Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976

Volume XXXVIII

Part 2

Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

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Preface

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


This statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

*Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series*

This volume is part of a subseries of volumes of the *Foreign Relations* series that documents the most important issues in the foreign policy of Presidents Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. The subsseries presents in multiple volumes a comprehensive documentary rec-
ord of major foreign policy decisions and actions of both administrations. Volume XXXVIII has been divided into two parts: Part One, published in 2012, documents the intellectual foundations of the foreign policy of the second Nixon and Ford administrations; Part Two, this specific volume, covers the organization and management of the foreign policy process as well as the development of U.S. information policy, public diplomacy, and cultural affairs during the 1973–1976 period. Readers should note that while the two parts have individualized prefaces and notes on sources, reflecting their respective contents, the two sections share common abbreviation and name lists.


This volume documents the adjustments in the national security decision making structure in the aftermath of the Vietnam War, drawing predominantly on material from the Nixon Presidential Materials, the Ford Library, and records of the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the Department of State. While an important, defining feature of the 1973–1976 period was the August 1974 resignation of President Nixon, the abrupt transition to the Ford administration brought relatively few changes to the architecture of the foreign policymaking apparatus where the National Security Council (NSC) system and the Department of State were concerned. Ford largely maintained the institutional frameworks of the NSC and the Department of State as set up under his predecessor. Change, where it occurred, occurred primarily as a result of other external factors. This volume documents the ways in which broader changes within U.S. society, most notably the changing roles of women and minorities, as well as the proliferation of transnational, global issues prompted organizational changes to U.S. foreign policymaking. The Stanton Panel Report of 1975 figures prominently in the documentation on public diplomacy, as it examined the range of activity in this function—including Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, the Voice of America, USIA, and the Department of State Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs—and the issues of governance in such a complex multi-agency endeavor.

The structure and activity of the Intelligence Community formed another major organizational focus for policymakers in this period. As the Nixon administration began its second term, its leaders maintained an emphasis on reorganizing the Intelligence Community to ensure that it was more efficient and responsive to larger policy objectives. Additionally, to meet the growing importance of international economic matters in foreign policymaking perceived by both the Nixon and Ford administrations, greater priority was given to economic intelligence.

These efforts were overshadowed, however, by the December 1974 leak of a catalog of illegal domestic operations conducted against U.S.
citizens by the Intelligence Community under Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon, known colloquially as the “Family Jewels,” and the series of Congressional investigations that followed. While the Ford administration attempted to pre-empt Congressional involvement by appointing its own blue-ribbon investigatory panel under the chairmanship of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller, both the Senate and the House created their own special committees to investigate the Intelligence Community in early 1975. The volume documents the administration’s often difficult interactions with these committees, reflecting the White House’s and the intelligence agencies’ resentment of what they regarded as Congressional interference in intelligence matters they considered their exclusive preserve. Nevertheless, the investigations pushed the administration to institute significant reforms of the intelligence apparatus.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversations are placed according to the date and time of the conversation, rather than the date a memorandum was drafted. Documents chosen for printing are authoritative or signed copies, unless otherwise noted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the original are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

Bracketed insertions have been added to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents that were withheld from release have been ac-
counted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of
pages not declassified in their chronological place.

The first footnote to each document includes the document’s
source, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This
note may also provide the background of important documents
and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy
advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent
material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional
documentary sources, provide references to important related docu-
ments printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide sum-
maries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate
the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and
other first-hand accounts has been used where appropriate to supplement
or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than
to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation,
established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records,
advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations
series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and
editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the prepara-
tion and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does
not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series,
but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and
reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory
obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Pres-
servation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 USC 2111 note), the National Ar-
chives and Records Administration (NARA) has custody of the Nixon
Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and
implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential his-
torical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations
require NARA to review for additional restrictions in order to en-
sure the protection of the privacy rights of former Nixon White House
officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate
their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and
implementing public access regulations require NARA formally to notify
the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that
the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical
materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House staff
members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require NARA to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from NARA’s Nixon Presidential Materials Project are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and other applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security, as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2009 and was completed in 2012, resulted in the decision to deny 4 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in 6 documents, and make excisions of less than a paragraph in 21 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented here provides an accurate and comprehensive account of the organization and management of U.S. foreign policy.

Acknowledgements

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of officials and staff at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library at Ann Arbor, Michigan, in particular Donna Lehman, Helmi Raaska, and Geir Gundersen, and the Nixon Presidential Materials Project of the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II) at College Park, Maryland. The editors also wish to acknowledge the Richard Nixon Estate for allowing access to the Nixon Presidential recordings and the Richard Nixon Library & Birthplace for facilitating that access. John Haynes of the Library of Congress was responsible for expediting access to the Kissinger papers, including the transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s telephone conversations. The editors were able to use the Kissinger Papers with the permission of Henry Kissinger. Special thanks are due to the His-
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torical Staff of the Central Intelligence Agency, who were helpful in arranging full access to CIA files.

M. Todd Bennett and Alexander R. Wieland collected the documentation for this volume and selected and edited it under the supervision of Edward C. Keefer, former General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. M. Todd Bennett, then Chief of the Europe and Global Issues Division, compiled the chapter on cultural and public diplomacy. Renée A. Goings, Carl Ashley, Keri Lewis, Aaron W. Marrs, and Mandy A. Chalou performed the copy and technical editing, and Dean Weatherhead and Chris Tudda coordinated the declassification review under the direction of Carl Ashley. Do Mi Stauber and Associates prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
December 2014

Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.

The Historian
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Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Many of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. The Department's indexed central files through the end of the Ford Administration have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Beginning in July 1973, the Department phased out the old subject-numeric Central Files classification system, replacing it with an electronic system, the State Archiving System (SAS), which has been transferred to the National Archives and, as the Central Foreign Policy File, comprises part of the online Access to Archival Databases (AAD). The reader will note a period of overlap of the two systems during 1973, which is reflected in the citations found in this volume. Many of the Department's decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969-1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred, or are in the process of being transferred, from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of Presidents Nixon and Ford and other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign
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affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are an important source for the Nixon–Ford subseries of *Foreign Relations*.

Access to the Nixon White House tape recordings is governed by the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (Public Law 93–526; 88 Stat. 1695) and an access agreement with the Office of Presidential Libraries of the National Archives and Records Administration and the Nixon estate. In February 1971 President Nixon initiated a voice-activated taping system in the Oval Office of the White House and, subsequently, in the President’s Office in the Executive Office Building, Camp David, the Cabinet Room, and White House and Camp David telephones. The audiotapes include conversations of President Nixon with his Assistant for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger, other White House aides, Secretary of State William Rogers, other Cabinet officers, members of Congress, and key foreign officials. The clarity of the voices on the tape recordings is often very poor, but the editors have made every effort to verify the accuracy of the transcripts that they prepared of the recorded conversations. Readers are urged to consult the recordings for a full appreciation of those aspects of the discussions that cannot be fully captured in a transcription, such as the speakers’ inflection and emphases that may convey nuances of meaning, as well as the larger context of the discussion.

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, the Ford Library, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. Since research for this volume was completed, the Nixon Presidential Materials have been transferred to their permanent home at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum in Yorba Linda, California. The Nixon Library staff and Ford Library staff are processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.

*Sources for Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, Volume XXXVIII, Part 2*

The compilations represented in Volume XXXVIII, Part 2 draw upon a wide range of sources.

The compilation covering the Congressional investigation and subsequent reorganization of the intelligence community (Chapter 1) draws extensively upon documentation from the Ford Library, Nixon Presidential Materials, Central Intelligence Agency, National Security
Sources XIII

Council, and the papers of James R. Schlesinger and Henry A. Kissinger located in the Manuscript Division of the Library of Congress. The Nixon White House National Security Council Files and the National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files), both located at the time of research at Archives II and now located at the Nixon Library, and the Nixon Administration Intelligence Files maintained by the National Security Council provided valuable records of the state of the Intelligence Community and its relationship to other foreign policymaking agencies during the last 18 months of the Nixon administration. At the Ford Library, the President’s Handwriting File, the National Security Adviser collection (especially the Outside the System Chronological File and Memoranda of Conversations file), and the files of White House officials Richard B. Cheney, Philip W. Buchen, and John O. Marsh proved to be indispensable for gaining insight into the White House’s reaction to the public scandal created by the leak of the “Family Jewels” in late 1974 and the nature of its interactions with the Congressional committees created to investigate the intelligence community the following year. Additional perspective on the Congressional investigations and the functioning of the Intelligence Community following the Ford administration’s reorganization of the community in February 1976 is provided by the Executive Files of the Director of Central Intelligence, maintained by the CIA.

The documentation included in the chapter on information policy, public diplomacy, and cultural affairs (Chapter 2) comes from several sources. Researchers are urged to consult the records of the United States Information Agency’s (USIA) Executive Committee, part of Record Group 306 at Archives II. Created in 1969, the Executive Committee served as the USIA’s central deliberative and policymaking body during James Keogh’s directorship, 1973–1976. The Committee’s records include meeting minutes as well as papers, studies, reports, proposals, and memoranda it considered.

The chapter also draws upon several other USIA collections, including the Director’s chronological files, 1973–1976; special reports prepared by the Agency’s Office of Research; and the Agency’s Historical Collection, especially the Subject Files, 1953–2000, and the Reports and Studies, 1953–1998, sub-collections. Readers should note that source note citations to this collection are reflective of the files’ disposition at Archives II at the time of this volume’s compilation and that some of the file entry numbers may have changed since that time.

Most of the records of the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) for this period were transferred to the University of Arkansas in 1983. Some high-level materials still remain in the Department of State’s possession, however. Researchers are advised to note the following: the Records of the Assistant Secretary of
XIV Sources

State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976, and the Subject Files, 1961–1977, of the Bureau’s Office of Policy and Plans. As of this writing, these two collections are housed at the Washington National Records Center in Suitland, Maryland, but are scheduled for transfer to Archives II. The following Department of State materials located at Archives II also include relevant documentation: the Policy Planning Staff Director’s File (Lord); the Records of the Counselor (Sonnenfeldt); the Records of the Deputy Secretary, 1976–1977 (Robinson); the General Correspondence of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management (Eagleburger); and the Central Foreign Policy File.

Chapter 2 also includes records of the Nixon and Ford administrations. The Nixon and Ford administration intelligence files located at the National Security Council in Washington, DC, include documentation on covert propaganda and media programs conducted by the Central Intelligence Agency. There are occasional references to CU in the Chronological File of the Kissinger Papers, located at the Library of Congress. As for the Nixon Presidential Materials, researchers should consider the following: NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files); White House Special Files, President’s Handwriting; White House Special Files, Confidential Files; and White House Central Files, Subject Files. At the Ford Library, the White House Central Files’ Subject Files and the NSC Institutional Files are useful, as are the following materials in the National Security Adviser’s collection: Memoranda of Conversations, National Security Decision and Study Memoranda, NSC Logged Documents, and Presidential Subject File. The Public Papers of Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter and the Department of State Bulletin provide insights on the administrations’ information policies, public diplomacy, and cultural affairs.

For the compilation on the management of the Department of State (Chapter 3), the lot files created by the office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management were the most important. Lots 78 D 295 and 79 D 63 largely cover the tenure of L. Dean Brown as Deputy Under Secretary and provide extensive documentation related to the organization of the Foreign Service, personnel issues, and the status of minorities and women within the Department. These topics are also covered in the files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger (Lot 84D204), who succeeded Brown in May 1975. Moreover, Eagleburger’s lot file documents a broad range of topics related to Department of State policymaking beyond organizational matters due in large part to his role as Executive Assistant to Secretary of State Henry Kissinger beginning in September 1973. For candid insight into Kissinger’s views of the Department and its organization, the memoranda of conversations collections within the Department of State files in the Kissinger Papers and the National Security Adviser files at the Ford Library, were of great value. Like-
wise, the lot files of other key Department figures, especially Winston Lord, Charles W. Robinson, and Philip C. Habib, provided useful perspectives on efforts to improve the flow of information, deal with leaks, and to foster greater institutionalization in foreign policymaking. Documentation for the compilation covering the transition from Ford to Carter (Chapter 6) was drawn largely from the Transition Records of the Department of State Executive Secretariat (Lot 77D253, Entry 5338), an excellent, if somewhat small, resource for illustrating the mechanics of institutional transition from one administration to another.

To document efforts undertaken by the Nixon and Ford administrations to create new institutions to deal with the proliferation of defense, economic, and transnational, global issues between 1973 and 1976 (Chapter 4), the Nixon-era National Security Council files, especially the Agency Files, the NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), and the National Security Council Institutional Files at the Ford Library were the most useful. At NARA, the Charles W. Robinson lot file (Entry 5176) contains significant documentation related to economic matters. Similarly, the Nixon and Ford NSC collections formed the foundation of the compilation on the National Security Council System (Chapter 5). Of these, the Nixon H-Files as well as the Outside the System Chronological File and Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files in the NSC collection at the Ford Library contained the richest veins of documentation, particularly on the various initiatives to expand NSC membership.

Much of the documentation used in the volume has been made available for use in the Foreign Relations series thanks to the consent of the agencies mentioned, the assistance of their staffs, and especially the cooperation and support of the National Archives and Records Administration.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and many of these records are already available for public review at the National Archives. The declassification review of other records is going forward in accordance with the provisions of Executive Orders 12958 and 13142, under which all records over 25 years old, except file series exemptions requested by agencies and approved by the President.

**Unpublished Sources**

**Department of State**

**Central Foreign Policy File.** See National Archives and Records Administration below.
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Lot Files. For lot files already transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland, Record Group 59, see National Archives and Records Administration below.

Administrative Correspondence Files, 1969–1977, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79D63

Files of Philip C. Habib: Lot 81D5


Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84D204

INR/IL Historical Files

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Foreign Policy File, 1973–1976

Part of the online Access to Archival Databases: Electronic telegrams, P-Reel Index, P-Reel microfilm

Lot Files

Records of Joseph Sisco, 1951–76: Lots 74D131 and 76D251, Entry 5405

Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Director’s Files (Winston Lord) 1969–77: Lot 77D112, Entry 5027


Transition Records of the Executive Secretariat, 1959–77: Lot 77D253, Entry 5338

Administrative Correspondence Files, General Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78D295

Records of the Office of the Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt: Lot 81D286, Entry 5339


Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency

Executive Committee File, 1973–1975

Historical Collection

Bureau of Programs, Records Relating to Select USIA Programs: Entry A1 (1061)


Subject Files, 1953–2000: Entry A1 (1066)

Office of the Director, Subject File, 1973–1975

Office of Research

Special Reports, 1964–1982: Entry 1009B
Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)

National Security Council Files
  Agency Files
  Country Files
  Institutional Materials
  Kissinger Office Files
    Country Files
    HAK Administrative and Staff Files
    HAK Trip Files
  NSC Unfiled Material
  Presidential/HAK Memcons
  Subject Files

National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files)
  Miscellaneous Institutional Files of the Nixon Administration—NSC System, Staff and Committees
  National Security Council Meeting Minutes
  National Security Decision Memoranda
  National Security Study Memoranda
  Under Secretaries Decision Memoranda
  Under Secretaries Study Memoranda

White House Central Files
  Staff Members and Office Files, Office of Presidential Papers and Archives, Daily Diary
  Subject Files

White House Special Files
  President’s Office Files
  President’s Personal Files
  Subject Files

White House Tapes

Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Cabinet Meetings

National Security Adviser
  Brent Scowcroft Daily Work Files
  John K. Matheny Files
  Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions
  Kissinger/Scowcroft West Wing Office Files
  Legislative Interdepartmental Group File
  Memoranda of Conversations
  Name File
  National Security Council Staff for Program Analysis, Convenience Files
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National Security Study and Decision Memoranda, 1974–1977
NSC Press and Congressional Liaison Staff, 1973–1976
Outside the System Chronological File
Presidential Agency Files
Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents
Presidential Subject Files
Presidential Transition File, 1974
Robert C. McFarlane Files

National Security Council
Institutional Files
   National Security Council Meetings
   Davis, Jeanne W.—Personal File

Philip W. Buchen Files
Richard B. Cheney Files
James E. Connor Files
Paul C. Leach Files
John O. Marsh Files
Ron Nessen Files
Papers of Michael Raoul-Duval
Papers of L. William Seidman
President’s Daily Diary
President’s Handwriting File

White House Central Files
   Subject File

Central Intelligence Agency, Langley, Virginia

Executive Registry: Executive Files of the Director of Central Intelligence
   Job 79M00467A
   Job 79M01467A
   Job 80B01495B
   Job 80M01009A
   Job 80M01044A
   Job 80M01066A

Declassified “Family Jewels” Document Collection (CIA FOIA Electronic Reading Room)

National Security Council, Washington, D.C.

Nixon Administration Intelligence Files
Ford Administration Intelligence Files
Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Henry A. Kissinger Papers
   Chronological File
   Files on the Department of State

James R. Schlesinger Papers

Washington National Records Center, Suitland, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lots 76D186 and 78D184

Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency


Record Group 330, Records of the Office of the Secretary of Defense

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0036
   Documents of Former Special Assistants to the Secretary of Defense, 1973–1975

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0002
   Top Secret records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1973

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0059
   Top Secret records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1975

OSD Files: FRC 330–78–0050
   Top Secret records of the Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, 1976

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U.S. Government Documents and Documentary Collections


XX   Sources

_____. Years of Upheaval. (Boston: Little, Brown & Company, 1982)
_____. Years of Renewal. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999)
Schorr, Daniel, Clearing the Air. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1977)
U.S. Department of State, Department of State Bulletin, 1973–1977
_____. Department of State Newsletter, 1973–1977
_____. Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1973–1977
Abbreviations and Terms

A, Bureau of Administration, Department of State
A/BF, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Budget and Finance
A/O, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Operations
A/SY, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Security
ABC, American Broadcasting Company
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACA, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ADDI, Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Air Force; also Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFGE, American Federation of Government Employees
AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFSA, American Foreign Service Association
AHEPA, American Hellenic Educational Progressive Association
AID, Agency for International Development
Amb, Ambassador
AP, Associated Press
APAG, Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
ARA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/LA, Office for Latin America, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/MGT, Office of Management, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARA/RPP, Office of Regional Political Programs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ASEAN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations
ASTP, Apollo–Soyuz Test Project
AVF, All Volunteer Force
B–1, U.S. strategic bomber
B–52, U.S. all-weather, intercontinental, strategic heavy bomber powered by eight turbojet engines
BEX, Board of Examiners of the Foreign Service, Department of State
C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CASP, Country Analysis and Strategy Paper
CBO, Congressional Budget Office
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CCINC, Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics
CCP, Consolidated Cryptologic Program
CDU, Control Data Corporation
CDU, Christliche-Demokratische Union (Christian Democratic Union, West Germany)
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CECLA, Comisión Especial de Coordinación Latino Americana (Special Committee for Latin American Coordination) (United Nations)
XXII Abbreviations and Terms

CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
CEO, Chief Executive Officer
CEP, Council of Economic Planners, also Council on Economic Policy
CFI, Committee on Foreign Intelligence
CFIM, Council on Foreign Intelligence Memorandum
Chicom(s), Chinese Communist(s)
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CIAP, Central Intelligence Agency Program
CIEP, Council on International Economic Policy
CIEPSM, Council on International Economic Policy Study Memorandum
CNO, Chief of Naval Operations
COB, close of business
COMINT, communications intelligence
COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam
CPI, Consumer Price Index
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSDI, Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions
CSU, Christliche-Soziale Union (Christian Social Union, West Germany)
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CY, calendar year

D, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State; also Democrat
D/LOS, Office of the Law of the Sea, Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
DAO, Defense Attaché Office
DAR, Daughters of the American Revolution
DAS, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
D/BFS, Executive Secretary of the Board of Foreign Service and Employee Management Relations Commission, Department of State
D.C., District of Columbia
DCA, defense cooperation agreement
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
DCID, Director of Central Intelligence Directive
DCM, Deputy Chief of Mission
DDCI, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
D/DCCI/IC, Deputy to the Director for Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community
D/DCCI/NIO, Deputy to the Director for Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers
DDI, Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
DDO, Deputy Director for Operations, Central Intelligence Agency
DDS & T, Deputy Director for Science and Technology, Central Intelligence Agency
DEA, Drug Enforcement Agency
DEFCON, defense readiness condition
DEFO, Defense Field Office
Dept, Department of State
DFI, Director of Foreign Intelligence
DFL, Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party (Minnesota)
DG, Director General of the Foreign Service
DG/PC, Office of Program Control, Department of State
DG/PER, Deputy Director General and Director of Personnel, Department of State
DGI, Director General of Intelligence
D/HA, Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, Department of State
DIA, Defense Intelligence Agency
Abbreviations and Terms

DISC, Domestic International Sales Corporation
DOD, Department of Defense
DPRC, Defense Program Review Committee
DRP, Defense Review Panel
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam (North Vietnam)
DSAA, Defense Security Assistance Agency
E, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
EA, Bureau of East Asian Affairs, Department of State
EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/IFD, Office of International Finance and Development, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EC, European Community
ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America
ECOSOC, United Nations Economic and Social Council
EEC, European Economic Community
EEO, Equal Employment Opportunity
EIC, Economic Intelligence Committee
E.O., Executive Order
EOB, Executive Office Building
EOP, Executive Office of the President
EPA, Environmental Protection Agency
EPB, Economic Policy Board
ER, Executive Registry
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/RPE, Office of OECD European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/WE, Office of Western European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EXCOMM, executive committee
EXDIS, exclusive distribution
EXIM, Export-Import Bank

FAM, Foreign Affairs Manual
FAS, Foreign Agricultural Service
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBS, forward-based systems
FDP, Freie Demokratische Partei (Free Democratic Party, West Germany)
FEA, Federal Energy Administration
FEO, Federal Energy Office
FIA, Foreign Intelligence Agency
FMS, foreign military sales
FNLA, Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (National Front for the Liberation of Angola)
FOI, Freedom of Information
FOIA, Freedom of Information Act
FonMin, Foreign Minister
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany (West Germany)
FS, Foreign Service
FSI, Foreign Service Institute
FSCO, Foreign Service Information Officer
FOO, Foreign Service Officer
FSR, Foreign Service Reserve Officer
FSR/JO, Foreign Service Reserve (Junior Officer) program
XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

FSRU, Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited
FSS, Foreign Service Staff Officer
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

GA, United Nations General Assembly
GAO, General Accounting Office
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GEOS, Global Experimental Ocean Satellite
GI, government issue
GLOP, global outlook policy
GNP, gross national product
GPO, Government Printing Office
GRC, Republic of China Government
GS, General Schedule
GSP, Generalized System of Preferences
GVN, Government of Vietnam

H, Office of the Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
HAKTO, series indicator for telegrams sent by Kissinger when away from Washington
HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
HFAC, House Foreign Affairs Committee
HK, Henry Kissinger
HR, House Resolution
HUD, Department of Housing and Urban Development
HUMINT, human intelligence

I, Independent
IAC, Intelligence Advisory Committee
IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency
IBRD, International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)
IC, Intelligence Community
ICBM, inter-continental ballistic missile
ICCS, International Commission of Control and Supervision
ICG, Intelligence Coordinating Group
ICSU, International Council of Scientific Unions
IDA, International Development Association; also Institute for Defense Analysis
IDB, Inter-American Development Bank
IDIU, Interdivision Information Unit
IEA, International Energy Agency
IEC, Interagency Evaluation Committee
IERG, International Energy Review Group
IFAD, International Fund for Agricultural Development
IFI, International Financial Institution
IG, Interdepartmental Group; also Inspector General
IGA, Office of the Inspector General of Foreign Assistance, Department of State
IGCP, Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming
ILO, International Labor Organization
IMF, International Monetary Fund
INCP, International Narcotics Control Program
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/CIS, Current Intelligence Staff, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/IL, Intelligence Liaison, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IOB, Intelligence Oversight Board
IPRC, Intelligence Policy Review Committee
IRAC, Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee
IRB, International Resources Bank
IRS, Internal Revenue Service
ISA, Office of International Security Affairs, Department of Defense
ITT, International Telephone and Telegraph
IWWY, International Women’s Year

JAW, James A. Wilderotter
J.C., Jimmy Carter
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
JFK, John Fitzgerald Kennedy
JO, junior officer
JOT, junior officer training
JR, Joint Resolution

K, Kissinger
KIQ, key intelligence question
KT, kiloton

L, Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department of State
L/PM, Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
LANDSAT, land satellite
LDC, less developed country
LDX, long distance xerography
LHS, Laurence H. Silberman
LIG, Legislative Interdepartmental Group
LOA, letter of agreement
LSD, lysergic acid diethylamide
LSE, Lawrence S. Eagleburger

M, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management
M/DG, Bureau of Personnel, Director General of the Foreign Service, Department of State
M/EEO, Equal Employment Opportunity Office, Department of State
M/EP, Office of Equal Employment, Department of State
M/FSI, Director, Foreign Service Institute
M/MO, Office of Management Operations, Department of State
M/WA, Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs, Department of State
MAG, Military Assistance Group
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MAP, Military Assistance Program
MASE, military assistance support funded
MBFR, Mutual Balanced Force Reductions
MBO, Management by Objectives
MCDA, Mutual Cooperation and Development Agency
memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFN, Most Favored Nation
MIA, missing in action
MiG, Soviet fighter aircraft
MILGROUP, military group
XXVI  Abbreviations and Terms

MIRV, multiple independently-targeted reentry vehicle
MNC, multi-national corporation
MODE, Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment
MPLA, Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MR, memorandum for the record; also military region
MRB, Management Reform Bulletin
MTN, multilateral trade negotiations

NAC, North Atlantic Council
NARA, National Archives and Records Administration
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NEA/RA, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State
NFIB, National Foreign Intelligence Board
NFIP, National Foreign Intelligence Program
NIC, National Intelligence Council
NID, National Intelligence Daily
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
NIEO, New International Economic Order
NIO, National Intelligence Officer
Nodis, no distribution (other than to persons indicated)
NRO, National Reconnaissance Office
NRP, National Reconnaissance Program
NSC, National Security Council
NSCIC, National Security Council Intelligence Committee
NSCID, National Security Council Intelligence Directive
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NYT, New York Times

OAS, Organization of American States
OASGA, Organization of American States General Assembly
OAU, Organization of African Unity
ODA, Official Developmental Assistance
ODC, Office of Defense Cooperation
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEP, Office of Emergency Preparedness
OER, Office of Economic Research
OES, Bureau of Oceans and International and Scientific Affairs, Department of State
OFP, Open Forum Panel
OGC, Office of the General Counsel, CIA
OHA, Office of Humanitarian Affairs
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
OPIC, Overseas Private Investment Corporation
OPRED, overseas personnel reductions
ORM, Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs
OSS, Office of Strategic Services
OTS, Outside the System
Abbreviations and Terms  XXVII

P, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Department of State
PA, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PARA, Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation
PARM, Policy Analysis and Resource Management
PDB, President’s Daily Brief
PER, Bureau of Personnel, Department of State
PER/CA, Deputy Director of Personnel for Career Counseling and Assignments
PER/MGT, Deputy Director of Personnel for Management
PER/PCE, Deputy Director of Personnel for Policy, Classification, and Evaluation
PER/PE, Office of Performance Evaluation
PER/REM, Deputy Director of Personnel for Recruitment and Employment
PFIAB, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
PL, Public Law
PL–480, Food for Peace
PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization
PM, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
PM/MC, Office of Munitions Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
PNE, peaceful nuclear explosion
POW, prisoner of war
POW/MIA, prisoner of war/missing in action
PPBS, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System
PPG, Priorities Policy Group
PRC, People’s Republic of China

R, Republican
R&D, research & development
RAB, Requirements Advisory Board
res, resolution
RG, Record Group
RNC, Republican National Committee
ROC, Republic of China
RVN, Republic of Vietnam

S, Office of the Secretary of State; also U.S. Senate
SA, supporting assistance; also security assistance
SAC, Strategic Air Command
SAIS, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SAPRC, Security Assistance Program Review Committee
SC, United Nations Security Council
SCA, Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, Department of State
SCC, Standing Consultative Committee
SCI, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State
S/CPL, Office of President-elect Carter Liaison Team, Department of State
S/CFP, Chief of Protocol, Department of State
SDR, Special Drawing Rights
SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization
SecDef, Secretary of Defense
SecState, Secretary of State
SECTO, series of telegrams sent from the Secretary of State when away from Washington
SELA, Sistema Economico Latinoamericano (Latin American Economic System)
Sen, Senator
XXVIII Abbreviations and Terms

SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SGU, Special Group Unit
S/IG, Inspector General of the Foreign Service, Department of State
SIG, Senior Interdepartmental Group
S/IL, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of International Labor Affairs
SIGINT, signals intelligence
SIOP, single integrated operating plan/procedure
SLCM, submarine-launched cruise missile
S/NM, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Narcotics Affairs
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
SPC, Space Policy Committee
SFDP, Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Social Democratic Party of West Germany)
S/PRS, Office of Press Relations, Department of State
SRG, Senior Review Group
S/R, Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Refugee and Migration Affairs
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–S, Department Duty Officer, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SSC, Senate Select Committee
S/S–I, Information Management Section, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–O, Deputy Duty Officer, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SST, supersonic transport
STR, Special Trade Representative
SVG, South Vietnamese Government
SVN, South Vietnam
SY, Secretary
SYG, Secretary-General

T, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
TASS, Telegraphnoye Agentstvo Sovyetskovo Soyuza (Telegraphic Agency of the Soviet Union; Soviet news agency)
TDY, temporary duty
T/O, table of organization
TOHAK, series indicator for telegrams sent to Kissinger when away from Washington
TOSEC, series indicator for telegrams sent to the Secretary of State when away from Washington
TS, Top Secret
TTB, technology test bed
TV, television

UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNCTAD, United Nations Committee on Trade and Development
UNDOF, United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNDP, United Nations Development Programme
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Fund
UNITA, Uniao Nacional para a Independencia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
Abbreviations and Terms

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>UNRWA</td>
<td>United Nations Relief and Works Agency</td>
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<td>UNSC</td>
<td>United Nations Security Council</td>
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<td>UPI</td>
<td>United Press International</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
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<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
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<td>USC</td>
<td>Under Secretaries Committee</td>
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<td>USCINCSO</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>USEC</td>
<td>United States Mission to the European Community</td>
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<td>USG</td>
<td>United States Government</td>
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<td>USIA</td>
<td>United States Information Agency</td>
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<td>USIB</td>
<td>United States Intelligence Board</td>
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<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Service</td>
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<td>USLO</td>
<td>United States Liaison Office</td>
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<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
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<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
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<tr>
<td>USS</td>
<td>United States Ship</td>
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<tr>
<td>USSR</td>
<td>Union of Soviet Socialist Republics</td>
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<td>USUN</td>
<td>United States Mission to the United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>VFW</td>
<td>Veterans of Foreign Wars</td>
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<td>VOA</td>
<td>Voice of America</td>
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<td>VP</td>
<td>Verification Panel</td>
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<td>VPWG</td>
<td>Verification Panel Working Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>WAO</td>
<td>Women’s Action Organization</td>
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<td>WFC</td>
<td>United Nations World Food Conference</td>
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<td>WH</td>
<td>White House</td>
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<td>WHCF</td>
<td>White House Central Files</td>
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<tr>
<td>WIN</td>
<td>Whip Inflation Now</td>
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<td>WMO</td>
<td>World Meteorological Organization</td>
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<td>WSAG</td>
<td>Washington Special Actions Group</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War II</td>
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Persons

Abrams, General Creighton W., Jr., USA, Army Chief of Staff until his death in September 1974
Acheson, Dean, Secretary of State, January 21, 1949–January 20, 1953
Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, 1949–1963; head of the West German CDU until 1966
Agniew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States until October 10, 1973
Ahern, Paul L., Staff Member, Office of Management Operations, Department of State
Ahern, Richard W., Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1976
Aiken, George D., Senator (R–Vermont) until January 3, 1975
Akalovsky, Alexander, staff member, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
Albert, Carl B., Representative (D–Oklahoma); Speaker of the House until January 1977
Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andrei M., Assistant to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev
Allen, General Lew, Jr., USAF, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community, March–August 1973; thereafter Director of the National Security Agency
Allende Gossens, Salvador, President of Chile until September 11, 1973
Andersen, Knud Borge, Danish Foreign Minister
Anderson, Admiral George W., Jr. (ret.) USN, Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board until 1976
Anderson, Jack, syndicated newspaper columnist, “Washington Merry-Go-Round”
Anderson, John B., Representative (R–Illinois)
Angleton, James J., Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, Central Intelligence Agency, until December 23, 1974
Areeda, Philip, Deputy Counsel to the President, 1974–1975
Arends, Leslie C., Representative (R–Illinois) until December 31, 1974; Minority Whip
Armstrong, Anne L., Counselor to the President
Armstrong, Oscar Vance, Political Adviser, U.S. Pacific Command until July 1973; Director, Office of People’s Republic of China and Mongolia Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, 1973–1976; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, from August 1976
Armstrong, Willis C., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until April 16, 1974
Asad, Hafez, President of Syria
Ash, Roy L., Assistant to the President for Executive Management and Director of the Office of Management and Budget, February 2, 1973–February 3, 1975
Atherton, Alfred L., Jr. (Roy), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs 1970–1974; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Bahr, Egon, State Secretary, West German Federal Chancellery
Baker, William O., President of Bell Laboratories; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1969
Baroody, William J., Jr., Special Assistant to the President and Chief, White House Office of Public Liaison

XXXI
Bartholomew, Reginald, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of Defense, 1973–1974; Deputy Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, 1974–1977; thereafter Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State

Beall, John Glenn, Jr., Senator (R–Maryland) until January 3, 1977

Bell, Alphonzo, Representative (R–California) until January 3, 1977

Bellmon, Henry, Senator (R–Oklahoma)

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, President of Pakistan and Minister of Foreign Affairs and Defense, 1971–1973; thereafter Prime Minister and Minister of Atomic Energy, Foreign Affairs, and Defense

Biester, Edward G. (Pete), Representative (R–Pennsylvania) until January 3, 1977

Bingham, Jonathan B., Representative (D–New York)

Bogg, Thomas Hale, Sr., Representative (D–Louisiana); House Majority Leader until January 1, 1973, when he was presumed dead after disappearing during an October 1972 Alaskan trip

Borg, Arthur C., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State, from 1974 until June 1975; Executive Secretary, July 1976–April 1977

Borg, Parker W., Staff Officer, Executive Secretariat, and Special Assistant to the Director of the Foreign Service, Department of State, until 1974; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1974–1975

Boumediene, Houari, President of Algeria

Boverie, General Richard T., USAF, Deputy Director; Director, Program Analysis, National Security Council Staff, August 1974–January 1977

Boyatt, Thomas D., Director of Cypriot Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until 1973; Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Chile from 1975

Bradenas, John, Representative (D–Indiana); Majority Whip from January 1977

Brandt, Willy, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Bray, William G., Representative (R–Indiana) until January 3, 1975; thereafter Commissioner, American Battle Monuments Commission

Bremer, L. Paul (Jerry), Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1973–1976

Brennan, Peter J., Secretary of Labor, February 2, 1973–March 15, 1975

Brezhnev, Leonid I., First Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Bridges, Peter S., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State, 1976

Brimelow, Sir Thomas, Deputy Under Secretary of State, British Foreign Office

Brinegar, Claude S., Secretary of Transportation, February 2, 1973–February 1, 1975

Brooke, Edward W., III, Senator (R–Massachusetts)

Broomfield, William S., Representative (R–Michigan)

Brown, General George S., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force; August 1, 1973–June 30, 1974; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Brown, L. Dean, Ambassador to Jordan until November 29, 1973; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, December 28, 1973–February 23, 1975; also Special Envoy to Cyprus, 1974, and Lebanon, 1976

Bruce, David K.E., former Ambassador to the United Kingdom; Chief, U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, May 14, 1973–September 25, 1974; U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, October 17, 1974–February 12, 1976

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, foreign policy adviser to the Carter Presidential campaign, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs from January 21, 1977

Buchanan, John Hall, Jr., Representative (R–Alabama); member, U.S. delegation to the United Nations, 1973

Buchen, Philip W., Executive Director, Domestic Council Committee on the Right of Privacy, March–August 1974; White House Counsel, August 15, 1974–January 20, 1977

Buffum, William B., Ambassador to Lebanon until January 17, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, February 4, 1974–December 18, 1975
**Persons XXXIII**

**Bundy, McGeorge**, Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1961–1966; thereafter President of the Ford Foundation

**Bunker, Ellsworth**, Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam until May 11, 1973; thereafter Ambassador at Large

**Burch, Dean**, Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission until 1974; Counselor to the President, 1974–1975

**Burger, Warren E.**, Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court

**Burns, Arthur F.**, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board


**Butz, Earl L.**, Secretary of Agriculture until October 4, 1976

**Byers, Wheaton**, member and Executive Secretary, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

**Byrd, Harry Flood, Jr.**, Senator (I–Virginia)

**Byrd, Robert C.**, Senator (D–West Virginia); Democratic Whip until January 1977; thereafter Senate Majority Leader

**Byrnes, James**, Secretary of State, 1945–1947

**Campbell, J. Phil**, Under Secretary of Agriculture

**Campbell, Richard T.**, member, National Security Council Staff; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, 1973–1974

**Carlucci, Frank C.**, Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare until 1974; Ambassador to Portugal from January 24, 1975

**Carstens, Karl**, Chairman, CDU/CSU Bundestag Parliamentary Group; member, CDU Federal Executive Committee


**Carver, George A., Jr.**, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers from October 1, 1973

**Case, Clifford P.**, Senator (R–New Jersey), member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee

**Casey, William J.**, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission until 1973; Under Secretary of State for Economic and Agricultural Affairs, February 2, 1973–March 14, 1974; President and Chairman of the Export-Import Bank, 1974–1976; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from 1976

**Castro Ruz, Fidel**, Premier of Cuba

**Ceausescu, Nicolae**, President of Romania

**Cederberg, Elford A.**, Representative (R–Michigan)

**Chaban-Delmas, Jacques**, French Prime Minister, June 1969–July 1972

**Chapin, Dwight L.**, Deputy Assistant to the President, 1971–1973

**Cheney, Richard B.**, Deputy Assistant to the President, December 1974–November 1975; White House Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President, November 1975–January 1977

**Cherne, Leon**, Executive Director of the Research Institute of America; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board from June 28, 1973; Chairman from March 11, 1976

**Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi)**, President of the Republic of China; Chairman, Republic of China National Security Council; Director-General, Kuomintang (Guomindang)

**Chiao (Ch'iao) Kuan-hua (Qiao Guanhua)**, Deputy [Vice] Foreign Minister, People’s Republic of China

**Chou En-lai (Zhou Enlai)**, Premier of the People’s Republic of China
XXXIV  Persons

Church, Frank F., Senator (D–Idaho); Chairman, Senate Select Committee to Study Government Activities with Respect to Intelligence (Church Committee), 1975–1976; Select Committee on Aging, and Special Committee on the Termination of the National Emergency until 1976

Clark, Richard Clarence (Dick), Senator (D–Iowa)


Cline, Ray, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until November 24, 1973

Cochran, William Thad, Representative (R–Mississippi) from January 3, 1973

Cohen, William S., Representative (R–Maine) from January 3, 1973

Colby, William E., Executive Director-Comptroller, Central Intelligence Agency, until March 1973; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Operations, March 2, 1973–August 24, 1973; Director of Central Intelligence, September 4, 1973–January 30, 1976

Cole, Kenneth R., Jr., Executive Director, Domestic Council, from December 1972 and Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs, January 1974–March 1975

Colson, Charles W. (Chuck), former Special Counsel to the President

Conable, Barber Benjamin, Jr., Representative (R–New York)

Connor, James E., Director of the Office of Planning and Analysis, Atomic Energy Commission, until 1974; thereafter Secretary to the Cabinet and Staff Secretary to the President

Cooper, Charles A., member, National Security Council Staff, 1973–1974; Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, 1974–1975

Coughlin, Robert Lawrence, Representative (R–Pennsylvania)

Cranston, Alan, Senator (D–California); Democratic Whip and Chairman, Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, from January 1977

Cromer, Earl of (George Rowland Stanley Baring), British Ambassador to the United States

Curtis, Carl T., Senator (R–Nebraska); Chairman, Republican Conference, from 1975

Cushman, General Robert E., Jr., USMC, Commandant, U.S. Marine Corps

Dam, Kenneth W., Assistant Director for National Security and International Policy, Office of Management and Budget, until 1973; Executive Director, Council on Economic Policy, 1973

Davignon, Etienne Viscomte, Director General for Political Affairs, Belgian Foreign Ministry

Davis, Jeanne W., National Security Council Staff Secretary

Davis, Nathaniel, Ambassador to Chile until November 1, 1973; Director General of the Foreign Service, November 13, 1973–March 17, 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, March 17, 1975–December 18, 1975; Ambassador to Switzerland, January 9, 1976–July 31, 1977

Dayan, Moshe, Israeli Defense Minister

Dent, Frederick B., Secretary of Commerce, February 2, 1973–March 26, 1975; thereafter Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

DeGaulle, Charles, President of France until April 28, 1969

DePalma, Samuel, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until June 20, 1973

DiBona, Charles J., Special Counsel to the President for Energy and Deputy Assistant to the President for Energy Matters, 1973–1974

Dillon, C. Douglas, Secretary of the Treasury, January 1961–April 1965

Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Donaldson, William H., Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, November 26, 1973–May 10, 1974; thereafter Counsel to the Vice President
Donelan, Joseph F., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Administration until March 31, 1973

Douglas-Home, Sir Alec, former British Prime Minister


Easum, Donald B., Ambassador to Upper Volta until January 19, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, March 18, 1974–March 26, 1975; Ambassador to Nigeria from May 22, 1975

Eberle, William D., Special Representative for Trade Negotiations until 1975; Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy, 1974–1975

Echeverria, Luis Alvarez, President of Mexico

Ehrlichman, John D., Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs until April 1973

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States, January 20, 1953–January 20, 1961

Elliot, Theodore L., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until 1973; thereafter Ambassador to Afghanistan


Enders, Thomas O., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs, July 24, 1974–December 22, 1975; Ambassador to Canada from February 17, 1976

Esch, Marvin L., Representative (R–Michigan) until January 3, 1977

Fahmy, Ismail, Egyptian Foreign Minister from October 31, 1973

Findley, Paul, Representative (R–Illinois)

Flanigan, Peter M., Assistant to the President and Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy until 1974

Ford, Gerald R., Representative (R–Michigan) and Minority Leader until December 6, 1973; thereafter Vice President of the United States until August 9, 1974; thereafter President of the United States until January 20, 1977

Foster, Dr. John S., Jr., Vice President, TRW, Inc.; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Fraser, Donald M., Representative (DFL–Minnesota)

Frelinghuysen, Peter H.B., Representative (R–New Jersey) until 1974

Frenzel, William E., Representative (R–Minnesota)

Friedersdorf, Max L., Special Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs until 1973; Deputy Assistant to the President for the House of Representative, 1973–1974; Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, 1975–1977

Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D–Arkansas); Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee until 1974

Galvin, Robert W., CEO, Motorola; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Gandhi, Indira, Indian Prime Minister

Gergen, David R., Special Assistant to the President, 1973–1974

Gibbons, Sam Melville, Representative (D–Florida)

Giscard d’Estaing, Valery, French Minister of Economics and Finance until 1974; thereafter President of France
XXXVI  Persons

Goodpaster, General Andrew J., USA, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, until 1974
Granger, Clinton E., Acting Director, Planning and Coordination, National Security Council Staff, August 1974–September 1976
Gray, Gordon, President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1958–1961; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board
Graybeal, Sidney, Chairman, SALT Consultative Committee (also known as Standing Consultative Committee)
Grechko, Andrei, Soviet Defense Minister
Green, Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until May 10, 1973; Ambassador to Australia, March 27, 1973–July 31, 1975; also Ambassador to Nauru, February 28, 1974–July 31, 1975
Greenspan, Alan, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers, 1974–1977
Griffin, Robert P., Senator (R–Michigan); Minority Whip
Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Foreign Minister
Gross, Nelson G., Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, 1971–1972
Habib, Philip C., Ambassador to the Republic of Korea until August 19, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, September 27, 1974–June 30, 1976; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, July 1, 1976–April 1, 1978; Secretary of State ad interim, January 20, 1977–January 23, 1977
Haig, Brigadier General Alexander Meigs, Jr., USA, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until January 1973; Army Vice Chief of Staff, 1973–1974; Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff, May 1973–August 1974; thereafter Commander-in-Chief, European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe
Haldeman, H.R., Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff until April 1973
Hammer, Armand, American industrialist and CEO of Occidental Petroleum
Hannah, Dr. John A. Administrator of the Agency for International Development until October 7, 1973; Executive Director, UN World Food Conference, from 1975
Hardin, Clifford M., Secretary of Agriculture, January 21, 1969–November 17, 1971
Harlow, Bryce N., Counselor to the President
Harriman, W. Averell, former Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs and Ambassador at Large
Harrington, Michael J., Representative (D–Massachusetts)
Hart, John L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Treasury for National Security
Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, January 8, 1974–June 8, 1977
Hartmann, Robert T., assistant to Vice President Ford; Counselor to the President from August 9, 1974
Hatfield, Mark O., Senator (R–Oregon)
Hays, Wayne L., Representative (D–Ohio) until September 1, 1976; Chairman, Committee on House Administration
Heath, Edward, British Prime Minister until March 1974
Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence until February 1973; Ambassador to Iran, April 1973–December 1976
Hersh, Seymour, New York Times journalist
Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam until his death on September 3, 1969

Holbrooke, Richard, member of President-elect Carter’s transition team, November 1976–January 1977

Holdridge, John H., member, Operations Staff/East Asia, National Security Council Staff, until March 1973; Co-Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing, 1973–1975; Ambassador to Singapore from August 1975


Hormats, Robert D., senior staff member, International Economic Affairs, National Security Council Staff, 1974–1977

Horton, Frank J., Representative (R–New York)

House, Arthur H., White House Fellow; Deputy Assistant to the President, August 1975–September 1976

Howe, Lieutenant Commander Jonathan T., USN, member, National Security Council Staff; Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs until 1974

Huang-chen, Chief of the PRC Liaison Office in the United States

Huang-hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations

Hummel, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, June 16, 1976–March 14, 1977

Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr., Vice President of the United States, January 21, 1965–January 20, 1969; Senator (DFL–Minnesota) from January 1971; Chairman, Joint Economic Committee, 1975–1976


Hussein I, ibn Talal, King of Jordan

Hyland, William G., senior staff member, National Security Council Staff, until January 1974; Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, January 1974–November 1975; Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, November 1975–January 1977

Ikle, Frederick C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from July 10, 1973

Ingersoll, Robert S., former Ambassador to Japan; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, January 8, 1974–July 9, 1974; thereafter Deputy Secretary of State, July 10, 1974–March 31, 1976

Inouye, Daniel K., Senator (D–Hawaii); Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence from 1975

Ismail, Hafez, Egyptian Presidential Adviser for National Security Affairs

Jackson, Henry M., “Scoop,” Senator (D–Washington); Chairman, Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs and Committee on Energy and Natural Resources


Janney, Stuart S., staff member, Bureau of Management, Department of State

Jaworski, Leon, Watergate Special Prosecutor, November 1, 1973–October 25, 1974

Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R–New York)

Jenkins, Alfred le Sesne, Director, Office of Asian Communist Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, until March 1973, thereafter Co-Deputy Chief of Mission of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing
Jobert, Michel, Secretary General of French Presidency to April 1973; French Foreign Minister, April 1973–May 1974

Johnson, James Paul (Jim), Representative (R–Colorado) from January 3, 1973

Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States, November 22, 1963–January 20, 1969

Johnson, U. Alexis, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until February 1, 1973; thereafter Ambassador at Large and Head of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Jones, Jerry H., Special Assistant to the President, 1973–1974; White House Staff Secretary, 1974–1975; Director of the Scheduling and Advance Office, White House, 1975–1977

Jorden, William J., member, National Security Council Staff; Ambassador to Panama from April 17, 1974

Judd, Walter, Representative (R–Minnesota), 1943–1963

Karamessines, Thomas H., Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Plans until February 27, 1973

Katz, Julius L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State, until 1976; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs

Katzir, Ephraim, President of Israel

Kekkonen, Urho, President of Finland

Kennan, George F., former Ambassador to the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia

Kennedy, Edward M., Senator (D–Massachusetts)

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States, January 20, 1961–November 22, 1963

Kennedy, Colonel Richard T., USA, Director of Planning and Coordination, National Security Council Staff, and Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Planning until January 1975; thereafter Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission

Keough, James, Director of the United States Information Agency, February 8, 1973–November 30, 1976

Kissinger, Henry A., Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; Secretary of State, September 21, 1973–January 20, 1977

Knoche, E. Henry, Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence until July 3, 1976; Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, July 7, 1976–August 1, 1977; Acting Director of Central Intelligence, January 20–March 9, 1977

Kornienko, Georgi M., Director, USA Department and member of the Collegium, Soviet Foreign Ministry

Korologos, Thomas C., Deputy Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, 1973–1974

Kosygin, Alexi N., Chairman, Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union

Krogh, Egil (Bud), Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs and Assistant Director, Domestic Council, 1971–1972; Under Secretary of Transportation, February 2–May 9, 1973

Kubisch, Jack B., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, May 29, 1973–September 4, 1974; Ambassador to Greece from September 26, 1974

Kubitschek, Juscelino, former President of Brazil

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense until January 29, 1973; Counselor to the President for Domestic Affairs, June 1973–February 1974

Laise, Carol C., Ambassador to Nepal until June 5, 1973; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, October 10, 1973–March 27, 1975; Director General of the Foreign Service, April 11, 1975–December 26, 1977; Director of Personnel, November 23, 1975–December 26, 1977

Land, Edwin H., CEO and founder, Polaroid Corporation, and member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Lawson, Brigadier General Richard, USAF, Military Assistant to the President, National Security Council Staff, 1974–1975

Le Duc Tho, member of the Politburo of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and Special Adviser to the DRV delegation to the Paris Peace Talks

Lee Kuan Yew (“Harry”), Singapore Prime Minister

Lehman, Richard, Director of the Office of Current Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, until 1975; Director of the Office of Strategic Research, 1975–1976; Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, 1976–1977

Leigh, Monroe, Legal Adviser of the Department of State, January 21, 1975–January 20, 1977

Leisler-Kiep, Walter, CDU member, German Bundestag

Levenson, Seymour, Acting Director, Management Systems Staff, Department of State, May 1973–May 1974; Director, Management Systems Staff, May 1974–June 1975


Lewis, Samuel W., Deputy Director for Planning, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, March 1974–December 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, December 24, 1975–April 13, 1977

Lodal, Jan M., Director, Program Analysis, National Security Council Staff

Lodge, Henry Cabot, II, former Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam and Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Paris Peace Talks

Lon Nol, General, FARK, Cambodian Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense

Long, Russell B., Senator (D–Louisiana); Chairman, Committee on Finance and Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation

Lopez Portillo, Jose, President of Mexico from 1976

Lord, Winston, Special Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs until 1973; Director, Policy and Coordination Staff, Department of State, October 12, 1973–February 26, 1974; Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, February 27, 1974–January 20, 1977

Love, John A., former Governor of Colorado; President’s Assistant for Energy Matters until December 3, 1973

Luce, Clare Boothe, former Ambassador to Italy; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Luns, Joseph M.A.H., Secretary-General, North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Lynn, James T., Under Secretary of Commerce until February 1973; Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, February 2, 1973–February 5, 1975; Assistant to the President for Management and Budget and Director, Office of Management and Budget, February 5, 1975–January 20, 1977

Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., former Assistant for Programs and Director, Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff; Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, until 1973; Assistant Secretary for Program Development and Budget, Department of the Interior, 1973–1974

McClellan, John L., Senator (D–Arkansas); Chairman, Committee on Appropriations

McCloskey, Paul N., Jr. (Pete), Representative (R–California)

McCloskey, Robert J., Ambassador to Cyprus, June 20, 1973–January 14, 1974; Ambassador at Large, 1974; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, February 21, 1975–September 10, 1976; Ambassador to the Netherlands, October 22, 1976–March 10, 1978
McCloy, John J., former Assistant Secretary of War; former President, World Bank, 1947–1949; former High Commissioner to Germany, 1947–1953
McCone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence, 1961–1965
McFall, John J., Representative (D–California); Majority Whip, 1973–1977
McFarlane, Lieutenant Colonel Robert C. (Bud), Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, 1974–1977; Special Assistant to the President, 1976–1977
McManaway, Clayton E., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Regional Programs, Systems Analysis, to 1973; Director for Management, Planning, and Resource Review, Intelligence Community Staff, 1973–April 1975; Deputy to Ambassador (Ret.) L. Dean Brown, then President Ford’s Special Representative and Director of the Inter-Agency Task Force for Saigon evacuation and Indochina refugee resettlement, April–October 1975; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Analysis and Evaluation, October 1975–June 1976; thereafter Director, Office of Management Policy, Department of State
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense, January 21, 1961–February 29, 1968; thereafter President, World Bank
Macomber, William B., Jr., Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration until April 4, 1973; Ambassador to Turkey from May 16, 1973
Mailliard, William S., Representative (R–California) until March 5, 1974; thereafter U.S. Representative to the Organization of American States; also member, Board of Directors of the Inter-America Foundation from December 10, 1975
Makarios, Archbishop, President of Cyprus until 1977
Malek, Frederic V., Special Assistant to the President until 1973; Deputy Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 1973–1975
Mahon, George H., Representative (D–Texas); Chairman, Committee on Appropriations
Mansfield, Michael J. (Mike), Senator (D–Montana); Senate Majority Leader until 1977, thereafter Ambassador to Japan; also Chairman, Select Committee on Secret and Confidential Documents, 1973–1974
Mao Tse-tung (Mao Zedong), Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party and Politburo of the People’s Republic of China
Marchetti, Victor, former CIA employee; co-author of CIA and the Cult of Intelligence (1974)
Marsh, John O., Jr., Counselor to the President, August 10, 1974–January 20, 1977; Chairman, White House ad hoc intelligence coordination group, 1975–1976
Marshall, Andrew W., Consultant to the National Security Council; Director of the Net Assessment Group, National Security Council Staff, until 1973; thereafter Director of the Office of Net Assessment, Office of the Secretary of Defense
Marshall, George C., former Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense
Meir, Golda, Israeli Prime Minister until 1974
Meyer, Armin H., former Ambassador to Japan; Chairman, Interagency Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism
Michel, Robert, Representative (R–Illinois); Minority Whip
Miller, William G., Staff Director, Senate Select Committee to Study Government Activities with Respect to Intelligence (Church Committee)
Mondale, Walter F., Senator (DFL–Minnesota) until December 30, 1976; Vice President of the United States from January 20, 1977
Moore, George Curtis, Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Sudan, until March 2, 1973
Moorer, Admiral Thomas H., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until July 1, 1974
Morgan, Thomas E., “Doc,” Representative (D–Pennsylvania); chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs
Morton, Rogers C.B., Secretary of the Interior until April 30, 1975; Chairman, Energy Resources Council, October 1974–1975; Secretary of Commerce, May 1, 1975–February 2, 1976; thereafter Counselor to the President
Murphy, Admiral Daniel, USN, Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community
Murphy, Robert D., retired Career Ambassador; Chairman, Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy until June 1975; Chairman, Intelligence Oversight Board from February 1976
Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D–Maine); Chairman, Committee on the Budget
Nedzi, Lucien N., Representative (D–Michigan); Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, February 19, 1975–July 17, 1975
Nessen, Ronald, Press Secretary to the President, September 1974–January 1977
Newcomb, David D., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until January 13, 1974; thereafter Ambassador to Indonesia
Nitze, Paul H., former Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Secretary of the Navy, and Deputy Secretary of Defense; member, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks until 1973; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States, January 20, 1969–August 9, 1974
Noel, Cleo A., Jr., Ambassador to Sudan until March 2, 1973
Oakley, Robert B., Senior Staff Member, Middle East and South Asia, National Security Council Staff, September 1974–January 1977
Ober, Richard, Senior Staff Member, Intelligence Coordination, National Security Council Staff, August 1974–September 1976
Odeen, Philip A., Director, Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff
Off, Robert B., Liaison Assistant, Presidential Personnel Office, 1974–1975; thereafter staff member, Bureau of Management, Department of State
Ogilvie, Donald G., Deputy Associate Director for Management, Office of Management and Budget, 1974; thereafter Associate Director, National Security and International Affairs, Office of Management and Budget
O’Neill, Thomas P., “Tip,” Representative (D–Massachusetts); House Majority Leader, 1973–1977; thereafter Speaker of the House
Ortiz, Frank V., Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Uruguay until 1973; Country Director for Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, 1973–1975; Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State, 1975–1977
Packwood, Robert W., Senator (R–Oregon)
Pahlavi, Mohammed Reza, Shah of Iran
Park, Chung-hee, President of the Republic of Korea
Parker, David N., Special Assistant to the President, 1973–1974
Passman, Otto E., Representative (D–Louisiana) until January 3, 1977
Pastore, John O., Senator (D–Rhode Island) until December 28, 1976; Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, 1975–1976

Pauly, Lieutenant General John, USAF, Assistant to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1974–September 1975; thereafter Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans and Operations, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force

Pearson, James B., Senator (R–Kansas)

Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor of the Department of State, until 1973; thereafter Ambassador to Hungary, September 10, 1973–March 26, 1975

Pell, Claiborne deB., Senator (D–Rhode Island)

Percy, Charles H., Senator (R–Illinois)

Peterson, Peter G., Secretary of Commerce until February 1, 1973

Pickering, Thomas R., Executive Secretary of the Department of State, July 30, 1973–January 31, 1974; Ambassador to Jordan from March 2, 1974

Pike, Otis G., Representative (D–New York); Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, July 17, 1975–January 1976

Pinckney, Samuel M., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Equal Employment Opportunity

Pompidou, Georges, President of France

Popper, David H., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs, July 12, 1973–January 2, 1974; Ambassador to Chile, February 22, 1974–May 22, 1977


Preeg, Ernest H., Director, Office of OECD European Community and Atlantic Political-Economic Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, 1974–1976; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary for International Finance and Development and Executive Director, White House Economic Policy Group

Price, C. Melvin, Representative (D–Illinois); Chairman, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct

Price, Raymond K., Jr., Special Consultant to the President, 1973–1974

Prince, Georgiana M., Federal Women’s Program Coordinator, Bureau of Management, Department of State

Quinn, Kenneth M., Vice Chairman, Secretary of State’s Open Forum Panel from August 1974

Rabin, Yitzhak, Israeli Foreign Minister

Raoul-Duval, Michael, Aide to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, March-October 1973; Staff Assistant, Domestic Council, October 1973–May 1974; Associate Director for Natural Resources and Associate Director for Energy and Transportation, Domestic Council, May 1974–October 1975; Assistant Counselor and Executive Director of the White House Intelligence Coordinating Group, August 1975–April 1976; Special Counsel to the President, April 1976–January 1977

Ratliff, Rob Roy, Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee, National Security Council

Reagan, Ronald W., Governor of California, 1967–1975; member, Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission), January–June 1975; candidate for the Republican nomination, 1976

Reston, James, “Scotty” syndicated columnist and Vice President of The New York Times

Rhodes, John J., Representative (R–Arizona); House Minority Leader

Ribicoff, Abraham A., Senator (D–Connecticut); Chairman, Committee on Government Operations from 1975

Richardson, John, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs

Robinson, Charles W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, January 3, 1975–April 9, 1976; Deputy Secretary of State, April 9, 1976–January 20, 1977

Rockefeller, David, CEO, Chase Manhattan Bank; member, Council of the Americas; Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations

Rockefeller, Nelson A., former Governor of New York; Vice President of the United States from December 19, 1974; Chairman of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller Commission), January–June 1975; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, until December 19, 1975

Rodman, Peter W., member, National Security Council Staff and Office of the Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Special Assistant to Henry Kissinger

Roe, Robert A., Representative (D–New Jersey)

Rogers, Gladys, Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs, Department of State


Rogers, William P., Secretary of State until August 23, 1973

Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States, March 4, 1933–April 12, 1945

Rumor, Mariano, Italian Minister of the Interior until 1973; President of the Council of Ministers of Italy, 1973–1974; thereafter Minister of Foreign Affairs

Rumsfeld, Donald H., U.S. Permanent Representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, February 2, 1973–December 5, 1974; Assistant to the President, September 27, 1974–November 19, 1975; Secretary of Defense, November 20, 1975–January 20, 1977

Ruppe, Philip E., Representative (R–Michigan)

Rush, Kenneth W., former Ambassador to Germany; Deputy Secretary of Defense until January 1973; Deputy Secretary of State, February 2, 1973–May 29, 1974; Secretary of State ad interim, September 3–22, 1973; Ambassador to France, November 21, 1974–March 14, 1977

Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State, January 21, 1961–January 20, 1969

Ryan, General John D., USAF, Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, until July 31, 1973

Sadat, Anwar el-, President of Egypt

Saucham Khoy, interim President of Cambodia, April 1975

Saunders, Harold H. (Hal), former member of the National Security Council Operations Staff; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, from December 1, 1975

Saxbe, William B., Senator (R–Ohio) until January 3, 1974; Attorney General, January 4, 1974–February 1, 1975; thereafter Ambassador to India until November 1976

Sayre, Robert M., Ambassador to Panama until March 14, 1974; Inspector General of the Department of State and Foreign Service, November 25, 1975–May 1, 1978

Scali, John A., former special consultant to the President; U.S. Representative to the United Nations, February 20, 1973–June 29, 1975


Scheel, Walter, Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany and Foreign Minister until 1974; thereafter, President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Scott, Hugh D., Jr., Senator (R–Pennsylvania) until January 3, 1977, Senate Minority Leader

Schlesinger, James R., Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission until February 1973; Director of Central Intelligence, February 2–July 2, 1973; Secretary of Defense, July 2, 1973–November 19, 1975

Schmidt, Helmut, West German Minister of Finance until May 6, 1974, thereafter Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany

Schneebeli, Herman T., Representative (R–Pennsylvania) until January 3, 1977

Schubert, Richard F., Under Secretary of Labor

Schweiker, Richard, Senator (R–Pennsylvania)


Seidman, L. William, Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs, 1974–1977

Shriver, Garner E., Representative (R–Kansas) until January 3, 1977

Shultz, George P., Secretary of the Treasury and Assistant to the President until May 8, 1974; member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board


Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, leader of Cambodian government-in-exile in Beijing


Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until February 18, 1974; thereafter Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until June 30, 1976

Slack, John M., Jr., Representative (D–West Virginia)

Solomon, Richard H., senior staff member, National Security Council Staff

Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr, Soviet dissident and author

Sonnenfeld, Helmut, senior staff member, National Security Council Staff; thereafter Counselor of the Department of State, January 7, 1974–February 21, 1977

Sparkman, John J., Senator (D–Alabama); Co-Chairman, Joint Committee on Defense Production and chairman, Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs until 1974; Chairman, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, from 1975

Spivak, Lawrence, NBC News reporter; moderator of “Meet the Press”

Springsteen, George S., Jr., Executive Secretary of the Department of State, January 31, 1974–July 14, 1976; Director of the Foreign Service Institute

Stalin, Josif, former Soviet Premier

St. Clair, James D., Watergate Special Counsel


Stennis, John C., Senator (D–Mississippi); Chairman, Select Committee on Standards and Conduct until 1975; also Chairman, Committee on Armed Services

Persons XLV

Stevenson, Adlai E., III, Senator (D–Illinois); Chairman, Select Committee on the Senate Committee System, 1975–1976; also Chairman, Select Committee on Ethics from 1977

Stoessell, Walter J. Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian Affairs until January 7, 1974; thereafter Ambassador to the Soviet Union

Stratton, Samuel S., Representative (D–New York)

Suharto, President of Indonesia

Sukhodrev, Viktor M., First Secretary, Soviet Foreign Ministry, and interpreter

Sutterlin, James S., Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State, September 4, 1973–October 15, 1973; Inspector General of the Department of State and Foreign Service, October 15, 1973–August 31, 1974

Symington, W. Stuart, Senator (D–Missouri); member, Committee on Armed Services

Tack, Juan Antonio, Panamanian Foreign Minister

Tanaka Kakeui, Japanese Prime Minister


Teller, Edward, founder, Lawrence Livermore Laboratory, and member, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Teng Hsiao-ping (Deng Xiaoping), PRC Vice Premier of State Council after 1973

Thomas, John M., Assistant Secretary of State for Administration from November 23, 1973

Thurmond, J. Strom, Senator (R–South Carolina)

Timmons, William E., Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs until 1974

Toon, Malcolm, Ambassador to Yugoslavia until March 11, 1975; Ambassador to Israel, July 10, 1975–December 27, 1976; Ambassador to the Soviet Union from January 18, 1977

Tower, John G., Senator (R–Texas); Chairman, Republican Policy Committee; Vice Chairman, Senate Select Committee to Study Government Activities with Respect to Intelligence (Church Committee), 1975–1976

Trend, Sir Burke, British Cabinet Secretary

Troia, Kathleen, Research Assistant, Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, National Security Council Staff, August 1974–October 1976

Trudeau, Pierre Elliott, Prime Minister of Canada

Truman, Harry S, President of the United States, April 12, 1945–January 20, 1953

Tunney, John, Senator (D–California) until January 1, 1977

Ullman, Albert C., Representative (D–Oregon); Chairman, Joint Committee on Budget Control until 1974; Chairman, Committee on Budget, 1973–1974; Chairman, Committee on Ways and Means from 1975; also Chairman, Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, 1975–1976

Vance, Cyrus, former Under Secretary of Defense; Secretary of State from January 1977

Vanik, Charles, Representative (D–Ohio)

Vavilov, Andrei, official, USA Department, Soviet Foreign Ministry

Vest, George, Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, from April 29, 1974

Vogelgesang, Sandra, Executive Director, Secretary of State’s Open Forum Panel, until August 1974

Vyshinskiy, Andrey, former Soviet Foreign Minister

Waldheim, Kurt, United Nations Secretary-General

Walsh, Paul V., Assistant Deputy Director for Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency
Walters, Lieutenant General Vernon A., USA, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence until July 7, 1976; Acting Director of Central Intelligence, July 2, 1973–September 4, 1973

Warren, Gerald L., Deputy White House Press Secretary, 1973–1974

Wehner, Herbert, Chairman of the West German SPD Bundestag Parliamentary Party Group; also SPD Deputy Party Chairman

Weinberger, Caspar W., Director of the Office of Management and Budget until 1973; Counselor to the President, 1973; Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, February 12, 1973–August 8, 1975

Weyand, General Frederick C., USA, Army Chief of Staff, October 3, 1974–September 31, 1976

Wilderotter, James A., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of Commerce until 1973; Executive Assistant to the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, 1973–1974; Associate Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, 1974–1975; Associate Counsel, White House, 1975–1976; General Counsel, Energy Research and Development Administration, 1976–1977

Wilson, Harold, British Prime Minister, 1974–1976

Wortzel, Arthur I., Deputy Chief of Mission of the Embassy in Yugoslavia until 1974; Chief, Foreign Service Counseling and Assignment Division, then Director, Office of Program Coordination, Bureau of Personnel, Department of State, 1974–April 1976; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel

Wright, W. Marshall, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, May 29, 1973–February 2, 1974

Yeh, Chien-ying (Yan Jiagan), Marshal, Vice Chairman, Military Council of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, 1967; member of the Central Committee and Politburo; Defense Minister

Young, Milton R., Senator (R–North Dakota)

Zablocki, Clement J., Representative (D–Wisconsin)

Zarb, Frank G., Associate Director of the Office of Management and Budget, 1973–1974; also Acting Assistant Administrator for Operations and Compliance, Federal Energy Office; thereafter Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration

Ziegler, Ronald L., White House Press Secretary and Assistant to the President, 1973–1974

Zumwalt, Admiral Elmo R., Jr., USN, Chief of Naval Operations, until June 29, 1974
Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976

The Intelligence Community: Investigation and Reorganization

1. Memorandum From the Chairman of the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Anderson) to President Nixon


In accordance with your directions, your Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board conducted, and has recently completed, an exhaustive examination here and abroad of U.S. capabilities in the field of human source collection of foreign positive intelligence. An ad hoc committee consisting of Gordon Gray, Chairman; Dr. William O. Baker, and Governor Nelson Rockefeller was empaneled by the Board to coordinate the study.

The purpose of this memorandum is to inform you of our principal conclusions. A much more comprehensive and extremely sensitive report is available should you wish to review our findings in detail.

Although there are some gaps, the U.S. human intelligence effort against non-Communist countries is considered to be generally effective. This is not the case with Communist targets, particularly in respect to the plans and intentions of these nations. [5 lines not declassified] As a

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Box 15, PFIAB. Top Secret; Sensitive. An attached cover sheet, hand-dated February 20, reads “DCI/Eyes Only.”


3 Not found.
result, [less than 1 line not declassified] human intelligence suffer from a lack of central direction, coordinated effort, defined doctrine, and clear responsibilities. We believe that attention from the Office of the President is necessary to make the best use of the several components of the government involved in human intelligence and to give their activities the cohesiveness which they sorely need.

Among the other elements which have hindered our penetrating the high level of Communist governments are an excessive bureaucratization of the CIA Clandestine Service; an overburdening of the Clandestine Service with collection and reporting of information which could be done as well overtly by the Foreign Service and other elements of the American diplomatic establishment abroad; and the general ineffectiveness of the Defense Attaché system, resulting largely from spotty personnel selection, training, and assignment procedures. A qualitatively-improved Defense Attaché system would [less than 1 line not declassified] result in better overt intelligence [2 lines not declassified].

One of the most glaring deficiencies is the almost total void in the clandestine collection of foreign positive intelligence within the highly favorable operating environment of the United States. [4 lines not declassified] However, there are more than a thousand other officials of Communist countries permanently assigned in the United States who, because they are not known or suspected to be intelligence officers, are not subject to recruitment efforts. In addition to the need for rectifying this specific situation, collaboration between the FBI and the CIA, which has been at best meager for the last several years, must be re instituted in both the positive and counterintelligence fields as a matter of priority.

There is appended for your consideration a summary of our principal recommendations.4 We are pleased to report that the mere conduct of our study has already produced encouraging results and has enabled us to eliminate some recommendations which we otherwise would have proposed.

It is our judgment that the implementation of our recommendations will serve to bring about an overall qualitative improvement of the government’s human intelligence efforts [2½ lines not declassified].

It is the opinion of the Board that these recommendations can and should be implemented without increases in personnel or funds cur-

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4 Attached but not printed is a summary of PFIAB’s principal recommendations covering 14 subject areas: national focus and direction, cover, clandestine intelligence collection within the United States, overt intelligence collection within the United States, intelligence responsibilities of ambassadors and the Foreign Service, liaison with foreign intelligence services, the role of defense attachés, the role of the U.S. military in clandestine collection, the responsibilities of legal attachés, technical aids to clandestine collection, physical surveillance, training, area specialization, and illegals.
rently programmed for the Intelligence Community although certain adjustments may be required in and among component departments and agencies. Any such adjustments would not be of a magnitude that would affect adversely other necessary intelligence programs.

In view of the extra-sensitivity of the subject matter, we believe that written communications pertaining to our findings and recommendations should be minimal; that they should be sufficiently sanitized of detail to prevent disclosures of successes and failures and to protect sources; and that they should be directed only to those officials with an absolute need-to-know. Accordingly, we recommend that the Executive Secretary, PFIAB, be assigned to assist Dr. Kissinger in the necessary staff work and that he be made responsible for the overall security protection of the contents of this report and the security of the implementing staff actions.

Following your decision on our recommendations, we would propose to inform, on your behalf, the DCI, Director FBI, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other appropriate officials, of the measures that should be instituted to carry out your decisions, together with the evidence and rationale which underlie our recommendations. To the maximum extent feasible, this will be done orally.

Respectfully,

George W. Anderson, Jr.
Admiral, USN (Ret.)

2. Conversation Between President Nixon and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 27, 1973, 5:11–5:13 p.m.

Nixon: You know, I think Helms is going to do a very good job there.\(^1\)

Kissinger: Very good.

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\(^2\) Former DCI Richard Helms was appointed Ambassador to Iran on February 8. Following his confirmation, he presented his credentials in Tehran on April 5. Helms’ replacement, James R. Schlesinger, was sworn in as DCI on February 2.
Nixon: He’s a—it’s a good place to have him.
Kissinger: And Schlesinger will do a good job at CIA.
Nixon: Well, we need a shake-up there, and he’s shaking it up.
Kissinger: Well, he’s getting rid of a thousand people. I don’t know whether Bob [Haldeman] told you that.3
Nixon: Good. He told me.
Kissinger: Good.
Nixon: You know, you can’t just keep people [unclear]. It’s sad, and, yet, I don’t like for anybody to have to leave his position, when he’s got his home and his kids are in school, and all the rest. But that’s sort of the law of life, isn’t it?
Kissinger: No, you had to—
Nixon: Huh?
Kissinger: You had to clean this thing up.
Nixon: He’s getting rid of a thousand, is he?
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: I was just wondering. They can get jobs, people that have been with the CIA [unclear].
Kissinger: It’s getting a little harder, but, still, they can get jobs.
Nixon: Oh, in business, they can get them. Business people would love to have CIA—What kind of—Now, these are not just stenographers, though? He’s getting—he’s—
Kissinger: No. No, operators, mostly in the clandestine division, which he feels is over-staffed and . . .
Nixon: And?
Kissinger: . . . over-aged.
Nixon: Well, it’s over-staffed, it’s over-aged, and unproductive.
Kissinger: Yeah.
Nixon: What the hell is it producing? What does it—

3 On February 24, Seymour M. Hersh reported in the New York Times that four senior officials would retire from the CIA “within weeks” in “the first round in a major shake-up of the agency under its new director.” The officials were Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community Bronson Tweedy, Tweedy’s deputy Thomas Parrott, Deputy Director for Plans Thomas H. Karamessines, and CIA General Counsel Laurence Houston. Their retirement was attributed by Hersh to “the White House’s growing disenchantment with Mr. Helms’s failure to effectively monitor and supervise spending and policy throughout the intelligence field.” “Mr. Schlesinger,” Hersh reported, “has been given the authority of the White House to wield more power in his role as director” with which “he could have a major impact on intelligence spending among the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency and the tactical intelligence units operated by the three armed services.” (Seymour M. Hersh, “4 High-Level C.I.A. Men Reportedly Being Ousted.” New York Times, February 24, 1973, p. 9)
Kissinger: Very little.
Nixon: —produce?
Kissinger: Very little.
Nixon: You see, Helms could never do that, could he?
Kissinger: No, because that was his own service. These were all his boys.
Nixon: Some of these guys, Henry, go back to the OSS days. Anybody from the OSS is just too damn old. Don’t you think so?
Kissinger: Oh, yeah. Oh, God yes. And most—and those who don’t go back to OSS, go back to the late ’50s, at the earliest—
Nixon: Even that’s a long stretch.
Kissinger: —which is also 14 years ago—15.4

4 In his memoirs, William Colby, Schlesinger’s successor as DCI, estimated that under Schlesinger’s “purge” about 7 percent of the CIA’s staff, estimated by the Washington Post to number 15,000 employees as of March 1973, were “fired or were forced to resign or retired. And the largest portion of these, in keeping with Schlesinger’s belief that most of the ‘dead wood’ was in the clandestine services, came from my Directorate of Operations (nee Plans).” (Colby, Honorable Men, p. 333; Thomas O’Toole, “CIA’s Schlesinger Begins Streamlining Operations,” Washington Post, March 4, 1973, p. A1)

3. National Security Study Memorandum 178


MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Program for National Net Assessment

In furtherance of his memorandum of November 5, 1971 concerning the organization and management of the U.S. Foreign Intelli-
gence Community, the President has directed the initiation of a program for the preparation of a series of national net assessments.

As a first step in this process, the President has directed that a paper be prepared which would:

—Define the national net assessment process, and discuss the range and types of topics that would be addressed.
—Discuss methodology appropriate for use in preparing net assessments.
—Establish reporting and coordination procedures for the program.

The President has directed that this paper be prepared by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees and chaired by the Director, Net Assessment Group, of the National Security Council staff.

The report of the Ad Hoc Group should be completed by May 15, 1973, and forwarded for consideration by the National Security Council Intelligence Committee.

Henry A. Kissinger

3 The Ad Hoc Committee’s report and accompanying attachments are attached but not printed. The report was forwarded by Andrew Marshall of the NSC Staff to Kissinger under a June 21 covering memorandum. See footnote 2, Document 8.
5. Memorandum From the Secretary of the Treasury’s Special Assistant for National Security (Hart) to Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger


[Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 122, NIC, Job 80B01495, Box 6, Office of Economic Research 1973. Secret. 5 pages not declassified.]

6. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Schlesinger to All Central Intelligence Agency Employees


1. Recent press reports outline in detail certain alleged CIA activities with respect to Mr. Howard Hunt and other parties. The presently known facts behind these stories are those stated in the attached draft of a statement I will be making to the Senate Committee on Appropria-

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Box 18, CIA. Administrative; Internal Use Only.

tions on 9 May. As can be seen, the Agency provided limited assistance in response to a request by senior officials. The Agency has cooperated with and made available to the appropriate law enforcement bodies information about these activities and will continue to do so.

2. All CIA employees should understand my attitude on this type of issue. I shall do everything in my power to confine CIA activities to those which fall within a strict interpretation of its legislative charter. I take this position because I am determined that the law shall be respected and because this is the best way to foster the legitimate and necessary contributions we in CIA can make to the national security of the United States.

3. I am taking several actions to implement this objective:

—I have ordered all the senior operating officials of this Agency to report to me immediately on any activities now going on, or that have gone on in the past, which might be construed to be outside the legislative charter of this Agency.

—I hereby direct every person presently employed by CIA to report to me on any such activities of which he has knowledge. I invite all ex-employees to do the same. Anyone who has such information should call my secretary (extension 6363) and say that he wishes to talk to me about “activities outside CIA’s charter.”

4. To ensure that Agency activities are proper in the future, I hereby promulgate the following standing order for all CIA employees:

Any CIA employee who believes that he has received instructions which in any way appear inconsistent with the CIA legislative charter shall inform the Director of Central Intelligence immediately.

James R. Schlesinger

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3 Not found attached. In his May 9 testimony before a subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee investigating the Intelligence Community’s involvement in the Pentagon Papers case, Schlesinger stated that the CIA had been “insufficiently cautious” in providing materials to White House adviser John D. Ehrlichman for use in the Ellsberg burglary. Schlesinger testified that Ehrlichman telephoned Cushman seeking assistance for the operation, led by Hunt, and that Cushman directed that “appropriate technical assistance” be given to Hunt on July 23, 1971. (Marjorie Hunter, “C.I.A. Head Admits ‘Ill-Advised Act,’” New York Times, May 10, 1973, p. 1) Two days later, Cushman told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he reported his actions to then-DCI Richard Helms, who “assented to what I had done.” (Marjorie Hunter, “Cushman Says Helms ‘Assented’ to C.I.A. Aid to Hunt for Break-In on Coast,” ibid., May 12, 1973, p. 14)

4 Signed July 26, 1947, the National Security Act of 1947 (50 USC 401) is the basic legislative charter of the CIA. Section 102 of the Act defines the positions of the Director and the Deputy Directors; Sections 103 and 104 outline the DCI’s responsibilities and authorities.
7. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Central Intelligence Agency Management Committee (Colby) to All Central Intelligence Agency Employees


SUBJECT

Agency Involvement in the Watergate Case

1. The leadership of the Agency continues to make a determined effort to investigate all aspects of Agency involvement with the “Watergate” case or any of those persons connected with it. The results of these investigations have been given to the appropriate legislative, executive, and judicial elements of the Government investigating these matters. Each employee has been asked and is directed to report to the Director any knowledge he or she has of the Watergate affair and related matters, any persons connected with it, or any other illegal activity in which they believe the Agency was involved in any way.2

2. In consonance with the foregoing, anyone who has had any connection or contact with individuals on the attached list,3 or anyone in their offices or anyone purporting to act for them or acting pursuant to their authority, should report these contacts fully. Activities of these and other individuals include not only the Watergate affair, but any investigative work on the Pentagon Papers/Ellsberg case4 and any contacts relating to the Executive Branch and White House efforts to locate and stem leaks of classified information to the press starting as early as July 1970.

3. Any work done by anyone in the Agency on any of these subjects, or any knowledge related thereto, should be reported to the IG

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Schlesinger Papers, Box 18, CIA. Administrative; Internal Use Only. Approved by Schlesinger. In his memoirs, Colby recalled that the memorandum was issued after he was informed that Watergate defendant James McCord had sent letters to the CIA containing “veiled allegations that an attempt was being made in the White House to pin the blame for Watergate on the Agency.” According to Colby, the existence of the letters had been revealed to Schlesinger and himself only after the DCI’s May 9 directive (Document 6) had been issued. (Colby, Honorable Men, p. 339) A timeline of events attached to the memorandum states that Schlesinger was informed of the letters on May 22.


3 Not found attached.

4 See footnote 2, Document 6.
through the appropriate Deputy Director, or directly and personally to the Director.\(^5\)

4. It is imperative that every piece of information bearing on these matters be reported immediately for evaluation by the senior management of the Agency. The public interest requires that all information be produced and reported to our oversight committees (on a classified basis if necessary) so that the Agency’s actual role will be clarified with respect to various charges and speculation.

W.E. Colby

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\(^5\) The catalogue of potential violations of the CIA’s legislative charter, compiled by the CIA Inspector General’s office, eventually totaled 693 pages. The catalogue, known within the CIA as the “Family Jewels” and referred to by Colby as “the skeletons in our closet,” included domestic operations against the anti-war movement, a mail intercept program conducted by CIA counterintelligence, experiments involving LSD, surveillance and bugging of U.S. journalists, involvement in the assassination or attempted assassination of foreign leaders, and connections to the Watergate break-in. These activities would remain classified until their existence was exposed in a December 22, 1974, article by New York Times columnist Seymour Hersh (see Document 17). The “Family Jewels” documents were released to the public in June 2007 and are available in the Electronic Reading Room on the CIA website.

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8. National Security Decision Memorandum 224\(^1\)


TO

The Secretary of State
The Acting Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

National Net Assessment Process, NSSM 178

The President, upon review of the paper prepared and submitted in compliance with NSSM 178\(^2\) and the comments of the NSCIC Prin-

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, Policy Papers, 1969–1974, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 224. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\(^2\) See Document 3 and footnote 3 thereto. The paper, prepared by the Ad Hoc Net Assessment Group for Kissinger, in his capacity as the Chairman of the NSCIC, is in the
Intelligence Community Investigation and Reorganization

cipals thereon,\(^3\) has approved the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Group and wishes to proceed with a program of national net assessment. To this end:

—A permanent Net Assessment Standing Committee is established, having representation from the Departments of State and Defense, and the Director of Central Intelligence, and chaired by a representative of the National Security Council Staff.

—Requests for net assessments will be issued as National Security Study Memoranda.

—Net assessments prepared in accordance with these NSSMs will be forwarded to the Chairman of the NSCIC for review by that Committee.

Addressees should forward to me the names of their representatives to the Net Assessment Standing Committee.

Henry A. Kissinger

\(^3\) The comments of the NSCIC Principals on NSSM 178 are summarized in Marshall’s June 21 memorandum to Kissinger. Marshall noted that, with the exception of Admiral Moorer, all parties agreed that the process for producing national net assessments recommended in the report were “suitable” and should be established “without further ado.” (Ibid.)
9. Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Objectives for the Intelligence Community

REFERENCE
The President’s Memorandum of April 18, 1973

Your directive of November 1971 included a list of major objectives that must be attained to increase substantially the efficiency and effectiveness of the intelligence community. I propose to adapt these as the Intelligence Community’s objectives and to require that specific steps toward them be taken during the next four to eighteen months.

A. The responsiveness of the U.S. foreign intelligence effort with respect to national requirements must be subject to continuing review and the quality, scope and timeliness of the community’s product must be improved.

To meet these objectives, I plan to do the following regarding the National Intelligence Product:

—through the NSCIC, determine by December 1, 1973 which national intelligence products satisfy user needs and identify new product requirements;

—achieve significant improvements in product formats and production procedures to increase responsiveness early in 1974;

—establish by December 31, 1973 procedures to enable the NSCIC and my own staff to review the responsiveness and quality of the community’s product.

B. Authoritative and responsible leadership for the community as a whole must be assured.

To meet this community leadership goal, I will:

—issue specific planning objectives shortly to the elements of the community;

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Agency Files, Box 209, CIA, Vol. VI, 1973 [1 of 2]. Secret. Attached to a September 13 memorandum from Marshall and Kennedy to Kissinger, on which Scowcroft initialed his concurrence with Colby’s objectives. Colby’s memorandum responds to an April 18 memorandum from Nixon to Schlesinger requesting an outline of major goals and objectives for the CIA in the coming year. (Ibid.) Colby was sworn in as DCI on September 4.

—complete the restructuring and strengthening of my personal staff by October 15, 1973 to provide me independent support in community matters;
—participate actively in the NSCIC and insure that IRAC and USIB have a dynamic and forceful role in the community;
—review the USIB committee structure before the end of 1973 and direct, if necessary, changes to increase USIB effectiveness in advising me on national requirements;
—review programs to upgrade the quality of intelligence personnel and improve personnel management in the community.

C. A more efficient use of resources by the community in the collection of intelligence information must be achieved. Utilization of the means available must be in consonance with approved requirements of U.S. security and national interests.

To meet this goal I will, with respect to National Intelligence Program Budget Recommendations:

—continue to support the President’s intelligence budget for FY 1974 before Congress;
—develop for FY 1975 and beyond National Intelligence Program Budget recommendations. These will result from the review procedure of the various intelligence entities and the total review and deliberations of the IRAC on the programs therein. The National Intelligence Program Budget will be my personal recommendation to the President on the level of national intelligence resources, their utilization and performance;
—institute a quarterly review by the IRAC of resource utilization by all intelligence entities;
—with the advice of IRAC and the USIB, define and complete, throughout FY 1974, a series of major program issue studies.

Research and Development:

—form an R&D Advisory Council as a subcommittee of IRAC by mid-October 1973;
—instruct the Council to review all R&D activities within the National Intelligence Program to identify ongoing R&D efforts, their costs, their purpose, and who has responsibility for each effort;
—instruct the Council to recommend by January 1, 1974 an overall R&D strategy and structure for IRAC consideration based on a clear perception of intelligence needs which identifies technological gaps and resource deficiencies, eliminates unnecessary duplication of effort, and stresses cross-program technology transference.

D. Assignment of intelligence functions within the community must be reviewed and revised to eliminate inefficient, unnecessary or out-moded activities.
To meet this goal I will, with respect to

Measures of Intelligence Worth:
—undertake specific studies to evaluate the intelligence product and its worth to the consumer and eliminate intelligence collection and production effort of marginal usefulness;
—undertake selective review during the next 18 months of the following in order to better rationalize the division of labor and increase the number of services of common concern performed within the community;
—indications and warning intelligence
—ELINT processing and exploitation
—current intelligence reporting
—HUMINT operations and foreign service reporting
—explore and, where necessary, increase the usefulness of the intelligence product to Net Assessment producers and consumers.

Tactical Intelligence:
—submit a report in the third quarter of FY 1974 on the national/tactical intelligence interface. As a basis for this report I will,
—ask the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to review the requirements for intelligence assets in place with the military forces, and identify support which could be provided to the military forces from national assets;
—determine, with the assistance of program managers, the contribution which can be made to the national intelligence effort by the in-place assets of the military forces, and identify the kinds and amounts of data from national assets which can be provided in a timely and usable form to military force commanders;
—formulate recommendations in consultation with the Secretary of Defense by early in 1974 to insure that the needs of national intelligence and of military operations are met and to avoid unnecessary overlap or duplication in the national and tactical areas.

E. The provision of intelligence and its utilization must enhance the formulation of the foreign, military and economic policies of the U.S. Government and the planning for and conduct of military operations by U.S. forces.

To meet this goal I will, with respect to

Consumer Needs:
—implement a procedure with USIB whereby requirements for collection and production of intelligence are kept under continuing review. Provision will be made for the introduction of new requirements as needed and for elimination of those which become out-of-date.

Military Intelligence:
—have the Department of Defense identify by November 1, 1973 the ten or so highest priority needs in the field of technical intelligence required by their planners;
Intelligence Community Investigation and Reorganization

—prepare for NSCIC approval in the third quarter of FY 1974 intelligence production programs in Soviet and Chinese military R&D, and in Warsaw Pact general purpose force effectiveness.

Economic Intelligence:
—identify during the second quarter of FY 1974 the current needs of the users of foreign economic intelligence;
—determine, in coordination with other Federal agencies, what contribution the intelligence community can make in this area;
—determine appropriate resource levels and, through USIB, assign responsibilities for collection and production in this area;
—provide for implementation of this program by the end of the third quarter of FY 1974.

Narcotics and Terrorism:
—in coordination with other Federal agencies, identify the needs for foreign intelligence in these areas, and match the unique capabilities of the intelligence community to those needs;
—determine by January 1, 1974 the appropriate assignment of responsibilities and the resource levels which the community should devote to these problems.

W.E. Colby

10. Memorandum From Andrew W. Marshall of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Colby’s Proposed Replacement for the Present Board and Office of National Estimates

Attached at Tab A is a memorandum describing the tasks of the new National Intelligence Officers. I believe this change is basically

good. There is also under consideration a parallel reorganization of the USIB Committee structure.

The intelligence community is primarily organized by function:

—By type of collection, e.g., Comint, photographic, human.
—By type of product, e.g., current intelligence, order of battle, national estimates.

The organization of the National Intelligence Officers on a geographic or topic basis should help the DCI to coordinate the collection and analysis efforts now organized by function. The NIO’s will resemble product or project managers in industry. They will have unclear lines of authority over other organizations, a demanding task of coordination, and a need to rely on personal influence. Industry has normally chosen its more aggressive managers for such tasks. My concern is that the implementation of Colby’s plan may falter on this point. The people chosen may see the job as primarily producing NIE’s, etc., rather than making sure there is a community-wide collection and analysis strategy for delivering improved products in their area.

I am doing what I can to make sure that the implementation is effective and tries to do more than just be another way of producing the NIE’s.

Tab A

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to U.S. Intelligence Board Members

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
National Intelligence Officers

1. National Intelligence Officers will be appointed by the Director of Central Intelligence for such geographical areas or functional subjects as may be required from time to time. Each NIO will be the Director’s personal representative and will report directly to him on his subject, but all direction will be subject to the Director’s approval and will pass through the normal command channels of USIB member agencies.

2. The primary function of an NIO will be to provide contact laterally on his subject across the functionally organized Intelligence Com-

2 Confidential.
munity and with customers and outside consultants as required. Each NIO will be responsible to the Director for providing Intelligence Community coordinated products (using such panels of experts or ad hoc committees and arranging USIB consideration as may be required) to satisfy requirements for NIE’s, NSSM responses, DCI briefings (e.g., NSC, WSGS, Congress), etc. He will assist the Director in identifying customer needs for National Intelligence, uncertainties requiring collection guidance, analysis or production, and national policy problems on which National Intelligence might offer assistance. He will maintain close personal contact with NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and contributors at the departmental level. The NIO will be charged with presenting for the Director’s review fully objective presentations of alternate views and interpretations.

3. Each designated NIO will be assigned one or more assistants and secretarial aid as may be required from time to time to assist him in his substantive, coordinating and requirements duties and in drafting or editing when needed. These assistants will be assigned on an ad hoc or extended detail from USIB member agencies as required.

4. One National Intelligence Officer will be appointed as the Senior National Intelligence Officer, with administrative authority over the National Intelligence Officers. He will chair meetings of National Intelligence Officers for discussion of production standards, work schedules, quality control and product review. He will be assisted by an Editorial Staff to provide central editorial standards, schedules and assistance for the National Intelligence Officers. He will keep the Director advised as to the activities of the NIO’s and be a central point of contact for their activities.

5. National Intelligence Officers (tentative):
   - USSR and Satellites
   - Europe, EC and NATO
   - Northeast Asia
   - Southeast Asia
   - Moslem World
   - Latin America
   - Economic Intelligence
   - Strategic Weapons and Advanced Technology (SALT)
   - General Purpose Forces (MBFR)

As requirements change, these assignments may also vary and ad hoc assignments may occasionally be made. The NIO’s will work together to resolve apparent gaps or overlaps.

6. USIB members are invited to nominate candidates for the tentative positions in paragraph 5, from their agency or from other sources. Final selection will be made by the Director of Central Intelligence according to individual qualifications. Any individuals selected from
outside CIA will serve on reimbursable detail. NIO’s will normally serve approximately three-year tours, followed by return to their parent agency.

7. The NIO’s will replace the present Board and Office of National Estimates, the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and other units as appropriate. No change will be made in the present USIB Committee structure or functioning by reason of the establishment of NIO’s, although that structure may be independently reviewed for possible change after some experience with the NIO concept.

W.E. Colby

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Printed from a copy with this typed signature.

11. Memorandum From the Chairman of the U.S. Intelligence Board (Colby) to U.S. Intelligence Board Principals


SUBJECT

National Intelligence Officers

1. Effective 1 October 1973, Mr. George A. Carver, Jr. is appointed Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for National Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO). National Intelligence Officers will be appointed by the DCI for such geographical areas or functional subjects as the DCI may deem necessary from time to time. Each National Intelligence Officer will be the Director’s personal representative and will report directly to the DCI on his area of responsibility. Any tasking the NIOs levy on other elements of the Intelligence Community will be subject to the DCI’s approval and will pass through the normal com-

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 79M00467A, Box 13, Reorganization of IC 010476–300476. Confidential. Under Nixon’s November 5, 1971, directive reorganizing the Intelligence Community, the USIB was reconstituted under the chairmanship of the DCI and included as members the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (Vice Chairman); the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research; the Director of the National Security Agency; the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; and representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Atomic Energy Commission. For Nixon’s directive, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 242.
mand channels of USIB member agencies. It is my hope, however, that the NIOs will maintain extensive informal direct contacts with the elements of USIB member agencies and others in the official and private sectors cognizant of the NIO’s area of responsibility.

2. The primary function of an NIO will be to provide contact laterally on his subject across the functionally organized Intelligence Community and with customers and outside consultants as required. Each NIO will be responsible to the Director for providing Intelligence Community coordinated products (using such panels of experts or ad hoc committees and arranging USIB consideration as may be needed) to satisfy requirements for NIEs, NSSM responses, DCI briefings, etc. Each NIO will assist the Director in identifying customer needs for National Intelligence, evaluations of product and program effectiveness, uncertainties requiring collection guidance, analysis or production, and national policy problems on which National Intelligence might offer assistance. Each NIO will maintain close personal contact with the NSC Staff and other principal intelligence consumers and contributors at the department level. Every NIO will be charged with presenting for the Director’s review fully objective presentations of alternate views and interpretations.

3. The Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the National Intelligence Officers (D/DCI/NIO) is assigned administrative and coordinating authority over the NIOs and will chair meetings of the NIOs for discussion of production standards, work schedules, quality control, and product review.

4. The NIOs will replace the present Board and Office of National Estimates, the Special Assistant for Vietnamese Affairs, and other units as appropriate.

W.E. Colby
12. National Security Decision Memorandum 239


TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
National Net Assessment Process

The President has directed that the responsibility for the national net assessment program be assigned to the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary of Defense should conduct the national net assessment program with the assistance of the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence.

NSDM 224, National Net Assessment Process, and NSSM 186, National Net Assessment of the Comparative Costs and Capabilities of U.S. and Soviet Military Establishments, are rescinded. However, the study required by NSSM 186 should be completed under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense.

Copies of all future completed net assessment studies should be forwarded to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs for his information.

Henry A. Kissinger

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–243, Policy Papers, 1969–1974, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 239. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

13. **National Security Decision Memorandum 253**

Washington, April 24, 1974.

TO
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Attorney General
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

SUBJECT
Membership of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee

The President has decided that the membership of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee shall include an Under Secretary of the Treasury. The NSCIC, as established by the President’s memorandum dated November 5, 1971, subject: Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community, therefore, shall comprise the following:

The Attorney General
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Under Secretary of the Treasury
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Chairman)

As stated in the President’s November 5, 1971 memorandum, the NSCIC “will give direction and guidance on national substantive intelligence needs and provide for a continuing evaluation of intelligence products from the viewpoint of the intelligence consumer.”

Henry A. Kissinger

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2 On November 23, 1973, Colby forwarded to Scowcroft a draft letter to Shultz inviting Department of the Treasury participation on the NSCIC “in view of the importance of foreign economic intelligence.” (Ibid., Box H–302, Miscellaneous Institutional Files of the Nixon Administration—NSC System, Proposal to Add Treasury to the NSC) Shultz informed Colby in a memorandum of January 23, 1974, that he intended to nominate Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs Paul A. Volcker as his representative. (Ibid.)

14. Memorandum From President Ford to Director of Central Intelligence Colby

Washington, October 9, 1974.

SUBJECT

Leadership and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community

I hereby affirm the responsibilities and authority charged to you as leader of the Intelligence Community in the Presidential memorandum of November 5, 1971. Much has been accomplished, but much remains to be done.

Intelligence is of vital importance to our national security and interests. In your role as the Director of Central Intelligence, you should insure that our intelligence is of the highest quality attainable and that it supports the planning for and conduct of U.S. foreign policies and military operations. You should continue to exercise leadership in maintaining a proper balance among intelligence activities by planning and reviewing all intelligence programs and resources. Your views on intelligence activities, including tactical intelligence, should be incorporated in an annual consolidated program budget which considers the comparative effectiveness of collection programs and relative priorities among intelligence targets. Should you feel that new technology or new substantive needs make alterations in management or organization desirable, your recommendations will receive my prompt and careful attention.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 2, CIA, 5/2/74–10/17/74. No classification marking. On October 8, Kissinger and Ash forwarded a draft of the memorandum to Ford for his signature, explaining in a covering memorandum: "Personal Presidential letters that recognize the DCI’s role as the President’s principal intelligence advisor and reiterate his responsibility for coordinating U.S. intelligence activities have been customary with the last three Presidents." Moreover, as the latter responsibility was “expanded and emphasized” by Nixon’s November 1, 1971, letter to DCI Helms and the President’s memorandum of November 5, 1971, on intelligence organization, it was “particularly important that the DCI and the other members of the Intelligence Community, particularly those in the Department of Defense, are aware that these reforms of intelligence management remain in effect and have your personal endorsement.” The November 1, 1971, letter and the Presidential memorandum of November 5, 1971, are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 240 and 242. Gerald R. Ford was sworn in as President August 9, 1974. See Document 199.

2 In his letter of response, October 11, Colby referred to this point, stating that all those in the intelligence field “recognize the truth of your charge.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 2, CIA, 5/2/74–10/17/74)
I shall expect that the heads of the departments and agencies having foreign intelligence responsibilities will cooperate with you and provide you with every assistance in fulfilling your responsibilities.

Gerald R. Ford

15. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 11, 1974, 1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
John McConed, former Director of Central Intelligence
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[AFTER initial pleasantries and small talk, the conversation turned to the problems of the intelligence community.]

Mr. McConed: I wanted to talk about the CIA and the fact that its image is being tarnished, both here and in Europe. People talk to me in a way far different from the way they did a few years ago. I am deeply concerned that it may be more than Colby. Nothing I say should be construed as criticism of Colby and the Agency. I had my eye on him for years and he is very able.

But I fear two things: The loss of image lowers morale and people leave the Agency, and second, the Agency is no longer the most attractive to college graduates. There are some things which can be done. [He hands the President a paper.]

The role and mission of the Agency and the intelligence community must be redefined and reaffirmed. This means:

—The authority of the Director over the intelligence community must be reaffirmed. President Kennedy did that for me.


2 All brackets, except those accounting for still-classified material, are in the original.

3 Not further identified.

—The question of Agency personnel abroad: There is an attitude of why should CIA have anybody abroad. They are there mostly to help the host country. [less than 1 line not declassified]

—The use of covert political activity: It is much less now than it used to be, as you know. There must be an understanding on the Hill that we must keep this in reserve as long as the KGB does it.

The President: Most of them on the Hill do, but you get these zealots, together with some of the press, who just don’t give a damn.

Mr. McCone: I met with Senator Church before the hearings and he understands, but then he shot barbed questions at me. I would hope you would meet with the Senate leadership and resolve the dispute between the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services. The House is much better organized. When Dick Russell⁵ was there I got him to invite Fulbright. He didn’t want to.

The Harrington matter arose because of the House rule.⁶ If you could bring about a situation where surveillance by these committees would constitute surveillance by the House...

The President: We had a leadership meeting recently where we went into this,⁷ and I think we have it pretty well taken care of.

Mr. McCone: I think at a breakfast you could also reaffirm the roles and missions. He [Colby] should also have access to you. I had access to President Kennedy. President Johnson was different. Allen Dulles had constant contact with Ike.⁸

The President: I meet daily with [name not declassified].⁹ I met with Colby three times before SALT, and we also had a meeting on the 40 Committee. I was surprised at how little we spend on covert activities.

Mr. McCone: I suspected it myself and I reduced it from the Dulles days.

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⁶ On September 25, a subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee began disciplinary proceedings against Representative Michael J. Harrington (D–Massachusetts) after it was alleged that he violated House rules by releasing classified testimony given by Colby on CIA involvement in Chile. (Seymour M. Hersh, “House Unit Meets on Chilean Leaks,” New York Times, September 26, 1973, p. 13) On June 11, 1975, the Committee denied Harrington access to classified information and five days later officially rebuked him for the leak. (George Lardner, Jr., “Harrington Rebuked for Leaks on CIA,” Washington Post, June 17, 1975, p. A1) Formal charges were brought against Harrington by the House Ethics Committee on October 21, 1975, but these were dropped on November 3, 1975. (“Rep. Harrington Charges Dropped,” Los Angeles Times, November 6, 1975, p. 1)

⁷ According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with the Republican Congressional leadership from 8:37 to 10:07 a.m. on October 4. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office) No record of this meeting has been found.

⁸ Allen W. Dulles was DCI from 1953 to 1961 under President Eisenhower.

⁹ Chief of the Office of Current Intelligence, White House Support Staff.
The President: What is your thought on whether DIA is a good organization. Has it been effective?

Mr. McCone: Yes. It is an instrument of the JCS, and to that extent it is parochial, but it does a good job. It has a lot of civilians, under Civil Service. It is a good idea, but I insisted that the Service intelligence chiefs still sit on the USIB.

Another subject is PFIAB. I would look at that—it needs revitalization, including the chairman and staff. It should be revitalized and it should have higher visibility. Then if it is shuffled, it could meet with the select committees.

The President: I met with them a couple of times when I was Vice President. There are some good people on the board.

Mr. McCone: Admiral Anderson is a good friend of mine but he is not an intelligence officer.

The President: Didn’t Johnson put General J.C. Meyer on it?10

Mr. McCone: There used to be a man by the name of Coyne who ran the staff.11 He knew the bureaucracy and he knew his way around. Giving this Board visibility and authority would help defuse some of the criticism that CIA is running wild. [Looking over a list of Board membership:] Land, Cherne, Baker, Gray are all good. Shultz is good. Teller is a fine guy but emotional.

The Board needs visibility.

The President: Brent, I want to meet with the PFIAB next time.12 Also I will meet with the leadership after the first of the year to discuss the handling of briefings and CIA oversight.13

Mr. McCone: There is legislation on the Hill for criminal penalties for people like Agee.14

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11 J. Patrick Coyne, PFIAB Executive Secretary until September 1970.
12 Ford met with PFIAB at the White House on December 6 and suggested that it could give an “objective analysis” of the Intelligence Community’s standing with the public. The memorandum of conversation is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Box 7, Memoranda of Conversations, 12/6/74.
13 Meeting not further identified.
14 On July 8, Philip B.F. Agee, a former CIA agent, revealed that he had written an exposé of CIA activities in Latin America during the 1960s, alleging CIA assassination of some of its own employees. (Seymour M. Hersh, “Ex-Agent, in Book, Is Said to Assert that C.I.A. Aided in the Killing of Some Employees,” New York Times, July 9, 1973, p. 27) Agee’s account was subsequently published in the United Kingdom in 1975 under the title Inside the Company: CIA Diary. On July 7, a Washington Post article identified Agee as the central figure in the closure of a CIA cover operation in Mexico City run by the Washington-based public relations firm, Robert Mullen and Company, an event referred to as a “WH Flap” in the July 1 report released by Senator Howard Baker (R–Tennessee) on CIA involvement in Watergate. (Lawrence Stern, “Ex-Agent Identified in ‘Flap,’” Washington Post, July 7, 1973, p. A1)
The President: Make a note of that, Brent.

Mr. McCone: What you need to show is that the Agency is not a free-wheeling unsupervised agency.

The President: Could I change the subject for just a minute? You have wide acquaintance around. Would you send me any names of people you think would fit in at the top or anywhere? That I would appreciate.

Mr. McCone: I will be glad to. I gave some to Bill Scranton.\textsuperscript{15} I will send you a list.

The President: I don’t anticipate any major changes. I don’t want any change on Kissinger’s or for the moment Schlesinger.

[There was a brief discussion of energy, reorganization, and the conversation ended.]

\textsuperscript{15} William W. Scranton, former Governor of Pennsylvania, 1963–1967, was a member of Ford’s transition team and Special Consultant.

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16. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to President Ford\textsuperscript{1}


Dear Mr. President:

You will recall that on 17 September 1974 in the wake of revelations concerning Agency activities in Chile, I wrote you a letter describing the history and status of Congressional oversight of CIA and the Intelligence Community.\textsuperscript{2} In that letter’s attachment I listed a number of options that might be pursued with the Congressional leadership in the interest of protecting against future erosion of our capability to protect intelligence sources and methods. Since that time, a number of developments have occurred which lead me now to recommend that you discuss with the Congressional leadership the establishment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 1, 12/31/74. No classification marking.

\textsuperscript{2} The letter was also sent by Colby to Kissinger under a September 17 covering memorandum. (National Security Council, Nixon Administration Intelligence Files, The 40 Committee and Predecessors, General Information, Jul 1961–Nov 1975)
In response to a request from Chairman Morgan of the Foreign Affairs Committee and Chairman Hebert of the Armed Services Committee, Secretary Kissinger and I agreed on 25 September 1974 that arrangements could be made for reporting our covert action activities relating to foreign policy to a restricted group in the Foreign Affairs Committee. Following that agreement, on 8 October 1974, the House of Representatives adopted as part of the Bolling/Hansen recommendations an addition to the House Rules to provide the Foreign Affairs Committee oversight with respect to “intelligence activities relating to foreign policy.” It was agreed in the supporting colloquy that this restated the agreement reached between Secretary Kissinger, myself and the leadership of the Foreign Affairs and the Armed Services Committees. Implementing details of this arrangement have not as yet been worked out by Chairman Morgan.

In the Senate, Chairman Stennis arranged for the Majority Leader and the Minority Leader to be briefed on the Agency’s covert activities and on 22 November 1974 I briefed Senators Mansfield and Scott on all current covert actions.

In addition, Chairman Stennis requested that I confirm to him in writing that I would comply with certain procedures with respect to his responsibility for oversight of our activities. On 25 September 1974 I wrote Chairman Stennis that I will abide by the restrictions of the bill that he has submitted (S. 2597) with respect to the Agency’s proper role under the National Security Act and that I would contact him on a weekly basis and raise with him any matters of which he should be informed (copies attached). He requested these assurances in view of the delay which would be involved in securing the enactment of his legislation.

More recently, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 (S. 3394) was enacted with a provision requiring that six committees of Congress (the four Agency oversight committees of Armed Services and Appropriations of each house and the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees) receive information on covert actions to be conducted by this Agency, after a finding by the President that these are important to national security. In the course of consideration of this bill, I wrote Chairman Stennis a letter expressing my strong recommendation that oversight of this Agency be handled in a manner reflecting the sensitivity and difficulty of keeping secret some of the delicate matters involved.

3 The letter from Chairman of the House International Affairs Committee Representative Thomas E. Morgan (D-Pennsylvania) and Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Representative Felix E. Hebert (D-Louisiana) has not been found.

4 Copies of Colby’s exchange with Senator John C. Stennis (D-Mississippi), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, were not found attached.
The expansion of responsibility for oversight of this Agency within the Congress, as evidenced by this enactment, appears likely to bring greater pressure for widening the audience for receipt of sensitive Agency operational information beyond those who, up to now, have been kept fully informed and who have exercised great restraint and wisdom in dealing with such information. Moreover, the exposure of my testimony on covert activities in Chile before the Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee\(^5\) is traceable to House Rule XI, Clause 27(a) which entitles all Members of the House to have access to all committee records.

As you know, both Secretary Kissinger and I (and my predecessors) have consistently taken the position that it is up to the Congress to determine its procedures for oversight and appropriation to this Agency. We have rested upon the sense of responsibility of the leadership of the Congress to exercise this duty and at the same time maintain the secrecy necessary to many of our efforts. The Congress' record on this matter has been good over the years, but I know you share my concern over the recent exposure of my Chile testimony and the possibility of further exposures from widening the group of knowledgeable Senators, Congressmen and staff in the future.

In addition to the initiatives from the foreign affairs committees, it is also clear, for example, that the Committees on Government Operations in both the House and the Senate have certain views with respect to their rights to investigate our activities. Several proposals are also pending before the Senate which would change the existing arrangements for legislative oversight of CIA, and Senator Muskie's Subcommittee of the Senate Government Operations Committee has held hearings on this question.

We will shortly be the subject of further exposures in Latin America through the writings of a former CIA employee, Mr. Philip Agee,\(^6\) who will expose a number of our agents and activities in that area, probably leading to further public debate and concern about CIA. We can anticipate, thus; intensified pressure from an even larger Congressional audience.

I believe we have been responsive over the years and provided to the appropriate Congressional committees all information requested or expected in the circumstances of the time. However, the time of the Members on these Committees is limited and the infrequency of formal meetings has been used to criticize the effectiveness of the existing oversight arrangements. In the present situation, I believe that public and Congressional pressures for an expansion of the circles to be informed pose a substantial danger to the ultimate security of our activities and functions. I thus believe it appropriate to recommend to you that the Executive Branch encourage the Congress to establish a Joint Committee on Intelligence. Such a

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\(^5\) See footnote 6, Document 15.

\(^6\) See footnote 14, Document 15.
committee, comparable to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, would in my opinion be a vehicle for the full Senate and House to establish firm procedures with respect to access to sensitive intelligence matters, appoint appropriate Congressional membership and staff support necessary to the oversight of our activities by the Congress, and clearly identify the individual Senators and Congressmen who would have both the authority and the position from which to assure the Congress and our public of their conclusions with respect to the value and propriety of our activities. It would also provide full Congressional recognition of the limits beyond which revelations of these sensitive subjects cannot go if our intelligence activities are to be effective. To assist in this process, I have attached a draft of a possible resolution.\(^7\)

Initiation of such a proposal would clearly require careful preparation and discussion with the leadership of the Congress and with the committees currently seized of this subject. You would have the best view of whether and how to initiate such an exploration. I will thus keep this recommendation to you completely private, and continue to maintain the established position that Congressional procedures must be established by the Congress, unless and until you direct to the contrary. I do urge, however, that you consider how best to initiate the process, perhaps by indicating to leading members of the Congress that you will take no public position but would view with approval an appropriate Congressional initiative in this direction.

Respectfully,

W.E. Colby\(^8\)

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\(^7\) The draft resolution was not found attached.

\(^8\) Colby signed “Bill” above this typed signature.

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17. Editorial Note

On December 20, 1974, Director of Central Intelligence William E. Colby met with journalist Seymour Hersh of the *New York Times* in his office at the Central Intelligence Agency headquarters. Colby wrote in his memoirs that Hersh informed him that “he had learned from several sources that the CIA had been engaged in a ‘massive’ operation against the antiwar movement involving wiretaps, break-ins, mail intercepts, and surveillances of American citizens” and that he intended to print the story. From Hersh’s description, Colby recalled that he “realized immediately that [Hersh] had come upon some disjointed and distorted accounts of several items on our highly secret ‘family jewels’
In his memoirs, Colby wrote, "'Look, Sy,' I began, 'what you are onto here are two very separate and distinct matters you’ve gotten mixed up and distorted.' I went on to try to explain—and put into some proper perspective— the two matters that his sources had confused and exaggerated for him. First, I said, there was an operation that the Agency had conducted to discover whether the American antiwar movement was being supported or manipulated by foreign powers, and that such matters were properly within the CIA’s charter. Moreover, I stressed, after having concluded that no foreign power was involved with the antiwar movement, the operation had been terminated. As for the talk of mail intercepts, wiretaps, and surveillance of American citizens, that something was entirely different and in no way connected with the antiwar movement. What he had come upon here, I explained, were some cases in which the CIA had acted under its responsibility to protect intelligence sources and techniques against leaks, and on some few occasions in its twenty-eight year history it had used some surveillance techniques in the United States and in doing had overstepped the boundaries of its charter. But the important point, I emphasized, was that the Agency had conducted its own review of such activities in 1973 and had issued a series of clear directives making plain that the Agency henceforth must and would stay within the law. ‘So, you see, Sy, you would be wrong if you went ahead with your story in the way you’ve laid it out. What you have are a few incidents of the Agency straying from the straight and narrow. There certainly was never anything like a “massive illegal domestic intelligence operation.” What few mistakes we made in the past have long before this been corrected. And there is certainly nothing like that going on now.’” (Ibid., pages 390–391)

Nevertheless, on December 22, Hersh’s article appeared on the front page of the New York Times. Hersh wrote that the Times investigation “established that intelligence files on at least 10,000 American citizens were maintained by a special unit of the C.I.A. that was reporting directly to Richard Helms” in an effort to determine if links existed between the antiwar movement and a foreign power. Moreover, he revealed, James R. Schlesinger’s ordered check of CIA domestic files (see Document 6) “produced evidence of dozens of other illegal activities by members of the C.I.A. inside the United States, beginning in the nineteen-fifties.” Hersh reported on the mail opening operations and on surveillance of antiwar activists, journalists, and former employees, including Victor Marchetti, a former CIA official who in 1974 published
CIA and the Cult of Intelligence, an exposé of Intelligence Community activities and practices. Drawing upon the assessment of unnamed former CIA officials, Hersh focused particularly on the roles of James J. Angleton, Chief of the CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff since 1954, as overseer of the operations, and Richard Ober, the official responsible for “assembling a large staff of people who acquired enormous amounts of data.” (Seymour M. Hersh, “Huge C.I.A. Operation Reported in U.S. Against Antiwar Forces, Other Dissidents in Nixon Years,” New York Times, December 22, 1974, page 1)

Following the story’s publication, Colby recalled, a “press and political firestorm immediately erupted.” “All the tensions and suspicions and hostilities that had been building about the CIA since the Bay of Pigs and had risen to a combustible level during the Vietnam and Watergate years, now exploded.” (Colby, Honorable Men, page 391) Following calls for an investigation from Senator William Proxmire (D–Wisconsin), former Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, and former CIA Executive Director Lyman B. Kirkpatrick, Jr., among others, the Department of Justice announced on December 23 that it would investigate the charges. Similarly, Senator John J. Sparkman, Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee; Senator John C. Stennis, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee; and Representative Lucien N. Nedzi, Chairman of the Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, announced hearings on the CIA activities would begin when Congress reconvened in January. (Hersh, “President Tells Colby to Speed Report on C.I.A.,” New York Times, December 24, 1974, page 1; Robert P. Hey, “Watchdog for CIA?,” Christian Science Monitor, December 24, 1974, page 1)

The story came as a surprise to the White House, which had never been briefed on the existence of the catalogue of CIA misdeeds, the so-called “Family Jewels,” that Schlesinger had commissioned the year before. After the story broke, Colby telephoned President Ford aboard Air Force One en route to Vail, Colorado, where Ford was to spend the holidays. Colby assured the President that “nothing comparable to the article’s allegations is going on in the Agency at this time” and offered to make a full report. (Colby, Honorable Men, pages 392–393) The following morning, December 23, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, telephoned White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld in Vail to talk about the “Helms matter.” Kissinger told Rumsfeld, “I don’t know the facts remotely. I have no knowledge whatever to what body of fact [the Hersh article] refers. If there were any such activities they were not reported to the NSC office but I do know that Sy Hersh is a son-of-a-bitch and I think for a senior official to get vilified without opposition from the Administration on the
basis of such an article is dangerous business.” Kissinger recommend-
ated asking Colby for a full written report “on the body of fact to
which this refers, whatever it is.” (Transcript of telephone conversa-
tion, December 23; Department of State, Freedom of Information
Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Transcripts) In his memoirs, Kiss-
inger recalled that he asked Colby himself, “on behalf of the President,”
for a “full report on the subjects covered by the Hersh article.” (Kissin-
ger, Years of Renewal, pages 320–321)

At 10:30 a.m. Washington time, Kissinger dispatched to Rumsfeld
via LDX a memorandum outlining recommendations for managing the
White House’s public posture, suggesting that the White House not
issue a statement, but rather address the issue in the usual press confer-
ence procedure. “We are concerned that we not act in such a way as to
give credence to the allegations of the New York Times story and create
an impression that a major problem actually exists and that the Ford
Administration is actually confronted with a scandal of major propor-
tions. We should act in such a way as to make it perfectly clear that
these activities ante-dated the current Administration and that this Ad-
ministration is acting forthrightly to insure that no such activities will
occur during President Ford’s Administration.” Kissinger provided a
list of answers to possible press questions regarding Hersh’s article,
stating that “the answers provided are drafted to indicate that the Ad-
ministration is acting decisively on the matter and to keep the matter
within the Administration and head off, if possible, a full blown Con-
gressional investigation outside of the normal legislative oversight
channels.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–
Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 3, CIA—Domestic Spying)

Kissinger also cabled former Director of Central Intelligence
Richard Helms in Tehran on December 23. After assuring Helms that
“you continue to have my complete confidence,” he cautioned that
there was “little doubt in my mind that the Hersh charges will not soon
fade away and that, in fact, there may be a call for some form of Con-
gressional investigation.” Kissinger told Helms that he had authorized
the press spokesman to say today that if a “duly constituted Congres-
sional committee” called for his testimony, he, Helms, would “natu-
really return for this purpose.” Lastly, Kissinger asked that Helms pro-
vide “on the basis of your own knowledge and recollection, your own
report on the charges contained in the Hersh article.” (Telegram 280175
to Tehran, December 23; ibid.) Helms responded on December 24,
stating, “I remember no illegal or unauthorized break-ins, tele-
phone taps, or inspections,” and questioning the identity of those who
made those charges. “I do not know what Schlesinger and Colby have
done,” he added, “to dredge up material designed, if not carefully ex-
plained, to hurt me. I still feel I had a lot of unnecessary grief over Wa-
tergate. In any event, someone or some group seems to have it in for me and does not want to give up." He concluded by informing Kissinger that he would return to the United States on January 2. (Telegram 10841 from Tehran, December 24; ibid.) In fact, Helms left Tehran on December 24. (Telegram 10842 from Tehran, December 24; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D740373–0839)

18. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Marsh) to President Ford


The matter involving the Agency seems to have gathered momentum with increasing interest arising out of the resignation of Angleton.²

Should results of the current investigation not quiet this sufficiently, you may wish to consider the following which I am sure others have suggested.

1. Selection of a Blue Ribbon Panel of individuals of reputation and who have knowledge of the security field. Their task would be to not only look at present complaints but make overall recommendations to improve effectiveness and suggest safeguards if needed.

2. The Panel might draw on detailed personnel from government with background in the fields of intelligence, law, and investigations to assist them in the effort.

¹ Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Rockefeller Commission—General. Top Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten notation at the top of the pages reads “Secret.” Sent through Rumsfeld. Forwarded on December 24 by Cheney to Rumsfeld, who was with the President in Vail.

² Angleton announced his resignation on December 23. In newspaper accounts, Angleton was reported to have told associates that “he was not leaving because he did anything wrong” and that his resignation had been decided upon the week before. (Seymour M. Hersh, “President Tells Colby to Speed Report on C.I.A.,” New York Times, December 24, 1974, p. 1) Colby recalled in his memoirs that he had recommended to Schlesinger in early 1973 that “he move Jim Angleton,” but that when he became DCI he decided, initially, against this to avoid further “personnel turbulence” in the clandestine service. Colby was soon convinced, however, that Angleton’s tendency toward “torturous theories” was “hurting good clandestine operational officers.” (Colby, Honorable Men, p. 364) On December 17, he met with Angleton and discussed replacing him as both chief of counterintelligence and head of intelligence liaison with Israel, Angleton’s other portfolio. (Ibid., pp. 387–388)
3. Consideration might be given to having certain senior officials of your Administration serve on the Panel.

4. The Panel’s efforts would take the initiative rather than finding ourselves whipsawed by prolonged Congressional hearings.

5. Candidates for Panel might include names such as:

- Curtis Tarr
- John Byrnes
- Arleigh Burke
- Bill Scranton
- Matthew Ridgway

Other possibilities would be educators and journalists.

6. Phil Areeda suggested to me a Commission approach, and from phone conversation with Buchen, I believe he would also be favorable.

19. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to President Ford


Dear Mr. President:

This report is in response to your request for my comments on The New York Times article of December 22nd alleging CIA involvement in a “massive” domestic intelligence effort. While CIA has made certain errors, it is not accurate to characterize it as having engaged in “massive domestic intelligence activity.”

The National Security Act of 1947 states that CIA shall have no “police, subpoena, law-enforcement powers, or internal security functions.” The Agency’s functions thus relate solely to foreign intelligence.

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01044A, Box 5, Bush Files (Eyes Only) Report to the President Regarding Seymour Hersh Article on 22 Dec. No classification marking. The text printed here is a copy sent to DCI-designate George H.W. Bush by E.H. Knoche on December 23, 1975. Kissinger forwarded to Ford a summary of Colby’s report on December 25, 1974, adding that he had discussed with Colby “other activities ‘in the history of the Agency’,” both legal and illegal, “which though unconnected with the New York Times article, are also open to question.” Kissinger also recommended that the proposed Blue Ribbon Panel focus initially on Colby’s report. “Once that work is completed,” he added, “you can decide whether the Commission should be asked to expand its activities.” (Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 5, General Subject File, Intelligence—Colby Report)

2 See Document 17.
Included in this responsibility is foreign counterintelligence, as stated in National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5. This provides that CIA shall, inter alia, conduct clandestine counterintelligence outside the United States and its possessions. Under this charge, CIA for many years has maintained liaison with the intelligence and security services of other nations and has conducted independent counterintelligence activities abroad. Whenever such matters relate to the internal security of the United States, information derived from such operations is passed to the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other Departments or Agencies of the Government when appropriate. In addition, CIA has responded to requests from the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and on occasion other Departments, for counterintelligence work abroad.

In 1967, when concern grew in the United States Government over domestic dissidence, questions were raised as to whether there might be stimulation or support of such activity from outside the United States. As a result, the Director of Central Intelligence on 15 August established within the CIA counterintelligence office a program to identify possible foreign links with American dissident elements (Annex A). Later that same year, this became a part of an interagency program (Annex B). In November 1967, the Agency produced a study, *International Connections of US Peace Groups*, in response to a request by the President. In late 1967 or early 1968 the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs requested an assessment of possible foreign links with American dissident student groups (SDS). In mid-1968 the Agency produced an assessment of youth movements throughout the world, including a section analyzing the American scene to complete the picture. This study concluded that: “There is no convincing evidence of control, manipulation, sponsorship, or significant financial support of student dissidents by any international Communist authority.”

In September 1969 the Director reviewed the counterintelligence program and stated that he believed it to be proper, “while strictly ob-

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4 Attached but not printed, Annex A is a memorandum from then Deputy Director for Plans, Thomas H. Karamessines, to the Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, James J. Angleton, August 15, 1967.

5 Attached but not printed, Annex B is message 49260 from DCI Helms to CIA Station Chiefs, November 2, 1967.

6 Students for a Democratic Society.
serving the statutory and de facto proscriptions on Agency domestic involvements” (Annex C).7

In 1970, in the so-called Huston Plan,8 the Directors of the FBI, DIA, NSA, and CIA signed a report to the President recommending an integrated approach to the coverage of domestic unrest. While not explicit in the Plan, CIA’s role would have been to contribute foreign intelligence and counterintelligence. The Huston Plan itself was not implemented but was followed by the establishment on 3 December 1970 of the Interagency Evaluation Committee which was coordinated by the Counsel to the President, Mr. John Dean. This committee was chaired by Department of Justice officer, Mr. Robert Mardian, and included representatives from CIA, FBI, DOD, State, Treasury, and NSA. Pursuant to this Government-wide effort, CIA continued its counterintelligence interest in possible foreign links with American dissidents. A full description of the CIA project, prepared on 1 June 1972, is attached (Annex D).9

Because of CIA’s effort during these years, some CIA employees, not directly involved in the program, misinterpreted it as being more focused on American dissidents than on their possible connections with foreign governments. In addition, however, there were individual cases in which actions were taken which overstepped proper bounds. For example, the Agency recruited or inserted individuals into American dissident circles to establish their credentials for operations abroad against those foreign elements which might be supporting, encouraging, or directing dissidence in the United States.10 In the course of their preparatory work or on completion of a phase of their mission abroad, these individuals reported on the activities of the American dissidents with whom they came in contact. Significant information thereby derived was reported to the FBI, but in the process CIA files were established on the individuals named.

In 1972, with the approval of the Director, the Executive Director issued an internal memorandum to senior CIA officials describing the program in order to clarify its scope and to invite reports of any departures from its policy:

“To carry out its responsibilities for counterintelligence, CIA is interested in the activities of foreign nations or intelligence services

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7 Attached but not printed, Annex C is a January 1969 memorandum from Helms to the Deputy Director for Plans, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Support, and the Deputy Director for Science and Technology.
8 Named for its originator, White House staff member Tom Charles Huston.
9 Attached but not printed, Annex D comprises four briefing papers entitled “Special Operations Group, Counter Intelligence Staff,” June 1, 1972.
10 An unknown hand wrote “50” in the margin next to this sentence.
aimed at the U.S. To the extent that these activities lie outside the U.S., including activities aimed at the U.S. utilizing U.S. citizens or others, they fall within CIA’s responsibilities. Responsibility for coverage of the activities within the U.S. lies with the FBI, as an internal security function. CIA’s responsibility and authority are limited to the foreign intelligence aspect of the problem, and any action of a law enforcement or internal security nature lies with the FBI or local police forces.” (Annex E)\textsuperscript{11}

On 9 May 1973, the Director issued a bulletin to all employees requesting them to report any indication of any activity they believed might be outside CIA’s charter (Annex F).\textsuperscript{12} Responses from some employees referred to the counterintelligence program. As a result, on 29 August 1973 the Director issued specific direction to the managers of the program re-emphasizing that the focus of the program was to be clearly on the foreign organizations and individuals involved in links with American dissidents and only incidentally on the American contacts involved (Annex G).\textsuperscript{13}

In March 1974 the Director terminated the program and issued specific guidance that any collection of counterintelligence information on Americans would only take place abroad and would be initiated only in response to requests from the FBI or in coordination with it; furthermore, any such information obtained as a by-product of foreign intelligence activities would be reported to the FBI (Annex H).\textsuperscript{14}

In the course of this program, files were developed on American citizens. The total index of these Americans amounts to 9,944 counterintelligence files. Approximately two-thirds of these consisted of the by-product coverage of the activities outlined above or stemmed from specific requests from the FBI for information on the activities of Americans abroad. One-third consisted of FBI reports on American Communists. We have for the past several months been in the process of eliminating material not justified by CIA’s counterintelligence responsibilities, and about 1,000 such files have been removed from the active index but not destroyed.

Aside from our Congressional liaison working records, we hold files on fourteen past and present Members of Congress. These were

\textsuperscript{11} Attached but not printed, Annex E is the April 21, 1972, memorandum sent by Colby, as CIA Executive Director-Comptroller, to the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Plans, the Deputy Director for Support, the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, and the Heads of Independent Offices.

\textsuperscript{12} Printed as Document 6.

\textsuperscript{13} Attached but not printed, Annex G is an August 29, 1973, memorandum from Colby to the Deputy Director for Science and Technology, the Deputy Director for Intelligence, the Deputy Director for Management and Services, and the Deputy Director for Operations.

\textsuperscript{14} Attached but not printed, Annex H is message 8786 from Colby to multiple CIA Stations, March 5, 1974.
opened prior to their election to office and were caused either by the process of clearing them for work with the Agency or because we were interested in them for foreign intelligence purposes. There is no, and to my knowledge never has been any, surveillance—technical or otherwise—of any Members of Congress.

*The New York Times* articles make a number of specific allegations of improper activity domestically by CIA and relates these to the above program. In the 1973 compilation by the Agency of all activities which might be questionable, a number of items were raised which were not related to that program. The Agency’s action in most of these cases was founded upon the section of the National Security Act of 1947 which provides that the Director of Central Intelligence is responsible for protecting intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure. Over the many years in which CIA has been operating, some actions have been taken which were improper extensions of the charge contained in this language. Apparently *The New York Times* reporter learned of some of these items and erroneously associated them with the above program. Examples include:

a. Unauthorized entry of the premises of three individuals, a defector and two former employees, to determine whether they had classified documents, and in one case to recover them (in 1966, 1970 and 1971). Two of these incidents involved breaking and entering.

b. Electronic surveillance (telephone tap) of two newspaper reporters (1963) and physical surveillance of five reporters (in 1971 and 1972) to determine the sources of classified information published by them. Similar physical surveillance of three ex-employees of the CIA who were suspected of unauthorized possession of classified documents (1969, 1971, and 1972).

c. [3 lines not declassified]

d. During the period 1967–1971, agents were also developed to monitor dissident groups in the Washington area considered to be potential threats to Agency personnel and installations, and Agency security field officers in the US also collected information on similar dissident groups, to advise the Agency of potential threats to its personnel and installations.

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15 An unknown hand bracketed “three individuals, a defector and” and struck through the last three words. An unmarked copy of Colby’s letter is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency File, Box 3, CIA, Colby Report, 12/2/74.

16 A marginal notation in an unknown hand indicates that this item had been “discussed with AG [Attorney General] and SecDef.”

17 An unknown hand wrote “10” in the margin next to this point.

18 An unknown hand wrote “newspapers or police” in the margin.
e. A list of individuals suspected of particular offenses considered to pose a security vulnerability was collected over a number of years prior to 1973. This practice was terminated and the file destroyed in 1973.

f. From May–September 1971 a long-time CIA source was under surveillance in the US in connection with a reported plot to assassinate or kidnap Vice President Agnew and the DCI. The individual covered was a Latin American revolutionary, but the surveillance expanded to cover several American citizen contacts in New York and Detroit.

A final category of questionable activity identified during the 1973 survey was related to the Agency’s mission to collect foreign intelligence. In some cases the Agency exceeded proper bounds or its activities were subject to misconstruction as being aimed at purposes outside its charter. The following examples, for instance, may be related to the charges made in *The New York Times* article, although they have no connection with the program first discussed above:

a. Records were made of the identities and addresses of individuals exchanging correspondence between the United States and certain communist countries, as an aid to determining possible leads to potential operations. This program included the surreptitious opening of certain first-class mail to extract positive intelligence or data valuable for the development of foreign intelligence operations against the communist country. This program was initiated in 1953, and from its inception was fully coordinated with the FBI, which received much of its product. The operation was approved by three Postmasters General and one Attorney General. The program was terminated in 1973.

b. We obtained names and addresses of persons telephoning a communist country so that we could follow up for possible operational leads.

c. Individuals were recruited or inserted into dissident groups in the US to establish their credentials to collect foreign intelligence overseas. By-product information reflecting planned violence or similar activity was passed to the FBI.

The items listed above are those questionable activities relating to matters covered in *The New York Times* article. Obviously, I am prepared to brief you fully on such matters, as I did the Chairmen of the Congressional Armed Services Committees.

Following our identification of all these matters in 1973, I issued detailed and specific instructions dealing with each activity. Some were terminated; others were continued but only as fully authorized by our statute and in accordance with law (Annex I).  

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19 Not found attached.
The New York Times article also states that I am considering the possibility of asking the Attorney General to institute legal action against some of those who had been involved in these activities. I have conferred with the Acting Attorney General, Mr. Silberman, as to my responsibilities with respect to evidence relating to possible illegal activities by Agency personnel. On December 21st I agreed with him that I would review the questionable activities noted in this letter and others to determine whether these should be brought to his attention for legal review. I will certainly keep you advised of any such action.

As I stated to you on the telephone, Mr. President, you have my full assurance that the Agency is not conducting activities comparable to those alleged in The New York Times article. Even in the past, I believe the Agency essentially conformed to its mission of foreign intelligence. There were occasions over the years in which improper actions were taken as noted above, but I believe these were few, were quite exceptional to the thrust of the Agency’s activities, and have been fully terminated. Agency personnel are instructed each year to advise me of any activity they consider questionable, and I am resolved to follow your directive that no improper activity be conducted by this Agency.

Respectfully,

W.E. Colby

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Printed from a copy that indicates Colby signed the original.

20. Memorandum for the File Prepared by the Associate Deputy Attorney General (Wilderotter)


SUBJECT
CIA Matters

CIA Director William Colby and CIA General Counsel John Warner met with LHS and JAW Tuesday, December 31 to discuss certain matters, including items apparently reported to the President by

1 Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, General Subject File, Intelligence—President’s Meeting with Richard Helms. Secret.
Colby in connection with the recent *New York Times* articles.² Colby did not show us his report to the President,³ but paraphrased that portion of its contents which, in Colby and Warner’s judgment, presented legal questions.

Colby began the meeting by describing the management style of former CIA Director Richard Helms. According to Colby, Helms utilized a very “compartmentalized” organizational structure, with each head of a constituent unit within the organization reporting directly to Helms. Colby described it as like “spokes from a hub,” with Helms as the “hub” and the various compartmentalized units constituting the “spokes.” It was possible to be in one “spoke” and have no knowledge of what the other “spokes” were doing.

Colby indicated that the various Watergate revelations touched the CIA in several ways, including: (a) Howard Hunt; (b) the matter of “psychological profiles;” and (c) the McCord letters to the CIA.⁴ Colby indicated that former CIA Director James Schlesinger sent a memorandum on May 9, 1973 to all CIA employees, directing them to report on all activities undertaken that may have fallen outside the CIA’s charter. When the reports came in, Colby—by then the CIA Director—sent out “corrective” memoranda.⁵ According to Colby, the reports submitted in response to Schlesinger’s May 9, 1973 memorandum constitute the “skeletons in the closet,” and form the basis of Colby’s recent report to the President. Colby and Warner are trying to track down more details about the various “skeletons.”

The “skeletons” related to us by Colby are as follows:

(1) In 1964, a Russian defector was brought to the United States; apparently, CIA thought he was a “fake.” The defector, a Russian citizen, was immediately confined in a house in Maryland, and later in a CIA facility in Virginia, for about two years. Apparently, he was interrogated during the two-year physical confinement. This defector is now settled in the United States, is married, and still works voluntarily with the CIA. According to Colby, former CIA Director McCone approved this confinement. Colby stated that occasionally, the CIA confines defecting individuals, but only outside the United States. Defectors are interrogated in the United States only voluntarily; according to Colby, “they can walk away any time.” Colby speculated that the confinement of the Russian defector from 1964 to 1966 might be regarded as a violation of the kidnapping laws.

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³ Document 19.
⁴ See footnote 1, Document 7.
⁵ Documents 6 and 7.
(2) In 1963, the CIA wiretapped two columnists—Robert Allen and Paul Scott—following a column in a newspaper in which they disclosed certain national security information. CIA records indicate that the wiretapping was approved by McCone after “discussions” with then Attorney General Robert Kennedy and then Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara. The wiretaps, which continued from March 12 to June 15, 1963, were described as “very productive”—among those overheard calling Allen and Scott were twelve Senators, six Congressmen and so forth. Apparently, the tap did not disclose the source of the security information published in the Allen–Scott column.

(3) From February 15 to April 12, 1972, “personal surveillances” were conducted by the CIA on Jack Anderson and members of his staff (Les Whitten, Britt Hume, and Mr. Spear). The physical surveillances consisted only of watching the targets, and involved no breaking, entry or wiretapping. Apparently, the physical surveillance occurred after Jack Anderson’s series of “tilt toward Pakistan” stories. The physical surveillances were authorized by Helms and conducted by the CIA’s Office of Security. (The Office of Security was headed by Howard Osburn from 1967 to 1973.)

(4) Between October, 1971 and January, 1972, the CIA conducted a physical surveillance of Mike Getler, a Washington Post reporter. Again, there is no indication of wiretaps, a break-in or an entry. Like the Anderson surveillances, the Getler physical surveillance was apparently authorized by Helms and run by the CIA’s Office of Security.

(5) In 1971, the CIA had reason to suspect a female CIA employee, who was then living with a foreign (Cuban) national. The former CIA employee and the Cuban national apparently maintain a joint residence and a joint place of business. CIA agents broke into the business premises and unsuccessfully attempted to break into the residence to search for any documents the former CIA employee may have taken with her. The agents found nothing. The break-in apparently occurred in Fairfax, Virginia, and was conducted by the Office of Security.

(6) In July 1970, CIA agents broke into and entered an office occupied by a former defector who was still “on contract” to the CIA, looking for any CIA documents he may have had. The operation was conducted by the Office of Security, and occurred in Silver Spring, Maryland.

(7) CIA agents apparently “talked their way into” the apartment of one Toftey—at that time a CIA employee—to recover CIA documents he had converted. The documents were recovered, and Toftey was promptly fired. Toftey apparently sued Helms, alleging that, in addition to the CIA documents, the CIA agents had also taken some of his, Toftey’s, personal correspondence. The suit was dismissed.
(8) Between 1953 and 1973, the CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff screened—and in some cases opened—mail to and from the Soviet Union going through the Kennedy Airport Mail Depot. This operation was terminated in 1973 by Colby. While it was in existence, it was “cleared by” at least three Postmasters General; and CIA records indicate that Helms discussed it with then Attorney General John Mitchell.

(9) From 1969 to October, 1972, the Far East Division of the CIA reviewed, in San Francisco, mail going to and from the People’s Republic of China in an operation similar to the Soviet one at Kennedy Airport. Apparently the CIA sought in this operation “tips” with respect to possible sources, contacts, etc.; the CIA was apparently also interested in mail handling procedures within the PRC.

(10) Between 1963 and 1973, the CIA funded research in some institutions, apparently including academic institutions, on the general subject of behavioral modification. According to Colby, these activities included the participation—on a “unwitting basis”—of some U.S. citizens, who were not told of the true nature of the testing. The example given by Colby was that of a pole put in the middle of a sidewalk, with people’s observations recorded as to which side of the pole they would walk. Apparently, some of the other testing also included reactions to certain drugs, although it is not known whether any “unwitting” individuals were used with respect to that type of experiment. In response to a question from LHS, Colby and Warner indicated they would provide more information on these activities, but that their own knowledge of them was very limited at this point.

