an equitable solution of this issue.

As I said at the beginning, the new types issue is one of the most important political-level issues remaining to be resolved in the agreement. If we are able to reach a satisfactory solution, I believe we will have made a great stride toward a final agreement.

In recognition of the importance of the issue for the progress of these negotiations, and in light of those constructive elements of the Soviet May 1978 proposals, and in an effort to bridge the gap between your proposals and ours, I am prepared to offer the following compromise.

I want to emphasize that in our view the new types issue has several related elements which apply to both ICBMs and SLBMs: a ban on new types, a definition of permitted modernization of existing types which prevents increases in the number of RVs on an existing type; and possible exemptions for new types. Our new proposal has been designed to resolve all these elements as a whole. It forms an integrated package and cannot be broken into individual parts.

We are prepared to prohibit testing and deployment of any new types of ICBMs through 1985, except that each side would be permitted to flight-test one new type of ICBM, MIRVed or non-MIRVed. However, deployment of new types of ICBMs would be prohibited through 1985.

—New types of ICBMs would be determined by the definition which we have proposed, including a ban on an increase in the maximum number of reentry vehicles on any existing type of missile. The exempted ICBM could have no more than 10 reentry vehicles.

—This proposal, when considered in relation to the 820 limit on MIRVed ICBMs, represents a meaningful arms control step. Yet it gives both sides flexibility in deciding how to structure its mix of MIRVed and single warhead ICBMs. We are also prepared to agree to a ban on new types of SLBMs through 1985, except that one new type of SLBM could be tested and deployed. The SLBM exemption would apply to Typhoon on your side and Trident II on our side. The Trident I and the SS-N-18 would be considered existing SLBMs.

There would be a prohibition on increases in the number of reentry vehicles for existing types of SLBMs. The maximum number of reentry vehicles on an exempted SLBM would be 14.

This proposal takes into account the essential elements of the approaches taken by both sides: you wanted to ban new ICBMs through 1985, and they could be banned. We have sought to obtain equality of constraints on both sides. It is good arms control and it gives each side flexibility to structure its own forces.

In making this proposal, I want also to make it clear that the US cannot accept a limit on the number of ALCMs carried by an aircraft limited under the 1320 ceiling, and this new proposal is contingent on your agreement that there be no such limits.

As I said, this new proposal is offered as an integrated package and cannot be broken into individual parts. We offer it in an effort to seek a fair and a prompt resolution of this issue.

I want to make two points in conclusion.

The United States has had no new ICBMs since the MM III, first deployed almost a decade ago. The Soviet Union has deployed several ICBMs in that period, most of them MIRVed and far larger than the MM III.

I must emphasize that by making this proposal the US has made a serious and substantial political commitment to conclude a new agreement. Unquote.

Vance

133. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 12, 1978, 2044Z

Secto 8021. For the President from the Secretary. Subject: Private Meeting With Gromyko.

I am reporting by septel on arms control discussions with Gromyko Wednesday.² In a private meeting with him, I discussed the dissident trials and delivered your oral message.³ On the slander charges against two U.S. correspondents,⁴ Gromyko thought something would be worked out. He was less sanguine on the Crawford affair.⁵ He indi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Prisoner Exchanges: (5/78–7/78). Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² July 12; see Document 132.

³ See Document 131.

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 129.

⁵ Reference is to F. Jay Crawford, a representative of International Harvester, who was seized by Soviet police on June 12 on charges of currency violation. See David K. Shipler, "Soviet Police Seize a U.S. Businessman," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1978, p. A6.

cated that at some future time he would wish to discuss the handling of intelligence matters, but did not think it useful to do so now.

Vance

134. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 12, 1978, 2048Z

Secto 8022. Acting Secretary please pass to the President. Pass to Harold Brown. Subject: Gromyko-Vance Talks: SALT.

1. At the end of this afternoon's meeting, Gromyko came to what he described as the "core" of his statement:

"I wish to ask a direct question—this is the core of my statement—if the U.S. really attaches paramount importance to the solution of the question of new types of ballistic missiles on the basis it proposes, will it be prepared to regard as agreed all other questions (cruise missiles on bombers, timing for reductions, Backfire, etc.) on the basis of our proposals, in the event we were to consent to U.S. proposals that for the duration of the treaty—i.e. to the end of 1985—within the limits of the relevant aggregate levels of strategic arms and MIRVed vehicles—each side would have the right to flight test and to deploy one new type of ICBM which it could equip at its own discretion either with MIRVs or with a single reentry vehicle, while there would be no limitations whatsoever on new types of SLBMs?"

2. There are a number of important ambiguities in the foregoing. For instance: when Gromyko speaks of accepting the U.S. position on "new types of ballistic missiles," does he mean our full position on the definition of new types? What does he mean by "etc."? Do the Soviets accept that our MIRV type rules would apply to their new single warhead missile?

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Presidential Messages In/Out, Box 102, 7/78. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance/Gromyko: Geneva, 7/12/–13, 1978.

3. I would intend to explore these and other ambiguities without flatly rejecting the proposal implicit in Gromyko's question. This would give us a basis for further evaluation and response.

4. I do not intend to raise any new points with regard to Backfire since the Soviets did not accept our proposal as you directed it be made.

5. Gromyko's "question" was preceded by his usual colorful remarks. He once again urged us to be firmer in our public support for SALT, and I told him we were already being firm. He accused us of seeking unilateral advantages, and I responded that it was the Soviets who were doing just that and that our proposals were fair. He was predictably sour about our new types proposal that I made this morning, saying that it was simply a ruse to allow us to continue our own programs and block Soviet programs. I stressed that it was an effort to bridge the gap, taking into account the national interests of both sides. I believe that the Soviets have not had time to give it any serious consideration.

Vance

135. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Geneva, July 13, 1978, 2015Z

Secto 8033. Subject: Gromyko-Vance Talks: SALT. For Acting Secretary—Please pass to Secretary Brown. Bonn for Dr. Brzezinski.

1. In SALT portion of meeting, Gromyko provided the following clarification of their proposal of yesterday.²

A. The Soviet proposal related only to its actual words, i.e., that each side could have one new ICBM type, MIRVed or not.

B. The proposal did not exclude or include fractionation or definition issues. Definition, which he described as when modernization makes an existing type a new missile, should be handled by delega-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1668. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate to Bonn. The full memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance/Gromyko: Geneva, 7/12–13, 1978.

² See Document 134.

tions. He said they agree that a fractionation limit was a sound principle and should be included, but was linked to a solution of the major issues, i.e., their acceptance of our position on freedom to choose a MIRVed or single RV ICBM in return for our acceptance of their position on cruise missile fractionation, timeline of reductions and Backfire. Limits on numbers of SLBM RVs was similarly a side question that could be discussed by delegations.

C. The Soviet proposal for handling exceptions (one ICBM, no limit on SLBMs) was linked only to U.S. acceptance of Soviet positions on the three items specifically identified—Backfire, ALCM limits per aircraft, and timing of reductions. There is, as he put it, “no etcetera.” He said the Soviets could not retreat on Backfire—ALCM numbers, but sounded a little more flexible on timing of reductions. On Backfire, however, he repeated that while they “could not add one comma, they could make it more compact” eliminating some matters, if that was what we wanted.

D. The aggregates referred to are the 2400, 2250, 1320, 1200, 820. On what he called the “secondary issues” i.e., those not listed, he seemed to want to suggest that the Soviets could be flexible, saying that the other matters were open for discussion by the delegations and all they had said was that they should be settled “on the basis” of their proposals.

2. In side conversation, Dobrynin said that “because of China” there could never be limits on air defenses, and suggested Soviets had come to Geneva with their proposal and had not considered our new proposal in great detail.

3. On CTB, the discussion was general. Gromyko said the Agreement should be “comprehensive,” without going into details. On duration, he suggested that there might be arguments for a five-year duration, to which Warnke countered that he was beginning to find the arguments for three years more convincing. Gromyko seemed to retreat from the Soviet acceptance of the concept of National Seismic Stations, saying that national technical means should suffice. His remarks were, however, somewhat inconsistent with the comments of Petrosyants, chairman of the Soviet CTB delegation. Petrosyants, said that verification could be “divided”, with initial reliance on NTM and then phasing in of National Seismic Stations. Warnke will clarify this issue with Petrosyants, stressing that we will discuss the number, location and timing but will insist on the principle of NSS.

Vance

136. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Bonn, July 13, 1978, 2319Z

Secto 8036. White House for President and Dr. Brzezinski. Department pass other posts as appropriate. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Gromyko: Final Session July 13 on Middle East.

1. Summary: The final session, devoted to the Middle East, produced no surprises. The Secretary briefed Gromyko on preparations leading to the London meeting² and our hopes for a favorable outcome. Gromyko made no special promise to intervene with the Palestinians on Lebanon. The Secretary said we would inform the Soviets of the outcome of the London sessions. End summary.

2. The Secretary led off by reviewing the present situation. He noted that both Israel and Egypt had put forth proposals on the West Bank and Gaza which over time might lead to a Declaration of Principles. This, in turn, could set a framework for a new Geneva Conference. The Secretary outlined the positions of Israel and Egypt, noting four basic areas of agreement and their basic differences over what would happen at the end of the five-year period.

3. At the upcoming London meeting, the Secretary said we expected the parties to explain their respective proposals in detail. He hoped this would make it possible during the two days of discussion to find common ground between them, or at least to clear up ambiguities. He added our further hope that this would start a process of resumed negotiations between Egypt and Israel in the Middle East.

4. Turning briefly to the Lebanon situation,³ the Secretary said that, according to our best information, some progress had been made during the last two or three days toward improvement. Syrian and

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 10, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1978. Secret; Niact Immediate; Exdis. Sent Niact Immediate to the White House. Vance traveled from Geneva to Frankfurt and Bonn, where he and Carter attended the Economic Summit Meeting, July 14–17. The memorandum of conversation of this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance/Gromyko: Geneva, 7/12–13, 1978.

² Vance met with Egyptian and Israeli Foreign Ministers on July 18 at Leeds Castle.

³ At the beginning of July, Syrian troops fought fiercely against Christian troops in Beirut, causing significant civilian casualties in addition to property damage. On July 6, Lebanese President Ilyas Sarkis threatened to resign, and Israeli officials warned Syria that confrontation would ensue if Christian areas in Beirut continued to be targeted. As a result of the two threats, on July 7, Syria stopped targeting Christian areas of Beirut. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1979, pp. 30006–30007.

Christian forces had been pulled back somewhat. A serious problem remained, however, in the lack of leadership at the top of the Lebanese Government. It was unclear to us if Sarkis would resign, but contingency arrangements were being considered for rapid election of a successor to avoid a vacuum. The Secretary noted we had asked the Israelis to urge restraint on the Christians. We had also cautioned the Israelis over the danger of introducing their own armed forces again. He pointed to the particularly dangerous situation posed by the 20 UN forces troops captured by the Palestinians. At this point, the Secretary urged Gromyko to use Soviet good offices with the Palestinians through Arafat to seek his influence in working toward resolution of the situation.

5. Gromyko asked two questions: first, what would happen to the Sinai Territory in the event of an Israeli-Egyptian settlement? Secondly, he asked what voice the Syrians would have and, in particular, what would be done about the Golan Heights. The Secretary said that the Syrians had indicated they did not want to be involved as long as only Israel and Egypt were taking part. Sadat's view was that, if the Declaration of Principles could be established as a framework for a comprehensive settlement, then Jordan and Syria would join in the negotiations. As for the Sinai, the Secretary said Sadat would not commit himself to withdrawal until the questions of the West Bank, Gaza, and the Declaration of Principles were solved. He noted, however, that Israeli and Egyptian Defense Ministers had discussed the situation in the Sinai and had a preliminary agreement on a number of questions which would be involved in a peace treaty.

6. Gromyko said he had listened attentively and would give only a brief reply. He said the Soviets did not have much hope for the Israeli and Egyptian talks since the two countries involved were only a small part of the Middle East. He added the Soviets strongly favored a complete, general and radical settlement with the participation of all parties, including the Palestinians. The most appropriate path to such a settlement was another Geneva Conference. He reviewed the difficulty in organizing a second Geneva Conference, but said he believed it could be realized. He recalled the U.S.-Soviet joint statement on the Middle East⁴ and complained that it had not been implemented, alleging that we knew the reasons why.

7. At this point, Gromyko said that the Secretary had not mentioned the Geneva Conference in his remarks. The Secretary rebutted this, calling Gromyko's attention to his earlier statement that the results of the London meetings could produce a Declaration of Principles,

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 52.

forming a framework leading to a Geneva Conference. Gromyko said that a preliminary accord between Egypt and Israel would not help possibilities for a Geneva Conference. It wouldn't even help if theoretically Egypt and Israel became allies. There were too many Arab countries which opposed Israel and the Israeli occupation. He said the Soviets would not assist in any partial deals which he felt would not permit a settlement but rather sowed the seeds of future conflict.

8. Referring to the Secretary's suggestion that the Soviets seek to influence the Palestinians, Gromyko said that the Soviets had exerted such influence in the past and continued to do so through Arafat. However, there were various factions in the Palestinian movement which complicated things. Furthermore, what Israel and Egypt were doing now limited Soviet possibilities. This did not mean the Soviets would remain passive however. Indeed they could not, if only for reasons of geography. Gromyko said that if the U.S. and the Soviets pursued a common line, pointing to the Geneva Conference as the means for settlement, peace could be assured. He complained about Israel's defamatory statements against a Geneva Conference. He said, however, that the USSR supported Israel's right to existence no less fervently than the United States did.

9. Gromyko alleged that the United States considered Israel to be strong because of its arms deliveries. This course, however, was unreliable. Looking back over the past 20 to 25 years, he claimed that we were now pleased that Sadat had come to us, but if the Soviets had given him two or three times more arms, the situation would be different. Concluding, Gromyko said the Soviets would hold to their position of principle and would continue to oppose separate deals, conferences, and meetings except for a Geneva Conference with full participation. However, he recognized that both the U.S. and USSR were interested in the situation and hoped that it would be possible to continue exchanging information from time to time in the future. In particular, if we saw fit, he would appreciate information on the London meetings. He thought that information exchanges should take place not only in formal meetings but in working contacts as well.

10. The Secretary promised to keep the Soviets informed on the London meetings. He agreed that security would arrive in the Middle East only with a real peace. However, if the Declaration of Principles could be agreed, it would set the framework for another Geneva Conference. The Secretary noted he had said many times that only at such a conference could all the pieces of the Middle East puzzle be fit together so as to lead to lasting peace.

11. Gromyko asked what the Secretary felt chances were for success in London. The Secretary replied perhaps 1 in 100. Gromyko seemed rather relieved by this but the Secretary pointed out that even if

the chances were this small for the London meetings, they could be a start. If agreement were reached on the West Bank and Gaza problems, this could fill a missing piece in the Declaration of Principles and lead the way to Geneva.

12. In closing Gromyko voiced the hope that it might some day be possible for President Carter and Brezhnev to get together and have grounds to congratulate each other on peace in the Middle East.

13. The Secretary then met alone with Gromyko at the latter's request on bilateral matters. A separate cable will follow.⁵

Vance

⁵ Not found.

137. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, July 13, 1978, 4:50–5:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Vance-Gromyko Private Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Mr. William D. Krimer,
Interpreter

USSR
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Minister Gromyko said that just before the UN Special Session on Disarmament,² during that session, and particularly after that session he and the Soviet authorities had noted a veritable explosion of hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union in the United States, and not just propaganda but a concerted hostile campaign against the Soviet Union. Some U.S. policy makers had been involved in that campaign. Did this represent a change in U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union? It was true that in recent days some statements on U.S.-Soviet relations had been

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance/Gromyko: Geneva, 7/12–13, 1978. Secret. Drafted by Krimer on July 15. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

² May 23–June 30.

made in the U.S., to the effect that our two countries ought to seek possible understanding on some questions. However, he would tell the Secretary quite frankly that the Soviet authorities had the impression that such positive comments had been uttered almost incidentally, as it were. The Soviets would like to hear such statement made as an expression of the official policy of the United States toward the Soviet Union. The Soviet authorities wanted to believe that what they had witnessed was a merely temporary phenomenon, and would ask for reassurance that it did not represent the revised policy of the new U.S. Administration. (Gromyko interjected that the Administration was no longer all that new.) This had been the subject of a number of discussions with L.I. Brezhnev. The policy of the Soviet Union toward the United States remained unchanged. Soviet leaders said so many times, and Brezhnev personally had spoken on that subject.

Not so long ago an editorial had appeared in Pravda which presented an assessment of U.S.-Soviet relations as seen from Moscow. He could confirm that this represented a realistic appraisal of U.S. policy by the Soviet leadership. At the last session of the Supreme Soviet Gromyko had also presented a report which confirmed this as the view of the Soviet leadership. He would note that Soviet newspapers, Pravda, Izvestiya and others, published articles almost daily, favoring good relations with the United States, speaking out in favor of strict compliance by both sides with all the obligations of the treaties and agreements between our two countries; articles in favor of detente, peace and furtherance of relations between us.

Gromyko would ask the Secretary to take a look at the question of disarmament on which our two countries diverged. The Soviet Union favored genuine disarmament, and not only in the area of strategic arms. Indeed, the difference between us appeared to be enormous. For example, what was going on in Washington at the same time that the Special Session on Disarmament was meeting in New York? Was all that some sort of a revenge for the Soviet policy of peace, of developing good relations with the United States, based on mutual respect and recognition of our mutual responsibility for peace, while strictly observing the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of each other's country? Gromyko would be very pleased if the Secretary could tell him something that he could report to L.I. Brezhnev personally and to the Soviet leadership as a whole. He would add that the Soviet Union's policy of peace was one that was pursued not only toward the United States, but also throughout the world. He would appreciate the Secretary's informing President Carter to that effect.

The Secretary said he would be happy to respond to Gromyko's question and would welcome the opportunity of saying what he was going to say.

Our policy toward the Soviet Union had not changed and does not reflect any change in U.S. attitudes toward the Soviet Union. We were seeking to establish better relations between our two countries. We wanted to see things get back on an even keel. We wanted to see more and closer exchanges on a whole variety of matters. He believed that our two countries bore a special responsibility in view of their political, military and economic power and influence. In our judgement it was in the best interests of both our nations to establish closer and deeper relations between us, both from a practical and a political standpoint, as well as because over many years there had been deep and close friendships between many of our citizens and between our two countries. There was a bad time for both of us during the Cold War, but fortunately there then came a period when we decided to put that behind us and improve relations between us. We made progress in that direction. However, during the past year several factors had divided us and made relations between us more difficult. One such factor was the different views we held with respect to Africa and the situation on the African continent. Another was the different views we held on matters involving human rights and civil rights. Still another were our different views with respect to the current situation and the trials currently going on in the Soviet Union. Events of this kind have exacerbated relations between us, and had unfortunately led to a gap between our two countries on a number of issues. He would point out, however, that we had been trying to find common ground and build upon it in the hope that in the future we can increase the area of that common ground and get us back on track again. Both the President and the Secretary hoped very deeply that this can be done. Gromyko would note that in his recent press conference President Carter had spoken about Soviet-American relations and had stated his deep desire to have good relations between our two countries. Another important area where we had common objectives was that of arms limitations, objectives on which we can build. The Secretary expressed his hope that we would remember and abide by the Principles of Relations which were signed by the United States and the Soviet Union when Nixon was President of the United States.³

Gromyko remarked that that was a good document.

The Secretary believed it was now necessary to turn the corner and enter upon a new path, take into account each other's concerns and see if we can build stronger relations between us in the future. Certainly that was our desire.

The Secretary had one final word. He had read with great care the article in Pravda which Gromyko had mentioned. He had decided not

³ See footnote 3, Document 4.

to respond to certain parts of that article, to which he took exception, because he believed that this would merely continue a strident dialogue between us. He thought that we should be judged by our actions, for it was actions that reflected the direction in which we were moving.

Gromyko said he had carefully listened to what the Secretary had said now and at the outset of their current talks. He would not repeat what he had said in briefly setting forth his assessment of U.S. policy and in explaining the basis for Soviet policy. There was only one aspect that he would mention, since the Secretary had raised it. He had already said a few words on that subject in their previous private talk. The Soviet Union would not allow anyone to interfere in its internal affairs. Here he could only repeat what he had said yesterday. In this respect the Soviets would stand firm as a rock. The trials in question dealt with observance of the internal laws of the Soviet Union, and were entirely within the scope of the Soviet Union's competence. He would ask the Secretary to explain this to President Carter and to others in the U.S. Administration to the extent he could.

Gromyko concluded by saying that it would be good if the relations between our two countries could be kept on a realistic track. That was the policy of the Soviet Union, and if U.S. policy was like that, too, both our nations could look forward to the future with optimism.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to convey his best wishes to President Carter.

The Secretary assured him he would do so and asked him to convey his best wishes to President Brezhnev.

138. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 11, 1978, 2121Z

203927. For the Ambassador. Subject: Message to Gromyko.

1. Please deliver the following message to the Foreign Minister.
2. Quote

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 112, 8/1–11/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Tarnoff; approved by Vance. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2243)

Dear Mr. Minister:

Having just completed my trip to Israel and Egypt,² I wanted to say a few words to you about the reasons for President Carter's invitation to President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to meet with him at Camp David.

As you know, we believe it is essential to continue efforts to build on the breakthrough that resulted from President Sadat's visit to Israel last year. Serious work has been done in the discussions since then.

While progress has been made, it has become clear that discussions must now take place at the highest political level. Agreements must be reached on the key issues of withdrawal, security, and the determination of the Palestinians' future before negotiations can succeed at the ministerial and technical levels. Our hope is to make progress at the summit on these basic issues.

We hope the Soviets will lend support to this endeavor, realizing its importance as a step toward achieving a just, lasting and comprehensive peace.

On another subject, we are working on the response that Paul Warnke will be delivering to you, and I hope that it will be ready soon.

Sincerely, Cyrus Vance

End quote

Vance

² Vance visited Israel and Egypt, August 5–9.

139. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, August 14, 1978, 0849Z

19273. For the Secretary from the Ambassador. Subject: Message to Gromyko. Ref: State 203927.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Gromyko Letter (Camp David) 8/11/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 138.

1. In absence of Gromyko, who is vacationing outside of Moscow, I delivered your letter to Acting Foreign Minister Korniyenko morning of August 14.

2. After reading the letter, and undertaking to transmit it to Gromyko, Korniyenko commented that your hope that the Soviet Union would support the Camp David summit meeting was unfounded. The Soviet side considers the path of Egypt-Israeli talks to be a blind alley which can cause “dangerous complications” in the Middle East. Noting that in my view the Soviet position was wrong, I told Korniyenko that as a careful reader of the Soviet press I was not surprised at his response.

3. Regarding a possible Warnke visit to the Soviet Union, I asked Korniyenko if he could clarify Gromyko’s vacation plans. Korniyenko replied that Gromyko was presently on vacation outside of the capital. He said the Soviet side would not want Warnke to postpone his trip, however. Korniyenko himself would go on vacation shortly (tomorrow in fact, but only for 10 days) in Moscow and therefore he would be available to meet Warnke at any time. In response to my hypothetical question, Korniyenko indicated that it might be possible for Warnke to meet with Gromyko outside of Moscow, although Korniyenko would of course have to discuss this with Gromyko should Warnke wish to arrange such a meeting.

Toon

140. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 17, 1978, 3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Jewry and Related Events

PARTICIPANTS

Eugene Gold, Chairman, National Conference on Soviet Jewry (NCSJ)
Jerry Goodman, Executive Director, NCSJ
Marina Wallach, Washington Representative, NCSJ
Rabbi Alexander Schindler, President, Union of American Jewish Organizations
Yehuda Hellman, Executive Director, Conference of Presidents
Charlotte Jacobson, Vice President, Zionist Organization of America
Jacqueline Levine, Vice Chairman, American Jewish Congress
Joseph Smukler, Vice Chairman, NCSJ
Sol Goldstein, Officer, NSCJ
Mr. Levine, Conservative Movement
The Secretary
Dr. Marshall Shulman, Special Adviser to the Secretary for Soviet Affairs
Edward Sanders, Senior Adviser
William H. Luers, Deputy Assistant Secretary, EUR
Robert W. Farrand, EUR/SOV (Bilateral) (Notetaker)

Gold expressed thanks for the opportunity to meet with the Secretary and for his frank and open comments on earlier occasions. Gold said he and his colleagues felt comfortable talking to the Secretary about what was happening to Jews in the Soviet Union. He noted that there seemed to be a marked increase recently in the signs of pressure being exerted by the Soviets on their Jewish citizenry. The internal situation was being exacerbated, Gold said, by pointed reports of Jewish criminal activity in the Soviet press. The media play was having its inevitable effect on the Soviet populace. Anti-Semitism in the USSR seemed definitely on the rise with the seeds already planted in fertile soil.

From Gold's and his colleagues' vantage point, the rumors of anti-Semitic activity in the USSR were spreading rapidly and the picture seemed to be "crystallizing" in an ugly way. For example, Gold said the day may not be far distant when the Soviets move to shut down emigration of Jewish persons altogether.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 2, Memorandums of Conversation, 1978. Confidential. Drafted by Robert W. Farrand (EUR/SOV) on August 18; cleared by Luers, Shulman, Shinn, and Ed Sanders (S); approved by Frank Wisner (S/S) on September 28. The meeting took place in Vance's conference room at the Department of State.

The Shcharanskiy case was also a particular problem about which something concrete needed to be done. Shcharanskiy was now among the many “Prisoners of Zion” in the USSR. Gold commended the Secretary for his and the President’s statements in the wake of Shcharanskiy’s trial. But, frankly, there was concern among the US Jewish community that these statements were meant to be the “fundamental response” on this unfortunate case. The President’s decision to reject the license application for sale of a computer to TASS (the Soviet News Agency) was fine but Gold questioned whether enough spade work had been done before the Dresser (drill bit) plant decision had been taken.² First the President had said the entire license was under review, then “bang” it was approved. Gold understood that there was still some controversy within the Government about the Dresser decision and wondered whether it could still be held up.

The Secretary told Gold that the letter authorizing Dresser to sell the equipment in question to the Soviets had already been transmitted.

Gold asked the Secretary what he could say about the present situation in the USSR. He was specifically interested in the “replists” (Note: These are lists containing names of Soviet Jews and others who have been trying unsuccessfully to emigrate from the USSR over long periods of time. The representation lists are compiled by the State Department and presented periodically to the Soviets by high level US officials.)

The Secretary asked about the ground rules for the meeting. He said that he could be much more open and frank off-the-record and would prefer it that way. Gold and his colleagues agreed and the conversation went off the record.

The Secretary said that he shared his visitors’ concern about where Soviet Jewry was headed. He said that there was certainly enough happening to justify their fears. He was not sure, however, that these fears would necessarily materialize in the manner or with the speed that Gold had indicated.

As regarded Shcharanskiy, the Secretary said that in addition to both his and the President’s speaking out on the matter, there had also been a large number of times when the case had been raised with the Soviets in other ways. The point was that Shcharanskiy had not been forgotten. The Secretary did not want—even off the record—to say

² In June 1978, Soviet trade organizations awarded Dresser Industries, Inc., two major contracts totaling \$180 million. One of these supplied the Soviets with equipment and technology to be used in manufacturing bits for the drilling of oil and gas wells. (“Company Roundup: Soviet Awards Dresser \$180 Million Contracts,” *The New York Times*, June 2, 1978, p. D5) In August, the Carter administration approved the export license for that sale. (Telegram 203480 to Moscow, August 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780329–0069)

more about what was being done now on Shcharanskiy's behalf. He had, however, met with Mrs. (Avital) Shcharanskiy in Geneva recently and she had been helpful in advising the Secretary on her husband's situation.

On the "refusenik" question, the Secretary told Gold we had been presenting the replists to the Soviets on every suitable occasion and will continue to do so.

As regarded Mr. Gold's comments to the effect that there had been little affirmative action on all of these matters recently, the Secretary said he would have to disagree with that assessment. The President and he had talked about Shcharanskiy to other heads of government after the recent Bonn Summit.³ Unfortunately, it had not then been possible to agree on a common statement. They simply had been unable to do it. Some governments had their own problems with the Soviets which precluded their taking a strong public position on the Shcharanskiy trial. For example, the Germans had finally been successful after many years in convincing the Soviets to permit thousands of German-speaking people to emigrate from the USSR. The German Government was thus chary about joining in a common statement condemning the Shcharanskiy trial for fear that the Soviets might retaliate by shutting off the flow of German emigrants. And different countries had different problems with the idea of a common statement because of their own relationships with the USSR.

Insofar as the future was concerned, the Secretary said that he continued to watch the figures on emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. In these he had detected a strange pattern in recent months. He noted that thus far this year the number of Soviet Jews allowed to emigrate has been higher than in any year since 1972–73.

With respect to the dissidents, it seemed as though the Soviet Government had decided to run right down the list and hit each dissident hard. The Secretary asked Ambassador Shulman to give his views on the dissident trials. The Ambassador said that the Soviets apparently made a decision at the beginning of this year to clean up the dissident movement. By sending some of the leading dissidents out of the country, an act which left the rest in disarray, the Soviets seemingly hoped to clear out the nests of dissidence and put a stop to the problem once and for all. They probably also took a look at the first quarter (1978) trade statistics with the US which were off notably from the same period a year ago, and decided they had nothing to lose in trade by moving against the dissidents at this time.

³ See footnote 1, Document 136.

The Secretary stated that we had three different sets of trials in the USSR to be concerned about. These were: 1) the trials of Soviet dissidents, 2) the slander charges against two American journalists, Piper and Whitney (of the *Baltimore Sun* and *New York Times*, respectively),⁴ and 3) the upcoming trial of a US businessman (Francis J. Crawford) of International Harvester Corporation.⁵ As to why these cases were all occurring right now, Ambassador Shulman added to his remarks about the dissident trials and noted that the Soviet Government seemed to have miscalculated that the negative impact in the West would soon dissipate, based on their experience with the invasion of Czechoslovakia ten years ago.⁶ Communists in Western Europe and elsewhere outside of the USSR and Eastern Europe had also reacted negatively to the dissident trials just as they had over Soviet actions in Czechoslovakia. The trials merely helped to feed the line about the dictatorial aspects of Soviet communism. This, in the Ambassador's view, would be a continuing problem for the Soviets. Our problem, however, was how to move along in our relations with them by providing a balance of incentives and disincentives so as to influence their behavior. With respect to the dissidents, we hoped to be able to manipulate the situation so that other elements of the Soviet Government would begin to hurt and eventually move to restrain the KGB.

The Secretary added that it was apparent from the charges against Whitney and Piper that the Soviets hoped to cut off the access of Western journalists to the dissident community, but it clearly hadn't worked.

Gold asked about the Helsinki Final Act and the review session in Belgrade. Did these not have a role to play in our efforts to bring pressure on the Soviets? Ambassador Shulman responded that in the case of Belgrade the Soviets saw it as an unmitigated disaster from the outset and refused to go along with most of the major initiatives there. Gold wondered about the rest of the "baskets" (apparently in addition to Basket III) and whether there was not more utility in talking about the Final Act as a whole when discussing it with the Soviets.

The Secretary said that in Belgrade we gave more emphasis to Basket III, while the Soviets concentrated their attention on Baskets I and II. We held throughout the Belgrade session that all Baskets should be included in the discussion as a connected whole. Views, even among

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 129.

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 133. For more information on Crawford's arrest and trial, see E. Barrett Prettyman, Jr., "An Arrest in Moscow: What's at Stake for U.S. Business," *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1978, p. A23; and Kevin Klose, "Soviets Asking Suspended Term for Crawford," *The Washington Post*, September 7, 1978, p. A1.

⁶ Reference is to the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968. See *Foreign Relations, 1964–1968*, vol. XVII, Eastern Europe, Document 85.

our own delegation, however, differed on whether we gave too much emphasis to Basket III at the expense of the others.

Dr. Shulman stated that we wanted to encourage the Soviets to keep the numbers of Soviet Jews being allowed to emigrate going up. What, he asked, could the U.S. Jewish Community do or suggest to keep those numbers rising? Gold responded that he did not think there was much more the U.S. Jewish community could do than it was already doing. The Secretary agreed with Gold that little more could be expected from the U.S. Jewish community by way of action on this issue.

Hellman asked whether we might not be able to use trade as a better carrot in our attempts at influencing the Soviets. The Secretary replied that the problem was that other countries had the same carrot. In the case of the Dresser license, for example, some thought that Dresser was the sole source of (drill bit) technology, but that was simply not true. Others could sell this (drill bit) technology to the Soviets as well.

Hellman then raised the subject of credits. He noted that they were perhaps a useful avenue for applying leverage on the Soviets.

Mr. Levine (Conservative Movement) said that he saw a contradiction in what was being said on the subject of "carrots." Clearly, in his view, we had none. He questioned whether we should try to buy the Soviets with concessions, anyway. Would it not be more effective and true to our principles to strive to become a bastion of human liberty? It seemed to him that that would be the simplest and best approach. He also wondered why we had lumped the dissidents in with the "refuseniks." Did not that needlessly complicate matters, especially since we were dealing with two different approaches to the problems of Soviet Jews?

Ambassador Shulman replied that Shcharanskiy was both a dissident and a "refusenik" and thus a connection between the two groups. We even had difficulty differentiating between Jews and non-Jews in many instances. In any case, the problem we faced was much more than a Jewish question alone. The Secretary said he agreed with Dr. Shulman. The Secretary said that we ought to act on behalf of, defend and argue for each group and sub-group which was having trouble either living in or leaving the Soviet Union. The Secretary wondered what one gained by making clear demarcations between these groups. To this Mr. Gold replied that the Germans had apparently done very well at it. Gold conceded that by making a clear demarcation between groups we risked doing less well overall, but perhaps certain sub-groups would do even better than they otherwise might were they lumped in to the whole. Gold thought that it was important to speak out toughly for each group.

Sol Goldstein asked for the Secretary's views on the Moscow Olympic Games in 1980. He said there was great concern and worry about what might happen to Jewish spectators and participants. He wondered whether the Soviets might not harass would-be Jewish emigrants before and during the Games. What if Jewish participants from the United States were excluded. The Secretary said that we are discussing some of these issues with other countries but that it was not yet clear what actions might be taken to reduce the fears which Mr. Goldstein expressed. He asked that any questions of this nature on the Olympic Games be referred to Dr. Shulman in future, since the Ambassador would be monitoring our review of the problem.

Ms. Jacqueline Levine raised again the question of trade and requested a clarification on whether the Secretary had said that there was no leverage in trade. The Secretary replied that he felt there was very limited leverage in trade; he had not said that there was no leverage at all. Ms. Levine asked how we could creatively come up with new ideas. The Secretary said that he would be very grateful to receive any new ideas on levers to use in dealing with the Soviets.

Gold said that during the group's last meeting⁷ with the Secretary there had been discussion of Embassy Moscow's current policy on contact between Embassy personnel and Soviet Jews. He also indicated that he had heard the Embassy had now been effectively closed to Soviet Jews. He wondered what the Secretary could say about Ambassador Toon's policy regarding contacts, specifically, with Jewish dissidents. The Secretary referred this question to Mr. Luers who said that Ambassador Toon had not restricted contacts between Embassy personnel and Soviet Jewish dissidents. The Ambassador had merely institutionalized procedures for approving such contacts within the Embassy and had defined which staff members—principally those who were knowledgeable about the problems Jewish and other dissidents face in the USSR—would be able to meet with them.

Ms. Levine inquired about reports that the Soviets intended to cut off all exit visas on January 1, 1979. Luers replied that a notice on the bulletin board of one OVIR (Office of Soviet police which is responsible for approving exit visas) had been spotted which reportedly carried a message to this effect. But there has been no official confirmation that this is, in fact, a new country-wide policy. We had heard nothing more on the rumor and therefore assume that it has no foundation in fact.

The Secretary concluded the meeting by saying that he wished we had better leverage on all of these issues. He wanted to emphasize, however, that our resolve and efforts to work on all of these problems

⁷ See Document 105.

and, especially, to see an increase in the emigration of Soviet Jews would continue.

141. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 29, 1978

SUBJECT

The Dresser Case

The Dresser case has again erupted into controversy,² and is becoming politically messy. Following Jim Schlesinger's reclama,³ it was agreed by all the parties that we would obtain an assessment from the Defense Science Board⁴ in order to provide a solid basis either for a negative or a positive decision. My hope had been that an authoritative DSB assessment would permit us to reach a unanimous and final decision, thus putting the matter to rest without your involvement.

However, though the State/Commerce decision was clearly hasty, both agencies are unwilling to reconsider their positions in spite of the clear-cut character of the DSB assessment, and are insisting that you now make the final decision.

The principal conclusions of the DSB report are as follows:

1. Deep-well drilling technology is a critical technology, which is wholly concentrated in the U.S.⁵
2. Rock drill bit manufacture is high volume and its supporting design and application technology are critical technologies. These technologies are concentrated in the U.S.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 89, Economics/International: 8-12/78. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter initialed the memorandum and wrote, "Jody [Powell] is preparing statement."

² In August, Kreps approved the \$140 million drill bit deal with the Soviets, unbeknownst to Brzezinski who read of the approval in the paper. Schlesinger opposed the technology deal, believing that national security would be compromised. Brzezinski questioned whether it was still appropriate to continue with the deal. See Brzezinski, *Power and Principle*, pp. 322–325.

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

⁵ Carter wrote in the right-hand margin, "We knew this."

3. Electron beam welding has military significance when computer controlled:

It is easily diverted

It is not foreign-sourced; the numerical control technology is licensed from U.S.

4. Tungsten carbide has military significance:

It is easily diverted

It is not foreign-sourced, at this scale of manufacture.

With regard to substance, I am quite impressed by these three paragraphs from the letter of transmittal by J. Fred Bucy (president of Texas Instruments and a member of the DSB):

“My conclusions are that this technology is very significant to national security in the broadest terms. It is critical to significant development of major energy resources throughout the world in the 1980’s.

“There must be a few times within a decade that a subtle decision can change the course of history. My sincere belief is that a decision regarding the export of a turnkey factory for the manufacturing of drill bits for the exploration of oil is one of those.

“This transfer of technology emphasizes that the whole is greater than the sum of the parts: that each individual piece may be all right, but when put together, the whole equals something that is very significant.”

To ignore the DSB assessment and proceed as if nothing has happened would be to play into Senator Jackson’s hands,⁶ in addition to perhaps generally hurting our national security.

However, to revoke the licenses would be preemptory and would now send an excessively negative signal to the Soviet Union. Therefore, on balance I recommend a suspension on both national security and foreign policy grounds. Some might say that this is another zigzag; but the DSB report represents a new factor and a review will preempt pressure for revocation on national security grounds.

Moreover, there are also broader foreign policy considerations involved in the transfer of oil technology to the Soviet Union. In essence, as the DSB assessment suggests, “it would allow the Soviets to enter the natural oil and gas fields throughout the world with advanced drilling technical competence, presenting increased opportunities for them to exert their policy influence.”

I attach a decision memorandum, in which the positions of the different agencies are stated in their own words.

⁶ Jackson wanted to prevent the deal by launching an investigation into the military and political ramifications of providing the Soviet Union with the technology. See Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, “Confusing Signals on Trade with Russia,” *The Washington Post*, August 16, 1978, p. A15.

Before you make your final decision, you may wish to check with Frank Moore and Ham Jordan,⁷ because I believe that this issue is going to become increasingly sensitive domestically. Moreover, I would recommend a prompt decision; the press is already entering into the fray, stimulating competitive and increasingly damaging leaks, and there are pressures for the release of the DSB report (which is unclassified).

Attachments: Decision Memorandum

Tab A: DSB Report

Tab B: New Letter from Senator Jackson

Tab C: Proposed PRM⁸

⁷ Frank Moore, Assistant to the President for Congressional Liaison; Hamilton Jordan, White House Chief of Staff.

⁸ None of the attachments was found.

142. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, September 2, 1978

Dear Mr. President:

I have asked Ambassador Warnke to convey to you and to Foreign Minister Gromyko our suggestions for the resolution of the remaining issues in the SALT II negotiations.

At the same time, I wanted to take advantage of the opportunity of his meeting with you to renew the direct exchange of correspondence with you which has been useful in the past and can be, I believe, even more useful in the present period.

I am distressed, as I know you are, that relations between our two countries have not developed well. We would each have our own explanation of why this has been the case, but I do not believe it would be useful to repeat familiar arguments about who or what is to blame.

I do not believe either of us can afford to forget how much responsibility is in our hands for issues vital to the peace and well-being of hundreds of millions of our fellow human beings.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. No classification marking.

I am sure we both agree that our first and most important objective should be to seek to bring these SALT negotiations to a successful conclusion—one that will strengthen the security of both our countries, and of all countries. The proposals which Ambassador Warnke bears reflect our serious effort to work out mutually-acceptable solutions to the handful of problems that stand in the way of a final agreement. I ask that you give them your careful consideration. Secretary Vance will be ready to discuss your reply with Minister Gromyko when he arrives in the United States later this month.

If these efforts are successful, then the conclusion of a treaty in this most vital of all subjects will provide an impetus to the improvement of other aspects of the relations between our two countries. This would also permit the direct personal contact which can add so much to the resolution of difficulties and the dispelling of misunderstandings between the Soviet Union and the United States.

If such a meeting coincided with the culmination of our SALT negotiations, so much the better; but in any case, it would, I am sure, have a constructive outcome.

I hope you will let me have the benefit of your thinking through this private channel of communication whenever it would be useful.

I send you my best wishes.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

143. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, September 8, 1978, 1546Z

21551. Dept please pass White House and Defense. Subject: SALT Meeting With Gromyko 8 Sept 78.

1. In 8 September meeting, Gromyko reviewed all points in U.S. package presented yesterday without changing substance of Soviet positions and objections. He characterized the talks as to a certain extent useful and as allowing clarification but stated Soviet initial view that

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P850059-2425. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

we had not yet given an adequate response to Gromyko's July question.

2. On specific issues:

A. New Types. Gromyko reemphasized that Soviet agreement to U.S. proposal for one new ICBM type, MIRVed or not, was part of a package, warning against thinking we had it "in our pocket." He stressed, however, that their proposal was not a "take it or leave it" proposition; they proposed only that the other issues be settled "on the basis" of Soviet proposals. They were prepared to discuss the remaining issues.

B. Cruise missiles. Gromyko repeated familiar Soviet positions on need for a limit of 20 ALCM's per heavy bomber, no conversion of transport AFT to carry ALCM's, no distinction between conventionally- and nuclear-armed CM's ("no external features can help"), and CM ranges. He made no direct comment on our ALCM numbers capability statement.

C. Backfire. Gromyko said issue can only be resolved on the basis of the unilateral statement the Soviets made in Washington.

D. Timing issues. Gromyko repeated the Soviet claim that completion of reductions before Dec. 30, 1981 was physically impossible. After repeating Soviet protocol duration position, he said it was impossible to discuss a fixed date for expiration of protocol before the sides knew when the Agreement would be signed, much less when it would come into force. This may have been a signal of receptivity to eventual agreeing to expiration three years from date of signature.

E. Fractionation: Gromyko said a mutually acceptable solution could be sought to the issue, repeating usual linkage to limiting number of ALCM's per bomber and agreeing on new types definition.

F. Depressed SLBM trajectory: Gromyko said it was difficult to respond substantively without a detailed U.S. proposal. Delegations could discuss the idea but he expressed concern that raising a new issue could delay reaching agreement.

3. Overall, Gromyko's tone was moderate. Gromyko's central view of the meetings was carefully balanced: the meeting had been "to a certain extent useful" in clarifying points, but the Soviet side had to say that they did not feel that the U.S. side had adequately responded to the Soviet "question" posed in Geneva in July, and they hoped this was not our last word. Gromyko hoped for instructions for the U.S. delegation in Geneva to move faster, and he briefly repeated his July complaints that the U.S. administration did not give "sufficient rebuff" to domestic criticisms of SALT.

4. Warnke responded by stating that we hoped Gromyko's comments were not the last word on the U.S. proposals either, and by re-

viewing the elements of the U.S. position that make it in our view adequately forthcoming, and a fair and equitable basis for reaching an agreement. He denied that we had raised the depressed SLBM trajectory idea with any view toward slowing progress, but rather as a useful and relatively simple limit in the interests of both sides. If after working on the depressed trajectory SLBM matter, rapid agreement proved difficult, the sides could review the issue of timing. As to the rate of progress in Geneva, our delegation would have instructions to work with all deliberate speed toward agreement and we were confident that the Soviet delegation would have similar instructions. But, Warnke said, the key to final resolution lay in the two capitals, not in Geneva, and, Warnke hoped, the later meetings in September would allow us to complete the process.

5. In a brief private session, Warnke gave Gromyko the President's letter for Brezhnev.² Gromyko did not open the letter during the meeting and made no further comment on SALT.

Garrison³

² See Document 142.

³ Mark J. Garrison, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Moscow.

144. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, September 17, 1978

Dear President Brezhnev:

I am pleased to inform you that President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin signed today two documents which were drafted in the course of intensive, thirteen-day long negotiations which I conducted with them at Camp David. One is titled "A Framework for Peace in the Middle East,"² and it defines principles that may apply to the negotia-

¹ Source: Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, unlabeled folder. No classification marking. Sent to numerous diplomatic posts as telegram 236043, September 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780379–0641)

² For the text of the framework, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1978, pp. 7–9.

tion of peace treaties between Israel and all its neighbors. The other document is titled "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel."³ Our Ambassador will transmit these documents to you. Together, they provide a constructive framework for the resolution of the tragic and difficult conflict between Israel and her Arab neighbors. I believe that a historic step toward peace in the Middle East has thus been taken.

Because the Palestinian issue has been so central to the Middle East dispute, the first document concentrates on developing an agreed basis which will permit the progressive resolution of that issue over the next five years. The parties to the Camp David meeting agreed on the need for a five-year transitional period during which the inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza will establish a self-governing authority with full autonomy to replace the Israeli military government. Israel will retain a military presence only in specified locations for security purposes. To negotiate the details of the transitional arrangements, Jordan will be invited to join the negotiations. There is a provision in the agreement for a Jordanian role in the maintenance of security, if Jordan so desires.

During the five-year transitional period, the Palestinians will also participate in negotiations with Egypt, Israel, and Jordan (if Jordan agrees to participate) on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza. The Palestinians have a right to join the negotiations on a peace treaty between Jordan and Israel. These negotiations will be based on all the provisions and principles of United Nations Security Council Resolution 242. There will be no new Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Gaza during the negotiations to establish the self-government in this area.

These arrangements recognize the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people and will permit them to participate in the determination of their own future. The Palestinians will decide how they shall govern themselves, their representatives will take part directly in the negotiations affecting their future, and their elected representatives will vote on the agreement on the final status of the West Bank and Gaza.

This document also provides for security arrangements and commitments to peace which should be part of a comprehensive settlement between Israel and each of her neighbors.

The second agreement, "A Framework for the Conclusion of a Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel," affirms both Israel's willingness to restore to Egypt the full exercise of its sovereignty in Sinai and Egypt's willingness to make peace and to establish normal relations with Israel. In the course of the Camp David negotiations, agree-

³ For the text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1978, pp. 9–10.

ment was reached on the establishment of three security zones, on the limitation of forces and armaments, on the phased withdrawal of Israeli forces from all of Sinai, and on the return of the Sinai airfields to Egyptian civilian control.

The first major Israeli withdrawal from Sinai will take place between three and nine months after the signing of the peace treaty, which itself should be signed within three months of this framework agreement. At the completion of this interim withdrawal, normal relations will be established between Egypt and Israel. The final Israeli withdrawal will take place between two and three years after the signature of the peace treaty.

There is one major issue on which agreement has not been reached. Egypt states that agreement to remove Israeli settlements from Egyptian territory is a prerequisite to a peace treaty. Israel states that the issue of the Israeli settlements should be resolved during the peace negotiations. Within two weeks the Knesset will decide on the issue of the settlements.

Obviously, not all of the problems in the Middle East conflict could be resolved by these Camp David agreements on a framework for peace. But with patience and good will, I believe that this achievement will generate the momentum necessary to resolve justly and constructively the remaining issues.

Because the Middle East issue is of such significance for relations between our two countries, I know that you share with us the conviction that peace in that region will contribute to a reduction of tensions between our two countries. I very much hope you can use your influence in the Middle East to bring about the comprehensive settlement that the United States and the Soviet Union both desire.

With my best wishes,
Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

145. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, September 19, 1978, 2207Z

237880. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Dobrynin, 19 September.

1. The Secretary met Dobrynin 19 September and covered the following points:

2. Climate in Moscow: Reporting on his stay in the Soviet Union, Dobrynin said Soviets were hopeful that US-Soviet relations could now begin to improve, and that it might be possible to wrap up SALT during Gromyko's present visit. Secretary said we shared this hope.

3. Middle East: Secretary summarized the developments at Camp David, and his trip plans.² He added the hope that this was a time for scaled-down rhetoric. Dobrynin replied that given the Soviet view that Sadat had split the Arab camp, that the Geneva Conference and the joint US-Soviet Declaration were "nowhere," and that the only reference to the Soviet Union had been the President's mention of "hostile powers," we could scarcely expect the Soviet Union to applaud. But he said Gromyko would wish to discuss the Middle East in detail with the Secretary.

4. Meetings with Gromyko: We tentatively worked out plans for the Secretary's meeting with Gromyko in New York Wednesday afternoon and Thursday morning.³ In consultation with the White House, we also explored the possibility of Gromyko meeting with the President Saturday morning, 30 September. Dobrynin subsequently informed us that he had confirmed these dates with Gromyko.

Vance

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 3, CV–Dobrynin, 9/19/78. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; cleared by Tarnoff; approved by Shulman.

² Vance traveled to Jordan, September 20–21; Saudi Arabia, September 21–24; and Syria, September 24, to discuss the Camp David Accords and other Middle East issues with the leaders of each of those countries.

³ September 27 and 28.

146. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 20, 1978, 2:20–3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Zbigniew Brzezinski

Ambassador Dobrynin came in to “renew our friendly discussions” after a prolonged absence. He asked me for my prognosis for U.S.-Soviet relations, pointing out that my earlier prediction of some likely transitional difficulties proved correct.

I pointed out to him that I thought that these relations would now improve. We would get a SALT agreement, provided the Soviet Union accepted our eminently fair proposals, and that subsequent to that we would probably have a summit meeting which would further improve the atmospherics. In general, I suggested to him that our principled and consistent policy toward the Soviet Union would contribute to such an improvement, provided the Soviet Union refrained from exploiting turbulence in the Third World, either directly or through the Cuban proxy, in a manner which then creates strong public reactions in the United States and gives us concern. In this connection, I specifically mentioned some potential dangers regarding Rhodesia and Yemen.

Dobrynin replied to the effect that we exaggerate these matters, but he conceded that the Soviets might have been more sensitive to our concerns had we not, in his judgment, artificially inflamed the human rights issue. He suggested that it was Soviet irritation over the human rights issue that made the Soviet leaders so unresponsive to President Carter’s repeated expressions of concern regarding the escalating Soviet/Cuban involvement in Africa.

That turned the discussion to the human rights issue. Dobrynin inquired how the outstanding cases might be resolved. I suggested that we might quietly arrange for the resolution of the more glaring cases, since this would in itself contribute to a better atmosphere, which in turn will make SALT ratification easier. I pointed out that resolution of such cases is in our mutual interest, and that we are prepared to do our part. Moreover, I suggested that it is also in our mutual interest to establish some understandings regarding what is proper insofar as intelligence activities are concerned.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 50, Chron: 9/78. Secret. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner, indicating that he saw the memorandum. The meeting took place at the White House.

Dobrynin agreed that we do need to discuss seriously “new rules of the game” regarding such activities. With regard to the specific cases, he emphatically asserted that Shcharanskiy could not be involved in any discussions. His case has become symbolic and the Soviet leaders feel very strongly about it. Instead, we ought to release the two Soviets charged for espionage in exchange for some of the less notorious cases, for example the Vins family.²

I pointed out to him that this was inadequate, especially since the exchange would be designed to have a positive political effect and hence would have to involve some of the cases that have attracted public attention in this country. Focusing on essentially obscure cases would not serve the political purposes of such accommodation.

There was a brief discussion also of CTB and its relationship to SALT. Dobrynin asked me whether opponents to SALT were the same as the opponents of CTB. I pointed out to him that the two were not identical, but rather tended to reinforce each other.

We agreed to have dinner on his return from New York.

Some of the conversation involved also exchanges regarding chess, involving analyses of my recent games with Begin as well as of the Karpov-Korchnoi matches.

ZB.

² Reference is to Georgy Vins, a Soviet Baptist minister who was released from the Soviet Union in 1979, and who, along with others, was exchanged for Chernyayev and Enger; see footnote 5, Document 159.

147. Memorandum From Jessica Tuchman Mathews of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, September 20, 1978

SUBJECT

Human Rights and The Olympics

In winning their bid to hold the Olympics in Moscow the Soviets scored a great potential coup for both their foreign exchange earnings and international prestige and propaganda interests. However it is also a big risk, for the spotlight could easily shift from the Games to the human rights issue. I believe we should be looking at ways to exploit that risk, and to exact the highest possible price in terms of advancing our own human rights interests.

—There are already rumors in the USSR that Jewish emigration will be cut off some time before the Games. Some believe that the high current rate of emigration is designed to ease the tension before the Games (though visas are being granted *only* to first time requesters and not to any refuseniks or to any prominent dissidents). Are there ways to exploit this situation: Can we accelerate emigration between now and 1980? Should we suggest to the Soviets that they grant visas to a particular list of individuals who are of concern to us, with the quiet implication that otherwise these individuals will be a focus of attention at the Games? Are there other ways to reach the same end?

—What about access to Russian citizens by press and athletes during the Games? Should we be pushing for maximum access in the true Olympic spirit? What are the terms of the NBC contract? After paying through the nose (a record high price) for the broadcast rights has NBC insisted on anything in the way of freedom of coverage or will they only be allowed to film designated glories of Soviet culture? If you watched any of the last several Olympics you will remember all the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: Olympics: 9/78–4/80. Secret. Copies were sent to Reginald Bartholomew and Jerry Schecter. Brzezinski wrote in the memorandum's left-hand margin, "Convene an inter-agency meeting to discuss—then let's decide if a PR [Presidential Review] is needed or WG [Working Group] instead. Good idea. ZB." David Aaron wrote in the memorandum's upper right-hand corner, "She [Tuchman] is getting better on this issue. DA." Immediately below Aaron's comment, an unknown hand wrote, "mini- pre PRC?" The memorandum is excessively underlined, also by an unknown hand. Mathews raised some of these same issues again in her October 27 memorandum to Brzezinski entitled "Human Rights at the Summit." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: USSR: 7/77–5/79)

“color” stories—scenes in Munich beer halls, the quaint beauties of Innsbruck, Canadian folk dancing, etc., etc. There will be an even greater incentive to do such coverage of a country that is of such great interest to Americans about which they know so little. Should we be offering NBC any help in these negotiations and in their subsequent planning? For example, if they do a piece on Soviet ballet, should they also have film (taped in advance) on the stories of Nureyev,² the Panovs,³ etc.? The same with music, science, etc.

—What will be our policy if RFE/RL are denied press credentials? What about other individual press? Should we quietly encourage the media to send a few of their Soviet experts—perhaps including individuals who were earlier asked to leave the USSR? What about denials of visas to individual spectators? In short, should we push the USSR to the maximum extent to live up to the spirit in which the Games are supposed to be held and to the promises they must have made to the International Olympic Committee, or should we just accept the fact that these Olympics will be different from those held in the West? I think we should push.

—What will be our policy if the Israeli team or the South African team is banned from the Games—especially if the Soviets announce the decision at the last minute?

—What will we do during the Games if an American or other participant gets into trouble of some kind that relates to human rights (e.g., press interview with a forbidden dissident) and gets deported? If we can develop an answer should we inform the Soviets in advance so that they will have no doubt as to how we would react?

—Should we do anything in the way of informing American participants about this issue—perhaps briefings made available to those who are interested? Or perhaps that is going too far.

—[1 paragraph (5½ lines) not declassified]

RECOMMENDATION:

That you give me some guidance on this. Do you feel these issues should be pursued? What about a PRM? Other?⁴

² Reference is to Rudolf Nureyev, a Soviet ballet dancer, who defected in 1961 while on tour.

³ Reference is to Valery and Galina Panov, both of the Kirov Ballet, who were dismissed and demoted, respectively, when Valery, a Soviet Jew, applied for emigration to Israel for the pair in 1972.

⁴ Aaron added the following handwritten note: “I say unleash Tuchman! Play the Olympic card! DA.”

148. Editorial Note

Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance met in New York to discuss the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) during Gromyko's annual trip to the United States for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Their initial meeting took place on September 27, 1978, in the Soviet Mission in New York. At that meeting, both men reaffirmed their commitment to approve and sign SALT II. The memorandum of conversation from the plenary session focused on Gromyko's presentation of the Soviet view on SALT. He agreed that each side had the right to test and deploy one new intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) during the term of the Treaty. He also reaffirmed the Soviet proposal to limit to 20 the number of long-range cruise missiles that each bomber could carry. Gromyko reiterated that the Soviets were tired of the new and unrelated U.S. proposals, which were put forth at each meeting. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko/Vance Meeting, 9/78)

The two men continued their talks at the U.S. Mission the following morning. According to the memorandum of conversation, Vance began by responding to Gromyko's statement of the previous day and reiterating the U.S. proposal. With regard to new types of ICBMs, the Americans and the Soviets were in agreement on one new missile. However, Vance reiterated that two differences remained between the two sides: one, the duration of the protocol, and two, the timing of the reduction of each side to the agreed upon 2,250 limit on delivery vehicles. Additionally, he noted that the definitions of cruise missiles and cruise missile range were still under negotiation. Gromyko followed up by restating the Soviet proposal, agreeing that a date for dismantling and destruction still remained to be determined. The meeting concluded with a brief discussion on the Middle East, during which Gromyko wanted to know how Syria, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan had responded to the Camp David Accords and to Secretary Vance's recent trip. Vance discussed these countries' concerns with Gromyko. (Ibid.) For the Camp David Accords, see footnotes 2 and 3 to Document 144. For the schedule of the Vance trip to the Middle East, September 20–24, see footnote 2, Document 145.

149. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1978, 9:30–9:45 a.m.

SUBJECT

Carter-Gromyko Private Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Secretary Cyrus R. Vance

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Foreign Minister Gromyko said that he had a message for the President from L.I. Brezhnev in response to the brief message the President had sent Brezhnev.² Inasmuch as Gromyko was coming to the United States in any case, Brezhnev had asked him to hand this message to the President personally. Gromyko handed the President the Russian text of that message together with a “working” English translation.

The President asked Gromyko if he should read the message now, and Gromyko replied in the affirmative.

After reading the translation of the message, the President said that he found this letter to be interesting and constructive. He would want to respond to it more directly in writing, but this morning he would also cover a few of these points in his presentation.

Gromyko said that at the present time the main question in terms of precedence was SALT II, of course. However, it might be useful to exchange views about Soviet-American relations as a whole.

The President thought that it would be advisable to go into the Cabinet Room, where he would offer a few brief general comments on the overall state of relations between our two countries, and then go on to present our SALT position which, he hoped, would resolve all the differences between us and lead to rapid conclusion of a SALT II Agreement.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9/20–25/78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² See Document 142.

150. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 30, 1978, 9:45 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Carter-Gromyko Plenary Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Secretary Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Warnke
Ambassador Toon
Mr. David Aaron
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Mr. V.G. Makarov
Mr. V.G. Komplektov
Mr. A.A. Bessmertnykh
Mr. N.N. Detinov
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President first wanted to tell the Minister that he was glad to have him come back to Washington for this meeting. He was happy to note that relations between our two countries appeared to be rapidly improving. He believed that a matter of first priority for our two states was successful completion of the work on the SALT Agreement. As far as we were concerned, this could be accomplished this morning. The President also wanted Gromyko to know that a comprehensive detente remained a major aim and keystone of our policy. We wanted our relations with the Soviet Union to be based on mutual respect and mutual advantage. There had been mention of competition as well as cooperation between us. The President wanted to put major emphasis on cooperation.

The President noted that there were a number of differences between us which had resulted from competition. He proposed to mention them briefly.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 81, Sensitive XX: 9/20–78. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place in the Cabinet Room at the White House. An unknown hand made minor edits to this version of the memorandum.

Middle East

The President believed that both our countries wanted to pursue peace in that region. Each of us had close relations with the countries involved in the Middle East dispute. We felt that the Camp David discussion² had produced a viable mechanism for working out a peace treaty between Egypt and Israel, the main combatants in that area. He expressed the hope that the Soviet Union could help to move this process along, and that within the bounds of its own foreign policy it would support the Camp David agreements. We did not have any military forces in that area and, in fact, our observers in the Sinai might be removed once that peace treaty went into effect.

MBFR Negotiations in Vienna

The President said he was discouraged by the lack of progress at the Vienna negotiations. The same was true of some of our allies; some of them, in fact, wanted to end the talks. The main difference between us concerned our present assessment of the Warsaw Pact forces, and we would like to see this difference resolved. One possibility, which the President had discussed with the leaders of Western countries when he was at the Bonn economic meeting, was to work out an appropriate definition of military forces to be counted. The present difference of 180,000 between our assessment and the number provided by the Warsaw Pact countries was possibly caused by a different definition of which troops were to be counted. The President repeated that he would like to see it resolved.

US–PRC Relations

Another matter of concern which President Brezhnev had expressed to President Carter and to Senator Kennedy³ was our future relations with the People's Republic of China. We had nothing to conceal in this respect, and the Shanghai communique⁴ showed that all we had in mind was to establish peaceful relations with the PRC. It would be a mistake for us to use our relations with the PRC against the Soviet Union. We have no thought of doing that. We did want to have peaceful relations with China, but would not permit anyone to drive a wedge between us and the Soviet Union.

² See Document 144.

³ Edward Kennedy (D-Massachusetts).

⁴ See *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 203.

Trade and Science

The President expressed his hope that we would be able to increase our trade with the Soviet Union. As Gromyko knew, he had recently approved US investment in a plant to produce oil-drilling equipment in the Soviet Union.⁵ As for science, he had instructed his Science Advisor, Dr. Frank Press, to proceed with scientific exchanges.

CTB

The President said he would like to see us move rapidly to conclusion of a complete test ban treaty.

Africa

He had one general comment with regard to Africa. The most serious threat to good relations between us and the Soviet Union in the future, in his view, resulted from Soviet activities in Africa. In the Horn of Africa the circumstances were now more stable and had improved since he and Gromyko had met the last time. We were trying with enthusiasm in the United Nations to bring about agreement on the Namibian problem, but even more threatening was the dispute concerning Rhodesia. We had noted the large contribution in the form of advice, instructors and weapons which the Soviet Union was giving the Patriotic Front forces. We were engaged in trying to bring about a peaceful solution for the conflict between the government of Rhodesia and the Patriotic Front. We would welcome the cooperation of the Soviet Union in bringing about that peaceful solution. If there were any Soviet military involvement in the area, that could have very serious consequences. We hoped that the Soviets would cooperate with us in bringing the parties together to decide on their future leaders. We had no preference among them, except to ensure that they were acceptable to the people of Zimbabwe and Rhodesia.

That completed the President's brief review of overall relations between our two countries. He would be glad to hear Gromyko's response and any other comments he might want to offer.

Gromyko noted that he and the President had agreed that they would discuss SALT II matters separately. At this time he wanted to say a few words about the relations between our countries, expressing views on behalf of the Soviet leadership and President Brezhnev personally.

⁵ See Document 141.

Overall Soviet-US Relations

Gromyko had to tell the President quite frankly that over the recent period our relations had worsened. It was true, of course, that he did discern a somewhat more positive note in recent statements by the President's representatives, in the President's comments today and in some press articles, indicating that in the most recent period, during the past month perhaps, there had been somewhat of a turning point for the better. That might be so, but he had to say that he had not discerned anything truly substantive to indicate an improvement in our relations. The fact that our relations had become worse as compared to the past was known to the whole world, and this could not fail to concern and perplex the Soviet Union. He wanted to convey this to the President in all frankness. He had taken note of the President's pronouncement, contained in his message to Brezhnev, where the President had used words to the effect that we should not try to place the blame for the worsening of relations between us, but should look ahead. This was quite understandable, but he would point out that the Soviet Union was not prepared to assume any blame for the worsening of relations and he wanted the President to know that.

Gromyko noted that in those matters where our respective views did not fully coincide, or did not coincide at all, affairs could be conducted in a number of different ways. Differences could be discussed without crossing a certain line, throwing back the relations between us. These relations had been laboriously built up between the Soviet Union and the United States and the process had not been easy. Quite the contrary, it had been an arduous and difficult road. On the one hand, relations between us could be conducted with the use of fine instruments, seeking ways to bridge gaps and to come to mutual understanding. On the other hand, one could also use an axe, raising and dropping it repeatedly to sever the threads that existed between us. Again, speaking quite frankly, he would point out that in his view the latter method was the one used by the United States quite frequently in the recent past. Of course, such a situation could not but have a negative impact on the delicate process called international detente. He would hope that in all assessments of each other's policy neither side would fail to observe a certain sense of proportion and not go beyond a certain limit. As seen by many people, one or two statements by the leaders of one of our countries were quite enough to derail detente. Of course, it would not be much of a detente if that were really true. He regarded detente as a process that goes much deeper, one that was based on the hearts and minds of literally hundreds of millions of people. He did believe that if one plotted detente as a curve on a graph, on the whole that curve was pointing upward. There were ups and downs, to be sure, but on the whole if one felt the pulse of hundreds and hundreds of millions of

people all over the world, detente was on an upward track. It was a process that needed to be developed and was developing, but the greater the effort applied in that direction the better and stronger it would be. For its part, the Soviet Union was fully prepared to do all in its power to promote everything that furthered detente, and to preserve in our mutual relations everything that had been achieved in the past, and boldly go further.

Gromyko wanted to assure the President that in all its actions the Soviet Union was not trying to undercut relations between the United States and third countries so long as these relations were not directed against the Soviet Union. He and the Soviet leadership felt that conditions were now ripe for going ahead, improving and strengthening our relations.

Gromyko noted that in his statement today the President had not referred to one thought which he had repeatedly expressed in the past. Perhaps that was only an oversight, but it was an axiom of foreign policy that the nature of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States to an enormous extent determined the general world situation, the state of detente, the state of East-West relations and the international atmosphere as a whole. That was indisputable, and it was an idea the President had put forward in the past and one with which the Soviet Union agreed wholeheartedly.

The President wanted to repeat that, as he had said earlier, good relations with the Soviet Union were a keystone of our foreign policy.

Gromyko said that was one aspect of the matter, the other being that these relations determined the general situation throughout the world. That was not necessarily to everyone's liking, and he was aware of the many epithets being directed at each of us, but particularly at the Soviet Union, referring to superpowers, to attempts at exercising hegemony, etc. He felt that neither of our countries was to blame in that respect, for neither of us had elected ourselves as superpowers. That had resulted from the objective process of historical development.

Gromyko wanted to speak briefly on some specific aspects the President had touched upon.

Middle East

With regard to the Middle East situation he had to say that the Soviet Union took a different approach to the actual state of affairs in that area. He would note that both sides agreed that the situation there was complex and dangerous. As for methods to resolve Middle East problems and the specific political steps necessary to ensure a settlement of the Middle East problems, our respective standpoints were entirely different. Regarding the Camp David meetings, of course the President would know that the Soviet Union did not share his views

concerning the results achieved and would not associate itself with the process and methods used. The Soviets were against separate “deals.” Gromyko would say that the United States had acted rudely toward the Soviet Union despite the common understanding achieved last year, to the effect that we would take concerted action with respect to the Middle East. He noted that the United States had gone a separate way, demonstratively disregarding the previous understanding with the Soviet Union.

As for Camp David, if anything was accomplished there, it was that Israel had obtained what it had been striving for from the very beginning, while Sadat had received nothing and had in fact lost everything he had. At the same time Syria and Jordan and the Palestinians had been completely circumvented, producing great disarray in the ranks of the Arabs. Was this really the path to peace and calm in the Middle East? The Soviets did not believe so, and no one could convert them to the views of the United States or Sadat or Begin on this score. They had their own assessment and views. That the Soviet Union wanted peace in the Middle East was well known throughout the world. It wanted to see the states in the Middle East live in peace as independent sovereign states, and this, of course, included Israel. The Soviet Union had stated this hundreds of times for all the world to hear, and its position was well known. It was equally well known that the Soviet Union wanted to do all in its power to safeguard the legitimate rights of the Palestinians. Now he could only say that they would have to wait and see how events developed in the future.

Gromyko asked the President not to consider him a pessimist. The Soviets were optimists and firmly believed that eventually all the problems would be resolved for the people of the Middle East. The Soviets had never had any idea of pushing Israel into the sea. On the contrary, they had upheld Israel many times in the international arena, certainly to a much greater extent than the Israelis themselves were doing by their ill-considered extremist statements. Gromyko concluded his discussion of the Middle East by saying he supposed each of us would retain our own concepts with regard to the Middle East.

MBFR—Negotiations in Vienna

Gromyko said that, of course, he, too, was disappointed that no real progress had been achieved in Vienna so far, although he would point out that when these negotiations first began, he had not thought that agreement was just around the corner. He thought that these negotiations would be lengthy, because the matters dealt with were important and sensitive for both sides.

Gromyko wanted to draw the President’s attention to one particular aspect of this entire subject. Statements were being made to the ef-

fect that the Socialist countries must reduce their armed forces and armaments in greater proportion than Western countries. The Soviet view was that reduction of levels must be accomplished in such a way as not to alter the existing correlation of forces between East and West. The Soviets felt that this was the only real road that could lead to agreement. He repeated the words “without altering the correlation of forces.” Surely this could not have a negative effect on any of the countries involved, because if the reductions were accomplished in this manner, the degree of security enjoyed by both sides would remain unchanged. In passing, he would point out that almost four months had elapsed since the last proposal by the Eastern countries, but the Western powers still had not responded.

China

Gromyko wanted to state at the outset that the Soviet Union was not all opposed to normal relations between the United States and China, just as it was not opposed to normal relations between any two or more countries. However, the Soviets were resolutely against any country, including the United States, developing relations with China in order to use them to the detriment of the Soviet Union. The President would probably not agree with this, but the Soviets were gaining the impression that the United States was trying to “play the Chinese card” to the detriment of Soviet interests. It was entirely possible that up to now this process had not gone beyond the framework of stated policy. However, the Soviets did see certain phenomena that were perplexing. In this connection, he would particularly mention the conclusion of a treaty between Japan and China. He could not believe that Japan had proceeded to conclude that treaty without some form of consultation with the United States and advice from the US Government. If this had indeed taken place, it would seem to him that the action taken was excessively hasty. This was not the road that should be taken in relations with China. In addition, he had noted reports appearing from time to time in the press to the effect that China intended or had already begun to purchase large quantities of arms from various countries, perhaps from some of the US allies and perhaps from the United States as well. He could not assert that he had a mountain of information on this subject, but such was the impression of the Soviet leadership. In this connection he could only say that if something like this was indeed taking place, it would be a very major problem that could seriously impact the relations between our two countries.

Trade

Gromyko said it was a fact and a truism that trade played an important role in the relations between our countries. Both sides had said so repeatedly. Unfortunately he had to note that trade between us,

which had been not too highly developed in the past, had regressed still further. He felt that this was detrimental to both countries and believed it to be a mistake. Of course, he was aware of and appreciative of some of the actions the President had taken to correct that situation. But, what was needed here was to open the gates to that volume of trade between us that would be worthy of our two nations. When he spoke of trade, he meant trade of mutual advantage with full recognition of the significance it had for overall relations between us.

Africa

Gromyko said that the Soviets could not understand the origin of the fears current in the United States with regard to the actions of the Soviet Union in Africa. He asked rhetorically what had been so terrible about what the Soviet Union had done in Africa. He answered that the Soviet Union had done nothing, it did not have a single base on the African continent, nor a single military detachment. As for Southern Africa, the Soviets had not dispatched a single individual to that area, not even diplomats. As for the influence of Soviet ideology, was not the United States spreading its own ideology every day, every hour and every minute? The Soviets could not be expected to erect barriers against ideology, and certainly no one could stop them from being what they were. However, they were not interfering in anyone's affairs.

With respect to Rhodesia, Gromyko pointed out that the Soviets did not have a single individual in the area. The President had spoken of the Soviets instructing the national liberation movement there. He would ask: "Whoever saw a Soviet soldier or instructor in Rhodesia?" No one could even produce a single white man who could be falsely accused of being a Soviet soldier or instructor. Regarding the various factions in Rhodesia, when Mugabe and Nkomo⁶ had met, Gromyko had expressed satisfaction, hoping that something would come out of their meeting. A few days later he had heard that they had been unable to reach agreement. In principle, the Soviet Union would like to see the local people take power into their own hands. He thought he had mentioned to the President during their last meeting that 24 out of 25 people in Rhodesia being black, that made it very easy to decide in whose hands power should rest—obviously not in the hands of the one, but in the hands of the 24. The Soviet Union resolutely opposed any attempt to tie the hands of the local people in order to preserve the colonial racist regime in Rhodesia. He was certain that the United States would only gain in prestige if it were to take a position in favor of the vast majority in Rhodesia and would come out against the pitiful

⁶ See footnote 3, Document 89. An unknown hand drew a question mark in brackets above "Mugabe."

handful of racists there who were trying to drown in blood the national liberation movement in Rhodesia. Of course it was up to the United States to act as it saw fit, but time in any case was working against the racists. He believed the President would appear in a very good light if he took a stand in support of the local people in that area. That would be a major noble act on his part.

As for Namibia, Gromyko believed the situation there to be somewhat similar. At long last he had seen a representative of Namibia in the United Nations, whereas he still did not know what a Rhodesian looked like. In Namibia the racist South African regime was trying to crush the liberation movement by staging farce elections. What was the purpose of all that? It was clearly flouting the will of the United Nations and yet, the countries friendly to South Africa kept silent. Regarding Namibia, too, Soviet policy was the same as with regard to Rhodesia—not to interfere in any way other than to make Soviet views known publicly in the United Nations or from Moscow. He thought that if the Soviet Union and the United States could act together, all these problems in Rhodesia and Namibia could be resolved promptly. The whole world would only thank us, and the only ones displeased would be the small groups of local racists in both these countries, who were engaged in exploiting the local population.

CTB

Gromyko noted that the CTB negotiations were indeed moving forward, but rather slowly. The main thing he would want to point out was that whenever the situation at these negotiations appeared to improve, US representatives would introduce new proposals that threw cold water on the whole process. There was a time when the United States had argued in favor of a five-year term for a CTB treaty. At that time the Soviet Union was more in favor of a three-year term, although it did not oppose five-years. It simply thought that it was easier to work out a three-year treaty. Then, quite suddenly, in the United States various officials began to assert that five years was too long, that such duration would interfere with certain national plans for testing nuclear weapons, while a three-year term would not. That position was hardly convincing. The Soviet Union had finally expressed agreement to the five-year term, but then the United States changed to three. All these zigzags were most perplexing and difficult to understand. The Soviet Union would take this into account in the future. For their part, the Soviets could also talk about national plans, but they stand on a different position. Things would be very difficult indeed were they to reply in kind. Nevertheless, since the United States had changed its position, obviously the Soviets would have to take this into account, because there were two other parties to the negotiations. Basically, they would like to see this agreement completed. It would be a limited agreement,

of course, because apart from the three particular powers, other nuclear powers would not be signatories to the agreement. Nevertheless, it would have a positive impact on the international situation.

In conclusion, Gromyko said that these were the specific considerations he had wanted to convey to the President, and in general wanted to tell the President on behalf of the Soviet leadership and L.I. Brezhnev personally that the Soviet Union's policy was aimed at good relations with the United States and remained as set out and formulated in Brezhnev's message to the President. The Soviet Union would do all in its power to maintain and develop good relations with the United States.

The President noted that the time at our disposal was limited and he would prefer to let Secretary Vance and Ambassador Toon respond in detail to what Gromyko had said. He would say a few sentences, however, so there would be no misunderstanding.

First, the President would tell Gromyko that we recognized the greatness of the Soviet Union and its profound influence throughout the world. We also recognized that whenever we could work together to alleviate conflict, this produced important results. We were dealing with other nations with a respect for their independence, and this was true of our relations with China, Israel, Egypt and others. We had no wish to impose our will on any nation. The President had already mentioned that in some instances the Soviets and we wanted the same thing, for example peace and autonomy in the Middle East. But, we approached these goals from a different perspective, doing so openly and without attempting to mislead anyone.

MBFR

The President noted that the MBFR negotiations had now dragged on for five years. What was needed was an agreed data base, on the basis of which progress could be achieved. We agreed that the forces of East and West should be equivalent, but we disagreed on the numbers the East had put forward. This difference should be resolved, and one possible way of resolving it would be to define what troops should be counted. The President had already said that he had discussed this possibility with Western leaders during his visit to Bonn.

China

The President thought it desirable to reemphasize that we were not planning to play the Chinese card against the Soviet Union. This would be furthest away from our plans, would be deeply resented by China as well as the Soviet Union, and the US people would not permit that. He would make one other point in this connection: the Chinese had never attempted to obtain arms from us. What other nations in Europe did

was of course their concern, but we had done nothing to encourage such arms sales.

Africa

The President believed that our purpose in Africa was the same as that of the Soviets, that is to ensure majority rule. We preferred to do this peacefully, while the Soviet Union did so by supplying weapons. We had noted large sales of weapons to Zambia and Mozambique, and this concerned us. As Gromyko knew, Cuba had 40,000 persons in Africa. Cuba was heavily influenced by the Soviet Union. The Soviets were making large payments to Cuba, exceeding five million dollars a day. The Cuban presence was also of concern to us.

CTB

In this connection the President said that a three-year term for the treaty would suit us better. He hoped we were in harmony on this and would proceed to conclude the treaty without delay. He did not, however, want to conclude it before concluding a SALT Agreement. It would be better if he submitted a CTB Treaty to Congress together with a SALT Treaty. We believed that there should be no testing other than laboratory testing, and that there should be adequate verification.⁷

[Omitted here is discussion of SALT; see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 218.]

⁷ In their final meeting, held in the Secretary's conference room on October 1, Gromyko and Vance each restated their country's respective positions and proposals on SALT II. They agreed to meet in the second half of October in Moscow to continue negotiations. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko/Vance Meeting, 9/78) After the meeting, Vance and Gromyko met privately for a few minutes, during which time Gromyko asked if there was any new material regarding the Woodbridge Case. Vance indicated that the United States wanted to propose an exchange. If he and Gromyko could reach a basic agreement, Vance believed that the details could be ironed out with Dobrynin. (Ibid.)

151. Message From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, undated

Dear Mr. President:

I am communicating with regard to the critical situation in and around Beirut,² which has become so dangerous and intractable that I believe urgent measures must be taken by the international community, following on the October 4 appeal by the President of the Security Council and the Secretary General of the United Nations.³

I firmly hope that our governments can agree on the need to bring the present violence in Lebanon to an immediate halt, in order both to stop the tragic loss of life and to prevent a possible widening of the conflict. If the violence can be stopped, it should then be possible to begin to seek solutions to the problems which have beset Lebanon.

I believe that the international community, which has a legitimate concern over the future of Lebanon, must be directly involved in a permanent resolution of Lebanon's problems, as well as in immediate steps to stop the violence.

I hope that the parties involved in the present fighting will agree to an immediate ceasefire, as a first step. My Government is prepared to support steps, including a Security Council resolution, which would call for a ceasefire, a separation of forces and humanitarian measures. We hope this would allow at least a beginning to be made in achieving a political reconciliation. I urge that your Government will support such steps.

I have also supported the efforts of the President of France⁴ to find a way out of the present crisis in Lebanon. Similarly, my Government

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, USSR (Brezhnev Drafts/Letters), 4/77–9/80. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Peter S. Bridges (IO/UNP) on October 5. Sent via the hot line. Brzezinski sent the message to Carter under an October 5 covering memorandum, which read in part: "The situation in Lebanon is critical and we anticipate that there will be a call to convene an emergency meeting of the [U.N. Security] Council tomorrow." Carter approved Brzezinski's recommendation that the message be sent immediately over the hot line so that it would be "in Brezhnev's hands at opening of business tomorrow [Moscow time]."

² Christian areas in Beirut continued to be targeted by Syrian forces during early October, resulting in high civilian casualties. See *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1979, p. 30007.

³ The appeal, made by the International Committee of the Red Cross, called for a truce, which would allow for the evacuation of wounded individuals from the eastern portion of Beirut. See *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, pp. 371–373.

⁴ Reference is to diplomatic attempts led by French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing to get Syria to agree to a cease-fire.

has taken a positive attitude toward the efforts of Arab states, as expressed in the Arab Deterrent Force;⁵ we would welcome additional efforts by these states to bring about a real and lasting ceasefire leading to peace in Lebanon. I believe, however, that regional efforts must be coupled with involvement of the wider international community.

I have sent my views on the present Lebanese situation to President Assad. My Government has also urged Israel to exercise restraint and to counsel their contacts in Lebanon to comply with a ceasefire.

I assume that you will be discussing the Lebanese situation with President Assad during his current visit. For humanitarian reasons, to forestall a drift toward wider hostilities in the region and to create a situation which will allow the process of reconciliation to begin, I ask that you use your influence with President Assad to support the objectives advanced by France and to do so publicly.

I assure you, Mr. President, of my desire to work with you on this important matter. I stress the urgency of acting immediately on this matter to stop the bloodshed which increases hourly.

Sincerely,

J. Carter

⁵ The Arab League created the Arab Deterrent Force, composed primarily of Syrian forces and under Syrian command.

152. Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

October 6, 1978, 0913R

Honorable Mr. President,

In answer to your communication of October 5,² I must report that the developments of events in Lebanon in recent days causes us great concern too.

We agree that an immediate ceasefire of all of the parties involved in the conflict must be implemented.

Second, I would like to especially stress: You undoubtedly have great capabilities in restraining Israel from any sort of action which may lead only to an even greater exacerbation of the situation in Lebanon.

The implementation of these primary steps, of course, would facilitate the prevention of a further widening of combat operations in Lebanon and the creation of conditions for a subsequent general settlement in that country.

Pres. Il Asad is in agreement with this proposal.

Respectfully yours,

L. Brezhnev³

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/77–12/78. Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. Forwarded to Carter under letterhead of the National Military Command Center. Carter wrote in the memorandum's upper right-hand corner, "Have Cy [Vance] share this general reply with Israelis & *strongly* urge them to desist. JC."

² See Document 151.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

153. Message From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

Moscow, October 22, 1978, 2015Z

WH81377. CommCen Camp David: Deliver immediately to Phil Wise for the President. Note: A memorandum from David Aaron to the President will be forthcoming. Exclusively for the President from Secretary Vance. Subject: Meeting With Gromyko.

1. We (Paul [Warnke], Mac [Toon] and I, plus interpreter) met for two-and-a-half hours with Gromyko, Korniyenko, Dobrynin and interpreter.² After some sparring around Gromyko agreed in principle to accept the concept of averaging for ALCM's on heavy bombers.

2. He recessed for a consultation with higher authority and came up with the following proposed package: a) an average of 25 ALCM's per carrier; b) no multiple independently targetable warheads on ALCM's through 1985; c) all ALCM cruise missile limits to be in the treaty/agreement; d) the maximum number of warheads on existing types of ICBM's not to exceed 10 through the period of the treaty/agreement.

3. I said I would be prepared to recommend to you for your consideration an average of 30 ALCM's per aircraft. As to the other items I said I would have to study them but that my initial reaction was: that 10 was too high, 25 was too low, and that any provisions concerning multiple independently targetable warheads should be in a statement as you had stated in Washington, and not in a treaty.

4. Gromyko then came back with the statement that inasmuch as you had stated in Washington that we would not equip air launched cruise missile with MIRV's for the term of the agreement through 1985 he didn't see why it couldn't logically be included in the agreement. I pointed out to him the political difference.

5. Gromyko then summarized again their proposal and added that if we would agree they would raise the number on their proposal of 6 warheads for new repeat new ICBM's to 10. He said in so doing he was taking into account our position that we wanted 10 rather than 6.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Box 7. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent from the White House Situation Room Immediate to Carter at Camp David. This telegram is a retransmittal of telegram 25514 from Moscow. The initial C written in the upper right-hand corner indicates that Carter saw the telegram. Vance was in Moscow to meet with Brezhnev and Gromyko from October 21 to 24. The telegram included a note indicating that a memorandum from Aaron to Carter was following. The memorandum was not found.

² Reference is to Vance's October 22 meeting with Gromyko at the Kremlin. The entire memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77—Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance–Gromyko Moscow 10/78.

6. We have an important concession on the averaging concept. 25 is too low but I believe there is room for some bargaining on this issue and perhaps also on a) the proposal of 10 warheads per modernized ICBM and b) whether the statement on MIRV'd ICBM's should be in the agreement or in an exchange of letters. I do think it will be hard if not impossible to get agreement on a straight unilateral statement of the latter matter.

7. I would appreciate your guidance for my meetings tomorrow,³ if possible, starting at 10 am with Gromyko and including a meeting with Brezhnev at about 5 tomorrow afternoon.

Vance

³ Carter provided Vance with instructions for his meetings in telegram WH81345, dated October 19.

154. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State and the White House¹

Moscow, October 22, 1978, 2032Z

Secto 12111. Dept. please pass NSC JCS and DOD. Pass NSC for Dr. Brzezinski. SecDef for Secretary Brown. JCS for Gen Jones. Subject: SALT First Plenary With Gromyko on 22 October 1978. Ref: Secto 12109.²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1523. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent to Carter at Camp David in telegram WH81378, October 23. Vance recalled this meeting in his memoirs: "In late October, I went to Moscow. I told Gromyko bluntly that the Soviets had missed an opportunity to conclude a SALT Treaty. I said that the Russians did not seem to understand that Carter had made a serious attempt at the last meeting in Washington to make an agreement possible, particularly with our movement on cruise missiles. Cruise missile limits were politically and militarily difficult for us, but we had tried to meet Soviet concerns and had gone as far as we could, consistent with our security interests and those of our NATO allies. The Soviets should have understood the importance of this move, as well as our proposal of a comprehensive negotiating package." (*Hard Choices*, p. 107). The full memorandum of conversation for this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Vance–Gromyko Moscow 10/78.

² Secto 12109 from Moscow, October 22, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1530.

Summary: Gromyko's presentation was generally tough. This has been standard fare at each initial meeting we have had over the past 20 months. He made constructive proposals on heavy mobiles, depressed trajectories and advance notice of launches and may have implicitly accepted averaging concept for ALCM numbers limits, but strongly rejected the number of 35. He repeated Soviet positions on new types linkage to ALCM numbers issue (without referring to the 10/6 issue) and cruise missile definition. He rejected the concept of irreversible inoperability, but said that reductions would take place throughout the period. He rejected any fixed date for protocol expiration. He rejected the U.S. draft of the Backfire statement, agreeing only to omission of the flight profile and radius, and said that there would be no Soviet confirmation of the production rate number or anything else. On telemetry encryption, he was confused, saying there is no necessity for agreement and nothing will come of attempts to reach agreement. End summary.

1. Expressing recognition that there were some positive elements in the proposals made by the President 30 September,³ and the hope that our meetings would be marked by "a major step forward," Gromyko also said the obstacles to progress lie in the unrealistic nature of some U.S. positions, unreasonable linkages, and the raising of new questions. On substance, his presentation was generally tough, especially on Backfire, cruise missile definition, protocol expiration, and telemetry encryption. Septel reports his agreement on heavy mobiles, etc., and his proposals on advance ICBM launch notice and to defer depressed SLBM trajectory issue to SALT III along with other measures to reduce danger of surprise attacks.

2. After repeating familiar point that Soviet agreement to non-increase in RV's on existing ICBM's is linked to U.S. agreement on ALCM numbers limits, he rejected our first alternative, the unilateral U.S. statement, as unacceptably linking limits on strategic arms to the non-strategic issue of air defenses. As to the second U.S. alternative, the averaging approach, he said the fixing of the obligation to limit ALCM numbers in the treaty text was a positive step but the specific figure proposed is unacceptable because it would make it possible almost to double the number of 20 per aircraft. Comment: This seems a clear signal that the averaging concept is acceptable with only the number in dispute.

3. Gromyko in his brief discussion of new types did not refer to either definition issues or to the 10/6 question.

4. Gromyko strongly rejected the U.S. cruise missile definition position, saying that no argument would change their minds, because it

³ See Document 150.

was impossible to verify the distinction. The U.S. offer of distinctions by externally observable design features he rejected as no more than word of honor.

5. Noting a positive shift in the U.S. position on timing for reductions, he rejected the requirement of irreversible inoperability by June 30, 1981. He observed that the Soviet reductions would take place throughout the period, but emphasized that this did not mean they would necessarily take place at a steady rate. He repeated Soviet condition that Treaty must enter into force by March 31, 1979 for Soviets to be willing to complete reductions by December 30, 1981.

6. He rejected a fixed date for protocol expiration other than three years from entry into force, but repeated earlier formulation that it was impossible to consider protocol expiration when we do not know when Treaty will be signed, much less when it will enter into force, which may suggest they have in mind three years from date of signature as the result.

7. Backfire. Gromyko rejected the text Warnke had given Dobrynin, saying that since what was involved was a unilateral Soviet statement, they would decide what went in it. He said his discussions with the President had established that the issue would be resolved on the basis of the text previously given, but with omission of the radius information and flight profile. He read the following text, which, although he did not mention it, also admits the “good will gesture” point: Begin text. The Soviet side informs the U.S. side that the Soviet TU-22-M aircraft, called Backfire in the United States is a medium-range bomber and that the Soviet side does not intend to give this airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances. In this connection, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the radius of action of this aircraft in such a way as to enable it to strike targets on the territory of the United States. It does not intend to give it such capability in any other manner, including aerial refueling at the same time, the Soviet side states that it will not increase the production rates of this airplane as compared to the present rates. End text. This statement would, he said, be handed to the U.S. side at the time of signing the Agreement and giving it must completely exhaust the issue. There could be no changes in the text; it was, for example, essential that it state that the Backfire is a medium-range bomber. Nor would the Soviet side agree to confirm in any way any statement by the U.S. side that arbitrarily interprets the Soviet statement and introduces concrete numbers. His only reference to the U.S. intention to send the statement to Congress along with the Agreement as part of the ratification process was to say that the Soviet side had no objection to the U.S. desire to present the matter in the best possible light, but we could not do that at the expense of the USSR.

8. I began my reply by saying that I was sorry to have to state that I felt that the Soviet side had not taken appropriate account of the very substantial moves made by the President in the meetings in Washington. In my statement, I reviewed those efforts, noting that they dealt with almost every major outstanding concern of the USSR and, in our view, represent a major effort to reach a fair and mutually beneficial agreement. I then summarized the U.S. positions and the areas of agreement and disagreement on the issues. It may be significant that, although he interrupted at a number of other points where he claimed I had not correctly summarized agreed points on Soviet views, Gromyko did not challenge my statement that the Soviet proposal to drop the 2,500 km range limits applied to both testing and deployment and meant that there would be no range limits for cruise missiles in either the protocol or the full agreement, except the 600 km limits.

9. Telemetry encryption. When, in the course of my statement, I said that the exchange between Warnke and Semenov indicated agreement that the already-agreed ban on deliberate concealment applies to deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as by encryption and that telemetric information can be important for verification purposes, Semenov interrupted to say that was not an accurate report of their conversation. Gromyko later said that nothing would come of attempts to reach agreement on telemetry, that there was no necessity for agreement, and that both sides will be in the same situation in the absence of agreement.

10. We will of course discuss the telemetry issue again with them. I don't think Gromyko understands the issue and rather than dealing with the underlying concept is concerned that we are charging them with a current violation of the Interim Agreement. I believe this issue will be satisfactorily resolved.

11. Now that we have gotten through the usual opening exchanges, we will be able to get down to real business in the talks among the smaller groups, that is, Vance, Warnke, and Toon opposite Gromyko, Korniyenko and Dobrynin.

Vance

155. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the White House¹

Moscow, October 23, 1978, 1402Z

25594. Exclusively for the President from Secretary Vance. Subject: Meeting With Gromyko October 23, 1978.

1. We met again this morning for three hours with Messrs. Gromyko, Korniyenko, and Dobrynin. I spent about 30 minutes alone with Gromyko.²

2. I carried out instructions in your telegram (WH 81382).³ No fundamental new ground was broken, as we reviewed the yet unresolved issues. Gromyko did state categorically that so far as our statement on Backfire was concerned we of course could state whatever we chose to say. I hit him hard on the need for confirmation pointing out that the problem was not merely our problem but also theirs if they wanted ratification to be voted. We have agreed with Soviets to call the talks “useful and constructive” and point out that some issues remain unresolved. We will not go into any detail with the press on which issues are unresolved or what specific progress has been made. I suggest no statements be made back home until I have a chance to report to you tomorrow.

3. I will be meeting with President Brezhnev starting at 6:00 p.m. Paul and Mac will accompany me.

4. Gromyko gave a luncheon for us this noon from which we have just returned. At lunch, Korniyenko suggested to Paul that our position on telemetry encryption was not accurately stated in our proposed common understanding. Without commitment, he asked if it would not be more correct to state that the parties agree that methods of transmitting telemetric information are not limited, including encryption, unless there is deliberate concealment that impedes verification. Also without commitment, Paul invited them to make this counterproposal in Geneva.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 51, Chron: 10/22–31/78. Secret; Flash; Eyes Only. The initial C is written in the upper right-hand corner, indicating that Carter saw the telegram. The full memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Vance Gromyko Moscow 10/78.

² The full memorandum of conversation of the private Gromyko–Vance meeting is *ibid.* In this conversation, Gromyko and Vance further discussed SALT issues.

³ Not found.

156. Message From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

October 23, 1978, 1908Z

WH81396. This is a retransmittal of Moscow 25640. Exclusively for the President. Subject: My Meeting With Brezhnev.

1. We just had a meeting of one and one-half hours with President Brezhnev, Foreign Minister Gromyko, Marshal Ogarkov, Ambassador Dobrynin, and Messrs. Aleksandrov, and Korniyenko.

2. The President read a rather long statement which was moderate in tone and positive in his hopes for better relations with the US—both from an overall international standpoint and from the standpoint of bilateral relations. He started off by calling for an active dialogue. After reviewing the situation in the SALT negotiations in a non-polemical way, Brezhnev said the Soviets are prepared to look ahead and develop a stable base for and a rising curve in our relations. Brezhnev went on to state that our two nations have no alternative but to learn how to live together, and it is our duty to our people and to the world to do so.

3. Brezhnev said that he hoped that you shared his hope for a summit meeting soon. He said this would of course require the necessary basis in terms of a SALT agreement to sign. He said venue would be no problem.

4. He also covered other subjects, including some off-the-record remarks on the need to reduce the chance of nuclear war, which I will describe when we meet.

5. I responded to his statement, point-by-point, noting that I must express disappointment at backward movement in two areas—the suggestion that they should be permitted 10 RVs per existing missile, and their position on the telemetry issue. I then dealt with each of the other points, including your desire for a more stable and better relationship, for a reduction in nuclear weapons, for early completion of a SALT agreement, and for a summit meeting at an appropriate time.

6. The tone of the meeting was friendly, and he closed by warmly sending his very best wishes to you.

7. Brezhnev seemed to be fit—in better shape than when I saw him last—and his diction was considerably improved.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 51, Chron: 10/22–31/78. Secret; Eyes Only. Sent from the White House Situation Room. The telegram is a retransmittal of telegram 25640 from Moscow. The initial C in the upper right-hand corner indicates that Carter saw the telegram.

157. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, November 6, 1978, 2236Z

282569. Subject: Response to Soviet Non-paper on Woodbridge Two. Ref: (A) State 280993; (B) Moscow 26993.²

1. At Secretary's request, Shulman called in Dobrynin on November 6 and responded to Soviet non-paper of November 3³ concerning Chernyayev and Enger espionage case.

2. Following is text of US non-paper which Shulman gave to Dobrynin:

Begin text: The Department of State refers to the Soviet communication of November 3.

The Department of State considers that the tone of the Soviet communication concerning the Soviet citizens V.A. Enger and R.P. Chernyayev is patently offensive. Moreover, the logic it contains and the assumptions it makes are erroneous.

As the Soviet Government well knows, Mr. Enger and Mr. Chernyayev violated their status as staff members of the United Nations Secretariat by engaging in a flagrant act of espionage. This was conclusively proven at the fair and open trial which found them guilty of engaging in such espionage.

The United States, for its part, is no less interested than the Soviet Union in furthering the process of relaxation of tensions between our two countries. Nevertheless, however regrettably, if US-Soviet relations are adversely affected, it will be entirely the responsibility of the Soviet Government, which should realize that it is solely because the Soviet citizens involved violated their status in the United States by engaging in espionage. End text.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 114, 11/1–11/78. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Gary L. Matthews (EUR/SOV); cleared by Shinn, Vest, Thomas Martin (S/S–O), and in S/S; approved by Shulman. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–2418)

² The telegrams, both November 4, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780455–0490 and D780456–0071. Telegram 280993 to Moscow, contained the Soviet non-paper on the Woodbridge Two; telegram 26993 from Moscow relayed the Embassy's preparation for retaliatory action as a result of the arrest of the Woodbridge Two.

³ The Soviet non-paper described the imprisonment and trial of the Woodbridge Two as a "judicial farce" and a "premeditated provocation." The Department transmitted the text to the Embassy in Moscow in telegram 280993, November 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D780455–0490)

3. Following are talking points which Shulman used orally during meeting with Dobrynin:

—The Secretary of State regarded the Soviet communication on Chernyayev and Enger intemperate and offensive. It is not only not helpful, but it has had a negative effect on the prospects for resolving this case.

—I will not dignify the note by a paragraph-by-paragraph response, but there are several points that need to be made.

—If there is damage to US-Soviet relations, it arises from the abuse of United Nations status by the espionage activities of these two men. As you know, the matter has been handled by the courts in accordance with our legal procedures. It has been handled fairly and openly, and the men had the benefit of counsel of their choosing.

—It should be appreciated in Moscow that bail arrangements enabling Chernyayev and Enger to remain out of jail reflect a major effort to take Soviet interests into account.

—What is more, as you know, an effort is being made to settle this matter along lines previously discussed, and we await a response to our most recent discussions.⁴ In the meantime, we hope that these communications will not be burdened or impaired by unnecessary publicity or further outbursts in official exchanges.

—Finally, while some agreement on “ground rules” is desirable, the abuse of United Nations status for espionage purposes would represent a continuing difficulty as distinguished from personnel covered by diplomatic immunity.

4. Dobrynin made no significant response to points made orally and in non-paper other than to express agreement with the point that further private discussions should be expedited.

Vance

⁴ Reference is to two telephone conversations between Dobrynin and Brzezinski, November 3 and 6, in which the release and expulsion of the Woodbridge Two were discussed. The memoranda of conversation are in the Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Prisoner Exchanges: (8/78–5/79). Dobrynin and Brzezinski also met on November 9 to discuss the logistics of the exchange. The memorandum of conversation is *ibid*.

158. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

November 17, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

I consider it necessary to use the channel of our private correspondence to draw your attention to the question that causes our growing concern.

The question is of the events in Iran² and, to be more precise, that according to numerous reports actions are being taken on the part of the United States to influence events in that country. This is confirmed by information from various sources. Information is also coming in about even a possibility of a military interference by the US in Iran. We would not want to believe it. But, unfortunately, it is difficult for us to judge real intentions of the United States, the more so that no denials followed press reports to that effect.

Therefore it is important that there should be no ambiguities in this matter.

Firstly, any interference in the internal affairs of Iran contradicts the principles embodied in the UN Charter³ which must be observed by all states, especially by big powers which bear special responsibility for the destinies of the world. Besides, it would be also appropriate to remind of agreement stated in the Basic Principles of Relations Between the USSR and the US, signed in 1972, that both sides will “do everything in their power so that conflicts or situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions” and that “they will seek to promote conditions in which all countries will live in peace and security and will not be subject to outside interference in their internal affairs”.⁴

Secondly, there should be no misunderstanding that an interference, and especially military, in the affairs of a country which directly borders on the Soviet Union and with which we established normal

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. A handwritten “C” appears in the upper right corner indicating that Carter saw the letter.

² On November 6, the Shah appointed a new government under General Gholam Reza Azhari, who enforced martial law and began an anti-corruption campaign in an effort to regain control. (*Keesing's Contemporary Archive*, 1979, pp. 29735–29737)

³ For the text of the U.N. Charter, see *Yearbook of the United Nations*, 1978, pp. 1185–1194.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 4.

good-neighbour relations cannot in general be regarded by us otherwise but as affecting the interests of our security.

We believe that the situation emerging around Iran requires clear and explicit statements to be made on our as well as on your part on nonadmissibility of outside interference in the internal affairs of Iran. It would serve the interests of both our countries as well as Iran itself. On our part we intend to state publicly our position concerning the necessity for all states to refrain from interfering in the developments taking place in Iran.

In our deep conviction in the situation prevailing in Iran and around it it is especially important that the USSR and the US would be strictly guided by the principles of the UN Charter, by the interests of universal peace and international security.

I would appreciate it you give us your position on the question raised by me.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁵

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

159. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 17, 1978, 4:01–4:48 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 5, USSR (General), 9/77–12/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House. Carter initialed the first page of the memorandum. Brzezinski recalled in his memoirs that he and Dobrynin "had prolonged exchanges" on the Woodbridge Two. "At times the arguments were quite heated, especially when I insisted that the execution of the Soviet citizen would jeopardize any possible deal on the Soviet spies. Dobrynin kept insisting that this matter was none of my business, but I pointed out to him that the Soviets themselves had made it our business by generating a letter from the prisoner addressed directly to Carter, pleading for assistance. That step had been taken presumably to embarrass Carter, but it enabled me to argue that the Soviets had thereby made it also our concern." (*Power and Principle*, pp. 338–339)

In reference to the telephone proposal conveyed by Ambassador Dobrynin on November 16,² I indicated to him that we would be prepared to proceed on the basis of his proposal, recognizing that the Filatov case³ in principle is an internal Soviet affair and would be resolved by the Soviet side separately; however, how the Filatov case is resolved would affect U.S.-Soviet atmospherics and hence we could not be entirely indifferent to this matter. Therefore, if the Soviet side in the meantime and on its own resolves the Filatov case by commutation, we would be ready to proceed immediately with the proposed exchange.⁴ If the Soviet side were to carry out the execution, it would doubtless have some effect on the atmosphere of our relations and we would have to reassess the proposed exchange in the light of the circumstances.

Dobrynin responded, at least initially, with some heat. He asserted that the Soviet side has gone a long way to accommodate American demands. It has given us Ginzburg,⁵ it has conceded simultaneity of the releases, and that we were nonetheless insisting on linking the Filatov case, making the exchange conditional on its resolution. He went on to say that in his view the Soviet side would not be prepared to accept this and the whole arrangement could become unstuck.

I responded by saying that I hope Dobrynin will convey to his principals not only our response but also the genuinely conciliatory spirit in which it is being conveyed. I added that our main concern is to eliminate extraneous sources of irritation, and that it seems to me in-

² A memorandum of a Brzezinski-Dobrynin telephone conversation, in which they discussed which Soviet dissidents would be included in the exchange, is in Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Prisoner Exchanges: (8/78–5/79).

³ Anatoli Filatov, a diplomat in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was convicted of having been recruited by the CIA in 1974 and conducting espionage for the United States until his arrest in 1977. On July 14, 1978, he was found guilty and sentenced to death for espionage. Telegram 18874 from Moscow, August 9, transmitted an August 8 letter from Filatov pleading with President Carter for his help: "Three years ago I was enlisted by American intelligence and fulfilled its assignments in the capacity of an agent." In his accompanying commentary, Toon asserted, "I have been briefed on the Filatov case, and I feel strongly that we owe him nothing. Moreover I have long felt that as a matter of principle when an agent is caught we should simply regard the development as a casualty of the intelligence wars. . . . I would wish to do so if you plan to discuss with Stan Turner." (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Prisoner Exchanges: Alpha Channel: 7/78–5/79)

⁴ In September 1980, *The New York Times* reported that Filatov's sentence had not been carried out, but had been commuted to 15 years in prison. (Craig R. Whitney, "Spy, Thought Dead, Now Reported Alive," *The New York Times*, September 24, 1980, p. A1)

⁵ Alexandr Ginzburg, who was convicted on July 13, 1978, of anti-Soviet agitation and sentenced to 8 years of hard labor, was released from the Soviet Union on April 27, 1979, along with Eduard Kuznetsov, Mark Dymshits, Valentin Moroz, and Georgy Vins. In exchange, the Woodbridge Two, Rudolf Chernyayev and Valdik Enger, were released and returned to the Soviet Union.

conceivable that he did not understand that the execution of someone for allegedly spying for the United States would convey a negative message regarding the state of our relations. Moreover, the Soviet side itself injected the Filatov case by forwarding to the President a letter from Filatov which asserted that the President is morally responsible for whether Filatov lives or dies. Such a letter was obviously transmitted with the cooperation of the Soviet authorities, and hence I do not understand how now the Soviet side can insist that we can be entirely indifferent to what happens to Filatov.

Finally, I stressed that we, too, have made significant concessions, the most important of which was to omit Shcharanskiy from the exchange, a fact for which we will doubtless take some political heat. As the discussion unfolded, Dobrynin became increasingly conciliatory and started asking me questions as to how I would envisage the “entirely separate and independent” resolution of the Filatov case. For example, would we be satisfied if the Soviets informed us privately that Filatov would not be executed; would we take public credit for it; would we leak it?

In response I assured Dobrynin that we would not link or make any claims regarding the Filatov case in the event that his life was spared, and that we would see the exchange as involving purely and only the other individuals. I could not guarantee that leaks would not occur, and I added the hope that in some fashion the Soviet side could make it known more publicly that Filatov was not being executed, since that doubtless would contribute also to better atmospherics.

Finally, I again asked Dobrynin to convey to the Soviet side not only the substance of our position but our genuine desire for a constructive resolution of these matters, with both sides necessarily making some concessions. I got the distinct impression toward the end of the discussion that something along the above lines might be contrived, even if the initial Soviet response is negative.

160. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Ambassador to the Soviet Union (Toon)¹

Washington, November 21, 1978, 2104Z

WH81548. For immediate delivery to Ambassador Toon.

At the President's direction, please transmit the following message for President Brezhnev to Minister Gromyko or as appropriate. Secretary Vance concurs.

Begin text:

Dear Mr. President:

I have given your private communication of November 17 on events in Iran² my most careful and thorough attention.

As you know, my government issued a statement Sunday³ which reiterated my firm support for the Shah in his efforts to restore domestic tranquility in Iran, our confidence that Iran can solve its own problems, and the United States' intention to preserve and pursue with Iran our strong bilateral political, economic, and security relationship. The United States remains fully committed to the independence and integrity of Iran.

The statement also made clear that the United States does not intend to interfere in the internal affairs of any country, and that reports to the contrary are totally without foundation. The statement expressed my expectation that other countries would conduct themselves in similar fashion. In this connection, I took note of your statement in the *Pravda* interview that the Soviet Union will not interfere in the affairs of Iran and will respect its territorial integrity, sovereignty, and independence.

In this connection, some aspects of your letter are troubling to me. I trust it was not your intention to suggest that the incorrect reports to which you refer might be used to justify Soviet interference in Iranian affairs. I am sure you appreciate that any such interference would be a matter of the utmost gravity to us.

It is important that our two countries have made our positions clear and explicit. My views in this letter and in our public statement

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 69, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–12/78. Secret.

² See Document 158.

³ See Bernard Gwertzman, "Carter Answers Soviet on Iran," *The New York Times*, November 20, 1978, p. A1.

represent a clear and unambiguous expression of the position of the United States.

Sincerely,
Jimmy Carter
End text

161. Message From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, December 14, 1978

I want to inform you that on Friday, December 15, at 9:00 p.m. Washington time, I will announce the normalization of relations between the Government of the United States and the People's Republic of China. This is an historic moment in the relations between the American people and the Chinese people. This step has no other purpose but to promote the cause of world peace. It is a step which I believe has been long overdue and which will redound to the benefit of all nations.

Let me also take this opportunity to express my appreciation for the reception accorded Secretaries Blumenthal and Kreps in Moscow.² They have reported fully to me on their conversations with you. I am gratified that we share a similar commitment to the prompt conclusion of a Strategic Arms Accord, to the expansion of trade and other relations. I hope that the meeting between our two Foreign Ministers later this month can make important progress in this direction and pave the way for a personal meeting between the two of us. There is no greater priority in my government than the strengthening of relations between our two countries.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, China: Normalization with PRC: Events—Aggregate Documentation: 8–12/78. Secret; Eyes Only. In the upper right-hand corner, Carter wrote, "OK. J."

² Secretaries Blumenthal and Kreps met with Brezhnev on December 6, while attending the meeting of the U.S.–USSR Trade and Economic Council in Moscow.

162. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 18, 1978

SUBJECT

CIA Report on Results of Stepped-up Publishing and Distribution Effort to USSR & Eastern Europe

Stan Turner has sent a good summary report on the results of CIA's effort, which we approved a year ago last summer, to publish and send more indigenous-language material into Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The results are impressive. They are typical of what can be done when long-established, professionally run programs are given the opportunity to expand and the best judgment of the people who are running them is taken as the basis of judgment for what can be done.

This expansion is projected to continue further during the coming fiscal years. By about 1981 it may be back at the level it was at 10–15 years ago. Its effectiveness is likely to be greater than it was then since the material available to be used is better and the receptivity in the target countries greater.

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)²

Washington, December 15, 1978

SUBJECT

Progress Report on Publishing and Distributing Literature to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 51, Chron: 12/14–31/78. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates that it was returned to Henze on December 19.

² Secret.

REFERENCES

- A. My Memorandum of 13 March 78; Subject: Support for Russian Emigre Publishing House
 B. Your Memorandum of 18 March 78; Subject: Support for Russian and East European Book Publishing³

1. Paragraphs 2–5 below summarize the use of the \$960,000 [*less than 1 line not declassified*] earmarked specifically for an increase in book publishing and distribution to the USSR and Eastern Europe.

2. The [*less than 1 line not declassified*] funds were made available to our major book distribution mechanism in February 1978. While all the funds were obligated prior to 1 October 1978, the full impact on actual distribution cannot be measured accurately until well into FY 79, as some of the books purchased are still in the distribution pipeline. Since our operational mechanism was largely in place, it was possible to utilize [*dollar amount not declassified*] directly for the purchase and distribution of books. Two preliminary indicators of the effectiveness of the effort are: (A) 212,000 items were distributed from 1 July 1977 to 30 June 1978 (115,000 to Soviets; 97,000 to Eastern Europeans) as compared with a total of 175,000 for the same period the previous year—an increase of 37,000 (21%); and (B) 122,000 items were distributed in the period 1 January–30 June 1978 as compared with 90,000 in the 1 July–31 December 1977 period—an increase of 32,000 (35%). [*1 line not declassified*]

3. Further to paragraphs 3–5 of Reference A, in the spring of 1978 we provided the first subsidy [*dollar amount not declassified*] to a prominent Russian-language publishing house [*place not declassified*]. With these funds it was possible for them both to keep in business and to plan the publication of approximately 12 titles of philosophical works much in demand in the Soviet Union. [*dollar amount not declassified*]

4. Increased funding has allowed an increase in publication of Russian-language books to provide a wider choice of materials available for infiltration into the Soviet Union. Two major works have now appeared, and four additional titles are in the process of being published. Three or four more titles will appear by the end of the year, including the initial volume of what is to be a major historical series. At the same time, in order to exploit more fully increased political activism in Poland, eight additional titles are in various stages of publication in the Polish language. Five volumes have already appeared and have been distributed. The demand for written materials in Poland is

³ Turner's March 13 memorandum dealt with the funding for the book publishing program and how the allotted funds would be used. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 3/78) Brzezinski's March 18 memorandum acknowledges receipt of Turner's memorandum. (Ibid.)

high, [2 lines not declassified] Russian and Polish editions of works of current importance in Western thought are now being given active consideration. [dollar amount not declassified]

5. Although tighter controls exist in Czechoslovakia than in Poland (especially during the tenth anniversary of the invasion) many manuscripts have been smuggled out of Czechoslovakia. The additional funds were used to publish more of these materials in a Czech-language journal and to publish an additional issue of this journal. Part of the funds were also used in an effort to increase internal distribution. [dollar amount not declassified]

6. [4 lines not declassified] We have received repeated verification [1 line not declassified] that our literature is distributed widely in both East Europe and the USSR.

7. The preparation of this report was delayed because of the need to collate information [2 lines not declassified] All portions of this document are SECRET.

Stansfield Turner⁴

⁴Turner signed "Stan Turner" above his typed signature.

163. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, December 19, 1978, 2:59–3:12 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Anatoliy Dobrynin
Zbigniew Brzezinski

Brzezinski: I stepped out of the meeting because I was told you would be leaving in one half hour.

Dobrynin: Right. I am leaving for Moscow. I have an oral message from President to President. I will read it and then send it to you.

¹Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, China: Normalization with PRC: Events—Aggregate Documentation: 8–12/78. Top Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner, "Good enough. J."

Text of message: I received your message of December 15 [14]² in which you informed of the forthcoming establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States of America and the People's Republic of China.

In this connection, I want to say the following: The establishment of normal relations between two sovereign states is of course a natural thing. The Soviet Union has always been and continues to be precisely for such relations between countries. Another question is on what basis the normalization is taking place. What aims are being set by the sides. This is also a natural question, especially in view of the perfectly clear direction of the present course of China.

The United States side and you personally, Mr. President, gave more than once assurances to the effect that the development of relations of the U.S. with China will not be directed against the Soviet Union. In your message you reaffirm that the decision to establish diplomatic relations with China has no other purpose but to promote the course of world peace. We take note of this although we cannot disregard the fact that the joint U.S.-Chinese communique allows expressions whose tendency with regard to the Soviet Union, taking into account the usual lexicon of the Chinese leaders, is beyond doubt.

Evidently the Soviet Union will follow most closely what will be the practical results of the development of U.S.-Chinese relations, and it will draw appropriate conclusions for its policy.

As for the hope you expressed for achieving at the forthcoming meeting of Gromyko and Secretary Vance an important progress in completing the preparation of the Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement, we would also like to share this hope. (End of oral message)

Brzezinski: Now, you will send this to me?

Dobrynin: Within one hour.

Brzezinski: Let me make just one factual comment. The wording you refer to in the communique originates in the Shanghai Communique,³ for your information.

Dobrynin: Yes, I remember.

Brzezinski: It might be useful to tell your colleagues that. It is not new language, it is taken verbatim from the Shanghai Communique.

Dobrynin: Yes. Also we are going to receive those senators, Senator Baker⁴ and some colleagues of his.

Brzezinski: I think it will be mutually useful.

² See Document 161.

³ See footnote 4, Document 150.

⁴ Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R-Tennessee).

Dobrynin: Brezhnev intends to receive them.

Brzezinski: Very good. Have a good trip.

164. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Geneva, December 21, 1978, 2251Z

Secto 15005. Department pass SecDef for Secretary Brown. Department for Christopher. Subject: Meetings With Gromyko Dec. 21.²

1. At morning plenary session I briefly reviewed major outstanding issues and Gromyko made similar statement in which he inter alia:

(A) proposed cruise missile definition should apply not only to nuclear and conventionally armed cruise missiles, but also to unarmed cruise missiles;

(B) suggested ban on cruise missiles with multiple warheads could be treaty article or agreed statement;

(C) confirmed Soviet willingness to accept U.S. ICBM fractionation proposals conditional on cruise missile resolution;

(D) indicated willingness to amend Soviet telemetry proposal to provide that encryption permissible provided repeat provided it does not deliberately hinder or impede verification of compliance with provisions of agreement;

(E) renewed issue of Minuteman II/III (including shelters).

2. At three hour afternoon restricted meeting we discussed telemetry, Minuteman II/III and shelters, cruise missile definition (including unarmed cruise missiles) and multiple warhead cruise missiles.

(A) In course of lengthy discussion Gromyko made concrete proposal "whereby sides would agree on principle" as described this

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, SALT—(11/78–4/79). Secret; Cherokee; Flash; Nodis. Sent flash to the White House. Vance was in Geneva, December 21–23, to meet with Gromyko regarding SALT negotiations. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² The full memorandum of Vance and Gromyko's December 21 conversation is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko/Vance Meeting, December, 1978.

morning and have thorough consultation between delegation experts on examples of telemetry encryption, which would constitute deliberate concealment measures. I rejected proposal for discussion of examples, and Gromyko accepted my rejection. He asked if we could not agree on the principle. I told him I would defer answer until tomorrow.

(B) On Minuteman distinguishability and shelters, Gromyko said he would put issue aside if we were to remove shelters. However, for the record, he reserved right to return to issue if problem of distinguishability still existed after shelter removal and described his earlier position as a “warning.” He made clear that Soviets could not distinguish between Minuteman II/III while shelters are in place. I reaffirmed that we are prepared to remove shelters.

(C) I told Gromyko that we would be willing to accept Soviet definition of cruise missiles provided that it was clear that it related only to long-range ALCMs in treaty after expiration of protocol. I spelled out in detail difference between ALCMs on the one hand and SLCMs and GLCMs on the other and emphasized that SLCM and GLCM limitations would expire with the protocol unless otherwise agreed. Gromyko said he would reflect on issue and return to it tomorrow.

(D) On unarmed cruise missiles Gromyko argued that armed/unarmed distinction was no more verifiable than conventional/nuclear distinction, and I made clear that we differed on this issue.

(E) He confirmed that the Soviet proposal to ban cruise missiles with multiple warheads for treaty applied only to those that are independently targetable.

(F) We discussed numbers of long-range ALCMs on heavy bombers and narrowed figure to between 25 and 30. We will return to this tomorrow.

3. Next meeting in restricted session at 10:00 am December 22.

Vance

165. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Geneva, December 22, 1978, 1605Z

Secto 15012. Department for Christopher. Department pass DOD for Sec. Brown. Subject: First Vance/Gromyko Session 12/22/78.²

1. In two-hour meeting this morning we made continued progress on several issues, referring a few points to heads of SALT delegations to work out possible resolutions and report back to Gromyko and me this afternoon.

2. On cruise missile definition, Gromyko reaffirmed that GL/SLCMs were limited only in the protocol, and the obligations of the protocol would expire with it, so that thereafter there would be only ALCM limits to which the definition could apply. Earle and Karpov are to try to work out language. Our objective is to insure that the treaty definition is cast in terms relating specifically to ALCMs, to forestall the argument that a generic definition should apply automatically to possible future limits on GL/SLCMs.

3. Gromyko raised the issue of how to “formalize” the understanding concerning the de facto limit on number of cruise missiles per bomber. I said we preferred to do this outside the formal document. Gromyko asked if the US might send an official letter and I said that we would consider this and assume the Soviets would give us a similar letter. We agreed to return to this subject.

4. On unarmed cruise missiles (unarmed RPVs), Soviet concern appears to be to insure that unarmed versions of cruise missiles that are normally armed should be covered (e.g., a recce version of Tomahawk). Soviets said they do not propose to treat all unarmed pilotless aircraft as cruise missiles. Karpov and Earle are to try to work out a type rule to settle this issue.

5. On telemetry encryption, I stated that I understood Gromyko to have said yesterday that the sides could arrive at a jointly-agreed principle banning denial of telemetry that impedes verification. I then reiterated US language as embodying this agreed principle. Gromyko emphasized that their “provided” language in their revised common

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, SALT—(11/78–4/79). Secret; Cherokee; Flash; Nodis. Sent flash to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² The full memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko/Vance Meeting, December, 1978.

understanding entailed their assuming an obligation, adding that disputes about compliance with that obligation could be considered by SCC. He has not yet expressly acknowledged that telemetry denial could impede, or otherwise directly withdrawing their assertion that telemetry is irrelevant to verification. I will seek such an acknowledgment. On language, Earle will hear out Karpov's views. Any revised language will be ad ref to me for my decision on whether to recommend to President. I made clear any change in our language will require presidential approval.

6. On protocol, I stressed that it is necessary to have a fixed date of expiration. Gromyko reiterated their view, but agreed to think further and discuss it again with me this afternoon.

7. On MW/CM, I stressed that ban would apply only to ALCMs. Gromyko argued that his earlier statement about the expiration of protocol obligations addressed this issue. Soviet language (in Article IX of JDT) however is a universal ban. Karpov-Earle meeting is also to consider this issue.

8. Before afternoon meeting with Gromyko, I will have Earle's report on Earle-Karpov meeting, all discussions at which are ad referendum.

Vance

166. Telegram From Secretary of State Vance to the Department of State¹

Geneva, December 22, 1978, 2348Z

Secto 15013. Department for Christopher. Department pass DOD for Sec. Brown. Subject: Second Vance-Gromyko Meeting, Dec. 22, 1978.²

1. This message will summarize my meeting this afternoon and offer my recommendations:

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, SALT—(11/78–4/79). Secret; Cherokee; Flash; Nodis. Sent flash to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² The full memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 8, Gromyko/Vance Meeting, December, 1978.

2. On cruise missile definition, Soviets agreed to separate definitions in treaty and protocol. Treaty definition would cover only those air-launched CMs limited by treaty; protocol definition would cover GL/SLCMs and would expire with protocol. Gromyko several times underscored that everything in the protocol expires at the end of the protocol. He said this three times. Language is to be worked out by delegations.

3. On multiple warhead cruise missiles, Gromyko recognized that “since the circumstances had changed since the time when they proposed a universal definition,” it would be appropriate to deal with multiple warhead cruise missiles only for the protocol period. However, (perhaps since the Politburo had approved the instructions on this point) he would have to seek approval from Moscow for any change in position. My assessment is that they will agree to include the ban on multiple independently-targetable warhead cruise missiles in the protocol only, and I would recommend acceptance of such a provision in the protocol.

4. On the definition of new types, Gromyko raised a new point, acknowledging as he did so that it was “not on the agenda, but very important.” The new point was a proposal that the definition of new types should ban increases of five percent in the limited categories, but permit decreases of up to twenty percent. (The Soviet position recently tabled permits only five percent increases, but unlimited decreases.) Presumably this is intended to accommodate some Soviet program. In this connection, I observed that the delegations should be given instructions to resolve remaining issues forthwith.

5. On telemetry encryption, I began by reaffirming our view that access to information transmitted telemetrically is relevant to verification. Gromyko did not disagree; nor did he respond affirmatively. I think it significant that for the first time in the course of our discussions of this issue, he, by silence, did not dissent from my assertion of the relevance of telemetry to verification. Following that, he offered to recommend to Moscow new language to deal with the issue, which conformed to the “non-proposal” Ambassador Earle had given the Soviet side a few hours earlier, with the addition of three words, provided I would provide the language he proposed to Washington for consideration. The language, with his insertions, follows:

“The sides agree that the negotiating record reflects the common understanding that each party is free to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except that, in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 3 of Article XV, neither party shall engage in deliberate denial of telemetric information, such as through the use of telemetry encryption, whenever such denial impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of

the treaty.” (The three added Soviet words are “including its encryption.”)

6. Finally, on the issue of unarmed, pilotless aircraft (PRVs), I noted that we had proposed a type rule that appears to meet what we understood to be our mutual concerns. I indicated that we hope for a prompt, affirmative answer, adding that I thought we should be able to settle this tomorrow. I expect Gromyko will be able to settle on the basis of a type rule, and I suspect that the only reason he could not agree on the spot is the need for Politburo approval of a change in a Politburo-approved position.

7. In private conversation, he confirmed an annual production rate of 30 for Backfire, and said he would recommend that Brezhnev confirm the same number, expressing his view that it was not certain that this could be done.

8. There was no further discussion of the ALCM average number or agreement to limit the number of ALCMs deployed on existing bombers (B-52, Bear, Bison) to 20.

9. My recommendations on these issues are as follows:

A. Telemetry encryption: Earle “non-paper” language preserves all essential elements of US position. Only Soviet addition is “including its encryption.” Gromyko commented that additional words are already “buried” in “methods” and are countered by Soviet acceptance of “such as” and “denial.” Recommend that I be authorized to accept our revised formulation with non-substantive Soviet addition. This should be taken in context of Gromyko’s not disputing my assertion of relevance of telemetry to verification.

B. Cruise missile definition: Also recommend that Earle be authorized to pursue separate definitions applicable to all cruise missiles in protocol and ALCMs only in treaty. In this context, I would plan to state that the inclusion of conventionally-armed cruise missiles in the definition of ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles does not constitute a precedent for the scope of any limits on ground- and sea-launched cruise missiles that might be agreed in the future.

C. RPVs: Authorize Earle to pursue solutions to unarmed RPV/cruise missile problem on basis of type rule.

D. New types definition: Authorize Earle to use 20 percent down-side rule as leverage for Soviet agreement to most important parts of US new types definition. Washington should forthwith define priorities in this area, including any areas in which 20 percent reduction not acceptable.

10. I intend to table language along the following lines for an exchange of letters on the number of cruise missiles on existing heavy bombers:

“The US side informs the Soviet side that during the term of the treaty the maximum number of cruise missiles capable of a range in excess of 600 km for which the United States of America will equip any existing heavy bomber for one operational mission is 20.”

This language parallels Backfire letter. The Soviets would provide an identical letter, dealing with Bison and Bear.

Vance

167. Message From Secretary of State Vance to President Carter¹

December 24, 1978, 1635Z

WH81701. The following was just received from Secretary Vance.
Subject: December 23 Morning Meeting With Gromyko.

1. In three hour meeting, mostly one-on-one without interpreters, the atmosphere was soured compared to yesterday, and we made little progress. Gromyko, however, did not contradict my statement that the 29 July practice would impede verification even under their language.

2. On telemetry encryption, in private session, I read relevant paragraph of instruction. Gromyko did not contradict. He reaffirmed his acceptance of the modified language, and said he would recommend its acceptance to the Politburo.

3. On RPVs, Gromyko took a wholly new and more difficult approach. He maintained that all unarmed cruise missiles be counted. But suggested that theirs could be an exemption for a specified number. He gave great prominence to our failure to respond to a somewhat casual request yesterday for the numbers of cruise missiles used for what they described as “peaceful purposes”. In side conversations, they made clear they were concerned about ground and sea, as well as air launched, ARPVs.

4. On protocol, he was fixed on three years from entry into force.

5. On cruise missile definition, he agreed with my statement that we had agreed on separate definition. I did not use the precedent state-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 38, SALT—(11/78–4/79). Secret; Cherokee; Nodis. Sent from the White House Situation Room. The telegram is a retransmittal of Secto 15029 from Moscow, December 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1453) Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner, “They seem not to want an agreement at this time. J.” No other record of Vance’s December 23 meeting with Gromyko was found.

ment, judging that it should not be used in the difficult atmosphere that had developed.

6. I handed over draft statement on not deploying more than, 20 ALCMs on existing B–52 bombers. Soviets raised issue of omission of B–1 from list. Gromyko suggested that he believed that US would agree not to deploy more than 20 ALCMs on any aircraft. I said that was clearly wrong, that the only aircraft at issue were existing ones, and that the idea of a maximum of 20 on all aircraft, including those built subsequently was inconsistent with the concept of averaging.

7. Gromyko agreed to 10 RVs being permitted on ASBMs.

Vance

168. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 27, 1978

SUBJECT

Oral Message from Brezhnev

The enclosed oral message from Brezhnev is designed to induce you to influence the Western Europeans not to sell any arms to the Chinese (the translation is by the Soviet Embassy;² am asking Cy for an official US translation of the Russian text). In addition to sending a copy to Cy, should I send a copy to Harold?

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, USSR (Brezhnev Drafts/Letters), 4/77–9/80. Secret; Eyes Only. Carter wrote in the memorandum's upper right-hand corner, "Pers[onal] File. J." Carter, in his memoirs, quoted his diary entry written after receiving this letter from Brezhnev: "On the 27th I got a very discouraging letter from Brezhnev, showing that they [the Soviets] are almost paranoid about the People's Republic of China and demanding that I prevent our Western allies from selling any defensive weapons to the PRC. We'll delay for a few days before giving him an answer. . . . Had an excellent meeting with Cy Vance. He spent the night with us at Camp David, and I went over a broad gamut of foreign affairs questions with him. He and I agree that the most significant responsibility we have is to balance our new friendship with the PRC and our continued improvement of relations with the Soviet Union. . . . As we moved toward a most-favored-nation relationship with the PRC, we must face the need to do the same thing with the Soviet Union." Ellipses in the original. (*Keeping Faith*, p. 201)

² Brzezinski placed an asterisk here and wrote "it's poor" at the bottom of the page.

My initial reactions are as follows:

1) If we accommodate the Soviets, both we and NATO will have bowed—for the first time—to Soviet pressure.

2) We would be engaging in a blockade of China to the benefit of the Soviet Union, and this would destroy the chances of any collaborative US-Chinese relationship.

3) It is noteworthy that the Soviet Union *armed* China when China was hostile to the US, and it has ignored all your expressions of concern regarding Cuban and Soviet arms in Africa as well as elsewhere.

4) The Soviet Union also rejected any linkage between its conduct in Africa and SALT, but it is hinting at linkage between our relations with China and SALT.

5) In the light of the above, I recommend that you ask Cy, Harold, and me to draft an ambiguous response, suggesting that this matter, as well as others, is something that can be discussed at the Summit, in the context of *reciprocal* efforts to improve US-Soviet relations, and without prejudice to the right of every state to acquire purely *defensive* weaponry.

Attachment

Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter³

December 27, 1978

Dear Mr. President,

Availing myself of our established practice of confidential exchange of views on urgent problems of international life and bilateral relations, I would like to touch upon one important question related to China. We have already had an opportunity to express our viewpoint concerning the forthcoming establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and the PRC. This time I shall speak of a different thing, namely, of the plans of some Western states to supply China with weapons, military equipment and technology which is intended for military purposes or can be used for those purposes.

This question is not a new one. Recently it has been a subject of discussion in various NATO bodies, at other forums of Western countries

³ Secret; Eyes Only. Printed from an unofficial translation.

and it may be dwelt upon at your forthcoming meetings with the leaders of some Western states. On our part, we have already drawn the attention of a number of states allied to the US to the acuteness of the question of arming China. So far they are slow about giving official replies which is evidently not coincidental. Meanwhile the time runs and the things move in the direction of concluding concrete deals for deliveries of weapons to China, including the transfer of sensitive technology.

It should be obviously clear to you that intentions of the US allies to sell weapons and military equipment to China cannot but make us consider possibilities of appropriate reaction on our part. Indeed, the question here is of arming a country with the biggest ground forces, a country whose leaders proclaim for all to hear the inevitability of a new world war and are driving in practice at unleashing such a war.

It would seem that the US, which along with the USSR share special responsibility for the maintenance on international peace and security, should neither bypass facts and trends of such kind. It is the more true that international relations are now, so to say, at a crossing of roads leading to peace, stability and cooperation and roads leading to confrontation and increased threat of a war pernicious in its consequences. So, the promoting of the armament of China in whatever form and under whatever pretext as a cover, predetermines objectively the development of international situation in a direction dangerous for the cause of universal peace.

To all appearances, some people yield to the temptation “to play up” to such orientation of Peking’s foreign policy course which is hostile to neighboring countries and increases the threat to international security. I will say straight, this is a game dangerous for all. It is built on a very shaky ground—on momentary political considerations. Not too distant lessons of history, both in Europe and in the Pacific, do not allow to forget that such plans bring results which in no way conform to the calculations of those who embark on the road of arming a big country which in the end decides for itself in what direction to turn its military might.

Sometimes one hears that the sales of weapons and transfer of technology to China promise some commercial, although rather problematic so far, advantages. I must say with all conviction that the considerations of a responsible policy, concern for broad interests of the world not only of today but also of tomorrow outweigh many times references to such commercial considerations.

Of course, we take note of the statement by the US side that the United States will not sell weapons to China and does not intend to encourage other countries to do so.

But even in the light of these statements, which we would like to take seriously, we have a number of questions. Indeed, a number of US allies are preparing—and this is an open secret—deals for deliveries of arms and transfer of technology to Peking. For us it is not so important who exactly signs this or that contract. Much more important is another thing: a state pursuing a policy hostile to the interests of peace gets modern weapons, made under US licenses for that matter, which include many components and systems of American manufacture, and such modern technology that can be used for the up-building of military strategic potential. Therefore, to call things by their own names, one has to conclude that the US is by no means standing away from promoting the cause of arming China.

One also can hardly avoid the impression that in this question there exists a certain coordination of efforts of the NATO countries. And it is well known that the US has not the least role to play in the NATO and its voice is closely heeded by the other partners.

In view of the aforesaid you, Mr. President, may well understand that a question arises before the Soviet Union, how should we react to the policy of arming China with the help of the US and other Western countries.

The armament of the neighboring country pursuing openly hostile course against us places us in a position where the necessity arises to undertake what we shall consider required so that plans and actions directed against us do not take even more dangerous turn, and to take due care of our defense with ensuing consequences. Our duty before our people demands it.

You evidently realize that all this could not but affect further steps in the area of limiting the arms race and of disarmament with regard to which both the Soviet Union and the United States as well as a number of other countries are exerting efforts, known to you, with the obvious advance to agreement. And indeed, a certain level of trust is needed for the solution of these problems which would make it possible to relieve the burden of armaments weighing on the peoples. There can hardly remain any doubts that contributing to the armament of China does not strengthen but, on the contrary, erodes trust in our relations which is being built with such difficulty.

In view of the all said you may well understand that in the conditions where concrete steps are being taken for levelling off the Soviet-US relations, for giving them a new positive impetus the present position of the United States with respect to deliveries of weapons and transfer of technology to China causes quite definite alertness on our part and desire to see this position more circumspect and weighed.

I hope that you, Mr. President, will appreciate my frankness and will take most seriously the questions raised by me both in determining

further course of your country and in your contacts with the leaders of countries allied to you.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

January–June 1979

169. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, January 17, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I have read attentively your letter of December 27 concerning the sale of weapons and military hardware to the People's Republic of China.² I want to assure you that in considering such matters, the United States adopts a responsible approach, taking into account the broadest interests of enhancing stability and world peace.

As you mention in your letter, it has been and remains our policy not to provide arms to the People's Republic of China, nor do we encourage others to do so. At the same time, every nation has the right to acquire defensive arms, and the United States does not have the authority to prevent other sovereign nations from selling such defensive arms to China.

When the issue is not weapons *per se*, but technology with possible military applications, obviously a judgment must be made in each transaction about the likelihood and magnitude of possible diversion of such technology to military purposes. We intend to scrutinize all sales in this category from a standpoint of maximum restraint.

In this question, we anticipate that some other nations may hold a different view about the level of technology that should be made available to the People's Republic of China. While we will express our viewpoint in such cases, we believe the ultimate responsibility for decisions on such sales to China rests with the government of each sovereign country.

Normalization of United States relations with the People's Republic of China is a realistic step toward improving the international situation and reducing the risk of conflict. It is not a matter of favoring one country over another, nor of seeking to use one country against another. Rather, we see benefit in drawing China into responsible participation in the international community. We believe our long-term in-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 18, U.S.S.R.—Carter/Brezhnev Correspondence: (1/79–6/79). No classification marking. Sent under a January 17 covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance, via the Alpha Channel. According to Brzezinski's memorandum, the letter was to be delivered by Toon to Gromyko "and/or other appropriate senior Soviet official." (Ibid.)

² See the attachment to Document 168.

terests are best served by an approach that respects the basic interests of all countries, and we are therefore determined to act in such a way that no country need fear that its interests are jeopardized. This will be our attitude towards arms sales or any other proposals that may arise in the course of future relations with China.

I welcome this opportunity to exchange views on a matter which we understand is important to you, and I am confident that you will appreciate the responsibility and seriousness of our approach to the matters you raised.

I would not wish to close without expressing again my earnest hope that we can move without further delay toward the successful conclusion of our SALT negotiations and an early meeting. I firmly believe that when we are able to discuss these and other important matters face-to-face with complete cordiality and frankness, it will contribute constructively to a further desirable improvement in relations between our two countries.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

170. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, January 30, 1979

THE SOVIET DISSIDENT SCENE SINCE MID-1978

The Soviet regime's behavior toward dissidents since the highly publicized trials last July² has been a mixture of selective repression and guarded tolerance. The regime apparently continues to view the various dissident groups as a serious political problem. But rather than incurring the costs of draconian policies to root out all dissenters, the regime has adopted a strategy to contain the dissent. The latter entails on the one hand harassment and at times severe punishment of leading activists and on the other hand enhanced emigration of Soviet Jews and a cautious flexibility toward other religious and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Global Issues, Bloomfield Subject File, Box 17, Human Rights: USSR: 7/77–5/79. Confidential. Prepared in the CIA's National Foreign Assessment Center.

² Reference is to the trials of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, July 1978.

ethnic minorities. The regime's approach has been successful, but only up to a point. While dissident groups remain generally isolated from one another, they have maintained contact with sympathizers in the West, and the spectrum of dissent is somewhat broader than it was six months ago. [handling restriction not declassified]

Morale among most dissident activists and religious groups dropped in the wake of the trials last July. The branches of the Helsinki Monitoring Group have been particularly affected. Two of the dissidents sentenced in July, Anatoliy Shcharanskiy and Aleksandr Ginzburg, were members of the Moscow branch. That group's specialist on governmental psychiatric abuses, Aleksandr Podrabinek, was sentenced to five years of domestic exile in August. At a press conference in September, the Moscow branch's spokesmen told of threats received by persons friendly to the group. They reaffirmed their intention to remain active even though only six of the group's active members remained free at that time. Branches of the organization in Armenia and Georgia fared no better: Robert Nazaryan, a member of the Armenian branch, was sentenced to seven years total confinement and exile for anti-Soviet activities, and Avandil Imnadze, an associate of a member of the Georgian branch, received nine years for distributing anti-Soviet literature. Last November various members of the Helsinki Monitoring Group circulated a protest against a new Soviet law, which makes it relatively simple for the regime to deny citizenship in dissident cases; but in general the Group has been relatively inactive. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

Government treatment of Soviet Jews is the one clear illustration of the regime's willingness to grant limited concessions to dissidents. The total number of Jews permitted to emigrate in 1978 exceeded 30,000 and may average 5,000 a month for at least the first part of 1979. The backlog of Jews in Odessa applying for exit permits reportedly caused the government to open a large, new office to handle it. In explaining the higher emigration figures, Soviet Jews themselves point to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, to the larger number of applicants, and, increasingly of late, to a desire by the regime to get rid of "malcontents" before the 1980 Olympics. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

The status of the Jewish "refuseniks" (those previously refused exit permits) may also be improving. According to Refusenik sources in Moscow and Kiev, some persons formerly denied emigration because they once held security clearances will now be permitted to leave. In addition, refusenik scientists held an international scientific conference in December. Authorities seized some of the conference documents from the residence of one of the organizers and denied visas to five US scientists who wanted to attend the event. The conference was held,

however, with three US scientists present. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The regime's attitude toward various Protestant groups appears to be somewhat ambiguous. The All-Union Council of Evangelical Christian Baptists was given permission to import 25,000 Russian Bibles; the last time a Soviet government permitted a significant influx of Bibles was in 1947 when 10,000 copies were imported. On the other hand, Soviet media continue to inveigh against "Bible smugglers", terming them "paid agents of Western intelligence." [*handling restriction not declassified*]

There are several reports of harassment and persecution of unregistered Pentecostal congregations in Belorussia and the Ukraine. A religious activist from a town near Moscow received a year in prison for organizing a seminar on the "defense of rights of believers in the USSR." In the Kirgiz SSR two citizens were each sentenced to three years in a labor camp for conducting a children's Sunday school. An 84-year old member of the Seventh Day Adventists was slated to go on trial this month in Tashkent for illegal religious activity—he wrote an eight volume treatise condemning the "dictatorship of state atheism."

The spectrum of dissent seems to be broadening once again. In October, an independent "trade union" surfaced in Moscow. Calling itself the Free Inter-Professional Union of Workers, the group focuses on genuine worker grievances. Reports indicate that the organization lacks internal cohesion and is plagued by diverse interests. On those rare occasions in the past when dissidents have tried to organize Soviet workers Moscow has reacted quickly and sternly. Several members of this group already have been arrested and one of its leaders has been confined to a state psychiatric hospital, but it has not yet been disbanded. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

On another front, a new journal called *Metropol* appeared this month. The avowed intention of its publishers is "literary excellence" rather than political debate. The first issue, however contained articles critical of Soviet literary restrictions. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Other forms of protest simmer along. Last August Crimean Tartars sent two petitions to Brezhnev requesting permission to return from Central Asia to their ancestral homeland. The government, as usual, made no direct response; one report claims authorities in the Crimea have bulldozed the houses of illegal returnees and deliberately stirred up local antipathy toward the Tartars. At Leningrad University, the "Left Opposition" was broken up in October—for the second time. A student leader was charged with anti-Soviet agitation and two other members of the group were charged with "hooliganism." Students at other Soviet institutions for the moment are quiescent. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

In general, the Brezhnev regime is ready to punish individual dissidents harshly on occasion, and seeks in various ways to divide and demoralize all of them. But the leadership avoids recourse to draconian measures, out of concern for both its international image and its own perception of what is required to maintain the stability and cohesion of the Soviet bureaucracy. Perhaps the best illustration in recent weeks of the regime's preferred method of handling dissidents was a reported directive from Moscow Party chief Grishin³ cautioning officials against firing Jewish "Refuseniks" lest they spread their "contagion" to their new place of employment. Under such circumstances—i.e. because the reasons for political protest continue and because the regime avoids using the harshest conceivable measures to deal with the protests—the dissidents are encouraged to persist in their activities. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

³ Victor V. Grishin.

171. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Vance in Mexico and the Embassies in Afghanistan and the Soviet Union¹

Washington, February 15, 1979, 0306Z

Tosec 10016/38921. Subject: (S) Death of Ambassador Dubs: Acting Secretary's Meeting With Dobrynin. Ref: Kabul 1098.²

1. (S-entire text)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 2/14–28/79. Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Shinn; cleared by Stanislaus R.P. Valerga (S/S–O); approved by Christopher. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–0105) Vance was in Mexico with Carter on a state visit, February 14–16.

² Telegram 1098 from Kabul, February 14, outlines the kidnapping and assassination of Adolph Dubs, American Ambassador to Afghanistan, who was killed on February 14 en route from his residence to the chancery. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790072–0735)

2. Acting Secretary³ called in Dobrynin evening of February 14 and, noting that he had been in touch with the Secretary, made the following points:

A. I want to express to you in the strongest possible terms our shock over the role played by Soviet advisers to the Kabul police in the events which led to the assassination of our Ambassador to Afghanistan.

B. We have reports from highly reliable eyewitnesses that Soviet advisers were intimately involved in the carrying out of the ill-advised assault which resulted in Ambassador Dubs' death. For example, a U.S. Embassy officer on the scene saw a Soviet adviser helping arm an Afghan policeman with full knowledge that the assault was to follow momentarily, and despite repeated pleas from U.S. Embassy representatives that no such assault be launched. We also have a highly reliable report that a Soviet adviser was present in the room in the Afghan Interior Ministry in which the assault was planned.

C. I am not accusing the Soviet advisers of responsibility for Ambassador Dubs' death. I am charging them with failure to heed repeated requests by our personnel that the assault not be undertaken.

D. The refusal of consultation by the Soviet advisers on the spot is impossible to justify, given the fact that the life of the American Ambassador was in jeopardy.

E. I ask you to furnish us with a full report of the actions taken by the Soviet advisers involved in this tragedy. We have already protested to the Afghan authorities.⁴

F. I wish to stress to you that this incident may well cause serious damage to our relations. We are already receiving press queries about the role that the Soviet advisers to the Afghan police may have played in the incident. I strongly advise you to recommend that your authorities respond immediately and fully to the presentation I have made.

3. On a personal basis the Acting Secretary noted that he had had a number of calls during the day from Capitol Hill and that the depth of concern there was significant. He added that when the fact of Soviet participation came out publicly it could have a devastating effect.

4. Dobrynin asked for clarification on several points, for which the Acting Secretary read passages directly from reftel. He assured Dobrynin that the eyewitnesses involved were US Embassy officials.

³ Christopher.

⁴ See telegram 1217 from Kabul, February 19, in which Bruce Amstutz, U.S. Chargé to Afghanistan, reported on his meeting with Foreign Minister Hafizullah Amin; and telegram 1274 from Kabul, February 20, in which Amstutz reported on Afghani efforts to minimize the role of Soviet advisers in Dubs's death. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790077–1181 and D790079–0098)

When Dobrynin asked for names of the Soviet security advisers the Acting Secretary mentioned Sergey Bakhturin.

5. Dobrynin said he had no details on the matter, only what he had heard on the radio. He promised to report the demarche immediately to Moscow. He expressed his deep condolences not only as a fellow ambassador but as someone who had known Ambassador Dubs personally, especially when he was office director for Soviet Affairs and Charge in Moscow. He said he was sure the Ministry echoed these sentiments. The Acting Secretary replied that this made the matter all the more perplexing to us.

6. For Moscow: You should not make any further representations to the Soviets on this matter for now. We will be advising you further.

Christopher

172. Message From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, February 17, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

We have learned that forces of the People's Republic of China today crossed into North Vietnam.

The United States strongly supports the principle of non-use of force to settle international disputes. The Chinese action today, together with the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea, represents a serious breach of that principle. Accordingly, we have informed the Government of the People's Republic of China that we object to the military steps they have taken and urge the immediate withdrawal of their forces from Vietnam, the same position we have taken regarding the Vietnam forces in Kampuchea.

The United States seeks a stable and peaceful structure of independent states in Asia. The Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea in recent months severely weakened that structure and led directly to the

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, MDS/Dobrynin, 1/31/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent under a covering memorandum from Brzezinski to Vance. Message was sent via Molink (Moscow–Washington direct communications link). Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the message, "OK to send out. ZB."

existing dangerous situation. We informed your government on January 20th and 26th of our deep concern over developments in Indochina,² and specifically of the possible consequences of the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea. It is clear, therefore, that Vietnam must share responsibility with China for the current situation.

Present circumstances require wisdom and restraint by our governments to prevent any widening of this conflict and to restore peace in Indochina. To achieve this most important and urgent goal, it is essential that all foreign forces withdraw from both Kampuchea and Vietnam.

In the spirit of dedication to preserving peace, as exemplified in our mutual effort to limit strategic arms, I urge you to exercise restraint and cooperate in seeking a peaceful resolution to this problem. As the Secretary of State stated to you on January 26, it is most important that the USSR not take actions which would exacerbate the situation, such as deploying military or naval units to Vietnamese ports or bases (such as Cam Ranh Bay) or other military actions. Only if all parties exercise restraint can the dangers implicit in the present situation be averted and peace restored in that area. The United States is ready to cooperate in such an effort.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter³

² Telegram 15594 to Moscow, January 20, described the conversation between Vance and Dobrynin which focused on Indochina. The telegram is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 1/15–24/79. On January 26 Shulman met with Dobrynin to discuss Indochina. The memorandum of conversation for this meeting is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, MDS–Dobrynin 1/26/79.

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

173. Backchannel Message From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, February 18, 1979

WH90292. Hold for the President's return.

Memorandum for: The President

From: Zbigniew Brzezinski

Attached is the final translation of the message Brezhnev sent you this morning.

His Excellency

James E. Carter

President of the United States of America

Honorable Mr. President,

I feel it necessary to express the following with regard to your message of 17 February².

We note that, as you wrote, the U.S. opposes the military actions undertaken by China and is insisting on the withdrawal of its forces from Viet Nam and that you brought this position to the attention of the Chinese leadership. Of course, we react to these words positively.

But we must frankly state, that we cannot agree with the fact that you have not given the necessary qualification to the main point—namely, the fact of China's armed aggression against a sovereign state—the Socialist republic of Viet Nam. The events in Kampuchea to which you refer, are only a pretext for Peking. The Chinese aggression against Viet Nam and those events which took place in Kampuchea are completely different questions and there is no basis whatsoever to link them. Kampuchea is a turned page. Old Kampuchea is no more. There is a new Kampuchea with a government which expresses the will and aspirations of the people of that country. The Chinese invasion into Viet Nam is a direct manifestation, if we are to call things by their names, of the expansionistic, hegemonistic aspirations of Peking. We have repeatedly brought to the attention of the leadership of different countries, including the USA, the danger of closing ones' eyes to its (Peking's) true goals.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 47, China: Sino-Vietnamese Conflict—Heads of State Exchanges: 2/79. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Specat. Carter initialed the message. Sent from the White House Situation Room. President Carter traveled to Mexico, February 14–16. Shortly after his return, he went to Camp David, February 16–19.

² See Document 172.

In this regard, I would not be candid if I did not call your attention to the fact that China's aggression against Viet Nam was undertaken soon after Deng Xiao-Ping's visit to the USA, during which he made pronouncements openly inimical to the cause of peace, including direct threats to Viet Nam. And is this a simple coincidence?

We and others must, of course, draw from this the appropriate conclusions. Therefore, we do not understand why you are appealing to us to exercise restraint. Such an appeal must be directed only to the aggressor—that is, to China.

Opposition to aggression is the only way to prevent a further dangerous development of events. Therefore, if, as you say, the USA is in opposition to the actions which China has undertaken, then it would be logical for the U.S. Government to officially declare this, to publicly condemn the aggression and demand the immediate withdrawal of Chinese troops from Vietnam.

For our part, the Soviet Union cannot remain indifferent. Our position is laid out in the declaration of the Soviet Government, the text of which has been published, and is, I presume, at your disposal.

We should like to hope that the Government of the USA, and you personally, Mister President, will treat our concerns with all seriousness and objectivity.

Respectfully

L. Brezhnev

18 February 1979

Moscow, The Kremlin

174. Message From the Soviet Leadership¹

undated

On January 5, 1979, eavesdropping equipment, installed by the US special services, was found in the premises of the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco. Photographs of the removed electronic de-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, CV–Dobrynin, 2/19/79. No classification marking. In the upper right-hand corner, an unknown hand wrote, “AD to CV 2/19/79.”

vices may be produced at the wish of the Secretary of State. In this connection we consider it necessary to state the following.

In the recent years the US special services have sharply intensified their activities aimed at technical penetration into the Soviet offices in the United States. For these purposes eavesdropping means, developed on the basis of advanced achievements of science and technology, are being used.

In the past we already drew attention of the US side to the inadmissibility of such actions which are directed to damage the Soviet-US relations. However, as the facts show, no appropriate conclusions have been made from these communications of ours.

The Soviet side states its strong protest in connection with the above-mentioned subversive actions of the US special services against the Soviet offices in the United States and demands that effective measures be taken to stop such activities.

Being guided by broad interests of the Soviet-US relations and expecting that our position will be duly appreciated by the US side we do not intend at present to make public the above facts concerning the activities of the US special services. However, in case of failure to take measures to discontinue such activities the Soviet side reserves the right to revert to this subject.

175. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 24, 1979, 3 p.m.

SUBJECT

China and Vietnam

PARTICIPANTS

United States

Acting Secretary Christopher

Ambassador Shulman

Mr. Curtis Kamman (notetaker)

USSR

Ambassador Dobrynin

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, WMC/Dobrynin, 2/24/79. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Curtis Kamman (S/MS). The meeting took place in Christopher's office at the Department of State

Summary: The Acting Secretary called Dobrynin in to hand him an oral note on the situation in Indochina (text attached) which emphasized the importance of continued restraint in the area and pointed out the potential adverse effect on our relations of a protracted Soviet military presence in the area. Dobrynin recalled that this subject had been raised several times; he suggested that we were trying to tie the hands of the Soviet Union to act under its treaty with Hanoi. He could not exclude the possibility that if the Chinese continued to advance in Vietnam, the Soviet Union would have to respond to a Vietnamese request for assistance. He asserted that the Soviet Union had already displayed considerable restraint, and he urged us to press the Chinese harder.

The Acting Secretary sketched out his forthcoming trip to South Asia in response to Dobrynin's questions. Both he and Dobrynin expressed concern about the possibility that Pakistan might proceed with Bhutto's² execution.

Turning to the purpose of the meeting, the Acting Secretary handed Dobrynin an oral note (text attached) which Dobrynin read carefully for about five minutes.

The Acting Secretary said he would be meeting the Chinese Ambassador later in the afternoon. He also thought Dobrynin might appreciate a full text of the U.S. statement in the Security Council on Vietnam, a copy of which he handed Dobrynin. He pointed out that the statement reflected our approach of dealing with the situation in a balanced way.

Dobrynin asked what would be said to the Chinese Ambassador. The Acting Secretary said we would urge restraint and ask them to withdraw from Vietnam.

Dobrynin said he would report our views to Moscow; meanwhile, he would offer a preliminary reaction based on what he anticipated the reaction would be in Moscow.

He expressed surprise at U.S. persistence in making the statement in the last paragraph of the oral note—it seemed as though the U.S. were trying to tell the Soviet Union to refrain from doing things it was not in fact doing. The USSR was not attacking anyone. Vietnam had a sovereign right to decide how to deal with a threat on its own territory, and this could only be a bilateral matter between Vietnam and the USSR. The U.S. has continually pressed the Soviet Union “not to be there.” The USSR has shown no interest in “being there.” If the Chinese would withdraw, the problem would go away.

²Reference is to Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, former Pakistani Prime Minister and President.

Dobrynin reacted to the statement in the note about Soviet propaganda on American complicity in the Chinese decision to attack, a view he said was not just propaganda but reflected real questioning in Moscow about the U.S. attitude. He recalled Deng's statements about Chinese plans during his U.S. visit, and there had been no U.S. response to these statements. It was not only the Soviet Union that had doubts about this matter—many in the Washington diplomatic corps held the same opinion.

Dobrynin said he understood what we were saying about Cambodia, but this wasn't the issue now. The issue was an attack by a larger power on a small country that had suffered for over 30 years. Why would such a country as Vietnam have any reason to provoke China?

Dobrynin added that persistent U.S. warnings about possible Soviet involvement in Vietnam made him wonder about our motives. If the Chinese continued their advance, he would not completely exclude the possibility that the Soviets would have to respond to a Vietnamese request for assistance under their treaty. The Chinese currently had penetrated 20 miles into Vietnam, and there had been no stronger U.S. statement than mere expressions of concern.

Dobrynin welcomed the idea that the U.S. and USSR should consult, but he wondered if we were prepared to do this as two major powers. The Soviet Union was already displaying restraint.

The Acting Secretary responded by reiterating that our policy was even-handed. The origin of the problem went back thousands of years, but the immediate cause was that Vietnam had overrun Cambodia. This was the first step. We had brought the matter to the UN and had tried to prevent this outcome, but we were blocked in the Security Council. The second step was the Chinese attack on Vietnam. We had opposed this action from the very first moment. Moscow may doubt this, but Dobrynin should know that we urged the Chinese against this course.

Subsequently, we had brought both conflicts back into the UN. Some countries did not want to discuss both, but we felt this was essential.

With regard to the note, the Acting Secretary said we must be concerned about the future. The actions we were calling to the Soviets' attention would have a deep effect on our relations if they occurred.

Dobrynin said the Chinese attack had already had an effect on our relations—a rather bad one. He urged us to address the Chinese. The Acting Secretary said this was the purpose of his meeting with the Chinese Ambassador.

Dobrynin assured the Acting Secretary he would send our note to Moscow verbatim. He worried that we might give Moscow ideas if we

continued to warn against doing one thing or another. He said the Soviet leaders were responsible people, but the persistence of the theme contained in the note has a bad impact in the Soviet Union. The threat in Asia is China and the risk that it will advance further—and yet, the U.S. advises the USSR not to do anything. Dobrynin thought the Vietnamese would block the Chinese advance, but nevertheless Hanoi could ask the Soviet Union publicly to take action. So far Hanoi had not done so, but it must be remembered that the fighting is taking place on Vietnamese soil.

The Acting Secretary interjected that the first attack had occurred on Cambodian soil. The Vietnamese had overrun the entire country.

Dobrynin reiterated that Cambodia was not the problem. He felt the debate in the Security Council simply heightened emotions and would not necessarily lead to a solution.

The Acting Secretary said he had a higher regard for the UN than Dobrynin. Dobrynin recalled his own assignment in New York, and he advised the U.S. to be more impartial.

Dobrynin said the Soviet Union had shown restraint, had not allowed itself to be provoked into a major conflict. The Acting Secretary said we should not allow the situation to spiral into greater conflict. Dobrynin said the U.S. was asking the Soviet Union not to aid the victim.

Shulman urged Dobrynin to look closely at the language of our note. We were not saying the USSR should refrain from any assistance whatsoever. The point was to urge Moscow to consider the larger consequences of the form of its response to events in Indochina.

Dobrynin said he thought Moscow had understood what we were saying, since it had been raised three or four times. He argued that the U.S. has forces in the Philippines, a sovereign country, and the USSR raised no objections to this. Vietnam was also a sovereign country. Did the U.S. maintain that it had rights which the Soviet Union did not have?

Shulman reiterated that we were trying to anticipate future sources of strain on our relations, and that the Soviets should look closely at the language of our note.

Dobrynin nevertheless thought the U.S. was trying to constrain Soviet options to act under the treaty with Vietnam.

The Acting Secretary said we had a responsibility to avoid future hazards; this was the purpose of our approach.

Dobrynin asked rhetorically whether the U.S. preferred that the Soviet Union attack China, since it wished to take away the option of coming to Vietnam's assistance. The Acting Secretary said he wanted it to be clear for the record that the U.S. was not in any way encouraging the Soviet Union to attack China.

The conversation ended with Dobrynin recommending as he departed that we look at the statement by Senator Mathias³ about U.S. policy in Indochina and its relationship to U.S.-Soviet relations.

Attachment

Oral Message From the U.S. Leadership to the Soviet Leadership

undated

The United States continues to view the situation in Indochina with the utmost concern and, as emphasized in President Carter's message to Chairman Brezhnev,⁴ we believe that both of our countries must act responsibly and effectively in bringing an end to the conflict in Indochina and in dampening the high tensions there.

As Ambassador Young said at the UN and as we have said to you here and in Moscow, we cannot accept the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia.

While it has been our consistent desire to treat the dangerous situation in Indochina in such a way as to minimize the risk of heightened tensions, in all frankness this approach is made more difficult for us by the steady outpouring of official Soviet propaganda seeking to implicate the United States in some way in the Chinese decision to use military force against Vietnam.

As the Soviet Union knows, we strongly counseled China to exercise restraint and not to attack Vietnam. We are today making another appeal to China in this regard, and Secretary Blumenthal in Peking will personally and on behalf of the President urge that China withdraw its forces.

Continuation of the conflict in Indochina can only lead to the expansion of region-wide tensions and instabilities. Such concern is shared by other countries in the area, and has been reflected in public statements by the Governments of Japan, Australia, New Zealand, as well as the ASEAN Foreign Ministers in their statement of February 20, 1979.

We believe some constructive proposals for defusing this dangerous situation are emerging from the Security Council discussion

³ Charles Mathias (R-Maryland). Reference is presumably to Mathias' February 26 statement; the text is printed in *Congressional Record*, vol. 125.3 (February 19–March 6, 1979), p. 3161.

⁴ See Document 172.

now under way. There is a clear expression of international sentiment in favor of a peaceful resolution of the current conflicts in Indochina. There have been offers of good offices by Secretary General Waldheim and the ASEAN states. We believe that progress can be made through channels such as these and we would be pleased to consult with Soviet government as well as other concerned nations in support of such an effort.

Accordingly, and in full view of the seriousness of the situation as mentioned above, I wish to convey the following message to your government:

—As you know from the President's message to Chairman Brezhnev and from Mr. Vance's previous discussions with you, the United States would be seriously concerned if there were to be protracted use of Vietnamese facilities by Soviet naval vessels or Soviet aircraft, or if there were to be a presence of organized Soviet military units in Vietnam. This would oblige us to review our security relationship with all the affected nations in the area.

176. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, February 27, 1979, 5:02–5:28 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary Vance
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Dobrynin

The President: I want to talk to you briefly and seriously. There is no more important relationship than maintaining peace between our two countries. I am concerned about the state of that relationship. We have missed an opportunity when we first proposed annual consultative meetings. I understand President Brezhnev's preference to link the summit with SALT, but as a result we have not had a summit.

We have both negotiated in good faith on SALT, but two issues remain: definition of new missiles, and encryption. (Vance: The encryp-

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 5, USSR (General), 9/77–12/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House. Carter wrote, "ok J" in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

tion issue has been resolved.) I am anxious to resolve SALT, and we should try to wrap it up and pursue other issues at the summit. With regard to the summit, it is not appropriate for me to go to Moscow. If Brezhnev's health does not permit a visit here, we would consider a neutral place. I would plan four to five days for discussions. You should be aware that the longer SALT is delayed the greater the ratification problem.

Additionally, we have been legitimately concerned about some recent Soviet statements. We have no secret agreements with China; we have had no private information on Vietnam; we cautioned Deng when he made his public statements; and our actions at the United Nations are consistent with the foregoing. We have used our influence to get China to live up to its statement that the operation will be limited in time and scope. At the same time, we do not agree with the Soviet Union, nor do most nations in the world, regarding Vietnamese actions against Cambodia.²

Most recently I am especially concerned about the South Yemeni attack on North Yemen.³ South Yemen is a friend of the Soviet Union, and we believe the Soviet Union has encouraged this altercation. We hope the Soviet Union will use its influence to end the penetration of North Yemen's borders. (Vance: It is an opportunity for the Soviet Union and the U.S. to cooperate in ending a conflict.)

We would like Soviet help in Namibia and Rhodesia.⁴ We would like to have a constructive partnership on these issues and we would like to enhance our trade with you. (Reference to Governors committee) Rapid conclusion of SALT would help to resolve these concerns. We hope to achieve in harmony with the Soviet Union the honoring of international borders.

I hope you will relay this and that the Soviet government will respond favorably. Particularly, tell President Brezhnev that I want to meet with him so that we can prove that we are as friendly with the Soviet Union as with China. I want you to extend to President Brezhnev my deep friendship and my commitment to better relations. I hope we can resolve past differences and prevent future differences.

(Dobrynin made some comments on the above, including a brief effort to push for a visit to Moscow, but the President pointed out that he would be glad to consider this after Brezhnev has been here.)

² See Document 175.

³ For an overview of South Yemen's attack on North Yemen and Yemen's subsequent unification, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1980, pp. 30197–30201.

⁴ Reference is to Namibia and Rhodesia's internal conflicts and struggles for independence. For information on the situation in Namibia, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1979, pp. 29461–29467. For information on the situation in Rhodesia, see *Keesing's Contemporary Archives*, 1979, pp. 29576–29579 and 29760–29762.

177. Telegram From the Department of State to the Liaison Office in Saudi Arabia and the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, February 28, 1979, 0126Z

47704. Subject: (S) Démarche to Soviets on YAR/PDRY Border Hostilities.

1. (S-entire text)

2. During a call by Ambassador Dobrynin February 27,² the Secretary raised the present border conflict between the Yemen Arab Republic and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.

3. The Secretary made the following points:

—We are concerned about the recent incursion by PDRY forces into the territory of the YAR.

—We realize there is a long history of border unrest between the two countries and it is difficult to determine which side has provoked specific incidents.

—Nevertheless, we are disturbed by the recent escalation of the conflict which has caused a significant increase in tensions.

—We have urged restraint on the leaders of the YAR. We hope the Soviet Government will similarly urge restraint on the PDRY.

—We believe it is in the interest of both the YAR and the PDRY to exercise restraint and to use diplomatic means and not force to resolve their differences. We also believe it is in the interest of the United States and the Soviet Union to work together to prevent the conflict from developing further.

4. We see no need for you to make a specific demarche to the Soviets on this matter. However, at your discretion and if an opportunity presents itself, we have no objection to your repeating the points made by the Secretary with appropriate Soviet officials.

5. For Riyadh: Ambassador may draw on points above in describing to SAG in general terms our demarche to the Soviets.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 2/14–28/79. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Exdis; Distributed as Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Sana, Jidda and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 176.

178. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, March 2, 1979, 0100Z

50197. Subject: (S) Soviet response to Feb. 24 US Demarche on Situation in Indochina. Ref: State 46398.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. Following is text of Soviet oral note on situation in Indochina, transmitted by Dobrynin on March 1, which responds to Acting Secretary's demarche to Dobrynin of Feb. 24 (reftel).

Begin text.

Moscow has carefully studied the communication of the US side transmitted by the Acting Secretary of State Christopher to the Soviet Ambassador in Washington on February 24.

We note the concern expressed by the US side in the communication about the prevailing situation in Indochina and its intention to act "in such a way as to minimize the risk of heightened tensions." At the same time we do not see how the practical line of the US Government with regard to Chinese actions against Vietnam conforms to these statements.

No less than puzzling is the persistent desire of the US side to avoid a clear characterization and condemnation of the direct aggression by China against Vietnam. Instead of demanding immediate cessation of the aggression and unconditional withdrawal of the Chinese troops from Vietnam the United States continues to link the actions of Peking to the events of a completely different nature. Such a policy, under whatever disguise, is in fact aimed at absolving the aggressor, at helping the Peking leaders to get out of the unseemly situation in which they found themselves, having committed the criminal attack on Vietnam.

References by the US side to the fact that it appeals to China as well for restraint, in particular through the US Treasury Secretary who is now in Peking, do not change the substance of the matter. One cannot see results of those appeals. It is clear to us, and not only to us, for what US Ministers visit China.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 81, USSR, 3–4/77. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman; cleared by Leo Wolleberg (S/S–O) and for information in EA; approved by Shulman.

² Telegram 46398, to Moscow and the Liaison Office in Beijing, February 25, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2564. The text of the demarche on the situation in Indochina transmitted in telegram 46398 is printed as an attachment to Document 175.

Indeed, now it is another thing that matters. China expands the scope of its invasion, resorting to the most barbarous methods, killing civil population—women, old people, children—in the parts of Vietnamese territory seized by it.

The more irrelevant and unacceptable to us is the raising by the US side of questions which are within the exclusive competence of two sovereign states—the Soviet Union and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam which are bound by the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. It is only they themselves who can and will determine, with due regard for the development of the situation, the nature and the scope of the assistance rendered by the Soviet Union to Vietnam in repelling the Chinese aggression.

The Soviet Union acts in the prevailing situation with full responsibility. And we expect that all who are really concerned about the consequences of the present aggression by Peking for the cause of peace will also act with full and clear sense of their responsibility.

We would like to hope that the US side would weigh all the circumstances with regard to the continuation and escalation of the Chinese aggression against Vietnam and would draw right conclusions. Only immediate cessation of the aggression by Peking and withdrawal of the Chinese troops from the Vietnamese territories can lead to the restoration of peace in that region.

End text.

Vance

179. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in the Soviet Union and Saudi Arabia¹

Washington, March 6, 1979, 0136Z

54819. White House—Pass Dr. Brzezinski on aircraft. Subject: Secretary's Meeting With Dobrynin. Ref: Moscow 5258.²

1. Secretary Vance met with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin March 5. Dobrynin requested meeting to provide Soviet response to our demarche on Yemen situation February 27.³ The Ambassador's instructions were to express satisfaction that Soviet urgings of restraint had resulted in a ceasefire; he was also to raise the question of U.S. arms shipments to the YAR. The Secretary told him the ceasefire had not held, and that the fighting had expanded, pointing out that Soviet logistical support and shipments of military equipment, including artillery and anti-tank rockets, had contributed to the present situation.

2. The Secretary impressed on Dobrynin the urgency of getting the PDRY forces back across the border from their deep penetration into the YAR and the importance of restoring the ceasefire. He indicated that we had obligations to Saudi Arabia and we would honor those obligations. The Soviet Union should understand that its actions in Yemen bear on our vital interests in the region.

Dobrynin said there was no threat to Saudi Arabia, but Secretary indicated that the Saudis were nevertheless worried. Dobrynin promised to report our views.

3. For Jidda: Ambassador may use summary of Vance-Dobrynin conversation in briefing Saudis on our continuing efforts to persuade Soviets to play a constructive role in the resolution of this conflict. After briefing Saud on the Secretary's demarche to Dobrynin, you should point out the anomaly of US support for Saudi Arabia vis-a-vis PDRY and the press play on his interview with *Hawadis*.⁴ At this particular

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, CV/Dobrynin, 3/6/79. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Barbara Bodine (NEA/ARP) and McCall; cleared by Barry, Shulman, William Crawford (NEA) and Frank Wisner (S/S); approved by Newsom. Sent for information Immediate to Sana, Paris, London, and the White House. The White House was instructed to pass the cable to Brzezinski aboard the aircraft en route Egypt. President Carter and Brzezinski traveled to Egypt to meet with President Sadat, March 7–10.

² Telegram 5258 from Moscow, March 2, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1010. The telegram outlined a discussion between Toon and Korniyenko about the conflict between the two Yemens.

³ See Document 176.

⁴ Presumably, *Al-Hawadis*, an Arabic-language periodical.

time, with the Yemen conflict raging, such statements might be interpreted as Saudi encouragement in Moscow.

4. For Moscow: Above points provided as background. You may draw on them if the occasion should arise but you need not approach Soviets on this specifically.

5. Addressees will be provided septel⁵ factual up-date of Soviet assistance to PDRY, with emphasis on post-June '78 coup arms deliveries and review of current political and military situation in YAR.

Vance

⁵ Not found.

180. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, March 7, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I believe you will agree that we are on the threshold of completing a SALT II Agreement that will enhance US/Soviet relations and contribute to world stability and peace. I am writing to you directly concerning an issue, telemetry encryption, which is critical to a SALT II Agreement that will serve these important purposes.

There have been long discussions between us on how to resolve this important matter. My own personal belief is that any encryption of telemetry from the testing of strategic missiles is unnecessary and ill advised.

Nonetheless, we had considered this issue acceptably resolved on the basis of the Common Understanding tabled by Ambassador Earle on January 31, 1979, and the statement he placed on the record in connection with this.² This arrangement confirmed the understanding

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—(Vienna Summit Briefing Book, 6/79) (1). No classification marking.

² The statement made on January 31 on the amendment of the common understanding, was transmitted in telegram 1614 from Geneva, January 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790047–0595) The common agreement stated that both sides agreed to the use of telemetry, except in instances where the denial of telemetric information impeded the verification of compliance with the treaty.

reached by Secretary Vance and Foreign Minister Gromyko in December in Geneva. However, Ambassador Karpov subsequently appeared to undermine this agreement by stating, on instructions, in Geneva "... this common formulation does not require additional interpretations."

I must tell you in all candor that the terms and future observance of our agreement concerning telemetry encryption is an issue that goes to the heart of the prospects for SALT II ratification, the verification and viability of the SALT II treaty, and the future stability of the strategic relationship between us. I believe that Secretary Vance and Ambassador Earle have placed on the record our complete position on this question and have made clear our view of the Common Understanding. Therefore, I intend to stand on that position in publicly explaining and defending the SALT Agreement. Moreover, this will constitute the United States position in regard to compliance with the provisions of the SALT Agreement when it enters into force. Because of the seriousness of this issue, if your view differs with mine I need to be so informed now.

We are near the end of a long and difficult process. I think a final effort by both of us can rapidly settle the outstanding issues.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

181. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

March 11, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I received your letter of March 7.² Like you, I feel satisfied with the fact that we are on the threshold of completing the preparation of the strategic arms limitation agreement. I am confident that our compromise proposals, including those transmitted recently through Secretary

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—(Vienna Summit Briefing Book, 6/79) (1). No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation.

² See Document 180.

Vance,³ on the few outstanding issues make it possible to complete this work really in the nearest future.

As for the question of telemetric information which you raised in your letter, frankly, I am surprised that you return to this issue once again since it has been considered already closed by mutual agreement of the sides.

I must say it straight that from the very beginning the US side introduced into the question of telemetric information many far-fetched things that are not related to the agreement being worked out.

Nevertheless, here again we have shown good will. As a result, during the Geneva meeting of Foreign Minister Gromyko and Secretary Vance last December⁴ a mutually acceptable formulation was worked out which provides that each side has the right to use various methods of transmitting telemetric information during testing, including its encryption, except for those cases when it would impede verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

We confirm that we intend to strictly adhere to the reached agreement having in mind that in practice there should be no encryption of such telemetric information which could become necessary for verification of the provisions of the concluded Treaty. I would like to remind in this connection that we proposed earlier to the US side that it names a list of parameters transmitted by telemetry which, in its view, would not be subject to encryption.

However, the US side would not come along. It was agreed that in case of any ambiguities in future regarding the telemetric information they will be considered at the Standing Consultative Commission which has been established precisely for the purpose of removing any misunderstandings whenever they arise. Indeed, practice has shown that the Commission effectively performs its duties.

There was even no discussion at all that at the time of including the worked out formulation in the agreement any additional statements or interpretations would be made.

Meanwhile, on January 31, when the understanding on telemetric information, worked out by the ministers, was technically included in the draft agreement the head of the US delegation accompanied the text with a statement which cannot be considered otherwise but as an attempt to undermine the reached understanding.⁵

Suffice it to point out the assertion contained in that statement to the effect that “*any* encryption of telemetric information could impede

³ See Documents 164, 166, and 167.

⁴ See Document 167.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 180.

verification.” It is perfectly clear indeed that such an assertion obviously contradicts the text of the very formulation which speaks of the right to encrypt telemetric information *except for those cases* when it impedes verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

Ambiguous, to say the least, is also the point contained in the said statement to the effect that the use in future of “such for example, encryption” of telemetric information which was used by the Soviet side in some tests in the past would contradict the agreement. Such statement can be interpreted in such a way as if *all encryption* which was used in the cases in question would be illegal as applicable to the agreement. This would again put in doubt the right of the sides, embodied in the earlier agreed formulation, to encrypt telemetric information about those parameters which are not regulated by the agreement and thus are not related to the verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement.

Therefore it is quite natural that the Soviet delegation could not pass in silence over the unilateral statement made by the US delegation at the inclusion of the formulation on telemetric information worked out by the Ministers in the agreement. On its part, it stated at once that this formulation does not require additional interpretations.

Thus, Mr. President, if there is someone who undermines the achieved agreement on telemetric information the guilty ones should certainly be looked for among representatives not of the Soviet but of the US side. Evidently, it would not take you much effort to find them.

We confirm our readiness to consider the question of telemetric information resolved having in view the inclusion in the agreement of the formulation on this subject worked out earlier with the understanding that in case of any ambiguities in future regarding telemetric information they will be referred to the Standing Consultative Commission. The Soviet delegation in Geneva is instructed to proceed exactly from this.

I hope, Mr. President, that you will also give appropriate instructions on this matter to the US delegation.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁶

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

182. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

March 19, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I consider it necessary to write to you on the question of the situation in the Middle East. In the past I set forth more than once my considerations on this matter. What makes me return once again to this question is the situation emerging now in connection with the steps taken by the United States to push forward a separate agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Our principled attitude to attempts to solve the Middle East problem on the road of separate deals is known to you. We have expressed this assessment of ours both through diplomatic channels and publicly, in particular in connection with the US-Israeli-Egyptian meeting in Camp David last year.

So far we do not know yet all the details of the agreement being prepared, and the fact that they are kept secret is symptomatic in itself. But whatever these specific details might be, the main thing is already clear.

This agreement is not designed for and cannot lead to a just and thus a lasting peace in the Middle East. No matter what statements are made, what explanations are given we are deeply convinced that the prepared separate deal is advantageous only to Israel. Not only does it fail to resolve fundamental issues underlying the Arab-Israeli conflict but it does not even bring us closer to their solution.

I will tell you with all frankness, Mr. President: what is said in your oral message of March 14,² has by no means shaken that conviction of ours, rather on the contrary.

Let us face the truth. All what is happening now means an actual departure from a solution of the Palestinian problem. It was simply drowned in various political manoeuvres which may appear subtle to someone but in fact are not in any way tied—neither from political nor from humane viewpoints—to the legitimate demands of the Arab people of Palestine. What kind of peace is that if more than three million people who have the inalienable right to have a roof over their

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 4, USSR (Brezhnev Drafts/Letters), 4/77–9/80. No classification marking. Printed from an unofficial translation. Carter's first initial is written in the upper right-hand corner of the letter with the request "Susan [Clough] file."

² The text for Carter's March 14 statement about the Egyptian-Israeli peace negotiations is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book I, p. 432.

heads, to have their own even a small state, are deprived of that right. This fact alone shows how shaky is the ground on which the separate agreement between Israel and Egypt being imposed by the United States is built.

They want to convince us that since the achievement of an overall settlement in the Middle East would not come out now, one should start, they say, with an agreement between Israel and Egypt and only afterwards to try and seek a comprehensive settlement.

We are of a different opinion. What is being done now may suit the Israeli and Egyptian leadership but it by no means suits the Arab peoples. We think that Syria, Jordan and other Arab countries as well as the Palestinians have equal rights and are equally interested in these rights being ensured. Indeed, the present agreement itself has been achieved entirely at the expense of the Egyptian side. But let the Egyptian leadership answer itself for this before its own people, before the other Arab peoples. It is clear, however, that in connection with a possible conclusion of the separate deal the number of acute issues will not diminish but will increase.

Besides, there is a desire, behind all this, which one even hardly attempts to conceal, to solve questions on the sly, bypassing the Soviet Union. In this connection one cannot help wondering what is more here, naivety or deliberate disregard of the legitimate rights of the Soviet Union particularly in view of the closeness of that region to our borders.

But the position of the USSR in the world cannot be changed at someone's wish. And we do not need at all someone's authorization to take interest in the development of the situation in the Middle East. No one can shake our interest in establishing a lasting and just peace in the Middle East.

Strange, to say the least, is an approach when despite earlier agreements the US evades joint efforts with the USSR to ensure a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East and then we are even asked to support separate deals.

And indeed, the fact is that provisions of principle regarding future course of action in the Middle East were agreed between the USSR and the US already when you, Mr. President, were in office. A Joint Soviet-US statement on this score was worked out and published on October 1, 1977.³ Shortly after that, however, it was nonchalantly dropped by the US side. This not only dealt a blow at the efforts aimed at achieving a Middle East settlement but in general was indicative of how Washington sometimes treats achieved agreements.

³ See footnote 2, Document 52.

In the light of the present US position a situation emerges where we follow completely different roads in the Middle East and it would be more than unjustified to count on our support of what is schemed with regard to that region. Now we do not see how the positions of the USSR and the US can be bridged. We tried to do it more than once but each time the US side destroyed those bridges. Such are the facts.

In this connection I wish also to tell you beforehand that we shall strongly object to having now the UN Security Council or the General Assembly—which, by the way, is not competent at all to decide such questions—involved in all that business in order to sanctify, so to say, the separate deal between Israel and Egypt by the authority of these international bodies.

Finally, I wish to draw your attention, Mr. President, to one more question fraught with very serious consequences. According to the incoming information, attributed also to US officials, efforts are now made to establish a new system of military relationship in the Middle East under the US auspices, to introduce in fact permanent military presence of the United States there. I must say that if the question really were of the presence of the US armed forces in the Middle East region it would only further complicate the situation. And in general the increase of the US military presence in that and adjacent areas would seriously destabilize the international situation on the whole.

I express these considerations in all candor, Mr. President, being guided by both the interests of ensuring really lasting and just peace in the Middle East and the interests of the Soviet-US relations in a broad sense. I had more than one occasion to give my views on the questions of Soviet-US relations. Now I would like only to note that there is a number of issues the solution of which requires our joint efforts. On our part we are ready—and we prove it in practice—to seek mutually acceptable solutions to these problems.

One of these problems is a Middle East settlement. In our deep conviction the policy of the Soviet Union on this issue meets the interests of not only the Arab but also of other states including the US if, of course, one is to proceed from the real interests of peace and not from some considerations of momentary nature.

In conclusion I wish to stress the following. Whatever direction the course of events in the Middle East may take the Soviet Union's resolute position was and is that there should be no war there, that a lasting and just peace be established, that the possibility be really ensured for all the Arab peoples, including Palestinians, as well as for the people of Israel to exist and develop as sovereign states. This is our unswerving policy and we intend to follow it in future.

At the same time we would like to count on the restoration—and on our part we are ready for that—of active cooperation between the

USSR and the US in the matters of the Middle East settlement, obviously, on a principled basis which requires taking into account the legitimate rights and interests of all sides and their full and equal participation in such a settlement.

Sincerely

L. Brezhnev⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

183. Memorandum From Jerry Funk of the National Security Council Staff to Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 22, 1979

SUBJECT

Strategy for the Horn

This is in response to Zbig's request for ideas on strengthening our position on the Horn.

Our first problem is to get State to agree in unequivocal terms that the Horn is vital to our national interests, and therefore worth the price of an *active* positive program to reassert our interest. This may require a PRC, and a good bit more to gain acceptance of the notion that passivity is not the way to peace and stability.

Flowing from this basic premise, we must gain a clear understanding that if the Horn is key to our interests in both the NE and Africa, then Ethiopia is the key to the Horn. Therefore, we must either try to regain our influence in Ethiopia, or retreat into a more difficult, dangerous and costly position of trying to "contain" an Ethiopia which serves as a base for Soviet/Cuban expansion.

Once this major (and minor) premise is understood and accepted, we can turn our attention to the individual countries. Again, we have to gain acceptance of our active program to reassert our strength with each nation.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Horn/Special, Box 2, Chron File: 3/79. Secret.

Sudan. I have the sense that we are headed in the right direction with Sudan—a combination of military and economic assistance. But the vital importance of the success of this program must be reemphasized, and we should be more attentive to helping Nimieri with his growing Ethiopia refugee problem, and his increasing requirements for security along his lengthy border with Ethiopia.

Kenya. I feel that State in general, and our Embassy in particular, does not fully appreciate the present vital (to us) role being played by Kenya, as our one solid, reliable friend in old East Africa. Nor is there a real understanding of the pressures on Kenya—the Somali threat, the problem of the probable installation of a government in Uganda which will be greatly influenced by Nyrere, the worry of the Soviet/Cuban force on their northern border.

We should: (1) continue to be more responsive to Kenya's need for both economic and military assistance; (2) reassure Kenya of our determination to restrain the Somalis; (3) actively assist GOK in its internal security function, with special attention to possible Soviet/Cuban activity; (4) encourage Kenya to exert some influence on the Ugandan war, so as to gain an IOU from Nyrere; and (5) encourage Nyrere to cooperate with GOK in establishing a new order in Uganda acceptable to both Kenya and Tanzania.

Somalia. We must gain clear acceptance of the notion that Somalia is a threat to regional stability for so long as Siad (or successor) continues active support of Ogaden expansion, and that to support him in the name of Soviet containment is counter productive.

We must continue to make it unmistakably clear to Siad that we will not arm him until he renounces Somali claims on Kenya and Ethiopia.

Yemen. Our stand with North Yemen is right on, certainly as far as sending some badly needed signals to the Horn and indeed to the rest of Africa.

Ethiopia. I am firmly convinced that we can and will regain a large measure of influence in Ethiopia at the expense of the Soviets, and I feel we can and should actively hasten the day.

As a basis for such a program, we need to do all we can to maintain as large and as active a mission as possible, including an AID component.

There remains in all walks of Ethiopian life significant and important friendship, and proclivity for things American and Western. The Soviets (and to a lesser extent) the Cubans have certainly not won the hearts and minds of the people, and the veneer of Marxism-Socialism is very thin. (This does not mean that the reforms of the revolution would or could be rescinded.)

Mengistu was confirmed in power by the Soviets, and the Soviets must realize that they will be asked to stay only for so long as Mengistu needs them to keep him in power. Therefore, if the Soviets want to use Ethiopia as a base for exporting their influence around Africa, it is in their interest to maintain a low-level, static instability in and around the Horn—along the Sudan/Ethiopian border, low-level Eritrean and Somali threats, and economic difficulties.

Thus, the Horn can look forward to instability for so long as the Mengistu/Soviet alliance remains.

Mengistu (or more properly, the Mengistu clique which must rely on Soviet support), is vulnerable on two grounds—the emotional “fer-enji”² issue, and the economic issue. [2 lines not declassified]

[3 paragraphs (21 lines) not declassified]

Conclusion. I am fully aware that these ideas are not presently popular, in many quarters, and specifically at State, and in parts of the Hill. But I sense that they may be becoming less unacceptable, and that we should try to float them once again—as the most reasonable way to try to regain our influence in the Horn, and to strengthen our position in Africa as a whole.

Note. I have discussed these ideas on Ethiopia in general with [2 names not declassified] The capability is there, as is the will. What is needed is a directive to start planning, and then to move.

² Foreigner.

184. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, March 27, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

In connection with the discussion of telemetry encryption,² I would like to reaffirm our adherence to the agreed common understanding on telemetry that has been recorded in the Joint Draft Text. It

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—(Vienna Summit Briefing Book, 6/79) (1). No classification marking.

² See Documents 180 and 181.

is very important that we share a common view of the meaning of the language so as to avoid disagreements on this issue in the future.

We both recognize that certain telemetric information is relevant to verification of the agreement because such telemetry provides information concerning compliance with the provisions of the agreement; and that the deliberate denial of such telemetric information, such as by encryption, is therefore prohibited.

We also both recognize that certain telemetric information is not relevant to verification of compliance with the provisions of the agreement and that the deliberate denial of that information which is not relevant to verification of the provisions of the agreement, such as by encryption, is therefore not prohibited.

It is my hope and expectation that the negotiating record on this issue may be considered complete and that with the agreed common understanding and this letter we can consider the telemetry issue as resolved.

This is another indication that we continue to make progress in settling the outstanding issues and that we can, in the near future, complete the agreement and have our long delayed meeting.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

185. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, April 12, 1979, 2012Z.

91597. Subject: Secretary's Demarche to Dobrynin on Afghanistan. Ref.:

1. (S-Entire text)
2. During a meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin April 11, the Secretary made the following demarche concerning Soviet accusations of U.S. support for the insurgency in Afghanistan.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Drafted by Robert Perito (EUR/SOV); cleared by Gary Matthews (EUR/SOV), James Collins (NEA), Ronald Lorton (NEA/PAB), Jack Perry (S), Jack Miklos (NEA) and Curtis Kamman (S); approved by Barry. Sent for information Immediate to London, Beijing, Jidda, New Delhi, Kabul, Islamabad, and Tehran.

3. The Secretary made the following points:

—The United States is not interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan and is in no way responsible for the current unrest in that country. This was made clear to the Soviet Government in repeated US public statements² and in a private demarche delivered by our Embassy to the Foreign Ministry in Moscow.³

—At the same time, the United States has made clear that we categorically reject the baseless allegations made by Soviet media of US involvement in Afghanistan's internal affairs.⁴

—Despite this, accusations continue to appear in Soviet media. Given similar statements by high Soviet officials we assume these media reports are inspired by the Soviet Government.

—One particularly objectionable example was the April 10 *Pravda* article by one A. Petrov. This article makes unfounded allegations against Deputy Secretary Warren Christopher and purports to give the names of "US experts in subversive activity."

—These reports that the United States is responsible for anti-government activity by various Afghan groups are completely false and do not serve the interests of US-Soviet relations or stability in an unsettled area of the world.

—Our two countries can surely agree that the present period is characterized by various tensions and instability in South Asia and the Persian Gulf. Our respective interests should be directed toward insuring peace and stability in these troubled regions, and we believe that an important step in this direction is the avoidance of provocative re-criminations and unfounded allegations of outside interference.

—Continued untrue accusations of involvement of the United States can affect the safety of American citizens in Afghanistan. Moreover, steps which inflame regional tensions can lead governments of the region to call for greater involvement of both our countries, a development which would make the instability of the area more dangerous to international peace and security.

Vance

² In telegram 72878 to multiple posts, March 23, the Department transmitted excerpts from the March 23 Department press briefing on this subject. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790135–0457)

³ For the text of the demarche, see telegram 81696 to multiple posts, April 11. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790150–0644)

⁴ In telegram 69537 to multiple posts, March 21, the Department responded to Soviet media accusations that the United States was responsible for the insurgency in Afghanistan. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 115, 3/17–21/79)

186. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

April 13, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I considered it necessary to raise with you an urgent and most serious question. According to reports which have been received citing U.S. military authorities, the United States plans to conduct this year very large strategic exercises “in simulation of nuclear war.”² In this connection it is reported that the exercises will involve U.S. strategic systems located both inside U.S. territory and at bases abroad. Among other things it is planned to launch strategic bombers toward the Soviet Union.

Naturally, every country has the right to conduct training and exercises of its armed forces. But the exercises now planned by the United States far exceed the framework of normal training, both in scope and in character. What we have here is a global military-political action on an unprecedented scale, and moreover, directed against the Soviet Union.

The reasonable question arises—for what purpose and for what sake is this openly hostile step, provocative to the Soviet Union, being undertaken? Does the current international situation and the nature of relations between our countries really warrant such “global games” using strategic weapons? And how would the U.S. Government feel if Soviet strategic systems were suddenly and without warning launched toward American territory?

In short, there is no justification, nor can there be, for carrying out such exercises. They do not in any way correspond with statements made by the U.S. Government in favor of strengthening peace and in-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 70, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–6/79. No classification marking. Printed from an official U.S. translation. Bartholomew forwarded the letter to Carter under an April 14 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

² Reference is to exercise “Global Shield 79.” The press release jointly issued by the Department of Defense and the Strategic Air Command on April 9 read in part: “The Strategic Air Command announced today that it will conduct a major command-wide, no-notice exercise later this year, nicknamed ‘Global Shield 79.’ Global Shield 79 will include command post and field training exercises designed to test the ability of SAC forces to implement emergency war orders (EWO) which support U.S. national policy if deterrence fails. All SAC units and selected Air Force Reserve and Air National Guard units will participate in one or more aspects of Global Shield 79. This exercise is strictly a training exercise based on a hypothetical scenario. Global Shield 79 will not affect SAC’s ability to meet its day-to-day alert, and other commitments. Aircraft flying exercise missions will not carry nuclear weapons.” (Telegram 93209 to Moscow, April 14; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840176–1003)

ternational security. And as such this runs counter to the joint efforts we are now undertaking for completing the negotiations on limiting strategic offensive weapons, i.e., in the long run, reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear conflict, easing Soviet-American relations, and improving the international climate in general.

Finally, one also cannot overlook the great risk associated with this, since in such a situation one cannot exclude, as a practical matter, the possibility of some unauthorized or unforeseen actions.

Taking all of this into account I would like to count on you, Mr. President, to regard this message with utmost seriousness and to give us appropriate clarification—and in any case not to allow steps which could lead only to an increase in tension in relations between our two nations and in the world in general.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

187. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, April 20, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I have received your letter of April 13² about U.S. military exercises involving strategic forces. The press release describing our forthcoming exercise,³ which was made public on April 9, and has since been given to Ambassador Dobrynin, adequately explains the nature of this exercise. In addition, I can tell you it does not involve the launching of U.S. bombers against the USSR.

Exercises such as this one, or your exercise of this month with your ballistic missile submarines—about which you have made no public

¹ Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 70, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 1–6/79. No classification marking.

² See Document 186.

³ Attached but not printed.

announcement nor informed us through diplomatic channels—remind us of the responsibility we both have to reduce the chances of nuclear war. For our part, we take special care in the design of such exercises and through their public announcement to insure that their purposes are not mistaken. We have also, in various international fora and negotiations, supported agreements and practices concerning military exercises that would limit the potential for concern and miscalculation. You will recall, for example, that the U.S. has in the past suggested that prior to all missile firings—an extensive practice in Soviet strategic exercises—notice be given in advance.

Against this background, I must tell you that neither our mutual understanding nor our mutual security is served by recent Soviet statements concerning this United States exercise. I would suggest that when we meet in what I hope will be the near future we discuss exchanging information on our respective strategic exercises before they take place with a view toward contributing to strategic stability. This could be part of a broader discussion of the risk of nuclear war.

We both have a unique responsibility for dealing with this issue which is of such fundamental importance to international security. It is essential that we come to grips with it soon.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

188. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, April 23, 1979, 11:30 a.m.–12:04 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Zbigniew Brzezinski

Ambassador Dobrynin indicated that the Soviet authorities have considered the question of mitigating Filatov's sentence. "Capital punishment will be replaced by long-term imprisonment."

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Prisoner Exchanges: (8/78–5/79). Secret. The meeting took place at the White House.

With the above item satisfying the issues raised by me on November 17, 1978 (see memcon),² the Ambassador indicated that the Soviet Union would be prepared by May 1 to expel from the Soviet Union Vins, Moroz, Kuznetsov, Dymshitz, and Ginzburg; together with those members of their immediate families who may want to accompany them (though perhaps some family members may have to follow later, if arrangements for their departure cannot be immediately concluded).

In return, the U.S. will expel from the U.S. within the same time frame Chernyayev and Enger.

The Ambassador proposed Helsinki, Warsaw or Prague as the venues for the exchange.

I indicated satisfaction with this outcome and asked whether the exchange procedure could not be simplified, with the parties concerned departing directly from Moscow and New York, respectively, for New York and Moscow, respectively.

After some further discussion he then agreed to explore the possibility of this being done in the above fashion either by this Wednesday or by this Friday, both being days on which there are direct Aeroflot connections between Moscow and New York.

In addition, I raised the question of a public announcement, pointing out that the item will leak and excessive expectations would be built up—and thus it is in our mutual interest that there be an early announcement. Dobrynin promised to check with Moscow and let me know whether Moscow has any difficulties with an announcement being made by this Wednesday, even if the release were to be culminated on Friday.³

² See Document 159.

³ Dobrynin agreed to the terms in an April 25 message. (Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Prisoner Exchanges: (8/78–5/79))

189. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

April 25, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

After receiving your letter of April 11, 1979,² in which you suggest that we already determine and fix the date of our meeting, I thought a great deal about it.

Since we have reached a firm mutual understanding that such a meeting can take place only when the Treaty on Limitation of Strategic Weapons is ready for signature, your suggestion on setting a date for the meeting can be understood as reflecting your confidence that we are in fact close to completion of work on this Treaty. This could only be welcomed.

Unfortunately, however, the line of conduct of U.S. representatives at the negotiations on this question, both in Washington and in Geneva, does not instill in us such confidence. Instead of concentrating on a search for mutually acceptable solutions to the few questions which were not fully agreed upon at the meeting between A.A. Gromyko and C. Vance in December of last year,³ the American side is ever raising new questions primarily of a technical nature. It is sufficient to point out, for example, that on April 11, that is on the date of your letter, Mr. President, the American delegation in Geneva introduced a whole series of new proposals of that nature (that the weight of one RV on the new type of ICBM should not comprise less than 4% of the missile's throw-weight; the 10% spread for changes in parameters of the new missile during the course of the last ten flight tests, etc.).

All of these limitations, as was the case with the earlier proposal limiting procedures for testing the release of RVs, make no practical sense from the point of view of the tasks of the Treaty being worked out, if one takes into account already agreed limitations. In addition, an impression is created that these American proposals aimed at regulating certain technical decisions proceed from the unilateral interests of the United States, ignoring the fact that each side has formed over a period of years its own practice in the resolution of technical questions of one sort or another.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, Brezhnev Letter to JEC on SALT & Summit, 4/25/79. No classification marking. Printed from the U.S. translation.

² Not found.

³ See Documents 164–167.

In this connection the legitimate question cannot help but arise of why the American side is creating ever new problems at the negotiations. And whether this is being done with your knowledge, Mr. President, is of course more apparent to you.

We expressed our attitude toward such tactics to Secretary C. Vance through the Soviet Ambassador on April 19,⁴ along with a presentation of concrete considerations on earlier remaining questions. We have not yet received a reaction to what we said to Mr. C. Vance. Meanwhile, the American delegation at the negotiations in Geneva continues to hold to the same essential line which is aimed at delay.

In these conditions I will say frankly the firm desire of the American side to set a date quickly for the meeting is not entirely clear. After all, it would hardly serve the interests of the matter if the dates of our meeting were to be determined and announced, and if it then turned out that it was not possible to complete work on the Treaty by that time. What would we do in such a situation? Cancel the meeting, or come to it without confidence in positive results? Either option at first glance appears politically unsuitable.

In this connection I would like to touch on still another question in the interest of avoiding any surprises which could complicate completion of a Treaty on Limiting Strategic Weapons, or perhaps even destroy [lit. “explode”]⁵ it. What I mean is that, according to reports that have been received, several variants of a possible deployment in the next few years of a new ICBM, MX, are being discussed in the U.S. Government, and a decision on this question may be announced sometime in the middle of May.

I would like to remind you that back in August of last year we laid out to the American side our principled position concerning the inacceptability of deploying mobile ICBMs in a manner which provides for the construction of a multitude of new silos, in each of which an ICBM could be placed. We noted at that time, and we emphasize again, that the construction of additional silos for launching ICBMs would be absolutely incompatible with the corresponding provision of the draft treaty already agreed to, to say nothing of the fact that even were such construction allowed each additional silo intended for launching ICBMs would have to be counted as a unit in the agreed aggregate levels of strategic weapons.

There must be absolute clarity on this question. It would be a profound delusion if, in case of a decision by the American side—on the eve of signature of the Treaty or thereafter—to carry out the above-

⁴ No record of this conversation was found.

⁵ Brackets in original.

mentioned entirely illegal method of deployment of the MX missile, someone were to count on the Soviet Union not objecting against this in the interest of saving the Treaty.

Yes, we are interested in the quickest possible completion of the Treaty on Strategic Weapons Limitation. But the U.S. as well should be no less interested in it. Only in that case will the Treaty make real sense. Consequently, both sides should also act accordingly, proceeding from the principle of equality and equal security.

I would like, Mr. President, to receive your clarifications on the questions I have touched upon. I also hope that the line taken by the American representatives at the negotiations will allow completion of work on the Treaty. After this has been done, the dates for the meeting can be fixed with little difficulty. It goes without saying that in principle I welcome your desire to have our meeting as soon as possible. Its results, in our opinion, can exert great positive influence on the entire international situation.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev⁶

⁶ Printed from a copy that indicates Brezhnev signed the original.

190. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, April 28, 1979, 0235Z

107269. Subject: Meeting With Dobrynin on Jackson-Vanik.

1. Confidential-entire text.

2. The Secretary met with Ambassador Dobrynin on April 27 and handed him an oral note containing talking points, approved at the highest level, which could form the basis for movement on the Jackson-Vanik issue. Treasury Secretary Blumenthal was also present at the meeting.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 116, 4/14–30/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information Priority to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

3. Dobrynin stated that he would transmit the approach to Moscow.

4. There follows the full text of the talking points handed over to Dobrynin. Begin text:

—Our consultations with Congress and Jewish leaders lead us to conclude that an effort to delete or amend Jackson-Vanik would be lengthy and not likely to succeed.

—There is a favorable attitude in Congress and the Jewish community toward the recent increase in Jewish emigration and the improvement in procedures and treatment of applicants for emigration.

—Taking advantage of this favorable climate, we believe the President could consider waiving the Jackson-Vanik limitations as provided in existing legislation so that the 1972 Trade Agreement will come into force. In doing so, he would simply report to Congress that he is assured on the basis of information available to him and relevant discussions that the emigration practices of the USSR will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of Section 402 of the Trade Act.²

—In our consultations here we have made it clear that neither the President's report on the waiver nor subsequent testimony would contain any statement that we had "received assurances."

—The USSR would not need to confirm nor deny that it had provided assurances to the US. It would be essential, however, that the Soviet Government say nothing inconsistent with the President's waiver and report to Congress.

—We believe the course outlined would be generally well received and would fulfill the requirements for granting MFN to the USSR.

—In deciding whether to adopt this approach, it is important for the President to have confidence in his understanding of the present situation and to know that there is a basis for maintaining the support of those in the Congress and the public interested in this question. Accordingly, we wish to ask if the President is correct in his understanding of prevailing Soviet policies and practices on the matter of emigration, as follows:

A) Soviet policy has recently resulted in an upward trend in the numbers of emigrants.

B) Soviet policy is to improve the efficiency of emigration processing and the circumstances of persons who have applied for emigration.

² Reference is to the Jackson-Vanik amendment, which prohibits the U.S. Government from providing export credit to any nonmarket country that does not allow for the free emigration of its citizens.

(C) Soviet policy is to regularize as soon as practical the criteria for refusal based on national security considerations.

D) The Soviet Union has no intention of changing the foregoing policies.

—In connection with this matter, we appreciate recent moves regarding some refusenik hardship cases and prisoners. We would consider it of particular symbolic value if exit permission were given to more of those prominent cases known to Ambassador Dobrynin from his own contacts with Jewish leaders. End text.

Vance

191. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 3, 1979, 1510Z

10906. Subject: (C) Leadership Update: Brezhnev's Health, Other Recent Observations and Rumors. Ref: Moscow 10711.²

1. (C-entire text)

2. Brezhnev's health. Recent observations suggest that Brezhnev is becoming increasingly feeble and that greater efforts are being made by the Soviet media to hide this fact. We have reported separately on Brezhnev's performance during the Franco-Soviet summit (reftel). The French found his condition markedly deteriorated from two years ago, when he last met Giscard. At the moment, Brezhnev is still able, though perhaps with increasing difficulty, to rally himself sufficiently to get through major appearances and meetings. How long he can do so will depend on whether the gradual deterioration in his condition can be arrested.

3. Brezhnev on TV. We have frequently noted that film of Leonid Il'ich is edited to show him in the best possible light. A recent example was the "Vremya" coverage of his speaking performance at the Supreme Soviet session, in which the awkward moments were elimi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR and East/West, Western Europe Country File, Box 4, Chron: 5/1-7/79. Confidential. Sent for information to the Consulate in Leningrad. Sent under a covering memorandum, May 4, from Stephen Larrabee (NSC) to Brzezinski. (Ibid.)

² Telegram 10711 from Moscow, April 30, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790201-0222.

nated. The same thing happened in coverage of Giscard's arrival in Moscow. In live coverage, Brezhnev was seen taking very slow, small steps as he moved through the arrival ceremony, and at one point he did not seem to know where to go. The "Vremya" film eliminated all of this. During "Vremya" coverage of the Giscard/Brezhnev document signing ceremony, the camera, which until recently would have focused all but exclusively on the top leaders, stayed on Brezhnev for no more than a few seconds at a time and repeatedly panned across the other Soviet leaders and French delegation members who were witnessing the signing.

4. Coverage of the May day ceremonies was also altered this year. On past such occasions, the cameras have zeroed in on the leaders as soon as they arrived, and before they mounted the steps of Lenin's Mausoleum. This year, there were no close-ups until well after Brezhnev had reached the reviewing platform. During the concluding ceremonies of the demonstration, the leadership was not shown at all.

5. Brezhnev at hockey matches. As earlier reported, he was at the rink almost every night during the World Hockey Championships, usually accompanied by Chernenko and Ustinov. On some nights, however, only his personal physician has been with him, according to the FRG Ambassador, who met Brezhnev's doctor when Leonid Il'ich visited the FRG last year. Brezhnev, Suslov, Ustinov and Chernenko attended the USSR-Sweden game and sat through the entire thing, but we understand that Brezhnev's box was empty for the final game of the championships, between the USSR and Czechoslovakia (the Soviet team had already won the championship).

6. Views of Roy Medvedev. According to U.S. correspondent Fred Coleman (protect), who saw Medvedev after the recent Supreme Soviet meeting, Medvedev said:

—Ryabov was ousted from the Secretariat, Medvedev had heard, because of "disagreement with elders;" he would not elaborate;

—he had "solid information" that Brezhnev fell seriously ill just before the Giscard visit was postponed; Brezhnev was given a "massive" dose of antibiotics;

—contingency plans were made within the senior leadership; Medvedev is convinced that it was agreed Kosygin should replace Brezhnev as Chairman of the SS Presidium, so that Kosygin could sign SALT II; this even though Kosygin would just as soon retire;

—Medvedev had heard other rumors, but was not sure of them; namely: Ustinov would become Chairman of the Council of Ministers and Andropov would become General Secretary (this as part of the contingency planning); alternatively, that Ustinov would become General Secretary and Ryabov might eventually become Chairman of the Council of Ministers;

—all contingency planning and rumors ceased when it became clear that Leonid Il'ich was going to recover;

—Medvedev has heard that Kirilenko has been ill; he feels, however, that Kirilenko cannot be counted out as a successor to Brezhnev, although it might be that some in the leadership would argue for one change rather than two (i.e., for jumping over Kirilenko in favor of a younger General Secretary);

—he thinks that no one can predict who will become the new CPSU General Secretary; even the Politburo will not know for sure until it sits down to work this out.

Toon

192. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense Brown to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 14, 1979

I am increasingly concerned over the complex of issues surrounding the Soviet military buildup in the Caribbean, the upgrading of Cuban offensive military capabilities and the need for more detailed planning concerning our response to these developments. These issues were highlighted by CINCLANT recently and comparable concerns have been expressed by the Joint Staff.

The forthcoming summit provides a natural and timely opportunity to address these concerns with Brezhnev, and we need to settle on our approach. Accordingly, I recommend that an SCC meeting be convened at an early date to determine our course of action on this matter. My staff will send your staff a background paper² which might serve as a point of departure for the discussion.

Harold Brown

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odum File, Box 19, Cuba: USSR Military Relations: 8/78–5/79. Secret. A copy was sent to Vance.

² See Document 194.

193. Oral Note From the Soviet Leadership¹

undated

Moscow has carefully examined the points made by the Secretary of State concerning questions of trade and economic relations between our countries.²

Naturally, one can only welcome the fact that the US Government recognizes the highly abnormal situation that has arisen in this sphere through the fault of the American side, and is demonstrating a desire to correct it. This question is long overdue. It is, of course, up to the President to decide what specific steps he considers it possible to adopt toward these ends. And we do not intend to give advice here. What is important is that artificially created discriminatory restrictions be eliminated.

Our position of principle is well known to the American side. It has been frequently set forth and it remains unchanged. We proceed from the premise that trade between our countries—like that between any other countries—can and must be carried out only on an equal and mutually advantageous basis without being linked with other, unrelated questions. So it is, of course, completely unacceptable in this that there should be any efforts to interfere in the internal affairs of one another. And yet this is precisely the aim of existing American legislation covering the conduct of trade and economic matters with the USSR. Only by rejecting such an approach can one anticipate that Soviet-American trade and economic ties will achieve the necessary scale for the mutual benefit of both countries and will contribute to the positive development of our relations as a whole.

If one examines the procedure that is now being proposed on the basis of this principled viewpoint, the question legitimately arises of what actually would change in substance. For what is referred to is not fundamental change, nor is it change in the existing legislation. To be sure, we are told that in the present instance it is not formally demanded of the Soviet side, as it were, to offer any assurances concerning its policy on the exit of Soviet citizens for permanent residence abroad. However, there is here the qualification that the President

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 53, Chron: 5/19–31/79. Secret. Sent under a May 19 covering memorandum from Aaron to Carter, in which Aaron stated that the Soviet response was “quite negative, stopping short only of outright rejection of our ‘proposal.’” (Ibid.) Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the covering memorandum, “Zbig—To hell with them. J.”

² See Document 190.

would nevertheless have to report to the Congress with respect to some sort of "relevant discussions." Moreover, we are expected to provide some kind of "tacit confirmation" of the way the American side understands Soviet policy and practice in matters of emigration. Thus, when one proceeds to decipher this concept, it appears that in essence it does not differ from what is required under the provisions of existing American legislation; i.e., it pursues the same aims of interference in our purely internal affairs.

It is hard to conceive that the American side could seriously expect that our principled position on this can undergo any changes. The question arises, therefore, as to what point there is in putting forward proposals which create only the superficial appearance of willingness to resolve this major question in our relations. We would not wish to think, but it is difficult to avoid the impression, that behind this there lies an effort in fact to avoid a real solution to this problem and at the same time to remove certain limitations on US foreign policy in some other quarters.

It appears to us that this is an inappropriate method of handling matters, especially at the present stage when we have the task on a practical level of exerting joint efforts toward smoothing out and fully developing relations between our countries. It is precisely because of this that we have considered it necessary to set forth our views with such frankness, in order that there not be any misunderstanding between us. We would like to hope that this is not the last word of the American side and that it will take genuinely effective measures for resolving the questions of trade and economic relations between our countries on a principled basis.

194. Background Paper Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs¹

Washington, undated

REAPPRAISAL OF U.S./CUBA RELATIONS

Summary and Conclusions

Recent Cuban arms modernization, including MIG–23s, naval base construction and the acquisition of submarines, together with Cuban activities in the Caribbean and in Africa all pose serious security policy questions for the U.S.

—The rapid buildup of Soviet-furnished conventional offensive weapons since early 1976 and the increased Soviet navy presence in the Caribbean increase Soviet-Cuban military capabilities in this hemisphere. The acquisition of MIG–23/Flogger aircraft, the Foxtrot and Whiskey submarines and the development of the naval facility in Cienfuegos exemplify this trend, which could be taking place without violation of existing agreements with the USSR.

—Based on the potential capacity of the new naval facilities and submarine/minelayer capability, Cuba could establish within 1½ to 2 years a capability to interdict our non-Arab petroleum supplies (Nigeria, Venezuela, potentially Mexico), our bauxite supplies (Jamaica, Surinam, Guyana) and ocean-to-ocean transit (Panama Canal).

—Therefore, in the event of contingencies in a NATO scenario, CINCLANT would be obligated to provide forces to protect our southern flank against Cuba. Both CINCLANT and the Joint Staff have indicated that the U.S. forces required to neutralize an increasingly modernized hostile Cuba could cause an important reduction in U.S. forces available to NATO.

—Cuba has been an influential communist regime and in some cases directly supported Soviet objectives by providing troops and direct aid to revolutionary movements elsewhere. Cuba's revolutionary small country mystique gives it entree into liberation struggles more easily than the USSR.

—The successes of these efforts and Cuba's continuing role in Africa encourage those antagonistic to us even in countries where Cuba has not actually sent troops. Recent developments in Central America

¹ Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 104, SCC 185, 7/20/79, Cuba after Summit. Secret. Sent under a March 16 covering memorandum from Carl Smith, the Military Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, to Robert Gates, the Special Assistant to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs.

and the Eastern Caribbean (Grenada, Jamaica, Guyana) are providing Cuba with new targets of opportunity in the Western Hemisphere which she has demonstrated a willingness to pursue.

—In sum, Cuba provides the USSR a cheap proxy to carry out Soviet policy objectives with little direct Soviet commitment.

In the face of these problems our policy is drifting. We have neither developed carrots nor sticks with which to deal with Castro. The embargo is an irritant to Cuba but has not brought them to revise their policies, and it does reinforce their dependence on the Soviets. Our efforts toward normalization of relations and other partial efforts to solve our problems have not paid off. Cuban initiatives in Angola and Ethiopia have not evoked a forceful response from the U.S. nor have they deterred the establishment of a new Cuban presence in South Yemen, and Mozambique. We have mounted a political challenge in the NAM through friends but this has not really undercut the Cubans and our efforts are flagging. We have not conveyed clear signals regarding the Cuban activities in Africa, the Cuban military buildup, or on Central American or Caribbean issues.

In short, the Cubans have many irons in the fire and may believe they are free to expand their activities at will. Therefore, a reappraisal of our relations with both Cuba and the USSR is in order and we need to redefine the agreement or "understanding" under which the placement of nuclear and/or offensive weapons in Cuba is precluded.

Obviously actions we take vis-a-vis Cuba will have a Soviet dimension and could impinge adversely on U.S./USSR relations. The purpose of this paper is to stimulate discussion of the joint Cuban-USSR strategy as we see it, to describe comprehensively the pattern of Cuban action, and to catalog possible U.S. responses.

Disturbing Trends in Cuban Actions

—Continued buildup of Cuban military, civilian advisory and training personnel abroad in unprecedented numbers. (Some 39,000 military personnel and 11,000 civilian advisors in 20 countries.) Notable deployments include:

	<u>Military</u>	<u>Civilian Advisory</u>
—Angola	20,000	7000-9000
—Ethiopia	13,000	600
—Mozambique	600	300
—Iraq	UNK	400
—S. Yemen	500	200-300
—Vietnam	UNK	200-300
—Laos	UNK	50-150
—Grenada	70	200 (anticipated shortly)

Note: The trends have been upward in each of the countries cited above in recent years. Increases in civilian advisory personnel are anticipated in each of these countries and a presence in Afghanistan may be expected this year.

—Continued acquisition of sophisticated offensive military weapons systems which represent an increase of potential threat to the U.S. (MIG–23s, Foxtrot submarine and Whiskey trainer, with Cienfuegos base construction, and possibility of additional submarines and missile patrol boats are examples.)

—Increased military capability has increased Cuban options for possible military action against the U.S., especially in a global U.S.–USSR conflict or in support of destabilizing the Caribbean as a surrogate force for the Soviets. These actions generally support Soviet foreign policies, but could also support independent Cuban objectives—a fact that suggests that we may need to deal with Cuba as well as the Soviet Union in forestalling problems.

—Strenuous efforts to control the NAM Summit and establish firmly Castro's leadership. (In 1970 Cuba had diplomatic relations with 7 African nations, in 1979 with 36. It now has relations with 66 of the 88 NAM nations.)

—Conclusion recently of long term economic arrangements with the USSR, keeping Cuba in the Soviet camp for years to come.

Note: Though Moscow is trying to reduce the burden in 1981–1986, they will find it difficult to hold aid to Cuba below \$3 billion per year. With such a subsidy constituting 20–30% of Cuban GNP, intensification of Cuban-Soviet planning for 1981–86 period cannot but have an effect on Cuban policy. The largest subsidies are paid by the Soviets on sugar, nickel and petroleum.

—A record of unbroken success has given Cuban leaders greater confidence in overseas expeditionary forces as evidenced by their increased presence in the Middle East (S. Yemen), Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos), potentially in Afghanistan and now in the Eastern Caribbean (Grenada).

—More sophisticated ability to influence events by indirect methods—infiltration, organization and training in Cuba, advice, and funds—rather than direct intervention with personnel and arms. (Witness their behind the scenes approach in Central America. Also their sophisticated marshalling of support for radical movements in Puerto Rico and attempts to make Puerto Rican independence a major U.N. issue.)

—Continued revolutionary and terrorism training in Cuba and in some cases (Jamaican trainees) encouraging them to immigrate to the U.S. to foment revolution.

[Omitted here are the sections entitled “Cuban Objectives,” “U.S. Policy Dilemma,” “Desirable U.S. Policy Objectives,” “Actions To Achieve Our Policy Objectives,” and “Actions To Neutralize Cuban Activities on the Spot.”]

Actions To Take With The Soviets

Approach the Soviets at the highest level and review the entire situation of the influx of offensive weapons to Cuba and the joint Cuban/Soviet involvement overseas.

—We should be prepared to tie the approach to major U.S./USSR issues, including economic steps as well as political and military moves.

—Redefine the agreements and understandings which precluded the introduction of nuclear and offensive weapons into Cuba.

—Point out where the use of Cuban forces overseas are contributing to deterioration of our relations and outline steps we feel might alleviate the situation and steps we may be forced to take to counter such actions if they continue.

[Omitted here are the sections entitled “Actions To Take Regarding the NAM,” “Economic Actions,” and “Longer Term Actions.”]

Why These Courses of Action?