(11) The CIA apparently “plotted” the assassination of some foreign leaders, including Castro, Lumumba and Trujillo. The CIA had no role whatsoever in Lumumba’s murder on January 17, 1961. With respect to Trujillo’s assassination on May 30, 1961, the CIA had “no active part;” but had a “faint connection” with the groups that in fact did it. In connection with these matters, Warner referred to 18 U.S.C. 960, concerning “expeditions against a friendly nation.”

(12) Between 1967 and 1971, the CIA covertly monitored dissident groups in the Washington, D.C. area (and possibly elsewhere) who were considered to pose a threat to CIA installations. The monitoring apparently consisted of physical surveillances only; no wiretaps were involved. Some results might have been distributed to the FBI.

(13) Between May and September, 1971, the CIA conducted a physical surveillance of a Latin American female (and others, including U.S. citizens), apparently in the Detroit area, who had advised the CIA

of a plot to assassinate Helms and then Vice President Agnew. It is possible that a “mail cover” was also utilized. It is likely that the Secret Service was advised of the assassination threat with respect to the Vice President.

(14) In 1972, the CIA conducted a physical surveillance of Victor Marchetti—who wrote a book about the CIA—to determine his contacts with CIA employees.

Except as noted, Colby and Warner did not indicate whether any of the above items had been approved by any individuals outside the CIA.

Colby then discussed a program conducted by the CIA beginning in 1967 and aimed at identifying possible foreign links to American dissidents. This program was handled in the CIA by James Angleton and Richard Ober. Around July, 1967, Helms sent a cable from CIA Headquarters referring to CIA’s “participation in an inter-agency group” with respect to these matters. Apparently, the cable also refers to “overseas coverage of subversive students and related activities.”

Apparently, a November, 1967 document in the CIA’s possession refers to a CIA survey of anti-war activities, including the U.S. peace movement and foreign groups.

In September, 1969, according to CIA documents, Helms reviewed the CIA’s efforts against “the international activities of radicals and black militants.”

Apparently, under this program, the CIA alerted people abroad to try to identify the foreign contacts of American dissidents. According to Colby, many requests in this area were originated by the FBI. Colby also indicated that the CIA had apparently placed some agents in the peace movement in the United States, with the purported purpose of establishing credentials to travel abroad. A “by-product” of these agents-in-place was information on the domestic activities of various peace organizations. Apparently, these CIA agents undertook no disruptive activities.

Apparently, the CIA’s files under this program contain the names of some 9,900 plus Americans. In response to a question from LHS referring to the New York Times stories about the “files on 10,000 Americans,” Colby indicates that the CIA’s “9,900 names” is not the same as the IDIS master subject index described in the December 30, 1974 memorandum from LHS to Philip E. Areeda, Counsel to the President.7

According to Colby, approximately two-thirds of the names in the CIA’s “9,900 plus” list were the results of either FBI requests or reports from the CIA’s foreign offices. The other one-third consists of FBI re-

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7 Not found.
ports on Americans in the peace movement, but no other information. Colby indicated he does not know why the CIA held these latter reports since no foreign travel was involved, etc. He speculated that they were kept as a result of the tendency of bureaucrats to retain paper whether they needed it or acted on it or not.

According to Colby, the “Huston Plan” and the subsequent establishment of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee8 “gave stimulus” to this entire effort by the CIA. Colby, after reviewing this program, considers it “worthless” from an intelligence standpoint. Among other things, the Soviets apparently thought U.S. dissidents were too unruly to be trusted with any sensitive operations.

Colby also reported on three other items:

(1) At the CIA’s request, the Sheriff of San Mateo, California polygraphed certain applicants for employment in an experiment to test effectiveness of the polygraph.

(2) Colby and Warner indicated that the CIA utilizes certain systems to create alias documents, such as birth certificates. Other documents—such as credit cards—are used for what Warner described as “flash” purposes; that is, they are not utilized in themselves, but are used only to corroborate the operative identifying document (such as a birth certificate). For example, a false credit card or similar materials described by Warner as “pocket litter” will not be used to actually charge credit purchases but rather only to corroborate a driver’s license or birth certificate. When documents of a Federal Agency are involved—such as a Social Security Card—the CIA does not manufacture or otherwise create the documents except with the knowledge of that Federal Agency. Warner indicated, however, that it may be a violation of some State Laws to “manufacture” or otherwise forge state agency documents. Colby and Warner indicated that this was an on-going operation.

(3) Colby indicated that the CIA occasionally tests experimental electronic equipment on American telephone circuits. The CIA apparently has established guidelines for these tests, which provide among other things that no records may be kept, no tapes, and so forth.

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8 See Document 19.
21. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 3, 1975, 11:10 a.m.–12:18 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense, former CIA Director
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President
Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to the President
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities

President: Since the story broke I have been talking to Henry, you, Phil and Jack about working up a charter for a Blue Ribbon Panel. Since then I have found out some things I didn’t know about. Let Jack fill you in.

Marsh: Let me mention three things: the Colby report, the Silberman report, and the file on the left.

Under Ramsey Clark, an intelligence division was set up by (IDIN) John Doar. It was directed toward the dissident movement which was against the war and which was urban-centered. Out of this came the (IDIU), in December ‘67. Helms wrote a memo which redefined this mission and urged them on. Then in the Nixon Administration came the Huston Plan, which was to be established in July 1970. They got orders to desist three days later. Then it was set up in October as an internal intelligence board and an internal intelligence staff. All this ex-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 8, January 3, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Marsh, Buchen. Secret. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 See Document 18.
3 Document 19.
4 A possible reference to a December 30, 1974 memorandum from Silberman to Areeda. See footnote 7, Document 20.
5 Not further identified.
7 The Interdepartmental Information Unit (IDIU) was established on the recommendation of Attorney General Clark on December 18, 1967. According to the June 1975 final report of the Rockefeller Commission, the IDIU was tasked with “collecting, collating, and computerizing information on antiterror activists and other dissidents. The IDIU produced daily and weekly reports on dissident occurrences and attempted to predict significant future dissident activities.” (Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, p. 118)
cluded NSC and DOD, but they did go to DIA, the Services, NSA, etc. We have turned up a summary of their activities, written by Angleton. They had seven meetings; it lasted apparently until 1973.

We have a Huston-to-Helms memo saying that all material on this sent to the White House would go to Huston, not through the NSC.

Schlesinger: The Intelligence Group, called “the family jewels,” covers all these “extra curricular” activities. Symington was briefed thoroughly, as were Nedzi and some others. I did this following the surfacing of the Ellsberg psychological profile, when I scanned the Agency.

President: Was the CIA involved in Watergate?

Schlesinger: Not as an organization. Some paraphernalia was given to Hunt and a psychological profile of Ellsberg was given to the Plumbers. There may have been an old boy net at work, but in my judgment CIA was not involved as an agency.

There is a layer in the Agency which you can never really find out what is going on. So you don’t ever want to give them a clean bill of health. I am not sure that Bill [Colby] knows all, nor that I did. You should defend it and call for clean actions, but not give them a whole-sale acceptance.

President: We need a three-step process: First, we’ll set up a Blue Ribbon Panel to look into the allegations. We’ve got Erwin Griswold, John McCloy, Lyman Lemnitzer, Ronald Reagan, Douglas Dillon, Judge Friendly, and one black—either Brimmer or Coleman.

Schlesinger: You might want a media man. How about Frank Murphy? He was on the PFIAB; he’s a Republican, with good liberal connections, President of the Los Angeles Times. Or Frank Stanton.

President: We want to keep it not more than seven.

Schlesinger: How about a Congressional representative?

President: As part two I want to call in the heads of all the intelligence agencies and ask if there were any illegal activities or anything that was out of their charter. I want it in writing. Third, I will suggest to Congress that they have an investigation—preferably by a joint committee—and that the Blue Ribbon Panel would cooperate with their panel and could investigate the CIA charges and say it is clear now. We can turn over all our documentation to the Panel and let them wrestle with how much they give to the Congressional Committee.

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8 A possible reference to the briefing paper prepared June 1, 1972, see footnote 9, Document 19.

9 See footnote 2, Document 6.

10 Brackets in the original.
Schlesinger: You should not denounce the allegations out of hand. Some of the activities are illegal, but justified—like breaking and entering to get codes.

President: I wouldn’t pass judgment. That would be the job of the Panel to report back to me. I won’t make any charges or deny any. Schlesinger: I was referring to the letters to you.

Buchen: We want to find out how they operate, rather than designate any of it as illegal.

Schlesinger: There are a number of time-honored activities. For example, we will get code books if we can. The others penetrate us if they can.

President: Why, when you went to the CIA, did you take the action you did?

Schlesinger: I heard about the psychological profile of Ellsberg that was done for the Plumbers. I had thought that the only other action had been the furnishing of equipment to Hunt. So I wanted to find out—not necessarily to stop them, but to know what is going on.

President: I plan to say that a Central Intelligence Agency is essential to our national security but it has to live within its Congressional charter. It has to be put positively—that it is essential.

Schlesinger: You may want to say that an effective intelligence operation is essential because you may want to restructure it like the British. The mixing of clandestine and non-clandestine activities is a source of disquiet to the American people. It tinges the non-clandestine activities.

President: What do you think of our counter-intelligence?

Schlesinger: It’s lousy. We are being penetrated more and more. The FBI has opted out. We are in bad shape.

Buchen: Should the investigation be restricted to counter-intelligence?

Schlesinger: I would have the Panel look both at the clean-up and at the positive need for intelligence. Have it look at the intelligence community.

President: How about a joint committee?

Schlesinger: That may be the best solution in light of this. One thing you might consider is a national intelligence board superseding or going beyond the PFIAB and including Congressional representation. It might defuse some Hill fervor.

President: I would oppose mixing the legislative and the executive; but I do think we need a change in PFIAB. I would keep the technical people but have a big turnover in non-technical people.

Any other questions?

Marsh: Is there a danger to our current operations?
Schlesinger: There always is. This whole episode can be educational though. We can make the point that most of the operations are legitimate and necessary.

President: What do you think of the Colby report?

Schlesinger: It is bland and could be released, but it dealt with the directives, and so on, and doesn’t get at what may have gone on. You could say publicly that the report indicates that the news reports are overdrawn but you are appointing a Blue Ribbon Panel to look into it.

President: I have no intention of releasing the report. Is there anything else?

Schlesinger: I have some names to suggest: There’s David Packard, Dean Rusk, Rostow, Cy Vance, Richard Neustadt, Bill Perry, Howard Robeson.

Buchen: Lloyd Cutler?

Schlesinger: You might want to look at Bromley Smith.

President: Cutler is a good lawyer, but he is cleverly very partisan.

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22. **Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, January 3, 1975, 5:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
William E. Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to the President
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities

President: I asked Phil and Jack to analyze the [Colby] report for me, but first, why don’t you tell me where we are.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 8, January 3, 1975, Ford, Colby, Buchen, Marsh. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
Colby: We have a couple of problems—one within the Agency and one with Congress. Already the two Armed Services committees, the two Appropriations committees, and Muskie want me to testify.

I think we have a 25-year old institution which has done some things it shouldn’t have. On the dissidents, the major effort was to check if there were any foreign connections. But we held it so close there was unease within the Agency—was it really done for the foreign connections or was it anti-dissident? We infiltrated some people so they could go overseas. That was okay, but in the course of training within the groups they wrote on the dissidents. We passed the information to the FBI and they passed information to us. But what happened is we would file the reports the FBI gave us. That, together with our reports from overseas, amounts to about 10,000. So we can’t deny that, but I will have to try to clarify it.

President: When were the names gathered?

Colby: Beginning in ’67. It was formally terminated in March ’74.

President: When was the Schlesinger directive?

Colby: In May 1973. Schlesinger was concerned when things popped up—the psychological profiles, and letters from McCord about CIA and Watergate. So, to find everything, he put out this directive. My report has some of it; I will cover the others now. I briefed Nedzi in July 1973; I gave Stennis a general briefing and Symington a detailed one. [He showed the President a looseleaf book.]²

President: What did the three say?

Colby: I said “Here it is; we are not going to do it again.” I then gave specific instructions to the Department. In March 1974, we stopped the program and I put it together with the dissident program and treated them as one. He mentions mail opening. We did have a New York and Los Angeles program in the 50’s of opening first-class airmail from the USSR. For example, we have four to Jane Fonda. That is illegal, and we stopped it in 1973. In San Francisco we had one with respect to China, to find out who the contacts were. Some letters were opened. We did break in to some premises to see whether there were classified documents.

President: Were these former employees, or people on the payroll?

Colby: Former employees.

President: Had they been fired?

Colby: One had just left—he wasn’t fired.

President: Who would approve such operations?

² Not found.
Colby: I would think only the Director, but possibly at these times the Director of the Office of Security.

The third area is the fact that we surveilled some people to find out why they had classified information. Some of the names are pretty hot. [He mentioned a couple of reporters.] In 1971 we surveilled Mike Getler. He had run a story which was an obvious intelligence leak.

President: Who would have approved that?
Colby: I’m pretty sure it was Helms, but whether it was directed from higher up I don’t know.

In 1972 at the time of the India–Pakistan war, we put a tap on Jack Anderson and three of his associates.

President: Who ordered it?
Colby: Helms. Whether on his own or not, I don’t know. This was not illegal, but (perhaps) outside our jurisdiction. We also followed some of our employees or former employees. Unfortunately, one was Marchetti. Again, it was not illegal, but it’s a highly emotional area.

President: Was this outside the Agency’s charter?
Colby: Helms says this is a gray area. We have the responsibility to protect our sources and information.

President: What would you have done?
Colby: I said at my confirmation that I have the duty but not the authority. I would go to the FBI or somewhere like that.

We have also run some wiretaps. Most of them are on our employees, but not all. Edgar Snow, for example. Generally, from 1965, they were approved by the Attorney General. One other was a defector, but most of them were employees. I doubt that before 1963 we had Attorney-General approval.

These were from 1951 through 1965. The last tap recorded was in 1971.

None of these have anything to do with the Hersh story, but he lists all these activities as being part of the anti-dissident effort.

Marsh: But Hersh will say that out of the dissidents program came the IEC and this is where the Getler and Anderson taps are very worrisome. He will say we turned to the IEC for operations when we couldn’t get action from the regular agencies.

Buchen: The directive was 9 May; the report was May 21. Isn’t that a bit short?
Colby: Most of these skeletons were around, but just in memory rather than on paper. It didn’t take much to get them on paper.

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3 The report has not been found. The May 9, 1973, directive is Document 6.
President: Who would have known of the dissident operation?
Colby: The Director, Karamessines, the Deputy Director, Ober—30 to 40 people were in the group.
President: Who assigned Ober over here?
Colby: When we terminated the program, I nominated him.
[General Scowcroft described how the NSC got him and what his normal NSC duties were.]
Colby: That’s about it. We did collect the names of some Congressmen—who weren’t in Congress when we got the names. [He gave the President a paper on this.] An “X” by the names means we ran a clearance for the purpose of collaboration with them; “Y” means the name came up in connection with a foreign country.

[The President leaves.]
Buchen: The last directives are undated. Why?
Colby: They were all issued at the same time.
Marsh: They will try to get this all linked with Watergate. Do you think there is a connection?
Colby: Watergate is a code word. Only that concern about dissidents and leaks may have been hypoed [sic] by political concerns.

[Buchen and Marsh asked a series of questions. The President then returned.]
President: Is counterintelligence work suffering because of a lack of coordination with the FBI?
Colby: No. We are cooperating very well. I think NSCID 9 will formally regularize the arrangement we’ve had with the FBI since 1966.
Colby: We obviously have a problem since we lost four of our top people.

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4 Not found.
5 An approved and promulgated version of a revised NSCID No. 9 has not been found. In a May 12 memorandum to Kissinger, Colby forwarded a draft of the proposed NSCID No. 9, “Central Intelligence Agency Foreign Intelligence Operations Within the United States and Clandestine Operations Affecting U.S. Citizens Abroad.” (National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–033, Action 3577X: NSCID No. 9 (6/10/75) The draft, summarized in a June 5 letter from Colby to Levi, stipulates that the CIA would conduct “no electronic surveillance within the United States” or “electronic surveillance directed specifically at American citizens abroad” without the “personal approval” of the Attorney General. (Ibid.) A June 10 action memorandum from Ober to Scowcroft indicates that the draft was forwarded to the NSC for consideration. (Ibid.) Revised versions of NSCID No. 9 were prepared by the CIA in conjunction with the Attorney General’s office on November 13, and forwarded to Scowcroft on November 26 (ibid., Proposed NSCID No. IX) and again by Ober to Buchen on January 22, 1976. (Ibid.) A May 17, 1976, memorandum from Special Assistant to the DDCI/IC Major General Jack E. Thomas to Lehman, Ober, and Clifford Opper of the DIA, states that action on drafts of proposed NSCIDs was deferred pending completion of revisions to existing NSCIDs in compliance with E.O. 11905. (Ibid.)
President: Tell me about them.

Colby: It has to be a highly compartmented activity.

Angleton is an unusual type and totally dedicated to his mission. He is very intense. I thought of asking him to retire when I took over. I didn’t because of the human factors. He also handled the Israeli account. On Friday before the Hersh article appeared, I told him he could move or retire.

Of the other three, one had already decided to retire. His deputy we told that he wouldn’t be the chief and he retired. The third was younger, but he thought apparently he might get the job and he retired when he didn’t.

Helms helped Hunt to get a job with Mullens when he retired.

President: We plan to do three things: One, early next week, all the Intelligence chiefs will come in and I will say “You know what the law is and I expect you to obey.” Two, I’m going to appoint a Blue Ribbon Committee to look into all of this. Three, I am going to suggest to the Hill that a joint committee is the best way for them to go to investigate.

We don’t want to destroy but to preserve the CIA. But we want to make sure that illegal operations and those outside the charter don’t happen.

Colby: We have run operations to assassinate foreign leaders. We have never succeeded. [He cited Castro, Trujillo, General Schneider of Chile, et al.]

There’s another skeleton: A defector we suspected of being a double agent we kept confined for three years.

There is one other very messy problem: After the ITT–Chile Congressional investigation, there was an allegation that our testimony

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6 Robert Mullen and Company, a Washington-based public relations firm where Hunt was employed following his retirement from the CIA in 1970.

7 General Rene Schneider, Commander-in-Chief of the Chilean Army, was assassinated in Santiago in 1970.

8 Following March 1972 press reports of efforts undertaken by the CIA and the International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) to undermine the government of Chilean President Salvador Allende, and specifically to prevent his 1970 election, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee’s Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations held hearings in early 1973 to determine the reports’ veracity. Testimony revealed that ITT had twice offered to participate in any U.S. Government plan to block Allende’s election, prompting the Senate to pass S. 2239 (S. Rept. 93–343) on July 26, 1973, barring corporations from making contributions to the U.S. Government with the intention of influencing elections in foreign countries. The House did not act on the bill, but the hearings prompted the subcommittee to launch a second investigation into OPIC involvement in foreign policymaking. Concluding that OPIC had “unnecessarily involved the U.S. government in the internal political affairs of less developed countries without sufficiently aiding in their development,” Congress passed S. 2957, (P.L. 93–390) on August 13, 1974, phasing out OPIC’s direct insurance and financial operations by 1979. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 856, 862)
was not all kosher. I don’t think there was any criminal action, but there was some skating on thin ice. There is an old rule that to protect sources and information you could stretch things.

But the White House hasn’t been told about my book of skeletons.

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23. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 4, 1975, 9:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: What is happening is worse than in the days of McCarthy. You will end up with a CIA that does only reporting, and not operations. He has turned over to the FBI the whole of his operation. He has offered to resign and I refused. It is not my prerogative, but I said not until you are proved guilty of criminal conduct.

The President: I agree.

Kissinger: Helms said all these stories are just the tip of the iceberg. If they come out, blood will flow. For example, Robert Kennedy personally managed the operation on the assassination of Castro.

[He described some of the other stories.]

I told him Buchen would warn him and he won’t say anything incriminating.

The President: I know Dick Helms and think very highly of him.

Kissinger: The Chilean thing—that is not in any report. That is sort of blackmail on me.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 8, January 4, 1975, Ford, Kissinger. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.


3 A reference to Colby.
The President: What can we do? We can get Griswold, Lemnitzer, Friendly, Reagan, Jack Connor, Shannon, Dillon.\(^4\)

Kissinger: You might think of Rusk. This will get very rough and you need people around who know the Presidency, and the national interest. What Colby has done is a disgrace.

The President: Should we suspend him?

Kissinger: No, but after the investigation is over you could move him and put in someone of towering integrity.

When the FBI has a hunting license into the CIA, this could end up worse for the country than Watergate.

The President: Would Rusk have known any of this stuff?

Kissinger: Why don’t you ask him?

[Discussed the Moorer spying incident\(^5\) and what he did to protect the institution of the JCS.]

[Rumsfeld enters to talk about Rusk.]

Kissinger: [Discusses some of the legislative restrictions.]

The President: [Talks to Rusk.]

[Tries to call Dave Packard.]

[Buchen and Marsh come in.]

[The Blue Ribbon announcement is reviewed.]\(^6\)

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\(^4\) The individuals referred to are: former Solicitor General Erwin N. Griswold; former JCS Chairman and Supreme Allied Commander, NATO General Lyman L. Lemnitzer; former U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Henry J. Friendly; former California Governor Ronald Reagan; former Secretary of Commerce John T. (Jack) Connor; former University of Virginia President Edgar F. Shannon, Jr.; and former Secretary of the Treasury C. Douglas Dillon.


\(^6\) The statement announcing the creation of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States was released on January 4. Ford mandated the Commission to “ascertain and evaluate any facts relating to activities conducted within the United States by the Central Intelligence Agency that give rise to questions as to whether the Agency had exceeded its statutory authority” and to evaluate existing safeguards “to preclude Agency activities that might go beyond its authority and to make appropriate recommendations.” The full text is in *Public Papers: Ford, 1975*, Book I, pp. 19–20. On January 5, the White House announced the appointment of Vice President Nelson Rockefeller as Chairman and Connor, Dillon, Griswold, Lemnitzer, Reagan, Shannon, and labor union leader Joseph Lane Kirkland as members of the Commission. (Ibid., p. 20) It was known informally as the Rockefeller Commission.
24. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 4, 1975, 12:37–1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Richard Helms, Ambassador to Iran, former CIA Director
John O. Marsh, Counsellor to the President
Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to the President
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities

President: Dick, you and I have known each other a long time. I have only the most admiration for you and for your work. Frankly, we are in a mess. I want you to tell me whatever you want. I believe the CIA is essential to the country. It has to exist and perform its functions. We will have a Blue Ribbon Panel look into these charges. It will investigate the domestic activities of the CIA.

Helms: Why not add the FBI? They overlap, and you may as well get to the bottom of it.

President: I will consider it. Secondly, though, the commission will look at the Colby report and, thirdly, make recommendations to me. It is a good commission. I hope they will stay within their charter, but in this climate, we can’t guarantee it. It would be tragic if it went beyond it, because the CIA needs to remain a strong and viable agency. It would be a shame if the public uproar forced us to go beyond and to damage the integrity of the CIA.

I automatically assume what you did was right, unless it’s proved otherwise.

Helms: I have been in the service 32 years. At the end all one has is a small pension and a reputation—if any. I testified in Watergate; I didn’t dump on President Nixon and I stuck to the truth. I intend to fight this matter. I welcome a Blue Ribbon Panel.

At the base is Congressional oversight. No Congress wants to join hands with the Bay of Pigs, et cetera; it’s bad politics. The CIA is the President’s creature.

If allegations have been made to Justice, a lot of dead cats will come out. I intend to defend myself. I don’t know everything which

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 8, January 4, 1975, Ford, Former CIA Director Richard Helms. Secret. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
went on in the Agency; maybe no one really does. But I know enough to say that if the dead cats come out, I will participate. I think the mood of the country is ghastly. I feel deeply for you, Mr. President. I am a member of your team and I don’t intend to foul the nest if I can avoid it.

The basic allegation—that we spied on dissidents—stemmed from the charge to me to discover if there was any foreign connection to the dissidents. I never permitted any spying on any Congressmen. The business of the files is ridiculous; if you get a name, of course you make a record and open a file in case it is relevant thereafter.

President: I have no doubt about your total integrity, and, in fact you did a good job running the Agency. What we are trying to do is look into the charges and protect the functions of the Agency with a Blue Ribbon group which will operate responsibly. I hope you understand my position. You have my pledge that everything I do will be straightforward. I plan no witch hunt, but in this environment I don’t know if I can control it.

Helms: I will help you, Mr. President. I believe in the Agency and its mission.

25. **Note From the Secretary of State’s Executive Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger**


HAK:

Dick Helms came in today to make the following report:

1. **Meeting with Colby**

   He says Colby is close to a basket case. He is “very up tight”; “not in good shape”; and moaned to Helms: “First I had Phoenix, then Watergate, and now this.”

   Colby said that the President had indicated to him that he would prefer that he (Colby) not show the Colby report around, and therefore

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1 Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—January 1975. Secret; Sensitive.

2 Colby’s July 1971 Congressional testimony about his role in the Phoenix program, the joint U.S.-South Vietnamese operation designed to destroy the organizational infrastructure of the National Liberation Front (NLF), raised public and media controversy when he claimed the program had killed 20,000 NLF members between 1968 and 1971.
he could not let Helms see it. Helms did not indicate to Colby that he had already seen a copy here. Helms says that after a good bit of discussion Colby finally did discuss ITT\(^3\) and the Family Jewels. Colby also told Helms that he had talked to Sy Hersh before the Hersh article came out in an attempt to put him straight. He also said that Angleton retired but only because he (Colby) took all his jobs away from him first.

At one point Helms said, "All right, Bill, what do you want to do, save the Agency?" Colby, flushing and pursing his lips, said, "Yes, but I will not do anything illegal or lie in order to do so." Helms, in some agitation, replied that he never suggested that Colby should do this and that he did not appreciate the intimation from Colby that Helms had in fact so suggested.

Colby showed Helms the Family Jewels.

2. Talk with Angleton

Helms saw Angleton today and gave him your message.\(^4\) He says Angleton totally understood and was grateful for the message but stated that he had never said that he thought you had gotten him. He had no idea or reason to believe that you were responsible for his leaving. The press quote did not come from him.

3. Meeting with the Vice President

Because White House lawyers had told the Vice President that they should not have a formal meeting without lawyers present, Rockefeller suggested an informal meeting which Helms readily agreed to. He said they had a pleasant chat in a good atmosphere.

4. General Impressions

Helms has talked to a number of Agency retirees as well as reviewed with people in the Agency the domestic intelligence situation. He says that he is not at all certain that Colby knows what the facts are and that the Colby report, except in its most general sense, is based on no real facts. Files are not yet pulled together, people he (Helms) has talked to do not support the charges already made, etc. He says on the domestic intelligence operation, his own investigation thus far shows that it was based primarily on the "foreign angle" and therefore perfectly acceptable.

Apparently Colby, in an attempt to marshal his facts, has sent some of his Agency people to talk to retirees or people no longer on active duty. The Attorney General has told Colby that he should focus his investigation solely on those now on active duty in the Agency.

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\(^3\) See footnote 8, Document 23.

\(^4\) Not further identified.
Finally, Dick asked me to tell you that he is now thinking about “doing something” with the press, perhaps at the end of the week. He is not sure yet what, if anything, he will do and will be in contact with me before he takes any final step.

Dick also asked whether you had yet talked to Acting Attorney General Silberman. I said I did not think so; Dick asked that I remind you since you may want to do so.

LSE

26. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Congressional Oversight of CIA

For years the practice of the Director of CIA in reporting in executive session to the subcommittees of the Appropriations and Armed Services Committees of the Congress has satisfied Congressional interest in overseeing the CIA while protecting the secrecy so vital to the conduct of covert operations.

You know from your personal experience how the oversight system worked—CIA withheld nothing from the subcommittees and volunteered information of possible interest. The record of the Congress has been good in maintaining the secrecy of the information supplied through this system. CIA Director Colby reported on the history of Congressional oversight in September when we examined alternatives to meet demands for increased Congressional access in the wake of publicity on CIA operations in Chile. It was subsequently agreed with Congressional leaders to provide information on CIA covert ac-

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2 In early September, Colby’s testimony before Representative Edwin Nedzi’s subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee about CIA efforts to prevent the election of Salvador Allende was leaked to the press. (Lawrence Stern, “CIA Role in Chile Revealed: Anti-Allende Funding Put At $11 Million,” Washington Post, September 8, 1974, p. A1)
tion activities to a restricted group of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, and to the Senate leaders.

Mr. Colby reports on these developments, and on the continuing proliferation of Congressional access to the Agency’s most highly classified operations in a memorandum at Tab A. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 adds the foreign affairs committees of both houses to the four oversight subcommittees which receive information on CIA covert actions. In addition, the Committee on Government Operations in each house wants to assert its right to investigate CIA. Public demands for closer Congressional oversight and investigations are also increasing. Mr. Colby wrote his memorandum before the public charges of CIA involvement in domestic operations, but he anticipates similar public reactions to revelations of CIA Latin American operations which will appear in a book by former employee Philip Agee.

Mr. Colby and his predecessors have continually held that it is up to the Congress to determine its procedures for oversight and appropriation. Faced with the proliferation of access, the House rules which permit any member to examine the records of any committee (which led to the exposure of Colby’s testimony on Chile), and Congressional and public demands for closer oversight, we are confronted with the problem of maintaining the security of covert operations. Colby believes that the pressures to widen the circle of those knowledgeable of CIA’s sensitive information pose “a substantial danger to the ultimate security of our activities and functions.” Erosion of CIA’s ability to maintain the secrecy of its operations adversely affects the protection of intelligence sources, methods and personnel, the recruitment and utili-

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3 Attached but not printed. The report, prepared by the CIA and sent by Colby to Ford on September 17, 1974, recapitulated the growth of Congressional oversight of CIA activities since the late 1940s and offered suggestions for addressing the issue in the future without compromising the secrecy of intelligence sources and methods.

4 Passed by Congress on December 18, 1974, and signed into law on December 30, the FY 1975 Foreign Assistance Act (S. 3394, P.L. 93–559) expanded Congressional oversight of CIA operations and restricted funding for covert actions. It included the Hughes–Ryan amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (Section 32 of the FY 1975 Act). Named for its sponsors, Senator Harold Hughes (D–Iowa) and Representative Leo Ryan (D–California), the amendment stipulated that no funds “appropriated under the authority of this or any other Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence Agency, other than activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the President finds that each such operation is important to the national security of the U.S. and reports, in a timely fashion, a description and scope of such operation to the appropriate committees of the Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the U.S. Senate and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the U.S. House of Representatives.” In a memorandum to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Operations, January 9, Colby stated that the CIA “intended to comply with the provisions of this section.” (Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M1066A, Box 7, Executive Registry Subject Files—1975 Congressional Oversight (1 Jan 75–31 Dec 75))

5 See footnote 13, Document 15.
zation of foreign agents, the cooperation of foreign officials and intelligence organizations, and the collection of information.

In his memorandum at Tab A, Director Colby recommends that you discuss with the Congressional leadership the establishment of a Joint Committee on Intelligence. He attaches a draft resolution for consideration. This concept has surfaced periodically but has been defeated whenever it came to a vote in the Congress. Patterned after the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, a Joint Committee on Intelligence would focus authority and responsibility for oversight of intelligence operations. It could be reassuring to the Congress and the public while providing machinery to protect sensitive information.

Mr. Colby urges that you initiate the process of advancing the Joint Committee on Intelligence concept—perhaps by indicating to leading members of the Congress that you would view with approval appropriate Congressional initiative.

I support Colby’s views. Faced with mounting pressures, which are likely to be accentuated by further revelations and the advent of the new Congress, I believe that support for the Joint Committee on Intelligence concept could provide an orderly method of conducting Congressional oversight, while affording protection for the security of CIA operations, and meeting Congressional and public demands for closer oversight.

**Recommendation**

That you approve Executive Branch support for the concept of establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence and authorize me to confer with Mr. Colby and other appropriate officials to advance this concept.6

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6 Ford initialed the Approve option on or about January 14, according to a note written in an unknown hand. However, a Joint Committee on Intelligence was not ultimately created. Between January 1975 and June 1976, 19 different pieces of legislation proposing the committee’s creation were introduced in the House and Senate, but none advanced beyond committee referral.
27. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the 40 Committee (Ratliff) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Sisco)


[Source: Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, INR/IL Historical Files, Pres. Rept.–40 Cmte. Act. 1/10/75. Secret (with Top Secret; Sensitive Attachment). 5 pages not declassified.]

28. Editorial Note

On January 15, 1975, Director of Central Intelligence William Colby testified before a joint session of the Intelligence subcommittees of the Senate Appropriations and Armed Services Committees regarding the allegations about the Central Intelligence Agency’s domestic activities made in Seymour Hersh’s, December 22, 1974, New York Times article (see Document 17). His testimony, Colby recalled later, “essentially amounted to repeating my Vail report” (Document 19). “But there was one crucial difference,” he noted. The Senators on the assembled Committees “perceived the intentions of the public clamor and the strong views of their fellow Senators, and they know a public answer was needed. So they requested my testimony be released and since I had testified in terms that in my mind were not classified, I consented. I was, of course, privately delighted. Ever since I had prepared the Vail report I had been hoping to get it out—believing it the most effective way to counter the misconceptions fostered by Hersh’s article. But on my way down from the Hill that afternoon, I realized that I had not told the White House what was coming in the press next day, so I stopped off to give Brent Scowcroft a copy of the statement the Committee had released; the substance was well known to them, but the fact of its public release was a new bombshell.” (Colby, Honorable Men, pages 401–402)

A1) Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recounted in his memoirs that the release of the DCI’s statement was “an incitement to riot, severely limiting whatever restraint the Rockefeller Commission might have provided.” “In normal circumstances,” Kissinger notes, “the CIA Director would have been expected to protect his sources and methods and, if pressed, to ask the White House to intercede with the committees. Colby not only refused to do this, he formally absolved his subordinates of the secrecy oaths they had sworn upon entering the service.” (Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, page 322)

29. **Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, January 17, 1975, 9:35–10:30 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

- President Ford
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: I think we have to sell a little more the purpose of your program. More conceptual.

The President: I am talking at 11:00 to the Cabinet; to Governors and Mayors at 2:00; and I’m having lunch with Sulzberger.  

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 8, January 17, 1975, Ford, Kissinger. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 No transcript of this luncheon with Arthur Sulzberger, publisher of the *New York Times*, has been found. Colby, who was not present at the “strictly off-the-record” meeting, wrote about it in his memoirs. He reported that in the face of criticism that the Rockefeller Commission would not do a “hard-nosed investigation,” Ford responded that he had chosen the members with “extreme care” since Colby told him that there were CIA activities the members would encounter “that were a lot more sensitive than those Hersh had reported on and that, in the nation’s best interest, he felt had to remain secret.” “Like what?,” *New York Times* managing editor Abe Rosenthal reportedly asked. “Like assassination,” Ford is said to have responded, “off the record.” The exchange was leaked to Daniel Schorr of CBS News. On February 28, Schorr reported, “President Ford has reportedly warned associates that if current investigations go too far they could uncover several assassinations of foreign officials involving the CIA.” (Colby, *Honorable Men*, pp. 409–410)
Now the Democrats are dragging their feet. They’re thinking of barring the import restrictions. If they are going to be negative, I think we will be in good shape because we have a tough positive program.

Kissinger: Colby has laid out all the CIA cover operation in this country. [He read from the report.]3

The President: Has Helms testified before Rockefeller?4

Kissinger: Yes.

The President: How did he do?

Kissinger: He was very aggressive. But now every businessman, professor, and American company will be suspect abroad. The morale of the CIA must be terrible.

[Omitted here is discussion of topics unrelated to intelligence issues.]

3 Brackets in the original. Presumably a reference to Colby’s January 15 testimony; see Document 28.

4 Helms, along with Schlesinger and Colby, testified before the first session of the Rockefeller Commission on January 13.

30. Memorandum of Conversation1


Participants

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to intelligence.]

[Kissinger:] We had a 40 Committee meeting.2 We can’t conduct covert operations. Colby is a disaster and really should be replaced. Colby is shellshocked—he wanted to testify on Azorian because it was

1 Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 8, January 23, 1975, Ford, Kissinger. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 No record of the meeting has been found.
a domestic operation. He said he would work it out with the VP—I said it was none of the VP’s business.

The President: That’s stupid.

Kissinger: There are now so many people who have to be briefed on covert operations, it is bound to leak.

There is no one with guts left. All of yesterday they were making a record to protect themselves about Azorian. It was a discouraging meeting. I wonder if we shouldn’t get the leadership in and discuss it. Maybe there should be a Joint Committee.

The President: I have always fought that, but maybe we have to. It would have to be a tight group, not a big broad one.

Kissinger: I am really worried. We are paralyzed. We have delayed a long time [less than 1 line not declassified] even though our capacity may not be too great.


31. Editorial Note

On January 21, 1975, Senator John O. Pastore (D–Rhode Island) introduced legislation (S. Res. 21) to establish a Senate Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities. By a roll call vote of 82–4 on January 27, the Senate approved the creation of a bipartisan 11-member Select Committee and gave it broad power to establish whether any U.S. intelligence or law enforcement agency had engaged in “illegal, improper, or unethical activities” as alleged in the press. (Congress and the Nation, Volume IV, 1973–1976, page 185) S. Res. 21 mandated the exploration of four specific issues: 1) whether the Central Intelligence Agency has conducted any illegal domestic intelligence operation; 2) the conduct of domestic intelligence and counterintelligence operations against United States citizens by the Federal Bureau of Investigation or any other Federal agency; 3) the origins and disposition of the Huston Plan; and 4) the need for legislative authority to govern the operations of any intelligence agencies. To accomplish this, the new Select Committee was given subpoena powers.

The following day, January 28, Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho) was named chairman of the Committee, composed of six Democratic
and five Republican members. Thereafter, the Select Committee would be known informally in public and policymaking circles as the Church Committee. In a statement to the press, Church asserted that his committee would “review the work of Vice President Rockefeller’s commission on the Central Intelligence Agency” and stated, after the committee’s first organizational meeting, that all of its members were “agreed that very strong security procedures must be established” before it began dealing with classified materials requested from the intelligence agencies. (“Senator Church Heads New C.I.A.–F.B.I. Panel,” New York Times, January 29, 1975, page 12)

32. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, February 1, 1975, 10:30 a.m.

SUBJECT

40 Committee Meeting, Saturday, 1 February 1975, 10:30 AM

Members Present: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements, Jr., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Joseph Sisco, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General George Brown, and Director of Central Intelligence William Colby.


Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by asking Mr. Colby in what order he wanted to discuss the agenda.

Congressional Relations

Mr. Colby replied that he’d better bring the group up to date on his relations with the Congress first. He said he had made arrangements with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to brief Senators Sparkman and Case; they would keep records and they would tell other members that they had been briefed. He said he would brief Holt

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1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1975. Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on February 4. Attached to a February 4 covering memorandum for the record by Ratliff, summarizing the decisions taken in the meeting. Copies were distributed to Clements, Sisco, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General George S. Brown, and Colby.

2 Pat M. Holt, Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
also (the committee’s Chief of Staff). He had yet to solidify arrange-
ments with the House, but Morgan has indicated that he wanted to
reactivate a subcommittee of about 11 members.

Dr. Kissinger said this would be impossible. He had talked to the
President, and we won’t authorize any covert operations until we get
this straightened out. How can you expect other countries to work with
us? Maybe I ought to name an Assistant Secretary of State for Covert
Operations since I get blamed for them anyway.

Mr. Colby said he told Congress that he would go off the record on
any details.

Dr. Kissinger asked how he could do that when House members
have access to the committee records?

Mr. Colby said it could be done; they won’t be able to see them all.

Dr. Kissinger said that the President plans to call in the Congres-
sional leadership and explain this problem to them.

Mr. Colby said they are aware of the problem but don’t know how
to deal with it. They just don’t know what to do.

Dr. Kissinger said we must discuss this. We will not approve any-
thing until we get this straight. If we approved operations in Portugal
and then it leaked, we would be playing right into the hands of the
Communists. We can’t do it.

Working Group

Mr. Colby said that one special item in his long report on world-
wide covert initiatives\(^3\) was the proposal to establish a 40 Committee
Working Group.

Dr. Kissinger said he could not see where this would work.

Mr. Colby said it was hard to get this group together.

Dr. Kissinger said, with all deference, you haven’t had anything
for us to do.

Mr. Colby cited Portugal [less than 1 line not declassified].

Mr. Clements, Mr. Sisco and Dr. Kissinger all said they disagreed
with the [less than 1 line not declassified] proposal.

Mr. Colby said Dr. Kissinger had asked him to come up with ideas
on what could be done; he was asked for initiatives.

Secrecy

Dr. Kissinger said that the major problem is . . .

Mr. Colby said “Congress.”

\(^3\) Not further identified and not found.
Dr. Kissinger continued . . . and having an intelligence organization that can do something in secret.

Mr. Colby said that he needed a law that said it was a crime to reveal secrets and that he did not have that now.

Dr. Kissinger said we can’t approve any covert operations until we can guarantee secrecy. He talked about a leak from a recent NSC meeting and that the President said later that he thought it was the policy that what went on at NSC meetings was kept secret. Dr. Kissinger said he assured him that was correct. He discussed a case involving the Pentagon where the details should have been kept secret but because they leaked, the policy must now be reversed. We are going to look too dangerous for anyone to do business with us. We must establish the integrity of the intelligence community. We have got to decide who is going to testify before these Congressional committees so that we can organize things. The President is ready to invoke executive privilege. We don’t want NSA to be looked at. They aren’t wiretapping, are they?

Mr. Colby said there were many ex-NSA employees who might want to talk.

Mr. Hyland said John Marks might contribute to NSA revelations and there would be others.

Dr. Kissinger declared again that the President would invoke executive privilege.

He wants to know who is going to say what before they begin to spout off. What can NSA be charged with?

Mr. Colby said they could be charged with listening to Americans.

Mr. Clements said that was right and that he had reported this.

Mr. Colby said there were three information levels: First, what could be made public; second, what was classified and you would hope to protect; third, what could not be talked about or leaked at all. You are going to have to discuss some of the second-level items; if you don’t you can’t win at all.

Dr. Kissinger said to let the President decide—if you need a Presidential order to hide behind you can get it. He asked for each intelligence agency to give him a summary of what shouldn’t be given out—decisions to be made on merit, not whether the agency thought it could protect the information or not—and let the President decide what to do.

Mr. Clements warned that what was going to happen was a shotgun approach calling on people right and left to testify. He thought General Allen should not testify.

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4 A former INR officer, John Marks co-authored *CIA and the Cult of Intelligence* with Victor Marchetti.
Dr. Kissinger asked who is to testify? We will have a conflict with the Congress on this. The President will explain to the Congressional leadership, and we will go to the courts if necessary.

Mr. Clements said that if anyone was called to testify he should not go until he has checked.

Dr. Kissinger said we must coordinate policy on testimony. He mentioned Vietnam as an area that would be exploited.

Mr. Colby said he was not worried about Vietnam—he thought all of that was out already—but he was worried about Europe.

Dr. Kissinger said that if we start unraveling intelligence operations we will lose our covert capability altogether. We’ve got to get some rules. The President will accept the responsibility.

Mr. Colby said he intended to establish some ground rules in an opening statement. He would refuse to give out names and details of operations. He would refer to items by continent, not by naming a specific country.

Dr. Kissinger suggested making recommendations to the President first, making clear what must not be revealed and what would be dangerous to reveal.

Mr. Clements said he wanted to see the draft.

Mr. Colby said he would comply.

[Omitted here is unrelated discussion.]

National Interests

Dr. Kissinger said this was not strictly 40 Committee business but that while they were all around the table, he wanted to emphasize that the President must determine what is in the national interest. There will be discussions with the Congressional leadership. His worry and mine is that in order to solve some other problems we may dismantle the intelligence community.

Mr. Colby said that the only way he saw out of the mess now was the Joint Committee idea—a small group.

Dr. Kissinger said that may well be the case; a small group; clear procedures. If we have to tell all, we might as well put covert action in State and assign it to INR. We cannot piddle away our intelligence community. The President will decide on how to deal with the Congress. He will do it for your protection.

Mr. Colby said that he would respond to Dr. Kissinger’s request for a memo re NSA.²

² Not found.
33. Editorial Note

On February 4, 1975, Representative Robert N. Giaimo (D–Connecticut) introduced H. Res. 138, proposing creation of a House of Representatives’ Select Committee on Intelligence to investigate the intelligences agencies. The resolution, approved by the House 280–120 on February 19, directed the Committee to probe the collection, analysis, use, and cost of intelligence information, allegations of illegal activities of the intelligence agencies both domestically and abroad, the need for improved Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community, and possible safeguards for U.S. citizens against improper actions by intelligence agencies. Following the vote, Speaker of the House Carl B. Albert (D–Oklahoma) named as members seven Democrats and three Republicans. Representative Lucien N. Nedzi (D–Michigan), who chaired the standing Intelligence Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, was named as Chairman.

House Republicans objected to the committee’s composition, arguing that the “heavily Democratic makeup of the committee would make the inquiry look like a ‘partisan effort’ bent on overlooking any sins of the CIA, the FBI and other agencies under the Kennedy and Johnson administrations.” “We want a thorough job for Democratic administrations as well as Republican,” stated Representative Robert McClory (R–Illinois), “We don’t want to have any cover-up of earlier activity.” Giaimo answered this criticism by denying that the Committee would be used for partisan purposes and defended its composition, which remained as above. (George Lardner, Jr., “House Establishes Special Panel to Probe CIA,” Washington Post, February 20, 1975, page A2)
34. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 20, 1975, 10:36–11:33 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Dr. James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
- William Colby, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
- Philip Areeda, Deputy Counsel to the President
- Mr. Laurence Silberman, Deputy Attorney General
- Martin R. Hoffman, General Counsel, Department of Defense
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
Investigation of Allegations of CIA Domestic Activities

Secretary Kissinger: Shouldn’t we discuss what we are trying to achieve in these investigations and what we are trying to prevent?
The fact of these investigations could be as damaging to the intelligence community as McCarthy was to the Foreign Service. The nature of covert operations will have a curious aspect to the average mind and out of perspective it could look inexplicable. The result could be the drying up of the imaginations of the people on which we depend. If people think they will be indicted ten years later for what they do. That is my overwhelming concern.

NSA, I don’t know what the abuses are.

Secretary Schlesinger: Legally NSA is spotless.

Secretary Kissinger: If they are only looking at illegal activities.

Mr. Silberman: There aren’t enough illegal activities for them to chew on.

Director Colby: The issue will be, do we do these things?

Mr. Areeda: Church says he’s going to look into the legal, moral and political cost-effectiveness aspects of it.

Secretary Kissinger: Then we are in trouble. The committees and staff don’t inspire confidence. Harrington and Miller are professional

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 9, February 20, 1975, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, Philip Areeda, Laurence Silberman, Martin Hoffman. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office in the White House.
Director Colby: My idea to control this is to get secrecy agreements. That keeps them from publishing.

Secretary Kissinger: In their own names. You can’t keep them from Sy Hersh.

Director Colby: Our testimony will have numbers in place of names. We will divide them into three categories in increasing order of sensitivity.

Secretary Kissinger: Who gets the lists?

Director Colby: The chairmen. It is under their control. If he insists on a name in category 3, we then move carefully—we either tell him, refuse on my own initiative, or buck it to the White House.

Secretary Kissinger: You can initially take a position on professional judgment, but then we must go to the President. Bill should invoke himself first so as not to invoke the President initially in each case. We must say this involves the profoundest national security. Of course, we want to cooperate, but these are basic issues of national survival.

Mr. Areeda: Should the President meet with Tower and Church to make these points?

Secretary Kissinger: In all the world, the things which hurt us the most are the CIA business and Turkey aid. The British can’t understand us. Callaghan\(^3\) says insiders there are routinely tapped. Our statements ought to indicate the gravity with which we view the situation.

Why can’t Bill testify?

Director Colby: Names, countries of operations.

Secretary Kissinger: You can’t even do it by country X. And Church wants to prove you shouldn’t do it at all.

Director Colby: I would do it in an executive session. If it leaks, then we have a good case.

Mr. Silberman: I agree. Our position on executive privilege would be better if we had a leak first.

Secretary Kissinger: What if Miller waited until after the investigation to go to Hersh?

Mr. Silberman: It won’t hold that long. We first give them less sensitive information, so if it leaks we aren’t hurt so much.

Secretary Kissinger: Suppose you say on covert operations that we support the moderate political parties? On a global basis that is okay,

\(^2\) See footnote 6, Document 15. William G. Miller was the Church Committee Staff Director.

\(^3\) British Foreign Secretary James Callaghan.
but how does that serve Church’s purpose? He will then just prove not only is it immoral but useless. We have to demonstrate to foreign countries we aren’t too dangerous to cooperate with because of leaks.

Mr. Areeda: Is there any mileage in having the leaders of the select committee have a meeting with the President?

Mr. Silberman: It’s premature. They could only discuss generalities because we couldn’t know the line yet. We should keep the President out of it until we get a crunch.

Secretary Kissinger: I agree.

Mr. Silberman: The FBI may be the sexiest part of this. Hoover\(^4\) did things which won’t stand scrutiny, especially under Johnson. We will put these out in generic terms as quickly as possible. The Bureau would like to dribble it out. This will divert attention and show relative cooperation with the committee. This relates only to illegal activities.

[Kissinger relates story about Hoover and the female spy.]

Secretary Kissinger: We have to be clear on what we want them to stay out of.

Director Colby: I will refuse to give them the files on people—on privacy grounds.

Mr. Areeda: That is a good case for a confrontation.

Mr. Hoffman: But don’t we have to preserve their ability to keep security?

Secretary Kissinger: Harrington is a leaker—any House member has access to the material we turn over.

We can’t fight on details—only categories. We have to know the rules about the NSA, covert operations and any other areas.

Mr. Areeda: There is a constitutional problem on covert operations. We can’t take the posture that we can engage in operations that were kept from the committees which Congress has designated as responsible for oversight.

Secretary Kissinger: First, we must define the issues. Then we could go to court . . .

Mr. Silberman: I doubt it would go to court—it would take two years.

Secretary Kissinger: Then we could go to the public that they are undermining the country.

Director Colby: But we are doing so little in covert activities it is not too damaging.

\(^4\) J. Edgar Hoover, Director of the FBI, 1924–1972.
Secretary Kissinger: Then disclosing them will show us to the world as a cream puff.

There are dozens of places where we are letting the situation go by default.

Let’s establish categories of especially sensitive activities. Then whoever testifies will follow these guidelines.

Director Colby: The dangerous thing on NSA is whether they can pick up conversations between Americans.

Secretary Kissinger: My worry is not that they will find illegalities in NSA, but that in the process of finding out about illegalities they will unravel NSA activities. In the process of giving us a clean bill of health he could destroy us.

Do we have a case on executive privilege?

Mr. Silberman: In the case of U.S. v. Nixon, there is something there, but you can’t analyze it on a strictly legal basis.

Secretary Kissinger: I think this group should establish categories of what we say, methods for protecting what we need to keep. Then we can sit down with the President to understand what the issue is.

Then we would avoid the danger that to get through each week we would jeopardize the next week’s hearings.

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5 A reference to the Supreme Court case (417 U.S. 683) that considered the claim of absolute executive immunity by the White House following Congressional demands that President Nixon turn over tapes requested by the Watergate Special Prosecutor. By a vote of 8-0, the Supreme Court ruled on June 24, 1974, that Nixon must surrender the tapes. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 651)

6 In a meeting with Ford and Scowcroft the following day, February 21, Kissinger argued that the administration needed a “common strategy” on Congressional testimony. “We can’t have witnesses making decisions on a case-by-case basis;” refusals to testify “should be on their authority and then refer to you [Ford],” Kissinger added. After Ford responded that he “won’t be rolled on this one,” Kissinger related the substance of a meeting he had the previous day with Church. Church, he stated, “wants to be President” and “asked that you [Ford] not seek a confrontation,” adding, “I have the impression that Church may be cooperative because of his ambitions.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 9, February 21, 1975, Ford, Kissinger)
35. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 5, 1975, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Senator Frank Church (D–Idaho)

Senator John Tower (R–Texas)

Philip W. Buchen, Counsel to President

Amb. Donald Rumsfeld, Asst. to President

John O. Marsh, Asst. to President

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Congressional Investigation of CIA

Church: I consider that any investigation that Tower and I agree on should be a source of satisfaction all around.

President: It is an unusual team.

Church: We decided that because of the unusual nature and the sensitivity of the material, we would suppress partisanship, have a unified staff, and rules of confidentiality. We are getting a good staff. They all will have Q clearances. We have had good cooperation from CIA and FBI. We are following security arrangements made by the FBI. We will make sure that documents are properly handled and checked in and out.

As far as the direction of the investigation, Tower and I agree the purpose is not to undermine, harass, or disable our intelligence organizations. The last thing we want to do is imperil the agents, or endanger the United States. But we have to have all the data about intelligence activities so we can discharge our responsibilities to recommend changes.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 9, March 5, 1975, Ford, Kissinger, Senators Frank Church and John Tower. Secret. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 On February 27, Church and Tower met with Colby in Church’s office to discuss security ground rules provided by the CIA to the Church Committee’s Staff Director William G. Miller. Church advised Colby that the rules would be complied with “to the letter.” Church also sought CIA cooperation with employee testimony and accepted Colby’s proposal that Colby issue an employee notice pledges cooperation with the Church Committee’s inquiries. (Central Intelligence Agency, OPI, Executive Registry, Job 79M00467A, Box 18, White House Correspondence Re: Congressional Investigations 010175–311075) A copy of the employee notice as signed and issued by Colby, February 28, is ibid.
and laws. On the domestic charges, we will look very thoroughly at the charges and may have some open hearings. If we can get your cooperation, we can get it done quietly but thoroughly.

President: Do you have any time frame in mind?

Church: The authorization goes to September.

Tower: Our charter is very broad, but we will not go into everything. We will focus the investigation.

Kissinger: You said you need all information about clandestine activities? Every detail on covert operations?

Church: We don’t want to be buried under minutiae. We do need enough to make recommendations about clandestine and surveillance activities. Speed is best for all.

President: I agree. This whole process of leaks and allegations has put CIA into turmoil. It is not now the kind of Agency I knew when I was on the Mahon group.3 We need a very good intelligence community. Until this is over, they will be paralyzed.

Church: True—but if the work is well done it will clear the air and restore the agencies to the good position they should enjoy.

Colby feels that an investigation could correct problems within the community and we should get on with it.

President: How will you work with the House?

Church: I talked to Nedzi. I hope we can cooperate and avoid duplication.

President: He has a problem with committee members. That worries me.

Church: Our Committee attitude seems good. What we need is a directive from you to the agencies which would direct full cooperation with the agencies. As we move along we will need first statutory and budgetary information for a good overview of the community. As we choose the cases which will be the focus of the inquiry. Tower and I agree there will be no partisanship.

President: I agree. It is as much under one party as another.

Church: Probably. Anyway we will go where the evidence leads.

President: Let me respond to your directive request. I gather they have cooperated.

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3 George H. Mahon (D–Texas) was Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, 1963–1978. Ford served as a member of the Committee from 1951 until he became House Minority Leader in 1965. Since 1947, the Senate and House Armed Services and Appropriations Committees had had the principal responsibility for oversight of the CIA.
Church/Tower: Very well.

President: I want to think that over. If I send your committee a letter and you handle it responsibly, don’t I have to do the same for Nedzi? Some of his people have mishandled classified data. So I want to think it over whether to do it separately or one omnibus letter.

Buchen: We will be keeping close tabs on what the intelligence community is doing. To give a directive on an abstract basis adds little. If problems arise, we can settle it on a case-by-case basis.

Church: Our purpose is just to expedite the flow of papers to the Committee.

President: Let’s leave it for now. I will have an individual designated to coordinate and you can deal with him.

Tower: We can get material more quickly through the White House.

Kissinger: I am not aware of any reluctance. If it arises, Church and Tower can come to us.

Church: That’s right, but we are not yet into substance.

President: I will put someone in charge and you can work with him. If then . . .

Church: We want to cooperate. We must decide what to publish, but we would want to coordinate to make sure what . . .

Here is what we want initially: the Executive Orders for intelligence activities, the NSCIDs, and all NSDMs.

Kissinger: That gives you the whole NSC system.

[He describes NSSMs and NSDMs.]

Church: Only the ones relating to intelligence operation. But we want to start with an understanding of the statutory basis of what has gone on.

Kissinger: That means you want a list of all covert operations.

Church: Perhaps we will only want to go back to the last Republican and Democratic Administrations. I don’t think we need to go back to the founding of the CIA.

President: Under the present procedure, if the 40 Committee makes recommendations, I just certify that an operation is in the national interest.

Kissinger: And there are new reporting procedures for each House that are so dangerous that we have done nothing since they were instituted.

President: Let me give a hypothetical case. Suppose there is a recommendation to interfere in another country’s political situation. For a President to have to certify in writing to such things is wrong.
Kissinger: [Speaks of U–2 incident] Similarly, there is an operation going on that is in technical violation of the Law of the Sea. It is one thing to do it; it is another for the President to certify it in a statement to the Congress. I hope you will look into this.

Church: That could result. What we need to know is all that has been going on in clandestine activities so we know what kind of rules and regulations to recommend.

Kissinger: What worries me is not the Committee staff. The 40 Committee approves reconnaissance activities and other things which, if compromised, are lost forever.

Church: I think there are ways the information could be provided which could protect it.

Kissinger: On some, if we could keep the most sensitive to 2 or 3 people.

Tower: Perhaps if Frank and I look at it first and then decide.

Church: Perhaps we could do it that way to decide what to put before the Committee.

Kissinger: Q clearances aren’t enough.

Church: We are not at cross purposes on this.

President: We will look at your memos. We can then have another preliminary meeting and point out the pitfalls if all of this were to be given. Maybe there are 10–20 areas which ought to be given only to you and John.

Church: That is fine. I will leave it with you.

President: This will give us a guideline. We will tell you where there is no problem, when we have difficulty.

Church: We don’t want a problem. We want to stay out of conflict. But the Committee has to have all the essential information. The press always asks the question about the Colby report. This is not a formal request. Colby said it was your property. But somewhere down the line you will have to make a recommendation. We would like to have your view.

Scowcroft: You gave it to the Rockefeller Commission. They will make recommendations.

Church: That raises another point. The Commission has asked for data from Congress. We have provided it and in return we would

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like all the material from the Rockefeller Commission to speed up the process.

President: I need to consult with my advisors to insure this doesn’t leak.

We had a thorough discussion. We will have to make decisions on the special requests of the committees. We will deal with them as they arise.

Church: You may want to invoke Executive Privilege. I hope to the extent possible you wouldn’t do that.

President: We will deal with this on a case-by-case basis.

Church: One other thing with Colby. We suggested getting directly into the files of CIA and FBI rather than them having to ship material down to us. That would greatly expedite the investigation.

President: I would want to consult on this. In theory it is better than trucking material down . . .

Kissinger: That is not the same as letting them go with free access to the files.

President: I presume you are not contemplating free roaming through the files.

Church: No. It would be for specific material.

President: In theory, it seems okay.

Church: The purpose of the meeting was just to say how we intend to proceed. We will come to you and give you specific details later on.

President: It was a constructive meeting. I hope it will achieve the purpose of making any changes in the law to strengthen the agencies and correct any abuses which may have been made in the past.

Church: Who will be the White House contact?

Rumsfeld: We have someone who will be working on it for a few days or so and someone else is tentatively selected.
36. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to the Chairman of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States (Rockefeller)


Dear Mr. Vice President:

In my last appearance before the Commission, you asked me whether or not CIA had lost any effectiveness as a result of directives I issued in 1973 and 1974 with respect to Agency activities.

I attach at Tab A a paper that summarizes a response to this question from the individual directorates within the Agency. The net judgment is that the directives have had only limited impact on the operational capabilities of the Agency. However, I do not want to convey an overly optimistic impression in sending you this assessment. The continuing public disclosures and clamor concerning intelligence matters are having an effect on the willingness of many of our agents and other collaborators to run risks. Attached at Tab B are some details that show this.

As I responded to you when you asked me about our effectiveness, it is my own judgment that the 1973–74 directives were issued in the best interests of the Agency and our Government. That assertion, however, must stand the test of outside review and we will welcome the Commission’s judgment on this important question.

Respectfully,

W.E. Colby

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 79M01476A, Box 17, Colby Appearance Before the Rockefeller Commission, 28 Apr 75, Book II 190973–250475. Secret. A copy was sent to David W. Belin, Executive Director of Rockefeller Commission.

2 For the 1973 directive, see footnote 13, Document 19. A later version of the directive is outlined in message 8786 from Colby to multiple CIA Stations, March 5, 1974. See footnote 14, Document 19. No directive issued on June 5, 1974, has been found.

3 Attached but not printed.

4 Printed from a copy that indicates Colby signed “Bill” above this typed signature.
Impact of the 29 August 1973 and 5 June 1974 Instructions on CIA Operations

1. The instructions that were issued to the CIA directorates on 29 August 1973 and 5 June 1974, covering the wide range of questioned activities now subject to inquiry, appear to have had little effect on the operational capability of CIA. While there may be some modification of this judgment over a longer period of time, at present the negative aspects of the restrictions imposed by the instructions appear to be limited. A summary by directorates is below:

Directorate of Operations

In general the Agency’s basic capability to conduct foreign intelligence operations has not been impaired, either abroad or within the U.S. A limited number of activities are affected, the most significant of which are noted below:

(a) The curtailment of surveillance of Soviet and Chinese mail in the U.S., which was a useful adjunct to information gained abroad [4½ lines not declassified].

(b) The restriction on categories of files on U.S. citizens [1½ lines not declassified] should not, however, affect substantially the Agency’s counterintelligence mission.

(c) [3 lines not declassified]

(d) [9 lines not declassified]

(e) Careful scrutiny now required for the content of communications intercept programs abroad, to ensure that they exclude coverage of U.S. citizens or U.S. companies, sometimes results in elimination of relevant information on foreign targets for which the operations were intended. [4 lines not declassified]

Directorate of Intelligence

There has been no unfavorable impact on the execution of the responsibilities of this directorate as a result of the instructions.
Directorate of Administration

To date there have been no instances in which the instructions have interfered with the directorate’s meeting its responsibilities and the requirements levied on it.

There is concern that there may be some erosion in the support received in the past from various law enforcement agencies and police departments within the U.S., resulting from decreased responsiveness on the part of CIA to their requests, [1 line not declassified]. It remains to be seen to what extent restrictions may inhibit CIA’s timely follow-up in situations in which the protection of intelligence sources and methods is at stake.

[1 paragraph (3 lines) not declassified]

Directorate of Science and Technology

This directorate has found that with one exception the instructions have not hindered the effectiveness of its operations. In fact, the existence of the instructions in explicit form has simplified the making of clear decisions in some instances, providing a basis for declining to provide requested support to other agencies or components in situations where it otherwise would be difficult to do so.

The single exception to date, in which there has been an adverse effect from the instructions, involves information formerly [7 lines not declassified].

2. At present the most troublesome consideration is not the inhibiting effect of the subject instructions, but the impact on foreign intelligence operations of public disclosures of sensitive operational information, which is expected to increase over the next year. [6 lines not declassified] American citizens, who have cooperated with CIA in the past for patriotic reasons, may find critical publicity and the risk of exposure something that they do not wish to undergo. Such developments seriously will impair U.S. foreign intelligence operations for an extended period.
37. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 28, 1975, 2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
The President
James R. Schlesinger, Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld, Assistant to the President
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President
Phillip W. Buchen, Counsel to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
Congressional Investigation of CIA

President: I know you wanted to discuss intelligence. We have set up a group here under Phil. Brent, Jack and Don are on it. We think this is of the highest importance. We look at each request to determine what should go up to the Hill, what shouldn’t, and why. I wanted you to have this background. I would appreciate your thoughts.

Buchen: The USIB also reviews it.

Schlesinger: I take that with a grain of salt. In these times it is less of a community than usual. There is demoralization and contention as to what should be done. Within the CIA there is bitter dissension.

One of my points is that in this period it is difficult for the DCI to serve as leader of the intelligence community as in the 1971 directive. We thought that the DCI should have a management job, operations would be left at Langley and the production would be brought closer to the White House. President Nixon didn’t want legislation so we went for a hybrid. The difficulty is that it is difficult for the DCI to be a manager and also to run the covert and other business. You can change it by patching it or by going for new legislation. The Hill will do it eventually, but maybe you should go in in nine months or so with an organization which would put clandestine operations in a less exposed position such as MI6.

President: Who is under the DCI now?

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, Box 10, March 28, 1975, Ford, Schlesinger, Rumsfeld, Marsh, Buchen. Confidential. All brackets except that accounting for still-classified material are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.


3 MI–6, officially the Secret Intelligence Service, is the British external intelligence agency.
Schlesinger: The line responsibility is CIA. He is also the chairman of the Executive Committee. If Bill becomes spokesman for other elements of the community, it tends to pollute the whole community.

Buchen: The DCI also has management responsibility throughout the community.

Schlesinger: There has been a DCI staff for years, but it wasn’t effective until I and Colby got there.

[There is a discussion about the Director and two hats.]

These arrangements are very fragile right now. Reducing the prominence of CIA operations is desirable in this climate.

If you look at restructuring the intelligence community you should look at a restructuring of the personnel field—it is now full of tired-out old agents.

President: Wouldn’t any proposal for a new intelligence community be submitted in the worst possible atmosphere? Just as the argument against a new director now.

Buchen: We are looking into the structural business quietly.

Schlesinger: In the interim, we have a job of patchwork.

[There is a discussion of separating the DCI from Director of CIA.]

Colby is inclined to be too damned cooperative with the Congress.

Rumsfeld: Colby is not sending papers up against our instructions, but 90% of the contacts we can’t control.

Schlesinger: [1½ lines not declassified].
38. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Buchen) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Request of Senate Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities for Information

By letter dated March 12, 1975, Senator Frank Church on behalf of the Select Committee requested production of four categories of White House documents (Tab A). We have now reviewed substantially all of the subject documents with representatives of the offices of Jack Marsh and Brent Scowcroft and with representatives of the intelligence community. Based upon that review we are now ready to recommend that a significant number of the documents be made available for review by the staff of the Select Committee no later than Tuesday, April 8, 1975. It is the joint judgment of all those who have reviewed the items that they will be helpful to the Committee in its initial objective of establishing the legal structure within which the intelligence community has operated and further, that the material contained in the documents to be released for review will not raise any undue security risks. In this regard we have been reassured by Director Colby’s office that the security arrangements made by the Select Committee are satisfactory for the consideration by the Committee and its staff of classified documents.

We have attached (Tab B) an analysis prepared in the White House of the materials which have been requested under categories 2, 3 and 4 of Tab A so that the distinctions which we have made between materials that can now be released for review and those that cannot may be better understood.

1 Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Release of Documents to the Church Committee, 4/2/75 (1). No classification marking.

2 Attached but not printed, Church’s letter to Ford, March 12, requested Committee access to four categories of documentation discussed in the March 5 meeting (see Document 35). These categories included Colby’s December 24, 1974, report for the President (Document 19); all Executive Orders, NSDMs, NSCIDs, and other White House directives pertaining to the “charter, structure or guidelines for any overt or covert foreign or domestic intelligence agencies or activities;” all Executive Orders, NSC memoranda or directives pertaining to the structure, functions, or organization within the Office of the President; and organization charts for “all intelligence-related organizations within the White House (NSC, Forty Committee, OEP, WSAG, etc.) including names of all key officials and staff personnel.” (Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Release of Documents to the Church Committee, 4/2/75 (1))

3 Attached but not printed.
It is our expectation that an additional number of documents requested by the Select Committee in its letter of March 12 will be appropriate for review by the Committee staff within 14 days.

It is our further expectation that following the later release there will remain certain documents which are so sensitive or so central to the Presidency that they may be studied by representatives of the Select Committee, if at all, only under special circumstances. It may be, for example, that we will recommend that certain of these remaining items be revealed only to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member of the Select Committee. Such a procedure has been agreed to in principle by the Select Committee.

Item number 1 requested by the Select Committee is the report submitted to you on December 24, 1974, by Director Colby concerning alleged improper activities by the CIA (Tab C). By reason of the substantial progress which we have made in processing all other items (2, 3 and 4) in the Select Committee’s request of March 12, we must consider now the question of whether the Colby Report should be released in the very near future. Our present recommendation, subject to further consultation with Director Colby and other representatives of the intelligence community, is that we be prepared to release that report for review by the Select Committee during the week of April 14. Our reasons for this recommendation are:

(1) Much, if not all, of the Annexes to Director Colby’s Report have been independently requested from the CIA which will be releasing such reports during this same time period and with our approval, and the Colby Report puts that material in a better perspective than if staff and Committee members read such material by itself.

(2) Neither our office nor any of the other representatives of the intelligence community have any reluctance to release the Report for review.

(3) A withholding of the Colby Report at the same time we are furnishing substantially all of the balance of the documents requested by the Committee letter of March 12 will focus unnecessary controversy on the Report.

(4) It is apparent from our discussions with the Committee staff that Select Committee members regard the White House response to its request for the Colby Report as a major test of the White House willingness to cooperate.

This memorandum is to alert you to the fact that we will seek final approval of the release of certain documents (see Tab B) for review by the staff of the Select Committee no later than April 8, 1975.

4 Tab C is printed as Document 19.
also wish to review with you our preliminary opinion that the Colby Report be released for review no later than the week of April 14, 1975.

39. **Memorandum for the Record Prepared by the Executive Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence (Knoche)**


**SUBJECT**

DCI Meeting with the President’s Commission

1. The Director met with the Commission for three and one quarter hours this afternoon to answer questions based upon his depositions given to the Staff the preceding week. All members of the Commission were in attendance except for Governor Reagan. The Vice President was in and out. President Shannon left after two hours. The only Staff members in attendance were David Belin and Monte Gray.

2. Gray asked a number of questions about internal Agency controls. The Director was asked how confident he was about knowing about any dubious activities within the Agency. He explained his use of the chain-of-command, communications within the Agency, and such groups as MAG to keep himself posted.

3. There were a number of questions about the Director’s use of the MBO management system. There seemed to be some concern that such systems may not fit the Agency. The Director emphasized the importance of assessing progress in reaching objectives, rather than in consideration, one by one, of individual projects. The Vice President asked how MBO would help in trying to determine what should be done in such trouble spots as [less than 1 line not declassified] Portugal.

4. Gray referred to the tendency of some previous DCI’s to run directly certain operations of special appeal to them. The Director said he

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01009A, Box 17, Rockefeller Commission, 070275–210775. Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

2 Colby gave two deposition interviews to the Commission Staff, April 21 and April 23, covering CIA domestic operations, FBI–CIA relations, external oversight, the roles of the DCI and DDCI, and the application of the MBO program to the Intelligence Community. Minutes of the two interviews were drafted by Knoche and are ibid., Job 79M01476A, Box 17, Colby Appearance Before the Rockefeller Commission, 28 Apr 75, Book II, 190793–250475.
would not undertake such “vest pocket operations”. He sees himself as a manager rather than an operator.

5. There were some questions on the role of the DDCI. The Director and various Commissioners, including the Vice President, had laudatory things to say about General Walters and his background. It was pointed out that the IC Staff Chief is a three-star military job and that this lessens the need for a DDCI from the military services. This led to questions as to whether the DCI should be an outsider and the DDCI an insider. The Director responded by saying that this could be made to work, but that he thought that any such arrangements should not be legislated. General Lemnitzer thought that it was important that the DDCI be from the military in order to “maintain balance” within the Community. He was reminded that the IC Staff job as it is now manned permits of this.

6. There were a number of questions about the role of the Inspector General. Commissioner Griswold was particularly concerned that a staff of somewhere between three and five be thought able to cope with important reviews. The Director said that his experience with past IG reviews did not show them to be all that productive and he thought a very small IG Staff could deal with appropriate internal reviews. He outlined his own view that the staff should be kept slim so that the line can concentrate on the real work. The Vice President questioned this saying that he thought the role of the staff was to plan and think, and the role of the line was to act. The Director said he thought that picking the best possible people to act in the line would also permit them to think and plan as well.

7. Griswold asked for the DCI’s concurrence, which he got, with the general proposition that the Inspector General should be enhanced and its responsibilities broadened.

8. Gray noted the Director’s efforts to develop a freer flow of communication with the Agency in efforts to break down unnecessary compartmentation. He asked if this does not cause some within the Agency to grow concerned about security. The Director said this was possible but it is something we believe we can handle.

9. Returning to MBO and internal auditing, Griswold asked if there were perhaps not too much concentration on efficiency and results without a comparable look at legalities and proprieties. The Director said legalities and proprieties are considered when a project is approved and that the auditing is designed to determine whether our resources have been productive.

10. Commissioner Kirkland asked about the role of the General Counsel in the approval process. The Director said the tradition has been that the General Counsel’s comments are sought when matters are referred to him. All new operational proposals are not sent to the
General Counsel, though if contracts or operational sensitivities are involved they would be. Kirkland asked if the General Counsel, in this day and age, would be consulted on the approval of activities like that of the Ober Project (MHCHAOS). The Director said yes.

11. Gray noted that often an approved Agency operation seems to change perceptibly in its thrust over time. He asked how operations can be kept monitored and controlled. The Director said his chain-of-command, internal communications and reliance on employees are his best bet. Griswold asked if this would not be an ideal charge for the IG? The Director said yes, but repeated that past IG inspections have not proved all that useful in surveying questionable activities.

12. Gray asked if there were a mechanical way to get the General Counsel cut in on all projects. The Director noted that he personally frequently asks the General Counsel for his view and that this is serving as an example to his subordinates.

13. Gray asked about the DCI Directives of 1973 and 1974, and in particular, how they are devised. The Director said he personally had dictated them and had invited comments from those to whom they were sent. He noted that not all of the directives were in our regulations; not all need be. Those that should be will be so included.

14. Commissioner Shannon noted recent press stories concerning details of intelligence activities and asked the Director for his views on the origin. The Director noted the interest of the press in pursuing these subjects and the availability of ex-employees and others who can provide bits and pieces which the press stitches together to form the stories.

15. The Vice President asked the Director to describe the nature of his meetings with Seymour Hersh prior to the New York Times story of 22 December 1974.

16. Questions then turned to outside controls, beginning with the Congress. The Director said a Joint Committee would be our best bet. As things stand now he must report to six committees and protection of security is difficult, if not impossible. He was asked for any examples of flagrant violations. He cited the case of the Chile disclosure last year.

17. In response to questions, the Director urged augmentation of the PFIAB role to include outside reviews of intelligence activities. He

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3 MHCHAOS was the code name for the CIA’s domestic spying operation begun in 1967.
4 See footnote 2, Document 36.
5 See Document 17.
pointed out that one particular value of outside inspection is that it forces instructions to devise matching inside inspection arrangements.

18. Belin suggested that an independent commission might be established to review the Community every few years. The Director said this would be an approach similar to his PFIAB suggestion.

19. The Director also urged that there be some kind of annual public report by PFIAB to help build public understanding.

20. The Director was asked if the NSCIC has played a useful role. The Director noted that it had met almost not at all.

21. General Lemnitzer asked how CIA and DIA differences are handled at USIB, and the Director discussed procedures and philosophy.

22. Commissioner Shannon asked if it would be good to establish a six- or eight-year term for the DCI. The Director said this might be a good idea if it were assumed that one serves at the pleasure of the President. The Director certainly agreed that no one should be allowed to lock into the job for an excessively long period of time.

23. Commissioner Shannon asked if it would be a problem if an unclassified Commission report were to mention the organization and internal operations of the Agency. [2 lines not declassified]

24. The Director was asked if he had ever been asked to tailor intelligence estimates. The Director replied in the negative. He said that Dr. Kissinger never asked him to discuss positions prior to meetings and that neither Kissinger nor Schlesinger is reluctant to criticize. The DCI finds that, in the main, disagreements and various points of view within the National Security Council are useful to the President and his consideration of alternatives. The Director cited the absolute need for there to be an independent intelligence agency in this context.

25. Questions turned to assassination allegations. [3 lines not declassified] The Director said that revolutions inevitably cause blood to flow but there is a difference in backing a side in a revolution and an out-and-out assassination plan. Gray asked if the DCI would inform the 40 Committee of qualifications and implications in any proposed plan concerning support to a revolution. The Director answered yes.

26. Belin asked if there were any evidence known to Director Colby that the CIA was involved in any way in a conspiracy to assassinate President Kennedy. The Director said absolutely not.

27. Belin asked if there were any evidence known to Director Colby that Oswald was a CIA agent of any kind. The Director’s response was

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6 Lee Harvey Oswald.
in the negative. Belin asked if he had ever been provided any money or other support from the Agency. The Director said no.

28. Belin noted that Allen Dulles had once been quoted as saying that he would lie to protect intelligence information. He asked Mr. Colby if he would do so also. The Director said no that there could be occasions when he would not want to discuss all information but that he would not lie to Congress or to duly constituted authority.

29. Belin asked whether the Director would carry out an order from the President to do something but not to inform State, Defense or PFIAB. The Director said yes, since this would be a matter of a President’s authority as head of the Executive Department. Belin asked what he would do if the President asked him to carry out an activity, but not tell Congress. The Director said he would have trouble here because he was pledged not to keep secrets from Congress and had so stated in his confirmation hearings. Griswold asked in such hypothetical cases would the Director resign and make the matter a public issue by going to Congress. The Director said he might have to resign but he would not make such an issue a public spectacle.

30. Belin asked whether compartmentation can prevent the DCI from knowing everything that is going on. The Director said that he couldn’t know everything that is going on, but that he should know about the programs and the general thrust of the activities and he repeated his reliance on chain-of-command, Management Committee, MAG, communications, etc.

31. The Director cited the importance of the Commission’s formulating its recommendations in such a way that we are allowed to operate within the United States. He noted the availability here of key foreigners. He mentioned current efforts to state the guidance for such activities, referring to NSCID #9. It has been staffed and prepared for USIB’s consideration prior to going to the NSC.

32. The Director was invited to discuss his views of counterintelligence and the details of Angleton’s departure. The Director went into considerable detail on this and tabled with the Commission, as Exhibit A, a paper prepared on the subject (attached).

33. One particular aspect of this arose when Commissioner Dillon said that the Commission had been advised that [names not declassified] had been told they couldn’t stay in their jobs. The Director said that was not his intention, that they were to be told simply that neither would succeed to Angleton’s job at the top of the CI Staff.

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7 See footnote 5, Document 22.
8 Not found attached. See footnote 2, Document 18.
34. Dillon referred to a recent magazine article which made the charge that Colby had instructed that the skeleton reports be drafted by the IG in such a way as to point blame at Angleton. The Director said there was no substance to this and invited the Commission to query [names not declassified] the authors of the report.

35. Belin asked if the Agency were losing morale and initiative as a result of the reviews. The Director said this is a danger but he thought we could pull out of this problem if the reviews can culminate with an understanding of the importance of intelligence rather than concentrating on hobgoblins.

36. Commissioner Dillon asked about the statutes concerning intelligence sources and methods. He asked the Director if he considered this a gray area. The Director said no, that he thought he had responsibilities to protect such information but authority resided with enforcement components. He invited the Commission to help us in efforts to get the law tightened.

37. Belin asked the standard question as to whether additional “bomb shells” still existed within the CIA files and records not yet uncovered by the Commission. The Director said he was not aware of any and was as interested as the Commission is in assuring credibility on this.

38. Commissioner Kirkland asked if the Agency has ever studied oversight arrangements covering foreign intelligence agencies. The Director said we had not but there is in general very little oversight abroad.

39. The Director urged that the Commission’s recommendations not prevent appropriate forms of surveillance. He particularly needs authorities to carry out surveillance with regard to Agency employees and a general prohibition can be harmful.

40. Commissioner Dillon noted that the White House staff frequently makes requests of the Agency. Some of them are for substantive intelligence which presents no problems, but some are for operational support which may be improper. He thought it might be a good idea to designate one officer close to the top of the Agency who would be informed of all requests for operational support to the White House. The Director thought this a very good idea.

41. Griswold returned to the problem of leakiness of some ex-employees and to the fact that Howard Hunt was able to get information directly from Agency officials. He asked whether all such relations with ex-employees should not be cut off. The Director felt there was no way to cut off friendly relationships but that it was a situation in need of watching. In Hunt’s case, most of what he sought was known to the Deputy Director and it would be hard to criticize the working level.
42. Commissioner Kirkland asked for the Director’s comments on the Tom Braden thesis about remaking the Agency. The Director said that a transfer of the analysis and production function to State would sacrifice the independence and objectiveness that is the Agency’s hallmark. He said that the transfer of covert actions to Defense would leave the problem of how to avoid official attribution to activities that must not be official. The Director was particularly critical of the Braden idea that the spymasters and paymasters be put off in a tool shed to accomplish their job. The Director said this is just the opposite of what we need.

43. The DCI was asked if he had any final thoughts or recommendations. He recommended that a decision be made on how to handle the classified records of the Commission when the Commission completes its work. He said that they could go to CIA Archives under appropriate control or simply to the National Archives. In any event, he was concerned about the sensitivities of the papers. The Director also noted that he did not wish to intervene in any way in the substance of the Commission’s final report but since it would be unclassified he would have a concern about revelation of sources and methods. He suggested that the report be made available to the President and be sent from there to the Director for advice on the security score prior to its publication.

E.H. Knoche

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9 On April 27, the Washington Post reprinted a Saturday Review article by journalist Tom Braden in which he suggested several reforms for the CIA, including turning over psychological warfare to the Voice of America, limiting covert operations to aiding “friendlies” with money, and appointing as CIA chief a civilian “who has demonstrated staunchness of character and independence of mind” for fixed, non-renewable term of six years. (Tom Braden, “CIA: Power and Arrogance,” Washington Post, April 27, 1975, p. 34)
40. Memorandum From the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (Graham) to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Brown)


SUBJECT
Future Organization of the Intelligence Community

1. Attached is a copy of an article from an April 27th Washington Post by Tom Braden. It calls for the dissolution of CIA. This is a studied piece and there is some merit in his arguments. There have been several others like it far more polemic in tone in various magazines and newspapers. They all point to a growing possibility that, after all of the Congressional investigations of intelligence, CIA will cease to exist in the form it has over the past 20 years. I believe it essential that DOD/JCS formulate its own concept of Intelligence Community reorganization or we may be stuck with harmful and ignorant solutions concocted by Congressional staff members. Further, some notion of desired outcome is essential to those of us in military intelligence who will be required to testify before the Congressional committees.

2. I have outlined below my views on this matter. I have discussed them with Lew Allen who essentially agrees with me. He has carried these views to Mr. Schlesinger who is also in essential agreement. I have also discussed these views with Gene Tighe and intend to discuss them with John Elder but with no one else. Naturally, neither Allen nor I wish to be characterized as kicking a wounded dog.

3. The last two Directors of Central Intelligence, Schlesinger and Colby, have tried hard to implement the Presidential decision of 1971 on the Intelligence Community. As you know, this directive stressed the DCI’s role as head of the Community rather than his role as Director of CIA. Schlesinger set up, and Colby supported, an Intelligence Community Staff headed up by a three-star uniform officer and staffed from the entire Community rather than just by CIA. There have been significant improvements in Community management as a result. However, the effectiveness of this arrangement has always been more dependent than is normally the case in bureaucratic arrangements.
on the character and style of two men—the DCI and his military IC Deputy. Without strong DCI support, the IC Staff is no match for the CIA barons. Further, the events of recent months cast doubt on the continuing viability of the notion that the DCI can serve both as the senior officer in CIA and the head of the Intelligence Community. For instance, none of the Intelligence Community is now willing to have Mr. Colby speak for them in the Congressional hearings. Colby is fighting for the institutional life of his agency and this is bound to take precedence over protecting the equities of the Department of Defense, Department of State, and other intelligence activities. IC Staff effectiveness in Community leadership is also degraded by ASD(I) attempts to perform the IC Staff mission as it pertains to DIA, NSA, NRO, [less than 1 line not declassified] and Service Intelligence activities.

4. My view of future Intelligence Community organization rests on the following assumptions:

   a. There is an unacceptable conflict of interest between the DCI and his role as head of CIA and that as an authoritative leader of the Intelligence Community.

   b. There remains a strong need for an extra departmental intelligence element serving the NSC with highly aggregated intelligence analysis—military, political, and economic.

   c. The need for a U.S. clandestine service remains.

   d. The Department of Defense has the capability to undertake intelligence programs of size and secrecy.

5. My basic proposal is along these lines:

   a. The Director, Central Intelligence, remains the senior U.S. intelligence officer reporting to the President and the NSC but with his responsibilities limited essentially to the production of National Intelligence Estimates and advice on National Intelligence Programs. His analytical and estimative functions would be restricted to those essential to National policy decision. His production staff would be divested of analytical efforts which would be delegated to the other agencies, e.g., military intelligence to DIA; political intelligence to INR, State; economic intelligence to Treasury and INR. The DCI would retain adequate capabilities to integrate all products competently. The USIB and its committee structure would be retained, chaired by the DCI. The IC Staff function and the National Intelligence Officers would be retained, staffed by detail from the various elements of the Intelligence Community. The NSC Intelligence Committee currently chaired by Mr. Kissinger would no longer be required.

   b. The DCI would retain a role in Community resource decisions concerning major National intelligence systems through his chairma-
ship of the IRAC and EXCOM. His effectiveness in these roles would be greatly enhanced as he would be divested of the conflicting role as spokesman for CIA program managers.

c. Major programmatic activities now resident in CIA, such as satellite procurement and operation, the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the Foreign Broadcasting Information Service, etc., are transferred to DoD elements, as appropriate. The satellite business should go to the Air Force NRO; NPIC to DIA, FBIS and development of advanced SIGINT hardware to NSA.

d. The clandestine services should be formed into an independent collection apparatus subordinate to the NSC, with strict adherence to anonymity, low visibility, and restricted to activities which must be done clandestinely. The highly visible overseas establishments of the clandestine service would be reduced to low visibility clandestine operations and liaison with foreign clandestine services.

6. I believe that the above measures will constitute an effective, and palatable to Congress, reorganization of intelligence. They would have their independent reporting capability to offset what they consider to be self-serving intelligence by the DoD and other departments. They would have some checks and balances in the problems of resource allocation. With the DCI in an independent role, rather than as spokesman for CIA, the Intelligence Community will respond much more readily to his guidance. With clear responsibility for sophisticated intelligence collection systems, the DoD can much more readily support both Washington and Commanders in the field with responsive intelligence and break down barriers of compartmentalization which have frequently been the tool of CIA managers to retain bureaucratic control. Further the sharp delineation of the clandestine service function would remove its pervasive influence over the rest of the Intelligence Community’s activities. As the central activity of the CIA, it has always tended to provide a means of obstructing other intelligence efforts and a convenient method for withholding intelligence from the Community at large. The clandestine mystique at CIA works directly counter to Community coordination functions of the DCI.

7. Even without the current pressures on CIA, technology would have driven us to new Community arrangements in any case. With near-real-time photography and signals intelligence from overhead satellites, the application of the so-called “National means” to the basic military intelligence problem is becoming more and more evident. Old

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4 The Intelligence Resources Advisory Committee comprised representatives from the Departments of State and Defense and the Office of Management and Budget who advised the Director of Central Intelligence about the consolidated intelligence budget.
arrangements whereby satellites were tasked by a cumbersome committee system headed up by CIA are no longer viable. In crises, the new satellites [less than 1 line not declassified] will have to respond to commanders. Not all requests will be met. Priorities will have to be set among military commanders’ requests and this must be done by the JCS, not by a civilian agency. As of today, CIA is attempting to take full control of [less than 1 line not declassified] via its managership of NPIC. NPIC’s product today is at least 95% in the military field. With the advent [less than 1 line not declassified] this percentage will go up and the direct application of photography to military operations will sharply increase. For that reason, NPIC should be brought under the control of the JCS through subordination of DIA.

8. Should the reorganization outlined above come to pass, we will probably require some reorganization within the DoD. Certainly, ASD(I) cannot be placed in the position it would like to be in, that is managing three large programs—DIA, NRO and NSA. ASD(I)’s function should be changed to that of: Comptroller for Intelligence Resources without further capability to dabble in the management affairs of the three major intelligence components or in the problems of tactical/national intelligence interface.

Daniel O. Graham
Lieutenant General, USA

41. Memorandum From Vice President Rockefeller to President Ford¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Report by James J. Angleton, former Chief of Counterintelligence for the CIA

During the course of the inquiry of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States we received testimony from James J. Angleton.

Among the matters he discussed with the Commission was his belief that the counterintelligence activities of the CIA had been seriously

¹ Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Report by James J. Angleton. No classification marking.
undercut by certain organizational changes instituted by Director Colby.

Angleton’s presentation so impressed the Commission members that he was asked to prepare a special memorandum on the subject.

Unfortunately, that memorandum was not delivered until the day before the Commission’s Report was due, and so could not be included in its Report.

However, I think the information in the memorandum should be brought to your attention, and I am attaching a copy to this memo for that purpose.

Nelson A. Rockefeller

Attachment

Report by the Former Chief of the Counterintelligence Staff, Central Intelligence Agency (Angleton) to the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States

Washington, undated.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON CIA ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Vice President and Members of the Commission:

In accordance with the Commission’s request, my former colleagues and myself submit herewith a critique of the counterintelligence function in the Agency. We welcome the Commission’s interest in this matter because it will be the first review of U.S. counterintelligence at such a responsible level in Government. In any event, it is urged that authoritative attention, beyond the life of the Commission, be given to the scope and role of counterintelligence in the Intelligence Community. This action is imperative because the current leadership is almost totally uninformed and inexperienced in the specialty of counterintelligence, and its authority for changes is being permitted to go unchallenged. The result is reflected in the failure to maintain continuity in this function. We believe that unless there are some enforceable guidelines set forth by a higher authority, the conduct of effective counterintelligence by the Government will be lost for years to come.

2 See footnote 2, Document 42.
3 Secret; Sensitive; [handling restriction not declassified].
[Omitted here is general discussion of the value of counterintelligence and the bona fides of Soviet defectors.]

Given the inability of the Intelligence Community to come to grips with the problems raised by counterintelligence, it is suggested that the only solution to the very unsatisfactory situation today would be the appointment of an ombudsman who would be authorized to act directly on behalf of the National Security Council on serious interagency problems which have a direct bearing on the plans and capabilities of the Communist Bloc and involve the more sensitive operations of counterintelligence. Alternatively, consideration could be given to the responsibilities of the Chairman of PFIAB, which might be enlarged to satisfy this need.

As Attachment A, I submit a letter and attachment which was submitted to the Secretary of Defense on 31 January 1975. Given the march of events and the uncertainties involved, in addition to the responsibilities of his high office, it is understandable, perhaps, that the Secretary has not wished to become entangled in disputation on this subject matter as long as the Agency and its various Directors are being subjected to investigation. Nevertheless, in our view, the issues involving Soviet strategic disinformation and our defense posture go to the heart of national security insofar as they relate to estimates affecting the world balance of power. Additionally, we believe it to be most misleading for one to assume that estimates derived from technical collection alone justify the negotiation of finite disarmament and other treaties with the Soviet Bloc governments unless there is corresponding high-level covert intelligence production which supplements and confirms the findings of technical collection.

This view argues against the philosophy now being aired with Olympian aplomb that technical coverage alone is a substitute for clandestine sources or that it gives a reliable data base which justifies a super power to bargain away its strength. (Attachment B sets forth the views of Mr. Paul Nitze and his first-hand impression of the SALT talks. Of particular interest is his description of the atmospherics: [a] the peculiar role of the KGB among Soviet negotiators, and [b] how an uninformed U.S. representative learned from the Soviet delegation of changes in the U.S. negotiating positions arrived at in Washington. The KGB attempted similar ploys during the Johnson Administration with a former high official of President Kennedy’s on the Vietnam issue.)

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4 Attached but not printed.
5 Attachment B is attached but not printed. Nitze was a member of the delegation to the SALT II negotiations.
6 Brackets in the original.
If there be validity to the information derived from Golitsyn,\textsuperscript{7} then it would follow that détente and estimates derived therefrom are misleading with regard to the events in Portugal, Vietnam and other areas where we are in competition with the Soviets and the Bloc. A more accurate picture could be obtained if the structure of the Intelligence Community, in its processing of information, were less concerned with public or overt data regarding the Soviet Bloc intentions, such as the reporting of Ambassadors and other representatives, and instead give full faith and credit to secret information from bona fide sources who are or were within the Soviet Bloc system and whose warnings regarding disinformation have been universally ignored. To repeat, it is the opinion of these sources that the bulk of information available to the West through Soviet Bloc contacts, regarding the strategy and aims of the Eastern Bloc, is, on the whole, spurious and represents little more than coordinated handouts which advance the interests of Soviet Bloc strategic disinformation at many levels of communications.

The remainder of this report represents the status, as of March 1975, of U.S. counterintelligence, primarily within the CIA, but also, as the perspective requires, at the national level. The discussion consists of four parts:

The authority under which CIA conducts counterintelligence activities.

The nature of those activities.


Recommendations which we respectfully urge the Commission to submit to the President for his consideration.

\textbf{I. The Authority}

The current version of National Security Council Intelligence Directive No. 5, U.S. Espionage and Counterintelligence Activities Abroad, effective 17 February 1972, is the charter for the conduct of foreign clandestine activities by CIA and by the other members of the U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence community.\textsuperscript{8} NSCID/5 defines counterintelligence as “... that intelligence activity, with its resultant product, devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and undertaken to protect the security of the nation and its personnel, information and installations against espionage, sabotage and subversion. Counterintelligence includes the process of procuring, developing, recording and disseminating information con-

\textsuperscript{7} KGB officer Anatoly Golitsyn defected from the Soviet Union in 1961.

cerning hostile clandestine activity and of penetrating, manipulating or repressing individuals, groups or organizations conducting such activity.”

As defined, counterintelligence consists of two parts, security and counterespionage. Security is essentially the static defenses erected against the clandestine activities of adversaries of the U.S., whereas counterespionage is aggressive activity of engaging the adversary clandestinely.

NSCID/5 stipulates that the Director of Central Intelligence shall undertake specified actions in order to ensure centralized direction of all clandestine activities within the scope of the Directive. It also charges CIA with primary responsibility for U.S. clandestine activities abroad and permits other departments and agencies to conduct such foreign clandestine activities as are supplementary or are necessary to their security. Departmental counterintelligence is brought together through two Director of Central Intelligence Directives, one which requires coordination in advance with CIA on clandestine counterintelligence operations abroad, and the other which stipulates that CIA shall serve as a central repository of foreign counterintelligence data to the Intelligence Community.

The flow of authority is from the National Security Council to the Director of Central Intelligence to the Deputy Director for Operations to the central counterintelligence unit of CIA or to an area division to provide whatever assistance the Director may require to discharge his obligations under NSCID/5 and its assignment to him of responsibility for the protection of methods and sources or under other laws, orders and directives. The immediate mandate of the counterintelligence component, however, is derived from those responsibilities assigned directly to CIA (and thus chiefly from paragraphs 1b, 3b, 3c, 3d and 9 of NSCID/5, the chief provisos of which have been noted above).

In our view the DCI is not exercising under NSCID/5 responsible centralized direction of counterintelligence clandestine activity. As indicated to the Commission in verbal testimony, the current Director has spent less than four to five hours with the Counterintelligence Staff from the moment he became the Deputy Director for Operations until the present. His knowledge of the activity during the period when he was Chief of the Far East Division was one of failure and is reflected in an Inspector General’s report of the period. This and some of his communications to the field are a matter of record in the FE Division. Instead of exercising leadership in resolving the serious problems of penetration and disinformation, which are of prime importance to the security of the country, under his aegis there has been a decentralization and mutilation within the Agency and, therefore, within the Community of high-level counterintelligence activity. We believe that sub-
stantial changes are needed and that these changes should be effected with and through an understanding of our counterintelligence mission, capabilities and needs. In setting forth our collective views on these matters, we do so, drawing on our professional experience as to what needs to be set right and how it may be done. The primary cause of the present vulnerability of our national security is the inadequate attention and serious lack of understanding of the counterintelligence function.

[Omitted here are Parts II and III, describing the nature of counterintelligence activities and summarizing the history of the CIA counterintelligence service.]

IV. Recommendations

The following recommendations are presented for the consideration of the Commission with the sole intent of revitalizing national counterintelligence and enabling it to discharge its assigned responsibilities in furtherance of national security. To this end we propose the following changes:

1. That the Operational Directorate of CIA assign not less than one-tenth of its component to counterintelligence.

2. That of this total about half be assigned to a central counterintelligence unit in Headquarters and that the remaining half be divided among the various Area Divisions and branches in Headquarters and selected Agency stations abroad.

3. That CIA provide this cadre with counterintelligence training in depth.

4. That selected counterintelligence personnel be rotated through Headquarters and field assignments of growing responsibility in accordance with career plans that afford them opportunities for advancement which equal those of their Agency colleagues.

5. That counterintelligence designees abroad work under the nominal command of Chiefs of Station but that they engage in counterintelligence work full time and that they have privacy channels of communications with the Headquarters counterintelligence unit which will ensure that access to their sensitive information remains on a compartmented, need-to-know basis.

6. That close operational liaison between the FBI and the counterintelligence unit be fostered, and that direct, operational, domestic liaison with other U.S. departments and agencies by the counterintelligence unit be maintained to whatever extent the national interest requires.

7. That the U.S. establish a single central organ to formulate policy for national strategic deception and to deal with adversary deception, specifically including disinformation. Further, that this body have the
necessary access to policy-creating levels of the U.S. Government and that it have the necessary measure of jurisdiction over Governmental components engaged in deception and counterdeception.

8. That CIA counterintelligence liaison abroad be improved through a judicious augmentation of exchange of counterintelligence information, including penetration leads, by augmentation of U.S. capacity for leadership in dealing with the common adversary, and the expansion of the cadre of counterintelligence liaison officers abroad.

9. That CIA undertake a more vigorous program to obtain further data about the intelligence and counterintelligence services of China, Cuba and Eastern Europe, so that our knowledge of them becomes fully comparable with our knowledge of the Soviet services, and that these increased holdings be placed in machine records as rapidly as their size warrants.

10. That the U.S., and especially the FBI and the CIA, intensify counterintelligence work against Soviet and other illegals.

11. That within the expanded counterintelligence unit in CIA headquarters a defector section be created and that this section be responsible for supervising the operational handling and continuing debriefing of designated defectors, both abroad and in the U.S., the latter responsibility to be assigned in agreement with the FBI and other affected departments and agencies.

12. That the chief of the counterintelligence unit have direct and frequent access to the Director of Central Intelligence and other Deputy Directors and members of the Intelligence Community engaged in security and counterintelligence to ensure that counterintelligence considerations are given due weight in the formulation of policy and that counterintelligence capabilities are fully utilized in defending CIA and other U.S. departments and agencies against clandestine activity, including penetration operations, carried out by our adversaries.

James Angleton
SUBJECT

Comments on the Rockefeller Report

I assume that some part or all of the report will be published quite soon. So the immediate problem is what stand the White House or the President takes on the report as a whole, how to deal with the specific recommendations, and how to deal with the related questions that inevitably will arise out of the report, especially the question of assassination.

I. Publication of the Report as a Whole

A case could be made for publication in two stages: (1) publish Part I, which includes all the findings and recommendations, and, (2) the follow up chapters which give the details later when all of the recommendations have been staffed and decided.

—The argument for this is that the summary focuses more on the constructive aspect, what is to be done in the way of remedial action, while the entire report only provides grist for the more gory details. There are tidbits scattered throughout the report that will make fascinating stories in the press, prompt all sorts of speculations and further inquiries e.g., what reporters were tapped, whose office was broken into, what files on what Congressmen still exist, who are the officials identified with Operation CHAOS, who are the police officials given

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 405, Department of State, Commissions—Commission on CIA Activities Within the U.S. (Rockefeller Commission), Chron File, June 1975. Secret; Sensitive.

2 In a June 4 memorandum to Scowcroft, McFarlane wrote that the Rockefeller Commission had completed its work and produced a rough draft of its final report. McFarlane stated that it would be “imprudent” to discuss releasing the report until it had been reviewed. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Robert C. McFarlane Files, Box 2, Rockefeller Commission—Report) On June 5, President Ford discussed with Kissinger and Scowcroft the timing of the report’s release and Rockefeller’s view that it be released immediately. On this, Kissinger stated that the Vice President “has to be slowed down.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Memoranda of Conversations, Box 12, June 5, 1975, Ford, Kissinger) The complete 299-page Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States was ultimately released to the public on June 10. Organized in four parts and including seven appendices, the report covers the CIA’s role and authority and its supervision and control, with individual chapters on CIA domestic operations and a summary of the Commission’s main findings, conclusions, and recommendations. (Report to the President by the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975)
gratuities, what defector was incarcerated, who died from LSD, etc., etc.

—On the other hand, failure to release the entire report (subject to some security deletions or rephrasing) will precipitate charges of cover up, and possibly stimulate inspired leaks to prove a point.

On balance, the prudent course would seem to be to publish all of the report at one time, and for the White House to try at the outset to set the tone and approach that the Executive Branch and the Congress should follow.

II. The Report as a Whole

A first reading of the full text suggests that the impact on the CIA is going to be very bad; the defenders of the agency are not going to find much ammunition, and the critics are going to have a field day, citing chapter and verse of various wrong doings.

—This will be offset in some degree by the very forthrightness of the report, which seems quite thorough and pulls few punches (there will be some carping over the bland euphemisms for “Illegal”).

I suspect that there will immediately be a polemical debate over whether the charges were “true” or not:

—The Administration’s position, assuming it supports the report, is contained in Chapter 3, which strikes the main, overall theme:

“A detailed analysis of the facts has convinced the Commission that the great majority of the CIA domestic activities comply with its statutory authority.”

—This refutes the initial charge of “massive” abuses; but it will probably only shift the debate to charges of systematic violations of the law over a long period.

The rebuttal, also in Chapter 3, is fourfold: (1) some activities should be criticized and not permitted to happen again; (2) some activities were initiated or ordered by Presidents; (3) some were in the doubtful area between those responsibilities delegated to the CIA by Congress or the NSC and those activities specifically prohibited; and, finally (4) some were plainly unlawful.

The other principal theme that should be emphasized is:

“The Agency’s own recent actions, undertaken for the most part in 1973 and 1974, have gone far to terminate the activities upon which this investigation has focused.”

In short, whatever statements or announcements that may be made at the time of publication, the following points need to be stressed:

1. The initial charges of “massive” illegalities have not been substantiated;
2. Those abuses that did occur were not part of a systematic pattern of disregard for the law or statutes, but were (a) in response to orders, (b) a byproduct of legitimate activities, or (c) in only some instances plainly illegal and inexplicable;

3. All abuses have been terminated;

4. The remaining problems, dealt with in some of the specific recommendations are either structural ones, of Agency supervision inside and out, clarity of its mandate or internal policing and discipline.

III. Recommendations

Obviously, the President cannot dispose of 30 recommendations in a few days. There is nothing to be gained by a wholesale endorsement of the recommendations, even though the bulk of them follow logically from the activities that were questionable or illegal.

The Commission identifies three areas of recommendations: (1) to clarify the doubt concerning the Agency’s authority; (2) to strengthen the Agency’s structure; and (3) to guard against recurrences of these improprieties.

At the time of publication the White House probably cannot avoid some comment on categories (1) and (3).

The President or the White House spokesman could and probably should endorse the Commission’s first three major recommendations:

1. To amend Section 403 of the NSC Act in order to make explicit that the CIA activities must be related to foreign intelligence; clarify the responsibility of the CIA to protect intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure and confirm the CIA’s existing authority to collect foreign intelligence in the US from willing sources.

2. To issue an Executive Order prohibiting the CIA from the collection of information about the domestic activities of US citizens, etc.

3. To recommend that the Congress consider establishing a Joint Intelligence Committee.

The White House could state that it will submit the Commission recommendations on proposed legislation to the Congress for consideration by the new select committees and that the President will issue an Executive Order within a few days.

Recommendations 4–11, deal with the Agency’s budget, the PFIAB, relations between CIA and the Justice Department and internal organization of CIA—These do not call for immediate comment, but pose no great problems per se.

Almost all the remaining recommendations can be characterized as strictures on what the Agency should do.

—For the bulk of them the White House might say that the President requested Mr. Colby to report to the President as soon as possible how he
would carry out those recommendations that concern the internal workings of the Agency, i.e., issuing internal guidelines, ceasing and prohibiting in the future certain activities, etc.;

—The White House might also say that the Justice Department has been requested to make a proposal to the President as to how it would carry out those recommendations that concern them (Recommendation 14);

—Since Recommendation 30 calls for the DCI and the Director, FBI, to submit a report to the NSC on jurisdictional responsibilities, that report would also be requested by the White House.

There is at least one recommendation that is a non-starter. Recommendation 29 calls for establishing a civilian agency to oversee the civilian use of overhead intelligence photography in order to avoid concern that the CIA in the US is misusing a CIA developed system.

—To some extent this is being done, without arousing sensitivities.

—There could be a problem if a civilian agency can make claims on the capacity of a system that is overwhelmingly important to strategic and tactical intelligence. The result would be a conflict between domestic and intelligence priorities. You may want to read the chapter that deals with David Young and the Nixon White House.

The Commission conclusion states on page 32:

“Finally, the Commission concludes that the requests for assistance by the White House reflect a pattern for actual and attempted misuse of the CIA by the Nixon Administration.”

The Commission recommends (26) that a single and exclusive high-level channel should be established for transmission of all White House requests to the Agency. This channel should be run by an officer of the NSC staff designated by the President and the office of the Director or his deputy.

—This strikes me as almost totally impractical, unless “requests” are defined to mean only operations. Obviously, you do not want to restrict the normal working relations on such things as SALT.

IV. Related Questions

Assassinations

My own view is that the domestic “abuses” are becoming old news, and the new frontier is the assassinations scandal.

—The report is a time bomb on this subject; it admits a lack of time, and dumps the issue in the President’s lap.

—This raises the immediate questions: how will the President proceed? Will he conduct his own investigation, will he simply turn it over
to the Church Committee, which is already off and running, or will he ask the Rockefeller Commission to resume its work.

—Some answer is obviously going to be required as soon as the report is published.

—There is considerable merit in asking the Commission to resume or continue its work (or at least do a staff study). It has a structure and staff and could finish fairly soon, thus providing some Executive Branch mechanism to deal with a very explosive issue.

—The alternatives have drawbacks: the Church Committee will proceed in any case, but the initiative and control shifts to the Congress.

—A Presidential investigation by the White House is simply impractical; finding a new Commission is also inefficient and loses time. In any case, the ultimate issue is not whether the CIA was involved but whether it was acting under Presidential mandate or on its own. Finally the office of the President has a moral obligation to past Presidents to clarify the record within the Executive Branch and only the White House has the key files.

_Prosecution for Offenses_

The question has already been raised of possible prosecution: There are numerous instances throughout the report of criminal offenses; at least one death is reported.

The choices are:

(1) To turn over the report to the Justice Department and let nature take its course;

—this would probably mean also turning over supporting material, names and places, etc.,

—it may be a breach of the Commission’s procedures to encourage prosecution, but this will be a thin reed,

—it would seem very likely that the net result would be some prosecution,

—there is even an outside chance that previous DCIs could be prosecuted.

(2) The alternative is to take a high road, and state that the Commission’s purpose was to examine the institutional questions, as well as an individual’s mistakes, and that an ex post facto investigation of Justice would not serve any constructive purpose—with the emphases on a constructive end of the Commission’s work.

—This may not be legally or politically sustainable, but the alternative is messy and probably unjust.

_Disposition of the Committee Records_

The Church Committee obviously will sustain pressure to have the White House turn over documents available to the Commission.
—The best position is to negotiate ad hoc and case by case, rather than take the political heat of opposing such a request outright, or granting them total access.

—Personal interviews and so forth ought to be protected while documentary evidence might be supplied, since the Committee can easily subpoena it by name from the Agency.

*What Next*

One question that will keep recurring is what does the Administration expect out of the Church Committee and, in light of the Rockefeller Commission Report, will there be a shake up or reforming of the Intelligence Community?

—There is a danger of rehashing every past mistake—whether in domestic activities, covert action, or even assassinations.

—The Church Committee, in particular, seems to be preoccupied with past sins; since the Rockefeller Commission has already made an investigation of domestic abuse this leaves only operations to be investigated; judging from the Church Committee’s shopping list, we will soon be on dangerous ground since our foreign relations are bound to be affected by rehashing Vietnam, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Laos, Congo, Indonesia, Greece.

*The Kennedy Assassination*

The Chapter on this is really first rate, and deserves some special mention because it lays to rest the continuing nuttiness on this subject.³

³ On June 11, President Ford issued a memorandum to the Secretaries of State and Defense, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence Agency on the Rockefeller Commission’s report, noting his belief that the report established “a sound basis for addressing structural and other possible weaknesses in the Operation of the CIA and other intelligence bodies.” He requested them to review the report and provide him with comments and recommendations. The same day, he asked the Attorney General to review the report for evidence of illegal activities. Both memoranda were released on June 12. (*Public Papers: Ford, 1975, Book I, pp. 809–810*)
43. Speech by Director of Central Intelligence Colby to Central Intelligence Agency Employees

Washington, June 18, 1975.

I am delighted to be here. I set this meeting at this early hour to be sure I could be here and not have to cancel at the last moment. Then last night I was told that I was supposed to be downtown at 9:00 this morning, but I have arranged to change that.

Are we in trouble? Sure. We’ve been in trouble a lot of times and we’re in trouble now. Are we rightly in trouble? Yes; partly. Did we do some wrong things? Sure. Did others participate in some of those wrong things? Yes. Was the organization responsible for every one of those wrong things? No; but the organization was responsible for the climate and the procedures of the organization and so was the rest of the country.

I think this last is the key point in our present trouble. CIA was established in 1947. At that time we were facing a cold war. There is some very dramatic language in some of the official reports at that time about the problems and dangers our country faced and the necessity to meet them with every weapon at our disposal.

We adopted essentially the old tradition of intelligence, that nations conduct intelligence but they don’t talk about it. We set up our structure and legislation to conduct intelligence privately so the war could be fought quietly without any exposure. Is this appropriate today? No, of course not. The climate of opinion, the climate of our country and the climate of the world is changed.

But, in the process of this change over time, we must admit that things have happened that we now wish had not happened. No question about it. This old tradition brought with it an ambiguity in our directives. It brought about policy pressures to do things, to do more. We were going to go out and we were going to be better than anyone else and do more than anybody else. It also brought very little outside supervision of what we were doing and to some extent little supervision within the organization. I think that if you give this kind of authority and kind of power to any large organization—with little supervision—and place strong pressure on it to produce results, you are apt to get missteps, misdeeds, wrong actions over a course of a 25-year history.

Were we involved in plots to assassinate? We have not said so publicly and we don’t want to, but leaks and independent evidence are

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 79M01467A, Box 21, Papers Relating to Rockefeller Comm Recommendations—Misc Others, 010175–300675. Administrative; Internal Use Only; Special Distribution.
suggesting answers.² Were others involved in these affairs? Our records are very obscure. They indicate that there was a climate of opinion in certain parts of the Agency and that it also existed in certain other elements of our Government. It reflected concern at the time about certain nations and in the process there were suggestions. Some of these suggestions were turned down inside the Agency. Some of them were turned down by case officers who were approached by foreigners asking for help. Some of them were turned down at the top level of the Agency.

Were we in contact with groups who in the course of trying to overthrow their government killed someone? Yes, because when a government is overthrown somebody is apt to get hurt in the shooting. Did we contemplate this? In some cases, no. In some cases we might have been warned that it might happen. In some cases we provided weapons to groups to help them in their program. This does not mean we had a specific intent to assassinate anyone. In several cases, we specifically did not. I do not want to go into detail on this subject because I believe it in the best long-term interests of our country not to, and because our policy has been clear since 1972 and 1973 that we will not engage in such activity.

Did we surveil American citizens? Yes, the Rockefeller report³ outlines this in some detail and number. We surveilled mostly our own employees and mostly for good reason because these people were reported to us as having very obscure contacts with foreigners. They were under suspicion. We thought they might have taken classified material with them. In a period of concern about leakage, of concern about discipline, there were steps, some perfectly proper, to find out whether this was going on. Some of our surveillance overstepped the bounds and went beyond what was proper. Sometimes it was done out of frustration that nobody else would help us on a serious problem, that we could not get assistance from other agencies and organizations.

In the process, did we make some missteps? Did we go outside our employees? Yes, we did. We listened to some telephone conversations. We stopped, incidentally, the telephone business in 1965 when the President said it would not be done without the Attorney General’s approval. Only one tap took place thereafter—still in 1965—and that was done with the Attorney General’s approval.

² In a Washington Post article, May 22, Senator Church was reported to have “indicated” that Colby acknowledged “CIA involvement in assassination plots directed against foreign leaders” in testimony to a closed session of the Senate Select Committee investigating intelligence abuses. (George W. Lardner, Jr., “Colby Said to Concede CIA Involvement in Death Plots,” Washington Post, May 22, 1975, p. A8)

³ See footnote 2, Document 42.
Were we involved in some kind of experimentation with drugs? Yes, because in the 1950’s there was great concern after Cardinal Mindszenty was put on trial, with the indications that some kind of influence was being exerted over him. We were also concerned about brainwashing in China and Korea. LSD was first appearing in this country and people didn’t understand what it was about. The Army had a large institution at Fort Detrick for chemical and biological warfare. At that time, yes, we participated with the Army in seeing what the nature of these particular drugs were, what were the possible defences against their use against us. We were concerned about their application to one of our officials in a foreign country so as to discredit him and put him under control. In the process, were some steps taken that should not have been? Yes, it’s true that on one occasion, in a totally indefensible action, one of our officers did put some LSD in the drinks of several people from Fort Detrick and the Agency, as a part of testing the impact of these drugs. The LSD so depressed one of the people involved, a Department of Army civilian, that he committed suicide some days later.

Were we responsible for that? Was the organization responsible for that? Was the individual who put the drug in his drink without his knowledge responsible for it? I think we all share a little of the responsibility, and let’s say the climate of opinion, the procedures in the organization, the excess of zeal, and the lack of control created the occasion, whether the individual was also responsible in that case or not.

There are a number of other things mentioned in the Rockefeller report and, undoubtedly a number of other things will come out in the further investigations going on. But, I think it is important as we look at this and as our country is shocked and shaken by some of these revelations, that we in the Agency, of all people, keep a perspective. We need also to put in perspective what this Agency has done to reflect the climate of opinion in America today.

You will remember that in 1973 we asked all of you to recall any questionable activities that the Agency may have conducted, and to report those either to the Director or to the Inspector General. We collected a list of these including the ones I just mentioned and some others. For example, there were situations in which we had helped federal narcotics organizations in their work; situations in which we had helped certain of the police organizations around the country as a matter of courtesy, and we had given them briefings and training and,

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4 Hungarian priest József Cardinal Mindszenty, an anti-Communist dissident, was tried for treason by Hungarian authorities in 1949.
5 See Documents 6 and 7.
in some cases, equipment. In some cases we had overdone our willingness to be helpful and gone into things that we should not have.

We thought we had a complete list of questionable activities at that time, but we didn’t. We’ve been collecting additional cases by bits and pieces ever since. I testified last January as to certain numbers of surveillances; certain numbers of wiretaps.\(^6\) I had to amend those figures later to add more. The Rockefeller Commission has added more. And, I suppose we’ll find still another case some day because we don’t file things in the Office of Security under the heading “Improper Surveillance” or “Illegal Wiretaps.” We file them under cases, and it’s only by going through the thousands of cases that you do find that yes, there was a break-in in that case; yes, there was one in that case; and this was the reason for it.

But I think the point is that after collecting these, we did something about them. I myself wrote specific directives on each of the cases that was reported to me at that time. I sent detailed memoranda to the Deputies to say what our policy and our attitudes would be henceforth, and a few of those are pretty obvious. We will not follow American citizens outside of this organization. We will not surveil them. We will not wiretap newsmen. We will not engage in, support, assist or stimulate assassinations. A variety of directives of this nature were given in 1973.

The information we collected at that time has been the foundationstone of the investigations that we are now under. It has been supplemented by additional testimony taken from ex-employees and from outsiders. There are some things that we don’t know about our own history because the memories and the records are not in our possession. The information is in the memories of others or in the documents of other agencies. So we sometimes do not know the full story. In some cases it looks like we were involved in something when additional people were cognizant of it and also aware of it.

Is this justified? No, because our system ought to be such that we shouldn’t allow ourselves to do things we should not. At my confirmation hearing, I was specifically asked, “What do you do if a President tells you to do something that is clearly improper?” and at that time it was easy to answer. I said I would leave the job. That’s an easy answer now. Suppose that had been asked in 1950. What would have the Director been expected to answer? In my confirmation testimony, I said I wouldn’t lie to anybody in Congress. I wouldn’t tell them the things I can’t tell them because they should be secret, but I wouldn’t lie to them.

We got rid of the word “plausible denial” which was a foundation stone of much of the thinking of the 50’s and 60’s, that somehow the

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\(^6\) See Document 28.
United States Government could deny something if it could plausibly do so, even though it were true. We’ve gone into a “No comment” situation. Sometimes we have to “No comment” the questions whose answer is “No” just so we won’t build up a record of four “No’s” and then a “No comment” to the last question, and thus give an obvious “Yes” to that one.

Now, what are these investigations all about then? They are an investigation of how we Americans want to conduct intelligence in this period of our history. The investigations are a look backwards in order to find out what we did which we now consider wrong and what directions we want to apply to us for the future. We are doing it in the somewhat clamorous American way; we’re doing it as a direct result of the Vietnam War and of Watergate because there is a desire in our people and in our press especially to look at the activities of the government, to open them up, and see if they really are what they appear to be. We are the focus of that because we are one of the most secret parts of the United States Government and there have been various situations in the past where we have come to public notice with some notoriety.

The Vice President’s Commission of course has finished its activity and you have seen its report. I urge you to read it. I urge you especially to read page 10, which says that the great majority of the Agency’s activities over the years have been proper, which also says that some of these activities were improper and should be criticized. It points out that some of these activities were undertaken under the direct or indirect pressure of Presidents; some of these activities were in gray areas where it was debatable whether we should properly or should not properly have done them; and some, and I say they are few over 28 years, were improper. There are those who will argue with me but I think 32 wiretaps in 28 years, the last being in 1965, were really few; I think 100-odd surveillances, most of which were either of our own employees or foreigners, were few.

I think 7,200 files on American dissidents with possible foreign links were few when a quarter-million Americans were demonstrating outside the White House. The Commission’s report also says that the Agency itself in great part has corrected these situations by actions taken in the last couple of years. In other words, the Commission says that the Agency is sensitive, still sensitive I might say, to American opinion and it has responded to this new climate of opinion and has cleaned itself up. I think it’s an important perspective to get into the situation.

The Senate hearing is a very serious and thorough look at our whole effort. It is looking into the estimating process; it’s looking into the budgetary process; it’s looking into the organizational questions; it’s looking into the legal questions; it’s looking into covert action; it’s
looking into the intelligence collection function and how we relate to the other agencies; it’s looking into the broad sweep of intelligence.

It is focused now, of course, on the assassinations. I would say in this regard that I think the Senate Committee is trying to keep the secrets given to it secret. There is clearly an effort being made by them to restrain leakage. Leaks, however, are occurring; they are occurring from current employees, perhaps; ex-employees, certainly; ex-officials, certainly; various other people in the U.S. Government.

The Committee is working at the assassination problem because it is the most sensational one at the moment and because it reveals some of these matters that I was telling about, about the climate of opinion and the procedures for approval of activity, and the controls within the organization and outside. It is looking into a matter which does concern the American people.

The House Committee, as you know, is in a state of some disarray at this moment,\(^7\) but there are developments that are encouraging. I think it is encouraging that there was a 290 to 64 vote in support of a chairman who took his responsibilities seriously, who did do a good job of supervision, and who was then confronted by an attempt to unseat him. I think we should take heart in the fact that five to one of the representatives of the Congress feel that they want to undertake a responsible investigation and not a spectacular one.

We don’t know how the House situation is going to come out. I think the House will feel it has to conduct an investigation as well. But I think we can take heart from this expression of the basic sense of responsibility of the constitutional structure that we have in our country.

Now, what are we going to see in the future? The Rockefeller Commission has made certain recommendations, and we will get additional ones out of the other committees. We are in the process of putting together our comments on the Rockefeller Commission’s recommendations to submit to the President. The other agencies will also be submitting their comments, and the President will then decide what action he wants to take. The various committees of the Congress will get together

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\(^7\) On June 16, the House of Representatives rejected the resignation of the Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence, Representative Lucien N. Nedzi. Nedzi had offered his resignation following reports that he had received secret briefings in 1974 on illegal CIA activities as Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee’s intelligence subcommittee, prompting calls for his removal and a vote among committee Democrats to place members on a new subcommittee under the chairmanship of Representative James V. Stanton (D–Ohio). A month later, on July 17, the House voted to reconstitute the Select Committee with 13 members instead of the original 10. The resulting resolution (H. Res. 591; H. Rept. 94–351) preserved the Select Committee’s original mandate, but named Representative Otis G. Pike (D–New York) as the committee’s new chairman. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 191–192)
and make their recommendations for legislation or for changes in procedure, and this will occupy us for a considerable time.

In general, I think we can look ahead to clearer guidelines. Those nice, broad, phrases like “such other functions and duties as the National Security Council may direct” in the 1947 Act will be replaced by more specific direction. For instance, as the Rockefeller Commission recommended, and as came up in my confirmation hearing, the word “foreign” will be put in front of intelligence when it applies to CIA. Let’s make it very clear that that’s our job. We know it; we’ve always understood it that way, but let’s make it clear so that we don’t overstep the edge and go into things that we shouldn’t, and then say well, it was an intelligence activity. Let’s make it clear that our job is foreign intelligence; that’s what we do; that’s the profession we joined; and let’s make the statute plain.

Let’s make a lot of other things clear. Let’s decide whether and how we want to conduct covert action. This is a question that’s been raised, as to whether we should or not. I think the nation needs that capability. Some people think it doesn’t. Some people think we ought to do away with it. Let’s have it out; let’s have a vote; and let’s decide clearly whether we are going to do it or not; and let’s put in some specific language as to whether we do it or not.

Let’s look at the structure of intelligence. What is the relationship between the different agencies? What’s the relationship between the FBI and CIA? What’s the relationship between CIA and the Defense Dept.? Let’s get clear what the structure is, and let’s get some supervision.

There is a recommendation in the Rockefeller Commission report that we strengthen the Inspector General in this Agency, and that’s a direct recommendation that I correct what appears to have been my mistake, and I’m for it. We’re going to have a bigger Inspector General’s office. I think we are going to have a lot of internal procedures around here which will perhaps tighten up and make clear the way in which we do things and force a conscious approval process on some of the questions. We have put the main effort on the command line and with the staff level clearly secondary. Obviously, at a time like this, there’s a tendency to increase the staff and increase the review process. Later we may find that this would begin to throttle our flexibility and throttle our activities.

I think we’ll try to come out somewhere in the middle to give us a still flexible and straightforward command chain but increase the degree of review. Our Inspector General, of course, for the last two years has been totally occupied in such things as Watergate and this particular set of investigations. So he has not been able to do even the kind of review and surveillance of our own activities that we had intended.
when we reduced the size of this effort and stopped those regular, periodic and, in my mind at that time, somewhat sterile reviews of how many people worked on this problem and how many people worked on that problem. Let’s get it down to an investigation of the questionable areas of our activity so that we are sure that we have an approval process, that we know exactly what we are doing, and that what we are doing is correct.

And let’s increase the supervision by the executive branch. The Rockefeller Commission recommends a strengthened Intelligence Advisory Board; I think this is a good thing. The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board has been a very great supporter of intelligence and of this Agency over the years. But, it has not been an active critic; it has not been an active investigator of our activities. It has a small staff. Maybe we can work together with it to obtain somewhat more active supervision.

I had a talk with the Board a few months ago and one of the members who runs a very large industry says that the relationship between his board and the president of his company is very clear. It’s on a basis of “no surprises.” The president need not bring every question to his board, but the board is not to be surprised by any development. I think this is a good system, and I undertook to follow that system with the Board—that there be “no surprises.” That is essentially the relationship I have with the Deputies here in the Agency, and I think it has worked quite well in terms of giving them the flexibility to act but to keep me informed of anything that I ought to know before it happens.

Let’s also strengthen supervision outside the executive branch. The Rockefeller Commission recommends a joint committee. At this stage, when we have to report our covert action to six committees, when we have to testify before the Post Office Committee, when we’re asked to testify before any committee on the Hill, the idea of a joint committee is very appealing as far as we’re concerned. We can look forward to working with a specific committee which has a right to supervise us, whose staff will be a nuisance once in a while as it comes around to ask questions and gets into our affairs; but we will find that the stronger the outside supervision of our activities, the stronger the inside supervision. If we don’t get supervised outside, then we are apt to be a little lax on our supervision inside. I think the people, the Government and the Congress at this particular time in our history require that there be more vigorous supervision outside as well as inside.

And let’s decide how big an intelligence effort we want to run, how do we want to divide it between Defense and ourselves. What’s the difference between national intelligence and tactical intelligence? What are the ways to make sure that this all works together? Is the 1971 directive to the Director to take a leadership role in the community a
good one? Should it be strengthened? Should it be changed? How should we accomplish this? How much money do we want to spend on intelligence? Should we be spending $1 billion or $5 billion or $10 billion? How do we decide how much we should be spending? Or should we not spend anything on certain kinds of activities? Should we divide it up between the agencies or should we stress a consolidated approach to it in a single budget? These questions I think will be looked at and I think it will result in some arrangement which will reflect today’s approach to intelligence.

I still recommend that we not have an open budget. An open budget will force a debate on the floor about the size of our budget. This debate will undoubtedly get into “Well, what does this include? Does it include technical programs, does it include covert action or does it include the military? Does it include the foreign service functions? What does it include?” The debate will begin to pick it apart and then get to the question “Why did it go up? Why did it go down? Let’s have good explanations for changes.” The inevitable exposures which would occur in this process could make it almost impossible to operate this secret agency.

I recommend that we not have an open budget, but that we deal with a joint committee in great detail. I’ve just finished my fourth session with the House Appropriations Committee this year, and I left there with about 75 further questions devoted to CIA which I must answer.

Lastly, I am convinced that this review of what intelligence needs and what we Americans need now in intelligence will be accompanied by some improvement in our ability to keep secrets. Our inability to keep the secrets of intelligence is a national scandal. It is becoming a very serious problem for our Agency in its relations with foreign services, in its relations with brave foreigners who have agreed to work with us, in its relations with Americans who have helped their country by contributing to our activities. They are all worried that their names are coming out, that they will be put in jeopardy, that they will have a political problem in their country, that their lives or their livelihoods will be in danger or that their businesses in America may be ruined by this exposure of their CIA connection. We are going to fight very hard to keep those names out of the investigation in which we have the sympathy of the Senate investigators and had the sympathy of the Rockefeller Commission in this regard. But, I still think we have a serious problem that can only be overcome by improved legislation.

So, as we go through this investigation and as more and more of my time, which last year was spent on the early 70’s and this year seems to be being spent on the early 60’s and maybe next year will be
spent on the early 50’s, let’s remember three main points about intelligence and I think they are all critical points.

First, intelligence is important to our country. It is important to our country’s safety; it is important to the welfare of our citizens; it is an important activity to our survival as a free nation.

Secondly, our intelligence is the best intelligence in the world. Let us make it very clear that no nation can come within miles of the excellence of our intelligence. We have had certain exposures which have helped to demonstrate this to some extent, for example, some of our technical exploits. The fact is that more than our technology is good. The analysis is good; we are producing good analytical decisions; clear-cut positions; reporting to our Government regarding problems that they face around the world. The clandestine work is good; it is producing clandestine material from within some tough, tight, closed societies on matters of great importance to our country. Our intelligence is good and the other countries admire it, because it is so good. And a lot of them use it and depend upon it. Our intelligence is being useful not only to our executive but also to our Congress and also to our people as it is properly revealed to them through proper briefings and proper explanations of the complexities of the problems of the world.

And lastly, let’s remember that our intelligence is American. It is going to reflect American opinion; it’s going to reflect American values. I think it did in the past. In that period, there was a conscious assumption that from time to time things might have to be done by intelligence which might not be quite proper. That assumption is no longer held. America doesn’t want it to be part of American intelligence and we are not going to have it either. We are going to run an American intelligence service. It’s going to reflect our country’s attitudes; it’s going to reflect our country’s standards; and it’s going to reflect our country’s laws.

But let’s face it, the most important things about our intelligence—the fact that it’s important, the fact that it is good, the fact that it’s American—depends on you, because you are the people who are the leaders of American intelligence, and it’s on your discipline, your initiative and energy that we have become good. And it’s on your conscience that we have depended for the revelation of things that we might have done in the past that we don’t want to do now; and it’s on your conscience, on your energy, and on your intelligence that our intelligence is going to keep on getting better as we go into the 70’s and 80’s and eventually stop reconstructing the 50’s and 60’s.

[Omitted here is a question-and-answer session between CIA employees and Colby.]
44. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Meeting in Situation Room on Friday, June 27 concerning pending requests of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Activities

Participants were:
Colby, Clarke, Knoche—CIA
O’Connor, Shaheen—Justice
Latimer, Wade, Marshall—Defense
Hyland, Hitchcock—State

also
Rumsfeld, Marsh, Scowcroft, Cheney
McFarlane, Buchen, Hills, Wilderotter

I. Access to Assassination Documents

Reported to the meeting was the arrangement made with the Church Committee to allow it to use assassination documents in a way that will facilitate the Committee’s investigation and examination of witnesses in its Executive sessions. For that purpose the documents will be put on loan to the Committee but cannot be used for any other purpose and cannot be disclosed or released. Instead, if the Committee should want to disclose any of the documents, it must treat the documents as though they had not been delivered and would have to subpoena them unless the Administration agreed to their release.

II. Access to Material on Designated Covert Action Projects

The Committee by letter of June 2, 1975, had designated six different programs on covert actions for its in-depth investigation and had

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1 Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Congressional Investigations (3). No classification marking. Initialed at the end of the memorandum by Buchen who presumably drafted it. Copies were sent to Rumsfeld, Marsh, and Scowcroft. A separate transcript of the meeting, drafted by John M. Clarke of the CIA, is in the Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 79M00467A, Box 18, White House Correspondence Re: Congressional Investigations, 010175–311075.

2 Arrangements for Church Committee members to have access to documents related to covert action briefings and documents were made in a June 26 meeting between Committee members and the White House Counsel’s staff. These are summarized as a series of ground rules prepared by the CIA on June 30 and forwarded by Knoche, under a covering memorandum, to Buchen. (Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Congressional Investigations (3))

3 Not found.
specified numerous files and documents which the Committee wanted its staff to review. At a discussion held by the White House Counsel’s staff with the Church Committee on Thursday, June 26,\textsuperscript{4} the Committee Members agreed to hear briefings by CIA officials on a limited number of covert actions, but the Committee insisted that, pending the return of the Committee from its current recess and the opportunity to receive such briefings, the Committee staff should be allowed to see the requested materials at the CIA offices.

For the purpose of avoiding a complete impasse on this issue, it was determined that the Committee staff should for the present be allowed to review documents concerning only the following:

A. Programs undertaken in Laos during the period [less than 1 line not declassified] the late 1960’s.

B. Programs undertaken in Indonesia between [less than 1 line not declassified].

C. The effects on covert action programs of the Presidential Order following the Katzenbach Report of 1967.\textsuperscript{5}

It was also determined that there should be excluded from documents on these topics any materials which do not deal solely with the ways in which these programs actually were conducted or with the fact that the programs were approved in accord with required procedures. To be excluded would be papers evidencing the approval process such as proposals or recommendations made to the President or to groups which advised the President, as well as deliberations within such groups. As to the materials to be included within these guidelines for inspection by the Committee staff, references to identities of agents or of secret collaborators and to sources of information would be eliminated. It was also proposed that for the three programs listed above, the CIA would prepare detailed briefings and be ready to present them to the Committee following the current Congressional recess. (See attached at Tab A\textsuperscript{6} a statement of CIA procedures to implement the foregoing.)

\textsuperscript{4} See footnote 2 above.

\textsuperscript{5} On March 29, 1967, a committee appointed by President Lyndon B. Johnson to review the relationship between the CIA and private U.S. voluntary organizations abroad, chaired by Under Secretary of State Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, delivered its final report. The report recommended that “no federal agency shall provide any covert financial assistance or support, direct or indirect, to any of the nation’s educational or private voluntary organizations.” See \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 260.

\textsuperscript{6} Attached but not printed.
III. National Intelligence Estimates

Requests for materials on this subject were embodied in a letter from the Select Committee to Mr. Colby dated May 27 asking for material to provide, "Foreign Intelligence Case Studies." At meeting of Counsel with Church Committee on Thursday, June 26 the Committee Members insisted that its staff be allowed to study the documents in question even before the Committee is given a briefing on this subject. To enable the Committee staff to continue in a limited way with a study of the subject, it was the consensus of the meeting that the CIA should give the staff a full briefing on the subject of National Intelligence Estimates, similar to that which will be given later to the Committee, and that only after this briefing would the staff be permitted access to particular documents. This access would provide information as to how particular National Intelligence Estimates are developed but would avoid getting into materials which dealt with how the estimates were used in the policy decision-making process.

IV. General Comments

It was realized that the conclusions reached at this conference would not resolve the major issues with the Church Committee but that the steps which were approved were consistent with the principle of protecting information which falls within the legal doctrine of Executive privilege prior to the time when consideration must be given to furnishing additional documents.

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7 The Church Committee’s May 27 letter to Colby requested documents related to the “quality and utility of National Intelligence Estimates,” “the authority the DCI exercises over the entire intelligence community,” and “how successfully the Foreign Intelligence agencies of the United States alert policymakers of impending events, e.g., the Middle East War of 1973.” A copy of this letter is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 87, Church/Pike Committees—Requests for Documents (1).
45. **Memorandum From Kathleen Troia of the National Security Council Staff to Robert C. McFarlane of the National Security Council Staff**


**SUBJECT**

Murphy Commission Recommendations on the Intelligence Community

The Murphy Commission addresses the question of the intelligence community in Chapter 7 of its Report (Tab A). Various members of the Commission have additional comments contained in several addendum (Tab B). The Murphy Commission as a whole identifies three main tests for intelligence services in a democracy: one, to provide accurate information and competent analysis; two, to avoid unnecessary costs and duplication; and three, to function in a manner which commands public confidence. To achieve these goals, the Commission concludes that **firmer direction and oversight of the intelligence community are essential**.

In this regard, the Report asserts that the CIA Director serving also as Director of Central Intelligence has worked only partially. While the Director does have line authority over CIA, he has only limited influence over other intelligence units. This situation results in the Director devoting himself almost entirely to CIA affairs at the expense of the rest of the intelligence community.

**Director of Central Intelligence**

The Murphy Commission makes the following recommendations on the role of the Director of Central Intelligence:

—The DCI should be a close assistant to the President, should have an office in close proximity to the White House and be accorded regular and direct contact with the President.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Robert C. McFarlane Files, Box 1, Intelligence Investigations Subject Files, Murphy Commission Recommendations on Intelligence. No classification marking.

2 Tab A is attached but not printed. The Murphy Commission, officially the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, submitted its final report on June 27. See the attachment to Document 147. On July 11, the NSC dispatched copies of the report to the Departments of State, Defense, Treasury, and Commerce, and the CIA for comment. These comments, addressed to President Ford, are in the Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Boxes 98–99, IPG Logged Documents, Murphy Commission—Comments on the Commission Report—Organization of Intelligence.

3 Attached but not printed.
—The DCI should delegate much authority for day to day direction of the CIA to his Deputy.

—There should be a slight extension of the DCI’s current responsibility for community-wide planning and budgeting.

In choosing a DCI, the President should select someone who has a broad understanding of foreign and national security affairs; has managerial skills; has a sensitivity to the constraints within which an American intelligence service must operate; and has a sense of independence and high integrity. Finally, the DCI should be a person of stature from outside the intelligence career service.

PFIAB

The Commission recommends that the President have sources of advice independent of the DCI. PFIAB, as the principal source, should be the steady, external and independent overseer of the intelligence community. In citing the Rockefeller Commission Report, the Murphy Commission recommends:

—that each incoming President review and make such changes in PFIAB’s membership as may be required to give him high personal confidence in its values and judgements;

—that the President make himself directly available to the Chairman of PFIAB upon the latter’s request; and

—that PFIAB be increased in size, drawn in part from sources outside the intelligence community.

NSCIC

The Commission feels that the NSCIC, charged with providing guidance on consumer needs and intelligence requirements, has not functioned adequately. To correct this situation the NSCIC should be actively used as the principal forum (short of the President) for resolution of differing perspectives of intelligence consumers and producers, and should meet frequently for that purpose.

Intelligence Analysis

The Commission believes that intelligence analysis should be improved on four fronts.

1. More effective utilization of the State Department’s routine Foreign Service reporting is essential. The Commission notes several problems in current reporting; particularly the absence of overall direction and guidance on information needed, the general lack of communication between the field and the mission, and the lack of analytical training and/or abilities of Foreign Service Officers.

2. While intelligence agencies should retain and exercise their improved competence in analysis of international economic issues,
the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce and Agriculture, and the Council of Economic Advisers must maintain and significantly strengthen similar analytical capabilities pertaining to their responsibilities.

3. Regarding the NIO system, a small staff of highest quality, drawn from within and without the intelligence community and responsible for drafting and review of NIE’s, should be established. This staff should report directly to the DCI and be charged with reporting different viewpoints of the agencies.

4. The entire intelligence community should strive for better balance between technical and human means of intelligence collection, and avoid the current trend to slight human contributions.

Finally, in an attempt to more adequately manage resources, the Commission recommends two initiatives be taken:

—One, that the IC staff prepare an annually-revised, multi-year plan for allocation of responsibilities across the intelligence community, and

—Two, that the IC staff prepare an annual Consolidated Foreign Intelligence Budget for the proposed Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security.4

Covert Action

While the Murphy Commission feels covert activities should not be abandoned, it believes covert actions should be employed only where such action is clearly essential to vital US purposes and then only after careful high level review. The Commission feels the present functioning of the 40 Committee to be inadequate, and proposes:

1. That covert action be authorized only after collective consideration of benefits and risks by all available 40 Committee members;

2. that the 40 Committee also regularly review the continuing value of on-going operations; and

3. that PL 93–559 (Hughes Amendment to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974)5 be amended to require reporting of covert actions to the proposed Joint Committee on National Security, and to omit any requirement for the President’s personal certification of covert activities.

Finally, the Commission recommends that the DCI be retitled the Director of Foreign Intelligence and the CIA be retitled the Foreign Intelligence Agency.

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4 The Commission proposes a Joint Committee of the Congress on National Security be established to serve as Congress’ NSC Staff. It would also be the central linking point between Congress and the Executive and take responsibility for Congressional oversight of the intelligence community. [Footnote in the original.]

Addendum—Supplementary Statement of Cong. William Broomfield
(R–Mich.)

While agreeing with the Commission recommendation of a Joint Committee on National Security, Broomfield believes its intelligence oversight responsibilities should be vested in a separate joint committee.

Additionally, Rep. Broomfield is not convinced that DIA, as presently constituted, is either an effective or essential element in the intelligence effort. If DIA is to be preserved, it should be strengthened and made more effective.

Addendum—Supplementary Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield
(D–Mont.)

Senator Mansfield objects to the creation of a Joint Committee on National Security because:

1. The committee would cut across jurisdictions and tasks assigned existing standing committees and in time inevitably would decrease their authority and powers.

2. The committee would become a favorite tool of the executive for centralizing Congressional oversight functions and diminishing their scope.

3. The committee would have no promise of access—quite the contrary—to NSC materials and deliberations.

4. According to the Commission Report, the Committee would be composed of the most senior members of Congress and would squeeze out the junior members.

5. The Committee would presumably take over intelligence oversight in time, but that would not be the main function and it could easily drop out of view.

6. The Committee could become a barrier to dissemination of sensitive material to standing committees, while having little or no power itself to initiate legislation.

7. Giving such a Committee control over report would mean control over information and soon mean control over action; a “supercommittee” might easily fall under executive dominance and reduce the overall authority of the Congress.

Mansfield also chides the Executive and Legislative branches for being inexcusably lax in overseeing intelligence activities. He refers to the intelligence community as swollen, expensive and inefficient and calls for either the abolishment of several military intelligence agencies or the dismantlement of DIA.

Mansfield believes there must be a full housecleaning of CIA and, thereafter, the Agency’s standing in the intelligence community should
be restored and strengthened. Initially, the necessary restructuring of the intelligence community should be accomplished by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. Thereafter, a Senate or Joint Committee on Intelligence should be created with responsibility for extensive oversight.

Mansfield disagrees with the Commission’s proposals for PFIAB. He feels “it would be easier, cheaper and logical (sic) to abolish it.”

He also believes that the DCI and his deputy should be civilians.

46. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger, the President’s Counselor (Buchen), and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn) to President Ford

Washington, August 9, 1975.

SUBJECT
Implementation of Recommendations of the Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States

We have reviewed the report and recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States and the views of the departments and agencies which you asked to comment on the report. These views are summarized at Tab A.2

The purpose of this memorandum is to recommend an approach to implement the Commission’s recommendations.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Robert C. McFarlane Files, Box 2, Intelligence Investigations Subject Files, Rockefeller Commission, Implementation of Recommendations (5). No classification marking. None of the senders initialed the memorandum.

2 Attached but not printed. Ford requested the comments on June 11, after the release of the Rockefeller Commission report (see footnote 3, Document 42). The reports from the Departments of Defense, State, Justice, and Treasury are in the Ford Library, White House Central File, Box 22, Philip W. Buchen Files, Box 106, Intelligence Investigations/Reorganization Numbered Files, Rockefeller Commission, Folders 6–7. The CIA’s comments are in the Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 79M01467A, Box 21, Papers Relating to Rockefeller Comm. Recommendations—Misc Others 010175–300675. A July 26 memorandum from Rumsfeld to Connor summarizes all agency comments. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Handwriting File, Box 9, FG Comm. On CIA Activities Within the U.S. (1))
BACKGROUND

The Rockefeller Commission was charged with investigating and making recommendations with respect to allegations that the CIA engaged in illegal spying on American citizens.

Its report on this subject was well received publicly, and almost all of its recommendations have met with complete approval in the intelligence community.

The recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission fall into two separate categories. The first consists of a series of twenty reforms which, although significant and deserving of your consideration and approval, will as a practical matter be implemented at the agency level. They are listed at Tab B. These recommendations are generally supported by all interested agencies and we recommend that you approve their immediate implementation by signing the memorandum at Tab C.

The second group of recommendations go to the question of the structure, function and direct Presidential command and control of the CIA. The seven recommendations in this category are listed at Tab D. As a package, they represent a responsible and effective initiative to establish better Executive control over, and prevent improper domestic activities by, the CIA. The Commission’s recommendations in this category (hereafter referred to as “the policy recommendations”) propose:

- revisions to the National Security Act which would clarify CIA’s authority by explicitly limiting it to foreign intelligence matters (this could also be accomplished by Executive Order);

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3 A Washington Post editorial, published the day after the June 10 release of the Rockefeller Commission report, endorsed the “positive and mature way in which the commission went about its work.” “Far from being a ‘whitewash,’” the editorial stated, “the Rockefeller commission report is a clear summons to professionalism in intelligence and to respect for Americans’ rights.” (“The Rockefeller Report on the CIA,” Washington Post, June 11, p. A18)

4 Two Commission recommendations are not discussed because they deal with matters primarily within the province of the Congress (a Joint Oversight Committee) or involve personnel (the qualifications of future DCI’s). A third Commission recommendation, that Congress carefully consider partial disclosure of the CIA budget, is dealt with elsewhere in this memorandum, as a decision which we recommend should be deferred. [Footnote in the original.]

5 Attached but not printed.

6 Attached but not printed. Ford initialed the Approve option. The memorandum to the Attorney General, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of OMB, and the DCI, sent on August 16, instructs them to implement 20 agency-level Rockefeller Commission recommendations. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Robert C. McFarlane Files, Box 2, Rockefeller Commission—Implementation of Recommendations (5))

7 Attached but not printed.
• an Executive Order to prohibit improper domestic activities of CIA concerning U.S. citizens;
• legislation to strengthen CIA’s internal organization and management structure, including establishing a second Deputy Director position;
• revised procedures on the handling of security violations, including new responsibilities for USIB in this area and stronger penalties for violations by present or former CIA employees (a version of this proposal is in S. 1, the new criminal code bill, which provides penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information);
• changed Executive Branch procedures on oversight of the intelligence community and White House contact with CIA and a stronger role for the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board.

It is to this group of policy recommendations that the remainder of this memorandum is addressed.

DISCUSSION

Since establishment of the Rockefeller Commission last January, the range of allegations against the CIA and the rest of the intelligence community has broadened considerably. Select Committees of both Houses of Congress are now engaged in inquiries under mandates which permit them to investigate and propose legislation on the most fundamental questions of intelligence—such as the role of intelligence, the organization of the community, oversight arrangements, the legitimacy and utility of covert action, and the degree of openness of the intelligence budget. In view of the scope of the Rockefeller Commission’s mandate, however, its recommendations do not address these issues.

Under these circumstances, you must decide whether to proceed with the prompt implementation of the Commission’s policy recommendations now, or await developments in the Congressional Committees over the coming months and include the policy recommendations in a broader package which responds to the more far-reaching initiatives that are likely to emerge later from the Congressional reviews.

In view of the limited scope of the Commission’s policy recommendations, action to implement them now might be criticized as being too timid, in light of the broad range of issues raised by the Select Committee investigations. Although such criticism is likely, we believe that the Commission’s policy recommendations are fully responsive to what is in fact the primary concern of the American people—that the CIA engages in “domestic spying” and is, in the words of Senator Church, “a rogue elephant out of control.” Implementation of the Commission’s policy recommendations—which can be fully accomplished by Presidential action—will deal with the fundamental problem now,
and enable you to handle separately, at a later time and in different fashion, the broader issues such as covert action, the classified budget, and other community-wide structure or management questions.

In addition, Congressional action on domestic improprieties is imminent. There are currently a number of Committees other than the Select Committees addressing various aspects of the reported improprieties; legislation in these areas is likely to be piecemeal and unacceptable, but it will come soon. On the other hand, issues such as covert action, the classified budget and major overhaul of the intelligence structure are moving on a different timetable and are being considered only by the two Select Committees. It is unlikely that legislative proposals will emerge in these areas until the Select Committees conclude their activities next Spring. Thus, not only is the “improprieties” area more urgent, but there is also a significant likelihood that Presidential action on these matters could effectively be foreclosed if put off and considered only as part of a broader—and, by definition, later—package of reforms.

For the foregoing reasons, we recommend that you order the development by August 25 of optional steps to act on the group of Commission policy recommendations as described above.

If you approve this action, we will continue to develop options for your consideration at an appropriate time on other matters being raised in the course of the Select Committee investigations.

If you disagree with our recommended action, you should direct a detailed study to develop broader proposals responsive to issues beyond the scope of the Rockefeller Commission’s inquiry. A list of the possible issues and a mechanism for dealing with them is set forth in Tab E. This approach would permit you to act on the broadest front and would negate criticism that you are not confronting these issues. However, there are drawbacks. A further and broader study would be very time consuming; we estimate that such a study would take at least several months. More importantly, this delay could cause us to lose the initiative entirely. We do not recommend this alternative approach for these reasons and because we find the arguments in favor of immediate implementation more persuasive.

Recommendation

That you approve action on the Commission’s policy recommendations to correct improper domestic activities and establish better Executive Branch control of the CIA. (If you approve this recommended action, an appropriate set of options to act on the Commission’s policy

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8 Attached but not printed.
recommendations will be developed and submitted to you by August 25. The plan will provide for your action by early September. (Recommended by all your advisers.)

9 Ford initialed the Approve option.

47. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Buchen), the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn), and Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford


SUBJECT
Implementation of Recommendations on Intelligence

We have reviewed the Rockefeller Commission recommendations concerning CIA activities in the United States and the effectiveness of executive branch oversight of intelligence activities and operations. This review also addressed some of the longer range problems inherent in the present organization and structure of the Intelligence Community, including those identified in the Schlesinger Report of 1971 and in the Murphy Commission Report of June 1975.

After this review, we have concluded, and this memorandum proposes, that the major recommendations of the Rockefeller Commission for control and oversight of the CIA should be extended to all the agencies of the Intelligence Community. This memorandum also recommends other near-term actions, not addressed by the Rockefeller Commission, which you can take now to prevent future abuses and to strengthen Presidential oversight of the intelligence agencies. Next steps to address long-range changes in Intelligence Community structure are also identified.


Background

The Role of Intelligence

The purpose of foreign intelligence is to provide you and other policymakers with the information, assessments, and analytical judgments necessary to illuminate the range of policy alternatives and to enable the policymakers in Government to exercise sound decision-making.

Three important areas in assessing our intelligence programs are:

1. **Public Confidence.** While many intelligence activities must be conducted in secrecy, the Intelligence Community must operate in such a manner as to command the confidence of Congress and the public. The intelligence agencies and CIA, in particular, have engaged in some questionable and, in some cases, illegal activities that resulted in improper invasion upon the rights of American citizens. As a result, the confidence of the Congress and the public in the Intelligence Community has been damaged.

2. **Product Quality and Timeliness.** The Intelligence Community must produce a quality product and respond in a timely fashion to the needs of the consumers and the concerns of the policymakers. Continuing emphasis is required on intelligence consumer needs and improved product quality.

3. **Economy and Efficiency.** Intelligence is a modern world necessity requiring large resources. The Community requires the authoritative leadership and oversight necessary to resolve problems of overlap and duplication in collection, make efficient choices between new and competing systems, and adjust the balance between collection and production.

We have not attempted an in-depth review of the broad issues facing the Intelligence Community. We have focused our effort on the recent study conducted by the Rockefeller Commission and have drawn on the Murphy Commission Report and on earlier analyses such as the OMB–NSC study of 1971 (the Schlesinger Report).

Near-term Actions to Prevent Future Abuses

The major concern of immediate importance is to take the initiative in imposing stricter controls over the intelligence agencies and to demonstrate to the Congress and the public that your actions will be effective. The Rockefeller Commission Report focused on this problem of control and the prevention of future abuses. It appropriately emphasized (1) improvements in Presidential oversight through strengthening the elements of the Executive Office of the President charged with support to you, as President, and (2) revised guidelines, either in
legislation or by Executive Order, that clarify and limit the role and functions of the intelligence agencies.

We believe there is a need to act now to prevent future abuses without prejudice to later decisions affecting product quality and efficiency in the use of resources. Specific actions on Rockefeller Commission proposals, short of legislation, are proposed for your consideration. Legislative changes are precluded because of the probable delays inherent in this approach.

1. Presidential Oversight

The Rockefeller Commission specifically recommended expanding the role of PFIAB to include oversight of statutory compliance and an enlarged staff with a fulltime chairman. The Murphy Commission endorsed this approach, and recommended expanded roles for the review of covert actions by the 40 Committee and of intelligence consumers’ needs by the NSC Intelligence Committee. Along with the OMB, which reviews the programs and budgets of the intelligence agencies, PFIAB and the NSC are the major elements of your office currently engaged in the oversight of the intelligence agencies on your behalf.

We have developed a proposal to expand the oversight role for the PFIAB as recommended by the Rockefeller Commission. In addition, we would propose to strengthen the supervisory role of the NSC and to enhance the OMB review function. The PFIAB would be directed to extend its oversight of intelligence activities to review allegations of unlawful conduct or other improprieties. The NSC Intelligence Committee would be expanded to include the Deputy Attorney General and would conduct continuing review and supervision of the Intelligence Community on behalf of the NSC. Finally, the Office of Management and Budget would institute tighter controls over intelligence resources during financial execution of the budget and would prepare a classified budget appendix that could be transmitted to the Congress along with your regular 1977 budget submission.

Your approval of these proposals would build on the strengths of existing institutions in the executive office, could be accomplished quickly and would enhance public perception of Presidential control over intelligence activities.

**Recommendation**

Your advisors agree that you should:

- Direct the PFIAB to expand its oversight of intelligence activities to include a review of allegations of unlawful conduct or other improprieties. The Executive Order to this effect is incorporated in Tab A.
Provisions for an enlarged staff, but not a full-time chairman, are included.

- Direct the NSC to strengthen its process for providing Intelligence Community guidance and supervision through an expanded NSC Intelligence Committee to include the Deputy Attorney General. Attached at Tab B is a directive to this effect.

- Direct the OMB to take those steps necessary to institute tighter fiscal controls of intelligence resources during budget execution and to prepare a classified budget appendix available to be transmitted to the Congress along with your regular 1977 budget submission.

We recommend that you sign the Executive Order at Tab A and the directive at Tab B.

2. Protecting Intelligence Sources and Methods

The Rockefeller Commission recommended changing the responsibility of the DCI with respect to protection of intelligence sources and methods in order to preclude improper investigatory or law enforcement functions. In a related action, the Commission recommended establishing a single point of contact for transmission of all White House staff requests to the CIA.

The agencies involved and your staffs agree with these recommendations and with extending their application throughout the entire Intelligence Community.

Recommendation

Your advisors agree that you should:

Issue an Executive Order limiting the DCI’s responsibility for protection of intelligence sources and methods to preclude an improper investigatory or law enforcement function. Attached at Tab C is the Executive Order.

Issue a memorandum establishing a single point of contact in the NSC to clear requests for other than routine intelligence materials from within the EOP. Attached at Tab D is the memorandum.

We recommend that you sign the Executive Order at Tab C and the memorandum at Tab D.

3. Restrictions on Domestic Activities

The Rockefeller Commission proposed an Executive Order limiting CIA’s collection of information about the domestic activities of U.S. citizens and the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from Americans. There are three options with respect to Presidential guidelines restricting the conduct of domestic operations by intelligence agencies:
(1) Issue an Executive Order establishing restrictions on the domestic activities of the CIA only, applying the standards enunciated by the Rockefeller Commission.

(2) Issue an Executive Order applying the standards enunciated by the Rockefeller Commission to the domestic activities of the entire Intelligence Community.

(3) Issue an Executive Order applying these standards to the entire Intelligence Community except the FBI.

The advantages of an Executive Order limited to the CIA are:

- The issues involved, as well as the particular restrictions, have been extensively studied by the Rockefeller Commission and are agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence. Your advisors who favor this option believe that the issue raised in the case of other intelligence agencies (NSA, DIA, and the FBI) are substantially different and require additional study.

- Additional Executive Orders can be issued later as to the domestic activities of other intelligence agencies after better identifying the kinds of restrictions needed.

The advantages of an Executive Order applicable to the entire Intelligence Community are:

- In concluding that the CIA should not collect and analyze information on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens, the Commission recommended restrictions which most Americans would agree should be applicable to any of the secret foreign intelligence or counterintelligence agencies of the Government; there is no reason, in principle, for precluding the CIA from collecting and analyzing such information while permitting the NSA to do so.

- An Order limited to the CIA would leave your Administration open to the charge that only a small sector of a large problem has been dealt with. This is particularly true if Congress and the media continue to uncover instances of abuses similar to those involving the CIA in other intelligence agencies.

- Subsequent Executive Orders applicable to the other agencies will invite comparisons to the CIA Order; any “discrepancies” will be characterized as “glaring loopholes.”

- Those of your advisors who favor this option believe it possible to frame a set of restrictions which will satisfy the American people and would not unduly restrict the other agencies engaged in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; a comprehensive Executive Order will probably be delayed for one or two weeks, particularly to resolve FBI objections.

The advantages of Option #3, an Executive Order applicable to all intelligence agencies except the FBI, are as follows:
• The FBI, which has law enforcement as well as counterintelligence functions, has been the major stumbling block in preparing an Executive Order which covers the entire Intelligence Community. The major problem is to develop regulations which effectively limit the FBI’s counterintelligence role while not impairing its law enforcement activities. This will take several weeks to resolve.

• The Department of Justice has been studying the activities of the FBI for the past year, and is in the process of preparing guidelines which, when completed, might be embodied in a separate Executive Order for the FBI.

• An Executive Order will be issued in about one week.

If you select Option #1, we recommend that you sign the Executive Order attached at Tab E. If you select Option #2, we will prepare an appropriate Executive Order for your signature by the end of September. If you select Option #3, we will have an Executive Order for your signature by September 16.

DECISION

Option #1, recommended by Justice, the DCI, and Counsel to the President.

Option #2.

Option #3 recommended by the Vice President, the National Security Council, and the Director of OMB.

4. Penalties for Disclosure of Classified Information

The Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions both recommend legislation providing criminal penalties for persons who disclose classified information. These recommendations stem from a number of incidents in recent years—the Pentagon Papers, the Marchetti and Agee books on CIA, and newspaper columns on SALT negotiations and the Indo-Pakistan crisis. Both Commissions avoided endorsing a specific proposal because of the difficult civil liberties problems inherent in any such law. A revision to the criminal code (Title 18) has already been proposed by the Administration in the form of S.1, which includes a new section providing criminal penalties for disclosure of classified information. These provisions have been under strong attack. The American Bar Association voted against passage, and several influential Congressmen have indicated strong reservations.

3 No Executive Order limiting the CIA’s collection of information about the domestic activities of U.S. citizens and the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from Americans was issued.

4 Marsh initialed this option, presumably to indicate the President approved it.
Recommendation

In light of difficult problems posed by this proposed legislation, we recommend that you not endorse this recommendation at this time, but reaffirm your previous position that appropriate safeguards for classified information need to be established with due consideration for the rights of individual citizens by directing that the task group proposed in the final recommendation in this memorandum develop options for solving this critical problem.

5. Dual CIA Deputies

The Rockefeller Commission recommended the establishment of a second Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, to be confirmed by the Senate, who would directly manage the CIA, thereby freeing the Director for overall Intelligence Community matters. The present military deputy would be assigned the task of liaison with military intelligence. The second deputy would ease the present workload on the DCI and provide for a full-time manager of CIA’s day-to-day activities. In order to carry out this recommendation, legislation revising the 1947 National Security Act would be required, and the designated Presidential appointee would require Senate confirmation.

Recommendation

A decision on this specific organizational proposal can be more properly made in the context of a full reexamination of the Intelligence Community management structure. We agree that you should direct the task group proposed in the final recommendation in this memorandum to address this proposal.

Longer-range Opportunities to Improve Intelligence

The near-term actions recommended above will go far to improve your oversight of the Intelligence Community and to provide safeguards against future abuses. They will, however, with the exception of the changes proposed for the NSCIC, have little impact on achieving the other major needs to improve the quality of the intelligence product and to improve efficiency. These are also extremely important if full public trust and confidence are to be regained.

The primary problem in this regard continues to be the fragmented intelligence organizational structure. Options available for improving Intelligence Community management and institutional arrangements were identified in the 1971 Schlesinger Report with some variations recommended by the Murphy Commission. They are:

- Strengthen the role of the DCI by providing him with greater authority over the operations and resources of the intelligence agencies, by either:
—making him an all powerful intelligence czar who has direct authority over the principal intelligence agencies and their budgets; or —enhancing his stature and prerogatives. This could include cabinet level rank for the DCI, full membership in the NSC, direct and regular contact with the President, and directive authority over intelligence activities.

- Increase the staff support to the Secretary of Defense and improve DOD management of all Defense intelligence resources.
- Establish a White House Coordinator for Intelligence to act as a single control point for intelligence policies, resources and guidance.
- Strengthen Congressional oversight of intelligence through revisions to current committee responsibilities and additional reporting requirements.

It seems likely that almost all of these solutions will be proposed and debated in the months ahead. We believe it is essential that, as the Congressional investigations proceed, the Executive Branch be prepared to advance its own proposals and to respond fully to the changes and propositions that are advanced.

Recommendation

Your advisors are agreed that there is a need to establish on a priority basis a group tasked with reviewing the major options available for improving Intelligence Community management and institutional arrangements. The question of a second Deputy Director of Central Intelligence should specifically be addressed. This group should develop options for legislation to protect vital intelligence information by providing criminal penalties for the unauthorized disclosure of classified information. Possible Congressional initiatives should be examined. This group would be composed of full-time nominees of the Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Director of OMB, Counsel to the President, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of State and the Attorney General, and would complete its report by December 31, 1975.

If you approve, we will prepare for your signature a directive establishing this group.5
48. Memorandum for President Ford

Washington, September 18, 1975.

FROM
The Vice President
Henry A. Kissinger
James R. Schlesinger
Philip W. Buchen
James T. Lynn

SUBJECT
The Intelligence Community

This memorandum presents alternative courses of action for dealing with issues relating to the intelligence community:
—those presented in the reports of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions;
—those to be addressed in connection with the work of the Congressional Select Committees.

A. Background

One of the most serious consequences of Watergate was that the intelligence community became a topic for Congressional investigation, as well as public and press debate. Starting with CIA links to Watergate, the issues have expanded to:
• CIA involvement in domestic spying and foreign assassination plots.
• FBI violations of civil liberties.
• NSA monitoring of the telephone conversations of American citizens.
• Insufficient control by Congress of the intelligence community pursestrings and insufficient knowledge of its operations.
• Poor management and control of intelligence community activities and resources, and poor performance of the community in specific instances.

Your initial response, when the public issue was only the domestic activities of the CIA, was to appoint the Commission on CIA Activities.

Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, General Subject Files, Intelligence Options Paper, 9/75. No classification marking. Printed from a copy that none of the senders initialed. The options approved by Ford are summarized briefly in a memorandum from Connor to Rockefeller, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Buchen, and Lynn, September 20. (Ibid., Philip W. Buchen Files, Box 111, Intelligence Investigations/Reorganization Numbered Files, Reorganization (7))
Within the United States (the CIA Commission) to look into allegations that the CIA had violated statutory prohibitions on such activities.

The Commission completed its report in early June, and, after seeking the views of the intelligence community, you directed in August that 20 of the recommendations of the CIA Commission be implemented immediately.\(^2\) Public announcement of this decision has been withheld until your advisers could prepare and submit to you a memorandum which provides options and recommendations for the implementation of the balance of the CIA Commission’s proposals.

Preparation of this memorandum, however, requires that you first resolve a number of major issues before work can go forward on the preparation of appropriate directives. Accordingly, after a brief discussion of the gravity of the situation in the intelligence community at the present time, the remainder of this memorandum will outline the issues—and the options for resolving them—which pose the most serious obstacles to the preparation of an action memorandum on intelligence for your review.

B. Current Situation

Two Congressional committees are currently investigating allegations concerning intelligence community activities ranging from expenditures to assassinations. Other Committees and Subcommittees of the Congress are also investigating separate parts of the community. These “band-wagon” efforts are increasingly partisan.

The scrutiny of the past, and the certainty of further disruptive scrutiny in the future, has had several seriously adverse effects:

- Intelligence targets, particularly in the Soviet Union, have been sensitized to our collection methods and appear to have taken measures to restrict the gathering of data by technical means.
- Human sources of intelligence, foreign and domestic, now fear to cooperate with our intelligence agencies.
- Cooperation of foreign intelligence agencies has been impaired.
- Morale in the intelligence community, and cooperation among its components, has been damaged.

The situation promises to become even worse. The Congressional investigations are likely to turn even more hostile as we enter an election year. By next Spring or early Summer one can foresee legislation which presents a series of Hobson’s choices—for example, any veto in the name of national security will be portrayed as a repressive act, unleashing the secret agencies of government to compile dossiers on the American people.

\(^2\) See footnote 6, Document 46.
Your principal problem is how to meet this political challenge while preserving the capabilities of the intelligence community under acceptable oversight arrangements.

C. Summary of Issues and Options

Under these circumstances, you must develop strategies in two broad (and partially interrelated) problem areas:

- **Political.** How should you counter the build-up of momentum behind activities which will result in permanent damage to our intelligence community?

- **Supervision and Control.** What mechanisms should you employ for the supervision and control of the intelligence community so that the intelligence product is responsive to your needs and the community conducts its activities efficiently and effectively?

Your advisers have under discussion a number of major initiatives which fall into the category of political responses. Your advisers agree that if you wish to go forward with any of these initiatives you should do so promptly. While you should consider that Congress may attempt to use your proposals as a jumping off point for more extensive legislative initiatives of their own, there is also the possibility that the implementation of your reforms will prevent the development in Congress of a consensus that reform legislation is necessary.

The following are four major proposed initiatives under consideration by your advisers, and your guidance is necessary on each:

- Where in the Executive Branch should responsibility for oversight of intelligence activities be placed;

- Should you issue an Executive Order restricting the activities of the CIA, or the intelligence community as a whole, with respect to American citizens, or, alternatively, a more comprehensive Executive Order which also incorporates a full statement of positive duties and responsibilities for the agencies of the intelligence community;

- Should there be a single person to plan and coordinate a response to the attack on the intelligence community;

- What actions are appropriate at this time to improve your supervision and control of the intelligence community.

**FIRST ISSUE: Oversight of the Intelligence Community**

The CIA Commission recommended that the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board be given additional authority to inquire into the propriety of CIA actions, and to report its conclusions to the President.

There is general agreement among your advisers that an independent oversight body of private citizens would be an appropriate
mechanism for inquiring into the propriety of the conduct of the intelligence community as a whole.

However, there is some question among your advisers as to whether PFIAB would be the appropriate vehicle for these responsibilities; some believe that it would be better to create a wholly new body, either to perform both the present functions of PFIAB and the oversight function, or to discharge the oversight function alone, with PFIAB retaining its present role as an independent evaluator of intelligence product.

Discussion

Option I: Extend the Role of PFIAB to Include Oversight

Those who favor this option argue that it is the simplest and cleanest way to create an oversight capacity in the Executive Branch. (It is also the approach suggested by the CIA Commission and supported by the so-called Murphy Commission, the joint Executive-Legislative Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy.) PFIAB is already in place, the intelligence agencies are familiar with it, and its assumption of new responsibilities can be achieved with little administrative disruption.

Those who favor this course also believe that some changes in the membership of PFIAB will be necessary if it is to transcend its image as a body primarily concerned with technical aspects of intelligence collection. If you choose this option, an implementing Executive Order can be ready within one week.

Option II: Approve Option I, but Rename PFIAB

The advisers that favor this option argue that retaining PFIAB’s name will fail to communicate the significance of the change you have made. If you choose this option, an implementing Executive Order can be ready within one week.

Option III: Retain PFIAB and Create a New Body Solely for Oversight

Some of your advisers argue further that there is an inconsistency between the oversight role, which implies an adversary relationship with the intelligence agencies, and a role in evaluating intelligence product, which requires the cooperation and support of the intelligence agencies. Accordingly, these advisers believe, you should leave PFIAB in place as an independent evaluator of intelligence, but create a new oversight body which would be concerned solely with the conduct of the intelligence community agencies. If you choose this option, an implementing Executive Order can be ready within one week.
DECISION

Option I: Extend the Role of PFIAB to Include Oversight; recommended by the Vice President, Jim Lynn and Henry Kissinger.\(^3\)

Option II: Approve Option I, but Rename PFIAB; recommended by\(^4\)

Option III: Retain PFIAB and Create a New Body Solely for Oversight; recommended by Jim Schlesinger and Phil Buchen.

SECOND ISSUE: An Executive Order Restricting the Collection of Information on American Citizens

The CIA Commission proposed an Executive Order limiting CIA’s collection of information about the domestic activities of U.S. citizens and the clandestine collection of foreign intelligence from American citizens. There are four options here:

Option I: Issue an Executive Order establishing restrictions on the domestic activities of the CIA only, applying the standards enunciated by the CIA Commission.

Option II: Issue an Executive Order applying the standards enunciated by the CIA Commission to the domestic activities of the entire intelligence community.

Option III: Issue an Executive Order applying these standards to the entire intelligence community except the FBI.\(^5\)

Option IV: Issue a comprehensive Executive Order incorporating duties and responsibilities as well as restrictions.

Discussion

The advantages of Option I, an Executive Order limited to the CIA, are:

- The issue involved, as well as the particular restrictions, have been extensively studied by the CIA Commission and are agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence. The advisers who favor this option believe that the issues raised in the case of other intelligence agencies (NSA, DIA, and the FBI) are substantially different and require additional study.

- Additional Executive Orders can be issued later as to the domestic activities of other intelligence agencies after better identifying the kinds of restrictions needed.

\(^3\) This option is marked with a “P,” presumably indicating the President’s approval.

\(^4\) The option is marked with a handwritten “possible,” with a handwritten notation: “review bd,” above the line of text. Connor’s September 20 memorandum to Rockefeller, Kissinger, Schlesinger, Buchen, and Lynn indicates that Ford approved Option I and the renaming of PFIAB. See footnote 1 above.

\(^5\) A handwritten checkmark appears in the margin next to this option, presumably indicating the President’s approval.
An Executive Order covering only the CIA can be ready in one week.

The advantages of Option II, an Executive Order applicable to the entire intelligence community, are:

- In concluding that the CIA should not collect and analyze information on the domestic activities of U.S. citizens, the Commission recommended restrictions which most Americans would agree should be applicable to any of the secret foreign intelligence or counterintelligence agencies of the Government; there is no reason, in principle, for precluding the CIA from collecting and analyzing such information while permitting NSA to do so.
- An Order limited to the CIA would leave your Administration open to the charge that only a small sector of a large problem has been dealt with. This is particularly true if Congress and the media continue to uncover instances of abuses similar to those involving the CIA in other intelligence agencies.
- Subsequent Executive Orders applicable to the other agencies will invite comparisons to the CIA Order; any “discrepancies” will be characterized as “glaring loopholes.” Those of your advisers who favor this option believe it is possible to frame a set of restrictions which will satisfy the American people and would not unduly restrict the other agencies engaged in foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.
- A comprehensive Executive Order will probably take three weeks to prepare, particularly to resolve FBI objections.

The advantages of Option III, an Executive Order applicable to all intelligence agencies except the FBI, are:

- Most of the advantages of Option II also apply to Option III.
- The FBI, which has law enforcement as well as counterintelligence functions, has been the major stumbling block in preparing an Executive Order which covers the entire intelligence community. The major problem is to develop regulations which effectively limit the FBI’s counterintelligence role while not impairing its law enforcement activities.
- The Department of Justice has been studying the activities of the FBI for the past year, and is in the process of preparing guidelines which, when completed, might be embodied in a separate Executive Order for the FBI.
- An Executive Order which does not cover the FBI can be prepared in about two weeks.

The advantages of Option IV, an Executive Order that would incorporate the duties and responsibilities of the community as well as the restrictions, are:

- Imposing restrictions only is an excessively negative approach.
Restrictions on intelligence activities should be imposed in a context which recognizes and reaffirms the positive duties and responsibilities of each intelligence agency.

The existing NSC Intelligence Directives provide a good starting point and should reduce the time required to draft the Order.

The time estimate for completion of such an Executive Order ranges from one to three months.

**DECISION**

Option I: Restrict domestic activities of CIA only; recommended by Jim Schlesinger

Option II: Restrict domestic activities of the entire intelligence community; recommended by [text missing]

Option III: Restrict all intelligence agencies except the FBI; recommended by the Vice President, Henry Kissinger and Jim Lynn.6

Option IV: An Executive Order incorporating duties and responsibilities as well as restrictions; recommended by Phil Buchen (some of your advisers would also recommend this option if you decided that you could wait up to three months before announcing action).

**THIRD ISSUE: Planning the Administration’s Response to the Attack on the Intelligence Community**

Since the Congressional inquiries began almost nine months ago, the Administration has consistently been placed in the position of reacting to initiatives on the Hill. There has been no coordinated political strategy to protect the intelligence community from continued disruption, to adequately explain the issues and stakes to the American people, and to provide leadership to those in Congress who are sympathetic to your position, or to deter unwise legislation from emerging in Congress.

In order to develop such a plan, and to make clear to the American people that there are formidable issues at stake in the Congressional hearings, many of your advisers believe you should consider designating or appointing a person to develop and implement a strategy of response.

**Discussion**

Those who favor this course argue that it is essential to develop and implement a strategy to limit the damage to the intelligence community. These advisers contend that the American people do not understand the extent to which normal intelligence activities have been disrupted, and the threat this poses to national security.

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6 None of the options is marked, but Connor’s September 20 memorandum indicates that Ford approved Option III. See footnote 1 above.
Those of your advisers who favor appointing a single individual argue that the job requires full-time attention from a senior adviser and that your other senior advisers are otherwise engaged on a full-time basis.

Those who oppose the appointment or designation of a single individual argue that it is difficult to separate the political aspects of the challenges made by the Congressional inquiries from those aspects which involve legal questions, tactical relationships on a day-to-day basis with Committee staff members, and ongoing Congressional relations as conducted from the agencies as well as from the White House. Visibly trying to centralize and control the political responses to the Committees and Congress may reduce the effectiveness and speed with which the other and related problems with the Congressional inquiries and in Congress are met on a day-to-day basis.

The advisers who oppose the concept of a central point for political coordination believe that the Administration’s response can be adequately coordinated through use of the existing White House staff framework.

**DECISION**

Appoint or designate a single individual to plan and coordinate the response to the attack on the intelligence community.\(^7\)

**FOURTH ISSUE: What Actions are Appropriate at this time to Improve Your Supervision and Control of the Intelligence Community**

*Option I.* Announce now the formal authorization of the NSC Intelligence Committee to evaluate the programs and product of the intelligence community.

*Option II.* An internal review of the organization of the intelligence community, the respective responsibilities and duties of its components, and the mechanisms for supervision and control of the community by the President.

These options are not mutually exclusive.

Those who favor Option I argue that the NSC already has the statutory authority to supervise the intelligence agencies of the United States Government, and that this Option would simply charge the NSC Intelligence Committee with these responsibilities.

This Option can be implemented with little administrative disruption and no new funds. It also indicates positive Presidential action on the question of supervision and control of the intelligence community.

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\(^7\) The Approve option is checked, presumably indicating the President’s approval.
If you choose this Option, it can be implemented by Executive Order within one week.

Those opposed to Option I argue that it represents a major change in the assigned functions of the NSC Intelligence Committee. This Committee, they note, was created in 1971 solely to provide guidance to the intelligence community on the needs of top level policy makers, and was not to have any responsibility for more generally directing or monitoring community programs or activities. It is further contended that any change in this committee’s responsibility should be part of a broader reorganization of the community.

Those who favor Option II argue that any decision about NSCIC should be considered in the context of a broader study of roles and missions in the intelligence community.

**DECISION**

*Option I:* Announce NSCIC functions now; recommended by the Vice President, Henry Kissinger.

*Option II:* Defer decision on NSCIC functions; recommended by Jim Schlesinger.⁸

No matter which Option you choose of those listed above, your advisers unanimously recommend that you authorize an internal review of the organization of the intelligence community, the respective responsibilities and duties of its components, and the mechanism for supervision and control of the community by the President.⁹

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⁸ The Approve option is checked.

⁹ The Approve option is checked.
49. Memorandum From President Ford


MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Central Intelligence Agency
Philip W. Buchen
John O. Marsh, Jr.

As a result of our meeting on intelligence matters, I have decided to designate a group specifically responsible for coordinating our response to matters dealing with the intelligence community. This group will be chaired by Jack Marsh. Each of the addressees of this memorandum shall serve as a member of the group.

I expect the group to function over the next several weeks and possibly months in a manner similar to the Energy Resources Council and Economic Policy Board, that is:

1. The group should meet daily to review problems, discuss strategy, agree on assignments and prepare issues for my decision.
2. The group will meet with me regularly, as often as twice a week, in order for me to decide issues and review progress.
3. I expect the group to produce by the middle of next week a time table of its actions over the next month including:
   Due dates for decision papers;
   Development of a comprehensive plan for dealing with Congress and the press; and
   Identification of individuals charged with specific responsibilities.

Gerald R. Ford

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01066A, Box 8, Executive Registry Subject Files—1975, The 1975 Reorganization of the Intelligence Community (1 Sep 75–31 Oct 75). No classification marking.

2 On September 19 between 9:50 and 10:50 a.m., Ford met in the White House Cabinet Room with all of the addressees as well as with Hartmann, Rumsfeld, Cheney, Scowcroft, Connor, Counsel Roderick M. Hills, and Counsel to the Vice President Peter J. Wallinsson, to discuss intelligence matters. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.

3 Attorney General Levi was also designated as a member.

4 The new Intelligence Coordinating Group met for the first time in the White House Situation Room on September 22. A summary of the meeting is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, John K. Matheny Files, Box 6, Subject File, Intelligence Coordinating Group (1).

5 See Document 53.
50. Decision Paper Submitted to President Ford

Washington, undated.

Background

From the outset of the House and Senate Select Committees on Intelligence, you have directed the entire Executive branch to cooperate and provide materials requested by the Committee, subject to a narrow exception in the case of certain materials such as references to techniques, agents and sources. You specifically stated that under no circumstances would you permit the Executive branch to cover up evidence of illegal actions or failures by the intelligence community.

On September 10, the House Committee, chaired by Representative Otis Pike, unilaterally declassified a document containing a passage objected to by Executive branch intelligence officials. The passage contained the four words referring to a communications security.

Two days later, Assistant Attorney General Lee read to the Pike Committee a statement authorized by you, to the effect that the Executive branch would decline to provide additional classified materials until the Committee satisfactorily altered its position concerning declassification.

Although the Church Committee in the Senate has subpoenaed certain documents concerning Cyprus, we generally have a good working relationship with them as to procedure for transmitting classified information.

It is important to note that our arrangement with the Senate Committee has never been clearly defined, but relies on comity and a "gentleman's agreement". For these reasons, it is felt you should not publicly ratify or endorse the Senate arrangement.

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1 Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 30, National Security Intelligence (3). No classification marking. Submitted by Marsh to the President under a September 24 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

2 According to an article in the *Los Angeles Times*, September 12, the document presented to the House Select Committee on Intelligence, chaired by Representative Otis Pike, on September 10, was a CIA post-mortem report on intelligence decisionmaking leading up to the October 1973 war. The report acknowledged that "those elements of the Intelligence Community responsible for the production of finished intelligence did not perceive the growing possibility of an Arab attack and thus did not warn of its imminence." (Robert Jackson, “Failure of U.S. to Predict '73 Mideast War Admitted,” *Los Angeles Times*, September 12, p. A1) Portions of the report are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973, Document 412.
As indicated at the Republican Leadership meeting this morning, we appear to be on a collision course with Congress on the question of release of classified materials to these two Committees.

Attached at Tab B, Tab C and Tab D respectively are general comments of Secretary Kissinger, Attorney General Levi and Secretary Schlesinger. These comments present in a general way their views on this subject. At Tab D [E] is a statement by the Republican Members on the House Select Committee setting forth their position.

It should be pointed out that the option paper attached focuses principally on classified, written documents and the question of guidance for witnesses in testimony before the Committee remains to be addressed.

Issue for Decision

First, what should your decision be concerning the procedures which will be acceptable for release of classified materials to the two Select Committees?

Two, how should your position on this issue be stated publicly, and what negotiating strategy should the Administration adopt for dealing with the Committees?

Options

Your advisors have concluded that there are two basic approaches you can take concerning how declassified materials should be provided to the Committees and how they should be declassified.

Option 1 (Compromise)

Materials to be supplied

Provided the Committee agrees to declassification procedures set out below, supply all materials with the narrow exception of:

—source, agents and methods
—
—

Verification procedures through Congressional Leadership would be available in case of Committee disagreement with the sensitivity of withheld portions of documents.

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3 A memorandum of conversation of the meeting, held September 24 between 8:05 and 9:50 a.m., is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15, September 24, 1975, Ford, Republican Congressional Leadership.

4 Tabs B–E are attached but not printed.

5 These three points are blank in the original.
Declassification

Once the Committee decided to declassify (publish) something and the appropriate Executive agency objected, the following procedure would apply:

1. These documents, or portions thereof, will be considered to have been loaned to the Committee.

2. The Executive will have reasonable opportunity to make its case (to the Committee) why it should not be declassified.

3. If agreement is impossible, then the Committee submits the materials to the President (or first to the Leadership and then from them to the President).

4. The President makes the final (and personal) determination.

Note: At this point, the Congress can still exercise its right to subpoena the materials and litigate the issue in Court.

Option 2 (President retains maximum control)

Provide only those documents which we are willing to let Congress make the final determination concerning publication.

The Executive would provide all materials except:

—Source, methods and procedures.
—Information from foreign intelligence sources or governments.
—Information on the decision process of the Executive agencies.

Sensitive matters which we are willing to provide so long as they retain their classified status would be withheld until the Committee-Executive agreement is reached.

A verification system for audit of the deleted materials could be offered to assure the Committee that the deletions were in fact sensitive.

It should be noted that Options 1 and 2 address the great bulk of classified materials that might be requested. However, questions relating to executive privilege are not addressed in either of them.

Concerning the strategy of your public position and how this should be negotiated with the Hill, the following options exist:

Option A: At the Leadership meeting tomorrow morning, offer to have your representatives work out the procedures with the Committees directly under the guidelines set down by you. A public statement to this effect would be issued along the lines of that contained in Tab A.⁶

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⁶ Tab A is attached but not printed. No evidence that a statement was released has been found, nor was access to documents discussed at the meeting on September 25. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15, September 25, 1975, Ford, Bipartisan Congressional Leadership) However, on October 1, Ford announced that an agreement on the handling of declassified material had been made with Pike, which was approved by the Senate Select Committee 10–3. (Public Papers: Ford, 1975, Book II, p. 1555)
Option B: Present a specific procedure to the Leadership and release it publicly following the meeting. This procedure would be in accordance with your decision in the preceding paragraphs.

Option C: Regardless of the options you select above, your Advisors recommend that you immediately make available to the Committees that information which can be declassified or that you are unwilling to submit to the Pike Committee under their newly adopted rules for unilateral declassification.

Decision

Option 1: (Compromise)
Favor: CIA, Justice, OMB, Defense
Oppose:

Option 2: (President Retains Maximum Control)
Favor: Defense (only if unable to get agreement on Option 1)
Oppose:

Option A: (Issue general statement and offer to work with Congress)
Favor: CIA, Justice, Defense
Oppose:

Option B: (Issue statement containing a specific procedure)
Favor:
Oppose:

Option C: (Release unclassified and non-critical materials)
Favor: CIA, Justice, Defense, OMB
Oppose:

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7 Ford initialed the Approve option.
8 Ford initialed the Approve option and added the notation, “if not successful.”
9 Ford initialed the Approve options of Options A–C.
51. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to President Ford


Dear Mr. President:

The scope of the several investigations being made of American intelligence has inevitably raised the subject of its organization. The Rockefeller Commission made certain recommendations on this subject, and it is predictable that the House and Senate Select Committees will do the same. Your own staff has also given consideration to whether an Administration initiative would be desirable on this subject.

Some weeks ago, six senior professional intelligence officers in CIA were asked to examine this question. I believed their experience in this field could possibly offer insights into the matter which would sharpen the issues, eliminate unnecessary focus on useless or even counterproductive proposals and identify some subjects for attention which otherwise might be missed. They approach the subject from a CIA perspective, of course, but in the nature of their work and in this study they have acquired a broad familiarity with the intelligence interests and problems of the other agencies and departments. They represent the various aspects of the intelligence process, from clandestine and technical collection to analysis and management.

This booklet is the result of their study, with an Executive Summary to provide a quick overview. It should be read as their work, embodying their ideas, and not as my own or any agency’s or department’s official view or recommendation. I do believe, however, that the ideas are worth considering with the other factors affecting the likely final outcome of the several investigations in process. For this purpose, I am planning to make it available to the members of the National Security Council, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board and members of your staff such as Messrs. Buchen, Marsh, and Lynn.

I am of course at your disposal for any discussions or other action you would like to take with respect to this study.

Respectfully,

W.E. Colby

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1 Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 30, National Security, Intelligence (4)–(6). No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that the President saw the letter.

2 Colby signed “Bill” above this typed signature.
Attachment

Executive Summary of a Report Prepared by a Central Intelligence Agency Study Group


AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR THE FUTURE

[Omitted here is a table of contents.]

Executive Summary

For the past year American intelligence has been subjected to intense scrutiny by both the press and Congress. In early 1975 the President established the Rockefeller Commission, and the Senate and House each established a Select Committee to investigate the American intelligence system and make recommendations for change. The Rockefeller Commission focused on alleged improprieties in the domestic area and recommended ways to prevent the American intelligence system from posing any threat to civil liberties. The Congressional investigations still underway are broader. They have a mandate to consider the full range of questions dealing with intelligence, from constitutional issues to the quality of the product.

These developments led the Director of Central Intelligence to commission this study, in the belief that a thorough analysis of American intelligence by a group of experienced professionals could make a useful contribution to the ultimate decisions to be made.

This paper does not address past excesses or steps to correct them. Nor does it address the related issue of oversight. We fully recognize the need for stronger oversight, but we believe the appropriate arrangements for this function require more than an intelligence perspective.

This study concentrates on basic issues which will need consideration in any reorganization of American intelligence. The President has a particular opportunity not available to his predecessors, who saw to varying degrees a need for basic reform in the intelligence structure but also recognized that basic reform could not be carried out without amending the National Security Act. Now the Act is certain to be reconsidered, with or without a Presidential initiative.

The intelligence structure must be made more efficient and effective. It must also be made more acceptable to the American polity. Thus, efficiency achieved through rationalization and centralization of authority is not the only test. Structural improvements must be accom-
panied by provisions for external controls and internal checks and balances, even at a cost in efficiency, to develop and sustain public confidence. Changes in the elaborate structure in being must also be justified by the improvements which would be achieved. These must be weighed against the losses and disruption which would result from altering the existing machinery; our recommendations must build upon the present, rather than start from scratch.

Part I describes the present environment of intelligence. Part II focuses on present problems in the organization and management of intelligence, emphasizing the central role of the Director of Central Intelligence and the difficulties in meeting his extensive responsibilities with the limited authorities vested in him. The expanding breadth and depth of national requirements for intelligence and the growing sophistication of the technology developed to meet them add year by year to the difficulty of this management task. We place particular stress on two problems:

—First, the relationship between the DCI, who has at least nominal responsibility for all US intelligence, and the Secretary of Defense, who has operating authority over the bulk of its assets. This relationship is ill-defined and hampers the development of a coherent national intelligence structure.

—Second, the ambiguity inherent in the current definition of the DCI as both the head of the Intelligence Community and the head of one element of the Community. This poses internal management problems for CIA and also reduces the DCI’s ability to carry out effectively his Community role.

Part III outlines three basic approaches to organizing the Intelligence Community. These are:

—Transfer most national intelligence activities out of the Department of Defense into a reconstituted and renamed Central Intelligence Agency, responsible for servicing the fundamental intelligence needs of both the nation’s civilian and its military leadership.

—Absorb the Central Intelligence Agency within the Department of Defense, eliminating the DCI’s role as it has been conceived since 1947 and placing responsibility for effective coordination of all American intelligence on a Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence who would absorb the Community responsibilities now exercised by the DCI, as well as those exercised by the present Assistant Secretary of Defense/Intelligence.

—Leave mostly unchanged the division of labor between Defense and CIA which has evolved since 1947 and, instead, focus on the office of the Director of Central Intelligence; modifying that office, and its authorities, in ways that will enhance the DCI’s ability to play a more effective role in contributing to the overall effectiveness of the Intelli-
gence Community, at the same time reducing his direct involvement in managing CIA.

The study argues that fundamental political problems and the unquestioned need to maintain both Defense involvement in intelligence operations and an independent CIA preclude the first two of these solutions.

The third basic approach structures the office of the DCI so that its holder can discharge the responsibilities of Community leadership without adversely affecting the legitimate interests of the Departments of State and Defense. The DCI clearly needs a stronger voice in decision making on fundamental substantive intelligence judgments and on management issues in the Intelligence Community. At the same time, individual program managers in Defense need to retain considerable latitude and flexibility in the conduct of day-to-day operations. Both goals can be met by increasing the DCI’s voice in the processes which determine how intelligence judgments are made and disseminated and how resources—money and people—will be allocated in the Community, while preserving an independent CIA and continuing Defense responsibility for actual operation of most present programs.

There immediately arises, however, a critical choice, namely whether:

1) The DCI is to be responsible in a major way for stewardship of the resources this nation devotes to intelligence and, simultaneously, to be the nation’s principal substantive foreign intelligence officer, or
2) The substantive and resource management responsibilities are to be split, with the DCI being replaced by two senior officers; one charged exclusively with resource management and the other with substantive responsibilities.

For reasons explained, we reject the second of these choices and argue that the Community leadership role must include responsibility for both resource and substantive matters. We present two options for restructuring the office of the DCI, leading to two quite different DCIs of the future.

In the first option, the DCI retains direct responsibility for CIA and a staff role with respect to the balance of the Intelligence Community. This option would much resemble present arrangements, but would differ from them in several significant respects. This DCI’s ability to influence decision making on certain important issues would be enhanced somewhat by creation of an Executive Committee, under his chairmanship, for the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, along the lines of the present arrangement with respect to the National Reconnaissance Program. His line responsibility for management of CIA would be reduced by creation of two statutory deputy directors, one re-
sponsible for day to day supervision of CIA and one for Intelligence Community coordination.

Implementation of this option would improve in important ways the overall management arrangements which currently exist within the Intelligence Community. The study group is convinced, however, that the changes needed are more fundamental than those reflected in this option, and that an opportunity for effecting such basic changes now exists.

*The second option would create a new kind of DCI called the Director General of Intelligence (DGI). He would be separated by statute from the present CIA, which would be renamed the Foreign Intelligence Agency (FIA), with its own Director (D/FIA). Funds for most US intelligence programs would be appropriated to the DGI, then allocated by him to program managers for actual operations. The DGI would assume broad substantive production and resource coordination functions and would receive staff support to exercise both responsibilities. Finally, the DGI would be a statutory member of the National Security Council with concomitant access to the President and standing with the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Defense.*

Under this arrangement, two important and interrelated questions must be answered:

—To whom should the Director of the FIA report; specifically, should he report directly to the NSC (as does the present DCI), or should he report to the NSC through the DGI, himself a member of the NSC?

—Should the DGI’s staff include the production elements of CIA or should these remain in the new FIA?

We present two workable solutions to the problems raised by these questions. Both have important advantages and serious disadvantages. The study group did not make a choice between them. A chart of these organizational choices appears opposite page 85.

If fundamental change could be at least contemplated in 1971, it is a central issue in 1975. Current political developments suggest that the National Security Act of 1947 will be rewritten, at least to some degree. Our analysis of the Act and the intelligence structure it established convinces us that it should be. We have made no effort in the pages which follow to set forth how precisely the law should be rewritten, but rather have addressed the broad principles which we believe should be incorporated in such an effort. It is not an exaggeration to observe that we are fast approaching an historical moment and unique opportunity to charter the Intelligence Community to meet future needs for effective intelligence support. It may be another 25 years before events provide the President a comparable opportunity. Our detailed recommendations are presented at the end of Part III.
52. Memorandum for the Record by the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland)

Washington, October 20, 1975.

As a result of an agreement between Mr. Buchen and the Senate Select Committee counsel, Mr. Schwarz, I read the draft report of the Committee on US involvement in assassinations of foreign leaders.

In my view the Report should not be published in full.

It will do irreparable damage to the reputation of the United States, not because of the findings on assassination, but because of the infinite detail that is presented about the inner workings of the Executive branch on a subject matter that was never at the forefront of high level concern. By taking a broad approach to the problem and rehearsing in great detail the flow of documentation and discussions, the impression is created that the US was preoccupied with plotting the removal of foreign leaders, whereas the report itself finds that in two cases out of five this plotting was actually carried on, but at a middle level, with no Presidential approval.

—The report repeatedly strains to find some evidence that there might in fact have been approval at the Presidential level; in doing so, the report handles much of the evidence in a highly dubious manner: for example, giving equal weight to one single witness 15 years after the fact, to draw an ambiguous conclusion about Presidential approval casts doubt on the report’s purpose.

In fact, the report concludes that in three cases examined there is no direct evidence that the US at any level engaged in plotting of assassination. Thus, the question is raised why any detail should be presented in these instances. By presenting considerable material in these three cases, nothing constructive is accomplished; in two cases, there are revelations about covert programs, even though their relevance is tangential.

Thus, the presentation of the full report rather than, say, the findings and conclusions, will only offer material for anti-American elements abroad who will find a vast reservoir of both trivia and more significant documentation to indict the US. Since very little of the evidence

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 2, 10/16/75–10/23/75. Secret; Sensitive.
cited is needed to prove the overall conclusions, the release of this minutia serves no legislative or foreign policy purpose, nor would restricting it to a classified report prevent the American people from learning the Committee’s findings.

Moreover, the report makes only a feeble effort to protect the privacy or personal reputation of the personnel interviewed, or those that appear in the documentation. There is a danger of retaliation for many of the officials. Unfortunately, it is almost impossible to disentangle testimony from documentation. It would be a monumental effort to purge the report of documents supplied from the Executive branch and, of course, the testimony was taken by the Committee on the basis of this documentation.

Another issue is not whether such information should remain classified, but whether its release creates a precedent that is tolerable in Congressional-Executive relations. Thus, if some future committee claims that it can release NSC minutes, memoranda of conversation with the President, Presidential directives, minutes of the 40 Committee—the potential for damage to our foreign relations is without bounds.

At a very minimum, if the report is released, it ought to be established that no precedent is created. After the publication of this report no government or political group will have any confidence that they can enter into a confidential relationship with the US on matters of great sensitivity. The decision to reveal, not the narrow basis for assassination, but a broad range of our actions in other countries, including operations of only five years ago, will have to be read by any current or future group desiring any US assistance as a clear liability.

Finally, there is the impact on current foreign relations: (1) damage to the US in Latin America, where three of the investigations are concerned, but only one involves an actual assassination plot; (2) damage in Africa (Zaire) where some of the people discussed are still alive and in power, and cooperating with the US.

In sum, it is impossible to see how a positive purpose is served by releasing the report in its full detail. The findings could easily stand alone, and their release would meet the Committee’s charge to investigate assassination plots. To release all of the report as an unclassified document would needlessly and recklessly damage the United States. To quote from the Committee’s Chairman, in one of his interrogations of Ambassador Helms: “... since these secrets are bound to come out, when they do, they do very grave political damage to the United States in the world at large ... revelations will then do serious injury to the good name and reputation of the United States.” The argument for
non-release could not be better summarized than in this statement of Senator Church.²

William G. Hyland³

² Despite protest from the White House, including an October 31 letter from Ford to Church arguing that the report jeopardized national security, the Senate Select Committee’s 347-page interim report on assassination was released November 20 and subsequently published. (Ibid., John O. Marsh Files, Box 59, Intelligence Subject File, SSC–Assassination Report—President’s Letter to the Committee) The report concluded that the CIA “directly plotted” attempts to assassinate Cuban Premier Fidel Castro and the assassination of Congolese Premier Patrice Lumumba, and engaged in “covert activity” against Dominican President Rafael Trujillo and South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem, although investigators could find no direct CIA involvement in the eventual deaths of the latter two leaders. Moreover, the report found evidence of Agency links to Chilean groups involved in the assassination of Chilean Army chief, General Rene Schneider, in 1970. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 186) The report was released on November 20. (United States Senate, Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Alleged Assassination Plots Involving Foreign Leaders, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975)

³ Hyland initialed “WGH” above this typed signature.

53. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Intelligence Coordinating Group (Raoul-Duval) to the President’s Counselor (Marsh)¹


SUBJECT
Draft Plan for Intelligence Coordinating Group

Background
The purpose of this draft plan is to provide a framework within which the Intelligence Coordinating Group can accomplish the tasks for which it was created by the President.²

¹ Source: Ford Library, James E. Connor Files, Box 57, Intelligence Community Subject File, Intelligence Coordinating Group—Draft Plan, 10/23/75. Sensitive; Eyes Only.
² See Document 49. The draft plan, attached but not printed, focuses on five main areas: the functioning of the ICG, problem management, the development of legislative planning and Presidential policy positions, the development of an Executive action plan, and the management of press and public support. Four Problem Management Task Forces were to maintain an early warning list of upcoming problems, as well as address issues arising from document delivery and security classification, Congressional strategy, and positions taken by the press and members of the public. Three Planning
Important Caveats

The following are some key constraints, as I see them, on our ability to tackle this problem with confidence:

1. Because of a history of compartmentalization and secrecy in the intelligence community, probably the best overview and perspective on this entire problem exists among the staff of the Select Committees (primarily the Senate).

2. We cannot assume that the agencies and departments within the Executive branch have fully briefed your Group or other members of the White House staff. I suspect that the CIA is cooperating the fullest, and the FBI the least. In between fall Defense (NSA and DIA) and State.

3. The White House staff has been an aggressive defender of legitimate national security secrets, and often firmer than the intelligence community itself. One might expect this would have been the other way around with the greatest strength coming from the intelligence community. Although I think our position has been right morally, legally and substantively, there is, nevertheless, great political danger in this position. We should recognize that we have been pushed out front in such matters as the NSA open hearings issue.

4. There is very little control over the intelligence investigation within the Administration. Events and personalities appear to be affecting the pace of activity more than our planning.

5. The Congressional investigations are becoming increasingly partisan, and the Press is picking up this theme. In this regard, there is an attempt to link President Ford with former President Nixon and the Watergate scandal. Already, Bella Abzug and Mondale have swung in in a highly partisan fashion. I wonder how long it will be before we hear from Reagan.

6. I don’t think we’re in a position to make any long-range decisions until we have a clearly established framework for decision-making.

Immediate Objective

I think we should immediately seek to tighten the reins on the Executive branch and regain control. We should not view this simply as a “damage control” operation but, rather, we should seize the initiative and attempt to make something positive out of this.

It is important to note that this current intelligence investigation may give President Ford an historical opportunity to restructure the in-
intelligence community, its method of operation and the role it plays in our society. This represents a great potential for the President to exercise leadership and to have a significant impact on a key element of our government, which directly impacts national security. There is a unique opportunity to blend personal and civil liberties with the Nation’s need for an effective intelligence capability.

We have to recognize that we are forming an organization and a process while we are fighting the battle. This is a high-risk proposition, but we simply have no alternative.

Next Steps

I have tried to tighten up our Coordinating Group activities and process by which decisions are made. I think we need to exert far more discipline on how the Executive branch performs, and if we do not, this thing is going to spin out of control.

Today, I would propose to go over this with you briefly, make whatever changes you want and prepare new copies for you to give to Rumsfeld, Buchen and Connor for their reaction. Once we hear from them, I recommend that you deal in Lynn and Scowcroft.

Hopefully, by Friday, we can present this to the Coordinating Group. I think we should discuss what they see, and it may be you’ll simply want to cover this orally with a one or two-page summary of assignments and organization.

4 October 24.
54. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, October 24, 1975, noon.

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Deputy Under Secretary for Management Lawrence S. Eagleburger
Mr. William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Ambassador McCloskey, Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations
Mr. Monroe Leigh, Legal Advisor
Mr. L. Paul Bremer, III, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Mr. Wesley Egan, Notetaker

SUBJECT
Secretary’s October 31 Appearance before the House Select Committee on Intelligence (The Pike Committee)

Kissinger: I’ve talked to Aspin\(^2\) who admits that the Committee has lost on the Boyatt issue\(^3\) and said they now want a solution.

Eagleburger: According to Kasten, Aspin and Dellums\(^4\) are two of those who are out for a confrontation. Aspin, like Pike, is itching to serve a contempt citation on somebody in the Executive Branch. They’re bothered by the deletions we’ve made in the documents we’ve provided the Committee thus far and continue to object to the restraints the Department has applied to middle and junior level officers on their testimony before the Committee. John Day’s error in this sense didn’t

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, October–November 1975. Secret; Administratively Sensitive; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office.

\(^2\) Representative Les Aspin (D–Wisconsin).

\(^3\) On September 25, the Pike Committee attempted to interview Thomas Boyatt regarding his role as Director of Cypriot Affairs at the Department of State in 1974, but was prevented from doing so by a Departmental order, presented to the Committee by Eagleburger, prohibiting junior and middle-level Department of State officials from testifying on recommendations made to senior decisionmakers. (Draft telegram to Kissinger, September 24; Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Lot 84 D 204, Chron—September 1975) On October 2, the Committee ordered Kissinger to release a dissent memorandum written by Boyatt on the Department’s handling of the 1974 Cyprus crisis. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 194) Kissinger responded in a letter to the Committee, October 14, that he would not release Boyatt’s memorandum in order to preserve the integrity of the Department’s Dissent Channel. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry A. Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 10, Nodis Memcons, October 1974)

\(^4\) Representative Robert W. Kasten, Jr. (R–Wisconsin) and Representative Ronald V. Dellums (D–California).
help any. Apparently he could have answered the Committee’s question re the facts involved but did not.

Hyland: The Committee is looking for a bigger principle as a target. They want to get us on a gag rule or on a false use of principles. They still want to show that we’re trying to cover up.

Kissinger: I am not willing to release the opinions and recommendations of FSOs as such. God knows they deserve to be thrown to the wolves; it’s no problem for me; I don’t get any protection out of all this. Nor will I release communications from foreign governments and their expressions of opinion; the same applies to the recommendations issue.

Eagleburger: Pike will say we’ve gone far beyond the restrictions laid down in my own testimony before the Committee in that we’ve refused to supply NODIS, etc., and may try to get you to expand on those restrictions.

Hyland: In addition, he’ll try to get to you by getting at the policy recommendations and subsequent instructions given to embassies abroad in an attempt to see how we handled the crisis per se.

Kissinger: How relevant is that to the Committee’s charter?

Hyland: They consider it part of their investigation into the costs, procedure and productivity of intelligence.

Kissinger: How long will they be in business?

Hyland: They are trying to wind up by mid-November in an attempt to get their report out before the Church Committee does. The Committee’s mandate formally expires at the end of the year.

Kissinger: What if they ask, “Are you prepared to turn over NODIS?”

Eagleburger: Colby and DOD have already undercut us on that issue.

Hyland: No doubt they will try to show that we are the least cooperative department of the executive branch.

Kissinger: I don’t care about that. We’ll do what is right. Never before has this issue of putting cables before a Congressional committee

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5 Not further identified. Foreign Service officer John K. Day served in the Office of Greek Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs.

6 In his memoirs, Colby recalled that he was a “dove” compared with some of his colleagues when it came to complying with Congressional requests for documentation. His position was that “committees should be given the materials they requested with the exception of those that revealed the identities of our officers and agents, our relations with foreign intelligence services and particularly sensitive technological data about our systems.” (Colby, Honorable Men, p. 437)
come up. I am responsible for policy and I will defend it. This is a vicious circle.

Eagleburger: I think you should say that you will do all you can except . . .

Kissinger: But there’s another principle. I will under no circumstances release instructions to our negotiators to a Congressional committee.

Eagleburger: It’s a question of tactics.

Kissinger: Will they be hostile?

Eagleburger: Pike, Dellums and Giaino will try and take you on. They’ll say, “Aren’t you trying to cover up the mishandling of the Cyprus crisis; aren’t you trying to punish Boyatt and that isn’t this typical of your excessive secrecy”, and things along that line. They will certainly try to imply that you are in the process of gagging the Department and that you are not prepared to cooperate with the Congress.

Kissinger: I want you to put down on paper for me the kinds of critical questions they may ask, the categories of issues they’re likely to try and get me on and after seeing that I’ll make up my own mind. You keep telling me they’ll ask me questions, what kinds of questions, I need to know that. My grandmother could tell me there may be hostile questions. I need to know specifically what they might be. You’ve seen my schedule. You know that between now and Friday I have perhaps 30 minutes to look at this. I refuse to be in a position of getting an already drafted statement as a fait accompli.

Eagleburger: We’ll get you a list of the questions and a draft of the opening statement within two hours.

Hyland: For instance, the Committee will allege that we are cooperating with Greeks and that we wanted the coup to fail.

Kissinger: If I can’t destroy them on substance, then it’s clear I don’t deserve to be the Secretary of State. The substance is easy. Give me a chronology I can read from. Why can’t EUR produce a usable chronology?

Hyland: The Committee knows that they’ll lose on the substance of the Cyprus issue. We already have a 40-page chronology on Cyprus in

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7 Representative Robert N. Giaino (D–Connecticut).
8 October 31, the date of Kissinger’s appearance before the Pike Committee.
9 A first draft of Kissinger’s opening statement was produced the following day, October 25. (Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—October 1975)
your briefing book for the Pike Committee appearance.\(^{10}\) Pike is convinced that he can build up a good record for himself and that he can show that you’ve run a series of programs irresponsibly.

Kissinger: Like what?

Hyland: Like the Kurds.

Kissinger: Am I involved in the Kurdish operation? I haven’t seen anything about it. What are the facts?

Hyland: The Shah had asked for some help; Helms drew up a program; you and the President approved it and it went forward. Everyone else was cut out. It was a sizable program [less than 2 lines not declassified].

Kissinger: I’m positive that it must have gone to the 40 Committee.

Hyland: They were informed after the fact.

Kissinger: Did they protest? Anybody could have gone to the President on it and said “No.”

Hyland: The Committee will say this is a case where the CIA went berserk.

Kissinger: But people can object.

Hyland: The Committee will also say that we got absolutely nothing out of efforts in helping the Shah.

Kissinger: My recollection . . .

Hyland: The Shah asked for your help when you were in Tehran with the President.

Kissinger: He must have asked the President because I had no private meetings with the Shah in the course of that visit.

Hyland: On substance the Kurdish issue is an easy one to explain and it will be simple to rebut the Committee’s charges. But the Committee will probably concentrate on procedures. They’ll go on from that to the [less than 1 line not declassified] and that that program went forward involving a great deal of money and there was no effort whatsoever to control it.

Kissinger: But that was done by [name not declassified] with the approval of the NSC. It couldn’t have been done by me. It was simply an execution of Presidential orders.

\(^{10}\) The briefing book for Kissinger’s appearance before the Pike Committee, which includes a copy of Boyatt’s August 9, 1974, “Dissent Memorandum;” an October 13, 1975, briefing memorandum from Leigh to Kissinger on alternative steps open to the Pike Committee to enforce its subpoena; an October 14 memorandum from Leigh to Kissinger on the use of executive privilege; and Kissinger’s October 15 memorandum to Pike refusing to provide the Boyatt Dissent Memorandum, is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 411, Subject File, Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), Chronological File, Sept. 1974–Oct. 1975.
Hyland: You shouldn’t forget that some of the members of the Committee and the staff as well are for the first time learning how business is really done in this town. Needless to say their approach is somewhat sophomoric.

Kissinger: Aspin told me that they won’t get into covert operations.

Eagleburger: This is one more example of the confusion that exists on the Committee itself and among the Committee staff.

Hyland: Pike runs the show over there and he doesn’t really give a damn about any of the substantive issues. He made a bad deal with the President on the classification issue and you have become his prime target. Pike himself would very much like the Democratic seat from New York, in addition to which he wants to show that the current Administration is beyond control and is taking wild risks.

Kissinger: Did we brief the Congress on the Kurdish issue?

Hyland: Yes, but at a very low level.

Kissinger: But it only started in 1972.

Hyland: It was turned down three times. The Committee will also turn to the Angola question but they’re disappointed on this one, largely because they have discovered that Colby was not forced into anything, and that there were numerous meetings on the issue and a great deal of Congressional briefing.

Kissinger: So they have [less than 1 line not declassified] the Kurds. Will they try to go public with this.

Hyland: No, it will probably be in executive session. They’ll also raise the issue of your wearing two hats, something they consider very dangerous. And naturally they’ll zero in on the guidelines for middle and junior level officer testimony before the Committee as an example of your refusing to allow criticism on issues like Angola and the Kurds. Basically, they’ll try to get at you in two ways: 1) they’ll look for principles that they can hang you with and 2) they will charge you with mishandling of assorted crises and make constant references to unusual procedures.

Eagleburger: We are pulling together all the documents previously supplied to the Committee as well as indications of those portions of the documents that were deleted. We’ll pull all that together by tomorrow.

Kissinger: I must know the facts. I must have the categories of questions and I must have them now. What’s been deleted from the cable traffic?

Hyland: Instructions to and recommendations from our ambassadors. The Committee has been told what categories have been deleted but they don’t understand why they can’t see instructions.
Kissinger: The answer to that is simple. The entire foreign policy process depends on confidentiality.

Bremer: Won’t the Committee then respond that it’s clear that the Secretary does not trust the Committee or the Committee staff.

Hyland: They’ll say that you are charging them with being irresponsible, to which you can naturally reply that if foreign governments realize or learn the extent and the detail with which we are discussing major substantive foreign policy issues with the Congress, they will be scared to death and we’ll be in real trouble.

Kissinger: Previously Congressional committees have wanted testimony from Department officials. Never before have they asked for cable traffic. This becomes a real precedent problem for us.

Hyland: You might consider releasing to the Committee the transcript of your August 5, 1974 talk with Assistant Secretaries and senior Department officials on the way in which the Department handled the Cyprus crisis and the substantive issues involved from your own perspective.

Kissinger: Show me the document (the Secretary then reads from his briefing book). What would be the advantage of releasing this document?

Hyland: It would meet the Committee’s charge that we are trying to withhold information.

Kissinger: The people that prepare these transcripts are absolute morons. Can’t they tell the difference between the word flexibility and publicity?

Eagleburger: That August 5 statement is eloquent and I think would be extremely useful.

Kissinger: If we let this Committee rummage through our files, foreign policy will collapse.

Hyland: We need to stress to them our willingness to allow senior officials to testify before the Committee.

Kissinger: How in God’s name did the CIA get into their current position?

Hyland: It grew out of the arrangement they had with the Church Committee and the fact that the White House didn’t feel the Executive Branch could refuse anything. Committee staffers were allowed to go out to Langley to browse through their files and then request specific documents. When the Pike Committee was created, this procedure was already rolling.

Eagleburger: The White House’s attitude is to simply give out everything.

Kissinger: I think the newspapers have helped us on this so far. But once this damn thing starts unravelling, there will be no end to it.
Eagleburger: Most of the people on the Hill have no real argument with this.

Kissinger: So they’re not really worried except for the fact that they can’t see our instructions.

Hyland: Pike wants to take the requirements you’ve laid down and expand them to illustrate massive obstruction on our part and thus get the Congress behind him.

Kissinger: That’s totally different. It doesn’t involve the foreign relations of the United States.

Hyland: But Pike wants to blame the current status on us.

Eagleburger: The problems on substance are quite small.

Hyland: The Committee and the staff are substantive morons. Furthermore Pike pays no attention to substance. He’s trying to look at the procedures and wants to know why the Committee can’t be told who signed what, who made what decision, and did this or that, etc.

Kissinger: The Kurdish issue then is a simple one.

Hyland: You can argue that as a result of our assistance there were almost no Iraqi troops involved in the Mideast war, there were no TU–22s involved, and that Iran was not part of their oil embargo. Furthermore we can show that there would have been real consequences in not helping the Shah. If Nixon had simply brushed the Shah’s request aside, the Shah would have felt isolated and obvious problems would have resulted.

Kissinger: I have no trouble with the policy. Will they ask about consulting the 40 Committee?

Hyland: They might.

Kissinger: We’ll simply say “No.” It’s something the President did and the 40 Committee was so informed. Colby framed us on the Track II operation. It was merely carrying out a Presidential decision in the manner in which the CIA implemented the 40 Committee decision. Is Colby a complete coward?

Hyland: Let’s say he was open and forthcoming. Brent has asked Colby to prepare a summary of the issues that he has already testified on.

Kissinger: Will the Committee be nasty?

Hyland: They’ll probably be pointed and sarcastic but not necessarily nasty.

Kissinger: Well they can’t win on sarcasm. I want an opening statement that is conciliatory and which discusses the issue as a common problem but which stresses that I must maintain the integrity of the foreign policy process, the Foreign Service and the Congress. Further-
more, it should say that I am willing to discuss any other issues. However, I will not raise specific substantive issues.

Eagleburger: We’ll have the opening statement for you in two hours.

Hyland: After the opening statement, Pike will go after the guidelines for junior and middle grade officers and the whole question of our deleting instructions and recommendations from the documents already supplied to the Committee.

Kissinger: I’ll simply tell them that I’ll have to look at the issue of instructions on a case-by-case basis. I also want the opening statement to somehow explain the rather unique structural character of the Department of State. We can probably let them see some of the instructions.

Hyland: That should meet the main attack. The open session versus closed session question will probably be addressed rather haphazardly. Certainly any discussion of the Kurdish situation, \[less than 1 line not declassified\] and Angola will be in closed executive session. They’ll probably also ask if you can come back.

Kissinger: No. This will be enough.

Eagleburger: If you agree to go back, they will simply collect all the other testimony and then try to clobber you with it at the end.

Hyland: I think we ought to have your opening statement point toward the discussion of Cyprus.

Kissinger: Not at all. I’m willing to help but I have to draw the line. Their approach would destroy the foreign policy process. I’ll ask them what I can do to help but I have no intention of making an issue out of something that they don’t raise.

Bremer: It would be useful to examine all this with the Committee.

Kissinger: Yes, what we want to do is address the cost effectiveness of intelligence. But not the question of policy decisions. I get the impression this is not a very high-powered committee and I doubt seriously that they can brow beat me. (to Eagleburger) Call Aspin Monday to see what he now thinks.

Hyland: Pike’s now on a short side.

Eagleburger: I think at least four of the members will be nasty and sarcastic.

Kissinger: Well, like what. Don’t just tell me they’ll be nasty and sarcastic in their questioning. Give me an example of the kinds of questions they’re likely to ask.

Leigh: For example, the Committee may very well ask under what authority you instruct a Foreign Service Officer as to what questions he can and cannot respond to before the Committee. They’ll say isn’t this a violation of first amendment rights.
Hyland: They’ll also probably say that their impression is that the lower level officers in the building are the only people who really know what’s going on and that senior “policy level” officials are interested only in protecting themselves.

Kissinger: I can handle that. If you follow that argument through to its logical conclusion, then it appears that junior and middle level officers are in fact running the Department and that if you don’t follow their advice then you run the risk of a Congressional investigation.

Ingersoll: Are they interested in the efficacy of foreign policy or the use of intelligence?

Hyland: The Committee wants to know why raw intelligence received from overseas is not acted upon.

Kissinger: Never in history has Congress taken this approach to foreign policy.

Leigh: They did it with China but after the fact.

Hyland: Pike will probably try to sum up that since no middle or junior level officials can testify as to their recommendations, the Committee is unable to do its job regarding the investigation of foreign policy.

Eagleburger: It would be a mistake to argue with the Committee on their own charter.

Hyland: The Committee is bored stiff by intelligence on Portugal and Pike for one does not conceal his own cynicism.

Eagleburger: Pike has told Wayne Hays that his real purpose is to get the Secretary.

Hyland: Pike is out for the publicity. He wants to beat the Church report out and will then probably walk away from the issue.

Kissinger: I don’t want the opening statement to be more than 10 minutes. If Pike wants to make the instruction thing a gut issue, I don’t see how he can win.

Hyland: His style is innuendo and sarcasm. His questions are designed to embarrass the witness but he’s not very good with witness who comes back at him.

Kissinger: I want a description of the foreign policy process and an explanation of my concerns regarding the integrity of the foreign policy process, the difficult situation the United States is in at the present, etc.

Leigh: I agree. We want to put our emphasis on the Boyatt case and the dissent issue.

Kissinger: No, I want the emphasis on the question of recommendations and the delicacy of foreign policy. If the Committee succeeds in the approach they apparently have taken, it will take years to rebuild our foreign policy structure. I want to use the Boyatt case as an illustra-
tion of the need to preserve the integrity of the Foreign Service and I want to use the other cases as illustrations of the need to protect the integrity of the foreign policy process.

McCloskey: Hyland is right. The open session should concentrate on the dissent channel issue itself and the principles at stake.

Kissinger: How long will I be there?

McCloskey: Until about noon or 1:00 o’clock and they may want to go into the afternoon. It certainly would be preferable if you could appear at 10:30 rather than 11:00 because of the Committee’s own schedule.

Kissinger: But open sessions are always long. When are we going into executive session?

Hyland: You may not have to.

Kissinger: I’ll give them from 10:30 to 1:00. How they divide the time between open and executive session is their problem. They’ve been clobbered in the press.

McCloskey: That by itself has added significantly to their own frustration.

Kissinger: I don’t think they can get out of a hole they have dug for themselves right now unless they latch onto a new issue. You must restate the need for the confidentiality of recommendations. I don’t want any mention of the dissent business in the opening statement. I want to stress the nature of the foreign policy process and my main concerns regarding that process.\footnote{In his testimony before the Pike Committee on October 31, Kissinger proposed to solve the deadlock over the Boyatt memorandum by providing the committee with an “amalgamation” memorandum of internal dissent and criticism of the Department’s Cyprus policy. The Pike Committee accepted this compromise solution on November 4. A copy of the dissent amalgamation is attached to a memorandum from Hyland and Eagleburger to Kissinger, November 5. (Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—November 1975)}
55. **Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Marsh) to President Ford**


SUBJECT

Assassination Report

*Background*

As you know, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has conducted a detailed investigation of charges that the Executive Branch engaged in plotting the assassination of foreign leaders. Under your instructions the various intelligence agencies provided the Committee complete access to all documents relevant to such charges. These documents were highly classified and unsanitized, and no claim of Executive Privilege has been made. You provided the documents on the express assumption that they would be used by the Committee in a responsible manner.

The final Report of the Committee on the assassination charges has been prepared in draft form and will soon be published.

Under an agreement that they would consult with us prior to publishing classified materials, the Church Committee submitted to us a lengthy list of names, phrases and quotations extracted from classified documents which they desired to include in their Report. Rather than approve such a list out of context, three senior persons from the relevant agencies went to review the Report in its entirety. No other members of the Executive Branch have seen the Report.

The three who have reviewed the report agree that its publication will be extremely damaging to the United States, that it will expose specific individuals who have been associated with these activities to serious risk of harm, and that it fails to resolve the issues raised by the inquiry. Their individual reports are at Tabs A, B and C.

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1 Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Report on CIA Assassination Plots (2). Secret; Sensitive. Attached to an October 29 covering memorandum from Marsh to Cheney, which states that Marsh’s memorandum was also forwarded to Kissinger, Schlesinger, Colby, and Buchen. A notation by Marsh on the last page reads: “Presidential letter to the Committee to be made public?”

2 The list was not found.

3 The Church Committee report was reviewed by S.D. Breckinridge of CIA, Thomas Latimer of the Department of Defense, and William G. Hyland of the Department of State. Their reports, all dated October 20, are in the Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 7, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Report on CIA Assassination Plots (2).

4 The tabs are attached but not printed.
Official acknowledgement of assassination plotting by successive Administrations of the United States Government would have an appalling and shattering impact in the international community. Without question, it would do grave damage to our ability to play a positive role of leadership in world affairs. It would provide profoundly harmful leverage to our adversaries and the resultant humiliation we would suffer would deal a serious blow to our foreign policy from which we could recover only with difficulty. In sum, the report could result in grave harm to the United States’ position in the world. In addition, it would expose specific individuals who have been associated with these activities to serious risk of harm.

Issue for Decision

What actions should be taken by you or your Administration regarding this Report in view of the potential harm from its impending publication?

Three broad options are present:

Option 1—Take no action whatsoever to influence the Committee’s decision of the Report.

Pro: This option allows the Executive to maintain complete distance from the Committee and avoid any possible charges of coverup; moreover, it avoids any implication of Executive approval of the Report.

Con: However, the Executive will have forfeited the opportunity to restrain a Report the publication of which in its present form will cause a significant harm to the United States. Also, we will not be clearly on the record in opposition to publication.

Option 2—Take no official position but forward to the Committee the three reviewers’ comments and request the Committee consider these views in revising their Report.

Pro: This option apprises the Committee of our concerns on the draft Report while maintaining the Administration’s distance from the Report itself. It largely overcomes any charges of coverup.

Con: This approach may not be strong enough, in view of the magnitude of the changes which would be required in the short time prior to publication of the Report. The Committee may simply ignore such a communication. Moreover, this option gives to the Committee advice offered within the Executive.

Option 3—Take an official Administration position, expressed by yourself or a spokesman in your behalf, opposing publication of the Report in its present form and stressing that the Committee must assume full responsibility for damage to the Nation because of publication.
Pro: Strong action by the Executive may persuade the Committee to revise the most harmful areas of the Report. This puts you firmly on the record in opposition to a Report whose publication will harm the Nation.5

Con: This option most clearly exposes you to charges of coverup. Should you select this option, there are the following positions available:

A. That no Report be published.

If you take this position, it will provide the most room for compromise; however, the chances of stopping publication entirely are slight. It most strongly exposes you to charges of coverup.6

B. That only the findings and recommendations portion of the Report be published.

If you select this position, you will have recognized the Committee’s intent to publish some form of an official report which acknowledges past assassination activity. This is the most feasible alternative noted by the three reviewers. However, this position will only reduce, not eliminate, the damage to the United States foreign relations.

C. That all sensitive sources and methods and any material the publication of which would subject individuals or groups to injury be deleted prior to publication.

This position would eliminate one cause of harm in the Report. However, it will pose very substantial difficulties in actual implementation since it will require page-by-page analysis by the Executive and the Committee. One reviewer noted that this type approach would be infeasible because of the intertwined mass of sensitive data. Even if the Executive is successful in removing most of the material harmful to individuals and groups, damage to foreign relations will still result from publication. Moreover, the Executive will have become so enmeshed in the Report that it will have, de facto, approved its publication in that form.

D. (Combination of A and C) That no Report be published, but if the Committee persists, all sensitive sources and methods and any material the publication of which would subject individuals or groups to injury be deleted prior to publication.7

This position would offer a fall-back to accommodate Committee demands for a full Report and would offer hope for minimum protec-

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5 Ford highlighted Option 3 and the “Pro” argument in its favor.
6 Ford wrote a question mark in the margin next to this paragraph.
7 Ford wrote a question mark in the margin next to this paragraph.
tion of individuals and groups jeopardized by the Report in its present form. However, the difficulty of piecemeal sanitization must be emphasized; and it will likely entail de facto approval of the Report by the Executive.

**Decision**

1. No action whatsoever.\(^8\)

   **Favor:**
   **Oppose:** Buchen, Colby, Schlesinger, Kissinger, Marsh

2. Take no official position but forward to the Committee the comments of the three reviewers and request the Committee consider these views in revising its Report.\(^9\)

   **Favor:**
   **Oppose:** Buchen, Colby, Schlesinger, Kissinger, Marsh

3. Take an official Administration position, expressed by yourself or a spokesman, opposing publication of the Report in its present form.\(^10\)

   **Favor:** Buchen, Colby, Schlesinger, Kissinger, Marsh
   **Oppose:**

   If you take a position:
   A. That no Report be published.\(^11\)

   **Favor:** Kissinger (with fallback to B), Buchen (in combination with B), Schlesinger (in combination with B)
   **Oppose:**

   B. That only the findings and recommendations of the Report be published.

   **Favor:** Colby (with fallback to C), Kissinger (as fallback to A), Buchen (in combination with A), Schlesinger (in combination with A)
   **Oppose:**

   C. That all sensitive sources and methods and any material the publication of which would subject individuals or groups to injury be deleted prior to publication.

   **Favor:** Colby (as fallback to B)
   **Oppose:**

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\(^8\) Ford initialed the Disapprove option.

\(^9\) Ford initialed the Disapprove option.

\(^10\) Ford initialed the Approve option.

\(^11\) Ford initialed the Approve option under option A; he did not initial either the Approve or Disapprove option of options B–D.
D. (Combination of A and C) That no Report be published, but if the Committee persists, that all sensitive sources and methods and any material the publication of which would subject individuals or groups to injury be deleted prior to publication.

Favor: Marsh
Oppose:

Under Option 3 it is necessary to designate a spokesman for the Administration. This can be you or one of your officials.\textsuperscript{12}
I will take position.
Others (_____ , _____, _____) will take position.

\textsuperscript{12} Ford did not indicate his decision on either of the options.

56. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Marsh) to President Ford\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, November 1, 1975.

SUBJECT
Senate Select Committee Plans for Open Hearing on Covert Activities in Chile

Background

The Senate Select Committee intends to hold an open session on the range of CIA covert activities in Chile from 1964 to present. The hearing, which is scheduled for next Tuesday,\textsuperscript{2} is intended as a case study on covert activities and is the only one of its kind scheduled for an open hearing.

The CIA has been asked by the Committee to declassify certain facts (Attachment A)\textsuperscript{3} for the proposed public hearing. The Committee plans on calling two witnesses: David Phillips, CIA’s former head of the Latin America Division of the Directorate of Operations and Am-

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 31, Subject File, National Security—Intelligence (7). Secret. Sent for decision. A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates that the President saw the memorandum.

\textsuperscript{2} November 4.

\textsuperscript{3} The list of facts submitted by the Senate Committee staff is attached but not printed.
bassador Korry who had been stationed in Chile from 1967 to 1971. In addition to declassification of the facts obtained from CIA files, the Senate Select Committee also wishes to quote from certain classified National Intelligence Estimates in an effort to prove that Allende was not considered to be a threat to the democratic processes of Chile. No other classified documentation has been requested for the hearing. The CIA has been advised that if Bill Colby wishes to appear, the Committee would hear his testimony.

During a recent executive session, strong objections were raised by Colby to holding a public session on this subject. Senator Church wishes to be advised as to whether or not the CIA will comply with the Committee requests.

**Issue for Decision**

Should the Administration object to open hearings on Chile?

**Reasons for Opposing Open Hearing:**

The argument that much information about the Agency’s activities in Chile has already appeared publicly fails to take account of the important distinction between unofficial reporting, rumors and allegations and the official verification of facts which would be the result of public hearings based on declassified documents and testimony.

People other than employees, including U.S. citizens and companies as well as foreigners who cooperated willingly with the Agency, could be exposed and become subject to harassment or even threat of physical violence. The confirmation of CIA covert activities in Chile would doubtless lead to the identification of highly placed political leaders of Chile who we have assisted over the years. In particular, former President Eduardo Frei, whose election in 1964 we contributed to and whose tacit participation in coup plotting in 1970 may be divulged.

Declassification of the facts or the appearance of the Director at an open hearing testifying to a declassified series of events in a covert action operation would have the following adverse results:

1. It would establish a precedent that would be seized on by the Congress in the future to hold additional open hearings on covert action.

2. It would have a shattering effect on the willingness of foreign political parties and individuals to cooperate with the U.S. in the future on such operations.

Finally, it should be noted that public, officially confirmed, rehashing of the Agency’s activities in Chile would result, according to Colby, in a rekindling of the Soviet, Cuban and other adversaries worldwide campaign against CIA and the U.S. Government.
Advantages in Not Opposing the Open Hearing:

Since it is apparent that the Senate Select Committee will hold open hearings on Chile, cooperating with the Committee with respect to the scope of the hearing could give us limited protection. In such fashion we could hope to keep out of the public record a substantial number of names of Chilians who cooperated with the U.S. Government. We avoid further charges of “cover-up”.

It would give an opportunity for Colby to demonstrate that the nature of our covert activity over a ten-year period was, in general, in support of the democratic process in Chile. It would also give him an opportunity to categorically deny any CIA participation in the 1973 coup and the death of Allende.

If the Senate publishes the assassination report, including Chile material, there will be little, if anything, left to protect.

Finally, if the CIA is to appear at open hearings, it would negotiate a more accurate statement of facts (e.g., paragraph 4 of Attachment A—from the Committee—is in error).4

What Would Happen If We Oppose Open Hearings:

1. David Phillips, former CIA officer, would be advised that the terms of his secrecy agreement are still in effect and that he could not testify in open session on the subject of covert activities in Chile. Phillips would likely adhere to the CIA request to avoid public testimony. Although the State Department does not have a comparable post-employment agreement with Ambassador Korry, he could be notified that the subject matter remains classified and that it was the State Department’s desire that he not testify in open session regarding covert activities in Chile. Both of these efforts could be construed by the Committee, and eventually by the press, as an attempt to “gag” committee witnesses. State Department officials believe that if Ambassador Korry is told that you want testimony in Executive Session only, he will object to appearing in public hearings. However, others point out that Korry could be unpredictable.

2. The basic facts relating to covert action in Chile from 1964 forward have appeared in the press. The Committee could, using non-

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4 Paragraph 4 of the attachment reads: “Between Allende’s inauguration in November, 1970 and his overthrow and death in September, 1973, the CIA spent over $6,000,000 in support of opposition political parties and media. Included in that support were limited amounts of money for private sector organizations. Proposals for support of private sector organizations suspected in involvement in strikes or direct support of strikers were rejected. At the same time, the CIA remained in contact through third parties with a right-wing terrorist organization, [less than 1 line not declassified]. The CIA also passed considerable money to the conservative [less than 1 line not declassified], whose right-wing members were known to have links with [less than 1 line not declassified].”
official sources, proceed with Ambassador Korry as a witness. In this fashion they could maintain the fiction of not having declassified the Chile covert activities.

3. The Chairman could attempt to declassify the pertinent material through a committee vote. While this is not consistent with Senate rules, Senator Church used this technique in declassifying the Sinai Accords earlier this month.

Decision

Agree to open hearings on Chile and try to structure as best as possible.5

Favor:
Oppose: Buchen, Colby, Levi, Marsh, Scowcroft

Oppose open hearings; executive session only.6

Favor: Buchen, Colby, Levi, Marsh, Scowcroft
Oppose:

5 Ford initialed the Disapprove option.

6 Ford initialed the Approve option. On November 13, the Church Committee voted to hold open hearings on covert activities in Chile and invited members of the Ford administration to testify. A copy of Church’s letter to Ford, November 14, requesting his presence at an open hearing on December 4, and an unsigned draft response from Kissinger declining to appear is in the Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—November 1975. However, former Ambassador to Chile Edward Korry testified before the Committee on December 4 and former CIA officer Phillips testified on December 5. Their respective testimonies are published in volume 7 of the Committee’s final report. (United States Senate, Hearings Before the Select Committee to Study Government Operations With Respect to Intelligence Activities, Vol. 7, Covert Action, pp. 29–35, 55–57)
57. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Research and Intelligence (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Pike Committee Subpoenas

Attached is a description of the 7 subpoenas: 5 to the NSC, one to State and one to CIA (Tab A).  

1. 40 Committee records of decisions since January 1965 (sic):
   — the committee has a sanitized list of projects approved;
   — we could stand on this, on the grounds that no full list can be supplied because of sensitivity;
   — unfortunately, decisions as opposed to recommendations, are difficult to refuse; the President could probably not invoke executive privilege (leaving aside the question of whether he would want to);
   — on the other hand, there is the separation of powers argument, buttressed by the fact that major decisions have already been briefed through the Congressional oversight mechanism.

My view is that the reply ought to be that the Committee has the sanitized material, and that we would have to treat each issue on its merits; i.e., give them decisions in the hands of the Church Committee, or already briefed to the Pike Committee: [less than 1 line not declassified] Kurds, perhaps Angola.

2. Documents furnished by agencies to NSC relating to adherence to SALT agreements:
   — The President (NSC) receives a quarterly “monitoring report”; it is highly classified but rather factual; this could be the answer to the subpoena.
   — There is probably a mass of memos on compliance; since most of this is virtually in the public domain, some of them might qualify.

The basic problem here, however, is the next phase: clearly this is a politically inspired request, fishing in the troubled waters of détente, SALT, Schlesinger, violations, etc. Thus, a total turn down guarantees a new round of wild stories, and continuing publicity for Pike, and potential problems on SALT itself.

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 411, Subject File, Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), Chronological File, November 1975. Secret; Sensitive.

2 Attached but not printed. The Pike Committee issued subpoenas on November 6 for the seven categories of records summarized here.
My view, therefore, is that we ought to respond by giving the quarterly monitoring reports only.

3. CIA/IRS (an unrelated problem).
4. Minutes of NSC Intelligence Committee Working Group.
5. All WSAG meeting minutes relating to the October war, the Cyprus crisis and the Portugal coup.
—Both of the above clearly warrant executive privilege and should be confronted frontally and denied.
6. All intelligence reports furnished to the NSC by CIA, DIA and NSA between October 15, 1973 and October 28, 1973, relating to the 1973 Middle East war and the military activities of the Soviet Union.
—Though a major task, there is no plausible reason for denial, and this could be done.
7. “All documents relating to State Department’s recommending covert action to the NSC and the 40 Committee and its predecessor committees from January 20, 1961 to the present.” (Tab B)
—The Department must refuse to provide what are, in effect, recommendations to the President. But even so, there are two problems:

(1) taken literally, this subpoena could require us to provide “all documents relating to recommendations”, and that could include a mountain of second-level memoranda; we will have to broaden the interpretation of “recommendation” to include our supporting material; and

(2) if we deny the material we have two legal answers: (a) to claim that the subpoena is misdirected because our recommendations are the property of the 40 Committee, or (b) to claim that we cannot supply recommendations to the President, invoking a Departmental privilege.

In any case, we need to have a legal position before Tuesday morning 10:00, when the subpoena falls due.

Recommendations:

1. That the Office of the Legal Adviser prepare a reply stating the Department of State recommendations to the NSC and 40 Committee can only be released by those bodies.

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3 Tab B was not found attached.
4 November 11.
5 Kissinger neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. However, in a letter to Pike on November 14, the Acting Legal Adviser of the Department of State, George H. Aldrich, stated that the President had instructed the Secretary of State not to comply with the Committee’s subpoena for documents relating to State Department covert action recommendations to the NSC and 40 Committee “for the reason that it would be contrary to the public interest and incompatible with the sound functioning of the Executive branch to produce the documents requested.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 411, Subject File, Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), Chronological File, November 1975)
2. That, in the discussion of Jack Marsh’s coordinating group, the Department of State representative argue in favor of invoking executive privilege on minutes of meetings of the 40 Committee, the NSCIC, and the WSAG.6

3. That we support a reply on SALT limited to intelligence reports.7

4. That we urge a sanitized response on all 40 Committee decisions, except those already briefed to the Pike Committee.

6 Kissinger neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation. However, in a memorandum to President Ford, November 13, Marsh noted that the Department “has declined to turn over” the subpoenaed documents to the Committee, “pointing out that they were sent to the White House and therefore the decision must be made here.” On the memorandum, Ford approved the invocation of executive privilege in withholding the subpoenaed documents on Department of State covert action recommendations. (Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 31, National Security Intelligence (8))

7 Kissinger neither approved nor disapproved recommendations 3 and 4.

58. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)1


MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Organization and Management of the Foreign Intelligence Community

The President has directed that a study be made of the organization and management of the foreign intelligence community. The study should include an examination of:

1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01066A, Box 8, Executive Registry Subject Files—1975, The 1975 Reorganization of the Intelligence Community (1 Nov 75–31 Dec 75). Confidential. A copy was sent to Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman General George S. Brown. Although Ford formally announced Colby’s removal on November 3, Colby remained as DCI on an interim basis until he was succeeded by George H.W. Bush on January 30, 1976.
—the basic structure of the community,
—key problems of organization and management,
—definition of requirements,
—systems design and selection,
—resource allocation,
—guidance mechanisms,
—consumer-producer relationships, and
—relevant recommendations of the Rockefeller and Murphy Commissions.

Based upon the results of these reviews, the study should:
—evaluate the need for changes in the current organization of the foreign intelligence community,
—present options for a possible reorganization of the foreign intelligence community, and
—submit the recommendations of each addressee on the options presented.

This study will be prepared by an ad hoc group composed of representatives of the addressees and chaired by the representative of the Office of Management and Budget. The study should be completed by December 12, 1975. It will be submitted to the Intelligence Coordinating Group which was established by the President on September 19, 1975.2

Brent Scowcroft

2 See Document 49.

59. Letter From President Ford to the Chairman of the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike)1


Dear Mr. Chairman:

I want you to know of my deep concern because the Select Committee found it necessary on November 14 to vote in favor of three resolutions which could lead to a finding by the House of Representatives that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger is in contempt for failure to

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, John K. Matheny Files, Box 4, House Select Committee on Intelligence, Presidential Letter to Chairman Pike, 11/19/75. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original.
comply with three Committee subpoenas.2 This issue involves grave matters affecting our conduct of foreign policy and raises questions which go to the ability of our Republic to govern itself effectively. I know that you, Mr. Chairman, share my deep respect for the rights and powers of the House of Representatives—where our cumulative service spans nearly four decades—and for the obligations and responsibilities of the President. The two branches of government have an extremely serious responsibility to consider the issues raised in the ongoing foreign intelligence investigations dispassionately and with mutual respect.

Former Chief Justice Warren pointed out twenty years ago that there can be no doubt as to the power of Congress and its committees to investigate fully matters relating to contemplated legislation. Without this power, which includes the authority to compel testimony and the production of documents, the Congress could not exercise its responsibilities under Article I of our Constitution. However, this power, as broad as it is, is subject to recognized limitations. Not only is it limited by powers given to the other two branches, but it also must respect requirements of procedural due process as they affect individuals.

The action of your Committee concerning the November 14th resolutions raises, in my mind, three principal issues: the extent to which the Committee needs access to additional Executive Branch documents to carry out its legislative functions; the importance of maintaining the separation of powers between the branches and the ability of the Executive to function; and the individual rights of officials involved in this matter. I am not interested in recriminations and collateral issues which only serve to cloud the significant questions before us.

From the beginning of the investigations of the intelligence agencies, I have taken action to stop any possible abuses and to make certain that they do not recur as long as I am President. I have also endeavored to make available relevant information in a responsible manner to the appropriate committees of Congress.

I have given great weight to my responsibility to maintain the integrity of our intelligence community and the ability of this Nation to develop and use foreign intelligence. This is one reason why I have insisted that much of the information I have made available to Congress be kept secret, so that current foreign intelligence operations, which are critical for the national security, can continue effectively. In accordance

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2 By a vote of 10–3, the Pike Committee approved three contempt citations stemming from Kissinger’s refusal to turn over the subpoenaed Department of State covert action recommendations, NSC records on covert action approvals given by the 40 Committee (and its predecessors) since January 20, 1965, and NSC documents on Soviet and American compliance with the 1972 SALT and 1974 Vladivostok agreements. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 194)
with these principles, your Committee and the Senate Select Committee have received unprecedented access to Executive Branch documents and information.

Your Committee’s November 6th votes on seven subpoenas for additional Executive Branch documents came in the context of several months of working together on this very difficult subject and a record of cooperation on both sides. They were served on November 7. The documents were due on the morning of November 11, and the appropriate Administration officials immediately went to work collecting the information. Four of the subpoenas were complied with fully. However, problems arose as to the remaining three issued to:

—“Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State, or any subordinate officer, official or employee with custody or control of . . . all documents relating to State Department recommending covert action made to the National Security Council and its predecessor committees from January 30, 1961 to present.”

—“the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or any subordinate officer, official or employee with custody or control of . . . all 40 Committee and predecessor Committee records of decisions taken since January 20, 1965 reflecting approvals of covert action projects. [separate subpoena] . . . All documents furnished by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s Standing Consultative Commission, and the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Intelligence Community staff, since May, 1972 relating to adherence to the provisions of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty of 1972 and the Vladivostok agreement of 1972.”

These three subpoenas are the basis of the Committee resolutions of November 14.

The subpoena directed to the Secretary of State requests documents containing the recommendation of State Department officials to former Presidents concerning highly sensitive matters involving foreign intelligence activities of the United States. The appropriate State Department officials identified and referred to the White House documents which apparently fall within the subpoena. None of these documents are from my Administration. These were carefully reviewed and, after I received the opinion of the Attorney General that these documents are of the type for which Executive privilege may appropriately be asserted, I directed Secretary Kissinger not to comply with the subpoena on the grounds of Executive privilege.4 I made a finding that, in

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3 See Document 57.
4 See footnote 6, Document 57.
addition to disclosing highly sensitive military and foreign affairs assessments and evaluations, the documents revealed to an unacceptable degree the consultation process involving advice and recommendations to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson and Nixon, made to them directly or to committees composed of their closest aides and counselors. Thus, in declining to comply with the subpoena, Secretary of State Kissinger was acting on my instructions as President of the United States.

With respect to the two subpoenas directed to “... the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or any subordinate officer, official or employee with custody of control ...”, the really important point here is that the NSC staff has made a major effort to deliver the documents requested. As you know, additional documents were made available to the Committee after the deadline of the subpoenas and indeed after the Committee voted on the November 14th resolutions. There has been and continues to be an effort on the part of the NSC staff to provide the Committee with the information and documentation it needs. In fact, a very comprehensive volume of information has been made available which provides the Committee a substantial basis for its investigation.

This effort was undertaken, notwithstanding the fact that the subpoenas themselves were served on November 7, made returnable only four days later, and called for a broad class of documents, going back in one subpoena to 1965, and in the other to 1972. Substantial efforts were required to search files, identify items covered, and to review them for foreign policy and national security reasons in accordance with procedures which have been previously used with information requested by the Select Committee.

In addition to our efforts to substantially comply with these two subpoenas, I have been advised that there are serious and substantial legal and factual questions as to the basis on which the Committee seeks to find Secretary Kissinger to be in contempt. The subpoenas were directed to “... the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, or any subordinate officer ...” and were in fact served on the Staff Secretary of the NSC. Secretary Kissinger had no responsibility for responding to these subpoenas nor for supervising the response to them. After November 3, he was no longer my Assistant for National Security Affairs, and he was neither named in the subpoenas nor were they served upon him. Thus there is no basis for the resolutions addressed to Secretary Kissinger on these subpoenas.

In summary, I believe that if the Committee were to reconsider the three resolutions of November 14, it would conclude that my claim of Executive privilege is a proper exercise of my Constitutional right and responsibility. As to the two subpoenas directed to the Assistant for National Security Affairs, they do not involve Secretary Kissinger, and
there has been a substantial effort by the NSC staff to provide these
documents. Furthermore, they will continue to work with you and
your Committee to resolve any remaining problems.

It is my hope that the Select Committee will permit Executive
Branch officials to appear at tomorrow’s hearing to discuss the points I
have raised in this letter.

It is my desire that we continue forward, working together on the
foreign intelligence investigation. I believe that the national interest is
best served through our cooperation and adoption of a spirit of mutual
trust and respect.5

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

5 On December 2, Pike announced that all subpoenas, with the exception of the one
requesting NSC documentation on covert action, had been “substantially” complied
with. Six days later, the Committee issued H. Rept. 94–693, a report recommending is-
suing a contempt citation to Kissinger for his refusal to deliver these documents. On De-
cember 9, however, the White House and the Pike Committee reached a compromise
whereby deliberations of the 40 Committee would not be delivered to the Committee, but
would instead be briefed orally. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 194; Kiss-
inger, Years of Renewal, p. 335)

60. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Marsh) to
President Ford1

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Proposed Executive Order Restructuring and Revising the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

Attached for your approval is a proposed Executive Order2 re-
structuring and revising the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board.

1 Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 15, Federal Government
Organizations Subseries, President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. No classifi-
cation marking. A stamped notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum. At-
tached to a covering memorandum from Connor to Marsh, December 10, which summa-
rizes Ford’s decisions.

2 Attached but not printed.
The Board is proposed to have responsibilities significantly broader than those of its predecessor. These include:

- Advising the President concerning its review of the foreign intelligence and counterintelligence activities of the United States government, including the quality of foreign intelligence collection and estimates; organization and management of the foreign intelligence community; and, in consultation with the Attorney General, the community’s compliance with law.

- Make recommendations to you with respect to matters identified to the Board by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Director of the FBI, the Secretary of Defense and other components of the foreign intelligence community.

In addition, PFIAB would be authorized to receive, investigate, consider and make appropriate recommendations with respect to allegations of improprieties by intelligence community agencies made by employees of those agencies. The heads of foreign intelligence agencies would be authorized to seek the advice of PFIAB with respect to activities which are or may be improper, or give the appearance of impropriety; and the agencies would be required to make available to the Board all information it required. The Inspector General of each foreign intelligence agency would be authorized to report directly to the Board, after notifying his agency head.

The proposed Executive Order states that you will designate from among the Board members a chairman “who shall devote substantial time to his duties with the Board.” The Order also indicates that PFIAB shall employ a staff headed by an Executive Secretary who shall be appointed by the President. If you approve the proposed Executive Order, a public announcement will be timed to coincide with your reappointment of the Chairman and new members (tentatively set for the week after your return from China).

There is one substantive area of disagreement between your advisers concerning this proposed Order. This issue, which requires your decision, is whether or not current employees of foreign intelligence community agencies may be detailed to the staff of PFIAB. (The entire staff of the current Board are detailees. The current Executive Secretary is from the CIA, and the other professional staff member is a military officer. The clerical employees are reimbursable detailees from the CIA, NSA and the State Department.)

As written, the proposed Executive Order would permit detailing of intelligence community employees, but provides a safeguard as follows:

“If the Executive Secretary or any member of the staff of the Board is appointed from an agency or department within the foreign intelligence community, then during his tenure with the Board, he shall be
subject to no supervision, control, restriction or prohibition from such agency or department, and shall neither possess nor exercise any supervision, control, powers or functions (other than as a member of the staff of the Board) with respect to such agency or department.”

There are three alternatives:

1. Permit detailing because:
   - Because all of the PFIAB members are part-time advisers, they will require a staff with in-depth knowledge of, and access to, all aspects of the community.
   - The safeguards in the current draft are the same as those provided under the National Security Act, and is designed to prevent detailed employees from being influenced by their parent agencies.
   - Detailing would permit staff continuity at a time when there are substantial changes in the Board.
   - Because of its concern over the size of the White House staff, Congress may refuse to authorize new positions for PFIAB staff.

2. Prohibit detailing because:
   - The Board has been given new responsibilities which make it inappropriate for the “watch dogs” to be employees of an agency being overseen.
   - The safeguards in the proposed Order are insufficient because any employee who continues to maintain a connection with an intelligence agency may be influenced in his work with the Board.
   - To keep PFIAB “pure”, Congress will likely authorize whatever ceiling spaces are necessary.

3. Permit only temporary detailees. This is a middle course option under which temporary details of intelligence community employees might be authorized on a case-by-case basis by the Chairman of the Board. However, the permanent staff would not be detailed from the intelligence agencies.

Decision

1. Concerning Detailees:

   Prohibit detailing of intelligence community employees to the staff of PFIAB.3

   Favor: Lynn

   Permit detailing under the safeguards set forth in the proposed Order.4

   Favor: Colby, Scowcroft, Buchen, Kissinger

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3 Ford initialed his disapproval.
4 Ford initialed his approval.
Permit detailing for temporary service only.\textsuperscript{5}

Favor: Marsh, Levi, Rumsfeld

II. Concerning Issuing the Order:

Kissinger, Colby and Buchen (would defer issuance of Order until Administration study on organization of intelligence community is completed); Scowcroft (would defer issuance until Executive Order imposing restrictions on intelligence activities is finalized); all other advisers favor issuance when new Board members are announced.

Timing of Issuance:

As soon as new Board members are announced (shortly after your return from the PRC).\textsuperscript{6}

As soon as Executive Order imposing restrictions on intelligence activities is finalized.

Defer until completion of Administration study on organization of intelligence community.

\textsuperscript{5} Ford initialed his disapproval.

\textsuperscript{6} The President initialed his approval of this option. Ford paid an official visit to the People’s Republic of China, Indonesia, and the Philippines December 1–7. No Executive order broadening the role of PFIAB was issued. Executive Order 11905 (Document 70), signed February 18, 1976, affirmed without modification the responsibilities of PFIAB established by Executive Order 11460 (March 20, 1969), and created the Intelligence Oversight Board, comprised of distinguished private citizens, to consider legal questions surrounding intelligence operations. The new PFIAB members were announced during March 1976.
61. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The Issues You Will Face in Reorganization of the Intelligence Community

The Congressional inquiries are reaching a point where they will be turning their attention to questions of how the intelligence community might be restructured. There are fundamental issues involved that will affect your interests as Secretary of State and the interests of your successors for the next decade or two. The purpose of this memorandum is to identify for your preliminary thought the main issues that you will face in the debate ahead and some of the considerations which will affect decisions on them.

Our purpose in coming to you now is to seek any early thoughts you may have so that we can go into the Executive Branch study which the President has ordered with a sense of the direction in which you would like to see any reorganization move. The study which the President has ordered will be producing a paper before Christmas, but that will be only the opening of the serious internal discussion of this subject. It is not at all clear how much we will be able to influence legislation on this subject, but it is essential that we know how we would like it to be shaped.

Your Choice

Let me note at the outset that you have the obvious choice between standing aloof from this debate and engaging in it.

On the one hand, you could take the position of letting the DCI and the Secretary of Defense work out the balance between them. You could judge that, whatever system they work out, enough significant intelligence will be produced to meet the Secretary of State’s needs. You could judge that the DCI will be looking out for most of the interests of concern to the President and to the Secretary of State, that he will be able to hold his own vis-à-vis the Secretary of Defense, and that it is not worth much effort to influence the remaining margin. The main

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, Box 3, M Chron, December 1975 (1). Secret; Sensitive. Sent through Sisco and Eagleburger. Harold H. Saunders was appointed Director of INR on December 1, replacing Hyland who became Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.
disadvantage in this approach during a period when some sort of reorganization seems almost certain is that we would accept institutionalization of a secondary role for the State Department in a system that will probably prevail over the next 10–20 years. The primacy of the military in a period of rapid technological advances would be left for the DCI alone to challenge.

On the other hand, you could take the position that the Secretary of State cannot afford not to be involved in decisions in this area. Unless he insists on a voice in all of the important decisions of the intelligence community, there will be a risk that more and more of these decisions will be made with only the needs of the Defense Department, or perhaps CIA, being considered. This approach would require augmentation of the Department’s resources dedicated to intelligence. Such an increase could come about only through absorbing elements of CIA (with their budgets) and/or a net increase in total Department personnel and funding.

You also have, of course, a choice on how soon you want to engage yourself in these issues. The debate is beginning now in the Executive Branch and in the Congress. Whether you choose to engage yourself early or not, there is an argument for putting us in a position now to try to shape the studies that are already underway.

The Main Issue

The central issue in whatever reorganization takes place will be whether the military and/or intelligence specialists within our government will achieve a dominant role in setting priorities for the nation’s intelligence effort or whether the Secretary of State will have a strong enough institutional position within the community to assure that that effort will continue to serve the broad spectrum of national foreign policy interests for which the President and the Secretary of State have special responsibility.

While part of the concern which arises out of Congressional inquiries is a desire to prevent future abuses, the DCI and Secretary of Defense are both trying to use the occasion to strengthen their own roles. This is the most significant opportunity since 1947, and another one like this will probably not come again for 15–20 years.

The appointment on December 5 of Bob Ellsworth to the long-vacant second Deputy Secretaryship of Defense with special responsibility for Intelligence clearly signals Defense’s intention to further strengthen its hand.

This reflects the contest between the DCI, who, under the 1971 reorganization directive, was given staff responsibility for the intelligence budget, and the Secretary of Defense, who retains unimpaired his statutory authority over some 80% of the resources committed to
these programs. Until recent years this was not a major problem. But resources for intelligence have dwindled, collection means have become increasingly technological, and the temptation to use “national” collection assets for tactical military purposes has become greater. Defense is therefore increasingly focusing the national technological intelligence resources under its control on military, and even tactical purposes. This tendency, if unchecked, could operate to the detriment of collection of intelligence across the broader spectrum of national interests which are the concern of the President, the Secretary of State and the DCI. State and CIA have a common interest in preventing this from happening.

A second matter of major concern is review and control over covert action. This is an area in which the Secretary of State ought always to have a major voice, indeed, probably the major voice excepting only the President. It would seem well to institutionalize such a role, perhaps by giving the Secretary a right of review of all covert action decisions before they go to the President.

State’s Present Role

As matters now stand, apart from the role which the Secretary plays personally as a member of the NSC and in direct relationship with the President, the Department’s participation in overall intelligence community activity has steadily declined. Insofar as the Secretary looks beyond his personal knowledge, he plays his role in policy councils on the basis of what the Department can provide him from its own analysis or from diplomatic reporting or from what is available to him from the intelligence community. The Department, however, has had a declining role in determining what will be available to him from the intelligence community.

The primary reason within the broader context is the increasing resources devoted to technological intelligence collection and processing in contrast to collection by human sources. The Department is relegated to a secondary role in the control and review of these technical programs. Thus the Secretary does not have a strong institutional role in shaping the intelligence effort in such a way as to meet his needs for intelligence or to assure that the overall effort is in consonance with his broad foreign policy objectives. Some of this can be corrected to a degree, but some is beyond our control.

The intricacies of setting priorities for intelligence collection systems may seem rather exotic. In the past our modest participation did not lose us much. But the problem looms in the future. I would rather see the Secretary’s interests represented when decisions on major systems and their uses are made. If these decisions are left to be made within Defense and CIA, there will be no guarantee that the Pres-
ident and the Secretary of State will have as much of the intelligence they need to prevent war as to wage it.

Thinking on Reorganization of the Intelligence Community

The debate over this fundamental issue will take the form of a debate over (a) whether the past and current fragmented approach to overall management of the intelligence community will increase or whether there will be greater centralization of authority and over (b) how to provide adequate checks on any central authority.

From the point of view of the Secretary of State, the greater the decentralization of management—that is, the greater the role of the Pentagon—the less influence he will have. The converse is that the greater the role of the DCI below Cabinet level, the stronger the State Department’s role can be because State and the DCI will share an interest in maintaining proportion in the role of the military. However, there are limits to this point.

Of the many options for reorganizing the US intelligence effort now under consideration, several could affect vitally the future role of the Secretary and the Department in the intelligence field. These include proposals to:

—Raise the DCI from senior advisor to full statutory membership on the NSC. This would strengthen the DCI’s hand vis-à-vis State no less than Defense and would be seen as elevating “intelligence” to the level of policy, and of identifying the government’s premier intelligence office with policy. It would require legislative sanction.

—Increase the DCI’s line authority over intelligence resources. This would arrest the drift toward increasing Defense control and would better assure that intelligence resources are deployed to satisfy the mainly convergent requirements of the DCI and the Secretary of State. It too would require major and controversial legislative change.

—Separate the DCI from Operating Headship of CIA. There are a number of variants of this proposal, some of which would seriously impair the DCI’s ability to function unless he were compensated by substantially increased line authority in other major areas, such as resources, and were given the staff necessary to exercise that authority.

If it is correct to assume that the Secretary of State shares a common interest with a strong DCI below Cabinet level, the question then becomes how to strengthen the DCI. You more than anyone will understand the advantages and the pitfalls of operating from the White House with only a small staff in the face of large bureaucracies whose natural tendencies are to cut outsiders off from access to program decisions. The only counter is the full backing of the President, which cannot be institutionalized from one Administration to the next.
The alternative is to strengthen the DCI’s authority but to leave him close to CIA which would continue to provide an institutional base. Congressional concern for checks on intelligence activities would then have to be met by closer coordination with the Congress and development of the inter-agency procedures for approving certain intelligence activities.

A Concluding Word

This memorandum is a first effort. The shape of the debate in a broader forum has only begun to clarify. At some point this month, after you have had time to reflect, you may want to discuss the question in a preliminary way with Joe Sisco, Larry Eagleburger and a few others. We will of course have then to consider what we should do with State’s own intelligence organization and resources.

62. Executive Summary of a Draft Report to President Ford by an Ad Hoc Interdepartmental Group


ORGANIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Executive Summary

The primary objective of the foreign intelligence community is to provide quality intelligence on a timely basis to both policy-makers

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01044A, Box 5, Bush Files (Eyes Only) Reorganization Report. Secret. Scowcroft directed the preparation of this study by an ad hoc group in his November 14 memorandum, Document 58. Ogilvie chaired the group. Lynn forwarded the complete 56-page draft to Ford under an undated covering memorandum. Lynn also forwarded the study for comment to Kissinger, Simon, Rumsfeld, Levi, Colby, and JCS Chairman Brown under a December 16 covering memorandum. The transmittal memoranda and agency responses are in the Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01044A, Box 5, Bush Files (Eyes Only) Reorganization Report. A summary version of agency responses prepared by Ober for Hyland, December 19, is in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 3, 12/19/75 (1). The final report, titled “Intelligence Community: Decision Book for the President,” comprising four chapters and three appendices, was sent to Ford on December 22. (Ibid., Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Intelligence Community Decision Book (1)–(2)) The decision book formed the basis of a January 10 meeting to discuss intelligence reorganization options. See Document 64.
and operational officials. Any organization and management of the Community—its collectors, processors, and producers—must be shaped to accomplish this objective. To assure public confidence and support, organization and management must be structured to prevent potential abuses and to make maximum use of limited resources.

Demands from Congress for information on intelligence operations and substantive intelligence will force the Intelligence Community to operate in a more public arena. Diffusion of political and economic power, proliferation of nuclear and sophisticated conventional weapons, and growth in terrorism are creating broader demands for timely integrated analysis. Ever-increasing demands for high quality intelligence assessments, especially in crisis situations, will require increased use of advanced technological systems as well as the more traditional human intelligence sources. Any restructuring of the organization and management of the Community must respond to these challenges.

Executive Branch safeguards are necessary to prevent potential abuses. Options include: (1) guidelines defining the scope of permissible intelligence activity and (2) mechanisms to improve Executive Branch oversight.

To improve quality and direction in the Intelligence Community, four major structural options—three requiring legislative action—are examined:

#1: Creation of a new expanded intelligence agency, headed by a Director of Intelligence, with resource and line control over the national programs—the CIA Program (CIAP), Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP), and the National Reconnaissance Program (NRP). This option is based on the premise that national programs are best managed if centrally funded and controlled, and that gains from centralization outweigh disadvantages resulting from separation of collectors from their primary consumers.

#2: Creation of a Director-General for Intelligence (DGI) with resource control over the CIAP, CCP and NRP, but line control only over his immediate staff. This option is based on the premise that a central leader with resource control and without a vested interest in any one element of the Community is needed. Option #2A differs from Option #2 by giving the DCI line control over present CIA production elements.

#3: Creation of a Director of Foreign Intelligence (DFI) with broad coordination powers but neither resource nor line control over any part of the Intelligence Community. This option is based on the premise that an intelligence leader, independent of any organization within the Community, would be best able to coordinate its activities, and that the Defense Department requires a major voice in resource and line control of intelligence assets. Option #3A differs from Option #3 by decentral-
izing intelligence production responsibilities through transfer of present CIA production elements to the relevant departments.

#4: Retention of current Community relationships with the addition of a second full Deputy to the DCI with management responsibility for the CIA and perhaps with expanded or restructured Executive Committees and production responsibilities. This option is based on the premise that major organizational changes may be undesirable, and that improved Community leadership structures are possible through administrative action.

The study also discusses moving the covert action capability out of CIA and placing it in a new, separate agency.

Finally the study also discusses certain possible management improvements.

63. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Colby to President Ford


Dear Mr. President:

Preparatory to your meeting on 10 January to discuss the Intelligence Community, I would like to proffer several general observations. Separately I have submitted to Jack Marsh specific recommendations with respect to the different issues that will be under consideration.

The Intelligence Community has been under attack for real, exaggerated and alleged abuses. The lessons of the year can, I believe, be summed up in the need for better guidelines, better supervision and better secrecy.

A draft Executive Order has been developed which in my view will provide better guidelines to ensure that the intelligence agencies remain within proper limits in their operations in the United States. To these might be added a few restrictions on activities abroad, such as prohibiting assassination planning, but I believe there is little senti-

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1 Source: Ford Library, Richard B. Cheney Files, Box 6, General Subject File, Intelligence Subseries, Meeting to Review Decision Book. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that Cheney saw the memorandum.

2 Not further identified.

3 Draft of Executive Order 11905. See Document 70 for the order as approved.
ment for any very sweeping limitations on the Community’s activities abroad.

With respect to better supervision, various proposals have been made with regard to the organization of the Community, and especially of the role of the Director of Central Intelligence.\(^4\) On the Congressional side, consideration has been given to improvements in the Congressional oversight procedure through standing committees, GAO audit, etc. There has been some tendency for the need for better supervision to spill over into extensive recommendations for organizational and bureaucratic changes.

The question of better secrecy is of course a most contentious subject. Some decry the secrecy of the past and call for greater openness. Others point to the serious damage being done to our country by the extensive exposure of intelligence matters, leading to the frustration of our foreign policy and danger to our officers.

In this situation, I make the following recommendations:

a. That, to provide better guidelines, you proceed to issue the draft Executive Order placing restrictions on the domestic activities of our intelligence agencies, that you indicate support of legislation against assassinations and that you direct the revision and issuance of National Security Council Intelligence Directives to provide specific charters for the intelligence agencies and their interrelationships. I recommend, however, that there be minimum change in statutory charters pending development of draft legislation by the Select Committees, which you may then consider on its merits.

b. That, to provide better supervision, you charge the Director of Central Intelligence, in a document addressed to Ambassador Bush on his swearing-in, with vigorous supervision of the activities of the Community and review of the propriety as well as the effectiveness of its operations. I recommend also that you request the Congress to consolidate in some form, such as a joint or separate standing committee, its supervision of our intelligence activities, thus improving the effectiveness of such supervision and ending the proliferation of supervisors. I recommend against any substantial modification in the organi-

\(^4\) On January 3, DCI-designate Bush sent Ford a list of 12 organizational recommendations. Among these was a suggestion that Ford prepare a letter outlining the powers of the DCI, including complete access to all intelligence information and direct personal access to the President. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 3, CIA, Communications (20) [1/2/76–1/20/76]) In a series of meetings, the White House also sought the views of former officials, including Admiral Thomas Moorer, Joseph Califano, William P. Rogers, Paul Nitze, David Packard, McGeorge Bundy, John McConaghy, Theodore Sorensen, and William J. Casey. Summaries of these meetings are ibid., Files of John K. Matheny, Box 6, Intelligence Community Decision Book for the President (4).
zational structure of the Intelligence Community at this time, prior to the appearance of Congressional recommendations, in an election year, and before Ambassador Bush, as well as the new Secretary of Defense and the new Deputy Secretary, have an opportunity to make their considered recommendations on this subject. Sweeping bureaucratic change would in my view be considered heavily cosmetic, would create substantial turbulence in the Community, and is not what the investigations were really all about.

c. With respect to better secrecy, I recommend the early submission to Congress of the draft legislation better to protect intelligence sources and methods, which I have recently submitted to the OMB. I also suggest that strong recommendations be made to the leadership of the Congress to establish some system for the orderly handling and protection of secrets made available to it. Lastly, I recommend that a new effort be made to articulate a better system of protection of classified information within the Executive Branch.

The subject of covert action requires particular attention, as it has been and remains the main topic of Congressional interest. On this question, I recommend a clear amendment to the National Security Act of 1947 authorizing such action and providing that a single Congressional committee be advised of the initiation of any such operation. I believe it essential to terminate the present procedure of briefing six committees, which has led immediately to vast leakage and great injury to our foreign policy. I believe it appropriate at the same time to call upon the Congress to state clearly its approval of the continuation of such activity, and to see whether the Congress really wants to assume the responsibility of prior approval of such operations. I believe the present system of Executive Branch decision and merely advising a Congressional committee will be the outcome.

Respectfully,

W.E. Colby

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5 A draft bill designed to cover unauthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods, drafted by CIA, was forwarded to the NSC for comment on January 19. In a memorandum to James Hyde of OMB, January 23, Jeanne W. Davis indicated that the NSC “strongly” supported the legislation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-files), Box H–301, Miscellaneous Institutional Files of the Nixon Administration—NSC System, Staff and Committees, [1 of 3]) The legislation (H.R. 12006) was submitted to Congress on February 18, but no action was taken on it during the session. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 183)

6 Colby signed “Bill” above this typed signature.
64. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Reorganization

The following are the details of the plan we discussed with you yesterday concerning the establishment of a new Intelligence Policy Review Committee.¹

1. The NSCIC would be abolished and replaced by the Intelligence Policy Review Committee (IPRC). This Committee would be directly subordinate to you through the NSC. It would be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and include as permanent members: (a) the Secretary of State; (b) the Secretary of Defense; (c) the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; (d) the Director of Central Intelligence and (e) the Director, Office of Management and Budget. In addition, as observers, invited to participate as indicated by the particular subject matter, would be: (a) the Secretary of the Treasury; (b) the Counsel to the President; (c) the Attorney General; (d) the Chairman, PFIAB; and (e) the Director, FBI.

2. The Intelligence Policy Review Committee (IPRC) would have the following responsibilities: (a) to conduct a periodic review of national intelligence priorities and requirements; (b) to review the production of finished intelligence from the standpoint of relevance to policy concerns and overall quality; (c) to review annually the consolidated foreign intelligence budget, and to review the five-year projected budget; (d) to review the activities of all components of the intelligence community with regard to any malfeasance or misconduct; (e) to review annually, and more frequently if necessary, the program of the 40

¹ Source: Ford Library, James E. Connor Files, Box 57, Intelligence Community Subject File, Intelligence Community Decision Meetings, January 1976. No classification marking. The memorandum bears a handwritten date, January 11, and a handwritten notation, “Close Hold.” Printed from a copy that was not initialed by Scowcroft.

² According to the President’s Daily Diary, a meeting on intelligence reorganization was held between 2:05 and 5:30 p.m. on January 10 in the White House Cabinet Room. In addition to the President, the meeting was attended by Rockefeller, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Simon, Levi, Brown, Colby, Scowcroft, Lynn, Buchen, Marsh, Raoul-Duval, Associate Director of OMB for National Security and International Affairs Donald G. Ogilvie, Cheney, Counsel to the Vice President Peter J. Wallison, Staff Assistant Raymond J. Waldmann, and Hyland. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) A briefing memorandum for the meeting was prepared by Marsh for Ford, January 9. (Ibid., John O. Marsh Files, Box 55, Intelligence Subject File, Intelligence Reorganization, Meeting with President, 1/10/76) No other record of this meeting has been found.
Committee. In each of the foregoing areas of responsibility the IPRC would be authorized to require reporting from the relevant agencies and to make recommendations to the President and the NSC.

3. The IPRC would establish working groups as necessary to carry out the staffing of its responsibilities and to provide a working relationship with parallel committees or groups established within the intelligence community.

Simultaneously, the intelligence community’s overall leadership would be consolidated along the lines of Mr. Colby’s modification of Option IV.3

1. For the intelligence community a new Executive Committee would be established to replace the EXCOMM (NRO); the Intelligence Resources Allocation Committee, and absorb their functions; and to absorb part of the functions of the United States Intelligence Board (USIB). The EXCOMM would be chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence, and include the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) and the Deputy Secretary of State (or the Under Secretary for Political Affairs). It would report to the President through the IPRC.

2. A second Deputy Director of Central Intelligence would be appointed with primary duties in the area of intelligence community coordination.

3. The USIB would be redesignated the National Intelligence Board, and would concentrate its work on substantive intelligence matters.

The 40 Committee

No changes would be required for the present in the 40 Committee, but it would now have some subordination, in terms of policy review, to the new IPRC; it would remain directly under your authority for operational purposes.

Committee on Domestic Terrorism

As we discussed, it would be difficult to assign the problem of domestic terrorism to the 40 Committee. As a first step, however, you could direct the Attorney General to establish an Interagency group to take over this area, and link it to the NSC through the participation of State, Defense, and the Assistant or Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Next Steps

Most of the foregoing can be implemented immediately by a new memorandum from you to replace President Nixon’s memorandum of

3 Option IV is summarized in Document 62. For Colby’s modifications, see Document 63.
November 5, 1971. While the main features of the new organization could be thus authorized, it would be advisable to direct some more detailed plans within, say, 30 days from now. In other words, your directive would establish the foundation, but the working arrangements would be confirmed by you after some further staffing.

Attached is a draft to implement the contents of this memorandum.4

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4 Attached but not printed.

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65. **Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Moscow**\(^1\)

Washington, January 22, 1976, 0137Z.

15449/TOSEC 10103. Subject: Highlights of Draft Pike Committee Report. For Secretary from Eagleburger and Saunders.

1. This telegram is to give you an initial sense of the main elements of the current draft of the Pike Committee report. The Committee staff provided CIA with a copy “as a courtesy,” saying that the Committee would be “interested” in the Agency’s comments while maintaining that the Committee’s final report is not subject to the agreement regarding access and disclosure of classified material which Pike reached with the President last September.\(^2\) We are participating in an effort to assure that, at a minimum, material which remains classified is not published in the report. The report is currently scheduled to go to the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted by Saunders and approved by Saunders and Eagleburger. Kissinger was in Moscow January 21–23 for talks with Brezhnev and Gromyko. In telegram 14881/TOSEC 10112 to Kissinger, January 22, the Department requested decisions on how to handle the Pike Committee’s charges. Kissinger authorized Saunders and Eagleburger to approach members of the Committee whom Eagleburger judged “might be prepared to help us in modifying the report in an effort to try to get them to work to remove the most grievous errors” and to prepare a draft response to “those portions of the Pike Committee report that are the most misleading and unfair.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 411, Congressional Hearings, House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee), Chronological File, Jan.–Apr. 1976, n.d.) Fact sheets refuting the Committee’s charges were prepared and cabled to Kissinger in telegram 17297/TOSEC 10182, January 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

2 See Document 50.
printer on January 27, and the Committee is meeting now to make its decision on the handling of classified material.

2. The headings of the table of contents are described at the end of this telegram. The highlights of the report which are of special interest to you are described in the next few paragraphs. We should point out in advance that, while the charges collected in one place as they are below are infuriating, for whatever consolation it is worth they are scattered through a 340-page report with long stretches of unrelated material between.

3. Overall. The tone of the report is set in its opening pages: “If this Committee’s recent experience is any test, spy agencies that are to be controlled by Congressional law-making are, today, beyond the lawmaker’s scrutiny. These secret agencies have interests that inherently conflict with the open accountability of a political body, and there are many tools and tactics to block and deceive conventional Congressional checks. . . . In short, the words were always words of cooperation; the reality was delay, refusal, missing information, asserted privileges, and on and on.” The entire first section of the report is devoted to a description of the Committee’s experience and the various devices which the report charges that the administration used to thwart its investigations. In a number of cases throughout the report, the text falls back on the assertion that the administration succeeded in withholding certain information and therefore definitive judgments are not possible in the report. The report goes on to discuss the dilemma of secrecy: “. . . There must be a responsible system of classification, accompanied by an equally responsible and effective system of declassification. We have neither.” Following that setting of the stage, the report goes on to indicate first that the costs of our intelligence operations are 3 to 5 times as large as the Congress has been previously led to believe and examines a series of “intelligence failures” to make the point that the American people are not getting their money’s worth, either in intelligence collection and analysis or in covert action.3 On top of that, the

program is subject to a number of abuses such as domestic intelligence investigations and manipulations such as the alleged “political control of intelligence in connection with the SALT ‘hold’ system.”

4. Of particular interest to you are the following which are spread throughout the report. These are presented more or less in the order in which they come up in the report.

A. Davies death.4 “There sits before the Committee, for example, unresolved testimony that Dr. Kissinger himself may have received a closely held intelligence report identifying the people who killed the American Ambassador, Rodger Davies . . . and that a public protest has perhaps not been raised because these same murderers are now officials of the Cyprus Government. Questions related to that intelligence report should, and must, be cleared up.”

B. Boyatt testimony.5 The charge is repeated that, in connection with the “silencing” of Boyatt, you asserted a “new doctrine that can best be characterized as ‘Secretarial Privilege’.” In this case, a footnote also carries your statement: “I have deliberately not asked the President to exercise Executive privilege, nor am I asserting a Secretarial privilege.”

C. Subpoenas. The draft asserts that the 3 subpoenas directed to the Secretary of State “not surprisingly . . . went unanswered.” This, of course, ignores the fact that a response was sent to the Committee in the form of the assertion of Executive privilege. In a seeming internal contradiction, the draft report later discusses the assertion of Executive privilege. It goes on to discuss the contempt citation, concluding that “access to information, even when it was backed up by subpoena, was not satisfactory.”

D. Secretiveness. Several cracks are taken at “the passion for confidentiality and secrecy at State.” With regard to the SALT material, the assertion is (a) that material was restricted within the US Government while the “Russians and other adversaries were either directly informed by Dr. Kissinger of the same secrets the Committee sought, or that Russians knew of them by other means.” Much later, in the report’s discussion of the intelligence failure before the Middle East war: “There was testimony that Dr. Kissinger’s penchant for secrecy may also have thwarted effective intelligence analysis. Kissinger had been in close contact with both the Soviets and the Arabs throughout the pre-war period. He, presumably, was in a unique position to pick up indications of Arab dissatisfaction with diplomatic talks, and signs of an

4 Ambassador to Cyprus Rodger Davies was murdered in Nicosia on August 19, 1974.
5 See footnote 3, Document 54.
ever-increasing Soviet belief that war would soon break out. When the Committee was denied its request for high-level reports, it was unable to learn whether Kissinger elicited this information in any usable form. It is clear, however, that the Secretary passed no such warnings to the Intelligence Community. . . . Despite the obvious usefulness of this information, Dr. Kissinger has continued to deny intelligence officials access to notes of his talks with foreign leaders.”

E. SALT. There is also a section on “SALT—Political Control of Intelligence.” The theme is: “The prime factor in this situation is Dr. Kissinger, with his passion for secrecy and his efforts to concentrate power and to consolidate ultimate control of important intelligence functions, through his various bureaucratic roles.” It charges that “In the final stages of the SALT talks, US negotiators did not fully consult or inform intelligence experts who had been key figures in previous treaty sessions.” It notes that “only Russian technical experts were on hand” and that “Dr. Kissinger’s private talks with Soviet leaders in this period were not disseminated.” It asserts that “ambiguities which plague the accord and benefit the Soviets may have been the result of US policymakers’ self-imposed intelligence blackout at the critical moment.” It then goes on to say that the “record indicates that Dr. Kissinger, US architect of the accord, has attempted to control the dissemination and analysis of data on apparent Soviet violations of the SALT pact.” It describes the “hold” status and concludes that “the sector of important information, suggesting Soviet violation of strategic arms limitation, purposely withheld for extended periods of time from analysts, decision-makers, and members of Congress, has caused great controversy within the Intelligence Community. In addition, it has raised questions as to the President’s own knowledge of and concurrence with, the ‘hold’ procedure.”

F. Backgrounder on Angola. In connection with the Angola operation, the report notes that the President’s letter refusing declassification of material on this subject went to the Committee at a time when “one of the items that allegedly would harm this nation’s security if made public had already been made public—by Dr. Kissinger.” A footnote then refers to a backgrounder on your aircraft en route to Tokyo on December 8, which described a statement attributed to “a senior official” as “the first administration acknowledgment of US involvement in Angola.”

G. Intelligence failures. The report then discusses “intelligence failures” in regard to the Tet Offensive, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the 1973 Middle East war, and Portugal. In addition to the points made above on the ’73 war, the report charges a US failure to track war developments which “may have contributed to a US-Soviet confrontation and troop alert called by President Nixon on October 24,
1973. . . . Thus misled, the US clashed with the better-informed Soviets on the latter’s strong reaction to Israeli ceasefire violations. . . . Poor intelligence had brought America to the brink of war.”

H. On Angola: “Past support to Mobutu, along with his responsiveness to some of Dr. Kissinger’s recent diplomatic needs for Third World support, make it equally likely that the paramount factor in the US involvement is Dr. Kissinger’s desire to reward and protect Mobutu in Zaire. The US expressed opposition to the MPLA is puzzling in view of Director Colby’s statement to the Committee that there are scant ideological differences among the 3 factions, all of whom are nationalists above all else.”

I. With regard to the Kurdish operation: “It appears that, had the US not reinforced our ally’s prodding, the insurgents may have reached an accommodation with the central government, thus gaining at least a measure of autonomy while avoiding further bloodshed. Instead, our clients fought on, sustaining thousands of casualties and 200,000 refugees. . . . It is particularly ironic that, despite President Nixon’s and Dr. Kissinger’s encouragement of hostilities to keep the target country off balance, Dr. Kissinger personally restrained the insurgents from an all-out offensive on one occasion when such an attack might have been successful because other events were occupying the neighboring country. . . . Despite direct pleas from the insurgent leader and the CIA Station Chief in the area to the President and Dr. Kissinger, Dr. Kissinger personally refused to extend humanitarian assistance to the thousands of refugees created by the abrupt termination of military aid.” A footnote describes how measures were taken to insure that the State Department did not gain knowledge of the project and that the Ambassador was “responsive to Kissinger rather than the Department of State.”

J. Wiretaps. There is a rather routine 3-page discussion of “electronic surveillance—the Kissinger wiretaps.” It revolves around a decision to install “a wiretap on the residence of a National Security Council Staff on May 9, 1969.” It states that “significantly approval for this ‘national security’ wiretap was not requested until May 10 . . . and was not approved by Mitchell until May 12.” It later uses the phrase “the FBI’s national security wiretap installed for Dr. Kissinger,” but it does not otherwise go into the question of responsibility.