We believe that our current efforts toward normalization with Cuba, while achieving limited domestic benefits, have damaged our long term strategic interests. If our intelligence is correct, the Cubans now do not expect significant improvement in U.S./Cuban relations over the next few years. Therefore, they feel they have much to gain and nothing to lose by continuing their present course on issues of concern to the U.S. In order to make them moderate their actions, this perception must be reversed. Strong, across-the-board but progressively measured actions as outlined above will lay the groundwork for the United States to respond to disturbances in the Third World fomented by the Cubans and Soviets. Keeping the Cubans and Soviets “honest,” even at a short term cost to normalization, would be preferable to the unopposed activism of the Cubans and Soviets. It might well advance us more toward normalization with Cuba in the long term. It would increase U.S. prestige and credibility worldwide. And it would, most importantly, force reconsideration of what appears to be a joint Cuban/Russian attempt to project force in this hemisphere, i.e., introduction of offensive weapons, construction of bases.

Implications for U.S.–USSR Relations

If we depart from the premise that Cuba’s actions are motivated both by Castro’s “revolutionary” zeal and the level of support received from the USSR, then we need to either decrease the level of USSR sup-

port or increase the cost perceived by the USSR, since we have no ready way of countering Castro's mind-set. That is the purpose of the possible actions listed above, all of which in turn have a cost to us in terms of our relationships with the USSR. The point is that the Cuba-USSR joint program which we now consider poses serious policy considerations for the U.S., will not be moderated unless we find a way to exacerbate subtle ideological differences between the USSR and Cuba, or increase the cost to the USSR compared to the benefit of using Cuba as its surrogate, as has been so comprehensibly described in both DIA and CIA studies (SNIE 85-79² and TCS 2315-79/1). Just as Cuban actions can only be viewed in a Cuban/USSR context, U.S. counteraction must also be viewed in a U.S./USSR context.

² SNIE 85-79, entitled "The Cuban Foreign Policy," is in the Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 79R01012A.

195. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 24, 1979

SUBJECT

Aftermath of the Prisoner Exchange—Treatment of the Families (S)

The US-Soviet agreement on the prisoner exchange specified that members of the five prisoners' immediate families would be allowed to leave the Soviet Union "without obstacle or delay". The definition of "members of the immediate family" was not specified. (S)

While it seems likely that all members of the families who wish to leave will be allowed to do so (with the possible exception of the Ginzburg's "adopted" son) the Soviets have made every step of the process as difficult and unpleasant as possible. Numerous obstacles have been thrown in the path of the families' orderly departure. (S)

Both Mrs. Ginzburg and Mrs. Vins have been subjected to heavy surveillance in their homes, and whenever they venture out. Both have

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 53, USSR: 5/79. Secret. Sent for information. Carter initialed the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

also been treated with varying degrees of rudeness, reaching to outright intimidation, by local officials. Mrs. Vins' first attempt to meet with US officials about her departure was aborted when she was snatched into a car outside the US office. She was taken to a local police station and held for several hours. Despite numerous efforts, Mrs. Ginzburg has been unable to convince the authorities to turn her telephone back on so that she can cope with the job of disposing of three apartments, arranging her papers, settling her possessions, etc. (S)

Friends of the families who have tried to help out (collecting or selling possessions, help with photographs and documents, etc.) have been regularly harassed. Friends of Mrs. Ginzburg who drove to Tarusa to get some of her husband's belongings from his home there were stopped and thoroughly searched on their way back to Moscow. (S)

As happens so often in the USSR, the families often find themselves trapped in a Catch-22 situation. Mrs. Vins has been told that the power of attorney sent to her by her husband cannot be recognized because he is no longer a Soviet citizen. Mrs. Ginzburg is having trouble selling her husband's home in Tarusa because her power of attorney was taken from her by a bureaucrat who now refuses to give it back. (S)

There has also been the problem of false deadlines. On Friday, May 4, Mrs. Vins was informed by local officials that she would have to be prepared to leave the USSR by 11:00 a.m., Tuesday, May 8. Otherwise, she was told, the Soviet government would inform the US Embassy in Moscow that she declined to emigrate. Several other false deadlines have been set for Mrs. Vins and for the others. (S)

Two "members" of the families who wish to leave have so far been denied permission to do so. The Ginzburgs have an "adopted" son who has lived with them for eight years, though he was never formally adopted. He is currently serving his military tour and, as of today, the Soviet position is that he will have to complete it before he can leave. Pastor Vins has a niece who is very close to the family and who wishes to leave with them. So far she has been denied permission. Mrs. Vins has said that she will not leave without her, and the case is still being debated. (S)

In most of these cases, US protests—from Washington or Moscow—have corrected the problem. It is likely that many of the problems simply reflect the natural inclination of lower level Soviet bureaucrats in their dealings with any dissident. On the other hand, the number and extent of the obstacles indicate, at the very least, that government officials did not go out of their way to insure that the letter and spirit of the agreement be met. (S)

196. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 24, 1979

SUBJECT

Decisions on Summit Objectives

Much of what we do at the Summit must be prepared beforehand. Accordingly, we need your guidance on the particular objectives we should pursue on the major Summit agenda topics. As we discuss these with the Soviets, we will come back to you for further guidance.

I will also shortly give you an agenda paper for your use at the Summit, with suggested points keyed to the topics and our objectives.

I have divided the objectives into two categories (following the order of the agenda in each):

A. *Agreements/Understandings*: Specific outcomes that would be agreed between you and Brezhnev.

B. *Positions*. Areas where specific outcomes are not attainable or appropriate, but where we want to use the Summit to register/advance our positions and increase mutual understanding.

You will see that there are no regional issues under Agreements/Understandings and that all come under Positions. As I describe in my strategy memorandum, specific outcomes are unlikely at the Summit. This said, it will be critically important to convey our perspectives and positions clearly and firmly to the Soviets so they know where we (and they) stand. This may, at a minimum, heighten their sensitivity to our concerns and possible actions and reduce the chances of miscalculation. Opportunity to go further and reach some understandings could conceivably develop before and during the Summit. We will position ourselves to capitalize on it in the unlikely event that it does.²

A. AGREEMENTS/UNDERSTANDINGS

• *Communique vs. Declaration*. The Soviets have hinted interest in a broad declaration of principles on the relationship, picking up on the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 21, President, US-USSR Summit in Vienna, 9/16–18/79: Aaron Briefing Book. Secret. Sent for action. Brzezinski handwrote the date on the memorandum. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: "Zbig, CC Warren [Christopher]. J." Carter checked "yes" for each option, unless otherwise indicated.

² Carter wrote in the margin: "Too *Timid*. We should have clear goals & strive for them."

1972 Basic Principles.³ The communique can do the job and it is best to avoid sonorous statements that create unreal expectations and standards. We will push a communique, but come back to you if the Soviets push hard on a declaration.

Yes _____ Other _____⁴

- *Consultations*. Communique or, as an acceptable concession to the Soviets, a declaration on period consultations: Summits, Foreign Ministers, Defense Ministers/Chiefs of Staff.

Yes _____ Other _____⁵

- *SALT II* (apart from signature)

—*Backfire*: Brezhnev acknowledgment that will not exceed 30 per year to 1985 and that will not significantly increase range/payload capability. (Previously approved by you.)

Yes _____ Other _____

—*Telemetry*: Brezhnev confirmation of agreement based on your March 14 letter. (Previously approved by you.) Perhaps even a ban, but that's a long shot.

Yes _____ Other _____⁶

—*Reductions*: Brezhnev agreement to 2200 or 2175 vice 2250 by 1985 (you directed "exploration of symbolic cut" by 3%).⁷

—*Standstill*: Agreement not to take any actions inconsistent with the Treaty between signature and entry into force.

Yes _____ Other _____

- *SALT III*. Agreement to reduce to 1800 as SALT III goal.

Yes _____ Other _____⁸

³ See footnote 3, Document 4.

⁴ Carter checked yes and wrote in the margin, "Either suits me."

⁵ Carter checked yes and wrote in the margin, "As firm a schedule as practical."

⁶ Carter checked yes and wrote in the margin, "We should work for a ban."

⁷ Carter wrote in the margin, "Yes."

⁸ Carter checked neither option and wrote in the margin, "Too timid. Let us list what we want & work for it."

• *TNF*. Communique reference that “any future arms control limitations on the theater nuclear systems of the two sides should be “mutual” (but no formal commitment to negotiate to avoid preempting Allied TNF deployment and arms control decisions).

Yes _____ Other _____⁹

• *ASAT*. Sign initial agreement. If not ready, announce progress or agreement in principle with target date for completion set after SALT ratification (so as not to complicate the process).

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Non-proliferation*. Communique reference to South Asia problem or maybe a separate joint statement.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *CTB*. Soviet agreement to negotiate actively on NSS (details will take several months) without prejudice to differences on size of UK NSS network, and some public acknowledgment in the communique of the progress already made.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *MBFR*. Agreement on framework for a US-Soviet Phase I agreement to be negotiated by Vienna MBFR delegations (looks doubtful at this point). At a minimum, Soviet public acknowledgment of importance of associated measures for verification, stability, and confidence in any reduction agreements; stress importance of data.

Yes _____ Other _____¹⁰

• *RW*. Agreement on a joint-initiative to be submitted to summer session of Committee on Disarmament in Geneva.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Economic* (Jackson-Vanik, etc.). Private mutual understandings regarding “assurances” strategy for waiver, and a public statement by you later.

Yes _____ Other _____

⁹ Carter checked yes and wrote in the margin, “mutual?”

¹⁰ Carter checked yes and wrote in the margin, “As much as possible—get clear among us what *we* want.”

• *Bilateral Exchange Agreements.* Soviet commitment in commu-
 nique to more access and freer flow of information and people in ex-
 change programs (we have problems).

Yes _____ Other _____

Agreement to renew the Cultural Agreement (if can be renegoti-
 ated in time to take care of problem of balance, restrictions, etc.—other-
 wise only general communique endorsement).

Yes _____ Other _____

Media and Commercial Representation. Soviet agreement to greater
 equality and reciprocity in access, treatment, etc.

Yes _____ Other _____

B. POSITIONS

• *Exchange on the Overall Relationship.* Put your view of US-Soviet
 relations on the record so the Soviets are clear about what we want and
 do not want.

• *SALT II.* Stress need for Soviet restraint during ratification. Give
 Brezhnev your assessment of ratification process and, in that context,
 turn Soviets off if they raise non-circumvention or MPS.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *SALT III.* Stress commitment to prompt start of SALT III after ra-
 tification. Explore our general SALT III approach.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *TNF.* Make clear our concern with Soviet TNF (SS–20) and
 Western intent to respond. Convey interest in exploring arms control
 possibilities without commitment to negotiations (Allied problem).

Yes _____ Other _____

• *CTB.* Affirm high priority and intent to move expeditiously, but
 avoid impression that CTB can/will be finalized in next few months.

Yes _____ Other _____¹¹

¹¹ Carter checked yes, struck through the last clause “but avoid impression that
 CTB can/will be finalized in the next few months.” and wrote in the margin, “Let’s see
 what develops.”

• *Indian Ocean.* Register our concern that Soviet activities in the region burden the prospects for arms control. Agree to explore in regular diplomatic channels with Soviets the basis on which the negotiations might be resumed. (More would be counter-productive, given the need to maintain US military presence in the area.)

Yes _____ Other _____¹²

• *CAT.* Stress need to focus on practical regions—Latin America and Africa—if talks to move ahead. Suggest heads of delegations meet to settle mutually agreeable agenda, including regions, for Round V of talks.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Middle East.* Press Soviets not to oppose UNEF Sinai role.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Southern Africa.* Press Soviets to reduce Soviet/Cuban military involvement in Rhodesia. Make clear that deeper involvement will damage overall relations, force freeze on various fronts, including economic.

Yes _____¹³ Other _____

• *Persian Gulf and Arabian Peninsula.* Make clear we have vital interests at stake and will act firmly and expeditiously to protect them. We will counter Soviet or Soviet-supported attempts (Yemen) to destabilize region.

Yes _____ Other _____

Iran. Stress respect for independence and territorial integrity and non-interference in international affairs. Warn Soviets of mutual dangers of turmoil and instability and effect of Soviet media accusations of US plotting against new regime.

Yes _____ Other _____

¹² Carter checked neither option and wrote in the margin, "Spell out clearly what *we* want."

¹³ Carter checked yes and wrote in the margin, "Plus—ask them to join with us in effort to resolve issues."

Afghanistan. Press Soviets to show restraint and urge DRA restraint on relations with Pakistan and Iran; press acceptance of Durand Line as international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Horn of Africa.* Press reduction in Cuban troops and Soviet arms transfers (see also Cuba).

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Cuba.* Press Soviets to exert restraining influence on Cuban foreign involvement, noting that if it continues, increased pressure on Cuba rather than an easing of tensions will result. Stress that Soviet introduction of new and sophisticated weapons (MIG–23, attack submarines) and construction of new bases (Cienfuegos) to support them—in effect, the creation of a unique offensive capability—is inconsistent with the spirit of the 1962 Understanding and the demands of stability and our security. Make clear that it will result in expanded US military presence and activities in area, increased pressures on Cuba, strains in overall US–Soviet relationship, and it would relieve the US of the obligation we undertook to exercise self-restraint.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Southeast Asia.* Stress that Soviet operational military use/presence involving Vietnamese facilities will be met with stepped-up US security presence in area and cooperation with Japan, ASEAN—China.

Yes _____ Other _____

Urge Soviets to cooperate in resolving SEA conflict on terms acceptable to all parties.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *China.* Only if the Soviets raise the subject, assure Soviets that China opening means no diminution in importance we attach to good relations with Soviets. Hint that development of US–PRC security relationship will be influenced by Soviet actions (e.g., Vietnam). Encourage continued Soviet restraint vis-a-vis PRC.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Global Social and Economic Development.* Press Soviets to cooperate on global issues (LOS, WARC, space, grains) and to increase aid to poorer LDCs.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Economic*. Make clear that the political climate will not permit credits and will hinder trade, and that this climate depends on the overall relationship.

Yes _____ Other _____

• *Human Rights*. Register our concern regarding non-compliance with Helsinki (I will be back to you with specifics).

Yes _____ Other _____

Three sets of *consultations* are necessary concerning the Summit:

1. *With the Soviets before the Summit*, as indicated above. Talking to Dobrynin may suffice. But I still think a mission to Moscow is best. Your views?¹⁴

2. *With the Allies before and after*. Personal letters from you to major leaders (Schmidt visit) and Cy Vance's May 30 NATO meetings will do the job *before*. I suggest that David Aaron stop in Europe to debrief *after* the Summit.

Yes _____ Other _____¹⁵

3. *With the PRC before and after*. This is important so that the PRC does not misperceive the Summit as a slide into a US-Soviet condominium. I suggest you authorize me to brief Chai before, and that during the Tokyo Economic Summit (whose rules do not provide for my attendance) I spend two days in Peking to debrief my dear and personal friends (including Deng, whom I consider to be an international treasure!).

Yes _____ Other _____¹⁶

¹⁴ Carter wrote in the margin, "Dobrynin ok at this late date."

¹⁵ Carter struck through David Aaron's name and inserted "someone." Additionally, he checked yes and wrote in the margin, "David needs to be here with Fritz [Mondale] during Summit."

¹⁶ Carter checked neither option and wrote in the margin, "I think afterward is enough. Let's check with Cy."

197. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, May 29, 1979

SUBJECT

Summit Strategy

The memorandum that follows provides a framework for your approach to the summit by reviewing what we have learned from previous summits; by outlining the central objectives of the two sides; by identifying the key messages and accomplishments; and by describing the scenario and strategy for these negotiations.

Moreover, we attach at Tab A a more detailed statement of our tangible and intangible maximum objectives for the entire summit; Tab B² contains the Soviet text of the proposed joint communique; and Tab C³ contains a memorandum previously prepared by Bill Hyland on the experience of past summits.

History and Setting

Some months ago, you read Hyland's memorandum, and I would urge you to reread it (Tab C). In brief, it points out that some summits created unreal expectations and, hence, generated disillusionment (e.g., the first Nixon-Brezhnev Summit of 1972). Some were outright failures, notably Paris in 1960 (Khrushchev walked out over the U-2 incident), and Vienna in 1961 (Kennedy was browbeaten and assessed to be a weak leader). Despite its relatively low key, Glassboro was a rather unusual success in that it helped bring the USSR to recognize the need for a comprehensive strategic arms control process, despite the then-blazing Vietnam conflict.

You will be meeting Leonid Brezhnev in a setting of unusual uncertainty and difficulty. Never has the mixed character of the relationship of cooperation and competition been more in evidence. Despite the successful completion of SALT II, U.S.-Soviet relations are clearly strained by a number of conflicting interests. The United States is increasingly skeptical of Soviet intentions because of the momentum of its military programs and its intervention in the Third World. In the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—(Vienna Summit Briefing Book, 6/79) (1). Secret. Carter wrote the following names in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: Zbig [Brzezinski], David [Aaron], Warren [Christopher], and Marshall [Shulman].

² Tabs A and B are not attached.

³ Tab C is attached but not printed.

past, we could discount Soviet intentions because Soviet capabilities were limited; today, even benign Soviet intentions are becoming increasingly suspect because of the implications of Soviet capabilities.

A further and critical element of uncertainty is due to the fact that the Soviet Union is already undergoing the trauma of a succession crisis. We do not know when Brezhnev will be replaced nor by whom. However, at Vienna you will be communicating through Brezhnev with the whole collective leadership, and—hopefully—through it perhaps also with the next generation of Soviet leaders as well. In some ways this may diminish the importance of whatever personal rapport you can develop with Brezhnev, but it enhances the importance of the signals and messages that you will want to transmit.

The U.S. side is also an uncertain quantity to the Soviet side. The firm centerpiece of the relationship now is SALT but the fate of SALT II in the Senate is unsure. The sensitivity of the United States to assertive Soviet behavior in the developing world, combined with our reluctance to get involved, makes it difficult for the Soviets to predict our reactions and can create the possibility of dangerous miscalculations.

Soviet Objectives

The Soviets have ample reason to invest in the relationship. They do not want our economic and technological might mobilized against them. They do not want us to move closer to China.⁴ They want to reduce the chances that security issues in conflict between us boil up to confrontation, yet they are unlikely to yield their positions in Africa, the Middle East or anywhere else.

While you would like to accomplish as much as possible—including strengthening SALT II reductions, agreeing on a number of other arms control measures and reconciling differences in the Third World—the Soviets have made it clear to us that they would be satisfied with signing SALT and having a positive atmosphere. We have their draft communique (Tab B). It is down to earth and businesslike. It has the usual Soviet boiler plate but is surprisingly moderate and breaks little new ground. They want to minimize consideration of contentious security and regional issues. They are prepared to reach further agreement on ASAT and MBFR but we don't know whether they are willing to make the needed concessions. They say little about economic relations, obviously seeking to avoid being a supplicant.

In effect, the Soviet objective is to create the impression of a U.S.-Soviet partnership in the management of world affairs; to downplay

⁴ Carter underlined most of the previous two sentences.

the importance of the U.S.-Chinese relationship;⁵ to improve the atmospherics and some tangibles of the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship; but not to limit in any way Soviet freedom of action in regards either to Europe or some of the Third World areas of turbulence.

In addition, the schedule proposed by the Soviet side minimizes public exposure and thus diminishes their usual penchant for public camaraderie. Above all, we are getting one message—no surprises.⁶ Their approach is one of extreme caution. What they appear to fear most is the picture of a young U.S. President making dramatic initiatives (a la March 1977) without careful preparation in advance to ensure their acceptability to the Soviet leadership.

Tone and Style

Given the character of Soviet objectives, atmosphere will be a particularly important⁷ aspect of this summit. Every indication is that both sides seek a positive atmosphere. We should understand, however, that the Soviets have more to gain and less to lose than you do from pumping up the atmospherics. A glowing summit gives the Soviet leadership a boost at home and abroad, because they face no public comparison between pretense and actual results.

In managing the atmosphere and the substance of the summit, a number of points deserve being kept in mind:

1. There is little to be gained by philosophical discourse or ideological debate with the Soviet leaders; they are not psychologically confident enough to engage at the philosophical level as the Chinese do; in particular, trying to debate rules of conduct becomes frustrating because of the gap in perceptions;⁸

2. Concrete issues, however, are more easily resolved but only if they have been well prepared⁹ and the Soviets do not have to contend with surprises that have not been aired by the collective leadership;

3. Soviet leaders are quite sensitive to their personal treatment;¹⁰ they are particularly concerned over any slights reflecting the inferiority of the USSR. This will be a particularly important issue at this summit with Brezhnev's ill health. It is not in our interest to exploit his infirmities.

⁵ Carter underlined "a U.S.-Soviet partnership in the management of world affairs," "downplay," and "U.S.-Chinese relationship" in this clause.

⁶ Carter underlined "no surprises" in this sentence.

⁷ Carter underlined "atmosphere" and "particularly important" in this sentence.

⁸ Carter underlined "little to be gained," "ideological debate," and "rules of conduct" in this paragraph.

⁹ Carter underlined "concrete issues" and "well prepared" in this sentence.

¹⁰ Carter underlined most of the previous clause.

4. Meeting the “people” is of little interest to the Soviets. Their pre-occupation is with those who have the power of decision. As a concession to us, they have reluctantly agreed on a joint call by the two Presidents on Austrian President Kirchschlager.

5. There is no basis for “personal trust”;¹¹ the Soviet system breeds power struggles; it is unlikely they would trust foreigners if they do not trust their own colleagues; expecting Western leaders to act against their class or national interest would subject a Soviet leader to ridicule, if not worse, in the Politburo;

6. Talks, that is conversation, mean little¹² compared to the reassurance found in written documents and precise obligations; that is one reason why communiqués and joint principles and treaties have more importance in the USSR than in other diplomatic exchanges; but the “spirit” of a document is virtually non-existent;

7. The main value to you may be simply to get some feel for the mind set of the Soviets and their mode of reasoning. The top Soviet leaders do in fact have extraordinary power and will make decisions. But they have no great incentive to make concessions and thereby expose themselves politically.¹³ Negotiations therefore take place within a pre-defined framework, and on any issue it is important for the Soviets to point to the precise concession they extracted in the bargaining.

Scenario

We originally wanted at least four days of talks. The Soviets have reduced the time available for discussion by making the first and fourth days largely ceremonial and by insisting that your private meeting with Brezhnev be on the last day. At this point we have agreed to a minimum of seven hours of talks with the possibility of two more on the final day before signing the SALT Treaty.

This will put a premium on the conversations at the two dinners. Accordingly we have in mind making them as small as possible—you, Cy, Harold, me and Dave Jones on our side and Brezhnev, Gromyko, Alexandrov, Ustinov and Ogarkov on theirs. Soviet attendance however is not yet set.

Equally important is the sequence of substantive issues. The first working day (Saturday, June 16) will be devoted to SALT and other arms control issues. This will be an upbeat day and we will be the hosts for the talks and the dinner. The next day will be hosted by the Soviets and will involve more contentious arms control, security and regional issues.

¹¹ Carter underlined most of the previous clause.

¹² Carter underlined “Talks” and “mean little” in this sentence.

¹³ Carter underlined “no great incentive to make concessions” in this sentence.

This will be the most important meeting from the standpoint of conveying firmness and determination to defend our interests. It will inevitably be more downbeat, with the atmosphere more filled with conflict and tension. The last day will see a private meeting and the SALT and other document signing and this should provide a positive conclusion to the summit.

In effect we have something of a drama—at first things are good, then they turn tense, then finally there is a positive resolution. The toasts and your remarks at the signing ceremony will be the key indicators of what is transpiring and they must be carefully crafted with that in mind. At the outset of the talks we must be careful to moderate expectations. The theme of SALT plus serious consultations,¹⁴ as we agreed previously, is the best note to strike before the summit begins.

U.S. Strategy and Objectives

This wary and uncertain setting makes it important that we concentrate on those objectives that have the greatest potential for longer term impact on the U.S.-Soviet relationship. I would define the central strategic objectives of the Vienna Summit in the following terms:

1. To consummate SALT II and to initiate SALT III;
2. To give additional impetus to further U.S.-Soviet arms control measures (such as ASAT, MBFR, CTB, CAT, etc.);
3. To make not only Brezhnev but also the Soviet leaders who stayed at home more aware that the U.S. sees the Soviet Union as insensitive to our vital interests or concerns in such regions as the Middle East, Southern Africa, Cuba, and Vietnam.¹⁵

In effect, your objective is to demonstrate that the United States can successfully manage the contradictory positive and negative tendencies in our relationship. To do that, you must articulate a conception of a reciprocal and realistic detente, based not only on the common interest in avoiding nuclear war, but also on genuine respect for each side's security concerns.¹⁶ This requires that you be candid with the Soviet leaders about our deep dissatisfaction with Soviet performance on a whole range of security-related issues. They must be made to understand that to move in a constructive direction now, U.S.-Soviet relations must involve positive Soviet behavior on key security issues of paramount U.S. concern.

¹⁴ Carter underlined "SALT plus serious consultations" in this clause.

¹⁵ Carter underlined "our vital interests" in this sentence. He underlined "Middle East" and "Southern Africa" and wrote "OK" underneath each of them. He underlined "Cuba" and "Vietnam" and wrote a question mark under each. In the margin Carter wrote, "W. Europe, S. Asia, N. Africa, Mediterranean."

¹⁶ Carter underlined the following phrases in this sentence: "common interest in avoiding nuclear war" and "respect for each side's security."

At the same time, Soviet leaders must be convinced that our complaints do not derive from a desire for bad U.S.-Soviet relations, or from the desire to gain a one-sided advantage—but that we genuinely wish those relations to improve.¹⁷

To this end, it is essential that all key members of your delegation be explicitly instructed to deliberately and repeatedly emphasize certain key and simple themes to their Soviet counterparts. Only a delegation that speaks with a united voice, that keeps repeating the same key themes is likely to convey the message that needs to be heard back in the Kremlin.

Accordingly, I would recommend that you instruct everyone going to Vienna to make the following points to every Soviet that they encounter:

1. The United States wishes to join the Soviet Union in containing the nuclear arms race through further cuts in SALT II and more ambitious cuts in SALT III, as well as through other arms control measures;¹⁸

2. The United States wishes to see the Soviet Union as a partner in dealing with many emerging global problems, the solution of which need not be the object of ideological disputes (food, development, energy, etc.);¹⁹

3. The United States cannot be indifferent to Soviet insensitivity to our concerns in such areas as the Middle East, Southern Africa, Vietnam, or Cuba—and such insensitivity will produce strong American reactions, particularly on matters which are of concern to the Soviet Union (e.g., China);²⁰

4. Soviet military buildup, both strategic and conventional, has gone beyond the point of legitimate defense needs, and is generating a genuine threat to the United States and its principal Allies—and unless the Soviet side shows restraint, the West, with the United States in the lead, will undertake major, comprehensive, and matching efforts.

If we succeed in communicating these messages effectively, we will have achieved our basic objectives. SALT II ratification will get a boost. Our Allies will maintain confidence in our leadership. You will have set a clear framework for a constructive U.S.-Soviet relationship regardless of who succeeds Brezhnev.

¹⁷ Carter underlined “we genuinely wish those relations to improve.”

¹⁸ Carter wrote “ok” in the margin next to this paragraph. Beneath the paragraph, he wrote, “We should mutually enhance verification techniques.”

¹⁹ Carter wrote “ok” in the margin next to this paragraph. Beneath the paragraph, he wrote, “Closer regular consultations.”

²⁰ Carter wrote underneath this paragraph, “V[iet]Nam, Cuba ok but too narrow. South Asia, North Africa more important.”

Next Steps

The final impression of the meeting will be shaped by the communique issued jointly by the two parties. It must be prepared well in advance. We need your guidance, therefore, on how to proceed on the full range of issues that are candidates for discussion.

In response to your admonition that we not be timid in our goals for the Summit, Tab A contains a statement of our maximum objectives organized around the agenda as it now stands. However, realism dictates the conclusion that not all these objectives will be attained at the Summit itself. The Soviets have also stressed to us that they desire “no surprises.” It follows therefore that these objectives need to be prioritized and prepared in advance with the Soviets.

Accordingly, I would welcome your guidance as to which of the items at Tab A you want us to pursue with particular vigor. Once I know your priorities, and with your permission, I will ask Dobrynin to join me and Christopher for a preliminary review of those items which ought to be discussed with the Soviets in advance of the Vienna Summit. In this manner, we will enhance the prospects of attaining not only our broad strategic objectives, but also the more concrete goals listed in Tab A.

198. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 6, 1979

SUBJECT

Emigration; Trade

PARTICIPANTS

US

Secretary Vance
Secretary Blumenthal
Marshall Shulman

USSR

Ambassador Dobrynin

Secretary Vance handed Dobrynin an oral note, text of which was as follows:

“In your message of May 16,² you indicated that you hoped our earlier message on emigration matters is not our last word on the subject. This note responds to that hope.

“We would like to propose that, at the Summit, President Carter raise the general subject of emigration with President Brezhnev. This discussion of emigration would be quite separate from any discussion at Vienna of other matters.

“President Carter would express the satisfaction of the American people with the existing trends in emigration from the Soviet Union in accordance with Soviet law, and he would say that he would like to be able to tell the American people that such trends can be expected to continue.

“We would hope that President Brezhnev would respond positively to President Carter’s interest in this area. We would be prepared to deal with any questions the Soviet side might raise regarding U.S. immigration law and policy.”

It was made clear to Dobrynin, who undertook to inform Moscow, that the questions to which the President would wish to have a positive response included whether any changes were contemplated in Soviet law or policy, whether the circumstances of applicants for emigration would be improved, whether the efficiency of emigration processing would be enhanced, and whether the criteria for refusal would be regularized.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, CV–AD, 6/5/79. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Shulman. Vance’s stamped initials appear on the memorandum.

² See Document 193.

Secretary Blumenthal, taking up a separate subject, outlined to Dobrynin the importance we attach to trade with the USSR. We had proposed communique language emphasizing this interest.

He told Dobrynin that we wished to break the impasse on MFN. The President is prepared to move, but there is no realistic possibility of changing the law. Our intention would be, at an appropriate time after the Summit, to initiate the procedure for granting MFN to the USSR under existing law.

Secretary Blumenthal indicated that in this process the President would make no explicit reference to any conversations at the Summit. Cabinet members in their Congressional testimony would confine themselves to statements that our action was based on enunciation of Soviet policies by responsible Soviet officials, including explanations given to Members of Congress visiting Moscow.

He noted that we were under pressure to grant MFN to China, and the Chinese are willing to give us assurances. It would not serve our mutual interests for US-China trade to be normalized without a parallel step in US-Soviet trade.

For the time being, we would propose to grant MFN without changing the provision of law which requires the President to recommend continuation each year, and gives Congress the opportunity to disapprove. Dobrynin asked whether this meant a year-by-year situation. Secretary Blumenthal responded that the agreement would be for three years, but it would be necessary to recommend a continuation each year.

Secretary Blumenthal expressed our view that this approach would be a significant step forward. He said we did not exclude the possibility that there might be some change in the law at some future time.

199. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, June 15, 1979, 6–6:20 p.m.

Carter-Brezhnev Meeting with President Kirchsclaeger
and Chancellor Kreisky

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Ambassador Wolf
Hamilton Jordan
Interpreters: Krimer and Obst

U.S.S.R.

President Brezhnev
U.S.S.R. Ambassador to Vienna
Two interpreters

Austria

President Kirchsclaeger
Chancellor Kreisky
Two interpreters

After some initial banter and welcoming remarks by President Kirchsclaeger, President Brezhnev asked if Kirchsclaeger could not make a speech so he could reply with a speech of his own, pulling out some prepared written remarks.

Kirchsclaeger replied that Austria was just a small country, therefore his speech would be very short, but he would be happy to accommodate Mr. Brezhnev. He hoped that Vienna would furnish a climate conducive to successful completion of the talks. Austria very much wished this visit to be a good one. Traditionally Austria had tried to

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Vienna Summit: (10/78–6/79). Secret. Drafted by U.S. interpreter Harry Obst. The meeting took place in the Office of the Austrian President at the Hofburg. Brezhnev and Carter met in Vienna from June 15 to 18. Carter described meeting Brezhnev in his memoirs: "I met President Leonid Brezhnev for the first time at the palace of Austrian President Rudolf Kirchsclaeger, where we were to pay a formal call on him and Chancellor Bruno Kreisky. I had carefully studied the latest intelligence reports about Brezhnev and his supposedly failing health, and had also heard from the French and German leaders that on his recent visits to their countries he had been frail and not always alert. Eager to see him, I hoped that he would be vigorous and able to conduct the long discussions that lay ahead.

"There was no need for me to worry. By arrangement, I arrived a few minutes ahead of Brezhnev. We greeted each other before an enormous contingent from the news media. He walked toward me slowly and carefully, but at a steady pace. Brezhnev seemed a little hesitant about approaching me, but I moved forward immediately and greeted him warmly." (*Keeping Faith*, pp. 243–244)

serve as a bridge between East and West and was willing to continue with that role.

Brezhnev started to read his statement haltingly and laboriously. He started by thanking the Austrian government for their hospitality and for having provided the opportunity for him to talk with President Carter. Twenty-five years ago the U.S.S.R. and the United States had been signatories of the state treaty guaranteeing Austrian neutrality in perpetuity.² Since that time contacts in many fields and cooperation between the Soviet Union and Austria had steadily improved. The treaty had provided the foundation for Austria to make a significant contribution to cooperation between other countries.

The motive of furthering international understanding which was the foundation for coming to Vienna and talks with President Carter was the same motive underlying the treatment of Austria by the U.S.S.R.

The central purpose of the Vienna summit was to try and find means to slow the arms race and to try to debate and possibly resolve other matters. The most important purpose, of course, as he had already indicated yesterday, was to sign the SALT TWO accord. He felt sure that all the people of the world, including the Austrian people, would welcome this agreement.

He was sorry that this visit would give him little time to see anything of Austria, but he was glad to be able to get a glimpse of Vienna. He would like to take this opportunity to officially and formally invite President Kirchsclaeger to pay a visit to the Soviet Union. He wanted him to not only see Moscow, but also visit other Russian cities.

Kirchsclaeger thanked Brezhnev for his remarks and for his invitation to come to the Soviet Union, which he was gladly accepting. Would President Carter also like to make a few remarks?

The President stated that that he felt that this meeting with President Brezhnev had long been overdue. It had taken two and a half years to reach the point where the two great powers could meet in Vienna. He felt sure that there would be considerably less delay in convening the next summit meeting between the two countries.

He felt certain that both the United States and the Soviet Union had come to Vienna determined to make this summit meeting a success. Brezhnev had a strenuous schedule ahead of him with four hours of negotiations each day plus having to go to the opera this eve-

² The Austrian State Treaty, signed May 15, 1955, by Austria, France, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, eliminated four-power occupation, established Austria's sovereignty, and guaranteed its neutrality. See *Foreign Relations, 1955–1957*, vol. V, Austrian State Treaty; Summit and Foreign Ministers Meetings, 1955, Documents 74 and 76.

ning. He was sure (said somewhat teasingly) that Brezhnev's vigor would measure up to the schedule.

His meeting with Brezhnev would offer an opportunity to discuss in depth not only SALT and disarmament, but also other matters of interest to the two countries and to the entire world.

He was struck by the beauty of Austria and by the genuine hospitality of the Austrian people. He was personally gratified that the Vienna Opera, of which he would get a first sample tonight, had agreed to come to the United States in the fall. The American people were looking forward to this event with great excitement. This was but another demonstration of the many ties of friendship existing between the Austrian and the American peoples.

Kirchschlaeger thanked President Carter for his remarks. Turning to Brezhnev, he repeated one more time that he was happy to accept the Soviet invitation to visit the Soviet Union. He was struck by the fact that President Carter in his arrival statement and President Brezhnev in his remarks just made had voiced very similar views on the importance of the state treaty of 1955 and of maintaining the neutrality status of the Republic of Austria. One could therefore conclude that the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union had already come to their first agreement during their Vienna summit meeting. (After Brezhnev began to understand the significance of this remark after two translations, he laughed heartily and turning to President Carter, said, "good!") Would the Chairman come to the opera tonight?

Brezhnev said that he was rather tired.

The President interjected he should really not go if he was feeling tired.

Brezhnev (turning to Carter) said, "Will you go?"

The President: "Yes, I and my wife will go. We have an advantage over you, as we have had one night's rest in Vienna."

Brezhnev (haltingly and after some deliberation): "then Brezhnev probably will go, too, at least for the first act."

Kirchschlaeger interjected that one did not need to sit through all operas until the bitter end.

The President (to Brezhnev): "As I told you before, I came here one day earlier and have had more rest than you. But if you could come just for the first act, that would be very nice. It would give us an opportunity to be together and shake hands."

200. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, June 16, 1979, 11 a.m.–12:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

First Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
General David Jones
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Dr. Joseph Powell
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. William D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

President Leonid I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Marshal Dimitriy F. Ustinov
Mr. Konstantin U. Chernenko
First Deputy Foreign Minister Georgiy M. Korniyenko
Ambassador Anatoliy A. Dobrynin
Marshal Nikolay Ogarkov
Mr. Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Mr. Leonid M. Zamyatin
Mr. Vavilov
Mr. Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The President welcomed President Brezhnev and said that according to the lot that was cast, he would speak first at this meeting.

Brezhnev nonetheless said he would speak first and proceeded to read his prepared statement.

Brezhnev said that he was happy to meet President Carter and get personally acquainted with him. Naturally, without ever having seen each other in person, they had already known each other for a long time. Nevertheless, such knowledge can never replace personal contact between the leaders of states, particularly such large states as the Soviet Union and the United States.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 75, Subject: Box 8. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place at the U.S. Embassy. Drafted by Krimer; approved by Bartholomew.

Brezhnev noted that the attention of people throughout the world was riveted on this meeting. Naturally, not everybody would wish them success. There were some people in the world who thought of nothing but what they could do to worsen Soviet-American relations, to frustrate detente and intensify international tensions. Fortunately, most people throughout the world had pinned their hopes on this meeting, believing that it would reduce the risk of war and consolidate peace.

Brezhnev was firmly convinced that it was his and the President's duty to do all in their power to justify those hopes. The SALT Treaty which he and the President were to sign will, of course, be the major outcome of this meeting. Along with this, however, they will also be in a position to discuss a number of other problems that were far from simple.

Brezhnev said that it had been agreed to start the discussion by addressing fundamental problems of Soviet-American relations. After all, if one had complete knowledge of the fundamental premises on which each side based its policy, it would become much easier to get to the bottom of the problems and resolve them. Brezhnev expressed the hope that the discussion between them would be frank and constructive. Of course, it would not be possible to accomplish everything all at once. But, by getting a better understanding of the position of each side, they could engage in an attempt to bring the positions of the sides closer together, to come to mutual understanding on some problems and to resolve them. Brezhnev felt that it was his and the President's duty to accomplish that and he expressed his trust that the President would agree with him in this respect. In view of their economic and military power and their broad international activities, the Soviet Union and the United States bore a special responsibility for the destiny of peace. In essence, the matter could be put as follows: "If we have good relations and mutual understanding between our countries, there will be peace, there will be no nuclear war, for jointly we will always be able to prevent that. And that we must do, I want to repeat and emphasize—we must." In Brezhnev's view, this alone should promptly move our two countries toward putting the relations between them in order, so as jointly to move toward peace and not aggravate relations between them. This is by no means simply a kind wish. Soviet-American relations began to develop not just yesterday. They are based on a certain foundation and long experience, in some cases negative, in some others positive. Brezhnev could recall a time when our two countries were allies in the fight against a common enemy—Hitlerite Germany. That was followed by the long and fruitless period of the Cold War with all the crises it produced, which was detrimental to the interests of both our countries and poisoned the political atmosphere in the entire

world. It had not been a simple thing to start restructuring Soviet-American relations which had been burdened by the inertia of the Cold War. The efforts of both sides were required for this; the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union met each other several times and eventually a turn in the relations between the two countries was achieved. It led to normal contacts and in some cases even to mutually advantageous cooperation. There is no doubt at all that this has been a major achievement. It is true that there are some people in various parts of the world, including some in the United States, who are not at all pleased by that turn of events. They began to allege, for example, that detente is a one-way street, that it was of greater benefit to the Soviet Union than to the United States. In substance, these people looked at things from the standpoint of who derived greater benefit from peace. But, Brezhnev would ask, is there any instrument that could measure who stands to gain more from peace? For his part, he and his people believed that peace was equally necessary for all the people of all the countries on earth. He would repeat and stress "all the people."

Brezhnev said that in thinking of Soviet-American relations he had always proceeded from the principle of peaceful co-existence between states with different social and economic systems. Indeed, there were fundamental differences between the economic and social structures of our two countries. But, he would ask, did that mean that it was necessary to exacerbate relations between us, thereby creating the risk of nuclear war? After all, neither country would be in a position to wipe the other off the face of the earth, nor will either country be able to restructure the other. He believed that in recognizing such differences, it was important to proceed in a peaceful manner and to resolve disputes in a peaceful way. It was necessary to respect the right of each people. . . (Pointing across the table, at Cy Vance Brezhnev said: "He is the only one who does not want that". Brezhnev noted that everybody had smiled at this comment of his, so it must be true. In any case, he heard no rebuttals.)

A turn for the better in the relations between our two countries had become possible precisely because the leadership of the two states had agreed to structure the relations between them on the principle of complete equality, equal security, respect for each other's legitimate interests, and non-interference in each other's affairs; in brief—the principle of peaceful coexistence. That understanding had been sealed by signatures at the very highest level. On that basis it had become possible to conclude the first agreement on the limitation of arms, above all, strategic arms; it had also become possible to sign a joint document of profound fundamental importance—the Agreement on the Preven-

tion of Nuclear War.² It had also become possible to cooperate on a number of international problems. On that basis a whole network of bilateral agreements had been established which made up the living tissue of the ties and contacts between our two states. Of course, a steady development of relations between states becomes possible only if each partner observes continuity in pursuing his policy. Without that, agreements between states would not be worth very much.

Brezhnev noted that at this meeting President Carter and he would be discussing a number of serious issues and adopt important decisions with regard to these issues. What would happen, however, if subsequently one of the sides, for reasons of its own, were to start revising those decisions or begin acting as if they did not exist at all? Would the time and effort expended on these negotiations have been worthwhile? The answer, of course, was—hardly. As far as the Soviet Union was concerned, it pursued a consistent policy. The Soviet state and party leadership, and the entire Soviet people believed that Soviet-American relations should be peaceful and should provide for broad cooperation over the long term. Brezhnev said that on more than one occasion he had said just that, and he was prepared to reiterate this now: the Soviet Union did not have any hostile intentions with respect to the United States. It did not seek any advantages or benefits at the expense of the United States anywhere in the world. He referred to the so-called “Soviet threat” that was so frequently cited. Any attempt to ascribe any bellicose intentions or designs to the Soviet Union were based on sheer fabrications and could only play into the hands of those who wanted to sow enmity between the Soviet Union and the United States and even set the two powers against each other. Of course, the Soviet Union, like the United States, is a state with broad global interests and has certain principles on which its policy was based, principles it could not give up. The Soviet Union has allies and friends, it has treaties providing for certain obligations with respect to these allies and friends, with whom it has interests in common that would be safeguarded against any encroachment. The Soviet Union had declared its solidarity with people who were struggling for independence and social progress, because it believed this to be just. It was by no means by Soviet efforts that a number of rotting regimes had collapsed and that a number of countries had asserted their independence. That process was governed by its own inexorable laws. Revolutionary changes occur as a result of conditions within a national territory, and it would only be self-deception to ascribe such changes to “Moscow intrigues”. The Soviet Union was opposed in principle to the export of revolution, just as it

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 122 and 129.

was opposed to the export of counter-revolution. That had been said a long time ago by Lenin.

If one were to read a number of articles in the U.S. press or certain statements by certain politicians, it would appear that the only thing the Soviet leadership was thinking of was how to organize a coup d'état in one part of the world or another. Sometimes attempts are made to base practical political action on such false premises. In Brezhnev's view, this was nothing but a dangerous self-delusion. He would stress over and over again that the Soviet Union did not have any hostile designs against the United States, that it was not in any way striving to prejudice legitimate American interests. On the other hand, the Soviet Union was entitled to expect a reciprocal attitude on the part of the United States. Brezhnev repeated and emphasized that thought. Regretfully, he had to state that in recent years the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States had been uneven. In a number of directions these relations had evidently been thrown back. He was deeply convinced that this was not in accord with the fundamental interests of either country.

Brezhnev told the President that the Soviet leadership had noted with great satisfaction those statements the President had made which favored good relations between our two countries and spoke of ridding mankind of the threat of war. But, speaking frankly, he would ask what, then, was the purpose of those ever increasing military outlays and the persistent buildup of military forces? Was it to achieve superiority over the Soviet Union? For its part, the Soviet Union was not seeking superiority over the United States, but could not, of course, allow such superiority to be acquired by the United States. What, then, was the sense in whipping up an arms race? Experience clearly showed that an arms race did not result in greater security or peace, but rather the opposite. The true path toward strengthening security was to lower levels of military confrontation, reduce existing stocks of arms, nuclear as well as conventional. Of course, this would only be possible if there were no attempt to upset the obtaining balance of forces, if there were no attempt to violate the basic principle of equal security. Whether or not the United States will take that path would depend above all on what general policy the United States intended to follow with respect to the Soviet Union. Quite frequently the concept of combining competition and cooperation between our nations was voiced in the United States. In the Soviet view, that formula rests on quicksand. It could hardly serve as a reliable reference point for policy. In the United States the U.S.S.R. was frequently referred to as an adversary. By competition or rivalry our two countries would not be able to resolve a single problem of bilateral or international relations. Quite frequently the unfavorable atmosphere deliberately generated in the United States with

respect to Soviet-American relations was explained to the Soviet leadership by references to the stand taken by the mass media or by sentiment of certain Congressmen. That, the Soviet side was told, was beyond government control. He had to note, however, that sentiment was necessarily formed and influenced by the policy pursued by the government itself. He was mentioning this not because he wanted to start a debate on that subject; he was saying this simply because he wanted to eliminate whatever impeded the development of good relations between our two countries. The present meetings, in his view, should be aimed at just that, and should serve to improve Soviet-American relations. He would therefore call on the President to overcome the present stagnation and to continue their joint move toward peaceful and constructive purposes.

Brezhnev said that the main question to be clarified at the present meeting was the following: did the United States, like the Soviet Union, want the relations between our two countries to be truly good and stable and continue to develop to the mutual benefit of our nations and in the interests of universal peace? Was the United States prepared to conduct its policy toward the Soviet Union on a basis of equality without attempting to hide a stone under its shirt front?

For the moment Brezhnev would conclude his remarks on this note, and would express the hope that he would have the opportunity to hear President Carter express his own frank views on the fundamental aspects of the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The President thanked Brezhnev for his statement and said that he had listened to it with great attention. As Brezhnev had said, they were here addressing matters of great importance not only for the Soviet Union and the United States, but also for the people of the entire world. He and Brezhnev not only represented two great nations, perhaps the two greatest nations on earth, but also two nations that had never been military adversaries throughout history.

Brezhnev interrupted to say: "But our nations had been allies in the past".

The President said yes, it was his firm hope and highest goal to structure our relations with the Soviet Union on a stable basis in order to preserve peace in our common interests and in the interests of people throughout the world.

Brezhnev interrupted to say that he certainly welcomed this.

The President noted that the first words he and Brezhnev had exchanged when they first met yesterday were to the effect that this meeting was long overdue and that future meetings should not again be delayed for so long a period of time. When the President had said

yesterday that they must succeed, President Brezhnev had said that if they failed, God would not forgive them.

Foreign Minister Gromyko added that God in His Heaven was in a position to see all.

In the President's view, the most important single item for their current meeting was to conclude and sign the SALT Treaty.

Brezhnev said he fully agreed.

The President continued that in view of the rarity of meetings between them, they should also take full advantage of this opportunity to make progress on other matters of great importance to our two nations.

He and Brezhnev represented two great and strong nations, having different interests and different goals in some respects, but also nations which shared the search for greater security for our respective peoples, for peace between our nations and peace in the world and for the development of a stable and productive relationship. Quite often unnecessary differences arise between us as a result of lack of understanding and lack of adequate consultations on a regular basis. Brezhnev had been quite right in noting in an aside that the two Foreign Ministers had met quite frequently. Sometimes the President had the impression that the two Foreign Ministers did not share the same objectives.

Gromyko interrupted to say in protest: "That is a very bold statement."

The President noted that the top military leaders of our countries had not met since 1946, when a meeting took place between General Eisenhower and Marshal Zhukov.³ Sometimes when our heads of state had met—he believed it was ten times since World War II—the results had been less than productive. He wanted to salute President Brezhnev for initiating the concept of detente, which provided for increased stability between us. In the area of control over nuclear weapons, progress had been steady but slow. At Glassboro the groundwork had been laid for SALT I, primarily for the limitation of anti-ballistic systems. Now, after seven years of negotiation, we were approaching the conclusion of the SALT II Treaty which for the first time set ceilings on missiles and in some instances provided for reductions, but still permitted both sides large increases in the number of nuclear warheads. The negotiations for SALT III will be different and very important. Because of increasing accuracy our strategic missiles would become increasingly vulnerable, and that was a destabilizing factor. It made verifiability of the terms of the SALT agreement much more important and concealment of infor-

³ Dwight D. Eisenhower, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff; Georgy Zhukov, Supreme Military Commander of the Soviet Occupation Zone in Germany.

mation by both sides much more serious. We needed to explore deep cuts in nuclear arms, non-use of force, and limitation or termination of the production of nuclear weapons. He and Brezhnev will be discussing SALT further this afternoon. It was obvious that peaceful competition was inevitable and will remain, but some elements of that competition are of deep concern to us and are potentially destabilizing. Those actions of both sides which concerned the other nation should be discussed fully so as to understand them, alleviate concerns and resolve difficulties. Neither nation can hope to dominate the other. Each is too powerful to be dominated by others. At the same time, there is enormous waste of natural and human resources, in the arms race, in nuclear and conventional weapons. There is also waste in the development of unnecessary capabilities, and in taking actions to prevent regional hegemony by one nation which might concern the other. As the President had heard Brezhnev say many times, the cost of miscalculation or misunderstanding that could result from the explosion of just one atomic weapon would indeed be catastrophic and must be avoided. Because of human nature, each country tended to exaggerate the actions of the other. The natural desire for secrecy is counterproductive and could lead to harmful consequences because it could build up suspicions and induce the other country to develop countermeasures when they may not be necessary.

Brezhnev interrupted and said he wanted to say something off the record, requesting that no notes be taken. He noted that President Carter had already approved a military budget for the coming year which significantly increased by billions of dollars the sums of money allocated to military use. Brezhnev did not know whether this was to be believed or not. The basic issue was this: when he and President Carter sign the SALT Treaty, that will, of course, be a major step, but they still will not be ridding mankind of the risk of perishing in an all-out war. Whether they believed it or not, the danger was very great indeed because just one button could set off a nuclear catastrophe that would blow the whole world to smithereens. In his view, he and President Carter had the duty of getting their nations used to the idea of limiting strategic arms, and this warranted their moving forward to further steps in SALT III. That was the main reason why he and President Carter were signing the SALT II Treaty. He added that this was just an off-the-record remark.

The President said he, too, would like to make an off-the-record remark. He said it was our understanding that year after year in the last fifteen years the Soviet Union had steadily increased expenditures for weapons of all kinds, and that it had done so at a much greater rate than the United States. He said that it was incumbent upon us to exercise greater restraint.

Brezhnev said: "But we look to the United States for guidance (on military expenditures)."

The President said that he realized that we look at each other.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was not spending at a faster rate.

The President said that it was, and that is what our data show.

Brezhnev said: "In any event, we should not hide the truth from each other."

The President continued by saying that the fact was that the Soviet Union is a great and powerful nation, not afraid, and very confident in its own abilities and strength. It was also a fact that the United States was a great and powerful nation, not afraid, and very confident in its abilities and strength. We were looked upon by the rest of the world as being of approximately equal strength. This was a compliment to us both. The world also looked upon us as leaders. The President believed that Brezhnev and he should not let other countries or leaders hold them back if they saw clearly how to proceed in the interests of improving relations and making progress together. He hoped that this meeting would let them embark on a new and more productive course and practical steps toward defined objectives we shared. The President said that we should make a genuine effort to understand each other's concerns, the things that we do that concern each other.

Brezhnev interjected: "Yes, on the course of truth."

The President said each generation of leaders must make a maximum contribution to peace and stability. As Brezhnev well knew, elected leaders were frequently held back by committees and bureaucracies, but they could not always depend upon their successors to take actions they had failed to take themselves. The President would like to see a greater frequency of routine consultations between our two countries, particularly consultations between our military leaders. And both countries should recognize that there can be no superiority and no victor in nuclear war. It was critical that we exercise restraint in regional political competition, that we restrict our military intervention in trouble spots in the world, either directly or by proxy. It was important that we take care not to deprive either of our countries or, for that matter, any other country, of access to crucial natural resources.

In closing, the President wanted to repeat that arms control at this present stage in our relations was the centerpiece, that verification of agreements was of crucial importance and that we should not wait for completion of an agreement before taking further steps, that step-by-step progress be achieved as we reach agreement. This applied in equal measure to the strategic arms limitation talks, to the comprehensive test ban talks, to the negotiations concerning anti-satellite weapons, to

conventional arms transfers, mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe and obviously SALT III. The President was eager for progress in all these matters without any further delay. The President was also very eager to understand Soviet concerns about us and to explore, while here in Vienna, every possibility for cooperation. He was eager to lay the groundwork for resolution of present difficulties and misunderstandings and for progress in the future.

Brezhnev said: "Lunch time."

The President concluded by saying that he looked forward to seeing Brezhnev this afternoon and expressed the hope that the network of our bilateral relations can be strengthened.

Brezhnev said that they would sign the Treaty right after lunch.

Gromyko said: "No, two days from now."⁴

⁴ The second plenary meeting held between Carter and Brezhnev, June 16 from 5:35 to 7:20 p.m., which dealt entirely with SALT is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 239. For the text of the SALT II Treaty and related documents, see the Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1979, pp. 4–48.

201. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, June 16, 1979, 8:20–10 p.m.

SUBJECT

Dinner

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Mr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. D. Arensburger, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

President L.I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Minister of Defense D.F. Ustinov
Mr. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter (part time)

In the course of a non-substantive social conversation President Carter said that we intended to replace Ambassador Toon in Moscow by Mr. Tom Watson, a former president of IBM and a very distinguished American. This has not been announced publicly and the President wanted to inform President Brezhnev in advance. He handed to Brezhnev a brief biography of Mr. Watson, which the Soviet leader might wish to study. The President added that in his view this was a superior appointment because Watson was an outstanding businessman and an expert on arms control.

Brezhnev, turning to Foreign Minister Gromyko, said, "If they want to change their ambassador, let them."

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Dimitri Arensburger on June 17. The meeting took place at the Ambassador's residence.

202. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Vienna, June 17, 1979

Mr. President,

Strong and immediate progress on SALT III is important. I suggest:

- a) Commitment to deep cuts in weapons—below SALT II limits.
- b) No encryption of telemetry plus other moves toward easier verifiability.
- c) Stop production of nuclear warheads and launchers.
- d) Provide safe ocean haven areas for missile submarines to prevent destabilizing ASW developments.
- e) No tests of depressed trajectory submarine missile firing.
- f) Conclude comprehensive test ban treaty with or without Great Britain.²
- g) Pre-notification of missile tests and large strategic bomber exercises.
- h) No tests of anti-satellite systems or³ missiles.
- i) Regular consultations between military leaders and between heads of state & exchange visits.
- j) Begin talks to limit and control nuclear weapons not covered under SALT II.
- k) Implement agreements as they are concluded, without necessarily waiting for a final and complete SALT II agreement (for instance, SALT II limits might be lowered annually by 5% as mutually agreed to be advantageous).

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Materials, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Vienna Summit: (10/78–6/79). No classification marking. Carter wrote about the letter in his memoirs: “On the ride down the small elevator to lunch, Brezhnev and I were alone with the interpreters. At his request, I agreed to give him a written copy of my proposals concerning the next steps toward SALT III. Saying that this was the most important thing we could accomplish in Vienna, he suggested that we discuss the proposals further at our private meeting on Monday [June 18]. At the embassy, I printed out this note by hand and gave it to Brezhnev when we met again that afternoon.” (*Keeping Faith*, pp. 252–253)

² Carter handwrote this letter on a legal pad. The following words were written at the end of this point in an unidentified hand: “(Hopefully with them).” The parenthetical comment is attributed to the President in Carter’s memoirs, in which his letter to Brezhnev is reprinted. (*Ibid.*)

³ An unknown hand added the word “anti-satellite” before “missiles.” The addition also appears in Carter’s memoirs. (*Ibid.*)

l) No nuclear fuel sales to countries not under Non-Proliferation Treaty or IAEA safeguards.

Mr. President, these are some important and practical suggestions. We would like to have your concurrence and other suggestions which we might consider. I will discuss this with you tomorrow—

Respectfully,

Jimmy Carter

203. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, June 17, 1979, 11 a.m.–1 p.m.

SUBJECT

Third Plenary Meeting between President Carter and President Brezhnev

Topics: SALT III and other arms control issues

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance

Secretary of Defense Harold Brown

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

General David Jones

Mr. Hamilton Jordan

General G. Seignious

Ambassador Malcolm Toon

Mr. Joseph Powell

Mr. David Aaron

Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

President L.I. Brezhnev

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

Marshal D.F. Ustinov

Mr. K.U. Chernenko

Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko

Marshal N.V. Ogarkov

Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance EXDIS MemCons, 1979. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 20; approved by Aaron. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Mr. L.M. Zamyatin
Mr. V.G. Komplektov
Mr. A.M. Vavilov
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The *President* said he was grateful that a successfully completed SALT II agreement would be signed tomorrow. For the first time, this agreement places ceilings on nuclear arms and provides for reductions of certain nuclear arms. However, it is obvious that SALT II does not go far enough. It still permits a massive buildup in nuclear arms and a buildup in warheads, and we are concerned about the future and very eager to make progress today in deciding ways to explore how we can have a meaningful SALT III agreement. As President Brezhnev would know, under SALT II both nations are permitted to develop and deploy more than 10,000 nuclear warheads. This is a waste of national resources, but each nation is inclined to match the potential nuclear strength of the other. In addition to great numbers, technological advances, which are almost inevitable, can be very destabilizing in the future. With cruise missiles, new types of submarines with missiles, our own MX missile, improved accuracy of warheads, air defense systems, civil defense commitments and the very large ICBMs, like the SS-18, all these advances can be very destabilizing in the future. So, under SALT II, the nuclear arms race will continue, but the United States is ready to stop the arms race. The President was sure that Brezhnev understood the military and technical aspects of this problem. He would now like to outline briefly some steps they might explore together as they approached the SALT III negotiations.

The *President* said that, first of all, there was a need to improve the ability of both sides to verify compliance with the technical constraints that will be necessary in the future. Hopefully, they could eliminate all encryption of telemetric information. They might agree on pre-notification by both nations to the other of all missile flight-tests and of massive bomber exercises; they might find ways to improve monitoring stations, thereby increasing mutual trust, and perhaps might be able to provide for on-site inspection under certain circumstances. The *President* wanted to explore with Brezhnev every possible way of improving the quality of verification and to establish mutual trust.

The *President* stressed to President Brezhnev that the United States was ready for an agreement that would ensure large reductions in numbers of launchers, numbers of warheads and throwweight. As a matter of fact, the United States would be willing to explore an immediate moratorium on the construction of any new nuclear launchers and missile warheads. As a prelude to SALT III, we would be glad to explore with the Soviet Union a step-by-step approach to reductions even below the SALT II levels, perhaps 5% a year, provided such reduc-

tions were balanced, so that the agreement is in the interest of both sides. As far as the number of nuclear weapons which might be reduced, the *President* would like to explore with Brezhnev means by which the remaining nuclear weapons could be made less vulnerable to possible attack from the other country.

Marshal Ustinov interrupted to note that President Carter had mentioned the possibility of reducing the vulnerability of the remaining nuclear weapons to attack from the other side; would this not require new weapons, and would this not be inconsistent with the first part of the President's statement?

The *President* said that only in a defensive way was he talking about making missiles less vulnerable to pre-emptive attack. One example of what he meant would be a safe haven or sanctuary for strategic submarines in certain areas of the ocean that could be excluded from activities involved in anti-submarine warfare. We would also like to explore with the Soviets the possibility of prohibiting the testing of missiles in depressed trajectory, because such launches from submarines might abbreviate the time required for the flight of attacking missiles. We would also like to include further constraints on the modernization of weapons systems, a process started in the SALT II Treaty.

The *President* said that these were proposals that should be explored privately, perhaps between our respective military leaders. They were not designed for propaganda advantage but were designed to open up the prospect of real weapons control for the future. He was sure that the Soviet Union will have similar proposals to make, which he would be eager to explore with them.

Further, the *President* said we would like to proceed with a comprehensive nuclear test ban agreement, either with or without the participation of Great Britain. We will do everything possible to induce other nations, France, Great Britain and China, to join in substantial reductions in nuclear weapons development and deployment. Obviously he could not speak for them and would think that the Chinese would be difficult to persuade. But it is obvious that for several years now the United States and the Soviet Union had such massive nuclear inventories that their predominance over the other nuclear powers is adequate. Moreover, the Soviet SS-20 missiles and other medium-range systems constituted a formidable means for dealing with these nations. But the absence of nuclear cooperation from other countries should not be allowed to interfere with progress on a bilateral basis toward the SALT III agreement.

The *President* thought that, along with SALT III negotiations, we should join publicly in an effort aimed at non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and agree not to make sales of nuclear fuel or technology ex-

cept to those nations that were under the terms of the NPT or agreed-to IAEA safeguards.

The *President* said we were ready to sign a partial agreement with the Soviet Union on anti-satellite systems, an agreement to bar any damage or destruction of satellites and announce publicly that neither side has plans to test anti-satellite missiles or systems.

Finally, in his opening statement, the *President* wanted to mention the talks here in Vienna on mutual and balanced force reductions, negotiations which have now been carried on for more than five years. With consultation with our allies, the United States was ready to make progress in this effort. We would be willing to consider a first phase step limited to just the Soviet Union and the United States, if the Soviets agreed. This can be discussed between Secretary Brown and Marshal Ustinov, but it would be necessary to overcome the need for agreed data, based on a common definition of what a soldier is and who should be included. These obstacles should be overcome if the leaders are willing to make progress. The *President* added that we would have to agree on associated measures to verify an MBFR agreement. (Marshal Ustinov missed part of the translation so the President repeated his statement on the definition of armed forces to be included in MBFR so as to resolve the data question.) The *President* said that this concluded his presentation.

Brezhnev said that both he and President Carter had given a high assessment of the importance of the SALT II Treaty, and quite rightly so. But it must be admitted that on the whole, very little—in fact, almost nothing—had been done in terms of curbing the arms race. It was true that there had never been so many ongoing negotiations on arms control measures as today. But, in most cases, these talks have been marking time for years and going around in circles. In the meanwhile, the arms race continues. To *Brezhnev*, this appeared to be a disquieting situation. He believed it especially important to halt and reverse this tendency. In this respect, our two countries can do a great deal and there is every reason to take advantage of the success in SALT in order to provide an impetus to progress on other arms limitations.

Brezhnev wanted to draw the President's particular attention to the Soviet Union's proposal to halt the production of nuclear weapons and to gradually reduce nuclear stockpiles up to and including their complete elimination. In this process, the Soviet side proposed to take into consideration the difference in levels of stockpiles so that the balance is preserved and no harm done to the security of this or that state. He would repeat further that it was necessary to avoid a situation in which our two countries would be reducing their nuclear arsenals while other countries could continue to build up theirs.

Brezhnev noted that the Soviet proposal was on the negotiating table in the Committee on Disarmament. He would like to hope that the United States will add its word in support of that proposal. In this respect, the Soviet Union would not wish to claim any monopoly. If advisable, it could be presented as a joint proposal. Acting together, the Soviet Union and the United States can achieve a great deal to the benefit of all.

One of the key tasks at this time is to strengthen the regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. Where we have a common interest, let us go on acting jointly and in parallel to attract more countries to accede to the NPT. Here we had a clearly common interest to establish strict controls over materials, equipment and technology that can be used for making nuclear arms. The appearance of such weapons in areas in which there are acute conflicts, and in countries which assert territorial claims against other countries would be particularly dangerous. In this connection, it was enough just to mention the Middle East and South Africa. Disturbing news in this respect was coming out of Pakistan; perhaps the President had more information on that matter than did *Brezhnev*. He had already drawn the President's attention to current plans to supply China with nuclear reactors produced under American license. Unfortunately, he had to note that he still had not received a satisfactory reply. But he would ask the President to take a look at the knot that was being tied there. Both the Soviet Union and the United States had urged Pakistan and India to accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But Pakistan was now working on the development of its own nuclear weapons and was referring to India in this context. In fact, however, this was just a pretext. The Soviet leadership believed the statement made by the leaders of India to the effect that their country did not intend to produce nuclear weapons. This had been reaffirmed again just recently by Prime Minister Desai.² At the same time, India was reluctant to sign the NPT at a time when the Western countries were engaged in helping the Chinese to build up their military might, including their nuclear potential. After all, the Chinese harbored territorial claims against India and were not at all averse to resorting to outright aggression against neighboring countries.

Turning to another subject, *Brezhnev* said it would be very important promptly to complete and sign a treaty on the general and complete prohibition of nuclear weapon testing. The Soviet Union had done a great deal in that direction, having met Western positions on a number of important matters. Speaking frankly, he would have to say that the CTB negotiations were being slowed and delayed, and by no means through any fault of the Soviet Union. *Brezhnev* expressed the

² Morarji Desai, Prime Minister of India.

hope that the United States and England will change their inflexible approach, in particular, to questions of verification. If that were done, all three partners could jointly and without further delay finalize their agreement on this important and necessary measure.

Brezhnev turned to the negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Together with its allies the USSR had made many efforts to reach an agreement that would be fair and equitable to all. President Carter, himself, and other leaders in Western Europe had noted the constructive nature of the Soviet proposal tabled in June 1978. Nonetheless, the negotiations are still marking time. Quite recently in Washington, the Soviet side had set forth its considerations on how to move things forward in this field by proposing that our two countries reduce their forces and armaments in Central Europe by way of a first step, without thereby prejudicing the fundamental positions of the sides at the Vienna negotiations, and for the time being, to leave aside everything that has been slowing down these negotiations. Unfortunately, in response, the Eastern countries had heard only the very same unacceptable demands on which the West had insisted all along at the Vienna talks. *Brezhnev* expressed the hope that this had not been the last word of the US side. If the United States was willing to reach agreement, the Soviet Union could take some very substantive steps in the context of the reduction of the level of forces in the first phase. *Brezhnev* asked Foreign Minister Gromyko to comment on this subject.

Gromyko noted that *Brezhnev* had already drawn attention to the importance of this matter and to the difficulties the Soviet side had come up against in Vienna. If one tried to get to the bottom of the complications besetting the talks, one would have to note that the Soviet Union was being told that it and its allies have a certain number of forces, and actual figures have been named. However, the figures cited exceeded by more than 150,000 the real strength of our armed forces and that of our allies. *Gromyko* repeated and stressed the figure 150,000. He pointed out that the East had said that it did not have those 150,000 troops, so how could it admit to their existence? Then, the East was told that if it did not recognize that number, it will be impossible to reach an understanding on the other matters being discussed in Vienna. The *President* interjected, "how do you suggest we reconcile this issue?" *Gromyko* continued by saying, when the East asked where that 150,000 figure came from, it received no answer. He could only conclude that the West had unreliable sources.

Gromyko said that in order to move these negotiations forward, the Soviets had recently made a second proposal. That proposal was a response to the questions the West had asked. The Soviet Union had suggested to circumvent the difficulties that had arisen at the negotiations by reaching a first understanding concerning the armed forces and ar-

maments of only the Soviet Union and the United States. In this context, the Soviet Union had made a specific proposal, suggesting specific numbers. But, in response, it had been confronted by the very same conditions that had been put forward at the general talks in Vienna; i.e., the question of current numbers. As a result, the talks are bogged down, and no progress is made. He would ask the President to take a fresh look at this business, because he felt that the present delay was entirely artificial. The Soviet Union felt that it would be a good thing if agreement could be reached by way of a first step between our two countries alone. The Soviet Union would like to see this happen and this is what President Brezhnev had emphasized in his statement.

President Carter thought that this was something that could be resolved today. He would ask Secretary Brown to represent him and meet with a Soviet representative this afternoon to engage in serious discussion and see if this matter could be moved forward.³ He believed that the suggestion of the Soviet Union that our two countries agree on a first step of reductions was a good one. Gromyko had asked what the difference in numbers in terms of data base consisted of. Secretary Brown would be prepared to discuss that, as well as the Soviet proposal, in an effort to move rapidly on this matter. The US side would be prepared to begin immediately after this meeting. Secretary Brown would represent the President and perhaps Brezhnev could choose someone to represent him in an effort to resolve this matter—perhaps today.

Marshal Ustinov remarked that Gromyko had somewhat underestimated when he said the difference was 150,000 men. The actual difference was closer to 180,000.

Gromyko said that he had named 150,000 as a minimum figure.

Marshal Ustinov said it would still be possible that Secretary Brown and he might fail to reach agreement, unless a decision of principle was taken at this table on a percentage reduction or on specific numbers of forces.

Gromyko pointed out that the Soviet side had named specific figures; i.e., 7% or 10%, or so many divisions and warheads on the Soviet side, and so many brigades and warheads on the US side. What was needed now was a decision in principle.

President Carter said he would like to see if this matter could be clarified. In his view, we did not have nearly so wide a difference as was assumed. Soviet troop strength could be discussed between Mar-

³ The memorandum of conversation for this meeting, June 17 at 3:30 p.m., is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 75, Subject: Box 8.

shal Ustinov and Secretary Brown, and he would agree that the first step be confined to Soviet and US forces. Secondly, we would like to explain to the Soviet side the basis for the disparity in numbers in detail. It might or might not be possible to agree on data. Third, we would like to discuss actual reductions that would be acceptable to both sides. To answer Gromyko's other question, we had no choice between a proposal to reduce specific numbers or, if preferred, to reduce by certain percentages. Either method was acceptable to us as a basis for discussion. The Soviet proposal to reduce specific numbers was satisfactory to us in principle.

Brezhnev said that an understanding on these matters would be a first practical step by our two countries and would set a good example for the other countries involved in the negotiations in terms of lessening the high concentration of forces and weapons in Central Europe. He was certain that a step of this kind would have great political significance and would be widely applauded throughout the world.

The *President* said he agreed and suggested we try to resolve this today.

Brezhnev said he would welcome that.

Turning to other disarmament issues, *Brezhnev* first wanted to remind the *President* that the Soviet Union was firmly in favor of disarmament and in favor of a comprehensive agreement prohibiting the development of new types of weapons of mass destruction. The Soviet Union considered this to be a correct way of proceeding and was prepared at any time to begin practical discussions of this matter. Unfortunately, the United States and its NATO allies had not manifested such willingness to date. Well, the Soviet side would have to wait until the appropriate situation matured. But in the meanwhile, as he saw it, it might well be possible to reach agreement on such partial measures as prohibition of radiological weapons and prohibition of chemical weapons, mutual renunciation of the manufacture of neutron weapons and some other actions to reduce the scope of military competition between our countries and in the world at large. Here, again, he would ask Gromyko to review the general state of affairs.

Gromyko noted that the Soviet Union was engaged in negotiations with the United States on some other partial disarmament questions, apart from mutual force reductions. The radiological weapons negotiations were scheduled to begin literally three days after conclusion of the current meeting. In general, at these negotiations, the situation was encouraging. There were a few minor remaining differences which could probably be eliminated quickly. He hoped that this would be so and that both sides would make a major effort to achieve the goal of bringing these negotiations to a successful conclusion. What was con-

templated in this area was the signing of an international convention on the prohibition of radiological weapons.

Turning to neutron weapons, *Gromyko* noted that the Soviet Union had tabled a proposal at the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, proposing that these weapons be prohibited and that both our nations be a party to such an agreement. The Soviet Union had stated its views on this matter more than once and, in particular, this had been emphasized repeatedly by President Brezhnev. The Soviet Union believed that the manufacture and deployment of weapons of this kind would be a major negative step that would adversely affect relations between our two countries and the international atmosphere as a whole. He would therefore express the hope that President Carter personally and the United States approach this matter seriously and that an agreement be reached which would serve the interests of improving relations between us and the interests of detente and peace.

Turning to chemical weapons and the possibility of reaching agreement to prohibit such weapons, *Gromyko* noted that the negotiations on this question are proceeding badly and in an unsatisfactory way. It would evidently be difficult to go into detail at this meeting, but he wanted to make two points in this connection. First, we had major differences between our views on questions relating to verification in this connection and, secondly, for an agreement on chemical weapons to be effective, it was important that all major powers, and certainly the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, join in such an agreement. What kind of an agreement would that be without the participation of China? Could one really agree to a situation in which the Chinese alone would have a free hand to manufacture chemical weapons? These were the major points to which he wanted to draw the President's attention.

Turning to anti-satellite systems, *Gromyko* said that Secretary Vance and he had discussed this matter just two days ago. He did not believe it necessary to repeat what he had said to Secretary Vance. The President was well aware of the Soviet position. The difference between our respective positions was very great indeed, and he would ask the President to take a more objective look at this matter. An agreement could not possibly be one-sided, benefiting the United States alone.

When *Gromyko* turned to conventional arms transfers, the *President* interjected a few comments on the anti-satellite talks. We had not complained about the Soviet-manned Soyuz/Salyut flights, and had not asserted that they were anti-satellite systems. Our space shuttle will not be designed as an anti-satellite system. It was the very center of our space effort in the future. The *President* hoped that this would not be allowed to block progress in the talks because we are going to continue

developing this vehicle. This was not a departure from our overall space effort, and if the Soviets took the position that the shuttle was being developed as an anti-satellite system, we would only assure them that it definitely was not.

Gromyko said that the Soviet Union was in favor of continuing these negotiations, but it would be impossible to reach agreement on the basis of the US position.

Returning to conventional arms transfers, *Gromyko* noted that the negotiations had begun some time ago and seemed to move right along, but then the representatives of the United States had proposed to discuss conventional arms transfers on a regional basis. In brief, the regions mentioned were those in which the United States was interested. When Soviet representatives mentioned other areas and countries of concern to both sides, US representatives had simply refused to discuss them. Such a unilateral approach could not possibly be acceptable to the Soviet side, so US representatives had simply walked out of the talks and had returned home. Thus, the conventional arms transfers talks were now in a state of suspense.

The President said with respect to conventional arms transfers that our position has been that we should not begin with areas where each country was deeply involved. We provide military assistance to South Korea and Japan, for example. The Soviet Union provided military assistance to Vietnam and Ethiopia. We would want to concentrate in the beginning on areas where there was not that much controversy, where our two countries were not involved by commitments of long standing.

Gromyko said the Soviet Union would be prepared to resume the conventional arms transfer negotiations.

Gromyko turned to the talks on the Indian Ocean and limitation of military activities in that area. He noted that the talks on this subject had begun at a lively pace, but then the U.S. had unilaterally suspended them and no discussions were in progress at this time. He thought that perhaps the United States might be prepared to resume the talks, but pointed out that in the absence of these negotiations the United States had continued its activities aimed at strengthening the Diego Garcia base, and in general had intensified naval activities in that area. The Soviet side was prepared to continue negotiations on this subject, but he wanted to draw the President's attention to the fact that it would be impossible to do so without a change in the position of the United States.

As for the Indian Ocean, *The President* said that we had never renounced developing the Diego Garcia base. What had occurred was massive Soviet arms supply to Ethiopia and before that to Somalia, along with the presence of thousands of Cuban troops in the Horn. Now the Soviet Union was building up arms in Afghanistan. Thus, the

situation had changed. In order to bring about a stable situation there had to be nonintervention and respect for international borders, and the Soviet Union nor Cuba would not inject themselves into regional military altercations. Such involvement caused us deep concern.

Brezhnev wanted to present another idea, suggesting that the two sides take a broad look at naval affairs. At one time he had already said that he did not think it was an ideal situation where the navies of the great powers cruise thousands of miles from their home territory for long periods of time, and the Soviet Union was prepared to resolve this problem on the basis of equality. The Soviet Union had proposed that Soviet and U.S. naval ships carrying nuclear weapons be withdrawn from the Mediterranean. The United States had not responded to this idea, however, but he still believed there could be an exchange of views on a bilateral basis and then involve other maritime countries as well. He would ask the President to consider this carefully. If that could be agreed in principle, he and President Carter might instruct their representatives to engage in a more detailed exchange of views.

In conclusion, *Brezhnev* said he recalled an idea put forward by President Carter in their correspondence, the possibility of exchanging advance notifications about the strategic exercises of the two countries. He said the two sides would need to specify such a discussion, but as for strategic forces proper, there is already a certain measure of agreement. There is a special clause in the SALT II Treaty on the advance notifications of test launches of missiles, but it would probably be worthwhile discussing further steps. *Brezhnev* said this concluded his considerations on the entire complex of issues involved in curbing the arms race but he wanted to say a few words regarding the Backfire.

Reading from a prepared statement, *Brezhnev* had the following to say on the subject of Backfire: as agreed in advance, he had made a relevant statement regarding this airplane yesterday. It would go without saying that the Soviet Union would proceed precisely from the exact text of that statement and cannot be bound by any unilateral interpretation of that statement.

Brezhnev then turned to a different subject. He said that, taking into consideration yesterday's exchange of views, he suggested including in the Communique that each side states that it will not be the first to use nuclear or any other weapons on the other side or the allies of the other side.

President Carter asked that the U.S. have an opportunity to think about that wording. The President then turned to the Backfire issue. He said that it had been agreed before Vienna that the Soviet Union would confirm at the highest level that the production rate of the Backfire airplane would be no more than thirty per year. We had not received such

confirmation, and that created a serious problem for us. He asked Brezhnev if that was his understanding.

Foreign Minister Gromyko interrupted and said there was no problem at all. What had been agreed before Vienna and what had been done in accordance with that understanding was that President Carter would make a statement to the effect that it was his understanding the Soviet Union would not produce more than thirty airplanes of this type per year. The Soviet side, for its part, would not rebut that statement. That is precisely what had been done, or rather not done, yesterday; the Soviet side had not refuted President Carter's statement. This was strictly in accord with the previous arrangement, and therefore there was no difference between the sides. The Secretary of State knew very well that there had been one word in the statement that had stood in the way of complete agreement, but that word had since been removed, and therefore he could see nothing that would indicate any difference in views.

Secretary Vance wanted to state his understanding of what had been agreed. It was that the word "approximately" would be removed from the Soviet statement, and that the Soviet side would confirm here in Vienna that our statement was correct.

President Carter noted that now Brezhnev had said that the Soviet Union would not be bound by any unilateral interpretation of its statement. Gromyko said that they would not be bound by any unilateral interpretations of the Soviet statement but that would not apply to the U.S. statement on the rate of production.

Secretary Vance said his understanding was that the Soviet Union would not produce more than thirty Backfires per year. President Carter had stated that, but had received no confirmation from the Soviet side.

Brezhnev interrupted to state that the two sides had an identical understanding on this score. He said that the Soviet Union will not produce more than thirty per year.

President Carter said that was perfect.

Foreign Minister Gromyko said this should end the discussion of the Backfire. He added jokingly that President Carter loves concessions.

President Carter said that resolved the Backfire problem and it need not be addressed again.

The President wanted to make one more comment. He had outlined to Brezhnev several very specific and important thoughts and suggestions regarding future arms negotiations leading to SALT III.⁴

⁴ See Document 202.

Brezhnev had not responded, but the President saw an area of agreement in Soviet willingness to halt the production of nuclear weapons and to reduce stockpiles, taking into account current stockpiles and the security interests of the sides. Secondly, he believed it very important that we agree and publicly say that we will not deliver nuclear fuel to any nation that is not under the NPT or under IAEA control. We needed to move forward on the comprehensive test ban. Personally, the President thought that a requirement for ten stations in a small nation such as Great Britain was excessive. Great Britain shared this view. If the talks failed for that reason, we were prepared to discuss with Prime Minister Thatcher the withdrawal of Great Britain from the talks so we can proceed to reach agreement on a bilateral basis. Third, the President thought that good progress could be made today on mutual and balanced force reduction if the discussions were continued between Secretary Brown and Marshal Ustinov. We needed to follow up further on President Brezhnev's suggestion concerning notification of tests and exercises. The President hoped that before he left Vienna these proposals could be pinned down so that our discussions could be fruitful and not wasted.

204. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, June 17, 1979, 5:30–7:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Fourth Plenary Meeting
International Issues

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.
The President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Joseph Powell
Mr. David Aaron

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 75, Subject: Box 8. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Arensburger. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

Mr. D. Arensburger, Interpreter
Gen. David Jones

U.S.S.R.

President L.I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Marshal D. Ustinov
Marshal Ogarkov
Mr. G. Korniyenko
Mr. L. Zamyatin
Mr. Ye. N. Kochetkov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

President Carter said that he was very gratified with the spirit of détente which had originated in Europe under President Brezhnev's leadership, and with how this spirit contributed to peace. He hoped that détente could spread elsewhere in the world. Brezhnev had pointed previously to protecting the interests of our countries and our allies. The best way to do this is to have full and frank discussions. This will be done this afternoon. Though some of these discussions might be unpleasant, the President believed that it would be best to speak in a full and frank fashion.

There were some areas in the world where the U.S. and its allies had absolutely vital interests, for example, the Arabian peninsula and the Persian Gulf. In areas like these, which were so sensitive, maximum restraint on both sides was essential to avoid a serious confrontation.

In other troubled areas, peaceful solutions were always preferable. He was referring to such areas as the Middle East, the Horn of Africa, Southern Africa and Southeast Asia. In these areas it was important for both of us to try to discourage armed combat and bloodshed, and to encourage peaceful resolution of differences.

The extensive military activities of Cuba were of deep concern to the American people. We regarded Cuba as a proxy of the Soviet Union, a surrogate or at least an ally, which was being supported, financed and equipped by the Soviet Union. There were some 40,000 Cuban military personnel throughout Africa, and Cuba was becoming increasingly active militarily in interfering in other countries, including in the Caribbean area and in Central America.

The President said that we have been deeply concerned by the violation of international borders in Southeast Asia. Vietnam had fifteen divisions in Kampuchea and shows no inclination to withdraw from this incursion. We were also concerned by the violation of the Vietnamese border by the People's Republic of China. At this time the Soviet Union was becoming more and more active in naval and military activities, using Vietnamese ports and facilities which causes us grave concern.

The President realized that in some instances our two countries had different perspectives, but he wanted to consult with the Soviet Union and cooperate where possible.

In Namibia, we were trying to achieve through the UN an independent country with a government of its choice. Similarly, in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia we were trying to resolve that conflict to the satisfaction of the people of that area in a peaceful way. On the Middle East, our two countries have had differences of opinion in the past and in the present. The President had tried to bring together all parties in Geneva, including the Soviet Union, with a view to finding a solution to the differences in the Middle East. This was some two years ago, but Syria and a number of other countries refused and no progress had been made. President Sadat had taken an initiative—the President would add that this was without consultation with us—and went to Jerusalem. Much progress had been made by Israel and Egypt. This was consistent with UN Resolutions 242, 338 and others, as well as the Joint Statement between the U.S. and the USSR. It was a fact that Israel was withdrawing from the Sinai. Israel was prepared to negotiate treaties with all its neighbors. Palestinian rights, under the Camp David accords, would be preserved. Security of all states was to be guaranteed. *The President* hoped that the Soviet Union would give its support and encourage other states to join in this process. Total Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai was part of a process as prescribed by the UN. UN supervision was important. We would expect all Security Council members to approve such UN supervision by UN emergency forces. But the U.S., in the interests of a peaceful resolution of these differences, was pledged alternative supervision if that was necessary. However, our strong preference was for a UN force.

The President continued that the United States had an interest in stability throughout this entire area of the world. In the past we always had good relations with Iran, though now they were not nearly as close as before. We had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of Iran or Afghanistan, but would endorse the independence of both these countries. It endangered U.S. lives for Soviet broadcasts to allege the contrary. This was of concern to us.

The President, turning to the People's Republic of China, said that he was aware of the Soviet concerns as Brezhnev had stated on several occasions in his letters, but we felt that after 30 years, normalization of relations between us and the People's Republic of China was long overdue. We believed that this new relationship would contribute to peace and stability not only between the U.S. and PRC but in the whole world. It was not directed against other countries of the world. We expected an increase in trade and an expansion of scientific and technical and cultural exchanges, but this would not be done at the expense of re-

lations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which we considered very important. We had nothing to conceal from the Soviet Union regarding that relationship.

The President concluded that he hoped that an exchange based on those views which he had given and which no doubt Brezhnev would be presenting today, would be productive. Inevitably, we would have differences on how to resolve some problems between us and among other countries. But the President wanted Brezhnev to understand and trust our intentions. He was eager to listen to Brezhnev in order to understand the Soviet concerns. He was sure that peaceful solutions of these differences would serve better relations between the U.S. and the USSR.

In fact, the *President* hoped that Brezhnev would agree with everything he had said.

Brezhnev said that before setting forth his considerations on international problems, the subject of this meeting, he wanted to refer briefly to the questions he had mentioned earlier this morning regarding further negotiations on SALT,² that is, in addition to the considerations he had already expressed in Vienna. He did not want to address in detail all the questions raised by the President. There could be differences of view on all of them and it was difficult to predict what decisions will come out of the forthcoming negotiations. However, it was impossible to escape the fact that before these talks developed into full scale negotiations it was necessary to consider a number of questions of principle. For one thing, the follow-on agreement had to involve not only the systems of the U.S. and the USSR, but also those of other nuclear powers. Second, there must be full clarity to the effect that the follow-on agreement must relate substantively to the forward-based systems of the U.S. and its allies, because, as was widely known, these systems were targeted against the Soviet Union and its allies. Third, underlying the follow-on negotiations—and this was the holy of holies from which the Soviet Union would not depart—must be the principle of equality and equal security and the necessity of taking into account all factors affecting the strategic situation. At present, it would be abnormal to negotiate some kind of annual reductions, say by 5 percent, in the levels of strategic offensive arms, independently of the other problems involved in SALT III. In other words, it was necessary to give further consideration to the follow-on negotiations. At this time, we should ensure prompt entry into force of the SALT II Treaty which has been fully approved and which we will be signing tomorrow.

² See Document 203.

Brezhnev wanted to begin his discussion of international problems by making several general observations. The Soviet Union approached very seriously the matter of reaching some common understanding and even a degree of cooperation with the U.S. in world affairs. The Soviet Union attached major significance to this and was prepared to act in the appropriate spirit. This made it all the more important to make note of the factors which were preventing this. He already had occasion to note that mutual understanding and, to an even greater degree, cooperation between our two states, including cooperation in international affairs, was greatly hampered when one of the sides was attributing changes in the world, movements for national liberation and independence, as well as for social progress, to the malevolent will of one of the sides. Brezhnev had been told that a rather strange theory had gained currency in the United States, a theory known as the arc of crisis, according to which the Soviet Union was allegedly reaching from Western Africa to Southern Asia, seeking to surround the Middle East, to the detriment of the United States and western countries in general.

Brezhnev wanted to say that this entire theory was an absolute fairy tale. Given such an approach to international events, it was hardly possible to make progress in international relations, including the settlement of world problems in which our two countries certainly could cooperate. Frankly, the Soviet Union was quite amazed at how lightheartedly some corners of the world were being declared spheres of vital interests of the U.S. This was not only contrary to elementary norms of international law, but also complicated the international situation even more when there were sufficient complications as it was.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union was sure that the U.S. and the USSR were able to make a major contribution to present international developments, not by sowing fear and by suspecting the intentions of the other side, but by strengthening understanding and businesslike cooperation. That would help to resolve pressing international problems. In this connection, it was always necessary—not in words but in deeds—to respect the independence and sovereign rights of every state and not to permit a manifestation of great power politics nor interfere in the affairs of other states. The Soviet Union wanted to interact with the U.S. in international affairs and if relevant understandings were reached and carried out—without an attempt to gain at the expense of others—Brezhnev was sure that there would be no lack of areas of cooperation of regional and worldwide importance.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet Union attached particular importance to European affairs. This was understandable, of course, because a large part of the Soviet Union was located in Europe and because its destiny was linked to Europe. Moreover, the situation in Europe has always exerted a major, at times a decisive, influence on the situation in

the entire world. It was the chief concern of the Soviet leadership that neither the Soviet people nor any other people in Europe ever live through what the Soviet people had experienced in the years of World War II as a result of the Hitlerite aggression. That was the firm resolve of the Soviet people and the Soviet leaders. Brezhnev was able to say with satisfaction that the political situation in Europe today was better than ever in the past and that the normalization of relations between our two states has played a role in that process.

Brezhnev continued that naturally, the Soviet Union, as well as the U.S., had to take into account reality. This reality was that Europe included neighboring countries with different social systems and that both the Soviet Union and the U.S. had allies and friends in Europe. Brezhnev could say for his part that the Soviet Union accepted this situation as constituting reality. Whether within the framework of the socialist commonwealth or in its relations with Western countries or in terms of its European policy in general, the Soviet Union did not pursue an anti-American course or try to prejudice legitimate interests of the United States. And certainly the Soviet Union was not spreading among the public the thought that the United States was an adversary or an enemy of the Soviet Union. Brezhnev wanted to expect a similar approach on the part of the U.S. with respect to the Soviet Union and its interests.

Brezhnev continued that the European situation did, of course, include elements which raised concern, such as efforts aimed at lopsided, Brezhnev would even say self-serving, interpretations of the provisions of the Final Act of the European Security Conference, when some provisions were emphasized more than others in order to use them as part of an effort to interfere in the internal affairs of other states. In Brezhnev's view, it was in our mutual interest to implement all the provisions of the Final Act and to do so in a spirit of constructive cooperation and good will. After all, that was the very essence of the Helsinki conference and of the document adopted at that conference. It was in this spirit that the Soviet side planned to approach next year's Madrid meeting. He trusted that the U.S. would pursue a similar approach and that there would be no repetition of the negative experience of the Belgrade meeting.

Today the climate in Europe was quite healthy, but such a climate could hardly be imagined in the absence of military detente on the continent. The Soviet Union saw the situation as follows. There long since has taken shape an appropriate balance of forces between the two military groupings. The Soviet Union accepted that balance, did not upset it and did not intend to upset it. However, of late, NATO countries have accelerated their military preparations to such an extent that questions arise about these military preparations. Could it be that the United

States and its allies were no longer satisfied with such a balance and that they had decided to gain military superiority? If that was the situation, what sort of cooperation, what sort of strengthening of peace was that? That would mean a new round in military competition. The Soviet Union, for its part, believed that the only way of ensuring security and lasting peace in Europe was to preserve the existing balance of forces and to reduce them on both sides without changing the existing correlation of forces. Accordingly, the Soviet Union was in favor of military detente.

Brezhnev continued by saying that it was his particular wish that the States-Parties to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe conclude a treaty on refraining from first use of nuclear or conventional arms in Europe. Was it not clear that this would create a healthier climate in Europe and between our two countries? To be quite honest, what objections could there be to that? In this area, in addition to the Vienna discussions that had been discussed, the USSR and its allies had submitted a package of specific proposals to the Western countries. All these proposals were still on the table and an answer was being awaited.

Brezhnev recalled that the Warsaw Pact members had recently proposed holding a conference at the political level with the participation of all the European countries, as well as the U.S. and Canada, to discuss and agree on practical measures of military detente in Europe, including confidence-building measures. Could a favorable reaction to this initiative be expected from the U.S.?

In conclusion, *Brezhnev* wanted to note that not everything was well with implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement regarding West Berlin, yet that was an important element in European stability. We had created that agreement in a spirit of cooperation and clearly it was in our mutual interest to suppress attempts to undermine that accord.

Turning to the Middle East, *Brezhnev* said that he presumed the President was well acquainted with the Soviet position of principle in its appraisal of the U.S. policy. Brezhnev had written to the President about it. Now, at this personal meeting he wanted to re-emphasize it. The fact that the October 1977 Soviet-U.S. understanding on joint action in the Middle East was violated and supplanted by an anti-Arab policy argued nothing good for the people of that region nor for the relations between us. Brezhnev thought that it was clear to everyone now that the Egyptian-Israeli treaty³ had failed to tranquilize the Middle Eastern

³ The Egyptian-Israeli Treaty was signed March 26, 1979, and provided for, among other things, each country's recognition of the other, cessation of the state of war, and Israel's complete withdrawal from the Sinai Peninsula.

situation, but it has aggravated it. He called attention to the indignation and determination of the Arabs and noted the war which Israel, protected by Egypt, was in effect waging in Lebanon. This could at any time grow larger. It was necessary to prevent a resumption of armed conflict along the lines of the 1967 war, to prevent a major conflagration.

Therefore, unfortunately, said *Brezhnev*, the positions of the U.S. and the USSR were fundamentally different at this time and not through any fault of the Soviet Union. To be frank, the Soviet Union would resolutely oppose any efforts to use the UN to bolster the separate deal between Egypt and Israel, be it by using the present UN troops in the Sinai or in any other manner.

The position of the Soviet Union with respect to the Middle East remained the same as it was all along. The Soviet Union believed that there would be no firm peace there without the complete vacating of the Arab territory occupied in 1967 and without an opportunity for the Palestinians to set up their own state, without ensuring the security of all nations in that region, including Israel. As before, the Soviet Union considered it desirable for our two countries to interact on Middle East issues, using earlier UN resolutions as a foundation.

Brezhnev then turned to Southeast Asia saying it was again becoming a dangerous flashpoint of tension because of the dangerous expansionist and jingoist policy of Peking in this region. It had proved possible to put a stop to China's aggression against Vietnam and the Chinese were forced to withdraw, though not from all of it, from the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Nevertheless, Peking once again is threatening to teach Vietnam another lesson, evidently having failed to learn the lesson that it itself had been taught. China has assumed the right to teach lessons and Peking is the seat of constant military aggression. So long as there was any claim to a right to intervention, there would remain a danger of war, especially in Southeast Asia. In fact, Peking makes no secret that its goal is to involve the world in a war so they can remain on the sidelines. This time the people of Vietnam have heroically rebuffed the Chinese aggressors. In this instance, the Soviet Union had manifested great restraint and had acted very responsibly in its actions. However, there was a limit to all self-restraint. The Soviet Union had assumed obligations with respect to Vietnam under its treaty of friendship with that country. He was sure that if the Chinese leaders were firmly told that methods of dictation, blackmail and threats were inadmissible in international relations and that the world would not tolerate Chinese aggression, there would be no need to be concerned over the situation in Southeast Asia. *Brezhnev* believed that it was on this that efforts should be focused in the first instance.

Brezhnev said that as far as Soviet cooperation with Vietnam was concerned, this was quite normal between two friendly countries, especially taking into account the military threat to Vietnam from Peking. As for Kampuchea, it would seem that one could only be happy that the people of that country had revolted and had finally freed themselves from a regime of rapists and killers imposed by Peking, a regime which the U.S., too, has called abhorrent and inhumane. The new government of Kampuchea was trying to end the chaos and restore the economy and the dignity of its people.

Brezhnev concluded by saying that their one and only concern is that enduring peace should reign in Southeast Asia and he called upon the United States to endorse that goal.

Brezhnev turned to Africa by saying that clarifying the situation with respect to Africa was long overdue. The peoples of this area were asserting national independence and overcoming the economic and political legacy of colonialism. The question is whether to promote the process or slow it down. As for the Soviet Union, it has consistently spoken out for full liquidation of the legacy of colonialism and racism in Africa and it respected the rights of all the peoples of Africa, without exception, to peace and independence. The Soviet Union did not pursue any other goal. The President should not believe absurd tales to the contrary. The Soviet Union did not seek economic or strategic advantages in Africa. The Soviet Union did not strive to infringe on anyone's interests. This applied equally to Southern Africa, but wherever colonialists impose bloodshed on the African peoples, the victims are free to take the path of armed struggle and in this they deserve the support of the Soviet Union. But no one could accuse the Soviet Union of being opposed to a peaceful solution, if it is a genuine transfer of power to the Africans and welcomed by the Africans themselves. The Soviet Union would welcome it if the Western powers would make efforts to this end. But the Soviet Union opposed neocolonialism by the former colonial and racist regimes. If this was a full implementation of the UN resolutions regarding the Republic of South Africa, Rhodesia and Namibia, which called for an end to the delivery of arms and to assistance to racist countries, no one could claim that the African Continent was a center for conflict between the forces of the USSR and the U.S. After all, in the face of acute and explosive events such as those which occurred in Iran, our countries had succeeded in remaining calm and sober and thereby had prevented a confrontation. *Brezhnev* believed that such a policy should be adhered to in the future as well.

Brezhnev went on to say that the Soviet Union's traditional friendship with Afghanistan was not aimed against any third country. In this country the people had made a social revolution of which, as *Brezhnev* had occasion to tell U.S. Senators, the Soviet leadership had first

learned from foreign broadcasts and from the wire services. He added, "yes, that is the way it was." Naturally, it was in the nature of revolutions that a struggle was taking place against the forces of the old regime. But this did not provide grounds for outsiders to incite or provoke anti-government riots. Unfortunately, such interference was occurring. Brezhnev wanted to hope that the United States would not participate in such actions, that instead it would develop normal relations with Afghanistan.

Brezhnev said that again and again the U.S. was raising the matter of Soviet relations with Cuba. He wanted to say that the Soviet Union complied strictly with the 1962 understanding. It had done nothing nor was doing anything that would be contrary to that understanding. This understanding should be continued without eroding or unilaterally interpreting this understanding. Here and there it was asserted that the Soviet Union was using Cubans to interfere in other areas. Nothing could be further from the truth. Cuba was an independent country and as an independent country Cuba rendered assistance at the request of legitimate governments which were threatened by aggression. This was fully in accord with international law and the UN Charter. Perhaps those in the U.S. who were so vociferous concerning the Cuban actions have forgotten that during the American War of Independence the ranks of General Washington's army contained foreign units. On the other hand, *Brezhnev* could cite genuine instances of U.S. interference in the affairs of other countries and, of course, he could draw on them to cause tensions in U.S.-Soviet relations. But the Soviet Union had no desire to do so.

One concern that the *President* had spoken of today pertained to a military buildup in Vietnam. The Soviet Union could not understand such a concern. The Soviet Union had no bases in Vietnam and had no intention of establishing such bases. Soviet ships entered Vietnamese ports for business and for friendly visits. Individual Soviet aircraft landed at Vietnamese airfields. But that was normal and generally accepted practice in international relations. It was not aimed against the interests of the U.S. or its allies. The threat to peace came from China, which had already carried out blatant aggression against Vietnam and which was now openly threatening to teach Vietnam a new lesson. As for Soviet assistance to Vietnam, it was being provided to a victim of aggression, under the friendship treaty with that country, and was designed to compel China to come to its senses and to refrain from its expansionist policy.

Brezhnev continued that there was one other destabilizing factor in the Far East, one which did not originate with the Soviet Union. He was referring to the major military bases in Japan, South Korea and the Philippines. Many such bases were being maintained by the U.S. near the

borders of the Soviet Union. Aircraft carriers with nuclear weapons and nuclear submarines were cruising the seas near Soviet territory and calling at ports of other countries located near Soviet territory. He asked who in these circumstances has cause for concern. *Brezhnev* said in conclusion that these were the considerations he had wanted to express on some international problems.

The *President* thanked Brezhnev for his remarks. He had listened with great attention and trusted that Brezhnev, too, had listened with equal attention and interest to our concerns. Obviously, there were differences of opinion on a number of issues, but the President believes this only emphasized the importance of continued consultations in the hope of understanding each other's attitudes. Despite regional differences, which caused real concerns, the meeting in Vienna and the signing of the SALT II Treaty constituted an important step toward peace and could serve as a foundation on which further progress in our relations can be based. The President promised to hand over to Brezhnev after the meeting a private note, discussed this morning, outlining some ideas which could be pursued in future negotiations. He hoped that we could continue our efforts and that future success in SALT could be realized more rapidly than in the past.

205. Joint Declaration Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics¹

Vienna, June 17, 1979

JOINT DECLARATION ON THE FURTHER DEVELOPMENT
AND REGULARIZATION OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF
SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, expressing their recognition of the importance of promoting greater stability, mutual confidence, and friendly relations between the two countries,

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Trip File, Box 22, President, US-USSR Summit in Vienna, 9/16–18/79: Cables and Memos, 5/21/79 [I]. Secret.

Emphasizing their desire for cooperation in the interests of maintaining international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations,

Reaffirming their commitment to the document entitled “Basic Principles of Mutual Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,” signed by the US and USSR on May 29, 1972,

And recognizing the importance and value of consultations between themselves and among other governments to discuss ways in which bilateral or multilateral cooperation and restraint can prevent or terminate war and conflict in various regions of the world and promote peaceful solution of disputes,

Declare and agree as follows:

1. The holding of regular—in principle, annual—summit meetings arranged in accordance with the various mutually acceptable forms of such meetings, including the presence of correspondingly high officials of the governing and political bodies of the two countries. President Carter extended an invitation to President Brezhnev to visit the United States in 1980 at a mutually convenient time and President Brezhnev accepted the invitation in principle.

2. The holding of at least two meetings annually between the Foreign Minister of the USSR and the Secretary of State of the US, and additional meetings as mutually desired and as opportunities arise. The two sides further declare that peace, stability and mutual understanding can be additionally enhanced by instituting periodic consultations between other officials of the US Department of State and the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the level of under secretaries and assistant secretaries, and of deputy ministers and department chiefs, respectively. It was further agreed that meetings of high-level representatives and experts could be called by either side as necessary in response to particular situations, including emerging regional tensions and conflicts.

3. The two sides further declare their agreement to initiate and continue periodic informal discussions between the Secretary of Defense of the US and the Minister of Defense of the USSR, and between the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the US and the Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR, including the presence of other senior military and naval officers of the two countries, as deemed appropriate. A program of exchanges of lecturers from military academies was also agreed upon. The sides express their conviction that such contacts will enhance mutual understanding and strengthen the traditional respect of the two countries’ armed forces toward each other, taking special account of the fact that these forces have never been involved in a conflict between the two countries, and that the two

countries bear the high responsibility of insuring the preservation and strengthening of peace and international security.

The consultative provisions agreed to under this declaration do not affect obligations previously assumed by the parties in respect of third states and are not directed against any of them.

The two sides declare that the agreed consultative provisions are designed not only to enhance mutual understanding and cooperative measures between the two countries themselves, but also to further stability, peace and progress among all countries.

Vienna, June 17, 1979

Jimmy Carter²

President of the United States of America

Leonid Brezhnev

*General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and
Chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium*

² Printed from a copy that indicates that Carter and Brezhnev signed the original.

206. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, June 18, 1979, 10–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Carter-Brezhnev Private Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President

Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

President L.I. Brezhnev

Mr. V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 5, USSR (SALT II Summit, President's Personal Notes), 6–10/79. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 19. The meeting took place at the U.S. Embassy. Carter initialed the memorandum.

General

President Brezhnev, reading from prepared notes, noted that the meeting between him and President Carter was now drawing to an end. He thought that the President and he had good reason to say to themselves, as well as publicly, that this meeting had been necessary, useful and productive. Apart from the document they were going to sign today, which would be the visible and greatly important product of this meeting, it was also of great significance that the President and he had been able to exchange views on a broad range of issues. Of course, it could not be said that their views on all these issues coincided or even that they were close. However, they now had a better understanding of the positions and thought processes of each other, and that was also very important.

Prevention of War

In this private meeting Brezhnev wanted to present some additional thoughts. It was his view that the most important element that should determine the relations between the two countries, the ultimate objective here, as it were, was to establish the kind of level of mutual understanding and confidence that would completely rule out the possibility of war breaking out between the Soviet Union and the United States; and, even more, to create the kind of relationship that would bring about an understanding that in the event of attack on either of the two countries by a third nuclear power, or in the event of the threat of such an attack, the Soviet Union and the United States would join forces in repelling the aggressor. Ultimately, such a situation was entirely possible. If the United States and the Soviet Union had the kind of understanding he was talking about, it would hardly be likely that any third power would embark on such madness. Brezhnev recalled that he had already expressed this thought to Secretary Vance, and the Secretary had promised to convey it to President Carter. He would be pleased to hear the President's reaction.

China

Partly in this same connection, Brezhnev wanted to speak to the President quite frankly about China, in particular, what in fact was ensuing from what the United States referred to as "normalization of relations with China." He would not repeat everything he had already said on this subject in the correspondence between them. He would only say that, as time went on, it was becoming very clear that the warnings he had conveyed earlier had been fully justified. Rapprochement with China, which looked at world affairs through the prism of the inevitability of war, was a dangerous thing.

Brezhnev wanted the President to know that if some people in the United States ventured to use Peking's anti-Sovietism to their own ad-

vantage, he would have to say outright that such schemes would not bring any benefit to the United States, but could inflict a great deal of harm. China's very first acts after normalization of relations with the United States and Japan, particularly its aggression against Vietnam, have graphically confirmed that a policy of smiles and bows in the direction of the Chinese was totally unproductive, as demonstrated by events in Kampuchea and by China's cynical aggression against Vietnam. These were graphic examples of China's policy when it felt it could act from a position of strength. The Chinese leaders are given to taking up arms very easily, pursuing their own designs and relegating the United States to the doubtful role of covering their rear. Even now connivance with China is turning into aggression against neighboring states, and it is clear that China strives for complete hegemony in Asia. Of course, the Soviet Union was quite capable of standing up for its own interests, but could that also be said of India, Japan or the Philippines, for example? What would happen if the Chinese obtain access to Western markets, Western materiel and Western military technology? And yet, some allies of the United States manifest a great deal of active interest in providing China with such access, evidently with the approval of the United States. Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that China is not bound by any international agreement relating to the limitation of nuclear arms, although even now China had many such weapons and also had good sources of primary materials.

Brezhnev said that he would not be frank with the President if he were not to point out that future encouragement by the United States of China's hostile policy toward the Soviet Union would seriously aggravate Soviet-American relations, not even to mention the fact that headway in the area of limiting and reducing arms would become quite impossible. In brief, as he saw it, U.S. policy toward China has now reached a threshold beyond which it could only produce a drastic deterioration of the entire international situation. Brezhnev expressed the hope that Washington would not prompt events in that direction.

Brezhnev had another point to make in this connection. The President was surely aware of the fact that the Soviet Union consistently pursues a policy of peace and cooperation with all states and therefore was certainly in favor of normalizing relations with China. As the President probably knew, right now the government of China, after repeated proposals for normalization of relations by the Soviet side over the past several years, has expressed its willingness to engage in negotiations. The Soviet Union had agreed, although its leadership was not too convinced of China's sincerity. The Soviet Union will try to reach agreement with China to put their mutual relations on an honest and correct basis of mutual respect, sovereignty of each other's territory, non-use of force and non-interference in internal affairs. The Soviet

Union had always been in favor of such relations. It will simply have to wait and see what the Chinese position will be.

Brezhnev wanted to emphasize to the President that if Soviet relations with the Chinese People's Republic improve, the United States and other countries will have no grounds whatsoever for concern. The Soviet Union has never given the Chinese any opportunity to drag the Soviet state into any anti-American adventures, and will not do so in the future. The President could rest assured on that score.