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K. On Cyprus, it notes that various factors “give rise to speculation that US officials, knowing that a coup was imminent, may have simply allowed it to happen by not strongly, directly, and unequivocally warning Ioannides against it. The Committee has been unsuccessful in obtaining closely-held cables to and from the Secretary of State during this period including a message the Secretary sent to Ioannides through the CIA the day after the coup. Accordingly, it is impossible to reach a definitive conclusion.”

5. To give you some sense of the scope of the report, the main headings in the table of contents are described below:

I. The Select Committee’s Oversight Experience.
   A. Access to information: Delay; cut-off; silenced witnesses; flank attack—an attack averted; deletions; privileges; more delay; routine problems; the right question.
   B. Congress and the secrecy dilemma: Oaths and agreements; selective briefings; special restrictions; the release of information.

II. The Select Committee’s Investigative Record.
   A. Costs: Deceptive budgets; an absence of accountability; spending abuses—covert procurement—local procurement—accommodation procurements—research and development—colleges and universities—US recording co.; budget secrecy.
   B. Performance: Tet: Failure to adapt to a new kind of war—the order of battle controversy—the consequences—the aftermath; Czechoslovakia: Failure of tactical warning; the Mid-East war: The system breaks down; Portugal: The US caught napping; India: Priorities lost; Cyprus: Failure of intelligence policy; domestic internal security and counterintelligence—Institute for Policy Studies—Socialist Workers Party; President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board; National Security Council Intelligence Committee; the management and production of Defense intelligence.
   C. Risks: Covert action—ten year survey—election support—media and propaganda—paramilitary arms transfers—organizational support—trends—three projects; intelligence collection—submarines—interception of international communications—manipulation of the media—CIA presence in the Executive branch—CIA relationships with US and foreign police, domestic intelligence investigations—programs

as abuses—law enforcement turned law-breaking; SALT: Political control of intelligence. 

III. Recommendations (we have not received this section). 

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9 On January 29, the House voted 246–124 to block the release of the Pike Committee report. On February 11, excerpts of the report were published by The Village Voice. On February 13, CBS journalist Daniel Schorr acknowledged that he had passed a copy of the report to The Village Voice, prompting the House Standards of Official Conduct Committee to announce an investigation of the leak on February 19. Public hearings were held July 19–21, with some members of the House Ethics Committee charging that the Pike Committee had failed to take adequate measures to ensure the secrecy of the report’s classified material. A subpoena was issued on August 25 for Schorr to testify on his role in the leak. Although he refused to answer the Committee’s questions in his September 15 appearance, the Ethics Committee on September 22 voted 5–6 against recommending Schorr’s prosecution. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 196) Schorr’s account of his role in the leak, the investigation, and its aftermath is in Clearing the Air, pp. 208–284.

10 On February 10, the Pike Committee adopted 20 recommendations for Intelligence Community reform. In addition to proposing strengthened Congressional control over intelligence budgets, including the creation of a new standing committee, the Committee recommended empowering the General Accounting Office to conduct a management and financial audit of all branches of the Intelligence Community. The Committee also called for the creation of a Foreign Operations Subcommittee of the NSC to advise the President on proposed covert intelligence operations, the membership of which would include the Ambassador of the affected country and the Assistant Secretary of State for the affected country’s region. Moreover, assassinations and paramilitary activities were to be illegalized except in time of war and covert operations could be authorized for no longer than 12 months. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 194–195) Unlike the main body of the Pike Committee’s final report, the report’s recommendations were released to the public on February 11. (United States House of Representatives, Select Committee on Intelligence, Recommendations of the Final Report of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1976)
66. Memorandum From Attorney General Levi to President Ford


In the meeting of the National Security Council at which we discussed improvements in our foreign intelligence activities, you asked for my suggestions as to what changes should be accomplished by legislation. In my view, the state of the law is unsatisfactory in several respects. There is a notable absence of specific statutory bases for much of the organization of and functions performed by the intelligence agencies. While I do not believe it necessary to propose a statutory scheme covering all of the responsibilities of the agencies—much has been and can be done by executive order—a specific statutory basis for some of these functions would clearly be advisable.

The Department of Justice, as you know, has been working on guidelines to govern the intelligence and investigative activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Some of these guidelines should be enacted into law. At your direction, we are also drafting guidelines for the electronic interception of communications by the National Security Agency. I believe that there should be a statutory basis for this activity and we intend to work with the Department of Defense in drafting legislation to this end.

We are prepared, at this time, to recommend to you two major legislative proposals giving statutory legitimacy to important national intelligence functions, and two others dealing with other aspects of intelligence operations. In our view they should all be enacted into law as soon as possible.

(1) Electronic Surveillance. As you will recall from our earlier discussions as well as our memorandum of September 12, 1975, the state of the law covering warrantless electronic interception of communications is unsatisfactory. No Supreme Court opinion explicitly affirms the authority of the President to authorize such activity; and while two Court of Appeals opinions (from different circuits) have done so, a dictum by plurality of judges in another Court of Appeals strongly asserts the opposite. Certain features of the authority for warrantless electronic surveillance have not been addressed by the courts—for example, the use of surreptitious entry to implant a microphone.

1 Source: Ford Library, Philip W. Buchen Files, Box 111, Intelligence Investigations/Reorganization Numbered Files, Reorganization (12). No classification marking.
2 Presumably a reference to the intelligence reorganization meeting on January 10. For a summary of the discussion, see Document 64.
3 Not found.
It is in my judgment essential to propose legislation which would create a special procedure for seeking a judicial warrant authorizing the use of electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes. The bill which we have drafted (Tab A) would apply only to the interception of wire and oral communications to or from persons in the United States (i.e., wiretaps or microphone overhearings) as well as the interception of radio communications both transmitted and received wholly within the United States. (The last limitation excludes NSA’s operation, which should be the subject of a separate bill.)

Under the special warrant procedures we have developed, the Attorney General must approve application to a special judge designated by the Chief Justice for this purpose. This judge is not charged with determining whether the information sought is important to the nation’s security or foreign policy; that matter is certified to him by an Executive official. The primary issue for the judge to decide is whether there is probable cause to believe that the target of the surveillance is an agent of a foreign power.

In my view, much of the cynicism and mistrust of the intelligence agencies stems from the belief—wrong though it is—that covert surveillance abounds within the United States, conducted by agencies indiscriminately and without regard for the rights of the citizen. While we have attempted to dispel this impression through testimony and speeches, only legislation establishing a warrant procedure will ease the suspicion about the legitimate use of this technique. Furthermore, a judicial warrant procedure will not, we believe, hamper the use of this significant tool. Indeed, because the legal shoals are presently not clearly marked, our policy in approving electronic surveillance has been more restrictive than that which would apply if the scope of the authority was delineated.

(2) Mail Openings. The current legal status of warrantless mail openings is exceedingly confused. It appears to be the congressional intent, and may well be the law, that no warrantless openings of domestic first-class mail can occur, even for national security reasons, without judicial warrant. For this reason, a mail opening statute may well be essential not only to regularize but positively to enable certain essential,
national security operations. The statute we propose (Tab B)\(^5\) would establish a special warrant procedure authorizing the opening of mail for foreign intelligence purposes only where there is probable cause to believe that the sender or recipient is an agent of a foreign power who is engaged in spying, sabotage or terrorist activities. The procedures—including the absence of judicial judgment as to the national security justification—are similar to those contained in the electronic surveillance bill.

(3) **Assassination of Foreign Officials.** There is currently no Federal law prohibiting an American citizen or, indeed, a government employee from assassinating a public official of a foreign country outside the United States. You have publicly expressed your concern over the possible existence of such a practice.

We propose that you give enthusiastic administration support to the legislation proposed by the Senate Intelligence Committee (Tab C)\(^6\) to meet this problem. It is in our view a sensible and extremely limited statute, and we think it is desirable to establish a record of supporting the product of the recent congressional investigation where that product is, indeed, a satisfactory one. The legislation would only apply to assassinations by officers or employees of the United States, for political purposes, with respect to foreign officials of a country with which the United States is not at war [or?] against which troops have not been committed pursuant to the War Powers Resolution. Moreover, the legislative history of the bill contained in the Senate committee report, the relevant portion which is under Tab D,\(^7\) leaves open the possibility of a special Presidential power, even to ignore the narrow restrictions of the bill where the national security overwhelmingly dictates.

(4) **Protection of Intelligence Sources and Methods.** There is a compelling need for statutory protection of the sources and methods of the intelligence agencies. Existing criminal provisions are deficient because the burden of proof requires the disclosure in open court of the very secrets the government is trying to protect. Further, there is no statutory authority for seeking an injunction to enjoin the disclosure of information important to our nation’s security before the damage is done.

Legislation has been drafted, primarily by the Central Intelligence Agency with the assistance of the Department of Justice, to provide

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\(^5\) Attached but not printed. Legislation was proposed as H.R. 14284 by Representative Charles A. Mosher (R–Ohio) on June 9, but did not advance beyond the House Committee on the Judiciary.

\(^6\) Attached but not printed. The legislation (S. 2825), introduced by Church on December 18, did not advance beyond the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. However, a provision prohibiting the assassination of foreign officials was included in Executive Order 11905, February 18, Document 70.

\(^7\) Attached but not printed.
Intelligence protection for our secret intelligence sources and methods. This bill would make it a crime for anyone who has been entrusted with sensitive information concerning intelligence sources and methods by virtue of his position as an officer or employee of the government or as a government contractor to disclose such information to one not authorized to receive it. In order to provide adequate safeguards to an accused, to prevent damaging disclosures during the course of prosecution, and to prevent prosecution with respect to information unreasonably classified, the legislation provides for in camera review by the court of the validity of the classification. The legislation also provides for injunctive relief in those instances where unauthorized disclosure is threatened and serious damage to the intelligence collection effort would result. I have been informed that this proposal has already been cleared as an administration proposal.

Edward H. Levi

8 See footnote 5, Document 63.

67. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The Intelligence meeting this afternoon is a follow-on to the long session a couple of Saturdays ago. You will recall at that time there was general agreement on Option 4 as the preferred approach to restructuring the Intelligence community. Option 4 did little more than create a second Deputy Director of CIA and strengthen the PFIAB and the NSCIC. Colby had a variant of Option 4 which would subsume a number of the various committees of the Intelligence community under a new Excom, chaired by him and with the Deputy Secretaries of Defense and State as members.

Following the meeting the President expanded on the Colby idea to the extent of abolishing all Intelligence committees—like USIB,
IRAC, NSCIC—and having the Excom run the whole show. I objected to this approach, on grounds that policy review, evaluation of the adequacy of the product and some other aspects should not be done by the Intelligence community itself. I proposed instead a “super” subcommittee of the NSC, chaired by the Assistant and with Secretaries of State and Defense, the DCI, and the Director of OMB as members. This would be the policy review organization which would oversee the community and its product. Basically, it would be a glorified NSCIC, with the cosmetic elevation of the members to Cabinet rank to show that the President was putting his most senior officials in charge. Colby’s Excom would be a major committee under the supervision of this policy review committee. The proposal for this structure is at Tab A (the memo never actually went to the President). The President called a small staff meeting last Saturday to talk over some of these ideas. What came out of that meeting was a hybrid system which amalgamated the previous proposals, creating a policy review group but not putting it directly between the Excom and the President. The membership of the Excom was revised, with the DCI remaining as Chairman and the members being the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Deputy Assistant to the President—basically the membership of the old Excom but with the Deputy Assistant replacing the defunct Science Advisor to the President. Observers would be the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Deputy Secretary of State and the Deputy Director of OMB. This Excom would replace the existing one, the IRAC, and USIB, thus giving it authority both over the management and the substance. In addition, the President proposed making the 40 Committee at the Secretarial level and adding the Attorney General either as a member or observer. An outline of the proposals coming from that meeting is at Tab B.

There is nothing magic about any of these organizations. One basic principle, however, is that the Intelligence community should not be in the business of passing on the adequacy of its own product. Neither, in matters of resource allocation, management and programs, should the Intelligence community go directly to the President without having the NSC structure in some way as the mediator to organize the issues and to insure that the non-Intelligence principals are involved. My major problem with the proposed organization at Tab B, aside from consider-

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3 See Document 64 and footnote 3 thereto.
4 Not found attached. Printed as Document 64.
5 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Buchen, Marsh, Scowcroft, Ogilvie, and Raoul-Duval on Saturday, January 24, between 1:35 and 3:45 p.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of this meeting has been found.
6 Not found attached and not found.
able fuzziness about the relationship between the policy review group and the Excom (called the Foreign Intelligence Committee) is that it would replace the USIB. I think that the development and production of the substantive intelligence product should go through a separate system from issues of management, resource allocation, etc. If the USIB has functions other than the production of finished intelligence, those could be stripped out.

68. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Marsh) to President Ford


MEETING ON INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY

Friday, January 30, 1976
3:30 p.m. (1 hour)
Cabinet Room

I. Purpose

To discuss your tentative Intelligence Community decisions with key Administration officials.2

II. Background, Participants and Press Plan

A. Background

On January 10, you met with your advisors (including those present today) to discuss the alternatives available to strengthen the Intelligence Community and avoid abuses.3

You have reached tentative decisions after reviewing all the papers and comments submitted by the agencies and departments affected.

You have stated publicly that you will announce your comprehensive decisions shortly.

1 Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 31, National Security—Intelligence (9). No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that the President saw the memorandum.

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting was held in the Cabinet Room beginning at 4:05 p.m. Ford participated in the meeting between 4:05 and 4:15 p.m. and then again between 4:30 and 5:14 p.m. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.

3 See Document 64.
B. Participants

Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Rumsfeld
Attorney General Levi
CIA Director Bush
Jack Marsh
Phil Buchen
Brent Scowcroft
Mike Duval
Peter Wallison (for the Vice President who is out of town)

C. Press Plan

No press coverage.

III. Agenda

Tab A contains a summary of your tentative decisions and Fact Sheets.

**Tab A**

*Briefing Paper Prepared by the White House Staff*\(^5\)

Washington, undated.

**INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY**

1) *Intelligence Community Leadership* (see attached Fact Sheets)\(^6\)

A) Establish a new *Foreign Intelligence Committee* made up of:

DCI, Chairman
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The following will be designated as observers from time to time, depending on the work of the Committee:

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\(^4\) Bush was sworn in as DCI at 11:14 a.m. on January 30 in a ceremony at the CIA. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) Prior to Bush’s swearing-in, Ford addressed a gathering of 525 guests, including Members of Congress, Cabinet members, and senior White House staff. During his remarks, he stated that he would announce “in the next few weeks” his decisions “on the steps I believe necessary to strengthen our foreign intelligence operations.” *(Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book I, p. 113)*

\(^5\) No classification marking.

\(^6\) Attached but not printed. Also attached but not printed is an organizational table illustrating the newly-created intelligence committees.
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
Under Secretary of State
Deputy Secretary of Treasury
OMB Representative
Director of FBI (as appropriate)
Others as designated by the President

This new Committee would replace the existing Executive Committee for the National Reconnaissance Program, the U.S. Intelligence Board and the Intelligence Resource Advisory Council.

It would have resource and policy control over the national foreign intelligence program, and it would establish sub-groups as necessary. It would be established by Executive Order.

B) The existing NSC Intelligence Committee would be replaced by a new Foreign Intelligence Advisory Group of the NSC, which would review intelligence policy, particularly from the consumer viewpoint. The members of the advisory group are:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Secretary of State
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of Treasury
Attorney General
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of the Office of Management and Budget
Director of Central Intelligence
Observers as designated by the President

C) Intelligence product (reports, briefings, etc.) will be submitted to the NSC by the DCI directly—not through the Foreign Intelligence Committee or the Policy Advisory Group.

2) Covert Action

The 40 Committee would be made up of:

Members:

Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, Chairman
Secretary of Defense
Secretary of State
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence

Observers:

Attorney General
OMB representative

3) Oversight

Establish an Oversight Board with the Deputy Attorney General as Chairman, and as possible members: Counsel to the President, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and a member
of PFIAB designated by the President. Agency Inspectors General and General Counsels would report periodically to this Board, which would transmit reports to PFIAB and the Attorney General. The Attorney General would report (including PFIAB comments) to the NSC.

4) **Agency Charters and Restrictions**

An omnibus Executive Order will be issued (publicly) containing the following:

- Responsibility of the Community leadership (Foreign Intelligence Committee, etc.).
- Charters for each agency (generally taken from existing National Security Council Intelligence Directives).
- Restrictions on intelligence activities.
- Oversight of intelligence agencies.
- Secrecy Agreements provision.

5) **Secrecy**

A) Submit legislation to protect “Sources and Methods”.

B) Require all Executive Branch officials to sign a Secrecy Agreement as a condition for receiving certain classified foreign intelligence information.

C) NSC will conduct a review of the classification system.

6) **Relations with Congress**

Support efforts to establish a Joint Intelligence Oversight Committee.

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69. **Letter From Secretary of the Treasury Simon to Director of Central Intelligence Bush**


Dear George:

I have felt for some time that U.S. intelligence could take a more active role in preparing estimates of future developments important to our foreign economic policy. While I have found many national estimates helpful in providing background material relevant to our interests—particularly in the scientific, political and military fields—I

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 79M00467A, Box 31, Department of Treasury. Confidential. Attached to a February 5 covering memorandum from William N. Morell, Jr., Treasury Representative on the USIB, to Bush.
have observed that these estimates rarely focus on important international economic issues. Although the various policy offices of the EPB departments and agencies will continue to do the lion’s share of this work—with the help of contributions from your Office of Economic Research—I would hope that we could work together to strengthen the national estimates process in economic areas.

The trend of Soviet economic relations with Eastern Europe is an example of the type of estimate we might consider in view of the possibilities these trends may offer to the United States and the West for involving Eastern Europe more with the non-Communist world. While we obviously must be cautious and realistic in our expectations regarding these possibilities, they do seem worth exploring.

We have seen a number of recent developments in the pattern of Soviet economic ties with Eastern Europe which suggest that in coming years several Eastern European countries will have less assurance that they can depend on the Soviet Union as a major source of foodstuffs, energy and raw materials. For example, as a consequence of recent Soviet crop disasters Moscow has told the Eastern European countries not to depend on the USSR for grain import needs during the 1975–76 period, stating flatly that they must fend for themselves. As you know, the Soviets also recently raised the price of oil and other raw materials to Eastern Europe, although not yet to the level of world prices. Thus, as these countries look to the future, they probably conclude that the Soviets will have continuing difficulty in meeting East Europe’s future import needs.

On the export side East European industries have emphasized sales to the USSR. As they shift their purchases to other areas, the Eastern Europeans must find ways to earn the necessary foreign exchange to pay for these imports by selling in hard currency markets, a difficult task since most of their current exports are not now attractive to Western buyers. Their trade must expand if these regimes in Eastern Europe are to achieve their modernization plans and meet the rising expectations of their citizenry. All of this presents a very real political and economic dilemma.

I believe it is important that we improve our perception of future prospects in this area and that we have a better understanding of the practical alternatives open to the countries of Eastern Europe. If the dilemmas described above develop, as we think they might, what trade and financing opportunities would the Eastern Europeans offer to the United States, other Western countries, Japan, and certain countries in the Middle East? What might the political and economic consequences be for our own interests if we were to more actively seek a strengthening of East Europe’s economic relations with non-Communist countries? How might this best be done? Many other issues should be con-
sidered which have a bearing on our policy deliberations—issues which we would be happy to discuss with representatives of the intelligence community.

If you agree that there is some merit in giving further consideration to the possibility of an estimate on this subject, please let me know. I hope, incidentally, that we can get together before long and discuss some of the more important aspects of intelligence support for foreign economic policy and negotiations.2

Sincerely,

William E. Simon3

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2 Bush replied to Simon on February 18 that he agreed “wholeheartedly with your observations on the desirability of a strong economic ingredient in our national estimates.” He invited Treasury Department participation in an ad hoc study of the Eastern European economic outlook undertaken “under the joint aegis of the NIO/USSR and the NIO/Economics, with talent drawn from OER, OPR, State/INR, and the academic community.” (Ibid.)

3 Simon signed “Bill” above this typed signature.

70. Executive Order 119051


United States Foreign Intelligence Activities

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States, including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

SECTION 1. Purpose. The purpose of this Order is to establish policies to improve the quality of intelligence needed for national security, to clarify the authority and responsibilities of the intelligence depart-

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1 Source: Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 12, No. 8, February 23, 1976, pp. 234–243. Ford announced the main points of the Executive Order during a news conference broadcast live on radio and television from the White House East Room beginning at 8 p.m. on February 17. At the same time, he announced the creation of an Intelligence Oversight Board, comprised of prominent private citizens, under the chairmanship of Robert Murphy. For the text of Ford’s announcement and the question-and-answer session that followed, see Public Papers: Ford, 1976–77, Book I, pp. 348–360.
ments and agencies, and to establish effective oversight to assure compliance with law in the management and direction of intelligence agencies and departments of the national government.

Sec. 2. Definitions. For the purpose of this Order, unless otherwise indicated, the following terms shall have these meanings:

(a) Intelligence means:

(1) Foreign intelligence which means information, other than foreign counterintelligence, on the capabilities, intentions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or their agents; and

(2) Foreign counterintelligence which means activities conducted to protect the United States and United States citizens from foreign espionage, sabotage, subversion, assassination or terrorism.

(b) Intelligence Community refers to the following organizations:

(1) Central Intelligence Agency;

(2) National Security Agency;

(3) Defense Intelligence Agency;

(4) Special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs;

(5) Intelligence elements of the military services;

(6) Intelligence element of the Federal Bureau of Investigation;

(7) Intelligence element of the Department of State;

(8) Intelligence element of the Department of the Treasury; and

(9) Intelligence element of the Energy Research and Development Administration.

(c) Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives means activities, other than the collection and production of intelligence and related support functions, designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.

(d) National Foreign Intelligence Program means the programs of the Central Intelligence Agency and the special offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, and those elements of the General Defense Intelligence Program and other programs of the departments and agencies, not including tactical intelligence, designated by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence as part of the Program.

Sec. 3. Control and Direction of National Intelligence Organizations.

(a) National Security Council.

(1) The National Security Council was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integra-
tion of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security. Statutory members of the National Security Council are the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense.

(2) Among its responsibilities, the National Security Council shall provide guidance and direction to the development and formulation of national intelligence activities.

(3) The National Security Council shall conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies and of ongoing special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives. These reviews shall consider the needs of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence products and the continued appropriateness of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives. The National Security Council shall consult with the Secretary of the Treasury and such other users of intelligence as designated by the President as part of these reviews:

(b) Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

(1) There is established the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (hereinafter referred to as the CFI), which shall be composed of the Director of Central Intelligence, hereinafter referred to as the DCI, who shall be the Chairman; the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence; and the Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The CFI shall report directly to the National Security Council.

(2) The CFI shall (i) control budget preparation and resource allocation for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(A) The CFI shall, prior to submission to the Office of Management and Budget, review, and amend as it deems appropriate, the budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(B) The CFI shall also adopt rules governing the reprogramming of funds within this budget. Such rules may require that reprogrammings of certain types or amounts be given prior approval by the CFI.

(ii) Establish policy priorities for the collection and production of national intelligence.

(iii) Establish policy for the management of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

(iv) Provide guidance on the relationship between tactical and national intelligence; however, neither the DCI nor the CFI shall have responsibility for tactical intelligence.

(v) Provide continuing guidance to the Intelligence Community in order to ensure compliance with policy directions of the NSC.

(3) The CFI shall be supported by the Intelligence Community staff headed by the Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community.
(4) The CFI shall establish such subcommittees as it deems appropriate to ensure consultation with members of the Intelligence Community on policies and guidance issued by the CFI.

(5) Decisions of the CFI may be reviewed by the National Security Council upon appeal by the Director of Central Intelligence or any member of the National Security Council.

(c) The Operations Advisory Group.

(1) There is established the Operations Advisory Group (hereinafter referred to as the Operations Group), which shall be composed of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; the Secretaries of State and Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Director of Central Intelligence. The Chairman shall be designated by the President. The Attorney General and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget or their representatives, and others who may be designated by the President, shall attend all meetings as observers.

(2) The Operations Group shall (i) consider and develop a policy recommendation, including any dissents, for the President prior to his decision on each special activity in support of national foreign policy objectives.

(ii) Conduct periodic reviews of programs previously considered by the Operations Group.

(iii) Give approval for specific sensitive intelligence collection operations as designated by the Operations Group.

(iv) Conduct periodic reviews of ongoing sensitive intelligence collection operations.

(3) The Operations Group shall discharge the responsibilities assigned by subparagraphs (c) (2) (i) and (c) (2) (iii) of this section only after consideration in a formal meeting attended by all members and observers; or, in unusual circumstances when any member or observer is unavailable, when a designated representative of the member or observer attends.

(4) The staff of the National Security Council shall provide support to the Operations Group.

(d) Director of Central Intelligence.

(1) The Director of Central Intelligence, pursuant in the National Security Act of 1947, shall be responsible directly to the National Security Council and the President. He shall:

(i) Chair the CFI.

(ii) Act as executive head of the CIA and Intelligence Community staff.

(iii) Ensure the development and submission of a budget for the National Foreign Intelligence Program to the CFI.
(iv) Act as the President’s primary adviser on foreign intelligence and provide him and other officials in the Executive branch with foreign intelligence, including National Intelligence Estimates; develop national intelligence requirements and priorities; and supervise production and dissemination of national intelligence.

(v) Ensure appropriate implementation of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives.

(vi) Establish procedures to ensure the propriety of requests, and responses thereto, from the White House Staff or other Executive departments and agencies to the Intelligence Community.

(vii) Ensure that appropriate programs are developed which properly protect intelligence sources, methods and analytical procedures. His responsibility within the United States shall be limited to:

(A) Protection by lawful means against disclosure by present or former employees of the Central Intelligence Agency or persons, or employees of persons or organizations, presently or formerly under contract with the Agency;

(B) providing leadership, guidance and technical assistance to other government departments and agencies performing foreign intelligence activities; and

(C) in cases involving serious or continuing security violations, recommending to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for further investigation.

(viii) Establish a vigorous program to downgrade and declassify foreign intelligence information as appropriate and consistent with Executive Order No. 11652.2

(ix) Ensure the existence of strong Inspector General capabilities in all elements of the Intelligence Community and that each Inspector General submits quarterly to the Intelligence Oversight Board a report which sets forth any questionable activities in which that intelligence organization has engaged or is engaged.3

(x) Ensure the establishment, by the Intelligence Community, of common security standards for managing and handling foreign intelli-


3 On November 12, Murphy provided Ford with a status report on the IOB, noting that since Executive Order 11905 a “good faith effort at compliance” had begun within all elements of the Intelligence Community. Furthermore, Murphy noted, the process of review and reporting “has caused some activities to be terminated, in whole or in part, and others to be suspended pending further review, modification or specific approval within the Department of Justice, the Operations Advisory Group or by you.” (Ford Library, Files of Philip W. Buchen, Box 116, Intelligence Subject File, 1974–76, Intelligence Oversight Board—General (2))
gence systems, information and products, and for granting access thereto.

(xii) Promote the development and maintenance by the Central Intelligence Agency of services of common concern to the Intelligence Community organizations, including multi-discipline analysis, national level intelligence products, and a national level current intelligence publication.

(xiii) Establish uniform criteria for the identification, selection, and designation of relative priorities for the transmission of critical intelligence, and provide the Secretary of Defense with continuing guidance as to the communications requirements of the Intelligence Community for the transmission of such intelligence.

(xiv) Establish such committees of collectors, producers and users of intelligence to assist in his conduct of his responsibilities as he deems appropriate.

(xv) Consult with users and producers of intelligence, including the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense, the military services, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Energy Research and Development Administration, and the Council of Economic Advisors, to ensure the timeliness, relevancy and quality of the intelligence product.

(2) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the supervision and direction of the Intelligence Community, the position of Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence for the Intelligence Community is hereby established (Committee on Foreign Intelligence).

(3) To assist the Director of Central Intelligence in the supervision and direction of the Central Intelligence Agency the Director of Central Intelligence shall, to the extent consistent with his statutory responsibilities, delegate the day-to-day operation of the Central Intelligence Agency to the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (50 U.S.C. 403(a)).

(4) To assist the DCI in the fulfillment of his responsibilities, the heads of all departments and agencies shall give him access to all information relevant to the foreign intelligence needs of the United States. Relevant information requested by the DCI shall be provided, and the DCI shall take appropriate steps to maintain its confidentiality.

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4 The implementation of the provisions of this and the following paragraph were confirmed in a memorandum from Bush to the Deputy DCI and the Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community, July 22. (Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 80M01044A, Box 2, Bush Files (Eyes Only) Reorganization of U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community)
SEC. 4. Responsibilities and Duties of the Intelligence Community. Purpose. The rules of operation prescribed by this section of the Order relate to the activities of our foreign intelligence agencies. In some instances, detailed implementation of this Executive order will be contained in classified documents because of the sensitivity of the information and its relation to national security. All such classified instructions will be consistent with this Order. Unless otherwise specified within this section, its provisions apply to activities both inside and outside the United States, and all references to law are to applicable laws of the United States. Nothing in this section of this Order shall be construed to interfere with any law-enforcement responsibility of any department or agency.

(a) Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. The senior officials of the CIA, Departments of State, Treasury and Defense, ERDA and the FBI shall ensure that, in discharging the duties and responsibilities enumerated for their organizations which relate to foreign intelligence, they are responsive to the needs of the President, the National Security Council and other elements of the Government. In carrying out their duties and responsibilities, senior officials shall ensure that all policies and directives relating to intelligence activities are carried out in accordance with law and this Order, including Section 5, and shall:

(1) Make appropriate use of the capabilities of the other elements of the Intelligence Community in order to achieve maximum efficiency.

(2) Contribute in areas of his responsibility to the national intelligence products produced under auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(3) Establish internal policies and guidelines governing employee conduct and ensuring that such are made known to, and acknowledged by, each employee.

(4) Provide for a strong and independent organization for identification and inspection of, and reporting on, unauthorized activity.

(5) Report to the Attorney General that information which relates to detection or prevention of possible violations of law by any person, including an employee of the senior official’s department or agency.

(6) Furnish to the Director of Central Intelligence, the CFI, the Operations Group, the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, and the Intelligence Oversight Board all of the information required for the performance of their respective duties.

(7) Participate, as appropriate, in the provision of services of common concern as directed by the Director of Central Intelligence and provide other departments and agencies with such mutual assistance as may be within his capabilities and as may be required in the interests of the Intelligence Community for reasons of economy, effectiveness, or operational necessity.
(8) Protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods within his department or agency, consistent with policies and guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence.

(9) Conduct a continuing review of all classified material originating within his organization and promptly declassifying such material consistent with Executive Order No. 11652, as amended.

(10) Provide administrative and support functions required by his department or agency.

(b) The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties and responsibilities of the Central Intelligence Agency shall be related to the foreign intelligence functions outlined below. As authorized by the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, the CIA Act of 1949,5 as amended, and other laws, regulations, and directives, the Central Intelligence Agency shall:

(1) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to the national security, including foreign political, economic, scientific, technical, military, sociological, and geographic intelligence, to meet the needs of the President, the National Security Council, and other elements of the United States Government.

(2) Develop and conduct programs to collect political, economic, scientific, technical, military, geographic, and sociological information, not otherwise obtainable, relating to foreign intelligence, in accordance with directives of the National Security Council.

(3) Collect and produce intelligence on foreign aspects of international terrorist activities and traffic in narcotics.

(4) Conduct foreign counterintelligence activities outside the United States and when in the United States in coordination with the FBI subject to the approval of the Attorney General.

(5) Carry out such other special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives as may be directed by the President or the National Security Council and which are within the limits of applicable law.

(6) Conduct, for the Intelligence Community, services of common concern as directed by the National Security Council, such as monitoring of foreign public radio and television broadcasts and foreign press services, collection of foreign intelligence information from cooperating sources in the United States, acquisition and translation of foreign publications and photographic interpretation.

5 P.L. 81–110, known as the CIA Act of 1949, gave the CIA the authority to carry out the duties assigned to it by the National Security Act of 1947, including to receive and spend money, administer overseas employees, and protect the confidentiality of CIA activities.
(7) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized in this subsection.

(8) Protect the security of its installations, activities, information and personnel. In order to maintain this security, the CIA shall conduct such investigations of applicants, employees, and other persons with similar associations with the CIA as are necessary.

(9) Conduct administrative, technical and support activities in the United States or abroad as may be necessary to perform the functions described in paragraphs (1) through (8) above, including procurement, maintenance and transport; communications and data processing; recruitment and training; the provision of personnel, financial and medical services; development of essential cover and proprietary arrangements; entering into contracts and arrangements with appropriate private companies and institutions to provide classified or unclassified research, analytical and developmental services and specialized expertise; and entering into similar arrangements with academic institutions, provided CIA sponsorship is known to the appropriate senior officials of the academic institutions and to senior project officials.

(c) The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:

(1) Collect, overtly, foreign political, political-military, sociological, economic, scientific, technical and associated biographic information.

(2) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States foreign policy as required for the execution of his responsibilities and in support of policy-makers involved in foreign relations within the United States Government.

(3) Disseminate within the United States Government as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomatic missions abroad.

(4) Coordinate with the Director of Central Intelligence to ensure that United States intelligence activities and programs are useful for and consistent with United States foreign policy.

(5) Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to our Chiefs of Missions abroad and provide guidance for their collection effort.

(6) Contribute to the Intelligence Community guidance for its collection of intelligence based on the needs of those responsible for foreign policy decisions.

(7) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging their responsibilities to direct and coordinate the activities on all elements of their missions.

(d) The Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:

(1) Collect, overtly, foreign financial and monetary information.
(2) Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general foreign economic information.

(3) Produce that intelligence required for the execution of the Secretary’s interdepartmental responsibilities and the mission of the Department of the Treasury.

(4) Contribute intelligence and guidance required for the development of national intelligence.

(5) Disseminate within the United States Government as appropriate, foreign intelligence information acquired.

(e) Department of Defense.

(1) The Secretary of Defense shall:

(i) Collect foreign military intelligence information as well as military-related foreign intelligence information including scientific, technical, political and economic information as required for the execution of his responsibilities.

(ii) Produce and disseminate, as appropriate, intelligence emphasizing foreign military capabilities and intentions and scientific, technical and economic developments pertinent to his responsibilities.

(iii) Conduct such programs and missions necessary to fulfill national intelligence requirements as determined by the CFI.

(iv) Direct, fund and operate the National Security Agency, and national, defense and military intelligence and reconnaissance entities as required.

(v) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government, signals intelligence activities and communications security, except as otherwise approved by the CFI.

(vi) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government.

(2) In carrying out these assigned responsibilities, the Secretary of Defense is authorized to utilize the following:

(i) The Defense Intelligence Agency (whose functions, authorities and responsibilities are currently publicly assigned by Department of Defense Directive No. 5105.21) to:

(A) Produce or provide military intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Defense components, and, as appropriate, non-Defense agencies.

(B) Coordinate all Department of Defense intelligence collection requirements and manage the Defense Attaché system.

(C) Establish substantive intelligence priority goals and objectives for the Department of Defense and provide guidance on substantive intelligence matters to all major Defense intelligence activities.
(D) Review and maintain cognizance over all plans, policies and procedures for noncryptologic intelligence functions of the Department of Defense.

(E) Provide intelligence staff support as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

(ii) The National Security Agency, whose functions, authorities and responsibilities shall include:

(A) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for the signals intelligence activities of the United States Government, except for certain operations which are normally exercised through appropriate elements of the military command structure, or by the CIA.

(B) Exercise control over signals intelligence collection and processing activities of the Government, delegating to an appropriate agent specified resources for such periods and tasks as required for the direct support of military commanders.

(C) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence in accordance with objectives, requirements, and priorities established by the Director of Central Intelligence.

(D) Dissemination of signals intelligence to all authorized elements of the Government, including the Armed Services; as requested.

(E) Serving under the Secretary of Defense as the central communications security authority of the United States Government.

(F) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United States for signals intelligence and communications security.

(iii) Special offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnaissance programs, whose functions, authorities, and responsibilities shall include:

(A) Carrying out consolidated programs for reconnaissance.

(B) Assigning responsibility to the various departments and agencies of the Government, according to their capabilities, for the research, development, procurement, operations and control of designated means of collection.

(iv) Such other offices within the Department of Defense as shall be deemed appropriate for conduct of the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of Defense.

(f) Energy Research and Development Administration. The Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration shall:

(1) Produce intelligence required for the execution of his responsibilities and the mission of the Energy Research and Development Administration, hereinafter referred to as ERDA, including the area of nuclear and atomic energy.
(2) Disseminate such intelligence and provide technical and analytical expertise to other Intelligence Community organizations and be responsive to the guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence.

(3) Participate with other Intelligence Community agencies and departments in formulating collection requirements where its special technical expertise can contribute to such collection requirements.

(g) The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:

(1) Detect and prevent espionage, sabotage, subversion, and other unlawful activities by or on behalf of foreign powers through such lawful counterintelligence operations within the United States, including electronic surveillance, as are necessary or useful for such purposes.

(2) Conduct within the United States and its territories, when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President, those lawful activities, including electronic surveillance, authorized by the President and specifically approved by the Attorney General, to be undertaken in support of foreign intelligence collection requirements of other intelligence agencies.

(3) Collect foreign intelligence by lawful means within the United States and its territories when requested by officials of the Intelligence Community designated by the President to make such requests.

(4) Disseminate, as appropriate, foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information which it acquires to appropriate Federal agencies, State and local law enforcement agencies and cooperating foreign governments.

(5) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.

Sec. 5. Restrictions on Intelligence Activities. Information about the capabilities, intentions and activities of other governments is essential to informed decision-making in the field of national defense and foreign relations. The measures employed to acquire such information should be responsive to the legitimate needs of our Government and must be conducted in a manner which preserves and respects our established concepts of privacy and our civil liberties.

Recent events have clearly indicated the desirability of government-wide direction which will ensure a proper balancing of these interests. This section of this Order does not authorize any activity not previously authorized and does not provide exemption from any restrictions otherwise applicable. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions of this
section apply to activities both inside and outside the United States. References to law are to applicable laws of the United States.

(a) Definitions. As used in this section of this Order, the following terms shall have the meanings ascribed to them below:

(1) “Collection” means any one or more of the gathering, analysis, dissemination or storage of non-publicly available information without the informed express consent of the subject of the information.

(2) “Counterintelligence” means information concerning the protection of foreign intelligence or of national security information and its collection from detection or disclosure.

(3) “Electronic surveillance” means acquisition of a non-public communication by electronic means, without the consent of a person who is a party to, or, in the case of a non-electronic communication, visibly present at, the communication.

(4) “Employee” means a person employed by, assigned or detailed to, or acting for a United States foreign intelligence agency.

(5) “Foreign intelligence” means information concerning the capabilities, intentions and activities of any foreign power, or of any non-United States person, whether within or outside the United States, or concerning areas outside the United States.

(6) “Foreign intelligence agency” means the Central Intelligence Agency, National Security Agency, and Defense Intelligence Agency; and further includes any other department or agency of the United States Government or component thereof while it is engaged in the collection of foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, but shall not include any such department, agency or component thereof to the extent that it is engaged in its authorized civil or criminal law enforcement functions; nor shall it include in any case the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

(7) “National security information” has the meaning ascribed to it in Executive Order No. 11652, as amended.

(8) “Physical surveillance” means continuing visual observation by any means; or acquisition of a non-public communication by a person not a party thereto or visibly present thereat through any means which does not involve electronic surveillance.

(9) “United States person” means United States citizens, aliens admitted to the United States for permanent residence and corporations or other organizations incorporated or organized in the United States.

(b) Restrictions on Collection. Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in any of the following activities:

(1) Physical surveillance directed against a United States person, unless it is a lawful surveillance conducted pursuant to procedures ap-
proved by the head of the foreign intelligence agency and directed against any of the following:

(i) A present or former employee of such agency, its present or former contractors or their present or former employees, for the purpose of protecting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; or

(ii) a United States person, who is in contact with either such a present or former contractor or employee or with a non-United States person who is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry, but only to the extent necessary to identify such United States person; or

(iii) a United States person outside the United States who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities or activities threatening the national security.

(2) Electronic surveillance to intercept a communication which is made from, or is intended by the sender to be received in, the United States, or directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful electronic surveillance under procedures approved by the Attorney General; provided, that the Central Intelligence Agency shall not perform electronic surveillance within the United States, except for the purpose of testing equipment under procedures approved by the Attorney General consistent with law.

(3) Unconsented physical searches within the United States; or unconsented physical searches directed against United States persons abroad, except lawful searches under procedures approved by the Attorney General.

(4) Opening of mail or examination of envelopes of mail in United States postal channels except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(5) Examination of Federal tax returns or tax information except in accordance with applicable statutes and regulations.

(6) Infiltration or undisclosed participation within the United States in any organization for the purpose of reporting on or influencing its activities or members; except such infiltration or participation with respect to an organization composed primarily of non-United States persons which is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power.

(7) Collection of information, however acquired, concerning the domestic activities of United States persons except:

(i) Information concerning corporations or other commercial organizations which constitutes foreign intelligence or counterintelligence.
(ii) Information concerning present or former employees, present or former contractors or their present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or contracting, necessary to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence sources or methods or national security information from unauthorized disclosure; and the identity of persons in contact with the foregoing or with a non-United States person who is the subject of a foreign intelligence or counterintelligence inquiry.

(iii) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be potential sources or contacts, but only for the purpose of determining the suitability or credibility of such persons.

(iv) Foreign intelligence or counterintelligence gathered abroad or from electronic surveillance conducted in compliance with Section 5(b)(2); or foreign intelligence acquired from cooperating sources in the United States.

(v) Information about a United States person who is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of a foreign power or engaging in international terrorist or narcotics activities.

(vi) Information concerning persons or activities that pose a clear threat to foreign intelligence agency facilities or personnel, provided, that such information retained only by the foreign intelligence agency threatened and that proper coordination with the Federal Bureau of Investigation is accomplished.

(c) Dissemination and Storage. Nothing in this section of this Order shall prohibit:

(1) Lawful dissemination to the appropriate law enforcement agencies of incidentally gathered information indicating involvement in activities which may be in violation of law.

(2) Storage of information required by law to be retained.

(3) Dissemination to foreign intelligence agencies of information of the subject matter types listed in Section 5(b)(7).

(d) Restrictions on Experimentation. Foreign intelligence agencies shall not engage in experimentation with drugs on human subjects, except with the informed consent, in writing and witnessed by a disinterested third party, of each such human subject and in accordance with the guidelines issued by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects for Biomedical and Behavioral Research.

(e) Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities.

(1) No foreign intelligence agency shall, except as expressly authorized by law (i) provide services, equipment, personnel or facilities to the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration or to State or local police organizations of the United States or (ii) participate in or fund any law enforcement activity within the United States.
(2) These prohibitions shall not, however, preclude: (i) cooperation between a foreign intelligence agency and appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of protecting the personnel and facilities of the foreign intelligence agency or preventing espionage or other criminal activity related to foreign intelligence or counterintelligence or (ii) provision of specialized equipment or technical knowledge for use by any other Federal department or agency.

(f) Assignment of Personnel. An employee of a foreign intelligence agency detailed elsewhere within the Federal Government shall be responsible to the host agency and shall not report to such employee’s parent agency on the affairs of the host agency, except as may be directed by the latter. The head of the host agency, and any successor, shall be informed of the detailer’s association with the parent agency.

(g) Prohibition of Assassination. No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.

(h) Implementation.

1. This section of this Order shall be effective on March 1, 1976. Each department and agency affected by this section of this Order shall promptly issue internal directives to implement this section with respect to its foreign intelligence and counterintelligence operations.

2. The Attorney General shall, within ninety days of the effective date of this section of this Order, issue guidelines relating to activities of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in the areas of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence.

Sec. 6. Oversight of Intelligence Organizations.

(a) There is hereby established an Intelligence Oversight Board, hereinafter referred to as the Oversight Board.

1. The Oversight Board shall have three members who shall be appointed by the President and who shall be from outside the Government and be qualified on the basis of ability, knowledge, diversity of background and experience. The members of the Oversight Board may also serve on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (Executive Order No. 11460 of March 20, 1969). No member of the Oversight Board shall have any personal contractual relationship with any agency or department of the Intelligence Community.

2. One member of the Oversight Board shall be designated by the President as its Chairman.

3. The Oversight Board shall:

(i) Receive and consider reports by Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community concerning activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(ii) Review periodically the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and General Counsels of the Intelligence Community designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(iii) Review periodically with each member of the Intelligence Community their internal guidelines to ensure their adequacy.

(iv) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Attorney General and the President on its findings.

(v) Report in a timely manner to the Attorney General and to the President any activities that raise serious questions about legality.

(vi) Report in a timely manner to the President any activities that raise serious questions about propriety.

(b) Inspectors General and General Counsels within the Intelligence Community shall:

(1) Transmit to the Oversight Board reports of any activities that come to their attention that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the Oversight Board on its findings concerning questionable activities, if any.

(3) Provide to the Oversight Board all information requested about activities within their respective departments or agencies.

(4) Report to the Oversight Board any occasion on which they were directed not to report any activity to the Oversight Board by their agency or department heads.

(5) Formulate practices and procedures designed to discover and report to the Oversight Board activities that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(c) Heads of intelligence agencies or departments shall:

(1) Report periodically to the Oversight Board on any activities of their organizations that raise questions of legality or propriety.

(2) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Oversight Board.

(3) Ensure that Inspectors General and General Counsels of their agencies have access to any information necessary to perform their duties assigned by paragraph (4) of this section.

(d) The Attorney General shall:

(1) Receive and consider reports from the Oversight Board.

(2) Report periodically, at least quarterly, to the President with respect to activities of the Intelligence Community, if any, which raise questions of legality.
(e) The Oversight Board shall receive staff support. No person who serves on the staff of the Oversight Board shall have any contractual or employment relationship with any department or agency in the Intelligence Community.

(f) The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board established by Executive Order No. 11460 on March 20, 1969, remains in effect.

Sec. 7. Secrecy Protection.

(a) In order to improve the protection of sources and methods of intelligence, all members of the Executive branch and its contractors given access to information containing sources or methods of intelligence shall, as a condition of obtaining access, sign an agreement that they will not disclose that information to persons not authorized to receive it.

(b) In the event of any unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence the names of any persons found to have made unauthorized disclosure shall be forwarded (1) to the head of applicable departments or agencies for appropriate disciplinary action; and (2) to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action.

(c) In the event of any threatened unauthorized disclosure of information concerning sources or methods of intelligence by a person who has agreed not to make such disclosure, the details of the threatened disclosure shall be transmitted to the Attorney General for appropriate legal action, including the seeking of a judicial order to prevent such disclosure.

(d) In further pursuit of the need to provide protection for other significant areas of intelligence, the Director of Central Intelligence is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations to expand the scope of agreements secured from those persons who, as an aspect of their relationship with the United States Government, have access to classified intelligence material.

Sec. 8. Enabling Data.

(a) The Committee on Foreign Intelligence and the Director of Central Intelligence shall provide for detailed implementation of this Order by issuing appropriate directives.

(b) All existing National Security Council and Director of Central Intelligence directives shall be amended to be consistent with this Order within ninety days of its effective date.7

7 A July 6 memorandum from Scowcroft to the Chairman of the United States Evaluation Board indicates that, pursuant to Executive Order 11905, the NSC was “reviewing and revising” all NSCID. (National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, United States Evaluation Board (USEB), 18 Oct 1974–24 Aug 1974) Undated drafts of revised versions of NSCID 1–8 are ibid., CFI Eighth Meeting, May 14, 1976.
(c) This Order shall supersede the Presidential Memorandum of November 5, 1971, on the “Organization and Management of the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Community.”

(d) Heads of departments and agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue supplementary directives to their organizations consistent with this Order within ninety days of its effective date.

(e) This Order will be implemented within current manning authorizations of the Intelligence Community. To this end, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget will facilitate the required realignment of personnel positions. The Director of the Office of Management and Budget will also assist in the allocation of appropriate facilities.

Gerald R. Ford

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71. Minutes of a Meeting of the Committee on Foreign Intelligence

CFI–M–1 Washington, February 18, 1976, 3:30 p.m.

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Robert F. Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Mr. William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

ALSO PRESENT

Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USA, Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

Mr. E. H. Knoche, Associate Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence Community

Mr. Richard Lehman, Assistant to the Director of Central Intelligence

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT
Draft Minutes of the 18 February 1976 Committee on Foreign Intelligence Meeting

1. The Chairman opened the meeting with observations and suggestions as reflected in the attached talking points.\(^2\) He covered each point and invited the other members to react.

2. Mr. Ellsworth commended the Director’s remarks, saying that he welcomes the DCI’s acting as a Chairman of the Board with respect to national intelligence. DoD leaders, he said, have long felt that a strong national perspective is necessary for intelligence leadership. Noting the charge in the February Executive Order\(^3\) calling for the CFI to control budgets and resource allocation, Mr. Ellsworth said it will be important to work out arrangements to coordinate budget and resource cycles. For the CFI to get its job done, the strongest possible staff will be required and well-qualified DoD personnel are available for assignment to the IC Staff, which will serve the CFI.

3. Mr. Ellsworth noted the Executive Order requirement that the CFI establish policy priorities for collection and production of national intelligence. He was not entirely sure what this means and the subject will require further discussion as will the CFI responsibility to set “management policy” for national programs.

4. At this point, Mr. Bush referred to the explicit point that he and the CFI are relieved of responsibility for tactical intelligence resources. Following a discussion of the overlaps between national and tactical intelligence Mr. Ellsworth said he was prepared to assign DoD personnel to work with the DCI’s representatives on this problem.

5. Mr. Ellsworth asked who would preside over the CFI in the DCI’s absence. After some discussion of this, there was agreement that for the time being this would be the DDCI who becomes Acting DCI when the DCI is not at hand. (Chairman Bush referred to plans for there to be two Deputies—one for CIA and one for the Intelligence Community and when the latter is called for by law and Presidential-appointed, the Community deputy would likely be the one to chair the CFI in the DCI’s absence.) There was agreement on the need to insure the best possible candidate for the Community deputy position and Mr. Ellsworth and Mr. Hyland were asked to provide Mr. Bush with some names to consider—and as soon as possible. Mr. Bush asked if

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\(^2\) A list of Bush’s talking points is attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Document 70.
each of the two CFI members will designate someone to attend CFI meetings if they are absent. Each said they would.

6. Mr. Ellsworth urged that the DCI, in his Community role, separate himself perceptibly and conceptually from CIA and Langley. Following a brief discussion the Chairman agreed to Mr. Ellsworth’s request that arrangements permit that personal representatives of CFI members be accredited to the IC Staff.

7. Mr. Hyland noted that the IC Staff will be reviewing NSCIDs and DCIDs to insure compatability with the Executive Order. He urged that a new series of CFI Directives (CFID) be issued beginning with those which can direct temporary arrangements pending development of more permanent machinery and procedures in the future.

8. Mr. Hyland foresaw an IC Staff which would concentrate on three primary areas: budgets, collection, and production evaluation. He emphasized that it is exclusively the DCI’s prerogative to arrange for the production of national intelligence. Mr. Hyland observed, however, that he believes it a matter of CFI concern to assess the value and utility of the intelligence product. In this respect, he noted that the National Security Council will conduct semi-annual reviews of intelligence and he urged that someone on the staff be designated to arrange materials and issues to be considered by the NSC. There was also some discussion of the OMB role in regard to CFI business.

9. There was general agreement that there is utility in considering amalgamation with the IC Staff of the key staff elements of the COMIREX, SIGINT and Human Resources Committees of what has been USIB, all of this in terms of providing maximum support to the CFI and its attention to national intelligence programs.

10. It was agreed that the CFI would meet frequently at the outset, the next meeting to take place at 1500 on 25 February. The CFI will consider draft directives at that time and further discuss matters of concern.

11. It was agreed that the IC Staff would undertake to develop agreement on an appropriate program and budget cycle (recognizing the sanctity of the DoD cycle) that will permit adequate time for CFI consideration of programs and budgets. In the process, definition of those programs under CFI purview will be made, all of this with an eye to providing the CFI with arrangements for its approval.

12. CFI members at this point met briefly in executive session, the meeting concluding at 1700 hours.

E.H. Knoche

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4 The minutes of the CFI’s second meeting, February 25, are in the National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, Box I–018, CFI/Second Meeting, February 25, 1976)
72. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger


[Source: Department of State, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron, March 1976 F. No classification marking. 2 pages not declassified.]

73. Memorandum From the National Intelligence Officers to Director of Central Intelligence Bush


SUBJECT

A DCI-Oriented Approach to National Production

1. Much of the discussion of the future of the national intelligence production system has been framed in terms of concerns over the purity of the chain-of-command, the centrality of the CIA, and other narrow structural issues. Such an approach does not focus on the real question of how a national intelligence production system can best be fashioned to serve the DCI’s basic objectives.

2. The signals from the Executive, the Congress, and the informed public are strong and congruent: they point to a mandate for the DCI to lead, manage, and exercise resource authority over the entire Intelligence Community. Central to such responsibilities is his cognizance and command of the national intelligence production process. The

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1 Source: Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 79M00467A, Box 13, Reorganization of IC 010476–300476. Confidential.

2 On April 14, Lehman sent Bush a paper discussing options for adapting the national intelligence production system following the issuance of Executive Order 11905 (Document 70). While confirming the DCI’s authority over national production, the Executive order, according to Lehman, generated two new problems. First, no central management system existed for the Intelligence Community staff to support the newly-created CFI in its role as the central resource authority for the Community. Second, Lehman argued, the Executive order “institutionalized” the “trend over recent years toward a greater separation of the DCI in his Community role from the Central Intelligence Agency” causing “morale problems in the CIA, which sees itself as ousted from its ‘central role.’” (Central Intelligence Agency, OPI 10, Executive Registry, Job 79M00467A, Box 13, Reorganization of IC 010476–300476)
product of that process is the Community’s principal reason for existence and the requirements of that product should drive both management and resource decisions. The focus of the DCI’s decisions, in other words, ought to be on the product as much as on the process.

3. By what criteria will the adequacy of product and process—and, hence, the effectiveness of the Intelligence Community’s performance under the DCI’s leadership—be judged?

—The **product** will clearly be assessed in terms of its analytic quality, timeliness and objectivity—and hence its usefulness to the national decision level.

—The **process** will be evaluated in terms of the perceived impartiality, equity, and even-handedness of the arrangements under which the Community elements participate in what is truly a common endeavor—and hence their willingness to accept and respond to central leadership.

The current debate does not focus clearly on these two fundamental DCI objectives of assuring a high-quality analytic product and creating a process that will elicit willing cooperation rather than active or passive resistance from the Community.

4. If these DCI objectives are taken as a point of departure, what should a national analytic and estimative intelligence production process seek to accomplish? Five key functions stand out:

—Management of an analytic and estimative system that will assure relevance, responsiveness, effective Community participation, and fair reflection of uncertainties and judgmental differences—including differences between government departments or Intelligence Community components and, sometimes, significant differences of informed opinion within departments or Community components.

—Development of improved analytic capabilities throughout the Community, especially with longer-term needs in view.

—Nurturing of the intelligence production base of CIA as a service of common concern for the whole Community (and the nation) and a recognized source of impartial analysis (i.e., no departmental policy or budgetary axes to grind).

—Interaction between producers and consumers to enhance policy relevance of the analytic product.

—Provision of sharply focused guidance to the whole range of collection systems, based on awareness of critical gaps and producer and consumer needs.

5. What institutional arrangement is best designed to perform these functions? It is our view that the existing NIO system, while far from perfect, can provide the basis of a production mechanism able to perform this particular mix of activities.
Being responsible directly to the DCI and operating under his authority, the NIOs are optimally positioned to cut across organizational barriers to focus Agency-wide and Community resources on production tasks; they also serve the DCI as his own substantive analytic advisory staff, viewing his needs and problems from his perspective.

Their expertise and analytic bent, unfettered by line responsibilities, sensitizes the NIOs to the system’s critical dependence on human talents—they are able to alert the DCI to key needs for qualitative improvements and to energize the Community in anticipation of policy needs. Furthermore, since they work directly for the DCI, their discharge of these tasks can be free of concern for institutional equities or institutional positions.

Their heavy dependence on CIA as a main repository of the Community’s analytic resources makes the NIOs strongly protective and promotional of CIA’s needs and problems. The NIO–CIA relationship should be mutually supportive; in fact, symbiotic. It is not, in any way, an adversary relationship or zero-sum game.

Being in continuous close contact with both producers and consumers under the DCI’s mandate, the NIOs are well equipped to strengthen the vital interaction between intelligence and the policymaker.

Because of their knowledge of the value of the various collection systems to the national intelligence product, and the gaps in that product which specific collectors can fill, the NIOs can add a critical substantive dimension to the DCI’s resource allocation decisions.

6. The NIOs’ ability to perform these functions does not appear to be basically in question. The debate seems to turn more on what are perceived as inherent weaknesses in the NIO system, or tensions inevitably created by its operation. A degree of tension is probably unavoidable in any event in so complex a structure, and may in fact be desirable in the interest of creativity. The larger an organization or conglomerate—such as the Intelligence Community—the more obvious is the need for order. But if order is made the chief desideratum, it crowds out innovation and flexibility. Routine becomes an enemy of quality. Moreover, what are perceived as weaknesses and some of the tensions can be readily alleviated by certain changes in the present structure and procedures.

7. What are the weaknesses and tensions and how might they be alleviated?

—The NIOs are criticized for undercutting and running athwart lines of command by commandeering analytic talent at subordinate levels. Our impression is that such instances are an exception rather than the rule. While NIOs do organize activities across the vertically structured intelligence organizations, they are under standing instruc-
tions to pass their tasking through normal command channels. Never-
theless, some line managers feel that they do not always share equi-
tably in responsibility for projects conducted under NIO auspices. The
following guidelines—which tighten what are supposed to be current
procedures—would do much to alleviate this problem.

—NIOs should make a point of levying tasks through the chain of
command in order to minimize any element of interference with the
management of production elements of the Community. All line man-
gers should understand that this is the way things are supposed to be
done and should be encouraged to raise objections with the NIO in
question, with the D/DCI/NIO, or—in extreme cases—with the DCI if
this rule is not followed.

—NIOs, line managers, standing NFIB committees, and ad hoc
working groups should all be responsible for assuring time for ade-
quate review of projects conducted under NIO auspices.

—Line managers should not consider themselves to be relieved for
their responsibility for the quality and timeliness of projects under-
taken under NIO auspices; but should realize that they are given max-
imum opportunity to raise their institutional viewpoints, criticisms,
suggestions for improvement, etc., during the Community-wide coor-
dination phase of the production process rather than in initial drafting
phase carried out under NIO supervision.

—What are frequently perceived as unscheduled NIO production
demands are often resented by line elements of the Community, whose
scheduled production may be disrupted. The NIOs, however, do not
invent these demands. The demands are imposed by urgent consu-
mer needs. It is a virtue of the NIO system that it provides a flexible
means of receiving these demands and spreading the resulting work
throughout the Community.

—Nevertheless, there is doubtless room for improvement in
meshing major requirements with the ongoing work of the Commu-
nity. One way to do so would be to make greater use of steering groups
consisting of appropriate production managers from CIA, DIA, and
INR, to consider major interagency projects, advise on their priority,
and make recommendations as to the distribution of the analytic and
drafting work. (Exceptions would be necessary for obviously high-
priority crash projects.) This would allow production managers more
voice in projects that involve use of their resources.

—The quality of Estimates, it is alleged, could be improved
through a collegial review process.3

3 There was already an experiment in competitive analysis of Soviet strategic forces
between CIA analysts, known as “Team A,” and a group of civilian and military experts,
known as “Team B.” Documentation on the Team A/Team B project is in Foreign Rela-
170, and 171.
—A review process could indeed prove useful, especially at the time an initial draft is completed, before it is circulated throughout the Community for coordination. (Review at the end of the production cycle, i.e., when a coordinated paper is ready for submission to the NFIB, would be much more cumbersome and do less to improve quality.)

—The current lack of formal collegial review within the NIO system is in part a function of the heavy present workload for most NIOs. This workload could be eased by a combination of measures tailored to the special needs of individual NIOs—some internal reallocation of tasks, some addition of assistants, some modest staff or drafting support—which would free NIO time for collegial review.

—Such review would be most helpful in the case of the broader military-political-economic Estimates—those which cut across geographic or functional lines or involve new and unfamiliar problems and hypotheses going beyond the conventional wisdom.

—Reviews of such Estimates could be further enhanced by the establishment of an external critique and review panel composed of several dozen broad-gauge specialists enlisted from the governmental, academic, business and journalistic communities. The panel could be drawn upon selectively (two or three for each paper) for participation in particular NIO collegial reviews. This would be a cost-effective way of providing a useful scholarly refereeing and advisory service and of offering some public assurance of impartiality. It would certainly be preferable to any attempt to superimpose a permanent additional coordinating body or board upon the system.

8. In sum, we believe that the NIO system, as originally conceived in Bill Colby’s charter of October, 1973 (a copy of which is attached), and with the kinds of modifications suggested above, will come closer to realizing the DCI’s key objectives—a high quality product and an equitable process—than any alternative solution so far proposed.
74. Memorandum From John K. Matheny of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)

Washington, April 24, 1976.

SUBJECT

Senate Select Committee (SSC) Report

After 15 months of investigation, two interim reports (assassination, Chile) and many headlines the SSC is ready to issue its final report.\(^2\)

The following are the salients as of this morning:

—The report will be printed over the weekend and be available for distribution Monday\(^3\) morning (CIA will pick up a copy for us).

—There will be two sections, Domestic and Foreign, totalling some 2000 pages. There will be over 100 recommendations all told. Parts that have been changed substantially or deleted will be so marked “at the request of intelligence agencies”.

—The release of the report will be preceded by a short meeting of the full Committee at 10:00 a.m. on Monday, followed by a press conference at about 10:30. DCI Bush will appear briefly at this meeting to, once more, make his case for not releasing any budget figures (currently there are blank spaces in the final proofs where such figures appear).

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, John K. Matheny Files, Box 11, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Final Report. No classification marking. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum and wrote at the top of the page: “It’s hard to figure out what is the main thrust of all of this.” All brackets are in the original except those accounting for still-classified material. Kissinger received a similar analysis of the SSC report from INR, April 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry A. Kissinger, Entry 5177, Box 19, Nodis Briefing Memos, 1976 (Folder 1))

\(^2\) Regarding the two interim reports on assassination and Chile, see footnote 2, Document 52, and footnote 6, Document 56. The final version of the Church Committee report was published by the U.S. Government Printing Office as a series of 14 individual reports, divided into 7 “volumes” of public testimony (covering the unauthorized storage of toxic agents by the CIA, the Huston Plan, abuses of the Internal Revenue Service during the Nixon administration, U.S. Government mail opening, the NSA and Fourth Amendment rights, the FBI, and covert action) and 7 “books” of Committee writings on the subjects investigated (covering foreign and military intelligence, intelligence activities and Americans’ rights, the John F. Kennedy assassination, as well as supplementary reports on these subjects).

\(^3\) April 26.
On a parallel track, CIA informs me that they have pretty solid information regarding the latest version of S. Res. 400, as amended by the Rules Committee (to be reported out at the end of this month):

— An oversight committee would be established consisting of 11–12 members.

— The members would be drawn from (and serve concurrently on) the Judiciary, appropriations, armed services, and foreign relations committees.

— The committee would have no legislative or authorization powers but would have an investigative charter to include subpoena power.

Senator Church intends to take this version on directly on the floor of the Senate (armed of course with his “just released” 2000 page catalogue of “abuses, misdeeds and mismanagement”).

As you know, I have been working in a low key manner with CIA and the Select Committee staff to review those sections of the report most troublesome to us. To this end I have concentrated on the Foreign Intelligence section; I am not familiar with (nor was I given access to) the Domestic Intelligence section.

Other than the incalculable impact of detailing virtually our whole intelligence apparatus and tracing its development over the past 30 years, there are two specific areas that are of concern to us. The first are the usual political swipes endemic to a report of this type. I have summarized three examples (at Tab A) but, in general they are much less troublesome than those in the Pike report. Many are common knowledge and others seem so obvious as to beg the question of their relevance. It is interesting to note however that where I did encounter some “believable” ones (such as those at Tab A) I was singularly unsuccessful in dissuading the Committee staff to either modify or eliminate them.

The other concern is the Committee’s penchant for quoting from NSC documents (Bill Hyland spoke to Staff Director Bill Miller on this).

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4 S. Res. 400, as approved by the Senate on May 19, established a 15-member Select Committee on Intelligence composed of 8 Democrats and 7 Republicans, and gave the new panel exclusive jurisdiction over the CIA and shared jurisdiction of the FBI, defense intelligence agencies and all other intelligence agencies with the appropriate standing committees. The intelligence agencies were required to keep the new committee “fully and currently informed” about their activities, but those activities were not subject to veto by the committee. In addition to subpoena authority, the Select Committee on Intelligence was given power to release classified information to the public if approved by a majority. The President had 5 days to approve any release; if he objected, the matter would be referred to the full Congress. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 190–191)

5 Not attached and not found.

6 For a summary, see Document 65.
We did in fact get most of the quotation marks deleted and/or the text paraphrased, and allusions to specific directives are now followed by characterizations of the text or paraphrased materials. It appears therefore that our FOI problems have not been unnecessarily complicated.

As bad as the initial impression of thumbing through the report might be, it was at least twice as damaging prior to the interagency review process. The report has none of the exposé quality of the Pike report and is—given the liberal suasion of the Committee’s majority—quite a well done piece of factual reportage. Unfortunately, this moderate tone will serve to blunt any outrage that may have otherwise occurred from friendlies in the media—and perhaps even from Senators Goldwater, Tower, and Baker.7 There are several quotes from HAK testimony in the report but most are not harmful (those that were have been eliminated), and overall the treatment of the NSC is not as rough as anticipated.

The Report

The SSC report states that the purpose of its year long investigation was to determine “how necessarily secret activities of the U.S. Government can best function under the rule of law.” It asserts that U.S. intelligence activities have been carried on over the 30-year period since the end of World War II under the cloak of secrecy and largely without a positive statutory basis. Although the need for a strong national intelligence effort is acknowledged and the admission is made that by and large the intelligence community has performed responsibly, the allegation is made that there have indeed been significant abuses. To prevent such abuses in the future, the Committee asserts that it is necessary to 1) inform the American people as to the “nature and scope” of these activities [which will be done by virtue of the contents of the Committee’s final report], and 2) establish an explicit statutory basis for U.S. intelligence activities “commensurate with the existing rule of law.” What follows is roughly 2000 pages which, in essence, amount to a road map for discerning the “scope and nature” of the U.S. intelligence apparatus together with a legislative prescription for codifying the charter.

There are obvious problems with this approach.

The level of detail to which the “findings” are carried in order to justify the recommendations is totally unwarranted and in some cases irrelevant. In several instances statistical data is used of the type that is bound to whet the appetite of those who would, for whatever reason,

7 Senators Barry Goldwater (R–Arizona), John Tower (R–Texas), and Howard H. Baker, Jr. (R–Tennessee).
exploit the more specific information that supports that data. Although
many additional specifics were removed during the interagency re-
view process, much is still left with which to build on; the net effect of
which will be to generate a never-ending cry for “who?” “which
names?” “where?” In most cases the subject area could have been
treated in a paragraph or two to include a reference to a classified ap-
pendix or addendum which more appropriately would be passed on to
the proper Congressional oversight body.

Another problem is the Committee’s attempt at providing a public
charter for activities which by their very nature have been relegated by
the history of diplomatic discourse to the “seen, but not heard” cate-
gory (espionage, covert financial or other assistance to friendly ele-
ments in other countries, recruitment of foreign nationals while in the
U.S. as future agents-of-influence, etc.).

The reasons why these revelations and the use of such explicit stat-
utory language jeopardize our future capability to continue certain in-
telligence operations are all too obvious. It would appear, however,
that there are motivations for doing so other than those cited by the
Committee. Committee members (and/or staff) do not believe that the
Congress will move expeditiously, if at all, to exercise its oversight re-
sponsibilities without being put into a position publicly (by virtue of
the report’s revelations) of having no choice but to face the “alarming
pervasiveness” and “seeming extralegal nature” of the U.S. intelligence
community. If the recommendations (which, if enacted would codify
both the scope of activities and the chain of accountability) then appear
to provide a prescription for curing these perceived ills, then the Com-
mittee will have done its job.

The obvious trouble with even this rationale is that, regardless of
the public outcry, such comprehensive legislation as is recommended
stands little chance of passing in a form remotely resembling the orig-
inal. Therefore, one is driven to conclude that the motivation of those
on the committee who know better is not workable legislation but
something less altruistic. As long as the Committee’s rationale is con-
strued in non-controversial but essentially meaningless terms such as
“the public’s right to know” it of course has the advantage of appealing
to whatever motives may exist within the Committee. Given this situa-
tion it would seem that our choices for response are pretty well dic-
tated: we should avoid impugning motives and concentrate on expres-
sing our concerns as to the net effect of publishing such detail, and
point out that indeed the net effect might be quite different from that
which was intended, given the noblest of motives.

The conclusions reached are that 1) covert action has been prac-
ticed indiscriminately and without adequate coordination and policy
guidance, 2) the CIA is largely “unsupervised” in those areas most
likely to get us in trouble at home and abroad (espionage and counterintelligence activities), 3) the Constitution requires public disclosure of intelligence community expenditures—at least in the aggregate.

Unfortunately, the prescriptions advocated for curing covert action abuses include bringing espionage and counterintelligence activities into the scope of specific NSC oversight responsibility, as well as expanding such specific oversight to include all covert action proposals, no matter how trivial or devoid of policy implications. In the case of budget disclosure, the SSC must of course explain first what the budget encompasses before a credible figure can be arrived at. In doing so, the Committee staff has drawn the rather naive conclusion that the diffuse nature of what appears to be a generically related endeavor—intelligence—dictates a re-ordering of management responsibilities within the Executive Branch (not to mention facilitating Congressional control through a combined authorizations process).

It is these three conclusions that provide the vehicles for all sorts of diverse “fixes” to the intelligence community—only some of which are directly related to Congressional oversight. Covert action ills are used to justify increased accountability up and down the chain of command—to the point of risking management paralysis by virtue of the vast increase in administrative workload on high level decision makers, not to mention increased risks of public disclosure. The Ambassador would be made an overt co-conspirator in any such activities in his country (which would now include all espionage and foreign recruitment activities), certain facets of covert action would be proscribed (assassination, interference with a democratic government and support to security forces who systematically violate human rights), and a written audit trail of approvals and dissents would be required in each case (presumably to be made available to Congress upon request). The “need” for budgetary candor drives everything from [2 lines not declassified] to the insistence that the DCI have full resource allocation authority over all national intelligence collection programs and extensive review authority over tactical intelligence resource allocation (although a satisfactory definition of tactical intelligence is not provided).

In summary, the Constitutional requirement for a public accounting of intelligence expenditures, the uncontrolled nature of covert operations and the lack of Executive branch supervision of CIA espionage and counterintelligence activities drive the perceived (by the Committee) need for a statutory basis for all U.S. intelligence activities. Within this framework a few pet grievances are evident (State control of a “rogue” CIA overseas, protection of academia and press above all else, White House interference in intelligence estimating processes), but most of these are manifestly obvious in the report’s text. A few of
the recommendations relating directly to the NSC and its role under the
1947 Act and EO 11905\(^8\) are as follows:

**The 1947 National Security Act and Related Legislation**

—The Committee states that the 1947 Act is “no longer an ade-
quate framework” for the conduct of U.S. intelligence activities. [It does
not explicitly authorize espionage, covert action, paramilitary warfare.]
There is no charter for NSA or DIA (and the CIA charter is inadequate),
and the DCI’s charter to coordinate national intelligence is not an effec-
tive one.

—The Act does not delineate an overall structure for the intelli-
gence community and does not set clear and specific limits on community
activities.

—The 1947 Act should be recast to include: statutory charters for
the NSC, DCI and all elements of the intelligence community; a defini-
tion of basic purposes; and clearly defined limits and prohibitions.
(This would be, in effect, E.O. 11905, in much greater detail, trans-
formed into statute law.)

Comment: Our main concerns would be (1) the impracticability of
changing a law, once enacted, to meet future management and organi-
izational requirements, and (2) the level of explicitness necessary to de-
scribe each agency’s charter to the liking of civil libertarians.

**The National Security Council and the Office of the President**

—The Committee asserts that only a small fraction of covert action
proposals are approved/reviewed by the NSC, and acknowledges that
the newly formed OAG, although a step in the right direction, is not a
workable mechanism as constituted if all covert action proposals are
forwarded for review.

—Espionage and foreign counterintelligence activities are in many
cases virtually indistinguishable from covert action in terms of their po-
tential adverse impact on foreign policy, and therefore should also be
reviewed by an appropriate NSC mechanism.

—Counterintelligence activities conducted in the U.S. should also
be reviewed by an appropriate NSC level, although for different
reasons (as a check against Constitutional encroachment, and to resolve
CIA/FBI jurisdictional disputes).

—The newly formed CFI should act to provide muscle behind the
DCI’s newly expanded charter under E.O. 11905.

—Past Presidents have had no effective oversight mechanism.

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\(^8\) Document 70.
• The newly formed IOB is not yet in business and its effectiveness is therefore untested.
  • The PFIAB, although useful, is not intended for that purpose.
  • It is questionable to put faith in only one branch of government’s oversight mechanism; Congressional oversight is needed as well.

—The NSC should be empowered by statute to direct intelligence activities in the U.S. to include collection, counterintelligence and covert action.

—The Attorney General should be made an adviser to NSC to insure adherence to Constitutional rights while conducting intelligence activities.

—The CFI should be established by statute and include the Secretary of State as a member.9

—The OAG should be established by statute and considerably expanded to include jurisdiction over sensitive foreign collection activities (espionage). The Director of the Clandestine Service (DDO) would also be added as a member, and the Chairman of the group would be subject to Senate confirmation (if not already).

—The OAG would get “an adequate” staff to deal with the new requirement to approve all covert projects as well as to review all ongoing projects on an annual basis.10

—Congress would be notified prior to each project (no room for interpretation) and the DCI would be required to provide semi-annual reports on all projects to appropriate Congressional committees.

—In addition to an enhanced CFI and OAG, a new NSC Counter-Intelligence Committee should be established. This Committee, established by statute, would ensure conformity with statutory and Constitutional requirements in carrying out intelligence activities domestically, review agent recruitment both at home and overseas, and resolve jurisdictional disputes between CIA and FBI.

Comment: The net effect is that Congress would decree by statute both the nature of the NSC oversight mechanism and the structure of NSC Committees. The concerns are obvious. Aside from the problem, once again, of the unnecessarily explicit nature of NSC Committee charters, this approach constitutes a wholly unwarranted interference in Executive Branch management prerogatives.

9 Scowcroft underlined “Secretary of State” and placed a checkmark next to this paragraph.
10 Scowcroft placed a checkmark next to this and the following paragraph.
The Director of Central Intelligence

—Recent efforts to give the DCI more power (i.e., the 5 November 1971 memo and EO 11905) should be expanded still further and enacted as statute law.

—Defense would become nothing more than a program manager for DCI allocated resources in peacetime, but would take over as the overall collection manager in time of war.

—Congress has a right to the full range of intelligence gathered by executive agencies and, in fact, Congress (in consultation with the President) should establish the overall composition of the national intelligence program.

—The DCI and his estimators (NIOs and DDI) should be split off from CIA (DDO, DDS&T, etc.) to insure a balanced approach to his enhanced resource management powers and to preserve his role as advisor to the President, not protector of CIA.

Comment: Our concerns, of course, would be the unnecessarily specific nature of the DCI’s statutory charter. The point could also be made that Congress should not have the primary power (“in consultation with the Executive”) to define the elements in our national intelligence programs when those programs are primarily designed to serve the President as both Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as chief foreign policy officer. The arguments concerning the DCI’s objectivity vis-à-vis the President and his role in defining national intelligence resource allocation can be noted as fair comment but rather ill timed in that the CFI has not yet had time to prove or disprove these arguments.

The Central Intelligence Agency

This section comprises the bulk of the findings and its narrative is used to explicate the reasons for the proposed expansion of the NSC oversight mechanism and the role of “countervailing” agencies (State, FBI, Justice) to moderate the sometime aberrations inherent in an essentially “unsupervised” CIA. The Agency’s relations with the media, academia and its behavior overseas are discussed in some detail and many sensitive facts and figures are bandied about as if to establish the Committee’s bona fides. This section is by far the most troublesome in terms of unwarranted public disclosures (although CIA’s lobby has succeeded in moderating this section to a great extent). I recommend that our comments be limited to expressing support for CIA’s concerns (if stated) as to the unnecessary level of detail. (This section of course provides the grist for the seemingly radical recommendations concerning enhanced NSC oversight and jurisdiction.)

The Department of Defense

The overall thrust of the Committee re Defense is (1) to provide a statutory basis for NSA and DIA, and (2) to adjust SecDef budget au-
authority to allow the DCI to manage a consolidated intelligence budget. The first operation is fairly straightforward and limited in its concept of execution only by the explicitness of each agency’s charter and, in the case of DIA, by the willingness of the JCS to relinquish some control (and resources) over the strategic estimating business (unlikely). The second recommendation, however, is offered with little more than a “hey, how about it” attitude and is embellished with no specifics. Our comments on the first subject are unnecessary and on the second subject would be characterized as “this is really a complex subject. Why don’t you leave it to the CFI and the follow-on oversight committee to work it out?”

The Department of State and Ambassadors

The Committee’s fetish here is twofold: (1) the FSO should, by virtue of his track record in collecting valuable intelligence, be appropriately trained and funded commensurate with his value; and (2) the CIA must be controlled overseas by the only non-intelligence entity who is in the position to do so, the Ambassador. I’ll leave the talking points on this one to you and will not attempt to suggest what they should be (both Church and Mondale, supported by Bill Miller and David Aaron, are adamant about ambassadorial prerogatives and obligations in this area).

Oversight and the Intelligence Budget

This is essentially a condensation of Al Quanbeck’s budget analysis as contained in his 90-page report on Defense Intelligence.11 It calls for disclosure of an aggregate budget figure and then (until the President’s recent letter) proceeds to list that figure (along with others) and calls for a monitoring (by GAO) of all intelligence expenditures to ensure that “priorities are appropriately balanced”. Bush’s pitch on Monday will no doubt be leave the decision to publish budget details up to the follow-on oversight committee [1½ lines not declassified].

General Recommendations

The Committee acknowledges the necessity to protect secrets and asks for standardized investigatory procedures for clearing both Executive and Legislative personnel. The Committee also notes the tendency for agency security forces to engage in law enforcement and calls for assurances that this will stop. The new oversight committee should also draft secrecy legislation to include penalties, appropriate definitions, and channels for dissent if abuses of the classification system are thought to have occurred. I would suggest we note only that the Presi-

11 Not found.
dent has already forwarded secrecy protection legislation to the Hill and stands ready to work with the Congress on standardized background investigations and security clearance procedures.

In sum, although many specifics have been deleted during the review process, there are a lot of details that could still be made on security grounds and a few subject areas that could have been treated with greater circumspection in the interest of our foreign relations. There are several proposals that are downright unworkable (Ambassador/CIA overseas, OAG interface with Congressional committees, NSC span of control over intelligence activities, and intelligence budget restructuring, etc.). The effect over time of a 2000 page report detailing our intelligence structure and activities since World War II is inestimable. As a minimum, hostile propaganda machinery will be provided with enough grist for years to come. A greater danger is typified by a quote (loosely paraphrased) attributed by CIA to Senator Mathias\textsuperscript{12} “No telling what Evans and Novak\textsuperscript{13} might come up with, if, on some rainy day, they decided to sit down and analyze this thing.”

Many of the details we have been able to delete to date may come out anyway under the pressure of intense media scrutiny during an election year. To the extent we can argue successfully before hand that “enough has been revealed” we stand a chance of at least temporizing this process. The following points are offered for your consideration:

—The connotation of much of the rationale supplied in the Report regarding CIA domestic objectives is that these activities (recruitment of foreign students, collecting information voluntarily offered by U.S. citizens) are “wrong” or illegal or morally repugnant. Although many times this rationale is either preceded or concluded by a paragraph which says it is okay to do this, such disclaimers will tend to get lost in the “news” of the revelations preceding it. To the end of effective oversight in areas where past practices in-and-of-themselves are necessary but in which excesses may have occurred, it would have been far more workable to supply the details to the follow-on committee confidentially, and recommend only that the potential for excesses or abuses exists and must be faced by the oversight committee. The point to be made is that the overall tone of the report suggests that people who cooperate with the CIA risk being taken advantage of or do so for some motive other than patriotism.

—in recommending improvements in the management of covert action (to include adding espionage, HUMINT and counterintelligence to direct NSC purview), the committee goes overboard in trying to correct

\textsuperscript{12} Senator Charles M. Mathias, Jr. (R–Maryland).

\textsuperscript{13} Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, political columnists.
every conceivable abuse by adding more and more layers of supervision and accountability. On the one hand a procedure, whether formalized or not, will probably not prevent a President from using his advisers and structuring his decision-making process in the way he wants. On the other hand, there is a point at which one must put some trust in the good faith efforts of its elected and appointed officials. In addition, many of the administrative safeguards present today (Intelligence Oversight Board, strengthened IG and General Counsel functions at CIA, rejuvenated PFIAB, strengthened management of covert action) were not in force earlier and should be given a chance to work and/or be modified in consultation with Congress. Such detailed legislation is both unnecessary and unwise at this point in time and certainly not conducive to effective management.

—The argument is made that Congress faces a dilemma in being informed of covert action programs but not being in a position to counsel against them if they do not agree (hence, the extraordinary means used in the case of Angola). Nowhere is the corollary to this point addressed, i.e., the Executive may brief a committee whose majority supports the action but who will not prevent the one or two members who might not support it from holding a press conference, reading their vote into the Congressional record or otherwise disclosing the operation. The point should be made that it is totally one-sided to expect a share in the responsibility for reviewing (and even approving) covert activities if there is not a commensurate sharing of the responsibility to go along with the decision if you are in the minority—assuming no impropriety is involved.

—EO 11905 addresses in some form or another most of the issues raised by the report. The argument—aside from what form of oversight Congress should exercise—then becomes one of whether legislation in areas other than those already proferred (electronic surveillance, secrecy protection) is necessary.

Depending on the press play surrounding the Report’s release I will work through Bud
\footnote{Robert McFarlane.} to assist Mike Duval in meeting any requirements we might have in supplying press guidance. My hope is that all the mileage is gone on this subject and that we can respond generally by observing that 1) there is nothing really new here, 2) the President’s Executive Order addresses most of the Committee’s concerns, 3) the Administration has supported legislation (electronic surveillance, mail opening, protection of secrets) where we felt it required, and 4) the Congress should now turn to exercising responsible oversight by working to insure that both EO 11905 and pending legislation is given a fair chance to work.
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Defense Intelligence Reorganization

The Department of Defense will announce today a reorganization of Defense Intelligence aimed at establishing improved oversight and clearer lines of accountability. There will be a new Director of Defense Intelligence (DDI), subordinate to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Bob Ellsworth. In addition, the Defense Intelligence Agency, which formerly reported to both the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will report only through the civilian side. The Joint Chiefs, however, will retain the authority to levy intelligence requirements on DIA.

The key features of the reorganization are as follows:

—A new Inspector General for Defense Intelligence will exercise oversight over all aspects of Defense intelligence operations.

—The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) will also serve as Director of Defense Intelligence; the Directors of DIA, NSA and the National Reconnaissance Office will report through him to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Ellsworth) and to the Secretary; this implements the Blue Ribbon Panel report of 1970 that recommended clearer lines of authority.2

—DIA will be reorganized into two main components, one for production and one for plans and operations, in place of 12 sub-units.

—A second deputy in DIA will take over responsibility for budget management and for Intelligence Community affairs.

—As an experiment, a Defense Intelligence Board will be created to provide a better relationship between the consumers in Defense and the intelligence producers in Defense.

The only one potential problem in this plan is whether the JSC will feel adequately served after having lost direct authority over DIA. Jack Marsh, Phil Buchen and I were briefed by Secretary Ellsworth, and he

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 8, Defense, 5/7/76–6/27/76. Secret. Ford initialed the memorandum, which bears a stamped notation indicating that he saw it.

believes that General Brown is satisfied with the new plan. It is possible that Congressional Committee members (Armed Services), who have been briefed, might have some reservations about the loss of military control over DIA, but we have heard no such complaints so far.

76. Memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Ellsworth)¹

MEMORANDUM FOR
Secretaries of the Military Departments
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director, Defense Research and Engineering
Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director of Defense Intelligence
Director, National Reconnaissance Office
Director, Planning and Evaluation
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
Director, National Security Agency
Director, Net Assessment

SUBJECT
Defense Intelligence Board

As I announced on 14 May, the Secretary has approved the establishment of a Defense Intelligence Board to assist me in insuring the maximum effectiveness and responsiveness of DoD intelligence operations in meeting user needs.

To this end, I will look to the Board to do the following:

—Identify key user needs and priorities.
—Appraise the effectiveness of the intelligence response in meeting these needs, and develop ways of making this response better.
—Determine needed actions on key intelligence issues and problems; initiate those actions which Board members may take without further approval; recommend to me actions which require approval of higher authority.

An additional, and equally important, purpose of the Board is to provide a forum for frequent contact between key users and service intelligence operating and management officials. I regard this sort of regular face-to-face dialog as indispensable for proper understanding by intelligence of what is wanted and understanding by users of what intelligence is capable of doing.

The Board will be chaired by the ASD(I)/DDI when that official is appointed; in the interim, I will act as Chairman. I would like either you or your designated senior representative with authority to speak for you to serve on the Board. In the case of the Military Departments, I would suggest that the Service “operations deputies” would be suitable representatives. Similarly, I would suggest the Director, Joint Staff, as the Chairman’s representative.

In addition to the Board proper, I propose that there be two working panels, representing users and intelligence producers respectively, and a third panel on intelligence resources.

Board membership and proposed panel purposes and membership are summarized on the attachment.

I would like to have the Board meet at least monthly. After a trial period of six months, I will report to the Secretary on the progress and usefulness of the Board and provide a recommendation with respect to its continuation.

I would appreciate being informed of Board member names by Tuesday, 25 May. I intend to hold the first meeting at breakfast on Thursday, 27 May.

Robert Ellsworth

Attachment

I. ORGANIZATION OF THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BOARD

Chairman ad interim: Deputy Secretary Ellsworth

Principals or Representatives of:

—Secretaries of the Military Departments
—Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
—Director, Defense Research and Engineering
—Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)
—Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation)
—Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)/Director Defense Intelligence

2 Secret; Codeword.
II. ORGANIZATION OF DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE BOARD PANELS

User Panel

—Charter. To consider intelligence requirements and formulate recommendations pertaining to the satisfaction of intelligence needs of Defense components in the Washington area, in the Service Training establishments in the unified and specified commands and in the Military Departments.

—Chairman: Principal or representative of Assistant Secretary of Defense (International Security Affairs)

—Principals or representatives of:

- Secretaries of the Military Departments
- Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Director, Defense Research and Engineering
- Assistant Secretary of Defense (Program Analysis and Evaluation)
- Director, Net Assessment
- Others as may be requested from time to time by the Chairman to address specific topics.

—Meetings: Monthly, or on call of the Chairman

Producers Panel

—Charter. To consider intelligence user requirements, intelligence quality enhancement measures, production delegation tasks, and collection requirements needed to support new, expanded or more economical production efforts and to address participation in the NFIB by DoD representatives as well as formulating recommendations for consideration and/or implementation by the DDI and, as appropriate, by the Secretary or Deputy Secretary of Defense.

—Chairman: Director, Defense Intelligence Agency/Deputy DDI for Production, Plans and Operations

—Principals or representatives of:

- Director, National Security Agency
- Director, National Reconnaissance Office
- Service Intelligence Chiefs

—Meetings: Monthly, or on call of the Chairman

Resources Panel

—Charter. To consider the adequacy of resources to support intelligence needs and to formulate basic and alternative program and
budget proposals for consideration by Program Managers, the DDI, the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and the Committee on Foreign Intelligence with respect to their presentation to the OMB and the Congress.

—Chairman: Deputy ASD(I)/DDI for Programs and Resources
—Principals or representatives of:
  • Director, DIA/Deputy DDI for Production, Plans and Operations
  • Director, National Reconnaissance Office
  • Director, National Security Agency
  • Service Intelligence Chiefs
  • Others as appropriate for the panel’s operation

—Meetings: On call of the Chairman

77. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT
Semi-Annual NSC Intelligence Review

Executive Order 11905 requires the National Security Council to conduct a semi-annual review of intelligence policies, the needs of users of intelligence, the timeliness and quality of intelligence products and the continued appropriateness of special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives. The following guidelines are intended to clarify how these reviews will be conducted.

—The National Security Council review cycle will be geared to the new fiscal year. This timing should help insure that the reviews have the maximum impact on program planning, budget decisions and management policies.

Prior to each such NSC meeting the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) will be expected to provide a written report summarizing its activities since the last review (or, in the case of the first review, since its formulation) including identification of major program and budget issues encountered and those anticipated within the next six months. This document will serve as background information for appropriate discussion.

Prior to each such NSC meeting the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) will be expected to provide a written report on its activities. For this purpose a special reporting format will be developed to help focus on the appropriateness of ongoing special activities and the issues they pose.

The DCI’s Intelligence Community Staff, in consultation with the NSC Staff, will be expected to assume responsibility for assessing on a continuous basis (a) the requirements of major users of intelligence products and (b) the timeliness and quality of intelligence reporting. The results of this program will be reported to and reviewed at each semi-annual NSC meeting on intelligence matters.

Brent Scowcroft

78. Letter From Director of Central Intelligence Bush to President Ford


Dear Mr. President:

I have been in my job as DCI exactly six months. Herewith a brief report on certain highlights, which is short enough to read but not long enough to be all inclusive.

A. Congressional Appearances

I have made 30 official appearances before Committees on the Hill. This does not include 33 other meetings with Members of Congress or Congressional Staff.

The appearances before Congressional Committees require a good deal of pre-briefing time. We are trying to cooperate fully with Congress but I now report to seven Congressional Committees. This is too...
much. I am pressing to implement your stated objective of more consolidated oversight, but neither House nor Senate is really striving to achieve this goal.

B. Implementation of Your Executive Order

We have implemented the Order. The Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI) has met 16 times. It is doing what you intended it do; namely, making budget decisions and setting priorities. For the first time the DCI has some machinery to enable him to exert real influence on the Intelligence Community budget. The system is working.

This fall the Intelligence Community Staff will move from CIA into a separate building [less than 1 line not declassified].

Our two Deputies are now in place. Hank Knoche was confirmed by the Senate and sworn in on July 7th. Admiral Dan Murphy now has the rank of 4 Star Admiral. Legislation making statutory the Deputy for the Intelligence Community is now pending in OMB.

The two Deputy system is working well.

Reports to the new Oversight Board from our General Counsel and Inspector General have gone in on time. That oversight mechanism is functioning.

C. Areas of Progress

1. I believe CIA’s relationship with the State Department is improving. At some echelons in State there is a lot of foot dragging, but thanks to great cooperation from Dr. Kissinger and Larry Eagleburger, we are getting better access to State cable traffic [2 lines not declassified]. I have had individual meetings with 36 U.S. Ambassadors.  

2. Morale at CIA is improving. As the excesses of the past investigations fade, things on the morale front improve. Our recruitment is up. Our people are willing to serve abroad and take the risks involved. The CIA is a disciplined organization—trained to support the Director. During this 6 month period, I have made 12 changes in our top 16 slots at CIA. These personnel changes have helped revitalize our various Directorates. They have, I believe, been accomplished with a minimum of personal and institutional heartburn.

3. I feel I am getting first-class support at CIA and, for that matter, from the Intelligence Community.

4. We have an excellent relationship with the NSC staff. On the personnel side, I get total cooperation from Brent Scowcroft, for whom I have the highest personal regard.

5. To help morale as well as my own education, I try to meet with as many of our Station Chiefs as possible on an individual basis (33

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2 Document 70.
such meetings to date); to appear before CIA groups at Langley (16 such meetings); and to visit Intelligence Community installations and contractor sites (21).

D. Areas of Major Concern

1. There is too much disclosure. We are continually pressed by Congress, by the courts, by the Freedom of Information Act, to give up sensitive material. We are trying to hold the line but there is a continuous erosion which gives away classified information at home and complicates our liaison relationships abroad. I am frustrated by our inability to deal with the leaking of classified information.

2. The press continues to berate us, though I sense a slight improvement. Scotty Reston, said, “George, your problem is that our profession thinks you are all lying bastards.” As long as this attitude prevails, there will be frivolous stories in print about CIA. I have made 21 public appearances but have turned down many more. I want to get the CIA off the front pages and at some point out of the papers altogether; thus, I have turned down many national media opportunities while accepting only a few. It is still almost impossible to have a speech containing positive things about CIA given prominent coverage.

3. The Congressional mood towards CIA is improving, but there is still a staff-driven desire to “expose” and to “micro-manage.” Staffers demand more and more. Our relationship with the new Senate Intelligence Committee is promising, though their many subcommittees give the appearance of many more investigations. The Staff of the House Appropriations Committee, on the other hand, gives appearances of wanting to run CIA.

E. Summary

Things are moving in the right direction. There are an infinite number of problems stemming, some from the excesses of the investigations and some from the abuses of the past—real and alleged. Somehow the problems, however, seem more manageable. Our organization is good, our product is sound though it can always be improved. Some of our assets have been diminished, but the CIA is intact, and functioning pretty darn well.

Respectfully,

George Bush
79. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT
Economic Policy Board Meeting on Intelligence, 9 November 1976, 0830, Roosevelt Room, White House

PARTICIPANTS

Principals
Treasury—Secretary Simon (Chairman)
Commerce—Secretary Richardson
Agriculture—Acting Secretary Knebel
Labor—Secretary Usery
Transportation—Secretary Coleman
DCI—Mr. Bush
State—Deputy Secretary Robinson
President’s Special Trade Representative—Ambassador Dent
White House—Mr. Seidman
Mr. Gorog
OMB—Mr. Lynn
PFIAB—Mr. Cherne
Mr. Casey

Others
White House—Mr. Porter
CIA—Mr. Ernst
[1 line not declassified]
NIO—Mr. Heymann
Treasury—Mr. Morell
Commerce—Mr. Laux

1. Secretary Simon requested all EPB members to send memos to Mr. Morell giving their views on intelligence support. Treasury will collate the recommendations and refer them to the DCI.

2. Mr. Bush noted the extent to which economics plays an increasingly pervasive role in our overall intelligence effort. He listed some recent accomplishments of the Intelligence Community and outlined efforts to improve the integration of various pieces of the intelligence production into a more comprehensive multidisciplinary framework. He concluded by soliciting the views of the EPB members on the perennially difficult question of how close the relationship between policy

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1 Source: Ford Library, L. William Seidman Papers, Seidman Subject File, Box 124, Economic Policy Board, Memoranda, 9/76 (3)–1/77. Confidential; [classification marking not declassified]. Drafted by [name not declassified], Chief of the Production Assessment and Improvement Division, OPEI.
makers and the Intelligence Community should be (see attachment for further details on his remarks).\(^2\)

3. Secretary Simon observed that Treasury had tried to draw CIA close to policy through debriefings, sharing policy papers, etc. There was a special problem in communicating some kinds of information because of State’s use of the EXDIS classification on cables. Economic policy users felt more of the Intelligence Community resources should be devoted to economics.

4. Mr. Lynn suggested headline clippings from the foreign press and more analysis of domestic political trends in foreign countries would be useful. The various Departments should do more to alert the IC to downstream problems which the USG will have to face. Intelligence should make a particular effort to report on how countries cope with domestic problems such as unemployment. Intelligence can also help verify trade agreements with foreign countries and alert the economic community to potentially harmful foreign actions such as East European countries dumping cheap goods on Western markets.

5. Secretary Usery said his Department needs to understand what the IC can provide in the labor field, including information on multinational corporations and the international trade unions. There is a problem in finding ways to disseminate intelligence to lower-level officials without security clearances. The IC has been of great help to him in recent months.

6. Secretary Richardson commended Simon for his efforts to improve relations between policy makers and the IC, noting the current study in Commerce on this matter. He felt there should be better representation for the economic community on NFIB and EIC—possibly an observer on NFIB for Commerce. More systematic review and documentation of economic intelligence needs is required, including regular user-producer interchange. A regular monthly meeting of the EPB with the IC might be scheduled. There is a need for an EPB–NSC–IC examination of the economic levers which could be used for national security purposes—i.e., “opportunity-oriented” intelligence. Ways must be found to get sanitized (downgraded) intelligence to staff-level users. Richardson thought there was a tendency to overclassify; Simon agreed.

7. DCI Bush replied that this subject was currently being studied but emphasized source protection was a real problem which limited what could be done to downgrade sensitive material. Richardson said that better IC awareness of user needs will permit intelligence reports to be sanitized in ways tailored to specific user needs. Ernst said OER

\(^2\) Bush’s opening remarks to the EPB are attached but not printed.
does this in answering specific requests but problems arise in producing reports for a wide audience of users.

8. Secretary Coleman noted that there was an extensive exchange of information between USG officials and foreign dignitaries, with no systematic means of checking for security on the information so disseminated. He also mentioned the outflow of technology information and data.

9. Ambassador Dent urged the IC to develop a briefing for new top people. It should include information on what’s available and the ways in which users and the IC mesh. Users need to do more to relate to the IC.

10. Mr. Gorog said there was need for an early warning system on foreign production, investment and trade decisions to alert the USG [1½ lines not declassified].

11. Deputy Secretary Robinson remarked that State was generally pleased with its relations with CIA but felt a closer exchange of information between State and Treasury was needed. In the real world the distinction between economic and political factors is often blurred. CIA needs to integrate political and economic analysis. Bush noted that the reorganization of the DDI is intended in part to effect improvements in multidisciplinary analysis.

12. Robinson urged that CIA make a clear distinction between facts and assessments (analysis of the facts). CIA should do more policy assessment of facts. Bush, noting Congressional criticism, said CIA needs to be extremely careful not to appear to be favoring one course of policy over another. Richardson said the answer is more top-level policy maker–IC interaction.

13. Robinson suggested regular OER/State/Treasury coordination meetings concerning the production of economic studies.

14. Acting Secretary Knebel said Agriculture has been a user of intelligence since 1972. He seconded the motion for establishment of an economic intelligence coordinating mechanism.

15. Mr. Seidman remarked that the need for an EPB or some other White House mechanism to coordinate economic policy and intelligence will continue.

16. Mr. Gorog agreed with the point made earlier by Mr. Lynn that more information on how other countries cope with domestic problems such as unemployment will help in formulating U.S. policy and justifying U.S. programs to Congress.

17. Mr. Cherne asserted that major progress had been made during the last several years in improving the intelligence inputs to economic policy decisions. We must do something to assure that the new Administration has similar cooperation between intelligence and economics.
Bush said he would raise this problem and cite the conclusions of the EPB meeting when he sees President-elect Carter.

18. Mr. Casey said PFIAB should report to the President on economic intelligence requirements and he will circulate a paper on the subject. The real deficiency in intelligence output is the lack of analysis, especially on long-term problems. He felt, for example, that intelligence should project the ways that a country might convert its economic assets into political power and military strength. Casey said there is no forum for long-term evaluation of economic strategy and threats, comparable to the NSC forum in the military and arms control areas. Some intelligence resources should be shifted from military S&T to economic S&T. [1½ lines not declassified] Bush remarked that many business contacts are very sensitive to the appearance of collaboration with CIA. Casey added that he had in mind obtaining economic analytic help from the business community, rather than increased use of businessmen to collect information.

[name not declassified]

80. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Criteria for Approving Covert Action Operations

The Operations Advisory Group (OAG) has developed a statement of criteria to facilitate the determination of the types of covert action operations authorized under your first Presidential Finding (Tab A).

You will recall that in your first Presidential Finding, required by Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act, [3 lines not declassified]. This proposed statement of criteria reflects our experience in carry-

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1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, 40 Committee/OAG Meetings, Minutes/Approvals, 1976. Secret. Sent for action. Attached to a November 23 memorandum for the record by OAG Executive Secretary Rob Roy Ratliff, stating that the approved paper “should now be considered an addendum to the Chairman’s Guidelines for Operations.”

ing out your wishes, including the provisions of your Executive Order 11905 concerning foreign intelligence activities. The purpose of the proposed criteria is to eliminate ambiguity by defining your intent more precisely.

The first pages of the criteria statement review pertinent legal and authorizing provisions, \([1\frac{1}{2} \text{ lines not declassified}]\). In this connection, we have explained what we understand to be your intent in making \([\text{less than 1 line not declassified}]\) (paragraph 7). Paragraph 8 describes procedures whereby CIA may check to insure that tasks \([\text{less than 1 line not declassified}]\) are consonant with U.S. policy. Paragraph 9 cites considerations in determining when an activity previously authorized by a Presidential Finding has undergone a “significant change” or resulted in a “new initiative” which would require a new Presidential Finding. Paragraph 10 cites operations which require OAG review and approval and Presidential Findings. Paragraph 11 requires reports to the OAG on those routine activities authorized by \([\text{less than 1 line not declassified}]\) Presidential Finding.

I believe these criteria would clarify and amplify in an area where there has been some confusion and would facilitate the OAG handling of the responsibilities you assigned it in Executive Order 11905. If you accept the unanimous recommendation of the OAG members and observers that you approve the criteria, I will distribute them as an annex to my operating guidelines for the OAG.

Recommendation:

That you approve the criteria at Tab A.\(^3\)

Secretary Kissinger, Secretary Rumsfeld, Attorney General Levi, Brent Scowcroft, James Lynn, George Bush and General George Brown concur.

Tab A

Statement Prepared by the Operations Advisory Group\(^4\)


SPECIAL ACTIVITY REVIEW AND APPROVAL CRITERIA

1. The purpose of this paper is to describe those “special activities” that must be reviewed by the Operations Advisory Group (OAG) either

\(^3\) Ford initialed his approval on November 20.

\(^4\) Secret.
because they require a Presidential Finding and reports pursuant to Section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or because they involve significant changes in previously approved "special activities."

2. Under Section 3(c) of Executive Order 11905 (19 February 1976), it is the function of the OAG, the successor to the 40 Committee, to consider and develop a policy recommendation . . . for the President prior to his decision on each special activity in support of national foreign policy objectives

and

[c]onduct periodic reviews of programs previously considered by the Operations Group.5

3. "Special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives" are defined by Section 2(c) of Executive Order 11905 to mean:

activities, other than the collection and production of intelligence and related support functions, designed to further official United States programs and policies abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of the United States Government is not apparent or publicly acknowledged.

Annotations of Executive Order 11905 (10 March 1976)6 define "special activities in support of national foreign policy objectives," to mean covert action.

4. The Chairman’s Guidelines for the OAG dated 19 July 1976 implement the provisions of the Executive Order cited above.7 The Guidelines require that Operations subject to OAG review shall include those for which certification (a Presidential Finding) by the President as ‘important to the national security of the United States’ is required by Section 662(a)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, or similar opera-
tions conducted by agencies other than CIA.

In addition,

new initiatives and significant changes (in terms of money or po-
litical impact or operational direction) in previously approved special
activities will be submitted to the OAG as proposals and will be consid-
ered in a formal meeting. The OAG’s policy recommendation, in-
cluding any dissents, will be submitted to the President prior to his
decision.

5. Section 662 was added to the Foreign Assistance Act in 1974. It
stipulates that

[n]o funds appropriated under the authority of this or any other
Act may be expended by or on behalf of the Central Intelligence
Agency for operations in foreign countries, other than activities in-
tended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, unless and until the
President finds that each such operation is important to the national se-
curity of the United States and reports, in a timely fashion, a descrip-
tion and scope of such operation to the appropriate Committees of the
Congress, including the Committee on Foreign Relations of the United
States Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the United
States House of Representatives.

The legislative history of Section 662 indicates that the intent of the
Congress was to bring CIA covert action operations under a new
system of controls and accountability, and that the words “operations
in foreign countries, other than activities intended solely for obtaining
necessary intelligence,” as used in Section 662, were in fact a reference
to covert action operations.

6. In accordance with the Executive Order and the Guidelines, pro-
posals for covert actions to be carried out by CIA will be submitted to
the OAG. The OAG will develop a policy recommendation for the Pres-
ident. In circumstances where a Finding as to the national security im-
portance of the activities is required by Section 662, that requirement
will be made known to the President. If the President makes a Finding,
the DCI, under delegation by the President, will be responsible for re-
porting it to the appropriate congressional committees.

7. The President has made a number of specific Section 662
Findings and these have been duly reported by the DCI to the appro-
priate committees. [2 lines not declassified] which have also been re-
ported by the DCI to the appropriate congressional committees, autho-
rize CIA to continue to:

[3 paragraphs (11 lines) not declassified].

The overall purpose [less than 1 line not declassified] was to permit the
CIA to carry out routine covert activity—[2½ lines not declassified]—
without imposing on the President a requirement that he make a sepa-
rate Finding with respect to each such action. The [less than 1 line not declassified] also included the following language:

... I [the President] also find important to the national security of the United States the support necessary to the tasks and operations covered by this Finding.

The main purpose of this language was to provide the CIA with authority [less than 1 line not declassified] to conduct covert action operations, as for example, to pay salaries and overhead, to pay for the procurement of items to support CIA [less than 1 line not declassified] activities, and to pay the costs of the cover and security support for these activities. In addition, this language authorizes tasks that are incidental to approved covert actions, as for example, withdrawal from an unsuccessful action.

8. In carrying out the routine covert actions [less than 1 line not declassified] the CIA will make a determination when employing and funding foreign personalities that such actions are in support of current United States policies. In tasking its [less than 1 line not declassified] CIA may look to specific proposals recommended by the OAG and approved by the President, guidelines approved by the Department of State [less than 1 line not declassified] as the U.S. Government policy on international issues or on other foreign developments as to which U.S. interests could be advanced by covert means with limited political risk, or where time is of the essence may receive specific guidance from the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs or such office as the State Department considers appropriate, in which case CIA shall report such guidance to the OAG at its next meeting.

9. No CIA activity, other than one “intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence,” may be carried out without a proposal for such activity being submitted to the OAG and approved by the President, unless that activity has previously been the subject of a Presidential Finding under Section 662. Where a CIA activity, previously the subject of a Presidential Finding, will undergo a “significant change” or may constitute a “new initiative,” such change or initiative must prior to execution be submitted as a proposal to the OAG and approved by the President. A “significant change” or a “new initiative” shall be deemed to exist if the effect of the change is likely to have a substantial political impact, if the change is likely to increase significantly the risks of exposure, if the change involves a significant increase in money to be expended from that contemplated in the Finding under which the activity is authorized [3½ lines not declassified], or if there is any significant change in operational direction. In cases of doubt the Chairman of the OAG may determine whether a “significant change” or “new initiative” is involved, in which case he shall report his conclusion to the OAG at its next meeting, or he may refer the question to the OAG.
10. The following matters shall always require OAG review and approval, [less than 1 line not declassified]:

a. Any programs involving [2½ lines not declassified] including operations which use [1½ lines not declassified]. For purposes of this paragraph programs shall include, but are not limited to, substantial enlargements of routine covert actions. In determining whether other matters are programs, CIA shall consider the contemplated length of time of the activity, the financial resources to be utilized, commitments to other countries, attendant risks, and likely political impact.

b. Any proposal to enter into a cooperative relationship or provide financial support [2½ lines not declassified]. This does not include the funding [1½ lines not declassified] where the intention is to employ such person primarily as an intelligence source. In these latter circumstances, OAG review and approval are not required.

c. [5 lines not declassified]

d. Any paramilitary program, [2½ lines not declassified].

e. Any counterinsurgency program where involvement extends beyond mere support or improvement of CIA’s intelligence collection capabilities through cooperative foreign intelligence and security services or the improvement of the intelligence collection capabilities of these services. For these purposes such programs include civic action or any covert use of U.S. Government personnel to promote institutional or other forms of national development. However, such programs do not include counterintelligence advice and technical assistance or counterterrorist training or training in intelligence collection techniques directed against international narcotics, given to cooperative foreign intelligence and security services by CIA to counter international terrorism and narcotics traffic. [1½ lines not declassified]

f. [4 lines not declassified]

11. Because routine covert actions [1 line not declassified] do not require the prior review of the OAG and the approval of the President, they shall be reported to the OAG as part of the OAG’s periodic reviews of programs previously considered. Such reports shall include [3 lines not declassified]. In addition, [less than 1 line not declassified] shall be reported by generally indicating the State Department [less than 1 line not declassified] followed and the general extent of the [less than 1 line not declassified].
FOREWORD

Executive Order 11905, promulgated by the President on 18 February 1976, states that the National Security Council (NSC) shall provide guidance and direction to the development and formulation of national intelligence activities. The Executive Order further directs the NSC to conduct a semiannual review of intelligence, including among other aspects “the needs of users of intelligence and the timeliness and quality of intelligence products. . . .”

This report responds to a request in June 1976 by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs that the Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff), in consultation with the NSC Staff, assess on a continuous basis these user needs and the products of intelligence, and report the results of this program for review at each semiannual NSC meeting on intelligence matters.

The report has been prepared by the IC Staff assisted by an ad hoc task force composed of representatives from the Departments of State and Treasury, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and the Energy, Research and Development Administration (ERDA). It has been developed through interviews with users and selected producers of intelligence, including those in the Departments of State, Treasury and Defense, the military services, the CIA, the Office of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Federal Bureau of Investigation and ERDA. Over 100 users of intelligence in the Executive Branch were formally interviewed. They ranged from the Vice President and the Secretary of the Treasury through senior staff and line policy officials in relevant departments and agencies. In preparing the report, IC Staff officers have analyzed the results of the consumer survey and also have drawn heavily upon documentary data, including the broad range of intelligence products over the past year or so and the observations on intelligence performance that have been made by: the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, the

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 11, Intelligence Community—NSC Semiannual Review (1). Secret; Noforn. Prepared by the IC Staff on behalf of the DCI for the NSC. An attached note indicates that this paper was part of Cheney’s briefing book for the January 13, 1977, NSC meeting.

2 Document 77.
Intelligence Community Investigation and Reorganization 275

Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the Rockefeller Commission Report,3 the Lynn Report of December 1975 on Organization and Management of the Foreign Intelligence Community4 which led to Executive Order 11905, and independent studies of the IC Staff. Comments by the Intelligence Community on a draft of the report have been utilized in preparing the final report.

This report is an initial effort to provide regular evaluations of a very broad scope. It covers a wide spectrum of political, economic, military and technical matters of concern to users of intelligence. Yet, it is by no means exhaustive, with many key regions and topics omitted because of time limitations. This report tends to concentrate on the needs of intelligence users at the “national” level, that is, to support policymakers on issues that confront the National Security Council, its members and their senior staffs, and top leaders in national foreign economic policy. By contrast, much less attention is paid to many departmental needs. For example, this report does not give extensive attention to the vital intelligence needs of military commanders, some of which are to be met by national intelligence resources and products. Some, but not all, needs of agencies dealing with arms control are treated. In subsequent evaluations the IC Staff will cover areas omitted from the first report and analyze in greater depth issues of continuing national concern.

This report attempts to delineate the broad strengths and weaknesses of the Community. In addition to analyzing performance on specific regions and topics, it discusses several systemic problems of intelligence management and performance which affect, directly or indirectly, the satisfactory response to users’ needs. These systemic problems are addressed to develop a better understanding of reasons for identified intelligence strengths and weaknesses, and to help generate measures for improvement. Problems addressed in this report relate primarily to Community structure, process, and resources. Largely untreated are questions of recruiting and training appropriate analytical manpower.

The report is organized into two volumes. Volume I contains an Executive Summary, The Assessment, and an Annex which summarizes salient points from Volume II. The second volume contains a detailed review of the timeliness and quality of intelligence products concerning various regions and topics, organized as seven Annexes to The Assessment.

3 See Document 42.
4 Document 62.
An Assessment of National Foreign Intelligence Production

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Findings on Intelligence Products

In the eyes of its users, the products of the Intelligence Community are uneven, a mixture of demonstrable strengths and significant deficiencies. This appraisal no doubt results in part from the large number of users, with diverse interests, concerns and responsibilities. But intelligence performance can be improved; indeed, it must be improved in many areas addressed in this review.

In summary, this review finds:

- An increasing diversity and sophistication in the demands of an expanding community of users.
- Inadequate Intelligence Community understanding of the needs of various sets of users and of priorities among these needs.
- General user satisfaction with current, short-term reporting on most topics and geographic regions, but a serious deficiency in anticipatory analysis which alerts policy components to possible problems in the relatively near future (one to three years).
- User desire for more multi-disciplinary analyses which integrate political, economic, technological and military factors to provide a broad appraisal of issues and events for developing US policies and programs.
- User discontent with NIEs and interagency products, especially regarding their utility, and relevance to policy issues.
- Problems in the Community’s ability for early recognition of impending crises; in integration of intelligence with information on US political and military actions; and in the definition of responsibilities of the DCI and other Government officials concerned with warning and crisis information.
- User concern about what they view as unnecessary compartmentation of many intelligence products.

Systemic Problems in Satisfying User Needs

The findings on intelligence products indicate an uneven record of performance. The causes are many, but the critical aspects appear to derive from some systemic problems of intelligence.

1. Demands and Resources

One problem concerns the demands on intelligence as compared with the fiscal and manpower resources available to meet those demands. The number of intelligence users is expanding and their needs are becoming more complex and sophisticated. Vital issues concerning
international economic, political, social and technological developments are striving for recognition on an equal footing with more familiar national security issues. But the Community cannot easily move to support these new concerns within fixed resources. This is because questions regarding the traditional issues of Soviet and Chinese military capabilities and intentions are becoming both more resistant to collection and more complex as regards the information needed by the United States.

2. Determining What Users Really Need

The Community too often has a poor perception of users’ needs and cannot project future needs with confidence. But most users do not articulate their needs for intelligence particularly well and inadequately project their future needs. Thus, intelligence managers have difficulty in setting priorities for allocating intelligence resources. This difficulty is particularly apparent in dealing with user needs which are not well established or which cut across traditional intelligence topics or regions, e.g., information relating to nuclear proliferation.

The following actions are under way or will be explored by Community elements and the Intelligence Community Staff (IC Staff) to alleviate this problem:

- More consultation with users in planning intelligence research and production.
- User review of or participation in the development of general intelligence planning and requirements.
- More workshops, briefings and personnel exchange programs to familiarize users and Community personnel with one another’s problems, perspectives and constraints.
- Examination of possible ways to increase the collection, processing and production flexibility of the Community to respond rapidly to shifts in user needs.
- A concerted Community effort to analyze in depth the several markets and customers it services, as an aid to better anticipation of users’ needs.

3. Allocation of Resources to Various Aspects of the Intelligence Process

At present, it is very difficult to relate intelligence resources to the end uses of intelligence or to future production requirements. Current management information systems at the Community level do not provide senior managers with adequate understanding of the complex ways by which parts of the intelligence process relate to one another. Community budgets and manpower accounts are currently organized by inputs (e.g., the Consolidated Cryptologic Program, CIA Program, General Defense Intelligence Program); resource allocation decisions
are not routinely made on the basis of their effect on outputs (the end products used by consumers). Needed are:

- Improved data bases to relate Community funds and manpower to intelligence products.
- Better measures of the utility of specific intelligence products, stated in terms of users’ needs.
- Analyses which explicitly relate collection, processing and production resources to intelligence products and users’ needs, to provide a better basis for decisions by the Committee on Foreign Intelligence (CFI).

Establishing the means for better intelligence resource management on the basis of outputs is a priority task for the Intelligence Community Staff and other Community elements.

4. Balance of Production Effort Among Data Bases, Current Intelligence and Analysis

Producers of intelligence tend to give priority to factual reporting on events and issues because it is necessary for their own operations and answers the first line demands of users for direct support. Most producers also want to undertake deeper analyses to improve users’ understanding of current situations and future developments bearing on policy and negotiating issues. But there are problems in moving from factual reporting to complex analyses. More comprehensive, detailed data and the best people are needed; analysis takes more time and closer supervision. This kind of product is in competition with the needs of both users and producers for factual reporting. But clearly both are needed.

In recent years it appears that the balance has tilted away from data base and analytic support of traditional national security concerns and in favor of current intelligence products to support new demands. For example, attention to detailed analysis of Soviet industry has given way to more effort on international trade. Steps which would redress this balance and permit a larger portion of in-depth analytic products include the following:

- Reduction in the amount of finished current intelligence products, consistent with the needs of departmental users.
- A reduction of self-initiated descriptive and factual memoranda, but the maintenance and improvement of solid data bases to support production of ad hoc analytic papers responding to the immediate needs of users.
- Joint user-producer procedures for establishing priorities for analytic reporting on regions, topics and areas of particular concern to users.
• Planning Community analytic work to better dovetail with the large amount of analytic work that takes place within the policy areas of key Government departments and agencies.

5. The Degree of Proximity Between Policy and Intelligence

Should the coupling of users and intelligence be tight, to enhance the relevance of intelligence to policy, or loose, to assure the objectivity of intelligence products? Users desire and, in many cases, encourage a close relationship (e.g., through participation in policy review committees, study groups, NSSMs) in the belief that it leads to more responsive intelligence focused on priority user needs. Producers—perhaps more in CIA than in the departmental components of the Community—are apprehensive about mixing policy and intelligence. Intimate user-producer relationships may suppress objectivity. Nevertheless, much of the effective intelligence support noted in this review is the result of close contact between intelligence personnel and policymakers.

The Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), following the philosophy of his predecessors, has instructed the Community to be action-oriented and responsive to users’ needs. But he demands total objectivity in intelligence reporting and analysis, and professional judgments on developments, without coloration by policy considerations. Perhaps there should be a more comprehensive policy statement on participation of intelligence producers in policy activities, to define a responsive, yet proper, relationship. Lacking this, users and producers should maintain professional standards of performance and an appropriate degree of tension in their relationship to ensure the objectivity of intelligence.

Actions and Recommendations

1. Actions to be Taken by the DCI

• Assure the effective functioning of mechanisms for evaluation of major new user requests for national intelligence production, to ensure intelligence sources and methods are required and will contribute meaningfully to the issues involved.

• Examine the possibility of key users augmenting their own analytic resources to reduce the volume of requests for memoranda that are not primarily dependent on intelligence sources and methods.

• Work to establish through the IC Staff a base of tools and data for assessing the interplay of resources for collection, processing and production and their impact on the value of intelligence products.

• Direct producers of national intelligence to consider reductions in current intelligence and event reporting, while assuring that high-
quality current intelligence support is provided as actually needed by users. Request departmental intelligence components to do the same.

- Direct national intelligence components to produce more broad, predictive, multi-disciplinary analyses to assess foreign developments which could have a major impact on US interests.
- Direct the National Intelligence Officers (NIOs) to be more active in soliciting users’ views in planning the production of National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) and other interagency papers.

2. Recommended NSC Actions

- Concur in the findings of this review and provide comments on the principal problems and issues.
- Consider improved ways for users to communicate to the Community their changing concerns and prospective intelligence needs.
- Express strong support of the DCI’s leadership in improving the quality and relevance of intelligence products and in determining the organizational and management arrangements within the Community that would enhance his authority to allocate resources toward that end.
- Endorse the continuing need for well-integrated national intelligence during a major crisis or war. Consider measures to assure a strong role for the DCI in providing this intelligence, while also assuring that his role is in consonance with the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

[Omitted here is the main body of the 35-page assessment, including sections on the Intelligence Community and its activities; findings on intelligence products; systemic problems in satisfying user needs; and the report’s final findings, actions, and recommendations.]
82. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

PFIAB Report on “Intelligence for the Future”

You have reviewed the PFIAB report concerning “Intelligence for the Future” and commented that it contains good suggestions which should be acted upon or passed on to the next Administration.

Since the PFIAB report, you have in fact expressly approved, as part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) budget, one suggestion. The NFIP also includes funds for at your earlier request, DOD and the Intelligence Community are developing plans to enhance the. This is an area of considerable concern to PFIAB and one on which we have moved expeditiously.

As you indicated, the other PFIAB suggestions will be called to the attention of the new Administration through appropriate channels. I believe it would also be useful to refer the PFIAB report to the CFI for its comments and recommendations. I have done so and asked George Bush to provide you with the Committee’s recommendations.2

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1 Source: National Security Council, Ford Administration Intelligence Files, NIE Evaluation by PFIAB. Top Secret; Sensitive. Ford initialed the memorandum, which bears a stamped notation indicating that he saw it.

2 On January 4, Scowcroft forwarded the PFIAB report to Bush, in his capacity as CFI Chairman, and asked for the CFI’s views on the report, including specific recommendations on the Board’s suggestions. (Ibid.)
Attachment

Executive Summary of a Report Prepared by the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board


INTELLIGENCE FOR THE FUTURE

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

General

The report does not present a prioritized inventory of intelligence requirements for the future. It is, rather, an overview of the problems, potentials and prospects which lie ahead for the intelligence community and derivatively, for those whom intelligence serves.

Conceptions of the future being fallible, judgments in the report must be subjected to extensive, critical evaluation. We view this process, wherein certain perceptions will be discarded and others modified, as a proper utilization of a report of this nature. Further, we hope that similar endeavors will be repeated at regular intervals to keep pace with the dynamics of change.

Observations

The Board rates of overriding importance, the development of initiatives to restore public understanding and trust in intelligence and intelligence institutions. This can be an important adjunct to security legislative and fiscal support for intelligence programs; to the passage of legislation for the protection of sensitive intelligence sources and methods; to the maintenance of security discipline by personnel within the intelligence community; and to sustain the ability to recruit people of integrity and high competence.

Strategic weapons intelligence and the Soviet Union will remain predominant targets. However, the role of tactical and technical intelligence in support of military commanders must continue to be given adequate attention in the decade ahead. In particular, as the U.S. faces a growing need to import critical commodities, maintenance of unhampered sea lines of communication will be essential. Fulfillment of this mission could be jeopardized by a Soviet naval threat of growing so-
phistication. Effective intelligence is the first step towards coping with this threat.

The future significance of economic intelligence will be dependent upon several factors: refinement of analytic techniques which minimize the flow of redundant and irrelevant data; sharpening of requirements so that the policy-makers’ genuine needs are addressed; recognition by producers that comprehensive analysis must incorporate all relevant disciplines—political, military, technological, as well as economic; and improved means of tapping the economic expertise of the private sector. We underscore the need for a continuing, close working relationship between principal users and producers to assure that these factors are given proper consideration.

The Board has reviewed and references in its report several recently published studies by the intelligence community which contain a number of innovative and technological approaches aimed at improving intelligence for the future; certain of these approaches are very encouraging and will be given detailed consideration by our successors. Also enclosed with the report is a two-page summary of Findings and Recommendations from an April 1976 report by a Board subcommittee which assesses National Intelligence Estimates and makes suggestions for their improvement.

Among the most important innovations to pursue, we believe, are:

— a breakthrough in automating the processing of foreign language voice intercepts to aid in reducing voluminous data collected without loss of important intelligence;

— [less than 1 line not declassified] to avoid loss of intelligence capabilities at critical intervals;

— means for reducing the vulnerability of our space reconnaissance systems [less than 1 line not declassified] and by developing the capability to produce greater numbers of less sophisticated, less expensive systems;

— comprehensive examination of the government’s responsibility to make the public aware of, and to provide the means of thwarting, intrusions to privacy by foreign intelligence services and the illegal efforts of private citizens intercepting communications and computer data links;

— refinement of the concept of “competitive analysis,” following completion of the experiment being conducted under the auspices of the DCI concurrent with production of this year’s NIE on Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict;4

4 See footnote 9, Document 83
—a means of seeing that which is hidden, as we face increasingly sophisticated efforts to conceal and deceive.

The concept of “streamlined” management, born 20 years ago with the inception of our space reconnaissance program and employed since in the operation of that program, needs to be carefully preserved. The imposition of layers of administrative and budgetary review will ultimately prove more costly, less effective and potentially destructive of the unique capabilities of this program. To preserve streamlined management the issuance of new guidance from the President will be required.

Recommendations

As an aid in determining future capabilities and limitations in the intelligence system, we recommend that 3 to 4 models of the world 20 years hence be developed, under the auspices of the National Security Council so as to reflect a senior, policy-level consensus of the ranges of probabilities in world relationships, and that the Director of Central Intelligence undertake a community-wide estimation of the intelligence system’s performance under each of the projected futures.

Crisis stemming from nuclear weapons proliferation and acts of terrorism will involve the Chief Executive more frequently in the decade ahead and effective intelligence in these areas will be vitally important. To assure its availability and utility, we recommend that the subject and structure of intelligence support to crisis management be given the most thorough review. This review should be directed by the National Security Council.

Concealment and deception by the Soviets require greater attention and novel approaches to better understand and cope with the serious vulnerabilities they pose to U.S. security interests. We believe a major contribution toward greater understanding could be achieved by a 1–2 year study effort conducted by a “tiger team” of highly competent analysts, insulated from daily bureaucratic life, and given access to all relevant intelligence and operational data. We recommend that the Director of Central Intelligence evaluate such a proposal with a view towards its early implementation.

With respect to certain kinds of intelligence such as weapons systems, the decision-makers’ real need is for a “net assessment” of the opposing forces. Issues such as capabilities of Soviet ICBM, and the Soviet air defense system really ask whether U.S. Minuteman missiles are vulnerable to Soviet attack and whether the B–52 will be effective against Soviet defenses. Net assessments will grow in importance and a renewed effort is required to determine how they can be performed and within what institutional framework; a proposal is currently before the Board.
Soviet technological innovations, especially in their military and economic applications, warrant the keenest attention by the intelligence community. As the USSR breaks new ground, unfamiliar to the U.S., the prevention of surprise will become more difficult. Special efforts at targeting Soviet research and development are warranted. We urge that the DCI take a new look at this problem with the view of recommending a more intensive and more imaginative effort in the future.

How the U.S. is perceived by others, both adversaries and allies, will remain a key issue for intelligence, and grow in importance as the U.S. continues efforts to rely on credibility, rather than force, as the means of sustaining foreign policy relationships. Previous intelligence community efforts to assess foreign (USSR) perceptions of the U.S. are applauded; we urge that they be made more comprehensive and that they be kept current.

The past decade has seen an emphasis on technological improvements in intelligence collection systems. Human source collection and analytic processes have not experienced corresponding advances. A vigorous effort needs to be undertaken to achieve major improvements in these human aspects of intelligence: the recruitment of agents; the management of data; and in-depth understandings of foreign relationships.

There are nearly 2,000 Communist bloc officials resident in the United States; each year, in excess of 4,000 Soviets enter the United States as commercial or exchange visitors; and 200 Soviet ships call at 40 U.S. deep-water ports. Counterintelligence records demonstrate that a high percentage of the individuals in each category are intelligence or security officials. Currently, five separate agencies engage in foreign counterintelligence activities, each on its own. There is no U.S. counterintelligence policy and no coordinated statement of counterintelligence objectives. A Presidential review of the U.S. counterintelligence policy is required as a basis for the formulation of a national counterintelligence policy and a statement of counterintelligence objectives.

Security discipline of personnel within the intelligence community has been difficult to maintain in the face of a culture which has come to abjure secrecy; we endorse Deputy Secretary of Defense Ellsworth’s suggestion that a blue ribbon commission examine these changed values in American society with a view to determining how to restore adherence to the principles of confidential service to the government.
83. Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting

Washington, January 13, 1977, 10:30–11:30 a.m.

SUBJECT
Semiannual Review of the Intelligence Community

Principals
The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
Director of Central Intelligence George Bush
Chief of Naval Operations James L. Holloway (Acting for Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff)
Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft

Other Attendees
White House: Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
NSC Staff: Samuel M. Hoskinson, Director for Intelligence Coordination
DOD: William Clements, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Robert Ellsworth, Deputy Secretary of Defense
Intelligence Community Staff: [1 line not declassified]

President Ford: This is the last meeting of the National Security Council in this administration unless a crisis develops in the next week. I would, therefore, like to thank each of you individually and as a group for the assistance and quality of materials and views you have provided. You have collectively and individually made the system work the way it should. We are meeting today to fulfill the requirements of the Executive Order (11905) which provides for semi-annual reviews of foreign intelligence activities by the NSC. First, I would like for George (Bush) to give us his views on how the Executive Order has worked out in practice. Secondly, I would like to discuss the quality of intelligence production.

Director Bush: Mr. President, the Executive Order has proved to be a major contribution to reform by putting the Intelligence Community within the proper constitutional framework. It has not received the
proper credit on the Hill, but there is some realization of its value and
the basic concept will probably not be thrown out.

On the whole, your intentions have been fulfilled. The Committee
on Foreign Intelligence has not been without its difficulties but gener-
ally it has worked well. First we established our procedures and then
we systematized resource planning and looked for resource trade-offs.
As a result the National Foreign Intelligence Plan budget came out
well. We didn’t get everything . . .

President Ford: Including your airplane . . .

Director Bush: I ride commercial a lot! Seriously, the machinery
has worked fairly well. We do, of course, still have some problems like
counterintelligence and manpower levels.

As for the quality of intelligence production my first observation is
that there are an increasing number of users. An example is the eco-
nomic intelligence area and I met recently with the Economic Intelli-
gence Board. Generally, we do things fairly well on such diverse areas
as political, military and economic developments throughout the
world, although there are some exceptions [less than 1 line not declassi-
fied]. Sometimes intelligence users find that our production priorities
don’t suit their specific needs. Others think we should be more alert to
short-run problems and do more multidisciplinary analysis. NIE’s are
frequently criticized for lack of relevancy. Unnecessary security com-
partmentation is another major criticism. For example downgrading
satellite-derived materials.

The semiannual review causes us to examine ourselves and results
in a major internal audit. We are no longer under fire for violating
human rights. There has not been one allegation of wrongdoing proved
under the Executive Order. CIA is today extremely sensitive to possible
misdeeds, but at the same time not defensive. Rights are being
safeguarded.

President Ford: Who will be your successors?

Mr. Hyland: They are going to do away with our committee
structure.

President Ford: How is the Moore case coming along? 3

Director Bush: The Justice Department is saying we must give up
all the information Moore was trying to sell to the Russians if we want

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2 See Document 79.

3 On December 22, 1976, the FBI arrested former CIA employee Edwin Gibbon
Moore II, after he attempted to sell documents to the Soviet Government. (Lawrence
was subsequently convicted of two counts of espionage and three counts of stealing gov-
ernment documents on May 5, 1977, and sentenced to life imprisonment a month later. In
December 1977, his sentence was reduced to 15 years in prison. (“Ex-CIA Man’s Life
Term for Espionage Reduced to 15 Years,” Los Angeles Times, December 9, 1977, p. A20)
them to prosecute him. There are some things in this package that are simply too sensitive to go public with, so Moore may get off free. They would probably find him insane anyway. [2 lines not declassified]

Secretary Kissinger: George Bush deserves a special commendation. The Justice Department’s role today is a threat to national security. Why it is better for a foreign government to have its spies in the U.S. caught than free to operate since if they are prosecuted everything must be made public. Because of the Attorney General’s rules, [2 lines not declassified] We should make it a point for the record that the Attorney General’s guidelines in this area be looked at again.

I find no degradation in the quality of intelligence analysis. The opposite is true, however, in the covert action area. We are unable to do it anymore. [4 lines not declassified]

Director Bush: Henry, you are right. We are both ineffective and scared in the covert action area.

Secretary Kissinger: Many things are not even proposed these days because we are afraid to even discuss them much less implement them.

Director Bush: [3 lines not declassified].

Secretary Kissinger: We should have done something but I was afraid to even make a recommendation. It’s not the Agency’s fault. [less than 1 line not declassified] It’s just not risky enough to be an enemy of the U.S. these days.

Secretary Rumsfeld: I agree entirely with all that has been said. The backside of this problem is that we now have a request from the Justice Department for information from NSA to use in prosecuting one of their cases.

President Ford: How have things changed so much today? How did we prosecute and convict in the past?

Director Bush: Things have changed a lot at Justice and with the Court system. For example in the Rosenberg case4 years ago intelligence information was not regarded as admissible evidence. In the Moore case [less than 1 line not declassified] we are being forced to give up sensitive information in order to prosecute.

Secretary Kissinger: It’s absurd!

Brent Scowcroft: Judges no longer are willing to do things in camera.

Director Bush: There are other problems as well. We have gone too far at this business. My greatest frustration—and I didn’t intend to say this today—has been the Justice Department’s prevention of my responsibility to protect sources and methods.

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4 The reference is to the 1951 espionage case against Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, who were tried and executed for passing atomic secrets to the Soviet Union.
Secretary Kissinger: We should leave a memorandum for the record on this problem for guidance in the future.

President Ford: George, would you summarize the problem in writing and send it to the NSC? I will pass it on to the new administration.

Director Bush: Yes I will. [1 line not declassified]

Secretary Rumsfeld: There is poor policy guidance in this area. The problem is that Justice takes the initiative against you in all these cases, rather than helping, and you are put on the defensive. You need them to help you but they work against you. The tension works both ways, but it’s a question of who has the initiative.

Secretary Kissinger: The Justice Department does not understand that intelligence problems must be treated in a special category. Why it’s an outrage what they are doing to Helms—now I got that off my chest! It has always been the case in history where vital interests are involved. Lincoln suspended certain rights, we have had emergency laws. There are many examples.

President Ford: Nelson what do you think? You had experience with the Commission.

Vice President Rockefeller: I had no idea that the situation had become this serious. Doesn’t the NSC have the right and power to order a change?

President Ford: There is really no experience in the past with this kind of problem. What accounts for the change in the situation at this time? Is it the law, the mood in the country?

Vice President Rockefeller: It’s the Attorney General himself, basically.

Secretary Clements: The Justice Department treats us like an adversary rather than a client.

Director Bush: Yes—we are dealing with an adversary in Justice.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two basic causes. First, there is the Attorney General himself, his personality. Secondly, the Justice Department bureaucracy is setting itself up like a Supreme Court to be the ulti-
mate judge of what people do. They act like a supreme legal body. It won’t end when Levi leaves.

Vice President Rockefeller: Can the NSC supersede Justice?

Director Bush: My problem is more with the institution than with the Attorney General, although he is a problem also. Their view of the role of intelligence is different. The Attorney General’s departure won’t make the problem go away.

Secretary Kissinger: They believe they have the right to demand total fulfillment on things like the Moore case. Classification no longer means anything or is accepted in law. First you must be able to prove that information is really vital to national security and that is frequently not very easy to do. In the end it means we will not be able to prosecute espionage cases.

Director Bush: On both this aspect and the leak problem I will send a recommendation.

President Ford: What language in the Executive Order creates problems?

Vice President Rockefeller: The NSA name use problem could be changed by us. Ed Williams got the Solicitor General to admit that he personally didn’t agree to this procedure but had been ordered to impose it.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Bob Ellsworth has had a lot of experience in this area. Bob, how do you view the problem?

Secretary Ellsworth: When the guidelines were negotiated the Attorney General’s attitude was that he was the President’s legal advisor and had to protect him against any charges of tampering with the rights of U.S. citizens. But now the climate is changing and we must pass on our recommendations to the new team.

Vice President Rockefeller: I think the President has a responsibility to act now. We already know the orientation of the new administration. Do you think Carter will do it? We should deal with the problem now.

Secretary Kissinger: Right!

Secretary Clements: In the Navy claims problem the Attorney General told me he was representing the American people and taxpayers. In effect arrogating the public prosecutor role to himself when he was supposed to be defending the U.S. Navy’s interests.

President Ford: Bill, you were trying to say something earlier.

Mr. Hyland: We do have a good damage assessment on the impact of the Attorney General’s guidelines in the electronic surveillance field and that will be left behind with a good recommendation. Secondly, my observation is that the Justice Department usually says that it can’t win in court without revealing all the sensitive intelligence involved
but in those cases where we insisted—like the *Glomar Explorer* and the Moss subpoena—we won.7

President Ford: I would very much like to see the report you mentioned as soon as possible this afternoon.

Mr. Hyland: The guidelines of course flow from the Executive Order.

President Ford: What would the Attorney General say about Henry’s example?

General Scowcroft: [*1½ lines not declassified*].

President Ford: I want to read the report right away.

Vice President Rockefeller: If I can I would like to propose an NSC resolution. It would say that the Attorney General’s guidelines issued under the Executive Order are seriously impinging on national security and should be modified accordingly.

President Ford: In deference to the Attorney General, I should look at the report first. The specific steps can follow.

President Ford: I have read the NIE and Team B assessment.9 George would you comment for us.

Director Bush: The competitive analysis idea seemed good at the time and I certainly did not think it would go public. But now I feel I have been had. A former general officer has gone public, even before the experiment is finished. I have to recommend that the approach not be institutionalized. The Estimate itself presents certain dissents of the Air Force and others whose views parallel those of Team B.

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8 Not further identified.

Basically this was an experiment to see if one viewpoint could stand up factually and it worked well in some areas like ICBM accuracy. There was no question of intelligence analysts knuckling under to Team B. The estimators stood their ground. In short the original concept was valid but failed in practice.

President Ford: I understand that Allen Dulles made a similar process work. But now the climate has changed and you get credit for leaks. This is damned discouraging to me. I endorsed the PFIAB experiment. The leaks are a disparagement of the quality of those people involved and are unforgivable.

Vice President Rockefeller: The good side is that the American people have been educated.

Secretary Kissinger: I have no real problems with the estimate. However, I think an across the board alternatives approach is very risky. I could find a board of Nobel Prize winners to construct any alternative analysis conceivable. Unless you construct both the hard and soft lines it can be used by someone for their own self-benefit. The real problem in the future is not the hardliners, it’s the others.

Director Bush: I am against institutionalizing the alternative analysis approach. The issue has been caught up in a lot of polemics—some of which I don’t understand—but I recommend that the NSC not institutionalize.

President Ford: The most discouraging aspect is the character of the people who leaked. Unforgivable.

Secretary Rumsfeld: Bush’s idea of presenting differing views was good but like Henry says the scope must be more narrow. On some subjects it is useful to have differing views. The leaks must stop. They inhibit the whole intelligence process.

President Ford: In the present atmosphere leakers become martyrs. There isn’t much you can do.

Secretary Rumsfeld: The NIE is a good one. The only question I have is how we tie it to policy judgments or make it a basis for policy rather than using it as policy. There are some net assessment judgments involved and they should drive decisions. There should be a very serious live review of these matters in the future.

General Scowcroft: We have done a quick comparison with the 1972 estimate and it has turned out to be very accurate.

President Ford: Are there any other comments?

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Vice President Rockefeller: Only to say again that you did a superb job last night\textsuperscript{11} . . .

Secretary Kissinger: The average person doesn’t understand the turmoil you faced in the world when you took over. Now we have total tranquility in the world and peace!

\textsuperscript{11} President Ford delivered the State of the Union address the evening of January 12.
International Information Policy, Public Diplomacy, and Cultural Affairs

84. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Director-Designate of the United States Information Agency (Keogh)


I noted with interest and approval your statement to the press after I nominated you as the head of USIA that we wanted to maintain the credibility of our USIA programs and therefore would present to the people of the world a true picture of America—“warts and all”.

This is exactly what you should say at this time in order to be sure that we establish a good basis for credibility. On the other hand, up until the time Shakespeare became the Director, and even after he became Director over his objections, people in USIA went overboard in letting the world see the warts without seeing the good face the warts sometimes obscures.

It is very difficult to maintain credibility without having some negatives as well as positives. But as you know better than anybody else the main job of USIA is to present America to people abroad in its best light and not in its worst. I want you to instill that philosophy in all the people you work with. This is particularly necessary because the kind of people who come from the media generally are people who either have given up on the U.S. or who because they are so enormously exposed to our media see the U.S. in a negative light. We frankly need to find some media people who want to build up America and not to tear it down. There are plenty of good subjects that can be developed along this line. Your greatest task will be to find individuals who share your

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Printed from a copy that Nixon did not initial. A copy was sent to Kissinger.

2 On December 13, Nixon nominated James Keogh, who had served as Special Assistant to the President from 1969 to 1971, to replace Frank Shakespeare as USIA Director. (Carroll Kilpatrick, “Nixon Speechwriter Named USIA Chief,” Washington Post, December 14, 1972, p. A1) Keogh’s statement to the press has not been identified but he had long been critical of press coverage of Nixon. A December 16 New York Times editorial opined that Shakespeare had “irritated foreigners, demoralized old agency hands and embarrassed American diplomacy with his stridently propagandistic hardline approach to the presentation of American policy abroad.” The newspaper’s editors concluded, “It is time the United States lowered its voice as well as its profile. Mr. Keogh will have to re-examine his own views as well as the policies of the agency he has been chosen to head if the multifaceted Voice of America is to regain respect in a turned-off world.” (“America’s New Voice,” New York Times, December 16, 1972, p. 30)
own deep convictions about the goodness of this country and the
rightness of its policies so that they will have their hearts in it when
they are asked to prepare materials which are positive rather than
negative.

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85. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans
(Towery) to the Director (Keogh) and Deputy Director
(Kopp) of the United States Information Agency


SUBJECT
USIA and the Bicentennial

This memorandum reports on Agency activities concerning the Bi-
centennial and requests your approval for suggested next steps.

The Opportunity for USIA

The Bicentennial presents the Agency with special opportunity to
inform our audiences worldwide about America’s past, present and fu-
ture as we see it.

A good deal of preliminary planning has already been done, but in
the relatively short time remaining before the Bicentennial Year is upon
us, these plans need to be made more specific and concrete.

Background

1. In 1968, the Director of USIA decided that the Agency should
not be an ex-officio member of the American Revolution Bicentennial
Commission, but the Director, or his representative, is invited to attend
all meetings of the Commission. Harold F. Schneidman is the Agency’s
representative to the ARBC, Mildred Marcy is the Agency’s Bicen-
tenial Planning Officer, and IOP and ICS work closely together on plan-
ning and coordination of Agency Bicentennial activities.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Records of the USIA, Executive Committee
wrote “Excom” at the top of the page to indicate that the subject was to be addressed by
the USIA’s Executive Committee.

2 Leonard H. Marks was Director of USIA, 1965–1968.
2. In 1970 and 1971 the Agency submitted reports to the Chairman of the ARBC on USIA’s role in the Bicentennial celebration. These reports outlined various media projects among which were:

a. Increased emphasis on American Studies abroad, with an international conference of foreign American Studies Associations to be held in Washington in 1976.

b. A major multi-media exhibit on the Age of Jefferson and Franklin, financed by the ARBC, designed and constructed under Agency contract with Charles Eames, will be previewed in Paris in Fall 1974. The exhibit will be shown in a few other European capitals and then possibly returned to the U.S. to be shown during 1976 under ARBC auspices.

3. In a July 28, 1972 memorandum President Nixon asked the heads of executive departments and agencies to submit detailed current reports of Bicentennial planning—“in the three designated theme areas (Heritage, Festival USA, and Horizons)—together with timing and cost data.” In our response we described a variety of media products which have been prepared or planned. We outlined several new approaches in training programs which would reinforce the knowledge of our personnel on matters historical and contemporary, related to U.S. observance of the Bicentennial. We stressed the creation, in cooperation with State/CU, of an Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee which met for two days last September at Airlie House.

Regarding costs, we stated: “Since the Bicentennial period adds additional reinforcement to activities in which USIA would be engaged anyway, it is virtually impossible to separate out cost data for Bicentennial-related activities. However, we estimate that by FY 1976 a significant portion of our media products and overseas cultural information effort, as well as training programs for our personnel, will be related to

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3 Shakespeare submitted the “Plan for USIA’s Role in the American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration,” to ARBC Chairman J.E. Wallace Sterling under a covering memorandum, April 2, 1970. In addition to the programs summarized below, the agency’s Bicentennial plan included English-language training, overseas exhibits, international trade fairs, VOA broadcasts, motion picture and TV programs, magazine distribution, assistance to foreign media, and multi-media projects. (National Archives, RG 306, Records of the USIA, Executive Committee File, 1973, Accession 306–89–0043, Meeting No. 178)


5 Shakespeare’s August 18, 1972, memorandum to ARBC Chairman David J. Mahoney also outlined developments regarding publications, motion picture and TV projects, VOA programs, and USIS information centers. (Ibid., Executive Committee File, 1973, Accession 306–89–0043, Meeting No. 178) The record of the initial meeting of the USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee, chaired by Robin Winks and held at Arlie House September 5–7, 1972, is ibid. The Committee identified themes for emphasis in programming and recommended actions to CU and USIA.
Bicentennial purposes. . . . Within USIA’s regular program expenditures in FY 1976 approximately $15 million will be used for Bicentennial programs. Lesser amounts will be spent in the years leading up to FY 1976.”

**Plans**

1. Beginning in 1974, all of the Agency’s university academic study training assignments will be to American Studies programs in appropriate American universities (seven in FY 1974, 14–15 in FY 1975 and FY 1976). These academic studies programs will be, as much as possible, designed to fill the Agency’s needs during the Bicentennial period (and thereafter) for officers genuinely well-informed on America’s past and present.

2. Beginning in FY 1974, IPT will offer twice a year a six or eight week course in the “American Experience” which will be required of all Foreign Service Officers before assignment abroad.

3. A work-study program will be established with the Smithsonian Institution and/or other similar institutions for officers who will be preparing exhibits materials and programs for the Bicentennial, the assignment to last about six months.

**Recommendation for Action:**

The Director should issue a statement to all Agency elements and to posts overseas somewhat as follows:

“USIA regards the American Revolution Bicentennial as a special opportunity to tell the people of other nations about America’s past, present and future.

Beginning in FY 1974 and reaching a climax in calendar 1976, the Agency plans to devote a major portion of its resources to this task. Training programs are being developed which will help prepare Agency personnel for this special campaign. All posts should begin planning now special programs for the Bicentennial period. The media will concentrate their efforts on special materials related to the Bicentennial.”
86. Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Information Agency Executive Committee

Meeting No. 178 Washington, March 20, 1973, 11 a.m.

PRESENT

James Keogh
Eugene Kopp
Ken Towery
Walter Roberts
Don Shea
Gordon Strachan
Stan Silverman
Henry Dunlap
Darrell Carter, ILA
Roger Feldman, IOA/BPP
Robert Levine, IOR
Hugh Woodward, IMV
Kenneth Boles, IMV/PS
Art Hoffman, IOP
Hal Schneidman, ICS

[Omitted here is discussion of USIA’s Ahora TV series.]

B. Discussion by Committee members of present and planned Agency programming in connection with the American Revolution Bicentennial. IOP will provide an oral presentation on what we have already done and what we plan to do, and ICS will give the background and status of cooperation with the ARBC on exhibits.

Mr. Keogh asked Mr. Hoffman to lead off the discussion. Mr. Hoffman began by describing the chronology of developments in the Agency concerning the Bicentennial. In 1966 the Advisory Commission alerted the Agency to the opportunities it presented. We began to pursue the idea seriously in 1969, sought post suggestions and issued a

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Records of the USIA, Executive Committee, File, 1973, Accession 306–89–0043, Meeting No. 178. No classification marking. Drafted by Executive Secretary Henry A. Dunlap. A list of attachments is attached but not printed. On March 29, Keogh sent a memorandum to the heads of USIA’s offices and services indicating that he intended to use the Committee, created in 1969 by Shakespeare, “as the central decision-making body in the Agency. In addition the Committee is also serving as the main Agency forum for the discussion and development of major policy.” (Ibid., Executive Committee, File, 1973, Accession 306–89–0047, EXCOM Procedures) Keogh, who succeeded Shakespeare as Director on February 8, chaired the Committee, which was composed of Deputy, Associate, and Assistant Directors and other invited officials, and which met regularly over the ensuing 4 years to discuss programmatic and administrative issues as needed.
paper in 1970. Much of what the Agency does will depend on commemorative activities that take place in the U.S. In 1968 the Director decided that the Agency would not be an ex officio member of the Commission, a decision not changed by Mr. Shakespeare. But someone from the Agency has almost always attended meetings of the Commission.

Last Summer the White House became concerned over the Bicentennial, and Mr. Garment was asked to keep an eye on it. At the same time, agencies were told to upgrade their representatives and we sent an Assistant Director. Mr. Schneidman has attended meetings of the Commission since last September. Mrs. Marcy in IOP continues to do a lot of planning work.

While the ARBC is in unsettled circumstances, it has made a major decision, not to have a single exposition site. Instead, a series of celebrations and sites will be used, in practically all of the fifty states. There will be many other minor celebrations also. Overseas there is much foreign interest. The British are considering a series of books on the Loyalists! The French, having been on the right side, plan to put a son et lumière show at Mount Vernon at a cost about a million dollars. Other European countries, Latin American countries and Japan are much interested.

September 6–7 of last year saw an Airlie House Conference on the Bicentennial sponsored by USIA and CU. It came up with themes and projects.

On the Agency side we plan more media products dealing with the Bicentennial, this is doing more of things we ordinarily do. Beginning in September of 1973 we are going to send some Agency people to Universities to take American Studies. We need journeyman American Studies experts to lecture overseas. There is a total of 8 possible for academic year 1973/74 for Yale, Minnesota and one or two other places. The people to attend have already been chosen.

There is another idea that requires approval before we can proceed. We would like to do for the Bicentennial what we are now doing with economics. We would want two six-week courses in FY 74, with about 25 Agency officers (FSIO 3 to FSIO 5) in each course. These would absorb the present one-week courses.

Regarding our media, the July 1972 issue of American Illustrated in both Polish and Russian had five articles on Bicentennial themes. IMV plans to do two films: The American Purpose and The Continuing Revolution. VOA has five projects scheduled for inclusion in the Forum series.

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2 See footnote 3, Document 85.
3 See footnote 5, Document 85.
Mr. Schneidman then summarized the results of the meetings he had attended.

1. The most important fact is that there is no single focal point for the whole event. Even the planned state activities may not work out. But many and varied segments of American life will do something important to their counterparts overseas.

2. On the governmental and private levels, enormous sums of money will be spent on projects such as films. We could have a say in how these are made so that they can be used overseas as well as in the United States.

3. What is the Agency going to do? Mr. Hoffman presented a good summary. We have to start now, cannot delay. In about a year Bicentennial programming will have taken over about everything ICS does.

Mr. Schneidman then described the developments in the Age of Jefferson exhibit. The French government offered us the Grand Palais in Paris for a large exhibit, and PAO Burnett Anderson suggested Jefferson as a good subject. ICS thought the suggestion good, and signed up Charles Eames to prepare a treatment of the subject. The Smithsonian and National Gallery followed along. ARBC was interested at once, but had no funds. So we used USIA funds to commission Eames to study Jefferson and come up with a proposed exhibit treatment. It was determined that Eames’ study would come out in the form of a videotape. When exhibit is on in Paris, Eames’ videotape will precede TV coverage of the exhibit satellited from France to Asia.

No Agency money can be in the exhibit itself, which in 1976 must be shown in the United States. Our money is being used for something shown only overseas, namely the Eames film. ARBC will pay for the exhibit in Paris, but ICS will supervise its construction.

Mr. Keogh asked if this arrangement caused any problems. Mr. Strachan said there is conflicting legislation: ours on domestic distribution with the fact that we are mentioned in the ARBC legislation. We can get by with the $37,000 already spent. Any further pooling of funds is complicated and problematical, but if we decide to do it we should go ahead. Mr. Keogh asked if we should ask the Congress about this, and Mr. Strachan said he felt asking Congress for guidance would be better than to go ahead and have it surface later.

Mr. Keogh asked when we would have to commit more money, and Mr. Schneidman said just about now. Mr. Strachan said the proposal now is to match funds with ARBC. But before us now is the need for a decision on involvement with the Jefferson exhibit and the detailing of more people to ARBC.

Mr. Keogh asked if it would not be wiser to wait until the ARBC is reorganized and a going operation. Mr. Schneidman said that Mr. Gar-
ment was hopeful that Congress will move quickly on the Commission reorganization. Mr. Strachan said that he has said in the past months we should not detail additional people to ARBC and should hold back on commingling our assets with theirs, though we will be in on the Jefferson exhibit.

Mr. Schneidman reverted to training programs, pointing out that the two described by Mr. Hoffman were aimed just at Agency people. There is another proposal to have a high-level Washington-based activity run by the Endowment for the Humanities. This would bring top thinkers to meet with top US government officials about once a month for perhaps a day.

Mr. Keogh said it was clear that in 1975 and 1976 we will be telling the world what we are doing, this will be almost our total thrust. What must we decide today? We should, if we can, wait until the ARBC is reorganized. We must also decide whether or not to approach the SFRC and the Appropriations Committee.

Mr. Silverman asked if the reorganization of the ARBC might not be a vehicle in which our role could be spelled out. Mr. Kopp said yes, if we wanted to do it. Mr. Schneidman commented that the ARBC is being considered by the Judiciary Committee. Mr. Kopp said that we must know how far we are going into bed with the ARBC before we decide whether or not to inform the Congress.

Mr. Keogh commented that it is still vague as to just what will be going on all over the United States. Mr. Schneidman said that new plans envision ARBC keeping a calendar of all Bicentennial events.

Mr. Keogh said he would defer action until we see how the ARBC is reorganized. But he would be willing to include funds for the Bicentennial observance overseas in our FY 75 budget. Mr. Silverman said that our pending authorization legislation asks for a non-specific amount of money increase. If we want to augment this further we should let OMB know now and provide a specific figure. He noted that OMB has already given us a preliminary figure for FY 75 involving no great increase.

Mr. Schneidman recommended asking for major sums, as other agencies have done. Mr. Keogh said we should certainly start the process of seeking more money for the Bicentennial. Mr. Hoffman said that in August of last year we had come up with a figure of approximately $15 million we planned to spend from within our existing resources. This is in a letter from Mr. Shakespeare to Mr. Mahoney.4

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4 See footnote 5, Document 85.
Mr. Silverman said we can pull something together quickly, and Mr. Keogh asked that this be done. (Action Memo: IOA/B, IOP and ICS)\(^5\)

Mr. Keogh approved the proposal for two six-week training courses in FY 74, as advocated by Mr. Hoffman. (Action Memo: IPT, IOA/B, IOP)\(^6\)

Mr. Keogh asked Mr. Dunlap to be sure to put the Bicentennial on the Committee agenda from time to time in order to keep up with developments.\(^7\)

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\(^5\) On March 29, Dunlap sent a memorandum confirming that the Executive Committee had decided “that we should start the process of seeking more money for the Bicentennial” and directing the specified bureaus to develop the request. (National Archives, RG 306, Records of the USIA, Executive Committee, File, 1973, Accession 306–89–0043, Meeting No. 178)

\(^6\) Dunlap issued a memorandum formally notifying the interested bureaus of the Committee’s decision on March 29. (Ibid.)

\(^7\) USIA’s semiannual report to Congress covering the period from July 1 to December 31, 1973 notes that the “1976 Bicentennial celebration became the springboard for long-range USIA planning to remind foreign audiences of and to revive their interest in the United States and its heritage. Programming was designed to show that this heritage produced the basic ideas and ideals that created and sustained our democratic government. Thus, the Bicentennial observance was seen as giving USIA a rostrum from which to reaffirm U.S. goals.” (Ibid., Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 (1066), Box 14, Policy, 1974–1975)
87. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Ash) and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty

The Commission chaired by Milton Eisenhower which you appointed last year to study RFE and RL has submitted its final report (Tab C).²

Conclusions of the Report

1. U.S. Government support for the radios should be continued.
2. A public “Board for International Broadcasting” should be established to administer funding and provide oversight.
3. Transmitting facilities should be modernized (estimated cost $30 million).
4. European Government funds should be solicited for research but not operations because the latter would dilute U.S. control.
5. Private fund raising in the U.S. and Europe should be resumed.

Congressional Reaction

The House should go along with the Commission’s recommendations, but Fulbright has told Eisenhower he will continue to oppose funding the radios. Other Senate criticism of the report will probably center on its failure to recommend that European governments be approached for operating funds.


² The five members of the Presidential Study Commission on International Radio Broadcasting—Milton S. Eisenhower, President Emeritus, Johns Hopkins University; Edward W. Barrett, Director of the Communications Institute, Academy for Educational Development; John A. Gronouski, Dean of the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs, University of Texas; Edmund A. Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; and John P. Roche, Professor of Politics, Brandeis University—forwarded the Commission’s final report to Nixon on February 5. Tab C, the report entitled “The Right to Know,” is attached but not printed.
Next Steps—Scenario

We concur in Dr. Eisenhower’s recommendation that the report be published and sent to the Hill.

The White House will at the same time release your statement endorsing the proposition that the radios deserve continuing U.S. Government financial support. The proposed statement does not include an endorsement of the specific recommendations of the report.3

Both the letters to the Congress (Tabs A and B) have been coordinated with Dave Gergen. Bill Timmons concurs in the above scenario.

Establishment of the Board

This is the sole aspect of the Commission’s recommendation on which we do not have a joint position. Since current congressional authority for support of the radios expires June 30, we need to prepare very soon new legislation that either reflects the Commission’s recommendations or another alternative.

As proposed by the Commission, the Board would consist of five members appointed by the President with Senate confirmation and two non-voting representatives of the radios. It would defend budget requests before the Congress, allocate funds to the radios, evaluate their performance, and assure that they operate in a fashion “not inconsistent with” U.S. foreign policy.

Pros and Cons

State and USIA support the Commission’s arguments that establishment of a Board would (a) minimize the impact on our foreign relations of complaints from foreign countries to whom the radios broadcast; (b) meet the radios’ apprehensions that their credibility might be compromised by a direct connection with a U.S. foreign policy agency; and yet (c) provide for appropriate foreign policy guidance.4

Henry Kissinger believes that these are strong arguments and recommends that you support the Commission’s recommendation.

3 Nixon issued a statement from Key Biscayne, Florida, on May 7 endorsing “wholeheartedly the conclusion of the Commission that these voices [RFE and RL] of free information and ideas serve our national interest and merit the full support of the Congress and the American people.” The statement continued, “the free flow of information and of ideas among nations is a vital element in normal relations between East and West and contributes to an enduring structure of peace.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, p. 520)

4 Eliot’s February 26 memorandum to Kissinger and Keogh’s February 23 memorandum to Davis outlining Department of State and USIA views on the Commission’s study and recommendations are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 380, Subject Files, Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty (1972), Vol. II [1972–Jan 1974] [1 of 1].
Roy Ash points out that, during the past two years, first USIA and now State oversight of the radios has produced no significant adverse effects on either of those agencies or the radios’ independence. He believes that the fact of U.S. Government financial support, rather than the particular agency through which funds are administered, is likely to be the decisive criterion when the USSR and Eastern European governments consider whether to retaliate against radio broadcasts; and he points out that the proposed Board will be a U.S. Government agency. Domestically, in Ash’s view, the Board might well tend to repeat the consistent pattern of independent agencies and commissions which take on a life of their own, lobby for increased funds, and become program advocates. In such a case, effective management control and any future decision to reduce or terminate U.S. funds would be severely hampered. Finally, he notes that Congress a year ago failed to enact a similar Administration-backed organizational proposal. He recommends continuation of the present arrangement of State Department responsibility for the radios.

Recommendations

1. That you approve the Next Steps as outlined above.⁵
2. That you decide between the following two organizational alternatives:

   Accept the Commission’s recommendation and establish the new Board (Kissinger and Timmons recommend).⁶
   Continue current State Department responsibility (Ash recommendation).

3. That you sign the letters to the Vice President and Speaker Albert at Tabs A and B.⁷

⁵ Nixon initialed his approval.
⁷ Nixon initialed his approval. His signed May 7 letters to President of the Senate Agnew and Speaker of the House Albert forwarding the Commission’s report to Congress are attached at Tabs A and B but not printed.
88. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹


SUBJECT

Private International Exchange Council

In 1971, the NSC Under-Secretaries Committee (USC) recommended that a private council be established to serve as a catalyst between the government and the private sector in the field of international exchanges. You approved the proposed council but requested a more detailed program on it for your consideration.²

After further analysis, the USC has written you recommending against the formation of a new private council primarily because (1) mechanisms already exist for stimulating and coordinating private sector exchanges, and (2) the private sector does not feel any need for a new “umbrella” organization without substantial grant-making resources (Tab B).³

Recognizing the importance of private sector exchanges, however, the USC proposes to continue strengthening and expanding other mechanisms to engage the private sector more effectively in international exchanges. (For example, State has increased its assistance to private sector exchange programs by more than 150 percent since 1969 and, in 1971, established an Office of Private Cooperation to stimulate private exchanges.)

I see no reason to pursue further the establishment of a new private exchange council at this time. We should, however, continue efforts to strengthen and expand other mechanisms to enhance the interest, involvement, effectiveness, and coordination of private sector international exchanges.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, Policy Papers (1969–1974), NSDM 223. Confidential. Sent for action. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Michael A. Guhin and David D. Elliott of the NSC Staff sent it to Kissinger under a June 15 memorandum, with the recommendation that he forward it to Nixon for approval. (Ibid.) A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “The President Has Seen.”

² The USC made its recommendation in an August 13, 1971, report to Nixon on international exchanges. NSDM 143, December 17, 1971, directed the establishment of a private International Exchange Council, charged the USC with oversight and reporting responsibilities, and directed the Secretary of State to develop “a central information system on exchanges.” The USC’s report and NSDM 143 are ibid., Box H–229, Policy Papers (1969–1974), NSDM 143.

³ Tab B, the USC’s report, sent to Nixon by Rush on June 5, is attached but not printed.
Recommendation:

If you approve, I will inform State that a new private council should not be pursued at this time but that efforts should continue to increase and improve private sector exchanges (proposed NSDM at Tab A).\(^4\)

\(^4\) Nixon initialed his approval. NSDM 223 is Document 89.

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89. National Security Decision Memorandum 223\(^1\)


TO

The Secretary of State

SUBJECT

Private International Exchange Council

The President has reviewed the report of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, forwarded by the Chairman’s memorandum of June 5, 1973, regarding the establishment of a private international exchange council as approved by NSDM 143.\(^2\)

The President has approved the Under Secretaries Committee’s recommendation that the establishment of a new private council not be pursued at this time.

The President considers it important, however, to continue to increase efforts designed to strengthen and expand the interest, involvement, effectiveness, and coordination of private sector international exchanges.

Henry A. Kissinger

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, Policy Papers (1969–1974), NSDM 223. Confidential. Copies were sent to the Acting Secretary of Defense, the DCI, the Administrator of AID, and the Director of USIA.

\(^2\) See Document 88 and footnotes 2 and 3 thereto.
90. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

USIA Director Reports on European Trip

USIA Director Jim Keogh has sent you the memorandum at Tab A reporting on impressions he gained during a recent conference of USIA public affairs officers in Western Europe. He also reports on the highlights of his visits to Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland.

He reports the impression of his officers at USIS posts in Western Europe that at present they are not faced with any deep anti-American issues. This, he notes, includes the subject of Watergate which, while widely reported in Western Europe and the subject of considerable conversation, has not produced moral indignation or deep-seated anti-American feeling.

In Eastern Europe, Director Keogh was left with the definite impression that the East European Governments desire better relations and expanded communication with the United States.

In Romania, Keogh unexpectedly was invited to President Ceausescu’s seashore residence for an hour’s talk. He reports that the conversation covered many subjects and that Ceausescu expressed concern lest the United States and USSR take decisions without sufficient regard for the destinies of the smaller East European countries. He also expressed his hope for continued and expanded good relations between the US and Romania and asked Keogh to give you his best wishes. (This is fully in keeping with the very warm gestures President Ceausescu continues to make to visiting Americans, and further evidence of his desire to keep a good line of communications with you.)

This memorandum forwards Director Keogh’s report for your information. I have already sent him a note of acknowledgement expressing your appreciation.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [1 of 2]. Administratively Confidential. Sent for information. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to Kissinger on July 31 with the recommendation that he sign it. (Ibid.) A stamped notation at the top of the page reads: “The President Has Seen,” and an attached correspondence profile indicates that Nixon noted it on August 8. He wrote a note on the memorandum addressed to Keogh: “Thanks. Excellent report.”

2 A copy of Kissinger’s August 6 note is attached but not printed.
Memorandum From the Director of the United States
Information Agency (Keogh) to President Nixon


On two recent trips overseas, I picked up some reactions which I believe are interesting enough to pass on to you.

1. At a conference of all of the USIA public affairs officers from Western Europe, we had a panel of the most experienced men develop a discussion which sought the answer to the question: “What are the deep anti-American issues that we face in Western Europe?” The group’s answer—and I will admit that it surprised me—was: There are none.

Not long ago, they said, the Vietnam war was such an issue. A radical element that wanted to stone a U.S. installation or burn the American flag could rouse a mob to do so about the war. Now that is no longer possible. (Only the PAO from Sweden demurred. There, it is still possible to stir up trouble about Vietnam.)

How about Watergate? The conclusion was that while Watergate is being played to the hilt in the West European news media and is a subject of fascinated conversation, it has not produced moral indignation or deep-seated anti-American feeling. The PAOs saw the possibility that it might ultimately leave some tarnish on the American image since the Europeans expect such developments in their own political structures but did not expect them in the United States. Among people involved in public affairs, there is a concern that Watergate might work to the disadvantage of the President in conducting his for-

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3 No classification marking.

4 A July 2, 1975, study, “U.S. Standing in Foreign Public Opinion Following Recent Indochina Developments,” drafted by Leo P. Crespi of the USIA’s Office of Research, found that public opinion surveys taken “some weeks after the fall of Vietnam—indicate major declines in U.S. standing.” Although “a fair amount of trust continues to prevail,” the USIA study concluded that “both trust in the credibility of U.S. defense commitments and confidence in U.S. wisdom in world affairs have declined to record lows in some of the countries surveyed.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Records, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1964–1982, Entry 1009 B, Box 15, S–39A; 39B–73) For criticism of VOA’s handling of the American evacuation from Vietnam, see footnote 2, Document 105.
Foreign policy. It was clear that they fervently hope that this will not be the case.\(^5\)

How about the economic issue—dollar devaluation, trade, etc? All agreed that this has not yet become a popular anti-American issue. It is widely discussed at the professional level and in the news media but has not taken hold among the general public. The conclusion was that it would become a widespread issue affecting feeling against the United States only if there is a deep recession in Europe which creates unemployment. Then the general public might be inclined to blame the troubles on the United States.\(^6\)

2. On a trip through five Eastern Europe countries—Yugoslavia, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia and Poland—I found what seemed to be a genuine reaching out toward the United States by journalists and government officials. While they were inclined to bring up some troublesome issues—the crown in Hungary, the gold in Czechoslovakia, the attacks by Radio Free Europe on Eastern European governments—they nevertheless left the definite impression that they deeply care about better relations and expanded communication with the United States.

Let me cite just two examples.

In Romania, I presented a moon rock and round-trip-moon Romanian flag to the Deputy Foreign Minister. At the presentation and at a

\(^5\) The USIA made a major push to promote foreign “understanding” and “fair coverage” of the Presidential transition in August 1974. According to a paper, “USIA Accomplishments and Assessments, 1974–1975,” forwarded to Keogh by USIA’s Assistant Director for Research James Moceri on April 15, 1975, the agency “had two all-important messages to get across in the period of the Nixon–Ford transition: the continuity of U.S. foreign policy and the strength of the American democratic system in the face of basic challenges to its institutions. Inextricably intertwined, the messages could not be separated and assigned to different media (fast vs. slow) or to different staffs (information vs. cultural). An integrated effort, utilizing all media and our network of overseas posts, was required to place developments in perspective while the events were taking place.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Records, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 (1066), Box 40, Research Reports, 1974–1975) For more on Nixon’s resignation and Ford’s assumption of office, see Document 199.

\(^6\) Two reports prepared by USIA’s Office of Research in early 1973, one dated February 6 and the other April 12, found that, while the American economy was still held in high regard, foreign public opinion foresaw that it was entering a period of decline and U.S. economic policy was embarking on a protectionist course. The reports are in the National Archives, RG 396, USIA Records, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1964–1982, Entry 1009 B, Box 14, S–34–73, and Box 12, S–10–73, respectively. USIA’s Executive Committee met at least twice in 1973—on March 6 and on March 27—to discuss the agency’s role in developing and distributing economic information. The records of the meetings are, respectively, ibid., Executive Committee File, 1971–1973, Accession 306–89–0042, Meeting No. 175, and ibid., Executive Committee File, 1973, Accession 306–89–0043, Meeting No. 180. According to a November 19 memorandum to USIA Assistant Directors, the Executive Committee inaugurated campaigns to promote U.S. exports, foreign investment in the United States, and foreign tourism to the United States. (Ibid., Meeting No. 189)
lunch which he hosted later, I recalled having been with you on the
visit to Romania in 1969. I spoke of the historic nature of that visit and
of how deeply it impressed me. At mid-afternoon the Deputy Foreign
Minister interrupted another meeting in which I was participating to
tell me that President Ceausescu wanted me to fly to the seashore to call
on him and to repeat the presentation of the moon rock and flag. I spent
about an hour that evening with President Ceausescu talking about
many subjects but principally United States-Romanian relations. He
took the occasion to express concerns—very familiar to you—that the
United States and the Soviet Union at Helsinki and Vienna may be
making decisions that affect the smaller countries of Eastern Europe
without sufficient regard for the opinions and the destinies of those
countries. I assured him that the United States had no such intention.
His reaction was: “Yes, but isn’t it too bad that we have reached the
point at which you must reassure me?” When I told him that I would
take full word of his concerns back to Washington, he delivered one of
those sly smiles with which you are familiar and said with a wave of his
hand: “Oh, we’ve just had a free-flowing discussion.” As I left he asked
me to take his best wishes to you and left no doubt about his hope for
continued and expanded good relations with the United States.

In Czechoslovakia I raised with the Minister of Culture the possi-
bility of having a USIA exhibit there. We have not had one in this era.
He and his aides reacted warmly and positively. I then suggested that
we might have our exhibit on progress and the environment in Czecho-
slovakia since the subject is of deep interest to both countries. To my
considerable surprise, the Czechs literally leaped at the possibility and
offered us cities and early dates for the exhibit. We are now at work on
the project.

Throughout the five countries I found that the news media were
saying little or nothing about Watergate. Thus there is no general
public reaction to the affair and our Missions say that it is having no di-
rect effect on their operations. However, it is obvious that the sophisti-
cated people in government and the news media are getting a great
deal of information about Watergate and are talking about it among
themselves. One or two tried to use it with me. In Yugoslavia, the Min-
ister of Information pointed out that the Yugoslavian news media are
being “held down” on Watergate and suggested that I should see to it
that the United States news media stop printing unfavorable things
about President Tito.7 I tried to educate him a little bit on that point but
I’m not sure I succeeded. In Poland a Deputy Foreign Minister pointed
out that government-controlled Polish news media have been saying
little or nothing about Watergate and suggested that we ought to stop

7 Josip Broz Tito, President of Yugoslavia.
Radio Free Europe from attacking the Polish government. I tried to spin that one off without answering his point.

In the end the general approach of the people I talked to—mostly government officials and journalists—could be summed up very sharply: They almost desperately hope that the President will weather this storm and continue to carry forward the foreign policies he has developed and established since 1969.

91. Memorandum From Michael Guhin of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Cultural Presentations Program

Per your request, Tom Pickering has sent you a paper on State’s program of sending performing artists abroad (Tab A).\(^2\) The main points are described briefly below.

—Field posts advise State on whether a given country should have a cultural presentation project and, if so, what type.

—State turns to advisory panels composed of private experts in various art forms for advice on specific attractions. Attractions not endorsed by panels do not receive financial assistance.

—Cultural presentations constitute a small part of the programs under the Fulbright–Hays Act\(^3\) and only 1.6% of the CU Bureau’s budget in FY73. In FY73, 21 performing arts attractions received $720,000 as full or partial support from State.

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\(^1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 39, Chronological File. No classification marking. Sent for information. Sent through David Elliott of the NSC Staff. A copy was sent to Richard Kennedy of the NSC Staff. Forwarded to Kissinger by Eagleburger under his September 10 memorandum, Document 92.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed are an undated memorandum from Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs William K. Hitchcock to Deputy Executive Secretary Harry G. Barnes, Jr., describing the process for selecting and funding performing artists for inclusion in the State Department’s Cultural Presentations Program, and Pickering’s August 31 memorandum forwarding it to Scowcroft.

\(^3\) The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–256), also known as the Fulbright–Hays Act, consolidated the legislative underpinnings of U.S. cultural and educational exchange programs.
—Sponsorship of performing artist groups is concentrated in countries which are largely closed to other types of programming. Groups going to the USSR under the Exchanges Agreement\(^4\) accounted for about 65% of the program. The second area of emphasis is Eastern Europe. State is funding about 50% of the cost of the first artists group to go to China, the Philadelphia Orchestra.\(^5\)

—There are only limited funds for use elsewhere. State encourages and relies heavily on private sector sources of funding for most of the programming outside the USSR and Eastern Europe, but some high priority countries in other parts of the world can be serviced only rarely.


\(^5\) In a visit facilitated and partially funded by the Department of State, the Philadelphia Orchestra toured the People’s Republic of China September 12–23, the first American orchestra to play in that country since 1949. (Department of State Bulletin, October 1, 1973, p. 428) The 106-person orchestra, conducted by Eugene Ormandy, gave six performances in Beijing and Shanghai. For an early account of the tour, see Harold Schonberg, “Philadelphians a ‘Big Success’ in Their First Concert in China,” New York Times, September 15, 1973, pp. 1, 19. Kissinger announced during his February 22 news conference after his return from China that the Chinese Government had invited the orchestra to perform. Such expanded contacts marked the movement of relations “from hostility toward normalization,” Kissinger said. (Department of State Bulletin, March 19, 1973, pp. 313–317)
92. Memorandum From Lawrence S. Eagleburger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
State Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU)

Responding to your request for more information about CU, State has furnished a description of the Bureau’s role and problems (Tab A) as well as a paper focused on the details of the Cultural Presentation Program (Tab B). The following summarizes the two State reports:

Description of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU)

The Bureau’s mission is to facilitate international cooperation through a variety of exchange activities. The legislative basis for CU’s role is the Fulbright–Hays Act of 1961. Congress has generally supported a steadily growing CU budget; the FY 74 request is for $53 million. The staff numbers 275, manning the Bureau itself and five foreign visitor Reception Centers around the US. Overseas planning and program proposals are initiated by our diplomatic missions. In Washington, the CU staff, in coordination with the regional bureaus, evaluates proposals and allocates resources according to the importance of the country and the expected benefits of the mission’s proposals. Interagency coordination is accomplished through a subcommittee of the Under Secretaries Committee.

The Exchange Programs

The heart of the CU program is grant support for visits and study by foreigners to the US, and for visits and study by Americans abroad. In FY 72, 148,000 people participated in the CU-sponsored exchanges. The academic part of the exchange program is known as the “Fulbright Program”, toward which 60% of the total exchange grants goes. The Bureau contributes over $5 million annually to support some 100 private American organizations with exchange programs of their own.

CU also operates a small program of “cultural presentations” (described in detail below).

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 39, Chronological File. No classification marking. Sent for information. Printed from a copy that Eagleburger did not initial. Copies were sent to Guhin and Elliott of the NSC Staff. Kissinger was nominated by Nixon on August 22 to replace Rogers as Secretary of State, confirmed by the Senate on September 21, and sworn in on September 22.

2 See Document 91 and footnote 2 thereto.
The CU–USIA Relationship

Close CU–USIA cooperation is obviously unavoidable. But, because of the propaganda function of USIA, there are both legislative and bureaucratic impediments to combining the two entities. Overseas implementation of the CU exchange program is carried out by USIA employees, and many individuals have urged the absorption of CU by USIA. The Administration has generally opposed this; Fulbright would certainly object vigorously to any “ politicization” of his favorite legislative offspring—the exchange program.

Cultural Presentation Program

Cultural presentations constitute a small part of the exchange program under the Fulbright–Hays Act, and less than 2% of the total CU budget. In FY 73, 21 performing arts attractions received $720,000 in full or partial support from State. Cultural presentation proposals are submitted by the field posts to State, which in turn seeks advice and evaluation from private advisory panels.

Sponsorship of performing artist groups is concentrated in countries which are largely closed to other types of exchange programming. Groups going to the USSR under the Exchange Agreement3 account for about 65% of the cultural presentation program. The second area of emphasis is Eastern Europe. State is also funding 50% of the cost of the Philadelphia Orchestra’s trip to China.4 Other areas of the world are serviced only rarely by CU’s cultural presentation program.

3 See footnote 4, Document 91.
4 See footnote 5, Document 91.
Tab A

Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs\(^\text{5}\)

Washington, undated.

BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS (CU)

I. What CU Does

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs administers the principal provisions of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (also known as the Fulbright–Hays Act). This provides broad permanent authority to stimulate and facilitate international cooperation and mutual understanding through a variety of governmental and non-governmental international exchange activities. We seek through these programs medium to long-term results which strengthen patterns of informal communication in ways that can favorably influence the environment in which U.S. foreign policy is conducted.

**Legislative Base.** Although official U.S. Government exchange activities actually got underway in 1938 with programs involving Latin America, the program is regarded as having been officially inaugurated by the Fulbright Act of 1946, which authorized the use of foreign currencies obtained under the Surplus Property Act of 1944 for academic exchanges. Subsequent legislation has considerably broadened that authority. The Fulbright–Hays Act states the purposes in this way:

— to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange;

— to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world;

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\(^5\) No classification marking. Although no drafting information appears on the paper, Hitchcock's undated memorandum forwarding it to Pickering was drafted by Neil A. Boyer and Richard L. Roth (CU/OPP) on September 6. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of Policy and Plans, Subject Files, 1961–1977, FRC 306–81–24, Department of State—General) Pickering’s September 6 memorandum forwarding the paper to Scowcroft also indicates that the paper itself was drafted in CU. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Box 52, FO 5: Information—Exchange Activities EX, 1/1/73–[8/9/74] [1 of 2])
to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement;
—and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.

Grants to Individuals. The heart of the CU program has been the provision of direct grants to permit outstanding people of other nations to visit and study in the United States and to enable outstanding Americans to go abroad. More than 148,000 people had participated in the program through FY 1972. The grants have involved more than 130 countries (currently there are programs with 127). Former participants include 18 who are currently Chiefs of State or Prime Ministers (e.g., Willy Brandt, Edward Heath, Indira Gandhi, and Anwar Sadat) and 263 who are Cabinet Ministers. During FY 1972, there were 5,402 participants, 20 per cent of them Americans.

The academic part of the program—generally known as the “Fulbright Program”—provides educational opportunities for students, teachers, professors and research scholars, usually for periods of a year or more. Participants are selected by the Presidentially-appointed Board of Foreign Scholarships, currently headed by Prof. James Billington of Princeton University. In 44 countries the programs are coordinated by binational commissions, in others by Embassy staffs and host government agencies. The interest of foreign governments in these activities is indicated not only by their participation in the binational commissions, but also by their contributions of more than $2.7 million in FY 1973. In FY 1972, 60 per cent of the total grants awarded by CU came under this academic program.

Most of the other 40 per cent of people receiving grants from CU are known as “international visitors.” These are outstanding leaders and potential leaders in government, politics, journalism, education, trade unions, business and other key fields. At the invitation of U.S. missions overseas, and in coordination with the Department, these people come to the U.S. for periods of 30–45 days to meet with professional colleagues and to gain a better understanding of this country and its people.

The Bureau also operates a small program of “cultural presentations,” which enables outstanding American artists and athletes to perform and meet counterparts in other nations. Most of our cultural attractions are concentrated on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where other forms of communication are relatively restricted. We also employ a so-called “pick-up” technique to enable artists who are already abroad under commercial auspices to extend their tours to include other nations of special interest to the U.S.

Large numbers of Americans contribute to the implementation of these grant programs. The scholarships made available by universities
and the time and services donated by professors, educational administrators and others, are of inestimable value. The international visitor program could not succeed without the voluntary services of more than 100,000 people and 97 local-community organizations throughout the country, handling well over a quarter million individual local visits each year. This participation reflects an active interest in foreign affairs by individuals who tend to be influential members of their communities. This “constituency” is a domestic asset of great importance to the Department.

Private Cooperation. CU supports numerous private organizations which conduct exchange programs. These include the Asia Foundation, American Friends of the Middle East, the American Field Service, and the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs. The last-named is an organization through which we relate to the 150,000 foreign students in the U.S. who are here under other than USG-assisted programs.

In FY 1973, 103 private organizations received nearly $5.5 million in support, representing 16 per cent of the program funds available to the Bureau. This is a major shift in emphasis from the beginning of this Administration, when only 8 per cent of the program funds were spent in this way and only 36 agencies were involved.

The Bureau, without providing financial support, also seeks to encourage broader private-sector participation in exchange programs. The Conference Board of New York, for example, is attempting to develop a clearinghouse mechanism to link private agencies interested in exchanges with other private groups which have funds available for this purpose. Another initiative is a current CU effort to stimulate American universities to develop continuing ties with foreign alumni.

Interagency Coordination. A special NSC study in 1971 resulted in the creation of a new mechanism to strengthen coordination of the 18 separate government agencies which have legislative authority for some form of exchange activity. This new mechanism, a Subcommittee of the Under Secretaries Committee, is seeking to establish a common database and trying to solve some of the most important coordination problems. Subcommittee members are:

- The Department of State (CU)
- The Department of Health, Education and Welfare
- The Department of Defense
- The Agency for International Development
- The Peace Corps (Action)
- The National Science Foundation

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6 A reference to the study that led to NSDM 143. See footnote 2, Document 88.
Budget. Since the beginning of this Administration, the CU budget has shown a steady increase, from $31.4 million in FY 1969 to the current request for $53 million in FY 1974. We have recommended to the Department a $70 million budget for FY 1975.

This upward trend has been accomplished with strong support from the top levels of the Department and the White House. Congressional support for the budgetary increases during this period has always been accompanied by expressions of confidence in CU management and program reforms.

Planning. The basic planning of CU activities is carried out at the mission level. Each year, the Country Public Affairs Officers and Cultural Affairs Officers prepare plans setting forth objectives and describing the programs to be undertaken in pursuit of them. Washington evaluation of these plans is carried out by CU in close coordination with the regional bureaus. Allocations are based on the relative importance of each country, judged in light of the potential which CU programs offer for strengthening communications with that country. An effort is made to ensure that all program activities are in accord with the overall CU Program Concept. This document (attached) sets forth our basic objectives for utilization in program management within the bureau.

As a result of improved planning, revitalized research and evaluation, and closer coordination with the regional bureaus, CU has a system which produces a more effective allocation of resources and a greater responsiveness to political developments. Thus, with the opening for better relations with China, CU was able to contribute $719,000 for exchanges with that country during FY 1973 and has tentatively budgeted $1 million for FY 1974. This flexibility has also enabled CU to expand programs with the USSR in accordance with the new agreements, as well as to develop exchanges in support of new foreign policy initiatives with several smaller nations.

The achievements of these programs are usually most evident in a long-term perspective. Over the years, we have found it advantageous to minimize the involvement of CU activities in transitory political issues. Among other benefits, this has served to keep alive personal and institutional relationships, even when official government ties have been broken. It is through the entire complex of exchanges, and the person-to-person relationships that flow from them, that CU programs have the capacity to favorably influence the environment in which our foreign policy is carried out.

East-West Center. Under a separate appropriation, CU also supports the East-West Center, a national educational institution located at the University of Hawaii. The Center seeks to build better relations and understanding between the U.S. and the nations of Asia and the Pacific
through cooperative study, training and research. Students, professionals and scholars from this country join with those from the nations of Asia to work in such key areas as population, food, technology and communications. The appropriation for the Center for FY 1973 is $6.8 million.

**Staff.** The Bureau operates with a staff of about 275, all in the United States. This includes Reception Centers for foreign visitors in five port cities. Many of the programs for grants to individuals are developed by private agencies under contract to the Department. The Institute of International Education, for example, handles the screening, placement and liaison with all student grantees, both American and foreign.

[Omitted here is an overview of CU–USIA relations, both past and present.]

**Attachment**

**Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs**


**BUREAU OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS**

**THE CU PROGRAM CONCEPT**

Pursuant to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, CU-sponsored programs are designed to strengthen patterns of informal communication in ways which will favorably influence the environment within which U.S. foreign policy is carried out and help build the human foundations of the “structure of peace.”

More concretely, these programs aim to increase mutual understanding and cooperation between the American and other peoples by enlarging the circle of those able to serve as influential interpreters between this and other nations, by strengthening the institutions abroad which affect comprehension of the United States, and by improving channels for the exchange of ideas and information.

Toward these ends, CU:

1. Helps present and potential opinion leaders and decision makers to gain through firsthand experience more accurate perceptions
and a deeper understanding of political, economic and cultural realities in each others’ societies.

2. Encourages a wide variety of institutions, including the mass and specialized media, to strengthen their capacity to cultivate (a) understanding of cultural, social and ideological differences and (b) awareness of similarities and interdependencies.

3. Helps develop transnational linkages based on shared intellectual, artistic, social, humanitarian, professional and economic concerns.

4. Works to increase the quality and efficiency of inter-cultural dialogue by various means including strengthening English as an international language.

To gain the greatest return from available resources, CU follows these general principles in deciding whether to undertake, facilitate or endorse particular projects.

When possible:

They should be designed to achieve multiplier effects through such means as stimulating and reinforcing other programs—private and governmental—that contribute to similar goals;

They should be multi-purpose, not only contributing to an improved communications environment, but furthering internationally shared goals of other kinds as well;

They should engage the energies of influential or potentially influential individuals of exceptional talent, achievement or promise and offer them face-to-face cross-cultural experiences of unusual quality;

They should reflect the two-way character of effective communication by emphasizing mutuality in planning, participation and support, and by responding to the reality that Americans are among those whose myths and misconceptions impair understanding; and

They should take full advantage of American strengths such as individual freedom, pluralism, openness and friendly hospitality in addition to the many fields of special American competence.
93. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Soviet Halt of Jamming of VOA

State and USIA inform you in the memoranda at Tab A² that on September 9 the Soviet Union ceased jamming VOA broadcasts to the USSR, and that BBC and Deutsche Welle jamming has also ceased.

While not mentioned in either memorandum, this Soviet move probably relates to efforts to improve the Soviet image on the eve of the resumption of CSCE, as well as official efforts to improve the Soviet image in the midst of the anti-Sakharov/Solzhenitsyn campaign.

This memorandum is to advise you that the jamming of VOA has ceased, at least for the time being. I see no need for any action on your part.


² Pickering’s September 13 memorandum to Scowcroft and Keogh’s September 12 memorandum to Kissinger are attached but not printed.

94. Address by the Director of the United States Information Agency (Keogh)¹


Information and Modern Diplomacy

What in the world is the United States Information Agency?

In the world, it is a multifaceted tool of modern diplomacy with a well-defined role in U.S. foreign policy.

¹ Source: Department of State Bulletin, January 21, 1974, pp. 57–63. Keogh delivered his address before the New York Chapter of the Public Relations Society of America.
In the United States, it is so little known and understood among the general public that even well-informed people are uncertain about what it is and what it does.

When I was nominated to be Director of USIA a little less than a year ago and my friends came around to congratulate me, I soon discovered that many of them were not quite sure just what it was that I was going to do. Some thought I was going to run the CIA, while others thought surely U.S. Information must have something to do with the Library of Congress. Some were as confused as the distraught woman who called our Paris office in an effort to determine the whereabouts of her husband, who had failed to return to their hotel after a night on the town. She thought that surely the U.S. Information Agency ought to know what he was up to.

This lack of information about the Information Agency is largely the result of legislation which specifically forbids the USIA to disseminate within the United States the information and media products it distributes abroad. There is a sound rationale for this legislation. Its aim is to prevent USIA from becoming an internal propaganda force in the service of a sitting administration. Yet its effect has been to keep the American public too much in the dark about what USIA does. We are now trying—by strictly legal means—to throw some light on the subject.

My interest in attempting to inform the rest of the world about the United States goes back a good many years. This interest was cultivated in the trips abroad that I took during my incarnation as an editor of *Time*. I recall flying from Honolulu to Sydney, Australia, a decade ago and stopping on the way at Nandi in the Fiji Islands. I walked into the lobby of the quite modern airport and saw a booth with a sign that read Fiji Chamber of Commerce. An attractive Fiji girl was in charge of the booth. Using up some of that airport waiting time, I struck up a conversation with her.

"Are you going to stay here long?" she asked, in a polished British accent. "No," I said, "we will leave just as soon as the crew gets the plane serviced. This is just a stopover." "Where are you from?" she asked. At that point, I drew myself up with some pride and I said, "I'm from the United States—from New York City." She seemed thoughtful, even puzzled, for a moment and then she said, "Ah, yes, New York City. I think that's where one makes a stopover on the way to London."

It was on this same trip, I recall, that I hired a car and driver so that my wife and I could travel through the outback surrounding Brisbane.

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2 Keogh was on the staff of *Time* magazine from 1951 to 1968, serving as assistant managing editor from 1961 to 1968 and then becoming executive editor in 1968.
It was a warm afternoon in January, and as we came to a small town I suggested to the Australian driver that we stop for something to drink. Searching for a place along the street, I saw a familiar sign and said, “Well, there’s a Coca Cola sign. Let’s stop there. It looks just like home.” The driver turned to me with what seemed genuine surprise and said, “Oh, do you have Coke in the States, too?”

Experiences such as these—and others with more depth but less anecdotal value—tended to punctuate my feeling that a strong information program is of great importance to the United States. This is not a new idea. From the time of the American Revolution the United States has employed information activities in one way or another to produce an impact in other countries. The merits of the American cause were argued abroad in the 18th century by a talented team of communicators, headed by a wily old PR man named Benjamin Franklin. During the Civil War the Union actively sought support from anti-slavery elements in Europe. At one point, Abraham Lincoln even addressed an open letter directly to the people of England.

If the history of American efforts to influence foreign opinion is a long one, doubts about the importance or even the existence of public opinion are equally venerable. The Declaration of Independence, we recall, enjoins us to show a decent respect for the opinions of mankind. Dean Acheson wrote in 1965: “World opinion simply does not exist on matters that concern us.” In his column a short time later, Walter Lippmann replied:

It is fashionable in certain circles to dismiss scornfully a serious concern about what foreign nations think of us. This is a reaction to the naive and often silly American wish to be loved by everybody. But the reaction has gone much too far. For it is not true that in the real world of affairs a great power, even the strongest, can afford to ignore the opinions of others. It must have friends who trust it and believe in it and have confidence that its power will be used wisely.

It was precisely to nurture such friendships that USIA was established in 1953 as the first separate U.S. Government information service with a mission of presenting the American case abroad during times of relative peace. Through the two decades of USIA’s existence, the nature of its mission has evolved with the times. It is evolving now—perhaps more than ever.

Communications Channels and Activities

What is the mission of the U.S. Information Agency? As I see it, the mission is to support U.S. national interests by:

—Conveying an understanding of what the United States stands for as a nation and as a people and presenting a true picture of the society, institutions, and culture in which our policies evolve;
—Explaining U.S. policies and the reasons for them; and
—Advising the U.S. Government on the implication of foreign opinion for the formulation and execution of our foreign policy.

To do this we use all available means of communication.

The largest element in USIA is the Voice of America, the radio arm of the Agency. It broadcasts in 36 languages around the world to an adult audience of many millions.

USIA produces or acquires some 150 films and television documentaries annually for showing overseas. The vast majority of these productions are acquired from commercial sources. In addition, a variety of special-targeted programs and many newscips are produced for foreign television. We also help television and film producers from other countries who want to do pieces about the United States.

We radioteletype texts of official policy statements and interpretive material to 127 overseas posts five days a week. Receiving the texts of such papers on an almost immediate basis is often of crucial importance to U.S. representatives in dealing with both the governments and the media in the host countries.

Special articles written by our staff and reprints from U.S. publications are regularly mailed to posts for placement in local media and for background information and use by Embassy officers.

We publish magazines in 27 languages and distribute them in 100 countries.

Every year we build and circulate abroad some 50 exhibits about life in the United States.

We maintain or support almost 300 libraries in information centers, reading rooms, and binational centers in 98 countries. These libraries are used by about 12½ million people each year.

The educational and cultural exchange programs which USIA administers abroad for the State Department form another vital element in the effort to communicate with people around the world.

Of course, the most important and effective means of communication we have is the personal contact between our officers in 109 countries and local opinion leaders. I recall Edward R. Murrow’s remark, when he held the position that I now occupy, that USIA could easily and immediately transmit information 25,000 miles around the world. The difficulty, he noted, is in conveying it the last three feet. That is the all-important job of our overseas officers.

These various communications channels and activities are brought together in a unified coordinated program by means of Country Plans drawn up by our posts overseas, cleared by the Ambassador, and fi—

3 Edward R. Murrow was Director of USIA, 1961–1964.
nally approved by our headquarters in Washington and the Cultural Affairs Bureau of the State Department.

The need for this kind of public diplomacy is widely recognized by the nations of the world. Back in 1954 a British study commission reported:

A modern government has to concern itself with public opinion abroad and be properly equipped to deal with it . . . The information services must today be regarded as part of the normal apparatus of diplomacy of a great power.

Picking up that cue, other major countries, including the Communist governments, have steadily expanded their cultural and information programs during the last decade. For example, appropriations for the French external cultural and information program reached $430 million in 1971—more than double the 1961 level and more than twice the size of USIA’s present budget. West Germany has increased its spending for this purpose substantially in recent years, and last year it reached $300 million, which is 50 percent more than our budget. While no solid figures are ascertainable, it is estimated that the Soviet Union has expanded its cultural and information programs to the point at which it is spending almost $1 billion annually, an effort that dwarfs the U.S. commitment for this purpose. While all this has been going on, USIA resources have been shrinking. In real dollar terms, the USIA budget for this year is approximately the same as it was in 1953.

This imbalance, to put it mildly, keeps us on our mettle.

New Tasks and New Techniques

In recent years, the environment in which we operate has changed tremendously—in both technological and political terms. This inevitably conditions our tasks as well as our methods of functioning.4

One change has been the extraordinary expansion of new techniques and channels of communication. Technical developments such as transistor radios, satellite telecasting, video cassettes, videotape recordings, computer data banks, and so on, have been matched by the expansion around the world of television and radio networks, news agencies, and non-media channels of communication involving business, tourism, and professional and scholarly contacts.

In this general area, I would like to mention just one of the new devices USIA is using. We call it the electronic dialogue. The first step in this process is the taping or filming of a speech or statement by a high government official or a distinguished leader from the private sector or academe discussing the discipline in which he or she is expert. A USIA post overseas will then gather that country’s leaders in the field under discussion—men from government, the private sector, and academic life. They will watch the tape or film and then through a special international telephone connection will question and discuss the subject with the speaker for as much as an hour or more. On important matters of U.S. policy in which the other country has a mutual interest, we have found this to be a highly effective means of communication.

Some critics of USIA take the position that in this day of rapid and saturated communication there is no longer any need for a U.S. information effort. Why, they ask, is it not possible to just let the regular news media take care of all that?

There are very fundamental reasons why the news media—here or abroad—cannot be expected to perform the information function for the U.S. Government. By its very definition, news is the unusual. The media, which are essentially and properly commercial enterprises, tend to highlight the special, the spectacular, and the bizarre, with a heavy tilt toward the negative. The broad sweep of the normal ongoing endeavors, developments, and achievements of a society do not make very exciting headlines or bulletins. The news media have no desire to be the platform for official statements or explanations of U.S. policy. Replying to foreign critics is not their job. Nor have they any financial incentive to attempt to communicate with people in closed societies or underdeveloped nations. As a result, it is often a confused and distorted image of the United States that reaches foreign eyes and ears and becomes an element in the balance sheet of our foreign relations. A continuing effort to explain the facts and underlying principles of our actions and policies and to correct the willful or unintentional distortions about our country abroad is the daily and vital task of USIA.

The task has become more complicated as the political atmosphere in which we function has changed. Some quite rapid changes have brought new opportunities as well as new problems. While a new climate for relations with the Soviet Union and China has been developing, there has been an undeniable erosion of old relations with some of our major allies. New problems have arisen; perceptions of national interest are changing. In Western Europe there is a generation of adults with no memory of World War II and the contribution of the United States to the defense and subsequent reconstruction of their countries.

This changed American relationship with Europe was aptly explained by Congressman Benjamin Rosenthal of New York as he was
speaking to a group of parliamentarians from the Common Market countries. He said that too many Americans still seemed to believe in “grandmotherly diplomacy—the idea that we have a delightful, charming, dependable and unique relationship with Europe because all of our grandmothers and great-grandmothers came from Europe. We can’t rely on our grandmothers anymore. We must rely on ourselves.”

Fostering Dialogue With Eastern Europe

As our government seeks to resolve differences through negotiations and engage former adversaries and old friends in constructive dialogue, USIA must attempt to foster a better and more extensive understanding of our purpose and policies. We must simultaneously listen attentively to the views and opinions of others, for an important part of our job is to make U.S. policy-makers aware of the attitudes, aspirations and fears of other nations on issues of mutual concern.

It is obvious that the policy of negotiation rather than confrontation, and the reality of détente, have presented the United States and the world with new opportunities for constructive dialogue which the USIA is in a unique position to foster.

In the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, the officials and the people are much more receptive to our traveling exhibits than before. During 1973 we have shown eight major exhibits in six countries in that part of the world, dealing with American approaches to research and development, outdoor recreation, progress and the environment, educational technology, and auto life—an exposition of the way the automobile has affected the social, industrial, and environmental aspects of American life.

More than 2¼ million people visited these exhibits. The Soviet Union not only cooperated with us in staging these exhibits but, for the first time, even accorded them a guarded measure of favorable publicity. In addition, we also displayed nine exhibits of American fine arts in five Eastern European countries.

In September I went to the Soviet Union to open our exhibit on outdoor recreation in the city of Irkutsk. The reception we were accorded in Moscow, Leningrad, and Irkutsk could not have been more cordial. The Soviet officials and people that I met gave the genuine impression that they were deeply interested in wider informational and cultural exchanges with the U.S. Government. Some of the officials may not have been entirely comfortable with the idea, but there seemed to be no question of their interest.

In Irkutsk, a city in the heart of Siberia, a city with a tradition of 300 years and a present that is filled with dramatic growth, our exhibit was the center of intense interest. It was welcomed with the greatest
warmth by the Mayor of Irkutsk, a 50-year-old local patriot deeply concerned about the growth and development of the city where he was born. He had visited the United States, especially the Pacific Northwest. As he showed us the illuminated chart of the plan for his city’s development, he expressed one great goal to make Irkutsk just like Seattle. I firmly believe that the importance of this kind of communication to the future of international relationships—indeed, to the future of civilization—cannot be overestimated.

Perhaps of the greatest significance in our new communications relationship with the Soviet Union is the fact that the U.S.S.R. no longer jams the Voice of America. After five consecutive years of steady jamming, the electronic blockade ceased last September 10. This presented us with a new and vastly larger audience within the Soviet Union than we had before. When I was in the Soviet Union, the Voice of America was coming through loud and clear in Moscow, in Leningrad, and in the heart of Siberia. An American correspondent living in Moscow told one of our officers that Russians he knows now consider it an “in” thing to listen to the Voice and do so openly at home and even on the street. Our spacemen in Moscow on the Apollo–Soyuz project have been told by their Russian counterparts that they and others in the scientific community now regularly listen to the Voice. The Russian-speaking guides with our traveling exhibits report a vast increase in VOA listenership.

While détente has thus given us new and welcome opportunities for communication with the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, it would be naive—indeed, fool-hardy—for us to assume that all differences between our countries are about to be wiped out. Clearly there is no end to competition either in the political sphere or in the realm of ideas. General Secretary Brezhnev [Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union]5 himself said of the new relationships: “The successes of this important matter do not signify in any way the possibility of relaxing the ideological struggle.” In this struggle, while we eschew polemics and the rhetoric of the cold war, we must meet international competition by insuring that a clear and balanced picture of the United States and its policies gets through abroad, both to those who make decisions and the public at large.

In larger focus, the opportunities and challenges presented by this set of circumstances were placed in historical context by Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he said:6

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5 Brackets in the original.
We are at one of those rare moments where through a combination of fortuitous circumstances and design man seems in a position to shape his future. What we need is the confidence to discuss issues without bitter strife, the wisdom to define together the nature of our world, as well as the vision to chart together a more just future.

Information Support for Economic Programs

In another way, changing world circumstances have placed new demands on the foreign affairs structure of government. As national priorities shift, USIA is shifting the emphasis of its own programs to lend information support to new foreign affairs objectives. Toward this end, and while still carrying on our larger and traditional role, we have launched a program to help improve the U.S. balance of payments in trade and tourism. I have called on Agency personnel in more than 100 countries to support the trade and promotion programs of the Departments of State and Commerce. We seek to portray the United States as an attractive place to visit, and we report on scientific and technical achievements, including the research and development of new techniques and products. USIA officers abroad will inform local businessmen about U.S. products and services available. Our organization will carry on an intensive effort to keep the U.S. position strong in the world trade. We look forward to closer cooperation with the private sector in this effort.

We see this part of our mission as going beyond the issue of the balance of payments—as important as that issue is. President Nixon recently expressed the wider view when he said:7

...trade leads to communication between peoples, not just governments but peoples.... I believe that as we increase communication between peoples at all levels, the opportunity of discussing differences rather than fighting about differences is greatly increased.

Recently an old friend of mine—a journalist—looked at me with an expression that can only be described as pity. “You must be having a terrible time,” he said. “How can you possibly find anything good to say about the United States these days?”

That point of view touches on a phenomenon that I believe is of the greatest significance for the picture of the United States which we deliver to the rest of the world. We must be careful not to be so obsessed with the short-term negatives in our society that we are blinded to the long-lasting positives. In telling America’s story to the world, USIA does not try to say that this is a society without troubles. It would be ridiculous for us to do so. Hardline propaganda is a relic of the past. We

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try to explain what is happening in the United States in a way that is factual and with a perspective that places events in the context of the general thrust of the American society.

What was on my friend’s mind, of course was that subject that seems so all-encompassing: Watergate and related matters. On our news programs on the Voice of America we report the story of the Watergate affair fairly and factually. We do not, however, deal in rumor, hearsay, speculation, or anonymous accusations. When I set that policy some of my old friends in the news media complained that I had turned censor and was somehow suppressing the truth because I would not allow rumor, hearsay, speculation, and anonymous accusations to run at full stream on the Voice of America. It seemed to me the only responsible policy for the Voice to follow in reporting this story to the rest of the world.

In explaining what is happening in this country as a result of the Watergate affair, we try to make the point to our overseas audiences that what they are seeing and hearing is this free and open society working out a problem. Charges against people in high places have been brought forward and extended largely by the free press. These charges are being investigated by the legislative branch, through the Senate select committee, and by the judicial branch, through the grand jury system. The interplay of all these forces in our society—the free press, the executive branch, the legislative branch, the judicial branch—is being carried out very much in public. Ultimately the problem will be resolved. Whatever remedial steps may be necessary will be taken, and the society will move on. While some of our friends abroad are appalled at what they see as a nation publicly destroying its own image, our unhysterical explanation of the free and open working of this society strikes a remarkably positive and calming reaction among the sophisticated in some lands where such openness is unknown.

While it seems at times difficult to avoid being obsessed with the negatives that batter our eyes and ears here at home, we at USIA cannot lose sight of the fact that the problems faced on many issues in many other countries make our own seem relatively minor. Take, for example, the omnipresent matter of the cost of living and inflation. It is a fact of life that a typical factory hand in Britain, France, or West Germany—to cite some of the most prominent—must work approximately twice as long as one in the United States to buy a home, a car, a washing machine, a television set, or a dozen eggs. As for inflation, the increase in the consumer price index from July 1972 to July 1973 was less in the United States than in any major developed country. Shortages? Our complaints about shortages would be incomprehensible to many relatively advanced societies of the world which have never known the plenty we have come to consider a right.
In these volatile days, we even hear now and then that our country is adrift on the international seas. But what country was it that served as the catalyst in the effort to bring peace to the Middle East—however difficult and unending that effort might be? Which country is it that, amidst new tensions, was able to maintain and move toward greater development of its new relationships with old adversaries with approaches for lasting peace?

Keeping as clear a perspective as we can, we at USIA see our foreign communications activities as part of a permanent long-range process whose effects are cumulative. Whether our officers are broadcasting on the Voice of America, or editing a magazine in Arabic, or scheduling a performance by Duke Ellington in Moscow, or setting up an exhibit in Bulgaria, or arranging a lecture by a Fulbright professor in New Delhi, or assisting a French TV producer to plan a series on American environmental programs, or giving the facts about U.S. trade policies to a Japanese editor, it is all part of the same effort: the extremely important work of explaining our country and our people, of correcting or minimizing misunderstandings that clog or contaminate relations between the United States and other countries.

These day-to-day contacts give substance to the continuing dialogue with foreign audiences. By providing facts and points of view and the human dimension of personal relations, we broaden and strengthen this discourse. Collectively and cumulatively these efforts affect attitudes and shape perceptions of the United States.

On the occasion of his 75th birthday, U.S. Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas expressed a view with which I am in wholehearted agreement, although I am sure that if I were privileged to sit in deliberations with the Justice he and I might find ourselves on different sides of many more limited issues. Justice Douglas said: “I think the heart of America is sound, the conscience of America is bright and the future of America is great.”

This is the vision of the United States that we want to share and make comprehensible to the people abroad so that in our relations with other nations distortion and doubt will be replaced by confidence, respect, and understanding.
95. **Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson) to Secretary of State Kissinger**


Monthly Report for November

We believe we can effectively pursue your intention to promote an increased sense of public participation in the foreign policy process by, inter alia, extending our reach into the intellectual community. The variety of relationships we in CU now have with that community are especially active, constructive, and for all practical purposes undisturbed by any problem of confidence.

While we are far from the Department’s only available instrument (INR, FSI, PA, the regional bureaus and others have their own direct linkages), we do believe that 26 years of experience with educational and cultural programming has built a network of fruitful relationships that can readily be further developed. It is a task we intend to pursue with emphasis in the future.

As you know, State has since 1947 engaged the academic community in direct international exchanges of “Fulbright” scholars and graduate students for periods of a year or more. There are now some 38,000 former Fulbright participants in this country and some 375 American scholars currently participate in the grantee selection process. Also, CU support and encouragement of programs of counselling, orientation and enrichment for foreign students not sponsored by USG agencies—now numbering more than 150,000—help to bring very large numbers of American professors and educational administrators into a constructive, although often indirect, relationship with us. Our arrangements for outstanding short-term visitors to this Country (some 3,000 per year) also bring Department sponsorship to the attention of American experts in a wide range of disciplines and professions—including especially those with competence on problem areas of common international concern. In the arts we have enjoyed a cooperative relationship for many years in the selection and support of tours abroad by outstanding performing groups. Finally, there is a smaller but important

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1 Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of Policy and Plans, Subject Files, 1961–1977, FRC 306-81-24, CU—Monthly Report to the Secretary. No classification marking. Drafted by Neil A. Boyer (CU/OPP) and Richardson. Pickering sent a memorandum on November 6 notifying all Assistant Secretaries and Office Directors that Kissinger had asked them to submit monthly reports “covering significant items and analyzing trends in the bureau or office’s area of interest.” Pickering’s memorandum and CU’s monthly reports are ibid.
flow abroad of American intellectual and professional leaders selected for their capacity to engage influential groups in useful dialogue.

Other specific projects in which we are currently engaged with elements of the U.S. academic/intellectual community are the following:

1. The development, with Steve Bailey of the American Council on Education, of five new joint task forces to enhance liaison between the government and the academic community on questions related to international education and research. (I serve as chairman of the government participants.) The five task force assignment areas are:
   - The government-academic interface in international studies;
   - Transnational research collaboration;
   - The diffusion of the product of international studies;
   - Language skill reserves; and,
   - Mid-career travel funds for area experts.

2. Continuing attention to the controversial question of HEW funding for foreign area and language studies centers around the country, under Title VI of the National Defense Education Act. (Apparently as a result of cumulative pressures from you and numerous others, Secretary Weinberger has written in a letter dated November 12, 1973 to Professor Lyle Nelson of Stanford—Chairman of CU’s Presidentially-appointed Board of Foreign Scholarships—that HEW will reconsider funding NDEA Title VI programs in its FY 1975 budget.)

3. Increasing support of programs aimed at stimulating American black college involvement in internationally-oriented activities.

4. A USIA initiated November seminar in Europe which brought together American and West European scholars, journalists and creative writers to evaluate cultural exchange with the Soviet Union.

5. Subsidizing foreign participation in the programs of the Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies.

6. Stimulation of the process which led to the outstanding conference in Venice last month on the Crisis in the Universities. The leading American scholars who participated joined in the decision by their colleagues from 14 nations to broaden the scope of the effort (re-named as the International Council on the University Emergency) and make it permanent.

7. A continuing dialogue with a variety of American scholars and professionals concerned with China, centering in the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the PRC and the National Committee on U.S.–China Relations.

8. An elaborate system of privately managed but officially coordinated U.S.-Japanese consultations and exchanges in a steadily growing
number of fields ranging from television documentaries to museum exhibitions and from newspaper editors to reciprocal image studies.

9. A dialogue with a variety of other intellectuals to obtain ideas useful in developing an over-all U.S. cultural policy concept.

10. A new Bicentennial-oriented effort which Professor Robin Winks (Yale) is helping us organize to reform and strengthen “American Studies” worldwide. We expect this project will be funded in part by the Humanities Endowment and the Ford Foundation.2

All these activities combine to provide an effective window on the academic world and offer a good base on which to build broader relations.

2 Richardson’s April 1974 monthly report to Kissinger details CU’s “expansion and reinvigoration of American Studies programs in other nations” as part of its contribution to the public diplomacy component of the national commemoration of the Bicentennial of the American Revolution. (Ibid.)

96. News Release by the United States Information Agency1


USIA REPORTS TO CONGRESS ON OVERSEAS OPERATIONS

Washington—The U.S. Information Agency has reported to Congress that initiative, innovation and projection of ideas rather than ideological confrontation now characterize the Agency’s field operations in support of American foreign policy.

The report was the first semiannual report submitted to Congress by USIA Director James Keogh who was nominated by President Nixon to head the Information Agency last January. Required by law, the report reviews USIA’s operations from January 1 through June 30, 1973.2

During the period, USIA placed greater emphasis on cultural programming and exchanges to reflect the American people and their support of a foreign policy that has brought détente and wider communi-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Records of the USIA, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 (1006), Box 14, Policy, 1974.
cation with the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China, U.S.
withdrawal from Vietnam, an even-handed effort to find a solution to
the problems in the Middle East and proposals to adjust the economies
of the world to new realities.

The Agency introduced two new techniques—electronic dialogues
and videotape recordings—to increase its communications capabilities
abroad.

And it expanded its exhibits programs, particularly in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, to gain larger audiences.

With détente, the report stated, USIA envisioned the development
of more intensive mutually beneficial and reciprocal exchanges of ideas
throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe even though consid-
erable obstacles inevitably remain.

The report said that East European members of the Warsaw Pact,
cought up in the quickening pace of East-West relations, became in-
creasingly receptive to ideas and information from the United States.

Recognizing that the Soviet Union remains as the major strategic
competitor of the United States, USIA reported that the relaxation of
East-West tensions, nevertheless, has apparently persuaded many East
European and Soviet leaders that they can to a certain extent tolerate
ideas from outside their societies and thereby safely indulge the desires
of their citizens for ideas from the U.S. and other countries.

USIA found that differences in political system and style need not
bar the free flow of information and ideas among peoples, as demon-
strated in the communist but non-aligned nation of Yugoslavia.

Turning to Western Europe, the report noted that abundant cov-
erage of the United States is provided that area by the commercial news
media.

The task, therefore, for USIA in Western Europe was concerned as
much with correcting the distortions whether willful or unintentional
of the American image as with filling gaps in popular knowledge about
the United States.

Thus, USIA gave priority in Western Europe to cooperative pro-
gramming with TV networks, providing speakers and lecturers, film
showings and exhibits and to intensive personal contact with educa-
tional and media representatives by USIA officers.

The primary objective of USIA in the Middle East was to keep the
record on U.S. policy straight and free from distortion and to maintain
communication on matters of mutual importance and interest with as
wide a variety of opinion leaders as possible.3

3 USIA’s next semiannual report to Congress, undated but covering the period from
July 1 to December 31, 1973, focused on the agency’s handling of U.S. policy vis-à-vis the
In explaining and supporting foreign policy objectives, USIA stressed the basic soundness and strength of the American economy and began working toward a major effort to lend information support to U.S. export and tourist promotion programs. Full support also was given to U.S. efforts to gain the cooperation of other governments in bringing international drug traffic under control.

Among other issues of interest to overseas audiences and included in USIA programming were civil rights, U.S. achievements in science and space technology, the environment, energy, air piracy and hijacking and territorial water negotiations.

USIA cultural programming during the first half of 1973 included several international exhibitions designed to convey the ideas, initiative, concepts, habits, skills, and institutions of the American people. The major exhibit was “Outdoor Recreation—USA” which opened a year-long tour of six Soviet cities in Moscow on May 21.

“Electronic dialogues” and “videotape recordings” gave the Agency a new dimension in communications.

Electronic dialogue permits at relatively low cost an authoritative review of American policies by an expert, from government or the private sector, who normally would be too busy to visit an overseas post to present his views in person.

The technique presents to a carefully selected audience a previously filmed exposition by such an American authority on a topical issue of concern to that audience. Immediately after the film showing, the American speaker is put in touch with his overseas audience via an amplified telephone connection. Questions can be asked and answered directly and simultaneous translation is provided.

Videotape recordings gave USIA’s posts abroad a new method for rapid communication on U.S. positions on critical international issues. Here again, the expertise of qualified Americans drawn from all segments of U.S. society is utilized for special programming designed for selected audiences.

Middle East. USIA programs supported “U.S. initiatives to assist in a peaceful settlement in the region,” the report stated, adding that stress “was placed on the avoidance of direct super-power military intervention in the area.” As for the energy crisis, USIA output “concentrated on the need for international cooperation and consensus building among consumers and producers to resolve the oil problem. This effort was tied closely to U.S. peace initiatives in the Middle East.” The report is ibid.

4 See footnote 6, Document 90.

5 In an April 13 memorandum, Kissinger informed Nixon that NASA and the Department of State had arranged a 4-week tour of 11 countries by the Apollo 17 astronauts. Nixon wrote “good” on the memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President’s Office Files, President’s Handwriting, Box 21, April 1973)
These new techniques augmented the traditional communication by the Voice of America, the broadcasting arm of USIA, the worldwide radio-teletype service, motion pictures and television, libraries and speaker programming.

97. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson)  

Denver, April 3, 1974.

Transnational Communications—What’s Happening?

[Omitted here are introductory remarks.]

Interested as you are in world affairs, you are as aware as I am of the growing stream of news reports from beyond our borders which reflect a common theme: reports on Arab oil summits; reports on European solidarity (or lack of it); reports on détente, floating currencies, worldwide inflation, famine and threats of famine, soaring population rates, worldwide pollution; and on and on over the horizon. These news stories teach the same lesson. I don’t think there could possibly be a human being who glances at a newspaper or television screen—much less one who actually tries to keep up with the world—who is not aware of the irreversible interdependence of all nations and all peoples on this tiny globe of ours.

You know much better than I about the great Pike’s Peak or Bust gold rush that led to the founding of Denver in 1859. Many a fortune hunter went “bust” and returned to the East. I’m told these men were known as “go-backs.” Well, in today’s interdependent world, there are

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1 Source: Department of State Bulletin, May 6, 1974, pp. 489–496. Richardson delivered his address to the Institute of International Education. Richardson’s address evidently stemmed from his September 27, 1973, memorandum in which he urged Kissinger to consider “an early initiative in the area of cross-cultural communication.” Richardson continued, “The goals would be to increase support here and abroad for purposeful efforts of official and unofficial agencies to reduce culture, ideological and other barriers to human communication, to build habits and mechanisms of intercultural cooperation, [and] to strengthen trends toward world community.” Among Richardson’s specific proposals was the cultivation of “a new focus in this country on intercultural education.” On October 3, Kissinger approved the further development of Richardson’s ideas. (Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lot 78 D 184, International Cultural Planning Group (ICPG), 1973)
no “go-backs.” None of us has any place to go back to, even if we wanted to.

You don’t need to be lectured at by me about economic interdependence. Anyone who has had to inch his way to a gasoline pump, as we all have in recent weeks, has had a basic lesson in international economics. And you are also as aware as I am of the strategic interdependence of nations like ours whose security depends on mutual deterrence—a system uncomfortably like wary scorpions in a bottle. But our interdependence goes beyond economics and beyond security. It has become a matter of simple human survival on Planet Earth as we approach the outer limits of world resources and the carrying capacity of the biosphere.

The foreign policy of your government today is aimed at achieving a world order sufficiently workable to prevent catastrophe, military or ecological, and sufficiently cooperative so that the quality of life in our own country may be enhanced in harmony with the aspirations of others. In pledging the readiness of the United States to work toward the achievement of such a world community, Secretary Kissinger summed up—at the United Nations a few months ago—by asking:

Are we prepared to accept the imperatives of a global society and infuse our labors with a new vision? Or shall we content ourselves with a temporary pause in the turmoil that has wrecked our century? Shall we proceed with one-sided demands and sterile confrontations? Or shall we proceed in a spirit of compromise produced by a sense of common destiny? We must move from hesitant cooperation born of necessity to genuine collective effort based on common purpose.

It is a choice no country can make alone. We can repeat old slogans or strive for new hope. We can fill the record of our proceedings with acrimony, or we can dedicate ourselves to dealing with man’s deepest needs. The ideal of a world community may be decried as unrealistic—but great constructions have always been ideals before they can become realities. Let us dedicate ourselves to this noblest of all possible goals and achieve at last what has so long eluded us: true understanding and tolerance among mankind.2

Conscious of our economic, as well as security, as well as ecological interdependence, most intelligent people the world over, I think, are becoming increasingly sensitive to the urgency of the problem of how to effectively communicate with peoples of other nations and other cultures, of how to relate to others so as to engender cooperation in place of conflict. Knowing we can’t return to the days of national self-sufficiency—if, indeed, those days really ever existed—we can ap-

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preciate not just the value but the necessity of learning to cope with the variety of social, cultural, and ideological perspectives that directly condition human thought processes and human behavior.

*Increase in Transnational Contacts*

It is about this quality of communication between peoples and how we can improve it through human interchange that I want to talk with you today, because that’s what’s really happening in transnational communications—we’re beginning to understand what it’s all about!

Simply increasing the number of exchanges of television programs or paintings, teachers or technicians, gadgets or gurus, across boundaries does not guarantee improved communication or understanding. On the contrary, pushing communications to speed-of-light limits, bringing jet travel to within reach of millions, immensely speeding up the print media, bouncing television programs off satellites—all these technological advances have had, and are still having, shattering effects on many cultures around the world. Increased numbers of contacts, while they broaden horizons, can also reinforce old myths and engender new anxieties and frustrations resulting from the technological disruption of traditional patterns of belief, community, and expectation.

In thinking about the title of my talk, “Transnational Communications—What’s Happening?,” I have to admit that the first thought that came into my mind was “Too much!” Because the technological means of communication have improved much faster than the ability of many cultures—I should say, most cultures—to assimilate the consequences.

Looking at the globe the other day, it occurred to me that the diplomatic post most distant from Washington was Perth, Australia, where we have a consulate. Perth is almost exactly halfway around the globe and far south of the Equator. When we were children we always believed that if we dug a hole straight through the earth we would come out in China. In fact, such a hole drilled from Washington would come out in the Indian Ocean just south and west of Perth. I picked up the telephone and called a colleague in the Department of State on the Australian desk and asked him how long it would take to get a telephone call through to Australia on regular commercial lines. He said usually it took only slightly longer than it did to make a local call from my Department to the Pentagon. Even if the circuits were busy, a call to Australia usually went through in a matter of a few minutes, never as much as an hour, he said.

Just a little over a century ago it took four days for the news of President Lincoln’s election to reach Denver by pony express from St. Joseph, Missouri, 600 miles away. Even after telegraph lines reached
the city in 1863, the wires were often severed by buffalo herds on the Great Plains when they weren’t by storms.

In the history of mankind, a hundred years is hardly more than the tick of the clock. But in the last century, physical distance between peoples has decreased so much faster than psychic distance as to threaten cultural confrontations—and that may mean political and military confrontations—of potentially disastrous proportions.

If you were to plot a graph of the current increase in all kinds of transnational contacts—that is, the increase in the number of overseas telephone calls, the number of pieces of overseas mail, the number of foreign travelers, the showings of foreign films, the translations of foreign books, the number of students, executives, and technicians living abroad—you would find the curve going straight up off the graph and through the ceiling. The percentage increase in overseas telephone calls alone is around 25 percent annually, I am told.

Some of these contacts are of direct, immediate concern to many governments. For instance, it is technically possible today to beam television programs by satellite directly from one country to home television receivers in nations on the other side of the globe. Many governments concerned about maintaining the cultural integrity of their nations, as well as others committed to walling out uncensored information and ideas, are fearful about the prospect of such direct media contact. (I must say when I think of much of our own television diet in this country, I can appreciate their feeling. So far as international understanding is concerned, unlimited reruns of “I Love Lucy,” “Hogan’s Heroes,” and “Peyton Place,” whether delivered by satellite or by carrier pigeon, may be something less than an unmixed blessing.)

**Constructive Interactions**

The point I want to make is this: Those of us who value the contribution of educational and cultural interchange to our foreign relations are not mesmerized by the probable very long-term net advantages of an increased quantity of contacts. What we do assert is that if inevitably increasing interchange of all kinds among nations is to result in more cooperation than conflict, more collaboration than chaos, more conciliation than confrontation, in our own and our children’s lifetimes, purposeful effort is urgently required: We must seek to influence the quality of some of the most crucial among those contacts. Our increasingly complicated task, therefore, is to find ways to encourage the most highly constructive interactions we can envisage between the American people and the peoples of other nations. We must, to repeat, focus on quality, not quantity.

I use the word “constructive” to characterize contacts which involve influential or potentially influential human beings with each
other in ways likely to stimulate their minds and engage their positive emotions to the ultimate benefit of relations among nations. We are not fundamentally interested in more efficient communication between peoples, even more efficient two-way communication, as such. The messages currently being sent back and forth by patriotic, civic-minded, conscientious citizens of two neighboring nations—Syria and Israel—across the Golan Heights are received on both sides loud and clear—and the feedback is usually immediate and to the point—but while this is efficient communication, it is hardly what we want to encourage.

How do you go about encouraging constructive human interactions? In this welter of willy-nilly people-to-people contacts and this constant bombardment by the media, how can we help ourselves and others to filter out the noise—the distractions—and encourage mutual learning under sufficiently favorable circumstances to engender both realistic appreciation and mutual respect?

It seems to me there are two essential elements in bringing about more cross-cultural human communication of the kind capable, ultimately, of favorably influencing international relations.

First, we should try to bring together people on both sides who are either already favorably inclined toward learning about each other or are sufficiently openminded to make getting to know each other an easy byproduct of activities satisfying other needs, personal or professional.

Note that I said “on both sides.” I doubt that a visitor to Denver from another country will have a truly rewarding experience in human terms here unless those he comes in contact with also are interested in him and his country—or at least have sufficiently open minds to make learning about him and his country a natural consequence of pursuing some common interest here together.

Indeed, any visit, here or abroad, if it is going to mean something, must offer the visitor opportunities for human encounters satisfying substantial emotional as well as professional needs. Whether a foreign student goes home from Denver to become a lifelong interpreter between his culture and ours—or merely with an adequate technical education—depends on whether he has had and used opportunities to become actively involved as a person in various aspects of American life. Whether an American Fulbright professor comes back to the University of Colorado with plans for a continuing interchange of visits, periodicals, and correspondence with his host university—which can produce lifelong linkages and therefore continuing constructive communication involving many people and organizations—depends on the friendships established and the mutual interests identified as well as his scholarly accomplishment during his year abroad.
And whether a future prime minister or business leader or TV commentator returns from a visit to Denver convinced that Americans are not only energetic, technically advanced, efficient, and rich but also straightforward, open, cooperative, sensitive to the needs of others, and easy to get along with—that of course depends on just what his experience was here, as well as on his ability to learn from it.

My second criterion for a really useful visit is this: The visitor must be someone whose personal, professional, or power potential is such that he can make a difference in his own country. Therefore, overall planning of cultural exchange, governmental or private, should, I believe, be based on serious analysis of actual and prospective patterns of interaction, both healthy and unhealthy, between the two societies. Without such an analysis, including the role of mass media, education systems, and other critical institutions within each society, miscellaneous cultural exchange activity will be just that—miscellaneous—with no assurance of significant favorable effect on our international relations.

**Purpose and Utility of Cultural Exchange**

Underlying these questions of how-to-do-it are the broader issues of purpose and utility. What do we really hope to achieve? Can more and better relationships among individuals, groups, and institutions in different countries really be expected to affect the way their governments ultimately behave toward each other?

One major study of this quite cosmic issue has been made by a group of 16 eminent scholars and statesmen from Japan, Africa, the Middle East, India, Southeast Asia, and the United States. This initiative is part of a continuing project entitled “Cultural Relations for the Future” sponsored by the Hazen Foundation of New Haven, Connecticut, a small private organization.

What the foundation did, through a series of meetings in out-of-the-way places, was to create a sort of mental spaceship where the 16 participants in the two-year study could develop a common wide-angle and long-range perspective on current world conditions. The title of their report, which I urge you to read, is “Reconstituting the Human Community.” Any one of them, when they started out, would have rejected such a title as pretentious and absurd. But that is the title they wound up with—“Reconstituting the Human Community.”

After two years of study, thought, and discussion, they agreed on that title, and the following quotation will, I hope, provide at least a

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glimmer of the level of conviction they came to share and which animates every page of their report:

If men want to move in new directions, they will have to broaden the range of their potentialities and capabilities. They have to be able to manipulate and manage larger political, economic and business units at the same time as they learn to build and preserve smaller communities. Against the depersonalized impact of the laws of science, technology and the larger bureaucracies, men must find and fathom new religious and spiritual depths. There is a need for a new humanism beyond the superficial unity that is imposed upon men by the global communications system. We cannot be kept together to build a new future unless we are linked to our fellowmen by more than survival instincts. What each of us needs is a new moral vision or a new philosophy of history capable of giving us at least some notion of where we may be going and some sense of the value of our place in the changing world in which we live.

In thinking about what I’ve just quoted, it’s important to keep one point in mind: These thoughtful leaders from many countries started out to make a study of cultural relations for the future; what they ultimately produced was a study on how cultural relations could be used to help accomplish what they came to conclude was the really essential task, namely, reconstituting the human community.

They take what may sound at first blush like a wildly optimistic view despite this sentence at the very beginning of the report:

It is no exaggeration to say that all systems on the basis of which the world is organized are facing a dead end, at least if present trends are allowed to continue.

Whether or not you accept this bleak premise, I think you will find three points the report makes—and its conclusion—interesting:

The first point: Perhaps our greatest contribution to developing nations, many of which have only recently emerged from colonial domination, would be to rid ourselves of the so-called European point of view—the idea that Asians, Africans, and other non-Western peoples are or ought to be “consumers” of Western culture. Can we instead learn to look upon other peoples as cultural equals with as much to contribute out of their heritage as we out of ours, and not in terms of strong versus weak, big versus small, developed versus developing? With our myriad social, moral, and spiritual problems in the Western world, can we learn to look upon cultural exchange as a possible means of bringing useful new insights into our own culture?

The second point: We tend to speak of “youth” as though young people were a minority, a problem apart. The opposite is true. We over 30 are the minority. The World Bank reports the median age worldwide is 17 years. And the world population is steadily growing younger. In the United States some 30 million people are between 18 and 25 years of
age. What can we in the educational and cultural exchange business do to help young people, the vast majority of the human race today, create a new and better life? If indeed a way must be found to reconstitute the human community, is not the youth of the world our greatest resource—and must we not encourage thoughtful young people to build more networks of relationships across boundaries of all kinds?

**The third point:** “Of primary importance in future cultural relations,” the report says, “will be a growing network of . . . private organizations, each existing independently and acting autonomously. The present domination of (what we call) cultural relations by nation-states reflects the fact that they are the most powerful components of international society; it does not prove that they are the most effective agencies for the conduct of such relations. We do not suggest replacement of governmental and intergovernmental activities, but the creation of supplementary channels based on particular areas of competence and concern.” I couldn’t agree more. And those private organizations include universities, businesses, professional associations, and service clubs, among others.

Now the conclusion from the Hazen Foundation report: Cultural relations “are the chief means to shape the future of men and nations, to change their directions through creative mutual borrowing and to strengthen an awareness of shared values. . . . Mankind is faced with problems which, if not dealt with, could in a very few years develop into crises world-wide in scope. (This was written before the oil embargo.) Interdependence is the reality; world-wide problems the prospect; and world-wide cooperation the only solution. As a tool for sensitizing people to the reality and the prospect, stimulating them to attempt the solution, . . . cultural relations are, and will increasingly become, a decisive aspect of international affairs.”

**Requirements of Interdependence**

As I personally see it, we have no choice but to work in practical ways toward the development of a functioning human community, quite apart from the question of whether we will ever have a world government, if we are to survive as civilized human beings. Yet we need much more than any such easy generalization. In order for the world to become a fit place to live, a place where all may have some prospect of enjoying the fruits of civilization, then we must face up to the first imperative of interdependence: to strengthen habits of constructive communication and cooperation across national, cultural, and ideological borders.

We must, in the first place, move urgently to strengthen understanding of that transnational economic interdependence I spoke of at the beginning at the same time we improve the efficiency of multina-
tional business organizations in meeting human needs. Otherwise the holders of economic power, whether government or private, both here and abroad, will be tempted to exploit their shortrun interest, at the cost of our longrun advantage. Please note that awareness of economic interdependence, and the commitment to long-range thinking it entails—as well as understanding of how different it looks, depending on where you are—can readily be increased by planned cultural exchange.

We need also to increase understanding of the indivisibility of peace and the interdependence of each nation’s security, which, again, I mentioned at the outset. In a world neighborhood, armed conflicts are increasingly difficult to isolate. Both knowledge and understanding of these life-or-death matters can be increased through planned cultural exchange. Indeed, it is arguable that without extensive, informal, and mostly unofficial personal contacts among Soviet and American scientists and strategists over many years, there might have been no test ban treaty, no SALT negotiations, no détente.

Another requirement of interdependence: We need to increase the degree of overlap between what decisionmakers in some nations believe to be overriding truths about the ecological dilemma and what is believed by others in other nations. The human race can perhaps physically survive disasters of unprecedented magnitude in particular regions arising from a failure of governments to collaborate to close the gap between population and resources, to overcome the contradiction between pollution and production. It seems to me doubtful that our collective sanity could survive a series of such disasters, all watched in living color by the fortunate few in the richest nations as we eat our meals with our children in front of the family TV set. Here again, cultural exchange can help directly, to accommodate differing perceptions and expectations, facilitate cooperation in devising common strategies—above all, to increase respect and appreciation for differing values, by far the healthiest approach toward reconciliation and convergence of values.

We need also, if we are to meet the challenge of interdependence, to improve the capacity of educational systems, media systems, and communities of faith to strengthen in every nation, beginning with our own, a more sensitive awareness of the human condition as we approach the 21st century. The accelerating velocity of technological change has already torn apart much of the fabric of loyalties, beliefs, and expectations on which societies generally had come to depend. What is to take their place? What will be the patterns of belief and commitment which will motivate world leaders in 2076? Once again, cultural relations can make a difference—perhaps, as the authors of the Hazen Foundation report thought, a lot of the difference.
Such considerations affecting the value we place on cultural exchange may seem to you a long way from the province of conventional diplomacy. If they once were, they are no longer, as the words of Secretary Kissinger quoted earlier suggest.

Furthermore, cultural exchanges play a direct and growing role as well in the day-to-day business of diplomacy, in the day-to-day work of the State Department in pursuing U.S. interests in bilateral relations with 130-odd other governments around the world.

This is no minor asset when diplomacy must struggle with increasingly complex conflicts of interest complicated by ever broader public pressures impinging more and more on traditional diplomatic prerogatives. Whether a U.S. negotiation is with Japan or the U.S.S.R., Panama or South Africa, Iran or Germany, our Ambassadors are greatly aided if two conditions obtain:

—First, they will be greatly helped if there is a substantial proportion of the leadership of the other country made up of individuals with understanding of our society, of our ways of thinking and behaving, derived from compelling firsthand experience.

—Second, our Ambassadors will be in a far stronger position, also, if there is a substantial number of those in our own country interested in the particular issue to be negotiated who can understand the way the other country sees it. Believe me, both advantages are exceedingly important. And cultural exchange, carefully planned and well executed, can provide both.

Here we in America have a resource of incalculable, indeed unique, value: the commitment and skills of some 800 voluntary organizations and of perhaps 100,000 individual volunteers throughout the country. Many of you in this room can testify both to what is given and what is received through cultural exchange in both directions. Many of you have worked and contributed and shared so that Very Important Persons invited by your government, or very important future leaders here to study in our universities, could have an optimum learning opportunity. And each of you who has done so knows, better than I, about the reality of learning from as well as showing to, about the special satisfaction of mutual sharing, mutual enrichment, mutual benefit.

On behalf of our Ambassadors, who are the first to see and feel the benefit of your efforts at the official diplomatic level, as well as on behalf of the Secretary of State, let me thank you for all you have already done and will do.

Of course, it will never be enough. There really is no end to the useful effort which the imagination and energy of concerned citizens can contribute to the achievement of our national goals in world affairs.

Every one of the 150,000 foreign students who come here with curiosity and hope and return home with a sense both of achievement
and comprehension, social as well as intellectual satisfaction—every such student will provide initial impetus toward a new and positive dynamic in American relations with his country. So does every visiting scholar, every business trainee, every professional person, and of course every visiting journalist, educator, artist, and performer—all, that is, who have come to know Americans as individuals and our institutions as they really are and who go home feeling that not only do they know, but they are known by, those they encountered here.

That is the challenge of cultural relations to citizens here in Denver. You really can do something about the peace of the world. The successful operation and growth of both private and governmental educational and cultural exchange programs over the past 35 years would have been impossible without the diplomatic skill, the patience, the countless hours, the plain hard work—in short, the commitment—of volunteers such as yourselves.

I hope, in addition, that you are concerned about intercultural and international education—let’s call it world education—in your elementary and secondary school systems. I believe our children—and our country—will be more secure if they grow up knowing from the start that ours is not the only workable system of government, that other peoples are also committed to their own ways and their own systems just as we are to the American way and our system, that we in this country have a monopoly neither on truth nor on resources. Foreign students right here in your colleges and universities can help our children learn this and thereby start them on the road to a true appreciation of our own magnificent heritage, an appreciation gained with the help of an external perspective.

In closing I should like to point out another exceptional opportunity for Americans everywhere to create new linkages with other peoples and to strengthen old ones. That opportunity is the coming bicentennial celebration.4

The challenge to us is how we can take advantage of the impetus of the bicentennial toward both reflection and renewed commitment. It seems to me eminently appropriate to focus especially on the chance to build new foundations of mutual understanding on which the human structure of peace can and must be built in the third century of our national life.

4 Richardson amplified his remarks on May 18, 1976, in the midst of the commemoration of the Bicentennial of the American Revolution, in an address, “Preparing for a Human Community,” made before an international convocation sponsored by the Board of Foreign Scholarships in observance of the 30th anniversary of the Fulbright program. For the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1976, pp. 752–759.
I’m confident that you who are gathered here by the International Institute of Education will be in the forefront among those across the country who know that we are still young enough as a nation to dream dreams, still vigorous enough as a people to contribute to great causes, still strong enough as a country to be a leader in world affairs.

I do not exaggerate when I say you can exert far-reaching influence. Success on the road to a more peaceful and just world order depends increasingly, and in no small part, on people and groups outside official foreign affairs establishments.

Progress depends increasingly on people like you and me—as individuals and as members of private organizations—sitting down with our counterparts from other countries, exchanging experience and perspectives, working on common problems, opening new lines of communication, developing vested interests in good relations, strengthening habitual patterns of effective cooperation.

I am convinced, finally, that success in moderating conflict and promoting a more humane and cooperative international system depends more than ever in history upon intelligent men and women of good will here and abroad who are committed to work for it, a hardheaded commitment for the sake of our continued existence, a moral commitment for the sake of our humanity. You—and I—share the opportunity for effective contribution to that end.
98. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Subcommittee for Joint Commission Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll)


Conduct of Educational and Cultural Relations Through Bilateral Joint Commissions

This subcommittee, whose membership is listed on the last page of this memorandum, met as provided for by NSDM 248 on November 15, and agreed on what follows.

An educational and cultural component has been included in most of the Joint Commissions so far discussed. Sometimes this element has been an initial part of the Joint Commission concept; sometimes it has been added later. Improved intercultural relations are seen as central to a sound rebuilding of relations with a few of these countries; in other instances they seem to be an afterthought, programs to be undertaken because they might do some good and are unlikely to be a problem.

In our judgment, inadequate attention seems to have been given to the contributions U.S. governmental and private educational and cultural programs can make, indeed are making, to a central purpose of the Joint Commissions, the development of wider networks of constructive relations between the U.S. and other societies.

I. The Current Status of Existing Joint Cultural Sub-Commissions:

All the Joint Commissions so far agreed upon or expected imminently are in the Near East and South Asian region. In this part of the world we are witnessing a massive turning toward education and man-
power development as a principal engine for the modernization of historic societies.  

_Egypt_—A Joint Commission was agreed to by Presidents Nixon and Sadat in a statement of “Principles of Relations and Cooperation between Egypt and the United States” signed at Cairo on June 14, 1974. Six Working Groups were provided in the Statement, one of which covers education and cultural affairs. These six have now been consolidated into four.

The Joint Working Group on Education and Culture had an initial and exploratory meeting in Washington, August 12–15, 1974; the second meeting took place in Cairo, October 24–27, 1974 with agreement to initiate exchanges involving U.S. and Egyptian professors and subject matter specialists, assistance to English language training programs at Ain Shams University, review of material contained on each country in standard textbooks in their respective primary and secondary schools, and other related educational and cultural activities. The U.S. delegation included representatives from several agencies and the university community.

A limited meeting of the Joint Working Group on Education and Culture is planned for May 1975 in Washington to review the progress in carrying out the 12 projects to be initiated before July 1, 1975. The full Working Group plans to convene in Cairo sometime in January 1976.

_Jordan_—A Joint Commission was agreed to by King Hussein and President Nixon during the President’s visit to Amman on June 17–18, 1974. AID Administrator Parker will chair the U.S. delegation at its first meeting in early January of 1975. Included among the provisions for various types of cooperation was agreement for a sub-commission on social and cultural affairs; however, Ambassador Pickering subsequently informed the Department that no formal mechanism is currently required to implement this part of the agreement.

The Department and Embassy Amman have agreed to review the current educational and cultural exchange programs with Jordan to decide whether currently available resources can be more efficiently and effectively used. The Embassy’s review will include consultation with Jordanian officials. Further, the review should consider whether a more institutional arrangement is either necessary or desirable.

_Israel_—No new bilateral mechanisms were introduced in the cultural field as a result of President Nixon’s meeting of June 16–17 with

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3 In addition to those outlined below, Joint Commissions also existed with the Soviet Union, Japan, and Mexico.

4 For the text, see _Public Papers: Nixon, 1974_, pp. 503–506.

5 For the text of the joint statement, June 18, following Nixon’s discussions with King Hussein, see ibid., pp. 534–535.
Prime Minister Rabin at Jerusalem. However, a joint statement issued on June 17 by the two principals included the following: "The President and the Prime Minister agreed to develop further the cultural ties between the two countries through exchanges of scholars, students, artists, exhibitions, mutual visits and musical and other cultural events." Secretary Simon during a subsequent visit to Israel discussed increased U.S. support for the bilateral science foundation in Israel.

**India**—Agreement was reached to establish a joint commission in India during the visit of the Secretary of State to New Delhi, October 27–29. Three sub-commissions (titled in this agreement committees) were specified, one concerning educational and cultural affairs. Plans are now in process for convening the sub-commission in India in January 1975, and consideration is being given to such broad agenda topics as: private cooperation and business involvement in educational and cultural relations, the performing arts, museology, the role of foundations, and exchanges in the communications media. The American delegation of 10 members has been appointed and will be chaired by Dr. Robert Goheen, Chairman of the Council on Foundations.

**Iran**—Agreement was reached on the formation of an Intergovernmental Commission at the Ministerial level during Secretary Kissinger’s visit with the Shah of Iran, November 1, 1974. The Commission will be concerned with political, economic, scientific and cultural relations between Iran and the United States; and it is expected that separate sub-commissions will be designated to pursue each of these subjects.

The Secretary has requested the Deputy Secretary to prepare suggestions by the end of the month as to the best means of carrying out this cooperation. Major emphasis will be on economic and technological affairs. Nevertheless, an educational and cultural working group would seem highly desirable, particularly in view of the status education and human resources development enjoy as great national objectives now in Iran.

**Syria**—Although no Joint Commission with Syria has yet been formed, the Secretary made a public statement on his visit to Damascus in June 1974 that the U.S. would expand its educational and cultural exchange programs with Syria. At present the Department has author-

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6 For the text of the joint statement, see ibid., pp. 525–528.
7 For the text of the agreement, October 28, see the Department of State Bulletin, November 25, 1974, pp. 746–747.
8 For the text of the joint communiqué, issued on November 2, see ibid., pp. 729–730.
9 As he departed Damascus on May 27 after talks with Assad, Kissinger stated that Syria and the United States had “made a decision to continue toward an improvement of our relations on a very broad front.” (Ibid., June 24, 1974, p. 693)
ized the Embassy at Damascus to reinstitute exchanges through its established channels. It is expected we will support the opening of a student counseling office in Damascus by the American Friends of the Middle East (AFME).

_Saudi Arabia_—During the visit of Prince Fahd to Washington on June 8, 1974 a Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation with four sub-commissions was announced by the Secretary of State. The head of the U.S. delegation is the Secretary of the Treasury.

The Joint Working Group on Manpower and Education has to date largely developed its proposed programs through the Labor and the Treasury Departments. The NEA Coordinator in the Department of State takes the position that, because of NSDM 278, CU should henceforth become involved. CU agrees and would propose also to review possible participation with other agencies engaged in exchange programs.

II. Problems:

Sub-commissions in the cultural field may present fewer problems than in some other areas of international relations less accustomed to developing programs binationally. Nevertheless, we expect to confront several of the difficulties all sub-commissions will face. These relate principally to satisfying the high level of expectations, managing a shortage of personnel and financial resources, developing real mutuality of effort, convincing our bilateral partners to work for the long haul, and encouraging a broader range of cultural cooperation between American and foreign private groups and institutions.

III. Managing Educational and Cultural Commission Activities:

The success of a productive and lasting bilateral relationship in the educational and cultural affairs field rests on the quality of the work of the U.S. delegations in their periodic discussions and the support and follow-up they receive at home. Thus we have formulated the following operating principles and inter-agency coordination procedures for cultural activities related to Joint Commissions.

A. Operating Principles:

In support of the general objectives sought through Joint Commissions, the goal of each Educational and Cultural Sub-Commission will be to develop between the governmental and private organizations of both countries a more constructive basis for educational and cultural interchange. Primary efforts will be made to broaden dialogue between the two societies and thus to contribute to improved stability and per-

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10 For the text of Kissinger and Prince Fahd’s joint statement on cooperation, see ibid., July 1, 1974, pp. 10–11.
manence in a particular bilateral relationship. These Sub-commissions provide a most useful opportunity to focus the regular attention of the participating countries on shared interests and concerns throughout the entire range of educational and cultural relations. The Sub-commissions are expected to develop recommendations for action by the governments or the private sectors of both countries. They should not be responsible for implementing the projects so identified, even though they will periodically monitor progress. Decisions as to implementation would be a national responsibility. (See B below.)

Given the major significance of non-governmental activities to the educational and cultural relations between any two nations, representatives of private organizations will be adequately represented on all U.S. delegations to joint cultural meetings.

B. Interagency Support in Washington:

Smooth and coordinated consultation on a regular basis among U.S. Government agencies concerned with the various Joint Commissions can do much to overcome some of the above problems. Thus, this Educational and Cultural Affairs Subcommittee in Washington (based on the existing NSC Subcommittee on International Exchange), chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs will be the mechanism used to ensure government-wide coordination of U.S. participation in current and yet to be named Joint Sub-commissions in this field. The U.S. delegations for each such Joint Commission meeting will be selected by the chairman, in consultation with the other members of the subcommittee.

The subcommittee will be responsible for developing such instructions as it believes are needed by delegations to the meetings of each Joint Educational and Cultural Sub-Commission. The reports of delegations will be reviewed by the Subcommittee. Required U.S. Government actions will be assigned and progress monitored between meetings of each Joint Sub-commission. To assist the Subcommittee, a working group, to be chaired by CU, will be named by the Chairman to provide operational support for each delegation, including preparing background materials for meetings and monitoring the implementation of recommendations emerging from Joint Commission meetings.

The members, in addition to State, of the existing Subcommittee on International Exchange are: AID, USIA, HEW, ACTION (Peace Corps), Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Science Foundation, and the National Security Council. When a meeting is limited to questions falling under NSDM 278, Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff will be so informed and may exercise the option not to participate. For the consideration of NSDM 278 problems, the following additional agencies will also form part of the Subcommittee:
99. **Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Subcommittee on International Exchanges (Richardson) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll) and the Executive Chairman of the National Security Council Interdepartmental Group for Inter-American Affairs (Rogers)**


Latin American Initiatives: Review of Cultural and Exchange Activities

To give reality to Secretary Kissinger’s goal of an inter-American dialogue which will go beyond government officials, and “involve our peoples, catching their imagination and liberating their abilities,” the Subcommittee (of the Under Secretaries Committee) on International Exchange has reviewed the programs of the principal agencies of the Federal Government active in this field in Latin America. The results of this interagency review are presented in the attached report. The Subcommittee, after discussion, also recommended to its member agencies the concrete additions and adaptations to USG educational, cultural, and exchange activities related to Latin America which are set forth in the recommendations memorandum, also attached.

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3 Not found attached.

4 Attached but not printed.
The Subcommittee prepared this report and these recommendations in the cultural and exchange field as a contribution to the overall Latin American policy review now being conducted in support of the Secretary of State’s initiatives for that region.

In a separate communication to Mr. Ingersoll, the Subcommittee discusses several additional steps which it believes would also further the Secretary’s goals in Latin America, but which would probably necessitate shifting funding and staff resources toward Latin America from other parts of the world. These proposals are being dealt with separately because several agency representatives believed that, before the Subcommittee made recommendations with that type of consequence to its member agencies, clarification was required from a higher policy level that such inter-regional shifts in favor of Latin America are in fact called for by current global foreign policy.5

The Subcommittee has requested its staff to remain in communication with its constituent agencies about implementation of the recommendations presented here, and to report back to the Subcommittee in February of 1975 on which recommendations are being carried out, which ones are not proving feasible, and on the conclusions which can be drawn from the pattern that emerges. As needed, we will inform you further of developments in this field.

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5 Richardson’s November 26 memorandum conveying the recommendations to Ingersoll is in the Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lot 78 D 184, Latin American Initiatives (NSDM 143), 1974.
100. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Keogh) to the Ambassador at Large (McCloskey)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Voice of America and U.S. Policy

From the very beginning of the existence of the Voice of America, there has been recurring controversy about its relationship to U.S. policy. On the first VOA broadcast in February, 1942, a statement inspired by OWI Director Elmer Davis\(^2\) promised that “the news may be good or bad but we shall tell you the truth.” This original precept has been the symbolic basis over the years for contentions that VOA should stay as free as possible of U.S. policy considerations. There have been intermittent storms around the issue of USIA management of the Voice. Both Henry Loomis and John Daly departed as Directors of the Voice because they felt their authority was encroached upon by Directors of USIA.\(^3\)

Under my predecessor as Director of USIA, the Voice was given an almost absolute freedom to do what it wished. He was essentially interested in only one issue: an ideological cold war battle against communism. So long as the Voice was in line with him on that issue, he was little concerned about its policy or programming.

My point of view is entirely different than that of my predecessor. I consider the Voice of America an instrument of U.S. policy. In the past two years we have tightened the policy reins to a considerable degree. This has involved a number of key personnel changes in important positions at the Voice. It has been my effort to change the Voice’s approach from that of an international CBS into a consciously government-related communications entity. This has not been done without some trauma. The most recent example is the story in the December 16, 1974, issue of \textit{Time} which was inspired (as I mentioned to you) by a disgruntled former VOA staffer who was removed from his


\(^2\) Director of the Office of War Information, 1942–1945.

\(^3\) Henry Loomis was Director of the VOA, 1958–1965. John Daly was Director, 1967–1968.
post because he was doing a bad job.4 While his removal was related to management rather than policy, he was the leader of the element that believed in “the sanctity of the news” and felt that the Voice should indeed be an international CBS or NBC and should not be sensitive to U.S. foreign policy considerations.

For some time our efforts to create a sensitivity to U.S. policy at the Voice have been greeted by the “sanctity of the news” people with charges of censorship, “news management” and warnings that we were undermining the Voice’s credibility. A favorite tactic of this group has been leaking to the press complaints that USIA management is interfering with free journalism at the Voice. However, I believe we are gradually bringing the situation under reasonable control.

We are not indulging in censorship. I have taken the position that when the Voice says “This is the news . . .”, we cannot avoid reporting legitimate news that may be bad for the United States. However, I have sought with some success to convince the professionals at the Voice that the matter of selection, timing and tone of news stories involves not censorship but sense. I have laid down guidelines which make clear that they are not to take on the obsessions of the private sector media. We require double sourcing on all news stories and do not indulge in our own speculation.

On the matter of policy, the most sensitive area of our programming is what the Voice calls “Analysis”—which is essentially the editorial page. Here we have a procedure through which the USIA policy office advises the Voice staff and carefully monitors its output. We have tightened this process substantially in the past two years—again not without some outcry at the Voice—and we are now tightening it further in ways which hopefully will not provoke too much counterproductive criticism in the press about “censorship.”

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4 *Time* Magazine reported that VOA journalists alleged that Keogh and USIA Assistant Director for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe John W. Shirley had “allowed political considerations to mute the Voice” by censoring stories about popular dissent behind the Iron Curtain that ran counter to détente. Keogh rejoined, “Détente has changed what we do in USIA. Our program managers must be sensitive to U.S. policy as enunciated by the President and the Secretary of State. That policy is that we do not interfere in the internal affairs of other countries. We’re not in the business of trying to provoke revolutions.” (“Muted Voice of America,” *Time*, December 16, 1974) In a June 16, 1972, memorandum to Kissinger, VOA Acting Director Henry Loomis outlined the USIA’s planned post-Moscow Summit output. Haig responded to Loomis by memorandum, June 29: “The policies you are proposing for USIA/VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union definitely appear to be in the right direction. We would agree, with regard to internal Soviet developments, that you should continue to place the emphasis on reporting, at the same time continuing the VOA’s policy of eschewing polemics, not seeking quarrels and not attempting to magnify small incidents in your broadcasts to the Soviet Union.” Both memoranda are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA, Vol. IV, 1972 [1 of 2].
One of our serious problems with respect to policy is that at times we do not have enough inside guidance to know exactly where and how to place the emphasis on a given issue. Our officers at desk level are in constant contact with Department officers. We carefully monitor the White House and Department press briefings. We pay close attention to the statements that have been made by the President and the Secretary of State. From these general sources of information we can usually do quite well. Nevertheless, I must admit there are times when we are uneasy because we feel we do not really know enough from the inside councils to be certain that our nuances are what they should be.

In the Voice’s total broadcasting (777 hours a week in 36 languages), approximately 43% is devoted to feature materials—such as science, education, sports, music, and other cultural subjects reflecting American life; 29% is devoted to newscasts; and 28% is devoted to news-related subjects, such as analyses, discussions, roundups of editorial opinion in the United States and abroad, speeches and press conferences by the President, the Secretary of State and, at times, other U.S. Government officials. Much of this last area of our programming has both opportunities and sensitivities with respect to policy. We can and I believe do make many policy points through the manner in which we use speeches, statements and press conferences of the President and Secretary of State.

In total, I see VOA—as I see the rest of USIA—as a communications instrument whose mission is to present a fundamental picture of the U.S. to the rest of the world and to support the foreign policy of the United States. While doing this, we must be careful to maintain the Voice’s credibility as an international news medium. (I have been convinced that it must be a news medium in order to attract and hold audiences.) However, we must not allow credibility to be used as an excuse for irresponsibility. We must maintain credibility as a tactic. It is necessary for us to reflect all relevant areas of opinion in the U.S., with particular attention to areas of important Congressional opinion. On the other hand, our own analyses should be used as tools to make points for U.S. policy. While there are occasional lapses and aberrations in the mass of material broadcast by the Voice, I believe we are doing much better in all this than the Voice was doing two years ago.

As we go forward I hope that we can work out additional and better means of communication and consultation between the Department and USIA to refine and enhance the contribution of VOA and all of USIA to the furtherance of U.S. foreign policy.
102. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 11, 1975, 12:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Frank Stanton, Chairman of Panel on International Information
Walter Roberts, Project Director
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President: Nice to see you.

Mr. Stanton: This is an independently funded study. Both of the parent Advisory Commissions called for it. The area hadn’t been looked at in depth for 20 years.

We spent 10 months on it. We have talked to Rusk, Rogers, Kissinger, and all the living USIA directors. We have a solution which makes it more effective and manageable.

There is duplication between the State Department and USIA. Our recommendation is to give it back to State. Take the cultural activities of USIA and the cultural affairs of State and make it a new entity within State like AID. Make the Voice of America independent under a five-man board with two people from State.

The President: Does that include RFE and RL?

Mr. Stanton: No, we thought of putting it in the BIB [Board for International Broadcasting]. One problem was the State board members

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversation, Box 10, 3/11/75—Ford, Chairman of Panel of International Information Frank Stanton. No classification marking. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Scowcroft’s March 11 briefing memorandum informed the President that the meeting’s purpose was to receive the Report of the Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Document 103). Scowcroft advised Ford, “While it would be appropriate to express your interest in the [Panel’s] recommendations, you should refrain from indicating support for any specific suggestions until the report can be thoroughly evaluated.” (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 77, FG 11–5, Educational and Cultural Affairs, Bureau of (Executive))

2 Brackets in the original.
on VOA. The other was the CIA association of RFE and RL—so as not to tar VOA with CIA.

The President: So USIA disappears.

General Scowcroft: Yes. Part of it goes into State and part of it would be autonomous.

The President: Who were your commission members?

Mr. Stanton: Lewis, Gulley [Gullion], Wrench [Reinsch], Shaheen.

The President: Was the panel unanimous?

Mr. Stanton: No, we had one abstention. One was appointed ambassador.

The President: Will this come to me or to Congress?

Mr. Stanton: Technically it will go to Georgetown University since they funded it. But I think it will get to you.

The President: How about the Hill?

Mr. Stanton: I think Slack is opposed, but most of the others commented favorably.

The President: I expect the USIA people will oppose it.

Mr. Stanton: Yes and No. VOA mostly likes it. Even Jim Keogh said it is more important for the cultural aspects to be united than who owned them. But he is not cheering.

The President: How about the USIA bureaucracy?

Mr. Stanton: You know there was an FSIO category. We maneuvered them into the FSO category. I don’t think it will cause any changes in the field, just more efficiency in Washington. USIA executes cultural affairs in the field, but State does it in Washington—mostly because of Fulbright who thought the propaganda (USIA) was dirty.

The President: My feeling is you would require legislation to get it done.

Mr. Stanton: Yes. There would be at least three or four separate pieces of legislation.

The President: I appreciate the job you did. I will try to look over the report. I think we should periodically look over these things. What was good at the time of the organization of the agencies isn’t necessarily permanently good.

Mr. Stanton: There were earlier recommendations to return the Information Agency to the State Department. There was one study done under Ike by Rockefeller.3

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3 A reference to the President’s Advisory Committee on Government Organization, chaired by Nelson A. Rockefeller. Excerpts from the Rockefeller Committee’s memorandum to President Eisenhower, April 7, 1953, on the organization of foreign affairs is reprinted in Annex IV to the Report of the Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations (Document 103).
Mr. Roberts: Legislation was initiated in August, but it died when Congress adjourned in September.

Mr. Stanton: This was in State originally, but Dulles pushed it out because he didn’t want to get more tangled up with McCarthy.

103. Report of the Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations


International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations:
Recommendations for the Future

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

Preface


Concern for foreign opinion and a commitment to the ideal of public diplomacy have been at the heart of American foreign policy for two centuries. They express not only our manner of acting abroad but also, and more significantly, many of the purposes behind our national existence. Today as in the past the United States stands committed to a way of life, to an actionable, realized philosophy of individual freedom.
and rule by the consent of the governed. That philosophy requires an equally firm belief in open criticism and controversy, in freedom of information about everything, including the United States and American society. These are powerful political ideals; upon them in large part rests the moral leadership which accompanies the exercise of American power in today’s world.

American international programs in information, education, and culture are thus not merely a tool of diplomacy or a means of supporting foreign policy, though they are certainly both of these things. Nor are they valuable simply because they express our national identity abroad, thus helping the world understand us and the use we make of our tremendous economic and political power. Beyond these things American programs in information, education, and culture are a means of fulfilling our national identity, of practicing the philosophy in which we believe. Public diplomacy is a central part of American foreign policy simply because the freedom to know is such an important part of America.

Nevertheless, it should be apparent even to the most casual observer that these activities have absorbed over the years an exceptionally small portion—less than seven percent—even of those public resources allocated to the non-defense side of America’s international affairs budget. Fortunately, the United States is well served in this area by the efforts of its citizens overseas in whatever capacity: all of the federal government’s educational exchange, for example, is only five percent of the total exchange of persons. But the government’s contribution, though small, is an absolutely vital one, for it does the things that the private sector does not do and takes action in places and at times that private individuals might not. Moreover, it has repeatedly demonstrated its success in terms appropriate to its objectives. Letters and oral testimony come from people all over the world who have been reached by the American experience. Government and business leaders hold different views of us, newspaper articles have a different theme because of an exposure to these activities. The evidence is not hard, but it is there in tangible form and it demonstrates that this small expenditure can have impressive results.

The Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations therefore wishes to state at the outset its conviction that these programs deserve all possible support now and in the years ahead. We believe they are an exceptional use of governmental energy and the taxpayer’s dollars, and all our recommendations are designed to improve the performance of what we consider a necessary and a noble task. Particular activities may come and go and bureaucracies change their forms and organizations; it is the objective that we consider controlling.
The long hours and hard work represented by this Report have been given in service of that ideal.

The Panel began its labors in April 1974, in response to concern expressed over the past few years by several public and private bodies that these programs, established some 25 years ago, be reexamined in the light of today's needs. In February 1968, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information called for "an in-depth critique," by an organization outside the government, "not only . . . of what USIA does well and what poorly, but of what it ought to be doing and how best it might approach it." It has since repeated that call. Then, in May 1973, the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate indicated its concern by recommending a redistribution of the functions performed by the United States Information Agency (USIA) and the State Department's bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). Finally, in July 1973, the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs decided to investigate how USIA and CU might rearrange their similar and related functions in a way more suitable both to their effective performance and to the changing directions of U.S. foreign policy. (See Annex I for texts of these reports.)

[Omitted here are the remainder of the Preface, a list of Panel members, and Chapter I: "History and Review of Present Program."]

II. Objectives for American Information and Cultural Activities

Public support for the general information and exchange of persons dimensions of U.S. international relations (the first and second functions above) has been justified over the years on two basic levels. First, and most important in the view of the executing agencies themselves, has been the support these programs provide for U.S. foreign policy. However, alongside this objective there has always been a second one, less often articulated but originally cited by Congress as the primary reason for establishing both programs. This goal is the promotion of mutual and reciprocal understanding of the United States abroad and of other countries here, both as an end in itself and as an essential basis for a peaceful world order.

The Panel believes that both objectives remain valid and have actually increased in importance.

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2 Annex I includes the following documents: an excerpt from the 23rd Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, February 1968, calling for an independent critique of official information, educational, and cultural programs; an excerpt from the 24th Report, May 1969, of that same body reiterating that call; Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Report No. 93–168, May 22, 1973, on the USIA's FY 1974 appropriations measure (S. 1317), in which the SFRC made its organizational recommendations; and a July 20, 1973, resolution by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Education and Cultural Affairs to investigate the pertinent functions performed by the USIA and the Department of State.
As to the first, the experience of USIA and CU clearly shows the need to inform people of other cultures about American society and about American perceptions of world affairs before they can be expected even to comprehend, let alone identify with, U.S. foreign policy. The second objective, admittedly, is far more difficult to justify. Nevertheless, it is clearly within the U.S. national interest. While understanding alone will not guarantee either peace or cooperation, without understanding, nations are less likely to define areas where they can cooperate and to pursue this cooperation to mutual advantage. If we are to work with peoples who are very different from ourselves, we must understand them and they must understand us. While not susceptible to scientific proof, then, the value of mutual understanding is accepted as a matter of faith by virtually everyone with broad international experience. The Panel reaffirms its belief that building mutual understanding should be publicly supported by a nation possessing the wealth and world responsibilities of the United States. It applauds the wisdom and forthrightness of Congress in giving active expression to this belief in the Smith–Mundt and Fulbright–Hays Acts.3

Changes in International Environment

The Panel cannot, however, be content with a mere reaffirmation of objectives that guided the program in the 1950s and 1960s. The 1970s are decidedly different times, and the dogmas of even so stormy a past now seem over-shadowed by new realities. In fact, the Panel has been astounded by the way in which developments in international politics, even during its own short existence, have increased the need for these programs and reinforced the objectives they must serve. These changes in the international environment are worth delineating, for they point not only to new reasons for strengthening the performance of the current program but also to ways it should be changed in the future.

In the Panel’s view, the events of the last year have added up to a remarkable acceleration in the tangible interdependence of all nations. The crises in energy, in the international monetary system, and in world food distribution have etched in reality the abstractions of mutual dependence formulated by philosophers for centuries past. Beginning decades ago, the modern revolution in communication and transportation technology, together with rapid population growth, have brought the peoples of the world closer together. Today, altogether new sources of conflict have arisen (like the problems of scarce resources and pollution control) which manifest a striking proximity to

3 The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P.L. 402), known as the Smith–Mundt Act, established the guidelines by which the U.S. Government conducts overseas information and cultural programs. For the Fulbright–Hays Act, see footnote 3, Document 91.
the basic needs of individuals as well as to the diplomatic maneuverings of statesmen. For democratic governments, this has meant a growth in the impact of foreign on domestic policy and vice versa, making accommodation on the international level ever more intertwined with the satisfaction of the needs of their electorates. If no other evidence were available, the experience of millions of Americans waiting for gasoline last winter is proof enough that today everyone is intimately affected by international relations.

Against our growing awareness of these new problems of interdependence, the old conflicts of traditional international politics remain. The rush to independence of the so-called Third World has recently brought the total United Nations membership to 138, with most of the new governments representing peoples that are ill-clothed, ill-housed, ill-fed. It has become commonplace to note that the benefits of science in health and communications have simply resulted in a world peopled by more dissatisfied human beings; the gap between rich and poor as well as between promise and performance grows wider every day. In the realm of great power relationships, the Panel is not persuaded that the current political détente, however desirable, means an end to the sharp East-West struggle that has so dominated postwar politics. There are still two very different forms of social and governmental organization in the world, engaged in serious contention on a variety of fronts and armed—all rhetoric aside—as if they meant business. The United States with all its domestic concerns is still looked to by many abroad for leadership in the free world, and today faces the formidable task of asserting its leadership effectively and of persuading a new generation abroad that American policies remain the surest road to a secure and prosperous international order.

Faced with such formidable challenges, both old and new, all Americans must experience a certain anxiety in assessing the ability of the United States to meet them. No one would doubt the difficulty of the situation. Our sudden awareness of dependence has destroyed the myth of American omnipotence; no nation can impose its will in today’s world, if ever one could. But to say that the solutions for today’s problems must be cooperative should by no means be counsel for despair. Interdependence does not make leadership useless or hopeless, but all the more necessary and rewarding. It may call, to be sure, for a new style of leadership, one that emphasizes new tools and puts old ones to new uses. In the Panel’s view, this diplomatic style will be one in which general information and exchange of persons activities must play a broader though different role than in the past, both in supporting foreign policy and in building mutual understanding. In action and in purpose, we are on the threshold of a new kind of cultural diplomacy.
New Conditions of International Life

In the Panel’s view, then, the following propositions seem self-evident:

1. Among the consequences of growing international interdependence is the prospect that American policies and actions will more than ever be felt abroad. There is, therefore, a greater need to explain the societal context in which those policies and actions are generated.

2. The new issues on the international agenda—energy, environment, food, oceans, population—involves individuals very directly. The societal forces and factors which set in motion the policies intended to address this new agenda of people-oriented issues will have to be explained.

3. In an era of negotiations leading to détente, there are new needs and opportunities to communicate with peoples, many of whom have been cut off from dialogue with us in the postwar period. Détente both requires and makes possible the fuller international expression of American ideas. It enables the United States to extend the conduct of its cultural diplomacy to countries which until now have been off limits.

4. The rise to significance of non-Western countries, especially in the Middle East and Asia, makes the job of international communications more difficult for the United States. At the same time, the growing importance of countries whose culture differs greatly from our own requires that the United States help them understand what lies behind American policy commitments.

5. While the United States retains considerable, perhaps predominant, power in international affairs, the capacity of America to dictate the course of international events has diminished. This means that the United States will have to count more than ever on explanation and persuasion. The new premium on persuasion makes cultural diplomacy essential to the achievement of American foreign policy goals.

These new conditions of international life not only establish the continuing need for strong governmental support of an expanded information and cultural program but also point to the new style and content it must assume. In the first place, the program must recognize that the communications revolution has educated the world to a greater skepticism concerning the things governments say about their societies. Hence, there is a great need today for credibility, to convince others that a program run by the American Government is presenting an objective picture of American society.

Second, if American leadership is to be redirected toward cooperative solutions to our common problems, the new programs must also be genuinely reciprocal. All too often, programming has seemed to reflect a ballistic concept of communication—a one-way shooting of a
message at a target. Today, however, Americans realize that they have much to learn as well as to teach and that cooperative leadership requires good listening as well as persuasive talking. America’s new leadership style will thus require dialogue, with the emphasis placed on the “mutual” side of building mutual understanding.

Public Support Justified

These last remarks on mutuality throw a new perspective on the concern with which we began this chapter, namely, the justification for continuing and increasing public support of the information and cultural program. Unquestionably, the conditions of today’s international environment have elevated not only the absolute need for these programs (both to build mutual understanding and as backup to U.S. foreign policy) but also their relative importance among the diplomatic tools at our command. In addition, however, the new cultural diplomacy in its mutual aspect will provide direct benefits to individuals, foundations, educational institutions, and business enterprises—to the hundreds of thousands of past and potential exchanges and the millions more who will benefit from contact with those who come to the United States. The program thus has the opportunity to evolve a genuinely symbiotic relationship with the private sector, rendering benefits far beyond those resulting from a successful foreign policy and in turn multiplying its own resources and impact many times through the efforts of the people it benefits.

To summarize, the Panel concludes that new conditions in today’s world necessitate both a strengthening of cultural diplomacy and a restructuring of its activities. Its purpose, concisely expressed, would be to contribute to mutual knowledge and understanding that is increasingly necessary for the effective communication and execution of American policy in cooperation with other nations. To fulfill this responsibility, the Panel has concluded that the new cultural diplomacy needs a new organizational home, one that will encourage and facilitate its accomplishment of this broad purpose. The next chapter is devoted to an explanation of that part of the Panel’s proposals.

[Omitted here are Chapter III on the Panel’s proposed Information and Cultural Affairs Agency, Chapter IV on the proposed Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information, and Chapter V on the VOA.]

VI. Recommendations for Implementation

In previous chapters the Panel has elaborated in some detail its recommendations for reorganization of American programs in the field of international information, education, and cultural relations. In the process we have attempted to explain the reasons why such reorganization seems logical and desirable, beginning with the challenges faced
by cultural diplomacy in the 1970's, and continuing with the characteristics we consider essential for any government structure seeking to meet them. The tasks remaining, then, are only two: first, to review our recommendations in order to lay out both the relationship between them and the total governmental structure that will result; and second, to explain what practical actions are necessary for our plan to be put into effect.

An Outline for the Future

In Chapter I we described four functions that the Panel has used to categorize the many activities of USIA and CU; these functions formed the foundation for the discussions in subsequent chapters. Our initial distinction was between the policy information and advisory functions, on the one hand, and general information plus the exchange of persons, on the other. The first two functions, it was submitted, simply could not be performed without the closest relationship to the people who actually formulate American foreign policy. In the absence of any convincing arguments against that association, it was concluded that the two functions should be fully integrated into the existing structure of the Department of State, the institutional repository of the policy making process. In particular, we recommended (in Chapter IV) that they should be the responsibility of a new State Department Office of Policy Information. This office would disseminate information about U.S. foreign policy overseas and advise the Secretary as to the state of public opinion worldwide.

By contrast, the second two functions, though needed to support foreign policy, could, in the Panel’s view, quite adequately be performed without involvement in the political vicissitudes of day-to-day policy problems. Indeed, due to their need for a close relationship to the private sector, a position somewhat detached from the daily administration of foreign policy seemed desirable. However, it was also found necessary to ensure that their programming would be directed to the service of long-range foreign policy goals. The similarity of the general information and exchange of persons functions in this delicate relationship to foreign policy, plus the unanimous assertion by practitioners of public diplomacy that people and media must be programmed together overseas, led to the conclusion that the two should be combined in an autonomous organization within the Department of State. We recommended the establishment of such an Information and Cultural Affairs Agency in Chapter III.

Finally, the Voice of America, though heavily involved in both policy and general information, was found to be a special case because of its third function as a news disseminator. It was therefore decided that it would fit neither in the regular policy structure of the Department nor in the newly established ICA. It was accordingly recom-
mended (in Chapter V) that it be organized as a separate agency under a presidentially-appointed Board of Directors.

A three-part organizational solution has thus emerged: policy information and advice would be folded into the Department of State, general information and exchange of persons would be integrated in the ICA, and the VOA would be established independently of each and responsible only to its Board. The three organizations would interrelate, but in rather different ways. The most direct connection would be between the VOA and the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Policy Information, who would sit on the Voice Board of Directors and whose office would furnish directly the foreign policy statements to be aired on the radio. The Director of the ICA would also sit on the VOA Board, but the Agency’s relationship to the Voice would only be that of providing general advice for the VOA cultural output. The ICA, as its autonomous status indicates, would likewise receive only general advice from the Secretary and the Deputy Under Secretary on the long-range policy goals that the information and cultural program should support. The Office of Policy Information would be almost completely independent of the other two, drawing its sustenance from its intimate involvement in the foreign policy process as conducted at the highest levels of the Department.

Overseas, the present triad of PAO–IO–CAO would be replaced by a Press Counselor/Attache´ (reporting to the Department of State) and an Information-Cultural Counselor/Attache´ (reporting to the ICA). Both the Department and the Agency would thus have their own officers in the field to execute their respective programs, instead of the current pattern, whereby CU programs are executed by USIA officers. The Press and Information-Cultural Counselors/Attache´s would work closely together, maintaining the pattern of teamwork that has so effectively interrelated the policy and general information programs in the past.

[Omitted here is a section entitled “Getting from Here to There,” on the logistics of implementing the Panel’s organizational recommendations.]

VII. Conclusions

In offering this report, the Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations wishes to emphasize the scope of the task it has undertaken. We recognized from the start that we were analyzing programs that have been of enormous benefit to our country over the course of a quarter century or more, activities which we believe have more than justified the resources and attention devoted to them.

The Panel thus did not set out to alter radically American programs in the field of public diplomacy. It set out, instead, to improve
the government’s capacity to carry them forward in the present and, if possible, in the developing international environment of the future. And, in the course of its investigations, the Panel found three major problems which nearly all witnesses agreed were hampering the execution of these programs now and were likely to cripple them in the future:

I. the division of one program between two agencies, USIA and the Department of State;
II. the assignment, to an agency separate from and independent of the State Department, of the task of interpreting U.S. foreign policy to the world and advising in its formulation; and
III. the ambiguous positioning of the Voice of America at the crossroads of journalism and diplomacy.

The Panel’s recommendations endeavor to solve these problems primarily by combining presently fragmented programs:

I. by uniting the two agencies responsible for American information, education, and cultural relations;
II. by uniting all foreign policy information and advisory functions in the one Department where they can be properly executed; and
III. by establishing the VOA in a position worthy of its unique role and mission.

The Panel recognizes that the solutions to our problems require organizational changes, but organizational forms do not adapt themselves to new conditions unless initiatives are taken. USIA and CU have done admirably in circumstances very different from those for which they were designed. Their dedicated officials, however, have labored too long under needless structural burdens. It is time, in the Panel’s view, to set them free.

Stanton Panel Recommendations—My Personal Views

The Task Force on the Stanton Panel Report, in preparing the memorandum sent you on April 26, adhered as closely as possible to your instruction that it not develop recommended courses of action. In this memorandum I want to try to identify what I think are the salient substantive factors that should influence the course of action of the Department.

From the outset of the Stanton review, and before, I have been convinced that it concerned a substantive problem of importance to our foreign relations and not just a bureaucratic issue related to government organization. The changes over the past twenty-five years in the nature of the relations between our own and other societies have dramatically altered the means and methods we need to employ in communicating with others. For one thing, the agendas and even the positions of governments are increasingly constrained by the perceptions and pressures of unofficial actors; this enhanced involvement of people and institutions is both an important determinant and an asset in foreign policy. For another, dialogue has replaced monologue as the preferred strategy to influence intersocietal relationships.

My view has been and remains that it is essential to our national interest that we develop more coherence in the variety of governmental programs which encourage or otherwise influence the linkages and other processes that relate America to other nations. The continued division between State and USIA in the cultural field is a self-imposed handicap we should no longer tolerate. Whether these now-divided activities are combined in an agency integrated within the State Department structure or allied closely with it in some other manner are bu-


2 The Stanton Panel’s report is Document 103. In a February 7 memorandum to Ingersoll, Richardson recommended that a task force, chaired by the Deputy Secretary, be established to formulate the Department’s position on the Stanton Panel’s report. Ingersoll approved. Richardson forwarded the working group’s first draft position paper to Ingersoll under an April 26 covering memorandum. Richardson’s memoranda and the paper are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lot 78 D 184, Stanton Panel, 1975)
reaucratic questions, less important, in my judgment, than acceptance of the premise that they have to be brought together. I shall have some further comments on this in the paragraphs below.

I share the view of others that the Stanton recommendation for separating the so-called spokesman from the cultural communications role, both in Washington and overseas, is a sound conceptual breakthrough which we should accept enthusiastically. There is a sharp distinction between programs designed to articulate and advocate current U.S. policies and the kinds of cultural communications programs supporting longer-range policy objectives through enhanced, two-way understanding. The first involves the articulation and elucidation of a political message. The cultural communications activities are quite different, centering not on a sharp policy line but on the development of perspectives and dialogue to enhance foreign understanding of America’s complex pluralistic society as well as American understanding of the intricacies of foreign environments with which we have to relate. We do not and should not attempt to foster cultural relations between us and others in accordance with a particular line dictated by the American position on a transient political issue. Suffice it to say that practically no one in the Department seems to disagree with the Stanton conclusion that the policy articulation and cultural communications functions should be separate and distinct.

To say that the policy articulation function must be completely integrated in the Department is not to suggest that cultural communications activities (in which I include general or long-range information activities) are less relevant to foreign policy objectives. Many believe that over a period of time the development of constructive patterns of communication and understanding between us and other societies will make an even greater contribution to the prospects for world stability, cooperation, and our own national security. Without presenting parochial arguments on this point, I would assert that our capabilities in the field of cultural communications should be seen by responsible officials as significant to the attainment of the objectives we seek. If accepted, this conclusion suggests intimate policy relationships between the cultural programs, the Seventh Floor, and the regional and functional bureaus.

My inclination is to believe that this can best be achieved by integrating them in the Department under an Under Secretary. Experience with the USIA pattern over the past twenty-plus years should convince us that the price of separation is an unacceptable reduction in program relevancy on both the policy articulation and cultural communications fronts. There is, however, some advantage in maintaining a slight distance between these programs and the day-to-day operational pres-
sures of the Department, provided the guidance mechanisms are adequate. In addition, there is a probable plus in budget separation.

These considerations have led me to believe that, if integration is not appealing or feasible, the head of the semi-independent cultural agency, as recommended by the Stanton Panel, should be double-hatted as an Under Secretary of State. In this latter capacity, he would also be responsible for such related but separate communications functions of the Department as PA and the support of our overseas policy articulation operations. (The spokesman in the Department would of course continue as at present to work with and be immediately responsive to the direction of the Secretary.)