Human Rights

Brezhnev now wanted to turn briefly to the so-called question of human rights. He did not consider this question appropriate for discussion at the official meetings between them. However, so as to leave nothing unclear, he wanted to tell the President the following: it would go without saying that each of them had his own views on human rights and freedom of the individual. The Soviet leadership did not object to these and other questions becoming the subject of ideological argument. Indeed, that was inevitable due to the different development of the social systems of each country. It was an entirely different matter, however, when questions of that kind were elevated to the level of official state policy and when attempts were made to exploit them in the relations between states. Brezhnev was far from any wish to engage in polemics, but he would trust that the President would agree that there could be little progress in our bilateral relations if, for example, the Soviet Union were to link trade and other ties with the United States to such questions as unemployment in the United States, resolution of the racial problem in the United States or equal rights for women. Naturally, the Soviet leadership could easily draw up a whole list of complaints of that kind, because there was a great deal they did not like in the social system of the United States. However, what would that lead to? It would be much better to leave questions of this kind outside of the framework of state affairs and to concentrate the efforts of each country on safeguarding the right of people throughout the world to live without war, under conditions of peace. Both countries must make every effort to safeguard that right. President Carter himself had said in one of his recent speeches, and quite correctly, that the most fundamental human right is the right to life. He would therefore call on the President to do all in his power to prevent the outbreak of another war.

Further Meetings and Contacts

Brezhnev now wanted to turn to the question of further meetings. As he understood it, the President favored holding such meetings on a regular basis. Brezhnev, too, believed that meetings between Heads of State should be held on a regular basis, but thought that they should not attempt now to set a rigid schedule. The important thing was to

agree in principle, but as for specific timing for the next meeting, that could always be discussed and agreed upon later.

Naturally, Brezhnev would like to see the President visit the Soviet Union, and therefore tendered him an invitation to visit the Soviet Union whenever he considered this to be appropriate and at a time when such a visit was convenient for both sides. As for the President's wish for regular contacts between the two countries at other high levels, he could see no problem with that suggestion. The two Foreign Ministers could continue their established practice of meetings and, if necessary, they could meet even more frequently, depending on the existence of specific matters requiring discussion. As for the idea the President had expressed concerning meetings between the military leaders of the two states, Brezhnev could state now that in principle he was not opposed to expanding contacts along that line as well, if that would be useful and properly reflect the development of Soviet-American relations. After all, the development of contacts of that kind was something new, and it must be properly understood and appreciated by public opinion in our two countries and in the world at large.

General, Further Contacts

President Carter wanted to say first of all that he had enjoyed getting to know Brezhnev personally and that he believed their meeting here in Vienna had been successful and will have great historic benefit for the world in the future. (Upon hearing this remark, Brezhnev seized the President's hand and shook it vigorously.) The President noted that Brezhnev had invited him to come to the Soviet Union, and [*he?*] would like to do so, but since our President had made the last visit to the Soviet Union, he would ask if it would be possible for Brezhnev to visit us in the United States.

Brezhnev responded that it certainly will be possible. Whenever conditions for such a visit were ripe, he would be pleased to hop aboard an airplane and come to the United States. This was something he could not refuse.

The President said that we have appreciated this almost unprecedented chance for our military leaders to meet. We had not attached particularly great significance to their meeting, but thought that when circumstances in the future dictated such meetings, they might be very important.

China

The President now wanted to discuss the China situation. We believed that our having normal relations with China was good for us, good for China, good for the Soviet Union and for world stability and peace.

Brezhnev interrupted and said: “Not for the Soviet Union.”

The President believed that it was good for the Soviet Union, too, and he would explain why. Whatever influence we have at this time or will have in the future on the leaders of China will be used to urge peaceful relations between China and the Soviet Union and all other countries. We will never let relations between us and China be at the expense of the Soviet Union, nor will we ever permit an alignment to develop between us against the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev interrupted and asked: “Why don’t you prod them to sign an agreement with us?”

The President said he will be pleased to do so, because we believe that this would be good for the United States. We will keep the Soviet Union informed about our relations with China and would appreciate it if the Soviets keep us informed about their relations with China.

Brezhnev said they could well do that.

The President said that we had nothing to conceal from the Soviet Union. There are some relations between the Soviet Union and the United States that are of both symbolic and substantive significance and are very important for us. The President had no desire to embarrass Brezhnev, but would like to speak frankly on these issues.

Telemetry Encryption

The President noted that all our missile test firings are over the ocean and the Soviet Union is able without obstacles to monitor the firings of our missiles. We do not encrypt telemetry data and until quite recently the Soviet Union had never encrypted data from missiles covered by SALT. Only with SS–20 missiles did the Soviets formally encrypt telemetry data. Of course, SS–20s were not covered by SALT, but during the last few months encryption of telemetry from strategic missiles had caused us great concern. As Brezhnev knew, we have peaceful observation stations at sea, in space, and in a few nations in his part of the world—formerly in Iran. The Iranian stations used to verify the SALT agreement could no longer be used. This has not been a secret operation, nor was it designed to act against the Soviet Union. It was only used to verify compliance with the very important SALT agreements. In order partially to replace this capability we would like to fly airplanes over Turkey on peaceful missions for the purpose of verifying compliance with our bilateral agreements. We were not asking the Soviet Union to approve, but only to let the Turkish government know that the Soviet Union would not object to such flights, or let us inform the Turkish government to that effect without the Soviet Union contradicting such information.

(At this point Brezhnev was handed a typed briefing paper by his interpreter, selected from what was evidently a stack of talking points on various subjects.)

Flights over Turkey

Reading from a typed brief, Brezhnev said he had the following to say with regard to so-called additional measures on verification related to SALT II. From the very beginning of the strategic arms limitation process the two sides had agreed to adhere to the principle of verification by national technical means. There were no grounds whatsoever to alter that principle in any way. He would have to say objectively that the efforts of the U.S. side appeared to be aimed at altering that principle, when the U.S. seeks to combine verification by national technical means with cooperative measures. This does not mean, of course, that the Soviet Union is against such measures. In fact, some cooperative measures are already provided for in the SALT II Treaty. They can also be the subject of further consideration during SALT III, but they should fit into the framework of verification by national technical means. As for the specific question raised by President Carter, the Soviet position regarding flights of U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over Turkish territory, close to the borders of the Soviet Union, is well known and hardly needs to be set out again. Brezhnev would only add that nothing in that position would change even if the U.S. side were to propose that this matter be resolved on the basis of reciprocal exchange, providing for flights of Soviet airplanes from Cuban territory. Questions affecting the sovereign rights of other states cannot be the subject of an exchange of operations between the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.

President Carter said that this is an important matter to us. It is important in building mutual trust between our countries, and it is important for ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Although he would not pursue this matter further today, he would ask Brezhnev to consider carefully the mutual benefit to be derived from a more forthcoming response from the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev said that he could not refuse the President's request to consider this further. He would do so and see if some way could be found to resolve the matter. This was as far as he could go now.

U.N. Forces in Sinai

President Carter said he had another difficult subject to raise with Brezhnev. That involved the United Nations monitoring Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai. We did not expect the Soviet Union to approve the Egyptian-Israeli Treaty; we were aware of Soviet concerns in that connection. However, the United Nations force was there now, specifically charged with monitoring Israeli withdrawal. We simply wanted to ask that the Soviet Union not veto in the Security Council an action to continue their present function.

(Brezhnev was handed another brief by his interpreter.)

Brezhnev said that in the course of the correspondence between him and President Carter he had not concealed that the Soviet Union was resolutely opposed to any attempt to sanctify a separate Egyptian-Israeli deal through the authority and prestige of the United Nations, *inter alia* through involvement of the U.N. forces presently in the Sinai. Whatever arguments are marshalled in favor of continuing the presence of U.N. troops in that area, such presence would mean complicity of and association by the United Nations in actions which cannot lead to lasting peace in the Middle East, but only the opposite. To expect the Soviet Union to support such a force in this matter would be hopeless.

President Carter said he understood but disagreed with² Brezhnev's response. We will do whatever is necessary to assure that monitoring of the withdrawal is adequate, and will attempt to work as closely as we can with the Soviet Union in this matter, and also concerning Lebanon and other troubled areas of the Middle East.

Soviet-American Cooperation

The President said he wanted to mention three other subjects that should not be difficult for Brezhnev. He hoped that Brezhnev and the other members of the Politburo will examine very carefully the statement the President had made yesterday regarding the trouble spots of the world and the need for the Soviet Union and the United States to consult closely and, whenever possible, to cooperate. Also, he hoped that very careful consideration will be given to the written note the President had given Brezhnev concerning the possibility of future arms agreements.³ We consider this to be very important, and the President hoped that it would be given careful consideration. He hoped that as early as possible the two sides would provide some means to consider these ideas together.

Brezhnev said that the Soviet approach to SALT III, based on principle, has been set forth here, *inter alia* last night. As for the specific questions President Carter had raised and included in the memorandum referred to, Brezhnev doubted if he could go into them today. They require further reflection and analysis in the context of other SALT III issues.

The President agreed and said that as he had listened to Brezhnev's statement, he had seen much in common.

² Carter added "but disagreed with" to this sentence by hand.

³ See Document 202.

Human Rights

Finally, the President wanted to say a few words regarding human rights. He had been very careful while in Vienna⁴ not to make any statement that would embarrass Brezhnev or aggravate the situation. The people of our nation had been warmly gratified by the actions the Soviet Union had taken on its own initiative and without any pressure from us. The President pointed out that he was a Baptist. Fourteen million Baptists had been very happy to welcome Mr. Vins in our country. Nothing the Soviet Union could do to increase friendship between us would be as significant as allowing Mr. Shcharanskiy to come to our country. The President recognized the difficulty for the Soviet Union posed by the human rights question. He simply wanted to let Brezhnev know that the more liberal human rights attitude⁵ referred to had been gratifying to us, once it became known that the Soviet Union had taken the action referred to.

Reading from another typed brief, handed him by his interpreter, Brezhnev said that the Shcharanskiy matter dealt with a man who had been convicted by a Soviet court for espionage for the benefit of a foreign nation. He said that he could not do anything that would violate Soviet laws.

General

Summing up, Brezhnev thought this morning's discussion had been very good.

The President acknowledged that he, too, believed they now understood each other better as a result of the Vienna meetings. There were some things of particular importance to us and some things that were important to the Soviet side.

Brezhnev said that he had been told a great many things about President Carter and President Carter had probably been told as much, if not more, about Brezhnev. Now that they had seen each other and spoken to each other, they knew that they could speak frankly without offending each other. If at times some question or other did not lend itself to immediate solution at their level, it might best be left for discussion and, if possible, action by the experts of the sides.

Brezhnev presented President Carter with a few copies of the books he had written, in the original and in English translation, each copy autographed by himself.

⁴ Carter added "while in Vienna" to this sentence by hand.

⁵ Carter crossed out the typewritten word "occurrence" and inserted "more liberal human rights attitude" by hand.

207. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, June 18, 1979, 11:50 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

Fifth and Last Plenary Meeting Between President Carter and
President Brezhnev

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The President
Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
General David Jones
Mr. Hamilton Jordan
General G. Seignious
Mr. Frank Moore
Ambassador Malcolm Toon
Mr. Joseph Powell
Mr. Reginald Bartholomew
Mr. Jerrold Schecter
Mr. Wm. D. Krimer, Interpreter

U.S.S.R.

President L.I. Brezhnev
Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
Marshal D.F. Ustinov
Mr. K.U. Chernenko
Deputy Foreign Minister G.M. Korniyenko
Marshal N.V. Ogarkov
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Mr. A.M. Aleksandrov-Agentov
Mr. L.M. Zamyatin
Mr. V.G. Komplektov
Mr. A.M. Vavilov
Mr. V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

President Carter said that President Brezhnev and he had agreed between them that this meeting would be brief, to enable them to get back on schedule and be on time for the signing ceremony.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 75, Subject: Box 8. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Krimer on June 21. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. Carter wrote about signing SALT II in his memoirs: "The treaty-signing ceremony was impressive and dignified. After we finished signing the documents and handed them to one another, I shook hands with President Brezhnev, and to my surprise, we found ourselves embracing each other warmly in the Soviet fashion. There is no doubt there were strong feelings of cooperation between us at the moment, and I was determined to pursue our search for peace and better understanding." (*Keeping Faith*, pp. 260–261)

The President said he considered this conference in Vienna to have been very satisfactory to him personally, to our nation and, he hoped, to the Soviet Union and the world at large. The signing of the SALT II Treaty in a few minutes will be a historic contribution to world peace.² The President expressed his gratitude to Brezhnev for his leadership role in making this achievement possible. His own hope and belief is that the SALT II Treaty will be a basis on which it will be possible more expeditiously to conclude discussions leading to agreement between our two countries on many other matters. At their private meeting this morning³ he and President Brezhnev had agreed to increase the frequency of meetings between them, and had extended mutual invitations to visit their respective countries. The President looked forward to the opportunity of exchanging visits without having to wait for a crisis or some other momentous event, simply for the purpose of routine discussions of issues and for the purpose of understanding each other better. The President also remarked that he and Brezhnev had agreed that the two Presidents at such routine meetings would be in a position to correct the mistakes that would inevitably be made by their Foreign Ministers. (Foreign Minister Gromyko protested vigorously.)

The President said that he and Brezhnev had agreed that in the relations between our nations they would never act in such a way as to threaten peaceful relations between the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union. In order to avoid misunderstandings between our countries, they will also continue their personal correspondence to keep each other informed of questions of mutual interest. Finally, they both greatly valued the statements each had made and had listened to each other with great care. Both had agreed to examine each other's statements with additional care when they returned home. Each had in particular remarked on the substantive conformity of and correlation between the plans Brezhnev had suggested for future arms talks and the ideas on arms control the President had put forward. He hoped they would be able to build on these without further delay as they moved toward SALT III. To summarize, the President said he was grateful for the progress achieved and hoped to continue making progress in their common work in the future.

Reading from a prepared statement, Brezhnev noted that he and President Carter had the same view—that conclusion of the SALT II Treaty should generate more favorable conditions and, he would say, a more favorable climate for solving other problems of Soviet-American relations. This naturally also applied to bilateral ties and contacts in

² See footnote 4, Document 200.

³ See Document 206.

various fields. The Soviet Union attached great importance to such ties. Their results were perhaps not too visible from the sidelines, but these ties and contacts did involve large numbers of people doing what was necessary to the mutual advantage of both nations. In the final analysis, this helped the two peoples to understand each other better and bring them closer together. On the whole, such ties and contacts were the most stable and steadfast element in our bilateral relations, for example, the contacts between our respective Parliaments and between various public and social organizations. American Senators and Congressmen and Soviet Members of the Supreme Soviet were no longer rare guests in Moscow and Washington respectively. In Brezhnev's view, contacts of that sort should be encouraged in the future as well, and, speaking frankly, it was not too easy to understand why the U.S. side sometimes took steps to impede contacts, such as for example, between Soviet and American labor unions.

Brezhnev said that one of the major and most important problems was regularization of trade between our countries. He had the impression that trade, which should be an important element in our relations, in the United States has been turned into a constant object of various linkages. This had begun in 1974 with the emigration issue,⁴ a purely internal affair of the Soviet Union; there was a linkage with economic relations between the two countries that the Soviet Union did not and, of course, could not recognize. As a result of the Soviet-American summit meetings in 1972, 1973 and 1974,⁵ Soviet-American trade had increased rapidly. However, discriminatory legislation had since brought it to a state of stagnation. He believed that such a state of economic relations between the two countries was not in the interests of either side. Brezhnev acknowledged that he was aware that the United States government had recently been examining the possibilities of normalizing trade relations with the U.S.S.R. He regarded this as a positive thing, but was not in a position to offer any suggestions in that respect because it was clearly the business of the United States. He would only ask the President to bear in mind that there were some basic political, legal and even moral principles which the Soviet Union could not possibly renounce. Brezhnev added that elimination of discrimination would contribute considerably to expanding trade relations to the ben-

⁴ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 183.

⁵ For the 1972 summit memoranda of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 259, 262, 263, 265, 271, 276, 277, 281, 283, 284, 288, 290, 292, 293, 295, 299, and 300. For the 1973 summit memoranda of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 123–133. For the 1974 summit memoranda of conversation, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Documents 186–199.

efit of both sides. He would note in particular that it would then become possible jointly to work out long-term programs of cooperation, similar to those that the Soviet Union had established with the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Canada and a number of other countries. There was a solid and realistic basis for that. The Soviet Union had an enormous market, and in turn could offer much that would be of interest to American firms.

Brezhnev noted that unfortunately artificial obstacles had been created that stood in the way of developing such relations as maritime shipping, air travel and others. Ridiculous accusations had been levelled at the Soviet Union in terms of allegations that the Soviet Merchant Marine intended to seize American shipping markets. Some civil aviation had been suspended, too. Brezhnev asked for what purpose this was done. To be honest, he found it hard indeed to understand the meaning of such actions by the U.S. side.

In Brezhnev's view, our relations in science and technology and active cooperation between Soviet and American scientists in a wide variety of fields were proceeding rather well, including such areas as energy, environment, medicine and agriculture. As he understood it, concrete results had been achieved in many areas and the prospects for continued cooperation were good, provided no artificial obstacles were put in its way. Some attempts had been made to exploit scientific cooperation for political purposes, reducing the levels of delegations, cancelling visas, etc. Here, too, he failed to see any sense in such artificial obstacles.

Brezhnev asked the President not to be offended by these comments. They were aimed at developing good relations with the United States on a stable and long-term basis. He very much hoped that the President would understand and share this view.

In conclusion, Brezhnev wanted to say that he was satisfied and highly gratified by the opportunity to have made the President's personal acquaintance and to have had useful and meaningful conversations with him. He was certain that this would help both of them in their future work aimed at improving Soviet-American relations for the sake of peace and to the benefit of our two nations.

The President noted that their time for this meeting was almost up, and said he would not respond to each of the points made by Brezhnev. He would, however, investigate the problems mentioned by Brezhnev like, for example, air travel, and would respond through Secretary Vance. He hoped that it will be possible to alleviate the obstacles standing in the way of better cooperation between our countries. If in the future we see any problems in the actions or policies of the Soviet

Union, we will try to make them clear so that each side can understand the attitudes of the other.⁶

⁶ For the text of the joint communiqué, see Department of State *Bulletin*, July 1979, pp. 54–58. The memorandum of conversation from the June 15 Vance/Gromyko meeting, during which they discuss the joint communiqué, is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance NODIS MemCons, 1979.

208. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Vienna, June 18, 1979

To President Brezhnev,

The signing of the SALT II Treaty a few minutes ago and also our fruitful discussions in Vienna² have demonstrated the importance of better understanding and enhanced cooperation. I look forward to the future, and especially to our next meeting, when we will be able to build on this new foundation which we have established. I trust that we both will make every attempt to accommodate the special concerns expressed in our private meeting today and during the plenum sessions.

Rosalynn, Amy and I appreciated the personal gifts from you. They will be continuing reminders of the spirit of friendship and the pleasure of our first visit together.

Sincerely yours,

Jimmy Carter

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—Vienna Summit: (10/78–6/79). No classification marking. Carter's letter is handwritten.

² See Documents 199–201, 203, 204, 206, and 207.

July–December 1979

209. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Intelligence Oversight Board (Farmer) to President Carter¹

Washington, July 3, 1979

SUBJECT

Use of Unwitting United States Persons in CIA Covert Action (S)

The Central Intelligence Agency has reported a question of propriety concerning the unwitting involvement of United States academics and other United States persons in a CIA operated covert system for distributing publications to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.² The United States persons are provided, at no cost, publications they request for the purpose of mailing or personally delivering the publications to friends and acquaintances in the target countries. The United States persons are not informed that the organization providing the publications is a CIA proprietary operating under commercial cover. (S)

Neither the Director of Central Intelligence nor the members of the SCC knew of the unwitting involvement of United States persons when this covert action was reviewed and approved in June 1978.³ At our request, the DCI and the Chairman of the SCC have been informed. The SCC Chairman and the DCI believe that it is not necessary to change the *modus operandi* of the publication distribution proprietary. (S)

The other members of the SCC have not been informed that the covert action includes the unwitting use of United States persons. Under section 1–302 of Executive Order 12036,⁴ the SCC is required to consider and submit to the President a recommendation on proposed covert actions. The Board believes that the unwitting use of United States persons is a fact directly relevant to the SCC's review of the covert action. That fact should have been brought to the attention of the SCC when the covert action proposal was first presented in 1978. (S)

¹ Source: National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box I027, USSR–JEC, 1979–1980. Secret. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner, “Zbig—Refer to SCC. J.”

² Carter underlined “distributing publications to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe” in this sentence.

³ See Document 162.

⁴ Executive Order 12036, signed January 24, 1978, addresses United States intelligence activities. The text is printed in *Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 194–214.

The Board recommends that the matter be referred to the SCC for full consideration at this time.⁵ (U)

⁵ According to an information memorandum Brzezinski sent Carter on July 16, the issue of unknowing U.S. citizens participating in a covert action was presented to the SCC on July 13. In a unanimous decision, the SCC agreed that no change in the program was needed. Carter initialed this memorandum and added "ok." (National Security Council, Carter Intelligence Files, Box 1027, USSR–JEC, 1979–1980)

210. Letter From Senator Richard Stone to President Carter¹

Washington, July 24, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

Last year you publicly issued a commitment which stated that it would be the policy of the United States to oppose any efforts, direct or indirect, by the Soviet Union to establish military bases in the Western Hemisphere.

I am deeply concerned about continuing, undenied reports of Soviet presence and activities in Cuba.² This is especially true in light of open Cuban support for anti-government movements in Latin America. This concern is what prompted me last year to ask for this policy commitment from you.

During Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings on the SALT II Treaty, top-level Administration witnesses have been questioned about the still-secret agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union which ended the Cuban missile crisis in 1962. I asked Secretary of State Cyrus Vance to make the terms of this agreement public, because it is important during the SALT II debate to know whether or not the Soviet Union has lived up to these commitments concerning Cuba. I would

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 3, President's Breakfast—5–8/79. No classification marking. Attached to Tarnoff's July 26 memorandum briefing Vance prior to his July 27 breakfast meeting with Carter. Tarnoff recommended that Vance "inform the President of what we have done to lay down a marker to the Soviets on their activities in Cienfuegos and on the question of a brigade structure in Cuba." (Ibid.)

² See the partial chronology of U.S. reaction to the Soviet brigade in Cuba, sent from Bremont to Brzezinski and Aaron on September 7, 1979. The memorandum is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 61, Cuba: Soviet Brigade Additional Documents: 9/5–20/79.

again respectfully request that you tell the public what is known about this agreement, and about Soviet military activities in Cuba.

Last Friday and Saturday,³ major news organizations quoted senior administration officials⁴ as conceding that “they had received intelligence that the Soviet Union was setting up a high-ranking command structure in Cuba.” Further, these officials were quoted as saying that “this command structure would be able to handle a brigade-size force, while insisting that no such force has been brought to Cuba.”

Mr. President, in my view the continuation of such a command structure by the Soviet Union in Cuba does constitute Soviet efforts to establish a military base. Therefore, I ask that you take appropriate steps to effect its removal.⁵

Sincerely,

Richard (Dick) Stone

³ July 20–21.

⁴ See “Soviet Brigade Reported in Cuba,” *Chicago Tribune*, July 21, 1979, p. A4; and “Network Says Soviets Sent Brigade to Cuba,” *The Washington Post*, July 21, 1979, p. A6.

⁵ Vance’s response to Stone, which outlines the history of a Soviet presence in Cuba, is printed in the Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, p. 63.

211. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs and Policy (Eizenstat) to President Carter¹

Washington, August 9, 1979

I received a call today from Avital Scharansky, the wife of Anatoly Scharansky. She reported that Mr. Scharansky’s mother and brother saw him in prison two days ago. Their report to her was that he had been very sick since February and was growing worse, that he could neither read nor write at this point, was having severe headaches, and had experienced a drastic loss of weight. She stated that he was getting little, if any, medical help.

She made a personal appeal that you petition the Russians for his release on the grounds of his physical condition. She said she under-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 8/80. Personal and Confidential. A copy of the memorandum was sent to Brzezinski. Carter wrote in the upper right-hand corner, “Zbig—Tell Cy to do this. J.”

stood that in previous instances this has often afforded the Russians an opportunity to release political prisoners. She also stated that she would like to talk with you by telephone personally. I did not encourage that suggestion; but you might actually consider making such a call to dramatize your concern about Scharansky's plight.

I would like to get back to her or have someone else in the Administration get back to her to respond to her personal request, since she may well tell the media shortly that she has made such a request.

212. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 15, 1979, 0116Z

212493. Subject: (C) Secretary's Conversation With Avital Shcharanskiy.

1. (Confidential-entire text)

2. Secretary called Mrs. Shcharanskiy on August 12 on returning to the United States but could not reach her. He called again early morning August 13 and told her that he had received her message delivered to him through Marshall Shulman² and that we were raising the issue of her husband's health with the Soviets. Secretary told her we would let her know as soon as we received a response. She expressed appreciation for our help in this matter.

3. During afternoon of August 13 Marshall raised the subject with the Soviet Charge, Vasev, expressing privately the Secretary's concern and that of the White House and asking whether something could be done, in the first instance to ameliorate Shcharanskiy's health conditions and then to seek his early release. Vasev said the problem grows more difficult when it is agitated, and expressed the opinion that if a solution comes it will come only after a period of quiet.

4. We regard it as important that we not discuss this approach publicly.

Vance

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Dissidents and Political Prisoner Subject Files 1974–1988, Lot 91D273, Box 8, Shcharanskiy, 1979. Confidential; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information to Tel Aviv. Drafted by Robert W. Farrand (EUR/SOV); cleared by McCall, Barry, David Korn (NEA/IAI), Arnold Raphel (S), and Bremer; approved by Shulman.

² See Document 211.

213. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 25, 1979, 0215Z

223462. Subject: Defection of Soviet Ballet Star. Ref: State 222149.²

1. (C) Entire text.

2. Summary. Despite U.S. insistence that Lyudmila Vlasova, wife of Bolshoy defector Godunov be interviewed by U.S. officials before departing the U.S., Soviets sought to spirit her out of U.S. August 24 aboard Aeroflot flight scheduled to depart at 1700 EDT. As of 2100 local, plane still being held and Soviets have not rpt not agreed to permit Vlasova to leave aircraft for meeting with US officials to ascertain whether she leaving voluntarily. End summary.

3. As reported reftel, Shinn (EUR/SOV) informed Bessmertnykh August 23 that Godunov's wife, Lyudmila Vlasova, must be interviewed by U.S. officials before she could leave the U.S. Soviet Consul General KavaleroV later advised Shinn Soviets understood U.S. had "a right" to interview her.

4. Because of concern Soviets might nevertheless seek to spirit Vlasova out of U.S., Department sought in concert with Justice to obtain legal means to ensure Vlasova did not depart without being interviewed by U.S. officials. Early afternoon August 24 Justice issued a restraining order to prevent her departure. Simultaneously, Department dispatched two officers, Hurwitz (EUR/SOV) and Smith (L/PM)³ to New York to conduct meeting with Vlasova today in event that became necessary.

5. DAS Goodby⁴ (EUR) saw Vasev mid-afternoon August 24 and reiterated U.S. position that Vlasova must not depart without interview

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 117, 8/17–31/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent Niact Immediate to USUN and the Consulate at Leningrad. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by S.M. Byrnes (EUR/SOV); cleared by Gary L. Matthews (EUR/SOV), Jeffrey Buczaki (S/S–O), and for information by James H. Michel (L); approved by James E. Goodby, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, N790007–0214)

² Telegram 222149 to multiple posts, August 24, outlined the defection of Aleksandr Godunov, a Bolshoi ballet dancer, and his desire to meet with his wife, Lyudmila Vlasova. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Policy File, D790385–0809)

³ Edward Hurwitz and Jeffrey Smith.

⁴ James Goodby.

with U.S. officials. Vasev indicated he understood, implying that Soviets would not attempt to circumvent the interview. Vasev repeated Soviet demand to meet with Godunov and stated again that Soviets could only consider Godunov's request to meet with his wife at meeting with him, and Vasev implied that requested U.S. meeting with Vlasova would be acceptable.

6. Shortly thereafter, Department received information that Vlasova had boarded Aeroflot aircraft and plane was preparing to depart. Aircraft was then denied permission to depart JFK. Following arrival of Hurwitz and Smith at airport, INS officials repeatedly requested Vlasova be permitted to leave aircraft for interview, a request Soviets continued to deny. INS officials who boarded aircraft several times confirmed Vlasova's presence aboard and large escort of presumed Soviet security officials.

7. In subsequent conversation with Vasev, Goodby charged Soviets with having violated clear U.S. instructions in seeking to spirit Vlasova out of U.S. and demanded that she be taken off aircraft for an interview. Goodby advised Vasev airliner would not be permitted to depart without such an interview. Vasev responded that U.S. had not only had opportunities to interview Vlasova but also she had been permitted by U.S. customs and Immigration officials to board aircraft and Soviets thus believed we had no objections to her departure. In subsequent response, Goodby pointed out to Vasev no U.S. Immigration and Customs controls exist formally for departing passengers.

8. We are at present at an impasse. Soviets are seeking by various means, including threat to halt tonight's Bolshoy performance at Lincoln Center—to pressure U.S. to permit Vlasova to depart. Department remains adamant that Vlasova must leave the aircraft and indicate to us, in non-coercive surroundings, that she is voluntarily returning to the USSR before we will permit her to do so. Soviets refuse to agree. Thus, aircraft with passengers and crew aboard remain at Pan Am terminal. Godunov himself is enroute JFK and his lawyer, Orville Schell is already present. Makeyev of SMUN appears to be senior Soviet official present.

9. We will keep you advised. Assume that you and we will be receiving mighty Soviet protest very soon. US position is that (a) Soviet side acted in bad faith by reneging on its earlier indications that meeting with Vlasova was acceptable and that (b) in light of present circumstances, U.S. side must be able to interview Vlasova in non-coercive environment.

10. Please advise by Niac Immediate of any known arrivals of U.S. chartered aircraft since we assume some form of retaliation is likely.

11. Leningrad should inform Charge Garrison⁵ of this immediately upon receipt of this message, and apprise Codel Biden⁶ upon his arrival. Soviets here are taking a very tough stance and, although we would not expect adverse actions vis-a-vis Codel Biden, this should not be completely ruled out.

Christopher

⁵ Mark Garrison.

⁶ Joseph Biden, Senator (D-Delaware).

214. Oral Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

undated

Leonid Brezhnev, with bewilderment, and, speaking frankly, with indignation, has learned that the American authorities have forcefully prevented the departure from New York of a Soviet airliner for almost an entire day, insisting without any basis on the exit from the aircraft of a Soviet citizen, Lyudmila Vlasova, who is aboard.

American representatives had the opportunity to speak with L. Vlasova aboard the aircraft and she firmly informed them that she is flying from New York to Moscow of her own volition and without any kind of coercion. At the same time, she categorically refused to leave the aircraft. If the President wishes to be assured of this, then he can commission one of his own trusted officials in New York to speak personally with L. Vlasova aboard the aircraft.

But it is impossible to consider seriously that Soviet officials or the crew of the aircraft will either force or will allow the American representatives to force L. Vlasova to leave the aircraft and find herself in the hands of those who clearly and in premeditated fashion are seeking to provoke a conflict which is neither in the interests of the Soviet Union nor of the United States.

L.I. Brezhnev hopes that President Carter will treat with due attention this approach to him and that the illegal actions—even more than

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: Ballerina Ludmila Vlasova, 8/79. No classification marking.

that, actions contradictory to the elementary understanding of humanity—will be terminated without delay and those guilty of these activities will be properly punished.

215. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 29, 1979, 0056Z

226820. Subject: Soviet Aircraft/Vlasova Case: Interview With Vlasova on Board Mobile Lounge, JFK Airport, New York City.

1. (C-entire text)

2. This message provides you with account of interview of Lyudmila Vlasova conducted between 3:00 pm and 3:20 pm, Aug. 27, on mobile lounge drawn up to Aeroflot aircraft at JFK Airport, New York City. Account was prepared from notes taken by EUR/SOV officer (Hurwitz) who was present during the interview.

3. Participants at meeting were as follows:

US side:

Donald McHenry, Dep. US Representative to the UN
Edward Hurwitz, Office of Soviet Union Affairs
Dr. Florence Kavalier, US Public Health Service
Jack Riccardi, INS
Orville Schell, Attorney for Aleksandr Godunov
Galina Tunik, Interpreter

Soviet side:

Lyudmila Vlasova, Bolshoi Ballet dancer
Yevgeniy Makeyev, Dep. Soviet Representative to the UN
Ivan Miroshkin, Soviet Mission to the UN
Vladimir Plechko, Soviet Consul General-designate, N.Y.
Vadim Kavalierov, Consular Section, USSR Embassy
Dr. Sargin, Soviet physician, Soviet Mission to the UN

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 117, 8/17–31/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Gary L. Matthews (EUR/SOV); cleared by Edward S. Hurwitz (EUR/SOV), Shinn, and Seton Stapleton (S/S-O); approved by James E. Goodby (EUR/SOV). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840142–2447)

4. Account of meeting is as follows:

McHenry: (Introduces the members of the US side, describing Mr. Orville Schell as “a lawyer hired by Mr. Godunov”) We are sorry that this difficult situation has arisen. Our only desire is to ascertain directly from you, in an atmosphere where you are as free as possible from any pressures, whether you wish to remain in the United States or return to the Soviet Union.

Vlasova: My only wish is to return to the Soviet Union.

McHenry: I understand what you are saying, but I would like to make clear to you the possibilities before you. You are now in the United States under US jurisdiction. Should you choose to remain in this country both your country and mine will honor this decision.

(Note: The US interpreter translated the verb “honor” as “uchtet.” At this, Soviet Ambassador Makeyev interjected that a better translation would be the Soviet expression “satisfy your desire.” The US side had no objection to this version.)

Should you freely choose to return to the Soviet Union, your government and mine will honor this decision and satisfy this desire also.

If you wish to remain in the United States for a period of time, you can also do this. You cannot be forced to leave this country. If you freely choose to stay, you can go from here to another place and reflect further before making any final decision. What do you wish to do?

Vlasova: In connection with the situation which took place with Godunov, I expressed my desire to return home on my own.

McHenry: What do you mean “the situation which took place with Godunov”?

Vlasova: My husband was missing for two days during which time I had no news from him. I knew absolutely nothing about what had happened. He had given no warning to me. That is the “situation” to which I referred.

McHenry: I don’t know the background of what occurred. I do know, however, that you are free to do whatever you wish, as was your husband.

Vlasova: I agree fully that I am free to express my wishes and am now doing so.

McHenry: I could discuss these issues further, but have agreed not to do so. You have expressed your views, but I wanted you to know the full range of options before you.

Vlasova: I understand. But again, I am expressing my views.

McHenry: I want you to know that you can delay any final decision and that any future decision will also be fully up to you.

Vlasova: I don’t know why we are having this conversation. I had already expressed my wishes and made a clear announcement of my intentions.

McHenry: The reason for the situation which has taken place grew out of our desire to know what you genuinely desired. This situation would not have arisen if we had not been told that you might have other views.

Vlasova: The only way I can prove this wrong is to tell you again that I requested to be sent to Moscow.

McHenry: I assume you are making this statement freely and under no duress.

Vlasova: Isn't that obvious? Do I look to you to be under duress.

McHenry: Miss Vlasova, is there anything else you wish to do? Is there anyone you would like to see?

Vlasova: No.

McHenry: Again, let me express my sympathy for the difficulties that have occurred in the last few days. I hope you understand that this situation arose not from any malice on our part.

Vlasova: Well, I don't completely understand why people were standing near me for three days with handcuffs and arms. It was for this reason I feared leaving the plane. If there hadn't been this kind of scene, I might have been willing to leave the plane. I don't know your ways of doing things, but I am not used to this kind of treatment.

McHenry: This would not have occurred if the "situation" to which you referred hadn't taken place and if we hadn't had a reason to believe that you might want to make other plans. I tried through Ambassador Makeyev to reassure you that there would be no threats to your safety if you had left the plane. Isn't it clear now that you see our side that no threats are involved.

Vlasova: (smiling) Yes, that is obvious.

McHenry: I wish you a pleasant trip back to the Soviet Union. I only regret that I was not able to get tickets to see you perform here in New York.

Vlasova: Come to Moscow to see the Bolshoi. It is better to see us dance in the Bolshoi Theater than here.

Comment: It was the judgment of the US participants, including the Public Health Service physician and Mr. Godunov's lawyer, that Miss Vlasova was calm, relaxed, fully in control of what she was saying, quick in her answers, and in apparent good spirits. There was no evident reason whatsoever for doubting that she was expressing her own wishes. The Soviet side gave no outward sign that they feared she might say, from their standpoint, the wrong thing.

216. Summary of Conclusions of a Mini-Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, August 29, 1979, 11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Military Presence in Cuba (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State

David D. Newsom, Under
Secretary for Political
Affairs

James E. Goodby, Deputy
Assistant Secretary for
European Affairs

Defense

Walter Slocombe, Principal
Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Affairs

CIA

Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence
Harry Gelman

JCS

Lt. General John Pustay, Assistant
to the Chairman

NSC

Marshall Brement
William E. Odom
Madeleine Albright

The meeting reviewed the talking points recommended by State for use in a demarche with the Soviet Embassy and the Cuban Government on the presence of Soviet ground forces in Cuba. State expressed the view that we have only a short time before the latest information, confirming the presence of Soviet ground units in Cuba, will be leaked to the press, creating public pressures for action. Secretary Vance, therefore, wants to make a demarche informing both the Soviet and Cuban Governments that we are aware of the Soviet troop disposition.² Having taken this step we will be better prepared to deal with the Congress, public pressures, and other factors. (S)

Defense expressed serious reservations about making such a demarche until we know what our larger policy objective is and what next steps we can take. (S)

CIA expressed similar concerns but acknowledged State's legitimate need to do something now. CIA also judged that the intelligence loss, which might occur through cancellation of a scheduled Soviet bri-

¹ Source: Carter Library National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 61, Cuba: Soviet Brigade Additional Documents: 9/5–20/79. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² See Document 217.

gade training activity on September 3, is marginal at this point and not a strong reason for withholding the demarche. (S)

The NSC Staff expressed similar concerns as Defense about next steps and our policy objectives. It was pointed out that a demarche could easily draw a Soviet denial and the statement of a Soviet position which would become firm and difficult to change later on. It was also pointed out that a demarche could, on the one hand, cost us an intelligence loss through the cancellation of the September 3 exercise, or on the other hand, demonstrate disdain for our demarche by letting the exercise take place. Finally, it was explained that State has an answer to public reactions in the event of disclosure of the confirming evidence of the Soviet ground forces presence: we are planning to raise the issue at a much higher level when Gromyko comes to the United States in September, and we have scheduled meetings of the NSC principals on the matter in early September. Furthermore, the recent Shulman/Barry demarche to the Soviet Embassy has already communicated the seriousness with which we view a Soviet ground force presence in Cuba. (S)

No agreement was reached on whether or not to make a demarche. It was decided to ask Secretary Vance to take up the issue by telephone with Dr. Brzezinski and Acting Secretary of Defense Claytor.³ (S)

The wordings of the State Department draft demarches for the Soviet Union and Cuba were edited extensively by the group to leave the greatest latitude for policy choices later on and to reduce the possible difficulties we might encounter with the Soviets, Congress, and Senator Stone. There was some discussion of the advisability of including or excluding the Cubans as a recipient of the demarche and its significance for the level of relations between our two countries. (S)

There was agreement on the revisions of the two demarches, which were made as close to identical as possible. (S)

The President is to be made aware of the new intelligence before he meets Senator Stone in Florida on Thursday.⁴ (S)

³ W. Graham Claytor.

⁴ August 30.

217. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 29, 1979, 2048Z

227407. Subject: Soviet Brigade in Cuba.

1. (S-entire text)

2. We have recently received intelligence information which confirms the presence of a Soviet brigade-type unit in Cuba. In response to this development, the following points will be made to Soviet Embassy, Washington on Aug 29. You should arrange to make same demarche at FonOff Aug 30.

—Marshall Shulman informed Bessmertnykh on July 27² that we would regard the presence of organized Soviet combat units in Cuba with deep concern.

—Our concern is not theoretical. We know that there are Soviet combat forces in Cuba.

—We regard this as a serious matter which cannot help but burden our relations.

—The Secretary sees the meeting with the Foreign Minister in New York as an early opportunity to have comprehensive discussion on the trends in our relationship of which this deployment is one significant element.

3. We will be making a similar approach to the Cubans in Havana.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 15, Cuba: Soviet Brigade, 9/19–30/79. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Newsom; cleared in substance by Daniel O'Donohue (PM), James E. Goodby (EUR), and Viron P. Vaky (ARA); cleared by Walter Slocombe (DUSD/PP), Anthony Lake (S/P), Brzezinski, and Bremer; approved by Newsom. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, [no film number])

² In telegram 195589 to Moscow, July 27, the Department summarized Shulman's conversation with Bessmertnykh. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790343–0066)

218. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, August 31, 1979

SUBJECT

McHenry and The Vlasova Denouement (U)

McHenry's final performance in the Vlasova affair² (see attached cable)³ was abysmal and mystifying, perhaps a result of battle fatigue. It is difficult to understand why he violated specific instructions from us that the presentation should be lengthy enough to allow Vlasova to orient herself, to understand the situation, and to have total confidence that any decision she made would be honored and enforced by us. (C)

At the very least, McHenry should have given her a full and frank explanation as to why we had held up the plane and inconvenienced her and her fellow passengers for three days. Specifically, she should have been told (a) that we were led to believe on three separate occasions by Soviet officials that we would be allowed an opportunity to speak with her in non-coercive surroundings; (b) that we were therefore surprised when, without notice to us, she was spirited aboard a plane surrounded by goons; (c) that we could draw no other conclusion except that there was at least a possibility that she might have been forced to board the aircraft against her will; (d) that we therefore had to insist that any interview be conducted off the Soviet plane, which any fair-minded person would agree was a coercive atmosphere in which to hold such an interview; and (e) that we proposed to hold the meeting in a mobile lounge Friday night and are puzzled, perplexed, and not able to understand why it took until Monday morning for the Soviets to agree to our proposal. (C)

She should have also been told specifically that her husband desired to speak with her, that he was available to do so, and that we would facilitate such a meeting if she so desired. (C)

From nothing other than a public relations point of view, McHenry should have dragged the conversation on for at least an hour, allowing for translation, even if he did nothing other than to read the New York

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: Ballerina Ludmila Vlasova, 8/79. Confidential; Outside the System. Sent for information. Brzezinski placed a check mark in the upper right corner and wrote: "too bad. ZB."

² See Document 215.

³ Not found attached.

phone book to her. As it was, he only spoke with her for a maximum of ten minutes, since the entire interview only lasted fifteen minutes altogether. We could have been severely criticized for this lapse, and we are lucky to have escaped with relatively little damage. (C)

I do not recommend further action on this, but we should keep it in mind for future reference. (C)

219. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron)¹

Washington, September 5, 1979

SUBJECT

Oral Message re Soviet Brigade in Cuba

Attached is a copy of the "oral message" that Vasev delivered to Christopher at 4 o'clock this afternoon. The operational paragraph talks about a "training center" which has existed in Cuba for 17 years and where Cubans are trained in the use of Soviet equipment provided to Cuba. On the whole, the message could have been much more polemical than it was, which suggests that the Soviets may be looking for a way out of this one. (S)

State will be working up a proposed reply, which will be discussed at the 5 o'clock meeting tomorrow of the Newsom group. This will of course be taken up during your breakfast on Friday. (S)

Since Dobrynin's father just died, we do not know when he will be returning to Washington. According to Shulman, Vance is leaning toward making our reply himself directly to Vasev and as soon as possible.² (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 82, MPRC009, Soviets in Cuba. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

² The talking points for a Vance meeting with Dobrynin is Tab 1 of Tarnoff's September 6 memorandum to Vance. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 3, President's Breakfast—9–12/79) There is no indication if or when this meeting took place.

Attachment**Oral Message From the Soviet Leadership³**

September 5, 1979

Moscow has carefully studied the US demarche expressing concern about the “presence of Soviet-organized combat units in Cuba.”

In this, the US side—without awaiting even our reaction to this demarche—set about stirring up a propaganda campaign which cannot but harm US-Soviet relations.

This is not the first instance in recent times of the US side unjustifiably complaining to us with regard to our relations with another sovereign state—Cuba. Nevertheless, displaying good will, we have provided exhaustive explanations which, in our judgment, should have closed this whole question.

The unfounded and unjustified nature of such complaints is clearly evident in the present instance. This is manifest in the actual state of affairs.

The US side seeks to portray as a near sensation, or at least as something new, the presence in Cuba of a certain number of Soviet military personnel, to whom, moreover, are ascribed functions they absolutely do not possess. Meanwhile, in actuality, there has existed in Cuba for 17 years a training center where Soviet military specialists train Cuban officers in the use and maintenance of Soviet military equipment in the inventory of the Cuban Revolutionary Armed Forces. And one could hardly imagine that the US side has been unaware of all this.

Any assertions about the arrival in Cuba of a “Soviet military unit” are without foundation, and cannot be regarded as anything other than a deliberate effort to distort the real situation and to mislead the American and world public. The same purpose is served by assertions to the effect that providing for the legitimate defense interests of Cuba represents some kind of threat to the United States, or that Soviet policy towards Cuba has the character of a “strategic action” aimed against the USA.

There exists between the USSR and the USA the well-known understanding of 1962 concerning Cuba.⁴ As we have already emphasized

³ No classification marking. Printed from the U.S. translation.

⁴ The October 1962 correspondence between President Kennedy and General Secretary Nikita Khrushchev outlines the joint understanding regarding Cuba. Documents 84, 91, 95, and 102 in *Foreign Relations, 1961–1963*, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, outline the then-known negotiations pertaining to the Cuban missile crisis. Docu-

on many occasions, the Soviet side is adhering in good faith and intends in the future to adhere to its part of this understanding, on the assumption, naturally, that the USA will strictly fulfill its own part. Raising questions not related to this understanding, to which the US side has resorted more than once, introduces absolutely unnecessary complications into US-Soviet relations.

Moscow would like to expect that the US side will properly evaluate the clarifications set forth and will take the necessary steps to close the question it has artificially created.

ment 99, however, sheds light on the secret portion of the negotiations, which was acknowledged decades after the fact. (Ibid.) Dobrynin provides an overview of the Kennedy-Khrushchev negotiations in his memoirs. See Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 86–91.

220. Telegram From the Department of State to All American Republic Diplomatic Posts¹

Washington, September 9, 1979, 1725Z

236643. Subject: Soviet Ground Forces Unit in Cuba.

1. (Secret-entire text)

2. Recent confirmation of a Soviet ground forces unit in Cuba raises new concerns about Cuba's increasingly close military and economic ties with the Soviet Union. We would hope that all countries in the hemisphere share our concern about the Cuban/Soviet relationship. Accordingly, addressees should approach host governments to sensitize them on this. The purpose of this demarche is to explain recent events relating to the Soviet combat forces in Cuba and to begin to encourage host governments to think about the Soviet-Cuban problem. Posts may draw on following talking points as well as recent state-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790411–0637. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Sent for information Immediate to the U.S. Interests Section in Havana. Drafted by Ralph Braibanti (ARA/CCA); cleared by Newsom, Viron Vaky (ARA), Mark Parris (EUR/SOV), Robert Pastor (NSC), David Smith (INR/RAR), Miles Frechette (ARA/CCA), and Jeffrey Buczacki (S/S–O); approved by Vance.

ments by the President, the Secretary of State and the National Security Advisor.² Talking points should not be left in writing.

3. Soviet ground forces unit

—We have recently confirmed, through multiple intelligence sources, the presence in Cuba of what appears to be a Soviet combat unit. Rumors and fragmentary intelligence concerning such a unit have been in circulation for some time. But this is the first time we have been able to confirm the presence of a Soviet ground forces unit on the island.

—Elements of the unit appear to have been there since at least the mid-1970's. We estimate that it consists of 2,000 to 3,000 men. The unit includes motorized rifle armor, and artillery battallions, and combat and service support elements. This is in addition to an estimated 1,500 to 2,000 Soviet military advisory and technical personnel in Cuba.

—The combat unit's mission is as yet unclear, and we are pressing the Soviets for an explanation. Possible missions include protecting Soviet intelligence facilities, protecting Castro and protecting Soviet installations.

—Ground forces per se did not figure in our bilateral understanding with the Soviets, which were directed toward offensive weapons.

—Nonetheless, we are naturally concerned about the presence of Soviet combat forces in Cuba, among other reasons because it represents the stationing in Latin America of non-advisory military forces from outside the hemisphere, and because of recent Cuban activities in this hemisphere.

—We have in recent months expressed to the Soviets our concern over the Soviet/Cuban military relationship. Within the last few days, we are making clear to the Soviets that the presence of this unit can exacerbate our relationship. We have also raised this with the Cubans. We will continue our discussion on this subject.

—What concerns us most about these troops and what should be of concern to all the countries of the Americas is the fact that the discovery of a Soviet combat force coincides with a heightened and dangerous collaboration between the Soviet Union and Cuba in recent years. This is true in military, economic, intelligence and foreign policy activities. The ongoing attempt by Cuba to transplant the non-aligned movement to the Soviet camp is only the most visible indication of

² The statement made by Vance, August 31, and the President's remarks, September 7, are both in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 1979, pp. 63–64. Both statements indicate the size and type of unit stationed in Cuba and what that means for U.S.-Soviet relations.

the new and extraordinary collaboration between Cuba and the USSR. This concerns the US, as we believe it does other countries in the hemisphere.

4. Soviet/Cuban military ties

—Since 1975, the Soviet Union began to transform the Cuban armed forces from a home defense force into a modern military power with formidable offensive capabilities, larger than any in Latin America except Brazil. It is an army of more than 160,000 men, including ready reserve.

—Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba averaged somewhat more than 10,000 tons annually during the early 1970's; since 1975 they have averaged nearly double that figure.

—Cuba now has MIG-23's, AN-26's, AN F-class (diesel attack) submarine, T-62 tanks, surface-to-air missiles and multiple rocket launchers.

—Cuba's Air Force includes over 200 jet fighters. Cuba is rapidly expanding its naval base at Cienfuegos.

—Cuba maintains nearly 40,000 troops in Africa as well as military advisors in Asia and Latin America.

—Cuba receives its military equipment at no cost and makes available to the Soviet Union military facilities as well as intelligence and military communications installations.

5. Soviet-Cuban economic ties

—Cuban economic dependence on the Soviet Union has continued to increase since Moscow first began supporting the Cuban economy in the early 1960s. The increase in subsidies to Cuba has been particularly notable since 1975, growing roughly threefold since that year to its present level of about \$3 billion per year, or roughly one fourth of the Cuban GNP in 1978. By comparison, Soviet subsidies to Cuba during the entire period 1960–1970 amounted to the equivalent of about \$1 billion. This figure does not include the increasingly large quantity of grant military aid the Soviets have provided the Cubans.

—Nearly three-fourths of Cuban exports go to the USSR, which supplies 60 percent of Cuba's imports—including most foodstuffs and a large proportion of capital goods.

—Cuba is a full member of CEMA; Cuba, Mongolia, and Vietnam are the only non-Warsaw Pact members that participate fully in CEMA.

—Cuban dependence is so great that in the absence of Soviet economic support, there would be an immediate drop in Cuba's domestic economic activity and little chance of economic growth for several years. The bleak long-term prospects for the Cuban economy and Cuba's increasing military activities abroad will probably mean increased economic dependence on the Soviet Union in the future.

6. Following points should also be made in your presentation:

—Relatively small numbers of Soviets present no direct threat to US security, but nevertheless raise important questions which Soviets have not thus far answered.

—We are concerned about increased collaboration between Soviet Union and Cuba and about the implied relationship to Cuba's involvement in revolutionary activities in Central America and the Caribbean. Consequently, we are strongly pressing the Soviets on this issue.

—The Carter administration has sought to build a new relationship with Latin America based on mutual respect, non-intervention, and multilateral consultation and cooperation. We believe increased Cuban activities threaten the countries of the hemisphere and the relationship we are trying to build. This is why we are consulting.

7. Please report reactions soonest.

8. For Managua. Do not carry out this instruction.

9. For Bridgetown. Do not carry out this instruction in Grenada.

10. For Kingston and Georgetown: use discretion in conveying details.

Vance

221. Summary of a Conversation Between Secretary of State Vance and Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin¹

September 10, 1979

CV emphasized serious, no game, shock, bad for Admin, not aimed at Cuban NAM meeting went through talking points.

AD:

- 1) will report back and seek guidance.
understands our sensitivity
in his view, withdrawal will not be acceptable
but wants to find way to work through problem.
- 2) there has been no significant change in numbers since '62
(± 500–1,000)

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 10, CV/AD Meeting 9/10/79. Secret. The date was written in an unknown hand in the upper right-hand corner of the summary.

- 3) there has been no change in mission of unit
- 4) mission is training Cuban officers in use (and maintenance) of Soviet equipment, and how to operate in unit-sized operations. not much contact with Cuban enlisted men.
- 5) while not acknowledging that the unit in question is a brigade, he said brigade is not an unusual unit in Soviet army and was very widely used in World War II.
added that organization structure is compatible with Cuban army organization.
- 6) numbers involved are small. (no threat to US)
- 7) does not acknowledge “combat” characterization of unit. does not deny term, but will check.
refers to Soviet “military personnel”
- 8) emphasizes that Soviet Union has not sought to “test” or challenge the present administration; has done nothing to change situation in recent years.
- 9) Soviet Union has not violated the 1962 understanding and will continue to adhere fully to the existing understanding.
- 10) In response to a question, said he would check to whom the equipment now belongs.

222. Summary of Meeting¹

Washington, September 12, 1979

1. Dobrynin read from oral message, translating as he went along. He gave us text in Russian. (Our translation is attached.)²

Main points of message:

- a) SU has not violated 1962 understanding.³ US is now raising artificial issue, which will harm US-Soviet relations.
- b) what US calls “combat unit” is a training center. Cuban servicemen are trained there to master Soviet military hardware with the help of Soviet military personnel.
- c) this training center has been functioning for 17 years, under all the US Administrations during this period.
- d) neither the numerical strength nor the function of these Soviet military personnel have changed significantly during this period. Any fluctuations in numbers were less than previously discussed (i.e., less than 500)

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 11, Cuba. Secret.

² Attached but not printed.

³ See footnote 4, Document 219.

e) We give this explanation out of good will to help close out the issue. This should not be interpreted as a supplement to the 1962 agreement.

f) There should be no misunderstanding of the fact that the withdrawal of Soviet military personnel from Cuba is out of the question.

2. Dobrynin added that the Soviet Union would not mind if the US wished to publish this information, which contradicts the US statement. It hopes this will close out the issue.

3. Dobrynin then added another paragraph, reading from a text which he did not transmit in writing:

“As for the hint in the US note⁴ regarding the possibility of a response by the US by certain measures in areas where it has displayed restraint until now: for one thing, we do not, speaking frankly, see much restraint; and secondly, such hints are not the way we can expect to lead to mutual understanding between our two countries.”

4. In response to questions, Dobrynin was not able to say whether there was significance in the fact that this note referred to the training of Cuban servicemen, while the earlier note and he in his conversation referred to the training of Cuban officers.

5. He was also not able to say whether the unit had been continuously in the same place, nor whether it had engaged in unit training, or what kind of training had taken place. While still not confirming the existence of a brigade, he said there had been no change in structure since 1962. Asked whether the Soviet government would be willing to confirm publicly that the 1962 and 1970 understandings were still in force, he said categorically yes with regard to 1962, but said re 1970 that it would have to be clear about what had been accepted; “what we accepted then, we still do.” Will ask Moscow about public statement. No response on question to whom the equipment now belongs.

6. CV said he would supply some questions for further clarification. Dobrynin was given geographical locations, to avoid misunderstanding re unit in question.

⁴ Not found.

223. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 14, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet Troops in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary
Marshall Shulman

USSR

Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin said Foreign Minister Gromyko had asked him to convey the following information to the Secretary.

In answer to questions put orally to him at the meeting of 9/13 [12],² Dobrynin transmitted an oral note in Russian (our translation—Tab A—is attached),³ which makes the following main points:

- a) The equipment belongs to the training center and is used there.
- b) The Cuban personnel being trained are officers. This does not exclude the possibility of some Cuban enlisted personnel being present, as specialists or support troops.
- c) The Soviet Union hopes that the clarifications which have been supplied clear up any doubts that what the US has called “combat unit” is in fact a training center. The Soviet Union fears that a further exchange of technical questions will only serve to prolong the affair artificially.
- d) The only understanding governing the situation is the one that was reached in 1962. What was discussed in 1970⁴ only constitutes a mutually-agreed reconfirmation of the 1962 understanding. The Soviet Union will continue to be guided by the 1962 understanding.

The Secretary stressed to Dobrynin that time is of the essence. Public opinion is jelling and we need to resolve the matter quickly. We would hope to have a full response from the Soviet Union by Sunday.

Dobrynin agreed to report our views and to request a response by Sunday, but he thought it would be difficult to get a reaction that soon.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 16, Soviet Brigade (Meetings With Soviets), 9/79. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman.

² See Document 222.

³ Not found attached.

⁴ For the 1970 discussions, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XII, Soviet Union, January 1969–October 1970, Documents 224, 226, and 228.

The Secretary explained that one of the reasons the combat unit is so sensitive for us is that people associate combat units with the missiles that were present in 1962, because combat units were associated with those offensive weapons.

Dobrynin said what the Soviets have in Cuba does not possess of-fensive capability. He asked rhetorically whether the US wanted the Soviet Union to declare that the troops now in Cuba are not the same as those present in 1962. He asserted that there are no troops there to guard missiles.

At this point, the Secretary handed Dobrynin an oral note about the Soviet brigade in Cuba. (Oral note is attached—Tab B.)⁵

Dobrynin's reaction after carefully studying the note was to express somewhat emotionally the conclusion that "we have a crisis on our hands." If the Soviet Union presented such questions to the US about its installations around the world, the US would tell the Soviets to go to hell. These questions do not lead to a way out—they lead to a deadlock. The Secretary responded that the US was open in dealing with its troops abroad and we have no hesitation in answering questions similar to those posed to Dobrynin.

Dobrynin continued that the current publicity and the Congressional hysteria are not of Soviet makings. Today it is one issue; tomorrow they will raise other questions, based on the broadening of the 1962 understandings the US is now seeking. He said the USSR did not want to create a new precedent.

He particularly reacted to the sentence at the outset of the questions which repeated the point that "the presence of a Soviet combat unit in Cuba cannot be accepted," pointing to this as an indication that the questions are not intended to lead to a solution of the present problem.

Dobrynin was doubtful that Moscow would supply answers to the questions submitted. He said he may be wrong, but he thought these questions would appear to Moscow to be a broadening of the problem.

Dobrynin then stressed the main point he had made in the paper he handed over: the Soviet Union sees this as an effort to broaden the 1962 understanding. The US has made no claim that the 1962 understanding has been violated, but is creating new grounds for its objections. The US appears to be trying to create a new "1979 understanding," which will be the basis for a series of additional challenges in the future.

Dobrynin said the Soviet Union considers that it has answered the question raised by the U.S. It has stated categorically that this is not a

⁵ Not found attached.

“combat unit” as alleged by the US, and that it is a training center. It has already gone beyond the terms of the 1962 agreement in answering questions previously put, in an effort to help resolve the problem.

There followed a somewhat stormy exchange between Dobrynin and the Secretary, in which Dobrynin argued that the US was trying to push the Soviet Union into accepting an expansion of the terms of the 1962 understanding, on the basis of which several Senators would then make a succession of demands on other supposed violations. The Secretary replied that the object of our efforts to obtain information about the troops was to enlist Soviet cooperation in establishing the facts.

Dobrynin said he thought the Soviet Union had already been helpful in clarifying the facts. “I may be wrong, but I don’t think they will be willing in Moscow to go further. They believe you know the facts.”

The Secretary indicated that the information provided so far was clearly insufficient, and he reiterated the adverse effects of delay in resolving the issue.

Again assuring the Secretary that he would report our questions, Dobrynin said he planned to meet Foreign Minister Gromyko when he arrives in New York on Monday⁶ (FYI: due at 3:15 pm). It was possible that he might receive instructions from Gromyko at that time, in which case he would request an appointment with the Secretary on Tuesday morning. If any response should be received from Moscow by Monday morning, Dobrynin would not go to New York to meet Gromyko but would bring the response to the Secretary.

⁶ September 17.

224. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 17, 1979

SUBJECT

Soviet Combat Forces in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

US

Secretary Vance
Marshall Shulman

USSR

Ambassador Dobrynin

Ambassador Dobrynin came in at his request to deliver to Secretary Vance the Soviet answer to the U.S. oral message of September 14,² which contained a request for further clarification on a number of points.

Characterizing the response as “rather negative,” Dobrynin transmitted the oral message in Russian, and did a sight translation for the Secretary. (U.S. translation of the Soviet note is attached.)³

The main points of the Soviet note were as follows:

1. The Soviet government felt that it had already provided clarifications on the matter, out of good will, even though it felt the issue was artificially raised.

2. The Soviet Union found the US “questionnaire” unacceptable in both tone and content, and saw it as an effort by U.S. intelligence to seek information regarding Soviet relations with other sovereign states.

3. The Soviet Union sees the issue as a pretext by forces seeking to undermine U.S.-Soviet relations. It hopes the U.S. Administration will take steps to close out this artificially-raised question. It repeats that the Soviet military personnel involved have been in place for 17 years, and have not changed their numbers or function. There is no violation of the 1962 understanding, which the Soviet Union intends to continue to observe. There can be no question of withdrawing these personnel.

4. If the US Administration is actually interested in improving relations by implementing agreements reached through joint efforts, especially by ratifying SALT II, its actions will be met by cooperation from the Soviet Union.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 10, Vance–Dobrynin Meeting, 9/17/79. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Shulman.

² See Document 223 and footnote 5 thereto.

³ Attached but not printed.

The Secretary replied, saying that he regretted very much the negative character and tone of the response. He said he had hoped we would work together to find a satisfactory solution to this problem. He found the Soviet statement and the fact that doors seem to be closing on this kind of cooperative effort to resolve the problem in a mutually-satisfactory way deeply troubling.

The Secretary repeated his previously-expressed concern over the negative effect a failure to resolve the issue would have on overall US-Soviet relations; the consequences for the ratification of SALT were all too obvious.

The Secretary concluded by saying he would study the text of the Soviet note, discuss it with the President, and would be in touch with Dobrynin. Dobrynin said he would be in New York with Gromyko, but would come back to Washington whenever the Secretary wished.

Attachment

Attachment to the Memorandum of Conversation⁴

September 17, 1979

There followed an *off-the-record* informal conversation, along following lines:

MDS asked whether Dobrynin had any intimation from his side-communications with Moscow if there would be some responsiveness to the possibility of concrete actions by the Soviet Union that would serve to alleviate U.S. concerns.

Dobrynin replied that he did not know. He said he had not received any suggestions from the U.S. of the kind of actions we had in mind, and had not therefore transmitted any suggestions along these lines to Moscow.

The Secretary then advanced some tentative illustrative suggestions, saying he was thinking aloud, and was not intending this for transmission to Moscow at this stage. He asked what Dobrynin's personal reaction might be to suggestions that would include such matters as, for example, the elimination of the brigade headquarters, so it could be made amply clear that it would not function in a combat capacity, and the removal or transfer from Soviet control of some of the major combat equipment, such as the tanks, the armored personnel carriers, or the artillery. These were just illustrative of the kind of actions which

⁴ Secret; Sensitive. For Secretary Vance only. Drafted by Shulman.

the Soviet Union might take which would not involve a back-down on its part, and would not strain Soviet-Cuban relations, but which we could note as relieving our concerns.

Dobrynin said he did not know what the Soviet reaction would be, but that he would be glad to find out when the Secretary was ready to have the matter transmitted officially.⁵

⁵ Vance transmitted these suggestions officially in his September 20 meeting with Dobrynin, according to a summary of the meeting prepared by Vance. (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 10, Vance–Dobrynin, 9/20/79)

225. Memorandum From Secretary of State Vance, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

U.S. Strategy to Cuba

In our concern with the issue of Soviet combat forces in Cuba we should not lose sight of the longer-term issue of U.S. strategy toward Cuba itself. After Cy's trip to Ecuador,² before we confirmed the presence of the Soviet brigade, and more recently we have discussed U.S. strategy to Cuba. We agreed that we ought to continue to seek to contain Cuba as a source of violent revolutionary change. Specifically, we agreed that our policy should be directed at the following four objectives:

- To reduce and eventually remove Cuban military forces stationed abroad. (S)
- To undercut Cuba's drive for Third World leadership. (S)
- To obtain Cuban restraint on the Puerto Rican issue. (S)
- To inhibit the Soviet buildup of Cuba's armed force. (S)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 61, Cuba: Soviet Brigade Additional Documents: 9/26/79–10/4/79. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Brackets are in the original.

² Vance traveled to Ecuador August 9–12 for the inauguration of Ecuadorian President Jaime Roldós Aguilera.

To pursue these objectives we agreed to adopt a six-prong strategy (these are longer term measures, independent of whatever we do in connection with the Soviet brigade):

—With the Caribbean and Central America, we intend to work with like-minded Latin American governments in an effort to compete with the Cubans and increase the chances of peaceful and democratic change. We intend to explore the possibility of increasing our presence in the area.³ On the military side, this would include port visits and training in order to demonstrate our concern for the region and enhance the security of the region. Also, the U.S. should be prepared to provide greater amounts of economic and military assistance to governments in the region that respect human rights and democratic values, and also resist Cuban influence. [The drop from 2.2 percent (in FY 79) to 1 percent of the FMS budget allocated to Latin America in FMS credits will have (FY 80) to be reversed, and perhaps even increased to 4–5 percent.] (S)

—With key Western allies and with selected governments in Latin America and the Third World, we will share intelligence information on the Soviet buildup in Cuba and on Cuban intelligence, political and military activities abroad.⁴ (With Latin American governments, we should seek to raise their consciousness of the Cuban problem as their problem—not just ours—in order that they begin to seriously consider actions to curb Cuban adventurism.) We should also hold periodic consultations with these governments about measures that might be taken individually or collectively to counter expansionist actions by Cuba. We should encourage them to adopt an approach, which denies the Cubans the recognition they seek and raises the costs to the Cubans of continued intervention abroad, including the denial of credit—an economic area where concerted action might give us considerable leverage. (S)

—With moderate members of the NAM we should urge attention to issues like human rights, arms restraint, non-intervention and foreign aid which could lead to criticism of Cuban and Soviet activities. We should continue to encourage the moderates in the NAM to resist strongly and publicly efforts by the Cubans to use their three-year NAM chairmanship to impose pro-Soviet positions of the kind reflected in the Cuban draft declaration for the NAM Summit.⁵ (S)

—We should continue to press vigorously to preclude Cuba from gaining a seat on the UN Security Council or from hosting the next UNCTAD Summit.⁶ (S)

—With the USSR, we should—both in the context of the brigade issue and otherwise—make very clear the depth of our concern about

³ Carter wrote in the margin next to this point: “How do OAS states line up now? (US vs Cuba).”

⁴ Carter wrote in the margin adjacent to this sentence: “With which ones?”

⁵ Carter wrote in the margin adjacent to this paragraph: “Let’s answer NAM ‘manifesto’ from Havana mtg.”

⁶ Carter wrote in the margin next to this point: “ok.”

Cuba's activities in the Caribbean and in Central America⁷ (as well as in Africa) and inform them of the costs to our relationship of continued Soviet support (or even acquiescence) in Cuba's activities. In this connection, we are transferring a few limited examples of dual-use high technology to the PRC. (S)

—With Cuba, we should seek to use the Cuban Americans as a potent force for influencing the Cuban people. They are returning to the island for frequent visits, and we should benefit from the insights gained during their visits. We should also increase the influence of U.S. culture on the Cuban people by promoting cultural tours and by permitting an arrangement to distribute U.S. films on the island.⁸ (S)

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve the objectives and measures described above.⁹ (U)

⁷ Carter wrote in the margin next to this point: "ok."

⁸ Carter wrote in the margin next to this point: "ok."

⁹ Carter checked his approval and initialed the memorandum. Carter's decisions were disseminated as Presidential Directive/NSC-52. PD/NSC-52 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XXIII, Mexico, Cuba, and the Caribbean.

226. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 24, 1979, 5:15–6:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary
Ambassador Marshall Shulman
Mr. William D. Krimer,
Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko
First Deputy Foreign Minister
G.M. Korniyenko
Ambassador A.F. Dobrynin
Mr. V. Sukhodrev

Foreign Minister Gromyko welcomed the Secretary and said he was glad that they had a chance to have a chat. The Secretary said that he was also glad to have this opportunity.

Gromyko said that since New York was the Secretary's home, it would be only logical for the Secretary to start the conversations and he would therefore ask him if he had anything new to convey.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 16, Soviet Brigade (Meetings With Soviets), 9/79. Secret. Sent via Alpha Channel. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations.

The Secretary said he would be glad to start. As Gromyko knew, the Secretary had met several times with Ambassador Dobrynin and had expressed to the Ambassador his deep concern and that of his government and President arising out of the Cuban situation.² He had very frankly laid out the deep concern that we have as to the effect failure to resolve this matter satisfactorily would have on the relations between our two countries and, in addition, upon the ratification of the SALT treaty. The Secretary had tried to be very clear, pragmatic, and accurate in everything that he had said to the Ambassador. In addition, during their last conversation, the Secretary had made specific suggestions as to steps that might be taken to resolve this problem. He was sure that Gromyko had been informed and that he now had had sufficient time to reflect on these suggestions. The Secretary said he would appreciate hearing Gromyko's views and response to what he had suggested.

Gromyko said that he would start out by pointing out that the Soviet leadership had been very much surprised by the noisy campaign raised in the US with regard to the small training center the Soviets had in Cuba. This has caused not only surprise but also consternation. The statements made in the US in this connection have no basis in reality of the true state of affairs. Therefore, the Soviet leadership was asking itself whether this had been done artificially and deliberately by the US Administration; if that was so, they would ask: Why? After all, in the course of many meetings between our two countries on various occasions, statements had been made about the importance of developing the relations between our two countries and, above all, a treaty had been signed, a treaty of exceptional importance. After the summit meeting in Vienna,³ a campaign had been launched in the US which was totally unfounded. If that campaign had been launched on the basis of certain information received from US intelligence agencies, he could only tell the Secretary that the US Government, President Carter, and the Secretary personally had been badly misled; some sort of myth had been created, a myth that had no real basis in fact. Therefore, there was no question at all of the Soviet Union's having to change something in their presently existing arrangements. The Soviet Union had not undertaken anything that would have been in violation of the well known understanding achieved in 1962;⁴ therefore, there was nothing that they needed to change and this question did not arise at all. In the Soviet view, the question should not be put in those terms at all.

Gromyko was well aware of the considerations which the Secretary had expressed to the Soviet Ambassador. However, the Soviet

² See Documents 221–224.

³ See Documents 199–201, 203, 204, 206, and 207.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 219.

leadership could only proceed from those considerations which he had just presented to the Secretary, i.e., there was no need whatsoever to introduce any kind of changes into existing arrangements, and therefore the Soviet leadership did not intend to do so. However, the suggestions the Secretary had made to Ambassador Dobrynin were aimed at introducing such changes.

Gromyko thought that there was a way out of this situation. He was firmly convinced that there was an appropriate way out. In a certain sense, he could understand that the Secretary found himself in a delicate situation as a result of certain statements made by the US Administration. However, since the Soviet side had had no hand in bringing about that situation, since those statements had been made by the US side, it would be up to the US to find an appropriate way out. He did believe that such a way out could easily be found. The US Administration had at its disposal the official statement the Soviet Union had made on Cuba, to the effect that there were certain Soviet facilities in Cuba, i.e., a training center. If the Secretary deemed it useful, he could make that Soviet statement public. He could say that some information had been received which required verification as well as certain clarification, that this had now been accomplished and apart from the clarifications provided, an official statement had been made by the Soviet Union. He was deliberately saying “statement” rather than “understanding between the Soviet Union and the US,” because this matter was one that concerned only the Soviet Union and Cuba. Nonetheless, the Soviet Union had made a statement to the effect that it had a training center in Cuba, and, further, the US Administration could state that it had taken note of that Soviet statement. This is what the Secretary could do if he was sincerely seeking a way out of the situation.

To reinforce what he had said about the noisy campaign in the US, Gromyko cited the following data regarding the number of US military personnel stationed in countries adjacent to the Soviet Union as of September 25, 1979 (Gromyko referred to a paper brought to him by Ambassador Makarov),⁵ he noted that in Turkey, i.e., close to the borders of the Soviet Union, the US had stationed approximately 5,000 men. He was in possession of the appropriate breakdown of that figure into ground personnel, air force personnel and naval personnel. In Japan, the US had 44,500 troops. Here, too, he had the relevant figures for ground forces, air forces and naval forces. After all, Japan was a neighbor of the Soviet Union, separated from Soviet territory by a narrow strip of water, just as Cuba was separated from the US by a narrow strip of water. In South Korea, the US had approximately 40,000 men, again broken down into the three categories. As for the overall

⁵ Not further identified.

number of US troops on foreign territory, that number was 465,000 all told. Gromyko asked rhetorically whether the Soviet Union was raising questions in connection with these large numbers of US forces, such as the questions raised by the US with respect to the instruction center in Cuba. Was the Soviet Union referring to various understandings and making a noisy campaign out of it? The US had presented demands to the effect that the Soviet Union must do such and such with respect to these armed forces in a country adjacent to the US, and yet those forces were there for training purposes only, unlike the combat forces of the US.

If the matter were approached with minimum objectivity, the Secretary would realize how the US appeared in the eyes of any objectively thinking individual, and not only in the eyes of the highest Soviet leadership or L.I. Brezhnev personally. As Gromyko had said at the outset, the Soviet leadership could only reach one of two conclusions in this connection. Either this whole matter had been artificially and deliberately concocted by the US Administration for reasons which he could not fathom, or the US Administration had been badly misled. Personally, he would not want to ascribe any personal motives to the President or to the Secretary, or to assert that the US had deliberately concocted these statements or allegations at some desk in the White House. Gromyko said he was simply analyzing the questions that had arisen without ascribing any malicious intentions to anyone specifically.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to tell President Carter (since he would not have an opportunity of seeing the President during his current visit) that in Moscow the Soviet leadership generally, including L.I. Brezhnev personally, had given appropriate attention to this entire matter. Brezhnev was surprised and perplexed as to the reasons why all of this was being done without any foundation. Brezhnev had asked Gromyko to convey to the President and to the Secretary that the Soviet leadership as such, and Brezhnev personally, cannot meet the wishes and demands made in this connection. The Soviet leadership was firmly convinced that the United States has no grounds whatsoever to interfere in an affair that concerned only the Soviet Union and Cuba. Gromyko personally was convinced that there were no legitimate grounds at all for this matter having been raised in the first place. He was saying all this without any ill feelings toward the United States. Quite the contrary, the Soviet leadership had taken a very positive view of everything that had been achieved in Soviet-American relations recently, and the Soviet leadership and Brezhnev personally had expected that the President of the United States and his Administration and all other US organizations involved in foreign policy would follow the path that had been charted in Vienna, an achievement that had been preceded by an enormous amount of preparatory work. Now every-

thing was viewed with a certain lackadaisical attitude, as if this was simply a minor social or diplomatic matter. After all, if one took an objective look at everything achieved in Vienna, particularly the treaty signed in Vienna which was of enormous importance, this present matter would appear in true perspective as a tiny bug, moreover as a tiny bug presented in an incorrect light.

Gromyko said he could understand that certain domestic considerations might have influenced the Secretary's actions but he would ask, how did this concern the Soviet Union? It was a different country, after all. The Soviet leadership preferred to view all these matters from a statesmanlike perspective and from the perspective of the relations between the two major powers in the world. If we were to embark upon the path of trying to adjust to each other's domestic political squabbles, tendencies, and trends, then both countries would lose control of foreign policy and the ship of Soviet-American relations would surely flounder on the rocks. That could have gloomy and dangerous consequences indeed. Why proceed in that manner? We need to keep our relations on an even keel, and not seek to create entirely unnecessary complications.

Gromyko said that just before leaving Moscow he had a conversation with Brezhnev, in the course of which Brezhnev had spelled out very clearly and lucidly the thoughts Gromyko had just presented, and had asked that these views be conveyed to President Carter. Gromyko would emphasize again that the Soviet Union had no malicious intentions toward the United States and would ask where any individual could be found who was so naive or myopic as to believe that a small training unit was a grave threat to the security of the United States. In the Soviet Union, at least, there were no such people.

At the same time, Gromyko wanted to use this opportunity to convey Brezhnev's best wishes and regards to the President and to the Secretary personally, and Gromyko would join in presenting his best wishes and regards.

The Secretary said he would convey this message to President Carter. He would now want to respond to the substance of Gromyko's remarks. First, he would explain very clearly just how we had come upon this matter and how we had acted. He wanted to make it crystal clear that there was no ulterior motive on our side in raising this issue. It cannot help us in any way; it can merely hurt both of us. The Secretary repeated this and stressed that it could only cause a severe deterioration in the relations between our two countries, which he believed were as important to the Soviet Union as they were to us. Secondly, in his judgment, if we did not resolve this matter satisfactorily, it would kill the SALT treaty. We believed, as the Soviet Union did, that the SALT treaty was a major, historic achievement of fundamental impor-

tance to world peace. As he had said in his speech at the United Nations, this was a matter of great fundamental importance. Therefore, it would be wrong, and indeed unthinkable, to say that we had dreamed up something when it could only damage relations between us and damage the prospects of the SALT treaty.

Now the Secretary wanted to turn to how we had come upon this problem. Information we had received recently, during early July and in August, tending to indicate that there was in fact a combat unit located in Cuba, namely a Soviet combat brigade. When the information we had received had led us to this conclusion, we had said that we must check that conclusion, and it had led us to search further. This was an extremely serious matter and, therefore, we had to be sure that we were right in our conclusion before raising it with the Soviet Union. For this reason, we took additional steps to ascertain the actual state of affairs, and on August 20 and August 23 our conclusion had been reached on the basis of the evidence we had, that this was indeed a combat brigade. Further information had indicated that this unit was not now involved in the training of Cuban forces. Consequently, we were faced with a very serious situation. The fact that there was a combat unit and that, from all the information we had, there was no evidence that this unit was being used as a training unit with Cubans, presented us with an obvious and very difficult problem which we could not keep secret and which then became a matter of public knowledge. It was the characteristics of the unit stationed in Santiago de las Vegas, which we have recently identified, that led us to conclude that it was a combat unit.

In trying to resolve this situation, and so as to prevent a serious deterioration in the relations between our two countries and prevent imperiling the SALT treaty, we had tried to see if there was a practical way to resolve this matter that would be acceptable to both sides. We concluded that a practical way would be to ask that the Soviet Union take certain unilateral steps consistent with its statement that this was a training unit to remove the elements that had led us to our conclusion. We had spelled out the following steps:

1. Eliminate brigade headquarters organization.
2. Remove from the Soviet brigade equipment and armament which gives a combat capability.
3. Discontinue Soviet unit field exercises, including combined arms exercises.

The Secretary wanted to point out further that a positive Soviet response to these suggestions would not need to be embodied in a formal agreement between us. We would not challenge any portrayal of such steps as unilateral actions. As long as these steps are taken and remain in effect, we would state that these steps met our concerns and that this

concludes the matter. We would expect that the Soviet Union, for its part, would not take exception to such a statement.

It seemed to the Secretary that this would be a practical way of dealing with a difficult problem that must be resolved if we want to achieve what he believed both countries wanted to achieve, i.e., improvement of the relations between us and final ratification of the SALT treaty. We made this proposal after a great deal of thought and had taken into account the sensitivities of the Soviet Union, as well as the problem and sensitivities that this situation had created for our nation.

In Vienna President Carter had indicated to President Brezhnev the great sensitivity in the United States to Soviet forces in Cuba as well as the broader effects in this hemisphere of what was happening in Cuba. He emphasized how important it was that each of our countries take into account the sensitivities of the other. Therefore, he thought Gromyko would understand the special nature of this problem arising out of the facts presented. He would very much hope that Gromyko would further reflect on this situation and on what we had suggested before rejecting what we had proposed, thereby creating a very deeply troubling situation for all of us.

Gromyko said that from everything the Secretary had said it followed that the US side was interested not in actually establishing the facts and the true situation, but wanted to adapt the situation to its allegations, to the myth and inventions that had been concocted. He had carefully listened to what the Secretary had said and saw that basically the Secretary had repeated what had been said before, even though in different words. As for himself, he had presented the Soviet evaluation of this matter and would once again assure the Secretary that he did not want to leave anything unsaid or conceal anything, and that he did not harbor any malicious thoughts or hostile plans against the United States. It would indeed be absurd for the Soviet Union to harbor any such plans. Yet, he would note that a great deal had been said in the United States about the alleged danger to the security of the United States presented by the existing Soviet training unit in Cuba. All this was sheer fabrication and nothing else. If Gromyko were to say anything further on this matter, he would simply be repeating what he had already told the Secretary and he saw no need in doing that. He would only add that if the US Administration failed to put an end to all the hullabaloo and propaganda created around that issue, Soviet-American relations would certainly be harmed. The consequences of such deterioration would, of course, be the responsibility of the United States and not the Soviet Union. The Soviet view was quite different. It was that both the Soviet Union and the United States should very solici-

tiously and carefully nurture everything good that had been achieved in Soviet-American relations in recent times.

The Secretary said he would not repeat himself, but would clarify that there was no question of our having charged that this matter was a violation of the '62 understandings between us. We had made it quite clear from the outset that the Soviet brigade as such, in its present configuration, posed no threat to the United States. We had tried to be honest and had not tried to build up this matter out of all proportion.

Gromyko said that he had not yet touched on one aspect of this matter. The training center in Cuba had now been there for 17 years, and over all these years no one had raised any questions about it. For this lengthy period of time everything had been regarded as normal. Why, then, had it been necessary to raise so much noise about it now? Why expand the importance of this matter out of all proportion? This aspect had not failed to attract the attention of the Soviet leadership, and it had tried to find answers and explanations, but had not succeeded. In fact, there could be no answer to this question. Why was this being done, since it harmed the relations between us and also harmed the prestige of the United States? That was the Soviet view of the matter, although the Secretary might see it somewhat differently. Nevertheless, this view was quite prevalent throughout the world.

The Secretary wanted to ask Gromyko a direct question. From our analysis over the years, we cannot specifically trace this unit all the way through. On the other hand, our information showed that during 1975 and 1976 at this location there had been an increase in construction and, after that time, all indications of training with Cuban forces, which we had witnessed in the past, had disappeared. It was this that had led us in July to investigate further into this matter again, coupled with photos of the equipment of this unit and a configuration that was used only for a combat unit.

Gromyko said that this kind of reasoning could lead to absurdity. For example, the United States might notice that the trousers of Soviet soldiers had increased in width or length and would then come to the conclusion that this, coupled with a different kind of boot worn now, had created a new situation. Logic of this kind was absolutely unconvincing. After all, what did that change? As the Secretary probably knew, US and NATO troops had also carried out maneuvers in different compositions. Sometimes officers stand at a table on which a map has been spread, and move around little symbols, each symbol standing for a corps, or an army, or a brigade, and yet these were only little flags or markers and did not in any way reflect the true situation on the ground. The Secretary had said that our information had indicated that in the past more Cuban troops had been involved with this unit, and that fewer Cubans were involved now (the Secretary inter-

rupted to say: “not fewer troops now, but none”). If Gromyko had understood him correctly, this had led to the supposition that this was now a different unit and yet, whether 200 or 100 Cubans took part in exercises really had no bearing upon the nature of the unit. He would ask whether American armed forces units were frozen for years or for decades. Quite obviously they were not. In fact, using the previous simile, the soldiers’ trousers might become narrower again without this indicating any change in the true situation. Could the Secretary really seriously argue that the number of Cuban troops exercising with the Soviet unit had changed its nature? What importance could this possibly have? He would ask the Secretary to give this further reflection. Quite possibly a US military person whose full-time job it was to observe Cuba had come to the conclusion that Cuba was the alpha and omega of his military career. But this could not be taken as a serious argument, not even to mention the question of the accuracy of the information obtained. The nature of the training center depended upon the various tasks assigned to it, but what sort of problems could such a small unit raise in terms of threatening the security of the United States? Gromyko was sure that he was right in saying that if this matter were viewed objectively, none of the arguments made on the US side would stand up.

The Secretary said he had nothing further to add, except to point out that he had not spoken of seeing fewer Cubans, but no Cubans at all. He said that he would report this conversation to his President and hoped Gromyko would do the same with respect to President Brezhnev. Gromyko said that he would naturally do so.

Both the Secretary and Gromyko noted that they would meet again on Thursday⁶ at 3:00 p.m.

⁶ September 27; see Document 227.

227. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 27, 1979, 3–4:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Brigade in Cuba

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

The Secretary

William D. Krimer, Interpreter

USSR

Foreign Minister A.A. Gromyko

V.M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

The Secretary told Gromyko that he had been informed that Castro was going to make a big statement tomorrow. He asked if Gromyko knew anything about this.

Gromyko said he did not know Castro's plans for tomorrow, but had heard that Castro intends to make some kind of speech or statement; frankly, he did not know the content of that speech or when it would be delivered.

The Secretary said he had been told it would be sometime tomorrow. The Cuban Interests Section had invited our press to come and listen to a major address by Castro.

Gromyko said that was possible, of course, but he did not know, since he did not have a direct line to Castro from here.

The Secretary said that he had listened with great care to Gromyko's speech at the UN. In fact, he had clapped upon conclusion of the speech. Some people had asked the Secretary for his views of Gromyko's speech, and the Secretary had said that he had seen some positive parts as well as some other parts that he would wish to study further.

Gromyko said he had been informed about the Secretary's comments. Now he would ask the Secretary what the world was standing on today.

The Secretary said that he would express some of his reflections since their last meeting on Monday.²

The Secretary had reflected on what Gromyko had said at their last meeting and, as he had indicated, he had listened carefully to what

¹ Source: Department of State, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81 D 109, Box 10, Gromyko–Vance Memcons re Cuba—9/24–27, 1979. Top Secret. The meeting took place at the U.N. Building.

² September 24; see Document 226.

Gromyko had said in his speech. He understood Gromyko's sensitivities and hoped Gromyko understood ours.

The Secretary said he would not repeat the ground they had covered earlier. We have sought to find a practical solution for this issue, which takes account of both Soviet sensitivities and ours. Unfortunately, the position Gromyko had taken does not lead to a satisfactory resolution of the problem. Without a reasonable measure of cooperation from the Soviet side, it is not possible for us to work out a resolution of the problem that would prevent a serious deterioration in our relations, as he had indicated the other day. We had suggested action which the Soviet Union might take to make it clear that this is not a combat unit. We had indicated that the Soviet Union could present these actions in any way it wishes, and we would not, for our part, represent them as the result of any agreement or as anything other than a voluntary action on the part of the Soviet Union. Such actions would make it possible for us to declare that our concerns had been allayed, and to press ahead vigorously with other matters, including the ratification of SALT.

As the Secretary had indicated the other day, Cuba, as Gromyko so well knew, is a highly sensitive issue with our people. We have sought to avoid confrontation with the Soviet Union on this issue, but several times now, in less than two decades, the discovery of Soviet military activities on the island has created the confrontations we have sought to avoid. We accept the reaffirmation of the 1962 understanding and note Gromyko's statement that this unit has not changed appreciably since 1962. We accept the fact that it has no capacity at the present time to move beyond Cuba. The possibility remains, however, that its organization might form the basis for expansion or that the Soviets might provide the airlift or sealift for its movement to other parts of the hemisphere.

To come to the nub of the question, it is evident that Soviet/American relations are poised at a fork in the road. If we are able to work out a mutually satisfactory resolution of the present problem, it will, in the Secretary's judgment, make it more possible to do a number of things, to complete the ratification of SALT, which we both desire, to press for early action in MFN and to work for a broad improvement in our relations on many significant fronts. If, however, we are not able to work out a mutually satisfactory solution to the problem, he was concerned that all the work he and Gromyko have done to try to stabilize the strategic military competition and to bring about a more sensible, a more stable and a more productive relationship between our two countries will be jeopardized. The President will have to consider what actions would have to be taken under the circumstances. The Secretary was concerned that, if this is the direction in which we will be moving,

then it will be difficult to preserve the proper relations between our two countries.

The Secretary expressed the hope that Gromyko might have, on the basis of his reflections since their last meeting, some thoughts on practical steps that could move us in the direction of a constructive and mutually satisfactory resolution of our problem. Steps which the Soviets could take along the lines we have suggested would speak more loudly than words and would be a considerable help in defusing the issue. As he had said earlier, we would, of course, not represent such steps as resulting from any sort of agreement between us.

That, in brief, was where the Secretary saw us at this point after reflecting carefully about the situation and where we stood at this moment.

Gromyko said that, from what the Secretary had just said, he drew the conclusion that the Secretary had nothing new to say as compared to what he had brought with him for their previous conversation.

The Secretary acknowledged that in the way of suggestions he did not have anything new. He had given the situation a great deal of thought.

Gromyko said that the considerations and comments the Secretary had made at their previous meeting had been the subject of Soviet reaction at that time, and Gromyko had voiced their thoughts regarding the Secretary's suggestions. He did not want to repeat himself, but would confirm what had been said then on their side.

The Soviets cannot accept any of the conditions the Secretary had suggested. He would restate this now.

Gromyko said he had to say that the Secretary was evidently proceeding from some sort of erroneous premises. He was evidently convinced that U.S. hints to the effect that certain questions might be resolved not in the way the Soviet side would want to see them resolved (and here he was specifically referring to ratification of the SALT Treaty and to MFN), that they would be decided in a different, i.e., negative way if the Soviets adhered to their position, would lead the Soviets to change that position. Gromyko would not recommend that such hints be voiced. They did not make any impression on the Soviets other than a negative impression. The Soviet side had always stressed that the Treaty is a bilateral matter, that it was needed equally by both the Soviet Union and the U.S., and that this matter could not be held hostage for exerting pressure or influence on the Soviet Union. A method of that kind was quite inappropriate and Gromyko thought that the Secretary was aware this was the case. The same thing applied to the question of MFN.

The Secretary said he wanted to speak to that. He believed that Gromyko had not carefully listened to what the Secretary had been

saying. We, that is, the U.S. Administration, continued to fight for SALT ratification because we believed that the Treaty was in our interests as well as in the interests of the Soviet Union. As a practical matter, as he had said earlier, our ability to win that fight will be made much more difficult or impossible—not because of us, but because of the absence of enough votes in the Senate. The Secretary had not stated that as a threat, but simply as a description of concrete facts.

Gromyko said that to that he could only say: “Why try to rectify the situation at the expense of Soviet interests?”

The Secretary said he would respond to that later; he did not believe that what he had suggested was against Soviet interests.

Gromyko said that the Secretary had implied that Soviet personnel in Cuba can be used for something that should not even occur to any individual with common sense, with respect to Latin America and elsewhere. That was surely quite a fantastic speculation. The Soviet side could only express total surprise that such thoughts could even occur to the Secretary. If the U.S. government had advisers or experts or anyone else who suggested such possibilities, Gromyko could only say that they do not know the Soviets, that they do not know Soviet policy. Consequently, they were bad advisers, indeed, bad experts. If such ideas were shared by those who guide U.S. foreign policy in terms of U.S./USSR relations, he could only express regret. Was it not possible to live in Washington without constantly inventing and placing in motion something or other against the Soviet Union and its foreign policy? At present this concerned the Soviet Union and Cuba, but Gromyko could not recall even a brief period of time in which some legend or other, hostile to the Soviet Union and its policy, was not current in the United States. Why was this being done? He recalled that when they had been in Vienna, Brezhnev, Gromyko himself, the Soviet Minister of Defense and others, all had the impression that the fundamental matters of both sides were prevailing, and that both sides recognized the necessity of searching for agreed solutions leading to detente and to safeguarding world peace. And yet, after the Vienna Summit and after the two heads of state returned to their respective countries, there had surfaced all sorts of hostile legends aimed against the Soviet Union. Perhaps those who invent such legends and myths are extremely well paid for doing so. Such was certainly not the situation in the Soviet Union.

In essence, Gromyko wanted to emphasize that there was no need to correct anything with respect to Soviet personnel in Cuba. The Soviets harbor no malicious intentions against the United States and do not undertake anything against the interests of the United States or any other nation. They did not engage in any nefarious activities and have no malicious plans of any kind. The Secretary could rest assured that

neither the Soviet Union nor Cuba harbor any hostile intentions against the United States. It would therefore be good if President Carter and Secretary Vance and all others having an input into the making of foreign policy approach problems with a cool head, in a carefully weighed manner and without emotions. If that were done, they would surely agree that it was unthinkable for the Soviet Union to do anything in Cuba to harm U.S. security. For the Soviets this was self-evident and so elementary that even elementary school children, given the facts, would come to that conclusion. Anything else was inconceivable, and he thought that the Secretary understood that very well.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary kept referring to sensitivities; but, he would ask, should not sensitivities be controlled? After all, the human being was distinguished by reason. The Secretary had spoken of the difficult situation in the United States and of conditions, such as can be used to harm ratification of the Treaty and proper resolution of the MFN issue, etc. He would have to say that considerations of that sort appeared to be based on some sort of fatalism. Was the U.S. Administration only in a position to register events, or could it choose to act in one direction or another? Could it not encourage and nourish desirable trends and counteract harmful and incorrect assertions by restoring the truth and allaying the concerns of people who were affected by deliberate distortions? Gromyko was sure the Administration could find a way out and put those who concocted harmful stories in their place.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had frequently spoken of the sensitivities of U.S. people to this question. However, for some reason the Secretary seemed to forget that the Soviets, too, were people, political figures who also have their own political interests and sensitivities. Speaking of sensitivities, if the Soviet side were to repay in kind, it would have to refer to the deployment of American combat forces close to the territory of the Soviet Union. This concerned several countries—Western Europe, Turkey, France, Japan, South Korea and others. Surely the Soviet Union would have genuine grounds, and not just concocted grounds, to refer to sensitivities in this respect. However, he believed that statesmen should regard issues from a broad international perspective and they should show understanding for each others' positions. The Government of the United States had manifested such a broad approach in discussing certain questions with the Soviet Union in an appropriate context. It had done so in consideration of the international situation in the world as a whole and had considered these matters together with the Soviet Union. Now, however, things were presented in a distorted light and questions are being put in a way that was completely and absolutely unacceptable both for the Soviet Union and for Cuba. He would remind the Secretary that the United States it-

self had troops in Cuba, that it maintained a military base on that island against the wishes of the Cuban government. Under these conditions the U.S. Administration had nevertheless chosen the path of upholding a legend whose sharp edge was aimed against the interests of the Soviet Union. Why such a legend? Who invented it? Why is all this being done?

Gromyko said that he and his colleagues do not believe that this was the way to increase the prestige of the United States or respect for American foreign policy. The Secretary might believe otherwise, but the Soviets did not, and he thought that they did know a few things about foreign policy. Did Washington really believe that its prestige would be boosted as a result of its current stand? He did not think so, nor did he think that this was any way to cure any harm that had been done to the prestige of U.S. foreign policy. He would ask the Secretary to reflect on all this with a cool head and make an effort to free himself of emotions, keeping in mind the fundamental interests of our respective governments, the world situation as a whole and the fundamental interests of peace.

Gromyko recounted the numerous occasions when President Carter and the Secretary personally had stated that everything had to be done to prevent the outbreak of another war. Those statements had certainly been fully in line with Soviet views. Should, then, this artificial issue be allowed to poison the international atmosphere everywhere, in the UN and here in the U.S. as well as in other parts of the world? This was something that he could not understand and could not accept.

Gromyko recalled that during their last conversation he had mentioned that there was a way out of the situation. He had tried to put himself in the Secretary's shoes. What would the U.S. Administration lose if it were to say that a certain matter had come up requiring clarification, and that after appropriate study and coupled with an appropriate statement by the Soviet side, which had helped to clarify the situation, the Administration had concluded that no threat of any kind existed for the United States or any other country as a result of the presence of Soviet training personnel in Cuba who had been there many years, that there was no question of any sort of threat to the security of the U.S. The Administration could state that that statement by the Soviet government, which had not been made before, had made it possible for the United States government and for President Carter to get to the bottom of the facts and find a solution to this matter. Thus, the solution would be based on unilateral statements by the governments of the Soviet Union and of the United States.

Gromyko had still another consideration that he wanted to bring to the Secretary's attention. In his remarks the Secretary had expressed

the thought that the Soviet Union ought to conduct itself in such a way as to ensure that everything was laid open to U.S. verification. He would ask where did such an idea come from, the idea that the Soviet Union must open up all its facilities, open up its lockers as it were for the U.S. to see everything? After all, the U.S. was not opening up its lockers, not only on the territory of the U.S., but also in other countries where it had stationed its combat forces. (The Secretary interrupted to point out that the presence of our forces had not been concealed but publicly announced.) Gromyko asked rhetorically if the U.S. was not asking for too much. The Soviet Union also made announcements of those things it believed necessary to announce. American demands were simply much too immodest. After all, there were matters of principle that were involved, and not that the Soviet Union wanted to conceal something. In the SALT II Treaty we had embodied the concept of verification by national technical means, and he would suggest that each country do what it could to strengthen that principle. Had the Secretary forgotten it in this instance? After all, that principle had been applied to much more serious obligations, but here the U.S. was trying to open up everything through the back door as it were. There was something here that was impossible to understand.

The Secretary said he would respond. First, we also believed, as both sides had stated at the meeting in Vienna, that fundamental interests must prevail, that the decisions taken by both sides must be in line not only with our own fundamental interests, but also with the interests of a better, more stable and enduring relationship between us; and we have proceeded in that fashion. We had proceeded with the hearings on SALT ratification and, as the Secretary had indicated earlier, we had appeared to make excellent progress before Cuba. Indeed, it had then become clear that we had more than two-thirds of the votes in the Senate in favor of the Treaty. Then, this issue arose and became a practical, real obstacle that we cannot ignore. Gromyko had spoken of the need to be cool-headed. Both President Carter and the Secretary had acted in a cool-headed manner and without emotions. He believed it ought to be clear that both sides should act on the basis of facts and not emotions, that both sides must exercise caution to view things in their proper perspective. The Secretary had indicated that the Soviet unit in Cuba posed no threat to the United States. We had indicated that at present it does not have any sealfight or airlift capabilities. These facts were not based on emotion, but on cool-headed thinking to keep matters in a proper perspective, so as to be able to discuss issues in a practical fashion. Another reality was that Cuban policy was seen as detrimental to the U.S. in certain Central American and South American regions. This stems from the fact of extensive military assistance received by Cuba from the Soviet Union. Moving on, the Secretary wanted to stress that we had not suggested anything other than confir-

mation of what Gromyko had said, i.e., that this was a training unit. The Secretary had stated that there was a major difference between the Soviet statement that this was not a combat unit and what our intelligence information reflects; this was the problem, a real problem.

The actions we have suggested would confirm that the Soviet troops in Cuba were not combat troops, but training troops as Gromyko had said. The combat nature of the unit is one of the key issues which, if not resolved, can produce a deterioration of relations between us. Lastly, on the question of U.S. combat troops, we do have such troops stationed abroad, we have not tried to hide that fact, it is a matter of public information. These troops are stationed on the territory of other countries on the basis of their treaties and agreements with the United States, just as the Soviets had such agreements with the Warsaw Pact countries. Our troops in South Korea are there to safeguard the peace and it is no secret that by agreement we had troops stationed in Japan. Thus, these are in a different category from the kind of situation we are dealing with in the case of Soviet troops in Cuba.

The Secretary wanted to come back to the difference between us as to whether this was a combat unit or not, and how to get around that problem.

Gromyko asked rhetorically who was in a better position to know the true facts—those who fed distorted information to the Secretary or the Soviet Union?

The Secretary said it was very hard when we saw pictures of the equipment to ignore that fact.

Gromyko said that Americans had incorrectly read the materials they had received. He could only regret that, but would point out that the Soviets were in a better position to know.

Gromyko suggested that the Secretary ask himself the question of why the Soviets would take some unit, which the Secretary had described as allegedly existing in Cuba, to threaten U.S. security, and also ask why the Soviets would need this, and why all this was being done.

The Secretary said that he could see one good reason for having the unit there. Castro could have said to the Soviet Union that he had deployed Cuban forces in Africa and that therefore he wanted reassurances at home, and had asked the Soviet Union to send its forces there. That would be perfectly logical.

Gromyko said that the Secretary must have read a mystery story that was very artistic. He asked if the Secretary was addicted to mystery stories.

The Secretary replied that he used to read them but lately did not have time for them.

Gromyko said there were much more serious matters our two countries should be dealing with than the scenario or some kind of a detective story. He said that when he returned to Moscow he would have to tell the Soviet leadership and Brezhnev personally that something had occurred that had never been contemplated by the Soviet authorities that the Secretary and the U.S. Administration were laboring under a delusion and that he had done his best to assure the Secretary of State that the very thought of harming the security of the United States could not have occurred to the Soviet leadership. He was certain that Brezhnev would tell him that he had been right in doing so. If such a thought had indeed occurred to the Secretary, Gromyko would assure him that it was groundless. It was a strange thing that many more serious problems related to halting the arms race, questions of the SALT Treaty—when and if it would enter in force, questions of SALT III, European matters, NPT, CTB and other most important matters which should have engaged the efforts of both sides, had been subordinated to a matter which did not exist. All this was very difficult to understand.

The Secretary said that he wanted to ask Gromyko one or two further questions. Was Gromyko saying that this was not a combat unit, that the Soviet Union did not intend to give this unit combat capabilities by airlift or sealift? Was that what Gromyko had been saying?

In reply to the Secretary's question, Gromyko said that the Soviets have only a training center in Cuba and did not intend to change the conditions under which that center operated. That is what he wanted to state officially. He could not state the matter any clearer. In fact, he could state that the Soviet Union will not change those conditions. That was even stronger than saying that it did not intend to change conditions.

The Secretary had said that he wanted to be clear. He wished it were a simple matter, but it was not. Could he (Vance) assume that what he had said does reflect the Soviet position accurately?

Gromyko repeated that the Soviets had said that they have only a training center in Cuba, which engaged only in training functions, and that the Soviet Union will not change that situation. It seemed to him that he and the Secretary were talking along the same lines. It was true that he was stating this to the Secretary unilaterally, and that he was also stating it quite definitely.

The Secretary said that one of the important factors would be the fact that the unit in question does not have airlift or sealift capabilities and that the Soviet Union did not intend to change that.

Gromyko said that was correct and that the Soviets will not change the function of the training center.

The Secretary pointed out that he had spoken of a Soviet unit which runs a training center.

Gromyko said that he had used the Soviet terminology in speaking of a training center. The term “unit” had been used by the Secretary, but he would prefer to use the Soviet’s own terminology. They had a training center in Cuba and will not change its function. In saying “will not” he was putting it stronger than if he had said “does not intend.”

Gromyko asked the Secretary if he really believed that he could be talking here to the Foreign Minister of the USSR, representing the Soviet Union and saying these things to the Secretary plainly on behalf of the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership, while at the same time the Soviet Union planned to threaten the security of the United States? The mildest comment he could make on any such idea was that it was entirely too bold. On the other hand, if the Secretary were to say that our two countries had some agreement between us, the Soviet Union would be forced to refute this for reasons of principle. The Soviet Union had provided a unilateral clarifying statement, that statement was strictly of a unilateral nature and was made as a result of the Soviet desire to allay any concerns President Carter and the Secretary might have with respect to Soviet behavior.

The Secretary said that we had not suggested an understanding, and had spoken only in terms of unilateral statements.

228. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

Moscow, September 27, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I and my colleagues have familiarized ourselves with your appeal.²

First of all, we must frankly inform you that we are extremely surprised at the active participation of the administration in the openly

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 32, MOLINK: 10/78–1/80. Forwarded to Carter under letterhead of the White House Communications Agency, which classified the letter as Top Secret; Sensitive; Specat. Sent via the Moscow/Washington Emergency Communications Link (MOLINK). Printed from a version that does not bear Brezhnev’s signature.

² See Documents 226 and 227.

hostile campaign which is developing in the United States against the Soviet Union, for which the United States has absolutely no actual pretense and no legal basis. It occurs to us that the single result of the exaggeration of this artificially created campaign could turn out to cause appreciable damage to the relations between our countries and the cause of strengthening peace, the importance of which we talked about in Vienna. We regret that you still support the contrived version about the Soviet combat unit which is allegedly located in Cuba.

We advise you: give up this version. We have a military training center in Cuba, which has been there more than 17 years. It is fulfilling its training functions by an agreement with the Cuban government. It is doing that and can do nothing more. You can be completely assured in this matter.

Secretary of State Cyrus Vance in a conversation with A.A. Gromyko,³ himself declared that the Soviet Union did nothing contradictory to the 1962 agreement, and that the Soviet military personnel located in Cuba do not present any threat to the United States.

I repeat, there is a military training center in Cuba. It will exist. We do not intend to change its status as such a center, now or in the future. We are informing you about it in order to show good will, since this whole question is entirely a matter between two sovereign states—the Soviet Union and Cuba.

But if that which is occurring in the United States now concerning this question is an endeavor which is dictated by some other understandings, we can only express our regrets regarding this matter.

It seems to us that any other understandings should retreat before the importance of Soviet-American relations in which the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty (SALT-II)⁴ now holds a significant place.

Let us, Mr. President, proceed from the results of the exchange of opinions, which we had in Vienna and which I greatly value, on fundamental questions of Soviet-American relations and of peaceful policies.⁵

³ Ibid.

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 200.

⁵ On October 1, Carter addressed the nation on the topics of the Soviet Brigade in Cuba and SALT. For the text of his speech, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1979*, Book II, pp. 1802–1806.

229. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

October 11, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I am sending you this letter with the aim of calling your attention to questions of military detente and arms limitation in Europe.

I wish briefly to summarize the essence of our thoughts and proposals on these questions, which were set forth in my speech in Berlin on October 6 of this year.

First, the assertions being spread in the West to the effect that the Soviet Union is building up its military might on the European continent on a scale not required by defense requirements have nothing in common with reality. They can only be evaluated as intended to serve as a screen for the development, adoption and realization of plans to deploy in Western Europe new types of American nuclear-missile weaponry. In other words—for the purpose of upsetting the existing balance of forces in Europe, of trying to secure military superiority for the NATO bloc.

One can say beforehand that it is doubtful that anything will result from such attempts. The Soviet Union and its allies would be forced to take the necessary additional steps to strengthen their security. No other course will be open to them.

It is entirely clear, however, that realization of the plans indicated by the countries of NATO would inevitably lead to aggravation of the situation in Europe and would in many respects poison the international atmosphere as a whole.

One would like to hope, Mr. President, that your government and you personally will again and again consider all aspects of this problem and will not allow steps to be taken which are insufficiently weighed.

As for the Soviet Union, I have said more than once, and wish to repeat again to you personally: We do not strive for military superiority, have not and do not intend to threaten anyone; our strategic doctrine has a purely defensive orientation.

Second, as I stated with all definitiveness in Berlin, during the past ten years the number of carriers of medium range nuclear weapons has not been increased by one rocket or by one aircraft. To the contrary, the

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, Carter/Brezhnev, 10/12/79. No classification marking. Printed from the U.S. translation.

number of launchers of medium range missiles, as well as the yield of the nuclear charges of these missiles, have even been somewhat decreased. The number of medium range bombers has also been decreased. The Soviet Union does not at all deploy such means on the territory of other states. For a number of years we have not increased the number of our troops stationed in Central Europe. Such are the irrefutable facts, Mr. President, and I am sure that they are well known by the appropriate organs of your country.

Moreover, we have expressed our readiness to decrease the number of medium range means deployed in Western areas of the Soviet Union as compared to the current level, but of course only if there is no additional deployment of medium range nuclear means in Western Europe.

As is known, important negotiations concerning SALT III are in prospect. We are in favor of commencing them immediately after the SALT II Treaty enters into force. We agree, within the framework of these negotiations, to discuss the possibilities of limiting not only intercontinental but also other types of arms, but with due account, of course, for all related factors and with strict observance of the principle of equal security of the sides.