On the VOA issue, I have no strong preference.

A great deal has been said within the Department and by AFSA about the problems surrounding personnel integration. While I have no brief for immediate integration, I am convinced that failure to make a commitment to bring the FSO/FSIO personnel systems together, eventually, would needlessly deprive us of the full potential advantages of whatever organizational realignments occur. The psychological impact of separation runs deep, and I know of no better way to assure a sense of belonging than by making personnel working on cultural communications questions a part of the same personnel system which administers our consular, administrative, political and economic activities.

105. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for East Asia and the Pacific, United States Information Agency (Payeff) to the Director (Keogh) and Deputy Director (Kopp)1

Washington, May 9, 1975.

SUBJECT

East Asia Assessments

Attached are the cabled replies we received following our request to IEA posts for a reassessment of program priorities in the wake of

the Viet Nam collapse.\textsuperscript{2} Also attached is a set of abstracts taken from these cables which will provide a quick idea of the substance of the responses.

We have found these useful in our program planning and were very pleased at the posts' thoughtful responses.

Attachment

Paper Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Director for East Asia and the Pacific, United States Information Agency (Payeff)\textsuperscript{3}

Washington, undated.

REASSESSMENT REPORT ABSTRACTS

In the wake of the fall of South Viet Nam, IEA began a reassessment of its East Asia programs\textsuperscript{4} and asked its posts to submit their own evaluations of the impact of Viet Nam and Cambodia on public opinion and program implications for USIA. Following are abstracts of each post’s response:

\textit{Japan}

The American defeat has been in good part written off by the Japanese since the US withdrawal two years ago. Although events in Southeast Asia are a destabilizing factor on the international political scene,

\textsuperscript{2} The cables were not found attached. The VOA, which was under the authority of the USIA, received criticism for allegedly suppressing news of developments leading up to the American evacuation of Vietnam. Senator Lloyd Bentsen (D–Texas) wrote Kissinger on April 10 “to inquire about reports that the Voice of America, on your instructions, has recently begun censoring and suppressing news of events in Southeast Asia.” (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975) Later, during hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on USIA’s FY 76 budget authorization, Senator Percy stated, “during the last two months of April, as the evacuation of Americans from Vietnam became a preoccupation of the world press, the administration, and the Congress, the VOA news was not similarly preoccupied.” This oversight, he claimed, represented a violation of the VOA’s charter, which required it to broadcast “accurate, objective, and comprehensive” news. (Richard M. Weintraub, “Percy Says VOA Violated Charter,” \textit{Washington Post}, May 6, 1975, p. A10)

\textsuperscript{3} Confidential.

\textsuperscript{4} During its November 27, 1974, meeting, USIA’s Executive Committee discussed and approved a plan for reorganizing its USIS Vietnam program and staff. (National Archives, RG 305, Records of the USIA, Executive Committee File, 1975, Accession 306–89–0045, Meeting No. 232)
we must respond to larger Japanese concerns over such issues as oil, food, monetary stability and trade balances. Multilateral cooperation is required; the unity of the developed world must continue to receive our first attention. We must also explain to the Japanese the nature of our Viet Nam commitment and how it differs from our security treaty with Japan.

Korea

Even before the fall of Indochina, the task of convincing Korean target audiences of American determination and ability to meet its commitments was already difficult because of the public debate over our military role in the ROK. In the post-Viet Nam period, all Korean target audiences recognize all too clearly that crucial US Executive Branch decisions affecting the ROK will be strongly influenced by Congressional and public attitudes, of which the Koreans are extremely uncertain. We must therefore attempt to obtain and transmit reassuring public comment from key Congressional members in the foreign affairs and military areas. A discussion of the stakes that the US, PRC, and USSR have in continuing détente would also be useful.

Thailand

The recent Indochina developments have speeded up Thailand’s reassessment of its foreign policy and relations with the U.S. What is important now is for Washington to determine our policy goals so that the Mission and USIS can disseminate these and influence Thai public opinion. If the determination and articulation of U.S. policy is delayed, we risk allowing the momentum of public opinion in Thailand to fill the vacuum and compel the Thai Government to fix its own policies without a clear perception of US regional intent.

During this waiting period, programs on U.S. security relations in Asia lack credibility and may in fact do damage to our relations. Thais still see us as friends and admire much in the American system. It is to our advantage to support Thai aspirations for the development of democratic institutions, economic development, and an increased role as a leader in the affairs of the region.

Our programs should focus on expansion of the exchange programs, support promotion of trade and economic cooperation, reinforce Thailand’s growing interest in regional cooperation, and publicize the U.S. assistance effort in Thailand.

Philippines

The US is in the midst of sensitive renegotiations with the GOP on trade and military base agreements, and the developments in Indo-
china have had a direct impact on Philippine attitudes. The Marcos\(^5\) government, although formally still wedded to its US alliance is keeping its options open, encouraging anti-American columnists and arguing for an independent policy and closer ties with the Third World. We must emphasize that the US intends to maintain a presence in Asia and that we will honor our defense commitments to the Philippines. In addition, we should aim at improving the image of the US military and stress the contribution of American business and the military bases to the country’s economic and military security. US policy in Asia is the key issue at the present.

**Indonesia**

The Indonesians are concerned about the role of the US Congress and the ultimate direction of US foreign policy, fearing the possibility of a US withdrawal from Asia. It is highly important that American policies and problems be communicated to the broadest spectrum of influential Indonesians in an effort to instill confidence that we intend to maintain our presence in Asia and to fully keep our treaty commitments. Round-ups of American opinion from periodicals, statements of Congressmen and American notables outside the USG which focus on support for continued American presence in Asia would be most useful.

**Singapore**

It is not so much the loss of Indochina which concerns the Singaporeans as the perceived loss of a sense of proportion by the US administration and indications that our failure in Viet Nam would place serious limitations on world-wide US capabilities. We should focus our programming on the benefits accruing from the end of our involvement; hoping that we have all learned the lesson that America is not omnipotent and that other nations cannot rely on Uncle Sam to do what they should be doing themselves. Our emphasis should be on how we snap back from defeat and the various inputs into making a new and realistic foreign policy.

**Kuala Lumpur**

The US “failure” in Indochina serves to strengthen the Malaysian argument for neutralization of Southeast Asia. Faced with the reality that American military power is ineffective in dealing with subversion and insurgency of the type present in Malaysia, respect remains only for American military power to deter global war and promote disarmament. Confidence in US economic power, technological and scientific

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\(^5\) Ferdinand E. Marcos, President of the Philippines.
capability, and our leadership role in seeking solutions for world economic and social problems remains. Our emphasis should now be in demonstrating American achievements and leadership ability in these fields, highlighting the strengths of American society.

Hong Kong

The denouement in Indochina has left Hong Kong viewing USG as “very clearly in default.” Until USG clarifies its policies re China and Southeast Asia, and enunciates them at the highest levels, the post feels it most useful to concentrate on programming illustrating American political processes and the viability of the American system.

Taiwan

Until the line set forth by Chiang Kai Shek changes drastically, of which there are no signs so far, the ROC will have particular concern about USG steadfastness vis-à-vis the PRC and nascent Communist takeovers. The results in Indochina have heightened the ever-present doubts on Taiwan about USG intentions and capabilities in Asia. ROC concerns go beyond declared Administration policy to Congressional and public willingness to support a strong American role in international politics. As a corollary, a stricter definition of détente on the part of the USG may raise the problem of generating unwarranted hope in the ROC. Unless and until a new USG policy emerges the post suggests continuing on its present course, with more effort at explaining American society and the USG conception of détente.

Burma

The USG and Burma have no mutual commitments, but contrast between USG words and deeds re Indochina are not lost on the Burmese. Until USG policy clarifies post suggest emphasizing themes of vitality of American political processes, society and culture.

Laos

Already a coalition government, and for a long time a direct factor in the general Indochinese situation, Laos is not subject to the same policy reassessments which haunt some other Asian countries. American policy has been in support of coalition and stability, and the post urges that its programming continue in the same direction.

Australia

The Australian labor Government’s policy in recent months had tilted considerably towards Hanoi at the expense of Saigon and had been critical of continued US involvement in Vietnam. This policy has

6 Chiang Kai-shek (Jiang Jieshi), President of the Republic of China.
caused considerable internal political problems for the Whitlam\textsuperscript{7} government which are reaching almost the crisis stage. The post believes that its highest priority objective stated in its 1975 CPP—to encourage appreciation of the importance of the alliance of Australia with the US and the retention of US facilities in the country—should continue to receive priority emphasis and support. They request Agency support for this objective which also emphasizes the determination of the US to remain a Pacific power and that US foreign policy does not include a withdrawal from our commitments in this area of the world.

\textit{New Zealand}

There is a general concern on the future role of the US in the Pacific. There is belief that the US no longer has the ability or the desire to control events in Asia. There is also concern that the reduced military role of the US in the area may be followed by a paralleled aloof stance in political and commercial contacts. Even the pronouncements by US officials following the recent ANZUS meeting\textsuperscript{8} have not fully assured the New Zealanders that our reassessment of policy would not produce greater retrenchment. The post believes that its original priorities for program emphasis are correct. Its primary objective concerns itself with “American Foreign Policy and Balance of Power in Asia”. The Post further feels that due to the recent events, greater emphasis be placed on this objective.

\textsuperscript{7} E. Gough Whitlam, Prime Minister of Australia.

106. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

USIA and the Stanton Report

You expressed an interest in the NSC’s position should be regarding Frank Stanton’s report on USIA. In particular, you asked what position Director Keogh has been told the White House holds on the subject.

As you will recall, the Stanton Panel recommended that the USIA’s information functions be transferred to the Department of State; that the long-range cultural and educational functions of USIA and State be combined into a new autonomous agency within State; and that the Voice of America be established as an independent entity under a Government/Public Board. In your meeting with Stanton on March 11, you were careful not to endorse these recommendations but merely indicated they would receive careful attention within the Executive Branch.

A task force has been formed within State under the direction of Deputy Secretary Ingersoll to study the implications of Stanton’s proposals. But any formal Administration position has been held up pending the report of the Murphy Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy. The Commission’s report, due in July, is expected to incorporate much of the work of the Stanton Panel and make further recommendations in the information-cultural area. We have thus taken the position that any Administration position on these issues would be premature pending the Murphy Commission’s report. The NSC staff has similarly held off

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1 Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 178, FG 230: United States Information Agency (Executive), 6/1/75–12/31/75. No classification marking. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads: “The President Has Seen.” Ford also initialed the memorandum, which an attached correspondence profile indicates he noted on June 5. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Janka sent it to Kissinger on May 6 with the recommendation that he sign it and forward it to the President. (Ibid., 1/1/75–5/30/75)

2 In a May 5 memorandum, Rumsfeld notified Scowcroft that Ford “would like some information on the NSC’s views concerning USIA.” (Ibid.) The Stanton Panel report is Document 103.

3 See Document 102.

4 The Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, chaired by Robert D. Murphy, issued its final report on June 27. For more on the Murphy Commission’s findings, see Documents 45, 147, and 179. The Commission’s
undertaking a formal review, with a view toward a full interagency study of both the Stanton and Murphy Commission proposals later this summer.

After his meeting with you, Stanton was reported to be saying that you favored his proposals. Director Keogh checked with the White House and was told by Don Rumsfeld that the White House would not take a position on the Stanton Report. He has subsequently held closely to the line that any formal Administration position should await a full interagency review of the Stanton proposals and the results of the Murphy Commission’s study. However, Keogh has published his own, personal critique of the Stanton Report and has used this critique as a USIA position in Congressional testimony. A copy of the relevant portion of Keogh’s opening statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Monday is at Tab A (the remainder of the statement covered the USIA budget authorization).

In summary, Keogh disagrees with Stanton’s recommendations to restructure U.S. information and cultural activities because there would be no central planning and coordination, since there would be no central management in Stanton’s scheme. Our public diplomacy functions would be split into too many different agencies and would not be effective. To quote Keogh, “... it would fragment rather than consolidate and thereby weaken rather than strengthen.”

three recommendations with regard to public diplomacy coincided with those of the Stanton Panel. First, the Commission recommended that “the function of policy advocacy should be placed in the Department of State,” where a proposed Senior Officer for Policy Information would “direct the press, public affairs and policy information functions currently assigned to the Department, and those to be transferred to State from the U.S. Information Agency.” Second, it recommended that “the longer range functions of cultural communication and general information should be combined in a separate agency,” a proposed Information and Cultural Affairs Agency. This new agency was to absorb the Department’s extant Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and be independent from, but responsible to, State. Third, the Murphy Commission recommended that VOA “should be independent, under a separate board made up of public and private members, taking guidance from the Department of State on all policy commentary.” (Report of the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 5–6, 12–13, 136–141)

5 Keogh sent his 16-page critique to Scowcroft, Rumsfeld, and Friedersdorf under separate covering letters, April 14. (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 30, FO 5: Information—Exchange Activities (Executive) (1)) Friedersdorf forwarded Keogh’s critique to Marsh under an April 14 covering memorandum, on which Marsh wrote: “This appears to be throwing the baby out with the bath water.” (Ibid., John Marsh Files, General Subject File, Box 42, United States Information Agency) Previously, on March 11, Keogh sent Scowcroft a copy of his press release responding to the Stanton Panel’s report. Janka forwarded it to Scowcroft under a March 19 memorandum, which Scowcroft initialed. (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 178, FG 230: United States Information Agency (Executive), 1/1/75–5/30/75)

6 The text of Keogh’s opening statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, dated May 5 and summarized below, is attached but not printed.
Some of the specific problems that Keogh foresees under Stanton’s proposed structure would be:

—The international cultural programs would lack substance and realism due to their distance from, and lack of concern with, foreign policy; as such they would be taken even less seriously by Congress and the Department of State.

—An enlarged public affairs bureau at State would not give the priority to explaining U.S. policy to foreign audiences that a separate USIA does.

—State would not be able to provide the timely constant flow of policy commentaries and news analysis to a Voice of America constituted as a separate agency, nor would such an independent Voice be as amenable to USG policy guidance.

Keogh’s critique emphasizes the key issues involved in such a restructuring and notes several of the budgetary and management problems such a fragmentation would engender. His alternative is to unite the cultural, educational, and information programs of State’s CU, USIA, and other agencies into a new and strengthened independent agency with direct, effective policy ties to the White House, NSC and the Department of State.

We shall continue to follow Congressional interest in these issues very closely and will ensure that no Administration positions are taken on these proposals without a full interagency review and presentation of any reorganization plans for your approval.
Approach to Soviets on Implementation of CSCE Provisions on Humanitarian Affairs

We have revised this memorandum and telegram to Moscow to take into account recent developments and your instructions that Embassy Moscow take a positive tone in its initiative with the Soviets, which would be general except for a few Basket III issues. Many of the points raised by Embassy Moscow are deferred for further study within the Department and with other agencies.

The Problem

Embassy Moscow has outlined an initial démarche to the Soviets calling for action on a number of bilateral problems, many of them long-standing, putting them into the context of the CSCE Final Act. This would be the first in a series of similar démarches to Warsaw Pact countries.

Background/Discussion

Pursuant to our instructions (Tab 2), US NATO has begun consultation with our allies, and Embassy Moscow has recommended an immediate approach to the Soviets on a series of issues in the human-
rights/humanitarian-affairs field, such as family reunification, requests for marriages, visits by relatives, and improved conditions for American journalists, students, and businessmen (Tab 3). The Embassy followed this up by recommending other initiatives in the information, cultural, and educational areas for future presentation to the Soviets (Tab 4). Ambassador Stoessel referred to the CSCE provisions when he presented the new US Representation List in Moscow and in our renewed proposal to the Soviets for reciprocal issuance of multiple visas to American and Soviet journalists. Embassy Prague has also recommended prompt bilateral initiatives on important existing problems (Tab 5).

We see no contradiction between multilateral and bilateral efforts to encourage implementation of the CSCE provisions by the Warsaw Pact countries and to monitor their performance. As Embassy Moscow notes, some issues within CSCE, such as CBMs, will require particularly close coordination and consultations and all will require close monitoring. Consultations will provide useful background for bilateral approaches to all Warsaw Pact nations.

As shown by the journalists’ visa cases, a well staffed-out program of bilateral initiatives toward the Soviet Union offers hope of success, and Soviet actions undoubtedly will set the tone for performance by their allies. Some visible progress by the Soviets on human rights questions would also be a shot in the arm for the Administration’s détente policies by demonstrating our intention to follow up on those elements of the CSCE agenda which are of particular concern to us. We will want to keep our allies closely informed of our efforts, and in some cases coordinate with them in areas of common interest. At the same time, we will not want to miss the opportunity of taking vigorous, speedy action at a time when the Soviets may see a potential advantage in making positive movement on some outstanding issues. We support the idea of an immediate approach in Moscow on some Basket III items

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4 Tab 3, telegram 12127 from Moscow, August 26, is ibid.
5 Tab 4, telegram 12308 from Moscow, August 28, notes that “information, culture, and education provide promising fields for post-CSCE bilateral initiatives vis-à-vis Soviets.” Among the Embassy’s suggested initiatives were: placing more “U.S. films, TV material and radio items in Soviet media;” expanding the “distribution of American newspapers, journals and other periodicals in the Soviet Union;” increasing the “translation of each country’s literature, and especially in connection with the Bicentennial;” and widening other educational and cultural exchange programs. (Ibid., D750299–0306) CU’s preliminary proposals for implementation of relevant portions of the CSCE Final Act are in the Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Records of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Subject Files, 1960–1976: Lot 78 D 184, Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe (CSCE).
6 Tab 5, telegram 2168 from Prague, August 26, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975.
to be followed later by an approach on other cultural and information aspects which will need more extensive study.

 Recommendation:

 That you approve the cable at Tab 1 authorizing Embassy Moscow to make an immediate démarche to the Soviets on the implementation of CSCE provisions in the area of human rights and humanitarian affairs.7

 7 Tab 1, telegram Secto 14005 to Moscow, was sent on September 28. (Ibid.)

108. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Request for Restoration of Fulbright–Hays Exchange Program Budget Cut

I urge you to restore $8 million appropriated by Congress for Fiscal Year 1976 (and the transitional quarter) and $10 million for Fiscal Year 1977 for the Fulbright–Hays exchange-of-persons program.2

Many regard this program as the most cost-effective of any we have in the field of foreign affairs. Our $65 million request for Fiscal Year 1977 (previously reduced by the Office of Management and Budget from $79 million) would permit us, with adjustments, to carry on the most essential elements of present exchange arrangements while responding also to several urgent new foreign policy needs.

All over the world I encounter former participants now in key positions: 200 are now members of cabinets in other countries; so are one in seven heads of state in the world today, not to mention thousands of editors, commentators, university presidents, prize-winning novelists, trade union executives, parliamentarians, historians and civic leaders in this and every other country in the world. Daily we are able to draw

1 Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, Box 30, FO 5: Information—Exchange Activities (Executive) (2). Unclassified.

2 Fulbright, who resigned from the Senate on December 31, 1974, following an unsuccessful bid for reelection, sent a letter to President Ford on December 15, 1975, urging him “to support the modest sum suggested by the Secretary of State.” (Ibid.)
on the reservoir of enhanced international understanding these activities promote.

Through this program we now cooperate with and help support the international activities of hundreds of private American organizations, comprising the cream of American leadership interested in our foreign relations. These include scholarly institutions, professional and business associations, journalist organizations, young political leadership groups, service clubs, women's organizations, sports associations and many more.

I am especially concerned about a cut in a program which was allowed to deteriorate in the '60s but is widely known in this country and abroad to have been steadily strengthened and improved since then.

Carried out between the U.S. and 122 countries, Fulbright–Hays exchanges express and help us to confront the growing interdependence of nations and provide support for policy initiatives in all parts of the world.

Our Soviet and East European cultural and educational activities are on a rapidly rising curve. We are expanding programs in Portugal, Italy, Greece, Cyprus and Turkey. Ambassadors in Africa clamor for more exchange-of-persons money, arguing that this is the most useful tool of diplomacy they have. Our current policy posture toward Latin America requires the further development of precisely the low key, mutually respectful communications capability the exchange program represents. Additional support is also needed for new joint commission undertakings in the Middle East. And in East Asia, the “mutual understanding” these exchanges foster is crucial because the power relationships are changing in an area where cultures and ways of thinking are fundamentally different from ours. These are some of the factors exerting upward pressure on this budget.

I have reexamined allocations within the total Department budget and have concluded that further reprogramming to meet this need would be unduly disruptive.

I strongly believe this Administration should continue to provide solid support to this sound and highly effective people-to-people dimension of our policy.

Recommendations:

1. That you refrain from any request to Congress to rescind funds already appropriated for the Fulbright–Hays program for Fiscal Year 1976;3

3 The memorandum bears no indication that Ford approved or disapproved either of Kissinger’s recommendations. However, according to a handwritten note on a December 22 memorandum from Janka to Scowcroft, Ford “restored $3 million (FY 77) of
2. That you include in your Fiscal Year 1977 budget request $65 million for the Fulbright–Hays program.

OMB cut” during a meeting that afternoon to discuss the FY 77 Federal budget. Scowcroft notified Fulbright in a January 6, 1976, letter that Ford “has agreed to restore $3 million of the funds which had been tentatively cut from the budget request for this program for fiscal year 1977. Our FY 77 budget will therefore include the sum of $58 million for these programs, which, while not all we would wish to provide, is relatively generous in a budget so constrained as this.” Janka’s memorandum and Scowcroft’s letter are ibid., White House Central Files, Subject Files, FO 5: Information—Exchange Activities (Executive) (2).

109. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT

Organization of International Information, Educational and Cultural Relations

The Department of State has carefully studied the report made by the Panel on International Information, Educational and Cultural Relations which was issued on March 11, 1975.² The Panel’s proposals provided a useful stimulus to an evaluation by this Department of the mission and structure of United States information and cultural programs.

Following discussions of this issue among appropriate officials of the Department³ and after weighing various options, we have

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Records, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 (1066), Box 7, Relations with State, 1975–1977. Unclassified. Richardson initialed the memorandum. Although no drafting information appears on this version of the memorandum, a previous version, December 17, 1975, was drafted by Frederic N. Spotts (M) and cleared by Richardson and Eagleburger. (Ibid., RG 59, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977: Lot 77 D 112, Entry 5027, Box 359, Chronological File, Jan 1–15, 1976) NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis prompted the Department for its assessment of the Stanton Panel report in an October 28, 1975, memorandum to Springsteen, who replied that, as of November 5, the Department was “still studying the recommendations” and had “not yet reached any final conclusions.” Both memoranda are in the Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 178, FG 230 United States Information Agency (Executive), 6/1/75–12/31/75.

² The Panel’s report, made public on March 15, 1975, is Document 103.

³ For Richardson’s personal views, see Document 104.
reached a number of general conclusions which we submit for your consideration.

The fundamental need is to establish policy coherence in our international communications efforts. They should serve two related goals:

1. Encourage respect for America and American policies in our interdependent world. This requires coherent articulation, honest explanation and fidelity to our commitment to individual liberty and cultural diversity.

2. Promote interactions which deepen mutual understanding, encourage rationality and strengthen cooperation among Americans and other peoples.

We do not believe the Panel’s recommendations to divide our information programs into “policy information” and other information programs and to establish the Voice of America as an independent agency will contribute to this needed coherence and therefore we do not favor these recommendations. With specific reference to the VOA, it is our view that the VOA must at all times be fully responsive to our foreign policy objectives and must therefore maintain its present close links to USIA, and through USIA to this Department, for guidance. We believe that this arrangement is highly advisable, whatever decisions are reached on the Panel’s other proposals.

On the other hand, integration of the functions of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs with those of USIA in an agency related to the State Department in such a way as to assure creative as well as coordinated policy management would be a major step forward.

We would therefore (1) merge the Department’s educational and cultural activities with USIA, (2) continue VOA’s organic relationship to USIA, (3) provide for effective State Department leadership in planning and coordinating coherent communications strategies by establishing a new Under Secretary in the area of intercultural communications who would also serve as director of the expanded USIA, and (4) maintain program independence and creativity by providing the organizational and budgetary autonomy for USIA in a relationship to the Department like that of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. We also believe that the new, expanded USIA should probably be renamed in order to reflect its broad responsibilities in the area of intercultural communication.

By virtue of his dual assignment, the new Under Secretary would have both staff and operational functions. He would assure that foreign policy considerations govern the development and operation of communications programs and that the policy formulation process has adequate regard for communications considerations. In addition, he would provide communications policy guidance for other international affairs agencies, such as Defense, AID, and the Peace Corps, as
well as for those departments and agencies whose programs, while domestically oriented, are related in significant measure to intercultural communications.

These arrangements, in addition to encouraging policy coherence would permit improved program management and a simplification of bureaucratic structure plus administrative and personnel savings.

Our final recommendation is that no steps should be taken at the present time regarding the Panel’s recommendation to integrate USIA’s FSIO's into the Department’s FSO Corps. The issue of personnel integration should, however, be reexamined at a later date.

In our view, the implementation of these, or alternative proposals should be deferred to the next Administration. They need, however, to be explored carefully with other agencies and with the Congress, and we recommend that the State Department be authorized to be responsive along the above lines in discussions within the Executive Branch and with the appropriate Committees of Congress.

Robert S. Ingersoll

110. Memorandum From Les Janka of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)

Washington, April 19, 1976.

SUBJECT

Panel on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations

The purpose of this memo is to review with you the developments regarding the Stanton Panel’s recommendations for the reorganization of the information/cultural functions of the USIA and State Department\(^2\) and seek your guidance on how best to proceed from here. As you are aware, the Administration has yet to take a formal position on the Panel’s recommendations. Following your request of last De-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents, Box 60, Additional Options on Stanton Panel Report on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations. No classification marking.

2 See Document 103.
mber, I solicited the views of State, USIA and OMB on these recommendations to ascertain the pros and cons of expediting a final Executive Branch position on the Stanton Report. These comments, as well as an assessment of congressional interest in the issue, are outlined in this memo. With only one exception, there is no pressure for action at this time. However, Representative Wayne Hays has hinted he may require an administration position in connection with USIA’s FY 77 authorization hearings next month.

Background

The Panel on International Information, Education and Cultural Relations (the Stanton Panel), created under the auspices of the Georgetown University Center for Strategic and International Studies in the Fall of 1973 to undertake a study of the functions and performance of the USIA and State Department in this area, issued its recommendations on March 11, 1975. Its final report called for a reorganization of USIA and VOA along the following lines:

—All information and cultural activities now carried out by the Department of State and USIA would be combined into a new autonomous agency reporting to the Secretary of State.

—All domestic and international programs which articulate and explain U.S. foreign policy now conducted by State and USIA would be combined into a new office within the State Department.

—The Voice of America would be set up as a new federal agency under an independent Board of Directors with a mandate to broadcast accurate, objective and comprehensive news, with State providing official foreign policy articulation.

The premise upon which all the Stanton Panel recommendations are based is that it is possible and desirable to separate the articulation of U.S. policies abroad from the communication of more general information about American society.

Subsequent to the issue of the Stanton Report, an interagency task force was formed under the direction of Deputy Secretary Ingersoll to

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3 On December 21, 1975, Scowcroft indicated on a November 25 memorandum from Janka that he wanted a memorandum done “outlining pros and cons of moving separately on Stanton Panel recommendations along with recommendations for proceeding to early decision by President.” Janka’s memorandum also recommended that Scowcroft sign a memorandum to Cheney responding to a September 8 letter of inquiry sent to Rumsfeld by Tom Curtis of the Federal Election Commission regarding the status of the administration’s action on the Stanton Panel’s proposals. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Files of NSC Logged Documents, Box 60, Additional Options on Stanton Panel Report on International Information, Education, and Cultural Relations) A status report was sent to Cheney under Scowcroft’s signature on December 22. (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 178, FG 230: United States Information Agency (Executive), 6/1/75–12/31/75)
study the implications of these proposals. A formal administration position was deferred, however, pending the final report of the Murphy Commission which was expected to incorporate the Stanton Panel proposals and make further recommendations in the information/cultural area. Since the Murphy Commission did, in fact, adopt much of the Stanton Panel’s work, it was assumed that both studies would be considered together in conjunction with a major interagency study initiated to examine the totality of the Murphy Commission work. As you know, this review is still under way.

Frank Stanton and others, concerned over the delay in the formation of an administration position on the panel’s recommendations, have been lobbying for their adoption. As you are aware, Tom Curtis wrote to Don Rumsfeld on September 8, 1975 inquiring into the status of the Executive Branch review. In addressing this inquiry you raised the issue whether the Stanton Report should be considered separately from the balance of the Murphy Commission Report on an accelerated basis. To assess the pros and cons of this approach, we requested the official views of USIA, OMB and State on the Stanton proposals last December.

Agency Views

1. **USIA**

   USIA is totally opposed to the Stanton Panel’s recommendations. Its major concerns, as expressed by Director Keogh, are the following:

   —The Report fails to make a compelling demonstration of what is wrong with the current organizational arrangement.

   —The Report proceeds from a fallacious premise that there is, in practice, a distinction between information and culture.

   —The recommendations regarding cultural affairs and VOA are designed to insulate these activities from policy concerns, notwithstanding their continued support by taxpayers’ funds.

   —A separate USIA is better able to provide communication support for the several departments of the Executive Branch that impact on foreign affairs, and provide the President with considerably more flexibility on the tactics of international relations. USIA Memo is at Tab A.

2. **State**

   The State Department also opposes the recommendation to divide programs into policy information and other information categories. It

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4 See footnote 4, Document 106.
5 See footnote 3 above.
6 Not found attached. See Document 106 for USIA’s position on the report.
also opposes an independent VOA not fully responsive to our foreign policy objectives.

The State Department would favor, however, the consolidation of USIA with the Department’s Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs into a new semi-autonomous agency within State (similar to ACDA). At the same time, the Department recommends that no steps be taken at the present time to implement this or other proposals until a careful study is completed. State memo is at Tab B.\(^7\)

3. OMB

The Office of Management and Budget considers the evidence in the Stanton Report insufficient to warrant the proposed reorganization. OMB agrees with USIA that it is very difficult to divorce foreign policy dissemination and explanation from general information dissemination and believes the recommended organizational structure would weaken a coordinated U.S. information posture and complicate administration.

Congressional reaction to the Stanton Panel on the Hill, while relatively weak, is somewhat mixed. Congressmen Slack and Broomfield oppose the recommendations largely on the grounds that, as even the Report concedes, the current USIA/State administration of our information and exchange programs works quite well. Congressman Slack further opposes any taxpayer funded VOA not under government control.

On the other hand, Senator Percy and Congressman Hays are reported to support the recommendations. It is apparent, however, that the Stanton reorganization plan appeals to Hays since he could use it to support his long-held desire to dismantle USIA. To further this objective, he held the FY 76 USIA authorization bill in committee until last month demanding an Administration position on the Stanton Report. He is threatening to use the same tactics in regard to the FY 77 authorization bill; however, in this case he has less latitude to do so. Under the

\(^7\) A December 17, 1975, version of Ingersoll’s January 15, 1976, memorandum to Scowcroft (Document 109) is attached, as is Eagleburger’s January 1 memorandum to Scowcroft. In his memorandum, not printed, Eagleburger remarked: “Personally, I found that the Stanton Report had an immediate, surface appeal but that the more I looked at the recommendations, the more convinced I became that they would harm rather than help USIA’s programs. I was also struck by the fact that the Report never established that there is anything wrong with USIA’s operations now and that drastic remedial action is therefore necessary.” Eagleburger’s remark corresponded to his June 17, 1975, briefing memorandum to Kissinger, to whom he addressed the following handwritten footnote: “HAK: I’ve pretty much reversed my position on the [Stanton Panel] report as I’ve gotten into it. I think you will want to think about the whole thing pretty carefully before you make any decision.” (National Archives, RG 59, Administrative Correspondence Files, General Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 68 D 295, M Chron, Box 2, June 1975 (1))
new Budget Committee procedures, the authorizing committees must complete their work by May 15. In such a short time frame it is unlikely Hays could obtain the necessary support to force the proposed reorganization. This view is further reinforced by the fact the Senate has already reported and passed its FY 77 USIA authorization bill with no mention of the Stanton Report.

With the possible exception of needing a response for Hays, there is no pressing need for action now. Nevertheless, we would like to have your guidance on the disposition of the issue for the foreseeable future.

Options

1. Do nothing and let the issue lie dormant and possibly die.

   Congressional pressure for action is relatively weak and its direction mixed. Given the fact that the Senate has already passed its FY 77 bill and the House must meet a May 15 deadline, there is little likelihood the Congress will even consider much less require the initiation of a government reorganization plan this year.

   Further, State, USIA, and OMB have strong reservations over the Stanton Panel’s recommendations, each seriously questioning the Panel’s basic premise that it is possible to separate foreign policy articulation from the dissemination of other information. It would seem unwise to move too swiftly on a reorganization plan over the opposition of those agencies with the most direct experience in the information/cultural sphere, without more thorough and comprehensive study and without waiting for the completion of the interagency review of the overall Murphy Commission recommendations. These recommendations encompass a wide range of governmental reorganization proposals which may more appropriately be considered as a coherent package to be implemented or submitted for congressional consideration at the beginning of a new administration.

   The only disadvantage to this approach is that it would not afford the Stanton Panel a formal response to its recommendations in the near future. However, we are not aware of any further inquiries by members of the panel since last Fall.

2. Prepare a joint NSC–OMB memo to the President outlining the Stanton proposals, agency comments, and possible options, requesting his decision on the matter.

   The advantage to this approach is that a Presidential decision will bring the issue to a clear conclusion.

   On the other hand, there is little chance of any reorganization being implemented this year, and in light of the considerable opposition within the Executive Branch, any formal study is likely to present the President with a negative recommendation which would not satisfy Stanton and could provoke an unwanted controversy on the Hill.
3. A third option, a variation of option 1, would be to defer any separate action on Stanton by deciding to consider the issues it raises only in the context of the Administration response to the Murphy Commission report.

I recommend, with Clint Granger and Denis Clift concurring, that you approve Option 1. (If Rep. Hays again raises the issue, he can be informed simply that the Administration has no position pending further study.)

Recommendation

That you approve Option 1.  

8 Scowcroft initialed neither his approval nor disapproval, nor did he indicate if he preferred another option. Rather, he added the following handwritten notation: “How about an NSC/OMB info memo to the President outlining the situation and suggesting no action at the moment. BS.” No record of such a memorandum was found. The Ford administration took no further action with regard to the Stanton Panel’s recommendations. President Carter effected a major reorganization of public diplomacy on October 11, 1977, when he sent his Reorganization Plan No. 2 to Congress (91 Stat. 1637). Carter’s plan called for the creation of a new agency, led by a Director responsible to the Secretary of State, to take over the functions previously performed by CU and USIA, including the VOA. (Public Papers: Carter, 1977, Book II, pp. 1765–1771) Both CU and USIA were abolished on April 1, 1978, on the establishment of the United States International Communication Agency.

111. National Security Study Memorandum 245


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, United States Information Agency
The Director, Board for International Broadcasting

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Institutional Files (H–Files), Box 46, NSSM 245 (1). Confidential. Copies were sent to Director of Central Intelligence Bush and to Charles W. Robinson, Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee.
SUBJECT

President's Report to Congress Concerning International Broadcast Facilities

The Fiscal Year 1977 Foreign Relations Authorization Act\(^2\) requires that the President submit to Congress by January 31, 1977 a report on steps that might be taken to improve the effectiveness of USG funded international broadcasting facilities, encompassing both greater cooperation among U.S. broadcasters and the feasibility of sharing facilities with foreign countries. In order to comply with the requirements of the Act, a number of important issues must be addressed, including the advisability of facility-sharing by Voice of America (VOA),\(^3\) Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty (RL). The President has therefore directed that a study be made of measures that might be taken to improve the effectiveness of U.S. funded international broadcasting and the impact such measures would have on current and future USG funded information exchange programs. This study should consider, but not necessarily be limited to:

—The respective missions of VOA and RFE with regard to Eastern Europe and VOA and RL with regard to the USSR. The missions should be clearly defined in terms of both political objectives and basic program content.

—The advisability of VOA and RFE/RL sharing each other’s facilities, including the possible impact of such sharing on other U.S. international information and exchange programs.

—A comparison of broadcast range (distance), quality (clarity of signal), and audience size of (1) VOA and RFE in Eastern Europe, and (2) VOA and RL in USSR as a basis for determining ways in which to reduce competition and duplication.

—A review of language priorities (target audiences) for U.S. international broadcasting based on current and anticipated program orientation by both VOA and RFE/RL.

—Measures to manage and coordinate more efficiently current and planned international broadcasting transmission facilities.

—The feasibility of negotiating with other nations the mutual use of their and U.S. facilities. In this regard, a survey should be

\(^2\) P.L. 94–350.

\(^3\) On July 12, 1976, President Ford signed the VOA Charter (P.L. 94–850). “The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the people of the world by radio. To be effective,” the Charter stated, the VOA “must win the attention and respect of listeners” by serving “as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news,” presenting “a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions,” and presenting “the policies of the United States clearly and effectively.” (National Archives, RG 306, Records of the USIA, Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1 (1006), Box 3, Agency Mission, 1976)
made of relevant Allied broadcast operations and facilities, especially the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany and France, in order to explore possible facility-sharing arrangements with U.S. broadcasters.

—The advisability and feasibility of extending broadcasting operations to additional countries where access to information is restricted by the policies of the governments of such countries.

This study should be prepared by the Under Secretaries Committee and should include policy options and recommendations as appropriate. The study should include as an annex the report by the President required by the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1977. The study should be submitted by October 1, 1976, for consideration by the President.

Brent Scowcroft

112. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs¹

Washington, undated.

EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS PROGRAM (CU)

The Issue

Two questions need to be answered before the capabilities and limitations of the U.S. educational and cultural program can be understood:

1. Are we properly organized to carry out the role that has been assigned to us?

2. Is there a coherent communications policy within the United States Government?

The answer to both these questions is “No.”

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of Policy and Plans, Subject Files, 1961–1977, FRC 306-81-24, State Department—Transition. No classification marking. Drafted on January 3. All brackets are in the original. A copy was sent to Assistant Legal Adviser for Human Rights Charles Runyon (L/HR). Roth (CU/OPP) forwarded the paper to Borg under a January 3 covering memorandum, which noted that the paper was CU’s third “issue paper” requested by Lake on behalf of the incoming Carter administration. CU’s two other transition papers are ibid.
This paper will restate some views already offered in other contexts and present new ones born of action-forcing events facing us in the near- to mid-term.

Many of the problems discussed here have been the subject of study for at least two decades. The most pressing one, however, is that there is no organizational arrangement to facilitate the orderly consideration of international political communications problems and opportunities (including information as well as educational and cultural functions). Without adequate high level attention, a central point of coordination, and clearly assigned responsibility within the bureaucracy, the Government lacks the capability to identify issues, assign priorities, develop programs, coordinate action, and utilize the considerable communications experience available in the Department and in the United States Information Agency (USIA). This problem deserves early attention not only to bring about the needed coherence in present activities but also to take advantage of what may be a fleeting opportunity for the Department to play a significant creative role in formulating policies for the social and cultural aspects of our international relations and in developing the means to carry them out.

Historical Background

Since the creation of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in 1953, a half dozen reports have addressed the problem of international political communication (in earlier years under the rubric of “psychological strategy”). Among them were the Stanton Panel Report, March 1975; the Murphy Commission Report, June 1975; a Congressional Research Service Report, August 1975; and most recently, the Linowitz Commission Report (on Latin American Relations), issued in December 1976 which endorsed the Stanton and Murphy conclusions. These recommended transferring overseas press activities in support of U.S. foreign policy to the Department and establishing the Voice of America (VOA) as an independent agency under a Board of Directors. Remaining USIA functions (primarily long range information and cultural programs utilizing exhibits, films, libraries, etc.) would be combined with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) and would be related to the Department of State as is the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA).

2 Document 103.
3 See footnote 4, Document 106.
4 Not further identified.
5 The report of the Commission on United States-Latin American Relations, chaired by Sol Linowitz, The United States and Latin America, Next Steps: A Second Report, was issued in December. (New York: Center for Inter-American Relations, 1976)
In response to a White House request for views on these recommendations, the Department in January 1976 favored the creation of the new agency, but with the VOA as a part of it. The Department also urged that its leadership role in this field be strengthened by making the Director of the new agency an Under Secretary of State. Action on these recommendations was deferred for a new Administration.

Pending resolution of the above organizational problems, an informal Communications Policy Group, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State [including the principals of USIA, the Agency for International Development (AID), CU, and the other relevant Department offices], provides an embryo forum within which political communication questions can be considered.

**Rationale for the Exchange Program**

The patterns of communication across national, ideological and social boundaries have dramatically altered in the 30 years since Senator Fulbright inaugurated a systematic U.S. effort to influence the cultural/political environment through a scholarly exchange program.

In our increasingly complex, interactive and interdependent international community, governments are strongly influenced by pressures of domestic and international interest groups. Tendencies toward both conflict and cooperation are affected by the perceptions of increasingly aware and potent publics. As communication and travel technologies impact on habitual ways of thinking, improved habits of cooperation become more important. These take time and purposeful effort to develop.

It is within this context that the Executive Branch must seek to influence the way America communicates with other parts of the world. In some cases the influence is a by-product of activities undertaken for other reasons. But it is through direct, constructive, transnational human communication that reasonably accurate mutual perceptions and reasonably widespread empathies among leadership groups are most likely to be developed. Without understanding of this kind, based on first hand, face-to-face experience, there is little likelihood that nations with different traditions, values, ideologies, and economic systems can overcome their own preoccupations sufficiently to develop the common ground of shared interests on which cooperative effort can be built. Not only is it necessary for leaders—both governmental and nongovernmental—to understand the issue at hand, but they must also appreciate how and why other societies perceive the issue differently, for decisions on important problems are likely to be based as much on

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differing ways of thinking and believing as they are on “rational” considerations.

The flow of ideas, information, artifacts, and people among nations is no assurance of understanding. Indeed, an increasingly interactive world system produces more opportunity for conflict as well as for accommodation. The critical need in foreign relations terms is for purposeful two-way communication which fosters accurate perceptions and mutual confidence among responsible leaders. It is this need that CU’s programs meet as they exert an ever-widening circle of influence.

Program Responsibilities

CU carries out its responsibilities under a mandate from the Congress: The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (MECEA). Under this law, CU is given broad responsibility “to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries” in order to assist “in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.”

More than 175,000 scholars, specialists, and leaders—American and non-American—have taken part in the program of sponsored exchange.

They have done so:

— in academic exchanges as professors, scholars, and teachers
— as short term visitors to the United States for orientation and professional consultation
— as American specialists traveling abroad to meet and consult with their counterparts on specific topics.

Increasingly, indirect strategies are favored. Therefore, CU encourages and assists countless private organizations and institutions in their conduct of exchange-of-person and other international programs. Three random examples of recent programs in support of the Department’s current policy trends are: an intensive multi-regional program on the operation of state and local governments in which participants came from Mauritius, Egypt, the Philippines, Kenya, and a number of European countries; a group of representatives from 18 countries traveled across the United States to obtain first-hand information on energy technology; and educators from Nigeria, Ghana, Mexico, Upper Volta, Peru, Cameroon, and the United States exchanged views and conferred on bilingual/bicultural education. The exchange program also supports trips abroad by some of America’s leading performing artists and athletes.

7 See footnote 3, Document 91.
Many of the American participants in both the academic exchange programs and the American Specialists program experience for the first time the realities of life in a different society. Many of the foreign visitors coming here discover and correct misconceptions about race relations, the standard of living for the average worker, the state of the arts, and other facets of American life. They forge lasting friendships, establish working partnerships in productive research, and influence their societies in such widely divergent matters as university curriculum reform, improved social welfare programs, advanced urban design, and increased respect for human rights.

Many of the persons involved early in the program, then at the beginning of their careers, have subsequently risen to leadership positions in which they influence world affairs. Among them are 14 presidents, 23 prime ministers, and 251 cabinet members in 75 countries. Other participants have become university rectors, labor leaders, publishers, health administrators, and so on.

Mention should also be made of the Binational Commissions in 44 countries which have active exchange agreements with the United States. They are composed equally of distinguished foreign nationals and resident Americans. The Commissions are responsible for the administration of the academic exchange program in each country. Where there is no Commission, the U.S. Embassy performs this function.

In addition to the Binational (Fulbright) Commissions, CU has made use of other bilateral vehicles to promote intercultural communications objectives. Regular cultural conferences have been a part of U.S. relations with Japan, Germany, and Mexico for several years, and ad hoc meetings are held with numerous other countries each year. CU also participates in the several Joint Commissions formed in the past two years or so to reinforce and expand relations with a number of Near and Middle Eastern countries.

Finally, in spite of all that the CU programs have been able to achieve, it is important to keep in mind that we can and must do more. In remarks made recently, Senator Claiborne Pell put the issue squarely:

... neither we in the United States nor others in the Western community ought to be content with what has been achieved in the past through cultural exchanges. More can and must be done, for I fear that the future challenges to democratic values and the ability of disparate nations to live together in peace are greater than is generally realized.

In addition to the principal task of carrying out programs under the MECEA, CU has two other major responsibilities: 1) a coordinating role relating to all USG international exchange-of-persons programs, and 2) policy advice to the President, Secretary of State and other agencies on cultural relations matters.
In its coordinating role, CU chairs the inter-agency Subcommittee on International Exchanges (of the Under Secretaries Committee) under the authority of NSDM 143 of December 17, 1971. Other participants come from the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs, USIA, AID, Action, and other agencies on an ad hoc basis. A number of projects have been undertaken by this Subcommittee, among them: revision and computerization of records of the Exchange Visitor ("J" visa) programs, a study of the economic problems facing foreign students in this country as a result of inflation, a review of USG educational and cultural relations with Latin America, and a review of problems associated with graduates of foreign medical schools who work in the United States.

Although effective coordination of all elements of the Government’s exchange programs remains a constant CU goal, it will not be achieved without increased support from higher level officials in the Executive Branch. Similarly, the CU policy advisory role will continue to have little substance until officials at higher levels give more attention to the significance of the cultural and social dimensions of foreign policy. For example, a speech on the subject from a top official could focus attention on this increasingly important foreign relations activity.

A by-product of CU programs is the extensive network of cooperative relationships linking the Department with hundreds of private American professional, civic, cultural, and educational organizations. It is estimated that some 800 voluntary organizations and perhaps 100,000 individual volunteers commit themselves and their skills to programs in which cooperation with the Department is an important feature. Colleges, universities, cities, and professional associations welcome visitors from foreign lands or send delegations to visit in return—often at their own expense. The business communities of the country, foundations, and service clubs all lend their support to programs facilitated or supported by CU. In this vast exchange there is the special satisfaction of mutual sharing, mutual enrichment, and mutual benefit.

New Challenges of Diplomacy

Many of the problems of the modern world—energy utilization, technology transfer, human rights, population expansion, food distribution, etc.—have only recently become grist for the mills of traditional diplomacy. “Cultural” programs have for many years been dealing both directly and indirectly with these subjects. They have developed world-wide networks of scientists, businessmen, scholars, and government officials. These networks of professionals who know each other’s backgrounds and analyze problems in similar conceptual

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8 See footnote 2, Document 88.
frameworks and use like terminology are equipped to move more effectively to cooperative solutions to world problems.

For example, in the field of Human Rights cultural exchange activities often demonstrate subtly but persuasively the American sense of the worth of the individual, the value of the free play of ideas and the importance of professional, scientific and academic standards, unhampered by political pressures. The foreign professor who has the novel experience of lecturing to American students without official constraint or the American speaker who takes issue with official U.S. and host-country positions and opens himself to direct questioning by the foreign audience, can be catalytic elements in change processes far more powerful than hortatory rhetoric. And, of course, issues of human rights can also be addressed more directly in seminars, research projects and professional courses dealing with subjects such as the rule of law, women and minority rights, freedom of press, academic freedom, etc. Thus through careful use of the international cultural resources of the Government, it is possible to make substantial substantive contributions to the achievement of political aims, even while the basic “mutual understanding” objectives are also being served.

Similar effects can be achieved in other fields. A multinational group of energy economists, for example, is brought to the U.S. to meet with its counterparts. Programs dealing with the status of women are undertaken in support of International Women’s Year and its follow-on activities. Specialized programs in narcotics education, agricultural economics, urban affairs, pollution management: these are other examples.

The U.S. has exchange programs with some 125 countries around the world. They are flexible and can and do respond to our need for communications with such widely divergent societies as those in the developing countries of Africa and Latin America, in the industrialized countries of the West and Japan, and in the closed communist societies of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and the People’s Republic of China.

What More is Needed

Despite the obvious and growing importance of the educational and cultural exchange program, not enough attention has been paid to utilizing it to the fullest extent possible. At the same time, there are sev-

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9 On July 6, 1976, Richardson sent a memorandum to Acting Secretary of State Robinson proposing that CU take certain measures to promote human rights. Robinson replied the next day, encouraging Richardson “to translate some of the ideas spelled out into actual projects.” No evidence of further action was found. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Deputy Secretary of State (Robinson), 1976–1977, Entry 5176, Box 2, D Chron, July 1976)
eral ways in which the program can be made even more effective. Some of them have already been pointed out. They are summarized here:

1. We need a coherent Government-wide international political communications policy.

2. We need an organizational framework that will facilitate

—development of a coherent policy and
—fulfillment of such a policy by carrying out properly coordinated programs through the appropriate departments, agencies, and bureaus, including the Department of State and USIA.

3. We need more involvement by individuals at higher levels of responsibility in the Executive Branch.

4. We need the goodwill of members of Congress who have supported the program in the past and of members who may not yet know enough about the program to have formed opinions one way or the other.

5. We need greater private sector involvement—both financially, institutionally, and personally—in the programs.

Finally, a sixth element is needed, adequate resources to do the task at hand. The case has been well stated by Senator Claiborne Pell whom we have already quoted in this paper. Here is another excerpt from remarks made on the floor of the Senate:

Mr. President, on September 23 I spoke before a visiting delegation from the European Parliament on the subject of cultural exchanges and democratic developments. I believe that exchanges play an important role not only in achieving their principal objective of fostering better understanding among nations of the world but also in promoting democratic development and respect for human rights. I expressed my concern to the European parliamentarians that despite the benefits which exchanges bring, democratic governments, including that of the United States, spend so little money on them. The Department of State, for example, spends only about $60 million annually on exchanges. A tenfold increase in that amount would only be the equivalent of two nuclear-powered guided missile cruisers. I urge the administration, whichever one takes office in January, to give serious consideration to increasing the amount budgeted for cultural exchanges.
113. Memorandum From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Robinson) to President Ford

NSC–U/DM–142


SUBJECT

NSSM 245: US International Broadcasting Facilities

The United States international broadcasting effort is a key element of our foreign policy. Making known our policies and our ideals to the peoples of the world is of vital importance to the furtherance of US interests and objectives. Our most critical audiences for international broadcasting are in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, where censorship and controlled media provide the peoples of the area with distorted images of the US, US policy, and events within their own countries and the world at large.

There are two distinct US international broadcasters to this area—The Voice of America (VOA) and Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL). The VOA is an integral part of the US Government and its primary function is to present world news, to give expression to US official policy and to articulate American values and opinions. RFE/RL, on the other hand, are by law “independent broadcast media, operating in a manner not inconsistent with broad foreign policy objectives . . .” Their primary task is to encourage a constructive dialogue with the peoples of the USSR (RL) and Eastern Europe (RFE). Broadcast content is focused on the interest of the local audiences. VOA broadcasts are generally, if reluctantly, accepted by the Soviet and East European regimes as an official USG activity; RFE/RL are still falsely labelled by these regimes, despite the change in the Radios’ basic approaches and funding, as “cold-war relics”, dedicated to subversion rather than the freer flow of information.

In the FY 1977 Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Congress asked that the President submit a report on the US international broadcasting effort. The Act states:

Sec. 403. Not later than January 31, 1977, the President shall submit to the Congress a report—

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box 46, NSSM 245 (2). Confidential.
2 Document 111.
(1) recommending steps to be taken to utilize more effectively the transmission facilities for international broadcasting, both existing and planned, of the United States Government;

(2) examining the feasibility of greater cooperation with foreign countries to insure mutually efficient use of nationally owned and nationally funded transmission facilities for international broadcasting;

(3) containing a comprehensive outline of projected needs for United States international broadcasting operations based on anticipated language requirements and anticipated cooperation among various agencies of the United States Government, United States Government-funded organizations, and foreign governments involved in international broadcasting;

(4) recommending steps which should be taken to extend broadcasting operations similar to those carried out under the Board for International Broadcasting Act of 1973 to additional countries where access to information is restricted by the policies of the governments of such countries.

This memorandum and the attached study are the result of the Under Secretaries Committee examination of measures to improve the effectiveness of US funded international broadcasting and the impact of such measures on current and future USG funded information exchange programs. A draft report to the Congress is also attached.

Conclusions

—With present program scheduling there is no significant unused transmitter capacity available for sharing between VOA and RFE/RL or between Western Governments or other USG Agencies and either of those radios.

—VOA could add or increase the strength of transmitters in the UK and the FRG without great difficulty. RFE/RL could do the same in the FRG and Portugal. Arrangement for added transmitters in the UK and/or Greece for joint VOA/RFE–RL use would probably encounter political difficulties. Success might only be possible in the UK, if other RFE/RL facilities were in jeopardy and we were prepared to approach the UK at the top level of Government.

—The rationale for two US broadcasters to the USSR and Eastern Europe (VOA and RFE/RL) with distinct missions remains valid. At
the same time, the national interest does not preclude consideration of reduction of duplication and/or elimination of some of the language broadcasts.

—There is positive advantage in maintaining the separate identities of the two radios (VOA and RFE/RL). Blurring the distinction between them might jeopardize their individual effectiveness, might lead to renewed jamming of VOA, and could have an adverse impact on the other US informational and cultural activity directed toward the USSR and Eastern Europe. These adverse effects are manageable to a degree and should not prevent sharing of transmitter facilities if necessary to preserve RFE/RL operations. Otherwise, the benefits of sharing should be carefully weighed against its costs.

—Even a cursory examination of the advisability of extending US broadcasting operations to additional countries where access to information is restricted suggests that there are immense difficulties in such a project. This question arose in Congress with regard to RFE/RL operations and referred to a possible geographical expansion of the Radios’ transmissions. Except for Western Europe, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Japan and a very few other countries, virtually all the remaining governments of the world restrict the access of their citizens to information by controlling the local press and/or by controlling and censoring international media coming into the country. Such restrictions would have to be judged as severe at least some of the time in several dozen countries in the Middle East, the Far East, Africa and Latin America. Political conditions, moreover, in many if not most of these countries can change markedly, resulting in a further tightening, or loosening, of restrictions. Thus, the list of “restricted” countries would be constantly shifting.

To undertake additional native-language broadcasting to countries outside of the USSR and Eastern Europe where information is substantially restricted would require construction of a world-wide network of transmitters the cost of which would run well over $100 million. The transmitters would have to be located in a number of appropriately located countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America. It is extremely unlikely that the Board for International Broadcasting (BIB) would be able to obtain agreement to lease all or most of the required transmitter sites. Those sites BIB could obtain would be vulnerable to political uncertainties of the host countries.

The existing US world-wide broadcasting effort carried out by VOA goes a long way towards meeting our needs. VOA presently broadcasts in 36 languages to diverse parts of the world for a total of 789 hours weekly. The VOA English Service is worldwide and averages 164 hours weekly. Among the major languages, Spanish to Latin America is on 38 hours each week, French to Africa 37 hours, and Ar-
abic 49 hours weekly. At times, unusual political circumstances arise in a single country which call for increased VOA activity. For example, the changing and volatile political situation in Portugal after the 1974 revolution led USIA to introduce a VOA service in Portuguese to Portugal since US policies and viewpoints were not receiving a fair hearing in the then Communist controlled media.

—While this study has focussed on RFE/RL and VOA broadcasting in Europe, it is possible to apply minimal signal strength requirements to VOA transmissions to Asia and Africa to arrive at a figure for transmitter requirements for a comprehensive US worldwide broadcast plan. In Asia and Africa, the US will require eight and four additional transmitters respectively to meet world-wide requirements. USIA will seek authorization for four of its Asian transmitters in Fiscal Year 1978. A larger USIA plan calls for the eventual construction of ten additional transmitters in the UK—five for Europe and five for other VOA world-wide requirements.

—The current crowding of the shortwave broadcasting band continues to reduce the quality of the signals on the available frequencies. There will be a World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979 to address the question of expanding the shortwave broadcast band.

—With the assistance of a recognized technical expert fourteen separate options were examined, including several which would assume integrated programming by the two radios. Four of these are assessed below and later in this memorandum. It should be stressed that all four accept the premise that, whatever the decision on the program schedules, the US should transmit signals which meet minimum requirements for technical effectiveness.

Options

1. **Option one would retain current program scheduling of VOA and RFE/RL broadcasts to the USSR and Eastern Europe and add seven transmitters to meet the minimum technical requirement (62 100 to 250 KW transmitters) for effective signals if no allowance is made for jamming.**

This option essentially would take the step considered necessary by competent experts to provide the current radio operations the minimal technical strength to pursue their missions as currently defined, thereby remedying a long-standing inadequacy. It would avoid the risks (possible resumption of VOA jamming and/or Soviet and East European inhibitions on other US informational and cultural activities) of blurring the radios’ separate identities. And it would reaffirm the US commitment to a freer flow of information in the face of the sharp Soviet/East European attacks on RFE/RL. It should command Congressional support.
This option would make no provision for an enhanced RFE/RL capacity to penetrate jamming or for meeting the contingency of loss of RL’s transmitter site in Spain (still a possibility) or resumption of jamming of VOA (a less likely development). Nor would it provide new transmitters for a reserve or strengthening capacity. At the same time, it would cost about $14 million and thus forego the economies possible under the third and fourth options.

2. Option two would retain current program scheduling and add sixteen transmitters, the seven of option one for current technical requirements plus nine to boost RFE/RL’s capacity to counteract jamming, to serve in a reserve capacity, and to upgrade and strengthen existing facilities.

This option would cost about $32 million. It could not completely overcome jamming, but the deployment of additional transmitters to counteract jamming is a feasible, realistic and necessary strategy to increase the level and reliability of RFE/RL reception in the USSR, Poland, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The study established the minimum number of transmitters required for broadcasting in an unjammed environment, and found that the requirements for RFE/RL broadcasting to jammed environments should be in excess of the requirements for an unjammed environment. While the number of additional transmitters to be deployed for this purpose is a matter of judgment, the study suggested a modest but significant increase of one additional transmitter for each of the nine sets of three transmitters for language broadcasts now being jammed—a total of nine additional transmitters. The Office of Management and Budget does not believe the addition of transmitters would overcome jamming, especially if the Soviet Union and the East Europeans step up their jamming in response.

This option would also reaffirm in strong terms our commitment to the freer flow of information. It would provide transmitters which could serve in reserve capacity in case of breakdown of existing facilities, and which could serve to upgrade and strengthen existing older and underpowered facilities. It avoids blurring the Radios’ identities, but it would forego the economies of options three and four. (It would, however, be possible to make the reductions in language transmissions foreseen in Options three and four, but add transmitters to combat jamming in the remaining broadcasts.)

A variant of this option would add six more new transmitters (cost $12 million) to provide additional capacity against the contingency of resumed jamming of VOA or loss of transmitter sites, but the Committee does not deem these contingencies sufficiently urgent to justify the additional expenditure at this time.

3. Option three would eliminate RL broadcasts in the native languages to indigenous Soviet nationalities in Belorussia, the Caucasus and Central Asia
and integrate VOA and RFE/RL broadcasting schedules for the Eastern European countries, the Ukraine and the Baltic states (full and separate VOA and RL Russian broadcasts would remain).

From the point of view of effecting economies through program alteration this option is the most feasible of the numerous options examined. Its advantages and disadvantages are substantial and it has received the most careful consideration.

This option would effect a saving of nine transmitters ($14 million for new facilities) from the 62 required for minimum technical transmitter requirements (option 1) and about $2.5 million in annual operating costs. Full VOA and RL programming in Russian would be maintained as would RL and VOA native language transmissions to Western-oriented nationalities (the Ukraine and the Baltic states) and VOA native language transmissions to the Caucasus and Central Asia (Uzbek only). No “original” programming in prime time hours by VOA or RFE/RL would be sacrificed in the integrated program languages (East European languages, Baltic languages and Ukrainian). Fifteen hours of simultaneous broadcasting by VOA and RFE/RL would be eliminated. RL languages eliminated (Belorussian, Georgian, Armenian and the Moslem languages) may be currently among the least effective of RL’s nationality broadcasts.

On the other hand, the integration of program scheduling would blur the distinction between the radios and thereby afford additional opportunity to the Soviet Union and the East Europeans to step up attacks on VOA, to resume the jamming of VOA and/or to inhibit other US information and cultural activities. This risk is difficult to evaluate but has been judged substantial by the previous US Ambassador to the Soviet Union, Walter Stoessel.

The substantial reduction in prime time transmission to the Ukraine and the Baltic states (over 50%) and Eastern Europe (about 25%) and the replacement of at least 3½ hours daily of unjammed VOA broadcasting by jammed RFE/RL broadcasts would occasion an appreciable decline in listenership. Coupled with the elimination of the only Western broadcasts to eight Moslem nationalities, these changes could well be interpreted by our public, some sectors of Congress, some allies and the USSR and East Europeans themselves as a weakening of our commitment to the Helsinki principles in the face of the Soviet attacks on US international broadcasters. In particular, key Congressional supporters would probably not find acceptable the reduced transmission to Poland, the Ukraine and the Baltic states. Lastly, no provision would be made to improve the RFE/RL’s capacity to overcome jamming, to meet the contingency of the loss of the Spanish transmitter site, or to provide reserve or upgraded transmitter capacity.
On balance, the Committee believes that the disadvantages of this option outweigh its benefits.

4. **Option four would eliminate RL broadcasts in the native language to indigenous Soviet nationalities in Belorussia, the Caucasus and Central Asia without any sharing of VOA and RFE/RL facilities.**

This option would effect a modest saving of three transmitters ($6 million) from the 62 required for minimum performance (option 1) and about $2.5 million in annual operating costs. RL and VOA Russian, Ukrainian, and Baltic language broadcasts to the areas would be maintained as would VOA native language broadcasts to the Caucasus and Central Asia (Uzbek only). Currently, the eliminated broadcasts may be among RL’s least effective transmissions. Congressional opposition would be less strong than if the Ukrainian and Baltic languages were eliminated. And the dangers and disadvantages of shared VOA and RFE/RL facilities would be avoided.

The option would eliminate the only Western native language broadcasts to eleven nationalities, convey diminished US interest in eight Moslem nationalities with rapidly increasing populations, and in the Georgians and Armenians, all quite nationalistic groups. It would probably be interpreted by the Soviets, some allies and some sectors of our public and Congress as a weakening of our Helsinki commitment in the face of Soviet attacks on RFE/RL.

While this may be a feasible option, it would seem preferable to continue transmission in these languages and regard the transmitters employed as reserve capacity to meet the contingency of RL loss of the Spanish transmitter site.

**Recommendations**

1. The Departments of State and Defense, The Joint Chiefs of Staff, The United States Information Agency, the Board for International Broadcasting, and the Central Intelligence Agency recommend the acquisition of sixteen new 250 KW transmitters (Option 2).

   The Office of Management and Budget supports the acquisition of seven transmitters (five for VOA, two for RFE/RL) as described in Option one. OMB does not believe that a sufficient case has been made that the acquisition of nine additional transmitters (or any other number) will overcome jamming. Copies of OMB’s letter of December 20 and of technical consultant James Moceri’s letter of December 28 are attached.6

   2. All members of the Committee recommend that the BIB review with the RFE/RL organization the management and staffing arrange-
ments and program planning with a view to improving the professional level of the RL broadcasts in the Soviets nationality languages.

3. All members of the Committee further recommend that the United States Government keep under constant review situations that might arise to threaten our broadcasting effort (i.e., a transmitter site agreement with Spain may not be consummated; there could be difficulties with the transmitter sites in Portugal; the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe may reinstate jamming of VOA). Should any of these contingencies appear to be developing we should be prepared to reexamine the practical questions related to sharing transmitter facilities and to discuss with the United Kingdom the installation of at least six additional transmitters in Britain for use by VOA and/or RFE/RL.

4. All members of the Committee finally recommend that the US Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee consider the need for expansion of the shortwave broadcast bands in its preparation for the World Administrative Radio Conference in 1979.

Charles W. Robinson

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7 The NSC coordinated contingency studies from 1974 to 1976 in the event that RFE and/or RL transmitting operations were curtailed by the host governments in Portugal and Spain. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, Box 17, RFE)
Managing the Department of State

114. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Post Cease-fire Assignment of Foreign Service Officers to Vietnam

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum (Tab A) which describes the State Department’s efforts to strengthen political reporting from Vietnam during the post cease-fire period. He notes that 45 Vietnamese-speaking Foreign Service Officers will be assigned for 6 months as political reporters in 20 provincial capitals and four new Consulates General. The Foreign Service Officers will focus particularly on the implementation of a cease-fire. The Embassy in Saigon has reported that 30 of these officers already have arrived and are moving out to their various posts in the countryside.

Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Political Reporting During the Post Cease-Fire Period in Vietnam

In order to strengthen the Department’s reporting capabilities in the period immediately following a cease-fire in Vietnam, I have asked that forty-five Foreign Service Officers who have previously served in Vietnam prepare to return as soon as a cease-fire is signed. These officers, almost all of whom speak Vietnamese, would return for tempo-
rary duty for about six months to areas of the country they are familiar with. They would serve as political reporters in twenty of the provincial capitals and in the four new Consulates General which will replace the old Military Region Headquarters. These political reporters will prepare concise weekly analyses on developments in the Vietnamese countryside, focusing particularly on progress toward implementation of the cease-fire agreement.

I am very pleased with the response of the officers selected for the program. Most have expressed a keen interest in returning to areas of previous assignment in Vietnam, and several have formed an informal task force to assist the Department in the development of an effective reporting system. Many are taking advantage of an intensive refresher course in Vietnamese offered by the Foreign Service Institute. Although we did not ask for volunteers, fifteen Foreign Service Officers have asked to be considered for the program.

We plan to ask these officers to arrive in Vietnam within about two weeks of the signing of an agreement, in order to provide a timely and direct source of information on developments.3

William P. Rogers

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3 In a memorandum to Scowcroft, February 22, Department of State Executive Secretary Theodore L. Eliot, Jr., indicated that all 45 FSOs had been deployed to their Vietnamese posts. (Ibid.)
115. **Executive Summary of a Paper Prepared in the Department of State**

Washington, undated.

**LINKING RESOURCE MANAGEMENT TO DECISION-MAKING: A STRUCTURAL APPROACH**

Executive Summary

As a practical matter the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary are normally unable to devote as much of their time and energy as they might wish to the management of the Department. The amount of attention afforded by them to the management task accordingly may well depend on the extent to which the resource allocation process is linked to the decision-making process.

The deliberations of the Management Reform Task Forces prompted several actions which were to provide for a closer relationship between these processes. Management Reform Bulletin No. 24 of July 1971 describes these actions which involved limited structural changes. In fact, the integration of the principal management functions—personnel and budget—was to be achieved without organizational change.

To institutionalize the linkage between resource management and decision-making, the structure of the Department has to be modified. This step is also required to assure the continued and orderly growth of the PARA system.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, Reorganization 1968–73. No classification marking. The main body of the paper, dated May 1973, is attached at Tab C but not printed. Drafted by Gerald J. Goldman (M/MS) on an unspecified date in March 1973. The linkage of management and decisionmaking had previously been studied by Task Force XIII, one of 13 task forces created by Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration William Macomber in January 1970 to study Department of State managerial problems (see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 312). Task Force XIII’s recommendations and actions taken to implement them were printed in Management Reform Bulletin No. 24 on July 6, 1971. For more on the Department’s management reform progress following the task forces’ reports, see ibid., Document 336. The preface of the paper, summarized in the Executive Summary, sought further reforms in order to meet Nixon’s goal of achieving “management excellence in the Executive Branch” during his second administration.

2 Attached at Tab D but not printed. For the text, see the Department of State Bulletin, July 26, 1971, pp. 103–109.

3 Introduced in 1971, the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation system (PARA) was designed, among other things, to ensure that U.S. foreign policy interests and objectives were “explicitly defined,” to improve long-range planning by identifying issues at an early stage, to stimulate “rigorous policy review and self-appraisal,” and to “ensure that the resources of the Department—and of other foreign affairs agencies—are related
Additionally, this modification must meet certain minimal conditions for the Deputy Under Secretary for Management—the Seventh Floor principal charged with exercising the Deputy Secretary’s responsibilities for the allocation of resources—to be able to perform his core tasks.

—M must divest himself of direct supervision of activities not central to his core responsibilities.

—The main resources of the Department—personnel, budget, and management support systems (including PARA)—must be organizationally located under M and eventually integrated.

—M must have a capability for determining resource management information requirements and for developing and operating systems to satisfy these requirements.

—M must continue to provide day-to-day guidance to S/IG to ensure the interrelationship of policy and program evaluation with the PARA process.

—Management activities such as substantive and administrative reporting; regulations, directives, and delegations of authority; manpower utilization, analysis, and control; records management; etc. have to be placed in an office under M.

In a large measure the foregoing conditions echo the intent of the changes announced in MRB No. 24:

“To give concrete support to the managerial role of the Deputy Secretary, the management functions of personnel, budget, evaluation, and methods development now delegated directly to the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration [redesignated “Management”] will be delegated to him through the Deputy Secretary.”

The required organizational changes should be implemented incrementally to permit structure and process (i.e., PARA) to develop in tandem and to minimize the impact of the disruptive energy that usually attends such realignments.

Charts 1 and 2 depict the immediate/mid-term and long-term organizational patterns proposed to institutionalize the linkage between resource management and decision-making. These charts are at Tab A.

An Implementation Plan and Schedule is at Tab B.

A more detailed description of the entire proposal is at Tab C.

Management Reform Bulletin No. 24 of July 1971 is at Tab D.


4 Brackets in the original.

5 Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
116. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff (Odeen) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT

Defense Attaché System

Bill Clements has forwarded a memorandum (Tab B) expressing his concern, as well as that of Admiral Moorer’s over the continuing reductions in the number of men assigned to the Defense Attaché System.² He asks that you send a memorandum to the Secretary of State calling for an end to personnel reductions, allowing for increases where they are justified, and referring all disputes to you for resolution.³

Admiral George Anderson has also written to you expressing concern over problems of establishing and manning attaché posts abroad (Tab C).⁴

Background

In 1965 the Defense Attaché System was authorized 1,880 personnel. As a result of efforts by both Presidents Johnson and Nixon to reduce our overseas manning, the Defense Attaché System was reduced to 1,024 by mid-1970. At that time Dave Packard⁵ requested that no more reductions be made and in a memo signed by you on May 26, 1970 you stated that the President agreed to suspend further reductions in the military attaché system (Tab D).⁶

On the other hand the President has charged the Under Secretaries Committee with controlling U.S. overseas presence and has directed them among other tasks to:

“Review ongoing programs to identify marginal and obsolete activities and supervise the implementation of appropriate reduction programs.”

² Clements’s June 8 memorandum is attached but not printed.
³ A draft is attached but not printed. No memorandum was apparently sent.
⁴ The June 27 letter from Anderson, Chairman of the President’s Foreign Advisory Board, is attached but not printed.
⁶ Not found attached.
So, despite the ban against reductions, the State Department has continued to evaluate individual positions, especially those viewed as surplus by their mission chiefs, for possible elimination. Also the State Department has taken a fairly rigid stance against agreeing to new positions. Defense cites nine reductions that have been forced on them since 1970 and six requested new positions that have been turned down.

In July 1971 the Chairman (Under Secretary of State) of the Under Secretaries Committee approved formation of an Ad Hoc Senior Management Review Group to help resolve interagency disputes concerning positions within Diplomatic Missions. This group was to develop a recommendation for the Under Secretaries Committee. No disputes have been referred to this committee by Defense because they feel it is controlled and dominated by State and any recommendations would be a rubber stamping of the State position. The committee consists of five members—one each from State (Chairman), Defense, JCS, CIA, and OMB.

Evaluation

It is clear that both State and Defense are looking at the problem from different perspectives. State feels responsible for minimizing U.S. overseas representation and DOD feels responsible for military intelligence. Even worse it appears that a bureaucratic tug of war has developed and the substance of any dispute is subsumed in the battle for jurisdiction. State and DOD have been reviewing and re-reviewing the need for one naval attaché in Tunis for two years.

Recommendation

I don’t think we want to set up a system whereby you or the President has to decide whether or not we need to replace a Staff Sergeant in Prague (one of the actual cases in dispute). Yet we need to be able to increase or decrease our attaché representation as conditions change and take less than two years to decide what to do.

Rather than try to dictate the procedures for resolving disputes I recommend you send a memorandum to the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee asking him to review the procedures used for resolving such disputes to insure they are fair and responsive (Tab A).7

7 An unsigned and undated draft is attached but not printed. A signed copy of the memorandum has not been found.
Following President Nixon’s inauguration for a second term on January 20, 1973, William P. Rogers remained as Secretary of State, but the President had already determined that Rogers’ remaining tenure would be brief. Shortly after his re-election on November 7, 1972, President Nixon, in consultation with his assistants, H.R. Haldeman and John Ehrlichman, decided that Rogers should not continue as Secretary. Haldeman informed Rogers of the decision on November 16, but in a meeting with Haldeman and Nixon later that day, Rogers persuaded the President that he should stay on until June 1, in order to “clean things up that he was doing and not look like Kissinger had forced him out.” To replace Rogers, Nixon met with Kenneth Rush, then the Deputy Secretary of Defense, on November 21 to discuss Rush’s prospective appointment as Deputy Secretary of State and the possibility that he might “move up to Secretary” upon Rogers’s departure. (See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 347.) Rush was named Deputy Secretary of State on February 2, 1973, succeeding John N. Irwin II.

As the Watergate investigation continued to weaken the Nixon Presidency, however, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, Henry Kissinger, became a stronger contender to take the reins at the Department of State. “Without Watergate,” Kissinger wrote in his memoirs, Rush “would have been made Secretary in the summer of 1973 and I would have left the White House a few months later.” (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, page 420) During his time in the White House, Kissinger’s relations with Nixon and his inner circle, especially Haldeman and Ehrlichman, were often strained. Haldeman recorded in his diary on January 14, 1973, that Kissinger was concerned that Nixon had “lost confidence in him” due to the latter’s contacts with the “left wing set” in the media and academia. (Haldeman, Diaries, page 570) In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled that he intended to leave the White House by the end of 1973 but that “Watergate left no doubt that the existing system could no longer be sustained.” Kissinger wrote that both Melvin Laird, then the President’s Counselor, and White House Chief of Staff Alexander Haig told him it was “necessary” for him to move to the Department of State if he was to “remain effective.” “Once Watergate descended,” Kissinger writes, “I could not operate effectively as a Presidential staffer; Nixon was fed up with the Rogers–Kissinger rivalry and had already decided in principle that Rogers had to go; Rush was too little known to be promoted.” (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, page 420)
Nixon made little reference in his memoirs to his decision to nominate Kissinger instead of Rush, who remained as Deputy Secretary of State until May 29, 1974. According to Kissinger, it was Haig who raised the matter with the President. Haig, as he recalled in his memoirs, felt that moving Kissinger to the Department of State would isolate him, “as he wished to be, from the Sturm and Drang of Watergate.” (Haig, Inner Circles, pages 344–345) On May 5, 1973, the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, Brent Scowcroft, cabled Kissinger in Zavidovo, where Kissinger was meeting with Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev, with news that Haig was going to propose to the President that he become Secretary. (Message TOHAK 44; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, HAK Office Files, Box 33, HAK Trip Files, Moscow Trip, May 1973, TOHAK) Nixon did not raise the issue with Kissinger personally, but, Kissinger reflected, “it must have been torture for Nixon to consider assigning the principal Cabinet post to someone who was being lionized by his opponents precisely in order to make the President seem dispensable.” Television journalist Dan Rather reported on the July 13 broadcast of the CBS Evening News that Kissinger was under consideration to replace Rogers, who accused Kissinger of engineering the leak. (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pages 421–422)

Haig met with Rogers on August 8 to request his resignation. Rogers, however, refused to offer his resignation to anyone but the President and did not submit a letter of resignation until an August 16 meeting with Nixon and Haig. Haig recorded in a memorandum for the President’s file that Rogers “viewed his incumbency as Secretary of State with the greatest pride,” citing the Middle East cease-fire, improvements in the Western Alliance, détente with the Soviet Union, the Paris Peace Accords, and the opening to China as major accomplishments. Nixon expressed “extreme gratitude to Secretary Rogers for his outstanding service.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special File, President’s Office Files, Memoranda for the President, Box 92, Beginning August 12 [1973]) Kissinger recalled that Nixon notified him of his nomination on August 21 during an informal chat in the swimming pool at the Western White House in San Clemente, California. (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, page 423) Nixon announced it at a press conference the following day. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pages 710–711)

During his first news conference on August 23, Secretary-designate Kissinger, who would continue as the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs until November 1975, outlined his objectives as Secretary. For the administration to reach its foreign policy objectives in its second term, he asserted, would require “a greater institutionalization of foreign policy than has been the case up to now.” To
accomplish this, Kissinger outlined three main requirements: close cooperation with the Foreign Service, “greater exchange between the State Department and the National Security Council Staff than has been possible up to now,” and a “close partnership” with the Congress in the “development, planning, and execution of our foreign policy.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 17, 1973, pages 368–369) On August 26, Kissinger held the first of a series of meetings with senior Department of State officials to familiarize himself with the roles and functions of the Department’s various bureaus and to discuss personnel assignments. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 331, Memoranda of Conversations Book, Aug.–Sept. 1973)

On August 28, Kissinger met with Ambassador William Sullivan and Lawrence S. Eagleburger of the National Security Council Staff in San Clemente to discuss how the interdepartmental system would continue to function. (Eagleburger had previously provided Kissinger with a memorandum on August 17 that outlined recommendations for balancing Kissinger’s National Security Council responsibilities with those he would acquire at the Department of State, as well as personnel recommendations, should he be offered the job of Secretary (Document 197).) In the meeting, Kissinger maintained that he would continue to spend time at the White House and would meet with Department officials there. “It would even be good for them to see me there,” he noted. “It would make clear to them that they can’t play the White House off against the State Department.” Sullivan recommended that Kissinger retain the extant interdepartmental machinery—meaning the various subcommittees of the NSC, including the Washington Special Actions Group and Senior Review Group, and brushed aside concerns that Kissinger’s continued chairmanship of these groups would inhibit Department of State participation in their meetings. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 331, Memoranda of Conversations Book, Aug.–Sept. 1973)

Kissinger recalled in his memoirs that Watergate made any large-scale reorganization of the Department “out of the question” but that he “insisted” that his staff produce “thoughtful” analytic work. (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, page 440) During a September 4 meeting with Eagleburger, Theodore Eliot, and Thomas Pickering, he assessed the Department and its shortcomings: “When there’s an interdepartmental problem, I get the impression that State runs around town trying to move it in their way without telling anyone what their way really is. This deprives the State Department of the leadership it ought to have. The Department ought to stand for what is right and stay there; let others compromise. But if you start from the view that an issue will be maneuvered, then you’re already in a weak position. I will tell you, I
could not always tell what State was trying to bring about after it made a particular move. This deprives State of the intellectual leadership it really ought to exercise. State needs to be more conceptual, a little clearer,” Kissinger said, adding, “I feel strongly about sharpness. We’ve got to have it.” To address this, he suggested that he’d “rather have three or four sharp differences set out before me.” Staff meetings were to be held to discuss “important issues,” not for the “morale” of Department officials. Kissinger set limits for his subordinates: “After a decision is made, it’s ok to appeal, but when I’ve overruled the appeal, and we are in the process of implementing, they must do what they’re told.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 331, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations Book, Aug.–Sept. 1973) Subsequent discussions with Eagleburger and Ambassador to Japan Robert S. Ingersoll on September 5 and with former Inspector General of the Department of State and Foreign Service Thomas McElhiney on September 15 covered the Department’s personnel system and the Foreign Service. (Respectively, ibid. and National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1027, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcons, April–November 1973, Presidential/HAK [3 of 5])

In addition to considering these broader conceptual issues, Kissinger considered the staffing of senior Department positions. Many of the posts would be filled by individuals who previously served on the NSC Staff and were close to Kissinger. Winston Lord was named Director of the Policy Planning Staff and Eagleburger became Kissinger’s Executive Assistant. Kissinger appointed Helmut Sonnenfeldt Counselor of the Department, with primary responsibility for East-West issues, and placed William G. Hyland at the head of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Peter Rodman, another Kissinger protégé, remained with the NSC, but served as a liaison with the Department. Rush remained as Deputy Secretary of State, but was replaced by Robert S. Ingersoll on June 30, 1974. Joseph J. Sisco replaced William J. Porter as Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs on February 19, 1974. Together, these individuals, along with the Assistant Secretaries from the regional bureaus, most of whom were Foreign Service officers appointed during the first six months of Kissinger’s tenure as Secretary, constituted the Department’s decisionmaking principals, meeting on an almost daily basis. (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, page 442)

Kissinger’s confirmation hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee began on September 7. The hearings covered a variety of subjects, including the bombing of Cambodia and the overthrow of Chilean President Salvador Allende, although most of the Committee’s attention was focused on the 1969–1970 wiretapping of NSC Staff members under Kissinger’s orders (for details of the wiretapping, see
The Committee voted in favor of the nomination on September 18 and the full Senate gave its approval on September 21. The following day, September 22, Kissinger was administered the oath of office in the East Room of the White House. For Kissinger’s account of the swearing-in ceremony and his remarks that followed, see Years of Upheaval, pages 431–432, 446. On September 24, Kissinger delivered his first major speech as Secretary, addressing the United Nations General Assembly in New York. For the text of that speech, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976, Document 17.

118. Memorandum From Lawrence S. Eagleburger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT

An Executive Assistant

Here are my more concise thoughts on the Executive Assistant idea.²

It’s a good one. There is a range of issues and problems which will remain uncovered with the arrangements we have thus far thought about for your immediate office. They include:

¹ Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—Aug. 16–31, 1973. Sensitive. Printed from a copy that Eagleburger did not initial.

² Acting Secretary of State Rush first suggested to Kissinger the creation of an Executive Assistant position to replace that of the senior staff assistant, whose primary role had been to keep the Secretary apprised of personnel matters in the Department. A study prepared by Executive Secretary Pickering on August 28 and forwarded to Eagleburger the following day, outlined the responsibilities of the new position. The Executive Assistant, unlike the senior staff assistant, would be given more responsibility for “substantive business,” have more personal contact with the Secretary, and serve as liaison with the Secretariat and Deputy Secretary. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1970–73, ORG WH) Upon Kissinger’s entry on duty as Secretary of State on September 22, Eagleburger was designated his Executive Assistant.
—Liaison of a personal or highly sensitive nature with the others on the Seventh Floor (particularly Rush and his staff, and the Executive Secretary).

—Liaison of a similar nature with other Departments (particularly Defense, and to a lesser degree the NSC).

—Contact at a less than official level with the bureaus, the Inspector General, and once in a while a desk officer, to see what goes on and to give you warning of issues brewing. It’s a form of spying, but if done right could be helpful to you.

—Sensitive political contacts which you don’t want to handle yourself and don’t want Congressional Relations to do.

—Keeping an eye on the promotion and personnel management system to see that good people are moved up, and given the important assignments. You will usually want to have your voice heard early—sometimes you won’t want to weigh in personally if it can be avoided. Thus, the answer may be to use the Executive Assistant. It’s worth looking into.

The job should not get into the Dick Campbell operation; scheduling, movement of paper, etc. should remain with him.

But access will be important (I know, everyone is saying that, but in this case it’s true). The Executive Assistant should be permitted to sit in on most of your meetings (silently), should see most of your telegraphic traffic, and should work closely with Lord, Sonnenfeldt, and Pickering. He will not normally need to travel with you, although you might want him along on occasion. He can also help out on speeches, look into specific issues you want examined, and review staff studies on which you have questions.

In short, he can be another pair of eyes, and an extension of your will downward.

If you decide it’s the job you want me to do, we ought to think about whether it makes sense to keep the NSC title as well. Offhand I doubt it except, perhaps, as symbolic of the interrelationship of the two jobs. Certainly it won’t help Brent much, because the really full-time work is in the Department.

But, putting aside the question of who does it, I think the Rush idea an extremely valuable one.
1. Over the coming months I plan to share with you my thoughts on how we can best work together. In return, I welcome, and in fact will rely heavily on your opinions as to how we can improve the conduct of our foreign policy.

2. My purpose in this cable is to make clear my views on reporting from the field. The emphasis I placed on the subject in my remarks to the Department on September 28 underlines the importance I attach to this process.²

3. We must have timely, accurate and useful reporting from abroad. Such reporting should be characterized by: (A) analysis, not just description; (B) quality over quantity; (C) open and free expression of differing views.

(A) Analysis. I have the highest respect for the knowledge and capabilities of the career professionals in the Foreign Service. Over the last four years I have been struck however by the sheer volume of information which flows into the Department, contrasted with the paucity of good analytical material whether from the Department or the field. Mere reportage of events which have already taken place and about which in many cases we can do little is not sufficient. For that reporting to be useful to me, I require not only information on what is happening, but your most thoughtful and careful analyses of why it is happening, what it means for U.S. policy, and the directions in which you see events going.

(B) Quality. I want to ask the Chiefs of Mission in each post to review most carefully field reporting. I have the impression we can eliminate many items of minimal and marginal interest. This will help to cut down the volume and will allow reporting officers more time to think about events and developments and to analyze them for us here in Washington. I ask also close attention to making your reports cogent and concise. Verbosity too often seems to substitute for careful thought. I am asking the Under Secretary for Political Affairs to study reporting

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973. Unclassified. Drafted by Pickering; cleared by Porter, Lord, and Eagleburger; and approved by Kissinger.

² Kissinger’s remarks to Department employees were transmitted to all posts in telegram 193812, September 28. (Ibid.)
requirements to eliminate as many marginal requirements as possible as well as to ensure that important areas not now being fully reported on and analyzed are covered in the future.

(C) Free Expression. I urge Embassies, and officers within Embassies who have differing views on major issues from those reported by their colleagues, to make them available to me in the special and controlled channels provided by the Department for that purpose. I expect that all officers in the Foreign Service and the Department will keep dissenting views in the channels provided for; we cannot operate the government or the Department if dissent is taken to the press. I of course will look directly to the Ambassador for advice; but on fundamental questions I believe that dissenting views and opinions should be heard. This should help to produce a more open spirit of the kind I am trying to encourage between the Department and the Congress and the Department and the American public. If we cannot have it within the Department we have little reason to expect it in our relations with those outside. Expression of differing views will of course be subject to the Ambassador’s control; however, I will expect that when his views are submitted, opposing views and compromises will be noted as well.

4. I have asked my colleagues in the Department to pay attention to your reporting and analyses. You can expect to hear from me when its quality merits praise or censure.

5. Please bring these thoughts to the attention of your colleagues at your Missions and constituent posts.

6. I look forward to working with you during this crucial period for American foreign policy.

Kissinger
120. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Pickering) to Department of State Principals, Assistant Secretaries of State, and Office Directors


SUBJECT
Staff Meetings

On the basis of his experience to date with the different types of staff meetings, both in terms of subject matter and attendance, the Secretary has decided to refine further the purposes of these meetings. He has approved a new schedule of staff meetings, with a varied composition and focus, to achieve the purposes of providing him with more thoughtful and careful analysis, bringing him up to date on major operational problems and issues, and also providing him with opportunities to inform the Department of his thinking on major problems of foreign policy.

1. Principals and Regional Assistant Secretaries Meetings—These meetings will henceforth be held twice a week, on Mondays and Thursdays, with the same attendance as in the past, and will be mainly operational in focus. In addition, the Secretary expects that they will be used from time to time for analytical discussions when the subject is broad enough to be of general interest to the participants. Consequently, S/S, in coordination with S/PC, will be soliciting from, as well as proposing to, the regional bureaus such broader topics for consideration at these meetings. As in the past, heads of relevant functional bureaus will be invited when there is a topic of direct interest to them and they may, in turn, suggest to S/S and S/PC topics of broad interest for consideration at these sessions.

2. Meetings with Functional Bureau Heads—To replace the present Tuesday and Thursday meetings with functional bureau heads in the...
Department and with the Directors of ACDA, AID, and USIA, the Secretary has decided upon a meeting every Tuesday with a small group of functional bureau heads in which the Principals would also participate. Included in this group are the Assistant Secretaries for International Organization Affairs, Economic and Business Affairs, Congressional Relations, the new Bureau of Oceans Environment Technology (in the interim the Director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs), the Directors of Politico-Military Affairs and Intelligence and Research, and the Legal Adviser. In addition to this small group, attendance at the Tuesday meeting will include the heads of ACDA, AID and USIA or any Assistant Secretary (from a regional or a functional bureau) when a topic of interest to them is being discussed. As is the case with the Regional Assistant Secretaries meetings, heads of bureaus which are not regular participants may suggest topics which are of general interest and would profit from a discussion at a staff meeting. While some of the topics for the Tuesday agenda will be operational, we would prefer and expect to schedule items which are analytical in nature at each meeting. Therefore, S/S, in coordination with S/PC, will be soliciting from, as well as proposing to, the bureaus such broader topics for consideration at these meetings as well.

3. Analytical Policy Planning Meetings—Each Friday, the Secretary will meet with a small group, whose composition will be determined by the topic, to discuss papers devoted to major foreign policy issues. For these meetings the Director of S/PC, in coordination with S/S, will oversee the preparation of thoughtful analytical papers to make the discussion as fruitful as possible. In the preparation of these papers, S/PC will work closely with the major bureaus concerned. In some cases, principal drafting responsibilities will rest with the bureau; in others, S/PC and the interested bureau (or bureaus) may set up a small ad hoc drafting group of competent officers; in still others, the paper may be written in S/PC. Participants in the Friday meetings will be those Principal Officers, Agency Directors and Assistant Secretary level officers immediately concerned with the question, plus those at the expert level who have made significant contributions to the paper. The group would, in any case, be small, to encourage as free an exchange as possible.

Papers for the Friday meetings, as well as those analytical papers designed for the other meetings noted above, will be expected to be ready at least two days in advance in order for participants to have an adequate opportunity to consider them before the discussion.

4. Presentations by the Secretary—The Secretary has agreed to meet periodically—about once a month—with Principal Officers and Agency Directors, all Assistant Secretaries, and office heads to share his thinking on major problems or issues of foreign policy or develop-
ments of special interest on which he wishes to give guidance to the leadership of the Department and its major elements. These meetings would be similar to those the Secretary had held following his trip to Moscow and his more recent trip to the Middle East and the Far East. They would provide an opportunity for both questions and discussion.

Finally, I would stress again, as I have to many of you in person, the importance the Secretary attaches to the staff meetings serving the dual purposes of providing him with the most cogent and clearly reasoned analysis of and approaches to the problems proposed for discussion as well as keeping him fully informed of the major concerns of those who attend.

Thomas R. Pickering

121. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Ingersoll) to the Ambassador to the Republic of Korea (Habib)


Dear Philip:

As you know from our discussions with the Secretary at the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Tokyo, he attaches great importance to improving field reporting. In State telegram 209583, he set forth his views with respect to the quality and quantity of Foreign Service reporting. As a follow-up to that message, Ambassador Porter asked the regional and functional Bureaus to provide specific suggestions for improving reporting to better meet the needs of the Department and the Washington community. EA submitted a series of such recommendations, based on contributions from country desks. Synthesizing suggestions from the Bureaus, Ambassador Porter found that five specific recommendations were widely shared and were, moreover, well

1 Source: Department of State, Files of Philip C. Habib: Lot 81 D 5, Chiefs of Mission Conference, Dec. 6–8, 1974—Honolulu. Limited Official Use. A handwritten note on the letter indicates that it was received on December 31. Similar letters were sent from Ingersoll to all Ambassadors in the East Asia and Pacific region.

2 Kissinger made the comment in his introductory remarks to the Conference of Chiefs of Mission to East Asian countries in Tokyo on November 15. (Ibid., Chiefs of Mission Conference—Tokyo—October 23–26, 1973)

3 Document 119.

4 Not found.
within the authority of the Bureau to implement. He therefore asked that each Bureau take the necessary steps to implement these measures without delay.

The approved recommendations are as follows:

1) The Department should provide systematic guidance to the field on what is wanted and, conversely, what is not needed.
2) The Department should attempt to evaluate reports that are received, and should inform posts of its evaluations.
3) Posts should submit more reports of a specifically analytical nature, perhaps on a fixed and regular basis.
4) Greater use should be made of airgrams in reporting.
5) At the Bureau level, more rather than less factual reporting should be submitted.

Let me stress at the outset that the last recommendation, discussed in more detail below, should not lead to an increase in the overall volume of reporting. Rather there should be an appropriate readjustment in the reporting program, giving more emphasis to some areas, but concurrently decreasing coverage of less important areas.

With respect to recommendations (1) and (2)—providing guidance to the field and evaluating reports from the field—action responsibility obviously resides here. Country directors have begun to draw up guidelines on what should and should not be emphasized in reporting and these will be communicated to you in the near future, either by telegram or Official-Informal letter. These will be changed and updated as necessary.

We will periodically offer you our comments on reports which are particularly well done and useful as well as those which for one reason or another seem marginal. With respect to the latter, our comments will be intended to make reporting more responsive to the Secretary’s directive as seen from Washington; they will not be intended, nor should they be taken, as a form of censure. We shall also provide you on a more systematic basis papers—NSC, INR and others—that are of particular interest to you. In return, we would ask that you let us know what you are missing from Washington. We realize only too well that the field has at times an impression of resounding silence from this end. The objective of this interchange is to insure open communications among us and the maintenance of a high-quality, professional product.

The intent of recommendation number 4)—increased use of airgrams—is to take advantage of the greater leeway the airgram format can provide, in terms of length and style, for in-depth reporting of both factual and analytical nature. We will attempt to insure speedier distribution of airgrams than often exists now and will see to it that they receive prompt attention at as high a level as the subject requires.

In the referenced telegram, the Secretary expressed the view that too much emphasis was given to factual reporting at the expense of
analysis. At the same time, EA and the other Bureaus feel that a certain amount of factual reporting on particular topics is essential to enable working levels of the Department to pursue their own analyses of trends and developments overseas as well as to provide necessary basic information to other Washington agencies. We shall be seeking to identify more precisely those high priority areas where more factual reporting would be useful and, at the same time, point out areas where factual reporting could be reduced. Recommendation 5) therefore should be applied selectively, within existing personnel resources.

We have given considerable attention to recommendation 3), calling for more analytical reporting, perhaps on a periodic basis. In our overall guidance for individual posts we will discuss areas in which analytical reporting might be increased and whether some of that reporting should be placed on a fixed schedule. However, with the exception described below, I do not intend to establish at this time a bureau-wide schedule for analytical reporting. In my opinion, each of you is the best judge of developments in your country requiring greater analytical consideration.

As you recall, in the Chiefs of Mission Conference in Tokyo, the Secretary specifically asked that you submit periodic assessments of trends and developments in your countries. It was agreed that this would be done on a quarterly basis. These reports, which will receive the Secretary’s personal attention, should be relatively brief and should be interpretive in nature—conveying your personal judgment as to the meaning for US interests and objectives of trends in the country, and highlighting potential problems of which the Secretary should be made aware. It will not be necessary to describe in detail problems or issues already familiar to the Secretary, the intent instead is to provide a thoughtful appraisal of general trends and to flag problems or opportunities on the horizon. These reports should be submitted according to the following staggered schedule:

—Saigon, Phnom Penh, Vientiane, Bangkok—no later than the end of the first month of the quarter (January 31, 1974).
—Rangoon, Kuala Lumpur, Jakarta, Singapore, Manila, Canberra, Wellington, Suva—no later than the end of the second month (February 28, 1974).
—Peking, Hong Kong, Tokyo, Seoul, Taipei—no later than the end of the third month (March 31, 1974).

Finally, I need not remind you that all reporting—factual or analytic, airgram or telegram—is greatly improved in value by including a short summary of its content and closing with a concluding comment, unless the report is brief. This will help to insure that it is given the attention it deserves at the highest level necessary.

I recognize the heavy reporting burden borne by many EA posts, and I know too that reductions in your staffs have made the problem
even more acute. I hope that the foregoing recommendations and requests will be manageable and we will be mindful of your problems in formulating specific guidance for each of you. If you feel that the guidance you are receiving is insufficient, or that any of these measures are unnecessary or ill-advised, please let me know. As I noted earlier, their purpose is simply to carry out the Secretary’s directive and refine what we consider to be excellent reporting from the field.

Sincerely yours,

Robert S. Ingersoll

5 Ingersoll signed “Bob” above this typed signature.

122. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Executive Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger


HAK:

Some thoughts on odds and ends:

—State Department Morale: I would imagine you are concerned about the spate of articles on secrecy in the State Department and low morale amongst the working stiffs. These are, in my view, all part of a campaign; I urge that you ignore them. As I indicated to you earlier, I am convinced that there is a problem at the office director level and below. It is not a new problem except in the sense that some of these people are now being excluded from meetings. The answer continues to be for you to develop a close association with the various assistant secretaries (and now that your own men have been appointed, this should not be a problem), and to rely upon them to keep the office directors and personnel below involved, productive, and satisfied. There is no way in the world for you to meet the problem headon; aside from the compelling fact that it is contrary to your working style, it would also be a terrible waste of time for you to try to be seen and heard by all the Indians in the building. The assistant secretaries are, and should continue to be, the key to the problem.

1 Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—January 1-23, 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
You might want to consider a meeting at some point with some junior Foreign Service officers (I think Bremer talked to you about this) but I would not do much more.

Where I do think we have a problem is in the amount of time you have been out of the country since taking office. This, inevitably, makes it more difficult for you to force this building to work as you would like. Thus, I would strongly recommend that you give serious consideration to spending as much time in Washington as possible in January and February. This would mean postponing your Latin American trip and your trip to Moscow, but I think it is important that you get your new team broken in before you again leave town (barring, of course, some major Middle East blowup).

—Appointments: As I told you, I doubt that you can find a better candidate than Nat Davis for the Congressional job, and therefore recommend that you move on this one quickly. While I agree that Davis would be better than Porter at the Under Secretary’s job, I do not think he would be as good as Sisco. Therefore, I suggest you take one more crack at Sisco, and if that does not work that you decide to stick with Porter until such time as you can find an adequate replacement.

I also think you should move on the executive secretary change quickly, and hope you will be prepared to move with Springsteen. After much thought, I am back to my original belief that Pickering in the Director General job would give a host of good signals to the Foreign Service and would also protect Tom from any harm that might otherwise be done him by the Springsteen change.

LSE


3 Eagleburger added the following handwritten postscript: “And always excepting vacation time—which I think you should take.”
123. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Rush)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

The “Back to Back” Relationship for State and AID in the Geographic Bureaus

Aid programs and their administration have historically evoked feelings ranging from mild anxiety to acute discomfort. Remedy has been sought in baptism (new name), conversion (new philosophy), and reorganization.

This dynamic condition derives from the ebb and flow of competing bodies of belief and has resulted in a high degree of eclecticism which leaves everybody dissatisfied, but few so unhappy as to wield the ax.

The concept of Back to Back, instituted in the Latin America Bureau a decade ago, is an organizational device which is intended to integrate our economic development programs with our total policy.

The eclecticism of our assistance policies is evident when we observe that the other bureaus were not so structured. Given the choice of two competing faiths, we chose both.

The term “Back to Back” as used herein refers to an integrated geographic bureau relationship similar to that in ARA, rather than to the co-location relationship which does not imply chains of authority but which has also been discussed elsewhere and at other times.

The Inspector General’s office has just completed another review of the effectiveness of the system. Other groups within State and AID have also recently performed evaluations in response to questions posed by the Murphy Commission.\(^2\) This paper does not duplicate those efforts or evaluations.

The Back to Back system has advantages and disadvantages. The net evaluation as to whether it or the status quo in the other geographic bureaus of State and AID is more desirable is largely determined by the perception of the role of aid which is brought to the judgement.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Files of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), Entry 5027, Box 346, January 1974. Confidential. Drafted by John K. Wilhelm (S/PC) on January 9.

\(^2\) Regarding the Murphy Commission, see Document 147.
The Functional Approach:

Internal organizational decisions for State and AID must be significantly influenced by the reality of the functional approach to aid. That approach is embodied in the legislation for FY 74, reflected in the orientation of policy makers in AID, and reinforced by the manner in which AID has configured itself.

The functional approach is not, in the first instance, country oriented. Conceptually therefore it is apolitical. This is reflected in the internal organization of AID where the policy making function has been heavily concentrated in the Bureau of Planning and Policy Coordination and the Technical Assistance Bureau. Given the present legislative mandate, it is not improbable that AID’s geographic functions would be even further de-emphasized by the creation of functional bureaus accompanied by a further narrowing of the geographic focus.

Realistically, geographic integration would have severely restricted relevance in a highly functionally oriented AID.

The Heart of the Problem:

At the heart of the problem is the perception—or judgement—of the appropriate function of aid. If aid is viewed as an integral part of US foreign policy which is to be configured in support of that policy, then a full integration of the Department of State and AID would be a viable alternative to the current arrangement.

If aid serves substantially independent purposes, then it is questionable as to whether or not a greater identity of State and AID is desirable. Indeed, some would argue for a genuinely autonomous agency.

It would be a gross misrepresentation to suggest that there is any enthusiasm for the Back to Back system among the senior officers in AID who were interviewed. One exception—an administrative officer—showed positive interest (as distinguished from enthusiasm). He saw efficiencies to be gained. Indeed it is amusing to observe that the administrative officers were the only ones who did not see substantial administrative and logistics problems associated with the Back to Back system.

A third, and purely pragmatic view would absent itself from the philosophic dispute. This view would be based upon the observation that in the real world both the development and the foreign policy views of foreign assistance have their constituencies and that the only way to get adequate funding for each is to do both. Proponents of this view would argue that our eclectic foreign assistance policy is appropriate both substantively and organizationally and therefore would not benefit significantly from change. They would assert that while the status quo entails certain tensions within the bureaucracy, notably between State and AID, that these tensions are by and large constructive
and creative and are on balance desirable. Indeed they would assert that the reduction of these tensions via a Back to Back relationship tends to obscure legitimate differences and that this is the price which is paid for the easier operation which Back to Back affords.

The potential interees are the coolest. They are unable to discern how their assumption of a position subordinate to their current peers would improve matters.

AID officers are second class citizens in the Foreign Service. They are not bothered by this so long as they are masters in their own house. However, they do mind being institutionally subordinate as a matter of principle to people whom they view—at best—as their peers.

Experience in ARA/LA has not lessened their concern. With one exception, all of the desk officers are FSOs. AID is not in on the main process by which desk officers are chosen. The deputy slot is usually the AID slot. Officers with options usually resist being assigned to it.

Few AID officers feel the need for the “foreign policy guidance” which FSOs are so prone to talk about. This is conditioned by their experience with FSOs, especially in the field, where contact occurs largely in countries to which AID officers aspire to go and FSOs are sent. There is little coincidence of assignment of the elites of the two groups.

One astute veteran of many reorganizations observed that in the final analysis there is a network of people in the US bureaucracy who do certain things in a relatively collegial fashion and that no matter how you organize them, the same people tend to be doing the same things. In his view, the benefits and liabilities associated with one form of organization or another were therefore rather marginal.

The Dual System:

State and AID have separate personnel and administrative systems. Promotion and assignment of officers in each system are made independently of the other. Necessarily, this means that officers in one system will be responsive to officers in another only to the extent that it does not impede their advancement within their own system.

The Back to Back system leaves this condition unchanged, and can therefore expect to enhance voluntary cooperation rather than the closer conformity which a single administrative and personnel system would encourage.

The separate personnel systems carry other difficulties. The buzz words that get AID officers promoted are not the same as those which get State officers promoted. It is therefore risky in certain instances for one to work for the other. More basic yet, there is no assurance that an officer from one system will understand fully what an officer from another is doing and therefore be able, even if he does know the buzz words, to give a fair and appropriate assessment of his subordinate’s
performance. This can result in over generosity as well as parsimony and therefore undeserved promotions as well as being undeservedly passed over.

There is also a problem of comparative rank in State and AID. While in the aggregate, State and AID officers tend to have the same age rank groupings, within each service different groups fare differently. For instance, an economic officer will most likely rise more rapidly in AID than in State. If they must compete for the same job, the State economic officer will be at a disadvantage.

Within each system, the benefits of working in the other system are disproportionate. Most State officers benefit substantially from the experience of dealing with the program and administering it. An AID tour is not considered “outside the career path”. In the case of AID officers, the State experience is career enhancing for a far more limited group of officers who aspire to the relatively small number of jobs which AID has with heavy political content.

On the State side the Back to Back system elicits differing views. Some officers welcome the opportunity to expand their career experience and believe that there are benefits to be gained from the increased mutual sensitivity which the Back to Back system promotes. Others, however hold a more traditional view and prefer to confine the State role to one of policy guidance.

Advantages of the Back to Back System:

The advantages of the Back to Back system can be substantial, and tend to vary proportionately with the size of the program in a given country. The more important the program, the more beneficial is the mutual sensitivity of officers. The real benefit lies in a convergence of the perception of a problem in a particular country, and of the approach which is desirable to deal with it. This convergence is a direct function of the closer interrelationship of personnel. It results in closer coordination and more expeditious resolution of difficulties, and provides a single geographic backstop in Washington. This latter is again of greater benefit to State than to AID because AID must still maintain a backstop in order to handle technical issues which are quite unrelated to the considerations of the State Department Desk.

Short of integration of the two personnel systems, the Back to Back system offers the greatest opportunity for bringing about a convergence of the views in State and AID as they operate in a particular country. This would be even more beneficial if it were extended to the field.

The judgement as to whether or not the Back to Back system is on balance sufficiently desirable and superior to justify its extension to EA, NEA and AF depends in significant measure upon the willingness of
participants in the arrangement to cooperate with one another, the willing-ness of AID to delegate sufficient authority to the State geographic bureaus to make it a genuinely viable and valuable approach. Most im-portant of all, however, is the philosophical judgement as to what con-stitutes the appropriate object of US foreign assistance.

If that object is to make assistance an integral part of foreign policy, broadly defined, and responsive to that foreign policy, then the Back to Back system offers the first step toward the attainment of that goal. Realistically, however, it is only a partial move in that direction, and only full integration of the two systems would offer significant promise of the attainment of the goal.

If, however, the primary purpose of our foreign assistance pro grams is to accomplish economic development as such, then the Back to Back system would derogate from that objective.

If the judgement is that as a pragmatic matter, US foreign assistance policy should be eclectic, then the advantages offered by the Back to Back system do not appear sufficient to offset the disadvantages involved in extending it to NEA, EA, and AF.

124. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Brown) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The Black Caucus

The group of blacks who want to meet with you consider themselves the representatives of blacks in State who have made it. Their preoccupations are largely with the educated blacks in the system who want quicker advance and greater recognition.

I have talked to many of them on an individual basis but have not tried to divert them from you as a group because such action would only disturb them more.

Here are some of their preoccupations:

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, 1973–74 EEO. No classification marking.
1. Blacks are not well served by the present director of the Office of Equal Opportunity (Fred Pollard, former Olympic star with little drive). The office should be revitalized and the 7th floor should pay it more attention.

Comment: This is true. The Black Caucus has to say this. Once it does, we can move on the problem.

2. Blacks are not getting the right jobs.

Comment: We sometimes take pride in having a good number of black Ambassadors. Unfortunately, we send the career blacks to black countries in Africa and the Caribbean. This bugs them. What we need to do is name a black to a white country. We have an opportunity with Costa Rica. We do not have blacks in top-level DCM jobs in Europe, Asia, or elsewhere. What we should do is take a first-class black like Terry Todman (now Ambassador to Guinea) and make him DCM in Paris, London, or some other important Class I post.

3. The lower blacks get nowhere.

Comment: Largely true, despite efforts to upgrade. Our mail sorters, cleaners, secretaries, etc., are lucky to move up one or two pay notches during their entire service with State. Perhaps the best way to cope with this is to get an energetic director of the Equal Opportunity Office and have him put pressure on us in an intelligent way.²

² On January 31, Kissinger met with a group of African-American employees from the Department, AID, and USIA to discuss career advancement opportunities for black officers. Following the meeting, an unsigned January 31 memorandum was sent to Kissinger suggesting he “continue to recommend Black officers for appointment to Ambassadorial and other senior level positions on a worldwide basis,” develop an “upward mobility program” for minority Departmental personnel, strengthen mid-career recruitment and lateral entry programs in all foreign policymaking agencies to increase the number of African-Americans at middle and senior level positions, and elevate the Office of Equal Employment Opportunity to Deputy Assistant Secretary level. (Ibid.) Samuel M. Pinckney was designated the first Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Equal Employment Opportunity on January 15, 1975. Pinckney’s appointment coincided with the creation of the Department’s Equal Employment Opportunity Office (M/EEO) through the combination of the former Office of Equal Employment (M/EP) and the Office of Women’s Affairs (M/WA).
125. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Executive Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger


HAK:

Attached are two memos: one from Ken Rush (Tab A) and one from Joe Sisco (Tab B) describing how they believe functions should be divided amongst the Seventh floor principals. (Sisco’s memo deals exclusively with his position.) While I think you neither should nor need to make any decisions now, I do think it would be worth reading through the memos at your leisure.

Rush’s memo makes the following points:

—The Assistant Secretaries should be the major operational actors.
—They must have direct access to you and the Deputy Secretary, and should not be forced to go through successive layers on the Seventh floor.
—It is both impossible and unwise to delineate “too precisely” a division of labor on political matters among Seventh floor principals.
—The Deputy Secretary should:

—be your alter ego;
—cover both functional and regional matters, and be a final court of appeal on both substance and management on issues that do not merit your attention;
—be the Department’s representative on NSC committees, and should determine “the tentative position of the Department of State . . .” State Department positions should not necessarily be previously cleared by you;
—continue as the Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee and be responsible for coordinating inter-agency working group activities on issues such as MBFR, SALT, etc.;
—be the principal point of contact with other Departments when you do not wish to become involved.

—The Under Secretary for Political Affairs should be:

—the focal point for Assistant Secretaries to bring political problems not normally within the purview of other Seventh floor principals;
—the coordinator of basic Department liaison with Defense (keeping PM informed);

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1 Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—February 1974. No classification marking.
2 Rush’s undated memorandum at Tab A and Sisco’s January 31 memorandum at Tab B are attached but not printed.
—the intelligence coordinator and supervisor of INR’s activities within the Intelligence community;
—the coordinating point for State and official visits, and senior liaison below you and Rush for inter-department coordination on political issues;
—the pater familias for the Foreign Service;
—available for trouble-shooting missions and the conduct of bilateral and multilateral negotiations. (On this latter point Rush believes Sisco should have primary responsibility for the Icelandic, Azores and Spanish negotiations.)

—Rush believes the Under Secretary for Security Assistance is so busy with energy and security assistance that he should be relieved of oversight responsibility of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and Bureau of Oceans and Technology.

—The Counselor should be the Senior Adviser to you and Rush on Soviet and East European Affairs, as well as SALT, MBFR, CSCE and the Year of Europe. He should also be the principal coordinator with ACDA.

Sisco’s memo makes the following points:

—The Under Secretary for Political Affairs should be your Political Chief of Staff, assuring that you are “apprised in a timely manner of all important political matters that require your attention. He must also ensure that needed action is taken expeditiously and effectively.”

—The job can be most effective when the Under Secretary is given a mandate by you to act as “principal substantive political adviser, on the model of the Permanent Under Secretary of the UK Foreign Office.”

—The Under Secretary’s responsibilities should not be focussed exclusively on intelligence activities and political-military relationships with the Defense Department. His mandate should range to all political matters, with his primary objective being to organize more effectively the Seventh floor’s decision-making process on political issues.

—This concept can be implemented slowly in order not to create major bureaucratic problems on the Seventh floor.

—The Under Secretary should be given over-all supervision of the upcoming base negotiations, with Bob McCloskey acting as principal negotiator under him.

—Sisco wants to remain in the Middle Eastern picture, but assures you that he will not substitute for the future Assistant Secretary of NEA.

Sisco makes one procedural recommendation: that you meet at 9:30 a.m. every Tuesday with your principal staff to plot activities over the course of the week, and to give preliminary guidance on policy and operations.
126. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Executive Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger


HAK:

Two studies of the Cone System are attached. At Tab I is Nat Davis’ report to you with recommendation on the future of the Cone System; at Tab II is the AFSA paper on the Cone System. The Davis paper is a far more thoughtful product, which includes some good arguments from various pro-Cone quarters (Tabs B, C, D, and F of Tab III). The AFSA study is less thorough but generally arrives at the same basic conclusions as the Director General’s report.

The Director General’s Study (Tab I)

I very much recommend you take a half hour to read the Davis 13-page cover memo. You may also want to leaf through the attachments to the Davis report which are included at Tab III. The report will not only give you more insight into the Cone System and its impact on the Service, but will also be a good introduction to some of the broader and more complex problems that afflict the Foreign Service (promotion, assignment, recruitment, etc.).

The Director General discusses the effects of the Cone System on the following areas of personnel administration:

Recruitment—The Cone System has improved the quality, morale and self-respect of young FSO’s in non-political specialities. However, differential exam scoring and directing uninformed young FSO’s into career specialities are cited as inequities of the system.

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1 Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—February 1974. No classification marking. Drafted by Eagleburger.

2 Tabs I and II are not attached and were not found. Beginning in 1963, the Foreign Service Board of Examiners examined candidates based on three functional specialities or “cones”: administrative, economic, and political. This was institutionalized in P.L. 90–494, signed on August 20, 1968. The consular cone was added in 1970. In the Secretary’s Staff Meeting on October 29, 1973, Rush stated that a proposal by the Departments of Labor and Commerce to create a new labor cone within the Foreign Service had been rejected by the Department of State. On this, Kissinger commented, “I am against all cones,” adding, “I want to abolish the ones that exist.” (National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 1, Secretary’s Staff Meeting, 10/29/1973) Later, following a meeting between Department and AFSA officials on December 6, 1973, Kissinger instructed Director General Davis to conduct a thorough study of the cone system. Telegram 241487 to all posts, December 10, sought the views of Department personnel and offered a number of alternatives for reform. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973)

3 Tab III and its tabs are not attached and were not found.
Assignment—For the individual case, cones don’t help much. A sophisticated, well-managed assignment system can match individual skills to specific needs with or without cones. However, cones do help in shaping and matching aggregate supply with demand.

Promotion—Political officers no longer dominate the promotion lists; hence their dislike for cones. Cones encourage FSO’s to eschew non-coned (linguistic and geographical) in favor of coned specialities. Shifting from less to more promising cones (lately out of the political cone) is not uncommon.

The Davis paper then presents you with the following three options (pages 7 to 13):

1) continue the present Cone System;
2) abolish cones;
3) the DG proposal: “Modify the Cone System to retain its best features in recruitment but eliminating grossly differentiated standards … Retain a modified Cone System in middle ‘professional’ grades. Relax cone designations at junior grades up through the threshold (6 to 5), and at senior grades. Revive a staff or specialist corps. Reestablish a meaningful junior officer complement and some rotation, or at least variety of job experience for junior officers.”

The DG asks you for an indication of which option you want him to pursue in forthcoming talks with AFSA (page 13).

The AFSA Study (Tab II)

Based on an “in-depth analysis and a thorough Service pulse-taking,” AFSA argues for changes that extend beyond the “narrow issue of the Cone System itself.” Lateral entry and assignment procedures also come under the AFSA gun. AFSA makes the familiar argument that the Cone System, devised to encourage specialization, has failed to produce leadership. AFSA’s goal is a system that would produce both specialists and policy leaders.

Two categories of recommendations are made: those for immediate action, and those to be implemented after further consultations between AFSA and Management. Briefly, AFSA wants you to:

1) Eliminate cones at Senior levels to restore the system’s ability to move the Service’s best people to the top.
2) Eliminate cones at Junior levels to obviate career specialization decisions by uninformed young Service entrants.
3) Modify and redefine cones at Middle levels—where specialization is admittedly important—to encourage functional and area specialization, and to reconcile this sort of specialization with the need for broad experience. Promote mid career officers in two groupings: specialists and an across-the-board group.
4) Provide a cross-training program and adopt an “open assignments system” to broaden backgrounds for tomorrow’s Senior-rank policy leaders.
5) Establish a single Foreign Service Specialist Corps to absorb the current multiplicity of specialist systems (FSS, FSR, FSRU, etc.) as well as any FSO’s who prefer to serve and compete as specialists.
6) Crack down on lateral entry “abuses.”
7) End differential passing scores on the entrance exam based on cones; instead, obtain specialists through recruitment efforts.

My View

While there are substantial arguments for the total elimination of the Cone System immediately, I believe the Davis proposal for elimination of the cones at the bottom and top of the Foreign Service ladder is the best way to proceed now. It would add substantial flexibility to the Foreign Service recruitment, assignment and promotion systems, while preserving basic needs for ensuring adequate specialization where it is most necessary, i.e., at the middle levels. In addition, from a purely political point of view, it would probably avoid the wild cries of outrage that would come from the specialists in the Foreign Service and from special interest groups outside the Department, such as Commerce, Labor, and OMB (see Tab III, f).

If in a year or two you still want to move to total elimination of the Cone System it would be far easier to take that step after some experience with a modified Cone System and when the political heat would probably be somewhat less.

Recommendations:

1) I recommend that you approve the Director General’s option for a modified Cone System and instruct him to initiate consultations with AFSA on this and AFSA’s other proposals immediately.
2) That you give specific blessing to the Davis proposal that we reinstitute the “junior officer complement” which provides a wide variety of training for junior officers in various functional areas.
3) That you instruct the Director General that the Promotion Panels now meeting on senior officers rank order their recommendations for

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4 On the copy printed here, none of the options under the recommendations is marked approved, disapproved, or see me. However, a summary of the options for reform of the cone system was printed in the July 1974 Department of State Newsletter. The summary’s preface states that Kissinger had instructed Davis to initiate discussions with the American Foreign Service Association on the implementation of a modified cone system. To retain the “best features” of the system and eliminate “grossly differentiated standards,” the new system would “relax” cone designations at junior grades and senior grades while maintaining the current system for middle “professional” grades. The new system would revive specialist corps and reestablish “a meaningful junior officer complement and some rotation [of duties], or at least variety of job experience, for junior officers.” (“The Cone System Study Report,” Department of State Newsletter, July 1974, pp. 64–67) See also Document 131.
promotion across the board rather than by cone. (Davis already has informally laid the groundwork for this; all he needs is your go-ahead.)

LSE

5 Printed from a copy with Eagleburger’s typed initials.

127. Editorial Note

At the beginning of 1974, the continuation of the Overseas Personnel Reduction program (OPRED), designed to reduce the U.S. civilian and military presence abroad, was debated by the Departments of State and Defense. The program, implemented in July 1970 and renewed in August 1972, was due to expire on June 30, 1974. In a letter to Deputy Secretary of State Kenneth Rush on March 1, Deputy Secretary of Defense William P. Clements argued “the reduction aspects of OPRED have outlived their usefulness and have now become a costly and inappropriate impediment to the efficient and economical management of DoD personnel overseas. Moreover, given the dramatic changes in the world situation of late, they may now run counter to our national interests insofar as those interests may dictate variously expansion, stabilization or contraction of USG representation overseas depending upon the prevailing circumstances.” Clements wrote that OPRED had “degenerated into a vehicle whereby one department engages in undue and inappropriate interference in the internal management decisions of another,” recommended that the program “should now be allowed to lapse at the expiration of its current term, i.e., at the end of FY 1974, and that no action should be taken thereafter to reinstate it.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–263, Under Secretaries Study Memoranda, U/SM 115–119 [2 of 4])

Rush, as Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee, recommended in a March 27 memorandum to the Committee that OPRED’s mandate be extended “indefinitely.” OPRED, he maintained in an attached draft memorandum for President Nixon, had “significantly reduced and adjusted the US Government profile abroad consistent with national policy requirements.” Rush pointed out that between early 1969 and mid-1973, the official U.S. presence abroad had been reduced by 53 percent (985,000) and that 28 percent (278,000) of that decrease had occurred outside Vietnam.
“The Defense Department, representing over 93% of the total presence overseas decreased an estimated 53.3%, accounting for the lion’s share (94%) of this reduction. The civilian agencies decreased their overseas complements by 49% (down 54,600 from a 1969 base of 111,000). Diplomatic missions have been pruned by 22%, despite the fact that staffs for certain priority functions have been expanded. If one excludes 7,164 Defense personnel in Vietnam newly added to the diplomatic missions category, the decrease in diplomatic missions in 32.5%.

“The Committee is satisfied that overseas employment has decreased significantly over the last four years. Priorities have been met without resorting to the large-scale, community-wide percentage reductions efforts which are operationally disruptive.

“Questions have arisen within the Committee as to the utility of continuing the present arrangements. In our judgment the OPRED process has been responsive to your clearly stated intention to control the official US presence abroad.” (Ibid.)

While OPRED was allowed to expire on June 30, in October the program was reconstituted and renamed Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment (MODE) and given the mandate to cut further the size of U.S. overseas posts. See Document 140.

128. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Brown) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, March 5, 1974.

Bureau Reorganization

The present bureau set-up is cumbersome and does not relate easily to political realities. A re-alignment is in order.

1. Transfer to EUR: Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. It is logical to put Greece and Turkey into EUR and the NATO context. Cyprus follows naturally.

1 Source: Department of State, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, January 1974 Chron. No classification marking. Sent through Sisco.
2. Transfer to NEA: Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria, and Libya. This action puts the Arab states of the Maghreb with their Middle Eastern brethren. AF becomes Black-Africa oriented and thus cohesive.

3. Transform NEA: NEA, in the first bite, could be constituted into two sections: Middle East/Maghreb (largely Arab/moslem); the subcontinent (India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Ceylon, etc.). In the second bite, NEA could sensibly be split in two. This will require Congressional approval as we would be creating an additional Assistant Secretary for the new Bureau which would emerge.

I have consulted Easum, Hartman, and Atherton. Easum has no problems. He does not think that Diggs will object but agrees that he should be consulted. Hartman goes along. Atherton wonders if Sudan should be included. There is some logic to this because of the relationship with Egypt. There is a perverse logic as well in not putting all the Arab League countries into NEA, especially those like Sudan and Mauritania whose populations are largely black.

Atherton has some doubts about the second bite. He wants a chance to think it over. Easum believes the eventual division of NEA is the sensible way out of what could become an overly large and diverse bureau.

Recommendation

(1) That you approve the switch of countries to and from NEA.

(2) That you approve for planning purposes and discussion with the Congress the later split of NEA into (a) Near Eastern and Maghrebian Affairs, (b) South Asian Affairs.

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2 Representative Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (D-Michigan), was Chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa of the House International Relations Committee.

3 Kissinger initialed his approval of both recommendations.

4 The Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs would not be created until 1992.
129. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 13, 1974, 5 p.m.

SUBJECT

The Secretary’s Meeting with Representatives of the Women’s Action Organization

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Kissinger
Mrs. Dorothy Stansbury, WAO
Miss Barbara Good, WAO
Mrs. Donna Oglesby, WAO
Dr. Dorothy Sampas, WAO
Nathaniel Davis, Director General

OBSERVER

Mr. Thomas Boyatt, AFSA

REPORTER

M. Dell Palazzolo, M/DG

Summary—The representatives of WAO praised the accomplishments of the foreign affairs agencies in the area of equal opportunities for women in the past few years, but expressed dismay that there are still few women occupying top level positions in the Department and overseas and that women are very under-represented in a number of offices and bureaus in the Department. WAO asked the Secretary to make two statements, one public and one “in-house”, supporting equal opportunities for women and to explore the possibility of developing in State a program similar to the one Director Keogh has initiated at USIA to involve his senior staff in equal opportunity programs. End of Summary

Mrs. Stansbury opened the meeting by introducing herself and the other representatives of WAO by giving some background on each one. Mrs. Stansbury said that the foreign affairs agencies have taken a lead in promoting equal opportunities for women. She outlined the accomplishments of the last few years including the policies on spouses, on non-discrimination in assignments, reappointment of former Foreign Service wives who had been forced to resign, and the upgrading of status for secretaries. The Secretary inquired as to the exact meaning of
“professional status for secretaries” and as to what the problem was. Miss Good outlined the frustrations of secretaries including the fact that there was a ceiling beyond which secretaries could not be promoted and that they were expected to take a full share of the work while not being treated as equals or given equal privileges. Furthermore, secretaries are the only category in the Staff Corps without professional status. Ambassador Davis commented that measures were being taken to correct this situation, that he hoped to institute FSRU appointments for secretaries in the near future and that the next step in this program was consultation with AFSA.

Mrs. Stansbury stated that the Department had indeed taken steps to overcome discrimination and that what WAO would like to see would be a reaffirmation by Secretary Kissinger of these policies of the recent past. Miss Good added that one question of the constituents of WAO was: where did Secretary Kissinger stand on the professional status of women in the foreign affairs agencies. Secretary Kissinger replied that he believed women should compete on an equal basis with men, that he was not in favor of quotas nor did he sanction reverse discrimination and that a woman should neither be excluded from a job nor given an assignment purely because she was a woman. He added that because of the long history of discrimination on the basis of sex and its pervasive nature it would take a while to redress the discrimination that had occurred in the past. He acknowledged that measures might have to be taken to redress historical wrongs.

Miss Good spoke of the under-representation of women in certain areas in the Department. The Secretary asked Director General Davis if we were taking more women into the Foreign Service now. Ambassador Davis reported that well over 25 percent of the people who took the last Foreign Service examination were women, a much better percentage than in the past.

Dr. Sampas commented that although there was no lack of good will on the part of Management, a problem existed in the middle and senior levels of the Foreign Service, exacerbated by the fact that those assignments with the best opportunities for advancement usually do not go to women. She mentioned the fact that there are no country directors, just one woman executive director in a functional bureau and no office directors in INR who are women. She also pointed out that there were no women in top jobs in PM or SCI or in the population office in the Department and cited such prestige areas as S/P and the NSC as being especially weak on the distaff side. Miss Good also mentioned that there was a dearth of women assigned to delegations and in the top echelons of CU, even though educational and cultural affairs were considered a traditional women’s area. Also in the area of delegates to International Organizations the U.S. has a very small per-
centage of women. The U.S. has 7.2% women in the FSO Corps, while developing countries have 10 to 50 percent women. Secretary Kissinger replied that he was unable to judge whether this problem was due to the fact that there were no qualified women for these jobs or if real bias did exist. He added that he would not, for example, want an unqualified woman as a country director. The WAO representatives agreed that women should be qualified for the positions to which they are assigned. Dr. Sampas pointed out, however, that a systematic search could and should regularly be made throughout the Foreign Service for qualified women who would not otherwise be considered if top assignments are made principally on the basis of personal acquaintance.

Director General Davis mentioned that a highly qualified and competent senior woman officer was currently heading up a major division in personnel and that every effort had been made, for example, to assure that women were placed on selection boards to the extent, in fact, that senior women officers had complained of being overburdened. Mrs. Stansbury, in turn, cited examples of outstanding senior women who had been discriminated against in terms of assignment because the offices had their “token” woman or women, and one case of a woman whose outstanding ability had been considered almost secondary to her race and sex in the question of a promotion.

Secretary Kissinger stated that he certainly had no argument with the objectives stated by the WAO representatives, that he agreed with these objectives, but that the problem was implementation. He stated he would like to see more women on delegations and that systematic search should be made for women from within and without the Department to serve on delegations. (Miss Good interrupted here with a word of caution against tokenism or bringing in lateral entrants to do jobs FSO’s could fill.) Secretary Kissinger also said that we should make sure that more women are brought into the Service as junior officers and that women are represented in all the bureaus. He expressed amazement that there was not a single country director who was a woman.

The Secretary added that one problem was that, while he could meet with groups such as the WAO, he did not then have the opportunity closely to oversee the follow-up. Director General Davis stated he would take responsibility for implementation with the help of Mrs. Gladys Rogers, head of the Office of Women’s Affairs.

Dr. Sampas indicated that the Department could provide the Secretary in the future with econometric studies which would show the degree of past Department bias toward women, whether the situation

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2 Mary S. Olmsted was Deputy Director of Personnel for Policy, Classification, and Evaluation.
vis-à-vis women was improving, the identity of particular women who seemed to have been victims of marked discrimination and who could be targeted for promotion. Secretary Kissinger then asked whether the group honestly believed that there were enough qualified women in the Department to be assigned to any sizeable number of jobs in the substantive bureaus. Dr. Sampas replied by stating that the Department could have done much better in this regard and she cited percentages which showed a miniscule increase in the numbers of women at the senior levels and only a small increase overall. Dr. Sampas also stated that she believed a comparative study of the qualifications of women at a particular grade versus those of men at the same grade would show most interesting results. Mrs. Stansbury said that with the aid of Mrs. Rogers and Mrs. Marcy of USIA she had compiled a list of women in the foreign affairs agencies who were qualified to be ambassadors or to be assigned to top positions in the Department and overseas. Secretary Kissinger said he would be most interested in seeing this list and suggested that a copy also be given to Director General Davis.

Mrs. Stansbury urged that the Secretary make a public statement containing the views on equal opportunities for women that he had expressed to the WAO representatives. He agreed to do so. Mrs. Stansbury also urged that the Secretary make a second “in-house” statement reaffirming the four existing major policy statements (on wives, secretaries, non-discrimination in assignments, and equal opportunity). Secretary Kissinger agreed to consider this request sympathetically, but stated that he first wished to read the four statements. The WAO representatives were able to provide three of the statements at the meeting and indicated they would send Dr. Kissinger a copy of the fourth statement. Miss Good pointed out that a reaffirmation of policies by Dr. Kissinger would be particularly appropriate now in view of the UN resolution designating 1975 as International Women’s Year (IWY). She also described the goals of International Women’s Year and its themes of equality, development and peace. A paper enlarging upon

3 To mark the observation of Women’s Week, August 26–30, Kissinger released a statement affirming the Department’s commitment to women in foreign policymaking: “Equality of opportunity and reward for merit are essential if the foreign affairs agencies are to respond creatively to the challenges of contemporary diplomacy. For this reason, I want to underscore my personal commitment to the role women must play in the formulation and presentation of U.S. foreign policy.” Moreover, he urged all senior officers to make “professional equality for women a reality” and to make “tangible progress toward that objective” by 1975, the United Nations International Women’s Year (IWY). For the complete text, see the Department of State Newsletter, September 1974, p. 28.
these points was given to the Secretary.\textsuperscript{4} The Secretary expressed his feeling that the Department should be doing something about IWY.

WAO indicated that much of the problem in career development of women stemmed from attitudes of senior management. In this regard Mrs. Oglesby stated that there was a third action that Secretary Kissinger could personally undertake. She explained the program through which Director Keogh at USIA was trying personally to involve his senior staff in equal opportunity programs. First, Keogh had ordered a statistical profile of the agency to demonstrate areas in which women and minorities were concentrated or were not. After the study was done, Keogh held a ninety minute discussion with the senior officers at the Agency about the study and its implications. This is to be followed by three further seminars on this subject in the spring. Every supervisor is encouraged to attend one of the three full day sessions. Secretary Kissinger said that the programs initiated by Director Keogh sounded good and that a similar program should be explored for possible use in the Department of State.

Secretary Kissinger said the major step is to take action, to assure that there is follow-up. He asked Director General Davis what had been accomplished as the result of the meeting with the Black Caucus.\textsuperscript{5} The Director General mentioned several areas of progress. Secretary Kissinger also pointed out that Tom Boyatt in his AFSA capacity sits in on these meetings.\textsuperscript{6} Secretary Kissinger reiterated his amazement that there was no country director who was a woman. He said he would be interested to find out why this was. Director General Davis stated he would look into the situation and would make an effort to get qualified women assigned as country directors.

Mrs. Oglesby stated that it would be interesting to find out how many women were staff assistants, that she thought they were few in number. Dr. Sampas added that the individuals who are assigned to difficult and demanding jobs early in their careers are the ones who are forced to grow and stretch and, thereafter, reach the top echelons of their professions. She added that over 40 percent of the women junior officers were consular officers and that the reason so many women are found in the consular and administrative cones is not because they necessarily lack qualifications for substantive work, but because of traditional pressures and bias that forces them into these areas. Secretary

\textsuperscript{4} Not found.
\textsuperscript{5} See Document 124.
\textsuperscript{6} WAO’s legal counsel had indicated that there was no need for Mr. Boyatt to sit in on the meeting and WAO had disagreed strongly with the fact that an invitation had been extended to him. WAO does not regard Mr. Boyatt’s presence as setting a precedent for any future meeting between it and any managerial officials of the foreign affairs agency. [Footnote in the original.]
Kissinger replied that he thought all Foreign Service Officers should have broad experience. A brief discussion of cones followed.

Secretary Kissinger indicated that he would be meeting with WAO representatives on occasions in the future, and expected WAO members to be blunt with him on such occasions concerning where progress was being made and where there was none.

The meeting ended with the participants expressing pleasure with having had the opportunity to discuss equal opportunities for women in the foreign affairs agencies. The representatives of WAO indicated they would supply the Secretary with some of the material that had been discussed during the meeting.

130. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Sisco) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Towards a More Systematic Policy Planning Process

We have thought over our March 22 discussion with you and conclude that the evolution of a more systematic policy planning process within the Department rests largely on two fundamental principles—the need to “anticipate the emerging form of things to come”, and then to address them systematically in a comprehensive study framework.

The necessary preoccupation of the bureaus with daily decision-making absorbs their attention and often produces a spiral of short-term solutions to immediate issues raised by you or other principals. We think, however, the process is reversible. In this paper we will suggest a course of action in one area—that of policy studies—where a better organized system could serve to flag potential problems and assure that they are systematically addressed, not relying on you to identify them to us. The process could be christened with a not unfamiliar name—“conceptualization”—which we would define as the for-

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2 No record of this meeting has been found.
mulation of a broader framework within which major issues are defined and policy recommendations put forward.

Since March 22 we have

—conferred with the Assistant Secretaries, INR, and other key Seventh Floor and Sixth Floor personnel,
—analyzed how the Department’s system can better produce the type of conceptual product you and others need and
—identified major additional issues on which we should now initiate study projects.

To carry out these projects, we propose a more systematic use of existing staffs within the Department, drawing on the experience of the NSC system. To avoid bureaucratic congestion, however, we would keep our procedures more informal.

In any event we recognize that fostering a more “conceptual approach” to policy here and in our embassies abroad is a fundamental intellectual challenge which only in part touches the type of papers which are written.

II. [sic] The Process

There are several types of policy studies which reach you.

—operational memoranda on immediate matters;
—papers directed at single countries or at relatively discrete problems;
—papers on impending events such as international conferences which require strategic plans of action; and
—broad studies of a whole region or of a functional issue (e.g., energy or food) which impacts on several regions and merits an effort to develop principles for general application.

At each of these levels there is clearly room for improving the quality of analysis. This paper, however, focuses on the broader types of issues (i.e., the latter three of the four categories) which we take to be your major concern.

An Alert System. To ensure that current priorities are reflected in the study agenda, S/P and INR will initiate a regular review process to include a look ahead by our respective staffs and a joint assessment of priorities. We will survey the future landscape for important political and economic landmarks, assess whether or not we have the right studies underway to address their policy implications, and add or defer studies as warranted.

To aid this process, every two or three months you could devote an Analytical Staff Meeting to reviewing with Principals, Assistant Secretaries and others as appropriate an alert list of events or trends for the next six months. This list would be compiled by S/P and INR after discussions with bureaus. It would be a carefully vetted compilation of the
most important items, together with a brief description of events and what we are doing or intend to do about them. Designated Assistant Secretaries would be asked to speak to particular items at those meetings in order to elicit your comments and guidance.

These periodic meetings would provide a good forum for keeping you and the principals abreast of future developments and for assuring such developments do not catch us off guard. We can also brief you on major studies in progress and obtain your reaction to our planned future study agenda.

**Preparation of the Studies.** Once a topic for the “study agenda” is selected, S/P will convene a planning meeting, to include representatives from all interested bureaus and S/S. This ad hoc group will agree on an appropriate chairman, time frame, working group membership, and draft preliminary terms of reference which can then be promulgated by S/S in a formal study memorandum.

We want to draw more in the future on all possible Department and outside assets for policy studies. Key embassies will normally be asked for their contributions at the outset. The planning group should also decide early whether an outside contractor, consultants, or an “experts symposium” should be scheduled to contribute in a timely way to the final product. To make better use of these resources, we will need to schedule studies well enough in advance to provide them sufficient lead time.

**The Review Process and The Analytical Staff Meetings.** Although many policy papers are sent forward through the system, these staff sessions are the primary tool we have used to date to engage you and others in the direct review of some important studies. We still think this format makes sense although some of the papers and much of the discussion could stand substantial improvement. These sessions need not lead to short-term decision-making. They should, however, produce broad policy guidance reflecting your general orientation. In some cases a written record of that guidance should be drafted by S/S, in consultation with S/P and the bureau concerned, to help orient our Ambassadors and officers at lower levels, both here and abroad, to authoritative policy thinking.

**Selectivity.** Neither the Department’s resources nor your time permit the indiscriminate launching of dozens of studies. This would produce low quality products which you and others could never satisfactorily review in any event. We will, therefore, seek periodic guidance on your personal priorities among possible study areas.

S/P has worked out with S/S a better system for screening ad hoc study requests. We must spend more time on framing and elaborating your questions precisely, and assessing their priority in light of other
studies already underway, if we are to obtain better responses within the building.

We also need from you a clearer notion of what types of study issues should be handled within State and which should be introduced into the NSC system.

Bureau Planning Capacity. With the heavy operational load carried by each of the major bureaus, it may be inevitable that the Assistant Secretaries’ time for reflection and creative thought will be limited. To improve their products, each Assistant Secretary could use a small one-or two-man planning unit attached directly to him which could also be a key point of contact with S/P. These officers must be of the highest calibre, closely attuned to their Assistant Secretaries’ views and concerns. While planning units exist in most bureaus, they are rarely of this nature. These officers must take the sort of global policy point of view for which you look to the Assistant Secretary. They can help make it possible for him to assure a higher standard of performance on papers of a policy nature intended for the Seventh Floor.