Third, the Soviet Union, motivated by a sincere desire to break through the impasse which has limited the efforts of many years to achieve military detente in Europe, to provide an example of transition from words to concrete measures, has decided, with the agreement of the GDR and after consultations with other member-states of the Warsaw Pact, to reduce unilaterally the number of Soviet troops in Central Europe. During the next twelve months up to 20 thousand Soviet servicemen, one thousand tanks, and also a certain amount of other technical military equipment will be withdrawn from the territory of the GDR.

We hope that this new, concrete manifestation of the peaceableness and good will of the Soviet Union and its allies will be properly evaluated by the governments of the member-states of NATO and that they will follow our example.

Fourth, being in favor of further strengthening trust between states, we are prepared in particular to reach agreement that notification as to large military exercises by ground forces, provided for by the Helsinki Final Act, be made not three weeks before the event, but rather a month ahead, and not from the level of 25 thousand men, as is presently the case, but, let us say, from the level of 20 thousand men. We are also prepared, on the basis of reciprocity, not to conduct military exercises involving more than 40–50 thousand men. In addition, we propose that timely notification be given not only about military exercises,

but also about the movements of ground forces numbering more than 20 thousand men in the area defined by the Final Act.

It seems to me, Mr. President, that the specific content of the new initiatives taken by the Soviet Union with the concurrence of other member-states of the Warsaw Pact speaks for itself. I would emphasize only one thing—all of these initiatives are motivated by concern for strengthening peace and security in Europe by supplementing political detente with measures of military detente, including measures for actually decreasing armed forces and weapons in Central Europe.

Of course, all proposals earlier made by member-states of the Warsaw Pact remain in force, including those regarding conclusion of a treaty between all participants in the All-Europe Conference on the non-first-use against one another of nuclear as well as conventional weapons, regarding notification of large air force and naval exercises which are conducted near the territorial waters of other participatory countries of the All-European Conference, regarding extension of confidence-building measures to the area of the Mediterranean Sea.

For our part, we will be prepared to consider other proposals as well, which are aimed at strengthening trust between states and lessening the danger of war in Europe.

Such are the considerations on questions of military detente and limiting arms in Europe that I and my colleagues wanted to bring to your attention, Mr. President. I would be happy to receive as soon as possible your answer to the questions I have touched upon.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev²

² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

230. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 29, 1979, 1–3:20 p.m.

SUBJECT

The US-Soviet Relationship

PARTICIPANTS

Alexander Bessmertnykh, Minister-Counselor of the Soviet Embassy
Marshall Brement, NSC Staff Member

The substantive part of the conversation began with a reference by me to Ustinov's October 26 article in *Pravda*, in which he alleged that Secretary Brown had said that we were aiming for nuclear superiority. Neither I nor members of Secretary Brown's staff were aware of any such statements, I pointed out, and I promised to send Bessmertnykh an authoritative pronouncement by the Secretary on this subject (see attached letter).² (C)

Bessmertnykh replied that he was glad to have this clarification. This was especially the case in that the Soviets regard Harold Brown as one of the most moderate and balanced officials in the Carter Administration. One could not always say that about an American Secretary of Defense, he added. (C)

Bessmertnykh then said that he was thinking about the course of US-Soviet relations over the next two years and the prospects were deeply troubling. He had a growing feeling that many key people in Moscow were "giving up" on the US relationship and believed there was little or nothing which could be derived from it over the next several years, Bessmertnykh said. This was particularly true during an election period in the United States, when many irresponsible things are said. The mood in Moscow is therefore somber and disturbing. (C)

I did not feel that we were facing an inevitable downward spiral in US-Soviet relations, I replied. The ratification of SALT II would be useful in putting the relationship on a more even keel. It was true, however, that we will soon be in the midst of an election campaign in the US. If the Soviets played an unhelpful role in fostering or engendering destabilizing events, the various candidates of both Parties would probably vie with each other to condemn the USSR. But if we were en-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 82, USSR: 11/79. Confidential. The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy. Sent under a November 8 covering memorandum from NSC staff secretary Christine Dodson to Vance, Brown, and Turner.

² Not found attached.

tering a period of relative calm and more inward orientation, then I saw no reason why we could not build, improve, and expand on the present relationship. The key was Soviet conduct. If Moscow demonstrated caution and prudence in the upcoming months, that would certainly be noted and understood by Washington. (C)

It is the concrete actions of the Carter Administration which bother us, Bessmertnykh rejoined. How can we help but take notice of a decision to add major new weapons systems to the NATO arsenal which can strike the territory of the Soviet Union and thereby destroy the balance which currently exists in the European theater? Furthermore, the US reaction to the Brezhnev East Berlin speech was very disappointing to us. The proposals put forward in that speech were intended to be constructive and realistic. They should be taken seriously and not be regarded as merely a propaganda ploy. It is very important that you respond to Brezhnev's message of October 11,³ which elaborated on the speech. Failure to do so would be noted in Moscow with grave disappointment, Bessmertnykh said. (C)

We have read the speech and the letter very carefully, I replied. Since this is a NATO matter, however, we obviously have to consult with our allies before formulating a response. I pointed out that similar texts had gone to the various NATO members and that normal consultations would take some time. (C)

We should understand, Bessmertnykh said, that the proposed deployment of TNF by NATO has had a very bad effect in Moscow. It will allow NATO forces to strike against the Soviet homeland with less warning and will require a significant military response. More than any other recent development, this has affected the mood in Moscow. For the first time in his recollection, Bessmertnykh asserted, serious analysts of the American scene are thinking in terms of a possible first strike by the United States. This kind of thinking cannot help but color the entire atmosphere, he said. (C)

The degree of alarm you describe is puzzling to me, I rejoined. What has happened is that the Soviet Union is in the process of carrying out a major overhaul of its theater nuclear forces, by introducing two major weapons systems, the SS-20 and the Backfire bomber. This gives the Soviet side a far more effective, accurate and threatening strike capability. It would not be realistic to expect NATO to accept such a situation and not respond to it. In any case, the weapons being considered by the alliance will not be operational for several years. This will give us ample time to formulate a sound arms control agreement to deal with the TNF problem. (C)

³ See Document 229.

Furthermore, I continued, any Soviet analyst who is seriously thinking about the possibility of a first-strike assault by the United States has no understanding of the American scene. Historically, no country has ever made a surprise attack on another without specific territorial gains in mind. But a glance at a map of the US and its possessions in 1919 would reveal that, unlike many other states, we have not changed the extent of our territory by one square inch in the last 60 years. Furthermore, there is no extant political group in the United States itself, no matter how small or insignificant, that desires any changes in our boundaries. We have secure and firm borders, and we have a democratic system that depends on popular support. Surprise attack, by its very nature, requires an autocratic and highly centralized system of government. We have therefore never in our history launched a war, or even contemplated launching a war, with a surprise attack. It is inconceivable, I said, that we would ever make a first-strike attack against the USSR. Soviet analysts who seriously think of this as a possibility simply do not know this country. (C)

(At this point, Ambassador Dobrynin joined us briefly. We chatted for a few minutes, and he expressed the hope that our relations would not be frozen during the coming year. His appearance was obviously intended as a goodwill gesture.) (U)

Returning to the thread of our previous conversation, Bessmertnykh said that many people in Moscow have a poor understanding of the United States. The Embassy tries to explain what is going on, but often this is difficult. Many people, for example, had wrong ideas about the recent dispute over the so-called Soviet combat brigade in Cuba. (C)

From remarks which various Soviet officials had made about this matter, I said, I had the impression that this issue may indeed not be fully understood. I pointed out that Marshall Shulman had made a demarche to Bessmertnykh July 27,⁴ which stated that we would be seriously concerned about changes in Soviet or Cuban offensive capabilities in Cuba, and which mentioned reports we have had about organized Soviet combat units there. Had this demarche been responded to in a serious manner, the crisis atmosphere which surrounded this issue could have been avoided, I said. Furthermore, the Soviet side knew that both Secretary Vance and Secretary Brown in mid-July had denied to the Congress that we had specific knowledge about this brigade. This should have reinforced the seriousness of Shulman's demarche. Soviet experts surely must understand that key Cabinet officers would never make such statements unless we were satisfied that they were accurate. (C)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 217.

Clear and frank communication between us is very important, I continued. This was evident at the time of the Vlasova case.⁵ The Soviet side should reflect on what would have happened had our authorities not been vigilant enough to discover that Vlasova was already on an Aeroflot plane in New York and about to depart for Moscow without having made any statement to us. Had the Soviets gotten away with this crude maneuver, the story in the press would have been that the wife of a defector was forcibly spirited out of the country and sent back to the USSR against her will. This action, in contravention of our kidnapping laws, undertaken despite assurances to us that we would have a chance to speak with Vlasova, would have been cited as evidence that the Soviets cannot be trusted to keep an agreement. It would have impacted very badly on US-Soviet relations and have offered real ammunition to the enemies of SALT, who would have discoursed about Soviet untrustworthiness. (C)

To my surprise, Bessmertnykh responded by stating that the Vlasova affair had been completely mishandled by the Soviet side. The first thing the Embassy in Washington knew about the matter was when Vlasova was actually on the plane, he said. The UN Mission in New York was entirely responsible. "If I had been handling it", Bessmertnykh said, "she would simply have had her interview and then left quietly." The one thing about the Vlasova case, which continued to rankle, he said, is that in the letter to Brezhnev you said that you had received assurances from the Soviet side on three separate occasions that you would have an opportunity to talk with Vlasova. This was not true. We never gave you any such assurances. (C)

While misunderstandings are always possible, I replied, the Soviet side should understand that we would never make such a statement in a letter from the President unless we were completely satisfied about the accuracy of what we were saying.

In fact, I confessed that I was surprised when President Brezhnev raised what was essentially a minor matter, and one which the President could not possibly satisfy, in correspondence with the President. The Soviet side must realize that we are a nation of laws and that once it appeared a reasonable assumption that a law might have been violated, as was the case in this instance, even the President would be powerless to stop our law enforcement officials from ascertaining the facts of the case. (C)

Returning to the Cuban brigade crisis, Bessmertnykh said that one of the results of that incident is that many analysts in Moscow in retrospect regarded various American statements about Cuba, which were

⁵ See Documents 213, 215, and 218.

made in the period leading up to the crisis, as part of the efforts of anti-detente forces to manufacture an artificial state of tension and thereby imperil SALT. (C)

This would be completely wrong and a serious misreading of what happened, I retorted. In the first place, so-called anti-detente forces had nothing to do with the way that the crisis developed. More important, there is nothing at all artificial about our concern regarding Soviet and Cuban behavior. This concern is shared by every key American policy-maker. Conversations at the highest levels at the Summit in Vienna should have made very clear to the Soviet side that the Soviet build-up of the offensive capabilities of the Cuban armed forces and Cuban adventurism in Africa, Yemen, the Caribbean and elsewhere are of deep concern to us. (C)

One of the real tragedies of this decade, I continued, is that the Soviet side chose to ship a Cuban army to Angola in 1975 to intervene in a civil war there. This took place at a time when no client or ally of either of us was engaged in armed conflict with the other. It irrevocably set the whole course of US-Soviet relations on a different path. The USSR must come to realize, I said, that what may appear like a cheap victory in Africa or elsewhere can turn out to be enormously expensive and can have unexpected ramifications several years after the victory has taken place and in areas far away from the original scene. (C)

We are not the masters of the Cubans that you think we are, Bessmertnykh said. They are an independent force. (C)

We can never accept the idea that you have no control over Havana, I replied. It may be true that you cannot tell Castro what to do in every case, but what is obvious is that you are in a firm position to tell him what he *cannot* do. After all, he can only get from Place A to Place B on Soviet ships and planes. Furthermore, in Ethiopia Cuban troops were actually operating under the command of Soviet officers. (C)

We can understand that you have principles and that you want to support those principles, I continued. Such support, it seems to us, can legitimately take the form of economic aid, training, or occasionally even military aid, but direct involvement in armed combat is not acceptable. Take the ouster of Idi Amin—an instance where Tanzanian troops went into Uganda and overthrew the constituted government of that state. This event has passed with scarcely a ripple on the center stage of our times. The reason is that the superpowers were not directly involved. In cases where they are involved, such as Cambodia, Afghanistan, Angola, Ethiopia, their involvement has a disproportionate effect. We signed an agreement in 1972 that we would not take unilateral advantage of each other. It is this concept that must underlie detente and be its basis. How can we interpret actual participation in armed

combat in third countries as anything other than taking unilateral advantage of us? (C)

I understand what you are saying, Bessmertnykh said, but you also must grasp that detente is not the bible for us. You know what our bible is. Certain things are more important to us than other things. Even though we get no benefit from it—it is you, not we, who use Angolan oil—we still have to do it. We understand that it may be costly and that it may require sacrifice on our part, but nevertheless we must do it. (C)

In that case, I said, you must also grasp that the United States cannot ignore your actions in areas such as Cuba, where our vital interests are involved. Reciprocity has to be the basic key to sound relations between the superpowers and it should be obvious that sooner or later we will react to Soviet insensitivity to our interests by being insensitive to its interests. (C)

I understand what you are saying, Bessmertnykh repeated. We are, of course, concerned that you do not take actions which will cause us practical problems, but you should understand that we must support progressive forces throughout the world. We feel that it is our duty to do so, and no action of your Government will dissuade us from fulfilling our duty. (C)

The Soviet Union must equally understand, I rejoined, that a Soviet three-legged policy of detente, of arming itself to the teeth, and of adventurism in the Third World cannot be maintained indefinitely. Something has to give. The change in climate with regard to the USSR, both in the United States and in Western Europe, is a direct result of policies pursued by the Soviet Government. The resurgence of what Moscow likes to call “anti-detente forces” has been engendered by policies which Moscow itself is pursuing. (C)

You should not assume that we will change our policy, Bessmertnykh repeated. We have our aims in the world, and these will be carried out. Militarily, we only really worry about the United States. China is not a problem to us. The Gobi Desert is flat, he said, running his palm across the luncheon table. We could be in Peking in two days. Western Europe would be a matter of five minutes. (C)

It may take you two days to get to Peking, I retorted, but what would you do after you got there? Bessmertnykh laughed and said he had not fully thought out that matter. (C)

Realizing that he had gone farther than he intended, Bessmertnykh quickly backtracked, and emphasized that this conversation was meant to be frank and completely informal in nature. I replied that this was certainly my understanding. (U)

At this point, the luncheon ended. (U)

231. Oral Note From Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin to Secretary of State Vance¹

November 7, 1979

We confirm with all definitiveness our principled position that the SALT II Treaty and the documents related to it can enter into force for the Soviet Union only in the form in which they were signed at the Vienna Summit.

It is known that, with respect to the specifics of some questions, apart from the documents that were signed, the two sides by prior agreement made certain statements relating to certain provisions of the SALT II Treaty itself, as well as on a matter of a different nature—the Backfire medium bomber. There was no question, nor can there be, of “juridical” confirmation of our unilateral statement regarding “Backfire.” Indeed, there is no necessity for this. The Soviet side naturally will act in precise accordance with what it stated, on this as well as on other matters. In this respect, we of course expect that the American side will act in just the same way regarding the statements it made, taking into consideration the consequences which any different behavior by it could have.

It is also entirely obvious that the Soviet side can in no way be bound by any “understandings” or “reservations” with respect to the SALT II Treaty which might be adopted by the U.S. Senate. Irrespective of the procedures employed by the sides in the process of ratifying the treaty, any attempts unilaterally to interpret individual provisions of the agreed documents can have no legal force for the other side.

Accordingly, we do not intend to, nor will we, comment upon, take note of, or in any way confirm any such “interpretations.” In this connection, there should be no misunderstanding that the absence of our comments on one or another “interpretation” in any way signifies our tacit agreement with it.

In saying all this, we are guided by a desire to avoid misunderstandings, now and in the future, in such an important matter as the SALT II Treaty.

We continue to favor the earliest entry into force of this Treaty. But it would be a delusion to consider that the Soviet Union somehow has a

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, CV/AD, 11/7/79. No classification marking. Printed from the U.S. translation. Dobrynin and Vance also met on the same date to discuss a variety of matters, including the SALT ratification debate. The memorandum of conversation from the Dobrynin–Vance meeting is *ibid*.

greater interest in the SALT II Treaty than the United States, and that therefore we would agree to reexamination of, or addition to, any provision of the Treaty—whether de facto or de jure—to bring it into force.

232. Letter From President Carter to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, November 13, 1979

Dear Mr. President:

I am writing in reply to your letter of October 11.² It raises a number of different issues which we and our NATO allies have under consideration.

Let me state at the outset that I share your belief in the importance of detente, in Europe and in our general relationship. At the same time, I am firmly of the view that progress in Europe is possible only if based on the principle of equality.

In your letter you indicate that the Soviet government is prepared to discuss limitations on medium-range nuclear systems in Europe. I have taken note of your statements on this issue. The matter of negotiations on limitations on such US and Soviet systems within the SALT III framework is under active consideration in the North Atlantic Alliance. The purpose of any negotiations dealing with medium-range systems must in our view be to enhance stability and security; they must be founded on the principle of equality for both sides.

The situation as regards these systems is far from satisfactory at present. The past decade has seen significant improvement in Soviet capabilities in medium-range systems, including your deployment of extended range and multiple-warhead missiles. It is against this background that we and our NATO allies are considering both the modernization of our own systems and also ways in which US and Soviet medium-range systems might be limited on an equal basis. Let me emphasize in this connection that we are not prepared to negotiate a regime which would preclude modernization of the capabilities of the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 54, USSR: 11/79. No classification marking. Brzezinski sent a copy of the President's signed letter to Vance under a November 13 memorandum, directing Vance to forward the letter to Watson for delivery. (Ibid.)

² See Document 229.

NATO alliance, while permitting the Soviet Union to maintain and modernize what is already a superior force. Such an outcome would neither contribute to enhanced stability and security, nor be consistent with the principle of equality on which any negotiations in this field must be based.

I welcome the announcement that the Soviet government will withdraw up to 20,000 of its troops, together with 1,000 tanks and other equipment from the German Democratic Republic, since this will bring about some reduction in the existing disparity between the forces of East and West in Central Europe. I hope that this will lead to progress in Vienna toward elimination of that disparity and to significant mutual and balanced force reductions.

Further, I note with interest your proposals for confidence-building measures as well as your proposal for a European conference dealing with these issues. We and our NATO allies are taking them into account in our own preparations for the forthcoming CSCE Review Conference in Madrid.

In closing, Mr. President, I would like to thank you for sharing with me your views on these matters of such critical importance to both our countries.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter

233. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, November 14, 1979, 0206Z

295771. Subject: Brezhnev Message to President on Nuclear Attack False Alarm.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Dobrynin at his request called on the Secretary today to deliver the following oral message from Brezhnev to the President expressing concern at reports of a recent false alarm to US forces of a nuclear missile attack. The Secretary said he would pass the message to the Presi-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1780, N790008–0693. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Vest; cleared by Tarnoff; approved by Arnold Raphel (S).

dent and get back to Dobrynin later on this question. George Vest, who sat in on the conversation, stressed to Dobrynin that we are still reviewing the incident and that we have a number of mechanisms to ensure that our forces are not mistakenly employed.

Quote. Reports have been received that recently, due to some erroneous actions, the US technical systems gave a signal of a nuclear missile attack on the United States which resulted in putting appropriate means on alert.

Mr. President, I think it is quite understandable that the said fact should cause a feeling of extreme anxiety in the mind of every state leader who is responsible for the policy of his country. It is reported that an unforeseen error has occurred. Let it be so. But a false signal of nuclear missile attack did take place. And this is fraught with a tremendous danger. What kind of mechanism is it which allows a possibility of such incidents? One hardly needs many words to characterize correctly this fact.

Finally, according to reports the incident was reported neither to you nor to the Secretary of Defence, nor to any other responsible officials. This only exacerbates the situation. It turns out that the world can find itself on the brink of a precipice without the knowledge of the President or of other US leaders.

I think you will agree that there should be no errors in such matters. They must be completely excluded—not 99, but all 100 percent. Although now references are made to the fact that the error occurred due to a computer fault it is clear that in the final analysis appropriate decisions were made by people.

I could not help, Mr. President, drawing your attention to this circumstance and expressing my judgement in a most frank manner. End quote.

Vance

234. Telegram From the Department of State to the U.S. Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization¹

Washington, November 28, 1979, 0022Z

307013. Subject: TNF: Soviets and the False Missile Alert. Ref: Copenhagen 7086 (DTG 211345Z NOV 79) (Notal).²

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary/Introduction: A November 9 test tape simulating a missile attack on the US was inadvertently transmitted outside NORAD headquarters. All commands had unambiguously and correctly identified and confirmed the data as false in less than six minutes. Four days later, Ambassador Dobrynin delivered to the Secretary an oral note from Brezhnev³ to President Carter in which Brezhnev noted with concern the false alert and not too subtly implied that the USG's procedures for controlling its forces were somewhat lacking. End summary.

3. We are considering a response to Brezhnev's note, but are concerned that the Soviets may attempt to make use of this incident to cast unwarranted doubt on the reliability of our nuclear control and thus influence allied attitudes on the eve of the TNF modernization/arms control ministerial meetings.⁴

4. We believe, therefore, that it is important to inform the allies of the facts of the false alert incident and the Brezhnev communication as soon as possible in order to avoid damaging rumors and unnecessary concern. We would suggest that USNATO use the talking points in para 6 and 7 to brief the PermReps at an early opportunity, and NATO capitals draw on the following in answering official queries.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 119, 11/23–30/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Priority. Sent for information Priority to all NATO capitals, Moscow, USNMR SHAPE, USEUCOM, USLOSACLANT, CINCLANT, USDELMC, CINCSAC, and CINCNORAD. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by T. Timberman (EUR/RPM); cleared by Michael Lemmon (PM/ISP), J. Siena (ASD/ISA), J. Thomson (NSC), G. Dinneen (ASD/C31), Mark Parris (EUR/SOV), J. Stempler (ATSD/LA), L.G. Lawson (OJCS/J-5), and in OASD and ODUSD; approved by Stephen J. Ledogar (EUR/RPM). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790547–0699)

² Telegram 7086 from Copenhagen, November 21, with the subject "Parliamentary Query Concerning Malfunction in U.S. Defense Alert System," is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D790536–0196.

³ See Document 233.

⁴ Reference is to the Defense Planning Committee and North Atlantic Council, which was scheduled to meet in Brussels, December 11–13.

5. You should underscore as you do so the redundant and complete nature of our well-established confirmation and control mechanisms which were proven to be quickly and appropriately responsive to the situation as it developed. Emphasize that no strategic nuclear forces were activated. Also emphasize that the system was again shown to be responsive, to have safeguards against hasty action, and to have a design which assures that human judgment can override inadvertent malfunctions. Finally, you should also emphasize the fact that the Soviets seem to be taking advantage of any situation to dilute alliance support for a December decision to modernize and deploy NATO's LRTNF. Therefore, as we move toward and through the ministerials, it is even more important to present a unified, strong image to the East.

6. The November 9 false alert: You should use the following information to brief the allies on the NORAD incident. (FYI: the gist of the information in the first tic below was passed by DOD to Netherlands Attache on 14 Nov in response to urgent request from Netherlands Defense Ministry who expected query in Parliament on 15 Nov. End FYI)

—A portion of a recorded test scenario was erroneously transmitted outside NORAD headquarters to a number of other commands and agencies. The entire system has a number of built-in checks and redundancies. Because of these, the test data was almost immediately recognized as spurious. All command levels demonstrated entirely proper responsibility in handling the data. No strategic nuclear units took any steps toward advanced alert. All commands had unambiguously and correctly identified and confirmed the data as false in less than six minutes. Because of an alert prior to that time, a small number of air defense aircraft took off from their bases to assume an alert posture. These were recalled in a few minutes—none carried any nuclear weapons.

—The procedures used to evaluate the missile launch indication proved to be effective, fast and correct.

7. Soviet message: Draw on following:

—On November 13 Ambassador Dobrynin delivered an oral message from Brezhnev to President Carter expressing Soviet concern over the incident. We are considering a response to Brezhnev's message.

—We consider it possible that the Soviets may return to this incident publicly as December 12 approaches in a further effort to derail TNF deployment.

—We wanted to share the facts of the event with you in advance of any such possibility.

8. For Copenhagen: This responds to reftel.

Vance

235. Oral Message From the U.S. Leadership to the Soviet Leadership¹

undated

The United States Government has received the oral message from President Brezhnev² concerning recent press reports of a purported “alert” of American strategic forces. Because the oral message was based on inaccurate and misleading information, the assertions in the message are inaccurate and unacceptable to the United States Government.

The level of alert of U.S. strategic offensive forces was not raised above its usual level because the U.S. command and control system assures review and control by responsible officials at all levels. It does not serve the purposes of peace or strategic stability for the Soviet Union to base its actions or its diplomatic exchanges on press reports or to propagandize such matters before finding out the true facts. The United States Government assures the Soviet Government both that its local commanders have and will exercise the authority to put their forces in condition to survive attack, and that control of the offensive use of our forces is totally reliable, as was demonstrated in this case. We would welcome similar information from the Soviet Union on its command and control procedures.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX: 11/79. No classification marking. Brzezinski forwarded the message to Vance under a November 21 covering memorandum, noting that the message’s text had been “agreed upon at our luncheon today.” In telegram 312357 to Moscow, December 4, the Department stated that this message was delivered to Bessmertnykh on December 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1903)

² See Document 233.

236. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 4, 1979, 2356Z

312888. Subject: Soviet Statement on Iran.

1. (C-entire text).

2. Ambassador Dobrynin passed to Secretary Vance afternoon of December 4 text of following Soviet Government message on situation in Iran.

3. Begin text.

The Soviet Union holds a clear and unequivocal position in connection with the conflict existing between the United States and Iran. As the Soviet side has already stated, we consistently stand for a just settlement of the conflict to mutual satisfaction of both sides. The Soviet representative in the Security Council underscores the necessity to strictly observe the Vienna Convention on diplomatic relations by all the countries.

Moscow has also considered it advisable to inform President Carter and the US Government confidentially that we communicated to the Iranian leadership through the diplomatic channels our advice to avoid further aggravation of the situation and spoke out for the release of the US diplomatic personnel² in Tehran and allowing them to leave for the United States. We drew attention of the Iranian leadership to the circumstances that the detention of foreign diplomats as hostages contradicts the obligations under the international convention, to which Iran is a party. We expressed the opinion that the release of the US Embassy personnel would be met favorably in the world and would not be detrimental to Iran.

We have not yet received Iranian reaction to our communication. We believe, however, in any case, it will contribute to a relaxation of tension and will work in the direction of resolving the conflict. We hope that such our position will be duly appreciated by the President and the Government of the United States.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 119, 12/1–7/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Mark Parris (EUR/SOV); cleared by Arnold L. Raphel (S), Sherrod McCall (EUR/SOV), Carl Clement (IWG), Richard Combs (S/MS), and Bremer; approved by Barry. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840131–1900)

² Reference is to the 52 U.S. diplomats taken hostage on November 4 at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran.

Moscow expects that the US leadership on its part will show restraint and composure. One should take into consideration that the developments in Iran are of a very complicated nature. As is known, they represent entanglement of numerous political, economic, and religious factors. As a result, passions are raging high there.

The Soviet leadership and L.I. Brezhnev personally are convinced that under the circumstances it is especially important not to yield to emotions, to display restraint. We say this because various sorts of disquieting reports are appearing also with reference to US officials on a possibility of some actions on the part of the United States with regard to Iran which are far from a peaceful resolution of the conflict.

We hope that the US leadership and President Carter personally will understand rightly these considerations of ours prompted by realistic motivations. It is clear that a conflict in relations between any two countries carries an element of a dangerous tension, not only for both of them. And, in this case, such a risk is the more considerable since one of the parties to the existing dispute is a big power.

We would like to especially point out that we express these considerations as if from aside, but naturally for understandable reasons we cannot be indifferent to what is going on.

End text.

Vance

237. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 8, 1979, 0112Z

315754. Subject: US Reply to Soviet Communication of December 4 on Iran. Ref: State 312888.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. You should seek appointment with Gromyko or highest alternative level at Foreign Ministry and deliver following US oral communi-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, CV/AD, 12/5/79. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Barry; cleared by Shulman, Raymond Seitz (S/S), and Henry Precht (NEA/IWG); approved by Vance.

² See Document 236.

cation on Iran in response to that which Soviet Embassy delivered here on December 4.

3. Begin text.

The United States takes note of the Soviet Government's communication of December 4 reporting Soviet communications to the Iranian leadership in support of the release of the US diplomatic personnel being held hostage in Tehran. We regard such steps as the appropriate and expected response to actions which constitute crude violation of international law and the norms of international conduct.

At the same time we cannot overlook authoritative commentary appearing in Soviet media containing allegations that can only further inflame tensions in Iran and endanger the lives of American hostages being held there. In particular, commentary by A. Petrov appearing in *Pravda* of December 5 contains inexcusable and irresponsible statements. This commentary all but justifies the seizure of American hostages, by claiming that this act "should not be taken out of the general context of American-Iranian relations" and accusing the United States of attempts to "blackmail" Iran.

Statements such as these contradict the contention in the Soviet Government's communication of December 4 that its position on these issues is "clear and unequivocal." If the Soviet Government wishes to contribute to the release of the hostages, as called for on three occasions by the United Nations Security Council, it should cease inflammatory propaganda which can only have the effect of exacerbating the situation. It should also unambiguously urge, in its public statements as well as its private demarches, that US hostages be released immediately and unconditionally. It should also publicly oppose any efforts to place them on trial. Such demonstrable steps would contribute to US-Soviet relations as well as the prompt release of the hostages.

End text.

Vance

238. Telegram From Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 13, 1979, 0022Z

Tosec 120055/321017. Subject: Message to President Brezhnev.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Following is text of message from President Carter to Brezhnev concerning the dangerous situation which now exists on the Thai-Kampuchean border. You should deliver as soon as possible.

3. Begin text:

Dear Mr. President:

When we met in Vienna last summer, we agreed upon the value of consulting with each other in order to prevent and eliminate conflict in various regions of the world. In this context, I am writing to you to express my concern about the threat to peace posed by increasing Vietnamese incursions into Thailand.

The threat to peace in Southeast Asia has grown steadily since Vietnam's invasion and occupation of Kampuchea late last year. We hope that Vietnam will move as promptly as possible to withdraw its troops from Kampuchea so that peace and stability, under an independent and non-aligned Kampuchean government, can be restored in the area. Of particular urgency is the fact that in recent weeks the Vietnamese have been intensifying their military operations near the borders of Thailand. On several occasions, the Vietnamese have shelled Thai territory or have sent ground forces across the Thai border.

A continuation of such incursions into Thailand could pose a grave threat to peace in the area. Because of our close relations with Thailand as well as our obligations under the Manila Pact, the United States could not remain indifferent to an expansion of the conflict.

I urge you to use your influence with the Vietnamese to ensure that their troops do not again violate Thai territory.

Sincerely,

Jimmy Carter.

End text.

Christopher

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 18, U.S.S.R.—Carter/Brezhnev Correspondence (9/79–2/80). Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the Secretary's delegation. Vance was in Brussels, December 12–14, to attend the NATO ministerial meeting and a special meeting of NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers; Christopher was Acting Secretary in his absence. Drafted in the White House; cleared by Shulman, Bremer, B. Levin (EA), and Robert Steven (S/S-O); approved by Barry.

239. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 15, 1979, 1830Z

323556. Subject: Soviet Military Deployments.

1. (Secret-entire text)

2. You should seek an urgent appointment with Gromyko or highest available MFA official and ask for an explanation of the significant continuing deployment of Soviet military units outside the borders of the USSR into Afghanistan which has come to our attention. You should explain that we wish to know the purpose and scope of these deployments.

3. You should make it clear that we are making this request in the context of the 1972 Principles of US/Soviet Relations and commitment therein to consult so that conflict situations will not arise which would serve to increase international tensions.

4. We will be making a similar request of the Soviet Embassy in Washington.

5. FYI only. Indications are that these new deployments are related to situation in Afghanistan but no firm conclusions have been drawn. End FYI.

Vance

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 17, Afghanistan: Soviet Moves. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Drafted by Barry; cleared by Shulman, Jane Coon (NEA), Jane Becker (S/S–O), and Bremer; approved by Vance.

240. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 15, 1979, 2326Z

323581. Subject: Soviet Military Deployment. Ref: A) State 323556;² B) Moscow 27491.³

1. (S-entire text.)

2. Shulman called in Soviet Charge Vasev December 15 and made points in reftel. Vasev agreed to transmit request for information to Moscow. However, he said, speaking personally, he believed Moscow would be disturbed by our request. While he had no information on Soviet deployment in Afghanistan, any such actions would be in the context of Soviet-Afghan relations and would constitute no threat to the US. Moscow might conclude that US focus on Afghanistan was designed as a diversion to detract attention from planned US action against Iran.

3. Shulman assured Vasev that there was no foundation for any such supposition and that our concerns regarding Afghanistan were related only to the situation we saw developing there.

4. Re Ref (B), we are providing you additional information in separate channel. However, you may not rpt not use this information in your discussions with the Soviets because of its sensitivity.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Afghanistan, Box 1, 12/14–22/79. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Barry; cleared by Seton Stapleton (S/S–O); approved by Shulman. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–1864)

² See Document 239.

³ Telegram 27491 from Moscow, December 15, describing Ambassador Watson's attempt to get an appointment with Gromyko to discuss Soviet troop movement into Afghanistan, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–1863.

241. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 21, 1979, 0032Z

328359. Subject: Soviet Response to US Demarche on Iran. Ref: (A) State 320173; (B) State.²

1. S-entire text.

2. Soviet Charge Vasev called on Marshall Shulman December 20 to deliver the following non-paper on Iran. Vasev said the paper contained the Soviet Government's response to demarches made by Acting Secretary Christopher on December 11 and DAS Barry on December 10.

3. Begin quote:

We decisively reject the efforts of the American side to place in doubt the clear and unambiguous position of the Soviet Union with respect to the American-Iranian conflict, and in particular on the question of American diplomatic personnel in Tehran. Allegations that the policy of the Soviet Union is deliberately vague and ambiguous are unfounded and unacceptable.

Although we see no sense in polemicizing on the subject of coverage of the American-Iranian conflict in the Soviet press, we consider, however, that it is necessary to point out that (Soviet press commentary) has been characterized by restraint and by an objective presentation of the materials—which cannot be said about the American media—and in any case cannot serve as a basis for distorting our declared position—provided, of course, that certain particular goals are not being pursued in this connection.

At the very least it appears strange that we are receiving from the American side “recommendations” on how we should act. For example, it is proposed to participate in some kind of collective demarche as a policy of the diplomatic corps in Tehran. The Soviet side will itself choose what form of action is appropriate for it—whether collective or independent. The weight of the voice of the Soviet Union does not depend on the form in which a given action is undertaken. In any event, we are convinced that what is needed here is not a formal-official approach but a political one.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 4, MDS/Vasev, 12/20/79. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent Immediate to USUN. Drafted by Perito; cleared by Barry and Tarnoff; approved by Shulman.

² The Department apprised Moscow of Christopher's and Barry's demarches in telegrams 320803 and 320173, respectively, both dated December 12. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840150–1871 and D790572–0193)

Both publicly, including in the Security Council, and in a private manner, we have expressed our position of principle. This remains unchanged: expressing the hope that the conflict between the USA and Iran will be settled to the mutual satisfaction of both sides, we firmly declare that the USSR is in favor of the strict observance of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations and considers that the violation of this Convention by anyone whatsoever constitutes an act contrary to international law.

In addition, we have approached the Iranian leadership on this account, expressing ourselves in favor of the release of the American diplomats and we have confidentially informed the American side about our demarche—that is, by our initiative we have in reality cooperated with the United States. There is reason to suppose that the advice we expressed did not go unnoticed in Tehran. It is, however, unclear to us whether the American side properly appreciates our constructive step.

We repeat: our position in this whole issue is clear and unambiguous. Any assertions to the contrary serve no useful purpose and can hardly correspond to the interests of the American side itself.

End quote.

4. In the conversation that followed, Shulman began by saying we welcomed the Soviet position on release of the hostages and regarded it as most important. He then made the following comments on points raised in the Soviet non-paper:

—Soviet media. Shulman said Soviet media continue to contain equivocal language which lends support to Iran's position and weakens the effect of Soviet support for the US on the hostage issue. Given the important stake which both countries have in preserving the principle of diplomatic inviolability, Shulman said we would expect the Soviet Government's position not to appear ambiguous or be diluted by the Soviet press.

—Security Council. Shulman said the President has shown utmost restraint and had made clear our policy was to exhaust every peaceful means to resolve the crisis. He said we were now approaching a new stage in our efforts to find a peaceful solution and would soon approach the Security Council to see how the ruling of the International Court of Justice could be implemented. Shulman said he hoped the Soviet Government would recognize the importance of utilizing peaceful methods and would support our efforts.

—US opinion. Shulman said the current crisis had a major impact on US public attitudes. He said he feared the consequences if Soviet behavior in the Security Council made it appear that the USSR did not wholeheartedly support release of the hostages.

5. In response Vasev made the following points:

—US policy. Vasev said restraint is the only policy which a great power could follow. Only “peaceful means” were possible and there should be no talk of “exhausting” them because this implied an ultimate resort to force which, he said, was unacceptable. If the Soviets were dealing with a similar problem, Vasev said they would rely on diplomatic moves, patience, and restraint. He said the US should not expect to just “snap its fingers” and that this crisis was “a good test of US maturity.”

—Security Council sanctions. Vasev said that “personally” he did not think our chances were good and implied that we could not expect Soviet support. He said he doubted whether we had “firm legal grounds” and, considering the general economic ramifications, whether we had the support of the West Europeans and the Japanese.

—“Other options.” Vasev said that talk of the US using “other means” to resolve the crisis had raised apprehension in the Soviet Union. He described the political situation in Iran as chaotic and said US threats only made matters worse. Claiming that Iran could survive a naval blockade for a year, Vasev said US military action would accomplish nothing and would be a calamity for US-Soviet relations. He said military action would kill SALT and “make the world a different place for years to come.”

6. Responding, Shulman pointed out that Vasev’s own characterization of the results of US military actions should convince him of the importance of supporting US efforts in the Security Council. He said that we would soon be making a detailed approach to the Soviets on sanctions and would continue to hope for a positive response.

7. Finally, Vasev said he wanted to raise a matter on his own initiative. After producing the text of a Jack Anderson TV commentary, Vasev challenged Anderson’s statement that Gromyko had assured the Iranian Ambassador that the Soviet Union would not remain neutral in the event of a US attack and had urged the Iranians to hold the hostages for a year. Noting that Anderson was quoting from “intelligence sources,” Vasev said he strongly objected if the US Government was responsible for such false accounts. Shulman said he was not aware of any such “intelligence reports” and assumed that Anderson’s information did not come from the US Government.

Vance

242. Letter From Soviet Secretary General Brezhnev to President Carter¹

December 22, 1979

Dear Mr. President,

I received your message of December 13, 1979.² In it you express concern over the situation in Southeast Asia and, in particular, in the area of the border between Kampuchea and Thailand.

I agree that there is cause for concern. I must, however, state at once that the reasons for the tension in this area—and we have no doubts on this score—lie not in some sort of actions being attributed to Vietnam, but elsewhere entirely.

The crux of the matter is that certain external forces do not wish to recognize the irreversible nature of the changes which have occurred in Kampuchea and the clearly expressed will of its people, and are attempting in every way to carry on a struggle against the legitimate government of the PRK. In this connection, it is no secret to anyone that one of the main areas for this subversive activity is in providing aid to the remnants of the Pol Pot bands operating out of the territory of Thailand. Who is arming these bands and whose specialists are in direct command of their attacks against Kampuchea is well known. You, of course, know whom I have in mind.

The question is: where does the threat to peace and stability in Southeast Asia come from? Certainly not from Kampuchea, whose people are at present completely occupied with rebuilding their country, and would like to have good relations with all states, including their neighbor Thailand.

The assertions regarding armed attacks by the Vietnamese against Thailand are also entirely without foundation. It is known that the leaders of Vietnam have stated repeatedly that the SRV respects the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Thailand. The Vietnamese side is making practical efforts to have normal good-neighbor relations with Thailand. We know that the armed forces of the PRK and the sub-units of the Vietnamese people's army, which are in Kampuchea pursuant to treaty obligations, are under strict orders not to cross the border with Thailand and not to shell the territory of Thailand. We have confidence in the information to the effect that this order is being complied with.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 70, USSR: Brezhnev–Carter Correspondence: 7/79–2/80. Secret. A copy of the Russian-language version of the letter is *ibid*.

² See Document 238.

At the same time, there is much evidence that the land border, the air space and the territorial waters of the People's Republic of Kampuchea have been violated from the Thai side.

In light of this, Mr. President, we would like to hope that the United States, which has close ties with Thailand, will give its leadership good advice, so that the hostile actions against a neighboring country will cease and the territory of Thailand will not be used as a base for sending Pol Pot bands into Kampuchea. Such a policy would serve the interests of normalizing the situation not only on the border between Kampuchea and Thailand, but also in Southeast Asia as a whole. This would be in accord with the understanding jointly confirmed by us in Vienna regarding the importance of efforts to facilitate the removal of existing centers of international tension and to prevent new ones from arising.

Respectfully,

L.I. Brezhnev³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

243. Message From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Aaron) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 24, 1979, 1724Z

WH92270. Deliver as soon as possible. Subject: Reply From Brezhnev on Iran Sanctions.

President Brezhnev has replied to your letter² in the message below received via State Department channels. It is not particularly helpful but it does not threaten a veto and the tone is quite moderate. With a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the offing, I do not believe they want a struggle with us in the Security Council. They may even

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 18, U.S.S.R.—Carter/Brezhnev Correspondence (9/79–2/80). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent from the White House Situation Room. Aaron sent the cable with instructions that it be delivered "as soon as possible" to Carter, who was at Camp David, December 21–28. Aaron was forwarding to Carter Brezhnev's response, which was sent to the Department as telegram 27895 from Moscow, December 24. Carter initialed Aaron's telegram.

² See footnote 3 below.

hope that if they take a low profile on this issue we will do the same on Afghanistan.

Subj: Soviet Response to Presidential Message on Iran

Refs: (A) Moscow 27880, (B) State 327895.³

1. (S-entire text)

2. I was called in on short notice to see Gromyko at 1:00 p.m. today (December 24). He handed me a response from Brezhnev to the President's message concerning Security Council action on the Iran situation. The message in effect disagrees with the appropriateness of sanctions and urges that the US continue to exercise restraint.

3. Following is an informal Embassy translation of the Brezhnev message:

Begin text

His Excellency

Mr. Jimmy Carter

President of the United States of America

White House

Washington

Dear Mr. President:

I have carefully studied your message which was transmitted on December 21, 1979.

As I understand it, its purpose is not simply to provide information concerning the steps which the US intends to take with regard to Iran, but to learn our views in this regard. Proceeding on that basis, I also consider it possible to express to you certain of our considerations. I would like to say at the outset that one can understand the feelings which are experienced in the US in connection with the holding in Tehran of the American diplomatic personnel. We have clearly and firmly expressed our position in this regard, having categorized those actions as violating international law. And I can definitely affirm that such remains our position.

At the same time the Soviet Union, like many other countries, firmly advocates that the dispute which has arisen between the United States and Iran be settled exclusively by peaceful means to the mutual satisfaction of the parties. We have several times emphasized the exceptional importance of restraint and equanimity in the situation which

³ Telegram 27880 from Moscow, December 21, outlined proposed sanctions on Iranian oil as a potential response to the hostage crisis. Telegram 327895 to multiple posts, December 20, transmitted the President's message on Iran, which was delivered to heads of state. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840140–2583 and P840163–1578, respectively)

has built up and the necessity of handling the matter in such a way as not to complicate the situation further but to seek a path for lowering the level of tension in connection with the question concerning the American diplomatic personnel in Tehran. In our opinion, that which the United States now proposes to undertake would change the situation for the worse.

Transferring the question to the level of any kind of sanctions, of physical action in relationship to Iran can only bring forth an exacerbation of the situation and complicate a solution of the question of the American diplomatic personnel in Iran. For the question of sanctions can arise, in accordance with the UN Charter, in situations in which a threat to peace exists. We are convinced that if the United States will not step over the bounds of reason, will show the necessary restraint as befits a great power, then there will not be such a threat. For that reason we do not think that there is a basis for broadening the interpretation of the existing dispute into the framework of a serious international conflict. It can be said immediately that, in contrast to the broad understanding which the position of the United States enjoys on the specific question of the "hostages" and the violation of diplomatic immunities, going over to sanctions will surely produce a different attitude on the part of many states, including during the consideration of this question in the Security Council.

It is also necessary to take into consideration the complicated situation which exists in Iran itself. It can by no means be excluded that posing the question of sanctions can produce there the opposite result to that which the American side is obviously counting on. This would far from facilitate the earliest possible release of the American diplomats.

These are the thoughts which I wanted to share with you frankly and confidentially in connection with your message. I repeat that we react with understanding to the concern shown by the United States.

We are deeply convinced that it is not an escalation of pressure on Iran through some kind of sanctions—which would inevitably be connected with serious costs, including for the United States itself—but restraint and a measured approach which are the surest way promising to produce a solution acceptable to both sides.

Such an approach would find understanding and support from the side of the Soviet Union, which also intends in the future consistently to advocate the observance by all states of the generally accepted norms of international law and, accordingly, to act in this direction.

I hope that you will react with understanding to the considerations I have expressed which are dictated by the wish that the American-Iranian dispute will find the earliest possible just solution.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev

Moscow

December 24, 1979

End text.

(Note: The message bears no written signature.)

4. I told Gromyko I would of course transmit the message to the President immediately. Speaking personally, I said that we of course all recognize that the action we are taking does carry with it the risks to which Brezhnev referred. Nonetheless, I noted that no new ideas have emerged to facilitate or speed up the release of the hostages. The action we are now taking represents a measured step forward and is, in fact, milder than the Soviets seem to view it. Its purpose, I said, is to achieve the goal we both want, the preservation of this fundamental principle of international law.

5. I then asked Gromyko whether we were to conclude that implicit in the Soviet position is the belief that the present situation does not fall within the conditions spelled out in the UN Charter. Gromyko affirmed this, adding that the Soviets do not consider that there is a threat to peace as a result of Iran's actions. There is, he said, not only a need but a possibility for finding a peaceful solution; the Soviets are convinced that not all means for doing so have been exhausted.

Watson

244. Telegram From the Embassy in Afghanistan to the Department of State¹

Kabul, December 26, 1979, 0552Z

8592. CINCPAC & CINCEUR also for POLAD. Subj: (LOU) Massive Soviet Air Operations into Kabul Continue.

1. (C-entire text)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Afghanistan, Box 1, 12/23–26/79. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate. Sent for information to Ankara, Athens, Beijing, Islamabad, London, Moscow, New Delhi, USNATO, Paris, CINCPAC, and CINCEUR. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

2. Summary: Massive Soviet air operations into Kabul began Christmas morning and have not stopped yet. AN-22s, heavy jets, and AS-12s have been observed in large numbers, and the total flights may now exceed one hundred fifty to two hundred. (Most of these aircraft have had Soviet Air Force markings.) No information is available as yet regarding what was on those planes, but we have not yet seen any Soviet troops on the streets of Kabul, nor have we observed any significant increase in the Afghan military's alert status in the capital. End of summary.

3. The first of three phases of intensive operations began at about 0400 Christmas morning and continued until just before 0700. These flights were probably all AN-22s, since they were the only aircraft seen after dawn broke at about 0600. Numbers of aircraft involved is very difficult to pin down, but at one point an Embassy officer (a former Air Force intelligence officer) could see five AN-22s stacked over the city, despite his limited field of view caused by nearby buildings and trees. Given this density of traffic, we would estimate that a minimum of twenty AN-22s arrived and/or departed Kabul during this first phase, although the number could have been much higher. Some of these aircraft departed the city beginning at about 1100, while at least four were observed still on the ground at 1500.

4. These operations were just the preliminary, however, as more action appeared to get underway at about 1800 Christmas evening. Heavy jet aircraft were heard arriving in fairly quick succession, but by that hour darkness had fallen and, combined with a low ceiling, it was impossible to determine the exact type of plane. These were definitely heavy jets, however, possibly IL-76 or something somewhat smaller. Again, the numbers of aircraft involved is impossible for us to determine with any certainty but we estimate that about twenty jet transports may have been operating during this second phase.

5. Finally, at about 2200 Christmas evening, operations switched to turbo-prop aircraft (most probably AN-12s, but possibly AN-22s as well). These seemingly unending flights continued throughout the night and have not stopped as yet. One officer counted more than one hundred and thirty flights between 2200 and about 0600 this morning. Since daybreak, we have seen AN-12s and AN-22s in the skies over Kabul.

6. We have no firm information as yet regarding what was on these aircraft, although some credible reports contend that heavy equipment and ammunition was on yesterday morning's AN-22 contingent. We have not seen anything resembling mass movements of any Soviet troops who may have been on these planes, but there are routes leaving the airport which the regime could use which would not be visible to innocent observers. It strikes us that this massive sky train could easily

have brought in thousands of personnel, and we will report immediately if any Soviet troops are seen in or around the capital.

7. After the above was written, a State officer arriving from New Delhi this morning saw about 200 Soviet Army troops around some of the planes at Kabul Airport. He also saw a group of APCs deployed at the east end of the runway. This leads us to believe that the Soviet troops are probably being deployed directly from the aircraft to waiting transportation, thereby bypassing the main highway into Kabul.

Amstutz

245. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordinating Committee Meeting¹

Washington, December 26, 1979, 9:30–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting on Soviet Moves in Afghanistan (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State
 Secretary Cyrus Vance
 Warren Christopher, Deputy
 Secretary
 David Newsom, Under Secretary
 for Political Affairs
 Harold Saunders, Ass't. Secretary
 for Near Eastern & South
 Asian Affairs

Defense
 W. Graham Claytor, Jr., Deputy
 Secretary
 Robert W. Komer, Under
 Secretary for Policy Affairs

JCS
 General David Jones
 Lt. General John Pustay

Central Intelligence
 Admiral Stansfield Turner,
 Director
 Frank Carlucci, Deputy Director
 Arnold Horelick, NIO for Soviet
 Union

[name not declassified]

White House
 Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
 David Aaron

NSC
 Thomas Thornton
 Col. William Odom

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 8–12/79. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

The CIA briefed the SCC on Soviet military actions in Afghanistan over the past two days. As many as 215 transports, including AN–22s, AN–12s, and IL–76s, arrived in Afghanistan from the Soviet Union during December 25th. Kabul airport appears to be a major reception point. Activity at Bagram airport is not known. This size airlift, it is speculated, could raise the Soviet combat force level in Afghanistan to somewhere between two-thirds and one and one-half divisions. No ground forces at Termez or Kushka have yet crossed the border into Afghanistan. Thus we have an unusually large air movement but no ground re-enforcement. There is [*less than 1 line not declassified*] intelligence indicating direct politburo supervision of parts of this operation. (S)

The greatest risk that we face is a quick, effective Soviet operation to pacify Afghanistan. This would be extremely costly to our image in the region and to your position here at home. Our objective, then, should be to make the operation as costly as possible for the Soviets. The covert actions that you authorized have been very slow in getting off the ground. CIA will submit a full status report tomorrow. (S)

There will be a PRC tomorrow to discuss the broad regional impact of the events in Iran and Afghanistan. By that time we should have a more definitive picture of the scope of Soviet activity. At the PRC we will develop options for dealing with the issue, including possible recourse to the UN. In terms of immediate actions, we decided this morning:

1. We will permit information of the newest Soviet actions to reach the media on its own and maintain our current public posture.
2. The new developments will be briefed promptly to concerned countries in the region as well as other interested parties.
3. State will brief the Congressional leadership today in connection with planned briefings on Iran.
4. You should not become personally involved in a further demarche to the Soviets at this time. We will have Tom Watson reiterate our concerns and press for an explanation of recent troop movements; the Soviets have probably passed the point of no return.² (S)

² See Document 246.

246. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 27, 1979, 1842Z

28030. Subject: Soviet Military Buildup in Afghanistan. Ref: State 331394.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. Per instructions reftel I called on First Deputy Minister V.F. Mal'tsev on December 27 at 5:30 p.m. to convey U.S. concern over wide-scale introduction of Soviet military units into Afghanistan and to ask for immediate clarification of Soviet Government's actions and intentions. Soviets had obviously anticipated our demarche and Mal'tsev was prepared with a written statement which he said he was instructed to convey to the USG and to President Carter personally. The statement acknowledged that "limited" Soviet forces have gone into Afghanistan at Afghan Government request to repel "external" aggression in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter.³ The statement said Soviet forces would be withdrawn when the reasons for their being sent no longer exist. The text of the statement follows.

3. Begin text:

I am authorized to transmit confidentially for the Government of the United States of America and personally for the President the following:

As is well-known everywhere in the world, including to the Government of the United States of America, for a long time there has been interference from abroad in internal Afghan affairs, including direct use of armed force. It is completely obvious that the aim of this interference is the overthrow of the democratic structure established as a result of the victory of the April revolution in 1978. The Afghan people and its armed forces actively rebuffed these aggressive acts and repelled encroachments against the democratic achievements, sovereignty and national dignity of the new Afghanistan. However, the acts of external ag-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Afghanistan, Box 1, 12/27/79. Secret; Sensitive; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Carter described his reaction to the invasion in his memoirs: "Now, during the holidays, the Soviets embarked on a massive airlift into Afghanistan. I returned from Camp David to the White House immediately because of this ominous event." (*Keeping Faith*, p. 471)

² Telegram 331394 to Moscow, December 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P840153–1433.

³ Article 51 addresses a country's right to self defense. See the text of the U.N. Charter in *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1979*, pp. 1337–1351.

gression continue on an increasingly wider scale; even now, armed units and weapons are being sent in from abroad.

In these circumstances the leadership of the state of Afghanistan turned to the Soviet Union for help and assistance in the struggle against external aggression. The Soviet Union, proceeding from the common interests of Afghanistan and our country in security matters—as set forth also in the Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation of 1978—and in the interest of preserving peace in this region, responded positively to this request by the leadership of Afghanistan and adopted a decision to send to Afghanistan limited military contingents to carry out the tasks requested by the leadership of Afghanistan. In doing this the Soviet Union also proceeds on the basis of the appropriate provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, in particular Article 51, which provides for the right of states to individual and collective self-defense in repelling aggression and restoring the peace.

The Soviet Government, in informing the Government of the USA about this, considers it necessary also to state that when the reasons evoking this action of the Soviet Union cease to exist, it intends to withdraw its military contingents from the territory of Afghanistan.

The Soviet Union again emphasizes that, as before, its only desire is to see Afghanistan an independent sovereign state carrying out a policy of good-neighborliness and peace, firmly respecting and fulfilling its international obligations, including those under the Charter of the United Nations. End text.

4. After hearing Mal'tsev out I proceeded to make the points per reftel and left a non-paper.⁴ In making the oral point concerning the safety of American personnel in Afghanistan, I referred to the loss of Ambassador Spike Dubs in Kabul.⁵

5. Mal'tsev initially refused to address any of the questions I raised and merely stated that the Soviet statement covered all the questions we had asked. He stressed the confidential nature of the information conveyed to the USG and personally to the President. After I pressed him further, Mal'tsev made the following comments. First, my reference to the introduction of "large numbers" of Soviet forces was in contrast to the Soviet statement which refers to "limited" military contingents. Second, the allegation that these actions constitute direct intervention in internal affairs and a threat to the peace does not correspond to the actual situation because Soviet actions are in response to the legal request of the Afghan Government in order to preserve peace

⁴ Not found.

⁵ See Document 171.

in that area. Mal'tsev concluded with the hope that, when I had studied the text carefully, I would find all the answers to the questions we had raised. He then said abruptly this was all he could say on the matter and that he was under instructions only to convey the basic statement he had handed me.

6. I told Mal'tsev I would convey the statement to my government and to the President, but made clear that the Soviet statement did not answer the questions we had raised, specifically regarding the size and suddenness of Soviet troop movements and military equipment to Afghanistan. Also, it did not explain the substantive change in Soviet intentions toward Afghanistan which all these military actions implied. I also made it clear that if I could have had an opportunity to discuss with him the serious issues these actions raise, I would have asked who are these outsiders interfering in Afghanistan's affairs? Mal'tsev repeated that he believed the Soviet statement was responsive and fully covered our questions. I repeated that I considered the Soviet response inadequate.

Watson

247. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, December 28, 1979, 1900Z

28119. Subject: Ramifications of the Soviet Move into Afghanistan.

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: The Soviet action in Afghanistan appears to mark a major watershed in Soviet policy: for the first time since World War II the Soviet Union has intervened militarily outside the Warsaw Pact area to install a regime of its own choice. The move against Amin apparently resulted from Soviet perceptions that:

—Amin's removal was necessary to broaden domestic political support for the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA), but could not be accomplished without the introduction of Soviet combat troops; and

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 17, Afghan-US Steps. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

—that the disadvantages of a military move into Afghanistan at this time were minimized by the current slump in U.S.-Soviet relations, and the deterioration of U.S. relations with Iran and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan.

3. In my view this action marks a dangerous and unacceptable change in Soviet policy. I trust Washington is considering a response appropriate to the threat this Soviet action represents. End summary.

4. It is too early to undertake a definitive analysis of the Soviet action in Afghanistan. But we offer the following preliminary thoughts.

5. The Soviets apparently decided that it was essential to replace Amin with a leader who offered some possibility of winning broader popular support in Afghanistan and was more amenable to Soviet direction, and we assume that was the principal purpose of the rapid Soviet military buildup.

6. It has become apparent that the Soviets hoped to broaden the base of the Afghan regime through a political solution, which involved plotting against Amin as the focal point of popular discontent with the DRA. The Soviets presumably were involved in the move against Amin in mid-September which backfired, at least in part because Afghan troops in the capital remained loyal to Amin. Soviet coolness toward Amin since then has been evident in their media treatment of him and in official messages to his government. The Soviets also made it clear that their commitment was to the Afghan nation, the DRA and the People's Democratic Party—not to a particular leader. Since the key Kabul military units remained loyal to Amin, however, the Soviets played along with him—until the effectiveness of these units could be neutralized by the introduction of Soviet units into Kabul.

7. Presumably one of the main constraints on Soviet introduction of their own combat troops into Afghanistan had been their concern about the detrimental effect on their relations with the U.S. and particularly on SALT II ratification. Concern about the impact on their relations with neighboring Muslim states such as Iran and Pakistan probably also played a role. The Soviets may have concluded that U.S./Soviet relations were already so bad, and the chances for ratification of SALT II so poor, that there was little to be lost on that score. Moreover, they probably calculated that the continuing crisis in U.S.-Iranian relations would minimize an adverse Iranian reaction to the Soviet move, which might otherwise have pushed Iran toward the United States. In the case of Pakistan, the Soviets may have calculated that the U.S. Congress' cutoff of military assistance to Pakistan over the nuclear issue would leave the Pakistanis little alternative but to accommodate themselves to the Soviet move.

8. It is too soon to tell whether Soviet calculations about the potential political gains and losses from replacing Amin with Babrak Karmal

will prove to be well-founded. There are evident risks of a reaction, especially from the Islamic countries, and especially if this move is perceived to be only to install a regime which will more effectively put down the Muslim insurgency by force of arms.

9. I assume Washington is carefully sorting out the ramifications of the Soviet move in terms of U.S. interests. My own view is that it marks a watershed in Soviet policy on the use of military force outside its borders and constitutes an unacceptable extension of the Brezhnev doctrine. I trust you will be assessing the best way to bring pressure to bear on the Soviets and to make the political cost to them so high that they will find a way to withdraw their troops. Even so, a dangerous precedent will have been established, but if the price has been sufficiently painful for them they may think again before undertaking another such adventure.²

Watson

² As a result of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the ratification of SALT II was further delayed. While the SALT II Treaty remained on the Senate calendar in 1980, it was not ratified. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1980, Document 245.

248. Editorial Note

On December 30, 1979, Acting Secretary of State Warren Christopher approved a telegram to Moscow, the contents of which contained President Jimmy Carter's December 29 hotline message to Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev regarding the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Also included in Christopher's telegram to Moscow was Brezhnev's response to Carter of the same date.

Christopher wrote, "Following is text of President Carter's message of December 29 to Brezhnev (there may have been minor changes in final version, as transmitted, but this text is virtually authentic):

"Begin text:

"Dear President Brezhnev:

"I want to insure that you have fully weighed the ramifications of the Soviet actions in Afghanistan, which we regard as a clear threat to the peace. You should understand that these actions could mark a fundamental and long-lasting turning point in our relations. Taken without any previous discussions with us, they constitute in our view a

clear violation of the Basic Principles on Relations, which you signed in 1972.

“My government can in no way accept the Soviet Government’s explanation, conveyed to Ambassador Watson on December 27, that Soviet military forces were sent into Afghanistan at the request of the leadership of that country. The facts of the matter clearly show that these same Soviet forces were employed to overthrow the established Government of Afghanistan and to impose a new government, which has brutally executed the former President and, reportedly, his family.

“Large-scale movements of military units into a sovereign country are always a legitimate matter of concern to the international community. When such military forces are those of a superpower, and are then used to depose an existing government and impose another, there are obvious implications both for the region and for the world at large. We note with the utmost seriousness that this is the first time since the invasions of Hungary and Czechoslovakia that the Soviet Union has taken direct military action against another country. In the present instance, the Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan—a previously non-aligned country—obviously represents an unsettling, dangerous and new stage in your use of military force, which raises deep apprehension about the general trend of Soviet policy.

“We are pledged not to exacerbate conflict-fraught situations and to consult when threats to the peace arise. If these mutual obligations are to have any meaning, then they must obviously include a refusal by the superpowers to engage in armed combat except as a very last resort and then only in legitimate self-defense. Because our interests are global, we must recognize that actions taken in one area have a spill-over effect in other seemingly unrelated areas, as well as in that area itself.

“Neither superpower can arrogate to itself the right to displace or overturn a legally constituted government in another country by force of arms. Such a precedent is a dangerous one; it flouts all the accepted norms of international conduct. Unless you draw back from your present course of action, this will inevitably jeopardize the course of US-Soviet relations throughout the world. I urge you to take prompt constructive action to withdraw your forces and cease interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs. Many years of promoting more stable and productive relations between our two countries could well be undermined if this situation is not resolved promptly.

“End text.

“Following is text of Brezhnev’s response to the President, received December 29:

“Begin text:

“Dear Mister President,

“In answer to your message of 29 December I consider it necessary to inform you of the following.

“It is impossible to agree with your evaluation of what is occurring in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. We have sent through your Ambassador to Moscow in a confidential manner to the American side and to you personally a clarification based on facts of what is actually occurring there, as well as the reasons which caused us to respond favorably to the request of the Government of Afghanistan for the introduction of limited Soviet military contingents.

“The attempt taken in your message to cast doubt on the very fact of the request itself of the Government of Afghanistan for sending our forces to that country seems strange. I am compelled to note that it is certainly not a question of anyone’s perception or lack of perception of this fact, or agreement or disagreement with it, which determines the actual state of affairs, which consists of the following.

“The Government of Afghanistan during the course of nearly two years has numerous times turned to us with this request. In point of fact one of these requests was sent to us on 26 December of this year. This is equally known by us and by the Afghanistationian Government which sent us these requests.

“I want to once more stress that the purpose of the limited Soviet contingent in Afghanistan has only one goal—to provide assistance in repulsing the acts of external aggression, which have been taking place for a prolonged time and have now taken on even greater scale.

“It is absolutely impermissible, and not in conformance with actuality, the claim (accusation), which appears in your message that the Soviet Union allegedly did something to overthrow the Government of Afghanistan. I must with all certainty stress that the change in the Afghanistationian Government was the result of the Afghanistationians themselves and only by them. Ask the Afghanistationian Government itself.

“Also not corresponding to reality is that which is said in your message in relation to the fate of the families of the former leaders of Afghanistan. We have at our disposal information contradicting the information you have received.

“I must further clearly state to you that the Soviet military contingents did not take any military action against Afghanistan and we clearly do not intend to do so.

“You have reproached us in your message that we did not consult with the USA Government in reference to the Afghanistationian matter before introducing our military contingents into Afghanistan. Permit us to ask you—did you consult with us prior to beginning the massive

concentration of naval forces near Iran and in the region of the Persian Gulf, as well as in many other cases, about which it would have been necessary as a minimum to notify us?

“In connection with the content and spirit of your message I consider it essential to again clarify the point that the request of the Afghanistani Government and the satisfaction of this request by the Soviet Union are exclusively a matter for the USSR and Afghanistan, which regulate their mutual relations themselves, by mutual agreement, and naturally cannot permit any sort of interference from without in their mutual relations. They, as any member states of the UN, enjoy the right not only to individual self-defense, but to collective defense as well, which is envisioned by Article 51 of the UN Charter, which the USSR and USA formulated themselves. And this was approved by all member states of the UN.

“There is, of course, no basis for your assertion that our actions in Afghanistan allegedly threaten the peace.

“In light of all of this, the immoderate tone of certain formulations in your message hit us squarely between the eyes. What is the purpose of it? Would it not be better to evaluate the situation more calmly, keeping in mind the supreme interests of the world rather than, ultimately, the mutual relations of our two powers.

“Concerning your ‘advice,’ we already informed you, and here I repeat again, that as soon as the reasons which prompted the Afghanistani request to the Soviet Union disappear, we fully intend to withdraw the Soviet military contingents from Afghanistani territory.

“And here is our advice to you: The American side could make its contribution toward ending the armed incursion from without into Afghanistani territory.

“I do not believe that the work to create more stable and productive relations between the USSR and USA can be in vain. Unless, of course, the American side wants this to be. We do not. I think it would not be to the benefit of the United States of America itself, either. It is our conviction that the way relations develop between the USSR and the USA is a joint matter. We believe that they must not be subject to vacillation under the influence of some kind of attendant factors or events.

“Despite disagreements on a number of issues in world and European politics, which we understand quite clearly, the Soviet Union is an advocate of conducting affairs in the spirit of those understandings and documents which were adopted by our countries in the interests of peace, equal cooperation, and international security.

“End text.” (Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, unlabeled folder)

**249. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the
Department of State (Tarnoff) to the President’s Assistant for
National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹**

Washington, December 31, 1979

SUBJECT

U.S. Soviet Relations and Afghanistan

In accordance with the NSC request, I attach the Department’s papers on U.S. Soviet relations and Afghanistan for Wednesday’s² NSC meeting.

Peter Tarnoff³
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

Tab 1—Afghanistan: Steps in the Framework of U.S. Soviet Relations.⁴

Tab 2—Possible U.S. Actions.

Tab 3—Possible Soviet Reactions.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 17, Afghan-US Steps. Secret; Nodis. Cleared by Paul Kreisberg (S/P), Jerome Kahan (PM), and McCall.

² January 2, 1980.

³ Bremer signed for Tarnoff above Tarnoff’s typed signature.

⁴ Tabs 1 and 3 are attached but not printed.

Tab 2

Paper Prepared in the Department of State⁵

Washington, December 31, 1979

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⁵ Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

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[Omitted here is the body of the paper.]

January–May 1980

**250. Overview of an Intelligence Assessment Prepared in the
Central Intelligence Agency¹**

ER 80–10037

Washington, January 1980

Impact of Economic Denial Measures on the USSR
[handling restriction not declassified]

Overview

The impact of economic denial measures on the USSR depends critically on whether (a) the United States acts alone or is joined by other major suppliers and (b) the measures are enforced for a year or a few months or are continued for several years. Acting alone, the United States can hurt the USSR appreciably only by its grain export embargo and, to a lesser extent, by cutting off critical oilfield exploration and development equipment. The effect of even a one-year denial of grain on Moscow's consumer programs will be marked. A longer term curb on US grain would be even more effective if other producing countries cooperated. These countries are capable of stepping up production to meet Soviet import requirements over a period of several years. A combination of Western countries could severely impair Soviet economic growth by refusing to sell steel and steel pipe, metallurgical equipment, and a broader range of oil and gas equipment. Except for steel, however, the denial would have to be maintained for a prolonged period to have a substantial effect. Finally, while a widespread boycott of the Moscow Olympics would not hurt the USSR economically, it would tarnish the leadership's image badly. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

Of the measures introduced or suggested in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, three (grain embargo and denial of superphosphoric acid and fishing rights) would impact mainly on Soviet plans to upgrade consumer diets. Four measures (denial of oil and gas equipment, metallurgical equipment, communications and automotive equipment and computers, and specialized steel products)—if supported by other Western suppliers—would impinge on Soviet efforts to eliminate bottlenecks that are holding down Soviet economic growth. Limits on Western credits would also retard Soviet growth by inter-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, International Economics, Tim Deal File, Box 11, USSR: 1/80. Secret; *[handling restriction not declassified]*. The paper was prepared in the CIA's Office of Economic Research.

fering with plans to modernize the Soviet economy across the board with the help of Western equipment and technology. Finally, a proposed boycott of the Olympics would be a political setback for Moscow and deny the USSR some hard currency. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

A review of these measures suggests that a one-year grain embargo would force meat consumption in the USSR down to the level of the early 1970s, which would have an immediate impact on consumer perceptions. A continued denial of Western grain would severely curtail the Brezhnev livestock program in the 1981–85 period. Losing the superphosphoric acid would reduce the availability of fertilizer (and thus grain) only marginally. The impact of a denial of fishing rights would also be minimal, even if Canada and Japan cooperated with the United States. The Soviet Union's catch in the waters belonging to these countries has been declining, and the USSR probably can move elsewhere to maintain its production. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Although the United States is the predominant manufacturer of petroleum equipment, the USSR probably could satisfy most of its needs from other Western countries if they did not cooperate with a US embargo. In any event, a brief embargo would have little impact. Continued denial of US petroleum equipment technology and know-how—if at least partially supported by other countries—would force a more rapid decline in Soviet oil production than we now expect and greatly reduce the chances that the decline could be slowed or stemmed in the late 1980s and beyond. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Because the steel industry ranks second only to energy as a Soviet problem area, Western denial of steel products could have a substantial impact on domestic steel supplies for several years at least. In the long term, a denial of Western help in building up the Soviet steel industry would severely impede Soviet efforts to modernize that industry and slow improvements in the technological level of machinery output. It would delay the completion of several projects necessary (a) to produce quality steels that the Soviet economy requires in growing amounts and (b) to eliminate Soviet dependence on imports. In addition, a long-term denial of steel pipe would seriously interfere with Soviet pipeline construction and cut the growth of gas production in half—a loss equal to about 250,000 barrels of oil per day. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Curbs on Soviet purchase of Western computers, communications equipment, and automotive production equipment would have little economic impact unless all important suppliers cooperated and the curbs were maintained for an extended period of time. The effects would be felt to a degree in oil exploration, and production would be

disrupted in certain new plants that have been built with Western help. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

A short-term interruption of officially supported Western credits to the Soviet Union would have little economic impact. The USSR, if necessary, could expand commercial borrowings and sell more gold. But Moscow probably counts on financing a large part of its machinery imports in the 1980s with official long-term credits. If Western governments and private banks refused to extend new credits, the Soviet Union would not be able to buy more in the West than it could pay for from current earnings—which we expect to fall drastically as Soviet oil exports decline. A boycott of the Olympics by major Western nations would have almost no effect on Soviet hard currency earnings because most of the earnings from tourism and broadcast rights have been pre-paid. But such a boycott would humiliate the leadership and deprive the USSR of the prestige and propaganda opportunities it clearly hopes to extract from a well run, noncontroversial Olympics. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

[Omitted here is the main text of the intelligence assessment.]

251. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, January 2, 1980, 9:30–10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

SCC Meeting on Soviet Forces in Afghanistan (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State
Secretary Cyrus Vance
Deputy Secretary
Warren Christopher

Defense
Secretary Harold Brown
Deputy Secretary
W. Graham Clayton

CIA
Deputy Director Frank Carlucci

JCS
Admiral Thomas Hayward
Lt. General John Pustay

White House
Zbigniew Brzezinski
David Aaron

NSC
William E. Odom
Marshall Brement

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1–2/80. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

CIA reported that about 40,000 Soviet troops are now in Afghanistan. They are encountering some resistance. The Afghan army is shrinking rapidly through desertions. The rebel tribes will retreat in the mountains and continue resistance, probably increasing in the spring. Thus, the insurgency will continue, and Soviet forces will be the main source of the counterinsurgency effort. (S)

[1 paragraph (2½ lines) not declassified]

It was asserted in the discussion that the degree of resistance in Afghanistan will depend upon two factors: [2½ lines not declassified]

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

Aid to Pakistan—Pakistan's ability to support the insurgency and to resist Soviet pressures, it was agreed, will be highly dependent on U.S. assistance and commitment. It was argued that the small support we can now promise Pakistan will be more confusing than reassuring because of the publicity about changing U.S. policy. It is essential, therefore, to address the non-proliferation issue with the Congress and find a satisfactory way to make an exception in the Pakistani case. It was agreed that this matter should be discussed at the National Security Council meeting today and a decision taken on whether to seek an amendment to the law or to seek Pakistani assurances sufficient to certify Pakistan's intentions on nuclear proliferation to the Congress. (S)

Christopher's Trip to the NAC—Warren Christopher gave a brief report on his impressions from the NAC meeting. He added that Japanese participation would be useful. He also argued that we need a standing mechanism for coordinating any joint actions with the Allies which may be taken in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. States are more likely to support actions as a group than alone without the reassuring presence of other states in the group. (S)

NSC on the larger Strategic Questions Posed by Soviet Intervention in Afghanistan—It was agreed to seek a meeting of the NSC later this week to discuss the larger regional issues arising from Soviet actions in Afghanistan as well as issues concerning our Allies in Europe and Asia. (S)

252. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Vance, and Secretary of Defense Brown¹

Washington, January 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Results of the NSC Meeting, January 2, 1980

The following decisions were reached as a result of the meeting:

1) The SALT II Treaty will be left on the Senate calendar. There will be no effort to bring it to the Floor for a vote. Our public posture will be to reaffirm that SALT is important irrespective of the tone of our relationship with the Soviet Union but, at this time, we do not believe it is advisable to bring it to a vote.

2) We will make no announcement concerning other bilateral arms control negotiations but, if asked, will take the position that they should proceed. The Indian Ocean talks will remain moribund. We will proceed with CSCE. In MBFR, we are awaiting a Soviet response to our initiative. CTB negotiations will continue at a slow pace. CW/RW negotiations will be pursued since they are in our interest. The proposed meeting next week of the heads of delegation for the Conventional Arms talks should be postponed.

3) The recall of Ambassador Watson will be announced today.

4) The Department of State will forward its proposal² for reducing the Soviet diplomatic staff in the U.S., excluding the Soviet UN Mission, to the level of the United States in the USSR. This should include measures to tighten restrictions on Soviet official travel in the U.S. to the equivalent of those imposed on the U.S. officials in the USSR.

5) Preparations for opening the Consulates General in Kiev and New York will be suspended.

6) Radio Liberty, Radio Free Europe and Voice of America broadcasts will be stepped up along the lines proposed in the State Department's December 31 paper.³ The necessary funds will be made avail-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Brement Subject File, Box 46, Afghanistan: 10/79–1/80. Secret. Copies were sent to Turner and Jones. According to the President's Daily Diary, Carter attended the meeting. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials)

² Vance sent the proposal, in the form of four backup papers, to the President under a January 13 memorandum. The proposal, which called for reciprocity in all U.S. and Soviet diplomatic, media and commercial personnel, is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: Measures Taken Against USSR After Invasion: 1/9–14/80.

³ See Document 249.

able by OMB. Worldwide diplomatic demarches and ICA actions will be increased to publicize the Soviet role in Afghanistan.

7) Our posture toward the Afghan Government will be not to conduct any formal business for the time being. The number of American personnel at the Embassy will be reduced to ten. The question of recognition of the Babrak regime does not arise.

8) The Consular Review Talks which are now in a state of suspension will not be resumed.

9) On a case-by-case basis, The Department of State will reject and delay visas for official visits to the United States.

10) Soviet media representation in the United States will be reduced to the same level as U.S. media representation in the Soviet Union.

11) Shipment by C5A aircraft of the MHD channel will be deferred indefinitely.

12) Negotiations with the Soviet Union on the General Exchange Agreement will not be resumed.

13) We will cancel the following:

—The Agriculture Joint Committee Meeting scheduled for January in the USSR.

—The Health Joint Committee Meeting scheduled for February in Moscow.

—Representative Green⁴ will be urged to cancel his Congressional Delegation visit to the Soviet Union scheduled for January 11–18.

14) Any meetings at the level of Assistant Secretary or above will be reviewed on a case-by-case basis with the presumption that they will be cancelled unless there are overriding reasons not to do so.

15) On the Olympics, we will take the following position which may be used publicly: "Our European Allies have questioned whether we should proceed to participate in the Olympic games in Moscow. We will assess this question and review the position taken by other countries in reaching our decision."

16) U.S. travel controls on Soviet officials and the enforcement of these controls will be reviewed to ensure greater reciprocity with the treatment accorded our officials in the Soviet Union.

17) We should postpone the following meetings: the Joint Commercial Committee Meeting scheduled for April 14–15 in Washington; the Business Facilitation Talks scheduled for January 9 in Moscow; and the Civil Aviation Talks scheduled for February 13. In addition, Aeroflot's scheduled service will be limited to the two weekly flights currently authorized.

⁴ Sedgwick William Green (R-New York).

18) The United States export controls on exports to the USSR will be tightened up on a case-by-case basis. The United States should be prepared to restrict export licenses to an even greater degree than our allies if it does not disadvantage U.S. business in comparison with our allies.

19) There should be an examination of Soviet commercial expansion in the United States with a view to restricting it. The Department of State should forward proposals to this effect within one week.

20) Allocations to the Soviet Union under our Fishing Agreements should be restricted.

21) The United States should continue to urge our allies to increase broadcasts to Muslim countries and Soviet Central Asia on developments in Afghanistan. There should also be prepared in conjunction with our allies a periodic circular to be distributed at the United Nations on the status of the Soviet invasion and occupation in Afghanistan.

22) The United States will join in a letter to the President of the Security Council urging that the Afghanistan situation be placed on the agenda. Unless it would be a violation of the UN Charter, Ambassador McHenry will be instructed to tell other nations that it is our preference to also raise this issue at the current General Assembly.

23) We will proceed on a case-by-case basis to implement the “Belgian Formula” for creating a de facto differential in COCOM favoring China in comparison to the Soviet Union. There will be no public statement of this policy.

24) We will consult with other countries to urge them to deny the Soviet Union further credit.

25) We will work with our allies to urge the IFI’s and countries with assistance programs to Afghanistan to terminate such assistance.

26) We will seek an amendment in the Foreign Assistance Bill to except Pakistan from the restrictions of the Symington and Glenn Non-proliferation Amendments so that it will be possible for us to provide FMS and ESF.

The Department of State should immediately inform our allies of our intention to take these actions and should urge appropriate allied support.⁵

Zbigniew Brzezinski

⁵ On January 4, Carter addressed the nation, focusing on the continuing hostage crisis and the invasion of Afghanistan. Carter addressed how U.S. bilateral relations would change with the Soviet Union, in an effort to underscore both the importance and severity of the situation. Trade would be restricted in three areas: no strategic technological items would be sold to the Soviet Union, fishing privileges would be curtained, and grain purchases would be further restricted. For the text of the address, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981*, Book I, pp. 21–24.

253. Memorandum From Vice President Mondale to President Carter¹

Washington, January 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Possible Restriction of Grain Sales to the Soviet Union

I very much hope that you will decide not to reduce grain sales to the Soviet Union. I believe it is in our interest to gain the cash sales—and it is all cash—from these sales to the Soviet Union and to maintain this market in future years which has a very beneficial impact on our economy and on the dollar. Sales of food for cash to the USSR takes hard currency from them to develop a stronger consumer economy with higher protein components for their consumers. All of this is good for us. If you feel we must do something in the grain area, I would hope at the most we would terminate our agreement for sales in excess of those already contracted. Some 17 million tons are already under contract—the remainder (i.e. up to 25 million tons) has not yet been contracted. It would hurt far less if we could do that. We might then follow Harold Brown's suggestions that the difference between the 17 million tons and the approved 25 million tons be made available on concessional terms for use in countries such as Bangladesh that are having serious nutritional problems. I think that this would be viewed by the farmers as moving with proper concern for their needs and be seen in the world as a responsible decision.

If you look at the list of actions that we've taken and will take in regard to this matter, it is pretty impressive.

1. Defer SALT
2. Recall Ambassador from USSR
3. Reduce Soviet diplomatic presence including expelling some Soviet agents and restricting travel. I think we also ought to review whether we can block Russian occupation of their new Embassy here in Washington—something that they want very much.
4. Suspend opening of Kiev and New York consulates.
5. Step up VOA broadcasts
6. Stall consular review
7. Reduce numbers of Soviet visitors
8. Require equal numbers of media representatives
9. I hope we would really go after the Olympics—I don't see why that is sacrosanct.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 82, USSR: 1/1–8/80. "Top Secret" is handwritten on the memorandum. Printed from a copy that does not bear Mondales's initials. The initial "C" is written in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, indicating that Carter saw it.

10. Reduce U.S. participation in selected exchanges.
11. Establish a permanent military presence in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
12. Let MFN lie.
13. Postpone commercial and civil aviation talks—limit commercial expansion.
14. Substantially tighten export controls—a significant move.
15. Tighten rules on Soviet fishing
16. The moves that we're making before the UN Security Council and hopefully thereafter the General Assembly.
17. Tightening COCOM rules
18. Substantially expanding the types of technical and defensive assistance available to the People's Republic of China.
19. Ending all international aid to Afghanistan.
20. Substantial aid to Pakistan.
21. Broadened resources for the CIA and for Foreign Aid.
22. Add to that the steps we've already taken to increase the Defense budget and the decision taken in LRT–NF

It seems to me that all these steps make a most significant response to the outrageous invasion of Afghanistan.

I realize that you have to make this decision without regard to politics. But if corn were to drop 10 cents or more a bushel—and the estimates are that it would drop more at first and then slowly stabilize—and wheat were to drop 20 cents a bushel—and the farmers were to realize, as they will, that the chances of a future market in the Soviet Union had been basically and fundamentally damaged and that a lot of this market would be picked up by the other wheat and bean producers around the world, that the reaction would be very, very tough politically in Iowa, in Minnesota and in Ohio and throughout the grain-producing areas of our country. Because of that, this decision could undermine your ability to persevere in a strong and unified assault upon the Soviet Union with a unified nation behind you. To me, there is something particularly grubby about using food as a weapon and the use of it could damage us in the international community as well. I might also point out that we did not use the food weapon in the case of the holding of American hostages and I believe to do so now would also raise questions as to how the differences in policy might be justified. I try very hard not to be a hair shirt for you, but I feel very strongly about this matter and have therefore written this memo.

254. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, January 4, 1980, 0305Z

2093. Subject: Vasev Call on Shulman January 3.

1. Secret-entire text.

2. After initially seeking a meeting with the Secretary, Soviet Charge Vasev called on Marshall Shulman January 3 to deliver (septel) a non-paper in reply to the Secretary's demarche of December 18² on NATO interest in TNF arms control.

3. On Afghanistan, Vasev offered his personal view that the US seemed to be overreacting. Shulman wondered how Moscow could have failed to anticipate the effect of such a blatant violation of sovereignty. Vasev allowed that Moscow had expected the US to object, but less severely, he asserted that the Soviet action was not against any US interest and claimed that the Soviets had nothing to do with the change in leadership in Afghanistan. When pressed on how long the "limited duration" of the Soviet intervention would be, he said that this would depend on operational needs. Shulman told him we frankly disbelieved the version of events circulated by the Soviets after the coup, and we were concerned about the implications of the Soviet action for future military action outside their own territory.

Vance

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, State Department Out, Box 119, 1/1–9/80. Secret; Sensitive; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Shulman; cleared by Jane E. Becker (S/S–O); approved by Shulman. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0698)

² Neither the septel transmitting the non-paper nor the demarche was found.

255. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 7, 1980

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations During the Remainder of the First Carter Administration:
The Domestic Angle (U)

The turnaround in the polls demonstrates—if any demonstration was needed—that the country wants the President to exercise firm, vigorous leadership in foreign affairs. The crisis in Afghanistan will enhance this desire. US-Soviet relations are, of course, central to American foreign policy. In the popular mind no aspect of our foreign relations is more important than how the President handles the Russians. This has been true for every President since Truman. (C)

But we should face the fact that, despite its enormous achievements, this Administration does not get the credit it deserves for handling foreign policy. A central factor in this, in my view, is that there exists a commonly-held perception that this Administration speaks with two voices on Soviet affairs. Kennedy and other Administration critics have repeatedly charged that the President cannot make up his mind as to what he believes about the Soviets; that consequently the Annapolis speech² was the greatest “paste job” in our diplomatic history; and that Moscow therefore reads us as weak, divided, and irresolute and does not hesitate to take advantage of our irresolution. (S)

The Afghanistan situation gives us a priceless opportunity to turn this perception around. To do so, it is essential that from this point onward the Administration speak with one voice about US-Soviet affairs. If we could accomplish this, then we would be in a position to make the following case on a private, background basis to key opinion molders:

—At one point there was considerable substance to the charges that the Administration was divided on Soviet affairs and as a result the President was receiving divided counsel on the subject;

—This was reflected in the Annapolis speech;

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 84, Sensitive XX, 1/80. Secret. Sent for information.

² Reference is to Carter's June 7, 1978, commencement speech delivered at the U.S. Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland. In this speech, Carter emphasized détente and the desired finalization of a SALT II Treaty. In his conclusion he stated, “The Soviet Union can choose either confrontation or cooperation. The United States is adequately prepared to meet either choice.” (*Public Papers: Carter, 1978*, Book I, pp. 1052–1057)

—The President's views on this matter, however, have been changed by three events:

(a) *The Vienna Summit*. This required the President to read deeply in Soviet and Marxist history, philosophy and politics and to ponder the continuing outward thrust of Soviet foreign policy.

(b) *The Soviet Brigade in Cuba*. This focused for the President the dilemma which we face in trying, on the one hand, to achieve strategic stability and balance with the Soviet Union and, on the other hand, to restrain its mischievous policies in vulnerable areas throughout the world.

(c) *The Afghanistan Crisis*. This has brought home to the President, as no previous event during his Administration, the brutal cynicism of the Soviets, the outward thrust that their system requires, and their willingness to sacrifice a detente relationship with the US to the needs of Soviet expansionism.

—The President is determined not to allow the Soviets to have their cake and eat it. He is convinced that the only way to stop Soviet expansion in Southwest Asia and into the Persian Gulf area is for the United States to adopt a firm and unequivocal policy of resistance to Soviet machinations. He believes that the Soviet rape of Afghanistan should not be viewed as an isolated event, but that it has to be seen in the context of what has been happening elsewhere in the world in such places as Angola, Ethiopia, Yemen and Cambodia. The Soviets are posing a challenge to us, he believes, and we must respond to it.

—As a result of this changed perception, the President will ensure that during the remainder of his first Administration and throughout the next Carter Administration the US Government will be speaking with one voice on Soviet affairs.

—He has come to realize that, both in terms of our relationship with Moscow as well as in terms of formulating US Government policy for dealing with the Soviet Union, it is essential that we enunciate clearly what US policy toward Moscow really is and that appearance of divided opinion on our part can not only be ineffective but dangerous as well, since it can lead to miscalculation.

—As a result, during meetings with his key advisors the President has directed that his Administration speak and act with one voice on this central aspect of American foreign policy.

—Those policymakers within the Government who are not in accord with the President's views will shortly be leaving the Administration. (S)

In sum, the above approach would enhance the President's political stature, the popular perception of his leadership ability, as well as the argument that we need *experience* and steadiness at the tiller during

these troubled times. To speak with one voice on Soviet policy would not only be a self-evident improvement in our diplomatic strategy toward the Soviets, but it would enormously help the President domestically as well. The charge that this Administration speaks with two voices on Soviet affairs has repeatedly been leveled by critics of the President. The invasion of Afghanistan has given us the opportunity to get our act together and cut the ground out from under such critics. (S)

256. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, January 9, 1980

SUBJECT

A Long-Term Strategy for Coping with the Consequences of the Soviet Action in Afghanistan

You have stressed—rightly so—that the Soviet action has created consequences which cannot be dealt with in only a few weeks or with a series of short-term measures. The Soviet action poses a test involving ultimately the balance of power between East and West. Our response will determine how several key states will adjust their foreign policy and particularly whether they will accommodate themselves to the projection of Soviet military power.

Before outlining for you an agenda of possible responses, let me put the foregoing in a brief historical context, which may also be useful to you when you comment on the subject. We have, in effect, entered the fifth decade in the U.S.-Soviet competition. Each of the decades has had a specific historical character:

1. The 1940's: consolidation of Soviet gains in the context of U.S. disarmament after World War II and probes for Western weakness;
2. The 1950's: lines drawn sharply in the West and in the East (the Iron Curtain, the Korean buffer);
3. The 1960's premature Soviet global challenge; increasing competition in other areas: economic (we will bury you); space (Sputnik); with

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1/9–31/80. Secret. In the upper right-hand corner of the document, Carter wrote, "cc Zbig J."

the U.S. then becoming bogged down in Vietnam after the respite won in Cuba, with massive Soviet investments in defense.

4. The 1970's: detente and continued buildup of Soviet strength;

5. The 1980's: the danger of conflict in the context of wider global turbulence.

It is both symbolic and significant that Soviet action in Afghanistan occurred in the first week of the new decade of the 1980's. To respond to that initiative, we need to generate a wider domestic consensus behind legislative and budgetary matters. Anything less will cause vacillation and accommodation by our allies and by states within the Persian Gulf region.

The context for a major response is provided by the three interdependent central strategic zones of our concern: Western Europe, the Far East, and the Persian Gulf. We have an alliance system and military deployments in two of these regions. We are only beginning to create a significant military posture in the third, the Persian Gulf. Accordingly, our response to the Soviet Union action ought to deal with the following aspects:

I. Regional Security

A. Unilateral U.S. Actions

1. Covert Assistance. We have in recent months authorized a number of new programs of covert assistance. David Aaron, Frank Carlucci and David Newsom will be reviewing each and recommending necessary additional steps (e.g. YAR, PDRY or Eritrea).²

2. Military Assistance to Pakistan (the subject of a separate paper to you).

3. Bases. Survey teams will depart on January 14 to assess the adequacy of existing facilities for U.S. use.³

4. Military Exercises/Deployments. We will review the planned U.S. Marine deployment scheduled for late summer and the possibility of rapidly deploying a brigade to the region in late spring or early summer as a demonstration of our ability and will to project effective military power into the region.

5. U.S.-Saudi Security Consultations. The Saudis have agreed to the deployment of AWACS through Saudi airspace. We will determine

² Carter wrote in the left margin, "We should share more with Spain & other countries."

³ Carter wrote in the left margin, "I'm ready to expedite & take a chance on Somalia."

if the Afghanistan situation has changed the Saudi view of security cooperation with the U.S.⁴

6. U.S.-Turkish Security Consultations. We will review the possibility of sending a mission to Ankara to consult with the Turks on the situation resulting from the Iran and Afghanistan situations.⁵

7. U.S.-Indian Security Consultations. We will review the possibility of sending a high-level mission to India to consult on the changed circumstances in the region.⁶

B. Multilateral Actions

1. Covert Assistance to Afghan Rebels. We will raise the question whether our European allies, in addition to the Chinese, should become involved in support for the Afghan rebels.

2. Security Assistance Consortium. We will pursue this concept with the allies. We might want to organize along the lines of the old Berlin Task Force (U.S., France, UK and FRG) to implement the lines of action agreed upon.

3. PRC. We will follow up on the Harold Brown mission.⁷

4. ASEAN. We will ask the ASEAN states to talk to the Indians about the appropriate Indian role in the region.⁸

5. Refugee Assistance. We must examine the question of how assistance to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan can meet the humanitarian need as well as serve other objectives. Multilateral assistance provided outside the UNHCR context (perhaps through Islamic organizations) could allow us to further the resistance effort more effectively.⁹

6. Approaching our Allies. We must plan for the desire of our European allies to set the Afghanistan issue aside as soon as possible so as not to do permanent damage to European detente. Our strategy should focus on seeking their assistance in the Persian Gulf region while deferring further direct European-Soviet initiatives (e.g. Schmidt mission to Turkey; French approach to the Iraqis).¹⁰

⁴ Carter wrote in the left margin, "Good."

⁵ Carter underlined the word "mission," and wrote in the left margin, "a person—to explore Turkish attitudes first."

⁶ Carter wrote in the left margin, "Goheen assess, then Clifford." Robert Goheen served as U.S. Ambassador to India. Clark Clifford served as the special presidential emissary to India.

⁷ Carter wrote in the left margin, "PRC (Huang Hua) should go to India." Huang Hua was the Chinese Foreign Minister.

⁸ Carter wrote in the left margin, "Good."

⁹ Carter wrote in the left margin, "Paks prefer UNHCR."

¹⁰ Carter wrote in the left margin, "I agree."

II. U.S.-Soviet Relations in the Wider Global Context

—Soviet actions in Afghanistan, regardless of their motives, have changed the strategic situation in the region; and we must take steps which will restore a balance. The steps outlined under Regional Security began to address this balance.

—This development requires two classes of response on our part.

- First, the actions which you have already taken vis-a-vis the Soviets in the economic and other areas have clearly demonstrated to the Soviets that their behavior will not be cost-free. I think the Soviets were surprised by your actions. Thus, further bilateral steps are not necessary; however, we must follow through with full implementation of the steps which have already been taken.¹¹

- Second, to counter growing Soviet aggressiveness, a long-term commitment is required. There are no easy solutions to an increased willingness on the part of the Soviets to use the military power which they have built over the past decade at great domestic cost. U.S. strategic modernization, increased defense spending, improvements in NATO, and the RDF are all steps which will in time work to deter the Soviets, if pursued diligently.

—Because the Soviets underestimated the U.S. response as well as that of the international community, especially the third world, to their invasion, we should expect that as soon as possible—within several months—the Soviets will embark on a peace offensive designed to separate us from our allies and to improve the Soviet image in the third world. We should anticipate this event and be prepared to counter efforts to deter us from our required course.¹²

These are preliminary thoughts. In effect, they add up to three key propositions:

1. Our response has to be a sustained one and a regional one. Success or failure will depend on what we do in terms of the longer run in Southwest Asia. You might want to think of a “Carter doctrine.”¹³

2. There is no need to freeze the U.S.-Soviet relationship any further, but by the same token we should have no illusions about an early improvement—nor should we strive for one. Any alteration, of course, would look like a zig zag, and it would make the attainment of our first objective more difficult, while undercutting your domestic support.¹⁴

¹¹ Carter underlined the words, “must follow through” and wrote in the left margin, “I agree.”

¹² Carter wrote in the left margin, “Let’s do it to them (see a) below).”

¹³ Carter underlined the phrases “sustained one and a regional one” and “Carter doctrine,” and wrote in the left margin, “No name.”

¹⁴ Carter underlined the words “no need,” and wrote in the left margin, “I agree.”

3. Whatever we do in the region, it will be costly.¹⁵ The more we can do with our allies, the better, but the major initiative will have to come from us.

These are painful and difficult issues. We will never know whether any of this could have been averted, but we do know one thing: if we do not respond in a timely fashion, the consequences of an inadequate response will be even more horrendous because our vital interest in the Middle East will soon be directly affected.

I will be chairing an SCC meeting on this in the next several days. I will also be discussing these issues with my European colleagues at the Tuesday¹⁶ meeting—though, naturally, in a very tentative fashion, without any commitments. Any guidance you could give me for either meeting would be very helpful.¹⁷

¹⁵ Carter underlined “it will be costly.”

¹⁶ January 15.

¹⁷ Beneath this paragraph, Carter wrote, “a) We should probe for more normal relations among friends of SU, i.e. Angola, V.Nam, Cuba, Ethiopia, Syria, Iraq, etc. as feasible. b) A quick move to consult with P[rime] M[inister] Gandhi is needed. We must leave the door open for her & encourage Pakistan & PRC to do the same. c) Economic consultations with LDC’s should be expedited, with rich OPEC & our trading partners involved to discuss food, energy, raw materials markets, etc. d) Assess how Mid East peace effort is affected.”

257. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, undated

SUBJECT

Embassy Moscow Assessment of the Impact of U.S. Economic Denial Measures (U)

Embassy Moscow has provided an assessment of the economic impact in response to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan.²

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, General Odom File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 1–2/80. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from a copy that does not bear Brzezinski’s initials.

² Brzezinski summarized the text of telegram 529 from Moscow, January 10, in this memorandum. The initial “C” is written in the upper right-hand corner of the telegram, indicating that Carter saw it. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 82, USSR: 1/9–15/80)

The Embassy believes that the principal short-term effect of economic sanctions upon the Soviet economy will be a significant decline in 1980 meat supplies resulting from the withholding of the bulk of planned U.S. grain exports. This decline will undercut a major Brezhnev program. Furthermore, the absence of an American cushion against another short Soviet grain crop will be a serious concern for the Soviet leadership each year the embargo remains in place. Over the medium to longer term (through 1985), denial of access to U.S. technology to the USSR could affect Soviet economic development significantly in sectors of the economy for which technology imports are considered critical to modernization and growth.

The effect of a U.S. technology embargo on the Soviet economy will depend largely on the degree to which it covers machinery and equipment produced in third countries, some of which is under license from U.S. firms. Soviet planners, anticipating severely limited access to U.S. technology, will try to substitute West European and Japanese technology. In the absence of direct or indirect limitations on such substitutions most Soviet projects will be able to proceed (although perhaps less efficiently), even with an embargo on direct exports from the U.S.

Our information on popular reaction is severely limited. We have looked for, but not seen, evidence of panic buying of staples. In fact, so far as we can tell, the reaction of the "man in the street" to both the Soviet invasion and the U.S. measures is one of puzzled apathy. Lectures in Leningrad have revealed considerable curiosity about Afghan events on the part of listeners, but no indication of their frame of mind. We have heard some minor grumbling over the possibility that events will make even worse the chronic shortages of meat and some consumer goods in some part of the Soviet Union. Our intellectual contacts are more sensitized to such matters and have caught on that U.S. action on grain could make the food situation even worse, but most Soviets probably are unaware of the extent of planned Soviet grain purchases.

In short, the traditional feeling of powerlessness to influence events, a vague patriotism and resistance to pressure from abroad, and a high toleration for privation and ability to sacrifice make it unlikely that we will see much popular reaction to the U.S. measures. Thus, we conclude that economic (and for that matter other) measures involving consumer goods will be effective primarily through their effect on incentives. In other words, if Brezhnev had planned to use more meat to get people to work better, he will now have to look for another incentive or settle for less work. But he does not have to worry about workers rioting in the street.

Embassy Moscow concludes that in order to have the desired effect, our economic measures must be prolonged, must have wide sup-

port from the developed and food exporting countries, and must be accompanied by equally decisive foreign policy and defense measures. Our overall policy should above all hold the prospect that a positive change in Soviet foreign policy will eventually permit a return to normal relations.

258. Memorandum From William Odom of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, January 18, 1980

SUBJECT

U.S. Reaction to Possible Soviet Military Intervention in Iran

I see possibly three strategies for dealing with a Soviet military move into Iran in the near future; none of them are very attractive:

1. Rapid Escalation to a "CRICON" (Crisis Confrontation).

We can follow the traditional pattern of 1962 and 1973² of escalating rapidly to the nuclear level and then negotiating de-escalation to a status quo ante-CRICON. You will recall that Kissinger told Sam Huntington and you in the early days of this Administration that we can no longer follow this strategy in light of the Soviet strategic force buildup. The Soviets are in much better shape to maintain domestic cohesion and implement mobilization and civil defense measures required for a credible crisis posture. I find it extremely painful to admit, but we are forced to recognize the strategic and political implications of the new military balance. The PRM-10³ CRICON paper, in retrospect, is sharply to the point.

2. Contain the Conflict within the Region.

This strategy would require some upgrading of strategic forces alert levels, [7 lines not declassified] By remaining on the western side of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 82, USSR: 1/16–31/80. Top Secret. Sent for information. Sent Outside the System. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.

² During the Arab-Israeli War in 1973, Nixon declared DEFCON III. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 269.

³ PRM 10, dated February 18, 1977, was entitled "Comprehensive Net Assessment and Military Force Posture Review." PRM 10 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

the Persian Gulf, we would avoid an early direct engagement between U.S. and Soviet ground forces in which we would be defeated. To make our deployment credible in the weeks and months to follow, a major conventional force mobilization in the U.S. would have to occur. Follow-on deployments up to field army in size, i.e., several corps, might soon be required.

The response of our allies in Europe and Japan would be critical. They might abandon us.

This strategy could lead to at least four outcomes which are unattractive. *First*, a stalemate and a prolonged period—years—of large U.S. force deployments in the region facing Soviet forces in Iran. *Second*, a stalemate followed by erosion and forced withdrawal. We could find ourselves with large forces deployed in an environment which is politically hostile, i.e., our allies are equivocating in Europe and our allies in the region prefer accommodation to the Soviets than war together with us against the Soviets. *Third*, direct conflicts between U.S. and Soviet forces in the Euphrates Valley could lead to a general war, including Europe (Berlin, a Soviet limited offensive into Germany with peace overtures to France, *et alia*). *Fourth*, a direct U.S.-Soviet ground force conflict in which the U.S. is defeated and unable to sustain a regional presence.

3. *A Strategic Retirement followed by a Major Long-Term U.S. Buildup.*

We would not project U.S. ground forces into the region. [3 lines not declassified] We would provide some sea- and land-based air to deter or defeat Soviet air. We would be prepared to retreat if the regional forces could not hold. Meanwhile, we would begin a major military reconstruction program at home and a long-term buildup. We would ask the same of our allies in Europe and the Far East.

Some version of the second alternative is the maximum strategy we could prudently pursue. We would put less strain on the Alliance and improve the long-term buildup possibilities by some version of the third strategy.

The course of action which is both *feasible* and probably *most attractive* to you is a rapid U.S. force deployment [3 lines not declassified]

259. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic Posts, the Embassy in Pakistan, and the Embassy in Libya¹

Washington, January 20, 1980, 0503Z

15459. Subject: Presidential Message on Olympics.

1. (C-entire text)
2. Embassy is requested to deliver ASAP to chief of state following message from President Carter. Recipients should be asked to hold the message in confidence until 1 pm Washington time January 20. FYI. President will announce his decision at that time in the course of his appearance on "Meet the Press." End FYI.
3. Begin text. On January 20, I am sending the attached letter to the President of the United States Olympic Committee informing him that I cannot support United States participation in the Summer Olympic Games in Moscow, the capital city of a nation whose invading military forces are occupying Afghanistan. I am requesting that the committee work with other National Olympic Committees to seek the transfer or cancellation of the 1980 Moscow Olympic Games unless the Soviet Union withdraws its troops from Afghanistan within the next month. If the Soviets do not withdraw and the Games are not transferred or cancelled, I am asking that the United States Olympic Committee not participate in the Games in Moscow, and, instead, work with other nations to organize alternative Games.
4. I hope that you will urge your own Olympic Committee to take similar action. I believe that such action is necessary to support the position of the United Nations General Assembly, to convince the Soviet Government and people of the world's outrage at Soviet aggression in Afghanistan and to deter future aggression.
5. Please hold my action in confidence until after 1:00 pm, Washington time, January 20.
6. Begin text of letter. To Robert Kane;
7. As President of this nation and as honorary President of the United States Olympic Committee, I write to advise you of my views concerning the Games of the XXII Olympiad scheduled to be held in Moscow this summer.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–1334. Confidential; Niac Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by the White House; cleared by Vest, William Harrop (AF), Morris Draper (NEA), Roger Sullivan (EA), William Bowdler (ARA), Nelson Ledsky (H), Raymond Seitz (S/S), and Seton Stapleton (S/S-O); approved by Vance. Sent for information Immediate to Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, USINT Havana, Moscow, the White House, Prague, Sofia, Rangoon, Vientiane, USUN, USNATO, Kabul, U.S. delegation to MBFR talks in Vienna.

8. I regard the Soviet invasion and the attempted suppression of Afghanistan as a serious violation of international law and an extremely serious threat to world peace. This invasion also endangers neighboring independent countries and access to a major part of the world's oil supplies. It therefore threatens our own national security, as well as the security of the region and the entire world.

9. We must make clear to the Soviet Union that it cannot trample upon an independent nation and at the same time do business as usual with the rest of the world. We must make clear that they will pay a heavy economic and political cost for such aggressions. That is why I have taken the severe economic measures announced on January 4,² and why other free nations are supporting these measures. That is why the United Nations General Assembly,³ by an overwhelming vote of 103 to 18, condemned the invasion and urged the prompt withdrawal of Soviet troops.

10. I want to reaffirm my own personal commitment to the principles and purposes of the Olympic Movement. I believe in the desirability of keeping government policy out of the Olympics, but deeper issues are at stake.

11. In the Soviet Union international sports competition is itself an aspect of Soviet Government policy, as is the decision to invade Afghanistan. The head of the Moscow Olympic Organizing Committee is a high Soviet Government official.

12. The Soviet Government attaches enormous political importance to the holding of the 1980 Olympic Games in Moscow, and if the Olympics are not held in Moscow because of Soviet military aggression in Afghanistan, this powerful signal of world outrage cannot be hidden from the Soviet people, and will reverberate around the globe. Perhaps it will deter future aggression.

13. I therefore urge the USOC, in cooperation with other National Olympic Committees, to advise the International Olympic Committee that if Soviet troops do not fully withdraw from Afghanistan within the next month, Moscow will become an unsuitable site for a festival meant to celebrate peace and good will. Should the Soviet Union fail to withdraw its troops within the time prescribed above, I urge the USOC to propose that the Games either be transferred to another site such as Montreal or to multiple sites, or be cancelled for this year. If the International Olympic Committee rejects such a USOC proposal, I urge the USOC and the Olympic Committees of other like-minded nations not

² See footnote 5, Document 252.

³ The U.N. General Assembly called an emergency session, January 10–14, to deal with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. For a description of the UNGA meetings, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980*, pp. 299–302.

to participate in the Moscow Games. In this event, if suitable arrangements can be made, I urge that such nations conduct alternative games of their own this summer at some other appropriate site or sites. The United States Government is prepared to lend its full support to any and all such efforts.

14. I know from your letter to me and your meeting with Secretary Vance and Lloyd Cutler of your deep concern for the men and women throughout the world who have trained tirelessly in the hopes of participating in the 1980 Olympic Games. I share your concern. I would support the participation of athletes from the entire world at Summer Olympic Games or other Games this summer outside the Soviet Union, just as I welcome athletes from the entire world to Lake Placid for the Winter Olympic Games.

15. I have the deepest admiration and respect for Olympic athletes and their pursuit of excellence. No one understands better than they the meaning of sacrifice to achieve worthy goals. There is no goal of greater importance than the goal at stake here—the security of our nation and the peace of the world.

16. I also urge that the IOC take a further step to eliminate future political competition among nations to serve as hosts for the Olympic Games. I call upon all nations to join in supporting a permanent site for the Summer Olympics in Greece, and to seek an appropriate permanent site for the Winter Olympics.

17. The course I am urging is necessary to help secure the peace of the world at this critical time. The most important task of world leaders, public and private, is to deter aggression and prevent war. Aggression destroys the international amity and good will that the Olympic Movement attempts to foster. If our response to aggression is to continue with international sports as usual in the capital of the aggressor, our other steps to deter aggression are undermined.

18. The spirit and the very future of the Games depends upon courageous and resolute action at this time. I call for your support and your help in rallying the support of the other Olympic Committees throughout the world. s/Jimmy Carter. End text of letter.

19. For London: Ambassador Henderson⁴ informed the Secretary today that HMG has decided to follow the same path as we have. London should be sure that FCO is aware of our intentions and should pass FCO a copy of the President's message for their information, telling them that we are seeking wide support for our action.

⁴ Nicholas Henderson, British Ambassador to the United States.

20. For East European Posts: You should inform your host government, as you feel most appropriate, at a senior level in the Foreign Ministry of the President's decision.

21. For Havana: The above is for your information; no action required.

Vance

260. Letter From Secretary of State Vance to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko¹

Washington, February 8, 1980

Dear Mr. Minister:

I have carefully studied Ambassador Watson's detailed report of his January 30 meeting² with you and reflected on my discussions with Ambassador Dobrynin since his return from Moscow. Clearly there is a high risk of miscalculation between us. In order to avoid this danger, I am writing you privately and personally to make clear our actions and policies.

As the President stressed in his State of the Union message,³ the relationship between our two countries is the most critical factor in determining whether the world will live in peace or be engulfed in conflict. A series of events culminating in the Soviet actions in Afghanistan have brought us to a critical juncture in our relations. It is vital that both of us give sober and dispassionate consideration to the implications of the current situation for each side's interests and the maintenance of world peace.

Despite the differing political convictions of our two countries, and because of the inherent competition between us, we have sought to establish common rules of behavior which would reduce the risk of

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretary, Personal Files of Secretary Cyrus R. Vance, Lot 80D135, Box 4, Chronological Files—January 1980–May 1980. No classification marking. Vance's stamped initials are in the upper right-hand corner of the letter.

² In telegram 1670 from Moscow, January 30, Watson described his two-and-a-half hour meeting with Gromyko, during which Gromyko responded to the U.S. démarche on bilateral relations and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files P900077–1625)

³ For the text of Carter's 1980 State of the Union address, see *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981*, Book I, pp. 114–180.

conflict, and to search for areas of cooperation which would help produce a more stable world. I have hoped and believed that this might be possible. This will not be possible, however, unless both of us recognize the need to act with restraint in troubled areas across the globe. As events following your actions in Afghanistan make clear, unrestrained actions in any one area inevitably have an impact on our relations as a whole.

Our most serious concern at present centers in Southwest Asia. The presence of Soviet military forces in Afghanistan creates a new and more dangerous situation in that region. We do not know your ultimate aims in sending your forces into Afghanistan. We do know, however, that your action has violated the sovereignty of an independent nation.

The continued Soviet military presence in Afghanistan will inevitably continue to raise concerns about the desire of the Soviet Union to conquer and subjugate the Afghan people and the further possibility of Soviet military action against Pakistan and Iran. Both the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, and the precedent of their use there, are of serious concern to Pakistan and other states in the region. The Soviet action in Afghanistan and increasing Soviet military activity along the northwest border of Iran also generate apprehension about the possibility of Soviet actions to undermine the independence and territorial integrity of that country.

It should be evident that the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet military forces from Afghanistan is necessary to restore stability to this region. The actions of the United Nations and the Islamabad Conference of Islamic States⁴ have made it clear that most of the peoples of the world share this conviction.

For our part, we have no interest in seeing a government in Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union. A return to a neutral, non-aligned but genuinely independent Afghanistan would be in the interests of all and we would support such a development.

There are similar dangers in the Middle East and in particular the Persian Gulf. It is essential you understand that the United States has vital interests at stake in this region. We are prepared to defend those interests. But if there is restraint on both sides, as befits our two great nations, and respect for the independence and territorial integrity of

⁴ The United Nations Security Council met six times between January 5 and 9 to address questions dealing with Afghanistan. For a summary of those meetings, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1980*, pp. 297–302. The First Extraordinary Session of the Islamic Conference of Foreign Ministers met in Islamabad from January 27 to 29. The first resolution of the conference condemned the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, suspended the Afghan membership in the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and called on all member states to suspend aid to the current Afghan regime.

the states in the region, our respective interests need not lead to confrontation. In this connection, I must note that the substantial Soviet/Cuban presence in the PDRY is a matter of grave concern to us and perhaps we should search for ways whereby we could reduce the possibility of confrontation.

The US has made clear that it supports the independence, unity, and territorial integrity of non-aligned Yugoslavia. In my discussion with Ambassador Dobrynin, he indicated that the Soviet Union does also. We welcome this position. We and our allies have no intention of interfering in Yugoslavia's internal affairs and would view any effort to weaken Yugoslavia's internal cohesion or undermine its independent foreign policy with gravest concern, as we understand you would.

In his State of the Union message, the President gave particular emphasis to the importance of SALT in the prevention of nuclear war. It is the President's intention to press for the ratification of SALT II at the earliest moment that the political climate permits. In the meantime, as we have said privately and publicly, we believe that observing the mutual constraints imposed by the terms of the SALT I and SALT II treaties will be in the best interests of both our countries and will help to preserve world peace.

Mr. Minister, I look forward to any response you may wish to make on these matters and any clarification you may care to provide.

Sincerely yours,

Cyrus Vance

261. Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Vance¹

February 16, 1980

Dear Mr. Secretary,

Having read your letter of February 8² I would like to tell you frankly the following.

One could only welcome the recognition in the letter of the crucial importance of relations between our countries for the general world situation and the apparent desire to search for ways of overcoming the serious situation prevailing now in these relations.

However, the attempt to evade consideration of the real causes complicating the international situation, efforts to reduce the whole matter to the recent developments in Afghanistan depicted, for that matter, in a completely distorted light, and the raising of various kinds of other far-fetched questions—all this in no way demonstrates a real intention to rectify the current situation.

Indeed, it is impossible, without sinning against the truth, to dispute the fact that the exacerbation of the international situation by no means began at the end of last December, but rather much earlier. We also pointed out to the US side the reasons for this exacerbation much earlier.

Among these is the decision on deployment in the US of the MX mobile ICBM system³ which was made almost immediately after the SALT–II Treaty was signed in Vienna.

There is also the artificially created “mini-crisis” on the question of a “Soviet brigade” in Cuba.

There is also the urgent establishment of the “Rapid Deployment Force” designed for armed intervention in various parts of the world.

There is the long-range program of permanent defense spending increases and arms build-up imposed by the US on its NATO allies.

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President’s Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 5, USSR (General): 9/77–12/80. Secret. The initial “C” is written in the top right corner of the letter, indicating that Carter saw it. Printed from the U.S. translation.

² See Document 260.

³ For more information on the MX missile decision, see *Congress and the Nation*, vol. V, 1977–1980, pp. 156–158.

Finally, there is the decision to deploy new US missiles on the soil of Western Europe,⁴ which creates a serious threat to the security of the USSR and its allies.

And what has become of the SALT II Treaty? Incidentally, in taking the decision to develop and deploy MX missiles the US Government stated that this decision would promote the ratification of SALT II. Without addressing now the substance of the MX missile question—which is a subject for a special discussion—one cannot fail to observe that in fact the decision on the MX missile is being implemented while the SALT II Treaty has not been ratified. In pressing its NATO allies to agree to the deployment on their soil of new American missiles, the US was also saying that this would facilitate the ratification of the SALT II Treaty. Even putting aside, once again, the question of the invalidity of such linkage, the picture remains the same: the decision on the deployment of new missiles in Western Europe has been adopted and is being implemented, but the Treaty has not been ratified.

Try to see all this through our eyes. Can these facts be seen in any way other than as a departure by the US from the principle of equality and equal security which was reconfirmed in Vienna, as evidence of a policy line now pursued by the US to break out of the existing military and strategic parity between the USSR and the US, to rush ahead in an effort to gain military superiority for itself?

No references to events in Afghanistan can conceal this turn in US policy—a turn from detente to a new aggravation of international tensions, to a new round of the arms race.

In your letter you mention the need for our two states to show restraint and moderation in international affairs and in relations with each other. Well, the thought itself is correct. We, on our part, are also in favor of this. It is important, however, for the United States also to adhere to such a course in international affairs and not treat them with such astonishing light-mindedness as it now does.

As for Afghanistan, our position on this question has been set forth more than once with utmost clarity, specifically as you know in the answers by L.I. Brezhnev to the questions of the Pravda correspondent as well as in our contacts with the US side.

Facts do not cease to be facts because the US side does not want to admit that acts of aggression against Afghanistan have been and continue to be committed from the territory of Pakistan. Also indisputable is the fact that in providing assistance to Afghanistan in repelling ex-

⁴ In December 1979 the United States committed itself to the basing of Pershing II and Tomahawk cruise missiles in Western Europe in an attempt to counter the Soviets' enhanced force of SS-20 missiles. The Pershing II was outfitted with an improved nuclear warhead, which could strike up to 2,000 km away.

ternal aggression, the USSR has acted in full accordance with the UN Charter and the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the USSR and the DRA.⁵

We have also spoken on more than one occasion as to when and under what circumstances the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan will be carried out. I would only like to stress that if the US really wanted this to occur sooner, it could, of course, take measures to stop the aggression against Afghanistan. So far, the practical actions of the United States go exactly in the opposite direction: everything is being done to expand armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan.

You say in your letter that the US has no interest in seeing a government in Kabul hostile to the Soviet Union. In fact, however, the United States is exerting every effort toward uniting counterrevolutionary Afghan groups under foreign auspices and even toward the virtual establishment of an illegal Afghan "government in exile" in the territory of Pakistan.

Nor does the reference in your letter to some kind of "increasing military activity" on the Soviet border with Iran bear witness to any US desire to contribute to the reduction of tensions. You must be well aware that this is not true. We have no "designs" whatsoever upon Iran or any other countries of this region. It is not for the United States to speak of "concern" about the fate of Iran while it is precisely the US which directly threatens this country and places all kinds of pressure on it.

For some reason you also raise now the question of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen, asserting that the situation in that country and its relations with third countries, particularly with the Soviet Union, are supposedly also a matter of "grave concern" to the US. There is no basis for this, nor can there be. But if we are to speak in terms of concern, the Soviet Union has far more basis for it in connection with the US military presence in, for example, Turkey and Greece, countries which either directly border on the USSR or are situated in close proximity to our borders. It is clear that an approach whereby the US arbitrarily declares regions of the world thousands of kilometers away from it to be a sphere of its "vital interests" and reduces everything only to securing its own narrow egoistic interests without wishing to take account of the legitimate interests of others, cannot lead to anything good.

And what is the meaning of the sudden mention in your letter of Yugoslavia? Presumably it is not just because such a country exists on

⁵ Signed December 5, 1978, the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation permitted the deployment of Soviet troops into Afghanistan, if requested.

geographic maps? The fact that the US side for some reason deems it necessary to launch into a discourse about Yugoslavia inevitably prompts us to think that the US itself has some sort of ill-intentioned plans in this regard. But if this is so, the United States runs the risk of gravely burning its fingers in Yugoslavia.

So, as you see, there is nothing we must justify before the United States, but the list of complaints which we have the right to present to the US happens to be a rather long and impressive one.

Of course, the serious damage to the international situation and Soviet-US relations already inflicted by the actions of the United States can hardly pass without a trace. But it is alien to us to be guided by emotions in our policies. We would be prepared, if the United States is also willing, to seek opportunities to return to the path of cooperation between our two countries and with other states for the sake of improving the international situation, strengthening peace and universal security.

If, as your letter says, Soviet-US relations are now at a “critical juncture,” then the choice of which way to proceed is up to the US. Our choice is clear. We would like to hope that the US will also make the only sensible choice—in favor of detente and peaceful coexistence.

I hope, Mr. Secretary, that you will understand correctly the motives by which I was impelled in speaking in such a frank manner. We would welcome any constructive considerations and ideas in support of detente in Soviet-American relations which you might offer on your part.

Sincerely yours,

A. Gromyko⁶

⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

262. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 26, 1980, 9–10:15 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran/Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

The Vice President*

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance*

Deputy Secretary Christopher

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown*

Deputy Secretary Graham Claytor

JCS

General David Jones**

Lt. General John Pustay***

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

NSC

Gary Sick

Marshall Brement***

White House

Zbigniew Brzezinski**

David Aaron

Lloyd Cutler

Hamilton Jordan*

Anne Wexler***

Hedley Donovan***

Joe Onek***

Henry Owen***

Peter Ueberroth, Executive

Director of the Los Angeles

1984 Olympics Organizing

Committee***

David Wolper, Producer of

"Roots" and Associate of

Ueberroth on LAOOC***

*Present for Political-Military Items Only

**Departed at 10:00 a.m.

***Present for Olympic item only

[Omitted here are the Political-Military items.]

Olympics

The SCC then reformed itself into a larger group, including two representatives of the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (Messrs. Ueberroth and Wolper), to discuss the possibility of organizing alternative games. Mr. Cutler outlined some of the problems. He thought alternative games would be helpful in persuading other nations to join us in boycotting the Olympics if the alternative games were not seen as destructive of the International Olympic movement. One of the problems is that the West Europeans, Canada, New Zealand and Australia do not have direct governmental control of their respective

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 32, Meetings—SCC 278: 2/26/80. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The initial "C" is written on the upper right-hand corner of the summary, indicating that Carter saw it.

national Olympic Committees. The Africans, by contrast, can order their committees not to participate. Some nations would probably attend alternative games even if they decide to participate in Moscow. The key nations which will have to be persuaded are France, West Germany, the UK, Kenya, China, Mexico, Japan and Italy. These are the most influential nations in terms of sports competition and participation in the Olympic movement. The West Europeans are the key. We must attempt to persuade them to commit to support alternative games, even if they will not make a firm commitment to stay away from Moscow. That would permit us to proceed with planning for the games. A major factor will be persuading the international sports federations to support these games since their approval is necessary to insure that participating athletes will not be disqualified. (U)

At the present time, we have no offer of any site but Los Angeles, and everyone agrees that we should not make this a solely U.S. alternative. We need 3–4 sites, perhaps including Los Angeles, which could be linked by television worldwide. The LAOOC representatives felt that such an approach was feasible and could be marketed worldwide. Japan, for example, could be the site for volleyball and judo, the UK for equestrian events, etc. It may be necessary for the governments to put in some money to handle the initial costs of organizing the games, although the LAOOC representatives believed strongly that the games would be self-supporting once they had overcome the initial lag and were widely accepted. Once a decision is made, it will be extremely important for the U.S. to convince the networks that this is a major event—perhaps by insuring Presidential attendance at the opening, etc. (U)

The best prospective time for the games to be held was for nine days, spanning two weekends, in the second half of August. That was desirable in terms of maintaining peak training by the athletes, to avoid the national conventions, and to stay ahead of the regular TV season programming. All agreed that was a reasonable planning date. (U)

All agreed that our next step should be to approach the various key governments involved to get them to make a firm commitment that they would send a team to the alternative games, regardless of what decision they may make on attendance at Moscow. This will have to be carefully handled to avoid giving the waverers an excuse to avoid a decision on boycotting Moscow, but we cannot wait for a decision past the end of March if planning for the alternative games is to be a success. The games should be open to all nations, including the Soviets, just as Lake Placid was. (U)

The LAOOC representatives noted the need to establish a private international coordinating committee as well as an advisory committee composed of leading sports and business figures. The LAOOC had

demonstrated that a private committee could organize such games without official government (or in their case, city) funding. Each site for the games would also require a local committee—either private or officially sponsored. Mr. Cutler noted that a meeting of all the key governments involved will be held in 10 days to two weeks. All agreed that we must make formal approaches to each government before they arrive at that meeting if it is to get any agreement. The LAOOC representatives stressed that unless we could get firm commitments of participation by at least the top five (France, West Germany, UK, Kenya and China), they would advise not to proceed. France is critical because of its dominant role in the International Olympic movement. However, if those nations are willing to commit, the rest of the world will almost certainly fall in behind them, and there is a strong probability that the Russians would end up cancelling their games entirely, as being largely irrelevant. They warned that the International Olympic Committee and its national components will fight very hard against the notion of alternative games of any kind. (U)

The SCC agreed that we would immediately go to the key foreign governments. We will reiterate our firm decision not to go to Moscow and seek their firm commitment to attend alternative games even if they have not made a final decision about Moscow. Mr. Aaron will meet with Mr. Christopher and Lloyd Cutler to work out the details of how this approach will be made and by whom. Mr. Cutler will also meet today with the Swiss representative of the sports federations to seek their sanction of alternative games. It is generally believed that they will find the potential economic benefits attractive and they are likely to go along if the key countries accept the concept. The LAOOC representatives observed that if a decision is made by the end of March, the logistics would not be a serious problem. (U)

**263. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordination
Committee Meeting¹**

Washington, February 28, 1980, 9–10:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Iran/Afghanistan

PARTICIPANTS

State

David Newsom

George Vest

Dean Hinton

Nelson Ledsky*

OSD

W. Graham Claytor

Frank Kramer

JCS

Lt. Gen. John Pustay

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

Justice

John Shenefield

Commerce

Secretary Philip Klutznick

Homer Moyer

Treasury

Robert Carswell

Robert Mundheim

STR

Robert Cassidy

White House

David Aaron

Lloyd Cutler

Hedley Donovan

Henry Owen

NSC

Colonel William Odom

Gary Sick

*Present only for discussion of Olympics

1. *Olympics*. Mr. Cutler summarized what has happened since the discussion at the last SCC.² It had been decided that it was important to go quickly to the key Olympic countries and get their commitment to support alternative games, irrespective of a decision on their attendance at the Moscow games. At the strong recommendation of Secretary Vance, letters are being prepared for dispatch today to the Foreign Ministers of the key states urging their commitment. Mr. Cutler has independently talked to the German representative and the ANZUS group during their visits to Washington, and the President will see

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 32, Meetings—SCC 282: 2/82/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Carter wrote, "Zbig. J." in the upper right-hand corner of the summary.

² For the summary of conclusions of the February 26 SCC meeting, see Document 262.

Schmidt next week. The Australians were particularly concerned that we move on this since public opinion in their country is slipping. (C)

Mr. Cutler had met with Mr. Keller, the Swiss head of the International Sports Federations, to request their support, which will be essential. Mr. Keller had not said flatly no, but he had not been encouraging about the likelihood that the federations would back the idea of alternative games. Mr. Cutler had given him a one-page memo outlining our position. Keller will take this back with him for a meeting of the Federation heads in Lausanne in early April. We will probably hear nothing from them until that meeting is over.³ (U)

Thirdly, Mr. Cutler thought it important that a promotional group be formed, and he strongly favored asking Messrs. Ueberroth and Wolper to take on the job as informal consultants looking toward the eventual formation of an International Committee. We have received offers of financial support from a number of industry and other sources, and a tax-exempt non-profit group was being put together to receive donations. (U)

Mr. Cutler said that we will go after Schmidt early next week and that would be crucial. The letters were intended to prepare the way for a group decision when the Steering Committee meets on March 10. We could hope for a decision at that time if the various national delegations were instructed in advance. The position of Germany will be critical to that process. All agreed that it would not be advisable to start with a letter to the French Foreign Minister. We also want to use the Germans to approach the French. However, the British were already in discussions with their Olympic Committee, and it was important to get to them as quickly as possible, by telephone to Ambassador Brewster⁴ if necessary. (C)

Mr. Aaron wondered about the advisability of forming committees at this point when we still do not have commitments from the key countries. The advice at the last meeting had been that if we cannot get those commitments, we should not proceed, and an existing infrastructure could be an embarrassment if that occurs. Mr. Cutler noted that his proposals to lay the groundwork for an organizing committee and a non-profit organization to receive donations were merely preparatory. Messrs. Ueberroth and Wolper would be coming on as consultants initially. The non-profit organization would be sponsored by a private law firm and would merely be a recipient of early donations. Neither would be public and neither would commit us to a course of action. (C)

³ Carter wrote in the left margin adjacent to this paragraph, "a) *We will* have alternative games even if zero, fifty or 100 other nations participate. b) It's to our advantage to get maximum participation. c)—a) prevails.

⁴ Kingman Brewster, U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom.

With regard to the blocking of shipment of goods to the Soviet Olympics, Mr. Cutler noted that he had worked on a draft public statement with Secretary Klutznick and Henry Owen.⁵ All of them had doubts about the advisability of such a statement since it risked making the President appear foolish. They believed it would be better simply to contact the key companies privately. Also, Levi Strauss was insisting that they needed a formal order in order to escape their contractual obligations. State noted that, based on the President's decision to proceed with a public announcement, a cable had been sent to 20 countries notifying them that such a statement would be forthcoming last Monday,⁶ and we are now beginning to get requests for the text. Henry Owen suggested it would be better to tell them we had changed our mind rather than look foolish. Secretary Klutznick expressed concern that the White House would be besieged by small operators wondering whether or not they should proceed and the whole thing would turn into a mess. (C)

Mr. Aaron expressed surprise at this development since the subject had been discussed rather exhaustively at the previous meeting and the President had made his decision on the basis of that discussion. There appeared to be no new issue here except a drafting problem. He wondered if the problem could not be taken care of by Secretary Klutznick privately contacting the key companies, urging them strongly to respect a boycott, and then posting an announcement at the White House that this step had been taken at the President's direction, without pumping it up into a matter of major importance. All agreed that this would be an acceptable way to proceed. (C)

Approve_____⁷ Other_____

Mr. Cutler reported that NBC is scheduled to make another progress payment on April 1 relative to their contract.⁸ NBC is firmly committed to provide no T.V. coverage of the Moscow games if there is no U.S. participation, and they would prefer not to make this next payment. Among other things, \$6 million of the payment will go to the International Olympic Committee, and the absence of that money might make a significant impression. The SCC discussed various methods available to us to provide the legal basis on which NBC can refuse to make the payment. It was agreed that Mr. Cutler would get together with Treasury, Justice and Commerce to prepare options about how

⁵ Philip Klutznick, Secretary of Commerce; Henry Owen, Ambassador at Large and Coordinator for Economic Summit Affairs.

⁶ February 25.

⁷ Carter checked the "Approve" option.

⁸ Carter wrote in the left margin, "I'm not particularly concerned about NBC."

this might best be accomplished. This will be reviewed at a subsequent meeting for a decision well in advance of April 1. (C)

2. COCOM. Secretary Klutznick reported that the internal U.S. review process is complete except for specific decisions concerning such difficult items as computers, software and technical data packages. Mr. Newsom agreed that this is the problem. The allies are aware of our policy in broad terms, and we have made clear decisions on certain specific cases, but the allies are now asking for greater detail on these complex and difficult areas of definition. At the present time, the U.S. effort is stalled awaiting a recommendation from the Department of Defense on how to handle these complex definitional problems. Mr. Claytor said that DOD was working on this; however, the complexity of the problem must not be underestimated. DOD will have a proposal available for interagency consideration by next Friday, March 7. State cautioned that the process would begin once the DOD proposal is submitted. Mr. Hinton drew attention to the fact that the computer paper for COCOM consists of 53 pages of highly complex and technical details. It will not be a simple process to revise this. (C)

Mr. Hinton pointed out that we have made a number of significant decisions establishing policy in the area of oil and gas technology, Kama River, phosphates, and non-exceptions to the COCOM list. He thought that we should be prepared to begin approving some licenses for exports in those areas where policy is well established, rather than keeping all export licenses frozen. Henry Owen and Mr. Aaron remarked that it was their understanding that Congress is looking for us to take an even harder position on punishing the Soviets, and our own announcements indicate that we would have completed our policy review before now. They did not believe this was the moment to begin approving exports. (C)

Henry Owen suggested that it might be useful to have Secretary Klutznick report to the Congress or in some other forum on those areas where decisions have been made—which are considerable—and note that some of the more complex issues remain under consideration. Secretary Klutznick agreed that it was important to make people understand the reasons for delay on certain issues were not just stalling or lack of decisiveness. Mr. Aaron agreed with this approach: Secretary Klutznick would prepare a report to the President⁹ which could, after approval, then¹⁰ be used to brief the Congress and the press. Once this had been accomplished and we had some reading on the public and

⁹ Carter underlined “a report to the President” and wrote “OK” adjacent in the left margin.

¹⁰ Carter deleted “also” in the original and replaced it with “after approval, then.”

Congressional reaction, then we might consider moving to approve certain licenses which are consistent with policy. The SCC agreed on this phased approach. (C)

Approve_____ ¹¹ Other_____

3. *Credits*. Mr. Newsom had talked to Richard Cooper¹² in Europe just prior to the meeting and reported that he was getting nowhere with the allies on restricting the granting of export credits to the USSR. The prospects for progress in this area were extremely dim, and he wondered whether it was worth the effort of continuing to push. Mr. Aaron said it would be useful to get at least some measure of agreement with the allies—even if limited in scope—which could be reported as progress. Mr. Newsom said we could push the approach Mr. Aaron had suggested previously: identify two or three major projects in the USSR and get agreement that credits or bids would not be extended for those. Commerce, Treasury and State all agreed that we are up against the simple fact that the Europeans want the jobs and the exports. (C)

Mr. Aaron said that the allies have done nothing, despite the difficult and painful decisions which the President has taken on grain and trade.¹³ He wondered if they were aware that this would have significant political implications for America's view of the alliance. State said that indeed the allies were getting the message and they were worried. They have slowed down on their contracting with the USSR and they have not undercut us on major deals such as ARMCO and ALCOA—at least not yet. However, they all say that they are afraid to act so long as there is the likelihood that the French will take advantage of their decision. The Japanese have generally been cooperative, but they are complaining that they may be undercut by the European allies to the detriment of their own business community. (C)

All agreed that the Germans were the key nation, if economic sanctions are to hold and be made effective. It was agreed that several key projects with the Soviets would be identified which the President could raise with Schmidt. We could also continue to press the Europeans to change the date of maturity of credits, which would cost the Soviets something by raising the price. Commerce and Treasury pointed out, however, that even the denial of all official export credits to the USSR would not prevent them from getting the development projects they want. They did not feel that this was an area which was promising if

¹¹ Carter checked the Approve option.

¹² Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.

¹³ Carter wrote in the left margin, "Correct."

our intent was really to punish the Soviets. In their view, it was worth no more in practical terms than a ringing denunciation. (C)

Mr. Aaron said that it would have the value of the allies taking some concrete action painful to themselves and then make clear that all the allies were making some sacrifice. He would report these views to the President, but all of the agencies should be aware that the President's position to this point had been to do what was right and to continue pushing, even if the prospects of allied cooperation were not good. (C)

264. Memorandum of Conversation of a Special Coordination Committee Meeting¹

Washington, February 28, 1980, 5:35–5:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Brigade Exercise in Cuba (S)

PARTICIPANTS

State

Secretary Cyrus Vance
Warren Christopher, Deputy
Secretary of State

OSD

Secretary Harold Brown

JCS

General David Jones

ACDA

Ralph Earle

DCI

Bruce Clarke, Director, NFAC

White House

Lloyd Cutler, Counsel to the
President

Zbigniew Brzezinski

David Aaron

NSC

Marshall Brentment, Staff Member

Zbigniew Brzezinski: The next question on the agenda is the exercise which the Soviet Cuban brigade is now carrying out. Our problem is how do we handle this.

Secretary Brown: It is not fundamentally different from what they did before.

ZB: However, we expected them not to do it.

HB: But the public did not expect to see any difference.

¹ Source: Carter Library, NSC Institutional Files, Box 110, SCC 282a, 2/28/80, Soviet Brigade in Cuba. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

ZB: Is this consistent with the conversations which we had with the Soviets on the subject?

HB: We did not like what the Soviets were doing before and we do not like this.

Lloyd Cutler: We have to keep in mind that the Church² reservation is now on the record and that it complicates the President's decision.

ZB: CIA should bring us up to date on what we have.

Bruce Clarke: [1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

ZB: How often have such exercises taken place in the past?

BC: About semi-annually.

ZB: Is this normal training or are the Soviets perhaps sending us a signal?

Secretary Vance: I think that may well be what they are doing.

LC: In the various consultations we had with the Soviets about this we certainly gave Anatoly³ the word not to hold such exercises.

BC: We flew an SR-71 mission two weeks ago [1 line not declassified] We also have an SR-71 on standby. [1½ lines not declassified] You should all be aware that in connection with the Jack Anderson article of Tuesday,⁴ a man from our staff met with Senator Percy, Bader, and Rick Inderfurth and gave essentially the same commentary that Hodding Carter made the day before. We left the group with an impression and this will have to be corrected.

David Aaron: The first operational question is how we handle this as an intelligence matter. Then we have to deal with Congressional and public aspects.

ZB: How long do we have before we must be ready to make a public statement?

CV: Not more than 24 hours. Some time tomorrow we have to decide what to say publicly about this.

ZB: David should hold a meeting with State and with others to draft Q's and A's and to make recommendations on how we deal with the subject.

DA: One thing the President raised previously on SR-71 flights is the question of why we should not cross the island, instead of flying up and down alongside it, thereby minimizing its exposure. DOD should consider this suggestion and come up with a reply. Any public state-

² Senator Frank Church (D-Idaho). See "Senator Church Charges Moscow Has a Brigade of Troops in Cuba," *The New York Times*, August 31, 1979, p. A2.

³ Soviet Ambassador to the United States Dobrynin.

⁴ Reference is to Jack Anderson's February 26 article in *The Washington Post*, entitled "Kremlin Stirs a New Crisis in Cuba."

ment should be drafted with Lloyd Cutler's observation about the Church reservation very much in mind.

LC: What will we say to the Soviets about this?

ZB: We have to review what has happened in light of previous assurances.

CV: Nothing has changed.

ZB: You dealt with this matter at a press conference.

CV: What I said at the press conference was that the facts were not discouraging.

LC: Our biggest problem will be whether this is a combat unit engaging in a combat exercise.

ZB: The reporters are certainly going to bore in on that question.

CV: From the State Department, Hodding Carter and Reggie should participate in the group.

DA: We will meet early tomorrow on this.⁵

⁵ For the Department of State's statement, see Richard Halloran, "Soviet Brigade in Cuba Resumes Maneuvers, State Dept. Discloses," *The New York Times*, March 1, 1980, p. 9.

265. Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts¹

Washington, March 1, 1980, 1820Z

56102. Subject: Summer Olympics: Update on National Reactions.
Ref: State 042913.²

1. (Confidential-entire text)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Olympics in Moscow, Box 21, 2/29/80–3/10/80. Confidential; Sensitive; Immediate. Sent for information Immediate to the White House for Cutler and Brent. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Marie T. Huhtala (S/OL); cleared in substance by Jeffrey C. Gallup (EUR/RPM), Donald K. Bandler (AF/I), Leta McNutt (EA/RA), George E. Brown (ARA/PPC), P. Dodd (NEA/RA), and Bremer; cleared by Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O); approved by Nelson Ledsky (S/OL). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800107–1241)

² In telegram 42913 to all diplomatic posts, February 16, the Department outlined the progress made in getting other countries to protest the Moscow Olympic games and commit to participating in alternative games. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800084–0211)

2. Following is update of reftel. As before, this information should be used with extreme discretion so as not to embarrass governments whose positions are private or still evolving favorably.

3. Our count on non-participants for the Moscow Olympics stands about where it was two weeks ago. Some 50 states will join us and not participate in the Moscow Games this summer. Support for non-participation continues to be strongest in East Asia and the Near East. In Western Europe as well as in Africa and Latin America, we have seen a growing tendency to hold off a decision in the expectation that the Afghanistan situation will improve in the next 60–90 days. Nonetheless our assumption continues to be that in the final analysis the West Europeans will join us in boycotting Moscow and that a number of additional African and Latin Americans will follow suit. As a consequence the Games themselves, if they are held at all, will be a pale imitation of previous Olympics.

4. We are publicly committed to holding high-quality international athletic competition later this summer. We hope that details for the alternative games can be developed and agreed to between March 15 and 31. Most American sports federations (called national governing bodies) we have spoken to would be interested in participating in these alternative competitions. Few of these groups favor the idea of a domestic sports festival, a concept recommended by the U.S. Olympic Committee.

5. The U.S. Olympic Committee, although it has given an informal pledge of support to the President, has technically not yet reached a formal decision on the Moscow Games. The Executive of the U.S. Olympic Committee will meet together on March 15 and draw up a resolution recommending non-participation. This resolution will then be sent to all members of the U.S. Olympic Committee's House of Delegates which will be convened in mid-April to vote on the recommendation.

6. A number of important meetings at which the Olympics issue will be on the agenda are planned for the near future. The British Olympic Association meets on the Olympic issue on March 4. The Japanese Olympic Committee holds a similar meeting on March 7. The Olympic question will be on the agenda of the Andean Pact Foreign Ministers Meeting in Quito March 10. The Olympic subject will also be discussed at the forthcoming African Football Confederation Meeting in Lagos. We have asked all posts to keep us informed as far in advance as possible of meetings at which the Olympic issue could be discussed.

7. Twenty-six governments have publicly stated that they do not wish their athletes to participate in the 1980 Summer Games in Moscow: Australia, Bahrain, Bermuda, Canada, Chile, Djibouti, Egypt, Fiji, Great Britain, Haiti, Israel, Japan, Kenya, Liberia, Luxembourg,

Malaysia, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, People's Republic of China, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Zaire.

8. Privately working toward non-participation are 14 governments: Bangladesh, Gabon, Gambia, Honduras, Ivory Coast, Mauritania, Monaco, Morocco, Oman, Pakistan, Singapore, Somalia, South Korea, Swaziland.

9. The following 8 governments have informed us that they will not be participating in the Moscow Olympics because of lack of resources, lack of a team; or other reasons. British Honduras, Chad, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Malawi, St. Vincent, Taiwan, United Arab Emirates.

10. Leaning or evolving toward non-participation in Moscow are 21 governments: Belgium, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Comoros, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, FRG, Guatemala, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Lichtenstein, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Thailand, Togo, Tunisia, Switzerland.

11. Finally, 26 governments are still undecided: Antigua, Bahamas, Barbados, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Iceland, Italy, Lebanon, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, North Korea, Rwanda, San Marino, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sao Tome and Principe, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Upper Volta, Uruguay, Venezuela.

12. Others are either unheard from, leaning against our position, or have decided to proceed to Moscow.

13. Addressees may as they deem it advisable use list contained in para 7 on an unclassified basis. Lists in the subsequent paragraph should be discussed only with extreme discretion with host government.³

Vance

³ Carter wrote about the Olympics in his memoirs: "We had to struggle all the way; the outcome was always in doubt. Most Olympic committees were wholly independent bodies, whose members deeply resented any government involvement in their decisions. Nevertheless, in television interviews, speeches, and through direct appeals during their official meetings, I and many other national leaders pointed out that it would be a violation of Olympic principles of good sportsmanship and fair play to be guests of the Soviet Union under existing circumstances. After a heated debate, the United States Committee, on April 22, decided by an overwhelming vote not to send a team to Moscow; eventually fifty-five nations made the same decision. A few others merely sent token groups or allowed individuals to go to Moscow on their own." (*Keeping Faith*, p. 526)

266. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 11, 1980, 1613Z

3989. Subj: (C) Ambassador's Discussion With Arbatov on Afghanistan and US-Soviet Relations.

1. (S-entire text.)

2. Summary: I had a lengthy discussion yesterday with USA Institute Director Arbatov, who provided no fresh insights into how the Afghan problem might be solved other than to stress that the Soviets would never accept an outcome which made it appear that they were being "punished." He said the Soviets were convinced that the US had been providing significant support to the Afghan insurgents, but he also described the excesses of the Amin regime as one reason for the Soviet action. He thought stability could be brought about within a few months if outside interference stopped. In blaming the US for the deterioration in Soviet/American relations, Arbatov said, that after almost all the other aspects of the detente relationship had been dismantled SALT II was left in an exposed position and therefore was also vulnerable. He was not optimistic that a relationship could be rebuilt on arms control alone, though he agreed on the urgency of getting the SALT process started again. While he had no specific suggestions on how this might be done, he mentioned the possibility of a Vance/Gromyko meeting in Vienna as a desirable beginning. End summary.

3. Mr. Arbatov came to lunch at Spaso House March 10 with his associate Mr. Zhurkin.² The Acting DCM and I represented the American side. Lunch started on an exchange of pleasantries. I had met Zhurkin at an Airlie House conference which I attended with Marshall Shulman, so the atmosphere was easy and relaxed. Shortly after sitting down at the table, we began to get into matters of substance. I mentioned that we were trying to find means of changing the present very low level of Soviet-American relations and getting the relationship back on track, moving ahead, and improving again. Arbatov expressed the same general sentiments and indicated his clear understanding that if we stayed in the present mode very long, an uncontrolled arms race in the future would be impossible to avoid. He said he thought our relations could not remain even in their present very bad state for long. If they did not improve soon, they would get much worse. And "many

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 3/1–19/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Vitaly Zhurkin.

people here in town” he said, are beginning to have doubts about the prospects.

4. We talked about perceptions and throughout the luncheon there was an interesting theme expressed again and again by Arbatov, which I shall characterize by a few examples. In response to Arbatov’s mention of Soviet concern about our increasing conventional weapons budget, I mentioned the inexorable increase of Soviet weapons budgets year in and year out. Arbatov said even if you added all of the budgets of the Warsaw Pact countries and his own, the amount of expenditure actually made was less than that made by NATO and the US. This seems like a doubtful statement to me, but he made it. In speaking of the SS–20/Pershing II situation, he mentioned that for years the Soviet Union was on the receiving end of superior weapons deployed by NATO countries and that it was only with the deployment of the SS–20 that this inequity was being attended to. He stressed, however, that with the deployment of the Pershing II, all of the Soviet western cities were for the first time at risk from our missiles based in Europe. He, like most Soviets who argue this point, seem to forget that Western European capitals have for a long time been under the threat of USSR medium range missiles. But the fact that this is a new situation for his western cities is indisputable. He mentioned that U.S. forward based systems could reach his western cities but the warning time was relatively long, whereas the warning time on the Pershing II’s would be extremely short relative to the warning of strategic missiles from the U.S. All Soviets that I have talked with absolutely forget Western capitals when they begin this argument. He also mentioned his concern about cruise missiles and the FRG which is not a new idea.

5. On Afghanistan, I made very strongly the argument that the Soviet press was blaming the whole problem upon the US upsetting the internal situation in Afghanistan and that we had specifically stated that we had not been interfering and had done so many times, most recently in President Carter’s letter to Tito, from which I quoted. Arbatov’s answer to this was, “I am not disputing your word, but perhaps the Agency has been misinforming the State Department.” He said his government was convinced that the US is in fact training and sending in Afghans from Pakistan to disrupt the internal situation. He said that about three million Afghans moved back and forth between Pakistan and Afghanistan seasonally with their flocks and that the infiltration of 200,000 armed Afghans would be relatively simple to be hidden in this migration—though he added that he had no information that this was actually happening.

6. While he stressed the role of outside interference, by the US and also by China and Pakistan, Arbatov discussed the internal situation in Afghanistan as well as a reason for the Soviet action. He said the So-

viets had gotten along very well with the King³ and with Daoud and then talked about the excesses of Amin, whom he compared with his namesake Idi Amin. He said that the elimination of the Amin regime, while in the Soviet interest, was also somewhat in the American interest because they were attempting to remove a bloody tyrant, installing a more generally popular regime, and bringing stability to the region.

7. As for how long it might take to bring about the stability they were seeking, Arbatov thought maybe only a few months—provided outside interference stopped. He did not dispute my point that the Brezhnev formula seemed like a non-starter, since it was impossible for us to pledge to stop doing something we are not doing. He did not seem much interested in talking about other formulas for getting the Soviets out of Afghanistan, although he thought the idea of having Mrs. Ghandi⁴ and a group of nonaligned nations or others work together to find some way to guarantee the Pak/Afghan border was an idea worth exploring.

8. The main point we made repeatedly with regard to an Afghan settlement was that the US seemed intent on “punishing” the Soviet Union and that they would not under any circumstances accept a solution that made them look punished. He said that when the US was willing to cease making Afghanistan a pure propaganda issue the matter could be treated seriously.

9. We talked in general about the state of US/Soviet relations, and Arbatov spent a good deal of time characterizing the things that made the Soviets decide after Vienna that the Carter administration was not going to follow through on SALT II. Among the things he mentioned were the Cuban brigade issue, human rights, the decision to go for a five percent increase in defense spending, and the refusal to accept the Brezhnev offer for negotiations on theater nuclear forces.

10. Arbatov seemed pessimistic about the prospects for getting the arms control dialogue started again in the near future, though he of course placed all the blame on our side. He said that arms control was only one part of the overall detente relationship and claimed that we had dismantled most other aspects of the relationship. He spoke of our excluding the Soviets from the Middle East peace process, trying to use trade as a weapon to interfere in Soviet internal affairs, and using SALT II as a vehicle for actually increasing our defense spending rather than as a step toward disarmament. All that was left was SALT II, and in its exposed position it also fell victim to what he saw as the anti-Soviet

³ Mohammed Zahir Shah.

⁴ Indira Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India.

trends in the US. He thus was not certain that we could pick up SALT in isolation as a means of rebuilding relations.

11. Despite this pessimism, Arbatov stressed the need for firm agreement between the US and the Soviet Union to begin trying to work the relationship back together. He repeated what he had said in his *Pravda* article—that the Soviets did not expect us to approve of the “assistance” they were giving Afghanistan but hoped that when the dust settled things might begin to get back on the track. He referred to the possibility of a meeting between Secretary Vance and Gromyko at the anniversary of the signing of the Austrian State Treaty as one possibility for the resumption of a dialogue, though he did not offer any specific suggestions as to what might be on the agenda for such a meeting.

12. All in all, the luncheon which took over two hours was a quiet, unemotional exchange of views with each side claiming to understand the other but with no constructive suggestion on the part of Arbatov or Zhurkin toward a solution to break the impasse. The two points that came through most clearly were that the Soviets will not abide by an indication that they are being punished, and two, that a Vance-Gromyko meeting might be desirable as a departure point for a new relationship.

13. However, since there is no movement in the Soviet position here, I am not hopeful that we as yet have any signal of a direction for sensible movement in the future.

Watson

267. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union and the U.S. Mission at Geneva¹

Washington, March 15, 1980, 0509Z

68654. Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree² only. Subject: Sverdlovsk BW Incident.

1. (Secret-entire text).

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P990025–0588. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Mark Palmer (PM/DCA) and Martin McLean (EUR/SOV); cleared by Aaron, Robert Martin (INR/PMT), Bremont, Shulman, Earle, Peter Wilson (S/P), Walter Slocombe (DUSD/PP), J. Taylor (S/S–O), John Pustay (JSC), R. McCrory (CIA), Kahan, and Barry; approved by Christopher.

² Charles Flowerree, U.S. Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

2. Summary and action requested. There is disturbing evidence pointing to the release of lethal biological agent as the cause of numerous deaths in Sverdlovsk, USSR, in April–May 1979. The intelligence community's present conclusions and report have been sent to you septel.³ Ambassador Watson is instructed to raise this matter with Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko as soon as possible. Ambassador Flowerree should inform Ambassador Issraelyan⁴ of the demarche promptly after it is made in Moscow. End summary.

3. We are deeply concerned about the incident in Sverdlovsk in April 1979 and its implications. We wish to make a serious effort to discuss this issue bilaterally in accordance with Article V of the Biological Weapons (BW) Convention.⁵ Speed is essential in view of the end of the BW Convention Review Conference on March 21, and our desire to give the Soviets as much time as possible to give us a considered response. It is in both our interests to have at least a preliminary response before the end of the Review Conference, since we will have to state at the conference that we have raised a compliance issue.

4. Ambassador Watson should personally make the following points as soon as possible to Korniyenko or, should he be unavailable, to another official on the First Deputy Minister or Deputy Minister level. Points should be provided in the form of a non-paper as well.

A.—The United States and the Soviet Union have a continuing interest in sustaining our mutual efforts to control the arms race.

B.—I have been instructed to raise a matter which potentially has extremely serious implications for the future of arms control negotiations between our countries and more specific bearing on the Biological Weapons Convention.

C.—Although no public announcement was made by Soviet authorities, for some time we have been aware of reports of an extraordinary outbreak of disease which was apparently pulmonary anthrax, which caused numerous deaths in Sverdlovsk in April 1979, and which resulted in the establishment of a quarantine.

D.—We have now received further information which indicates that this extraordinary outbreak appears to have been caused by the release of a quantity of anthrax agent exceeding that justified for prophy-

³ Telegram 68653 to Moscow and Geneva, March 15, is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0592.

⁴ Victor Issraelyan, Soviet Ambassador to the Conference on Disarmament.

⁵ The Biological Weapons Convention, which was signed in April 1972 and entered into force in March 1975, prohibits the development and stockpiling of biological weapons that are intended for harmful use. Article V states that parties will work together in solving any problems pertaining to biological weapons that arise as a result of the convention.

lactic, protective, or other peaceful purposes and that it originated at a military facility in Sverdlovsk.

E.—Article V of the Biological Weapons Convention provides that the parties shall consult and cooperate with one another in solving any problems which may arise. In accordance with that Article, the US Government is asking that the Soviet Government consult and cooperate with it and provide information to explain this outbreak of disease in Sverdlovsk in April 1979.

F.—We want to deal with this matter in the same serious way in which we have consulted on a number of questions involving compliance with arms control agreements in recent years. Because of the implications regarding compliance with the Convention itself and for other arms control negotiations, we are raising this matter directly with you and asking for prompt and full consultations. A simple denial in response to this present US approach will not advance the situation and will not serve our mutual interests.

G.—Since we are now in the process of consulting with you on a compliance related question, we will make a statement before the Review Conference concludes indicating that we are pursuing consultations in accordance with Article V. Any response you can make to our request for consultation and cooperation under Article V before the end of the Review Conference will be taken into account in determining the character of the statement we will make.

H.—Obviously, under these circumstance we would not be prepared to approve language in the final document of the Review Conference which states that no questions have arisen relating to compliance.

5. Embassy Moscow should inform Ambassador Flowerree immediately after Ambassador Watson sees Korniyenko. Ambassador Flowerree should then inform Ambassador Issraelyan of the demarche, and repeat points made in para 4 above.

6. For Geneva: We will provide additional guidance on RevCon and consultations with allies.

Vance

268. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 17, 1980, 8–10:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin

The conversation started with Dobrynin expressing considerable pessimism about the longer range trends in U.S.-Soviet relations. He feels that we are on a spiral—that both sides are becoming increasingly antagonistic, and that he does not see much prospect for an early improvement.

I suspect that this was a deliberate line designed to “smoke me out.” I made the point in response that he may well be right, but that what happens this year in U.S.-Soviet relations is likely to influence a great deal the next four years. This is why we both have an obligation to see if something could not be done in the near future to reverse the negative trends set in motion by the Soviet action in Afghanistan.

Substance

The discussion then turned more specifically to the question of Afghanistan. Dobrynin spoke at some length, reviewing recent history. He said that the Soviets had no intention of moving into Afghanistan but the deteriorating situation gave them no choice. (Incidentally, he told me that Babrak returned secretly to Kabul in October of last year.)

The Soviets have no intention of dominating the region according to him and will withdraw once a “stable government” has been created. He put a lot of emphasis on organizing a new Afghanistan army which will carry on once the Soviets have left. In response to a question, he indicated that it may be up to a year or so before the Soviets can leave, but he professed great optimism about their capacity to crush the resistance.

He said that the Soviet Union would be willing to give guarantees to us that it has no designs against Pakistan and Iran.

I responded by saying that the key issue is whether the Soviet Union insists on imposing a Communist government on Afghanistan or whether it desires an Afghanistan that is genuinely non-aligned and non-hostile to the Soviet Union. If it is the former, conflicts between us

¹Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Geographic File, Box 19, U.S.S.R.—U.S.-Soviet Relations: 7/78–3/80. Secret. The meeting took place at Brzezinski's residence. The initial “C” is written in the upper right-hand corner of the first page, indicating that Carter saw the memorandum.

will persist because it will require the Soviet army to maintain such a regime. But if it is the latter, I am sure that we could work out international arrangements, including transitionally some neutral forces from Moslem countries to assure Afghanistan's genuine neutrality. Communists could participate in such a government, even if they could not dominate it. (I cited Finland as an example.) In effect, the Soviets have to decide whether their objective is to make Afghanistan into a Mongolia or whether they can live with an Asian variant of Finland. In the latter case, there could be a relatively quick upswing in U.S.-Soviet relations.

Dobrynin responded by saying that the above is a "harder" statement than made to Moscow by "some of your allies." He gave me the impression that my position on this is also harder than he thought the U.S. position actually was. He maintained that his impression was that we would be satisfied with Soviet "guarantees" for the region and with Soviet departure after Afghanistan has become "stable." Our allies are more interested in the region than in Afghanistan and the Soviets can assure us about the region.

I responded that the President in his letter to Tito² made it clear that we saw neutralization and departure of the Soviet troops as linked, though we are not insisting that the latter is sequentially a precondition for the former. I drew his attention to the sentence in the letter which said that we would be prepared to enter into guarantees "with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops" and I emphasized that the word "with" implied simultaneity.

I went on to say that the issue is not assurances but arrangements that can endure. If the Soviets insist on a Communist government in Kabul, the Soviet army will have to stay in Afghanistan for a long time and this has objective consequences not only for relations with us but for stability in the region.

At this point, Dobrynin seemed to hint that it is not to be excluded that there could be some change in the Afghani government and Babrak could become non-essential—though he immediately qualified this by saying that he is not in a position to negotiate on this subject with me.

I responded by saying that the creation of a genuine Afghani government need not be the point of departure for a solution because it is not our intention to humiliate the Soviet Union, but we do have to

² Carter's February 26 letter to Tito addressed how the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan had changed the dynamic of détente and offered support to Yugoslavia as an independent and nonaligned country. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, President's Correspondence with Foreign Leaders File, Box 22, Yugoslavia: President Josip Broz Tito, 6/79–2/80)

agree in advance on where we will end up (i.e. a genuinely neutral and independent Afghanistan) and then we can work on the steps of getting there. (I have to add that the hint about Babrak's dispensability was quite vague and I am not certain whether it did indicate some flexibility on the Soviet part.)

Procedure

Dobrynin said that formal talks on the Vance–Gromyko level are premature. He thinks it is better to continue his discussions with Vance and occasionally perhaps with me, and then formal Vance–Gromyko talks can be held when the time is right. He thought it would be inappropriate to hold them at Tito's funeral. He then referred disparagingly to the idea of sending Shulman as an emissary to Brezhnev, but I did not respond to his baiting.

Other Matters

On the Olympics, he did not respond to the possibility of postponement.

On this Administration, he asserted a similarity between its anti-Sovietism and Reagan's, but I felt he was saying that for the record. I did talk to him about SALT and MBFR and reiterated our intention to pursue both. I told him flatly that we will not wage the Presidential campaign on an anti-Soviet basis but that we will also not rescind our current measures unless the situation in Afghanistan alters in a reasonable fashion.

He is leaving this weekend for Moscow and hopes to see Cy before he goes. He said he would call me if he has any afterthoughts, and he also urged me to do the same.

The whole evening was very cordial and also involved some exchange of personal gifts.

269. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 17, 1980, 1031Z

4225. Department repeat Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree. Subj: Demarche on Sverdlovsk BW Issue. Refs: (A) Moscow 4211, (B) State 70023, (C) State 68654.²

1. (S-entire text.)

2. I made the demarche on the Sverdlovsk incident this morning to First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, reading and leaving with him as a non-paper the talking points from Ref C as amended by Ref B. In supplemental remarks I made the additional point that a simple denial would not advance the situation or serve our mutual interests.

3. Korniyenko responded to my presentation by stating that the Soviets would of course study the statement I had made, but that he would like to make a few immediate points. First of all, he said, in the case of the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC),³ as with all international agreements to which the Soviet Union is a party, the Soviet Union strictly complies with all requirements of the agreement. Secondly, in a number of instances US Government agencies have been compelled to admit publicly and officially that charges which have appeared from time to time in the US press about the alleged non-observance by the Soviet Union of this or that agreement were unjustified.

4. In the present case, Korniyenko continued, he could not but wonder why we were raising the matter and what the purpose of our statement was. He noted that Soviet, US, and British specialists, as representatives of the BWC depositories, had jointly worked on a report for submission to the BWC Review Conference and that no such questions had arisen during the preparation of the report. Now, all of a sudden, the US side was raising expressions of concern, asking for urgent consultations, and stating that it would inform the Review Conference that it had done so.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0580. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Reference telegrams 4211 from Moscow, March 17, and 70023 to Moscow, March 16, both of which addressed the Sverdlovsk biological weapon incident, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0584 and P880025–0585. For telegram 68654 to Moscow and Geneva, March 15, see Document 267.

³ Article I of the BWC states that each party commits never to produce, stockpile or retain biological weapons, the intent of which is to cause harm.

5. Korniyenko then characterized the information I had provided about the incident itself as vague. He did not know, he said, on what it was based and added that it was not unheard of for there to be no basis for such allegations. Even assuming, Korniyenko went on, that some kind of illness did occur in the Sverdlovsk area, what relationship did this have to the BWC? He asked me to imagine how we would react if the Soviets today or tomorrow were to make such a representation to us, expressing concern about the “Legionnaires’ disease,” obliging us to enter into consultations under the BWC, and trying to bring that matter into the work of the BWC Review Conference.

6. In commenting on Korniyenko’s remarks, I stated that the US representation was occasioned by an interagency study of all available evidence of the unexplained incident in Sverdlovsk, some of it received fairly recently, and that what we were seeking was an explanation of the incident. As for his reference to the vagueness of the information, I told him that I thought it was spelled out rather clearly in the non-paper I had left with him but that if he could characterize what was not clear to him I would try to elaborate. Noting that the parties to the BWC are not permitted to have biological warfare stocks, I told him that if there was a sensible explanation for what had occurred in Sverdlovsk I hoped it could be provided to us quickly so it could be taken into consideration in the report we were required to make [garble].

7. Answering his question on how we would react if challenged about the Legionnaires’ disease, I said I thought I had a pretty good idea of what our procedure would be. We would in all likelihood invite the Soviets to send scientists to discuss the matter with our scientists and to visit the Communicable Disease Center in Atlanta to go over the records of what our investigation had shown thus far.

8. Korniyenko said he had nothing to add and would merely repeat that the Soviets would study our statement and provide a response. He stressed that he did not know whether anything had happened in Sverdlovsk or not and that it would require looking into and checking. But he was still struck by the fact that our experts had worked together for several months and that no such matter had been raised. Our raising of the question at this point could only give rise to feelings of apprehension on the Soviet side as to our good faith in doing so—particularly in view of the fact that the Soviets would do nothing which would violate the Convention.

Watson

270. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, March 20, 1980, 1054Z

4496. Subj: Soviet Reply to Demarche on Sverdlovsk BW Incident. Refs: (A) Moscow 4225, (B) State 68654.²

1. (S-entire text.)

2. In replying to our demarche on the Sverdlovsk incident, the Foreign Ministry confirmed that an outbreak of anthrax occurred in Sverdlovsk in March/April 1979 but said this was due to natural causes, denied that it had anything to do with the Biological Weapons Convention and charged that the raising of the issue by the United States creates the impression that someone is trying to cast a shadow on the efficacy of the Biological Weapons Convention. The reply was given to the Acting DCM in the form of an oral statement this morning (March 20) by Viktor Komplektov, Chief of the Foreign Ministry USA Department. Because Komplektov insisted that the appointment take place before 12 noon, we imagine the Soviets may be planning shortly to release the text of the statement to the press.

3. Following is the Embassy's informal translation of the oral statement, a copy of which was given us as a non-paper.

Begin text:

In connection with the representation of the Embassy of the USA in Moscow of 17 March 1980, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR is instructed to state the following.

The Soviet side firmly rejects the efforts of the Government of the USA to place in doubt the conscientious fulfillment by the Soviet Union of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons. With regard to this Convention, just as with other international agreements in which the Soviet Union participates, the Soviet side strictly fulfills all provisions of the documents under which it has accepted the relevant obligations.

In accordance with the legislation and practice of the Soviet Union, the observance of the provisions of the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, ratified by

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 3/20–31/80. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis. Sent with a request that the Department repeat to Geneva. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² See Documents 267 and 269.

order of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of 11 February 1975, is guaranteed by the appropriate state institutes of the USSR. In a statement made by the representative of the USSR in the committee on disarmament on 24 June 1975, it was pointed out that the Soviet Union does not have any of the bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery indicated in Article 1 of the Convention.³

As for the incident referred to by the American side which occurred in April 1979 in the area of Sverdlovsk, there did in fact occur in this area in March–April 1979 an ordinary outbreak, arising from natural causes, of anthrax among animals and cases of illness of people from the intestinal form of this infection, connected with the use as food of the meat of cattle which was sold without observance of the rules established for veterinary supervision. Appropriate warnings in connection with this were given in the press. No quarantine of any kind was established.

That it occurred, however, has no relationship to the question of observance by the Soviet Union of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons, and therefore there is absolutely no basis for putting forward the question which has been raised by the American side.

The impression is automatically created that someone would like under a clearly invented pretext to cast a shadow on the efficacy of the Convention on the Prohibition of Bacteriological Weapons—one of the most important agreements in the arms control area—and to do this at the very moment when the Review Conference on the operation of this Convention is taking place in Geneva.⁴ Such actions by the Government of the US are clearly not dictated by concern for the strengthening of valid international agreements on disarmament. On the contrary, they are only capable of weakening these agreements, of complicating the situation, of hampering the efforts of states in the matter of limiting the arms race. The Soviet side condemns such actions as directly contradicting the interests of preserving and strengthening peace. End text.

4. A/DCM stated that the Embassy would transmit the Soviet Union's response immediately to Washington. He took note of the fact that the response contained some information on the incident in Sverdlovsk, but added that it was not possible to accept the allegations as to the motives of the US in raising this matter. Given the growing evi-

³ Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention outlines the prohibitions detailed in the BWC. While specific substances are not banned, their purposes can be if they would prove to be harmful. Biological weapons that are prophylactic, protective, or peaceful are permitted by the BWC.

⁴ The First Review of the Biological Weapons Convention met March 3–21.

dence on the incident, it clearly had to be raised in order to be dealt with before the BWC Review Conference meeting in Geneva ended. He emphasized that it was not the intent of the USA to “cast a shadow” over the BW Convention or any other disarmament treaty.

5. In seeing A/DCM to the door, Komplektov commented that, only 24 hours after the Ambassador had met with first Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko on March 17,⁵ everything he had said at that meeting had appeared in the press and that this happens “every time”. That circumstance, he said, only served to bear out the validity of the views expressed in the final paragraph of his statement.

Watson

⁵ See Document 269.

271. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 20, 1980, 1–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Alexander Bessmertnykh; Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Marshall Brement, NSC Staff Member

SUBJECT

Afghanistan and US-Soviet Relations (U)

Bessmertnykh opened the conversation by insisting on the need to maintain channels of communication between us, a sentiment with which I readily agreed. (U)

It was particularly important for us to understand, he continued, the sour view of the US that is now widespread in the USSR, not only in official circles, but among the general populace as well. He said he was struck during his recent home leave by the fact that most people who specialize in foreign affairs were taken aback by the US “overreaction” to Afghanistan. We, of course, understood that there would be a strong

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Presidential Advisory Board, Box 79, Sensitive X: 3/80. Secret. Sent for information to Vance and Turner under a March 28 covering memorandum. (Ibid.) The meeting took place at the Soviet Embassy.

response, said Bessmertnykh. That was unavoidable. But what surprised us was the vehemence of the response, the language used, and the willingness to throw away what had been built up painfully over almost a decade. (S)

This contrasts markedly with Soviet behavior in Vietnam in 1972, Bessmertnykh went on. When the Americans were blockading Hai-phong² and bombs were falling right next to Soviet ships, the USSR nevertheless went ahead with the first Moscow Summit³ and the signing of the basic agreements which led to the period of detente, a period which has now ended. There were those who counseled a cancellation of the 1972 Summit, but their advice was rejected. We had a sense of balance and knew what was important. It is that sense of balance which seems to us completely absent in the US reaction to Afghanistan. (S)

The situations are hardly comparable, I replied. The bombing of North Vietnam was in response to a major direct invasion of South Vietnam by mainline North Vietnamese divisions supplied by the USSR. That invasion was planned with the support and foreknowledge of Moscow. It is not the Soviet Union which deserves praise for entering a detente relationship with the US during the Vietnam war, I said, but rather the other way around. American soldiers were, after all, being killed and maimed by Soviet-supplied and Soviet-encouraged armies. Nevertheless, we were willing to conclude the basic arms control negotiations with the USSR which ushered in the period of detente. I pointed out that from 1964–1966 I had served in our Embassy in Moscow as the officer in the Political Section covering Soviet relations with Asia, and could personally attest to the fact that Soviet reaction to the war in Vietnam was far more offensive to my government and far more “unbalanced” than Washington’s reaction to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Furthermore, I continued, I was surprised to hear him allude to Soviet behavior in Vietnam in the context of Afghanistan. Surely he was not proposing that the US model its behavior toward the conflict in Afghanistan on Soviet behavior in Vietnam? (S)

Such was not his intention, Bessmertnykh acknowledged with an icy smile. (S)

In fact, despite the extremely unhelpful Soviet attitude toward Vietnam, I said, both Presidents Johnson and Nixon clearly desired better relations with the Soviets and regarded this as a fundamental

² See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972, Document 136.

³ See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Documents 257, 259, 262, 263, 265, 271, 273, 276, 277, 281, 283, 284, 288, 290, 292, 293, 295, 299, and 300.

aim of US foreign policy. I could assure him personally, I continued, that President Carter had a deep commitment to detente, to improved US-Soviet relations, and to the establishment of viable, reciprocal, and mutually beneficial arms control agreements with the USSR. It was these very goals which had made the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan so disappointing and repugnant to us. (S)

The difference with previous administrations, Bessmertnykh rejoined, was that they placed US-Soviet relations at the center of American foreign policy. The great mistake that this administration had made was to reduce the focus on this vital subject. A supreme irony is the fact that Afghanistan clearly restored US-Soviet relations to the primacy it should have had all along for the Carter administration, and this was clearly shown in the President's January 4 speech.⁴ (S)

In any case, Bessmertnykh said, many people in Moscow had given up on the idea of trying to establish good relations with the US. There are some, such as Gromyko and Korniyenko, who are genuinely in favor of restoring US-Soviet relations to an even keel. But such people only represent 20–30 percent of the policymakers. Those who maintain that there is no point in going on with such a policy represent 60–70 percent, and this includes not only foreign ministry officials, but people in the Central Committee as well. Many of my colleagues were really taken aback by the pointless nature of the American response, Bessmertnykh said. It is “a policy of pin pricks.” Nothing you have said or done will have any real influence over us. I hope nobody within the Administration believes that the efforts you have made can accomplish anything. Such is not the nature of the Russian people. In fact, your propagandists made a great mistake in announcing that the grain embargo would affect Soviet living standards. That kind of threat has a very bad effect among the Russians. We do not like to be menaced by foreigners. You have lived in Moscow and you know that Americans are not unpopular there. There is much good will still left over from the war. Even if the government would want to change the views of the Soviet people, it cannot do it. (S)

Another real irony is that despite the differences in our two systems the American government can have a profound effect on public opinion, which can change overnight, whereas my government cannot reshape the basic attitudes of the Soviet population, Bessmertnykh said. Nevertheless, I can assure you in all sincerity that both in Lithuania, where I spent my vacation, as well as in Moscow, quite ordinary people voiced their indignation to me about this American announcement. After all, a great many people in the USSR did not even

⁴ See footnote 5, Document 252.

know we were buying grain from you. They only learned about it when our press carried reports of your statement. Furthermore, we are not in the least concerned about your various economic measures against us. It has not exactly escaped our notice that your allies are crawling all over each other trying to replace the US for commercial benefit, he said. You have been reading our press and you must know the effect this has had. Before Afghanistan, both Dobrynin and I had some influence in toning down the way our journalists treated US affairs. But now they have full freedom to give vent to their bitterest feelings about the United States, Bessmertnykh said. (S)

I had indeed noticed the way our leaders have been treated recently in the Soviet press, I replied, and consider it most unfortunate. Personal attacks on the President or his close associates do not serve any useful purpose. I am not sure what your journalists think they are doing, but they should understand that personal slanders of the President cannot have a good effect on future US-Soviet relations, and this is not just a question of the next several months. (S)

I agree that some of our writers may have gone overboard about some Administration figures and that this really serves no purpose, Bessmertnykh replied. Nevertheless, you should understand that we follow what is said about us very closely, and it is difficult to restrain our journalists. We certainly understand and anticipate that we are dealing with an administration that will be here for another five years. It is our prediction that President Carter will be nominated and re-elected, and our expectation that Dr. Brzezinski will be a part, an important part, of the new administration. Nevertheless, our feeling is that the rhetoric you have used about the USSR has exceeded what was really necessary. You have to understand that we are no longer living in the world of the 1950s and 1960s. At some point we will return to a detente relationship. It may be in two years, it may be four years from now, but we have to live together in this world. We have no choice about that. But it will never be the same as it was. It will have to be an entirely different track, Bessmertnykh said. (S)

Based on a close reading of your press and of what I know about Afghanistan, what is not clear to me, I responded, is whether you fully understand that the current low state of US-Soviet relations is entirely the fault of the USSR. It was, after all, the USSR which invaded Afghanistan and brought about the very dangerous situation which now faces both of us in Southwest Asia. (U)

Afghanistan is only the latest in a series of events, Bessmertnykh rejoined. Relations were on the way down beginning last summer and they have gotten steadily worse ever since then. We had absolutely no choice but to take the action we did in Afghanistan. It was a state along our borders. Our vital interests were involved. Hostile states were dis-

turbing our security. We have no intention of remaining in Afghanistan. We will get out. But we could not let the situation simply fall apart. (S)

You did not use your security needs to justify the invasion, I retorted. You did not say that this was a vital interest of the Soviet Union and therefore you had no choice but to invade Afghanistan. On the contrary, you said you were invited into Afghanistan by the legally constituted government and that you had every right to be there because you have a treaty with the Afghans. That kind of justification can apply anywhere in the world. And if the superpowers arrogate to themselves the right to use combat forces whenever they feel like it, then we will truly be living in a dangerous situation in the '80s and '90s. (S)

You say that Afghanistan involved your "vital interests," I continued. But you do not explain why it involved your vital interests. The fact of the matter is that Soviet vital interests were far better served by the Daoud government, when Afghanistan was a true buffer state. The President has said that this is the most dangerous situation we have faced since the Second World War, and I am firmly convinced that this is an accurate statement. My hope is that the Soviet government will perceive the danger and that a reasonable solution will be worked out to resolve this problem. (S)

But your allies are not in accord with your assessment, Bessmertnykh interjected. They have said so publicly. More convincingly, they told this to us privately. Nevertheless, I agree with you that the problem of how to define vital interest is a real one. The heart of our problem is that we seem to disagree on that definition. We do not understand how an area halfway around the globe can be a "vital interest" to another country. (S)

I hope it is very clear, I stated, that the United States regards that area of the world as a vital interest. The State of the Union speech⁵ is not in the least ambiguous, and I would hope that there was clear understanding about this very important point in Moscow. (S)

Afghanistan was, of course, a buffer state in the past, Bessmertnykh said. We were perfectly comfortable with Daoud—and with the King, for that matter. But one could only seriously regard it as a buffer state when the United States had 40,000 servicemen in Iran, a country that is no longer the same. It has changed and changed for good. So Afghanistan is no longer a buffer state between us. You no longer control either Iran or Pakistan. It is Iran rather than Afghanistan that has perhaps become a buffer state. We are dealing with a changing area, and the United States always finds it difficult to accept change. (S)

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 260.

You state that the Daoud government was perfectly acceptable to you, I rejoined. Nevertheless, you felt it necessary to support those who had shot and killed Daoud and who had overthrown his government. Your response was to prop up the government of Daoud's killers by increasing your military personnel and economic assistance tenfold, despite the fact that the new Afghan government was following policies which were highly unpopular and which eventually led to the current destabilizing crisis in the area. (S)

It is true that support for revolutionary movements is a fundamental aspect of our foreign policy, said Bessmertnykh. We have no choice in such situations. For better or worse, we feel we have to support revolutionary movements. "If anyone wants Soviet support, all they have to do is start a revolution." (S)

While we might not like your various actions in Afghanistan and elsewhere, I replied, we nevertheless can accept that the USSR has a right to assist those governments and political forces with which it is sympathetic. This could even include military assistance. However, where one has to draw the line is armed combat. The introduction of Soviet combat troops, or even the introduction of the troops of Soviet surrogates, such as the Cubans or Vietnamese, creates situations which make a detente relationship between the superpowers impossible to maintain. Furthermore, it makes no sense to view the invasion of Afghanistan in isolation. In 1975 the USSR shipped a Cuban army to Angola. In 1977 and again in 1978, Soviet generals commanded Cuban troops in combat in Ethiopia. Then the Vietnamese attacked Cambodia. Finally, at the end of 1979, you invaded Afghanistan with Soviet troops—the first time in 30 years that Soviet troops have transgressed the boundaries you achieved as a result of World War II. This is not something which you could expect the United States or its allies to ignore. It sets a remarkably dangerous precedent and is an event to which we have to respond unambiguously, so that your government does not mistake the depth and gravity of our reaction or what our reaction will be if this type of behavior continues. (S)

The fact of the matter is, Bessmertnykh replied, that your allies see the situation entirely differently than you do. Not only do they not regard Afghanistan as endangering them in any way, they rather see it as an opportunity to derive commercial advantage in their dealing with us. Many people in Moscow are aware of this and are trying to take advantage of it. Dobrynin and I have worked very hard to build up US-Soviet trade, and now it will all go to the West Europeans and the Japanese. (S)

More important than trade, I said, is whether the Soviet Union thinks it has the right to introduce armed combat troops anywhere in the world to support "revolutionary movements" wherever they exist.

We have the right to do whatever you do, Bessmertnykh replied. There has been a great change in the world. This is no longer the '50s or '60s, he repeated. And what has changed is that we have achieved military parity with you not only in the strategic field, but in conventional arms as well. You have your troops all over the world, half a million of them. You do not ask our permission to go into places like Korea. Your troops are there not only to defend that territory, but to prop up the local government. There is no reason for you to have any rights which we do not have. We must insist on equality. It is hard for you to adjust to this, but you must come to realize that it is a new fact of life. You have lived many years in my country and you understand very well that we are quite cautious. We do not undertake actions such as those in Afghanistan without fully realizing their implications. We moved only to protect our vital interests. We do not consider that Afghanistan is a precedent for future action. (S)

Although you say this, and might even believe it, I replied, there is no way that you can know for certain that what you are saying is the truth. Events have a way of becoming precedents which can ultimately surprise the people who triggered those same events. It is therefore essential that Afghanistan indeed not be a precedent for future Soviet actions. US-Soviet relations cannot stand future Afghanistans. We therefore must find a viable way to resolve this problem. The President suggested one such way when he indicated that the US is ready to support efforts by the international community to restore a neutral, non-aligned Afghan government that would be responsive to the wishes of the Afghan people. The essence of a settlement must therefore consist of prompt and complete Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, coupled with agreement by all interested parties that such a government be installed in Kabul. (S)

The key to a settlement must be the stopping of assistance to the rebel forces, Bessmertnykh countered. Once such assistance has ceased, we will be able to resolve this problem quickly and satisfactorily. (S)

The problem does not arise because of outside forces, I rejoined, but rather because of the Soviet invasion. A genuine national liberation movement exists within Afghanistan. In fact, it is not one movement but several, with roots in different regions within the country. Resistance arose through spontaneous combustion, not outside help, and Afghanistan was aflame before the world knew anything about it. There were 300,000 refugees in Pakistan less than a year ago. Today there are more than 600,000. These people left their country because they could not support the government which existed there. It is their determination to carry on the struggle which makes a long and bitter war inevitable unless some means is found of installing a government in Kabul which is to some degree responsive to their wishes. If your aim is to es-

tablish in Kabul a government that is completely under the thumb of Moscow, a government similar to the one that exists, for example, in Ulan Bator, then it is difficult to foresee anything other than great difficulty in Afghanistan itself and a downward spiral in US-Soviet relations. And if we are to avoid confrontations, it seems to me essential that we come to some agreement as to rules of superpower behavior in the coming decades. We have signed several agreements on mutual behavior, but the USSR does not seem to abide by such agreements. (S)

The people of Mongolia are very satisfied with the government they have. And you should know that the Soviet Union always abides by agreements which it signs, Bessmertnykh replied. (S)

At that point I read him the following from the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War:⁶

“The parties agree . . . to proceed from the premise that each party will refrain from the threat or use of force against the other party, against the allies of the other party, and *against other countries* in circumstances which may endanger international peace and security.”

Afghanistan is far away from you, and we do not think that what has happened there may endanger international peace and security, Bessmertnykh replied, smiling faintly. In any case, we have to live with each other and something will be worked out. But I do not see how anything can happen during 1980, since it will obviously take some time before we can resolve the Afghanistan question. And 1981 will also be a difficult year when agreements will be expiring. It may take two years, it may take longer, but I am confident that reasonable relations will eventually be restored between us, Bessmertnykh repeated. (S)

At that point I had another meeting to attend. We agreed once more on the importance of staying in touch with each other. (U)

COMMENT: Despite the hard edges, the conversation was entirely non-polemical in tone. Bessmertnykh's performance was, as usual, smooth and affable. (U)

⁶ For the text of the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 122.

272. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 21, 1980, 1:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin

PARTICIPANTS

US

The Secretary

Assistant Secretary George Vest,

EUR

Soviet Union

Ambassador Anatoly F. Dobrynin

SUMMARY. Dobrynin, who returns to Moscow on Sunday for a medical check-up, had a one and a half hour conversation covering SALT, the possibility of a future meeting between the two Foreign Ministers, the state of relations between the United States and the USSR, the causes of friction and the future. Dobrynin had little to give but pessimism. He saw the relationship built up over the last ten years down the drain and thought it likely that US-Soviet relations by the end of the Administration's second term would be about where it was when it began the present term. END SUMMARY.

SALT II

The Secretary said that he was aware that the Soviets were questioning whether there had been a change in our policy on SALT. He stressed that the President has left SALT on the Senate calendar and on the top of the calendar. The climate is not yet ripe, however. There is just a possibility that there may be a window when SALT II could be considered around June. If we miss that window, we will have to wait until after the elections. In response to Dobrynin's question, he repeated we have made no decision to "postpone indefinitely" ratification of SALT II. We remain firmly committed to SALT II and are determined to pursue its ratification as soon as circumstances permit.

The Secretary continued that we are disappointed by the position taken by the Soviet side at the SCC that there was no justification to continue the work on SALT II implementation procedures. We had proposed to continue the work on these procedures in the belief that this served our mutual interest and this remains our view. Dobrynin said that the reason for the Soviet attitude was there [*that*] it seemed pointless to continue this work if SALT were to be postponed indefi-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Cyrus R. Vance, Secretary of State—1977–1980, Lot 84D241, Box 9, Vance April/May/June, 1980, MemCons. Secret. Drafted by Vest; approved by Vance.

nately. Moscow had heard what the President had said and they also heard the comments of so many Senators, but in any case he would pass to Moscow what the Secretary was now saying.

The Secretary said that the President is firmly committed to SALT II and we feel it becomes even more important when times are tense. We do not intend to take any action which would impede the implementation of the treaty and we will maintain that policy. We hope and expect that the Soviets will do the same. Dobrynin replied that the United States has the means to check the Soviets.

Possibility of a Foreign Ministers' Meeting

The Secretary said he would talk to the President this weekend about when such a meeting might be appropriate. Dobrynin had apparently nothing with which to respond. He said there had been various exchanges since the year's beginning, including the proposal to send a special emissary for conversations in Moscow. The Secretary and Dobrynin went to and fro about events. Dobrynin thought we had changed our mind. The Secretary observed that from the tone of the high-level exchanges we had been left uncertain whether the Soviets wanted to have a meeting; that was why earlier the President had decided to let the matter rest. However, the Secretary thought the time had come to consider when a meeting would be worthwhile—April or May—and he asked Dobrynin to pass on his views to Gromyko.

US-Soviet Relations

Dobrynin was pessimistic about the future. He saw no prospect of improvement in our relations during or until well after the election campaign and thereafter it might take six months, two years, or longer before we could make progress. What did the Secretary think?

The Secretary pointed out that the invasion of Afghanistan had caused a major deterioration in our relationship and this would continue to be an important negative factor until the Soviet troops were withdrawn. We don't see much chance in the foreseeable future of that withdrawal. The President had made our position clear in his response to Tito² and in his comment on guarantees as related to a Soviet withdrawal. The relations between our two countries is the most important foreign policy issue for both of us and we had to find a way to control the dangers. There are positive things we must do. We should pursue SALT and key nuclear negotiations between us such as TNF and CTB. Arms control is the area in which bridges can be built, even in difficult times like the present. We on our side do not wish to destroy this essential part of the East-West framework. We will continue to abide by the

² See footnote 2, Document 268.

terms of our existing legal agreements with the Soviet Union. We will continue our other arms control negotiations, including MBFR and chemical warfare treaty. We have a common interest in the NPT review and in going ahead with the CSCE review in Madrid. Dobrynin interjected that Moscow until now is prepared for Madrid also. The Secretary added that we are trying to move our British friends on the site numbers for CTB and it is just possible that we will see more positive action there. In the more general bilateral areas, cultural and scientific, we are pursuing these activities at lower levels and at a slowed-down pace but they should be kept in place for the future because it will be easier to build on them than to reinitiate. The Secretary concluded that our relationships are under strain and there are indeed many negative factors on the immediate horizon, but there is a basic desire on our part to get the relationship back on track through frank talks, to develop a more stable understanding in the important areas such as arms control, Southwest Asia, Southeast Asia, etc.

Dobrynin replied that this was his assessment of our policy. He was very unhappy with the present state of affairs. As he saw it, there is nothing but negativism for now and the immediate future. It was his impression that the US is disrupting our relationship so completely that it now affects even the least things between us. It took years to build the relationship which the US is so easily disrupting. That kind of relationship cannot be rebuilt possibly until the end of a second term, at which time the US will only be where it was when the Administration began. In the meantime, the US reaction is moving the Soviets to a counter-reaction, internally, not seen but happening with considerable emotion and even if it doesn't show, it will be difficult to handle later on.

The Secretary asked Dobrynin what he saw in the future concerning the Afghanistan problem. He would be ready to sit down and discuss this with Dobrynin when he returned or to discuss it with Gromyko when we could also discuss broader concerns. Dobrynin wondered if this would be fruitful given the mood of the present US Administration.

Dobrynin reverted to US negativism again and the Secretary reminded him of Soviet negativism in Afghanistan. Dobrynin replied: But you ask how Moscow sees things, and they see this Administration as 100 percent negative, right down to the lesser things. He cited as examples:

—PanAm refused to ship the coffin containing the wife of the UN Deputy Secretary General for Political Affairs, Mrs. Sytenko. PanAm said this was against PanAm policy so the coffin went on Polish airlines. (Comment: PanAm had labor union difficulty on all freight shipments to USSR at that time. The Department was not asked to help.)

—The situation has so deteriorated that now Soviet diplomats are acting as longshoremen.

—A Soviet trawler violated its catch limits on fish in Alaska and was handled with unusual harshness. (Comment: The trawler was handled in accordance with routine Coast Guard procedures followed in all violations of this nature, e.g., Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese. The vessel was escorted to Kodiak and the Coast Guard explicitly reported that relations with the crew of the “Zelenograd” remained cooperative and cordial.)

—Soviet scientists, seeing the mood in the US, are increasingly reluctant even to come to the US.

—The mood of the country is reinforced by the pronouncements of the Administration, so much so that there seemed to be practically nothing left to maintain in our bilateral relations.

Dobrynin illustrated his point with the report of Soviet gassing of Afghanistan villages, complaining that our official press briefing accused the Soviets without evidence to back it up. The Secretary replied that for weeks we have gotten extensive and numerous reports which give detailed accounts describing two kinds of gas, smoke and another which causes bleeding and death. We have report after report from many different sources. Therefore, our Spokesman was correct when he said that, although we have no photographs, we have so many reports from refugees that we have to take account of them. Dobrynin’s reply was that these are only stories and we have no proof. Do you believe, he asked, that we have no sense of civilization? It seems that you will accept any accusation against the Soviets.

He then turned to the bacteriological warfare episode. Anthrax, he said, is a disease which from time to time occurs in the Asian world. The Soviets have experienced it before in Siberia³ and warned people to avoid infected meat. In this case it was not a secret episode, it happened a year ago. Yet when people came to the West and told stories, we listened to their stories, reacted in public and to the UN agency without waiting for or giving credence to what the Soviet Union said. The Secretary pointed out that the essential fact was that there appeared to be evidence that some material had not been destroyed which should have been. Dobrynin replied that the Soviet authorities would not take such chances with their own citizens. The episode took place a year ago and now was being used as propaganda against the Soviets. The State Department Spokesman had no answer as to why this subject came up a year late or why we made accusations without proof. He was forced to conclude that a US TV commentator was right when he described it as

³ See Documents 267, 269, and 270.

an instance of the Administration's "aggressive psychological warfare." Certainly that is the atmosphere, an atmosphere which is altogether negative, a search warrant atmosphere, and as a result the structure of the past ten years is left standing like a building exposed to an atomic bomb. The Secretary commented that it was not our intent to destroy the structure. He had said that before and stood by it, but he did not minimize the problems. Dobrynin repeated gloomily that the only thing left was the bare framework of the structure and nothing else. The Secretary asked if Dobrynin thought the people in Moscow understood the intensity of the US public reaction to the invasion in Afghanistan. Dobrynin replied yes, they did understand it and, if not, the US reminded them of it daily.

The Secretary asked Dobrynin what he thought were the reasons for the deteriorated relationship. Dobrynin replied there were many reasons, including:

—The conduct of the SALT talks at the beginning of the Administration which should have been more prudently handled to dispose only of the remaining issues (the Secretary said it took us two plus years to dispose of them); the US suggestion for deep cuts had thrown off the negotiating stride.

—Human rights.

—Middle East. After the communique with Gromyko the Soviets were dropped out of the picture.

—Disarmament, where the US really set out to build up its arms.

—Vienna, a good meeting but instead of building on it the US fanned the Cuba incident⁴ and lost two months on SALT because of a non-existent issue and it was non-existent because Soviet troops had been in Cuba for 15 years.

Dobrynin then turned to SALT and TNF. The Soviets had thought SALT, as agreed at Vienna, would represent rough parity—and then we threw in TNF. The Secretary interjected that the Soviets had begun it with the SS-20 with multiple warheads. Dobrynin argued that we should not have thrown TNF into the middle of SALT but should have finished SALT II first, then turned to the problems of weapons in the allied area when we could have dealt with them sensibly. Doing it our way had built more and more impediments into the US-Soviet nuclear relationship. As a result the Soviets had grown angry and now said they would not discuss TNF. He saw each side having new weapons systems by 1983 and as a result did not see any prospect for SALT III.

Dobrynin concluded that massive US negativism affected even minor aspects of the US-Soviet relationship. Consequently he had to

⁴ Reference is to the Soviet brigade in Cuba; see Documents 217 and 219–228.

ask himself whether we had concluded that we saw no future between us for a very long time indeed. That seemed to be the case. Only the skeleton of the structure of our relationship exists. He wondered where we would be two years hence and whether we would even have reached the level of 1979. He bemoaned the fact that it was so easy to destroy and so difficult and so slow to build. At the moment he saw us going downhill.

The Secretary said he shared Dobrynin's worries and that is why he raised these questions and discussed what we could do in the future. In summing up the conversation, he would review the situation with the President. He hoped that Dobrynin would do the same in Moscow. He thought there should be a meeting with Gromyko within the next six weeks or so and he looked forward to discussing this with Dobrynin when he returned. He asked Dobrynin to convey his regards to Gromyko and respects to Brezhnev and Dobrynin asked the Secretary to convey his respects to the President.

273. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, April 17, 1980

SUBJECT

Dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR—Are We Doing Enough? (U)

Dissidence in this paper is used to mean not simply actions by regime critics who achieve prominence, but the entire range of activity, some obvious, some extremely unobtrusive, which generates pressures for freedom of thought and expression, human rights and the advantages of a pluralistic society. (U)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 56, Chron: 4/15–18/80. Secret. Copies were sent to Griffith (presumably, William E.), Brent, and Stephen Larrabee. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner, "Good memo. Consult with MB/LB on possible implementation. What steps? What means? ZB." MB/LB presumably refers to Marshall Brent and Lincoln Bloomfield, both members of the NSC staff. Two papers, "The U.S. and Dissidence in Eastern Europe," and "U.S. Government Initiatives on behalf of Human Rights in the U.S.S.R.," are attached but not printed.

On the demonstrative and declarative level the record of the Carter Administration is second to none in the past fifteen years. The President has personally identified himself with prominent Soviet dissidents such as Bukovsky, Shcharansky and Sakharov and during his visit to Poland² insisted on contact with both dissident and church figures. Other Administration officials, most notably yourself, have repeatedly met, endorsed and communicated with dissidents in the USSR and Eastern Europe. The “spies for dissidents”³ exchange you arranged last year was one of the most politically astute moves the U.S. Government has ever made on behalf of Soviet dissidents. The Administration’s human rights policy has generated worldwide debate on human rights on which dissidents in Communist societies have capitalized. Our participation in the Belgrade CSCE meetings under the vigorous leadership of Arthur Goldberg underscored our commitment to principle and highlighted Soviet efforts to avoid honoring commitments they accepted in 1975. The Administration took early decisions which will soon expand the power of VOA and RFE/RL. (U)

Other programs for communicating with Eastern Europe and the USSR have been modestly expanded. (S)

Allocation of resources—both manpower and money—to programs encouraging dissidence and serving the needs of dissidence has not been proportionate to the high level of attention the Administration has given this field in statements and demonstrative actions.⁴ There have been other problems in respect to performance and procedure. No new operational instrumentalities have been created for implementing human rights policies, sustaining research effort and channeling and coordinating human rights initiatives on a self-propelled basis. (C)

Human rights have been overly politicized domestically as a result of priority assigned by the State Department to more energetic pursuit of human rights issues with non-Communist Latin American and African countries than with Communist-ruled states. As a result human rights is in danger of becoming a negative concept among conservatives both in the U.S. and abroad. The subject needs to be brought into better balance. (C)

Our most valuable instruments for communication with Eastern Europe and the USSR are the big radios. New investment in transmitters has not been matched by comparable investment in programming. Though budgetary allocations for broadcasting have risen each year, they have not been sufficient to offset inflationary increases in

² Carter visited Poland December 29–31, 1977.

³ See Documents 157 and 159.

⁴ Brzezinski highlighted a portion of this sentence and made a check mark in the margin.

both the U.S. and Europe and the declining value of the dollar. As a result manpower rejuvenation and expansion of programming and research support have continued to be postponed. The effect is evident in decline in Radio Liberty listenership in the USSR. New investment for programming improvement is urgently needed. This has been strikingly demonstrated as we have taken up the question of broadcasting in Muslim languages, where Radio Liberty's current level of performance is only a fraction of its potential. The same is true to a lesser extent for VOA. (C)

Book and publication programs for Eastern Europe and the USSR, like the radios, provide the basic seed and fertilizer on which dissidence is nourished. These programs were at a low ebb in 1977, at a far lower level of real-dollar input than they had been ten years earlier. They have received modest increases each of the past four years but are still, at a total expenditure of less than \$5 million per year, funded at levels which do not enable them to exploit the new opportunities for penetrating the Communist world with ideas and information which are constantly developing.⁵ *Samizdat* and *tamizdat* available for republishing and distribution into Eastern Europe and the USSR are becoming available at a much faster rate than they are able to take advantage of because of limitations of funds and manpower. (S)

Realization of the importance of Islam, national self-assertion among the Muslim peoples of the USSR (as well as Christian peoples such as the Balts, Ukrainians and Georgians) and the ferment and feedback generated by events in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, (*inter alia* the resultant suppression of dissidents of which the Sakharov exile is only the most flagrant example) are developments which have highlighted new opportunities. Existing resources are inadequate to meet these opportunities. Existing manpower working on these subjects is insufficient to do all the research and operational planning that is required. (C)

RECOMMENDATIONS:

Programs for exploiting dissidence in Eastern Europe and the USSR (and perhaps Cuba as well?) are, comparatively, in terms of the continuing effect they generate within Communist societies, the most cost-effective activity the U.S. Government undertakes. (U)

- *While maintaining and refining its verbal commitment and demonstrative public actions in behalf of dissidents and human rights in these countries, the Administration should urgently consider immediate increases*

⁵ Brzezinski highlighted this sentence and the one previous, and made a check mark in the margin. For more information on the Eastern Europe/U.S.S.R. book programs, see Document 162.

*in resources allocated to these activities. At a minimum they merit classification as essential national security operations subject to real annual increase of 3–5% on a par with defense outlays.*⁶ (U)

- The creation of *one or more semi-autonomous institutions* for sustained implementation of *human rights goals*, with perhaps a combination of governmental and private funding, should be urgently studied. (C)

- *Expansion and refinement of radio programming* by all instrumentalities available—VOA, RFE/RL—should be undertaken at a steady tempo. (U)

- Plans should be made for *future expansion of radio transmitters* to counter continued Soviet increases in transmitter power and efforts to jam our transmissions. The long lead-time required for building transmitters makes this essential. (C)

- *Expansion of publication and distribution operations* should also be undertaken. Even modest increments of funds enable existing publication and distribution projects to perform at a much higher level of efficiency. E.g., publishing 6,000 rather than 3,000 copies of a Ukrainian dissident book costs much less than the initial cost of the original 3,000. (S)

- *A tape-cassette distribution program* should be developed to augment existing book and magazine programs; there is increasing evidence that cassettes are popular and effective in the Communist world. (S)

- Substantively, areas and peoples who are poorly served by current or even planned publication and distribution programs include:

- The Baltic States, especially the Lithuanians.

- The Ukrainians.

- The Caucasus, including the Georgians, Armenians and Muslim peoples. (C)

- *Religion*, not only Islam, should be given higher priority for planning new operations. E.g., the potential of persistent Orthodox tradition in the Ukraine and among Russians as a focal point for anti-Communist nationalism (or nationalism that regards Communism as irrelevant) needs to be examined. (C)

⁶ Brzezinski wrote in the margin, “reprogramming of budget (CIA).”

274. Special Analytical Paper Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

Washington, undated

USSR

Suppression of Dissidents
by [name not declassified] CIA

As relations between the US and USSR have become more strained, Moscow has intensified its campaign against the Soviet dissident movement. The authorities have detained more than 40 dissidents since the crackdown began in October 1979, concentrating particularly on human rights activists such as members of the Helsinki Act Monitoring Group. The activists have been subjected to continual harassment, including repeated house searches and close surveillance. [handling restriction not declassified]

The greatest blow to the dissidents was the exile in January of Andrey Sakharov to Gorkiy, which removed the human rights movement's most prominent spokesman. He is now isolated from contact with all but family members. [handling restriction not declassified]

In the past, Sakharov's remarks automatically commanded the attention of Western correspondents in Moscow and shaped world opinion against Soviet tactics toward dissent. Without Sakharov, the members of the Moscow Helsinki group believe that they are being ignored by Western media at a time when the group is being decimated by arrests. [handling restriction not declassified]

There was little publicity in the West when Malva Landa, one of the most prominent members of the Moscow group, recently was sentenced to three years of internal exile for "slandering the Soviet state." Trials of several other human rights activists in custody should follow shortly. [handling restriction not declassified]

The Soviets had been expected to remove likely troublemakers before the Olympics, but the severity of this latest campaign appears aimed at paralyzing all forms of dissent. Following Sakharov's exile, a number of dissident activists reportedly were warned by Soviet officials that the action taken against Sakharov demonstrated that the authorities are prepared to take measures against any member of the dissident movement. Some reportedly were told that the authorities expect to "finish off" the movement within a couple of months. [handling restriction not declassified]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Brement Subject File, Box 59, USSR: Dissidents/Defectors: 6/79–11/80. [classification and handling restriction not declassified]

Dissidents Discouraged

The US Embassy reports that most dissidents believe that the Soviet human rights movement will survive the crackdown, while others are less optimistic that it will be able to continue in its present form. The Soviet intelligentsia has allegedly become disenchanted with the movement, partly because the dissidents are preoccupied with the arrests of their colleagues rather than focusing on the main problems in the USSR. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

In addition, the current climate of cynicism and apathy among students has resulted in fewer young people being drawn to the dissidents. Those who do become activists are attracted by the nationalist and religious dissident movements, which apparently have a broader base than does dissent over human rights. According to the Embassy, the human rights movement has lost much of its sense of purpose and is being forced into a period of relative inactivity. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Restrictions on Jewish Emigration

Although not directly linked with the crackdown on dissidents, new restrictions on Jewish emigration reportedly were introduced about the same time. A reduction in the number of visas became evident last November when the total dropped to 3,600 from the year's monthly average of 4,200. A slow decline has continued through March, lowering the total for the first quarter of 1980 by more than 25 percent as compared with the same period last year. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The reduction is caused primarily by a severe cutback in emigration from the Ukraine, a result of strict enforcement of a regulation limiting sponsorship of emigrants to immediate family members living in Israel. Considerable variation in emigration practices is still apparent among the Soviet republics, however, with the majority showing a slight increase in the number of emigrants this year. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

275. Summary of Conclusions of a Special Coordinating Committee Meeting¹

Washington, May 1, 1980, 3:10–4 p.m.

SUBJECT

Summary of Conclusions: SCC Meeting on Soviet Grain Policy

PARTICIPANTS

State

Acting Secretary
Warren Christopher
Richard Cooper, Under Secretary
for Economic Affairs

Defense

Ellen Frost, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International
Economic & Technological
Affairs

Treasury

Robert Carswell, Deputy Secretary
Herbert Horowitz, Director, Office
of East-West Economic Policy

Agriculture

Jim Williams, Deputy Secretary
Dale Hathaway, Under Secretary
for International Affairs
and Commodity Programs

Commerce

The Secretary Philip Klutznick
Robert Herzstein, Under Secretary
for International Trade

USTR

Ambassador Robert Hormats,
Deputy USTR

JSC

Brig. Gen. David Palmer
Lt. Col. Don Miller

DCI

Douglas Diamond, Chief USSR
Eastern Europe Division,
Office of Economic Research

OMB

John White, Deputy Director
Kitty Schirmer, Associate Director

Vice President's Office

Gail Harrison

White House

Ambassador Henry Owen
Lloyd Cutler

NSC

Marshall Brement
Timothy Deal

The SCC reviewed a State/USDA options paper² regarding US policy on grain sales to the USSR. The paper sets forth three options: (1) *Continue the present policy*. The US would sell the Soviets 8 million metric tons (MMT) of grain, as required by the bilateral grain agreement, and would ask other exporting countries to limit shipments to

¹ Source: Carter Library, Brzezinski Donated Material, Subject File, Box 33, Meetings—SCC 308: 5/1/80. Confidential. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. The minutes of this meeting are in Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Meetings File, Box 21, SCC Meeting: #308 Held 5/1/80, 4–5/80.

² Deal sent the April 30 paper “Options for Future International Cooperation to Restrict Soviet Grain Imports” under a May 1 memorandum to Brzezinski and Henry Owen. (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, International Economics, Tim Deal File, Box 13, USSR: Grain: 5/80)

“normal and traditional” levels. (2) *Seek agreement to a more restrictive program.* We would hold sales to 8MMT and ask other exporters to reduce shipments *below* 1979/80 levels. (3) *Relax all restrictions* and reestablish a competitive export posture. (C)

The group agreed that the grain suspension had been effective this year. The Soviets would obtain only about 7 MMT of the 17 MMT we had denied them. Except for Argentina, the other exporting countries had been fairly cooperative in limiting shipments. But the overall commitment was imprecise, and some countries (e.g. Canada) are pushing the upper limit of “traditional” sales. Continuation of the present policy into 1980/81 (option 1) was undesirable because the American farmer would continue to bear most of the economic burden while other countries increased their share of the Soviet market. Option 3 would require the US to retreat from the decisions announced in January and was undesirable from a foreign policy standpoint. Option 2 seemed the preferable course if: (a) it would have a significant impact on the Soviet economy; and (b) other exporters would cooperate. (C)

On the first point, assuming a Soviet crop of 215 MMT (trend estimate), option 2 would impose further pressures on the Soviet livestock sector and prevent the rebuilding of stocks. If their crop is much higher than 215 MMT, there is little we could do unilaterally or jointly to punish the Soviets. They could rebuild stocks and increase livestock herds. (C)

There was detailed discussion about the prospects for gaining exporter cooperation. It was agreed that Argentina is the key. If Argentina continues massive grain shipments to the USSR, it would be difficult to convince others to hold the line, much less cut back exports. Argentina has just concluded a long term agreement with the Soviets, calling for minimum grain shipments of 5MMT annually. We might be able to convince Argentina to hold to that level. It was noted that we have little bargaining leverage with Argentina to go below this level unless we are willing to back away from our policies on human rights, nuclear nonproliferation, etc. If we don't go below this level, other exporters would object, since 5MMT is 180% of average Argentine exports to the USSR in recent years. Canada and Australia both have large unsold stocks from this year's crop. Canada wants our approval for the export of 1979/80 grain to the USSR. Canadian farmers claim they have borne the main burden of the embargo—just as ours do. Conceivably, Canada might conclude a long term agreement with the USSR. (C)

The group agreed that the degree of cooperation we receive will depend in large part on the size of the Soviet harvest. If their crop is good, there will be a competitive scramble for a limited market, and any agreement will fail. We will not have a good estimate of the crop until July. (C)

Even before the Soviet crop is known, other countries might agree to establish an overall export target, say, of 30 MMT which might include individual country ceilings. This would not lead to significant cutbacks, but it would hold the line at present levels or slightly below. (C)

The SCC agreed on the following actions: (a) We will seek Argentine agreement to a cutback, or at least a commitment not to exceed the 5MMT annual limit, in discussions with Argentine Economic Minister Martinez de Hoy,³ who will be here next week. The discussions should take place at the Secretary of State level. (b) Dale Hathaway will also discuss the possibility of numerical targets with the Canadians in meetings scheduled early next week. (c) We will then review the situation at a subsequent SCC meeting and decide whether, and if so how, to approach other exporters. (C)

On other matters, USDA will provide the SCC two memos:⁴ the first will set forth the considerations bearing on whether to proceed with technical level consultations with the USSR in May, as required by the grain agreement. The second will consider the question of sales to the USSR of non-US grain by American grain firms. (C)

³ José Alfredo Martínez de Hoz.

⁴ Not found.

276. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, May 2, 1980

SUBJECT

Organizing the State Department to Deal With US-Soviet Relations (C)

In the belief that it is very important to do something tangible to demonstrate (a) that the Administration now speaks consistently on its policy toward the Soviet Union, (b) that it realizes that *how* you deal

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 60, Chron: 12/10–11/80. Confidential. Sent for action. Printed from a copy that does not bear Brement's initials.

with the Soviets can sometimes be as important as *what* you do about their behavior, and (c) that Secretary Muskie² does not intend to perpetuate the grave errors in style that Vance was guilty of in his handling of Dobrynin, this memo proposes:

—that an Under Secretary of State, preferably Matt Nimetz, be designated to handle not only arms control and security matters, but Soviet relations as well;

—that a new bureau of Soviet and East European affairs be formed in the State Department, preferably headed by someone who has a clear association with you, such as Sam Huntington or Madeleine Albright; and

—that new rules of conduct on how to handle the Soviets be agreed upon and that Vance's deplorable practice of having long one-on-one subsequently largely unreported conversations with Dobrynin be stopped. (C)

The Nature of the Problem. Critics of the Administration (including Reagan, Bush and Kennedy) have repeatedly charged, and continue to charge, that one of its great weaknesses has been an inability to deal consistently with the Soviets and have cited the well-publicized Vance-Brzezinski differences on strategy and tactics as evidence of the gulf which divides the NSC and the State Department on the subject. Turning this perception around would be of obvious help to the President and to our entire diplomatic effort around the world. Were we able to convince others that we now view Soviet policy consistently and realistically and that we have achieved a widely shared consensus within the government on the Soviet threat which faces us, it would not only help domestically, but it would markedly undercut Soviet efforts to drive a wedge between us and the allies. (C)

Given the problems that face us in Afghanistan and Iran as well as with the West Europeans, it is important to demonstrate that Senator Muskie regards US-Soviet relations as central to our foreign policy and that he is moving vigorously to come to grips with the problem. It would also demonstrate both domestically and to the allies that the President is continuing to give the creative resolution of US-Soviet difficulties the priority it deserves. (C)

The three recommendations enumerated below are based on the assumption that Marshall Shulman, in line with his personal desires, will be going back to Columbia no later than this summer. The University wants him to do so and now that Vance has departed there is no logical justification for the senior man on Soviet affairs at the State Department to be a lame duck, particularly at a time when US-Soviet bilateral relations have ground down to almost zero. Once Marshall has left

² Vance resigned, effective April 28. He was replaced by Edmund Muskie, who entered duty as Secretary of State on May 8.

the scene, the new Secretary could make the changes suggested without reflecting unfavorably on Marshall or implying that Senator Muskie has no confidence in him, since his desire to return to the Academy is well known. (C)

(a) *Designate an Under Secretary for Strategic and Soviet Affairs.* Reporting to him would be both the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs and either the offices of Soviet and of East European Affairs or a newly-created Bureau of Soviet and East European Affairs (see below). This would ensure that one official at the top level of the State Department would be responsible for the entire range of questions dealing with the Soviet Union, just as Korniyenko deals with all aspects of American affairs within the Soviet Foreign Office. Such a move at one stroke would overcome most of the irrational aspects of organization that have plagued us in our relations with the Soviets in the past, parallel the bureaucratic structure which the Soviets use to deal with us and thereby rationalize the process of US-Soviet diplomatic interchange, and considerably ameliorate some of the burdens on the Secretary, who on too many occasions has been acting as Soviet desk officer, since there has been nobody underneath him in the hierarchy who dealt both with bilateral affairs and arms control matters. (This meant, incidentally, that the Soviet side of the Department made no input into a whole range of questions which formed the most important US-Soviet business from Moscow's point of view.) The rationality of having a single Under Secretary of State for both Soviet, strategic, and arms control matters should be obvious, since the latter fields are really only separate aspects of US-Soviet relations. (C)

My candidate for the job is Matt Nimetz. He is already in place as the Under Secretary handling security policy. He is smart, tough, and realistic about Soviet affairs—by far the best man in this regard on the seventh floor of the State Department. At least as important, Nimetz is a well-known Vance protege, a former partner in his law firm. Both for its symbolic continuity and for its substance the appointment would be an outstanding one. (C)

(b) *Create a Bureau for Soviet and East European Affairs.* The United States spends more than a third of its national budget dealing with the Soviet Union. Yet it is the only major Western nation without an official of Assistant Secretary or comparable rank dealing with Soviet and East European affairs in its Foreign Ministry. Instead, we subsume Soviet affairs under the broader aegis of European affairs and ask one Assistant Secretary of State to be in charge of everything from London to Vladivostok. The fact of the matter is that George Vest and all of his predecessors spend more than 90 percent of their time dealing with our knotty relations with the allies. This is inescapable. It is impossible for someone handling Western European affairs to devote adequate time

and creative energy to dealing with the Soviet Union. Soviet affairs are thus neglected at the bureau level. SOV now has just a shade of its former influence and competence. It is largely ignored on high policy matters. The creation of a new bureau devoted exclusively to Soviet and East European affairs would demonstrate that:

—Secretary Muskie is taking a creative and dynamic approach toward US-Soviet relations;

—he is giving them the emphasis they deserve during these troubled times;

—he intends to implement organizational changes which demonstrate that he is convinced he will be Secretary of State for the next five years; and

—he recognizes that NATO and Soviet affairs should not be in the same bureau of the State Department because the problems we face in dealing with these areas are in many cases antithetical and therefore should not be settled within the bureau, but rather be dealt with at the high policy level. (C)

Finally, the person in charge of such a bureau (or for that matter Shulman's replacement if a new bureau is not organized) should obviously be somebody who has been closely associated with you in the past. This would help the President because—together with the Nimetz appointment—it would be a striking symbol of the new unity between the Department and the NSC on Soviet affairs. With Nimetz (a Vance protege) in command and one of your own colleagues or former colleagues as the new Assistant Secretary for East European affairs, we would have in place what would be perceived as a new, balanced team. This would be an important symbol that there are no longer fundamental differences in viewpoint within the Administration on how we should be dealing with the Soviets during the Era of Afghanistan. Possible candidates which occur to me might be Sam Huntington or Madeleine Albright, but you, of course, are in the best position to suggest somebody, if you believe the idea has merit. (C)

(c) *Adopt Sound Basic Principles on How to Deal with the Soviets.* Senator Muskie has an opportunity to behave toward the Soviets in a way that makes sense diplomatically, that will strike the right tone publicly, and that will gladden the heart of the State Department and of all professional observers of US-Soviet relations. To do so he should adopt the following basic principles of behavior. (C)

(1) *Maintain a multiplicity of channels, i.e., do not use Dobrynin as the single means of communication for dealing with the Soviet government on high policy matters.* It is Gromyko and Brezhnev who should be the recipients of our message, not Dobrynin, who cannot always be counted on to convey our message in the way we want it conveyed.

(2) *Adhere to Strict Reciprocity in all our Bilateral Dealings.* This is a cardinal rule for handling the Soviets, who are past masters at nickeling and diming you to death if you let them get away with it.

(3) *Do Business at a Normal Level,* i.e., to the extent possible, avoid negotiations of routine matters at the level of Secretary of State.

(4) *Utilize the Embassy in Moscow as Much as Possible,* i.e., double track all messages of importance both to ensure that Dobrynin is being an accurate reporter and to enhance the prestige of our Ambassador in Moscow.

(5) *Never see Dobrynin Without a Third Person Present.* This has been a real dereliction on Vance's part, for which he and the Administration might pay heavily in the eyes of future historians.

(6) *Never Have a Conversation with Dobrynin or Other Key Soviet Officials Without a Detailed Written Record Being Made.* This is fundamental diplomatic behavior. Vance's many violations of this principle were shocking to specialists in Soviet affairs.

(7) *Keep Our Ambassador in Moscow Fully Informed on All Aspects of the Relationship.* There is no point in having an Ambassador and not making real use of him.

Implementation of the above guidelines would not only ensure more effective and professional handling of our relations with the USSR, but it would also elevate the new Secretary of State enormously in the eyes of his State Department colleagues. (C)

RECOMMENDATION

That you float the above ideas with the President and with Senator Muskie at Camp David.³

³ Carter was at Camp David May 2–5.

277. **Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the
Director of the National Security Agency (Inman)**¹

Washington, May 12, 1980, 2218Z

COUNTRY

USSR/Afghanistan/Italy

SUBJECT

Comments by Georgiy Arbatov on Soviet perceptions on Afghanistan and possible scenario for Soviet withdrawal [*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[1 paragraph (4 lines) not declassified]

1. According to Georgiy Arbatov, head of the USSR's Institute of the U.S.A. and Canada (IUSAC)—Soviet perceptions about the dangers of the internal situation in Afghanistan in December 1979 had been distorted, and he implied that there had been a serious debate within the Soviet Politburo on the advisability of intervening militarily in Afghanistan. Arbatov said that at the time the "hardliners" in the Politburo had been successful in pointing out that there was little of benefit to the USSR that could be obtained by continuing to exercise restraint in Afghanistan, but Arbatov commented that now there was beginning to be a reflection in the Politburo of a perception that the Soviets had suffered a greater propaganda defeat over the intervention than had been anticipated prior to the Politburo decision to move troops into Afghanistan. [14 lines not declassified]

2. Arbatov described some of the atmosphere in Moscow that preceded the intervention decision. Arbatov noted the decision of the U.S. Government to exaggerate the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba and then back away from the issue as one of the initial factors contributing to a Soviet perception of American inconsistency and weakness. The second factor was the 12 December 1979 decision of the NATO governments to permit the basing of modernized theatre nuclear forces (TNF) in Europe,² a decision that Soviet hard-liners viewed as an attempt to create a disequilibrium in the balance of strategic forces. The third factor, and the one that Arbatov cited as the predomi-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Cables File, Afghanistan, Box 10, 5/9–14/80. Secret; Sensitive; Noforn; Nocontract; Orcon. Sent to the Departments of State and the Treasury, DIA, White House, NSC, and CIA's Office of Current Operations.