Your Personal Involvement. There are several other procedural aspects which should be mentioned. Given the tremendous demands on your schedule, there is the question of how much time you can spend in meetings on conceptual studies even though they contain major issues on which decisions are required during the next several months. One staff meeting a week of an analytical character would seem about right—but the basic pace should be determined by the readiness and quality of the products. In such meetings, it continues to be desirable to include the country director or working level officers most directly involved—both for the expertise they can bring and for their exposure to conceptual discussion.

In any event, however, your primary links to the Department remain at the Assistant Secretary level, as you yourself have observed. You and they must be on the same wavelength. They in turn bear the responsibility to lead their bureaus intellectually. In order for this process to work effectively, however, key officers will need to have as full information as possible. We believe this can be done while still protecting sensitive material.

There is the additional need for freer flow of information from meetings with foreign officials. This provides the essential grist of guidance for our ambassadors in the field. Many ambassadors now believe that they are inadequately informed in this regard. There is, therefore, a greater likelihood that they may not be taking precisely the tack desired. Nor are they in as good a position to contribute conceptually in relating their own activities to the overall purposes of our foreign policy. Here too, as within the Department, the Assistant Secretaries
should bear the primary responsibility for relaying information and
guidance to the field on a more systematic basis.

[Omitted here is a description of new studies undertaken by the
Policy Planning Staff. Topics covered are: Food, Fertilizer, and Popula-
tion; the Middle East; South and Southwest Asia; Foreign Aid; U.S. Af-
rican Policy; the Third World; Brazil; Human Rights; Détente; Europe
and the Atlantic Alliance; the Eastern Mediterranean; and Economic
Relations with Communist Countries.]

Recommendation:

That you agree to meet with your principal advisers as soon as
your schedule permits to discuss points covered in this memorandum.3

3 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

131. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Executive
Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, April 18, 1974.

HAK:

SUBJECT

The Cone System

Here, again, is the Cone System Study.2 In essence, the Cone
System institutionalizes specialization within the Foreign Service by
varying recruitment, assignment and promotion standards among four
specialities—Administrative, Economic, Consular and Political. The Sys-

1 Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204,
Chron—April 1974. No classification marking. A handwritten note by Eagleburger indi-
cates that the memorandum was forwarded to Davis through Brown on April 23.

2 See Document 126.
having to compete with the Political officers. OMB and other agencies are averse to elimination of the cones for fear that, in this complex age, the all-purpose FSO would not be able to cope with the specialized problems confronting him.

Nat Davis proposes that we relax cone designations at senior and junior grades, but retain a specialization system in middle grades. This would (a) eliminate differentiated entrance standards and (b) improve promotion chances to the senior “leadership” level for the traditionally better Political officers. By retaining mid-level specialization, however, Davis’ proposal ensures the availability of specialized skills at the grades where assignments requiring such skills are most common.

Davis’ proposal does away with the worst trappings of the cone system. The beauty of this approach is that, should you decide to do away with the Cone System in its entirety in a year or two, this is a logical first step. And leaving mid-level cones intact for now will partially mollify the Cone Supporters.

Recommendation:

That you approve the Director General’s recommendation for a modified Cone System and instruct him to initiate consultations with AFSA on this without delay.3

LSE

3 Kissinger initialed his approval.
of it for which they are responsible fit into the whole, and act accordingly. Moreover, some of those who do understand do not have line responsibilities.

The institutional implications of this “understanding gap” are important: for the conduct of our affairs with other governments, for the Department’s ability to conceptualize—and from a more limited perspective for PA’s ability to enlist the services of officers competent to participate in the kind of dialogue which might lead to a new national “consensus.”

If consensus is going to begin, it will have to begin within the Department.

We wish to propose a simple and—in terms of your own investment—a relatively low-cost way to get at this problem over the next several months. Between now and August 1, for example, it would require only some 20 hours of your time, but repay disproportionately high dividends in terms of institutional cohesiveness and effectiveness.

The proposal is that you meet with the 12–15 senior officers (down through country director) of each major bureau for approximately two hours. By combining some of the smaller functional offices the number of sessions could be held to approximately ten.

These sessions would offer an opportunity for you to convey directly your world view, the Administration’s larger purposes and some of the operating principles and style of diplomacy which you consider central to our foreign affairs—to give life, for example, to the phrase “a stable international structure.” The pay-offs would be in terms of getting the bureaus better attuned to Seventh Floor thinking and encouraging Department officers to think in more conceptual terms. You should find the meetings a convenient way to profit from some of the thinking that percolates in the Department below the levels with which you are normally in direct contact.

If you accept the S/P recommendation for setting broad goals (forwarded together with this memorandum), the goals and bureau responses would provide a natural structure for your discussions. In this case, it would be wise to hold these meetings after the bureaus had a chance to respond to the procedure recommended by S/P. PA and S/P would prepare talking points and issues for you to raise, based on the goals and bureau responses.

2 The memorandum from Brown and Lord to Kissinger, April 26, is attached but not printed. In it, they propose responding to an OMB request to introduce a Management by Objectives (MBO) system for the Department by setting a series of broad U.S. foreign policy goals for the coming year.
The “trickle-down” to subordinate officers could be substantial. It could be enhanced, and posts abroad could be included by proxy, if transcripts were available.

Your subordinates would welcome and benefit from this kind of opportunity.

Action Requested:

That you authorize S/P and PA to arrange such sessions with the appropriate bureaus and offices.3

3 Kissinger initialed his approval on April 29. No evidence indicating when the sessions were held has been found.

133. Memorandum From the Special Assistant for Women’s Affairs of the Department of State (Rogers) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Brown)1


SUBJECT
Office Administration for 1974–84

The supply of willing, skilled female office workers on which 20th century bureaucracies are predicated is about to run out. Shirley Norlem, an expert on the secretarial occupation, outlines the problem realistically in the attached memo. (Tab A).2

Ms. Norlem’s findings should not surprise anyone who has seen the secretary of the 40’s with the college degree and a year at Katherine Gibbs replaced by high school graduates with imperfect shorthand and growing discontent at unequal career training and advancement opportunities. What the 70’s has added is the accelerating women’s movement which provides increasingly attractive alternatives to office work.

State, which has thus far avoided some of the worst problems by reliance on the Foreign Service secretary, is now feeling the pinch as

1 Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Management and Management Operations Files, 1969–1976: Lot 82 D 210, BALPA–OPRED Under Secretary Com. on Overseas Cuts ‘71–’73. No classification marking.
2 Dated April 25, attached but not printed.
these able women join with their civil service colleagues in challenging permanent consignment to second rate status.

As Ms. Norlem points out office administration and clerical work in the future will turn on competitive career rewards and new modes of office operation.

I urge that—as was the case with Diplomacy for the 70s— you establish under your direct sponsorship task forces concerned with (a) career and retention incentives, status, classification, training, education, and recruitment requirements for office employees and (b) organization of office work, equipment, space layout alternatives and other operational factors.

Recommendation:

That you sign the attached directive (Tab B) establishing task forces to develop a comprehensive program for meeting State’s requirements for office administration for the coming decade.

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4 The April 29 draft directive addressed to Rogers is attached but not printed.

5 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, a Secretarial Task Force was established by Brown on July 23 and charged with examining the role and future prospects of secretaries in the Department and Foreign Service. The Task Force submitted its final report on January 27, 1975. Among its recommendations, the Task Force suggested improvements to the recruitment, training, and career mobility of Department secretaries, as well as changes to prevailing “paternalistic” social attitudes by mandating more rigorous enforcement of anti-discrimination regulations and establishing formal guidelines for office management and for all supervisor/secretary relationships. The text of the report was published as a special supplement to the Department of State Newsletter, February 1975.

134. Editorial Note

On June 18, 1974, the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Samuel Lewis, forwarded a paper prepared by the Staff on the progress and future of the Policy Analysis and Resource Allocation programming system (PARA) to Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management L. Dean Brown. (For the origins of the PARA system, see footnote 3, Document 115.) The paper concluded that the Department continued to require a systematic, rather than piecemeal, response to its substantive and managerial weaknesses and, cumulatively, PARA had produced “substantial” successes. The system had compelled the geo-
graphic bureaus to accept the “requirement that each diplomatic post prepare or update annually a country policy paper” that identified specific U.S. objectives, set forth a strategy for attaining them, and involved the Inspector General’s office and other agencies in the policy review process. The Policy Planning Staff viewed these accomplishments as a “good foundation,” especially now that the “policy initiative has once again returned to the Department” with Secretary Kissinger’s appointment, but noted that further progress depended upon convincing “those in the system that there is utility in what they’re doing.”

“Based on our PARA experience,” the Policy Planning Staff recommended “the Department concentrate its management reform efforts in two crucial areas.

“—First, we believe it is important that the Department at all levels articulate much more systematically U.S. global, regional and functional policy interests, priorities and objectives. What broad policy guidance now exists is spotty and incomplete, often out-of-date, sometimes inconsistent and scattered throughout numerous documents. Surely, we can do better in providing a broad, timely and coherent framework for the foreign affairs community.

“—Second, we should redouble our efforts to develop procedures which will ensure that the resources of the Department—and, insofar as possible, eventually of other foreign policy agencies too—are related in the most effective way possible to policy objectives and programs. OMB thinks we can and should be doing a far better job in managing our own resources. We agree. Until we do, we will have an uphill battle in justifying requests for additional funds and personnel, to say nothing of persuading other agencies to follow our advice in allocating their own resources.” (National Archives, RG 59, Administrative Correspondence Files, General Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, M Chron June 1974)
135. Memorandum From Sandra Vogelgesang of the Secretary of State’s Open Forum Panel to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord)\footnote{Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 344, July 1974. No classification marking. Drafted by Vogelgesang. Lord forwarded the memorandum to Eagleburger under a July 5 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)}


SUBJECT
Proposal for Follow-through on Institutionalization

Emerson said that “an institution is the lengthened shadow of one man.” Press preoccupation with “Pax Henrica” suggests that, while that may be true, it is not necessarily good for the man or the institution.

I have written several memoranda\footnote{The memoranda have not been found.} this spring on the need to follow-through on the Secretary’s expressed goal of institutionalization at the State Department. He may regret ever having invoked the term. At any rate, I persist in urging action in this area because (1) so few Secretaries have had comparable opportunities to affect both the substance and structure of U.S. foreign policy and (2) so many FSOs have expressed concern about this issue to the Open Forum Panel.

Though there has been much progress in many areas, large problems remain. Some are probably inevitable in any bureaucracy. Others—like excessive layering, duplication of work, or the unresolved roles of AID and USIA—can and should be addressed. Much of what the Secretary wants to accomplish now and to leave as his heritage depends on building a creative, responsive institution. A “structure for State” may prove as important in the long-run as the “structure for peace” elsewhere. Clearly, the two are related. As with any important issue, the need for action is sooner rather than later—lest the opportunity of the Kissinger era be lost.

Proposal for Action

Because the Secretary cannot be expected to give much of his time to essentially institutional or organizational questions, I would propose the following:

1. Mandate the new Deputy Secretary to follow-up on institutionalization and make that one of his first and most important responsibilities. Direction for the overall administration of the Department has been a
traditional responsibility of the Deputy Secretary. No other office, including that of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management or the Director General, has the authority to address a challenge as broad-gauged as that of institutionalization. Mr. Ingersoll has a reputation for particular energy and expertise in this area.

2. **Appoint a Special Task Force on Institutionalization** reporting to the Deputy Secretary. This should *not* be just another committee. There is no need for yet another unwieldy group starting from scratch and ending with toothless generalities on “Whither State.”

Instead, the proposed Task Force should *make decisions*, not launch more studies. Common sense and assimilation of work already done should suffice.

The Task Force itself should be *small*—no more than ten top-notch officers of varying grade levels and backgrounds.

Service on the Task Force might well be considered a *full-time assignment* for a short period (as is the case with many other Seventh Floor task forces). Three months might be a reasonable time for the Task Force to formulate its recommendations.

The *terms of reference* for such a Task Force might include such questions as the following:

—In what areas of the Department is there conspicuous duplication and how can it be eliminated? Replication on political-military affairs comes to mind.

—What bureaus are most notable for layering and how can the chiefs be pared away to let the Indians operate? Far too many examples leap to mind.

—What new problems (energy?) or concepts (more transnational perspectives?) suggest the need to re-cast the present bureau structure of the Department and in what form?

—In what areas (economics? intelligence analysis?) does State lag in initiative or resources and what can or should be done?

—How might the allegedly disproportionate percentage of personnel and other resources devoted to purely administrative functions be whittled down?

—Looking beyond State per se, what of the Department’s relationship with USIA, AID, and ACDA? To what extent might one or all of those agencies be reconstituted to serve better the overall objectives of US foreign policy?

3. **Present the recommendations of the Task Force to the Secretary for action.** Prior to that step, the recommendations should be submitted to the Deputy Secretary for his consideration and, perhaps, any input from the bureaus or other Seventh Floor principals he believes necessary. The report, once completed and containing the Deputy Secretary’s own
comments, should then be forwarded to the Secretary for approval. Given his stature, the Secretary’s endorsement is essential for meaningful action on the kinds of significant recommendations which are likely to emerge.

There could obviously be many variants to the above proposal. The important point is that action be taken soon—at a sufficiently high level, with a set deadline for results, and with the well-publicized backing of the Secretary. That done, the Department might well become more responsive to the Secretary and the Secretary himself could counter charges of “personalization” of diplomacy with concrete progress on “institutionalization.”

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136. Memorandum From Raymond F. Smith, Kenneth Quinn, and Sandra Vogelgesang of the Secretary of State’s Open Forum Panel to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, September 26, 1974.

Leaks and the Lack of Consensus

We share the concern you expressed at our meeting of August 27 about the frequency of leaks from this building and agree with your analysis that the leaks are due to a lack of consensus on your policy framework. This lack of consensus derives in part from basically differing global outlooks and in part from a closed and secretive decision-making process which increases dissension rather than builds consensus.

As we noted in our meeting with you, FSO’s often diverge from current policy, not just because of “clientism” or short-term concerns, but because they genuinely believe that their global conception better serves overall US interests than the currently prevailing one. They feel frustrated when their perspectives on US interests—for example, in

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 348, October 1974. No classification marking. An unknown hand crossed out the typed date on the first page and replaced it with the handwritten date of October 22. A note handwritten by Lord indicates that he, Eagleburger, and Lewis met with Smith and Vogelgesang to discuss this memorandum on October 22. No other record of such a meeting has been found.

2 A transcript of Kissinger’s August 27 meeting with Smith, Quinn, Vogelgesang, and Lewis, summarized herein, is ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, P820097–1176.
cases of alleged disregard for human rights—are dismissed as particularistic nay-saying. Though sensitive to the limits of US intervention abroad, many FSO's believe that US influence in the world suffers from discrepancies between expressions on behalf of human rights or improved welfare and actions which seem to belie these expressions. Apparent disregard for such perspectives combine with lack of participation in the policy-making process and lack of information about the reasons for policy decisions to cause genuinely concerned officers to go public either in frustration or because they see no other way of affecting policy.

The way to stop such leaks is not to further tighten the decision-making process and further restrict information, which produces a downward spiral of mutual mistrust, but to open up the process. Officers who have a chance to participate are not likely to leak information, even if they disagree with the decisions made. We urge a basic change in the style of operation of this Department. We propose as part of this change the following:

1. The Assistant Secretaries should be your direct link with the lower levels of the Department, a function they now serve in name only.
   — They should meet at least monthly with junior officers (i.e., below level of Office Director and Alternate) for an exchange on the major issues facing the Bureau—how the Seventh Floor is approaching these problems, the relevant forces operating on the issue, different perceptions of junior officers, etc.
   — In crisis situations, when there is the greatest tendency to cut desk officers out of the decision-making process, Assistant Secretaries should make a special effort to ensure that such officers understand the Seventh Floor’s approach to the problem and, if they still disagree, encourage and provide them with means to communicate their views to decision-makers.

2. The Open Forum Panel should be used more effectively by the Seventh Floor as a means of developing consensus within the building.
   — Seventh Floor principals should occasionally appear at open meetings sponsored by the Panel.
   — They should periodically meet with small groups of Panel members for the more frank and intimate dialogue on policy issues which larger, open meetings preclude.
   — In addition to fulfilling its basic function of providing a vehicle for new or dissenting policy views, the quarterly classified publication, Open Forum, can occasionally provide a channel for illustrating the kind of thinking on policy issues that you wish to see and/or for critiquing the Department’s performance in a given situation (for example, in the Cyprus situation).
3. Distribution of information should generally be on the basis of building consensus, not avoiding leaks.

—The image of the Department as a single-minded monolith is neither tenable nor helpful.

4. The decision-making process should be de-personalized.

—Many non-vital decisions which should be made at lower levels are being made on the Seventh Floor.

—In many cases, it would be better to have a less than optimum decision made and carried out at a lower level than to have a marginally better decision made on the Seventh Floor.

If you think a further exchange of views on these matters would be useful, the Panel leadership would welcome the opportunity to meet with you again.

Note:

Vice-Chairperson Kenneth Quinn did not participate in the preparation of this memorandum and disagrees with certain of its conclusions. He therefore disassociates himself from all sections of it other than recommendations 1 and 2, to which he subscribes.

137. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 27, 1974, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
The Deputy Secretary
The Undersecretary for Political Affairs, Mr. Sisco
Deputy Undersecretary, Ambassador Brown
Director General, Ambassador Davis
Assistant Secretary Hartman
Mr. Eagleburger
Jerry Bremer, Notetaker

Kissinger: I just wanted to spend ten minutes with you to discuss in general the Department. This grew out of a talk I had with Dean

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, Aug. 1974–Mar. 1975. No classification marking. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office in the Department of State.
Brown yesterday.\(^2\) I read the Hersh article today.\(^3\) Now I don’t care about the substance of such articles, but we have these cables going all over the place and we have FSOs contradicting instructions from the seventh floor.

I just want it to be made very clear that the party is over. I don’t want to hear from you what I am doing wrong any more and any one who doesn’t like what I am doing can leave. Bob [Ingersoll], I am simply fed up. I want this place run.

My objective is this: I want to end the presumption that every FSO is the Secretary of State. The emphasis on the Foreign Service should be on the word “service”.\(^4\) The desire and honor should come from caring about and serving the United States. Now you read, for example, that article by John Wallach.\(^5\) Every newspaper man here can get twenty quotes on what the seventh floor is doing wrong. If the people down below don’t get enough information it’s the Assistant Secretaries’ fault.

The Foreign Service is a disgrace to itself. I don’t really care because I will be gone from here in two or three or five years, but it is a disgrace to itself. I am prepared for a public confrontation with the Foreign Service and it is a confrontation I can win. The prestige of the Foreign Service is not that high that it could survive such a confrontation.

I don’t care about the leaks because I will be gone anyway. The only Secretaries who survived leaks are those who tolerated them.

You have a week to make to me a solid proposal about what can be done. I may act, you should know, in a very forceful sense anyway before that.

I want Popper’s explanation of what his role was in this Hersh thing, Dean [Brown], I want you to find that out and do it in such a way that it’s the Foreign Service looking into itself and not me taking a shot at the Foreign Service.

It’s a disgrace to the Foreign Service and to the country. The method of operation here is irritating. I know. It’s a method that has worked however in other places. I am what I am and I will not change. They will have other Secretaries they don’t like too.

\(^2\) No record of this talk has been found.

\(^3\) Seymour Hersh reported in an article in the *New York Times* on September 27 that Kissinger had rebuked David H. Popper, Ambassador to Chile, for his remarks to Chilean officials regarding human rights issues. (Seymour M. Hersh, “Kissinger Said to Rebuke U.S. Ambassador to Chile,” *New York Times*, September 27, 1974, p. 18)


\(^5\) Apparent reference to John Wallach, Foreign Editor of Hearst Newspapers and syndicated columnist.
There should be no doubt about it though, Bob, I want you to run the Department. I want the Bureaus to have a sense that they are responsible to somebody. I don’t want to hear from Assistant Secretaries that they don’t know what the policy is. That’s their fault if they don’t know.

I want no doubt on the seventh floor that I have had it. And I will get the President to back me. If you have any doubts about what will happen if I go before an Appropriations Committee, just think about it. Five years from now the Foreign Service will thank me for it.

This place is a pigsty. Take the Moynihan cable. It did me no particular damage, but eighty percent of the Foreign Ministers I spoke to in New York asked me how it could possibly happen in our Department of State that such a cable would be published in the New York Times. It did me no damage but what damage it did do to the United States.

If a Secretary of State cannot write a note on a cable without it being leaked and the Bureau then contradicting the instructions, you don’t have a Foreign Service but a rabble. There are plenty of ways to grieve around here—too many ways in fact. I do not mind people disagreeing with me. That’s not the point. You don’t notice any military majors dumping on their senior staffs.

I will take drastic action no matter what. I want to know what it is in people who are selected for the Foreign Service that makes them believe they can undermine the system. Why can’t the Assistant Secretaries control this damn Department? Why are people shuffling papers around in self-service without serving the country?

Five years from now with a good Foreign Service, it will then deserve to be at the center of foreign policy. Right now it doesn’t deserve that because the Service is not good.

Except in Africa—we have leaks—but there the Assistant Secretary is not on our wave length. And, you know, he doesn’t know what our policy is anyway. Do you know our policy? (to Hartman)

Hartman: Yes.

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6 In telegram 12063 from New Delhi, September 10, Ambassador Daniel Patrick Moynihan reported comments made by Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi indicating that reports of CIA activity against Chilean President Salvador Allende confirmed to her that the United States was plotting against her government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, D740252–0012) The telegram was leaked to the press and appeared in an article by Seymour Hersh in the New York Times on September 13. (“Concern by India on C.I.A. Related,” New York Times, September 13, 1974, p. 11)

7 Kissinger traveled to New York on September 27 for annual UNGA meetings and for the SEATO Ministerial meeting on October 3. He returned to Washington on October 3.
Kissinger: Well, why is this Wallach article then quoting the French desk officer saying he’s spent twenty years of his life but he doesn’t know what our policy is?

I tell you this is going to end if I have to put half of them in the Senior Seminar.8

Eagleburger: Popper called me to say that he wanted you to know that only he and his personal secretary have seen the letter from Kubisch9 to him.

Kissinger: I haven’t even seen it.

Eagleburger: I will show it to you.

Kissinger: These were two separate problems. I had by then talked to the Chilean Foreign Minister at the OAS about doing something about human rights and I didn’t want Popper to give them a lecture before the military group and humiliate them. I don’t feel obligated to explain myself to Sy Hersh.

These leaks are simply unmanly, cowardly and disloyal. If they had guts, if there was one person who had the guts to resign, it would be something. But there must be something wrong with this system and how we take them in. No other agency has this problem in town and no other agency has such good people. In the end, of course, they are hurting the Foreign Service and not me. How can we let such a cable into the system? How can they be trusted when such single, minuscule cables get out into the newspapers? These people are not leaking for national interest, or even for national security, but for self-aggrandizement. At least when we had the disagreement on Cyprus there were disagreements about what was in our national interest.

Art [Hartman], you are the only Assistant Secretary I asked to come here, because I think EUR is basically the best-run Bureau. And you are involved in everything important that is going on in your area.

When I come back from the UN I want a plan of action from you. And I may talk to the President anyway about this problem. Let there be no doubt in the Department that there will be a showdown. I would prefer that the showdown not be public, but if it is necessary I can do that too.

Ingersoll: On the basis of what you are saying, Henry, I think we should not discuss this problem outside of this group.

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8 Established in 1958, the Senior Seminar is a Department of State advanced professional development program designed for small groups of experienced mid-level Foreign Service officers, military officers, and officials of other agencies.

9 Jack B. Kubisch was the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until September 4.
Sisco: No. I don’t think it should be outside of this group or it will go into the newspapers the next day.

Kissinger: I’m prepared to have it public if necessary. The whole thing is a sorry reflection on the Foreign Service.

Eagleburger: I don’t think you should go outside this group on this particular subject, but we do need to try to get the Assistant Secretaries together to express your concern.

Kissinger: If the Foreign Service were anywhere near self-respecting, it would have started disciplining itself over the last three months when this started happening. I cannot believe it is an unmanageable problem.

Ingersoll: We did have three good talks with the Assistant Secretaries and I felt it had improved for a while, but it has certainly gone back again now.

Kissinger: It’s worse now than ever. Now it’s malicious. At least in Cyprus it was a policy difference. Though now I notice Boyatt has told the press that he is in the Senior Seminar because he sent me a dissent memo.10

Sisco: Take Tasca. The press says you and I leaked the information about Tasca. But I am sure it was leaked by somebody down the line who has been after Tasca all along.11 Now he will come back to town and accuse us of having put the prod on him.

Kissinger: There’s this fellow Blood, who is also in the newspapers saying I sent him to the Seminar because of his behavior in Dacca.12 I do remember him well and unfavorably. He disagreed with our policy in

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10 Thomas D. Boyatt was the Department of State Desk Officer for Cyprus before and during the attempted overthrow of President Makarios in July 1974 and the Turkish invasion of the island that followed. On August 9, Boyatt sent a Dissent Memorandum to Kissinger, outlining disagreements with U.S. policy in Cyprus. The memorandum was subpoenaed by the House Select Committee on Intelligence (Pike Committee) on October 2, 1975, as part of its investigation of the Intelligence Community. Kissinger refused to comply with the subpoena and was cited for contempt of Congress. (See Document 54, especially footnotes 3 and 10 thereto.)

11 Henry J. Tasca was Ambassador to Greece until September 16, 1974. Sisco’s remarks regarding press leaks refer to newspaper reports alleging Tasca’s unresponsive attitude toward Washington’s directives before and during the coup against Makarios. On September 16, the Washington Post reported that Athens Embassy personnel felt Tasca had been made the scapegoat “for the sharp deterioration of Greek-American relations” following the Cyprus crisis and the subsequent overthrow of the military junta in Greece. (Jim Hoagland, “Envoy Recall Angers U.S. Athens Staff,” Washington Post, September 16, 1974, p. A1)

Dacca. That’s not why I remember him unfavorably, but he double-crossed us and he misinterpreted his instructions in the classic Foreign Service tradition of assuming he could do what he wanted despite his instructions. Yet I never in any way expressed any view on where he should be assigned, did I?

Davis: No.

Brown: No, we assigned him.

Kissinger: And I certainly can’t worry too much about dissent from younger Foreign Service officers. If I can’t handle junior Foreign Service officer dissent on substance I’ve got a real problem. If a subordinate had a problem with a policy, he should go to his Assistant Secretary and let the Assistant Secretary pursue it.

Ingersoll: I can talk to some of the Assistant Secretaries about the general problem.

Kissinger: Only African Bureau doesn’t leak because I tell them nothing. I have no confidence in them whatsoever.

If you had a high morale organization, and a pride in the country, if they didn’t think every Ambassador was his own Secretary of State and the payoff for every Country Director was to sit in on meetings to show what a bigshot they are, then you would have a better Department and a better morale.

Eagleburger: Another thing we have to look at is this whole question of the distribution of cables.

Kissinger: The number of cables really doesn’t matter, if you don’t trust people to distribute them 700 cables, then it won’t matter if you give them 1500.

Ingersoll: But some of these cables get outside the Foreign Service.

Kissinger: But Bob, I don’t want to hear the excuses. I hold the Foreign Service responsible. Let’s look at the Foreign Service. Every FSO lives by trading information. There’s excessive attention to prerogatives and they think they are making policy. This is nonsense, they are not making policy, they are contributing to its formulation. They are not going to be Secretary of State. The job is filled. The problem is that most of these people are not thinking strategy, but they’re thinking on the day to day basis without an assessment of the overall impact of their actions on the country. They have no pride in the Service or in the country. If you baby them, they are ok until something goes wrong.

In this last year, this one year that I have seen the Foreign Service, when the foreign policy was the one thing that held the country together and of which the country was proud, this is the way they have acted. I shall make a major effort to leave a disciplined Foreign Service behind me.
How can I tell the President to have confidence in these people? Look at this food problem. The President made a decision to operate on a certain level of food aid. The next thing I know I get a bitch from the Open Forum Panel because we didn’t get this high a figure announced. Now we are operating at that higher figure over everybody’s opposition and the Open Forum Panel has no business knowing about it or about the Presidential decision. The President himself insisted on not making it public. Somehow this got to the Open Forum Panel and the next thing I get is an unclassified memo from the Open Forum Panel.13 Now I happen to agree with them. In fact, I fought everyone for the higher figure. But the lack of pride and self-respect is inconceivable. Also I should point out their reasons for supporting the 1.36 billion are wrong. It’s the same old bleeding heart masochism that you always get.

This place has become an extension of the New Statesman. Tell me how the New Statesman thinks on one foreign policy issue and I’ll tell you the State Department position.

I want to meet again with this group on a week from Thursday and get from you a precise program.

Ingersoll: Can we make it Friday because I’m due to be doing the SEATO meeting on Thursday?

Kissinger: OK. We’ll do it Friday.14

13 Not further identified and not found.

14 No record of a Friday, October 4, meeting of this group was found. The group, however, did meet on Sunday, October 7. See Document 139.
MEMORANDUM

From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
(Lord) to the Deputy Secretary of State (Ingersoll)


SUBJECT
Institutionalization/Morale/Openness/Leaks

As a follow-up to the meetings you held Saturday morning on these related subjects, I thought it useful to set down some of my views, most of which were covered in those sessions. I won’t attempt to rehash the various themes and dilemmas that we have all discussed on various occasions but rather will focus on some concrete steps that could help alleviate the situation.

As I said at the meeting, the crucial link is the Assistant Secretary level. Almost all the score or so officers who were at your meeting are career personnel; and I believe the great majority think that they have adequate access to the Secretary and a good feel for his strategic approach in their areas of responsibility. Thus I think “institutionalization” is working in most cases between the Secretary and the top officers, and morale/openness are not major problems within this circle (though we all recognize that greater feedback from the Secretary is desirable). At the same time there seems to be a consensus that problems exist at lower levels within the building. Even this has to be kept in perspective. These are perennial issues with any Secretary of State. One cannot generalize around the building, and I suspect in many areas morale and performance are good. In any event there should be pride in the fact that there is a dynamic leader and an exciting foreign policy, with the State Department once again playing a central role. The central issue must remain how we can better serve the Secretary and adjust as best one can to his style, even while recognizing that this is a two-way street.

Thus I believe in many respects it is up to the Assistant Secretary level to convey to the bureaus the sense of participation and direction which they themselves in most cases possess. The Secretary cannot be expected to deal closely with a circle that is much larger than the group which attended your meeting. (He can and should be encouraged to have Country Directors as note-takers at meetings; rein in his cracks about the Service; hold more regular staff meetings, etc.)

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 349, October 1974. Confidential; Personal.

No record of these meetings held Saturday, September 28, has been found.
The following concrete suggestions which I mentioned at the meeting are little more than good management techniques, as you pointed out. But I suspect they are not being practiced very widely. There are only two prerequisites for these procedures. The bureau chiefs must have: (1) a sufficient sense of the Secretary’s strategic thinking and policy lines; and (2) a willingness—or rather a lack of intimidation—about passing this on to their bureaus. The first prerequisite is being fulfilled in most cases. As for the second, I think the Secretary expects his top assistants to disseminate the basic policy directions while at the same time showing good judgment on particularly sensitive tactical moves. The recent Springsteen memorandum establishing the “daily” staff meetings with the Secretary can be used as a charter to do this. To quote the last sentence: “The Secretary looks to the participating bureau heads to use these meetings not only to keep him current on matters of importance, but equally as a means to keep their bureaus informed on matters of policy.”

In brief, I believe the bureau chiefs should do more of the following:

—(1) Relay more systematically to the top people in their bureau and to their desk officers this sense of direction and policy guidance, using the staff meetings with the Secretary as one particular tool for this purpose.

—(2) Encourage Country Directors (or their equivalents) who have several officers in their domain to do this in turn. We sense a substantial communications gap between Deputy Assistant Secretaries and Office/Country Directors and their desk officers and assistant desk officers.

—(3) Make clear to all officers that if views are strongly felt and presented with excellence they will reach the 7th Floor even if they diverge from the bureau chief’s position. The Secretary has specifically encouraged this here and in a circular to all our posts abroad.

—(4) Establish better direct rapport with the junior officers either by meeting with them periodically or at least having a deputy responsible for taking their pulse.

—(5) Talk to the press more about our general policy orientation in their area. This involves answering their phone calls; occasionally

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3 The substance of Springsteen’s memorandum announcing the October 4 initiation of daily morning staff meetings between Kissinger and Department of State Principals and Assistant Secretaries whenever the Secretary was in Washington was relayed in a memorandum from Lewis to all members of the Policy Planning Staff, September 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 349, October 1974)

4 Document 119.
joining the press spokesman when a daily briefing will cover a particular item of importance in their area; and occasionally holding backgrounders such as Phil Habib did last week on Korea.

A few caveats about the above procedures are in order. There is some information that is sensitive, and is not necessary for many people to know to do their jobs. The Assistant Secretary level is a tremendous pressure point, and these officers cannot be expected to spend a great deal of time in meetings; but what I have suggested above need not take more than 3 or 4 hours a week. Hopefully these steps will help to produce better papers for the 7th Floor, but frankly I am not oversanguine about this prospect; I would agree with Bill Hyland that quality control should take a significant portion of the bureau chief’s time.

Nevertheless, I believe that if these procedures were more widely and regularly followed, the Department would be serving the Secretary better, and at the same time we would make some progress on the interrelated issues of institutionalization/morale/openness/leaks.

139. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 7, 1974, 10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Robert S. Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
L. Dean Brown, Deputy Under Secretary for Management
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Nathaniel Davis, Director General
Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Executive Assistant
L. Paul Bremer, Notetaker
Robert J. McCloskey, Ambassador-at-Large

Kissinger: Bob, would you like to lead off?

Ingersoll: Well, we had two one-hour meetings last Saturday after our meeting with you Friday. We went around trying to come up with

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, Aug. 1974–Mar. 1975. Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in Kissinger’s office in the Department of State.

2 See footnote 2, Document 138.

3 See Document 137.
some suggestions. You got during the last week the reductions in copies of cables. This, of course, won’t solve the problem completely. And another matter we are looking into is the control of the Xerox machines, which Dean is looking into. For example, he is trying to find a machine where if you Xerox a cable, it destroys the original.

Kissinger: It would be better if it then destroyed the building.

Ingersoll: Anyway, these are possibilities that are further down the road.

Now another question is the problem of putting the responsibility on the Assistant Secretaries to manage their Bureaus. This is the only way we can create the spirit so people will not leak. In addition, it will mean the Assistant Secretaries will know which people are leaking and after that we can have the security people act to trace down the leaks.

Another problem we addressed is the question of the quality of the work which is being turned out on various issues. Again, this is a matter of management.

Kissinger: What are the other people’s views?

Sisco: Henry, I have no concrete suggestions. I’ve thought about it all week long. There is no one answer. The principle of responsibility in the sense of assuring quality of work to minimize leaks rests with the Assistant Secretaries. Another thing which I, myself, am personally concerned with is what do you do about the things which are coming out which you don’t want to have come out, but which are not coming out of this building? This last one, the Eilts thing\(^4\) for example, I’m sure it was an AID source. Now the cable reduction might help with some of these problems, but there is no one solution. The fact is, no matter how you go about distributing it there will have to be some distribution, and therefore there is a possibility of some leaks.

Kissinger: Let me be clear. I am talking about two things. One is the question of leaks. I do not want to set up a police organization on leaks. The second thing is what the leaks represent. And that is much more important. Much more fundamental. The self-image of the building is involved. The lack of self-respect and the lack of concern for national policy is what really disturbs me.

For example, DOD leaks like crazy. But when they leak they leak for what they conceive to be national purposes. You almost never have a leak over there against themselves and very rarely against the Secretary of Defense.

\(^4\) Hermann F. Eilts was Ambassador to Egypt, 1974–1979. Eilts planned to attend a military parade commemorating Egyptian Armed Forces Day on the first anniversary of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war. Eilts informed the Department of his intention to attend in telegram 7853 from Cairo, October 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1974)
Now you look at these quotes they are getting here. The ARA people are quoted as saying “you shove this into the face of the Chilean Government and make them swallow it”. Now the idea somehow is that we are missionaries and every sixth level guy has the right to kick everyone around. The way of leaking was the same in the beginning of the Cyprus crisis. Now, I just wonder what this means about the conception of themselves among Foreign Service Officers.

The way they also talk about not being cut in on things. Now, it may be that there is to some extent truth in that, but I do not believe it is true that every single lieutenant needs to know as much as the four-star generals.

Ingersoll: We cannot bring about these changes over night.

Kissinger: These guys are too self-indulgent. Every time something goes wrong, you cannot find the guy who did it. When I ask who’s responsible for something, you’d think I want to throw the guy out the window. There are horrendous idiocies around here, but the guilty person is always protected by this self-serving protective association.

This crowd will never be any good if we can’t get any concept of service in it.

Hartman: I have been looking at this very hard over the last week at my own operation and I have found that I simply have not spent enough time with the staff. In some cases I have conveyed things to my deputies and I really have one of my deputies running the Bureau.

Kissinger: Who’s that?

Hartman: Lowenstein.6

Kissinger: Is he the senior deputy?

Hartman: No, Stabler7 is. But Jim is running the Bureau. I have not spent enough time myself with all the groups in the Bureau. I find as I look back that my weekly staff meeting is continually getting cancelled. The communication problem is definitely very important. We’ve got to find a way to divide the roles we have. Several of us Assistant Secretaries are operating in effect as your special assistants, which is very hard to do when we are also charged with running the Bureau and meeting and greeting Ambassadors.

I think we simply have to give a deputy much more control over running the Bureau.

5 The article with this specific quotation was not found, but see footnote 3, Document 137.

6 James G. Lowenstein, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.

7 Wells Stabler, Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs.
Ingersoll: That’s right. If the Assistant Secretary doesn’t have time, then he simply has to delegate it.

Brown: This problem is apparent in several bureaus.

Kissinger: It is ironic that the lousiest Bureau doesn’t leak at all. We have had no leaks out of AF.

Brown: That’s because they have no substance to leak.

Eagleburger: No, they haven’t leaked the sale of the DC–8 to Gabon.

Sisco: Someone there is going to sue one lawyer, what’s her name?

Brown: Allison Palmer.

Sisco: She’s going to sue the lawyer related to the prior sale arguing that he knew the plane was going to be used in the Rhodesia trade.

Kissinger: I’ll get to that in a minute. What I’m talking about is the effect on the self-image of the Foreign Service.

Brown: I sent some of my younger officers out into the bureaus this last week to find out what’s going on and the result is I find that there is a split. At the level of about the Country Director people are involved, but below that level people feel left out. They don’t see the Assistant Secretaries and even the Deputy Assistant Secretaries, who spend too much time chasing after people like you, Art, to find out what the policy is. We’ve got to pull these other officers back into the building.

They visited ARA and found out a very interesting thing about Kubisch. When Kubisch was Country Director for Brazil, he was the most popular guy in the entire Bureau. Then I find in the last six months he is hated.

Kissinger: Why?

Brown: Because he clammed up at the staff meetings. Every time at a staff meeting when particular subjects came up, Kubisch would say we can’t discuss that in this group.

Kissinger: He was right, but he wasn’t acting on my instructions. Actually, I don’t know what ARA is doing that is so sensitive.

Brown: Delegating to one deputy is simply not enough. You, Art, will have to do some of it yourself. If we can maintain fairly regularly this 8:00 staff meeting with you, then the Assistant Secretaries can go back to their bureaus and debrief their people, not necessarily in detail. But this way they can pull their people in the bureau into the larger picture of the organization, to tell them what everybody on the 7th floor is concerned about. Then, with the deputies working, you can get some kind of a team feeling.

Sisco: I know I felt when I was Assistant Secretary in NEA, the most useful thing to me was I had four staff meetings every week,
every day except Friday. The Country Directors and their deputies would then tell me what was in the cables and what they thought should be done. I don’t know how regular your’s have been, Art, but it seems to me that once a week is inadequate.

Ingersoll: We also have the problem of quality standards. The Assistant Secretaries or their deputies simply have to police the standard of the paper. If they don’t have time then they have to delegate it.

Kissinger: Bob (McCloskey), what do you think?

McCloskey: I don’t know what I think yet. I think I would just like to listen a little more.

Kissinger: That’s all right. Don’t be bashful.

McCloskey: I think there are two things which are running through our minds here. The first thing is this question of information going public. Secondly, there is the broader question of having a Foreign Service which really puts out as an institution for the Government. There is some anarchy in the ranks as there is everywhere.

You know, you are doing more for governments now than a Secretary of State should be asked to do—35 days shuttling in the Middle East. Institutions are suffering from these things all over the place. Families are having trouble understanding their children.

I think if you would give more time personally because more poses with you than with previous Secretaries of State, to take time now and then, perhaps in the Western Auditorium, to let a group of people see and talk to you—how many people can we get into the Western Auditorium? 500–800? Just to give them some personal exposure which would be symbolic and could affect the morale.

Kissinger: How much exposure have previous Secretaries of State had? Did Acheson do this? What about Rusk?

McCloskey: It’s not the point that much. It’s a very different phenomenon now.

Kissinger: Well, I’m not opposed to it. It’s not a bad idea. Perhaps once every three weeks.

McCloskey: It could be once every several months.

Kissinger: Or once a month. It’s not a bad idea.

Brown: It would have to be an upbeat presentation.

Ingersoll: You could cover some controversial subjects and give everybody guidance.

Kissinger: I cannot accept the proposition that I must give guidance to 800 Foreign Service Officers together. But for inspiration the idea might be good.

Now I’ve seen enough to know over the past years that it is no accident that the State Department is not used by the President. This Presi-
dent essentially is indifferent and open-minded on the subject since I am here and he doesn’t have to face the problem. But when the two jobs are split again, you mark my words that you will have the same problem and this building will become a fudge factory again and the President will rely on his assistant or he will rely on the Secretary of State acting as his assistant, but not on this building.

What I am after is to leave something behind. The Foreign Service, if it wants to be what it pretends to be, must see its fulfillment, not in the perogatives of the job. Look at the kind of thing they are leaking. But if the Foreign Service is working for the national interest then morale will soar. I would rather have a year of lousy morale now followed by that.

In the reporting and in the other things they do, you just don’t get the sense that “by god they will do something for the country”. Get the younger fellows to write to you about where is the U.S. going to be in ten years? What is the nature of peace? These are the questions that concern foreign policy.

What they yell about instead is reforming the government in South Africa, doing something about Rhodesia, or as the ARA man said, “shoving it in the face of the Chilean government”. Now that is not a serious view of foreign policy. I happen to believe that if we have a disciplined and organized Foreign Service, we will even bring about some humanitarian changes for the better.

Sisco: In principle I agree with Bob. But I don’t agree with his specific suggestions. If you go see a group now, it will be seen as an empty gesture. What we need to do is look over the next two, three, or four months to taking some quiet moves such as the ones that Dean discussed.

McCloskey: No, it is certainly not a substitute for that.

Kissinger: No, it’s just a palliative.

The basic problem is how to give the Foreign Service the concept of serving. They should get along with me, but I don’t feel that I need to get along with them. On the other hand, I don’t want to personalize this. The question is can one create a tradition that will serve other Secretaries of State.

The whole system here is geared to making the Secretary do what the Bureaus want. Unless you’re a monomaniac like me, you can’t beat them and I perhaps can’t beat them. You are overwhelmed with cables to approve. This is not done consciously. No one says we are out to get the Secretary on this. But the system and the mentality is not geared to where the country or even the region ought to be going.

It becomes a matter of selling your cable to the Secretary. And high on the list of how the cables are drafted is consideration of getting along with foreign governments.
Now you take this damn NEA. I find just last night that Eilts and Guay\(^8\) are planning to go to a Yom Kippur victory parade. That’s like going to some Japanese parade honoring Pearl Harbor. I understand Eilts’ pressures, because he’s being pushed by Sadat, but consider what the Jewish community would do here if this happened during the election campaign. Now that should have been caught somewhere.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the organization and management of the Department of State.]

Eagleburger: I agree that the key to the immediate problem is the Assistant Secretaries. But the best way to get to the heart of the question is to figure out why we are the way we are. We have to address the whole range of things. For example, how we go about recruiting Foreign Service personnel, the promotion system, etc.

Kissinger: The Foreign Service is excellent on reporting but lousy on telling you what it means. Now in the areas where I know something, I can just take the reporting and put it into context myself. But what does the ordinary Secretary of State do? The analytical reporting we do here is generally lousy. There are exceptions. Scotes\(^9\) helped me more with his reporting from Damascus than any three Ambassadors.

Every now and then a cable comes along that sticks in my mind. But for example we have never gotten a decent analysis out of Portugal since April on what’s going on. I knew six months ago, and I’ve been saying all along what’s going to happen there and if I had followed my instincts I’d have been much more strong-armed there instead of taking this vapid line the State Department’s giving me. I didn’t have the guts to do it because it would have meant breaking massive opposition in this building and elsewhere.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the organization and management of the Department of State.]

Sisco: Over the last twenty years in this institution we have had the bout with McCarthyism, the change in generations and the fact that it is a large bureaucracy with the bureaucratic tendency against conceptualization. Which is not all that bad, I might say. I do not find it disturbing to have the regional bureaus pressing in competition for your time, for example. And then our job on the 7th floor is to try to make the judgments about how your time should be spent.

My point is that what Larry has said about having a real look at the Foreign Service by itself, is a good one. What is its role? Like most insti-

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\(^8\) Georges Guay, Defense Attaché at the Embassy in Cairo.

\(^9\) Thomas J. Scotes, Principal Officer at the Embassy in Damascus.
tutions, the loyalty tends to be to the institution itself as Secretaries come and go. But we do have the past twenty years where this institution has been maligned by successive Secretaries of State and Presidents. Perhaps the role has to be altered.

Kissinger: An institution which is maligned by its chief over a period of twenty years, must have something wrong with it. Especially since the Chief’s instincts cannot be to malign his own institution. He has nothing to gain by doing that. If Presidents as different as Eisenhower, Kennedy and Johnson came to the same conclusion, even if the criticisms are unjust, there must be something wrong and the criticisms are almost irrelevant.

The fact that the regional bureaus compete for my time is ok. But for what are they competing? This place is well geared to reporting and producing cables. In some areas there is excellence and great loyalty.

But what the President and the Secretary need is the conceptual national look. The problem is the loyalty of the middle and lower officers. Look at the leak of this Eilts cable.

Brown: That is the result of a group of people over at AID. Since the early Kennedy days they have been leaking cables as missionaries.

Kissinger: Well, we should get rid of them.

Brown: You can’t get rid of them.

Kissinger: Then give them irrelevant jobs.

Hartman: What we should do is look at the places where there have been successes. Those are in the areas where the people know what they are doing.

Kissinger: And doing what they like to do. For example, Embassies love to have me come to visit. The reason is simply because it gets them in to see the top people. The Foreign Service does some negotiations well. For example, if you are ever negotiating for a residence or anything like that, you do that pretty well. No seriously, any negotiations where there is no concept, they do very well. Claims, for example.

Hartman: But I don’t think we use our missions overseas as well as we should.

Brown: Look at the crisis countries like Portugal and Italy.

Kissinger: Look at our Embassy’s reporting from Lisbon since April. The whole tone is to calm everybody down.

Eagleburger: That can be a product of bad leadership.

Brown: Or censorship.

Kissinger: It’s the mentality of people. The Ambassador sees himself as the spokesman of the country he is accredited to. Rarely do you get the dynamics of this situation reported.
Hartman: That situation in Lisbon I can tell you if Knight\textsuperscript{10} were there still it would have been very different. We wouldn’t have had the same sloppy stuff coming at us.

Kissinger: Scott\textsuperscript{11} was sent there when Portugal was supposed to be a rest home.

Brown: Have we gotten anything useful out of the Embassy in Italy?

Kissinger: No. Then, Art, when that happens you should really sit on them, and tell them the questions we need the answers to.

Ingersoll: Here you have a problem of organization. The Ambassador is supposed to be above the people who are in charge of him.

Kissinger: I don’t accept that. The Bureaus ought to be looking into the question that no one else is raising.

Davis: I have been thinking of what in the management area and specifically the personnel area we might do. Really, you do have two sides here. There is the question of clarification of what the Foreign Service is all about and there we can do something.

Kissinger: How?

Davis: It takes a degree of explanation. The officers need to understand the discipline. We can do more to clarify the nature of the service in the Foreign Service. That is one side and that needs to be done by everybody.

There is another side. I looked at the regulations on enforcing discipline. Now, for example, we have people leaving classified material out on the desks. We have the authority to suspend people for these things. In the past decade we have never enforced these regulations; but we can.

Kissinger: How?

Davis: Well, when you have a real breach of the regulations, we can investigate and find the people.

Brown: We have eight men now working on the fifth day of their investigation into the Eilts leak. They told me they simply cannot find anything about it without talking to Gelb.\textsuperscript{12}

Kissinger: That is a waste of time. And also it would lead to another story.

Davis: Well, I know of leaks that have been found out and not followed up in the past few years.

\footnote{10 Ridgway B. Knight, Ambassador to Portugal, 1969–1973.}
\footnote{11 Stuart Nash Scott, Ambassador to Portugal, 1973–1975.}
\footnote{12 Leslie Gelb, journalist at the \textit{New York Times}.}
Kissinger: Daniel Schorr told me yesterday that Ray Cline\textsuperscript{13} is going on TV saying the Department opposed the Chilean operation. Now, I have looked through the files and I found a handwritten note from Cline that Cline himself overruled his own analyst and supported the operations.

What is more important is the lack of self-respect of a man, an intelligence man, who goes on national television to give the details of intelligence internal discussions. Even if he were telling the truth. I told Schorr that as far as I could remember, all the decisions of the 40 Committee were unanimous. In this particular case, the Ambassador supported it, the analyst opposed it and Cline overruled him.

Eagleburger: I have found that the guy who is behind a lot of this Chile stuff now is the former Ambassador there—Dungan.\textsuperscript{14}

Kissinger: But he thought it up; [I line not declassified]. For an intelligence guy to talk on television—I just think is all wrong. This is one reason why I haven’t come out publicly for you, Nat. I cannot be forced to talk publicly about the 40 Committee. You are getting a bum rap here. Your predecessors did much more than you did. Most of it was instigated by either Korry\textsuperscript{15} or Dungan.

Davis: There is a third thing about the Foreign Service.

Kissinger: How do we study the problem of who gets recruited, etc.

Davis: Well, we are engaged in this right now. I think it is very difficult to recruit for loyalty.

Kissinger: Well, I am not interested in recruiting for loyalty, but in the Foreign Service’s self-perception of it.

Davis: Well, we can introduce a stronger aspect of this into the oral exam for the Foreign Service and in the training we can strengthen the concept of the Foreign Service too. We can do this all the way to the Senior Seminar where I am thinking of borrowing an idea from the National War College where they teach a course on the ethics of their profession.

Kissinger: You know the military are doing a much better job in training their people though the quality of their people is generally many notches below us. For example on SALT, DOD’s SALT position, though it is crooked as hell, is analytically superior to anything that has been done here. In fact, I am using my White House staff. There is nothing being done analytically here. It seems to me there has to be a

\textsuperscript{13} Ray S. Cline, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, October 1969–November 1973.

\textsuperscript{14} Ralph A. Dungan, Ambassador to Chile, 1964–1967.

\textsuperscript{15} Edward M. Korry, Ambassador to Chile, 1967–1971.
seventh floor home for every activity. Joe, I want you to take charge of the Bureaus.

Ingersoll: You mean the regional bureaus?

Kissinger: Yes, the regional bureaus, though I want Sonnenfeldt to continue working with EUR on the East-West stuff and SALT, etc. I want you to really sit on them in terms of the quality of their material. The toughest job is to keep an eye on the future. There we are doing a horrendous job.

I am not impressed by the argument that the Ambassadors are kings. The Embassies must work up to certain standards.

I have an uneasy sense that in Europe we are watching the erosion of the political structure. If you take what is happening in Italy, in Greece, in Portugal—I just hate to think what will happen in the next French election.

We must do something about the Foreign Service. I guarantee it will be destroyed by somebody if it doesn’t reform itself.

What I want is for it to be the best group of foreign policy advisors in the country. Then we don’t have to cringe. We can be intellectually superior when we go up to Congress or when we confront our critics. On the whole, now, we are much too defensive with Congress.

I would like a report on just how the Foreign Service is recruited and what we intend to do about it. I don’t believe it can reform itself and therefore we may need some outside assistance, but I would like to see the report.

If we could shake it up in a one or two year period there would be a lot of bloody howling in that time but in five years people will thank us for it.

There is now no brutal insistence on intellectual excellence here.

It is very hard to control the leaks from way up here. To do that is to be a cop. But the leak is symptomatic of something deeper. I am much more concerned by a guy who says “we are going to shove it into his face”. That shows a total lack of conception of how foreign policy is made.

McCloskey: Are we exaggerating this morale problem?

Kissinger: Even when the morale is not low, the Foreign Service Officers are praising themselves for the wrong reasons. The French desk officer shouldn’t have high morale because he thinks he is running our policy, but because he is involved in something big.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the organization and management of the Department of State.]

16 Presumably a reference to Document 141.
[Kissinger:] I want this report by my return from the Middle East.
Eagleburger: I think we also ought to address in that report the question of why, if your estimate of us is true, why is it true?
Davis: Well, we have got to answer these questions.
McCloskey: You have to because the Secretary has a perception of us and we need to know if he is 99 percent right or if he is 60 percent right, why it is.

Kissinger: We are dealing with first class people here, but when the State Department wants a course it comes at you like a bunch of gnats and the victories that they get are simply not worth having. The President’s signature on a piece of paper. These victories are irrelevant because there is no concept of why they got the victory. If the Department could just win one good victory a year that would set the course, it would be worth it. Now you take the question of non-proliferation. I have the feeling that the Department is really hot on the non-proliferation issue and that they want me to use the non-proliferation treaty as the instrument. Every paper I get takes a whack at me on the subject. Do something about the Non-Proliferation Treaty. But there is no analysis of the fact that there is only one country—Japan—which may do anything about it. Nobody else is going to do anything. This is typical of the vapid thinking here. I know now that what I said at the UN will be used as a hunting license throughout the building to go after the Indians.17 That is a waste of time. There is no way you can return India to its pre-nuclear status.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the organization and management of the Department of State.]

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17 In a speech to the U.N. General Assembly on September 23, Kissinger called for new international safeguards to control the transfer of nuclear materials. The text of his speech is in the Department of State Bulletin, October 14, 1974, pp. 498–504. India conducted its first nuclear test on May 18, 1974.
140. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford

Washington, October 9, 1974.

SUBJECT

Controlling and Reporting U.S. Employment in Embassies

Over the past four years, U.S. employment by all agencies in diplomatic missions abroad has been reduced by almost twenty-five percent, pursuant to President Nixon’s directive to cut the size of our overseas posts. The reduction has taken place under the aegis of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (USC) personnel reporting and control system known as OPRED.

OPRED expired on June 30, 1974. The Chairman of the USC, Mr. Ingersoll, has now asked you to approve a new directive which would modify the old system in minor ways and extend it indefinitely (Tab B). The new system would be called MODE—Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment.

Mr. Clements does not agree with the MODE proposal (Tab D). He believes the reductions which the Department of Defense has made make MODE controls superfluous. While not adverse to the reporting functions in MODE, he believes that the control functions are too rigid and cumbersome. He also wants to exempt Defense Attachés altogether.

Mr. Ingersoll believes MODE should have both control and reporting functions. CIA and OMB concur in the MODE directive. (Tabs B and C).

I believe that permanent machinery is needed to control the tendency of all bureaucracies to expand. Moreover, such machinery should embrace all elements of diplomatic missions. It should facilitate reporting both to you and to Congress, as necessary, and allow efficient reprogramming of personnel to priority functions within existing ceilings. Such controls are a critical foreign policy management tool as

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–276, Under Secretaries Decision Memoranda, U/DM 96–97. Confidential. Sent for action. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum on behalf of Kissinger. A stamped notation at the top of the page indicates that the President saw the memorandum.

2 Attached but not printed.

3 Clements’s July 13 memorandum to Ingersoll expressing his concerns is attached but not printed.

4 Attached but not printed.
well as a buttress of economical operations. The USC which is in the
best position to ensure prompt and objective adjudication of inter-
agency disputes, should be charged with these responsibilities.

The proposed directive at Tab A\(^5\) would give effect to these views
and approve the Under Secretaries Committee Chairman’s proposal.

Recommendation

That you authorize me to sign Tab A.\(^6\)

\(^5\) The October 14 memorandum to Ingersoll, as signed by Scowcroft on Kissinger’s
behalf, is attached but not printed.

\(^6\) Ford initialed his approval.

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141. Memorandum From the Director General of the Foreign
Service (Davis) to Secretary of State Kissinger\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

Improvement of the Foreign Service

I know you believe the most serious deficiency in the Service to be
inability to furnish sufficiently dispassionate description and analysis
of foreign events and their relationship to us. Too often, reporting is
only reporting. Too many papers represent a lowest common denomi-
nator of clearing offices.

A second major deficiency lies in the fields of ethics and morale.
There has been indiscipline unworthy of a career service in a democ-
racy, despite the altruism and devotion of most officers. Senior and
middle-grade officers complain that they are not made privy to Prin-
cipals’ deliberations and decisions; junior officers bicker over relative
opportunity for promotion; assignments are too often negotiated.

You have also been concerned over the narrow focus of some of-
icers. The program of transfers out of area is broadening the Service’s

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files
of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, M Chron, No-
ember 1974. No classification marking. Sent through Brown. Printed from a copy that
Davis did not initial. Drafted by Peter S. Bridges (PER/PCE/SPS) on October 17. A note
on the first page indicates that the memorandum was received from Eagleburger on No-
ember 12, forwarded to Laise on November 12, and returned to Brown on November 20.
outlook, but some officers still resist leaving a familiar environment. The Bureaus are changing in attitude and receptivity to new blood, but there is a way to go. The breadth and depth of officers’ contacts with American society and institutions leave room for an increase.

Causes

Some causes of these deficiencies are external to the Service and the Department. Perhaps even the best of modern Americans are less analysis-minded and less disciplined than we would like. Perhaps the sense of a changed role for America in the world, and the recent course of domestic events, have damaged our diplomats’ morale and sense of ethical commitment. Our problems are compounded by the general realization of most officers that many things are wrong with the Service. Self-doubt has fed on introspection; and both unfair criticism and relentless truth have undermined confidence and the Service’s sense of style. If so, we must intensify our efforts to improve recruitment, self-improvement and the management of our corps.

One factor working against improvement in the past was the fact that our position seemed so strong that it could hardly be weakened by faults in an individual Embassy, or indeed in a whole Service. It seemed we could send anyone abroad as an Ambassador, or tolerate any standard of reporting and analysis, and hardly be hurt. This is not the case now. In truth, it never was; and some of your predecessors found the same faults you have.

According to our Foreign Affairs Manual, political reporting “...forms an indispensable base for foreign policy decision-making.”2 S/S issues instructions on how papers should be written for Principals. But the organization of the Department contributes to deficiencies in communication between the Service and the Principals. Bureaucratic layering does not prevent significant reporting from reaching your desk, but it can make it difficult to send forward a policy memorandum without views being watered down. Too little feedback is given to the field about reporting.

We have not put full stress, in examining candidates for the Foreign Service, on their ability in conceptual thinking and analysis. A junior officer does not receive enough schooling in these skills either in training or on the job.

Morale and discipline are affected adversely not only by a sense of non-participation, and by factors general to our society, but by such things as pay. People have never been attracted to the Foreign Service by high salaries, but in a time of low morale our continuing failure to

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2 Ellipses is in the original.
compete with industry salaries, and the effects of inflation at home and abroad, cause additional discouragement.

Another difficulty lies in our system of rewards. There are frequent complaints in the Service that promotions are slow. This was true for several years, but the trend since 1973 has been larger promotion lists at senior and middle-grade levels and we shall be able to continue this improvement in 1975.

Although we have pushed a number of the ablest officers to the top reasonably fast, the continuing lack of candor in our Efficiency Reports—despite some improvement—leaves open the question whether we always promote the best. Nor does our promotion system put sufficient emphasis on excellence in conceptual analysis.

The recent trend in employee-management relations is continuing. The Department’s new grievance procedures and the development of employee-management relations have influenced the atmosphere and psychology of the Foreign Service. There are some who believe that a “sense of separation” between employees and management has worked against discipline and unity of purpose. To the extent there is truth in this view, it is an oversimplification and concentrates on the costs of what has been, overall, a healthy change.

A further cause of trouble is the inherent ambivalence of the diplomat’s role. He may feel his own importance as he sits in the front row, but he is not the main performer. He is called over-cautious; but in part that is because he brings the bad tidings, and points out the pitfalls, and warns that we cannot always have things our way. He is accused of clientism, and sometimes he is guilty; but at other times he has been reporting unwelcome realities. The diplomat must serve his nation’s interests; he must also be a bridge, and bridges get walked on. Washington is not always faithful or fair in upholding the diplomat in the field who is not “popular.”

Steps to Improve the Service

Steps proposed in this paper relate to (A) recruitment, (B) selection, (C) training, (D) assignment, and (E) promotion. To be effective, these should be complemented by steps in other areas of the Department aimed at the same goal.

A. Recruitment:

We have a sufficient number of applicants—over 13,000 applied for and 9,000 actually took the last FSO written exam, and of these only about 170 will be commissioned. By every criterion those appointed are gifted, well prepared, and well motivated. (A 1965 Carnegie study found younger FSOs better at problem analysis than a group of young company Presidents.) Still, we do not know how many good potential
candidates never approach us; and we have not put all possible emphasis on creativity and talent for conceptual analysis. We therefore propose to take the following steps:

1. We shall go systematically to college deans, heads of graduate schools, and key professors to seek their views as to what types of young people are attracted to the Service, with particular regard to our success and failure in finding people with analytical ability and creativity.

2. We shall revise our recruitment literature for the 1975 written exam to heighten our emphasis on the role of the Foreign Service in providing policy analysis to the Secretary and other principal officers of the Department. Recruiters will give similar emphasis during their visits to campuses.

B. Selection:

1. All candidates passing the written exam in 1974 and thereafter will be asked to submit to the Board of Examiners, prior to their oral examinations, material illustrating their ability in conceptual analysis.

2. Instructions for the essay written by the candidate as part of the written examination will, beginning with this December’s exam, emphasize that the essay will be used to discern ability in conceptual analysis.

3. Although the Educational Testing Service tells us the 1974 exam already contains questions designed to test such analytical ability, more will be added in the 1975 exam.

4. Examiners will be trained to give special attention during the oral examination to candidates’ capacity for conceptual analysis. This capacity will also be given full weight in our selection of examiners.

In addition, instructions have been sent to Deputy Examiners currently conducting Junior Threshold interviews here and abroad, that particular attention is to be paid in their evaluations to evidence of ability in conceptual analysis.

Our selection process already emphasizes the need for morality and probity in a candidate. All candidates are asked about their readiness to support U.S. foreign policy. The right of dissent, within the discipline of the Service, is explained. Examiners have been instructed to take particular care to ensure that all candidates understand clearly the intellectual and ethical expectations of the Foreign Service.

C. Training:

We are proposing to take several steps which we believe will make our training programs quickly responsive to the need for greater skills in conceptual analysis, and for heightened awareness of professional ethics and professional discipline:
1. We are working with FSI to design a new segment of the Basic Officer Course to relate to these needs. Drawing on the best officers in the Service, we hope to give the new officer a clearer understanding of the need to relate each functional and area assignment to our policy, its formulation and implementation. We will also present the clearest possible picture of ethical and disciplinary requirements, particularly as they relate to problems an officer is likely to encounter in his first years of service.

2. For high-calibre mid-career officers, we are working with FSI on a new program of short courses and seminars and longer-term training. We shall put new stress on the analysis of foreign-policy issues (particularly in a redesigned course for Section Chiefs and DCMs), and on an individual’s need to relate growing expertise in an area to global considerations and the broadest U.S. interests. FSI has already begun giving a new course in systematic political analysis—a copy of the syllabus is attached at Tab A—^ and Pete Vaky^ will lead the discussion on this subject at the next Section Chiefs’ course, in Bogota. We are looking into the best way to add material on ethical and disciplinary needs to courses for mid-career officers.

3. We plan to work into the Senior Seminar a series of case studies of the ethical and analytical problems a senior officer is likely to encounter—where local problems and priorities, or bureaucratic pressures in Washington, may sway an officer’s perception and decisions. Particular stress will be put on the senior officer’s responsibility to serve the policy-makers, and to inculcate the highest professional standards in junior officers. Officers at the Seminar will be encouraged to choose a subject in these fields for their Seminar paper. (The National War College has already instituted a course on professional ethics; a copy of the syllabus is attached at Tab B.)

D. Assignment:

1. In assignment to program-direction and other senior jobs, we shall pay particular attention to proven ability in conceptual and analytical thinking.

2. To assist in bringing the Foreign Service into closer contact with American society, we shall continue to emphasize the desirability of assignments outside of the Department for Foreign Service officers. Officers are already assigned to thirty other U.S. agencies. We shall also encourage officers to take periods of leave without pay for professional and educational purposes. If an apparent conflict in legislative provi-

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^ Attached but not printed.


^ Attached but not printed.
sions can be resolved, the Pearson Amendment to this year’s authorization bill will enable us to detail fifty officers a year to State and local governments. We should be able to keep approximately 10% of the officer corps in activities outside of the Department and Foreign Service.

E. Promotion:

We plan several immediate steps to identify and reward analytical ability:

1. Officers particularly known for their analytical and intellectual abilities are being named to this year’s senior selection boards, and to future boards, in order to stimulate the Boards to give high rankings to officers with a policy-analysis bent.

2. Special directives to this year’s senior boards will expand on the existing injunction to consider each officer’s ability to analyze problems. Precepts and directives to future boards will carry this theme forward.

3. The annual Officer Evaluation Report form, and instructions for it, will emphasize analytical ability as a particularly important quality.

In addition to the above, we have been considering the advantages of instituting an Assessment Center to permit more accurate identification of the most promising officers in our Service. Such centers are used widely in private industry and elsewhere in the Federal Government. We might have to discuss with AFSA various aspects of instituting such a center. If you should approve our moving ahead on this, we would need funding. A paper providing information on Assessment Centers is attached at Tab C.6

We need to say more to the members of the Foreign Service about what is expected of them. I hope you will address a message to the Service on this subject, perhaps building on the draft statement S/P has prepared.7

Recommendations:8

(1) That you indicate your approval of the proposed immediate steps outlined above in recruitment, selection, training, assignment and promotion.

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6 Not attached and not found.
7 Not found. However, on November 18, Lord forwarded to Davis a November 1 memorandum from John Kornblum (S/P), relating Kissinger’s thoughts on the organization of the Foreign Service. (National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, M Chron, November 1974)
8 Kissinger approved both recommendations.
(2) That you authorize M/DG to proceed with plans to institute an Assessment Center for Foreign Service officers of Class 3, with final decision to be made by M following discussions as appropriate with AFSA and further definition of costs.

142. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, February 8, 1975.

SUBJECT
The Role of the Policy Planning Staff

This is a rundown on S/P’s current role and approach. You already know much through our conversations, papers, reports and other sources. But since I am taking stock after 15 months and since so much of our work is not particularly visible to you, I think this accounting will be useful. It may also elicit your thoughts on S/P priorities and ways we can improve.

I am hardly reluctant to agree with you that this staff has its most central role since the days of George Kennan. But we can do better. With the talent assembled, we should provide you (and the Seventh Floor) with more intellectual stimulation. As I mentioned recently, I am shifting our emphasis more in this direction, without abandoning the other important functions we do well.

Assets and General Approach

I inherited a staff of mixed quality, some excellent, some just adequate; a staff out in the cold for years due to the indifference of previous Secretaries of State. This created a general tendency toward more academic efforts, or bureaucratic “paper massages” and “coordination.” Marginal activities prevailed.

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Fortunately, I came to S/P with assets that are indispensable to the efficacy of any planning staff: the central and broad mandate you publicly articulated; your conceptual approach to foreign affairs and therefore immediate interest; our working experiences and personal relationship; an understanding of your approach and needs; adequate access to sensitive information; and a charter to get the best people for the Staff.

Eighteen of our twenty-eight staff members are new recruits. The staff is quite strong now, though some soft spots remain. We continually battle against attrition and search for new talent. S/P has two outstanding and complementary deputies—Lewis (political/economic, NEA, ARA, AF and management) and Bartholomew (political/military, EUR, and EA). By going to academia, outside institutions, and other agencies as well as the Career Service, we have a wide range of abilities, bureaucratic contacts, specialities, outside connections, and—believe it or not—a broad ideological spectrum. The Staff is generally younger and leaner. We are carrying on a mini-institutionalization process by exposing many youngish career officers to the Seventh Floor/conceptual perspective which should prepare them well for future responsibilities.

Generally, I’ve tried to steer between the two poles of “ivory towers” and “operations,” while preferring to veer toward the more operational so as to ensure being relevant, without however duplicating the roles of others. We’ve tried as well to manage the inevitable tension between the two extremes of (1) working with and helping the bureaus to serve the Department as a whole (at the risk of losing our identity and being co-opted) and (2) serving as shock troops and devil’s advocates to keep the system honest (with some ensuing bureaucratic friction).

This problem can never be completely resolved—nor should it be—but we have achieved a reasonable equilibrium. Statistics don’t mean much by themselves, and in particular reveal nothing about quality. But the following rundown of our workload does give a feel for volume and emphasis. During the past 15 months, 220 substantive memos (or the equivalent of almost one per working day) went directly to you, while over 100 others have gone to other Seventh Floor Principals (who of course receive the bulk of yours as well). Meanwhile, S/P contributes to more than 50 memoranda each month produced elsewhere in the building, often in a very substantial way.

Various Roles

(1) Catalyst. We have pioneered in a few major areas, generally where new ground was to be broken, or several bureaus were involved, or the Department was not particularly strong. Examples include en-
nergy ever since the Pilgrim’s Speech\(^2\) and the Washington Conference;\(^3\) food strategy; non-proliferation policy; reactor sales and safeguards; Latin American strategy; themes for re-building a public consensus; and human rights policy. In such areas we did most or much of the early conceptual papers, working with the appropriate bureaus. We then turned over much of the implementation to the bureaus while reserving a monitoring/channeling role for ourselves, and moving back in when major policy questions arise.

(2) **Scout.** Here we look for potential issues and problems, then either undertake planning or get the bureaus/NSC system to do so. This is a particularly difficult task, and the record is spotty. At one point I seriously considered proposing that you institute a NSSM-style planning process within the Department, but decided that it would be too cumbersome. We have used such methods as the Alert Lists (soon a new format to cover all major concerns of the Seventh Floor for the coming months) and analytical staff meetings (a process we have continued for some other Seventh Floor Principals and I’d like to reinstitute on a selective basis for you). I have generally cut back on longer term papers so as to concentrate on major issues foreseeable over the next year or two. For balance, we have done some studies that project several years ahead: the Japan study you requested last spring; a paper on underlying trends in US–Brazil relations; an analysis of Iran’s evolving role in Southwest Asia; and a dissection of Balkan diplomacy in the détente era. An example of a joint effort with a bureau was the book on overall negotiating strategy for the Middle East on which we worked with NEA last summer.

We have also picked up current topics not getting sufficient analysis elsewhere, e.g. Ethiopia.

(3) **Devil’s Advocate.** This is one area where we plan to do more. In retrospect, our Greek study of last year raised the tough issues which clearly warranted attention, though unfortunately the discussion at the analytical staff meeting degenerated. Our alternative strategy paper for Camp David energy meeting with allies at the end of September proposed an approach which now approximates our present course. Brief comments on current issues such as Cyprus, Middle East negotiations, the Italian financial crisis, the Berlin question, the Indo-Pakistan arms dilemma, and nuclear strategy vis-à-vis the French are other examples.


Longer papers on Cuba policy and prospects for the New Dialogue with the Latins\textsuperscript{4} also apply.

(4) **Seventh Floor Substantive Staff.** While you are our primary audience, we also serve the other Principals. In this role, we have spent a great deal of time with generally good results. For example we staff Bob Ingersoll for the Under Secretaries Committee (a substantial workload) and have done particular studies like human rights; uranium enrichment; overall US interests in sub-Sahara Africa; and issues and organizational problems involving the new Joint Cooperation Commissions.

Other work in this category includes responding to Sisco and Robinson requests on such matters as Peace Corps and PL 480 global priorities, political angles on AID strategy, and nuclear weapons issues; supporting Ingersoll and Maw on Law of the Sea as well as playing a major role in broad studies on military assistance principles and priorities; providing substantive support to Ingersoll and Dean Brown on the budget review process, PARA, and the “Management by Objectives” exercise for OMB; helping Sonnenfeldt on delicate military matters with the French (nuclear relations, F 104 replacement etc.); and helping to staff Ingersoll and Sonnenfeldt on SALT and MBFR. I have told all Principals that S/P will do special studies or provide alternative views, as well as help on major speeches. We are another resource, another view different from the 6th floor.

(5) **Mini-NSC Staff.** Frankly, it’s not possible, nor desirable, for S/P to function vis-à-vis the rest of the building the way the NSC operates vis-à-vis various government agencies.

We do monitor nearly all material going forward to the 7th floor and selectively work with bureaus to improve quality or add options. If still unsatisfactory, we can and do weigh in with our own views. But to avoid bogging down, we are highly selective, leaving S/S to assure coordination, clearance, etc. One of our most useful efforts was our work with the bureaus on issues papers for President Ford during the transition. Another was our contribution to key papers for the President’s visit to Japan and Korea.\textsuperscript{5}

(6) **The Public Dimension.** The nucleus here is the agony (and the ecstasy) of speeches. Naturally I consider this role to be crucial in its policy-making, as well as consensus-building, dimensions. We are all unhappy about how this has worked and maybe always will be. But I

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\textsuperscript{4} During an October 5 luncheon in New York for Latin American delegates to the United Nations, Kissinger announced the beginning of a “new dialogue with our friends in the Americas.” For the text of Kissinger’s remarks, see the Department of State Bulletin, October 29, 1973, pp. 542–543.

\textsuperscript{5} Ford visited Japan November 19–22, 1974, and Korea November 23–24, 1974.
want to talk to you separately about whether/how we can perform this vital function better, saving everyone, particularly you, time and pain.

I would also include here the great effort we expend on questions and answers and talking points for Congressional appearances, toasts, and other informal remarks, etc.—not only yours, but often other Principals. I suspect that some of this is marginal to the effort spent.

I am freely available to the press and try to convey the basic lines and rationale of our policy. In addition, we undertake many speaking engagements in and out of the building, mostly informal.

(7) Dialogue with the Outside. This includes both the work with Carol Laise on consensus-building and our contacts with academia and other external institutions. We can and should help bridge the intellectual gaps; and also feed to you and others the best thinking done elsewhere. We have tried a variety of techniques. We work with Bill Hyland and the bureaus on seminars with outside experts on current issues; arrange working lunches or “Bundygroup” type sessions with you; set up seminars for key new ambassadors. We plan to expand our reach in this area.

(8) Institutionalization. S/P performs a variety of functions here which include advice on management and personnel; guiding FSI on countering the intellectual shortcomings of the Service; seeing our Ambassadors from abroad; and speaking to various groups, such as inspectors going overseas, Scholar-Diplomat groups and Chiefs of Missions conferences—all toward a more conceptual approach and a better appreciation for our policies.

(9) The Interagency Process. I purposely relieved S/P of the task of pushing papers through the NSC system, while staying substantively involved with the bureaus in the writing of the interagency studies.

Wreath Gathright of my staff serves as Staff Director for the Under Secretaries Committee. We also are continually involved in various contingency studies, NSSMs, preparing the State Department representatives for interagency meetings, etc. Gathright or other S/P members frequently chair interagency Working Groups for State where the issue cuts across bureau lines, e.g. Azores base negotiations, test ban issues review, PNE relationship to the Limited Test Ban Treaty, technology exports to the Soviet Union, environmental modification for military purposes, direct broadcast satellites, and population policy.

(10) Foreign Contacts. I recently sent you a separate memorandum on S/P exchanges with other planning staffs. I’ve been ruthless in keeping this to a handful, i.e. Japanese, British, NATO and Latin Amer-

\[6\] Not found.
ican, with the French and Germans coming up. I also see my counterparts in key countries when we travel if I can; and they drop in on me here.

The April NATO planners (APAG) meeting will be on the new global issues in the East-West context, a good subject in itself but also politically helpful in seizing NATO with economic as well as military dimensions of our security.

While I guard against expending too much time in this process, these sessions have actually proved helpful in sensing the mood and direction of our allies and in laying out our own. The most recent case is the report I sent you on my talks with Cable of the UK. We also try to extract meat for longer term analysis as we did after our Planning Team toured Latin America last fall.

Also, on a selective basis, I talk to influential foreigners visiting Washington.

(11) *China*. I personally follow China (and to a lesser extent Indochina) on a daily basis.

The Future

At present, in addition to the usual workload, we are moving ahead on several broad, analytical efforts which should be completed in the next few weeks. They include the new Alert Report; an attempt to dissect and assess the multiple challenges from “third world” nations to the current distribution of power in the international system; an evaluation and projection of our Latin American strategy for the next 1–2 years; and a spelling out of the concept of economic interdependence in concrete, institutional terms.

In short, we’re heavily engaged and generally on course, but we certainly can improve. I plan to target you individually more frequently and place more emphasis on the “devil’s advocate” role. I would appreciate any thoughts you have on priorities.

Your meeting with the staff would be extremely helpful. Perhaps we could schedule a session soon after your Middle East trip, either to discuss the S/P role on the basis of this paper, or the broad agenda facing you over the coming six months, based on the new Alert Report which will be ready upon your return.
143. Action Memorandum From the Director General of the Foreign Service (Laise) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The Professional Service of the Department of State

In the Department of State you, as Secretary, have a resource of exceptional wealth. As you have acknowledged, it is a pool of intelligence, versatility, and dedication. Yet you, like other leaders, have found flaws in the Service that seem to defy explanation or correction. You have characterized the fault as one of organization.

During my first month as Director General, I have conducted a rigorous examination of our personnel management problems as seen both from within Personnel and by key officials in the rest of the Department. The conclusions which emerge support your diagnosis. The central and overriding fact is that to have a coherent organization and personnel system requires a centralized management strategy responsive to the foreign policy priorities established by the President and you. Our condition is ripe for correction and can be turned to good account only if you give a strong lead. We have the vision, the authority, the policies, and the people to do the job; in effect we know the score, but are sadly out of practice in harmonizing our efforts. Strong central direction and your personal authority will be required to pull together our long-fractured system because it is split by numerous vested interests which will see change as jeopardizing their territorial imperatives. These are bureau heads, Ambassadors and other agencies (e.g. Commerce, Labor, OMB), some with strong lines to the Hill. And as we move forward, we will also need AFSA’s cooperation.

An analysis of our problems, the decisions we need from you, and our planned courses of action follow.

The Problem

Our mission is to provide service and leadership for the nation in foreign affairs. To do this we must organize our talents so well that the Department of State will by the excellence of its performance become the point of synthesis for American policy toward the rest of the world and command the conduct of our foreign relations. We can no longer compensate for our shortcomings by the vastness of our nation’s resources or by a position of worldwide dominance. Nor can we now af-

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 335, Department of State, Eagleburger, Lawrence S.—Management Reform Proposals, Professional Service, May 1975. No classification marking. Sent through Eagleburger.
ford to look only outward; we must also face inward to the American people, their elected representatives, and the other agencies of Government. To achieve our mission, we must, above all, have a sense of that mission. Only with a vivid concept of purpose can we engage the enthusiasm and discipline for the task and achieve the standard of excellence required.

Analysis

Our professional service today is without a proper sense of its own professional mission, nor do we have a clear view whether our organization is adequately arranged to meet our goals. We must develop a central definition of objectives and direction, and in doing so, make some basic judgments that affect not only the foreign policy interests of the United States, but determine how we develop people, how they should relate to the objective, and how they should function and organize in working towards that objective.

Without an agreed sense of professional purpose, the Department has increasingly slipped into particularism. Our system is criss-crossed with rank, position and organizational patterns, different employment structures, and competing cones. While this diversity could be a strength, the various elements are in fact ill-defined and their relationships to each other blurred. The old laissez-faire system—a small Foreign Service of political generalists—admittedly produced some unfair monopolies, but it has long since faded and been replaced by a system of protectionism. Our vision is fractured both substantively, with our resources supporting a bilateral approach to multinational problems, and organizationally, with the emphasis on which part of the elephant one happens to be touching. Many of the rigidities in our structure arose from long overdue attempts to correct wrongs of the past and the improvements should be carefully guarded for rational and equitable management. But they have also encouraged a system of competing self-interests that is bedraggled and divided by regulations, rules, labels, and guarantees where each force produces its own counter-force and where each group regards the other with suspicion. There is an element of creativity in these competing tensions, but not when it is without focus. And the more rigid and divided we have become, the less flexible and responsive we can be. We need more mobility, more breadth of vision, and more emphasis on excellence; but the drift in the Department, perhaps reflecting a drift in our society as a whole, is towards security and narrowness. Discipline, without which a complex organization cannot operate effectively, is often now countered by self-interest.

The ill-defined central role of the Department and the increasing particularism within the organization have an amplifying effect on each other. The more confused we are about central objectives, the more vulnerable we are to centrifugal tugs. It is this process which must be reversed.
We have also been unable to resolve a long-standing dichotomy in the Foreign Service experience. The arts of diplomacy abroad are not easily translated into the dynamics of policy formulation at home. Overseas we observe events in which our participation is limited and seek to compromise when faced with conflicts. In Washington we are expected to lead within the bureaucracy and seek confrontation if necessary. Virtues abroad become sins at home. The requirements for service overseas and service in Washington are not irreconcilable, but they demand different emphasis in training and experience if we are to act effectively in both contexts.

There are varying or conflicting perceptions, interests, and expectations when people view our Department and Foreign Service. External criticisms, proposals for sweeping reform, and our own self-analyses have never produced a workable alternative to the concepts underlying the professional service. We must proceed on the basis that the nation requires a corps of foreign affairs professionals, recruited and selected through rigorous procedures, which should include persons expert in politics, economics, and other disciplines. This central corps of professionals should not be merely coordinators of other interests and specialties. It must be capable of drawing together the widely divergent interests of our society and government, synthesizing this array of forces, tapping the available expertise, and advising our political leadership how best to pursue our national objectives. It embraces generalists and specialists; mobile people and continuity people; African specialists and financial economists; experts in liaison with Defense and experts in Russian; computer analysts, Ambassadors, and vice consuls. To insist that this variety of Americans amounts to one service is not to say that any single member can qualify for all the jobs we offer. Career patterns will vary widely. What is vital is to ensure opportunity, so that those who rise to the top are the best, whatever their previous field of expertise. The construction of tight-walled career categories does not facilitate this; nor does it correspond to the fact that our professionals have extraordinarily varied mixes of talent and experience which no single category can adequately encompass. Our service should be single in its mission, not necessarily in its structure.

A single service embracing all professional employees of the Department seems a laudable goal, but efforts to move in that direction have simply created different sets of divisions and rearranged the mirrors. The dilemma of trying to squeeze different professional roles into one system is enduring, and recent efforts have not met with much success nor have they overcome the neglect of our Reserve and Civil Service Officers and their potential. We continue to need three basic groupings of people: a Foreign Service Officer Corps which serves at home and abroad, a corps of specialists which also serves at home and
abroad (the Foreign Service Reserve), and a professional corps which serves only at home (the Civil Service). We must rationally and structurally sort out the dedicated specialist and the broad-based generalist, provide realistic and open career opportunities for all professional employees, and give coherence to the whole. It requires examination of the role of the Civil Service in the Department, of the purpose of the Foreign Service Reserve authority, and of the advantages and disadvantages of functional specialization within the officer corps. At the same time we must attach a heavy weight to the pendulum that regularly swings through the management of personnel resources, fix a corporate strategy, and stick with it. This requires continuity, both in policy and people, which is essential to leadership in Washington.

Finally, we must tighten the bond between the institution and the individual. Commitments are required by each to the other. The institution can best discharge its obligations in a context of openness, consistency, and responsiveness to the personal concerns of our employees. If we act rationally and equitably, we have every right to expect that the individual will respond with the discipline and esprit which lie at the heart of our professional ethic. Developing our central mission and breaking down service parochialism will depend to a large extent on the maturity of the relationship which is established and on the discipline of both the individual and the institution.

**Action Required**

Bringing it all together requires leadership, which can only come from the Seventh Floor of the Department.

Before its policies can be institutionalized, the Department must institutionalize its authority in resource management. I do not believe the leadership of the Department has yet been able to organize itself to establish its priorities and shift its resources to meet new requirements. Only the Seventh Floor has the broad outlook and authority to order competing priorities and to allocate or reallocate money, positions, and people to support these objectives. A central concept needs central direction.

The Bureau of Administration is developing some proposals and new mechanisms to improve resource allocation planning in the Department. I would propose that their and our efforts be brought together and concentrated on the Seventh Floor and that you authorize the formation of a Priorities Policy Group which would systematically review the relationship between policy priorities and resources, and identify the fat and the lean. Its primary aim should be to develop basic policies that will guide the allocation of our resources and thereby establish a central framework to assure that the operations governing the use of people, money, and positions are responsive to top management’s priorities. It should be adequately staffed in M to give it institutional force. The
Group should be chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management and include the Director of the Policy Planning Staff, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, and the Director General. The A Bureau, with responsibility for funds and positions, and M/DG, with authority in recruitment, training, and assignments, would be responsible for the coordinated implementation of policies developed by the Group.

Recommendation:

That you approve the establishment of the Priorities Policy Group.\(^2\)

It is your support of the Group’s authority that will in turn enable me to attack six critical areas in our personnel management. We already have in the Department the instruments for improvement, but they must be grasped firmly, and it is my intention to do so. There are constraints, especially in the necessity to consult and negotiate some procedures with AFSA, but our relations with the Association have been candid and cooperative. The six key items on my agenda are summarized below and discussed more fully in the attachments.\(^3\)

1. An Integrated Service—If it is to provide a versatile, responsive professional corps to the Department, the personnel system must utilize all available means. With varying demands for skills and for both mobility and continuity in staffing the Department and posts abroad, we should draw upon our authority under the Civil Service system as well as the Foreign Service Act\(^4\) to gain the advantages of each. Under objectives set by the Priorities Policy Group, we need to define our requirements and fit them to the characteristics and strengths of each personnel category in light of experience and changing needs. It is an enduring problem and one that strikes at the foundation of our organization. We need as well to ensure intelligent use of techniques of recruitment, assignment, career development and advancement for all professionals of the Department. We must include effective means to permit movement of people among service sub-structures. We are now re-examining the relationships among the three basic employment categories of the Department—the Foreign Service Officer Corps, the Foreign Service Reserve, and the Civil Service—with the goal of an integrated service characterized by unity if not uniformity (see Tab 1).

\(^2\) Printed from a copy with no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

\(^3\) None of the attached papers, drafted in M/DG and undated, are printed.

\(^4\) The Foreign Service Act of 1946 (H.R. 6967), signed by President Truman on August 13, 1946, was the foundation of the Foreign Service’s postwar organizational structure.
2. Recruitment—Recruitment of the best available professionals is vital to renewal within the Department. FSO recruitment needs refinement, including an end to labeling by cone at entry, although a form of the cone system continues at the middle levels for FSOs to encourage functional expertise. Our ad hoc hiring in the Reserve and Civil Service is in need of drastic overhaul. Lateral entry and conversion programs which allow mobility between substructures must also be subject to more rigorous standards and systematized. Clearer definition of our needs in all categories is essential to the success of recruitment efforts, but perhaps more important, we must assure that the best people already in the service are enlisted in the process of attracting the best new people to the service. The best professionals must be prepared, when asked, to leave their operational activities to devote short blocks of time to recruitment and examination if we are to have an institution capable of high quality self-renewal (See Tab 2).

3. The Best to the Top—If our recruitment is successful, our organization should also be able to identify the truly outstanding in the service and promote them so that they reach positions of leadership quickly. Our performance evaluation process, however, is not wholly satisfactory and has led to undue reliance on the assignment process to ensure that the best get to the top. But we can improve the existing evaluation process, and our prime aim is creation of effective junior and senior “thresholds” for all categories of professionals as a means of examining officer potential at critical points in their careers to identify, develop, and advance the best. We are now developing a program—drawing on assessment center techniques—which will permit us to examine closely those who are ready to move into the senior leadership positions in the service. We are also proposing that the Inspection Corps participate more vigorously in the process of evaluating individuals. Again, as in recruitment, we need to draw on the best in our service to act in the evaluation system. This is a major priority and we plan to insist that the very best officers be made available to serve on evaluation panels (see Tab 3).

4. The Assignment Process—Here is the crux of the problem. The quality of our policy and of its execution is a direct function of the people we select for key positions. Yet under the current system assignments are not the product of a rational, service-wide process but rather emerge from a continuous negotiation among a welter of competing interests. There are parochial claims of priority and in fact two assignment systems, one formal and the other informal, with different interests, objectives and authority. Today, bureaus and ambassadors can veto proposed assignments, even down to the lowest levels, and individuals negotiate their own assignments, turning down those they do not consider suitable. The core questions are: how policy priorities are communicated to the
personnel system, so it can decide where the best talent should be allocated; the integrity and ability of Personnel to meet service needs, where many improvements are required; and the relative authority of bureaus, individuals and the central system in the assignment process. The solution proposed in Tab 4 is to provide a locus for orderly resolution through a graduated series of assignments panels, which take into account the legitimate interests of bureaus and individuals but make assignments without the right of turn-down by individuals and with Bureau and ambassadorial vetos limited to only the most senior assignments. The assignments process is perhaps the most sensitive nerve in relations between vested interests in the service, and of all the proposals in this paper, this one may have the greatest immediate impact.

5. Professional Development—It is unlikely that recruitment, promotion, and assignments can alone produce the top quality leadership we need. Learning a profession requires training as well as experience. But our professional development program, which is vital to our task of getting the right people in the right jobs at the right time, is fragmented and lacks direction. We must consider formal training, on-the-job training, and details to other agencies all as part of a total career development program. And training is perhaps the best tool we have to resolve the dichotomy of service abroad and service in Washington. We need to place some of our very best younger and middle-grade officers with the Congress, private industry, state and local governments, and academic institutions. A revised Pearson Amendment offers one vehicle for this purpose, and changes in that amendment are already under consideration in the Congress (see Tab 5).

6. Resource Allocation—One key to managing the large, multifaceted service of the Department is a clear description of both the needs of the organization and the people available to meet them. An organization has to get its facts straight. We have not. The Department can develop the necessary manpower information systems (see Tab 6) to be effective and responsive to policy objectives, and it is this sort of central system that can provide the information on which the Priorities Policy Group and its staff must rely to understand the resources available and match them to our priorities.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to proceed to implement the programs summarized in this memorandum.5

5 Printed from a copy with no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation, but see Document 144.
144. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, June 5, 1975, 6:30–7:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Secretary Kissinger
Deputy Secretary Ingersoll
Ambassador Carol Laise, Director General
Mr. Lawrence S. Eagleburger, Deputy Under Secretary for Management
Mr. L.P. Bremer, Executive Assistant to the Secretary
Mr. Wesley W. Egan, Jr., Notetaker

SUBJECT
“The Professional Service of the Department of State”

The Secretary opened the discussion and congratulated the Director General on the quality and thoroughness of her report. He noted that he had read the covering memo and the sections on the assignment process and recruitment with special care.

Ambassador Laise stressed the importance of establishing the Priorities Policy Group (PPG) to be chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management and to include the Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Director General, the Director of Policy Planning and the Inspector General. Ambassador Laise and Mr. Eagleburger described the PPG as a staff arm for the Secretary and the channel through which the priority allocation of the Department’s personnel and material resources can be made. The Secretary agreed and stressed that the bureaus must not have the authority to veto assignments either in Washington or overseas.

Mr. Ingersoll noted that ambassadors and assistant secretaries should have some choice in the selection of their DCMs and deputy assistant secretaries respectively. The Secretary agreed but complained that too many ambassadors consider themselves autonomous barons overseas. This, he indicated, must stop. The Secretary further stressed the need for more background information on ambassadorial appointments, a more accurate assessment of the individuals’ professional capabilities, and greater emphasis on their strengths and weaknesses. Ambassador Laise commented that the efficiency report system is a complete charade and in her opinion does not honestly reflect an individual officer’s strengths and weaknesses. The Secretary asked what re-

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1 Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—June 1975. Confidential. Drafted by Wesley Egan (S). The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the Department of State.

2 Document 143.
forms were possible within the next six months that would not be either ignored or reversed after he leaves.

Ambassador Laise replied that a serious junior and senior threshold system must be devised and that a personnel inspection system, along the lines of the proposed Assessment Center, be established including representatives from outside the Department. Mr. Eagleburger noted that “Selection Out” as a thinning process has eroded to the point of uselessness and that since the creation of the Junior Threshold and the Review Board there had been only one case of selection out for time in grade at threshold. Mr. Eagleburger related the need for a tighter personnel system to the need for a “Comptroller”—to which the Secretary agreed—and the function of the central complement pool in providing much needed flexibility in staffing the needs of the Department and the overseas missions. The latter would remove control over assignments from the bureaus. The Secretary asked what the bureaus’ reaction to the consolidation of control over the assignment process would be and why assignment control had not been centralized before. Mr. Eagleburger responded that the reaction would, of course, be negative. He furthermore explained that since the days of Dean Acheson, the Department had gone through a series of managerial and personnel reforms and that the present situation represented extreme decentralization. Ambassador Laise noted that according to the Murphy Commission, George Marshall was the last Secretary of State to take any real interest in the Department’s daily management problems.

Mr. Ingersoll asked how the Foreign Service could be excluded from the present confrontational labor-management syndrome. Mr. Eagleburger said that to accomplish that the Executive Order would have to be amended. Ambassador Laise commented that in that respect the Murphy Commission might be willing to assume the responsibility for such an initiative. Mr. Eagleburger noted, however, that the Secretary would have to be involved in such a change. Ambassador Laise ex-

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3 See Document 141 and footnote 5 thereto.
4 Established by Section 633 of the 1946 Foreign Service Act, the “Selection Out” process authorized the Secretary of State to prescribe regulations concerning a maximum period in which a Foreign Service officer “below the class of career minister shall be permitted to remain in class without promotion” and the standard of performance officers needed to maintain in order to remain in the Service. The process stipulated that Foreign Service officers below the class of career minister who did not receive a promotion within the specified period or who failed to meet the required standard of performance “shall be retired from the Service.”
5 See Document 147.
6 Eagleburger is referring to Executive Order 11491, signed October 29, 1969, which governed labor-management relations for Federal employees (for the text, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 5, No. 44, November 3, 1969, pp. 1501–1508). This Executive Order was amended by Executive Order 11838, signed February 6, 1975 (ibid., Vol. 11, No. 6, February 10, 1975, pp. 158–160).
explained that the labor-management relations have been aggravated because: a) management has not made the existing system work effectively; and b) there is seldom a firm or fair management position.

The Secretary then explained that as a result of Ambassador Laise’s report he wanted to make a press statement regarding the general management and personnel reforms he planned to initiate after consultation with AFSA. He stressed the need for a basic statement of the problem and a thoughtful explanation, comprehensible to the layman, of those reforms anticipated. He insisted that some statement on the PPG be included and asked Ambassador Laise and Mr. Eagleburger to prepare a statement for his use within the next two weeks. The Secretary complained that State was the worst run department in the Government. He felt the need to give the Foreign Service a sense of pride in the Department’s overall operation that could be passed on to succeeding Secretaries of State. Ambassador Laise commented that the Foreign Service has traditionally focused on serving overseas missions and not the Secretary. In this context, she noted two basic problems: a) can the merit system as it now functions successfully equip the Foreign Service Officer with enough “political” experience to service the Secretary and the White House as the present structure now demands; b) the Department’s excessively hierarchical structure makes it difficult to respond quickly to the Secretary’s needs.

Mr. Eagleburger felt the problem was of our own making and suggested the creation of a task force to examine the Department’s modus operandi. In addition, he suggested a thorough restructuring of the Foreign Service Institute. Mr. Eagleburger also felt that he and the Deputy Secretary should discuss the Department’s operational shortcomings with the Assistant Secretaries. He suggested that part of the problem might be the under-utilization of junior officers. He noted that they have a valuable contribution to make but too often are overburdened with menial clerical duties.

The Secretary agreed and indicated that he wanted the Foreign Service Institute reorganized by the beginning of the next academic year. He approved the creation of a special task force as suggested by

7 On June 27, in remarks delivered at the swearing-in ceremony of the 119th Foreign Service officer class, Kissinger announced several reforms to the Department’s personnel and resource allocation systems, including adjustments to examinations for FSOs; the institution of a program to recruit more women and minorities; implementation of a “threshold” system for evaluating promotions; and the establishment of a centrally-directed assignment process, a Board of Professional Development, and a rotation scheme for training junior officers. In addition, Kissinger announced the creation of a Priorities Policy Group (PPG) with oversight responsibilities for the Department’s budget and resource allocation. The full text of this speech is in the Department of State Bulletin, July 21, 1975, pp. 85–90.
Mr. Eagleburger and asked that it pay special attention to the clearance procedure which he considered excessively cumbersome.

145. **Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Ortiz) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger**


SUBJECT

Proposed New Format for Your Staff Meetings

You have indicated to Mr. Ingersoll your belief that some refo-cusing of your Principals and Regionals Staff Meetings would make these meetings more useful for all the participants. We have considered ways to make these meetings meatier and propose the following:

As Lord has already suggested, we should in any event revive the practice of holding periodic “analytical meetings” on major planning papers. These are subjects which deserve an hour or so and the participation is limited to those directly interested. The first one, on the LDC challenge is scheduled for Wednesday, June 18.

Without duplicating these kinds of sessions, we propose that most of your regular staff meetings should include a presentation by one of the participants on a substantive topic of sufficient broad significance to our foreign policy to warrant some general exchange for 15–20 minutes. Ideally such presentations and the discussions that would follow could open up your meetings to more intellectual exchange among your principal associates, as well as being more stimulating for you.

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2 In a June 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Lord noted that the quality of analytical work produced for the Secretary by Department bureaus showed “steady improvement” reflecting “the larger, encouraging phenomenon of ‘institutionalization’ taking place on the sixth and seventh floors.” Lord also recommended holding analytical meetings twice a month when Kissinger was in Washington. (Ibid.)

The topics to be presented would be determined beforehand by S/S and S/P in consultation with your staff. We also would solicit ideas from the participants. You would know beforehand what topic is to be raised. The presentation would be limited to 5–10 minutes, and would pose the issues in their broadest most significant terms. A short period of discussion would follow. The atmosphere should be informal. No papers would be involved.

Since the present meetings have real value to many participants as they now are constituted, we propose that you also continue to go around the table asking for comments on topics of current significance. The responses certainly can be more thoughtful than has been the case recently. But it is important—to alert you to problems, to provide guidance for your key staff members, and to give the seventh and sixth floors a continuing appreciation of the manner in which you want them to think about foreign policy issues.

In addition, we think it would be extremely helpful if on occasion you gave the group a brief rundown of your impressions of a major event or series of events, such as a trip or key visit—somewhat along the lines of your sessions with committees on the hill.

We are assuming that you have no objections to this procedure and are moving ahead. We are asking Mr. Habib to be ready to make the first presentation on the more significant policy issues he encountered during the course of his just-completed trip to the Far East.

146. Briefing Memorandum From the Director General of the Foreign Service (Laise) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Institutionalization Within State: Follow-up to your June 27 Speech

Your speech to the Junior FSO Class has attracted widespread interest within and outside the Service and has given a needed lift to our

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, M Chron, July 1975 (2). No classification marking. Drafted by Arthur Wortzel (DG/PC) on July 8. Printed from a copy that Laise did not initial. Sent through Eagleburger whose initials are stamped. A typed notation indicates that Eagleburger hand-carried the memorandum to Sisco for delivery to Kissinger on July 10.

2 See footnote 7, Document 144.
reform efforts. While, as you would expect, a speech about organizational change at State did not draw the public attention your policy statements usually do, press coverage was adequate and essentially accurate. Some connection was drawn to the Murphy Commission report, which was seen as eclipsed by your announcement. Media coverage focused upon establishment of the Priorities Policy Group as a means of institutionalizing management of the Department’s resources and centralization of management authority. In the Department both bureau heads and other personnel see the announced program as a significant step forward.

To increase understanding of your program, we have briefed the Assistant Secretaries and other officials, and are publishing in the July Department Newsletter the speech text as well as explanatory material on the Priorities Policy Group and on assignments. The text has also been distributed by the Bureau of Public Affairs throughout the Department, to posts abroad, and to the Congress. I will meet later this month with the Board of the Foreign Service to brief them and to deal with their concern that we preserve or enhance our capacity to meet their specialized interests.

Within M/DG, we are rapidly moving ahead with initial steps to give effect to the speech. As you know, our essential strategy for 1975–76 is outlined in the annexes to my memorandum of May 17 (The Professional Service of the Department of State), which you approved. However, the calendar makes the following actions more urgent than others:

1. We are using the budget process for the review of the 1976 and 77 budget estimates to re-target our own resources on the program objectives now before us.

2. Our credibility in the Service will hinge very largely in the first instance on making a strengthened central assignments system a reality. The procedure for this is being drafted.

3. Revision of the 1975 FSO examination to eliminate entry by cone while meeting skill requirements is underway and the recruitment literature is being altered accordingly.

Next in order of priority ranks the importance of coping with our need for, and the Washington foreign affairs community’s interest in, functional specialization. (The community’s expectations will be quickened by the Murphy Commission Report’s call for greater emphasis on functional specialization.) To attack this need, we are:

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3 See Document 147.
4 Document 143. The annexes to Laise’s report are not printed.
1. Meeting shortly with our British counterparts to learn what we can from their experience in restructuring their service and in strengthening specialized skills, while at the same time preserving the primacy of policy leadership and synthesis.

2. Designing plans for a professional development program spearheaded by a Board of Professional Development. In this we are working with the Inspector General to analyze and define our problems and requirements. We are also turning to Peter Krogh, Dean of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service; Ed Gullion of Fletcher and Robert Osgood of Johns Hopkins’ SAIS among others to get an essential outside perspective.

3. Identifying both our needs and the methods we must institute to recruit the expert, specialized officers we need outside the FSO corps. Since the 1975 FSO promotion process is quite far along, we will be working toward changes in the evaluation system for next year. For now, the most important objective is to obtain the best officers for service on this year’s FSO Selection Boards. We will be back to you for support in getting Assistant Secretaries and Ambassadors to make such officers available.

147. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, July 9, 1975.

Murphy Commission Report

The attached paper summarizes the major recommendations of the Murphy Commission Report. While the work of the committee touched every branch of the government concerned with foreign af-

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2 On July 13, 1972, Congress established the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy under the chairmanship of former Ambassador Robert D. Murphy. Known as the Murphy Commission, this blue-ribbon panel was charged with studying a wide range of organizational subjects across all government foreign policymaking bodies. The Murphy Commission’s final report was submitted to President Ford, President pro tempore of the Senate James Eastland (D–Mississippi), and Speaker of the House of Representatives Carl Albert (D–Oklahoma) on June 27, 1975.
fairs, this Department was more carefully studied and is more deeply affected by the recommendations than any other organization. Some of the proposals regarding the Department and the Foreign Service are similar to our own plans and trend of thinking while others are at variance with them. We want to examine all of these points, and I have therefore established a task force to review our position on the issues raised in the report. Since it took more than three years to prepare the report, it seems reasonable for the Department to take several months to consider the recommendations and consult with those bureaus most affected by them. Once our study is completed, we will report to you our conclusions and recommendations.

Attachment

Summary of the Murphy Commission Report

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE COMMISSION ON THE ORGANIZATION OF GOVERNMENT FOR THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN POLICY

1. Organization

The commission was established by Congress to “submit findings and recommendations for providing a more effective system for the formulation and implementation of the nation’s foreign policy.” Its aim was to propose improvements in the organization of the executive departments as well as in relations between the executive branch and Congress.

2. Political Issues of the Future

Government organization must be related to the evolving nature of political problems. The near future will be characterized by growing

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3 No classification marking. Copies of the Murphy Commission report were circulated for comment to all concerned Federal departments and agencies by NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne W. Davis on July 11. Their responses are in the Ford Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 98, IFG Logged Documents, Murphy Commission—Comments on the Commission Report, 4 folders. The Department of State comments on the report, drafted by the Policy Planning Staff, were sent to Sohm by Lord for decision on July 18. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord) 1969–77, Entry 5027, Jul 16–31, 1975) The Murphy Commission’s final report was released in June 1975. (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, pp. 161–192)
interaction and tightening interdependence among all nations of the world. Economic issues, technological and environmental and related affairs will become more important, with foreign policy and domestic policy tending to merge. Policy making will require greater public and congressional participation.

3. The President

The President is dependent on assistance of three kinds:

—an able staff. The present Assistant for National Security Affairs has met the requirements of this post while also serving as Secretary of State. However, the responsibilities of this Assistant are sufficiently different in nature from those of the Secretary of State that the Assistant should in the future hold no other duties.

—an effective organizational structure. The NSC should be upgraded and, with the recent increase in importance of economic issues, should be expanded to include the Secretary of Treasury and should address itself to international economic problems. Other cabinet and staff officials concerned with domestic issues should also be invited to attend sessions on an ad hoc basis. The NSC should be more extensively used as a deliberative body.

—cabinet departments. These departments must be drawn into policy formulation.

4. Department of State

As the central point for the conduct of foreign affairs, the State Department should concentrate on three major functions: (1) Assess the overseas impact of proposed decisions; (2) Play a major part in the formulation of all policy with significant foreign implications and “monitor and influence” the foreign activities of other foreign agencies; and (3) Conduct relations with other governments and international organizations.

In keeping with these aims the Department should be reorganized as follows:

—the Under Secretary of Political Affairs should be retitled Under Secretary for Political and Security Affairs while the position of Under Secretary for Security Assistance should be abolished. The Under Secretary should be the focus of greater Department attention to defense issues.

—the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs should become the Under Secretary for Economic and Scientific Affairs.

4 See Document 202.
—EB, OES, and the functional units of IO should be reorganized into four new bureaus:

—International Economic and Business Affairs
—Energy, Transportation and Communication
—Oceans, Environmental and Scientific Affairs
—Food, Population and Development

—a new senior officer for policy information should be established to direct press affairs and policy information activities currently belonging to USIA.5

—CU should be transferred to a new Information and Cultural Agency.6

—the Deputy Under Secretary for Management should be made an Under Secretary.7

5. International Economic Policy

International economic policy deserves greater attention; the following steps would lead to this objective:8

—The White House should appoint a senior assistant for economic policy; establish an international policy advisory board of private citizens; establish an independent study group on international economic issues and create a subcouncil on international economic policies.

—The State Department must significantly improve its ability to deal with foreign policy aspects of economic, scientific, transportation, population and related issues by:

—appointing more ambassadors and DCMs with economic expertise.

—expanding personnel interchange among agencies and between government and business.

—increasing “multiagency participation” in political negotiations overseas.

—giving Treasury primary responsibility for supervising U.S. commitments to international development institutions.

—transferring the President’s special trade representative to the State Department upon completion of current trade negotiations.

5 A senior officer position for policy information was not created during the Ford administration.

6 In 1978, under the provisions of Reorganization Plan No. 2 (91 Stat. 1637), the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs was abolished and its responsibilities transferred to the International Communication Agency (as the U.S. Information Agency was titled under the Carter administration). The Bureau was re-established in 1999, with the integration of the U.S. Information Agency into the Department of State. See footnote 8, Document 110.

7 The Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management was made an Under Secretary by Congress on October 7, 1978. (P.L. 95–426; 92 Stat. 968)

8 See Document 179.
6. Defense

To strengthen defense as an instrument of foreign policy, the following steps are recommended:

—Create a National Security Review Committee to insure integration of defense policy with foreign policy aims.

—Create an Advisory Board on National Defense comprised of private citizens to inject the public view into defense affairs.

—The State Department should improve its handling of political-military issues; the new Under Secretary for Political Affairs should assist this.

—ACDA should be strengthened by (1) making the Director the principal advisor to the NSC on arms control and disarmament;9 (2) making the Director a member of the National Security Review Committee; (3) expanding external research concentrating on long-term issues; and (4) substantially increasing ACDA’s budget.

—OMB should give greater attention to broad defense policy issues.

—Within Defense, ISA should be given a greater role in formulating defense programs and budget.

7. Intelligence

National security and an effective foreign policy require an intelligence capability. However, there should be firmer oversight of the intelligence community and a better review of its covert activities.10 To this end:

—The Director of CIA should have closer contact with the President (with an office in the White House) and delegate much of his day-to-day responsibility to his deputy, who should no longer be military.

—CIA should be retitled FIA (Foreign Intelligence Agency) to emphasize its exclusive foreign responsibility.

—The Director of FIA should normally be someone from outside the career service.

—The President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board should become the President’s principal source of intelligence.

—The NSC Intelligence Committee should be more active in improving the quality of intelligence.

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9 See footnote 6, Document 202.
10 For a more detailed discussion of the Murphy Commission’s recommendations on intelligence, see Document 45.
8. Public Opinion and Humanitarian Considerations

—The new Office of Humanitarian Affairs in the State Department should be upgraded.\textsuperscript{11}

—An Advisory Committee to the Secretary of State on Human Rights should be created.

—The U.S. representative to the U.N. on Human Rights should be given a broader mandate.

9. Practice of Diplomacy in our Bilateral Relationships

—Ambassadors must have greater control of communications and personnel in their missions.

—Foreign service reporting requires substantial improvement.

—Inspections of overseas posts should be modified.

In our public diplomacy the conclusions of the Stanton Panel should be endorsed.\textsuperscript{12}

10. Planning

Serious planning work is of great importance and a Council of International Planning should be established at the presidential level.

11. Budget

Congress should simplify the authorization process.

12. Personnel

The State Department’s personnel system must be improved by:

—encouraging greater functional expertise.
—encouraging better management.
—revising employee-management relations.
—institution a strong executive development program.

13. Executive-Congressional Relations

There should be better arrangements regarding executive agreements, executive privilege and a comprehensive security classification system. The four presidential proclamations of national emergency which are currently in effect should be terminated.

14. Congressional Organization

A Joint Committee on National Security should be established to perform for Congress the political review and coordination now performed for the executive branch by the NSC. This committee

\textsuperscript{11} See Document 186.
\textsuperscript{12} For documentation on the Stanton Panel, see Documents 102, 103, and 106.
should take responsibility for congressional oversight of the intelligence community.

Supplementary Views

In comments attached to the report, Congressman Broomfield, Senator Mansfield and Vice President Rockefeller disagreed with some aspects of the report. Broomfield strongly opposed the Commission’s endorsement of the Stanton panel report on USIA, in particular the proposal to give VOA greater independence. Vice President Rockefeller also expressed some reservation on this point. In a scathing attack on the entirety of the Commission’s work, Mansfield remarked that “the ratio of effort to result has not been up to expectations. A surfeit of words masks an absence of clarity.” Mansfield considers the commission’s findings and recommendations on executive-congressional relations to be fatuous at best, the section on intelligence inadequate at most and the emphasis on economic issues risking the danger of fadism.

13 Not found.

148. Memorandum From the Federal Women’s Program Coordinator of the Department of State (Prince) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)


SUBJECT
Task Force to Study FSO Women

In recent years the Department has made significant strides in equal employment opportunity for women in the Foreign Service Of-
ficer Corps, especially in the issuance of policy statements. Yet all is not well. No matter where I look I find evidence that our good intentions are not being fulfilled as they might be or as they should be.

For example:
—Representation of women FSOs stands at only 9% as of June 30, 1975 (Tab A). Women in the national workforce exceed 38%.
—Representation of women FSOs has increased only 2% in the ten years since the Civil Rights Act of 1964 opened a new era (Tab B), and recent increases include FAS lateral conversions rather than just pure intake from the outside.
—Intake of women FSOs via the written/oral examination process has averaged only 11% over the past ten years (Tab C). Please note that in FY–75 just closed we slipped to an intake of only 13% from a high of 22% in FY–74.
—Only 27% of the persons applying for the 1974 FSO written exam were women and only 26% taking the exam were women (Tab D), which suggests that we need to improve recruitment since enrollment of women at publicly-funded institutions of higher learning is now in the vicinity of 40%. Also, please note that the pass rate among women (10%) was lower in 1974 than the pass rate among men (17%), which to some viewers suggests that our exam might still be discriminatory against women.
—Women FSOs are underrepresented in political and economic functions while perhaps being overrepresented in administrative and consular functions (Tab E), which some feminists view as outmoded stereotyping (i.e., housekeeping vs. policy roles).
—Thirteen of the fourteen women in the FSO–1 & 2 ranks are eligible for voluntary retirement (Tab F), which, if elected, could cause a 93% extinction of the species. Please also note that almost one quarter (24%) of all FSO women are eligible for voluntary retirement.

2 In May, the Department and the AFSA instituted a new program designed to promote the mid-level hiring of women and minorities and “ensure that the diversity of American society is represented in the senior ranks of the [Foreign] Service more rapidly than is possible solely through junior officer level intake.” Up to 20 individuals per year would enter the program and would be evaluated by a special review panel. Beginning May 6, the Department held briefings for 150 senior level officers on equal employment opportunity issues, focusing on employee discrimination complaint, and the Department’s current status on the employment of women and minorities. A private contracting firm, hired by the Department to assess equal opportunities for employment, interviewed 50 people representing a cross-section of the work force in order to gauge employee perceptions. (Department of State Newsletter, June 1975, p. 11)

3 The tabs are attached but not printed.
—Women FSOs above the entry level are older than their male counterparts (Tab G), which tends to indicate that women FSOs have been promoted more slowly.

—Only two career women FSOs are serving as Ambassador, only two as DCM, only three as Principal Officer, etc. (Tab H), which easily allows the conclusion that women FSOs are inadequately represented in leadership roles while male FSO-3’s are being given “stretch” assignments like Ambassador.

The cumulative impact of data like the above leaves the Department vulnerable to class actions like those brought by women’s groups against AT&T, Sears, etc. (a recent issue of U.S. News and World Report carries a quote from a member of the Center for Women’s Policy Studies subtly suggesting that the federal government will be its next area of attack). On an individual basis, all signs indicate that women are losing patience and the old intimidation. We currently have individual formal actions from one woman FSO candidate charging discrimination in the oral exam and from three women FSOs charging discrimination in assignments, training, and promotion. And there are signs that the women who have not chosen the formal complaint route harbor sentiments not flattering to any institution—like the paper under Tab I which emerged accidentally (name and title deliberately obliterated).

Apart from wishing to spare the Department the nuisance and embarrassment of discrimination actions, I also want the Department to focus on the fact that it may be cheating itself out of a valuable human resource.

The things that need doing cannot be accomplished haphazardly here-and-there by people of good will who come and go in top roles, as we have done up until now. Policy statements aren’t enough unless there are people at all levels in all functions to promulgate them on a continuing basis. For example, the Secretary’s June 27 call for recruitment of minorities and women cannot be successful until BEX has a full-time professional recruiter who spends a number of years on the job—vice the current practice of a non-professional doing the job one year at a time on a part-time basis.

The Department appears to be in an era of new self-examination and reform. I therefore urge that we make affirmative action in EEO a reality by ordering the formulation of a Task Force to study FSO women. The Task Force could easily resemble the Task Force on Secretaries (which has inspired other federal agencies to similar action and has aroused admiration in the private sector).

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—The Chairperson of the Task Force must be of Ambassadorial Rank.

—At least half of the force members should be outsiders (like Joyce Robinson and Caroline Bird who served with distinction on Selection Boards two years ago).

—A penetrating questionnaire should be sent to all women FSOs to illicit where they exist attitudes and perceptions like those revealed under Tab I.

—Recruitment should be explored (are we going to the right campuses? etc.).

—The FSO written and oral exams should be validated to ensure nondiscrimination.

—Counseling functions in PER should be reviewed to preclude, e.g., charges of paternalism.

—Assignments should be studied to ensure that women FSOs are being assigned to jobs which lead to promotion and thereby close the age gap shown under Tab G.

—Training practices should be reexamined (e.g., no women in the FY–75 Senior Seminar, only one woman in the FY–75 War Colleges and Senior Fellowships), perhaps to change grade qualifications and imaginatively select outstanding women from the lower-graded pools.

—Etc.

Finally, since the fate of women FSOs resembles in many ways the fate of minority FSOs (only 4% of the total FSO Corps), the Task Force should be given a mandate to explore and report on parallel minority problems. The end product should be a series of recommendations and pervasive commitment on how the Department can improve its EEO profile in less than what was described as a “glacial pace” by a recent syndicated column on women at State.5

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5 The task force was not created, although the idea was revived in January 1976. See Document 152. The column was not further identified.
149. Memorandum From the Director General of the Foreign Service (Laise) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)  


SUBJECT
Realigning the Department’s Personnel Functions

Problem
To realign the personnel functions of the Department to maximize utilization of the present workforce and other resources in accomplishing policy objectives.

Discussion
The Secretary, in his speech of June 27, 1975, remarked that “it is time to turn our attention to the development of a Departmental structure that is more responsive both to the needs of its members and the demands of an increasingly interdependent world.” In particular, he focused his attention on personnel operations and directed new departures to improve the recruitment, evaluation, assignment, and career development processes.

Since then we have concerned ourselves with deciding how we might best realign our organizational structure and allocate our workforce and other resources to meet the Secretary’s challenge and mandate.

I am recommending the establishment of a Bureau of Personnel, headed by the Director General, with the overall management of its operations under a Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel. We have already established a Program Coordination Staff, reporting to me, to coordinate planning, policy formulation, execution and evaluation of our programs. We would abolish the four Directorates (PER/REM, PER/CA, PER/PCE, and PER/MGT) and replace them with six offices, organized on functional lines (recruitment and examination, career development and assignments, evaluation and promotion, employee services, position and pay management, and general management services). We would continue the present employee-management relations, public affairs and grievance staff units. A visual design is pre-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, M Chron, November 1975 (1). No classification marking.
2 See footnote 7, Document 144.
presented at Tab A, with functional statements at Tab B. A proposed Department Notice is at Tab C.³

We anticipate improved communications of policy priorities to operating levels by reducing layering in the hierarchy; improved coordination among, and execution by, Bureau of Personnel operating offices through monitoring and overview by the Program Coordination Staff in my office, whose members chair various coordinating groups on programs that need priority attention; more efficient operational accomplishments by realigning functions into offices that correspond to classical personnel system activities:⁴

—Bringing in of new people (Office of Recruitment, Examination, and Employment);
—Career development, training, and assignment (Office of Career Development and Assignments);
—Evaluation and promotion of people (Office of Performance Evaluation);
—Services to employees (Office of Employee Services);
—Control of positions and pay matters (Office of Position and Pay Management);
—The management of our resources (Office of Management).

In addition to meeting the Secretary’s emphases, I believe we also will be responsive to criticism of the Civil Service Commission in our administration of Civil Service programs; meet the Commission’s requirements for a Personnel Management Evaluation Program; and the Inspector General’s recommendations on greater attention to, and resources for, our foreign national (local employees) personnel program.

In our resource review allocation process during the summer, we identified a number of positions for reprogramming to higher priority efforts. A summary of the results of this process is at Tab D. This is the beginning of linking our resources to policy priorities through our improved organizational structure. Such reallocations will give resource emphasis to the priorities of the Secretary in the direction of recruiting, not only through the classical FSO examining process, but also professionals through the lateral entry and FSR process, including women and representatives from minority groups; more effective methods for evaluation, including an expansion of the threshold concept to senior levels; a more open and more centrally directed assignment process; and expanded and more dynamic training program, with special emphasis on junior officers, administration, and secretaries; expanded details to other agencies, and states and local government; and greater emphasis on the needs, and fuller utilization, of our total workforce.

³ The tabs are attached but not printed.
⁴ Eagleburger added the handwritten note “outplacement?” next to the following six points.
I believe our proposals for restructuring our organization, the setting of priorities and goals, and the reallocation of our resources to meet these priorities, represent a positive and significant beginning in moving forward toward accomplishment of the Secretary’s clear and urgent mandate.

Recommendations:

1. That you approve the redesignation of the Office of Personnel to the Bureau of Personnel and my proposed organizational structure as reflected in Tabs A and B to be effective the beginning of the first pay period after your approval.

2. That you approve the attached Department Notice (Tab C) for issuance.

3. That you approve the reprogramming of positions within M/DG (Tab D).

5 Eagleburger initialed his approval of all the recommendations on November 19. The Office of Personnel (DG/PER) was re-designated the Bureau of Personnel (M/DG), under the direction of Ambassador Laise, on November 23. The provisions of the reorganization were published in the Department of State Newsletter, December 1975, pp. 24–25.

150. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Measures to Reduce Staffing of U.S. Diplomatic Missions Abroad

Recently a number of ambassadors have urged privately that steps be taken to reduce personnel, particularly of other agencies, in our Missions overseas. They argue that staffing of some activities remains disproportionate to our interests and needs, despite continual efforts to limit and reduce numbers. This view corresponds to tentative assessments developed independently in the Department.

1 Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Management and Management Operations Files, 1969–76: Lot 82 D 210, Possible Reduction FY 76. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Glynn R. Mays (M/MO/DG) on December 1 and concurred by Earl D. Sohm (M/MO). Sent through Ingersoll. Copies were sent to Sisco, Robinson, and Maw.
We doubt that the situation merits another large-scale, across-the-board reduction drive. Rather, we prefer a selective approach, utilizing the MODE system for controlling overseas staffing, approved by the President last year.²

We have therefore asked the ambassadors to Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines and Guatemala to review staffing of their Missions and to submit any recommendations they may have to eliminate specific positions through FY 77.³ Pending their responses we have not broached this subject outside the Department. However, these pilot efforts could open the way for similar actions involving other Missions.⁴

If the ambassadorial assessments are persuasive, we will press for reductions, initially with the concerned agencies and if necessary in inter-agency adjudication. While we hope to keep most of the bureaucratic battling from requiring your attention, I want you to know about our effort and to enlist your support if that should become necessary.

² See Document 140.

³ The Embassy in Manila submitted its recommendations of positions to be eliminated in telegram 471, January 9, 1976. Submissions from the Embassies in Guatemala and Tokyo are in telegram 338, January 19, and telegram 1741, February 5, respectively. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, 1976) The report from the Embassy in Jakarta has not been found.

⁴ In a January 9 memorandum to Eagleburger, Sohm reported that the Embassies in Kingston and Caracas had also been asked to “look seriously into possibilities for mission reorganization.” (Department of State, Miscellaneous Management and Management Operations Files, 1969–76: Lot 82 D 210, Possible Reduction FY 76) Under this initiative, known informally as “Operation Clean Slate,” both posts reported on various studies of Embassy operations. The Embassy in Caracas reported its review of the staff and action plan for reorganization in telegram 1277, January 2, and the Embassy in Kingston in telegram 408, January 29. Staff cuts in other posts were discussed in telegram 17375 to Beirut, January 23; in telegram 6838 from Santiago, July 13; in telegram 7471 from Brasilia, August 26; in telegram 228119 to Vientiane, September 15; and in telegram 7560 from Quito, October 21. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)
151. Letter From the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)\(^1\)


Dear Larry:

Under the Committee’s responsibility to review the staffing needs of on-going programs overseas, I am requesting your cooperation in a review of regional office staffs which the U.S. Government maintains in foreign countries.

Regional office personnel service requirements in two or, normally, more countries. The objective of the review is to identify possibilities for reducing the numbers of such personnel overseas, relocating their operational bases to the United States and realizing savings which could flow from a lowered USG profile abroad.

The clear and continuing necessity to control federal spending provides one important motive for this review. We need also to weigh the impact of improved communications and transportation, inflation, and the rising costs of operating in many foreign countries, increased risks to the safety of personnel and dependents abroad, and possible efficiencies of consolidating field staffs with Washington staffs covering similar problems or performing similar functions.

To facilitate our review, I am asking that for each overseas regional office which your agency maintains, a summary assessment with recommendations be completed, according to the specifications listed on the enclosure to this letter.\(^2\) Please submit these assessments to my office by February 27, 1976 for review.

If that review identifies likely staff adjustment possibilities involving your agency or its interests, your agency will be notified and expected to participate in the resolution of the issue. Decisions will be reached in accordance with provisions of the MODE guidelines dated

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Miscellaneous Management and Management Operations Files, 1969–76: Lot 82 D 210, RORG—Regional Overseas Review Group. No classification marking.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed. On January 27, Sohm requested reports on overseas personnel requirements from all functional and regional bureaus. (Ibid.) In a February 10 memorandum to Lord, Sayre, Laise, Thomas, and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs Julius L. Katz, Sohm reported that a working group had been created to review all bureau submissions. (Ibid.)
May 23, 1975.\textsuperscript{3} Interagency disagreements at the level of geographic Assistant Secretary of State will be subject to adjudication by the Senior Management Review Group or, where necessary, by the Under Secretaries Committee itself.

To assure that we overlook no reasonable opportunity for savings or efficiency, I am also asking the Committee’s MODE Staff to seek the views of appropriate ambassadors concerning possibilities of achieving staff reductions in overseas regional organizations. Such queries will be coordinated in advance with the agencies involved.

If you have questions concerning the enclosed table of specifications, or about other aspects of this effort, I would appreciate your having them raised in the first instance with the Committee’s MODE Staff Director.

Very best regards.

Sincerely,

Robert S. Ingersoll\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3} The Department’s guidelines for the MODE program, May 23, 1975, designed to replace those established under OPRED, detailed each agency’s personnel ceilings and reporting requirements. These guidelines were forwarded to all Department of State Principal Officers, regional and functional Assistant Secretaries, and Office Heads by Sohm on June 6, 1975. (Ibid., Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, Management by Objectives MBO, 1975)

\textsuperscript{4} Ingersoll signed “Bob” above this typed signature.
152. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Equal Employment Opportunity (Pinckney) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)


SUBJECT
EEO Study

The Director General and I have for some months now been concerned about the effectiveness of our Foreign Service Reserve (Junior Officer) program. This program as you will recall provides for the recruitment and employment (with BEX approval) as Foreign Service Reserve Officers of some 20 minority group members per year. Participants in the program are expected during their 5 year tenure to qualify for appointment as Foreign Service Officers either by taking and passing the FSO written examination or via the Lateral Entry process.

While this program has been one of the major sources of minority Foreign Service Officer appointments (second only to Management Reform Program) it has yielded only 37 career appointments since its implementation in 1967. (We estimate that it should have yielded closer to 100 by the end of 1975.) The pass rate at the Lateral Entry Oral Examination stage is decreasing. Five out of seven candidates examined during 1974 passed the Lateral Entry Oral Examination while during 1975 only three out of eleven passed. During 1975 two candidates were separated while in probationary status. The 1975 Threshold Promotion Boards report that only 7 percent of the FSR/JO eligibles were recommended for promotion and that 5 percent were low ranked. The Board also expressed concern over evidence of persistent weakness in verbal skills and identified this factor as the major contributor to the comparative low ranking of FSR/JO participants.

As I reported to you earlier, 1976 looms as an important year for the program. Twenty-five participants will become eligible for Lateral Entry during the year and we had hoped that a meaningful number of that total would qualify for Foreign Service Officer appointments. Current trends, however, would not support such optimism.

1 Source: Department of State, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron, January 1976 F. No classification marking.

In an attached handwritten note addressed to Eagleburger, January 26, Special Assistant Donald J. Bouchard wrote: “You might recall that we intended to meet with Sam [Pinckney] and Director General on this.” Bouchard added, “I’ve not run this past DG prior to your perusal. Although I don’t believe that this is a great problem, DG should be aware of attached. Maybe the time is ripe for a discussion with all parties.”
Our initial analysis of the program led to a preliminary conclusion that the problem lay in the Lateral Entry process. We felt that the alarming increase in oral examination failures resulted from inadequate orientation and counseling of participants who appeared to misunderstand the conditions of their service and who took too lightly the oral examination process. In an effort to correct this deficiency, M/EEO has intensified its contacts with JO candidates to make clear to each the conditions of the contracts under which they serve and to emphasize the importance of the Lateral Entry examination. Reactions from participants suggest that this action has corrected some misconceptions and there are indications of increasing efforts on the part of participants to prepare themselves for the oral examination. There is no guarantee, however, that the pass rate will improve. The problem of performance weaknesses identified by the Selection Boards has ominous implications.

The developments set forth above lead us to conclude that if the FSR/JO program is to survive, the Department will require professional guidance in correcting deficiencies in the program.

The program needs to be examined in its entirety to determine the cause of its failure to increase significantly the number of FSR appointments. At the same time the problem of competitive performance, particularly in the field of verbal skills, needs to be addressed. As the Lateral Entry oral examination is the most important step in the process of FSR conversion to FSO, that process needs to be carefully examined to assess its validity by comparison with other recognized testing systems. A policy with regard to the disposition of candidates currently in the program whose performance records after 5 years of service would not justify Lateral Entry consideration and/or whose performance records after 5 years of service justify Lateral Entry consideration but are found unqualified by the BEX oral examination panel needs to be developed. Lastly, we must seriously consider the question of providing remedial training to current participants in the program where such training is indicated.

Despite our current concern about the FSR/JO program I support its continuation at this time. While it has not yielded as many Foreign Service Officers as I think it might have, those who have joined the ranks under its provisions are serving competitively and are steadily advancing within the system (two-thirds have reached the mid-levels). I believe that with some modification, the program could provide a more steady and orderly increase in the number of competent and productive minority group officers in the FSO ranks. The Department has received wide acclaim for its Affirmative Action approach to recruitment and selection of minority group officers under this program, and I am convinced that it should be continued until our efforts at recruit-
ment via the written examination process begin to show positive results.

The professional assistance to which I referred earlier can be provided by a professional research firm directed by Dr. Kenneth B. Clark whose 1967 study entitled “An Appraisal of the Process of Selecting Foreign Service Officers” included recommendations which, when modified, formed the basis for the development and implementation of our current FSR/JO program. Dr. Clark is fully familiar with the Department’s Foreign Service Officer selection systems. His firm would be eminently qualified to examine the program and provide us with the guidance necessary to make it more productive.

In July of last year we forwarded to you a memorandum recommending a task force to study FSO women.2 We remain concerned, for example, by the fact that the representation of women FSO’s has increased only 2% in ten years (from 7% to 9%) inspite of lateral conversions from FSS and accelerated outside recruitment. We therefore remain convinced that a study of women FSO’s is necessary. In his 1967 research, Dr. Clark also addressed himself to women FSO’s. That background, plus other qualifications mentioned above, argues in favor of combining a study of women FSO’s with the study urged earlier. As I have mentioned elsewhere, the fate and problems of minority FSO’s in many ways resemble the fate and problems of women FSO’s. A simultaneous study of both should be extremely useful to the Department and would best be accomplished by Dr. Clark.

I urgently request your permission to discuss with Dr. Clark the feasibility and costs of a study along the lines suggested above.3

2 See Document 148.
3 No evidence of the proposed study has been found. In EEO’s annual assessment of minority hiring, the results of which were printed in the July 1977 Department of State Newsletter, minority employment in the Department changed “little” in 1976. “Minority group employees,” defined as African-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, Native Americans, and Asian-Americans, constituted 15.1 percent of the Department’s total work force as of December 31, 1976. The total number of minority employees increased by 12, although all were employed in the Civil Service. The number of minority Foreign Service employees remained unchanged at 547, out of a total of 8,939. (“Minority Employment: Little Change in ’76,” Department of State Newsletter, July 1977, p. 36)
153. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Equal Employment Opportunity (Pinckney) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)


SUBJECT

Status of Women Employees

Statistics on women employees as of December 31, 1975 are attached. Highlights in representation vis-à-vis December 31, 1974 are:

—Overall total up 1% (from 37% to 38%)
—Total FS up 1% (from 25% to 26%)
—FSO up 1% (from 8% to 9%)
—FSR up 3% (from 16% to 19%)
—FSRU no change (remains at 9%)
—FSS up 2% (from 54% to 56%)
—Total GS up 1% (from 66% to 67%)

Unfortunately no dramatic improvements are visible. In fact, it could be argued that we have retrogressed because the Foreign Service Staff and Civil Service, sometimes perceived as second class citizenship, are becoming more female which suggests we do not allow women first class citizenship too readily.

We should also take note of the fact that, as of December 31, 1975, 33% of the Department’s women are at the support level vs. 32% in 1974. A particularly worrisome slippage has occurred in the Civil Service ranks where 47% of the total GS women are now at the support level vs. 43% a year ago. In other words, rather than moving upward and out of the lowest ranks our women in that area are increasing.

A related situation appears at the Junior Officer level where in 1975 women are 53% of their total vs. 54% in 1974. A decline there might be acceptable if there were an increase at the middle and senior levels. But such is not the case. Women at the middle level represent a static 13% of their total in both 1975 and 1974; at the senior level, women remain less than 1% of their total in both years.

It is clear that the initiatives begun in 1975 (target recruitment, EEO briefings, middle level program, etc.) must be continued and that other

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1 Source: Department of State, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron, March 1976 A. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Laise. A handwritten note by Eagleburger addressed to Laise reads: “CL—Let’s talk. LSE.”

2 Not found attached.
initiatives are probably needed to improve the representation of women at State.

M/EEO is developing similar statistics on minorities which will be sent to you later this month. ³

³ Not found.

154. Memorandum From the Director General of the Foreign Service (Laise) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

The Department’s Personnel Structure: A Rational Solution

The structure of the Department’s personnel system has been studied enough times, both from without and within, so that any attempt to characterize the process almost inevitably falls into cliches.

Even as we moved into the postwar era, the Foreign Service Act² moved to strengthen the Department’s personnel system. The Hoover Commission which followed three years later opened a series of diagnoses, or autopsies, which exposed flaws in performance and prescribed varied systemic remedies.³ Of these, two (Hoover and Diplomacy for the 70’s) advocated an essentially unitary worldwide Foreign

¹ Source: Department of State, Administrative Correspondence Files 1969–77, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron, March 1976 C. No classification marking. Printed from a copy that Laise did not initial. Laise sent a second copy of the memorandum to Eagleburger under a March 10, 1976, covering memorandum which indicates that her original memorandum was dated December 1975.

² See footnote 4, Document 143, and footnote 4, Document 144.

³ Chaired by former President Herbert Hoover, the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government was created by Congress on July 7, 1947 (P.L. 162), and mandated to examine the organization and operation of the Executive branch. The Commission’s Task Force on Foreign Affairs, created in January 1948, published its findings on January 13, 1949, as Appendix H of the Commission’s final report. For the text, see The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Task Force Report on Foreign Relations, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1949.
Service system, one (Herter) postulated worldwide and domestic categories in a Foreign Service system; and three (Wriston, AFSA, and Murphy) presumed or advocated continued use of the Civil Service, as had the Foreign Service Act itself.

It has been painfully clear to me that we have not yet solved the problems which have driven us to these searches for solutions. The Secretary having approved the review which I proposed in my memorandum of May 17, we have studied the Department’s structure against the background of our current personnel policy and the broad foreign policy objectives discussed in that memorandum. We put primary focus in the former on that policy’s premise that it would bring a unity of effort and flexible management while meeting the Department’s human needs in a modern diplomacy. In the latter—our foreign policy goals—we addressed the critical need for special skills, including those which are most needed at the headquarters.

As an analytical tool, we examined the central processes of our personnel system—and the problems which beset us—in terms of the three types of personnel structures advocated in the various studies. The report of this examination is at Tab 1.

Since current policy postulates a total Foreign Service system, unified in the sense that non-FSO’s would be in a single worldwide cate-

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4 Transmitted to Secretary of State William P. Rogers in November 1970, Diplomacy for the 70’s: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State was drafted by 13 separate task forces, each charged with studying a different aspect of the Department’s organizational and managerial problems. For a full account of the report’s compilation and dissemination, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 312.


7 Document 143.

8 Not found attached.
gory,\textsuperscript{9} we first examined this model. While there is little contention that the FAS system has solved our problems, it is important to judge whether these problems persist through failures of implementation or of concept—and the distinction raises temperatures and strains tempers. The first thesis—that the Department’s managers have failed to do what could have been done—variously suggests inefficiency and bad faith. Considering the pressures over the years for developing a personnel corps outside the Civil Service, and the incentives offered to accomplish this, it requires almost a devil theory to accept this conclusion without a test. In fact, there is a history of efforts to manipulate our various personnel procedures and standards to meet the single service objective as well, to be sure, as ideas which management has chosen not to test.

As we examined our experience in recruitment, career development, assignment and promotions, it has become clear that our efforts, and our manipulation, have often snagged on structural or human factors, most of which relate to service in Washington. The need for expertise or for management support at the headquarters often defies attempts to meld these into the processes or the dynamics of a worldwide system. Foreign Service evaluation systems do not fit the mold of the Washington-based specialist, nor do some other elements in managing his employment and career development. (These are further burdened by legal complexities, which are discussed below.) The human problems are perhaps best reflected in the fact that, despite the blandishments of enhanced retirement and increased salaries which give added substance to our exhortations, a substantial majority of our domestic officers remain in the Civil Service.

Most painfully, years of pressure for unification may have distracted us from strengthening our domestic skills, fostering instead both uncertainty as to our purposes and inexcusable neglect of valuable human assets.

As a second possibility, we have explored a model which takes account of the specific needs of the Department for domestic expertise and support services, while preserving the concept of a total service administered under the Foreign Service Act. This, for example, would build personnel procedures tailored to accommodate the distinctions between worldwide and domestic service. (These are discussed in detail in the attached study.) As we moved through this process, questions arose of the ability of the Foreign Service Act to cover some of the elements in a domestic career. Specifically, these include exemption

\textsuperscript{9} Although about 1800 Civil Service and 1200 Foreign Service Staff personnel are not provided for, and over 1000 officers would be in the domestic category. [Footnote in the original.]
from service abroad, exemption from selection out, which is often ill-fitted to a specialist career in Washington, use of rank-in-job promotion, and participation in the Foreign Service retirement system. I have asked L for its advice and have learned (Tab 2)\(^\text{10}\) that an attempt to use the authority of the Foreign Service Act to meet our essentially domestic requirements is unrealistic, since it would both require amendment to the Act and would lead to grievances and legal challenge. By and large, L sees these challenges as arising whether or not we declare the existence of a finite domestic category, as long as we have, in fact, groups of personnel whose careers are essentially domestic. (This judgment begs the question of how and why these flaws in the FAS concept were not exposed earlier. I understand that, possibly due to an earlier lack of definition of some of the central questions I addressed to L, its judgment had not been sought on these questions. When asked to evaluate the domestic (DES) concept in the 1960’s, L said that the Foreign Service Act would require amendment. This was not pursued.)