² On December 12, 1979, a special meeting of the NATO Foreign and Defense Ministers convened in Brussels and determined that theater nuclear forces could be based in Europe.

nant factor in the Soviet decision, was the Soviet assessment that SALT II was in significant trouble in the U.S. Senate and was not likely to be ratified and thus nothing was to be lost in this regard by intervention.

3. Arbatov said that the regime of Prime Minister Babrak Karmal in Afghanistan was prepared to accede to the withdrawal of Soviet forces in his country if an international guarantee could be provided that would neutralize Afghanistan and end the civil war. Arbatov made it clear that he was speaking about abandoning the Soviet public policy position of preserving a Socialist regime in Kabul and did not make it a precondition that Karmal himself would have to remain as head of state. [4 lines not declassified]

4. Arbatov said that he expected that Afghanistan would be one of the main subjects discussed between the U.S. Secretary of State and Soviet Foreign Affairs Minister Gromyko at Vienna. Arbatov noted that the earlier refusal of the Carter administration to broaden the agenda of the Vienna talks from strictly Afghanistan had prevented an earlier meeting between Gromyko and former Secretary of State Cyrus Vance at Vienna, and that the apparent decision of the U.S. Government to broaden the agenda to include SALT II apparently signaled a more open attitude by the U.S. Government about reestablishing detente.

5. ACQ: [1 line not declassified]

278. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Vienna, May 16, 1980

SUBJECT

Meeting between Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign Minister Gromyko

PARTICIPANTS

*U.S.*Secretary of State Edmund S. Muskie
William D. Krimer, Interpreter*USSR*Foreign Minister Andrey A. Gromyko
Viktor Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Foreign Minister *Gromyko* opened the conversation by suggesting that he and Secretary Muskie conduct their talks in compact form since they did not have much time at their disposal. It was his understanding that there was no formal agenda for this meeting; thus they would be free to choose whatever topics they wanted to discuss.

Bilateral Relations

Gromyko thought he would be fully justified in asking a specific question in order to obtain Mr. Muskie's reply to it in his capacity as Secretary of State of the United States: how was the Soviet leadership to understand why the U.S. Administration had decided to enter upon a path of serious disruption of the relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union? Why had the U.S. Administration done so much to throw back these relations, throw them back a considerable distance, he would say, although in the Soviet view there were no reasons for such setbacks. That was his first question. Where did the U.S. Administration intend to lead matters with regard to Soviet-American relations?

The *Secretary* wanted to tell *Gromyko* first that the question of whether or not their present meeting should take place had been pending when he became Secretary of State. His own reaction had been based on his background as a legislator. It was important to explore each other's positions, and, therefore, he was glad to be here. He thought he could answer *Gromyko's* question best from his perspective as a member of the U.S. Senate and his reaction to the events which had

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/79–10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Krimer. The meeting took place at the Hofburg. Muskie and *Gromyko* were in Vienna attending ceremonies celebrating the 25th anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. An unknown hand wrote in the upper right-hand corner a May 23 note addressed to Brzezinski: "The approved version. Muskie has asked that it be very closely held."

led to the disruption of relations of which Gromyko had spoken. His answer would be based on the reaction of not only President Carter and the present Administration but also on the reaction of the Congress of the United States and the country at large. He would try to put his answer in as precise and clear terms as he could because he believed, as Gromyko did, that the answer to this question was central to everything else.

At the point of the events in Afghanistan, we were facing a very difficult challenge in the Senate in connection with ratification of the SALT agreement. If Gromyko could recall their meeting in Moscow in 1971 (and the Secretary felt that he had more reason to remember that meeting than Gromyko), he had even then been a supporter of SALT. He had to tell Gromyko that last year the prospects for ratification of the SALT Treaty, which initially had been quite good, had deteriorated during the summer, and the Administration faced the problem of picking the right time to put the issue to the Senate. Senator Byrd,² the majority leader, had been for the Treaty, and Gromyko would recall that Senator Byrd had told him so last summer; the Secretary, too, was a supporter of the Treaty, and at that time a majority of senators, although perhaps not two-thirds, were in favor of the Treaty. The Senate leadership had decided that January of this year would be an appropriate time for consideration of SALT II and had cleared the Senate's calendar of all other business, disposing of domestic issues in order to be ready to debate the Treaty in late January and early February, expecting that after several weeks of debate the Treaty would have a fighting chance of being ratified. The events in Iran³ had set us back in this respect, simply because Iran had stimulated and strengthened the conservative elements in the U.S., those who in any event were already opposing SALT. The events in Afghanistan destroyed any chance of getting a two-thirds majority for this very reason. The Soviet intervention with troops across the Afghan border had created doubts as to whether detente had the same meaning for the Soviet Union as it did for us. The belief became prevalent that the Soviet Union had changed direction in its foreign policy, thereby creating new risks and challenges for us. Afghanistan was geographically close to the Persian Gulf region, appeared to be a threat to the oil life line of the U.S. and the West, and in addition the Soviet action looked like pointing a dagger at the U.S. and the West. That was a real perception with which a politician simply had to deal.

The Secretary added that a lot of people in the U.S. still would like to see the SALT Treaty proceed toward ratification, but could not see

² Robert Byrd (D-West Virginia).

³ See footnote 2, Document 236.

any prospect of obtaining the necessary votes unless the Afghanistan problem was resolved. Even then, it would take some time to re-build the positive atmosphere which had been carefully built up by both sides during the decade since the Secretary had last seen Gromyko.

In that connection, we were aware that the calendar exerted certain pressures; that there were provisions in the SALT Treaty that would become outdated with the passage of time unless the Treaty was ratified this year or early next year. He believed it urgent for the sides to get back on track if at all possible.

There were other issues between us, such as Theater Nuclear Forces in Europe, SALT III, the CSCE Final Act Review in Madrid, MBFR, and others, all of which had a high priority. But, what stood in the way of possible support in connection with these problems was the problem of Afghanistan. The President as a politician had to respond to public opinion. When people feel as deeply as ours did as a result of this event, the President had to respond.

The Secretary wanted to add one other perspective. At the beginning of 1979 a lot of people in the Senate thought that we were on the right track, although a number of problems were still with us: economic problems which affect the entire world, SALT II, getting our federal budget under control, and several other critical domestic issues in the United States. There was therefore no disposition for us to be diverted by events abroad which exacerbated relations between us and the Soviet Union or anyone else. We had plenty of work to do. In addition, as a result of the SALT hearings in the Senate there was a perception that the Soviet Union had engaged in a massive expansion of its arms and that we had reached a point where we had to build our defenses in order to match the Soviet effort. This applied both to strategic and to conventional arms. In his position as Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee the Secretary had not been able to achieve any success in curbing such tendencies. Therefore, even before Afghanistan, support in the Congress for defense spending had reached proportions we had not seen since Vietnam. That support had grown even further after Afghanistan. The Secretary was sure that Gromyko was familiar with similar tendencies in his own country: if the military has public support for a build-up of weapons (and that was really their job), it became very difficult to erode that support for economic reasons, to fight inflation by reductions in domestic spending. The whole situation had added burdens which we certainly did not welcome. It is with this background that the Secretary welcomed the present chance of talking with Gromyko, assuming that perhaps some misapprehension on the Soviet part with respect to our reaction to Afghanistan might be cleared up. What we might do about the Afghanistan problem was another matter; the Secretary had no answers and could only express the hope that out

of these discussions might come some ideas that would lead in the direction of resolving the problem.

Gromyko said he fully understood that it was not an easy task to respond to the question he had asked at the very beginning of their present talk. To provide an objective response to that question it was necessary to refer to the actual facts which had a bearing on it. He would now recall some of these facts, which could not be refuted by the Secretary or the President or anyone else if the purpose was to arrive at an objective assessment of the present situation.

The first such fact was the following: several years ago the U.S. had undertaken a sharp escalation in the area of weapons. The question arose as to whether the U.S. had deliberately engaged in an increase of military spending at the very time when the Soviet Union at the U.N. in New York was proposing measures aimed at disarmament or at least at restraining the arms race, measures to be taken jointly by both states. In spite of that the U.S. had gathered with its allies in Washington and had taken the decision to engage in a sharp upsurge in military spending for many years ahead. This had come as a surprise for the Soviet leadership and not only for the Soviet leadership; this had been taken to mean that the U.S. was moving counter to all the efforts the Soviet Union had undertaken jointly with the U.S. and with other countries toward curbing an arms build-up and toward disarmament. And, he would point out, this had taken place long before Afghanistan. How was the Soviet Union to assess this fact? At that time there had not even been a hint of any problem in the Afghan situation. The second fact was that following the meeting between President Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna,⁴ the U.S. had promptly moved ahead with the decision to introduce large numbers of new weapons in Europe, weapons which were usually referred to as medium-range missiles, some of which, however, also had strategic significance, although, *Gromyko* strongly emphasized, in Vienna both sides had solemnly declared that approximate equality existed between the forces of the two sides. President Carter had spoken to that effect and *Gromyko* could assert that because he had been present. Brezhnev had said as much on this subject. As soon as the U.S. President had returned to Washington, it had turned out that what he had solemnly stated in Vienna was not at all in accord with reality, and what he said now had run counter to the statements he had made in Vienna. Official Washington took the position that it was necessary to introduce new weapons into Western Europe. *Gromyko* was sure that there could not be two different truths; there was only one. Where was the truth? Was it what the President had said in Vienna or what he had said in Washington? *Gromyko* stated emphat-

⁴ See Documents 199–208.

ically that the fact was that in Vienna he had expressed a generally objective assessment of the existing equality between the sides; i.e., the Soviet Union and the United States, while in Washington he took the position of striving for a military advantage for NATO and first and foremost for the United States. Gromyko would now cite a third fact; the Secretary had mentioned SALT II and while he, Gromyko, had intended to speak on this subject separately, he would present the third fact here. This fact was that the U.S. had undermined the Treaty. The U.S. Administration seemed to have been selling it, but it could be said that in fact it had buried the Treaty. This, too, happened before the events in Afghanistan. The U.S. Government invented a certain situation in Cuba, and this had made it very clear for the Soviet authorities that something was brewing in Washington. The Soviets understood then that the Cuban situation had been invented artificially for a specific purpose. It became clear that SALT II was being pigeon-holed for a long period of time and that the Senate had decided at an early stage to remove SALT II from its agenda. Leaving aside the fact that the U.S. had taken a very frivolous attitude toward an agreement that had been carefully arrived at as a result of lengthy negotiations, and had been signed by the two heads of state, the practical result of withdrawing SALT II from the ratification process had struck a severe blow at the relations between our two countries and had gone a long way to undermine the Soviet Union's confidence and trust in the U.S. Administration, its words, and its agreements and understandings with the Soviet Union. Indeed, the U.S. Administration was acting quite frivolously—achieving understandings today and rejecting them tomorrow. Gromyko said that the Secretary might reply that in the U.S. the President, the Secretary of State, many officials and other people, among them the Secretary's predecessor as well, had made speeches in favor of SALT II. It is true that some statements to that effect had been made, but they were of the kind that undermined rather than supported the substance of the Treaty.

These three facts were irrefutable; they could not be denied by anyone. All three taken together and, indeed, each one of them separately, constituted a well-rounded system designed for striking a severe blow at Soviet-American relations. Considering the role that the U.S. and the Soviet Union played in world affairs, such a severe blow could not but have a negative effect upon the international situation as a whole. This had already produced a strong effect: many people today are worried about their tomorrow. The Soviet leadership had the impression that there were some people in Washington who had completely lost their self-control, particularly in these days, when weapons of terrible destructiveness were in the hands of both sides. This was an entirely different situation from anything twenty, thirty, or forty years ago. The Soviet leadership asks itself how responsible statesmen could

make such frivolous statements on a question of such vast importance for the entire world. Gromyko had no desire to name names today; the people he was referring to were well known to the Secretary, people who influenced the foreign policy of the United States directly or indirectly. If one analyzed the whole situation, one was forced to ask how all this could have come about. It was indeed true that not only the U.S. Administration, but also those forces in the U.S. which play a role in determining U.S. foreign policy had taken such views. How could it not be clear to them that the absence of friendly relations between our two countries would destroy detente and be contrary to the genuine interests of world peace? Here Gromyko wanted to emphasize in this first contact with Senator Muskie in his capacity as U.S. Secretary of State that the Soviet Union was equally interested in improving the international atmosphere, and its relations with the U.S., as was the U.S. He would ask the Secretary not to misunderstand: when the Soviet Union raises these questions and expresses concern, it is not standing there with outstretched hand, begging as it were. No, the Soviet Union proceeds from the premise that both countries are equally interested in basing their relations on equality and respect for each other. At the present time it appeared that the U.S. was proceeding from a different principle. It was trying to get an advantage over the Soviet Union, to outstrip the Soviet Union in its military might. Many skillfully worded official statements in the U.S. made this quite clear, failing to conceal this striving for superiority over the Soviet Union. Indeed, it is quite impossible to conceal something like that. The Soviet Union will not and cannot permit such superiority to develop. Perhaps some U.S. officials underestimated the capabilities and determination of the Soviet Union in this respect. They keep on trying to get an advantage, but the Soviet Union will not permit that to develop, whether in arms or other crucially important fields. He would say that there was no need for anyone in the U.S. to step on Soviet toes or seek to gain an advantage. This would hardly be a promising endeavor. If one looked at the entire history of Soviet-American relations, many presidents—Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and now Carter—not even to mention Franklin Roosevelt, for at that time our two countries were fighting on the same side—both our countries always benefited only when they conducted their relations on the basis of equality and mutual respect, when they did not try to gain an advantage over each other. It is only on this basis of equality that he wanted to and indeed could conduct our bilateral relations.

Gromyko noted that the Secretary had said before leaving Washington that at this meeting between them he would not intend to go into detail, but would want to speak in more general terms on matters of principle. Gromyko could only agree to such a way of proceeding. He had discussed this matter with L.I. Brezhnev personally and they

had decided to let the Secretary know through the Soviet Embassy in Washington that they agreed to speak in terms of principle. That was indeed what they were doing now. Gromyko emphasized that if the most important principle of equality was adhered to in the conduct of our mutual relations, our two countries could move forward toward normalization. Should that principle be violated, however, it would be most damaging to both our countries, and here he was not speaking in terms of money only; not everything could be measured in terms of money. On that basis the Soviet people in general, its Party, its Central Committee, and its outstanding leader, L.I. Brezhnev personally, favored the development of normal relations with the U.S. and believed that hostility between us would not only be unreasonable but would also inflict major damage and involve enormous risk. Taking into account the enormous strength of each side there was no need to prove the enormity of the risk involved. The risk ensued from hostility, from the possibility that someone might not always carefully manage these forces. Gromyko would point out that he expected no profit or interest payments from propaganda efforts. Therefore, when he and his colleagues said that there was no reasonable alternative to peaceful relations between us, this was not propaganda, not by any means. In the Soviet view this represented a realistic assessment of the existing situation, and up to very recently U.S. political leaders had also made identical statements on this subject. He recalled the statement made by President Carter in Vienna last year—he had been present on that occasion.

Gromyko said that he intended to speak separately on the problem of Afghanistan, but would stop at this point in order to give the Secretary an opportunity to respond to what he had said so far.

The *Secretary* agreed to this way of proceeding; two words occurred to him to describe a problem which he supposed would always plague our two countries in dealing with each other. Both concepts resulted from our respective strengths. One of these words was “miscalculations”; the other was “misreading.” The Secretary intended to cover briefly the first three points Gromyko had made.

- 1.—defense spending,
- 2.—Pershing missiles, and
- 3.—SALT II.

In discussing these issues he would not assume that he would be able to disabuse Gromyko of all misperceptions. As concerns NATO spending, he supposed that Gromyko had referred to the 3% real increase in spending each year over the next five years, which the NATO defense ministers had agreed upon two years ago. The fact was, of course, that with respect to the forces in Europe it has been difficult for opponents of such increases to prevail in view of the Soviet build-up and in view of the fact that the steps taken in the MBFR negotiations to

reduce those forces had not succeeded. The NATO ministers were persuaded that the advantages gained by the Soviet side were of such an extent as to make it necessary to increase spending by NATO countries each year. Of course, the entire question had been a controversial subject in our Congress. Not all the NATO countries had met their commitment. There were some dissimilarities between NATO conventional forces vis-a-vis those of the Soviet Union, and it was these dissimilarities that the increases had been intended to correct. In our judgment at least, the kind of increases provided for would not constitute an offensive threat for the Soviet Union. Whether that level of spending can be sustained, of course, is a question and will to a large extent depend upon successful conclusion of the MBFR negotiations. As for the Pershing missiles, which had been developed long ago, the Secretary would only point to the development of Soviet SS-20 modern and advanced missiles, against which we did not have comparable weapons in Europe. The Secretary would also recall in this connection that the decision taken by the NATO countries December 12 last year involved weapons that were not covered by the SALT Treaty. Each side, of course, viewed this differently: we saw this in terms of the SS-20s deployed, while the Soviet side viewed this in terms of missiles that were not yet in place. We believed that it was entirely legitimate to discuss this issue and still supported such talks because whenever one side or the other goes ahead with new weapons systems, this was bound to raise questions on the other side. The asymmetries involved concern different defense requirements in view of the Soviet Union having a larger and stronger army. This was one of the complex questions—how to act with respect to requirements that were not symmetrical. The Secretary had the impression that in the SALT negotiations both sides had exercised a great deal of skill in dealing with such asymmetries.

As for SALT II, Gromyko had referred to the Senate's decision to remove this issue from its agenda. In fact, however, no such decision had been taken.

As for Cuba, perhaps we had misread the situation in Cuba, but in any case this item had dealt a setback to ratification of SALT II. By the end of 1979 that perception had blown over and we had thought it possible to obtain ratification and were determined to do so. He could only assure Gromyko that this was so, although he realized it may take some time before Gromyko could accept that assurance as to the background of SALT II ratification.

As for the question of equality, the Secretary would tell Gromyko that he had long ago abandoned the notion mentioned by Gromyko that either side could win an arms race should we give each other the signal that arms control was no longer possible. However, he did not believe this to be the case. He was in a position to think back to World

War II; in fact, he had been in it. Until the early 1960s we had been in a superior position in nuclear arms. A number of conflicts had arisen during the early 1960s (for example, the Cuban missile crisis), but that had not deterred us from seeking genuine arms control negotiations. It had not stopped us from understanding that equality and not superiority must be the test. We had watched the development of Soviet technology and knew what the Soviets could do. We had no desire or expectation that the Soviet Union would come to us as a petitioner as it were. It had come to us as an equal, and the Secretary accepted that and believed that the people of the U.S. had accepted that. The Secretary would add one other characteristic which rendered the situation most difficult: equality was a fact that can be recognized, while respect was something that had to be earned. Trust and confidence in each other's intentions and motivations had been shaken. What Gromyko had said indicated that clearly. On the other hand, what the Secretary had said with respect to Afghanistan was that the situation there had also created these kinds of doubts. He agreed with Gromyko that normalization of relations served each of us better than any other basis. He did not know if there was any test of normalization of relations between the two superpowers. It was difficult to arrive at in view of our different cultures and histories. Whenever any nation has the kind of power that we each had, it was difficult to establish mutual trust. We knew that and believed the Soviet side knew that. Much could be said that would be useful for discussion at great length. The Secretary was glad that Gromyko had raised these points, because he had seen press reports about the concern in the Soviet Union with respect to our country. He would only suggest that Gromyko consider the situation thoroughly and use his experience in arriving at a judgment that he could convey to his people.

Gromyko said that before addressing the Afghanistan issue he wanted to make two or three points in connection with the questions the Secretary just discussed. The Secretary had alleged that the U.S. and NATO move to deploy medium-range missiles in Western Europe had been dictated by the deployment of SS-20 missiles. In this connection he had to tell the Secretary that this was not a new weapons system. The SS-20 was an old missile, but the Soviet Union was modernizing it; in brief, equipping it with MIRVs, although the overall yield of the missile remained the same. Thus, what NATO had done in Western Europe and in the Mediterranean was something entirely different. It had decided to deploy new missiles armed with nuclear weapons, which could reach deep into the territory of the USSR. Apart from that, he could recall a time when the U.S. did not have ships in the Mediterranean, armed with nuclear weapons that could also reach deep into the territory of the USSR. Now such a fleet was there, and so were U.S. air forces in the British Isles, also capable of reaching Soviet territory, not

to mention the territory of Soviet allies such as Bulgaria, GDR, Hungary, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. He would point out that Soviet SS–20 missiles cannot reach the territory of the U.S. and that this weapons system had not been designed for that purpose. Consequently, if there is equality in Europe at present, the balance works in the favor of the U.S.

Gromyko was sure that the Secretary knew all of this very well. Therefore, it seemed to him that when the Secretary was referring to Soviet actions, in particular deployment of SS–20s and alleged that these constituted a threat to NATO forces in Europe, he was convinced that the Secretary himself did not believe that Soviet arms or Soviet policy could be a threat to the U.S. and NATO. But, if that was so, he would ask the Secretary to put himself in his shoes and think objectively. As for the Soviets, since there was no basis for NATO's decision, it had to ask very serious questions as to the purpose of some of the statements made in this connection. It was evident to Gromyko that such statements were made for the purpose of concealing NATO's own actions. That was how the Soviet side assessed the situation, and he would ask the Secretary to look at it objectively.

Gromyko said that further, as far as strategic weapons were concerned, the U.S. was now planning to deploy the MX missile. He had to tell the Secretary that the Soviet Union had not yet reacted to those plans, that it had not yet had its say. The time will come when the Soviet side will have to say something about this system of strategic arms.

Further to the subject of strategic arms, Gromyko noted that some statements had been made, including one by the Secretary after entering upon his new duties, to the effect that SALT II had been suspended, but that the U.S. would like to have an understanding with the Soviet Union for both sides to observe the obligations under the SALT II Treaty as if it had entered into force. That was strange logic indeed. How could there be a situation when a treaty was not in force, but the parties to the treaty had to observe its provisions? No, it seemed to him that this could not be done. Those who made statements to the effect that a treaty not in effect obligated anyone to do something or other were probably the only ones in possession of the secret of how that could be accomplished.

Gromyko had a second point. Since he and the Secretary were speaking frankly he had to tell the Secretary something that might not be to his liking. It was a fact today that the Soviet Union did not fully trust the U.S., that if the two sides were to agree that they would observe the provisions of the Treaty, the Soviet side would not have full confidence that the U.S. side would do so, in view of what had been done by the U.S. side with respect to agreements and understandings

concluded with the Soviet Union. This was all he had to say on the subject of arms.

Afghanistan

Gromyko now wanted to turn to the subject of Afghanistan. He would deal with it in the context of how this problem had affected other problem areas between us. First of all, he would like to demonstrate the complete untenability and absurdity of an argument current in the U.S. today. He had not yet heard it from Secretary Muskie in so many words (in this respect being a new man was an advantage), but he had certainly heard many statements on the U.S. side to the effect that the Soviet Union wanted to dig in in Afghanistan. It was said that the Soviet Union wanted to occupy Afghanistan in order to target the oil-rich regions in the Gulf of Iran, thereby either depriving the U.S. of the possibility of buying Iranian oil, or making it more difficult to produce and to transport oil from the Persian Gulf to the U.S. Gromyko wanted to emphasize as strongly as he could that such a view was possible only as a result of a very low level of understanding of Soviet policy, a very low level indeed. Some people were talking of some sort of "Arc of Crisis" which started no one knew where and ended perhaps in Africa or perhaps even in the Atlantic. The Secretary should realize that such an "arc" existed only in the thinking and imagination of those who talked in this manner. The Soviet Union did not need any kind of Iranian oil. The very manner of looking at the question from this standpoint could only be regarded as schoolboyish, nothing more. He believed it important to explain the Soviet position on this subject to the Secretary. He did not know whether he would be able to convince the Secretary, but such was the Soviet position nevertheless. He would state it on behalf of the entire Soviet leadership and L.I. Brezhnev personally.

Now to the substance of the Afghanistan question. The Soviet Union had introduced its forces into Afghanistan at the request of the Afghan Government in order to assist it in repelling outside aggression against that country. That request had been made not only by the present Afghan leadership, but had also been made repeatedly earlier by Amin and before him by Taraki. The Soviet leadership had reflected on that request for a long period of time, hoping and expecting that the external intrusion would cease. Under the UN Charter such intervention could only be qualified as aggression. When the Soviet leadership saw that this aggression was being expanded, when it saw that forces were being trained and armed on the territory of Pakistan and then sent into Afghanistan, the Soviet Union had sent in its contingent of troops. The Secretary surely knew that the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan runs through a mountainous region and that there were literally hundreds of passages through the unsecured border. Each year at

least 100,000 people crossed through them. When forces crossed from Pakistan, where they had been armed and trained, the Soviet Union had come to the conclusion that it must send in its own forces to put an end to the threat to Afghan independence. At the very outset, the Soviet Union had stated that as soon as the reasons for which it had sent in its forces ceased to exist, and as soon as the Afghan Government was in a position to ensure its country's independence, the limited Soviet troop contingent would be withdrawn from the territory of Afghanistan. The Soviet Union had stated that on the very first day of its action, and the U.S. Government had the text of the relevant Soviet statement. He would repeat that statement today and add that there was no need for the Soviet Union to say anything else in clarification. There had been no zigzags in Soviet policy. If anyone on the Western side believed that the Soviet Union would comply with the wishes expressed in several capitals, and withdraw its forces as a precondition for a political settlement in Afghanistan, he would have to tell the Secretary very frankly that those who had such expectations were very poorly informed of the actual situation. They had their heads in the clouds and were engaging in fantasy and unrealistic polemics.

Nevertheless, statements continue to be made, calling upon the Soviet Union to withdraw its forces. That is totally ruled out. He would repeat that as soon as aggression against Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan and to a lesser extent from that of Iran was halted, the Soviet troop contingent would be withdrawn. He was availing himself of the opportunity to clarify Soviet policy for the Secretary.

Gromyko said that the Secretary might want to ask the question (and he had encountered such questions in his talks with others): was it really true that there was a massive invasion into Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan or Iran for the purpose of fighting against the present Afghan regime? He would ask the Secretary to look into this matter more thoroughly. He would suggest that he ask President Carter and Zia ul-Haq, President of Pakistan, that he ask if there are dozens of camps on the territory of Pakistan where forces are being assembled, trained and equipped, and whether incursions into the territory of Afghanistan are taking place. Even President Carter had recently said publicly: "Yes, we do assist those forces and will continue to assist them." He had called this assistance, but in fact it was a struggle against the regime in Afghanistan. President Zia had confirmed this and said that he was aware that this was taking place, but that he could do nothing to stop it. It was strange, indeed, that the President of Pakistan cannot stop all this, although it was taking place on the territory of his country; that he was unable to put his house in order. Gromyko wondered if the Soviet Union should offer its assistance to Zia to accomplish that purpose. However, he had not heard Zia make such a re-

quest of anyone. As for the domestic affairs of Afghanistan, one thing had to be said firmly: questions of the internal leadership of Afghanistan were internal affairs of that country and could only be resolved by the Afghans themselves. No one had the right to interfere in these matters. The President of Pakistan had said that he did not wish to negotiate with the President of Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal. Gromyko wondered whether Zia had asked himself the question of how many people liked the present leadership of Pakistan. Many people recalled that Zia himself had come to power at the point of a rifle or bayonet; but now Zia did not want to talk to these people, although people did talk to him. Gromyko wanted to emphasize that the core of this problem was that any settlement had to be arrived at in negotiations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, that there must be peace between these two countries. The Afghan leadership agreed with this premise and was prepared to enter into negotiations. Naturally, Iran must be involved as well, but first and foremost this was a matter of relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Just two days ago the Afghan leadership had once again made its proposal, but Zia says that he does not want to sit down at a table with them. Gromyko would urge the Secretary to try and persuade Zia to enter into negotiations. If he genuinely wished to settle this matter peacefully, Zia must be persuaded to enter into negotiations. The Soviet Union was certainly in favor of a political settlement, and believed that such a settlement was necessary and possible. Thus, it was necessary to persuade Zia. As soon as the invasion of Afghanistan was halted and a settlement reached, and relations between Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iran returned to a peaceful basis, Soviet forces would be withdrawn and Afghanistan's neutrality would be guaranteed. Of course, guarantees would be required and, as Brezhnev had said, one such guarantor power could be the U.S., perhaps also the Soviet Union and some other countries. That question, too, should be discussed between Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. Gromyko could not understand why this was not acceptable to the U.S. He had explained his position to the Secretary. He had explained that the Soviet Union favored a peaceful solution, but no one should demand that Afghanistan conduct its affairs to suit some other capital, whether it be London or any other. In conclusion, he would point out that this was an internal matter for Afghanistan. He would urge the Secretary to reflect on this matter. In the Soviet view it was something well worth reflecting on. If such a course is followed and a settlement reached, the question of Afghanistan will simply disappear and disappear completely. It was currently being used in an artificial manner to stop progress on other issues. While the Secretary might not agree, Gromyko was certain that it can and must be resolved in a political manner.

There were two more issues Gromyko wanted to address briefly—China and Iran.

China

This was one issue to which the Soviet Union had drawn attention repeatedly. L.I. Brezhnev had talked about it during his meeting with President Carter in Vienna last June. In effect the U.S. had now started to cooperate with China in a number of fields and to some extent at least—Gromyko did not know to what extent—in military areas. In the past U.S. Administrations had repeatedly stated to the Soviet leadership, including L.I. Brezhnev, that the U.S. would not endeavor to develop its relations with China to the detriment of its relations with the Soviet Union. Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter had made statements to that effect. Today, however, the situation appears to be different. Gromyko could tell the Secretary that from the standpoint of our bilateral relations, both present and future, and also from the standpoint of the long-term prospects of world peace and the entire international situation, such a policy will be very harmful indeed. He felt there was no need to go into detail, except to point out that the very heart of China's policy is a course toward war (in their dreams, a war between the United States and the Soviet Union). In fact, this is the main reason for the break between the Soviet Union and China. Soviet policy is a policy of peace, theirs a policy of war. Of late, the Chinese leadership has retouched their war-like statements to some extent, but their basic policy remains war-like and can have very dangerous consequences.

So much for China.

Iran

Turning to the question of Iran, Gromyko said that some political leaders had frequently asked him why the Soviet Union had not publicly advocated release of the American hostages,⁵ saying that this would ease tensions throughout the world. Gromyko would tell the Secretary that the Soviets had made very clear statements to the effect that the holding of U.S. hostages by Iran violates international law and all relevant international conventions. Moreover, the Soviet Union had undertaken a private demarche with the Iranian leadership through restricted channels, calling for the release of the American hostages. At the time of this demarche Washington had been informed to that effect; that was several months ago. But, instead of hearing thanks for its initiative, the Soviet leadership had heard nothing but an avalanche of unfriendly statements against the Soviet Union. True, there was a minor assistant who had expressed appreciation, in passing as it were, but the

⁵ Reference is to the aborted, April 24, 1980, attempt to rescue the U.S. hostages in Iran. Information about the Iranian hostage crisis and rescue attempt is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. XI, Iran: Hostage Crisis, November 1979–January 1981.

Soviet leadership had heard nothing from the President of the United States or from the Secretary of State. Let no one throw stones at the Soviet position with regard to hostages. But, the Secretary knew very well that the Soviet leadership did condemn military methods of liberating the hostages. It believed that such methods cannot help the United States and can only damage U.S. prestige. That also applies to the recent action undertaken by the United States. In his judgment, had the mission proceeded, it would have resulted in the death of all the hostages and probably in the death of many other people as well.

The Soviet Union did not need anything at all from Iran. Let Iran develop its own country peacefully and live in peace with all its neighbors and everyone else.

Afghanistan

Gromyko wanted to add one additional thought with respect to Afghanistan. He would like the Secretary to know that the Soviet Union was in favor of Afghanistan being a non-aligned state, and that it had informed the Afghan leadership to this effect. Non-aligned status for Afghanistan fully suited the Soviet Union.

The Secretary noted that they had come to a very difficult problem. He believed that their discussion today could be most valuable if he were to convey to Gromyko a frank description of perceptions in the United States.

Gromyko had asked how a treaty could be in effect if it had not entered into force. He would point out that restraint does not require a treaty. It was obvious that restraint could not operate indefinitely in the absence of a treaty, but restraint might be useful for both sides; both sides would be taking risks. That was the reason why he and President Carter had made statements about mutual restraint pending ratification. That was a policy that they wanted the Soviet Union to consider. Neither of them regarded this as a substitute for the SALT Treaty but rather as an interim kind of measure. He recalled that something similar had been done during the negotiation of the Test Ban Treaty, i.e., the sides had exercised mutual restraint prior to signature of that Treaty.

Afghanistan

With regard to Afghanistan the fact was that as a matter of geography many Americans viewed the Soviet move into Afghanistan as giving the Soviet Union the potential to interrupt our oil supply lines whether or not such was the intention of the Soviet Union. This was a very sensitive matter and as long as the Soviet Union appeared to possess such capability, it was bound to lead to apprehensions among the American people. After all, we were thousands of miles away from the Strait of Hormuz while the Soviets were just 200 miles away. This

indicated clearly that even in the absence of any inimical intentions by the Soviet Union, its move into Afghanistan was regarded as a risk, whatever the reasons for it. He would add that in the Senate Budget Committee hearings a number of witnesses had appeared who were not at all in agreement regarding Soviet motives. Thus US concern in this regard was not a frivolous matter. If it were, we would not have acted that way.

As for the justification Gromyko had provided for the Soviet move into Afghanistan—if by massive arms intervention from the outside he had meant the involvement of U.S. forces, that was not a fact. He had to say that we were not yet persuaded that there was justification for the Soviet action. However, he had listened to what Gromyko had told him today. In fact, he had come here to listen.

Gromyko had also asserted that the Soviet Union had moved its troops into Afghanistan at the request of that country's government. And yet, Amin, who had been President of Afghanistan at the time of the Soviet move had not survived. That appeared to us to be very strange indeed.

As for the precondition Gromyko had mentioned, the Secretary had simply stated the fact at the outset of the present talk that the problem of Afghanistan was a roadblock to the development of relations between us. It would not be hard to make a distinction between that statement and a statement concerning preconditions. He would only repeat that if this problem was not resolved, it would be very difficult to make progress elsewhere. Therefore, the failure to withdraw Soviet troops had to be regarded as the largest obstacle to resumption of detente. He would repeat that he had not spoken about a precondition, but had simply stated a fact. What formula could express this adequately remains a problem.

As for the proposal Gromyko had outlined today, it was the same proposal that had been offered by Afghanistan during the last two days. We had studied it and saw the biggest problem in legitimization of the government of Karmal. Such legitimization would give the Soviet Union full control as to the judgment when the reasons for Soviet intervention cease to exist. Therefore we had trouble with this proposal. He naturally intended to indicate to President Carter that he and Gromyko had discussed this proposal today.

China

Normalization of U.S. relations with China in the first instance was not directed against the Soviet Union. Before normalization the Secretary had led a Congressional delegation into China in the belief that it made sense for us to normalize our relations with that country. We were not contemplating any military alliance with China. Indeed, we

had not sold any weapons to the Chinese and could see the risks involved in such a relationship. It was unfortunate that the situation in Afghanistan created pressures to develop a military relationship with China, although we had no intention to develop such a relationship. Our relations with the Chinese were aimed at assisting that country to modernize in peaceful areas. Gromyko surely was well aware of the fact that as part of our agreement with China we continue to provide arms to Taiwan. We agree with the Soviet Union that it would be unfortunate if pressures to develop that relationship continue.

Iran

The Secretary said that he was aware of Soviet support and opposition to taking hostages last January. He appreciated that support in spite of other difficult problems we have with each other. But he had to tell Gromyko that two questions were being raised in the United States in connection with Soviet actions with respect to Iran. First there was a feeling among some that the Tudeh Party of Iran was an instrument of Soviet policy in that country, and that part of the problem with the hostages was the fact that no one in Iran today had authority. The Iranians have not finished structuring their government; perhaps when they finish we might be able to do business with whoever emerges. Secondly, the Secretary had been told of radio broadcasts from the Soviet Union that were provocative in nature and fed anti-American feelings in Iran. He would make one final point in conclusion. The rescue effort we had undertaken was not regarded by us or intended as a military effort against Iran. It was strictly a rescue effort. It was his view that any government would be remiss in its responsibilities if it did not consider and implement efforts to rescue its citizens. It was unfortunate that our effort had failed, but no one could say with certainty what would have happened had it succeeded. In any case, the rescue effort had served a useful purpose in dispelling some of the frustrations felt by the American people. The hostages have now been held for more than six months and it must be clearly seen that the United States as a great power had displayed extraordinary patience toward a much smaller power such as Iran. The course of patience is what we must follow and hope that diplomatic contacts with Iranian authorities would demonstrate to them that their own best interests dictated release of the hostages. The Secretary did not know whether we will succeed or not. In any case, the failed effort had bought us some time. This was an election year in the United States and he did not know whether in the heat of the contest a policy of patience can survive. Gromyko knew who the contestants were and he could draw his own conclusions. Conservative opinion in the United States is on the rise and it has had its effect on questions involving detente, arms control, and defense spending. There are pressures on the President who is running for reelection and

he cannot ignore those pressures. The Secretary suspected that he had been selected for the office of Secretary of State precisely because he had a political constituency that would take pressure off the President. He was willing to do that. In that spirit he had come to the present meeting in order to explore possible solutions. He hoped that its result would be more than simply he and Gromyko gaining confidence in each other. He hoped that some ideas for solutions would emerge from this meeting, enabling both sides to pick up the policy of detente, which in the Secretary's view was the only sensible and serious course to follow. Both of them had said things to each other that were unpleasant, trying to be frank. Perhaps they would be able to communicate some of these sentiments to those they represented.

Iran

Gromyko first wanted to reply to the Secretary's comments about the Tudeh Party. This was an internal domestic political force in Iran, and the Soviet Union had nothing to do with it. It seemed to be an old habit of political leaders in Washington to refer to special relationships between the Soviet Union and such forces as the Tudeh Party. He could only say that these political leaders were victims of their own inventions.

As for the Soviet radio broadcasts to Iran of which the Secretary has spoken, Gromyko could only point out that these broadcasts stated official Soviet policy, i.e., condemnation of the military means contemplated by the U.S., condemnation of the actions of the U.S. fleet of contemplated blockade and mining. That was official Soviet policy and it had been stated in the broadcasts. It was difficult for the Soviet Union to understand why such military actions were being contemplated or undertaken. In particular, the last rescue operation seemed to him to be contrary to the purposes the United States wanted to accomplish. Had it continued, it would surely have led to the death of all the hostages and perhaps many other people. It would surely be much better to get the hostages out alive. As for the broadcasts the Secretary had mentioned, if one were to compare these broadcasts with those the United States beamed at the Soviet Union, one could only come to the conclusion that if medals were awarded for hostile statements, the United States would walk away with all the medals. He would only ask the Secretary not to consider these to be Olympic medals since the United States obviously did not believe in the Olympics.

Gromyko said that the only policy toward Iran the Soviet Union was pursuing was aimed at seeing an independent, sovereign state, peacefully developing its own interests without any outside interference or intrusions.

Gromyko noted that they were now approaching the end of their conversation and surmised that each of them would probably be asked

a lot of questions by representatives of the press. For himself, he would say that they had had a meaningful discussion, that they had discussed a number of important problems of Soviet-American relations, as well as a number of important international problems. Since this was the first meeting between the Foreign Ministers of our two countries in several months, it could be said that the meeting was necessary and he would express the hope that it will turn out to have been useful as well. Quite obviously, certain questions will continue to crop up between our two countries, but he would express the hope that the Secretary will reflect on what Gromyko had told him today and that he would find a way to provide a response through whatever channels were available to him.

The Secretary said that he would make a very similar statement to the press. In addition, he would say that he preferred not to discuss the details of this talk before reporting to President Carter. Of course, that will be somewhat more difficult for him than for Gromyko, for a number of press representatives were flying back to the U.S. on the Secretary's plane. He would try to resist their pressure. He believed that it was very important for them to have had this talk. He had not expected that either of them would come up with proposals to which the other one could agree. But he believed it important that they each understand what the real problems with each other are so that they can work out proposals to resolve these problems.

Gromyko agreed with the Secretary's view of the importance of their meeting today. He had believed that it would turn out to be useful, and he had been joined in this view by all his colleagues in the Soviet leadership, including L.I. Brezhnev, with whom he had a long talk just yesterday.

279. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, May 27, 1980, 1505Z

8339. Special encryption. Subject: Ambassador Watson's Call on Foreign Minister Gromyko. Ref: (A) State 135799, (B) State 137543.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. Summary: I had a wide-ranging discussion with Gromyko on various issues affecting U.S.-Soviet relations and, drawing on Department's instructions, made a general presentation of our views on these subjects. On the overall state of U.S.-Soviet relations, Gromyko repeated the Soviet position that responsibility for normalization of relations and repairing the damage is that of the United States administration. He took an uncompromising line on the Afghanistan question and urged the U.S. to "be more or less objective" so that "a common language can be found" to resolve this issue. He said the U.S. underestimated the significance of the May 14 Afghan proposal.³ On arms control negotiations, Gromyko claimed that both bilateral and multilateral negotiations were "terminated" by the U.S. before Afghanistan. While stating that the entire burden of blocking SALT II was on the U.S. side and that the Soviets do not place much hope on repeated U.S. statements of intent to have SALT II ratified, he voiced guarded optimism over "hints" of positive developments leading possibly to SALT II ratification. On the U.S. offer to negotiate mutual and equal limitations on LRTNF within the SALT III framework, Gromyko said this is not contrary to the Soviet position but that the way to do it was on the basis of the Soviet proposals for the cancellation or suspension of the NATO LRTNF decision and after SALT II ratification. He specifically rejected preliminary negotiations on TNF. He supported the Madrid CSCE Conference, but cautioned against anyone undermining the conference well in advance of its taking place. Concerning Iran, he repeated the Soviet position on diplomatic immunity, charged that the U.S. is ex-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 5/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate, Nodis.

² Reference telegrams are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–2034 and D800255–0782. Telegram 137543 to multiple posts, May 24, issued policy guidance when talking with Eastern European governments on the following issues: Afghanistan, U.S.-Soviet relations, U.S. relations with Eastern Europe, SALT, TNF, MBFR, CSCE, and Iran.

³ The May 14 Afghan proposal is outlined in telegram Tosec 30031/127465 to Muskie in Vienna, May 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P890005–1914) The proposal, which was similar to earlier proposals, addressed issues of Soviet withdrawal, and was believed to be timed to influence the Islamic Conference.

plotting the hostage issue more and more against the USSR and condemned the U.S. rescue attempt and any use of force in Iran. On Cuban refugees, he basically said that Cuba was free to choose its own policies and the U.S. was exploiting the issue for hostile purposes against Cuba. On Soviet media and official attacks against President Carter, Gromyko deflected the issue by stating that if a comparison was made, U.S. officials and media accounts would win “first place” in the intensity of criticism against Soviet officials.

At the end of Gromyko’s long presentation I said it would be useless to comment on each of the points he made and singled out some of his key statements for rebuttal. I made clear that since the beginning of our relationship with the Soviet Union there has not been anything to parallel their military invasion of Afghanistan which was recognized as a nonaligned state. The Soviet action has jeopardized the international situation to such an extent that the Soviet Union must live up to its responsibilities and a way must be found to make some forward movement, lest the situation become even more dangerous. I stressed that it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which forced the postponement of SALT II ratification, that the U.S. intent to pass SALT II at the appropriate time was real, and that our interest in preliminary negotiations of LRTNF within the SALT III framework was serious and could help relieve tensions. I pointed out the unilateral Soviet deployment of SS-20’s is the cause of the unbalance in European theater systems. Finally, I concluded that Gromyko’s allegations of the U.S. seeking unilateral strategic advantage were patently false. End summary.

3. I called on Foreign Minister Gromyko on May 25, at our request, and made a basic presentation based on Department’s instructions contained in reftels, which included U.S.-Soviet relations post-Afghanistan, arms control negotiations, Iran, Cuban refugees and attacks on President Carter by the Soviet media and officials. I also handed over our representation list of divided families and a shorter list of U.S. citizens and their families who wish to depart the Soviet Union. Gromyko asked that I proceed with my talking points and that he would respond after I had finished. He took notes on specific issues throughout the course of our meeting. I preceded my presentation by informing Gromyko that I would be leaving this week for the United States to testify before the SFRC on the state of our relations and expressed my appreciation for his meeting with me on such short notice. Gromyko was cordial and relaxed throughout the course of the meeting and made his remarks in a calm and reflective manner interspersed with instances of his well-known barbed wit.

4. Gromyko prefaced his remarks by stating that his government would reserve the right to make any additional response or comments,

if necessary, after studying the substance of the points I had raised more fully. Gromyko then stated the following:

5. Afghanistan

You emphasize that Afghanistan is the main event which has brought about the deterioration in relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union and which is responsible for the general deterioration in the international situation. We categorically reject this. We believe that the problem has been artificially exaggerated. Afghanistan is not the main problem, especially if it is viewed factually. In any event, Afghanistan should not be viewed as a problem resulting in negative consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations and for international relations in general. The U.S. completely distorts the meaning of Soviet actions and the introduction of Soviet forces into Afghanistan. We introduced those forces to help Afghanistan repel aggression and did so according to the UN Charter and our treaty with the Government and leadership of Afghanistan. We have not violated anything by that action and have acted in accordance with international law. We categorically reject all these distortions of the situation which are made by Washington. We shall withdraw our forces after we are requested to do so from the Afghan Government and, of course, if there is such a request. Also, our withdrawal is dependent on whether or not interference and intervention cease from Pakistan and Iran and they stop fighting against the legitimate Government of Afghanistan. The withdrawal of our forces will be accomplished also when an agreement is reached and it is guaranteed. The question of a withdrawal of our forces before that is beside the point. Those who raise such questions are wasting not only their time but our time. We have expressed our position publicly and Leonid Brezhnev has done so on more than one occasion. Our position has been explained to the United States and I repeated it the last time in my meeting with Secretary Muskie.⁴ Our position should be clear to you. Why does the U.S. continue to take such an unrealistic position on Afghanistan after all these explanations? We are aware of what Washington and the West wish to see happen (in Afghanistan) but are you prepared to take a realistic position? If the U.S. were prepared to be more or less objective, a common language can be found but, I repeat, only if you are prepared to look objectively at the situation and take an objective position.

Concerning the Afghan Proposal which was recently made and which the U.S. has been critical of, it seems to us that the U.S. underestimates the significance of that proposal. If you do wish to settle the situation around Afghanistan, your attitude would be different. The

⁴ See Document 278.

Afghan Proposal is aimed at normalizing the situation around Afghanistan, including Pakistan. It is a good basis for normalizing the situation.

6. Arms control

The U.S. alleges that the events in Afghanistan and Soviet activities had provoked some negative effect on negotiations that had taken place on arms control before Afghanistan. Indeed, there were negotiations in both the bilateral and multilateral fields but it was the U.S. that terminated them before that. Why did you do this? You must know the number of times the American side terminated negotiations because it did not want them. And all this before Afghanistan could have ever been thought up. That approach should be rejected.

7. As for SALT II, you are aware of our position. The entire burden of blocking the entry into force is on the U.S. side. The U.S. has made very many statements on SALT ratification. We have had promises, half-promises and quarter-promises. Therefore we don't attach much weight to these promises. What comes out of these statements are nothing—zero. There have been hints given of positive developments. We will now see how the U.S. administration acts from now on. To be optimistic would be hasty on our part. Nevertheless, the entry into force of SALT II would be a major event and would contribute to U.S.-Soviet relations and the international situation as a whole.

8. On SALT III, it seems the U.S. administration believes it is possible to exchange views on medium-range systems. When the question arose lately on an exchange of views on SALT III, it was understood we could do so if SALT II was ratified. This is not contrary to our understanding. There are ways to resolve the question of medium-range systems in Europe and it is possible, but the way to do it is on the basis we have proposed. In order to resolve the problem without any long delay what is needed is to cancel the NATO decision or to officially suspend its implementation. Concerning preliminary negotiations, how can one separate preliminary and non-preliminary negotiations? What will be decided in these negotiations will be the same subject. Nothing will change if you call these negotiations preliminary. But you have removed the basis for these negotiations. Washington did not want those negotiations and the West has sought unilateral advantage. We want to work on the basis of the principle of equality. Leonid Brezhnev said that to Carter in the Vienna meeting and I repeated this to Muskie in Vienna. We cannot accept a situation where the U.S. seeks unilateral advantage. The idea of preliminary negotiations does not remove the barricades surrounding this problem.

9. U.S.-Soviet relations

Concerning actions which have allegedly harmed the fabric of U.S.-Soviet relations, this is a distortion of the situation. The responsi-

bility for normalizing and repairing the damage is that of the U.S. administration. It's not Soviet actions which have damaged U.S.-Soviet relations or the Afghanistan problem. Rather, these relations have been damaged as a consequence of the U.S. administration's frivolous actions, not to put it harder. The real reasons for the damage are not Afghanistan at all. One has the impression that Washington is trying to cram all the hard words it can into this issue. They understand our policy and character poorly in Washington. Before, they used to understand our policy and our character better and they viewed U.S.-Soviet relations more soberly. It is not we who are responsible for what has happened in our bilateral relationship.

10. Attacks on President Carter

It is not our style to be much interested in personalities and refer to them frequently in statements in our mass media. But there is an avalanche of anti-Soviet statements in the U.S. media and on the part of officials including those at the highest levels. We have no special interest in mentioning personalities like President Carter. From time to time some representatives of the President make references concerning us which, I can assure you, cannot be compared to what is done in the Soviet Union. You would certainly win first place on this issue. References are made in our media, but we do not take any official steps toward our press.

11. CSCE

We are for Madrid and wish it to be positive and successful. This depends, of course, if all the countries including the U.S. work for the success of the conference. But if any party wishes to undermine the conference well in advance, then it will have to bear its responsibility.

12. Iran

Briefly, our position on the hostages is well known. We condemn the arbitrary actions against diplomats. As I told Secretary Muskie, we sent private messages to the Iranians and informed Washington about that. The response of the U.S. administration was a rude and tactless reaction. We received the most hostile statements from Washington. We decided at that time that Washington was not thinking of putting the various elements of its policy together or that Washington was thinking of the matter in an entirely different way.

It would have been an elemental matter to explain one's gratitude for our actions but, when we saw that our actions were not appreciated and that Washington was not interested in our assistance, we decided that the minimum behavior of the U.S. administration clearly deprived us of the opportunity to take another step on the hostage question. It is hard for us to act on that problem when it is used against the Soviet Union, and it is being directed more and more against the Soviet Union.

The U.S. cannot really think that Washington's camouflage can actually hide that aspect of U.S. actions.

We resolutely condemn U.S. military action against Iran and there can be no other approach. Iran did not invite you, you did yourself. No one objectively can agree to your military action. We resolutely condemn any use of force in Iran in any form.

13. Cuba

We are for having the Cubans resolve their emigration issue and problem themselves. They are free to resolve their emigration problem in their own way. It is an entirely different problem how one or another government may assess the Cuban Government's policy. As far as we know, Cuba is doing nothing which goes beyond its sovereign rights. The U.S. is exploiting this question for hostile purposes against Cuba. This fact is demonstrated in the southern part of the United States, and especially in Florida facing Cuba. The U.S. is a big country. Why is this all necessary? These actions can backlash against your policy. U.S. policy can find no justification beginning with your presence in Guantanamo and ending with the emigrant issue. I will confine myself to these remarks on this issue.

14. Upon the completion of Gromyko's remarks I told him that I would, of course, communicate what he said to my government and that it would be useless at this point to try to address each point he had made, many of which I took strong objection to. I then singled out some of his key statements for rebuttal and made the following comments.

15. Since the beginning of our relationship with the Soviet Union we think there has not been anything that parallels the Soviet Union's invasion of Afghanistan which was recognized as a non-aligned state. I stressed the importance of the historical implications of the Soviet Union's actions and that they had endangered international stability and peace. The Soviet Union must understand this. It is now necessary to find a way to make some progress in removing tensions lest the world situation become even more dangerous. In this respect the Soviet Union must live up to its responsibilities as a world power.

16. I questioned Gromyko's remarks on U.S. termination of arms control negotiations. It was evident that withholding SALT II ratification was our decision and that we recognize our responsibility to move forward on that at the appropriate time. However, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan which forced the postponement of SALT ratification. Also, I was unaware of the U.S. unilaterally terminating any major arms control negotiations. Concerning TNF negotiations within the framework of SALT III, I stressed that what was important was to make forward movement in arms control negotiations wherever we can and, thereby, reduce tensions. That is why the U.S. is prepared to begin preliminary exchanges on TNF without preconditions or delay even before

SALT II is ratified and SALT III begins. I pointed out that it was the Soviet deployment of SS-20's which has given the Soviet Union a definite lead in theater nuclear weapons in Europe. Our theater systems would not be deployed until the mid-80's. In effect, the whole purpose of our TNF decision was to establish equilibrium in Europe, which had been disrupted by unilateral Soviet deployments.

17. Concerning Gromyko's remarks on our quest for unilateral advantage, I told him that his allegation was patently false. After spending two years on arms control matters, I saw no way that either side could successfully seek unilateral advantage in a thermonuclear environment.

Watson

June–December 1980

280. Memorandum From Paul Henze of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, June 2, 1980

SUBJECT

CIA's Book & Publication Programs

CIA's comptroller called me this afternoon to say that they had reached the end of the line in their efforts to persuade OMB to provide adequate funds to keep the book and publication program going in FY1981—OMB had simply turned them down and Turner concluded he must appeal to you for further support. So they are sending a draft letter from you to McIntyre. I will review it and send it to you as soon as it arrives.²

It is appalling—as we all know—that these excellent programs should have fallen into such jeopardy at a time like this. You probably noticed the piece in the NYT last week on Chojecki.³ These programs relate to his activity in many ways—and what he is doing in Poland is an example of what others like him may eventually be able to do in other places, including the USSR, if we keep these activities going. . . Chojecki, by the way, republished Jan Nowak's memoirs in Poland.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 55, USSR: 7/80. Secret; Sensitive.

² Brzezinski highlighted the last two sentences and wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "I will back it strongly. Make a compelling case, factually and budget wise. ZB."

³ Reference is to John Darnton's article on Miroslaw Chojecki, a Polish chemist who published censored works. See "Polish Underground Publisher Flouts Censor and Thrives," *The New York Times*, May 28, 1980, p. 2.

281. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, June 5, 1980

SUBJECT

US-Soviet Relations

PARTICIPANTS

Alexander A. Bessmertnykh Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Marshall D. Shulman Special Adviser on Soviet Affairs to the Secretary of State

*Muskie-Gromyko Meeting at Vienna*²

Bessmertnykh said that before the meeting took place the Soviet side had been following with some apprehension the things that were said about the meeting beforehand. However, Bessmertnykh said that Gromyko had come away from the meeting itself with a good feeling and with a favorable impression of Muskie. He had found him an extremely intelligent man who presented the US positions in a very effective, reasoned, and non-irritating way.

*Watson-Gromyko Meeting*³

Bessmertnykh said there had been some puzzlement in Moscow as to why Ambassador Watson had been sent in to see Gromyko so soon after the Vienna meeting. It seemed to them that the Watson message reflected a hardening of the US position and they wondered if something had happened in the interval to produce this hardening.

I indicated that one of the purposes of the Watson meeting with Gromyko was to be sure that Gromyko did not have the impression that the American reaction to Afghanistan was primarily a function of the election season; Bessmertnykh assured me that neither Gromyko nor other high officials in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs believe that this was so or thought that their troubles on this issue would be over after the election.

Negotiating Process

Bessmertnykh said that they had noted what the Secretary had said about the need to keep the channel open and they agreed with this, although it might be a while before the Afghanistan problem can be re-

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 5, MDS–Bessmertnykh Meeting, 6/5/80. Confidential; Sensitive. Drafted by Shulman.

² See Document 278.

³ See Document 279.

solved. "We will definitely get out of Afghanistan—there can be no doubt about that—but it may take a while before conditions make this possible." The negotiating process should not wait until we are ready to withdraw, he said. It would be good if there could be discussions beforehand of the steps that each side could take as part of the process. Perhaps there will be a role for third countries to play in the process.

In the meantime, he said, the channels of communication should not be solely occupied with Afghanistan. Other subjects could be discussed as well.

He said that Gromyko would probably take his vacation from the latter part of July into August. The Soviet Embassy here had not received definite word, but he assumed that Gromyko will be coming to the United Nations General Assembly in late September, as he has done in previous years. His personal view was that if there were to be a meeting between the Secretary and the Foreign Minister in New York at that time it might be good; conversely, the absence of such a meeting would be regarded as a negative break with the precedent of earlier years.

Bessmertnykh is leaving for his regular vacation in the Soviet Union this coming week. He expects to be back in the latter part of July, and anticipates that Dobrynin would take his vacation following Bessmertnykh's.

Soviet Vessel Port Stop

At the end Bessmertnykh asked me whether we could do anything to clear up the refusal they had received about the stop of a Soviet vessel in Baltimore for five hours on June 26 to pick up members of the Soviet Embassy and take them on a vacation cruise. The Baltimore Port Authority had cited political and labor factors in their refusal, but Bessmertnykh believed that the labor difficulties had been cleared away in a conversation with Gleason.⁴ Vasev had mentioned this to Barry yesterday, and Bessmertnykh said he would appreciate anything we could do about this since all the vacation schedules at the Embassy had been built around the anticipated port stop of the ship. I said I would do what I could.

⁴ Not further identified.

282. Letter From Secretary of State Muskie to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko¹

Washington, June 5, 1980

Dear Mr. Minister:

Since our meeting in Vienna,² I have given a great deal of thought to your views on the situation in Afghanistan and to our own concerns about events there. I noted your indication of an interest in continuing an exchange on this issue and on the importance of improving relations between our two countries.

It is the position of the United States that any viable solution to the problem of Afghanistan must be based on the principles of non-intervention and non-interference in the domestic affairs of sovereign nations. Accordingly, with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces from Afghanistan, the United States will be prepared to join in assurances and arrangements to establish a truly independent and non-aligned Afghanistan, administered by a government acceptable to the Afghan people.

The United States has no interest in interfering in Afghanistan's internal affairs. We will not endorse arrangements designed to perpetuate a government imposed upon Afghanistan through foreign arms. Nor could we agree to conditions which affect adversely our own vital interests in the area or those of Afghanistan's neighbors.

If the foregoing approach is accepted by the Soviet Union, the United States would be prepared to explore some transitional arrangement, to be implemented along with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet troops from Afghanistan, for the purpose of ensuring that peace and tranquility are restored in Afghanistan. The creation of an international peacekeeping force could be considered in this connection.

It is the US view that a solution based on such principles would facilitate the restoration of more cooperative relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Sincerely,

Edmund S. Muskie

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 5, Muskie/Gromyko Letter, 6/5/80. Secret; Sensitive.

² Document 278.

283. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, June 12, 1980, 1916Z

9449. Subj: (S) Delivery of Secretary's Letter² to Gromyko on Afghanistan.

Ref: (A) State 150827, (B) Moscow 9439.³

1. (S-entire text.)

2. Summary and comments. Though Gromyko was in an amiable mood during my 90-minute meeting with him this afternoon, his line on Afghanistan was hard. In effect, he said that the proposals in the Secretary's letter offered no prospects for reaching a settlement, stating that insistence on prior withdrawal of Soviet troops is a dead end. If the US really wished to promote a political settlement, he said, it should urge Pakistan to stop the aggression and enter into a dialogue with Afghanistan.

Gromyko repeated what he said he had made clear at Vienna—that the withdrawal of Soviet troops could take place only after—repeat after—an agreement on cessation of external aggression had been reached and implemented. He focused on the formulation in the Secretary's letter on implementing other arrangements "with the prompt withdrawal of Soviet forces" but seemed to reject any notion of simultaneity. He criticized the idea that outside states should have any voice in the nature or composition of the Afghan regime and, while not absolutely rejecting it, questioned the reasons for suggesting third-party peacekeeping forces. As for "transitional arrangements," referred to in the letter, Gromyko said the proper subject for discussion under that heading would also be the stopping of outside aggression—this by implication being the transitional stage to a troop withdrawal. After discussion of Afghanistan, Gromyko made a demarche (reported separately) on the two recent NORAD computer malfunctions.⁴ End summary and comments.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 5, Delivery of June 5 Muskie Letter. Secret; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 282.

³ Telegram 150827 to multiple diplomatic posts, June 7, transmitted the text of Muskie's letter to Gromyko and telegram 9439 from Moscow, June 12, reported the delivery of Muskie's letter to Gromyko. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880029–1204 and P880025–0504)

⁴ Telegram 9472 from Moscow, June 13, provided the Soviet demarche on the June 3 and June 6 NORAD computer malfunctions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0488)

3. At the outset of my meeting with Gromyko at 4:45 this afternoon (June 12), I mentioned briefly my meetings in Washington last week with the President, the Secretary, and members of the Senate and House committees, then stated that the Secretary had asked me to deliver a letter, which was the result of very careful deliberations in Washington. Gromyko first asked his interpreter to read a translation of the letter into Russian, then went over the English text very carefully himself.

4. In the initial translation, the Soviet interpreter, in the second sentence of the second paragraph (“accordingly, with the prompt withdrawal of all Soviet forces . . .”) rendered the word “with” as “after” (posle). My political counselor, who was present as notetaker, interrupted to suggest that “after” was not an accurate translation and after some discussion with the interpreter and USA Director Komplektov it was agreed that “pri” might be a better Russian translation.

5. Gromyko stated that he would like to say the following in response to the Secretary’s letter; the position of the USSR was set forth very clearly and precisely in Vienna during my meeting with the Secretary. I will repeat briefly the essence of that position; the Soviet Union will be prepared to withdraw its military contingent from the territory of Afghanistan, as it has stated many times, after—and I emphasize the word after—the aggression and armed intrusion into Afghanistan from the territory of Pakistan and, naturally, from Iran also, to the extent that it is taking place from Iran, is terminated. If that termination is guaranteed, [omission is in the original] contingent will be withdrawn. Until that has been done, there can be no discussion of the withdrawal of the Soviet contingent.

6. Gromyko continued that the Soviets resolutely reject any statements that the Soviet Union is interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, any allegation that the introduction of the Soviet military contingent is a form of interference in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, or any allegation that it is as if the Soviet forces created the current leadership or current regime of the Afghanistan Government. “We introduced our contingent in order to assist Afghanistan at repelling aggression, in order to liquidate interference in the most flagrant form—armed interference in the affairs of Afghanistan. It is not our action which constitutes interference; rather our military contingent is the means of eliminating that interference, of repelling aggression.” It is in this way that the situation must be viewed if one wishes to view it objectively.

7. Gromyko continued by stating that one can hear from the American side statements to the effect that the Afghan leadership or regime must be acceptable to other states, especially to neighboring states such as Pakistan. Since when, he asked, do other states have the right to

create the regimes or leadership of a neighboring state? Such claims must be resolutely rejected. One can only marvel at the view of those who say that the nature of the Afghan Government must correspond to the taste of its neighbors. Does the US really share such a view, that for the Afghan regime to have the right to govern it must suit the taste of the leaders of other states?

8. Turning to the reference in the Secretary's letter to an international peace keeping force, Gromyko asked whether the reference was to the forces of other states, forces which were not now on the territory of Afghanistan. Why, he asked, were such forces needed? The US administration knows very well that this is not a realistic idea, that it has no prospects. Gromyko said he could only express surprise at the reasoning of the USG in expressing such a view.

9. If, Gromyko went on, the US administration really wanted to contribute to a resolution of the problem, to settle the situation around Afghanistan, it could do so. It would simply need to drop a few weighty words to Pakistan to the effect that Pakistan should stop the aggression and all acts of banditry which it is now taking against Afghanistan. One must be afflicted with political blindness, he added, to take such acts against Afghanistan, because the goals of the organizers of the aggression are futile. Gromyko then added that he was not speaking formally to the paragraphs of the Secretary's letter but rather was responding to the position of the US administration on the Afghan question. It appeared, he said, that that position is expressed in the letter of the Secretary of State, and at this he could only express regret. He added that a policy has strength only when it is based on an objective formulation, on a realistic evaluation of the situation. That factor is unfortunately lacking from the policy of the USG on the Afghan question. So far, we have seen no attempt to take a more realistic position, no indication that Washington is so far ready to do so.

10. Gromyko then asked me to transmit the foregoing views to the Secretary with the request that he be understood correctly. He had no wish to enter into polemics; he had expressed his thoughts because there is a tremendous difference between the positions of our two countries on the Afghan question.

11. Without waiting for me to respond, Gromyko then picked up the letter again and began to comment on some of the individual formulations. The reference, he said, to "arrangements" in the second and fourth paragraphs in itself represented flagrant interference in Afghan affairs. The possibility of such "arrangements" is totally excluded, he said; there is no room for an accommodation of our positions.

12. In referring to the "prompt withdrawal" of Soviet troops, Gromyko continued, the letter loses sight of the main question, which is stopping the armed aggression from the territory of Pakistan and Iran.

To stop that armed intrusion, an agreement is needed. Once agreement is reached, to sign a paper embodying the agreement takes only three minutes. It is after that that the question of the withdrawal of Soviet forces will arise.

13. Gromyko then focused on the passage in the fourth paragraph concerning exploration of a “transitional arrangement” and asked what was envisaged by that. Obviously, he said, it referred to the early language in the letter concerning changing the regime and leadership of Afghanistan. If the US has something else in mind by “transitional” then it should say so. But to be precise, what one should have in mind by a “transitional arrangement” is the stopping of the aggression. That is what he would consider the appropriate transitional stage; what the US meant by the term he did not know.

14. I then responded that Gromyko had covered a great many points and that I would only reply to a few of them. We in the Embassy, I said, had considered this message from the Secretary as something which would open the door at least a crack for further discussion. I was therefore disappointed at Gromyko’s reaction to the letter. On the one point in which there had been initial confusion in translation, I commented that, although I was not in a position to interpret the Secretary’s letter, which I thought spoke for itself, my own understanding was that the phrase “with the prompt withdrawal” would mean “simultaneously”. As for Gromyko’s suggestion that the US was somehow in a position to facilitate the stopping of the “aggression,” I said it was difficult to see how we could prevent the sorts of intrusions from outside on which he generally based his conversations, but said we would like to have any suggestions he might have in that regard. As for his assertion that the Soviet Union is not interfering in Afghan affairs, I commented that I have frequently expressed the position of the US on that matter and would not waste his time by repeating it. Finally, as for his comment concerning the acceptability of the Afghan Government to its neighbors, I said I had the impression that it in fact would be in the interest of the Soviet Union to have an acceptable government because of Afghanistan’s traditional buffer status. Gromyko seemed to be adding a new dimension. To this latter point, Gromyko said that I had not interpreted his position correctly; the interest of the Soviet Union was that there be a leadership established by the Afghans themselves and that no one interfere in its internal affairs.

15. Gromyko then returned to the question of simultaneous action, stating that it was surprising to suggest that there could be a coincidence in time between the withdrawal of Soviet troops and the stopping of aggression. It should be an easy task he said to stop the aggression and easy to sign an agreement on stopping it; this would take only a few minutes. But the withdrawal of forces takes time. And a with-

drawal cannot take place in any way other than by the guaranteed agreement on the stopping of aggression and the entering into force of that agreement. "There can be no thought of simultaneity of these two things; the concept is devoid of sense."

16. Gromyko then referred to statements that the US side is "still" not convinced that armed intrusions into Afghanistan are taking place from Pakistan. He acknowledged that the terrain was difficult and the border complicated but insisted that the intrusions were nevertheless taking place and that no thinking person would seriously assert the contrary. One only need read statements being made in Washington and also by the Pakistani president. He also attacked a statement by President Zia to the effect that it was not within his power to stop the intrusions, asking whether this meant he was unable to manage the situation in his own country and what one could expect in the way of adventures from such a country. But the point is, he said, that no one believes in Zia's inability to stop the intrusions: this is a deliberate distortion of the situation.

17. Gromyko asked that Secretary Muskie think over what he had had to say. If the US also wants a political settlement of the issue, he said, there is a possibility for settling it. What is required is for Pakistan to stop the carrying out of intrusions from its territory. The Soviet Union has no doubt that a word from the USG to that effect would be of great significance for stopping the action. Gromyko then stressed the importance of a meeting between representatives of Pakistan and Afghanistan in order to reach agreement on the complex of issues involved, criticized Pakistan's rejection of such a meeting, and expressed the view that the USG could play a realistic role in initiating a dialogue between Pakistan and Afghanistan. He also noted that such a dialogue between Iran and Afghanistan was desirable but added that he doubted a US role was possible in the case of Iran.

18. Responding to Gromyko's earlier question about the introduction of third party forces, I noted that Afghanistan is currently occupied by Soviet troops, that it is a very primitive country and that when the Soviet troops pull out someone must be there to maintain order. Of the possibilities which might be explored, it seemed to me that the UN might offer one approach. As for his reference to our endeavoring to persuade Pakistan to sign an agreement on "stopping the aggression,"⁵ I thought if he reread the Secretary's letter carefully would find that that possibility was not excluded so [long?] as there were other actions on the part of the Soviets. While I said I thought it unnecessary to comment on all of the positions he had stated with which we disagree, I

⁵ An unknown hand corrected the previous phrase by adding "As" and "Pakistan." They wrote "corrected para" in the right-hand margin adjacent to the paragraph.

would emphasize that it would be difficult for us to support a regime which had been established and maintained by Soviet troops. But I added that we had been over the ground before on our respective views on the nature of the current regime and that it was perhaps unnecessary to repeat those views.

19. Before turning to another subject, Gromyko asked me to tell the Secretary that the formulation in his letter was a deadlock—that insistence on prior withdrawal of Soviet troops is a dead end. And to discuss the simultaneous withdrawal of troops and the stopping of the aggression is “quite impossible”—it is like trying to add together two things that are quite different and incompatible—like comparing the painting on the wall with the weather in Moscow. Warming to his simile, he went on that to try to compare these things is like saying Kom-plektov wants to go to the Crimea and isn’t that a very pretty clock.

20. At the conclusion of the meeting Gromyko, taking up a new subject, read a statement concerning the recent NORAD false alarms (reported septel).⁶

21. Department please repeat to other posts as desired.

Watson

⁶ See footnote 4 above.

284. **Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (McIntyre)**¹

Washington, June 16, 1980

SUBJECT

CIA's Soviet/East European Book and Publication Program (S)

At my request, CIA has provided the attached summary² of the funding status of its highly cost-effective book and publication distribution program targeted at the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. This long-established program, notably sophisticated and with demonstrated impact in its target areas, has taken on added significance since the invasion of Afghanistan and the resultant strain in East-West relations. It provides the basis for continued stimulation and channelizing of discontent and ferment among elites in these Communist societies and feeds the processes which take the form—most spectacularly—of the dramatic open letter of Academician Sakharov which was published in the *New York Times Magazine*³ last Sunday. It is important that this program have the funding to continue at the very least at a level of effectiveness achieved prior to the Afghan invasion. Releases from the CIA Reserve in the amounts sought by the Agency appear to me to be fully justified to sustain it. They do not require appropriations of new money. I urge you to authorize them as soon as possible *for this matter is urgently in our national security interests.*⁴ (S)

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 55, USSR: 7/80. Secret; Sensitive.

² Not found attached.

³ See "Sakharov: A Letter from Exile," *The New York Times*, June 8, 1980, p. SM8.

⁴ On June 27, Brzezinski received a response from John P. White, Deputy Director of OMB, in which White recommended using existing CIA unobligated program funds. The first two reasons among several that White used to support his argument were 1) "CIA has not presented any materials to OMB or to the Congress that demonstrate its impact in the target area or its cost-effectiveness. It measures accomplishments in terms of titles and items distributed." and 2) "The CIA and DCI, while continuing to support a program, have repeatedly assigned a low priority to maintaining the program even at the current level in terms of titles/items distributed." (Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 55, USSR: 7/80)

285. Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Muskie¹

June 27, 1980

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I have carefully read your letter of June 5,² which is a continuation of the exchange of views we started in Vienna.³ As we agreed at that time the purpose of this exchange is to promote the improvement of Soviet-US relations, to seek solutions on a wide range of bilateral and international problems of mutual interest.

Now about the specific problem you raised in your letter: that of Afghanistan.

As you know, a few days ago we withdrew from Afghanistan, in agreement with the Government of the DRA, some Soviet military units. It was done in view of the fact that the present situation does not make it necessary to maintain in Afghanistan our military contingent of previous strength.

It goes without saying that the Soviet Union will continue to render necessary assistance to Afghanistan against any actions aimed from outside at depriving it of independence and territorial integrity. You must be well aware of that, though, from the report by L.I. Brezhnev at the recent plenary meeting of the Central Committee of our Party and from the resolution on international questions adopted by that meeting in connection with the report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs on international situation and foreign policy of the Soviet Union.

The substance of our position with regard to a political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan is that it is necessary to ensure the cessation of armed incursions from outside into the Afghan territory, to reach appropriate agreements on normalizing relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, between Afghanistan and Iran, and to guarantee non-recurrence of all forms of outside interference aimed against the Government and the people of the DRA. It is precisely in this context that the question of withdrawal from Afghanistan of the Soviet military contingent, stationed there to help in repulsing outside aggression, could be also solved.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Country Chron File, Box 1, Afghanistan: 6–11/80. No classification marking. The initial “C” is written in the upper-right hand corner, indicating that Carter saw the letter.

² See Document 282.

³ See Document 278.

These are the considerations I wish to state in connection with your letter in addition to what has been already said in the conversations with the US Ambassador in Moscow.

In conclusion I deem it necessary to stress the following: in order to place Soviet-US relations into normal tracks, so that they would not be subject to fluctuations of political expediency but develop to the benefit of both our peoples and strengthening peace they cannot be built otherwise than on the basis of equality, mutual respect for each other's legitimate interests, compliance with agreements already achieved.

The Soviet leadership has proceeded and intends to proceed in future exactly from this premise. We would like to hope that the US side will also act likewise.

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

286. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency

July 1980

[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, NIC Files, Job 83T00237R. Secret; NoFORN. 5 paragraphs (24 lines) not declassified]

287. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to the Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget (White)¹

Washington, July 3, 1980

SUBJECT

CIA's Soviet/East European Book and Publications Program (S)

I have reviewed your memorandum² on the chronology of OMB's consideration of added funding for the Soviet/East European book program and am in sympathy with the points you raise. In considering all the factors, however, I believe that the importance to our national security interests of augmenting the program outweighs the potential risk in Congressional perceptions of the CIA Reserve for Contingencies. Therefore, I ask that you authorize the use of the Reserve for the remaining \$550,000. Though, as you say in your memorandum, your accession is reluctant, I appreciate your support in this matter, which—as you know—I consider to be very urgently³ in the national interest.

Zbigniew Brzezinski

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 81, Cabinet Members, Misc. Communications with: 1980–1981. Secret; Sensitive.

² See footnote 4, Document 284.

³ An unknown hand underlined “very urgently.”

288. **Memorandum From Steve Larrabee of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)**¹

Washington, July 3, 1980

SUBJECT

Strikes in Poland: A warning sign?

The situation in Poland remains unclear, but the reports of strikes in Ursus and Trzecz are disturbing. Even more disturbing is a report that Kania made a speech in Gdansk in which he said the Central Committee was no longer in control and that there would be shortages of bread and other staples in the future. (S)

The potential for unrest in Poland has always been fairly high, but it is accentuated now by the fact that the Soviets are particularly vulnerable. They are constrained by several factors:

—*Afghanistan*: the Soviets are currently tied down in Afghanistan and would be reluctant to commit troops elsewhere, especially in Eastern Europe.

—*the Olympics*: the Soviets will want to avoid taking military action just prior to or during the Olympics. This would absolutely kill the games and (hopefully) lead to massive withdrawals by many countries, especially in Europe.

—*Madrid and CDE*: any military action would make a mockery of Soviet calls for a Conference on Detente and Disarmament in Europe and probably lead to the postponement of the Madrid Conference. (C)

In short, the Soviets' hands are tied to a great extent, and in the face of any unrest in Poland, they will try to avoid military action if at all possible (at least until after the Olympics).

This gives Gierek as well as the leaders of the opposition a certain freedom of action which they may seek to exploit. In particular, the leaders of the opposition may feel that the Soviet Union is unlikely to take military action for the reasons outlined above and that now is the time to press the government for change and reform. Faced with such pressure from below, Gierek in turn may come to feel that he has to do something to keep the lid on or risk serious unrest which could lead to his overthrow or Soviet intervention.

At the same time, wishing to avoid military intervention, the Soviet leaders may be willing to give Gierek a freer hand to deal with the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 65, Poland: 7–8/80. Secret. Sent for information and outside the system. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that Brzezinski saw it.

situation and may be willing to tolerate greater changes in order to keep the situation from becoming more explosive. (C)

Any unrest is likely to be spontaneous and it is difficult to predict what the workers will do. But if real unrest does break out and begins to spread, it is likely that KOR and other dissident groups will try to forge alliances with the workers, and try to use the situation to press for reforms. As in 1956, Wyszynski is likely to play an important role as a broker. In return, however, he too would be likely to try to exact concessions from the regime. (C)

The above scenario may be overly alarmist, and the regime may well prove capable of containing any widespread public reaction to the price increases. But discontent in Poland today is so widespread and the regime's capacity for ineptitude so great that one cannot be too sure. Moreover, Poland's history of spontaneous unrest and political upheaval does not give one cause to be sanguine. It has been precisely such actions which have triggered widespread unrest and political change in the past—in 1956, in 1970 and in 1976. (C)

In sum, the strikes may prove to be isolated incidents but the potential for political upheaval—and even change—is there, and it would not take much to set off a chain reaction, which could have significant political repercussions. We should therefore watch the situation closely in the coming weeks. (C)

289. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 9, 1980, 1553Z

10852. Subj: Discussion With Korniyenko. Refs: (A) State 179940, (B) Moscow 10680.²

1. (S-entire text.)
2. My luncheon conversation with First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko today, at times heated and at times amiable, was general in

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 7/1–10/80. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

² Both reference telegrams are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–1617 and P880025–0435. Both telegrams address Watson's scheduled luncheon with Korniyenko. Telegram 179940 to Moscow, July 9, deals specifically with questions regarding transition arrangements in Afghanistan and TNF.

nature, covering a broad range of topics touching on the current state of US-Soviet relations. Much familiar ground was gone over again, but a few points of interest emerged:

3. TNF negotiations. I did not bring up the Soviet TNF proposal and Korniyenko offered no comments on the proposal itself. He did say, however, in the course of a general discussion of the desirability of resuming the SALT dialogue, that “it is possible” that the Soviets will be sending us a direct communication on the proposal they had discussed with Chancellor Schmidt. As he had told me at the 4th of July reception that there would be no such communication from the Soviets to us, it was clear that he was correcting himself on that score, though there was nothing definite in what he said.

4. NATO LRTNF decision. As is customary, Korniyenko asserted that the US had shelved the SALT II Treaty long before Afghanistan, and he made the usual references to the Cuban brigade issue, our defense spending increases, etc. A new argument which had not been made directly to me before was that the December NATO modernization decision violated “both the letter and the spirit” of SALT II. His argument was that the protocol to SALT II and the Joint Statement of Principles for SALT III made it clear that the cruise missiles issue was to be left open for discussion in SALT III. By deciding now to deploy cruise missiles we were unilaterally determining that the general issue of cruise missiles was no longer open for discussion and that we would only be prepared to discuss numbers of cruise missiles. I pointed out that this was not an interpretation which we can accept, since it was clear that the protocol had a fixed expiration date. In addition, as he had become almost belligerent in his allegations that we had scuttled SALT, I spoke with considerable frankness on Afghanistan as being at the root of the difficulties with SALT and with the state of our relations in general.

5. Afghanistan. I probed for any indication of interest in additional Soviet steps on Afghanistan but basically drew a blank. My political counselor, as we had agreed beforehand, raised the point suggested in ref A as to how the Foreign Ministry was translating “transitional arrangements”. He noted that, since the Soviets had thrown cold water on our willingness, expressed privately and publicly, to explore such arrangements, and since the Soviet press was translating the term as “settlement,” Washington was wondering whether the point might have been misunderstood. Both Korniyenko and USA Department Chief Komplexov insisted that it was not a question of translation but of concept. They then asked for a fuller explanation of what we had in mind by the concept, and we described transitional arrangements in terms of measures or a process by which we would get from today’s situation to a situation in which Afghanistan was once more an independ-

ent non-aligned nation with no foreign troops. As had been officially stated by the US, the sorts of arrangements that might be reached for that interim period were something that could be discussed if it was of interest to the Soviet Union.

6. Instead of responding directly, Korniyenko said that the President has already made clear what we had in mind by transitional arrangements in his February 13 press conference³ and that the Secretary had defined the term to Dobrynin by referring him to that press conference. This meant, in effect the overthrow of the legitimate Government of Afghanistan and was therefore unacceptable to the Soviet Union. I suggested that the February 13 remarks should be considered illustrative and that there was no point in going into any greater detail in the absence of a Soviet indication of interest in discussing the possibilities, while Korniyenko implied that there was nothing to discuss if the February 13 formulation was what we were proposing.

7. Korniyenko then reiterated in considerable detail the May 14 Afghanistan proposal,⁴ which he said the Soviet Union fully supported, and asked what was wrong with that approach to a peaceful settlement in Afghanistan. I responded that the basic problem for the Pakistani and Iranian Governments was that the starting point of that proposal was that they should deal with a government that had been imposed on Afghanistan by outside force.

8. US-Soviet relations. Early in the conversation and at various points throughout, Korniyenko made the familiar point that the Soviet Union desired no freezing in our relations and that the fault lay entirely with the United States for trying to link totally unrelated matters together. Though I had made the point in previous conversations with him, I again explained in no uncertain terms the political realities in the US which do mean that, until there is some real movement on Afghanistan, SALT ratification remains problematical despite the firm desire of the President and the Secretary to move the treaty through the Senate at the earliest possible time.

9. Aside from disputing the fact that Afghanistan was at the root of our problems, Korniyenko also tried to belittle the significance of the measures we had taken in response to Afghanistan. He spoke derisively of our refusal to request flight clearance for Armand Hammer⁵ to come to the Olympics in his private plane (something on which he said he had just received a telegram from Washington) and asked what pur-

³ During the February 13 press conference, Carter answered a variety of questions, including several about the situation in Afghanistan and the 1980 Summer Olympics. See *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981*, Book I, pp. 307–315.

⁴ See footnote 3, Document 279.

⁵ President of the Occidental Petroleum Corporation.

pose we thought was served by the grain embargo. I told him that the Hammer action was directly related to our Olympics boycott and that it, like the grain embargo, whether they had any effect on Soviet conduct or not, were designed to show the depth of our feelings about the Afghan invasion—a feeling which I noted was shared by the vast majority of the world's nations.

10. Possible meeting with Brezhnev. At the outset of the discussion, Korniyenko said he had discussed with Gromyko my earlier request for a courtesy call on Brezhnev and was authorized to tell me that Brezhnev would receive me when he returns from his current vacation. He first asked if it was correct that I was returning in mid-August, and I said I would be glad to do so if Brezhnev wished to see me then though my present plan was to return September 3. Korniyenko said I should not rush back and that early September would be fine.

Watson

290. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 10, 1980

SUBJECT

BW: The Sverdlovsk Incident

PARTICIPANTS

US
The Acting Secretary
PM—Reginald Bartholomew
S/MS—Marshall Shulman

USSR
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

Toward the end of a discussion on TNF,² the *Acting Secretary* mentioned that he had one other matter to raise. This concerned the outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk last spring. The *Acting Secretary* said

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Institutional File, Box 42, INT Documents: #4200s: 7/80. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Bartholomew. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Brzezinski wrote, "M[arshall] B[remer], Next step? ZB."

² The July 10 memorandum of conversation covering TNF is in the Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 47, Nuclear: TNF: 1-10/80.

that we felt that we hadn't been able to engage the Soviet Government on this matter to the extent its seriousness warranted. He noted that Ambassador Earle would meet with Dobrynin to discuss this issue in some detail.

Dobrynin responded by questioning what it was the US wanted, since this was not clear. He noted that the Soviets have already given us an explanation of this incident.

The *Acting Secretary* again stressed the seriousness we attach to engaging in bilateral consultations so we could satisfy ourselves on this issue, and not permit this question to undermine the BW Convention or damage prospects for arms control generally.

Dobrynin reiterated that they have given us what they have on this matter, and that the Soviets have not seen anything from us that would contradict their explanation. He said that our goal should be preserving the Convention and prospects for arms control. *Dobrynin* again stressed that what they have heard was based on hearsay, and that if we have anything else more to say in terms of evidence or proof would we please tell them.

The *Acting Secretary* replied by stressing that Ambassador Earle will provide information that will underline the seriousness of our concerns.

Due to the press of vacation plans, *Dobrynin* suggested that Ambassador Earle see Vasev instead and give him a paper, which *Dobrynin* would then make certain is dealt with in Moscow. *Dobrynin* stressed that he needed to take something back with him.

The *Acting Secretary* repeated that this was a serious political matter, that Ambassador Earle had important things to say about this question, and that *Dobrynin* should definitely try to see Earle before returning to Moscow.

Dobrynin said that he understood the seriousness of this issue, but suggested that it reflected domestic American election-year politics. But he asked whether we really had something to say. If so, this would be good. But he did not want to discuss just anything on this issue in a general fashion. People in Moscow are critical of the way in which this issue has been the subject of rumor, hearsay, and press reports.

The *Acting Secretary* said that this issue would be every bit as serious to the USG if we were now in the first year of this Administration instead of the fourth year. He suggested the possibility that the issue might be addressed by distinguished scientists from each country.

Dobrynin repeated again that up to now there has been no proof, and there have been indirect discussions in the scientific community

which have caused a chain reaction. There has not been a single additional fact but only hearsay.

The *Acting Secretary* concluded this portion of the conversation by urging Dobrynin to see Ambassador Earle on the BW question.

Attachment

Paper³

undated

In March 1980 at the Five-Year Review Conference of the Biological Weapons Convention, the United States Government reported that it had initiated consultations with the Soviet Union as the result of information which raised questions concerning the compliance of the Soviet Union with the Biological Weapons Convention. We indicated that we were proceeding in these consultations in a cooperative spirit and in accordance with the specific provisions of the Convention; we further indicated our hopes that the Soviet Union would also proceed in the same manner. At that time, anticipating that the bilateral consultations would take some time, the USG promised to make a full report on the results of those consultations to the Parties at a later appropriate date. This paper constitutes that promised report. (S)

The basic obligation of the BWC, set forth in Article I, provides that parties undertake “never in any circumstances to develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire or retain microbial or other biological agents, or toxins whatever their origin or method of production, of types and in quantities that have no justification for prophylactic, protection or other peaceful purposes.” The Convention also provides, in Article V, that Parties undertake to consult and to cooperate with one another “in solving any problems which may arise” relating to the application of the provisions of the Convention. (S)

Early in 1980, the United States Government became aware of an event which apparently happened in the city of Sverdlovsk in the Soviet Union during the spring of 1979. Information concerning this event raised questions regarding the compliance of the Soviet Union with the obligations it had undertaken in Article I of the Biological Weapons Convention. On the basis of the evidence then available, it was decided that the matter would be raised with Soviet authorities pursuant to Article V of the treaty. The timing of the request for information from the Soviets was complicated by the fact that, purely by coincidence, the

³ Secret.

long-planned Five-Year Review Conference of the parties to the Biological Weapons Convention had convened in Geneva and was in session at that time. (S)

The USG raised the matter in Moscow on March 17⁴ and informed the participants in the Geneva Conference of that action. The USG further promised to report the results of consultations with the Soviet Government to the parties to the BWC. In responding to the USG demarche, the Soviets acknowledged that a number of deaths had occurred due to an anthrax epidemic in Sverdlovsk in April 1979, but asserted that it was the intestinal form of anthrax resulting from contaminated meat. The USG again raised the issue with the Soviets on March 28 and proposed expert consultations as called for in Article V. The Soviet Government repeated its earlier explanation and denied the request for consultations. Most recently, in June, the USG reiterated its concerns to the Soviets and re-emphasized its interest in pursuing expert consultations as provided in Article V. The Soviet Government has again repeated its simple denial and refused its request for consultations to resolve the issue. (S)

The concerns which originally led the USG to raise this issue with the Soviet Government are as follows:

There is located in the south of Sverdlovsk a military facility which is subordinate to the section within the Soviet Ministry of Defense which is responsible for biological and chemical warfare. This facility is contained within a heavily secured perimeter and operates in secrecy. It includes structures, including animal pens, which suggest that it is engaged in research and/or production activities involving biological effects on living organisms. Other physical characteristics of the facility include structures suitable for storage of explosives. The facility was built before 1972 (i.e., before the signature of the Biological Weapons Convention), and it remains in active use up to the present time. (S)

According to reliable reports, during the first weeks of April 1979, at least 40 persons died in Sverdlovsk after experiencing pulmonary and other symptoms normally associated with inhalation anthrax. Many additional cases were reported in the following weeks, and a large hospital in Sverdlovsk became devoted exclusively to the treatment of anthrax cases—under military control and strict secrecy. (S)

Anthrax is an animal disease caused by a bacterial organism which may infect humans who are exposed to it. There are three forms of anthrax, which are distinguished by the manner in which the spores enter the body. *Cutaneous* anthrax, the most common form, is caused when spores enter through a cut in the skin of a person handling contami-

⁴ See Document 269.

nated animals or animal products. *Intestinal* anthrax results from the consumption of contaminated meat. *Inhalation* anthrax is caused by airborne spores entering the lungs. (Spores in animal hair or hides can become airborne in industrial processing of contaminated material.) Cutaneous anthrax is readily diagnosed, easily treated, and not usually fatal when treated. (Untreated cases result in death about 20% of the time.) The intestinal variety, however, often results in death. Inhalation anthrax is almost always fatal. Anthrax organisms which are ingested or inhaled are transported within the body to lymph glands (in the abdomen and in the chest, respectively) where they multiply and produce a toxin which spreads through the body and is difficult to arrest. These forms of anthrax are more difficult to diagnose, but are readily identified and distinguished from each other in clinical diagnosis. A principal difference between intestinal and inhalation anthrax which assists in clinical diagnosis is that the former type is usually characterized by abdominal distress and the latter by respiratory distress. Both varieties produce cyanosis, general toxemia, and death within about a week of exposure. (S)

The initial victims of the Sverdlovsk outbreak resided or worked in the immediate vicinity of the military facility described above. Many reports indicate the widespread belief in Sverdlovsk that the outbreak of anthrax was indeed caused by an accident at that military facility. The reported locations of the initial victims, near the facility, suggest that the disease could have reached them by an airborne cloud emanating from the facility. Meteorological data for the most likely dates of such an occurrence are consistent with this possibility. (S)

Official Soviet explanations of the outbreak as initiated by anthrax-infected cattle are not credible because of the large number of victims and the contrary clinical reports indicating symptoms of inhalation anthrax rather than intestinal anthrax. Furthermore, decontamination measures taken by Soviet authorities, including the spraying of buildings and terrain with disinfectants, were more consistent with a response to an airborne infection than with a response to the presence of contaminated meat. A quarantine of the affected region of Sverdlovsk was established and transportation out of the city was controlled. (S)

The information which gave rise to the USG's concerns has come from a variety of sources, including extremely sensitive technical and human intelligence information. The USG will not jeopardize these sources and methods of intelligence collection. Consequently the USG cannot elaborate further on its understanding of the events in Sverdlovsk or on the origins of its information. (S)

Although this evidence is less than conclusive, the USG believes that it raises questions serious enough to warrant pursuit of the issue

under Article V of the Convention. Despite three formal overtures from the USG, the Soviet Government has declined to cooperate and consult as provided in Article V. The US Government regrets that its concerns have not been allayed. (S)

The USG has attached great importance to seeking a resolution of this issue which would enhance confidence in the BWC, in contrast to one which could result in complications for future cooperation among nations in the vital sphere of arms control. The furtherance of the arms control process has been a common objective of fundamental importance to both the US and the USSR. It is hoped that the Soviet Government will respond to this report in a manner satisfactory to the other parties to the BWC so that the viability of the Convention, and the broader process of arms control so vitally important to the security of all the nations of the world will be enhanced. (S)

291. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 12, 1980, 8:30–9:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin

The Ambassador opened by saying that he wished to ask me two questions prior to his return to Moscow, because he will be asked them by the Politburo: (1) who will win the elections; (2) what outcome would be better for U.S.-Soviet relations?

I responded by saying that my objective judgment is that Reagan's lead will evaporate as the public nears the moment of decision regarding who ought to be the President of this country, especially since Reagan will not be able to withstand close press scrutiny, and that the reelection of the President is obviously better for U.S.-Soviet relations because the President can pursue both a policy of firmness in dealing with Soviet expansionism and arms control as well as detente. Accordingly, his reelection can avoid the decade of the 80's being a repetition of the unmitigated Cold War of 1945–1955.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 57, Chron: 7/1–16/80. Secret. The breakfast meeting took place at Dobrynin's residence.

Dobrynin responded by saying that he fully agrees but wanted to know what, in that case, prevented an improvement in our relations. I told him that there is no point in playing games with each other, that Afghanistan was clearly the issue because it not only posed a strategic challenge to our interests but also because it has become a symbol of what is perceived in this country as Soviet expansionism.

This led to a discussion of whether the Afghanistani problem can somehow be solved. I explained to him what we mean by the “transitional arrangements” designed to create a government in Afghanistan which is not hostile to the Soviet Union but which is not dependent for its survival on the presence of a Soviet occupation army.

Dobrynin maintained that we are in effect insisting that Babrak Karmal has to go, whereas the Soviet Union is willing to solve the problem on the basis of withdrawal of Soviet forces, once an Afghan army that is capable of sustaining Karmal has been created. “Why not accept then a solution based on the principle of neutrality and non-interference?” he asked.

I pointed out that Babrak Karmal is part of the problem that needs to be solved and hence cannot be the solution. To govern he has to have a Soviet army of occupation. Moreover, to govern without Soviet troops, there would have to be a massive and inevitably brutal counter-insurgency operation which would further poison U.S.-Soviet relations. This is why it is in our mutual interest to try to find an accommodation soon, perhaps through more extensive explorations of what a transitional arrangement would involve. If such a solution could be found, it would be a real breakthrough, making possible rapid progress on other issues, notably arms control.

Dobrynin then asked me about the prospects for SALT. I told him that the President and the Secretary of State are fully committed to it and that we will seek its ratification. However, (1) if the present situation in Afghanistan continues, ratification will be difficult; (2) if there is a massive Soviet counter-insurgency after the Olympics, ratification will become even more difficult because public emotions here will be further aroused; (3) but if there is some genuine progress on Afghanistan, pointing toward the withdrawal of all Soviet troops and involving perhaps some transitional arrangements, then the public would welcome SALT and ratification would be facilitated.

I added that the public wishes a firm policy toward the Soviet Union but also desires accommodation with the Soviet Union. It is our task to make that accommodation possible and I hoped that Dobrynin would impress the Soviet leaders with this thought.

He tried to discuss TNF and the Middle East with me but I told him that TNF had been discussed with Christopher, that on the Middle East I did not have anything new to say, and that in any case, I knew

that he would be having a more formal and comprehensive discussion on Monday with the Secretary of State. (I did not mention the fact that there will be a letter to Gromyko.)²

²In a July 14 meeting with Dobrynin, Muskie gave him a letter for Gromyko dealing with Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. (See Document 292.) The men also discussed issues pertaining to relations with China and how the U.S. election might affect U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations. The memorandum of conversation is in the Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 5, ESM/AD 7/14/80.

292. Letter From Secretary of State Muskie to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko¹

undated

Dear Mr. Minister:

In the interest of continuing our exchange on Afghanistan and US-Soviet relations, I would like to comment on your letter of June 27.²

We have carefully considered the implications of your announcement of the withdrawal of some Soviet military units from Afghanistan. Your letter indicates that there has been a reduction of the overall number of Soviet troops in Afghanistan, although neither your public announcement nor our own analysis indicate that this is necessarily the case. We will carefully watch for evidence of such a reduction.

As the Venice Summit Communique³ makes clear, the US and the other summit participants would regard such withdrawals as a useful contribution to the solution of the Afghan crisis if they are permanent and continue until there is a complete withdrawal of the Soviet troops. We would welcome as a significant step an indication of your intention to undertake a process leading to complete withdrawal and a political settlement.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/79–10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Telegram 185645 to multiple posts, July 14, indicates that Muskie gave this letter to Dobrynin during their meeting on July 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–1626)

² See Document 285.

³ The Venice G–7 Summit, June 22–23, 1980, was an economic summit held among the leaders of Canada, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States. For the final communique, see Department of State *Bulletin*, August 1980, pp. 7–11.

We recognize that the Soviet Union has legitimate interests in the security of its borders and in friendly relations with Afghanistan. In our view, an independent and non-aligned Afghan government prepared to maintain friendly relations with all its neighbors would be consistent with Soviet interests. Such a government would have to be acceptable to the Afghan people, for otherwise there can be no restoration of peace and tranquility in Afghanistan. Any legitimate concern you may have regarding outside interference in Afghanistan could be met by mutual and reciprocal guarantees of non-intervention and non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan by all concerned parties.

I would like to reiterate our strong interest in an improvement in US-Soviet relations based on reciprocity and mutual restraint. The key to an improvement in this relationship remains a political solution to the Afghan crisis which I believe can be achieved with the complete withdrawal of Soviet troops, pursuant to appropriate transitional arrangements. If you are prepared to discuss such a solution seriously, you will find us fully and immediately cooperative.

ESM⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that indicates Muskie signed the original.

293. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 15, 1980, 1722Z

11164. Dept. pass USDA/FAS for Saylor, Vovotny; USICA. Subject: Effectiveness of U.S. Grain Embargo on the USSR: Mid-July Assessment.

1. (C-entire text).
2. Although the grain embargo has been less effective than originally hoped for in terms of limiting total Soviet grain imports, it has nevertheless been costly to the Soviets. It certainly compounded the

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, International Economics, Tim Deal File, Box 14, USSR: Grain: 7/80. Confidential; Immediate. Sent for information to Belgrade, Berlin, Brussels, Bucharest, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, and USNATO. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

problems the Soviets were already suffering from the small grain harvest in 1979. Instead of importing the 36 to 37 million metric tons (MMT) of grain the Soviets had planned in 1979/80, they were able to buy only an estimated 31.2 MMT. Moreover, the Soviets paid a considerably higher price for the non-U.S. grain and may well have gotten lower quality grain. We have heard reports that the switch in origin of certain imported grain caused shortages and problems in formulating animal rations, particularly for poultry.

3. Based on published statistics, it appears that the Soviets have been able to maintain cattle and poultry numbers in spite of the embargo, but they have been forced to reduce hog numbers due to limited feed supplies. The rate of build-up in Soviet animal numbers has also definitely been slowed, affecting future production potential.

4. It now seems clear that the crop failure in 1979, combined with the embargo has resulted in a serious setback to Brezhnev's plans to improve the availability of meat and other animal products to Soviet consumers. Not only will meat production fall in the short-term, but we think the Soviets will have no chance of meeting planned production goals for sometime into the future. In effect, this means that per capita meat consumption, already at a low 57 kilograms (Poland is close to 82 kg), will not likely increase for sometime to come. Also during 1979/80, the Soviets were forced to draw down their strategic grain reserves to a level where we think it is causing considerable concern. Based on current crop prospects, plus estimated grain import availabilities in 1980/81, we see little, if any, chance of rebuilding these reserves without a further cut in meat production in 1981.

5. Recently there have been many reports about food shortages in the Soviet Union, mainly meat and dairy products. We believe such shortages are in part related to the U.S. embargo on grains sales. Although there are reports suggesting that current shortages are due to the Soviets stockpiling meat for the Olympics, Soviet published statistics show that meat production has been declining steadily since the first of the year. Cattle and hog slaughter weights are declining due to the tight feed situation. Partly as a result, total meat output in May was 5.5 percent below the same month a year ago. We feel official statistics will show that meat output in June will be as much as 8 percent below a year earlier. State procurements of meat have been running at an even lower level than production.

6. There is no question that the availability of dairy products is also less, with the embargo aggravating an already bad situation. Milk production in the Soviet Union has been trending downward for the past three years, mainly as a result of the difficult feed situation. Milk output so far this year has been running 5 percent under a year ago, and government procurements 6 percent under. The butter shortage is

probably the most acute problem as production has been sliding for the past 3 years. So far this year butter production is down another 8 percent. The Soviets have been attempting to shift limited milk supplies into cheese production probably as a protein food in lieu of the meat shortage.

Watson

294. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, July 18, 1980, 2021Z

189291. Geneva for Ambassador Flowerree. Subject: Soviet Response to U.S. Demarche on Sverdlovsk Incident.

1. S-entire text.

2. Summary: Soviet Charge Vasev came in with a reply to Ambassador Earle's demarche of July 11² to Dobrynin requesting consultations under the BW Convention on the reported incidence of anthrax at Sverdlovsk. Vasev said he had been instructed to confirm that the Soviet side considered the allegations completely unfounded, that there had been no violation of the BW Convention and that there was consequently no basis for consultation. Ambassador Earle regretted that the Soviet reply had not addressed the factual information we had conveyed and cautioned that, since the problem would not go away, we would have to continue pursuing the matter by other means which would probably include the participation of other parties. End summary.

3. Saying that he was speaking on instructions, Vasev delivered the following "oral reply" on July 17:

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 7/11–31/80. Secret; Priority; Nodis. Sent for information to Geneva, USNATO, London, Bonn, Paris, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Shinn; cleared by Jane E. Taylor (S/S–O) and Mark Palmer (PM/DCA); approved by Ralph Earle (ACDA). (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0402)

² The referenced demarche, telegram 182944 to multiple posts, July 12, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0422. See also the memorandum of conversation from U.S. officials meeting with Dobrynin on Friday, July 10, during which the referenced paper was provided to Dobrynin. (See Document 290)

“In view of repeated requests of the American side the Embassy has been instructed to confirm once again that the Soviet side considers as completely unfounded allegations which try to establish some sort of connection between an outbreak of anthrax in the region of Sverdlovsk in April 1979 and the compliance by the Soviet Union with the Convention Prohibiting Bacteriological Weapons.

“The Soviet Union, as one of the initiators of and participants in the Convention, has always attached the utmost importance to the un-deviating fulfillment of all its provisions which represent a major measure in the field of real disarmament and the effective prevention against making and storing types of weapons of mass destruction lethal for mankind. We have already emphasized that the fulfillment by the Soviet side of obligations established by the Convention is guaranteed by the appropriate state institutions of the USSR and that the Soviet Union does not possess bacteriological (biological) agents, toxins, weapons or equipment and means of delivery as mentioned in Article I of the Convention.

“Besides, in view of the request made by the American side concerning information on the causes of an outbreak of anthrax in the region of Sverdlovsk in April of last year the Soviet side has communicated the fact that the outbreak was a result of periodic livestock epidemics in those regions and that the cases of human illness were due to the consumption of cattle meat sold in violation of established veterinary rules. This communication was based on data from the Epidemiological Service furnished in particular by the magazine ‘Microbiology, Epidemiology, and Immunology’ (May 1980 issue).

“The stated facts show that the incident concerning anthrax in the region of Sverdlovsk is completely within the realm of veterinary and public health and does not touch upon any matter relating to the aims or observance of the Convention Banning Bacteriological Weapons as mentioned in Article V.

“It is noted with bewilderment and regret how irresponsibly some American officials make public statements obviously trying to cast a shadow over the faithful fulfillment by the Soviet Union of its treaty obligations. The obviously inspired clamor in the American mass media around this contrived problem is also noted.

“The Soviet side reaffirms that there is no basis for consultations within the context of Article V of the convention on the Banning of Bacteriological Weapons”. End text.

4. In the discussion which ensued, Ambassador Earle regretted the Soviet disregard of our demarche which had furnished detailed information underlying our concern over compliance. He noted the Soviets had not addressed themselves to the information in our paper. Referring to his conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin last Friday, Am-

bassador Earle reiterated his concern that the Soviet unresponsiveness would cast a shadow over both our bilateral relations and the multilateral arrangement created by the Convention. Noting that we had not accused the Soviets of a direct violation, he stated our purpose as seeking to raise in a diplomatic and noncontentious way a mutual problem which called for consultation under Article V of the Convention. He added that we were open to Soviet suggestions on the form such consultations might take. This was our preferred course. However, Ambassador Earle cautioned, the problem would not go away and if necessary we would be obliged to deal with it by other means which would include the involvement of other parties.

5. Vasev denied that the substance of the US demarche had been ignored. He said the Soviet side had studied our paper carefully and reviewed the situation. The Soviets did not possess any biological agents, weapons, or means of delivery. Their explanation of what happened in Sverdlovsk had been based on data furnished by medical experts. Nothing more was required since Article V did not cover matters of public health and sanitation. Vasev charged that we were pursuing psychological warfare against the Soviets and referred to recent newspaper articles based on emigre sources.

6. Ambassador Earle pointed out that we could not let the issue be resolved by a flat Soviet statement. He referred to the information we had supplied in our paper, noting that many of the points had not been based upon emigre sources. Vasev responded that the heart of the matter was simply that the Soviets had given us a complete explanation. He claimed we were indulging in rumors and psychological warfare. Ambassador Earle again stressed the applicability of Article V, quoting from it directly to make his point. He noted that as a co-depositary of the Convention we had responsibilities to insure its observance. Vasev again stressed that the Soviets found no basis for consultation under Article V. After Ambassador Earle had denied a final time Vasev's charge that our purpose was one of propaganda, Vasev said he had nothing to add and the meeting ended.

7. Septel will contain instructions for briefing allies.³

Christopher

³ Not found.

295. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, July 21, 1980, 1457Z

11437. Subject: Post-Afghanistan Sanctions: Some Thoughts on Strategy. Refs: State 181587, B. Kabul 2103.²

1. (C-entire text)

2. This cable was largely approved in draft by Ambassador Watson before his departure.

3. Summary. Ref A provides a good basis for a fresh look at both Soviet and our own tactics and strategy regarding Afghanistan. We agree that the Soviets are trying to gain our acceptance of the fait accompli by dangling the prospect of improved relations. Paradoxically, if we admit publicly or to our friends in private the probability that the Soviets are not going to withdraw from Afghanistan, we run a serious risk of encouraging the erosion of the punitive measures we and our allies have adopted, and thus acceptance of the fait accompli the Soviets are urging. For this reason our best tactic is to continue to express firm determination to continue the sanctions and belief that continued pressure can lead to a political solution and withdrawal. In order to keep our allies aboard, we should take appropriate initiatives to hold out rewards to the Soviets for movement, respond appropriately to Soviet gestures, and argue convincingly to keep the measures in place, until there is sufficient movement to warrant relaxing them—even if this means a protracted wait. Specifically, we should try to keep all meaningful sanctions in place but pursue possibilities in arms control matters and possibly consult with the Soviets on CSCE, as well as take a positive position on efforts to develop a political solution in Afghanistan. This package of incentives for the Soviets would provide a good platform from which to persuade our allies to stand firm on trade and other ostracizing measures. End summary.

4. Ref A arrived at a time when we were giving thought to the question of whether, when and under what circumstances it may be

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 2, Afghanistan: 5/80–1/81. Confidential; Exdis. Sent for information to Kabul and USNATO. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Telegrams 181587 to multiple posts, July 10, and 2103 from Kabul, July 12, are in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800331–0758 and D800334–0182. Telegram 181587 outlined the Soviets' desire to improve U.S.-Soviet relations, assuming that the United States accepts the situation in Afghanistan as a fait accompli. Telegram 2103 addressed the possibility of a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

come appropriate—or necessary—to relax some of the sanctions which the U.S. and our allies imposed on the Soviet Union in the wake of the Afghan invasion.

5. Already there are indications of difficulties for the sanctions policy:

—efforts are underway in the U.S. to rescind the grain sales embargo;

—some of our allies are displaying nervousness over the impact of detente and are inclining toward normal political contacts;

—one of our most significant sanctions—the Olympic boycott—will in any case soon have run its course;

—sustaining trade restraints is becoming more difficult: if the French break ranks, others will quickly follow suit, making our own trade sanctions almost meaningless while leaving us isolated;

—though we have no clear-cut indications as yet, we can envisage a situation in which prominent American scientists and cultural figures begin to argue for exchanges, and move to circumvent them.

6. One factor contributing to the erosion of support for sanctions is a growing sense of resignation, a realization that international pressures may not succeed in dislodging the Soviets from Afghanistan. We expect increasingly to hear the line now being articulated privately by Dobrynin (as reported in ref A) that we are faced with a *fait accompli* in Afghanistan, that we may as well adjust to it and move ahead on other matters of greater importance to the world. There is probably a parallel here with the Vietnamese invasion of Kampuchea,³ where Gromyko and his colleagues soon after the event simply stood down all complaints and asserted that what has happened was irreversible.

7. At this juncture, the Embassy draws these conclusions:

—In the absence of Soviet concessions, now is not the time to begin to rescind the measures we have imposed; this would reduce or eliminate any incentive the Soviets might have for following up their initial withdrawal announcement with some more meaningful steps toward a political settlement.

—While standing firm, however, we should not commit ourselves to continuing the full array of current sanctions until the last Soviet soldier is out of Afghanistan; that probably won't happen for a long time, if at all, and to set that as the criterion for any relaxation whatsoever would tie our hands and risk our becoming isolated.

³ Large-scale fighting began in late December 1978.

—Instead, we should begin trying to formulate a strategy that maximizes our influence on Soviet behavior, attainment of our own security objectives, and maintenance of allied unity.

8. Our strategy should be based on our objectives of deterrence, punishment and minimizing the regional and global consequences of the Soviet action by achieving the fullest possible Soviet withdrawal and the greatest possible autonomy for Afghanistan. It must also take account of the reality that truly effective deterrence is possible only in circumstances where Western military power can be brought effectively to bear.

9. In concrete terms, this means:

A. Using all possible means to urge solidarity and patience on our allies and friends in maintaining trade and other sanctions. We can argue that any future deterrent effect of our sanctions depends heavily on their duration. We can argue that total withdrawal is still a possibility if we remain firm, and that the way to get withdrawal is to allow even slight relaxation of sanctions only in exchange for movement toward total withdrawal. We can underline the importance to Moscow of acceptance by the rest of the world as an equal in all fields—including cultural as well as political and economic relations—and the usefulness therefore of raising Afghanistan as an obstacle to contacts of all kinds.

B. An important element of a strategy to maintain solidarity is to continue expressing our readiness to explore a political settlement (while trying to develop a clearer idea of what that might entail). We are struck by Embassy Kabul's idea (ref B) for proposing the sort of peacekeeping scheme which would be needed to assure stability, even if we know there is little or no chance the Soviets would accept any such scheme. Not letting the propaganda initiative slip away is essential. Soviet rejection of a plan would help keep the pressure on. And the Soviets might be constrained to make counter-offers which could provide the starting point for compromises eventually leading to a reduction in direct Soviet involvement in Afghanistan sufficient to meet our purposes for restoring a broad dialogue with the Soviets.

C. In order to succeed in keeping our allies and friends on a course of firm opposition to the occupation but flexibility in negotiating withdrawal, the U.S. must be careful not to appear to be prematurely relaxing its own sanctions:

—The grain embargo is crucial not only in terms of showing our allies that we will stand firm even if it hurts us, but also in terms of showing strong national will toward the Soviet Union. The embargo has had a significant though not crippling effect on the Soviet effort to use consumption as a tool to achieve [garble] economic efficiency [garble]. Its real force, however, is in its potential effect in the future if a

very poor Soviet harvest should coincide with a tightening of international markets. Although such a nightmare for Moscow is now only a possibility, the consequences would be so disastrous that it undoubtedly affects Soviet calculations even though Soviet leaders cover up any such concerns.

—U.S. limitations on high technology exports and the freeze on large projects are also significant, both symbolically and in terms of uncertainties in the planning process. They will be more difficult to maintain in the face of inevitable sliding away by other industrialized countries, but it seems possible that the U.S. can continue to have a dampening effect if we adhere strictly to our own policy and are not stampeded by isolated examples of West European or Japanese backsliding.

—The U.S. freeze on high visibility cultural, educational and scientific exchanges will, if it continues, cause these staples of the relationship to wither away. That is a pity, because these opportunities for establishing long-term direct contacts with individuals and institutions in the Soviet Union have useful potential for eroding the isolation and singlemindedness of this society. But they are not essential to the U.S. in any immediate sense and are symbolically important to the Soviets. Therefore we should resolutely resist any temptation to relax our restrictions on the high visibility exchanges prematurely. In the Embassy's view, a return to normalcy in high visibility exchanges should not be one of the first steps toward a normal relationship with the USSR, but should be held back until the Afghanistan situation has changed to U.S. satisfaction.

D. A final and important element of U.S. strategy is the delinking of certain key issues and negotiations from Afghanistan as we are doing in the case of the test ban negotiations, MBFR, the Committee on Disarmament, and LRTNF. CSCE should be considered as another acceptable area for preliminary talks with the Soviets; CSCE itself is valuable as an ongoing forum to demonstrate the ideological dividing line between democracy and totalitarianism, but in order for it to be effective we have to keep in close harmony with the West European democracies. We should therefore show the way, by consulting with the Soviets and telling them that we will sound off at Madrid nonpolemically but firmly on aggression in Afghanistan as well as human rights.

10. In sum, the U.S. should be in the forefront of efforts to demonstrate to the world how to cope with Soviet aggression when circumstances prevent a direct military response: by principled and long-lasting sanctions, readiness to show flexibility in negotiating an end to the aggression, and clearmindedness in defining key issues to be dealt with separately. How to carry this out in practice is not so easy to specify, but the way may become clearer in the process. We should not

let progress on arms control issues distract attention from the issues raised by Afghanistan. But we must recognize that if we simply stand fast and insist on no movement on any front until the Soviets leave Afghanistan, we will eventually be standing pretty much alone and without having significantly affected Soviet behavior.

11. Department pass to other posts as appropriate.

Garrison

296. Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Muskie¹

July 22, 1980

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I would like in continuation of our exchange of views to express some considerations in connection with your letter of July 14.²

We have noted the interest of the US Government expressed in your letter in improving Soviet-US relations. As is well known to you, this is consistently favored by the Soviet Leadership. However, it is important to act precisely along these lines in practice. We, on our part, are ready to do so provided there is a similar readiness on the part of the United States.

Given such an approach and being guided by broad goals of strengthening peace and security our two countries, as was proved on more than one occasion in the past, are quite capable of developing constructively their relations and finding mutually acceptable solutions to most complicated questions of mutual interest for the USSR and the US.

This, to use your own word, is the key to everything. Attempts to reduce the whole matter to any one single question and to tie to it the prospects of our relations on the whole are not only wrong but also non-productive. You are aware of our assessment of the causes that led to the present state of Soviet-US relations. This was also the subject of detailed discussions at our meeting in Vienna.

Therefore, I will not restate this assessment.

¹ Source: Department of State, Office of the Secretariat Staff, Special Adviser to the Secretary (S/MS) on Soviet Affairs Marshall Shulman—Jan 21, 77–Jan 19, 81, Lot 81D109, Box 5, ESM/Vasev, 7/22/80. No classification marking.

² See Document 292.

Now with regard to Afghanistan. We note the recognition in your letter of the legitimate interest of the Soviet Union in ensuring the security of its borders and in friendly relations with Afghanistan as well as of our concern about an outside interference in Afghanistan. This would seem to be a realistic premise.

However, this premise is directly contradicted by your persistent notion about the Government, which exists in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan, being unacceptable to the US and by raising in this connection the question of “transition” to some other government. Here a complete clarity is in order: we do not intend to and will not engage even in discussions on posing the question in such a way.

I may as well note here that no useful purpose either can be served by the attempts to put in doubt the fact of the recent withdrawal of some Soviet units from Afghanistan. Why are you doing this? After all, you know as, by the way, the whole world knows, that such doubts are groundless.

As to your question what assurances of non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan would be considered by us as satisfactory, the answer thereto is contained in the known proposals of the DRA Government of last May, 14. Fairly ample discussion was devoted to it also in our previous exchanges of views. The guarantees of non-interference must be an integral part of the general political settlement, the path to which goes through direct negotiations of Pakistan and Iran with the Government of Afghanistan with the aim of normalizing relations between them with simultaneous, repeat—simultaneous cessation of armed incursions into the territory of Afghanistan as well as of all forms of interference in the internal affairs of that country in general.

It is Pakistan and Iran who, by continuing to refuse to conduct negotiations, are bringing the task of the political settlement to an impasse. This is why, the United States, if it has a genuine interest in such a settlement, could, as we have already pointed out, exert appropriate influence on the Pakistani leaders and induce them to hold negotiations with the Government of Afghanistan.

We would like to hope that the US side will be able to make a realistic assessment of the situation and will take steps to facilitate in practice the process of political settlement of the situation around Afghanistan.

You may have no doubt that such a position will find an appropriate understanding on our part.

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

297. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, August 11, 1980, 1545Z

12712. Subj: Demarche on Sverdlovsk Incident. Ref: State 209746.²

1. (S-entire text.)

2. On August 11 Charge raised Sverdlovsk incident with First Deputy Foreign Minister Korniyenko, presenting oral statement as provided in reftel. (Demarches on MBFR and Iran reported septels.)³

3. Korniyenko's response followed familiar lines. He said the Soviet side could agree that the "fuss" being made over the outbreak of anthrax could damage future joint efforts at controlling the arms race, but asserted that the fuss, including the public distribution of information with vague accusations that the USSR had violated the Biological Weapons Convention, had been organized by the American side over an imaginary incident. The whole affair was thus the responsibility of the U.S.

4. Korniyenko said that the Soviet position on what had occurred at Sverdlovsk had been expressed many times. Unfortunately, he said, outbreaks of anthrax do occur almost every year in the Sverdlovsk region; last year's outbreak was reported in the local press, which prescribed precautionary measures for the population to prevent infection from contaminated animals. But the anthrax outbreaks which occur in Sverdlovsk have no relation to the Biological Weapons Convention. Ambassador Dobrynin had already explained this, Korniyenko added.

5. Korniyenko said the U.S. request for consultations under Article V of the BW Convention aroused suspicion on the Soviet side. After all, either side could always dream up pretexts for invoking the Convention. Why the U.S. was doing so at the present time, Korniyenko said, was not hard to guess: it was the result of an irresponsible attitude on the U.S. side toward international agreements. Korniyenko went on to note that the BW Convention was the first agreement that had fully banned not only the use of a type of mass destruction weapon, but also

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 83, USSR: 8/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

² Telegram 209746 to Moscow, outlined Garrison's talking points for his meeting with Korniyenko regarding the Sverdlovsk incident. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0412)

³ The *démarche* on MBFR was not found. The *démarche* on Iran, telegram 12360 to Moscow, August 5, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, D800374–0420.

its possession. The sides should be striving to protect the Convention, he said, but instead the U.S. was discrediting it by raising Sverdlovsk. This understandably caused indignation on the Soviet side. He wondered how the U.S. would have reacted if the Soviet Union had invoked the BW Convention and demanded information on the outbreak of Legionnaire's disease in the U.S.

6. Continuing, Korniyenko noted that the U.S. had proposed consultations of the sort conducted under SALT. But in SALT, he said, there was a special commission for discussing questions which might arise (implying, without saying it, that there is no such body under the BW Convention). Moreover, the U.S. underlined its desire for confidentiality, yet at the same time was spreading information around the world about the USSR's suspected violation of the BW Convention. The two sides began to discuss the issue, yet immediately the American side began to spread stories that it was not convinced by the USSR's statements.

7. Summing up, Korniyenko said that, from the Soviet perspective, it was clear that the U.S. had chosen to create a fuss over Sverdlovsk as yet another way of increasing tensions and another attempt to damage US-Soviet relations.

8. In response, Charge said he would attempt once more, briefly, to clarify the U.S. position, since Korniyenko's remarks indicated continued serious misunderstanding of the U.S. position. It was precisely the great concern that was bound to arise and did arise in the U.S., in Congress and elsewhere, when the reports became known about the event in Sverdlovsk, that made it essential for the sides, if they wished to "protect" the BW Convention, to deal with the questions that had arisen concerning Sverdlovsk. Charge stressed that U.S. had not accused the Soviet Union of a violation. The U.S. was simply asking for information pursuant to Article V of the BW Convention, and felt the best way to exchange information would be through bilateral meetings of experts. The U.S. cannot accept the explanations provided thus far by the Soviet side, because the information available to us points to inhalation anthrax rather than a form of the disease transmitted by contaminated meat. If the Soviet Union, as Korniyenko suggested, raised Legionnaire's disease with the U.S., the U.S. would have invited Soviet experts to consult with U.S. disease control specialists.

9. Korniyenko replied that there would not have arisen any public concern if the U.S. Government had not taken the initiative after the first of the year to activate the issue in the press and in Congress. After all, the subject was not unknown prior to the first of the year; the local newspapers in Sverdlovsk had published warnings to the population at the time. It seemed to Moscow that the American authorities had decided in January to worsen the atmosphere between the U.S. and USSR

by using the Sverdlovsk incident. Charge said this was definitely not the U.S. objective, regardless of how the chronology of events may appear. While it is regrettable that the Sverdlovsk question had leaked to the press before it was resolved through confidential bilateral discussions, this simply illustrates that problems of this nature must be dealt with forthrightly and cannot be swept under the rug, because it is a fact of life that information on matters of such great import will sooner or later become public in the U.S.

10. Department repeat to Geneva and elsewhere as desired.

Garrison

298. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

August 21, 1980

Distinguished Mr. President,

I deemed it necessary to address myself to You on the issue which deeply concerns and affects the peoples of the European continent and has also a substantial bearing on the prospects of USSR and USA relations.

I have in mind the issue emerged in connection with plans to develop and deploy in Western Europe new American medium-range missiles.

As is known, seeking to prevent a new round of nuclear arms race on the European continent, we approached, as far back as last fall, the United States and other NATO countries with a proposal to initiate negotiations on the medium-range nuclear systems, while readiness was expressed on our part even to cut the number of these systems deployed in the western regions of the USSR, provided there is no additional deployment of nuclear missiles of that category in Western Europe.

At the present time too, we believe that it would be the most correct and radical solution of the question of medium-range nuclear

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Subject File, Box 61, Soviet Exchanges: 1/79–10/80. Secret; Sensitive. Printed from a Soviet translation and received on August 25. Brzenzinski wrote in the upper-right hand corner, "JT [presumably James Thomson], MB [Marshall Brent] 1) need quick assessment 2) *reply*. ZB."

systems in Europe. We maintain our proposal to this effect but for it to be translated into reality it is necessary, of course, to restore the status which existed prior to the December session of the NATO Council.²

It is also known to You, I believe, that in order to overcome the impasse created as a result of the said NATO decision we are ready to adopt yet another alternative, whereby the questions concerning medium-range nuclear missile systems in Europe would not be subject of separate negotiations but would be discussed, after the SALT-2 Treaty enters into force, in the framework of SALT-3 negotiations and, naturally, on the basis of those principles which are agreed between our countries for the SALT-3 negotiations.

Although there followed no formal objection from the US side and the other NATO countries against such an alternative, it has proved impossible of practical realization since the United States does not ratify the SALT-2 Treaty.

Having thoroughly weighed up the existing situation and being guided by broader interests of peace and international security we decided to undertake one more step.

Without withdrawing our former proposals we expressed ourselves in the course of the Moscow conversations with FRG Chancellor H. Schmidt in favor of starting negotiations to discuss simultaneously and in organic relationship both medium-range nuclear systems in Europe and American forward-based nuclear systems.

That these weapon systems are to be considered as being interrelated and also in connection with the question of their locations i.e. the bases, is determined by the factual state of affairs. After all, the Soviet Union cannot disregard hundreds of American nuclear carriers which due to their location can reach the territory of the USSR and its allies and which thereby constitute a substantial and integral element of the general strategic situation. The same is also true of the bases per se which not only expand operational capabilities of the systems already there but make it possible in a short time, additionally and on a great scale, to increase the number of such systems.

It is not a new question at all. This question was already subject of discussion in the process of negotiations on strategic arms limitation. It was touched upon by us too when we met in Vienna last year.

We are prepared to begin right now the negotiations that we are proposing, without waiting for the SALT-2 Treaty ratification. However, practical implementation of agreements that could be reached during these negotiations, as is understood, would be carried out only after the Treaty enters into force. This is necessitated by the fact, that

² See footnote 2, Document 277.

the subject of the proposed negotiations is closely tied not only to the existing balance of forces in Europe but also to the general strategic equilibrium between the USSR and the USA.

I want You to understand me correctly, Mr. President: we are confident about our ability to neutralize any attempts to disrupt the existing correlation of forces, to change it in the NATO favor and to attain military supremacy over us. In other words, if the West triggers a new round of arms race, we will, although with a heavy heart, accept the challenge.

However, we believed and continue to believe that further arms race is not the kind of a road which can lead to a stronger security of anyone; on the contrary, this road is fraught with serious danger for all countries and peoples without exception. This is the reason why we resolutely favor negotiations and are convinced that only this way corresponds to the vital interests of the peoples of the USSR and the USA, as well as all other peoples.

Since there has been no answer from the American side to the proposal we made, we cannot but have an impression that the US government took the course of delaying the beginning of the negotiations. In the meantime, the possibility, which we believe is there, to find a mutually acceptable solution may slip away and be wiped out by the march of events.

I would like to hope, Mr. President, that You will accord all due attention to this communication of mine and that we will be able without further delays to reach agreement on the beginning of negotiations on the aforementioned question.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev³

³ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

299. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, August 30, 1980, 1739Z

232100. Subject: President's Reply to Brezhnev Letter on TNF². Ref: State 226447.³

1. Confidential-entire text.

2. On Tuesday (September 2) Charge should request an appointment with Gromyko or Korniyenko for Wednesday (September 3) to deliver President Carter's reply to Brezhnev's August 21 letter on TNF (reftel). Text follows.

3. Begin text: Dear Mr. President: I am responding to your letter of August 21 concerning theater nuclear forces

—It is useful to recall that this matter arises primarily because of the Soviet Union's substantial deployment of new long-range theater nuclear weapons, and in particular, the SS-20. Our own plans in NATO are a measured response which is necessary to preserve the security of our alliance. For our part, we did not have and do not now have any intent to seek any advantage in these weapons.

—Indeed from the very outset, we made clear our interest in negotiating equal limitations on theater nuclear forces in the framework of SALT III. Beginning in December 1979, we repeatedly urged the Soviet Union to join with us in preliminary exchanges to this end without precondition or delay, notwithstanding postponement of ratification of the SALT II Treaty caused by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.

—For the ensuing seven months, your own position and proposals delayed any discussions because they required that we and our allies renounce the planned deployments which are necessary to respond to your own substantial and ongoing programs. Now that you have agreed to move ahead without any preconditions, the path toward preliminary exchanges lies open and we are preparing for them in consultation with our allies.

—I note your views concerning what you refer to as American "forward-based systems." We have also repeatedly stated our views on this issue. We continue to believe that the most expeditious way of pro-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096-1982. Confidential; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted in the White House; cleared by H. Allen Holmes (EUR), Raymond Seitz (S/S), Raymond Snider (D), and Bartholomew; approved by Christopher.

² See Document 298.

³ Telegram 226447 to Moscow, August 26, transmitted the text of Brezhnev's letter to Carter on TNF. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096-1652)

ceeding to concrete arms controls results is to focus initially on achieving agreed limits on long-range land-based theater nuclear missiles, because these are the most dynamic and threatening new deployments. This approach will enhance the prospects of reaching timely agreement.

—I propose that Secretary of State Muskie and Foreign Minister Gromyko take the opportunity of their visits to the United Nations in September to agree upon precise timing and venue for the exchanges. It is, of course, my earnest hope that now that you have agreed to move ahead these important exchanges will be productive. Sincerely, Jimmy Carter. End text.

4. President's letter should be dated September 2, 1980.

Christopher

300. Intelligence Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency¹

PA M-80-10389

September 8, 1980

THE PROSPECTS FOR SOVIET MILITARY INTERVENTION IN POLAND

SUMMARY

We do not think that Moscow is now seriously considering military intervention in Poland. Although the Soviets are deeply troubled by developments there, they probably do not view the concessions granted so far regarding independent trade unions as sufficient cause for the use of Soviet military force in Poland. The Soviets probably also do not consider these concessions irreversible and will place substantial pressure on Warsaw to curtail them. In fact, with Kania's replacement of Gierek as first secretary, their hopes appear buoyed that the development of political and social chaos in Poland that might have compelled them to use military force in the near future has been forestalled. Nevertheless, Moscow's anxieties are still high, and if Kania does not limit the concessions granted the strikers or if he cracks down too forcefully and sparks a violent popular reaction which the government cannot con-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 65, Poland: 9/80. Secret; [handing restriction not declassified]. The memorandum was prepared in the National Foreign Assessment Center by members of the Office of Political Analysis. Sent under a September 9 covering memorandum from Stansfield Turner to Brzezinski.

trol, the Soviets may yet have to step in militarily. [handling restriction not declassified]

Current Soviet Attitudes

The Soviets behaved cautiously during the Polish labor crisis. Only after the settlement of the strikes on the Baltic coast—that is, when the immediate danger of an explosion had lessened—did they openly begin to express their anxieties. Subsequent critical commentary reflected Moscow's recognition that the negotiated settlement with the strikers may have set in motion a process of political liberalization of the Polish system, which could at some point prove to be beyond the control of the Polish Communist Party and could spread elsewhere in Eastern Europe. It also was a sign of Soviet dissatisfaction with Gierek's handling of the crisis. Whether or not Moscow had a hand in Gierek's ouster, the Soviet leadership is openly pleased with the choice of Kania as first secretary and consider him to be the best possible replacement at this juncture. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

It remains to be seen whether Kania will live up to his image as an orthodox, hardline apparatchik, who will strictly limit the gains made by the strikers. At the very least, the Polish party has bought time as far as Soviet military intervention is concerned. But if Kania proves unable or unwilling to curtail the new unions, the Soviets would step up first the political, then the military, pressure tactics on him to reverse the erosion of party control in Poland. If these pressures failed, Moscow would intervene militarily. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

Fundamental Threat to Party Control

The agreement reached between the strikers and the Polish regime at the end of August, if implemented liberally, would threaten the very foundations of the Communist system in Poland. The theoretical justification of the Communist party's control is its claim to rule as the vanguard of the working class. But with the overwhelming majority of the workers rejecting the party-run unions for unions that will truly represent their interests, that justification would be undermined. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

The Soviet Union, quite clearly, would not stand by idly if this occurred. The case could even be made that Moscow has already decided that its military intervention is necessary—that the threat is so dangerous that it should be stamped out before it has a chance to spread. *[handling restriction not declassified]*

The Soviets may have already decided that the Polish leadership has given up too much of its authority in agreeing to the unprecedented establishment of free trade unions and the partial lifting of censorship. The Politburo may have reasoned that, as in Czechoslovakia in 1968, the political and social conditions for continued dissipation of the

party's authority had been established. There is no reason to believe, however, that this is the case and that the Soviets have gone that far in their thinking—let alone their contingency planning. We believe that the Soviet decision to intervene will depend on where the situation goes from here, not on what has happened so far. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Even if the Soviets had decided in favor of intervention—and there have been no signs of Soviet military preparations that would precede such a move—Kania's accession to power would call for a delay in plans. If Kania can erode the concessions and restore the Polish party's shaken authority, thus obviating the need for Soviet military intervention, Moscow would be delighted. It would much rather achieve its goals without suffering the substantial damage to Soviet global interests military intervention would bring. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Possible Precipitants of Intervention

The Soviets nevertheless realize that the situation in Poland will continue to be unpredictable and unstable for the immediate future and that they must monitor events closely during the coming months for any signs that their concerns are materializing. The breakdown of the Polish party's control does not appear imminent, but should it occur, the development could be a rapid one and the Soviets would move in quickly with force. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The essential grounds for Soviet military intervention in Poland are:

- the Communist Party's loss of control over Poland, including its ability to contain the political actions of the workers and the dissidents, and
- any compromise of the basic socialist orientation of the regime's domestic and international policies.

The path to either or both of these worst case scenarios (from Moscow's point of view) could be lengthy and full of zig-zags. An accumulation of seemingly minute factors could convince the Soviet leaders to intervene. We will not necessarily realize when the Soviets, themselves, actually cross that decision threshold to intervene, but once they do there may not be any turning back even if it appears to Western analysts that the Polish regime is getting the situation under control. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Moscow will keep a particularly sharp eye on the development of the new independent trade unions, which pose a potential serious threat to the Communist Party's control over Polish society. Moscow would be particularly concerned if unions spring up across the country, cohere into a potent political force, and influence national economic

decision-making, especially trade with the USSR and defense spending. In the wake of Cardinal Wyszynski's meeting with Lech Walesa, the Soviets will be especially sensitive to any signs that the unions are developing meaningful alliances with the Catholic Church or political dissidents, receiving substantial aid from unions and other organizations in the West, or adopting openly hostile attitudes and policies toward the Soviet Union. Soviet media are already attacking assistance provided to the independent unions from Western trade unions. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The relaxation of censorship is another issue that the Soviets will find difficult to live with. Although the media restrictions the Gierek regime pledged to lift are minimal when compared to the near total abolition of censorship agreed to by the Dubcek² regime in Czechoslovakia in 1968, this issue was one of the primary Soviet complaints to the Czechoslovak party in the months before the invasion. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Although it appears unlikely at the moment, the possibility exists that the present or a future Polish leadership—whether out of fear of the consequences a crackdown could bring or from a genuine sympathy with the workers' desires—could assume the lead in the liberalization process and take it much further. This could create a situation reminiscent of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Soviet party officials have already noted [*text not declassified*] that there are trends evident in Polish society similar to those present in Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring. If Moscow perceived these trends in the Polish party leadership, it might feel compelled to take preventive action before the process reached an unmanageable stage. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

An opposite course by the Polish leadership—a crackdown on the unions and all opposition—while probably more in line with the desires of the Soviet leaders, could inadvertently lead to Soviet intervention. If the workers responded to this tightening by resuming their strikes, there would be a strong likelihood of violent confrontation which, if it got out of the Polish authorities' control, could trigger the use of Soviet force. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Another development that would profoundly disturb the Soviets is a serious outbreak of labor unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe or in the USSR. Unrest appears unlikely in the USSR at the moment, but the reports of strikes at major automotive plants in Tolgiatti and Gorkiy earlier this year have to give the Kremlin pause. Strikes and/or calls for free trade unions in other East European countries will induce the So-

² Alexander Dubcek, former First Secretary of the Czechoslovak Communist Party.

viets to step up their pressure on the Polish leadership to curtail the new unions. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

These variables will interact in a complex, protracted process, the specific developments of which cannot be predicted with any certainty. Moscow's perception of this process may be quite different from ours or the Poles'. No one of these factors is likely to develop by itself. But a combination of developments could suggest to Moscow that a trend toward liberalization was approaching the point of irreversibility and that Soviet vital interests were at stake and that the situation could only be put right by military intervention. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

A Decision to Intervene

Once the Soviet threshold of tolerance is crossed, Moscow would take direct action. The Soviets would first demand that the Polish leadership contain the liberalization process. If Warsaw either refused or was unable to bring the situation under control, the Soviets might opt for still another change in leadership, believing that only a more hard-line group could put a stop to the erosion of power. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

Past experience suggests that the Kremlin would resort to political and military pressure to get the Poles themselves to bring the situation under control before sending in troops. This would probably include high-level visits between Moscow and Warsaw, increasingly explicit warnings in the Soviet press, and possibly threatening military movements. Several factors probably would be at work here—among them a hope that the Poles would back down when faced with a display of overwhelming force. The absence of unanimity within the Soviet Politburo could also be a vital factor. It would be no easy matter to get the entire Politburo—or perhaps even a significant majority—to agree that armed intervention was the only way to hold the Poles in line. This certainly seems to have been the case in 1968, when Kosygin, Suslov and others reportedly held out to the last moment in opposing the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

The Soviet leaders, in reaching a decision to use military force, would have to weigh the constraints, which are substantial. They must assume that:

—the strongly anti-Russian Polish people would fight, as might part or all of the Polish Army.

—Poland's submission would require the largest military operation by the Soviet armed forces since World War II and would involve protracted combat.

—Moscow's effort to salvage detente in one of its most critical areas—Europe—would receive a setback from which it would be a long time recovering.

—intervention would probably entail a substantial long-term occupation that would complicate Soviet security planning in both Europe and Asia. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

In the final analysis, however, the Soviet leaders would decide to bear these enormous costs rather than lose control of Poland:

—Poland lies astride the traditional invasion routes to and from Russia and is thus a vital corridor, essential to Soviet military planning.

—A less politically reliable Poland would leave East Germany in an exposed position.

—A Soviet failure to act forcefully could encourage similar unrest elsewhere in Eastern Europe and, possibly, in the Baltic republics of the USSR as well. [*handling restriction not declassified*]

301. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Carter¹

Moscow, September 15, 1980

Esteemed Mr. President,

I avail myself of this opportunity—the meeting between the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, A.A. Gromyko, and the United States Secretary of State, E. Muskie²—to convey a reply to your letter of September 2³ on questions of limiting nuclear arms in Europe.

Your interpretation of the reasons for a delay in starting negotiations on these questions and your considerations as to the motives for the NATO decision to develop and deploy new American missiles in Western Europe certainly cannot be accepted.

Neither can we accept the interpretation of the events in Afghanistan contained in your letter, or an attempt to link these events with issues that have no relation to them whatsoever.

In taking note of the readiness expressed in your letter to begin an exchange of views on nuclear arms in Europe, I must say that this time, too, you have failed to respond to the substance of our proposal to the

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 5, USSR (General): 9/77–12/80. No classification marking. Printed from the U.S.-edited translation. Carter wrote in the upper-right hand corner, "Zbig J." Original letter in Russian was attached.

² Muskie met with Gromyko during his trip to the United States for the United Nations General Assembly meeting. See Document 302.

³ See Document 299.

effect that concurrently and in organic interrelation discussions be held on questions pertaining to both medium-range nuclear systems in Europe and US forward-based nuclear systems.

Our approaching the issue in this way—and I have already written this to you—is determined by the principle of equality and equal security. We are pursuing no other objective. There is nothing unclear about this position of ours. But the question of what specific systems would be limited and in what way is naturally something that is subject to discussion and agreement.

It is important, and I emphasize this point, that the exchange of views—no matter what it is called—should deal from the very beginning precisely with the substance of the problem. Proceeding from this understanding and taking note of the considerations you put forward in your letter, we propose as a practical matter to start such an exchange of views during the week beginning on October 13. A.A. Gromyko and E. Muskie could agree on the organizational aspects of the matter and on when to make an announcement of the understanding reached.

In conclusion I would like to emphasize that the Soviet Union approaches the forthcoming negotiations on the substance of the problem in all seriousness and will do everything necessary for achieving in them mutually acceptable results provided the US side takes a similar approach.

Respectfully,

L. Brezhnev⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

302. Summary Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 25, 1980, 10 a.m.–1:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

<i>United States</i>	<i>USSR</i>
Secretary Muskie	Minister Gromyko
Marshall Shulman Special Adviser to the Secretary	G.M. Kornienko First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Reg Bartholomew Director, Political-Military Affairs	A.N. Dobrynin Ambassador to the U.S.
Robert L. Barry, Deputy Assistant Secretary, European Affairs	V. Isakov Deputy Director, USA Division
Dmitri Zarechniak, Interpreter	V. Sukhodrev, Interpreter

Secretary Muskie opened the conversation by pointing out the importance he attached to face-to-face meetings as an effective way of moving toward accommodation. The President had called him this morning and asked to have his best wishes passed on to Brezhnev and Gromyko.

The Secretary said that he and Gromyko had listened to one another's speeches and thus their discussion had already begun. There were many differences but both sides also sought positive results. He wanted to begin the discussion where possibilities for accommodation were greatest.

Iraq-Iran

Pointing out that we wanted to avoid new areas of misunderstandings Secretary Muskie said we were deeply concerned about the unfortunate outbreak of hostilities between Iraq and Iran.² This conflict was taking place in an already unstable part of the world and could endanger our hostages as well as Western oil supplies. Our aim is to end hostilities immediately and we are pursuing this goal through the UN and other international efforts. We favor a meeting of the UN Security Council and a cease-fire resolution as a means of obtaining an immediate end to hostilities.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 58, Chron: 9/21–30/80. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted by Barry. The meeting took place at the Soviet Mission to the United Nations. In the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, Carter wrote, "Predictable propaganda. J."

² In September 1980, clashes took place along the common Iran and Iraq border, concentrated most heavily along the Shatt al-Arab waterway. Territorial possessions along the border were contested by Iraq, who had repealed just a few days prior the 1975 treaty which mutually agreed on a common Iran–Iraq border in the Shatt al-Arab waterway. (John Kifner, "Iraq Asserts it Sank 8 Iranian Gunboats, Shot Down Fighter," *The New York Times*, September 22, 1980, p. A1)

Gromyko said he wanted to begin by giving the Soviet perspective on the current international situation. Both the international situation and US-Soviet relations have become more complex lately and tension in the world is to a large degree due to the deterioration in US-Soviet political relations. US-Soviet economic relations have virtually been broken off. Cultural relations which had been maintained in earlier periods of tension were not disrupted. Contacts on various levels—which had earlier served as a means of developing relations as well as demonstrating their level—had withered away.

The cause of this deterioration is US policies directed at the worsening US-Soviet relations, *Gromyko* said. The US has recently violated many agreements, understandings, and promises. The US administration has set out to destroy the principles of equality and equal security on which relations between two great nations must be founded. Brezhnev and Carter both recognized this principle in Vienna and formally declared their allegiance to it. Now, as demonstrated by the rapid growth of US military budgets, the US is not observing this principle.

Gromyko pointed out that the new tension in international relations was reflected here at the UNGA. This is not the fault of the Soviet Union, which does not want a deterioration in US-Soviet relations. This is demonstrated by the decisions of the 25th Party Congress, Plenums of the CPSU and decisions of the Supreme Soviet supporting the development of normal and good relations with the U.S. The USSR wants to put relations back on a normal track where both sides respect each other's legitimate interest. We call upon the US government and the US President to follow a similar policy.

Turning to the Iraq-Iran situation, *Gromyko* said that despite recent tense relations, the outbreak of military conflict had been somewhat unexpected at least to us. It is in the interests of the region and the world not to let the conflict spread but to extinguish it. In the Soviet view, no country—neither great powers or others—should interfere in the conflict. The USSR will follow this course on the understanding that others do so as well. From US statements it appears that the US intends to pursue this same line. If so, this would be a positive development.

Gromyko went on to say that in the Soviet view it would help the situation if the US would withdraw its very powerful Naval force from the Persian Gulf. Its very presence creates greater tension. So far neither Iran nor Iraq has cut oil communications or access to oil resources. The USSR was opposed to the presence of the US fleet in the area before but is all the more persuaded that its presence is unjustified at present.

Secretary Muskie responded to *Gromyko's* comments on the general international situation by pointing that attitudes of governments are affected by their peoples' perceptions of actions of other governments. As superpowers, the US and the USSR are especially sensi-

tive to each other's actions. Once confidence has been undermined, it is very difficult to restore.

The Secretary said that he had long believed in a policy of accommodation and before the SALT process had begun had urged a delay in deployment of MIRVs as a means of avoiding a new spiral in the arms race. As Chairman of the Senate Budget Committee, he had watched Soviet defense expenditures climb steadily from the early 1960s to the present. Throughout this period the US had been ready to accept equality, although a minority disagreed with this policy. Most Americans supported increased contacts and saw the prospect of building an enduring peace.

Since then, a single act—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan—had turned the situation around. There had been a good prospect of getting SALT II ratification in January after televised TV debates in the Senate had shaped public opinion. The Soviets have their version as a justification for invading Afghanistan, but the US sees it differently because we and our Allies rely on Persian Gulf oil. This is a vital US interest in an area far removed from us logistically. This explains our naval presence in the region, although we had tried to hold this to a minimum before Soviet actions in Afghanistan.

Naval powers create fleets to defend their vital interests, Muskie continued. The Soviets have been recently developing a Navy which sailed the Pacific, appeared near the straits of Malacca and off US shores. We see this as legitimate. The US Navy in the Persian Gulf is not contributing to war but may restrain the combatants. The fact that Iran has declared the Straits a war zone is causing shipping to back up and threatening a cut-off in oil flows. If Iran and Iraq began to stop vessels, what would happen? The presence of the US fleet is designed to restrain, not to provoke. It makes no sense to argue that the US presence is provocative.

The Secretary repeated that it was urgent to call for and implement a cease fire as soon as possible before one side gained an advantage over the other. At present, both parties want to obstruct a Security Council meeting. (Gromyko said he agreed.) It would be best if the non-aligned called such a meeting or the Islamic countries, but everybody wants someone else to take the first step. Thus we are immobilized.

Muskie said that US relations with both Iran and Iraq were poor. We had cancelled the sale of civilian planes to Iraq as well as the sale of US engines for Iraqi ships in hopes of exercising restraint.

In sum, Muskie said, the US was making two contributions in order to end hostilities:

- Encouraging a Security Council meeting.
- Using diplomatic channels to promote a cease fire.

Gromyko agreed that our countries need to have confidence in each other. But he decried the flood of US hostile propaganda against the Soviet Union. All aspects of Soviet life are attacked by people totally unconcerned about facts. This takes place every day in the US, including at the top levels. The Soviet Union and its foreign policy are described as the epitome of evil. This kind of propaganda is “not our style,” Gromyko said, and we carefully weighed our reaction. Finally we concluded that it would be a sign of weakness not to reply.

In the US we recognize that the tone of the media is set by the Administration, which is following a policy designed to prejudice the legitimate interests of the USSR. It is true that our confidence has been undermined by this official Washington line and we do not know how much time it will take to restore it.

Turning to *SALT II* the USSR believes that if the US Administration took a stand for ratification this would not be hard to achieve. But we are uncertain if Administration statements to the Congress are designed to support ratification or undermine the Treaty. Objectively they undermine it. A typical statement devotes one phrase to saying the Treaty is mutually advantageous and then devotes 25 phrases to undermining it. In fact the Administration pigeon-holed the Treaty before the Afghanistan question arose. In this connection, Secretary Muskie’s references to the Afghan question won’t work.

Afghanistan

Gromyko went on to say that he would like to state the Soviet position on Afghanistan so that it would not be necessary to return to this question. The USSR has described the real situation in its correspondence with the President and the Secretary and Gromyko explained it to Muskie at Vienna. The USSR sent in its limited contingent in accordance with the Soviet-Afghan Treaty and Article 51 of the UN Charter—a very good article which the US and the USSR wrote at San Francisco. We said from the outset that we would withdraw as soon as there is a guaranteed end to armed intrusions from the outside and if there are effective agreements between Afghanistan on the one hand and Iran and Pakistan on the other.

Gromyko said that he believed that the US did not in fact doubt that the Soviet Union would live up to its word. If we didn’t, what position would we be in? The US simply does not wish to admit this publicly.

The continued incursions into Afghanistan are the fault of Pakistan and Iran is also not without sin. While large-scale gangs no longer cross the border, small bands of terrorists burn and loot the villages. You won’t win this war, Gromyko said. We will keep our word and won’t get out until there is a guaranteed and secured end to outside intru-

sions. The Soviet Union questioned whether the US could not look seriously at this question and give its good advice to Pakistan so that they would enter into contact with Afghanistan and develop good relations with them. Recognizing the state of affairs between the US and Iran, the USSR would not ask us to use our influence there but Iran would follow Pakistan's lead. The Pakistanis should not use the excuse that they do not like the present Afghan leadership since the Afghans hardly respect Pakistan's leaders.

If agreement can be reached, Soviet forces would withdraw and Pakistan would have nothing to fear. Pakistan should have no apprehensions about Afghan territorial claims against them. The Soviets knew there were no such claims. However, if this remains a question in Pakistani minds they can raise it when talks begin.

Gromyko said there had been some talk on an international conference on Afghanistan which the USSR considered totally unnecessary. There could be no question of such a conference discussing the internal situation in Afghanistan. As for the situation between Afghanistan and its neighbors, this must be discussed between them.

Indian Ocean

Gromyko went on to describe the US effort to build bases far from US shores as an effort to threaten the USSR and encircle it. This poisons the general atmosphere between our countries and is opposed by countries of the region. The US has refused to discuss the Indian Ocean while it is grabbing a new military bridgehead. The US should approach this question from a broader perspective.

Secretary Muskie said that if the USSR thought it was being treated badly in the US press, they should pay more attention to President Carter's press clippings. Skepticism about one another's intentions is easy to generate but based on his long experience in the Senate, the Secretary said he could testify to this Administration's good faith on SALT II. It took time to head off amendments and convert them to understandings which would not destroy the Treaty. But SALT II was never pigeonholed and had been ready to be acted on.

Concerning the future, the Secretary said the President had made SALT ratification an issue in the campaign. This was not an easy decision since promoting a Treaty while Soviet intentions were in doubt was unpopular. The President took a courageous decision because he believed in the issue. The President, the Vice President, Secretary of Defense Brown on "Face the Nation" Sunday,³ the Secretary in his many speeches had begun an effort to build support for SALT II. They hoped

³ September 21.

to make the Treaty better understood and to make people understand the consequences of a no SALT world. We would make an effort to obtain ratification early next year or before; it was a long shot but worth the effort.

On the question of equality or equivalence, the US is committed to it. We can't have Arms Control on any other basis. This is common sense—though not to all. Some believe in superiority but this is impossible.

Turning to Afghanistan, the Secretary said that we see no basis for saying that self-determination is at work in Afghanistan. The government which the Soviets say invited them in did not survive their arrival. Babrak was installed by Soviet forces. Gromyko interjected that Afghanistan did not have a tradition of elections and Muskie responded that they didn't have tradition of governments installed by outside invaders either.

Muskie said we agree on the need for political settlement. But the question was how to arrive at this point and gather support in Afghanistan. A political settlement without the support of the Afghan people would simply lead to new Soviet intervention. There might be a basis for further US-Soviet dialogue on this question, but the Secretary wanted to eliminate all misunderstanding. Withdrawal was essential to the normal, good US-Soviet relations we want to have.

Concerning the Indian Ocean, Muskie said he understood how US deployments might be misunderstood by the Soviets but when a nation has vital interests far from its shores, it logically uses its Navy to defend these interests. The Soviets assert a right to be involved in Cuba close to the US. The US is prepared to discuss Naval limitations in the Indian Ocean when the Afghan situation is resolved.

TNF

Muskie went on to propose talks in Geneva to begin at an agreed date in October on TNF. The US proposed that its delegation would be at the level of ACDA Deputy Director Keeny and that the initial round would last about one month. We are prepared to deal positively and constructively with the issue. We did not think the description of the talks should be a problem. Questions of scope could be addressed in the negotiations themselves. We wanted to describe the discussions as preliminary since we did not want to give the impression of moving to SALT III before SALT II was ratified. This would only encourage those Senators who wanted to avoid a vote on SALT II.

Gromyko began by objecting to what was published in the US concerning Soviet military budgets. He went on to raise a question which he said was relevant to SALT II or SALT III, claiming that the US has taken steps to undermine SALT II by developing a new type of strategic

weapon which goes beyond the provisions of SALT II. Both SALT II and SALT III had to be founded on the principle of verifiability by national technical means. The US is underestimating the importance of that principle, and the Soviet Union has not yet said its final word on that subject.

Concerning TNF, Gromyko said that the Soviet Union had not developed any new type of weapon but had only more or less compensated for steps the US had taken to modernize its weapons in Europe. At no time had the Soviets achieved equality, given the presence of US bases in Europe. Referring to the Brezhnev-Carter exchange of letters and Gromyko's exchange with Muskie in Vienna,⁴ Gromyko said Soviet views had been clearly formulated. We are prepared to discuss US FBS in Europe and medium range nuclear systems organically as one problem. In the US, one sometimes hears that you want to discuss medium range systems only and overlook the other half. We are not simpletons to forget the second half of our position. We want you to take this into account so that you will see what is going on.

We have agreed to an exchange of views. It is up to you whether you call them preliminary or not. We agree that whatever can be agreed to would be implemented only after SALT II has been ratified. We are agreeable to be represented at the same level as you. Our man will have the rank of our representative at SALT II negotiations at the latter stages in Geneva.

Gromyko said the Soviet side was agreeable to start talks in the week beginning October 13 in Geneva. The decision should be made public by a short joint formulation which could be worked out now or in a few days.

PD 59⁵

Gromyko asked to continue to make one more point. There is a strange and worrisome thing going on in the US which is new. It is a cult of war, and a nuclear war at that. The concept of limited nuclear war and a lowering of the threshold of nuclear war is being drummed in to the ordinary American man. The Americans are beginning to think about the acceptability—or the inevitability—of nuclear war. There is a military fever with civilians scaring the military and the military scaring the Administration. This really worries the Soviet Union and we cannot fail to reach the conclusion that the US is preparing for

⁴ See Documents 298, 299, and 301 for the Brezhnev and Carter letters. See Document 278 for the meeting between Gromyko and Muskie in Vienna.

⁵ Presidential Directive 59, "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy," was issued on July 25. PD 59 is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1977–1980*, vol. IV, National Security Policy.

the first strike. If the Soviet Union did the same thing, nuclear war would become inevitable.

Gromyko asked the Secretary to inform the President on behalf of Brezhnev that the Soviet leadership wants to know where this doctrine is leading. They want a reply to the question. This is not like allocating agenda items to committees in the UN but a truly serious matter. Gromyko asked the question be posed to the President.

Gromyko then turned over Brezhnev's reply to President Carter's recent letter.⁶

Secretary Muskie said that the Soviets posed a legitimate question about PD 59, one he had looked into himself. The US had no intention of acquiring a first-strike capability and didn't believe the Soviets did either. In any event, strategic capabilities are determined by weapons, not by doctrine alone.

The purpose of the new US doctrine was to cover the full range of deterrents. PD 59 succeeds NSDM 242⁷ issued at the end of the Ford Administration. It reflects an evolutionary change from this doctrine, not a sharp departure. The evolutionary change is caused by changes in weapons themselves—their accuracy and numbers.

The US does not believe that a limited war is conceivable and thinks that use of nuclear weapons will escalate to a full scale exchange. But we believe that a flexible doctrine is necessary in case someone else may consider nuclear war conceivable. The Secretary said he would convey Gromyko's comments to the President and that he recognized the need to avoid any misunderstanding. This could be explored in the context of the SALT process.

Iran and the Persian Gulf

The Secretary turned over a copy of the attached non paper⁸ which he first read aloud to Gromyko.

Gromyko said the US statement had "piled word upon word." In light of what he had already said concerning Soviet policies, the US statement was wide of the mark. He urged the United States not to intervene and to keep hands off the region. Gromyko said he had already set forth Soviet policy concerning Iran and the Persian Gulf.

Gromyko asked if we planned to publish our statement and said the USSR would make a suitable response in that case.

⁶ See Documents 299 and 301.

⁷ National Security Decision Memorandum 242, "Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear Weapons," was issued on January 17, 1974. The text is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976.

⁸ Not found attached.

Secretary Muskie said we had no intention of publishing our statement and agreed that it should be considered part of their confidential conversations.

The meeting concluded with a discussion of alternate formulations for an announcement concerning TNF talks. Secretary Muskie objected to the Soviet draft on the grounds that it specified limitations on nuclear arms “in Europe.” Gromyko objected to the US draft on the grounds that it did not specify what nuclear arms were to be discussed and thus left the impression that we were moving into SALT III.

The following formulation was subsequently agreed upon for release at 5:30 p.m. September 25.

Joint U.S./Soviet Announcement

At their meeting on September 25, Mr. Muskie and Mr. Gromyko had an exchange of views regarding the beginning of discussions on questions of limiting nuclear arms which were raised in previous contacts between the parties. As a result, an agreement was reached that representatives of the U.S. and U.S.S.R. would meet in Geneva the week beginning October 13, 1980 in order to begin the discussion of this question.

303. Message From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, October 5, 1980, 0524Z

WH07367. Forwarded per request of Secretary Muskie. Please deliver as soon as possible. Subject: Soviet Demarche on Iran-Iraq Conflict.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Begin summary: Dobrynin gave the Secretary an oral statement on the Iran-Iraq conflict on October 4 in which the Soviet Government requested clarification from the USG on the purpose of reported plans for naval activity in the Straits of Hormuz and the deployment of

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, President's Personal Foreign Affairs File, Box 5, USSR (General): 9/77–12/80. Secret; Sensitive; Cherokee; Eyes Only; Nodis. Handwritten time of receipt reads “10:15 pm, 05 Oct 1980 EST.” Sent from the White House Situation Room. The initial “C” written in the upper right-hand corner indicates that Carter saw the cable. Carter spent October 4 and 5 in a fishing cabin in Spruce Creek, Pennsylvania. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

AWACS to Saudi Arabia. The statement also reaffirmed the Soviet position on non-interference in the conflict and expressed the assumption that the U.S. was aware of the “far-reaching consequences” of any interference in the conflict. The Secretary noted that U.S. naval activity, like the AWACS deployment was defensive in nature, aimed only at being prepared for contingencies which we hoped would not arise. He said the Soviet statement would be studied carefully to determine whether an additional reply would be needed. He also responded to questions from Dobrynin on our assessment of the present military situation in the Gulf area and on his recent conversations with the Iraqi and Pakistani Foreign Ministers. End summary.

3. Near the conclusion of a meeting in the Department on October 4 which the Secretary had requested to discuss other topics (reported septel),² Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin stated that he had just received instructions to deliver an “oral statement” on the Iran-Iraq situation. Translated text of the statement follows:

Begin text

In the course of the recent conversation with the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR,³ the Secretary of State on behalf of the American Government gave assurances to the effect that the USA would observe neutrality in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict and that it in general did not intend to interfere in the affairs of the countries of that region.

However, there have been numerous communications in recent days to the effect that plans are being discussed within the US Government as well as between the USA and other Western powers concerning a possible use of their armed forces in the Persian Gulf area under the pretext of assuring freedom of navigation in the Straits of Hormuz.

No refutations of such communications on the part of the U.S. Government have followed. Moreover, the accuracy of some of them, for example those concerning the transfer to Saudi Arabia of military aircraft of the “AWACS” type with American crews, has been confirmed by official representatives of the US Defense Department and Department of State. Nor do they deny the fact that additional naval forces, including one more aircraft carrier, are being moved to the Persian Gulf area.

A legitimate question cannot but arise on the Soviet side: how can one understand all this in the light of the assurances given by the American side?

² See Document 304.

³ See Document 302.

In Moscow they expect to receive from the Government of the USA prompt and comprehensive clarifications on this score, having in mind the need—as was also emphasized by the Secretary of State—for the USSR and the USA to have a precise and clear view of the position of each other in connection with the Iranian-Iraqi conflict.

The Soviet position on this question remains just as it has been stated by us, namely: no one should interfere in this conflict, be it a large power or any other state. The Soviet Union will also in the future adhere to this course on the understanding, of course, that all other countries, including the USA, will act in the same manner.

We proceed on the basis that the far reaching consequences with which any, especially military, interference of the USA or of anyone else in the Iranian-Iraqi conflict, and in general in the affairs of the countries of the Persian Gulf area, would be fraught must be clear to the American side. End text.

4. After hearing the statement, the Secretary stated that he would give a brief reaction now and that the statement would be studied to see what additional response might be required. He stated first of all, that with regard to the sea lanes in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere, our only concern was that they be left open. In the first days of the war we were concerned that the Iranians were going to seek to “regulate” shipping in the Straits of Hormuz, and they in fact went so far as to hail two ships transiting the Straits.

We were concerned that this might be the first step in an effort to restrain shipping. The immediate effect was an increase in insurance rates, and a second effect was that shipping was backing up in the Straits area. If shipping and the flow of oil were to be seriously disrupted, our vital interests would be so seriously affected that we would need to consider what steps to take.

5. Recently, the Secretary continued, the risks appeared to have diminished. The Iranians have stated that they too want to protect the open sea lanes; in fact much of their normal shipping flows through the Persian Gulf. Nonetheless, we continued to discuss possible options that would be available to us because of the serious consequences of a disruption of shipping.

6. The Secretary said that it was not our desire to take sides in the conflict and that it was important that we not be perceived by either of the combatants to be taking sides.

7. With regard to AWACS, the Secretary noted that the aircraft had no offensive capabilities. The Saudis had requested this assistance so that they would have as much advance notice as possible of any “desperate” attacks by Iran. The AWACS deployment was thus a defensive move made at the request of Saudi Arabia, and was not an attempt to violate our policy of neutrality. The Secretary added that, when the de-

ployment was being discussed, he was aware of the possibility that it would raise concerns on the part of the Soviet Union and thus had made it clear to the Saudis and publicly that the planes were strictly for Defensive 3. He assured Dobrynin that both our naval movements and the AWACS deployment were thus done strictly in preparation for contingencies which we hoped would never arise.

8. Dobrynin asked whether the U.S. was discussing with other countries the creation of some joint flotilla. The Secretary responded that we had no concrete idea in mind for keeping open the sea lanes, and that the situation might never go beyond the discussion stage. As he had said we saw the risk diminishing at present. We had no desire to get into the Persian Gulf with our naval forces and hoped the region states would patrol the Gulf and keep it open.

9. Dobrynin commented that the U.S. already had a sizeable strength in the area and asked why, if we saw the risk diminishing, it was necessary to continue to beef up our naval forces there. This served only to increase tensions, he said. The Secretary responded that the Iranians had a continuing ability to disrupt the flow of oil. While we did not want the contingency to arise where we would need to act to protect the oil flow, we could not act as though the risk did not exist.

10. Continuing his argument, Dobrynin stated that the Secretary had earlier in the conversation spoken of the need for mutual restraint. But after his conversation with Gromyko the U.S. had sent an additional carrier to the area—an action he implied showed lack of restraint. The Secretary pointed out that Iran had displayed an inclination to indulge in irrational acts; the U.S. was already the victim of one such act. It was impossible to know what role Iran might see for the hostages, or what it might perceive as the best way of bringing pressure on Iraq.

11. Asked by Dobrynin for his general impression of the present military situation, the Secretary responded that it appeared to be stabilized at a containable level but that the conflict might be a prolonged one. The Iraqi Foreign Minister had told him their objectives were limited, though there had been subsequent movements into Iran. It was possible Iran could force a stalemate and thus the Iraqis faced a dilemma—whether to sit where they were or to take some additional action. If they choose the latter, the next steps in the conflict would be unpredictable.

12. Dobrynin asked whether it was true, as he had heard, that the Secretary had advised Iraq not to move its aircraft into other states of the region. The Secretary responded that he had not discussed this with Iraqi Foreign Minister Sa'dun Hammadi except in terms of the possibility that the conflict could spread. He had told Hammadi that if it did, other nations would have to decide how to respond, and the Soviet Union would then have to decide its own reaction—especially if insta-

bility inside Iran increased. He added that he had told Hammadi that the U.S. was following a hands off policy and that it was his impression that the Soviet Union was doing the same. Dobrynin asked whether there were any Iraqi planes in Oman and Saudi Arabia, to which the Secretary responded he thought those planes had left and that in fact this had occurred before his discussion with Hammadi. It was possible that the Iraqis had decided not to spread the war to the southern end of the Gulf.

Afghanistan

13. After the Secretary had stated once more that the oral statement Dobrynin had delivered would be studied, Dobrynin asked whether Pakistani President Zia, in his talks in Washington, had been “helpful” with regard to the Afghanistan situation. The Secretary responded affirmatively, adding that he had also talked with Shahi⁴, who had described to him his meeting with Gromyko. Shahi said there had been a frank exchange and that he had found the meeting relaxed, not threatening as he had expected it to be. (Dobrynin interjected, “of course not since the Soviets were trying to find a way out.”) The Secretary said it was obvious from our discussion with the Pakistanis that they were receptive to a political settlement of Afghanistan, but that they have serious difficulties with the May 14 proposals.

Muskie

⁴ Agha Shahi, Adviser to the President for Foreign Affairs of Pakistan.

304. Message From Secretary of State Muskie to President Carter¹

Washington, October 5, 1980, 1511Z

WH07366. Forwarded per request of Secretary Muskie. Please deliver as soon as possible. Subject: Muskie-Dobrynin Meeting: Follow-up to Gromyko Bilateral.

1. (S-entire text).

2. Begin summary. Secretary Muskie met with Ambassador Dobrynin October 4 to take up several issues which time had prevented his raising with Gromyko in New York:² Poland, the Sverdlovsk anthrax outbreak, the September 14 Soviet high-yield test, prospects for Madrid, including human rights issues, and a problem affecting continuation of construction of the new Moscow Embassy complex. He also responded to a question which Gromyko had raised during the New York bilateral on PD-59.³ In response, Dobrynin complained that most of what the Secretary had to say was negative, that there was nothing very positive about it. On the specific issues raised, Dobrynin said the Poles knew how to handle their problems without outside interference; there was no utility in continuing to discuss Sverdlovsk; he had no information as yet on the September 14 test; our plans for discussing human rights issues at Madrid would have a very negative effect; and he could understand that the construction problem was one that might bother us. The Secretary pointed out that the fact that we continued to set forth our views frankly, in an effort to lessen the differences between us, should not be regarded as "negative." He also stressed the importance of resolving issues which would facilitate our efforts to achieve ratification of SALT II. End summary.

3. The Secretary told Dobrynin he thought his talk with Gromyko in New York on September 25 had been very useful and that he had appreciated Gromyko's frankness and relaxed tone. Despite the fact that the meeting had been extended beyond the agreed time, however, there were several subjects we had not had time to cover. He thought the best way to treat these was to set out our position on each of them in a non-paper, briefly and without any polemics, which Dobrynin could

¹ Source: Carter Library, Plains File, Box 5, USSR (General): 9/77–12/80. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Nodis. Handwritten time of receipt reads "11:55 am, 05 Oct 1980 EST." Sent from the White House Situation Room. The initial "C" written in the upper right-hand corner indicates that Carter saw the cable. Carter spent October 4 and 5 in a fishing cabin in Spruce Creek, Pennsylvania. (Carter Library, Presidential Materials, President's Daily Diary)

² See Document 302.

³ See footnote 5, Document 302.

transmit to Gromyko. If there were additional subjects which Gromyko would like to bring to the Secretary's attention in a similar manner he would be glad to consider them.

4. The Secretary then summarized each of the issues orally and at the end of his presentation handed Dobrynin the following non-paper:

Begin text:

Follow-up to September 25 meeting

Poland: We wish to reiterate the commitment of the U.S. Government to exercise the greatest restraint in dealing with events in that country. This continues to be our position, and we expect others to exercise similar restraint. We continue to believe that the Polish people and Government must be left free to work out their problems without outside interference. Outside military intervention from any quarter would have incalculable consequences and would inevitably place in jeopardy the entire framework of detente in Europe.

On arms control matters, we wish to reaffirm the U.S. commitment to SALT II ratification and to the achievement of progress in CTB, MBFR, CW, and ASAT. We would also like to raise two matters which could have far reaching implications for the future of arms control negotiations in general and, in the near term, for SALT II ratification. First, the inability to find a suitable means of resolving the concerns expressed by the United States regarding the April 1979 outbreak of anthrax in Sverdlovsk raises serious questions concerning Soviet compliance with the Biological Weapons Convention. This is a problem that will not simply go away with the passage of time. We continue to believe that the best way to resolve our legitimate concerns in this matter would be to arrange for technical discussions among experts. Although we prefer to resolve this matter on a bilateral basis, the U.S. Government will also consider other ways to resolve our concerns in accordance with the terms of the Biological Weapons Convention—including possible multilateral action. Soviet cooperation in resolving this matter would be a very positive step.

Second, our seismic data concerning the Soviet nuclear test of September 14 strongly suggest that the yield may have exceeded 150 kilotons. The President is concerned about this matter and has directed that this be conveyed to the Soviet side. The U.S. attaches even higher priority now to its proposal of last December for the establishment of an ad hoc bilateral working group to exchange geophysical and geological data for regions of active test sites on both sides. This would help to reduce the uncertainties involved in estimating the yields of our respective nuclear tests. The U.S. attaches great importance to the statement we made in 1976 concerning limiting our tests to 150 kilotons and below. However, if the Soviet side is not responsive to our legitimate security concerns in this area, it will be increasingly difficult to con-

tinue the policy of restraint which we have consistently exercised. Further, it is particularly important that the Soviet Government understand that failure to resolve this problem could constitute a severe blow to SALT II ratification prospects.

With regard to the concerns of President Brezhnev over PD-59, conveyed by Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 25, 1980, we wish to make clear that PD-59 is not a radical departure from previous policy, nor is it a first strike strategy. Nothing in United States nuclear strategy, including PD-59, conflicts with our determination to avoid the outbreak of nuclear war or our commitment to the arms control process. PD-59 reflects our fundamental conviction that there can be no victor in a nuclear war of any kind or at any level. Thus, its purpose is to strengthen deterrence and reduce the likelihood of such a conflict. Specifically, with regard to alleged U.S. preparations to carry out a nuclear first strike, the President has asked that we reaffirm the categorical denial which Secretary Muskie gave Foreign Minister Gromyko in New York.

CSCE: One of the most important contributions to the lessening of tensions in Europe has been the signing of the CSCE Final Act in Helsinki. We look forward to a full and thorough review of the implementation of this agreement at the upcoming Madrid Review Conference. We are committed to work for a constructive session which avoids a sterile exchange of polemics and which creates the basis for balanced progress in all areas of CSCE. But we intend to discuss such retrogressive steps as the resumed jamming of the Voice of America and other Western radio broadcasts and to pursue in a businesslike manner the deep concerns of the American people and Congress concerning human rights, including freedom of emigration and the treatment of dissidents. We want to draw special attention to those cases of particular interest to the American people, for example the cases of A.D. Sakharov, and of Anatoliy Shcharanskiy, Yuriy Orlov and other members of the Helsinki Monitoring Group, the resolution of which would be welcomed in the U.S. and in the international community as a whole as a positive step which would improve the prospects for a fruitful review session.

Chancery construction: We wish to raise a matter which threatens our ability to continue with the construction of our new Embassy in Moscow. Despite the agreement reached in December 1972 that both sides would "assist each other in the unhindered importation and delivery of freight to the construction site," problems with Soviet customs clearance of construction materials could force us to suspend the entire project. The United States has suggested a solution to the customs problem which we hope will receive an early and positive response from the Soviet side. If it should become necessary to suspend work on

the U.S. complex, other aspects of the December 4, 1972 Agreement on Embassy Complexes would have to be addressed. End text.

5. Dobrynin said he would of course report the Secretary's remarks to Gromyko. Overall, however, his impression was that they, quite frankly, were not very encouraging. He then commented briefly on the individual issues raised as follows:

—Poland is an independent country and knows how to handle its problems without outside interference.

—The U.S. knows the Soviet position on arms control very well: the Soviets favor a continuation. But we have discussed Sverdlovsk "hundreds of times" and he doesn't see anything useful in discussing it further. As for the September 14 Soviet nuclear test, he has no information as yet.

—He would report what the Secretary had to say about PD-59.

—The Secretary's remarks on CSCE were discouraging. The Madrid Review Conference should have two purposes—performance review and constructive steps for the future. The U.S. of course has the right to discuss anything it wishes. But in planning to raise such issues as the Shcharanskiy case, does the Administration understand that this will have a very negative effect? This was the beginning of the Soviets' trouble with this Administration from the very beginning. In short, there is nothing positive in our remarks on CSCE—and even the allies of the U.S. are telling the Soviets that the U.S. has "only negative" plans for Madrid.

—As for the Embassy construction issue, Dobrynin would report what the Secretary had to say. He could understand it was a problem that might bother us.

6. Dobrynin then remarked that most of the questions the Secretary had raised were not new; many of them had a "long beard." This surprised him; he had thought that, with the approach of elections, he would have something on the positive side to say.

7. The Secretary responded that it was obvious that the state of US-Soviet relations was such that the problems were difficult and sensitivities were strong. In presenting these problems, as in his discussion with Gromyko in New York, he was motivated not by a negative attitude but by a desire to find a positive way of improving our relations. He thought it necessary to keep working at resolving our differences. He had particularly mentioned the problems in the arms control area because they were all interrelated. He had told Gromyko of our plans for moving toward SALT II ratification and considered it important to mention as well the other [garble—*related?*] problems. While we plan to move for ratification in any case, the issue would be decided by a handful of votes and it was important to resolve as many problems as possible beforehand.

8. The Secretary noted that PD-59 was an issue which had been raised on the Soviet side; he had the impression that Gromyko had expressed greater feeling in discussing that issue than on any other topic—to which Dobrynin responded, “that’s true.” Recognizing that it was obviously of concern to Gromyko, the Secretary continued, he had raised it at the highest level and wanted to reassure Gromyko. He recognized that that might not end the matter, but wanted to make the point that even if Gromyko should repeat his views on the subject he would not regard it as a “negative” approach, but rather as an indication that problems remained which must be ironed out, just as we succeeded in doing in the SALT process.

9. On human rights, the Secretary said he understood what Dobrynin was saying but pointed out that the problem was not simply one which was being raised by this administration. Rather, our position reflected concerns widely felt within this country, and we had an obligation to continue raising those concerns with the Soviets.

10. The Secretary reaffirmed the President’s and his own commitment to the arms control process but noted that we were going to need some assistance from the Soviets to get the job done. If we could make progress in resolving Afghanistan, we ought to try; if we could make progress in the other problem areas he had mentioned, we ought to try. It was in that context that he had raised them—not because of a negative attitude. Progress in all these areas would improve prospects for the arms control process, something which was important both in order to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation and in order to reduce the cost of the arms burden on both sides.

11. The Iran-Iraq conflict, the Secretary said, drove home to both sides the importance of developing policies of restraint. So long as the fighting continued the threat of a broadening war became more evident. He had found concern over this possibility in his travels inside the U.S., in his discussions with other foreign ministers in New York, and in his meeting with Gromyko. He sensed that both the U.S. and the USSR were at present following a policy of restraint toward that conflict, and he thought restraint was the best description of what our policy should be. We should attempt to lessen irritants. He recognized that this was not going to be easy and that this was a very difficult period in our relationship.

12. Dobrynin then abruptly changed the subject by asking whether the Secretary was going to attend the Madrid Conference, adding that FRG Foreign Minister Genscher had told Gromyko he planned to do so. The Secretary said that it was not his present intention to go to Madrid. He then commented that he realized Madrid offered the possibility that there would be much shouting at each other, but that it was not his desire that the Conference develop in that manner. He thought there were

possibilities for constructive progress at Madrid, adding that both Griffin Bell and Max Kampelman⁴ have a constructive attitude toward the Conference and want to see progress, not a shouting match.

13. The Secretary concluded that, even at the risk of repeating our position on subjects that have “long beards,” we should try to make progress and reach agreements, particularly in the field of arms control.

Muskie

⁴ Former Attorney General Griffin Bell served as Ambassador and Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE from 1979 until 1980; Max Kampelman served as Ambassador and Co-Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE from 1980.

305. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 14, 1980, 1601Z

16123. Subj: Meeting With Gromyko October 14: Iran/Iraq. Ref: State 271743.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. Gromyko received me at 10:00 a.m. October 14 for an hour and twenty minutes of an icy and confrontational meeting. After hearing me out on the talking points³ in the nonpaper, and having me repeat the last paragraph (regarding inflammatory Soviet accusations), he then delivered a thirty minute rebuke on the following lines.

3. Gromyko said he had explained in clearcut terms the position of the Soviet leadership toward the Iraq/Iran conflict when he met with Secretary Muskie in New York. It has been clearly stated that the USSR had no intention to intervene and that no other party, big or small, should intervene, either. In particular, the US, for reasons known and

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 10/80. Secret; Cherokee; Niact Immediate; Nodis.

² Telegram 271743 to Moscow, October 11, provided the U.S. response to the Soviet démarche on Iran and Iraq. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–1797)

³ Not found.

understood, should keep its hands off. The US side, for its part, replied that it had no intention to interfere, subsequently, the Soviet side had been surprised that the US, after the meeting, made press statements about having warned the USSR not to intervene. Such unilateral misleading statements served to aggravate the situation, misrepresenting the facts of what had transpired in the meeting, “turning matters on their head,” all in an attempt to make public opinion believe that the Soviets were at fault and had been warned. Why did the US behave this way, making the Soviets look bad? It was a petty method. No candidate for political office could get any use out of it and it was not a good basis for conducting foreign affairs because it undermined credibility and confidence in high level statements.

4. He went on at length to say that he had not believed when he talked with the Secretary that in a few days the Soviet position would be publicly distorted and presented in a wrong way. The USSR could and should present the US “a political bill for its recourse to such misrepresentation,” and this was why, after returning from New York, the Soviet side had decided to draw US attention to matter of intervention. As the Soviets analyze the situation, the US is itself interfering, but reproaching the USSR as if it were the guilty party. The USSR had a right to reply to this; had Washington lost its sense of reality? War and bloodshed could come out of the situation as it was developing and the Soviet side was free to express this opinion, which he specifically asked me to convey to Washington. Washington was adopting the principle that offense is the best defense, but it won’t work. The responsibility could not be shifted to the USSR.

5. Gromyko said he wished to draw serious attention to the concentration of a large US fleet in the Strait of Hormuz and the adjacent area. There was no reason, “not even a formal pretext,” for this, and the naval force was even increasing with reinforcements arriving from other areas. True, the US guns were silent and didn’t shoot, but the presence was political-military pressure and tantamount to “very rude interference.”

6. Gromyko said he wanted to speak of Iran: Iraq could be generally included in his meaning, but he was now speaking about Iran. The oil riches of Iran could not be construed as belonging to the US. Iran was not a “US oil tank.” It was the Iranian people’s oil, to dispose of as they chose, and “no capital in the world is entitled to give Iran a timetable for how much oil it is to provide in any month or year.” It was in the interest of detente and a better world situation generally to withdraw the US Navy from the Persian Gulf. He could include the Indian Ocean, too. But for the purpose at hand he was referring only to the Gulf and Hormuz.

7. He said the American press with gusto suggested and reported rumors to the effect that the Soviets are delivering weapons to Iraq or Iran. The USG makes no attempt to set matters straight, although it knows the truth. He would take this opportunity to say again that the USSR was not making any arms deliveries to Iran or Iraq. Finally, he said, the Soviets had nothing to recant, it was the US which was responsible for the military buildup in the Gulf area. Restraint and coolheadedness by great powers were in the interests of all, including the US “and the countries which are carrying out US policy.”

8. I replied that the shipping lanes of the Persian Gulf area are a lifeline of the industrial world and it appeared that the Soviet Union seriously underrated the importance of this to US interests. Shipping had come under threat and insurance rates had jumped up. Gromyko’s remarks underemphasized the vital importance involved. That’s why our fleet was there, and I noted that there was also a Soviet fleet in the area, my careful reading of the record of the New York conversation was clearly that both sides, not just the Soviet side, had given warnings.

9. Gromyko came back at this, saying that the distorted public statements made by the US side had not been made by the Secretary. It was up to us to measure precisely the responsibility, but the President had repeatedly said that the US had warned the USSR. There would be no objection if it had been truthfully revealed who said what in what sequence, but all had been distorted.

10. I tried to bring Gromyko back to the question of vital interest, saying that we had no interest in getting involved in the Iran/Iraq conflict and that we did not consider the oil deposits of the area to belong to us. We had no idea or desire to take oil by force which now had become the thrust of his conversation. But so long as people were willing to sell us oil—the industrial world received a substantial portion of its oil from this area—then it was our vital interest to see that we got the oil out. Our fleet presence could be reduced with the reduction of tensions in the area and progress toward a peaceful settlement of the conflict. I could see no reason why this position would bring us into conflict with the Soviet Union.

11. At this point, saying that it was in the interest of avoiding conflict that we not have any surprises or misinterpretations, I took up orally points in paragraph 4 reftel regarding RD deployment. Gromyko listened in silence and gave no reaction.

12. Gromyko coolly and abruptly ended the exchange by saying “our approaches and reasoning are so different that it would be difficult to erect any bridges between them. The substance of all this is that

you are trying to arrogate rights, and you are now trying to convince yourself that you are justified in this.

13. Gromyko raised a second matter which is reported septel.⁴

Watson

⁴ Telegram 16121, from Moscow, October 14, addressed the CSCE meeting in Madrid. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1747)

306. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, October 28, 1980, 0106Z

287283. Subject: Muskie-Dobrynin Meeting: Reply to Oct 4 Demarche.²

1. (S-entire text.)

2. Dobrynin called on Secretary Muskie on October 27 to provide Gromyko's response to re Secretary's Oct 4 demarche on those US-Soviet issues which could not be covered in Sept 25 bilateral in New York. Text of oral statement follows:

3. Begin text:

—We, for our part, have considered and presently consider it useful to continue a dialogue on various questions concerning relations between our countries and on international issues. Such discussion, in our view, must be aimed at bringing as close together as possible the positions of the sides, at finding points of overlap, in order to move toward the solution of questions of mutual interest.

—In the conversation with A.A. Gromyko in New York, the Secretary of State said that the US side also wished to have normal relations with the Soviet Union. Regretfully, this wish is not to be found in what was said by the Secretary of State on October 4. The choice of the questions and the way they are posed do not indicate a readiness by the US side to seek mutual understanding. We have no desire to engage in po-

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 10/80. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by George Rueckert (EUR/SOV); cleared by Barry, Robert K. German (EUR/SOV), Gary Matthews (S/MS), Bremer, Leon Sigal (PM), and W. Scott Butcher (S/S–O); approved by Christopher.

² See Document 303.

lemics for the sake of polemics. But we, understandably, cannot silently pass over statements and actions of the US side with which we cannot agree.

—We would like in this connection to point out the inappropriateness of the US side's raising questions regarding the situation in Poland. Such questions in general cannot be subject of discussion between the USSR and the USA.

However, since the Secretary of State did touch upon this question, we cannot help noting that all sorts of statements, including those made at the official level, as well as certain actions by the US side, cannot be regarded in any other way but as being directed at interference in the affairs of a sovereign state, the Polish People's Republic. We, together with the Polish leadership, resolutely condemn such a line of conduct.

—Recently, on many occasions including the meeting of A.A. Gromyko with the Secretary of State in New York we have assessed the present unconstructive policy of the USA on questions of arms limitation. Unfortunately, the considerations put forward by the Secretary of State introduce nothing new in this respect. The position held by the USA is, in fact, impeding progress toward the solution of these questions; Washington at the same time continues in practice to increase the arms race.

—We expressed in an explicit and clear-cut manner our sharply negative attitude toward the so called "new nuclear strategy" of the USA. This attitude remains as it was stated by L.I. Brezhnev in his recent speech in Alma-Ata.³ It was also set forth during the conversation with the Secretary of State in New York. We will follow carefully the activities of the United States in this regard.

—Neither is any useful purpose served by attempts to put doubt, without any grounds whatsoever, [to?] the conscientious implementation by the Soviet Union of its obligations under the agreements and understandings in force in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. We are convinced that such a course, which is in fact aimed at disrupting what we succeeded in achieving in this area, does not correspond to the interests of the United States itself.

—We reaffirm our position on the question regarding an outbreak of anthrax in the area of Sverdlovsk and on the observance of the agreed yield threshold of 150 kilotons during the conduct of underground nuclear explosions.

³ For the text of Brezhnev's August 30 speech in Alma-Ata, see *The Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, vol. XXXII, no. 35, October 1, 1980, pp. 1–5.

—We would like to express the hope that the US side will after all embark on the path of a realistic policy and will exert necessary efforts so as to facilitate the working out and adoption of practical measures in the field of arms limitation and disarmament. This applies to both the negotiations already under way for a certain period of time, and to the just started discussion of questions concerning the limitation of nuclear arms in Europe. Such efforts on the part of the USA would meet a positive response throughout the entire world. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready as before to cooperate effectively in the resolution of the said questions.

—The present situation dictates in a particularly forceful way the necessity of taking urgent measures to reduce military danger. In this connection, we would like to draw the attention of the Secretary of State to the concrete proposals introduced by the Soviet Union at the current session of the UN General Assembly: to renounce the extension of existing military-political groupings and the creation of new ones; to undertake not to increase from a certain date armed forces and conventional armaments of states; to strengthen security guarantees of non-nuclear states; and to establish a one-year moratorium on conducting any nuclear explosions by all nuclear powers. We call upon the United States to cooperate in implementing these initiatives, that would without doubt have a positive impact on the international situation.

—We have noted the words of the Secretary of State to the effect that the USA is determined to work constructively at the Madrid meeting. For our part, we also resolutely favor this, as we are convinced that only such a policy corresponds to the interests of all states-signatories of the Helsinki Final Act and to the objectives of a genuine strengthening of security and the development of cooperation in Europe. However, the above-mentioned pronouncement of the Secretary of State is in no way corroborated by the present line of conduct adopted at the preparatory session by the US Delegation, which is doing everything possible to create there a situation of conflict, even in the coordination of organizational and procedural questions for the principal meeting in Madrid. We will be ready to carry on a balanced and business-like discussion there. But it must be clear that, should this be forced on us, we will respond appropriately to attacks in regard to Soviet foreign policy as well as to any attempts to interfere in our internal affairs.

—We again resolutely reject the attempts of the US side to raise questions which pertain totally and entirely to the internal competence of the Soviet state, particularly with regard to all kinds of renegades engaging in hostile antisocial activity. We reaffirm also our position concerning the broadcasts of the “Voice of America”.

—We see no basis for the expression of concern by the US side in connection with the construction of the new US Embassy building in Moscow, and in particular with regard to the importation into the USSR for these purposes of construction materials and customs examination thereof, if, of course, no aims of some different nature are being pursued in this matter. On our part we seek to achieve a mutually acceptable solution of specific questions that arise, being strictly guided by the 1972 Agreement and acting, of course, in the framework of the customs regulations existing in our country. We proceed on the assumption that as a practical matter such questions will continue to be discussed and resolved between the relevant Soviet organizations and the US Embassy in Moscow.

—We would like to invite the attention of the Secretary of State to the problems associated with carrying out the flights of Aeroflot aircraft in the USA and their servicing there. We expect the proper assistance in this regard on the part of the US authorities. End text

4. For the Ambassador: At October 28 quadripartite meeting, you may brief in general terms on the purpose of Dobrynin's call on the Secretary. You should not go into details pending receipt of guidance for briefing which will also be given at NATO.

Christopher

307. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, October 31, 1980, 2208Z

291234. Subject: Demarche—Commentary on U.S. Interference in Poland. Ref: Moscow 17285.²

1. S-entire text.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P910096–1823. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Warsaw. Drafted by Mark R. Parris (EUR/SOV); cleared by Barry, Vest, Robert K. German (EUR/SOV), Harry Gilmore (EUR/EE), Anthony Lake (S/P), Rozanne Ridgway (C), Gary L. Matthews (S/MS), Brement, and Bremer; approved by Muskie.

² Telegram 17285 from Moscow, October 30 is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P900077–1754.

2. You will be receiving separately FBIS text of October 30 Moscow World Service English commentary by Dimitriyev³ on alleged U.S. interference in Poland. Dimitriyev point of departure is gross distortion of October 29 comments by Department press spokesman, text of which is at para 4 [5]. The commentary's references to US activities against Allende⁴ in Chile and its allegations of US disregard for Helsinki Act's non-interference provisions strike us as sufficiently ominous to warrant raising the issue promptly with Moscow.

3. You should therefore seek early appointment with Korniyenko to convey copy of spokesman's remarks and make the points below. You should point out that we are raising this particular issue against the background of a number of public statements by Soviet and other Warsaw Pact leaders which contain false allegations about US and Western interference in the Polish situation. These intentional distortions cause us serious concern.

4. Points to be made:

—The Soviet side is well aware of our position that current developments in Poland are an internal matter best resolved by the Poles themselves without outside interference of any kind. We have scrupulously observed this policy ourselves and have displayed the greatest restraint in our actions and our statement.

—For this reason I have been instructed to protest in strong terms an October 30 broadcast by the Moscow World Service citing remarks by a State Department spokesman as evidence of US interference in Poland's internal affairs.

—We are deeply disturbed by this broadcast, which was a gross distortion of the spokesman's actual remarks, a copy of which I would like to leave for the record.

—Such biased and tendentious treatment of the facts can only raise questions about the intentions of the Soviet Union itself.

—I wish to reiterate in the strongest terms Secretary Muskie's statements⁵ in recent meetings with Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin that Soviet intervention in Poland would have incalculable consequences for East-West relations.

5. Text of relevant comments from October 29 press briefing follows: Begin Text. I don't have anything in particular to say about Poland. We regret that the process of compromise and negotiation that has been taking place between the Polish Government and the Polish people has not yet reached an acceptable settlement where the union

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Salvador Allende, President of Chile from November 1970 until September 1973.

⁵ See Documents 304 and 306.

registration question is concerned. We hope that it will be possible to reach a solution satisfactory to all of the parties. We continue to feel and state that the Poles should be allowed to work out their problems without outside interference. End text.

6. Re reftel we agree with your analysis and have been in close touch with the British, French and Germans concerning approaches to the Soviets and other contingencies.

Muskie

308. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, November 3, 1980, 1524Z

17440. Subject: Protest to MFA on Poland. Ref: State 291234.²

1. (S-entire text)

2. The Soviet response to my demarche on Poland (reftel) was essentially to reject that we have any right to raise the subject of Poland. Deputy Minister Kovalev received me November 3 in place of Korniyenko who is said to be ill. After I had made the instructed points in reftel, Kovalev, who seemed nervous throughout the meeting, made an initial weak attempt to assert that Soviet radio was doubtless simply repeating something which had been said to Western or even American media about US interference in Polish internal affairs. Then in consultations with his notetaker, Sokolov from the USA division, Kovalev hit upon the argument that the statement made by the Department spokesman contained a "sign" of interference because it tried to drive a wedge between the people of Poland and their government. This could be the basis for the Soviet radio broadcast.

3. Warming to this sophistry, Kovalev went on to say that the reference I had made to concern for Soviet intentions in Poland was irrelevant and had no connection with US-Soviet or Soviet-Polish relations. He implied that I was out of order raising Poland and he noted that he was replying to the strong terms of my reference with strong terms of his own.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 11/80-1/81. Secret; Cherokee; Immediate; Nodis.

² See Document 307.

4. I replied that the matter of Poland was not at all irrelevant to US-Soviet relations. It seemed to me that the world situation was becoming more and more dangerous. There were three crises now: Afghanistan, Iran/Iraq, and Poland. It was in the mutual interests of the USSR and the US to preserve peace, and in this connection it was in our mutual interest to see that there was no outside interference in Poland.

5. Kovalev responded that the Department spokesman had sought to make a distinction between the Polish trade unions and the Polish Government, which constituted interference in internal Polish affairs. Governments represent states in international affairs, and any dealing with or reference to other elements in a state was interference. As to my point about Soviet intentions, it was an act which we had to reject in strong terms. Mixing Soviet objections to US interference in Poland with threats to peace could only be met by misunderstanding and ridicule.

6. I told him that I could not see the point he was trying to make. We wanted to see a peaceful settlement in Poland. Everything I had heard in Soviet media seemed to imply that the Soviet Union did, too. The spokesman had said nothing that departed from this. Did the Soviets not want to see a peaceful settlement? Telling him I wanted to be sure I understood him, I asked if even the expression of hope for a solution in Poland acceptable to all Polish sides constituted in his mind interference in Poland's affairs. He immediately answered "yes." The Soviets had already stated very clearly to us their position on Poland. There were no grounds for discussion [garble] Poland: "to discuss it would be interference in Poland's internal affairs."

7. I said that I didn't want to beat a dead horse. I could see how, if we were to say that we hoped the Poles could not settle their affairs, that would be interference in their affairs. But I could otherwise not see any basis for charges of interference. I did see, however, a clear need to understand the matter in the context of the dangerous world situation. US-Soviet relations were already burdened.

8. On that note the conversation on this subject ended.

9. Department please pass Embassy Warsaw and other posts as appropriate.

Watson

309. Editorial Note

The revolution in Poland began in August 1980 when approximately 16,000 workers at the Lenin shipyards in Gdansk went on strike.

The strike quickly spread and ultimately led to a breakdown in the Polish economy. As a result, the Polish Communist government gave in to strikers' demand for trade unions that were independent from the government. These trade unions joined together to form the Solidarity movement.

President Jimmy Carter reflected upon these events, which occurred during his last months in office, in his memoirs: "Early in December, not quite a year after Soviet troops had invaded Afghanistan, we became convinced that their military forces were preparing to move into Poland. The Polish trade unions had formed the political front 'Solidarity,' and with broad backing among the people and with support from the church, they were building strength and wresting concessions from the government leaders. There seemed no way that the Polish officials could control this movement toward freedom, which appeared completely incompatible with their regimented system of government." Carter continued, "We were monitoring Soviet military preparations very closely. Fifteen or twenty divisions were ready to move; for the first time, Czech and Soviet forces were conducting night exercises together. The Soviets were surveying invasion routes, had set up an elaborate communications system throughout Poland, were conducting intensive photo reconnaissance flights out of Czechoslovakia and East Germany, and were holding their military forces in a high state of readiness." (*Keeping Faith*, page 584)

310. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

Washington, December 2, 1980, 0108Z

318738. Subject: Poland: Newsom/Dobrynin Meeting.

1. (S-entire text).

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 11/80–1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Sent for information Immediate to Warsaw, USNATO, and the White House. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room. Drafted by Barry; cleared by W. Scott Butcher (S/S–O); approved by Newsom. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P880025–0214)

2. Following a discussion of other matters (septel)² with Ambassador Dobrynin on December 1, Under Secretary Newsom brought up the situation in Poland. Newsom pointed out that we were disturbed by allegations which had appeared in *Rude pravo* and were now being repeated by Soviet media to the effect that the West is attempting to carry out counter-revolution in Poland. Such allegations are, to our knowledge, totally without foundation and they cause us concern because they could be designed to set the stage for Soviet intervention. Such a step would have very serious consequences for East-West relations in general as we have pointed out in the past. Senator Percy has conveyed this same point to Soviet leaders in the past few days.

3. Newsom pointed out that recent reports of Soviet military moves add an element of disquiet. The United States is following a policy of great restraint and this should be apparent in Moscow.

4. In reply, Dobrynin acknowledged that the administration had been restrained in its actions but pointed out that broadcasts of the Voice of America and Radio Free Europe seemed designed to stir up the situation and make it appear that Solidarity Union spokesman had a monopoly on the truth. Concerning US warnings, Dobrynin said that “we are mature people” and understand the various elements of the situation in Poland and their effect on our relationship. “Your message is getting through”, he said, and it is not necessary to repeat it. Concerning the substance of Newsom’s comments, Dobrynin would only say that he too “hoped” that intervention would not take place.

5. Newsom said that he could not accept Dobrynin’s characterization of VOA radio broadcasts which he had reason to believe were responsible and objective.

Christopher

² In telegram 318737 to multiple posts, December 2, the Department outlined Newsom and Dobrynin’s discussion on Syrian-Jordanian tensions. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P870143–0504)

311. Summary of Conclusions of an Ad Hoc Meeting¹

Washington, December 3, 1980, 12:20–12:51 p.m.

SUBJECT

Poland

PARTICIPANTS

White House

Dr. Zbigniew Brzezinski

State

Secretary Edmund Muskie

Defense

Secretary Harold Brown

CIA

Admiral Stansfield Turner

NSC

Steve Larrabee (notetaker)

On December 3, 1980 a meeting was held in Dr. Brzezinski's office to discuss contingency measures in response to increasing signs that the Soviets may be preparing to intervene militarily in Poland. Participating in the meeting were Dr. Brzezinski, Secretary Muskie, Secretary Brown and Admiral Turner. (C)

(Notetaker missed first few minutes of discussion.)

Secretary Brown raised the question of whether a hotline message should be sent to President Brezhnev.² (C)

Dr. Brzezinski thought a message would be appropriate which emphasized that the U.S. had no interest in exploiting the situation in Poland for its own political advantage and that any invasion would have serious consequences for East-West relations, especially U.S.-Soviet relations. (C)

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Europe, USSR, and East/West, Brement Subject File, Box 57, Poland: Fall of 1980: 12/1–8/80. Secret. The meeting took place in Brzezinski's office.

² No hotline message was found. Carter, however, wrote about Poland and the hotline message in his memoirs: "I sent Brezhnev a direct message warning of the serious consequences of a Soviet move into Poland, and let him know more indirectly that we would move to transfer advanced weaponry to China. I asked Prime Minister Gandhi to pressure Brezhnev (who was about to visit New Delhi), and warned the opposition leaders in Poland so that they would not be taken by surprise. I and other administration officials also made public statements about the growing threat to European stability." Carter then quoted from his diary, December 8, "We're continuing our worldwide effort to arouse information and interest in the Soviet moves toward Poland . . . The Soviets have not denied our public statement, and Brezhnev has not answered my hot-line message. This is the first time that has occurred." Carter continued, "I was convinced that the Soviets would already have moved into Poland if they had not been bogged down in Afghanistan and condemned by most nations of the world for it." (*Keeping Faith*, pp. 584–585) Ellipsis in the original. The text of Carter's public statement, December 3, is in *Public Papers: Carter, 1980–1981*, Book III, pp. 2771–2772.

Admiral Turner asked what the objective of such a message would be. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski said it could serve as a deterrent. (C)

Secretary Brown felt that such a statement could only be helpful if the Soviets were on the brink of intervention. He also stressed that it would have a greater effect if it was supported by the Allies. (C)

Secretary Muskie asked what the effect on the Soviets would be if we did not do anything. (C)

Secretary Brown said that unless we took the lead on this issue the European reaction would be too weak and disparate. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski agreed that any statement would not be decisive. However, it would be an indication of the seriousness of our concern and would put down a marker. While such a statement would not deter the Soviets, it was preferable to ambiguity and silence. (C)

Secretary Brown said that if the Soviets were not sure whether they were going to intervene, the more we made clear to them the consequences of their actions ahead of time, the better was the chance of deterring an intervention. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski also pointed out that it would be odd if Governor Reagan and Richard Allen³ appeared to make the stronger statements. (U)

Secretary Muskie agreed that the statement as it stood was fine. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski turned to the question of a hotline message to Brezhnev. It would emphasize that we had no intention of exploiting the situation in Poland but that we wanted Brezhnev to know that we were issuing a statement. He asked what the group thought Brezhnev's reaction would be. He pointed out that we had used the hotline before in non-crisis situations. (C)

Secretary Muskie replied that he did not see how the Soviets could be upset by such a statement or regard it as threatening to their security. In his view it was a relatively moderate statement. He stated that if we held a meeting of the political directors, we had to be prepared to tell them what we would do. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski said we could press them harder on economic conditions. (C)

Admiral Turner felt that the language "exploiting the situation" would go better in a private message. (C)

³ Richard Allen served as President Reagan's National Security Adviser. Ronald Reagan won the presidential election in November 1980 and was inaugurated as the 40th President of the United States on January 20, 1981.

Dr. Brzezinski replied that the language was related to economic assistance which the Soviets had criticized as interference in Polish internal affairs. He felt that it was useful to keep it in. (C)

Secretary Muskie stated that the paragraph had to be read as a whole. It hung together. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski suggested that he recommend to the President that the group felt that the statement should be issued. He then inquired again whether a hotline message should be sent. (C)

Secretary Muskie felt that the hotline message should be reserved until something was imminent. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski asked whether we should precede the statement with the hotline message. (U)

Secretary Brown thought the statement should be preceded by a message; otherwise Brezhnev would not take the statement seriously. (C)

Admiral Turner was uncertain, as was *Dr. Brzezinski*. He stressed that it was important to understand the psychology of the Soviet leadership. When they received such a message, how would they react? (C)

Secretary Muskie pointed out that the statement went beyond previous statements and was therefore not likely to be taken as sheer posturing. It was stronger than what we had said to Dobrynin. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski then dictated the message from the President to Brezhnev to his secretary. (U)

Secretary Brown noted that the message had the advantage of allowing us to be both tougher and more reassuring at the same time. (C)

Dr. Brzezinski said he was coming around to this view as well. One had to think about history. They would have to ask themselves whether they had done all they could to prevent an invasion. (C)

Secretary Brown pointed out the last time they had used the hotline was the night of the abortive rescue of the hostages in Iran. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski said that the hotline has been used on a number of occasions in non-crisis situations. (S)

Secretary Muskie agreed that sending a message would be useful. (U)

Dr. Brzezinski pointed out the serious consequences that a Soviet invasion would have for East-West relations. In many ways it would set things back to the '50s. He asked whether it would not be useful to have a meeting of the Political Directors. He then read aloud the message to be sent over the hotline to Brezhnev. (S)

Secretary Muskie said it sounded fine. (U)

Admiral Turner was concerned that the sentence on "exploiting" would be criticized and felt the word "politically" should be dropped. The group agreed with this suggestion. (S)

Secretary Muskie cautioned that Political Directors should not be called together until we knew what we were going to do. (C)

Admiral Turner suggested the mini-SCC should discuss [*text not declassified*] particularly means aimed at building up sentiment in Europe against an invasion. (S)

Dr. Brzezinski asked the group to look at the President's debrief of Reagan. He felt the mini-SCC should be sure to deal with the question of the (1) meeting of the Political Directors; (2) economic sanctions; and (3) military measures. (C)

[Omitted here is discussion of Korea.]

312. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Turner to President Carter, Vice President Mondale, Secretary of State Muskie, Secretary of Defense Brown, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 5, 1980

SUBJECT

Plans for Warsaw Pact Intervention in Poland

1. The following information was received [*1 line not declassified*] The date of the information is 4 December.

a. Moscow has developed a plan for intervention in Poland which was delivered to the Polish General Staff and agreed to by Polish military leaders. The intervention is to take place under the pretext of joint Soviet, East German and Czechoslovak exercises in Poland. *Readiness* to cross the Polish frontiers was set for 8 December.

b. The plan calls for forces to include three armies comprising 15 Soviet divisions, and one army comprising two Czechoslovak divisions and an army staff and one division from East Germany. Altogether, the intervention forces in the first phase will comprise 18 divisions. An additional four divisions will be attached to the Czechoslovak and East German armies. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] these are four Polish divisions located along the border with East Germany.)

c. Warsaw Pact officers in civilian dress are currently surveying the march routes and areas where future actions are contemplated. The

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 65, Poland: 11/80–1/81. Top Secret.

Czechoslovaks and East Germans are to operate in Western Poland and the Soviets in Central and Eastern Poland.

d. The operational scenario calls for a regrouping of the Warsaw Pact troops in all the main training areas of the Polish forces, where live-fire exercises will be carried out. Then, depending upon how the situation develops, all major and industrial cities in Poland will be put under blockade.

e. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] the political decision to intervene was taken some time ago, and there appears to have been no resistance to it from Party leader Kania and Polish Defense Minister Jaruzelski.² Elsewhere in the Polish military establishment, however, there has been determined high-level opposition to the plan. As a result, an alternative (Polish) plan has been worked out which calls for using only the Polish armed forces to establish internal security in Poland. The key part of this plan is a program of harsh measures against Solidarity and opposition groups by forces of the Ministry of Internal Affairs. This plan will be presented to the Soviets on 7 December with an accompanying proposal that the introduction of the Warsaw Pact intervention forces be put off until the actions of Poland's own forces have proven to be ineffective. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] not believe that the Soviets will go along with this alternative or even that the Polish leadership will be forceful in presenting it.

2. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] is consistent with information provided [*less than 1 line not declassified*] earlier this week that Soviet forces in East Germany had been placed on alert pending orders to move to the Polish border area and be in position to attack by the weekend of 7 December.

3. The invasion scenario described also is generally consistent with the military preparations we have been observing for the past few weeks. Three Soviet armies in the Western USSR have appeared in the Soviet General Staff communications link between Moscow and Rembertow (near Warsaw) throughout most of the Polish crisis. Additionally, the mobilization activity we have seen has involved these three armies. The Soviets have two divisions permanently based in Poland, however, and these almost certainly would also play a role.

4. Various sources report the convening today in Moscow of a Warsaw Pact Summit, apparently attended by Party 1st Secretaries and Foreign Ministers. Poland appears to be represented by First Secretary Kania and Politburo member Stefan Olszowski. The single agenda item for the meeting is said to be Poland.

Stansfield Turner³

² Wojciech Jaruzelski.

³ Turner signed "Stan Turner" above this typed signature.

313. Memorandum From Marshall Brement of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski)¹

Washington, December 9, 1980

SUBJECT

Soviet Options in Poland: An Alternate Scenario

As you know, most analysts at CIA think the Soviets will move into Poland, perhaps as early as this weekend. This conclusion is largely based on the fact that the Soviets have gone so far militarily to prepare for an invasion that it is unlikely for them to pull back at this stage. The timing would be triggered by a desire to head off demonstrations commemorating the 10th anniversary of the Gdansk strikes of 1970. (S)

As you know, I take a different view. The difficulties which would face the Soviets if they actually invaded Poland (international reaction, compounding Soviet economic weaknesses, possibility of armed Polish resistance, downgrading of Warsaw Pact forces, inability to predict the ultimate consequences, etc.) are fairly obvious and are not worth repeating here. Because of such difficulties, I do not think the Soviets will move in Poland until they are completely convinced that the Polish leadership has little if any chance of handling the situation in a reasonably satisfactory manner. (S)

But no matter how pessimistically Polish events are viewed from Moscow, the Kremlin must see at least a one in five chance that Kania, or perhaps a successor, will ultimately be able to work out some kind of *modus vivendi* which would make it possible for Brezhnev to avoid ordering an armed invasion. As long as such a possibility exists, in my view, the Soviets lose little if anything by holding off an invasion. They could, after all, undertake such action a month from now, two months from now, or five months from now. There is nothing to stop them. (S)

What Has Happened in Poland?

My own reconstruction of Soviet/Polish events is roughly as follows:

—The Soviets must have begun preparing for possible intervention in Poland as early as last August when things, from their point of

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Staff Material, Office, Outside the System File, Box 60, Chron: 12/7–9/80. Secret. Sent for information. Copies were sent to Odom, Thomson, Welch, and Blackwill. Brzezinski wrote in the upper right-hand corner: "I tend to agree, but speaking up is useful because →" The arrow presumably directs the reader to his comment on the last page (see footnote 6 below).

view, were getting out of control. We saw signs of such planning in September and October.²

—Soviet concerns were somewhat alleviated by Kania's first trip to Moscow October 30.

—However, the Soviets were undoubtedly dismayed by subsequent developments, which they may well have regarded as proving the unreliability of the Kania leadership.

—The last straw was the release from prison of Narozniak and Sapiello³ on November 27, an act which was simply not acceptable to the Soviets.

—On that date (probably at the usual Thursday afternoon Politburo meeting) the Soviets probably made a firm decision to intervene in Poland, unless they could get credible assurances from the Poles that this sort of "capitulationist" behavior would not happen again.

—Beginning November 28, Soviet, Czech and East German forces proceeded with a military buildup aimed at being ready to invade Poland by December 8.

—The Moscow Summit meeting was Kania's last chance. At the summit he gave the Soviets assurances that his government would crack down on any future unauthorized strikes or counter-revolutionary activities. According to the Romanians, the only Warsaw Pact leader to argue forcefully for immediate intervention in Poland was Honecker.⁴ That sounds credible to me. Subsequent events would indicate that the Poles (and the Romanians) left Moscow thinking that the Soviets were willing to give them more time to solve their problems.

—Although far from sanguine that the Polish problem had been resolved by the meeting, the Soviet leadership probably opted to take a wait-and-see attitude. The Moscow Summit was over on December 5,⁵ i.e., three days before D-Day.

—Only three days away from achieving full readiness, the Soviets decided to go ahead with their pre-planned scenario for the following reasons:

² Industrial unrest and changes in the Polish United Workers' Party leadership contributed to instability in Poland beginning in mid-1980. For more on the changing political situation, see *Kessing's Contemporary Archive*, 1981, pp. 30717–30724.

³ Reference is to Jan Narozniak, a union volunteer, and Piotr Sapiello, a government employee, who were arrested on allegations of stealing a government plan on regulating dissidents.

⁴ Erich Honecker, Chairman of the German Democratic Republic's State Council.

⁵ Reference is to the Warsaw Pact summit meeting, held in Moscow, December 4–5.

(a) It gave them the option of moving against the Poles immediately if Kania's words in Moscow were contradicted by his subsequent behavior in Warsaw, as was the case after the October 30 "consultations."

(b) It provided a useful dress rehearsal for an ultimate invasion. (The Soviets went through a similar exercise in Czechoslovakia in 1968.)

(c) By pushing ahead with their preparations to invade, Moscow forced both this Administration and Richard Allen, representing the next, to state explicitly and publicly that a Soviet invasion of Poland would not trigger a military response from the West. (This was, of course, a logical supposition for them to make, but a supposition is far different from an explicit assertion by the United States that they had nothing to fear from us militarily in the event that they decided to invade Poland.)

(d) Most Poles, especially the leaders of *Solidarnosc*, have been much too overconfident that the Soviets would not invade. Only by inducing genuine alarm could the Soviets exert a decisive effect within Poland. By carrying out these invasion preparations they alarmed us and our alarm brought home the seriousness of the situation to many Poles. The Soviets thus achieved a very important political objective—i.e., to ensure that all segments of Polish society understand that the limits of Soviet tolerance have been reached.⁶ (S)

What is Next?

My guess would be that the Soviets will not invade next weekend. They will rather keep up their current state of readiness for another several weeks or longer. They will maintain such readiness to invade until they are satisfied that all Poles—the Party, the Church, the workers—understand that the Polish government is literally operating under the gun and that the Soviets will not hesitate to invade Poland if, by Moscow's definition, "anarchy" and "counter-revolutionary activity" are allowed to continue out of control.⁷ (S)

⁶ Brzezinski underlined the phrase, "all segments of Polish" and drew arrow in the margin, which connects this sentence with Brzezinski's marginalia found below: "1) in part, that is also our goal—and speaking up helps; 2) in any case, we deprived them of the element of surprise; 3) we heightened international pressures on the Sovs."

⁷ Brzezinski wrote in his memoirs, "The Polish crisis was the final major test of American-Soviet relations during the Carter Presidency. The President handled it well, firmly and calmly, and there is no doubt that he had digested fully the lessons of the U.S. underreaction to the Czechoslovak crisis of 1968. During the critical days of December, Carter did not need to be convinced of the historical importance of deterring a Soviet move, and in this effort he was quite prepared to exercise the full weight of American influence and to take a public position designed to convince the Soviet Union that the reaction of the United States, and the world more generally, would be even more severe than it was in the period after the invasion of Afghanistan." (*Power and Principle*, p. 468)

314. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Brzezinski) to President Carter¹

Washington, December 19, 1980

SUBJECT

NSC Weekly Report #161

1. *Fact*

[Omitted here is the section entitled "Muskie-Brown-Brzezinski Meeting."]

Soviet Invasion of Poland Postponed

[1½ lines not declassified] the invasion has been postponed for the "indefinite future." The principal reason for the postponement, [less than 1 line not declassified], was the effectiveness of the Western counter propaganda campaign which convinced the Kremlin the West would retaliate "massively" with political and economic sanctions. Invasion forces, however, remain in a high state of readiness, and can move into Poland at any time. An invasion move would be made under the pre-tense of Warsaw Pact maneuvers.²

[Omitted here are the sections entitled "Exercise BRIGHT STAR" and "National Security Affairs Calendar."]

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Brzezinski Office File, Subject Chron File, Box 127, Weekly National Security Report: 8–12/80. Secret. Carter wrote, "Zbig. J." in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² In the margin next to this sentence, Carter wrote, "Sounds accurate."

315. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, January 5, 1981, 1504Z

38. Subject: Ambassador Watson's Farewell Call on Foreign Minister Gromyko.

¹ Source: Carter Library, National Security Affairs, Brzezinski Material, Country File, Box 84, USSR: 11/80–1/81. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Printed from a copy that indicates the original was received in the White House Situation Room.

1. (S-entire text)

2. I received word late Sunday morning, January 4, from the MFA that Gromyko was prepared to receive me for a farewell call on him at 3 pm that same day. At the meeting Gromyko explained he was going on leave and that, unfortunately, he would not be available to attend a farewell luncheon that the MFA wanted to give for me, so he wanted to take this opportunity, with apology for the short notice, to say goodbye. He was very courteous, friendly and in a relaxed frame of mind. I expressed my appreciation for the working relationship we had established during the number of meetings we had together, despite the fact that many of those meetings were confrontational because of the issues involved. Gromyko quipped that although some of our encounters may have been confrontational, "at least we didn't pound our fists on the table and the people waiting outside the room didn't hear such pounding."

3. I informed Gromyko that Jack Matlock was coming here as Charge prior to the designation by the incoming administration of a new US Ambassador. I also told him that I expected to remain active in US-Soviet affairs at this particularly difficult time in our relations. I was saddened by the state of the relationship, but hopeful that ultimately we could work out our differences on some of the key issues which separated us. In any case I wanted to do what I could to develop US-Soviet relations.

4. Gromyko, while avoiding any mention of the word "detente" commented on US-Soviet relations as follows: You came here as Ambassador when some cold streams of air blew into our relationship. I do not want to use harsher words than that. I personally feel that when there were sharp turns in our relations you did not consider this a very inspiring situation. Indeed it did not inspire anyone who wanted to develop good relations between the two powers. I don't want to dwell further on the matter but wish to concentrate on a positive point. It is the view of the Soviet leadership—the State, the Party, and President Brezhnev personally—that, objectively, there exist conditions for the US and for Soviet Union to find a common language on international issues, especially the crucial issues. But if such a common language is not found, we believe that these issues—even if they have to be left open—should be considered on a policy plane. Confrontation should be entirely ruled out of our relationship. This is what we mean when we say we want to have peaceful coexistence with countries of different socio-economic systems. I believe the same formula has been prevalent in the US as well. It is the view of the party and of the leadership that we want to live in peace with the US. Of course it would be even better still if we could maintain friendly relations. Nevertheless, and even without friendship in the profound sense of that word, we believe we

can live in peace with one another and seek solutions to common problems. That is to say that we can have normal relations. I listened with satisfaction when you said you favor the positive development of US-Soviet relations. If this will continue to be your position, it will be to the mutual benefit of our two countries.

5. I made the point to Gromyko that there should be no misunderstanding: my basic position on US-Soviet relations has not been in variance with that of my own government's and I was in agreement with my government's policies. Gromyko commented that he did not wish to imply that I have ever taken a different position from that of the US Government, but that he was referring mainly to the inauspicious circumstances of the situation between our two countries. I emphasized that among the crucial issues facing our countries I want to give primary attention to strategic arms control. Both sides are grossly over-armed and, given the differences in the political systems of our two countries, we could easily turn toward a collision course. The present challenge was to do what was necessary to get relations on a better track and to establish a viable and coherent relationship which would respect the basic security interests of both sides.

6. At the end of the meeting, which lasted approximately 40 minutes, Gromyko said that he, personally, and the Soviet Government, in general, would work with my successor in a cooperative and businesslike manner.

Watson

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