In light of the impact of the crucial difficulties exposed by L, our examination of the third model—one which uses Civil Service along with Foreign Service authority—is central to our analysis. Historically, the complexities of administering a Civil Service category, the question of flexibility, and the disadvantages of dualism were seen as arguments for seeking a separate Foreign Service system for the Department. Since the Department has for several years planned to phase out its Civil Service component, it has devoted less attention to management under this system. We have, therefore, had to carry out a detailed review with the Civil Service Commission of current practice in order to evaluate these earlier assumptions. We have also checked with two major systems (Air Force and Agriculture) for examples of actual practice. What emerges are indications both that practice has evolved significantly and that the Department has been guilty of serious, if understandable, shortcomings in its use of the system.

In examining Civil Service practice, we centered on recruitment, assignment and termination. We found that wide areas of management flexibility exist and that the notion that we must frequently check our actions with the Commission is far from the mark. Management is, of course, bound by legislation and regulations which set standards and prevent abuse, but there is a wide range of independence in administration and wide variety among agencies in how they operate. I have had wide-ranging discussions with senior officers of the Commission, who emphasized the Commission’s wish to work constructively with

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\(^{10}\) Department of State Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh’s December 22, 1975, memorandum to Laise is attached but not printed.
the Department if we resume use of the Civil Service authority at the officer level. This applies as well to the thorny problem of supergrades.\footnote{We have discussed the supergrade question with senior officials of the Commission and, while there is no way they can make commitments until we approach them with concrete word of our intentions and requirements, I feel I have grounds for confidence that the Commission will not frustrate our effort to build a full career GS system with adequate room at the top. [Footnote in the original.]} 

We should look hard and without euphemism at the question of management flexibility, of which much has been argued over the years. On its face, an independent Department personnel system is not specifically bound by laws or regulations which are specific to the Civil Service system. What remains is only an obligation by the Department to abide by other legislation, legal or judicial precedent, regulations, and the dictates of personnel practice which is consistent with federal standards and the dictates of equity and competitiveness. Clearly, flexibility carried beyond that point is arbitrariness and can be self-defeating, since it would risk reactive legislation or legal action above and beyond morale problems within the system. In an increasingly litigious society, the protection of a broad federal system may compensate for some degree of lack of independence. In any event, and as I indicated above, there is a real question whether we have authority under our own legislation to run a domestic system, either avowed or implied.

There is a significant reminder in the just-issued report of the President’s Panel on Federal Compensation of the trend toward a regime in federal employment practice which will continue to erode areas of agency independence or flexibility. With specific reference to the Foreign Service pay system among others, the Panel recommended review of “the need for the many Federal civilian pay systems now in existence, with the objective of proposing legislation to eliminate or combine separate plans wherever appropriate.” We cannot afford to ignore the risk to the separate Foreign Service system if it is found to encompass categories of employees whose careers are in all major respects identical to those in other cabinet departments, including many groups, such as in AID, Commerce, Treasury or DOD, involved in our foreign relations and who are in the Civil Service.

As you know, I recognize and share your concern at any appearance of the Department’s abandoning a policy thrust which is said to have pervaded both dictate and practice for some years, or of returning to former policies which were unsuccessful. There are some straw men which litter this battleground and which need to be carried off. As I noted above, only three of six major studies between 1949 and 1975 mandated an all-Foreign Service system, and none since Hoover in
1949 proposed a single worldwide system, and even it excluded junior personnel. The landmark Wriston committee and two of the three most recent studies, including this year’s Murphy Commission, proposed a mixed Foreign Service/Civil Service system. The third, as expressed in the basic implementing document (Management Reform Bulletin No. 8),12 is equivocal in defining the system. As for worldwide service, it asserts that “as a general policy, officers . . . will normally be expected to serve some time abroad” (underlining added)13 and defined over 1000 officer positions as solely domestic. As for single service, it excluded the entire category of non-officer personnel.

In any event, the record both of past studies and of performance raises essential questions of ends and means. It should be clear from both that developing a personnel system which serves national policy is an end and that any notion of unity or flexibility is only a means which, as such, needs to be tested against itself and other factors to judge how it serves the end. I am fully satisfied that the concept of unity, at least when used to blur or weaken our ability to manage a strong, focussed domestic service which meets our needs in Washington, is seriously flawed. Beyond this, we need to ask whether a sense of unity or common purpose requires structural uniformity, or whether enlightened management of human resources cannot provide the sense of equality and shared participation, even in varied roles, which renders labels of less account. We should remind ourselves that we have robbed our Civil Service colleagues of a sense of a future in the institution, and that we have in many ways reminded them—as we have domestic FSR’s—that our central interest is in the worldwide Foreign Service.

To suggest this is to admit a failure of personnel administration and to recognize the work needed to remedy the failure. In this connection, I find no support for the argument that we are unable to manage a system which includes multiple categories, or even that it is less efficient. Quite apart from the examples in other agencies, I believe that personnel mechanisms built around clear and rational categories and based upon authority which is well-established and relevant can be managed effectively and free of the complexities which have dogged our recent effort to make a single authority serve varied needs.

In considering management of a mixed Foreign Service/Civil Service system, we need to assess the impact of such change in terms both of its effect on people’s careers and of their view of the change. First, we must define categories in an integrated system. The FSO corps would continue to play its present role. The FSR category would con-

12 Not found.
13 Printed here in italics.
continue to serve for temporary appointments (and as staging for FSRU appointments unless we obtain legislative authority for direct appointment). The FSRU would continue to meet our worldwide non-FSO requirements including—just as with FSO’s—Washington positions related to the worldwide career. It is only in meeting our need for essentially domestic expertise and extended continuity of service where a unique Foreign Service requirement is sometimes not demonstrable that we would utilize the Civil Service. This arrangement would, thus, continue the FSRU category in considerable measure and is by no means an abandonment of the FAS concept as has been alleged.

By this definition, the impact on people in the Department’s system would not be widespread. Over 3,200 Civil Service personnel would simply find that they are now in a career category which suits our purposes. Many of our FSR/RU officers are properly serving in worldwide categories. Depending on analysis, between 400 and 550 are in such careers as would be in the Civil Service category (although they themselves may in some cases shift into worldwide service). Thus, the number of “anomalies” falls from over three thousand (our Civil Service people) to one-sixth that number (our domestic FSR/RU’s). I assume, in any event, that we would no more force conversion of the several hundred persons who might be out of phase than we have the far larger number of Civil Service personnel under current policy, and that they would have the option of conversion or continuation. We would insure, in any event, that no employee would be disadvantaged in any way as a result of having converted under the FAS program.

The reaction of individuals to change can only be estimated. Clearly the several thousand Civil Service people will see themselves benefitted, particularly if we demonstrate by action a renewed concern and intention to make them full participants in our work. The several hundred people who have converted under current policy and who will find themselves in a category unsuited to their career interests have a right both to a personal choice and to an explanation of our decision. For them, and for more general use in explaining our decision, there is a proposed statement attached at Tab 3.14

A decision affecting the central structure of our institution, in its essence, affects the way the institution operates. If we accept, as my memorandum of May 17 and others argue, that the institution’s needs are changing and have not always been well-defined or well-served, particularly in today’s complex diplomacy and in the increasing interrelationship of domestic and foreign policy, then we should not ignore the possible role of personnel structure. After lengthy study, I am con-

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14 Attached but not printed. No statement, as issued, has been found.
vinced of a need for change, and that change is both acceptable in kind and promising of results.

If you approve the expanded use of Civil Service authority, various steps toward implementation are required. These are discussed at Tab 4\(^\text{15}\) and include several forms of consultation. While those consultations proceed, we would develop operating procedures and would expect, by the completion of consultations, to be ready to announce the change in necessary detail. We will, of course, be in close touch along the way.

**Recommendation**

That you approve re-establishment of a domestic category based upon the use of Civil Service authority, and that you authorize the preliminary steps toward implementation at Tab 4.

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\(^{15}\) Not found attached.

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155. **Memorandum From Stuart S. Janney of the Office of Management Operations and Paul L. Ahern and Robert B. Off of the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)\(^\text{1}\)**


**SUBJECT**

Political Impact of 1976 Campaign on the State Department

By now it is clear that Presidential politics will have a marked effect on the conduct of foreign policy and that foreign relations will in turn strongly influence Presidential politics. While this is normal every four years, the effect this year will be heightened by the fact that the Secretary has dominated foreign policy for the last eight years and is the most prominent link remaining to the Nixon Administration.

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\(^{1}\) Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—March 1976. No classification marking. Eagleburger added a handwritten note addressed to Kissinger: “HAK—FYI. I’ll have these 3 working on this more or less full time from now on.”
While the conduct of foreign policy cannot be dictated by election year polls, the Department and particularly the Secretary must be more sensitive to national political currents than in non-election years. This also means that there must be changes made in the way the Department through its principals presents foreign policy to the public. In an election year for example scholarly presentations of foreign policy are less effective and must at times give way to short, hard-hitting statements of a particular position.

We recommend that you approve continuing or beginning the following activities designed to (a) keep principals informed of political developments and (b) present Administration foreign policy in the context of an election year.

I. Informing principals of political developments which impact upon the conduct of foreign policy.

A. Activities and projects to be undertaken—

1. Weekly analysis of political developments to you at the end of each week.

2. Action memos to you based on daily analysis of breaking news as appropriate.

3. Regularly scheduled discussions with you concerning the impact of domestic developments on the conduct of foreign policy—at least twice weekly—preferably, in the late afternoon or evening on Mondays and Thursdays.

4. Liaison with the White House (with the exception of Personnel related matters) Roy Hughes and Tim Austin in Morton’s office and Bill Kendall in Congressional Relations.

5. Compilation of statements made during the Presidential campaign by all contenders which touch upon foreign policy issues.

II. Presenting Administration foreign policy in an election year.

A. Activities and Projects to be undertaken—

1. Publications.

a. Rebutting criticism—we recommend concentrating drafting efforts on periodicals and dailies which have criticized Administration foreign policy. The fact that there has been criticism not only indicates reader interest but permits the Department to argue that another point of view should be printed and makes it appropriate to draft a “strong” defense of the particular policy under attack. Some assistance from S/PRS is needed to review the major national and regional dailies and periodicals for critical articles. Where appropriate and worthwhile

2 Rogers C.B. Morton, Counselor to President Ford.
we will prepare rebuttal for in-house or outside authors (possibly members of Congress).

b. General descriptions of Department activities—we have discussed with you the possibility of placing articles of general interest on State Department activities in magazines that normally do not carry foreign policy articles. We believe there is limited utility in pursuing this effort. Too much time would be expended in identifying publications that would be willing to run a foreign policy story. Furthermore, the article would have to concentrate on the Department as an institution rather than on current Administration foreign policy or the Secretary of State. Finally we anticipate encountering during an election year considerable opposition and skepticism from the periodicals that we approach.

2. Speech Writing—we recommend more encouragement to members of Congress to speak in support of Administration foreign policy. An offer of drafting assistance could serve as an important inducement.

3. Speaking engagements of principals—the public appearances of principals must henceforth take into account the schedule of primaries and other relevant political factors. PA is now providing a weekly update on all speaking engagements for seventh floor principals.

4. Public appearances by the Secretary—again there is a need to factor in the political pressures that are generated by the Presidential race. It is important to continually review whether the tone, content and length of the Secretary’s speeches are suited to an election year. We must determine what is the optimum manner for the Secretary to convey his views to the American people. We suggest a hard look at the speech drafting process to see whether it satisfies election year demands.

5. There needs to be an intensified schedule of informal meetings between the Secretary and members of Congress, academics, media representatives, and other opinion makers in the foreign policy field—where the long-term views of the Secretary can be most effectively articulated.

Conclusion

In proposing that the above procedures and policies be implemented we do not wish to indicate that there will not be other, possibly more important, activities that will require our attention. By the very nature of an election year, needs are hard to anticipate. For this reason we have not suggested a rigid set of procedures; but rather a program which should allow the flexibility necessary to quickly shift priorities.
156. Memorandum From the Director General of the Foreign Service (Laise) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger)\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Personnel Structure

Following your decision earlier this year approving in principle the re-establishment of a domestic personnel category based on the use of Civil Service authorities, we have been engaged in a review and analysis of issues to be resolved and actions required to permit us to move forward. I believe we are now in a position to confirm your decision, announce the proposed revisions and begin phased implementation.

In studying the proposed revisions, it is important to bear in mind where we have been, what we have attempted in the past, and why we are proposing these measures. In 1965–66, the Hays bill was introduced and considered by Congress.\(^2\) This was a major effort to rationalize our system by establishing a single personnel system integrating Civil Service and Foreign Service employees. Despite wide executive support, the bill failed in the Senate. Following the demise of this effort, the Department, through Management Reform Bulletin #8,\(^3\) attempted to implement many of the same goals and objectives that were sought by the Hays bill. That is, having failed to gain the necessary legislation, we sought to carry through without it.

The results are now apparent. Our attempts to operate the current system raise serious legal questions. We do not and cannot legally have a unitary personnel system, and in fact, we have a less than coherent dual system. In the absence of a renewed attempt to broaden the Foreign Service Act (an even more unlikely prospect in today’s world), our

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\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron October 1976 B. No classification marking. In a handwritten note at the top of the page, dated October 9, Eagleburger instructed his administrative assistant to forward copies to McManaway and Wortzel and to schedule a meeting with the latter.

\(^2\) The Hays bill (H.R. 6277), named for Representative Wayne Hays, proposed a single personnel system for the Civil and Foreign Service employees of the Department of State, USIA, and AID. Approved by the House in September 1965, the bill was opposed by unions and veterans’ groups and failed when it was tabled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 15, 1966. (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1965, p. 681) See Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy; United Nations, Document 38, footnote 4.

\(^3\) Not found.
goal must be to develop a rational dual system, based on the authorities and legislation which we do have. Without such a system, we cannot manage our problems legally. Moreover, we will be hard pressed to satisfy Senator Pell and the Congress in our required report, which is due at the end of the year.

Now that we have reached this point, I believe that we cannot defer a decision any longer.

A major focus of our activity has been a position-designation study intended to give us the needed information regarding which of our U.S.-based positions should be filled by domestic employees, which should be occupied by world-wide available Foreign Affairs Specialists and which by members of the FSO Corps. We have now completed designation of virtually all domestic positions, as well as other steps necessary to implement a revised policy. In most cases the designations proposed to individual Bureaus have resulted in agreement. In some cases, discussed below, some differences remain to be resolved. Overall, there will be, at most, a small net shift in the present balance between Foreign Service categories and the Domestic category (See Tab J).4

We have been guided in our conclusions and proposed designations by the principles that formed our criteria at the outset of the personnel structure effort. We examined all Departmental officer-level positions in terms of (a) whether counterpart positions existed abroad; (b) whether service abroad was required to perform effectively in the position; (c) the degree of specialization required; (d) whether the position was needed or suitable for rotational opportunities for world-wide personnel; and (e) the degree to which continuity was required for effective job performance.

Within these guidelines, we made further assumptions. We assumed that by definition, members of the FSRU plan would be available for world-wide service and would be expected to spend all, or virtually all, of their careers serving in the same skill area, barring a basic career shift, because FSRU is a specialist hiring authority and system, not a more generalized staff support system.

We assumed that recruitment of individuals for world-wide service (using Foreign Service appointing authorities) should be triggered only by a specific need within a specific career field, and that FS hiring should not be undertaken on the assumption that future needs may provide opportunities abroad which do not now exist or opportunities in other career fields. We assumed that, under no circumstances would FS appointing authorities be used in order to circumvent specific quali-

4 None of the attached tabs, which outline personnel reorganization plans for various offices, is printed.
fications requirements or to provide managers with a way to avoid meeting minimum standards.

Using these criteria and assumptions, agreement has been reached on the vast majority of position designations in the Department. Agreement is still pending, however, in several Bureaus.

In IGA, following the general principles governing this study, we concluded that almost all of the Foreign Assistance Inspectors’ positions should be designated GS (see Tab A). They disagree. In SCA, there is a difference of opinion between SCA and one of its components, the Passport Office. SCA believes that there should be certain areas in PPT containing positions which are designated as FS, while PPT believes that all positions within that office should be designated as GS. We believe that SCA and PPT should attempt to compose their differences internally (see Tab B). We are still ironing out remaining differences with CU and OES.

As you know, there are more basic issues with the Bureau of Administration. Their proposals for position designations range from proposals for total FSR designation (A/SY) through no specific proposals (A/O). We have carefully reviewed all of the “A” Bureau submissions, and applied the principles which guided this study. Because the kinds of functions in “A” were so varied, we have avoided any generalizations and have applied the principles as they related to individual offices.

In the case of A/SY, the issue is whether the Security Officer career pattern should be viewed as a single one, the same at home and abroad, or two similar but separate entities, one domestic and the other worldwide. If it is unitary, the issue becomes whether the resultant rotational possibilities (a maximum of two years of service abroad in eight) constitute a genuine world-wide career.

In the case of A/O, where most positions are specialist and found only in Washington, the “A” Bureau proposal favors a single Foreign Service system allowing full flexibility to move individuals from one position to another, who may not meet qualifications. It also presumes that individuals should be hired under FS authorities, because worldwide opportunities may turn up, even though they are not currently visible for that individual or that particular occupational area. These issues and those pertaining to other parts of “A” are contained in Tabs D through H. Together they represent some basic questions you will wish to address.

The designation process concentrated upon officer level positions. Designation of secretarial/clerical positions will be made upon the completion of our analysis of the question of FS and GS secretarial placement. This issue is discussed in Tab I.
The major features of the new system are discussed in our proposed Notice to Employees at Tab K. Recruitment and hiring for positions designated in the Domestic Service will be conducted under Civil Service authorities. As you know, since May we have attempted to follow GS procedures on a contingency basis and determine Civil Service eligibility of FSR candidates for domestic-type positions under the existing system. In this manner we have strengthened our capability to move with a minimum of disruption into the proposed system.

The proposed conversion plan is also discussed at Tab K. The plan is predicated on the following principles: (a) the ability to transfer individuals between categories is an essential element in a personnel system containing separate categories for domestic and world-wide personnel; (b) conversions must be based on the application of clear standards; (c) there will be no forced conversions; (d) there will be no special incentives for conversion; and (e) every effort will be made to assure that no employee will be disadvantaged because of his or her personal decision regarding conversion.

The plan would provide opportunities for employees to apply for conversion with decisions based upon (a) individual qualifications, (b) needs for the individual’s skills in the respective categories, and (c) the individual’s willingness to meet the conditions of service of that category.

When we initiated the Merit Promotion and Placement Program in November 1975, we indicated that a second phase of the program would be forthcoming. The second phase is now under development. Our original intention for the second phase had been merely to extend the plan to “domestic” FSRs and to make its application mandatory once the categories of people and positions had been identified. The new Director of the Office of Civil Service Career Development and Assignments, however, has undertaken a more far-reaching revision of the Merit Promotion Program, as a basic instrument for upgrading the career management of our domestic personnel. We expect to complete the drafting, management concurrences, consultations, and Civil Service Commission review in time to implement it by the beginning of the year. We can then move on to a new upward mobility program for domestic personnel and other improvements.

A final element in the revised domestic career system involves the availability of supergrade positions. As you recall, through an exchange of letters with the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, the Department has received the Commission’s assurance that it will be fully sympathetic to our needs, including a willingness “to go to Congress, if need be, to request additional supergrade spaces.”

While it would be desirable to know, in advance, which positions we can designate as proposed supergrade slots, and which and how
many of the designated slots will be approved by Civil Service Commission for allocation to the Department, this is not possible. We cannot analyze the designated positions until we know for certain which positions are, in fact, to be designated as domestic. Thus, the supergrade evaluation process awaits the final decision on personnel structure. The Civil Service Commission, in its turn, cannot give us an estimate of whether they agree with our supergrade designations until they receive our proposals. The process of internal evaluation and review with the Commission will take some time. Under the circumstances, we are satisfied that the assurances we now have from the Commission provide a satisfactory basis for proceeding with the domestic service based on use of Civil Service authorities. Of course, in the interim, we will continue to rely on use of the FSR–1 and FSR–2 authority, where appropriate, until we have come to resolution on the supergrade issue.

We would be happy to brief you more fully on any aspects of the proposed implementation program. What we seek, then, is authority from you to complete the position designation process, and the components attached to it, as outlined above, along with resolution of the existing designation issues. We would proceed on the basis of the principles enunciated and so inform the various Bureaus and offices. We also seek authority to issue the memorandum attached at Tab K to all employees.

With your agreement to the foregoing, we plan to initiate immediately a program of final consultation and briefings with interested parties—The Board of the Foreign Service, bureau management, the CSC and the authorized employee representatives. We anticipate completing these and being ready for phased implementation within about 10 days.⁵

⁵ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. Eagleburger, however, added a handwritten postscript that reads: “This is an excellent paper. Tab K still needs some work, however. I want to meet with PER and those offices where there are disputes. Also—what has been done with the designations in S/P? I’d like details on [illegible—SCT?] today. And, A/O had better know that in the absence of cooperation from them I’ll go with PER. I also want to talk about how we involve HAK.”
Job Analysis in the Department of State

As part of our continuing efforts to strengthen our ability to select the best officers rising through our Service and to develop effective leadership, we have recently initiated promotion reforms and are undertaking a fresh approach to executive development. I want to acquaint you with some work we are doing or planning in order to gain a better sense of what talent we need and to build better instruments for finding and developing that talent. An early step in our process is to identify and analyze the differing demands of senior and middle level jobs, and to discern with the maximum precision possible those qualities and skills which distinguish exceptional performance in various positions at those levels.

No one can define and weigh the qualities needed for effective performance in the Department of State better than those officers now in the Service. Our task is to tap the reservoir of collective knowledge and judgments of able and respected career State Department officials, and synthesize it by proven methods of analysis which will meet established standards of reliability and job relatedness. To accomplish a thorough, objective, and reliable study we plan to engage the services of professionals to work with our own officials on this project. This survey, to be conducted over the next several months, will involve meetings of panels of officers and in depth interviews with carefully selected individuals to identify and attempt to verify with methodological rigor the qualities needed for superior performance, especially at the senior level. The conclusions of the survey will provide a basis for our efforts to improve the evaluation, selection, training and assignments process.

I would be happy to discuss the results with you when the study is completed. Meanwhile, I will be available to provide further information on the project if you are interested.

MEETING FUTURE FOREIGN AFFAIRS PERSONNEL NEEDS

Report to the Congress on Plans for Improving and Simplifying the Personnel Systems of the Department of State and the United States Information Agency

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

I. Introduction and Summary

To meet the demands of national policy in a time of change and growing complexity, the foreign affairs agencies must have an able and diverse corps of professionals. This requires a rational, effective management system which will attract and retain the wide range of talents essential for today's diplomacy.

Shortly after World War II, the Congress legislated a new charter for the Foreign Service of the United States in the Foreign Service Act of 1946. It has served well in the thirty years since then as the basis for a professional, worldwide diplomatic service. In the ensuing years, however, the foreign affairs environment has changed greatly. Major issues have increasingly involved complex technological or economic questions and, with the growth of interdependence among nations, the link between domestic and foreign policy has grown closer. These changes have called for more varied skills and a stronger capacity in Washington. During these years, we have attempted repeatedly to find a personnel structure which would enable us to meet fully the special requirements of a Washington headquarters staff, to strengthen our capacity at home as well as abroad and to blend successfully our worldwide and domestic staffing requirements. A brief summary of major proposals for reform is contained in Section II.

Six years ago, following an internal review, the Department and USIA embarked on an effort to build a “single service” under the Foreign Service Act. The plan sought to reduce or eliminate the distinction between worldwide and domestic service at the officer level. Based on our experience since then, it is clear that we are still far from achieving a single service, and that in the process of trying to build one we have not

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1 Source: Department of State, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron, January 1977 D. No classification marking. Eagleburger forwarded the report to the President of the Senate, Vice President Nelson A. Rockefeller, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, Thomas P. O'Neill, Jr. (D–Massachusetts), under separate covering memoranda dated January 12. (Ibid.)
been able to meet the legitimate career aspirations of our personnel or our own requirements.

In June 1975, the Secretary of State and the Director of USIA ordered a basic reexamination of the personnel system and structure. In the Congress, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1977 called upon the Secretary to transmit to the Congress a comprehensive plan for the improvement and simplification of the personnel system.

The studies of personnel improvements within both the Department of State and the United States Information Agency and discussions between the two agencies have been based on the premise that to the extent possible the personnel systems of the Department and USIA should be compatible but that the different responsibilities of the two agencies may require some differences in the two personnel systems. Our studies have not examined possible unification of State, AID and USIA personnel categories. This question, we believe, would have to be considered in the context of proposals for governmental reorganization.

In parallel studies of the personnel system over the past 18 months, the current administration of the Department and USIA considered a number of options regarding basic personnel structure and concluded that we should seek to resolve our difficulties through an expanded use of existing Civil Service authorities for domestic positions and, as intended by the Foreign Service Act, continued use of Foreign Service authorities for both Foreign Service Officer and specialist needs for those personnel who serve worldwide.

The conclusion that the Department should expand its domestic system is based on the recognition that we need to create a working environment in which specialized, Washington-based, functional talents are respected and rewarded in a department given to a generalist tradition, an overseas orientation, and a regional pattern of organization. Headquarters needs are often different from overseas requirements. There are a number of specialized headquarters jobs, from arms control expert to systems analyst, which have few counterparts abroad. We need both continuity and mobility, generalist and specialist skills and career systems which will allow us to meet all of these needs effectively.

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2 See Document 144.
3 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1977 was signed into law on July 12, 1976. (S. 3168; P.L. 94–350)
4 See Documents 156 and 109, respectively.
Under this plan, which the current administration of the Department of State and USIA recommend to their successors, the FSO and FSIO corps would remain as the group of professionals conducting our overseas diplomacy and performing related functions while in Washington. The domestic service (GS) would serve in positions peculiar to headquarters and would not be required to serve overseas. As a result of these adjustments, the foreign affairs specialist category would thereafter cover only worldwide specialist careers, including several existing components, primarily Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited and Foreign Service Staff. As a result of personnel management analyses now in process, the category might also include certain specialized functions recently vested in the FSO Corps. In addition, the two agencies will utilize limited or temporary Foreign Service Reserve appointments to meet special, short term needs and to provide probationary status for potential Foreign Service career employees. A comparison of present and future personnel categories is shown in an attachment to this report.

Past experience has shown that personnel reforms are difficult to implement in the best circumstances and require the full support and commitment of top management if they are to succeed. While simple in concept, effective implementation will require concerted management effort and sustained attention. Certain aspects of the system will be subject to review by the Board of the Foreign Service and consultation with authorized employee representatives prior to implementation.

II. Background

The question of the most appropriate personnel structure for the foreign affairs agencies of the government has been investigated repeatedly since 1946, usually in the course of broader examination of the foreign affairs system or of personnel problems as a whole. These reviews have been conducted by the Congress, by internal groups within the agencies, and by both official and private outside groups. Their conclusions have been mixed. Of the major reform initiatives, the first Hoover Commission (1949), the original Hays Bill (1965–66) and “Diplomacy for the 70’s” (1970) advocated an essentially unitary, world-
wide Foreign Service system. The Herter Committee (1962)\textsuperscript{10} recommended worldwide and domestic categories in a Foreign Service system. Three other major reports, however, by the Wriston Committee (1954), the 1968 AFSA report, “Toward a Modern Diplomacy,”\textsuperscript{11} and the Murphy Commission (1975),\textsuperscript{12} each explicitly favored continued use of a domestic category based on Civil Service authority. This was also an underlying premise of the 1946 Foreign Service Act itself.

In a more limited action following the failure of the Senate to pass the Hays Bill, PL 90–494 established the Foreign Service Information Officer Corps as a permanent career category for USIA, and created the Foreign Service Reserve Unlimited category for USIA and the Department of State.\textsuperscript{13} It did not, however, deal with the issue of overall personnel system structure and the use of the Civil Service category.

Thus, these studies, based on different perspectives and spanning three decades, represent two basic approaches to the question of personnel structure, one which emphasizes the advantages of a single system and the other the benefits of a diverse career system. Since 1971, the Department and USIA have followed a personnel policy based on the single service concept. Because of problems which have arisen in attempting to make this system work effectively, our recent study has examined again the advantages and implications of the two approaches.

III. Plan For A More Rational Personnel Structure

The objectives around which any sound personnel structure must be built can be stated simply: to determine the needs and functions of the institution and identify the human resources which best serve those needs. As a summary of past efforts (Part II) illustrates, the two agencies and outside groups have sought repeatedly to design an effective foreign affairs personnel system. Unlike some earlier studies which foundered on broad structural conclusions based on ideal solutions, in the recent review we have concentrated on determining our actual requirements and on identifying structural flaws which prevent us from meeting them. In this process, we have operated on four principles:

1. We must improve and clarify the definition of our staffing needs.
2. We must utilize equitable, competitive career systems which support those needs.
3. We must insure fairness for all people in the career service, and mobility among career categories.

\textsuperscript{10}See footnote 5, Document 154.
\textsuperscript{11}See footnote 6, Document 154.
\textsuperscript{12}See Document 147.
\textsuperscript{13}P.L. 90–494 was signed by President Johnson on August 20, 1968.
4. We must maintain our goal of an integrated, effective service to conduct our foreign relations.

Thus, we have sought to build a personnel structure that best assures our continued ability to serve national interest and one that is flexible enough to meet the future needs of American diplomacy without repeated reorganization. In the process we have attempted to assure also that no member of the service is disadvantaged as a result of changes required. We have been determined to build carefully from present circumstances, avoiding change for its own sake or symmetry for symmetry’s sake.

The Home Service

A central reality which no earlier study or plan has changed—although some may not have faced it fully—is the existence of a domestic category of people in the Department and USIA who supply essential skills and continuity of service which cannot be met effectively by a worldwide, mobile service.

Our examination of past efforts to create a single service has made clear that the Foreign Service Act cannot serve as an instrument to manage a domestic service. Efforts to implement this program have not been successful. Uniformity has not brought equity or management efficiency. Serious management and legal questions have arisen. In retrospect it is clear that the Foreign Service Act, designed for a generalist, disciplined, mobile officer corps, serving throughout the world, does not fit the career patterns and needs of individuals hired for specialized and essentially home service jobs in Washington. Nor was it evidently intended for this purpose. For example, under the Foreign Service promotion system it is possible for a subordinate to be promoted to a rank above his supervisor; while this is tolerable in a mobile, worldwide system where transfers are frequent, it is clearly undesirable where longer term staffing patterns prevail, as in the domestic corps.

Thus, barring substantial amendment of the Act, in concept as well as in provision, management of a domestic component in the foreign affairs agencies must rest, as it has in the past, on authority contained in the Civil Service system. Since several of the largest cabinet departments have successfully managed dual service systems, the foreign affairs agencies should not find this beyond them. We need a single management program but not necessarily a single structure.

Rebuilding the domestic service to provide needed skills and institutional stability and strength has involved substantial analysis and redesign. It has included extensive work in designating which functions and positions form the home service. In deciding this, we considered whether prior service abroad was essential to effective job performance, whether counterpart jobs exist abroad, the importance of conti-
nuity, the degree of specialization required and career needs. Rebuilding the domestic service also includes return to participation in the Civil Service recruitment program, improved mechanisms for promotion, assignment and training, and other elements in proper management of careers within Civil Service authorities and principles. All of these have tended to fall into disuse as we moved away in recent years from reliance upon a strong home service working alongside the Foreign Service.

As a corollary to definition of the home service, simplification of the personnel system around three integrated elements makes it possible to sharpen definition of the Foreign Service categories. The Foreign Service Officer Corps and the Foreign Service Information Officer Corps will continue to perform the core diplomatic, information and related functions. The foreign affairs specialist category will continue to provide career specialists to meet worldwide needs for skills in special professional fields, e.g. science, technology, trade development, and in support of the diplomatic effort. The specialist category, based on Foreign Service Act authorities, and henceforth including only personnel available for worldwide service, will operate under a career system which maintains stringent, competitive merit standards for recruitment, selection and other terms of service.

As a corollary to the clarity and simplicity of the three-category system, it is important to include methods for insuring mobility for individuals among the career categories on the basis of institutional needs and rigorous standards. Such flexibility will help to guard against parochialism or divisiveness and help to insure preservation of a truly coherent, integrated service. At the same time rigorous standards governing both new recruitment and conversion from one category to another will insure quality and the preservation of merit principles.

Finally, in designing an integrated system we have taken steps to assure the preservation of adequate career opportunities in each category and have developed policies to assure that individuals involved in the changeover will not be adversely affected.

The Department and USIA are aware that much time has been spent in developing an improved foreign affairs personnel system. We have, however, been motivated both by recognition of history of past efforts and by a determination to avoid the pitfalls of writing a grand design which may or may not accord with reality. We have, thus, sought for the proven and practical rather than the ideal and untested. We have built around existing authority. Thus, except for possible minor technical adjustments in the Foreign Service Act (which would be sought in due course) no legislative action would be required.
Organizing for Defense, Economic, and Global Issues

159. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt and Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Procedures for Dealing with Various Types of Non-Military Incidents

Your memorandum of January 20, 1972 (Tab II),² directed the Under Secretaries Committee to recommend improvements in procedures within the Government for dealing with incidents such as that involving the Coast Guard and the Soviet trawlers off the coast of Alaska in January. As you may recall, that incident pointed up serious flaws in our internal procedures for handling such matters.

The Under Secretaries Committee has conducted a thorough review of this somewhat diffuse problem and has forwarded a report (Tab B) to the President which identifies current deficiencies and recommends that a Presidential directive be issued prescribing general governmental coordinating procedures, with the Department of State’s Operations Center functioning as the focal point of coordination.³

The report, which is restricted to non-military incidents (in that military incidents are already coordinated by the National Military Command Center), reviews critically the existing procedures and their application in specific incidents over the past three years. It identifies some 26 significant non-military incidents since 1969 that have had a direct or indirect foreign relations impact, and predicts that a large majority of such incidents can be expected to fall into the categories of:

² Attached but not printed.
³ Attached but not printed. The report, submitted to Nixon by Deputy Secretary of State Irwin, concluded, among other things, that the Department of State had a “central role in the coordination of inter-departmental actions relating to non-military incidents which might bear upon the conduct of U.S. foreign relations.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–238, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 207 [1 of 4])
—aircraft hijacking, and related incidents,
—request for asylum,
—those involving U.S.-owned vessels,
—those involving U.S. citizens, officials, employees, or property abroad, and
—those involving foreign nationals, officials, representatives, and property located in the U.S.

The report observes that past deficiencies in coordination have resulted primarily from one or more of the following:

—lack of guidelines for officials in the field, incident not reported or reporting given low priority,
—inadequate procedures for inter-agency coordination, delay in establishing contact with responsible officials,
—in some cases, there is a lack of adequate communications between representatives in the field and parent departments or agencies,
—error in judgment by officials handling incidents, possibility of adverse consequences not recognized, and
—the incident involves an agency that would not normally be expected to furnish timely reports to the White House.

The principal conclusions of the report are that:

—Many non-military incidents have impacted upon U.S. foreign relations or embarrassed the Government in the past, and associated coordination procedures could be improved for dealing with incidents which will occur in the future.
—With regard to the Bering Sea incident, matters of coordination were “entirely consonant with such directives as existed at the time.”
—No overall Executive Branch guidance exists on inter-departmental coordination of non-military incidents. While “understandings” have been reached on procedures for handling specific types of incidents, there is little uniformity or completeness.
—The State Department Operations Center is equipped to provide a central focus for inter-departmental coordination.

—The role of the Department of State in coordinating inter-departmental actions and, when appropriate, obtaining White House concurrences on matters relating to non-military incidents, which could impact upon U.S. foreign relations or embarrass the Government in the conduct of foreign relations, is a central one.

In considering improvements in procedures for handling such incidents, the report cites as guidance the Presidential statement in your January 20 memorandum:

“The President wishes it understood that the Department of State has primary responsibility for coordinating, with White House concurrence, the plans of action to be pursued in such incidents, both in terms of contingency planning and guidance and in dealing with a given incident as it develops. This responsibility, and the requirement for White House concurrence, also extends to public announcements of and comment on incidents.”
The Under Secretaries Committee therefore recommends that a Presidential directive be issued prescribing general coordinating procedures for handling non-military incidents, and making State the focal point of such procedures. It further recommends regular review by the USC of the procedures established in implementation of this directive.

We agree with these recommendations, but think that State’s responsibilities to the White House should be more rigidly defined than is the case in the draft Presidential directive forwarded by the USC. We have done this in the draft NSDM included at Tab A, which directs State to inform the White House of proposed actions in all cases rather than at its discretion, as State had proposed.

If you agree, the memorandum for your signature to the President at Tab I reviews the USC report and forwards a draft NSDM (Tab A) on procedures for dealing with non-military incidents for the President’s approval.

Recommendation:

—That you sign the memorandum to the President at Tab I.
—That, if the President approves, you sign the NSDM at Tab A.

4 Not found attached. NSDM 207, as signed by Kissinger on March 13, 1973, is Document 163.

5 The unsigned version of the memorandum was not found attached. However, a signed copy, March 8, 1973, discussing the USC report is attached but not printed. In the memorandum, Kissinger notes that the January 1972 incident involving the Soviet fishing trawlers “pointed out that there are still flaws in our internal procedures for handling such matters, flaws primarily involving faulty coordination among State, any other agency involved, and the White House.” Nixon initialed his approval of the memorandum and authorized the release of NSDM 207. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–238, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 207 [1 of 4])
160. Memorandum From the Assistant to the President (Ash) to Secretary of State Rogers


SUBJECT
Institutionalizing International Narcotics Control

At the President’s request, I am reviewing Federal drug control management.

The international program is an essential component of the overall anti-drug effort.

Given personnel changes and the President’s desire to move program management out of the White House wherever possible, my feeling is that the State Department should undertake expanded responsibility for overseeing international narcotics control, including its interagency aspects. The Department would thus assume many of the responsibilities now performed by Domestic Council staff.

These views are reflected in the proposal at Tab “A.”

To assist in upgrading and expanding the State Department’s drug role, I would hope to be able to make available an executive level position from the White House pool for this purpose.

I would be pleased to discuss this subject with you at your convenience. My Administrative Assistant, Jim Edwards, is coordinating this project at the staff level.²

Roy L. Ash

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5. Administratively Confidential. Copies were sent to Ehrlichman and Cole.

² Rogers replied to Ash on February 13 that he would consider the proposal. (Ibid.)
INSTITUTIONALIZING INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL

I. The Problem

The United States launched an intensive worldwide offensive against the international drug traffic with the President’s June 17, 1971, special drug message to Congress.4

A substantial beginning has now been made toward getting our own bureaucracy concerned about international narcotics control and in conveying to other governments the seriousness with which we view the problem.

Continuous diplomatic pressure—as well as the alarming spread of drug abuse abroad—has resulted in all fifty-nine target governments paying at least some attention to narcotics control.

Despite a good start, for which the State Department is in large part responsible, much more must be done—especially in more effectively managing the program.

Under the aegis of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC), Domestic Council staff have been heavily involved in most major operating decisions.

The present decision-making mechanism has been hobbled by a lack of clear lines of authority, the absence of independent funding or budget coordination, the need to secure agreement (or at least reluctant acquiescence) from each of the seven organizations involved for even minor program decisions, and the absence of any real management information system or program evaluation capability.

With the turnover of most of the program’s key personnel and a sharply reduced Domestic Council staff, a new international drug management apparatus must be created and institutionalized.

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3 No classification marking.

4 President Nixon, in his Special Message to the Congress on Drug Abuse Prevention and Control, June 17, 1971, announced steps to secure international cooperation in the “worldwide escalation in our existing programs for the control of narcotics traffic.” In addition to proposing new initiatives to provide aid to foreign countries and international organizations to stem the international drug trade, Nixon announced the request to Congress for $1 million to train international narcotics enforcement officers. The text of Nixon’s message is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 739–749.
Although it is not feasible to combine functions as disparate as covert action, training of foreign narcotics officers, control of GI drug smuggling, negotiation of overseas treatment programs, and foreign agricultural research into any one department, these activities must be carefully integrated into one overall program in each Mission and in Washington.

The ambassador is the key to success or failure of our drug program in each country overseas. Given the neatly stratified and status conscious nature of our diplomatic establishment, the man in charge of the program in Washington must be at a sufficiently high level to be able to deal effectively with ambassadors. He must, in addition, have an appropriate interagency title to be able to oversee the international drug activities of the other departments and agencies contributing to the program.

II. Recommendation

That the State Department name an executive level Deputy Under Secretary of State for Narcotics, who would also be Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC).

The Deputy should report directly to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs to emphasize the importance placed by the President on drug control as a key foreign policy objective of the United States and the “diplomatic” rather than “assistance” nature of the effort.

The new Deputy Under Secretary’s responsibilities should include:

2. Overseeing the operation of the CCINC interagency committee structure.
3. Acting as the principal point of contact and advisor on international narcotics control matters for OMB, the NSC, and the Domestic Council.
4. Ensuring implementation of White House policy guidance.
5. Providing drug control direction to United States ambassadors and narcotics control coordinators in our fifty-nine target countries.
6. Communicating, as appropriate, with foreign governments on drug control matters.
7. Representing the United States at the annual United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs meeting and like international drug conferences.
8. Directly supervising expenditure of the drug control funds now appropriated to the President and administered by AID.
9. Advising OMB on the international narcotics control budget submissions of other departments and agencies.
10. Serving as the principal customer and action officer for international narcotics control management information and program evaluation conclusions generated at OMB’s behest.

The Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Narcotics Matters (S/NM) has been somewhat less effective than it might have been because of inadequate staff size and the absence of anyone with real expertise in the budget and programming and in the law enforcement areas. Both are critical to the successful implementation of our fifty-nine Narcotics Control Action Plans. If S/NM is to assume the greatly expanded responsibilities envisioned by this proposal, it is essential that it be upgraded and strengthened in these respects.

S/NM should be headed by the new Deputy Under Secretary for Narcotics. The staff of the office should include: (1) a deputy; (2) an administrative, budget, and programming expert; (3) an intelligence, law enforcement, and training expert; and (4) three regional specialists. Someone should also have special expertise in dealing with international organizations.

III. Advantages of the Proposed Solution

1. Places the Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee in the same department as the Committee’s chairman.

2. Provides the top Washington man on international narcotics control with an appropriate forum from which to give direction to ambassadors and to obtain a fair hearing on his ideas within our diplomatic establishment.

3. Establishes a sufficiently strong institutional link to the White House to permit the new international drug boss to command the attention of the other departments and agencies whose coordinated participation are essential to success of the program.

4. Permits a program of key importance to the President which is irrevocably interagency in nature to be centrally coordinated and directed from a position organizationally removed from the Executive Office and without the need for any Executive Office staff personnel.

5. Makes it possible for those on the President’s staff to have a single point of contact on international narcotics control.
161. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

National Energy Office Organization

This proposal causes me great concern.\(^2\) It seems clear that its implementation would result in a new NSC-like structure cutting across and competing with NSC, CIEP and Domestic Council business. It is difficult for me to imagine that we need another empire to further complicate the bureaucratic pulling and hauling already extant.

Without knowing what discussions have already taken place, I would think that Charles DiBona could perhaps better serve as a sort of Executive Secretary to the Special Energy Committee. His job would be that of coordination among NSC, CIEP and the Domestic Council. Tasks would be given to whichever of those organizations had the predominant interest in the issue, with representation, if necessary, from the others. In this manner, we might be able to avoid the development of a new bureaucracy which, I fear, would be constantly trodding on our—and everybody else’s—toes.\(^3\)

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\(^2\) In a January 29 memorandum to Kissinger, Odeen outlined a proposal made by Charles DiBona for a “White House-based organization, structured like the NSC and CIEP, which would be the focal point for coordination and direction of national energy policies and programs.” Odeen disagreed with DiBona’s proposal that this group “manage the analyses of both the domestic and international aspects of the energy problem,” arguing instead that the foreign policy and national security aspects of energy be handled “within the National Security Council framework.” (Ibid., March 1972-Feb. 1973—Volume I [2 of 2])

\(^3\) DiBona’s appointment as Special Consultant for Energy heading an energy staff in the Office of the President was announced by the White House on February 23. The appointment was confirmed by Nixon on April 18 in his special message to Congress on energy policy. On the same day, the President signed Executive Order 11712, establishing the Special Energy Committee consisting of Kissinger, Secretary of the Treasury Shultz, and the President’s Assistant for Domestic Affairs, John D. Ehrlichman. (Public Papers; Nixon, 1973, pp. 317–318) The Committee’s functions were taken over by an expanded Energy Policy Office, announced by Nixon on June 29. Former Colorado Governor John A. Love was appointed to head the Office as an Assistant to the President; DiBona was appointed the President’s Deputy Assistant for Energy Matters. (Ibid., p. 625)
162. Memorandum From the White House Counsel (Dean) to President Nixon


SUBJECT

Executive Order entitled “Assigning Policy Development and Direction Functions with Respect to the Oil Import Control Program”

Forwarded for your approval and signature is a proposed Executive Order entitled “Assigning Policy Development and Direction Functions with Respect to the Oil Import Control Program”.2

In the message transmitting Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973 to Congress,3 the President announced his intention to designate the Deputy Secretary of Treasury as Chairman of the Oil Policy Committee in place of the Director of the Office of Emergency Preparedness. This proposed order would reconstitute and, for the first time, institutionalize the Oil Policy Committee, with the Deputy Secretary as its Chairman. The Committee and its Chairman would perform their functions in accordance with guidance from the Assistant to the President with responsibility in the area of economic affairs.

This order was drafted by OMB and my office in response to your earlier decision in regard to the Oil Policy Committee. OMB, OEP, Treasury, and Justice have approved its issuance. Also Secretary Shultz, Ray Price, Bill Timmons, and the offices of Peter Flanigan and John Ehrlichman concur with the order.

Recommendation

That you sign the Order attached at Tab A.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 250, Agency Files, National Energy Office, March 1972–Feb 1973—Vol. I [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Sent for action. An attached note from White House secretary Lora D. Simkus to Scowcroft, dated February 7, reads: “Jeanne Davis advises that the attached has been reviewed by Bob Hormats and by Phil Odeen’s people. Neither has any objections.”

2 Attached at Tab A but not printed. Nixon signed the attached as Executive Order 11703 on February 7, creating the Oil Policy Committee with Deputy Secretary of the Treasury Simon as its Chairman.

163. National Security Decision Memorandum 207


TO
The Secretary of State

SUBJECT
Procedures for Dealing with Various Types of Non-Military Incidents

The President has reviewed the Under Secretaries Committee report on this subject submitted by memorandum of the Under Secretary of State, dated February 24, 1972. He considers that there is a need for more uniform and clearly understood procedures within the government for dealing with various types of non-military incidents which could have an adverse impact upon the conduct of our foreign relations.

Accordingly, the President has confirmed that the Department of State has the primary responsibility for coordinating, with White House concurrence, government planning, actions, and public statements dealing with such incidents. He has directed that the Department of State Operations Center will function as the focal point of coordination. In this connection, he has directed that the following basic procedures for dealing with such incidents be put into effect immediately:

—All Departments and Agencies in receipt of this directive are hereby charged to establish a 24-hour watch supervised by a responsible officer, or such other comparable mechanism as will in the opinion of the Department/Agency and the Department of State be adequate to achieve the objectives of this directive. It will be the responsibility of this watch to advise the Operations Center of any incident that is developing in a way that could impact adversely upon U.S. foreign relations. Agency recommendations for dealing with the incident will likewise be made to the Operations Center. Watch officers shall be kept

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–239, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM–207 [1 of 4]. Secret. Kissinger sent the NSDM to Nixon under a March 8 covering memorandum with the recommendation that he approve it. (Ibid.) Copies were sent to the Secretaries of the Treasury and Defense; the Attorney General; the Secretaries of the Interior, Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and Transportation; the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration; the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency; and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency.

2 See footnote 3, Document 159.

3 See footnote 5, Document 159.
informed of all consultations concerning the incident between officials of various Departments and Agencies.

—The Operations Center will promptly inform appropriate Department of State officers and the White House Situation Room of such incidents, and will assure timely communication to the White House Situation Room of information concerning an incident and its development, proposed courses of action, and actions already taken.

—The Operations Center is charged with transmittal of guidance from the White House and the State Department to the relevant authorities.

—The coordination of press guidance shall be handled in conformity with the procedures described above.

The President further directs that the Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee, shall prepare detailed directives to implement this guidance. Departments and Agencies in receipt of this memorandum shall prepare internal implementing directives and watch lists for transmittal to the Chairman, Under Secretaries Committee, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the White House Situation Room, and the State Department Operations Center.

The President expects that each Department or Agency in receipt of this memorandum shall provide the fullest possible support to the Department of State in the discharge of its responsibilities under this guidance, including, as necessary, the assignment of supporting personnel to augment the coordination capabilities of the Operations Center.

The President has directed that the Under Secretaries Committee should monitor implementation of the procedures set forth in this memorandum for dealing with various types of non-military incidents, and should recommend improvements as necessary.4

Henry A. Kissinger

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4 As Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Rush reported to Nixon on November 9 that of the 15 agencies and departments responsible for complying with the requirements of NSDM 207, only the Departments of Labor and Agriculture and the ACDA had yet to do so. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–238, National Security Council Decision Memoranda, NSDM 207 [1 of 4]) Kissinger reported in a memorandum to Nixon on December 17 that the provisions of the NSDM had been implemented and were being monitored by the Department of State and the Under Secretaries Committee. (Ibid., Box H–239, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM–207 [3 of 4])
Memorandum From Charles A. Cooper of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹


SUBJECT
CIEP Role on Aid

You should be aware that CIEP is trying to establish a central role for itself on aid policy. If the current CIEP game plan is carried out, our ability to use aid flexibly for foreign policy purposes is likely to be seriously undermined.

Having spent its first two years of existence on international monetary policy (now shifted to Treasury) and trade (on which it has done a credible job) Peter Flanigan is now expanding CIEP’s role to try to include aid policy. He has had a consultant, Stephen Enke, do a major report.² The report is poor and its conclusions would be a foreign policy disaster because they stress the development aspects of aid. We need flexibility in our aid programs to support our foreign policy objectives even if that is not the most effective developmental use of funds. Moreover, we hardly want to create a series of foreign policy problems by pressing hard for population limitation programs and other economic reforms as strict conditions of our assistance. I have indicated our concerns with the study to CIEP (Tab A).³

CIEP has recently added an assistant director for aid matters (Ray Sternfeld) and will now proceed to develop some of the Enke report findings further. State is advanced in preparing a general study of our policies toward the developing studies [countries?]—the Casey report.


² On March 13, Flanigan announced the establishment of the Foreign Assistance and Development Project, under Enke’s direction, in a memorandum to the Secretaries of State, Treasury, Defense, and Commerce; the Director of the Office of Management and Budget; the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs; and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development. In an attached handwritten note to Kissinger, Scowcroft wrote: “Henry—Are you aware of this? I can’t imagine we want Flanigan mucking around in aid and MAP.” Kissinger noted at the bottom, “Get it stopped.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 219, Agency Files, Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), 1973, Vol. II) Documentation related to Enke’s report is ibid.

³ Cooper’s undated draft memorandum critiquing the Enke report is attached but not printed.
Treasury has completed a study on the international banks. Peter Flanigan has announced that he will chair a meeting of CIEP principals in mid-September to deal with aid policy on the basis of these three studies.

This year Congressional cuts, the shortage of PL 480 commodities, and increased foreign policy requirements (Indo-China) mean we will be more constrained than ever before in finding sufficient aid funds for foreign policy purposes. We will face difficult trade-offs such as South Vietnam versus Jordan, Indonesia versus Pakistan. This is not the time to be considering major new rhetoric for the development justification of aid. Nor can we afford to have aid policy set in the CIEP forum where Commerce, Agriculture, Treasury and Labor have equal voice with you and State.

There is much that can be done within present general aid policies to improve the effectiveness of the program while maintaining the foreign policy flexibility you need. We would welcome active CIEP efforts in this field. This is a big job and will keep Sternfeld—who is good—fully occupied. Meanwhile major aid decisions should be staffed and forwarded to the President, not decided by Peter Flanigan after meeting with a group of departments with marginal interests at best.

What we need is to reach an understanding with Flanigan and CIEP to proceed incrementally on aid policy with NSC taking the foreign policy issues and CIEP working on improving implementation and development effectiveness. We shall also have to watch for an opportunity to include the Casey study in a more controlled framework. We have a little time to act as the Flanigan aid policy meeting is not scheduled for another month.

**Recommendation:**

That you authorize Brent Scowcroft and myself to work with Flanigan and his people on a division of responsibility in this field and get his agreement to proceed by resolving individual problems instead of trying to set broad general aid policies that are not appropriate to present funding levels and will substantially reduce foreign policy flexibility.  

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4 Neither study has been further identified or found.

5 Kissinger initialed his approval and added the following note to Scowcroft: “Brent, what exactly are you after?”
Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to the White House Chief of Staff (Haig)¹


SUBJECT
Memorandum from Peter Flanigan on Agricultural Coordination

There is, as Peter Flanigan states, some duplication of effort in gathering data. We, therefore, concur in his suggestion to designate OMB to provide overall coordination in the statistical area.² This will take care of the most time-consuming area of overlap. We do not concur that CIEP should coordinate “all work on international actions, consultation or negotiations involving agriculture.”

Agriculture is a vital factor in many aspects of our basic foreign policy and national security interests. Of all the economic issues we will be dealing with in the coming year, this is one of the most important in foreign policy and security terms:

—Agriculture policy has been a primary area of friction with Japan and Europe.
—Agriculture exports have been the major component in expansion of our trade with the USSR and China.
—PL–480 food aid is essential for such high-priority areas as Indochina and Indonesia.

In short, our food exports and the way we handle agriculture policy are linked to basic foreign policy interests. They cannot be dealt with separately from our overall foreign policy. How we manage our agricultural trade will influence, and be influenced by, our interests in other areas including energy, defense, détente and our relations with LDC’s.

It is because of this link with foreign policy that the NSC has been working with the State Department and the USDA to stimulate initia-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 196, Agency Files, Agriculture, 1971 Through 1974, Vol. II [Part I]. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Ash, Flanigan, and Cole. A copy was also routed to the NSC Staff’s economic section.

² In his October 16 memorandum to Haig, Flanigan expressed concern about the “breakdown in Executive Office coordination and management of the government’s work on agricultural problems and the ‘food crisis.’” He identified five different agencies working on independent projects related to international agricultural issues, producing significant overlap. To address this, he proposed that OMB coordinate all interagency work on food supply, that the CEP and CIEP coordinate “international actions, consultation, or negotiations involving agriculture,” and that George Shultz coordinate policy at the Cabinet level. (Ibid.)
tives and constructive proposals with respect to the World Food Conference\(^3\) and NSSM 187.\(^4\) At this point, we believe further articulation of conceptual approaches in this area is needed before there is an urgent need for better “coordination.” The fact that there are at present a number of studies under way on different aspects of agriculture does not in itself denote lack of coordination. There will, of course, be requirements generated for analysis of specific options and proposals, and in many cases we believe these should be explored under CIEP direction. However, at the present stage, we believe that if improved arrangements for coordination beyond those suggested above are considered essential, the NSC should assume responsibility for coordination of major issues of agricultural policy impacting on our basic foreign policy objectives.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) During his first speech as Secretary of State, delivered at the United Nations on September 24, Kissinger proposed the organization of a World Food Conference under international auspices to be held in 1974. For the text of Kissinger’s speech, see *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, Document 17. At U.S. request, the proposal for the conference was inscribed on the U.N. General Assembly agenda on October 9, according to telegram 206146 to Rome and USUN, October 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973) The conference was held in Rome in November 1974; see Document 176.


\(^5\) On November 28, Haig sent a memorandum to Flanigan and Scowcroft instructing them to further define the NSC’s responsibility pertaining to international agricultural consultations and negotiations. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 219, Agency Files, Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP), 1973 Vol. II) Flanigan and Scowcroft responded to Haig on December 8, indicating that CIEP would assume responsibility for coordinating the response to NSSM 187 and for developing policy alternatives regarding “stockbuilding, world food security, and food aid” in consultation with the NSC. On strategy for the World Food Conference and trade negotiations, the two agencies recognized the need for “continued close cooperation” with CIEP providing a “coordinating and review mechanism” and NSC contributing “foreign and security policy guidance.” Haig wrote “Good!” on Flanigan and Scowcroft’s memorandum. (Ibid.)
How Foreign Economic Policy Might Be More Effectively Organized

Foreign economic policy is a problem area not only in terms of substance but of organization as well. Aside from the inherent difficulties of economic policies cutting across domestic and foreign interests, and varying in circumstance from one part of the world to another, there has been a particular lack of clarity about the State Department role in this field. The Treasury, the Office of the Special Trade Representative (STR), Commerce, and White House staffs have all staked out claims to primacy over certain aspects of foreign economic policy, while State’s role has steadily waned. The result has been fragmentation, lack of direction, and often economic issues being decided on essentially a technical or domestic basis alone.

To orient you better as to how State—and the Executive Branch in broader terms—might improve the formulation and implementation of foreign economic policy, I asked Ernie Preeg, a member of my staff, to lay out various possibilities for changes in the organizational structure in this field. Ernie has had long and varied experience in economic work and is particularly well qualified to think this subject through. The attached memorandum is the result. This is strictly an in-house effort and has not had the benefit of comments from others in the building. I think it provides useful grist for discussions you will want to have with your top people on these issues.

While the memorandum is basically a neutral exposition of various options, I would oppose the suggestions pointing toward a

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord) 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 346, Chronological Files, November 1973. Limited Official Use. Kissinger had been confirmed by the Senate as Secretary of State on September 21.

2 For more on the rivalry between the Department of State and the Department of Commerce for control over various aspects of international economic policymaking during the Nixon administration’s first term, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 349, 351–356, 358, and 361–368. In February 1972, President Nixon directed the Office of Management and Budget to prepare a study of U.S. economic and commercial representation overseas. Following the study’s completion in April 1973, Nixon announced on May 29 that the Department of State and the Foreign Service would retain their existing responsibilities for representing the country’s economic and commercial interests and that he would “continue to look to the Secretary of State” to oversee these activities at Embassies and Consulates. For the text of Nixon’s announcement, see the Department of State Newsletter, June 1973, p. 6.
semi-autonomous Department of Foreign Economic Affairs, even if it were under your broad jurisdiction. Rather, I believe we should be moving toward greater integration between the economic and the non-economic aspects of foreign policy, and, more specifically, giving greater political direction to economic policies.

Tab A

Memorandum From Ernest H. Preeg of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord)\(^3\)


SUBJECT

How the Implementation of Foreign Economic Policy Might be More Effectively Organized

Introduction

The organization of foreign economic policy within the Executive Branch has been the bane of policy coordinators for years. The many interests, domestic and foreign, and the corresponding diversified responsibilities within the government, create a very complicated power structure. Moreover, frequent changes in organizational structure have tended to confuse the issue of who is really in charge of foreign economic policy—or of particular parts of it.

Foreign economic policy is often separated out from other areas of foreign policy (principally national security policy) for two reasons: first, the links with domestic interests are more important and diverse, and second, the existence of a “multilateral system” in the economic field is more elaborate than elsewhere, increasing the need for a global, functional approach cutting across the various geographic relationships. Nevertheless, the fundamental organizational problem of dealing with policies that affect domestic as well as foreign interests, and have bilateral as well as multilateral applications, cannot be fully resolved: any resolution will be nothing more than the optimum compromise between competing objectives.

In this context, the following should be viewed as opening again the question of whether the present organization of foreign economic policy is the best possible compromise—in terms of overall national interests—or whether certain changes might improve the existing situa-

\(^3\) Limited Official Use.
tion. The time framework considered is that of the next two to three years. The suggestions concentrate on improving the performance of the State Department, although they are not limited just to this agency, and deal with the overall Executive Branch structure as well. The suggestions are put forward in terms of three categories of possible changes:

1. Limited changes within State, preserving the existing organizational structure.
2. Major changes within State, but without fundamental change in the interagency relationship.
3. Reform of the Executive Branch structure.

Before proceeding to the specific suggestions in each of these categories, however, a brief discussion of two underlying issues should be useful: the need and best location for overall coordination of foreign economic policy; and some apparent trends in the substance of foreign economic policy bearing on organizational change.

Who coordinates foreign economic policy?

There has been almost continuous discussion in recent years as to who in the Executive Branch—below the President—is or should be in charge of coordinating foreign economic policy. At this point there seem to be only three realistic candidates: the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasury, and some form of Special Assistant to the President. Without elaborating the pros and cons for each, it should be noted that, over the past four years, each has had some claim to be the chief coordinator: in the original implementation of the Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) in 1970, the Secretary of State was named to chair the Council in the absence of the President; and the present dual role of Secretary Shultz as Secretary of the Treasury and White House top coordinator, supports the claims of the second and third alternatives.

Only two points are made here about overall coordination of foreign economic policy as bearing on the substance of this memo:

1. The purported need for such coordination has been exaggerated. There are major questions as to who has or should have primary responsibility for specific areas of foreign economic policy, such as trade policy or expropriation policy or East-West economic relations, but decision issues concerning broad interrelationships among the various component parts of foreign economic policy are still relatively infrequent. Moreover, depending largely on how some current economic issues evolve, it is not clear whether overall coordination problems will grow or diminish in the years ahead.

2. Short of major reorganization as described in category 3 below, overall coordination, to the extent needed, should best reside with a
White House coordinator. However, this would not preclude a greatly reduced role for the White House staff, particularly if clearer lines of authority are established over particular areas of foreign economic policy. Indeed, a more logical designation and regrouping of authorities in the most appropriate agencies could go a long way to simplifying what are now perceived to be highly complicated White House coordination problems.

Trends in the substance of foreign economic policy bearing on organizational structure

Organizational structure should be designed to support the realities of the policy substance being organized. Similarly, changes in the substance of policies should be reflected in corresponding changes in organization. Unfortunately, this is easier said than done, and this brief discussion is not meant to analyze the changing structure of foreign economic policy in any detail. Rather it is to make the point that we need to be aware that there are changes under way as to the “facts of economic life” which may necessitate changes in the way we do business. And at times we seem to be fighting the facts rather than simply using them.

The point can best be made by citing several illustrative examples of major apparent shifts now under way in the foreign economic policy field which could affect the way the bureaucracy is organized:

A. The international monetary system. We seem headed toward a far more flexible and loosely defined international monetary system, perhaps along the lines of the existing managed floating rate arrangement. On the one hand, this should reduce the likelihood of financial crises and indeed the role of central banks in responding to such crises; on the other hand, it could well lead to more frequent special policy arrangements between certain countries, of a largely political character, from simple consultative procedures to various steps on the road to monetary union.

B. The economic relationship with developing countries. The high degree of government intervention in almost all areas of economic policy in developing countries makes our economic relationship with these countries more integrated in character than that with our industrialized trading partners, and increases the need for a coordinated approach on our part. Such an approach may also become more highly political, particularly as we attempt to differentiate the situation in one country or in one part of the world from another.

C. The global supply/demand relationship for petroleum, grain and other basic commodities. Recent problems of adequate world supply of food and fuels points to a growing need to link more effectively domestic objectives and requirements with foreign economic relations.
D. East-West economic relationships. Major economic dealings with centrally planned economies—in an adversary political relationship with the United States—present new challenges to our organizational structure which have not yet been fully resolved.

Directions of possible change in the organizational structure of foreign economic policy

With the above factors in mind, the following organizational changes for improving foreign economic policy formulation and implementation should be considered. They are discussed in very brief form in this memo—and in some cases it may be desirable to elaborate them further—but the gist of the idea should be clear in each case. As noted above, the suggestions are separated into three categories.

Category 1: Limited changes within State, preserving the existing organizational structure.

This category is the most straightforward and therefore can be put in most specific terms. The order of listing is random and does not necessarily indicate relatively greater or lesser importance.

1. Congressional liaison. Numerous Congressional committees are involved in foreign economic policy and State has only a bare bones organizational response for dealings with members of the Congress and their staffs. One person in EB spends part time on this, and there is no one in H assigned principally to economic matters. (AID has its own Congressional liaison staff.) A stronger and more systematic link with the Congress would appear useful, and could be located in EB or in H.

2. OECD affairs/economic policy planning. The Office of OECD Affairs is an appendage to the European Community Desk in EUR. This does not fully reflect Japan’s role in the OECD or many North-South issues raised in the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. Economic policy planning (particularly where links exist between monetary, trade and investment, etc.) is officially located in EB, but the assigned positions are not all filled, and there is no functional office of this kind actually in operation. A logical combination would be to take the operational responsibility for OECD affairs out of EUR and combine it with economic policy planning in EB. Such an office might report directly to the Under Secretary and Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs.

3. S/PC Deputy for Economic Affairs. There are three S/PC Deputies, but no clear line as to who is responsible for economic matters. The designation of one Deputy as economic, with supervisory responsibilities for other S/PC members working in economic and related functional fields, would establish a better focus for economic staff support to the Principals.
4. **INR economic research.** INR has beefed up its economic staff considerably in size over the past year, but this operation presently lacks an in-depth professional expertise, largely because it is completely dominated by FSOs. Either the number one or number two person should be a professional research economist, preferably from outside the government on limited tour. Perhaps half of the entire complement of officers should be FSRU research analysts or outside academic economists.

5. **Asian regional economic analysis.** There are many regional links developing in Asia, particularly between Japan and neighboring countries. But there is no regional economic office to analyze these issues, comparable to those in EUR and ARA. There is also little regional focus in the field (except for one relatively junior officer in Tokyo and the Bangkok operation described below). This situation could be improved on both ends. In the field, the regional office in Bangkok could broaden from its present AID and ECAFE concentration, to do in-depth policy analysis of economic developments throughout the region; even better would be to split this operation between Bangkok and Tokyo, with frequent interaction. An appropriate Washington backstop would complement this effort in the field.

6. **East-West economic relationships.** Support for our economic relations with communist countries is split within the building, including major division within EB. At a minimum EB should pull together all responsibility for East-West economic affairs in one place. Once this is done it would probably lead to a more central leadership role for EB relative to EUR and other interested parts of the building.

7. **Food policy.** Food policy will almost certainly grow in relative importance over the next few years. Responsibility in the Department is now split, however, between EB and AID, and a single focus of operational responsibility would probably be an improvement.

**Category 2: Major changes within State, but without fundamental change in the interagency relationship.**

Various proposals have been put forward to reorganize State in a major way, which can be described in terms of three generic forms, listed in order of the degree of change involved.

1. **Enlarged 7th Floor staff.** This approach was used during the tenure of Douglas Dillon as Under Secretary.\(^4\) It would basically involve directing the daily operations of AID as well as trade and other economic policies from the Under Secretary’s office. The size of such a staff might be in the order of 10 to 20 officers, or certainly much larger

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\(^4\) C. Douglas Dillon served as Under Secretary of State from 1959 to 1961.
than the two or three members of S/PC primarily engaged in economic work.

2. **Integrate EB, AID, and parts of IO and other bureaus.** This would in effect bring together all operational resources in the economic field under a single command. It might be possible to utilize the statutory high level position of AID Administrator as head of this organization—perhaps as Deputy Under Secretary to the existing Under Secretary for Economic Affairs. With the restructuring of development assistance toward multilateral institutions and smaller, “low visibility,” overseas aid missions, this integration would be in line with the emerging State role in the development assistance field. In fact, AID has been merged with the economic sections of embassies in a number of overseas posts in recent years. However, such amalgamation would require careful consultation with members of the Congress to ensure them that short-term political objectives will not become excessively overriding in our development efforts. Therefore, the new integrated bureau might best be separated to some extent from the rest of State as a semi-independent Department of Foreign Economic Affairs—but responsible to the Secretary of State much as AID now is.

3. **Restructure the bureaus along the lines of political economic systems rather than geography.** The bureau structure could be reorganized into three categories of countries: industrialized, communist, and developing countries. This breakdown would supersede the present five geographically defined regional bureaus. This approach would follow the lines of the three main “chess boards” of foreign relationships frequently analyzed, but would raise new problems when dealing with issues of a local geographic character. Under this revised structure, many economic policies could be placed in one bureau or another, although a small core of EB would still be necessary for handling issues not lending themselves to such a breakdown and for coordination of some aspects of economic policy among bureaus.

**Category 3: Reform of the Executive Branch structure.**

This category covers a multitude of possible changes within the Executive Branch, and the discussion here is limited to two types of suggestions: first, a number of limited changes that would clarify and simplify the present arrangement; and second, a few broadly sketched possibilities for revision of the present CIEP structure. Under the first grouping, the following would seem the most useful:

1. **Development Council.** The North-South economic relationship is badly splintered within the Washington bureaucracy, and suggestions frequently recur to establish some form of Development Council within the US Government. Such a council could be chaired by State, AID, or a White House coordinator. The apparent direction of the
overall policy relationship with most developing countries would probably tilt toward a State chaired council, but much depends on how the State/AID relationship evolves, as US development efforts shift more and more toward multilateral aid and less direct involvement in recipient countries. The reorganization of AID contained in the House Foreign Affairs Committee initiative earlier this year (which has not been adopted) provided for a council of this sort chaired by the newly established aid organization.

2. US representation to the World Bank and regional development banks. Instructions to the development banks are now under the control of the Treasury, with State participation merely in an advisory capacity to the Treasury within the National Advisory Council chaired by Treasury. Since our policy toward development banks is becoming increasingly political, a coequal State role with Treasury would seem appropriate. In fact, until a few years ago the number two person in the US representation to the development banks was normally from State, but more recently Treasury has filled both positions. State might also play an active role in Congressional presentations in support of funds for multilateral development institutions.

3. Bilateral US-Canadian Council. This idea has been discussed in great detail within the US Government over the past two years. Essentially it would consist of a bilateral umbrella framework to bring together the myriad of official bilateral contacts. It could perhaps include a joint secretariat, and would probably best be located in Washington. State is the most appropriate candidate to chair such a commission, although with strong and active participation by the other agencies involved. The objective would be to develop a more coherent and consistent strategy in our complex political/economic dealings with Canada.

4. Joint East-West commercial service. The State–Commerce cooperation both in Washington and in the field for promoting US commercial interests in communist countries could be developed in a much closer and more systematic way. Difficulties for businessmen dealing in centrally planned economies, as well as language problems in the Soviet Union and East Europe, might indicate a need to develop a corps of specialized commercial officers in this area. A more integrated response by State and Commerce at the Washington end would complement such an effort in the field.

5. US Government organizational response to monetary reform. Until two years ago State was the official US Deputy Governor to the IMF (with Treasury as the Governor). We have since given up this position to the Federal Reserve. It would seem, however, as the evolution of the monetary system—and related policies—becomes more political, particularly with regard to West Europe and Japan, that State should assert growing interest in this field. This could be done through official desig-
nation in our representation to the IMF, or perhaps through more active interagency participation via the kind of OECD/Economic Policy office described earlier.

Such changes would define more clearly agency roles in a number of areas. A more fundamental restructuring of the CIEP appears less feasible at this time, but could be undertaken in various ways, such as:

1. Designate the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs as Deputy to Secretary Shultz in running the CIEP, and make the Operations Group (which is chaired by the Under Secretary) the principal interagency operating body.

2. Reduce the size (and therefore the unwieldly character) of the CIEP by combining the domestic agencies into a single participant. This would leave State, Treasury, the domestic representative and STR as the four permanent operational bodies on the Council.

3. Combine the EB/AID arrangement described in Category 2 above with STR to form a truly comprehensive Department of Foreign Economic Affairs. With this more drastic change, it would be particularly important that the head of such an agency act with independence from the State politically-oriented regional bureaus, although it would still appear possible that such a Department could be within the State framework (again with analogy to the existing AID). One result of this change would be a much smaller White House coordination staff, which might be put back within the NSC staff, or an appropriately renamed foreign affairs wing of the White House staff.

The suggestions put forward in this third broad category—reform of the Executive Branch structure—lean heavily in the direction of a stronger State Department role. This may reflect to some extent irrepressible bureaucratic prejudices on my part, but it is also a conscious reaction to the waning position of the State Department in recent years. Some criticisms of State’s performance in the foreign economic policy field a decade or two ago were undoubtedly justified, and if State is to reassert a primary role in this field it must be able to follow a balanced course, taking full account of domestic as well as foreign interests. But this area of policy needs to be implemented in a consistent and assertive way. Such implementation now appears lacking in important respects. And the least bad alternative, if that is the appropriate phrase, would appear to be a stronger and more central responsibility for the State Department. The apparent changes underway in the international political economy clearly support this judgment.
167. Memorandum From the Secretary of State’s Executive Assistant (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger


HAK

SUBJECT

The New Bureau of Oceans and International Environment and Scientific Affairs (OES) and Two Related Matters

Although Mr. Rush is overseeing the execution of the legislative establishment of OES, there are several issues of which you should be aware and one issue—the nomination of a new Assistant Secretary—in which you will of course want to involve yourself. Procedurally, Rush is about to receive an action memo from Tarr that would determine the structure and direction of OES (draft at Tab A). The issues I outline below are largely drawn from the Tarr memo. I recommend that you leave the creation of OES in Rush’s hands and indicate to him your views only on those specific issues that you think require your intervention.

The Functional Scope of OES

Explicit legislative mention (and therefore basically unavoidable): Oceans, Environment, Science, Technology, Fisheries, Wildlife and Conservation

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1 Source: Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—November 21–30, 1973. No classification marking. A typed notation on the memorandum states that David C. Gompert (S) “said Mr. Eagleburger gave the original of this paper to Mr. Donaldson.”

2 The creation of the new bureau, to be headed by an Assistant Secretary of State, was formally authorized by the Department of State Appropriations Authorization Act, signed by Nixon on October 18. (P.L. 93–126; 87 Stat. 453) The bureau, which began operation on October 8, 1974, incorporated the functions of several existing offices that were to be abolished: the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife and Coordinator for Ocean Affairs, the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Population Matters, and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Environmental Affairs. The first Assistant Secretary of State for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, Dixy Lee Ray, was appointed on January 19, 1975.

3 Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Curtis W. Tarr’s draft memorandum, summarized below, was not found attached, and no final action memorandum from Tarr to Rush was found. However, a November 28 memorandum from Lord to Tarr commenting on the issues involved in the establishment and structure of OES, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Files of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), Entry 5027, Box 346, November 1973.
Other functional areas proposed for inclusion by Tarr: Population, Health and Weather Matters

Your Special Assistant for Population Matters, Phil Claxton, opposes incorporation of his domain into OES, arguing that the population problem is unique and that an unfortunate downgrading would result.

The Role of OES in Policy Formulation

Tarr identifies three approaches:

1. Program approach—giving OES primary policy responsibility in the functional areas in which it will be active.

2. Shared responsibility approach—OES sharing with the appropriate regional bureaus or IO responsibility for policy formulation.

3. Institutional approach—making OES a supportive, advisory body and leaving intact the regional and IO bureaus policy responsibilities.

Rather than being discrete options, Tarr’s three approaches (of which he recommends #1) seem to me to represent poles toward which the new bureau can gravitate, depending of course on the general direction that Rush—or you—decides to go.

There will be considerable overlap with IO—namely, U.S. involvement in numerous UN-family organizations. Current planning would have IO retain responsibility for the political aspects of our memberships and OES assume primary responsibility for functional/technical involvement.

Organizational Impact of OES

To conform with the legislation, the core of the new bureau will be the present Bureau of Science and Technology (SCI), the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Environmental Affairs (SCI/EN), and the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Wildlife and Fisheries (S/FW–COA). As well, Tarr is recommending that the Special Assistant for Population Matters (S/PM) and the Law of the Sea Office (D/LOS) be absorbed, the latter upon conclusion of current negotiations.

Additionally, if Rush buys Tarr’s proposal, the American Sections of the US–Canada Joint Commission, the US–Canada Boundary Commission, the US–Mexico Boundary Commission and the US–Mexico Water Commission would no longer report directly to you, but instead to the new Assistant Secretary or the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, Donaldson.

Rush is being asked to decide the number of Deputy Assistant Secretaries—two, three or four. Tarr recommends two: a deputy for Science and Technology, and a deputy for Environment, Population and
Ocean Affairs. Herm Pollack (presently SCI) suggests four deputies: oceans, environment, technology and science.

[Omitted here is discussion of personnel matters.]

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4 Printed from a copy that bears Eagleburger’s typed initials.

168. Briefing Memorandum From the Inspector General of the Foreign Service (Sutterlin) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The Department’s Performance in International Narcotics Control

During the past ten days we have reviewed the Department’s performance in the International Narcotics Control Program (INCP). This review was undertaken as an updating of our November 1972 inspection report on the role of the Department in international narcotics control. It was performed under the severe handicap of the absence of your Senior Adviser for Narcotics Matters and his deputy—both out of the country for the duration of the study.

Our findings and conclusions are known only by me and the three officers who conducted the review.

I. Principal Finding

S/IG continues to believe that the lead role in international narcotics control is a proper responsibility of the Department, but finds that its performance of that role during the past year has varied from unacceptable to barely sufficient. The significant contributing factors are:

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2 A copy of the report is attached to a memorandum from Pickering to Scowcroft, September 19. (Ibid., PER KISSINGER, HENRY A.)
The Department’s delay in accepting the INCP leadership role offered in the Ash memorandum of February 1 (attached) and in filling the position of Senior Adviser for Narcotics Matters;

—Insufficient aggressiveness on the part of the new Senior Adviser, once appointed, to exercise State’s new authority; and

—General belief within the INCP community that the program is now essentially “orphaned” with neither the President nor the Secretary of State viewed as active proponents of the program.

II. Background

The Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC), which you chair, is the top interagency forum for setting international narcotics control policy. Subordinate committees in Washington and the field are responsible for developing and coordinating programs to reduce the flow of narcotics and drugs into the United States.

Other agencies playing major roles in the International Narcotics Control Program (INCP) at the present time are OMB’s Federal Drug Management Division, the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the CIA, AID, and Treasury. Except for OMB, their activities are operational in nature—improved intelligence collection, strengthened law enforcement capabilities abroad, crop diversification. In most cases they must work closely with host governments.

The success of our operational activities overseas is dependent on the effectiveness of our diplomatic effort. Without internal political decisions to clamp down on narcotics production and trafficking, our overseas activities will produce only limited, and often disappointing, results.

Accordingly, when the interagency structure for the INCP was adjusted early this year, at the recommendation of OMB Director Ash, it was agreed that State should exercise key leadership/management responsibilities previously handled in the White House. The Senior Adviser was given the additional functions of Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee and Chairman of the CCINC Working Group—replacing Egil Krogh.

On May 3, Secretary Rogers sent a letter to the other members of the Cabinet Committee informing them of the appointment of William J. Handley as Senior Adviser and Executive Director of the CCINC. A copy of Rogers’s May 3 letter to Secretary of Defense Elliot L. Richardson informing him of Handley’s appointment is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, SOC 11–5.
2. Coordinating the international narcotics control activities and programs of all involved US agencies;
3. Acting as the principal point of contact and adviser on international narcotics control matters for OMB, the NSC, and the Domestic Council;
4. Ensuring implementation of United States policy in international narcotics control matters;
5. Providing drug control direction to American Ambassadors and narcotics control coordinators abroad;
6. Communicating, as appropriate, with foreign governments on drug control matters;
7. Representing the United States on the United Nations Commission on Narcotic Drugs and at other international drug meetings and conferences; and
8. Supervising the expenditure of funds now appropriated in the AID budget for international narcotics control programs.

III. Assessment of Performance

A. Interagency Management

An effective INCP requires that the activities of the numerous participating agencies, in Washington and in the field, are consistent with US interests and are complementary and mutually reinforcing. Strong central leadership and coordination are essential, therefore, and are best provided by someone who can relate the narcotics control interest to other foreign affairs interests of the US.

In outlining State’s expanded INCP role on February 1, 1973, Ash sought to remedy “a lack of clear lines of authority, the absence of independent funding or budget coordination, the need to secure agreement (or at least reluctant acquiescence) from each of the seven organizations involved for even minor program decisions, and the absence of any real management information system or program evaluation capability.” He indicated willingness to provide an executive level position from the White House pool so that S/NM could be headed by a Deputy Under Secretary, and he called for an enlarged and upgraded S/NM staff.

The Department has been slow in exerting the leadership and developing the staff required to do its expanded job. It declined the offer of an executive level position. It failed to capitalize on the personal recommendation of the OMB Director as a way to obtain needed positions quickly. It allowed the top S/NM job to lie idle from January 20 to May 7. It allowed the Department’s INCP efforts to be headed for several months by an officer who does not believe State should have been given its new role. It did not convene meetings of the Cabinet Committee Working Group or Coordinating Subcommittee, and it allowed the job of Coordinating Subcommittee Chairman to go unfilled.

Ambassador Handley, taking the job of Senior Adviser and Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee, carefully reviewed the activ-
ities of State personnel, participated in preparation of a PARA paper, and worked on obtaining control of the narcotics budget. He requested new positions to complete his staff but did not seek reprogramming action to avoid the long delay in getting them through the budget process. He did not move aggressively into his interagency manager role.

With the creation of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)\(^5\) and the end of a period in which old organizations and leaders were being phased out, the lack of strong leadership and coordination became more apparent and the patience of OMB wore thin. OMB provided, on non-reimbursable loan, one of its staff to serve as Coordinating Subcommittee Chairman. That officer moves effectively among the agencies and is regarded as the man who ties the program together. While he operates under a title given him by Handley, he is widely regarded as representing Walter Minnick, OMB’s Federal Drug Management Division Chief. Minnick, who sharply decreased his own activity on the international drug program when he left the White House staff last winter, found it necessary to take the initiative on such matters as the Burma program and the drafting of the delegation of authority transferring funds control from AID to S/NM. Now he does not hesitate to issue orders and bring pressure to bear when he thinks that the State Department is not moving rapidly or forcefully enough.

The delegation of authority has been obtained and there are pending FY 1974 budget and supplemental appropriation requests for additional S/NM positions. The Senior Adviser/Executive Director is still operating with inadequate staff, however, and has not gained other agency acceptance as the interagency manager of the INCP. He is not sought out on important issues. He almost never sees such important INCP officials as John Bartels of DEA and Ed Morgan of Treasury. OMB views him as having abdicated his leadership role. Most INCP participants have concluded that he lacks the high-level backing previously exhibited by Krogh and Gross.

Handley has been in a difficult position. He took on his current responsibilities after several months of neglect throughout the INCP, as substantial changes were occurring in organization and personnel. He has not had a strong deputy, and the rest of his incomplete staff has consisted of overcomplement and borrowed officers. In addition, his leadership status has suffered from talk, in and out of the Department, about family difficulties, a drinking problem, and his possible retirement. S/IG was not in a position to substantiate the validity of the drinking problem allegations.

\(^5\) The DEA was created on July 1, 1973, by merging the Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs with the Office of Drug Abuse Law Enforcement.
There is evidence that Handley is now attempting to become more forceful. His November 21 memorandum to you and his reaction to being bypassed by Minnick on the change in policy on licit opium demands are cases in point. Our judgment, however, is that it is too late for him to establish himself as an effective interagency manager. Not entirely through his own fault, confidence has dipped too low.

B. Narcotics Diplomacy

The foreign policy priority of narcotics control needs to be maintained. It must compete with other priorities for the time of Ambassadors and for the attention of host country leaders. Frequently those other interests are either more imperative or more easily advanced. A major part of the Senior Adviser’s task is that of diplomatic protagonist for the INCP. His performance of this role is enhanced to the extent he has the active and evident support of you and the President.

Narcotics diplomacy has been pursued with diminished vigor during the past year. The four-month gap between the departures of Gross and Krogh and the appointment of Handley did not help. Handley is now on his third foreign trip and has plans to visit the Far East and Middle East in the coming months. However, we would distinguish between trips to brief and exhort operational level personnel (as at the current regional meeting in Bogota) and those for the specific purpose of meeting with the Ambassador and top host country officials on priority programs. To date, only Handley’s trip to Mexico falls clearly within this definition of narcotics diplomacy.

Other agencies engaged in the INCP do not view the Senior Adviser as having ready access to you and other Department principals. By some this is interpreted as a lack of backing. We do not find this a convincing explanation for his having failed to attempt a more vigorous diplomatic role. It may be a contributing factor.

C. Department Catalyst

It is essential that S/NM play a strong guiding and attention-focusing role within the Department. S/NM must be both an advocate and a catalyst—at the 7th and 6th floors, as well as at the operational levels. It should: stimulate programs and initiatives directed at key

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6 Not found.
7 The meeting of narcotics officials at ARA posts was held in Bogota December 3-4. An agenda for the conference was transmitted in telegram 231213 to all American Republic diplomatic posts, November 24. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973)
8 Handley visited Mexico June 26-July 1 to confer with Mexican officials and Embassy personnel on narcotics policy. A description of Handley’s trip is in telegram 123095 to Mexico City, June 22. (Ibid.) Details of Handley’s June 27 meeting with Mexican Foreign Secretary Rabasa are in telegram 4668 from Mexico City, June 22. (Ibid.)
problems; promote complementarity of efforts both within and across regions; identify emerging priorities at the earliest possible date.

We find that S/NM has performed this role with only moderate effectiveness during the past year. The most important shortcoming is failure to engage the attention of both 7th and 6th floor principals. Without pressure from above, the regional interagency committees have met less frequently, and there has been less participation by high-ranking regional bureau officers.

How to make best use of the UN and its Fund for Drug Abuse Control (to which the US has been the principal contributor) has been a persistent question within the INCP. On this matter we have found little indication of innovative thinking from within State or willingness to support initiatives from elsewhere.

S/NM is devoting more staff effort to the Department catalyst role than was the case a year ago. However, there is some question whether the overall calibre of personnel in S/NM is adequate to the task. The fact that permanent positions have not yet been made available has contributed to recruitment difficulties.

On the positive side, it should be noted that S/NM took the initiative in updating the country Narcotics Control Action Plans early this year, and is organizing a new round of regional conferences for Embassy narcotics and key Washington personnel.

D. Congressional Relations

Congressional relations requirements are to keep the Hill informed on international drug control matters, to consult with it on programs in which there is strong Congressional interest, and to maintain support for funding. Difficulties arise not from lack of Congressional interest, but rather from Congressmen who are impatient with the progress being made and, in their zeal, threaten other important US interests. For example, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, now requires the President to suspend economic and military assistance to a country which “has failed to take adequate steps to prevent narcotic drugs and other controlled substances” from entering the United States unlawfully.

The Senior Adviser has performed the Congressional relations function well. He has devoted substantial time to it. He enjoys both support and confidence on the Hill. It has, however, been largely a one-man performance. The Office of Congressional Relations does not now accord INCP matters high priority. If S/NM gets the additional positions it has requested, it would be desirable to designate a full-time “public relations” officer to work closely with the Office of Congressional Relations and to assist the domestic agencies in their Congressional liaison problems relating to the INCP.
IV. Conclusion

To fulfill the role it has been accorded in the INCP, State must name a new Senior Adviser/Executive Director who is a more active and forceful narcotics diplomat and who possesses a “take charge” managerial style. His appointment must be accompanied by that of a deputy who has the same traits, by making the Coordinating Subcommittee Chairman a regular State employee, and by providing S/NM with its required positions (on a permanent basis) and staff.

The alternative is to force OMB, by State default, to assume management of the program. S/IG believes State should retain leadership—as does OMB and the rest of the INCP community.

169. Action Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Donaldson) and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Organization of the United States Government to Carry Out a Successful International Energy Policy

There is an immediate need to establish an effective mechanism to organize our international energy policy. This need has two elements: 1) an interagency coordinating mechanism, and 2) providing the necessary support of this effort within State.

The present ad hoc arrangement for dealing with your Energy Action Group proposal and broader international energy policy issues are not adequate over the longer term. Under the informal arrangements of a Donaldson-chaired Interagency Group reporting to the Simon-led

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2 Kissinger proposed establishment of an International Energy Action Group of oil consumers in a speech to the Pilgrims Society in London on December 12, 1973. Flanigan, following a discussion with Shultz on January 4, proposed to Scowcroft the creation of an ad hoc energy group comprised of representatives from the State and Treasury Departments, CEA, and the Energy Emergency Action Group and chaired by Cooper. Scowcroft related the details to Kissinger in a memorandum the same day and the Secretary concurred. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 5, Chronological File A, January 1–7, 1974)
Emergency Energy Group, there is the likelihood that broad foreign policy goals might be short-shrifted.

FEO has been moving to preempt this field with both Executive Orders and proposed legislation. But the issue goes beyond the area of responsibility of the FEO and must include monetary and trade problems (Treasury) and nuclear energy (AEC) among others.

The proposals below are for immediate action to deal with decisions which are pending. Further proposals will be made to you to deal with long range issues and the question of legislation.

Inter-Departmental Coordination:

We propose that major international energy policy and implementation be placed within the NSC system at once. To this end we propose that responsibility for the USG action to establish an Energy Action Group and inter-departmental coordination of other major international energy policy issues be handled henceforth in one of two ways:

Option 1:

Establish within the NSC system an International Energy Policy Group, chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, with an Operations Group chaired by Under Secretary Donaldson.

Under this approach, a new NSC group would be established, parallel to such US groups as the Verification Panel, the DPRC, the WSAG, and the Vietnam Special Studies Group. The new group would be at the Deputy Secretary level.

The Operations Group, chaired by the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, would have as its members Deputy Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary level officials. Membership of such a senior NSC Energy Group would include, in addition to State (represented by Donaldson), Treasury, FEO, AEC, CIA, DOD, CIEP, FPC, Interior, and as required other agencies such as NSF. The Senior Group would report to the NSC as do similar NSC groups or perhaps directly to the President. The staff of the Operations Group would be in State as proposed in the following section.

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3 President Nixon announced on December 4, 1973, that he was consolidating the energy resource management functions of the government into one agency with the establishment of the Energy Emergency Action Group under his personal chairmanship. Simon was its Executive Director. He also asked Congress to create a Federal Energy Administration and a Federal Energy Office in the Executive Office of the President. For the text of Nixon’s announcement, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 990–991. John A. Love, the President’s Assistant for Energy Matters, and Charles J. DiBona, the Deputy Assistant, resigned their posts on December 3.

4 The Federal Energy Office (FEO), under Simon’s direction, was created by Executive Order 11748 in anticipation of statutory authority and announced by Nixon on December 4. (Ibid.)
An alternative to the establishment of a new NSC group would be to use the Senior Review Group with an expanded membership as the mechanism to coordinate our international energy policy. Under the SRG a Working Group would be established, chaired by Under Secretary Donaldson, to deal with the day-to-day decision-making on the interagency level. The staff of the Working Group would, however, be located in State.

Option 2:

Entrust responsibility to the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (USC) and form an Interagency Task Force under the auspices of the Committee.

Under this option Under Secretary Donaldson would be given responsibility for chairing an NSC Interagency Task Force at the Deputy Under and Assistant Secretary level to develop policy papers for the US Government and the President, and to provide interdepartmental coordination for the international aspects of energy policy. This Interagency Task Force would be similar to the Law of the Sea mechanism which has already been established.

Discussion:

Option 1—The formation of a new NSC body—is the approach followed by you in the past in staffing major new policy areas through the NSC. You personally would chair the new senior group. Even though meetings of the senior group would be limited, the new arrangement would make clear organizationally your direct and continuous personal involvement. Formation of a new group would also be in line with the somewhat different composition and orientation of the group as compared with other NSC bodies—the relatively greater role of Treasury and the AEC and the role of an entirely new agency, the FEO, and the relatively lesser role of DOD and CIA.

Further advantages of this option are:

1) It provides for clear lines of authority between the NSC International Energy Policy Group and its subordinate Operations Group;
2) it can be very flexible on membership and the establishment of sub groups with different membership; and
3) it would be a distinct body exclusively occupied with international energy matters.

Option 2—Use of the Under Secretaries Committee—has the advantage of broad acceptance and direct access to the regularized NSC decision-making process. The Deputy Secretary would be available in his capacity as Chairman of the USC to intercede when necessary in interagency problems. Under Secretary Donaldson, reporting to you, would provide day-to-day direction for both State and the Task Force. Further, early on other interested agencies as noted above should be
brought into the work of the USC and the Task Force—particularly the AEC. This will provide for an integrated approach to the international energy question.

We recommend that you choose Option 1.

Department of State Internal Organization:

Within State, we need to move rapidly to establish a central office which can act as the focus for decision making. It should report to Under Secretary Donaldson directly as your principal deputy for energy matters. A precedent for this kind of organization exists in the Law of the Sea Task Force (D/LOS) office which serves as the staff on LOS matters for both the NSC Interagency Task Force and as the Department’s action office on this topic.

There is need, in short, for a strong, competent and coordinated effort to organize our energy policy centered here in State but with the assistance of the other interested agencies. Action on our part here at State is even more imperative since Administrator Simon has acted to establish a strong international office in the new Federal Energy Administration with some 27 professionals—more than we have working on the entire range of energy problems here at State. Pending FEA legislation also gives the new agency strong foreign affairs authority. This effort is being backed up with a strong research and statistical arm which will be the largest and most expert in the US Government. While we do not propose trying to compete with FEA in numbers, we do believe it is necessary that we have a strong staff organization and that there is a central focus for action. Further, given the narrow short-term and oil orientation of the proposed FEA, there is a vital need to keep this initiative within a foreign policy perspective.

One alternative would be to look to the individual bureaus to back-stop this effort. Under this option individual offices would be asked by you to put together the parts of the effort under their area of jurisdiction, perhaps with a coordinating committee to act as an integrator of the parts. We believe this to be an unsatisfactory approach. It does not provide for a day-to-day full time oversight of the entire package across bureau lines, except for Donaldson personally. In any case, it would be necessary to add additional experts and staff to the offices involved if they are to back-stop the EAG initiative in addition to their normal responsibilities.

For these reasons, we propose the following for your consideration:

That immediately you establish within State a temporary Task Force on International Energy Policy. This group would act as both 1) the Staff of the NSC Interagency Task Force or Operations Group to be established by a NSC memorandum, and 2) as the Action office within
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State to coordinate and develop our international energy policy and backstop our diplomatic initiatives.

The temporary Task Force would be headed by Under Secretary Donaldson but it would have a Staff Director who might also be designated as the Deputy Chairman of the NSC Interagency Task Force, to provide day-to-day supervisory responsibility over the work of the Task Force staff. The staff would consist of the best available individuals from within and without the government. It might draw some of this personnel from the bureaus but this would not be its primary source of slots. The bureaus would continue to perform their regular energy responsibilities and would act as support for the work of the Task Force. (The normal ongoing work on energy now keeps EB and SCI fully occupied.) We should draw upon the best outside experts for some of the key positions, especially since many of the other agencies will not want to spare their best staff.

We should eventually be thinking of a total staff of about 20 professional members. Initially we should program for about ten Departmental professional staff with the necessary secretaries. While the staff would be able to draw upon work of other agencies and bureaus, it will nevertheless, be necessary to integrate this material into a realistic and coordinated package for international discussion and negotiation. Further, the staff should have sufficient depth and knowledge to independently develop initiatives and programs on a wide range of energy fields from coal to nuclear energy. They would also have primary responsibility for coordination with other agencies. As its work load grows so should the staff.

This staff would continue through the EAG meeting and would provide much of the USG substantive input into the international task force which might be established after the first consumer meeting and perhaps after the EAG meeting itself. However, the Task Force would not be a permanent organization.

The Task Force and its staff would be assisted by an Advisory Committee made up of the best experts available. These experts would be used effectively and would be given specific assignments and when used full time paid for their work. Industry officials can be drawn upon informally as needed for information and discussion as they already have been.

We should also give consideration to the establishment of a Special Representative who would report to Under Secretary Donaldson with Ambassadorial rank whose primary function would be negotiation and consultation with foreign governments and international organizations. The Special Representative would be located in State with the Task Force. He might also be designated as the US Representative to
the International EAG Task Force developing proposals for the main EAG meeting. (See Tab B for draft memo establishing new Task Force.)

Recommendations:

**Interagency Coordination:**

Agree, EAG and international energy policy shall be placed in the NSC mechanism with the establishment of a NSC International Energy Policy Group and a Subordinate Operations Group. (At Tab A–1 is a draft NSC memo to be forwarded to the President for his approval.)

Or alternatively, place EAG and related energy matters under the Senior Review Group with a Working Group chaired by Under Secretary Donaldson.

Disagree, prefer Option 2 placing EAG and international energy matters under NSC Under Secretaries Committee with Interagency Task Force chaired by Under Secretary Donaldson. (At Tab A–2 is a draft NSC memo to be forwarded to the President for his approval.)

Disagree, continue with ad hoc mechanism with Donaldson chairing group reporting to Simon-led Energy Emergency Group.

**State Coordination:**

Agree, establish State Task Force on International Energy Policy chaired by Under Secretary Donaldson. (At Tab B attached Action memo directing the establishment of a State Task Force.)

Disagree, continue basic back-stopping in bureaus with establishment of coordinating Committee under Under Secretary Donaldson and increase in staffing for energy matters.

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5 Attached but not printed.

6 Tabs A–1 and A–2 are attached but not printed. None of the options was approved or disapproved. However, on January 15, Scowcroft recommended to Kissinger that this proposal be adopted instead of Flanigan’s. (Memorandum from Scowcroft to Kissinger, January 15; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft Daily Work Files, Box 5, Chronological File A, January 11–15, 1974) Scowcroft repeated this recommendation in a January 30 memorandum to Kissinger, to which draft copies of a NSDM outlining the details of the Donaldson–Lord plan were attached. (Ibid., January 27–31, 1974) This draft formed the basis for NSDM 244, Document 170.

7 Neither of these options, like the others, is initialed, but the memorandum at Tab B was signed by Kissinger on January 10. (National Archives, RG 59, Administrative Correspondence Files, General Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, Energy Matters 1973–74)
170. National Security Decision Memorandum 244

Washington, February 8, 1974.

TO
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Interior
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
The Director, Federal Energy Office
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Assistant to the President for International Economic Policy

SUBJECT
International Energy Review Group

In view of the significance of recent changes in the international energy market, the President has directed the establishment of an International Energy Review Group (IERG), chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The IERG will analyze the international implications of U.S. and foreign supply and demand in the field of energy and formulate policy recommendations to the President in the international energy area. Membership will consist of representatives of the addressees. Representatives of other agencies will be invited to participate as appropriate.

A Working Group of the IERG, chaired by the Deputy Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs, shall continuously review the international political and economic implications of the world energy situation and their linkages to U.S. foreign and domestic policies and programs. It will be responsible for directing the necessary policy analysis and for formulating policy recommendations to the IERG.

The IERG shall also establish a subcommittee on policy implementation and operations to be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance. The subcommittee will be responsible for the im-

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Implementation of policy, including interdepartmental coordination, and the preparation of the U.S. positions on energy related matters for international meetings and conferences.

Henry A. Kissinger

171. Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Robert C. McFarlane of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Foreign Assistance

Based upon an assessment of Congressional and Executive Branch attitudes and intentions with regard to the foreign assistance program, we believe that the Administration may be facing a serious legislative defeat that will have a major impact on our relations with foreign aid recipients around the world and on the credibility of the Nixon Doctrine. In our judgment, a successful effort to reverse this defeat will require:

— the personal participation of you and Secretary Schlesinger in defending the foreign assistance program; and,
— changes in the way in which foreign assistance is planned, administered, and promoted.

The purpose of this memorandum is to identify the nature of the problem and to make recommendations for its resolution.

The Problem

This year we are making over 10 individual requests, either regular or supplemental, for foreign assistance of various kinds—nearly twice the normal number (Tab A). Indochina Relief, Jordan, ICCS


3 Attached but not printed is a list of current and potential requests before Congress.
funding and the MASF ceiling increase are only illustrative of the vital character of the requests. The Congressional climate in which they are being received is increasingly hostile. The defeat of the IDA replenishment in the House and the steps taken to end Foreign Aid by both Mr. Fulbright and Mr. Gross⁴ are indicative of the deep antipathy this year on the Hill—deeper than those in any other year. Even in the House, where we have been supported in the past, there is strong sentiment against the programs—a reflection of the effects of our domestic economic dilemmas, the energy crisis, and the unsettling aftermath of the Middle East War. In addition, Jane Fonda and her entourage have made headway on the Hill in spreading disenchantment with our “open-ended” commitment to South East Asia.

The problem this year is complicated by the lack of coordination between the economic and security assistance programs and by the lack of attention devoted to Security Assistance within the State Department.

—The mechanism for coordinating Security Assistance and economic programs, which formerly was managed by Deputy Secretary Irwin is not working—yet such coordination is an absolute must if the two programs are to be presented and defended effectively on the Hill. (OMB and Peter Flanigan are moving to fill this void with the institutional viewpoints of which you are aware—and we are fighting this problem continually.)⁵

—Defense is in our judgment at best lukewarm—e.g., they don’t like SVN MASF; they don’t want to fight for amounts needed for Cambodia; and State’s leadership role is simply not driving Defense nor even coordinating effectively the efforts of the two departments.

The problems on the Hill are so formidable and these programs so important, that they demand a comprehensive, intensive, coordinated, government-wide effort with full support from the highest levels. Up to now the efforts have lacked inspiration, management and coordination.

—The legislative Staffs of Defense, State, AID, and the White House are essentially going their own individual ways without the coordinated hard-hitting drive necessary to get even minimally acceptable results.

—State’s Under Secretary for Security Assistance has no staff immediately responsible to him to drive the program and its defense on the Hill; nor, because of his necessary concentration on energy matters, has he sufficient time to prepare himself either for the development of the

⁴ Representative H.R. Gross (R–Iowa).
⁵ Kissinger wrote in the margin next to this paragraph: “What can be done?”
programs or for the vital job of defending them. This is doubly bad because the Hill perceives for the second year in a row that the Under Secretary is devoting little or no time to the task for which the position was established by Congress—evidence to those who are either opposed or on the fence that the Administration does not place a high priority on the programs.

This recitation of horrors is not meant to suggest we have only to throw up our hands. It is late but not necessarily too late.

We believe the following action program is the minimum essential.6

(1) State

—The Under Secretary for Security Assistance should be (a) tasked, and (b) staffed to do the security assistance job. This means the personnel working on the program who are now in PM, should be made directly responsible to the Under Secretary; a legislative coordinator also should be assigned to his staff.

—The Under Secretary for Security Assistance should be tasked to coordinate for you and State the full range of Foreign Assistance legislative proposals.

—The Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs and the AID Director, in coordination with the Under Secretary for Security Assistance, should be tasked to develop a full game-plan for presentation and defense of the programs.

(2) Defense

—A full game-plan for presentation and defense of the MASF and MAP programs should be developed in coordination with State’s Security Assistance coordinator.

(3) White House

—The LIG mechanism must be called into play immediately and focused on this panoply of assistance legislation to (a) refine, extend, and coordinate the Departmental game-plans and (b) bring full White House support to bear.

(4) Cabinet Participation

—Both you and Secretary Schlesinger will be absolutely essential to any successful effort.

—The Departmental game-plans should be developed around some key appearances by you and Secretary Schlesinger. Your commitment to individual contacts later would be extremely valuable.

In order for this action program to get off the ground it will be necessary for you to direct the revitalization of the critical coordinating

6 Kissinger wrote “Agree” in the margin next to each point of items 1–4 below, with the exception of the second point of item 4.
role which is vested in the office of the Under Secretary (SA) by law. With that designation, the other steps can fall into place.

172. Memorandum From the White House Staff Secretary (Jones) to the White House Chief of Staff (Haig)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

East-West Trade Policy Committee

The purpose of the above Committee is to determine our East-West trade policy and to oversee the negotiation and coordination of major trade initiatives. George Shultz was named Chairman of this Committee when it was established in March of 1973.\(^2\) He served as Chairman because of his role as the Chairman of CEP.

The members of the Committee are as follows:

- The Secretary of State
- The Secretary of the Treasury
- The Secretary of Commerce
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- The Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy
- The Special Representative for Trade Negotiations

The Deputy Under Secretary of the Treasury acts as Executive Secretary of the Committee and chairs a working group which does almost all of the actual work of the Committee.

Since this is a Committee to coordinate the work and efforts of several line departments, the conceptually clean organization is to name the Chairman of the Council of Economic Policy to chair this Committee; the President’s key economic advisor is best positioned to play the coordinating role among several line departments. Also, I would suggest that the working group chairmanship be moved to CIEP from Treasury. Finally, by naming Simon to the post as Secretary of Treas-

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special File, Staff Member and Office Files, Alexander M. Haig, Box 28, May—Jones [3 of 3]. No classification marking.

\(^2\) The Committee was created by President Nixon on March 6, 1973. Shultz served as Chairman until his replacement as Secretary of the Treasury by Simon on May 8, 1974.
I, therefore, recommend that you name Rush to head this committee and move the working group chairmanship to CIEP.3

Attached at Tab A is the press release that established the Committee.4

3 By Executive Order 11789, June 25, amended by Executive Order 11808, September 30, the Committee was renamed the President’s Committee on East-West Trade Policy. (Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 10, No. 26, July 1, 1974, pp. 719–720; ibid., Vol. 10, No. 40, October 7, 1974, pp. 1216–1217) The Committee was abolished by Executive Order 11846, signed by President Ford on March 27, 1975, and the East-West Foreign Trade Board was created in its place. (Ibid., Vol. 11, No. 13, March 31, 1975, pp. 310–312)

4 Attached but not printed.

173. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Ash)1


SUBJECT
Management of the International Narcotics Control Program

Your memorandum of April 16 in which you expressed interest in the State Department’s role in managing a viable interagency international narcotics control program has been reviewed.2

As you know, early this year, I asked Ambassador Sheldon Vance to return from Zaire to be my senior advisor for international narcotics matters and to provide strong leadership both in that capacity and as Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control.3 I have directed that the Department give Ambassador Vance full support to enable him to provide this leadership.


2 Attached but not printed.

3 Vance was sworn in on April 1, succeeding Handley as Senior Adviser to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of International Narcotics Matters.
At my direction, professional staff positions have been increased threefold and the secretarial staff doubled. Ambassador Vance is negotiating with AID and DEA for three additional professionals. The Interagency Regional Committees, chaired in each instance by a Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, have been revitalized. Ambassador Vance has programmed in full the financial resources provided for international narcotics control for FY 1974 ($42.5 million).

Our primary aim continues to be the full engagement of the organization and resources of the Government both here and abroad. Only in this manner can the full potential of the program be achieved. In conclusion, let me say that Ambassador Vance looks forward to continued close coordination with your Office of Federal Drug Management.

174. Briefing Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Brown) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, undated.

Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs

The Problem: The Department lacks a focal point for humanitarian affairs. Whether or not to reorganize the presently dispersed functions and the degree of change depend on your views.

Background: There is no firm central policy direction for such disparate programs as refugee assistance, asylum, disaster relief, prisoners of war, development assistance and food relief. These have developed on an ad hoc basis since the end of World War II. Responsibility is spread over several offices in the Department and AID.

More recently the issue of human rights in the conduct of foreign affairs has been raised by several Congressmen including the Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs—Donald Fraser. We have responded to some of these pressures by designating

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management 1968–1975: Lot 78 D 295, Box 1, M Chron—September 1974. Limited Official Use. Sent through Deputy Secretary Ingersoll. Drafted on August 8 by Susan T. Tait (M/MS). Sent under a covering memorandum from Brown to Ingersoll, September 6, in which Brown advised “Option Three is the best at this time.”
human rights officers in the regional bureaus and in L and IO. This, however, is not responsive to Senate views that would establish a new Bureau of Humanitarian and Social Services headed by an Assistant Secretary of State. The voluntary agencies that play a major role in funding and operating relief programs abroad are also seeking enhanced status for this work in foreign policy considerations.

There is no agreement within the Department or outside on how to handle this problem. There is no consensus on what “human rights” does or should cover or even if this aspect should be blanketed into the same office with other humanitarian affairs.

The options range from preserving the status quo to the creation of a new bureau. Within each option are sub-options dealing with personnel considerations, permutations in the delegation of your statutory authority, resource allocations and the like which are not necessary for you to decide upon in detail.

The first option is to do nothing. It can be argued that: (a) present operating arrangements for humanitarian affairs are working effectively; (b) there is a logical division between multilateral matters handled by IO and bilateral affairs traditionally accomplished in the regional bureaus; (c) a new office would further fragment this function; (d) the role of human rights in foreign affairs needs thorough study and refinement before the Department plunges into a major organizational change based upon external pressures; and finally (e), we would need more time to find and train specialists in human rights and humanitarian programs before embarking upon a radical departure from current operational procedures.

A second option would involve a minor reorganization of the Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs (ORM). This office would be renamed the Office of Humanitarian Affairs (OHA). Reallocation of responsibilities within ORM would be necessary to provide positions for an expanded mission to include policy monitoring of disaster and food relief and development assistance. Operations would remain in place in AID (disaster relief) and D/PW (prisoners of war). Human rights matters would continue to be conducted by IO as at present, and an additional officer would be added to its human rights staff. Each regional bureau would designate a human rights officer for bilateral problems and as liaison with OHA and IO. Such concessions should serve to stave off Congressional pressures. They would not ruffle feathers in concerned offices in State and AID. Some infusion of new blood in ORM would provide a base upon which we could build a stronger OHA.

A third option would go beyond “cosmetic” reorganization. It would create a new office headed by a senior advisor who would report to a Seventh Floor principal. The essential difference here would
be that both the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Refugee and Migration Affairs (S/R) and ORM would be abolished and their functions incorporated in the new office. Part of the twelve officer ORM staff would be retained in the new office and D/PW would move in, perhaps as one of two deputies to the senior advisor. This office would provide policy guidance over a broad spectrum of human rights and humanitarian affairs and exert a major influence in setting budget priorities. This option begins to attack the core problem of the need for fresh and dynamic leadership, plus providing other advantages listed for earlier options.

A fourth option would carry the reorganization forward both substantively and institutionally. It would involve the appointment of a Director with the administrative rank of deputy assistant secretary in the office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, thus providing a high-level channel for inserting humanitarian affairs into the mainstream of political policy decisions. The Director would have delegated authority over both plans (including budgets) and operations. He would have direct supervision over all operations, both bilateral and multilateral, including those presently in AID, D/PW and IO. This option would involve major transfers of personnel and resources. It would provide unambiguous evidence that the Department is moving vigorously to ensure that enlightened, coordinated consideration is being given to humanitarian issues in all major policy determinations.

The fifth and most drastic option would be that now espoused in the Senate of creating a new Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs headed by an Assistant Secretary reporting directly to the Secretary. The staff would be enlarged to encompass total involvement in the planning, budgeting, programming and operation of all continuing as well as one-time humanitarian and relief programs. It would contain a separate office of human rights. It would require its own budget which could be only partially filled by reallocating funds from S/R, ORM, IO, D/PW and AID. This option would provide the strongest possible evidence that the Department had seized the initiative in moving humanitarian affairs and human rights to a level co-equal with political and economic policy concerns. Since, to our knowledge, no other Foreign Office in the world has so elevated the humanitarian aspects of foreign affairs, this option could have international implications.

**Analysis of Options:** The central issue is how far we want to go and how fast. The status quo option is not really viable except as a holding position. We could study the situation again (the Inspector General has already done this), but in view of the fact that we have already taken

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2 No report was found.
some small steps (see Tab A)\(^3\) to elevate the role of human rights in foreign policy considerations, we have already signaled our interest in moving ahead.

Both a status quo position and a cosmetic reorganization using the present ORM staff in a somewhat expanded area of responsibility, risk another statutory reorganization such as happened with the establishment of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs (OES). Moreover, there would be strong in-house objection on the part of other humanitarian affairs program directors and regional bureaus to policy guidance from a staff of refugee specialists, many of whom have been in place for years and would not provide dynamic leadership.

The first two options would do little to reduce our vulnerability to Congressional and other external pressures whereas the third one, while conservative, has a potential for doing so. The key to the success of the third option is the person chosen to head the new office. A senior officer with outstanding leadership qualities could placate Congress, provide constructive guidance to the voluntary agencies, reduce in-house objections to centralized functional policy management, and make humanitarian programs more effective. In this option, as in the two that follow, a thorough-going shakeup of ORM is a necessary first step. Operating programs would be left in place in AID and IO, thereby preserving existing effective program direction. Under these circumstances, D/PW probably would not object to being integrated into the new office. This alternative is the least disruptive in terms of organizational changes. It provides a basis for building future changes slowly.

The fourth option moves in the direction of a separate Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs. It provides for a Director with the administrative rank of deputy assistant secretary. He would have centralized authority over plans, resources and operations in both bilateral and multilateral channels. Strong opposition from AID and IO can be expected. This alternative would give the appearance of reduced status since an Office Director at the DAS level is ostensibly lower in the hierarchy than S/R and he would report to P rather than D. Despite appearances, this arrangement would provide the most effective channel for substantive consideration of humanitarian issues. It would place the function at an appropriate level where it would receive more attention than if it were located in the over-burdened office of the Deputy Secretary.

\(^3\) Tab A, a May 14 memorandum from Acting Management Systems Staff Director Seymour Levenson to Brown, is attached but not printed.
The last option, creating a new Bureau, would not improve operating efficiency, but it would convey most strongly the appearance of enhanced status. It would, of course, bring us up against the need for legislation if the bureau is to be headed by an additional Assistant Secretary. It would also increase the Secretary’s burdens directly. Some see this Bureau as a kind of “conscience of the Department” and this could cause substantive problems. On the other hand, merging good works programs (disaster relief, food) with the far more tendentious human rights area could provide a useful mix.

In all of the options listed above, present personnel and budget resources would be about the same. Reallocation of resources would vary in degree from none to fairly drastic in the case of a new Bureau. Integration of disaster relief programs would, of course, involve transfer of funds from AID.

The Options:

1. Keep present organization and responsibilities.

   Pro: Not disruptive; operating programs are effective; pressures for reorganization are not strong; useful to play down human rights.

   Con: Risk statutory reorganization; no longer viable in view of organizational changes already made in Department; maintains deadwood in place; viewed by some as fragmenting the function and increasing layering.

2. Use the present staff of ORM, change name, add a few minor responsibilities, leave in S.

   Pro: Would probably be sufficient to placate Congress; leaves S/R reporting directly to the Secretary for enhanced status; avoid undesirable emphasis on human rights; preserves effectiveness of non-integrated operational programs.

   Con: Same as for Option 1 above.

3. Create a new office headed by a senior advisor reporting to a Seventh Floor principal responsible for all policy guidance.

   Pro: Removes ORM from core organization; opportunity for new dynamic leadership; acceptable to concerned Bureaus and Offices; provides base for future growth.

   Con: Difficult to dismantle ORM; could be viewed as downgrading humanitarian function by removing it from S; possible charge of layering.

4. Director reporting to P and responsible for both plans and operations.

   Pro: Most effective option both institutionally and substantively; would position humanitarian affairs in optimal spot for impact on policy decisions; could serve as Department’s “conscience,” plus advantages listed under Option 3 above.
Con: Invites charges of downgrading (from S to D to P); will provoke serious confrontations with IO and AID; disruptive to on-going effective operations; requires dismantling ORM.

5. Create a new Bureau headed by an Assistant Secretary reporting to the Secretary.

Pro: Best way to placate Congressional pressures; most positive evidence of status; provides functional integrity.

Con: Requires legislation; would necessitate major reallocation of resources; increases Secretary’s burdens.

Bureau Views: ORM prefers Option 5. It sees itself as the core of the new Bureau and S/R as the Assistant Secretary. ORM believes that a Bureau will have to be established sooner or later in the Department owing to pressures from Congress, the voluntary agencies, religious organizations and ethnic groups. Further, ORM believes that human rights should be integrated into the new Bureau since this area can operate more effectively outside of the UN context.

IO prefers Option 1. It believes that integrating human rights with other more spectacular humanitarian issues would result in burying the former. Moreover, it believes human rights concerns in the Department “largely stem” from UN Charter provisions. IO, backed by NEA, strongly opposes separating the UNRWA program from other aspects of our UN relations. It believes that its coordinative responsibility through UN development, food, UNICEF, and disaster relief meets current needs; a new office or bureau would represent layering and would sap the strength of the line bureaus. IO argues for a new study by a task force or S/P to chart new directions rather than creating a new organization to handle what may be a temporary problem.

AID would probably prefer Option 1 and would not object strenuously to Option 2. As long as any reorganization is confined to the Department and no AID prerogatives are threatened, it would remain neutral. AID has reservations about the Department’s capabilities for running disaster relief programs. It could probably be persuaded to accept a larger measure of policy guidance from State, but would balk at operational guidance and/or takeover.

L, having designated a human rights officer, would probably be amenable to Options 2 and 3 as long as the selected option did not affect L’s role as a service staff (i.e., no take-over of the human rights legal advisor).

D/PW is persuaded of the logic of reorganization despite the fact that it would impinge on his direct access to D. Given a change in leadership, D/PW would probably be amenable to integrating his programs in a larger humanitarian affairs office or bureau.
Defense, Economic, and Global Issues Organization  605

You will note that I have not myself recommended a particular option. It is not an easy subject to sort out. What I need before going further is some sense of your own thinking.4

4 On April 21, 1975, the Department established the position of Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs (option 3).

175. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for Economic Affairs (Seidman) to President Ford1

Washington, November 6, 1974.

SUBJECT

Economic Policy Organization

On October 1, 1974 Executive Order 11808 established the President’s Economic Policy Board (EPB).2 This memorandum outlines a set of general principles to guide economic policy making and a more detailed description of how the EPB and its Executive Committee will organize to fulfill these objectives. The guiding philosophy of this proposal is not to transfer departmental functions into the White House but to insure the maximum flow of information for effective policy making and implementation.

General Principles

Economic policy structure should:

(1) Provide the President with a full range of adequately researched options and recommendations.

(2) Eliminate overlap and duplication of policies to ensure consistency.

(3) Provide a focus for policy development, before options and recommendations reach the President.

(4) Provide a systematic pattern for implementing Presidential decisions on economic matters.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 52, Relationship between NSC and Economic Policy Board. No classification marking. Attached to a memorandum from Hormats to Kissinger, November 11, which outlines the “essential features” of the Economic Policy Board.

2 See footnote 3, Document 172.
(5) Maintain flexibility to respond rapidly to changing conditions.

(6) Ensure that economic policy decision-making is coordinated with national security and domestic policy objectives.

(7) Coordinate and make decisions not requiring Presidential approval.

Organization

In order to achieve these objectives, the following organizational structure and responsibilities are recommended:

(1) The EPB and its Executive Committee will “provide advice to the President concerning all aspects of national and international economic policy, will oversee the formulation, coordination, and implementation of all economic policy of the United States, and will serve as the focal point for economic policy decision-making.” (Executive Order 11808).

(2) The Executive Director of the EPB will have responsibility for liaison with the staffs of the National Security Council, the Energy Resources Council, the Domestic Council, and with the White House senior staff.

(3) The Executive Director of the EPB will have responsibility for White House liaison with the President’s Labor-Management Committee, the National Commission on Supplies and Shortages, and the proposed National Commission on Regulatory Reform.

(4) A Domestic Economic Policy Staff Coordinator will have responsibility for policy guidance and EPB liaison with the Council on Wage and Price Stability, the Commission on Productivity, and the Committee on Fertilizer. He will also have responsibility for economic policy coordination among Executive departments, agencies, and other entities including: Department of the Treasury, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Labor, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Department of Housing and Urban Development, Department of Transportation, Office of Management and Budget, Council of Economic Advisers, Federal Energy Administration, Federal Reserve Board, and Environmental Protection Agency.

(5) The Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy will serve as the International Economic Policy Staff Coordinator with responsibility for policy guidance and EPB liaison with the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Fiscal Policies, the Development Coordination Committee, the East-West Trade Policy Committee, the Trade Expansion Act Advisory Committee, the Inter-Agency Committee on PL 480, and the Special Trade Representative. He will also have responsibility for economic policy coordination among Executive departments, agencies, and other en-
tivities including: Department of State, Department of the Treasury, Department of Defense, Department of the Interior, Department of Agriculture, Department of Commerce, Department of Transportation, Office of Management and Budget, Council of Economic Advisers, Federal Energy Administration, Export-Import Bank, Overseas Private Investment Corporation, and the Federal Reserve Board.

(6) Policy coordination by both the Domestic Economic Policy Staff Coordinator and the International Economic Policy Staff Coordinator will entail ensuring that departmental and agency recommendations and proposals are properly communicated to the EPB and the Executive Committee and that economic policy decisions are properly communicated to and implemented by departments and agencies.

(7) The Executive Committee of the EPB will meet daily to address economic policy issues.

(8) The Executive Committee of the EPB will meet with the President to present options papers, make recommendations, and discuss current economic developments.

(9) The Executive Committee of the EPB will report on its actions at Cabinet meetings as requested.

(10) The Executive Director of the Executive Committee will be responsible for supervising and directing the staff of the Executive Committee.

(11) The organization of the Economic Policy Board is shown at Tab A.³

(12) Proposed staffing for the Executive Committee and the Office of the Executive Director is at Tab B.⁴

³ A chart is attached but not printed.
⁴ Not attached and not found.
MEMORANDUM FOR
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Deputy Secretary of State
Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors
The President’s Special Representative for Trade Negotiations
Executive Director, Economic Policy Board
Executive Director, Council on International Economic Policy

SUBJECT
Follow-Up Group to World Food Conference

The President has directed that an International Food Review Group, comprising the addressees of this memorandum, be established to coordinate the implementation of United States’ decisions and initiatives stemming from the World Food Conference. It should, as appropriate, make recommendations on further actions to be taken to implement the measures announced at the Conference. The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Agriculture are to be Chairman and Vice Chairman respectively.

The Group should coordinate its recommendations, as they relate to U.S. agriculture and trade policy, with the Executive Committee of the President’s Economic Policy Board.


3 In a November 8 memorandum to President Ford, Seidman argued, on behalf of Simon, Ash, Greenspan, Eberle, and Cole, that the major issues of the World Food Conference were primarily the responsibility of the EPB and therefore should be handled by the EPB instead of Kissinger’s proposed International Food Review Group. (Ford Library, Paul C. Leach Files, Box 10, World Food, Nov. 1–22, 1974) Seidman’s memorandum is Document 274, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976.
The International Food Review Group should create a working group chaired by the representative of the Secretary of State with the representative of the Secretary of Agriculture as Vice Chairman. Other members of the working group should include representatives of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the Office of Management and Budget, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy, the President’s Special Representative for Trade Negotiations and other agencies as appropriate. The working group should coordinate its activities with U.S. Government efforts in multilateral trade negotiations.

Henry A. Kissinger

177. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Brown)¹


SUBJECT
Food Policy Organization

The Secretary has directed that international follow-up to the initiatives he launched at the World Food Conference be managed by the Department of State. We anticipate a NSDM which will formalize that directive in the near future.² Regardless of what interagency mechanism is finally chosen for this purpose, I agree that the Department needs to be organized internally in the most effective way to carry out our responsibilities in this crucial area.

The problem, as I see it, contains two main requirements: 1) leadership of an interagency mechanism to prepare US positions and recommendations through the Secretary to the President and 2) implementation of the Secretary’s WFC program through the various international coordinating groups which he proposed.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, Box 1, M Chron November 1974. No classification marking. Drafted by Robert J. Morris (S/P).
² No NSDM was issued. This is apparently a reference to Document 176.
Since action is required immediately on both fronts, I recommend that initial responsibility be assigned to Tom Enders who should coordinate closely with AID and IO internally.

However, while we were in Rome, the Secretary indicated that he would in the future look primarily to Under Secretary Robinson as well as his Special Assistant (currently Ed Martin) for Departmental leadership in this field. Therefore, I believe we have essentially two options for organizational arrangements as we move into the coming year:

1) Leave it to Robinson to determine how responsibilities for interagency coordination and international negotiation should be divided up within the Department and between the Department and AID. I would assume he would look mainly to Enders and EB staff (working with IO and AID) for his primary support, but I would encourage him to continue to call on S/P for appropriate help as well.3

While this approach is the cleanest, it may not be the most effective, since Enders (and I assume, Robinson) will be simultaneously and deeply involved in the Secretary's other main international economic concern: oil and recycling, not to mention other pressing issues in the trade, aid and monetary fields.

2) The other alternative is to appoint a Special Food Policy Coordinator of Ambassadorial rank, in effect to pick up where Ed Martin will have left off if he retires at the end of this month. The Coordinator should normally take his policy guidance from Robinson. But he should also be able to present his views directly to the Secretary if there are differences. Though he may need a small staff of his own (as Martin has had), he would rely primarily on Enders, Buffum and Parker and their staffs for most of the work.

A Special Coordinator would relieve both Robinson and Enders of much of the time-consuming effort that will be needed, both within the government and in international negotiations. However, the exact status of the position and the specific division of responsibilities may well turn on the personal strengths and weaknesses of the individuals concerned. We should stay flexible at least until Robinson comes on board. If this proposal commends itself to you, Robinson, Enders and the Secretary, we should discuss potential candidates for the post. We have a few names in mind.

3 In a November 25 memorandum to Ingersoll, Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff Reginald Bartholomew also argued in favor of giving Robinson the responsibility for "general guidance and coordination" of the Department's food policy. Bartholomew also recommended that OES and AID take responsibility for the "population/food/nutrition relationship," with EB providing staff support. (National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management, 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, Box 1, M Chron November 1974)
Whichever route we choose, I believe Enders must continue to play a central role, both within the Department and in the international negotiation area, to ensure effective coordination both between our oil and food strategies (which are intimately linked) and between those areas and the more traditional issues of commodity, PL 480, trade and financial policies which are the tools with which we must implement the main strategies. It is for this reason that I have not included any recommendation that would result in a basic reorganization of EB (e.g., splitting the Food Policy Division out of the Bureau and putting it in a separate status).

178. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Your Lunch with Bill Seidman

Your lunch provides an opportunity to correct a totally unsatisfactory relationship between the NSC and the EPB. Seidman has proposed to the President a restructuring of the economic policy making apparatus. My memo of November 11 (Tab A) describes this, indicates several major problems and recommends a response to Jerry Jones (a) pointing out that the NSC has significant responsibilities in the area of international economic policy which are not reflected in the Seidman proposals and (b) suggesting provisions for NSC and State participation in meetings, preparation of papers, and clearances.

It is totally incomprehensible to me why the NSC is not included in meetings of the Executive Committee of the EPB. The argument that the Committee wishes to keep down the size of attendance or to limit meetings to principals only is nonsense—since others regularly attend. Moreover, numerous issues relating to foreign economic policy—food, trade, tax policy, etc., arise almost daily. At times State is invited to at-

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2 No record of Kissinger’s lunch with Seidman has been found.
3 Attached but not printed. For Seidman’s proposal, see Document 175.
tend and the NSC is not. (I have not attended an Executive Committee meeting in over a month.) This, of course, is inconsistent with the coordination responsibilities of the NSC, not to mention depriving you of whatever substantive advice I might be able to provide. My feeling is that Seidman is not against my coming to meetings but that he has been intimidated by Simon—who wants to run the show himself, keeping your knowledge of what is happening to a minimum, except as he chooses to inform you.

I would recommend that you make the following points to Seidman on these issues:

—The NSC must continue to have primary responsibility for providing advice to the President and ensuring proper coordination on East-West, aid and PL–480 issues. On many other economic issues it must clearly work based on guidance and under the leadership of EPB. But on these issues it should be meaningfully involved in the advisory, implementation and coordination process.

—The NSC and the Department of State could usefully contribute to the work of the EPB, help me to reflect the group’s views and recommendations in my activities, and strengthen coordination in key areas of international economic policy if:

—My NSC Deputy for International Economic Affairs were to sit in on meetings of the Executive Committee (at least when issues relating to international economic policy are discussed). When a matter of significant importance in this area arises, a senior State official should also be invited.

—State and the NSC staff should participate in drafting position papers on international economic issues used by the Executive Committee, EPB or going to the President.

—A senior State official and a member of the NSC staff should be included in the clearance process on all international economic issues, and on domestic issues which impact on foreign policy.

179. Editorial Note

As part of its study of the U.S. foreign policymaking community, the Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy (the Murphy Commission) conducted an extensive inquiry into the organization of international economic policy. Recognizing the increasing scope and complexity of international economic relations, the Murphy Commission sought to give U.S. international economic policy “coherence and design.” Its final report, issued
on June 27, 1975, recommended a mixture of fixed organizational structures and flexible processes with the aim of encouraging “a consistent general framework in foreign economic policy responsive to and integrated with vital considerations of domestic and foreign policy” and permitting “a broad sharing of authority and responsibility for the formulation of policy, while providing protection against narrow and isolated views becoming dominant.”

The Murphy Commission recommended a raft of reforms. It recommended the creation of a position of senior assistant to the President to act as the central staff member for both domestic and foreign economic policy, with membership in the National Security Council, the Domestic Council, and the Economic Policy Board. The commission also advocated establishing an International Economic Policy Advisory Board, a senior group of experts drawn from the private sector to periodically consult with the President and an independent study group under the auspices of the Council of Economic Advisers. In order to merge domestic and foreign policy considerations more closely, it recommended the creation of the Subcouncil on International Economic Policy, responsible to the NSC, Domestic Council, and EPB. This new subcouncil, which would replace the Council on International Economic Policy and be composed of representatives from the Departments of State, Treasury, Commerce, and Agriculture and the CEA, would be tasked with creating committees and task forces to assure interagency cooperation.

On overseas representation, the Murphy Commission suggested a flexible approach:

“Unlike foreign political policy, where State has virtually exclusive responsibility, the execution of foreign economic policy has been shared to a degree among the Departments of State, Treasury, Agriculture, Commerce, and others, depending on the substance. We believe this is appropriate, both because of the degree of knowledge required in specialized areas and because of the value of direct exposure to foreign concerns for domestically oriented agencies. Moreover, as international economic problems have grown in importance and multilateral diplomacy has increasingly supplanted bilateral negotiations as the main channel of international decision-making, Washington-based officials have assumed a larger role in economic negotiations relative to Embassy personnel. These trends have suggested to some that the time has come when we might appropriately transfer from State and the Foreign Service the bulk of its responsibilities for economic negotiations and reporting.” The commission rejected this line of reasoning, but added, “an attempt to centralize all responsibility for these matters, removing them from economic departments to State, appears impractical and counterproductive in terms of our basic objectives.”
Consequently, the commission supported “flexibility in the use of multiagency participation in policy negotiations and implementation abroad. The State Department must retain overall coordinating responsibility; no international negotiations should proceed without its knowledge and approval. It should normally participate in the manning of international delegations, but need not automatically chair these, depending on the substantive area. Overseas representation of domestic departments should continue in selected areas (e.g., agriculture and finance) so long as their representatives are under the control of the Ambassador,” a recommendation that the commission’s report stated applied specifically to overseas representation of the Department of the Treasury. (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, pages 55–57, 59–60, 63, and 67–68)

For the commission’s recommendations for other parts of the foreign policymaking apparatus, see Documents 45, 106, and 147.

Copies of the commission’s final report were distributed to the relevant agencies by NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne Davis for comment on July 11. The responses of the Departments of Commerce, Treasury, and the CIEP are in the Ford Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 98, IFG Logged Documents, Murphy Commission—Comments on the Commission Report. See also Document 202.

180. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the National Security Council Under Secretaries Committee (Ingersoll)¹


SUBJECT

Establishment of a Standing Committee on Space Policy

The President has directed that a standing committee of the Under Secretaries Committee be established to address issues connected with our national space policy as it relates to the civil/military interface.

The committee should review the relationship between civil and intelligence space programs, the military significance of certain civil space programs, and any relevant international considerations. The committee should propose for the President’s consideration appropriate new policies or changes to existing policies, and be a forum for the interpretation and implementation of such policies.

The membership of the committee should include the members of the Under Secretaries Committee augmented by representatives of NASA, NRO, OMB, the President’s Science Adviser, and other agencies as appropriate to the particular issue under consideration. The committee should be chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

DOD and NASA have requested that at an early opportunity the committee examine the international political considerations of remote earth sensing, the protection of sensitive space technology, and the public release of space data and information.2

Henry A. Kissinger

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2 The organization and management of these space programs became a sensitive issue for both the Defense Department and NASA. A memorandum to Scowcroft from Leon Sloss, Chairman of the Working Group of the Standing Committee on Space Policy (SPC), November 21, outlined the two agencies’ objections to a proposed SPC study of earth-sensing programs. Recognizing the agencies’ fears of diminished influence over the programs, especially as they related to intelligence, Sloss recommended that the SPC refrain from any organizational studies until the completion of the intelligence community reorganization. The memorandum is published as Document 118, ibid. On November 9, 1976, the SPC sent Ford a report with recommendations concerning remote earth imagery policy (Document 138, ibid.).
181. Memorandum From Clinton E. Granger and Robert B. Oakley of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT
Proposed Arms Transfer Group

The Secretary has asked for recommendations for an effective means of handling the arms transfer problem. He has had a brief opportunity to discuss this with Joe Sisco and he will undoubtedly wish to have your views. You have indicated a willingness to talk to Sisco and Carl Maw about this. This memorandum is to give some perspective to the issues involved and possible approaches to deal with them.

Arms sales, expanding at an accelerated rate, have begun to create serious problems in several areas—adversely affecting our military capabilities where equipment for sale or grant must be drawn from U.S. inventories, creating strains in our relations with countries interested in equipment with long lead times, and focusing Congressional scrutiny on the impact of U.S. arms in sensitive world areas.

At the present time we lack two essential elements for effective control of arms transfers: —an effective mechanism for interagency coordination of policy formation and implementation; and —a dependable means for identifying troublesome issues at an early state. Over the past several months problems associated with these two areas have intensified. (State has compiled a list several pages long of significant instances of lack of interagency coordination on arms transactions over the last several months.) The series of decisions on the Jordan Hawk issue—running from the agreement with King Hussein to provide 14 batteries through the timing of transmittal of the LOA to the uncoordinated positions taken by Administration representatives during Congressional debate—is a good case at point. The larger issue of differing...
positions on Israeli arms requests and deliveries is another. This trend will likely continue particularly in view of accelerated deliveries to the Middle East. Our problems are not limited to the Middle East, however. For the foreseeable future, worldwide demand for our arms will far exceed supply placing a premium on effective management and political control of our limited resources. Thus the Administration must be brought to work more as a team in making decisions on arms deliveries and defending them with Congress. If not, there will be huge foreign and domestic complications, given the amount of arms involved.

The question is how management and control can best be established. The Murphy Commission, recognizing the lack of centralized control in this area, recommended establishment of an interagency group, to be chaired by State at the Under Secretary level.3 State has informally presented a proposal for a similar, but lower-level group. However, we believe the ability to monitor arms transfer at the agency level must be combined with a facility for quick, high-level decision-making and effective interagency coordination. These criteria are best met by a group under the auspices of the NSC.

Whether there be a formal decision to establish an official body, or whether it is to be done on an informal basis, we believe the following guidelines should be applied:

The group could be chaired by you and would include the Under Secretaries of State for Political Affairs and Security Assistance, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs and the Director of the Defense Security Assistance Agency. Its mandate would be determined by its members, but—at a minimum—should include:

I. Analysis Prior to Approving Arms Requests
   —foreign policy considerations
   —proliferation and arms-race considerations
   —U.S. ability to meet requests (including delivery dates)
   —impact on U.S. military capabilities

II. Making Good on Approved Requests
   —establishment of priorities between potential foreign consumers of items which are in short supply or will have long lead-times for delivery

3 The proposed group was designed to reshape the existing Security Assistance Program Review Committee (SAPRC), established in 1971, into a standing committee of the NSC which would serve as the “primary forum for interagency review of all issues involving arms transfers and security assistance.” Chaired by the Under Secretaries of State for Political and Security Assistance, the group was to include representatives of OMB, ACDA, State, Defense, JCS, Treasury, and the NSC staff. (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, p. 76) For more on the Murphy Commission’s report, see Documents 147 and 179.
Because of fragmentation of responsibility, we presently lack a single source of information about the broad spectrum of FMS and MAP, and commercial sales. As a result, our ability to identify potentially controversial issues of the sort which should be addressed by a high-level group is severely limited. Thus, of equal importance to the establishment of a high-level review group is the establishment of a standing working group, to monitor the day-to-day flow of arms transactions and identify those issues which should be brought to the attention of policy makers for information or action purposes. In practice, we anticipate that the working group would establish and periodically update criteria for the types of arms transactions which would be submitted for its review. This would allow the working group to focus on those aspects of the work of DSAA, Munitions Control, and State with potential political consequences. Aside from providing staffing for the high-level group, such a procedure would establish within the Administration a central information (and control) mechanism for arms transfers. Under present circumstances, we believe that such a working group should be chaired by the Director of NSC’s planning staff with DOD, DSAA, ACDA, and State participation. However, in the future, it may be desirable to transfer this responsibility to State’s Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs.

We believe you should talk, in the first instance, to Sisco and Maw to elicit their views on how this increasingly serious problem can best be handled, including the establishment of a working group, and whether the high-level group should be established formally or not. It is certainly not necessary to adopt the formal option at the outset, but we foresee problems in establishing the kind of comprehensive management and control we need unless both the high-level and working group have clearly-defined authority and areas of responsibility.

Attached is a list of major military supply issues which we expect will require high-level attention over the next several months. 4 You can use this for illustrative purposes in talking to Sisco and Maw.

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4 Attached but not printed.
182. Memorandum From Richard T. Boverie of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT
Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC)

Our current defense strategy ostensibly is based upon the NSSM 3 study completed in 1969. Given that subsequent DPRC efforts to review strategy were abortive, the NSSM 3 study represents the last comprehensive Presidential review and determination of our military posture and defense strategy. Since the international, domestic, and economic environments were substantially different in 1969 than we face today, I believe it is important that we do something to regenerate the Presidential review process and make sure our strategy is on track—or change it if it isn’t. (I do not count the annual budget review as a substantive examination of our strategy and policy. The current budget process deals largely with on-the-margin items, not the basic thrust of the defense program.)

We need a review process to answer hard questions concerning defense strategy and alternatives. In particular, if some of the alternatives being discussed in Congress and elsewhere have merit, then we should take the lead in adopting those which are preferable to current policies. On the other hand, if it is determined that our current policy is the preferred approach, we should know how to answer those who argue for the alternatives in a consistent and effective manner, based on facts and sound analysis.

In part because of its size and visibility, the defense program is a prime target for attack by outside critics. Critics are saying that new military budgets of record proportions are being prepared (and locked in) with minimal input from outside DOD; that skyrocketing costs of

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military programs, inflation, unemployment, shortages, and changed international circumstances make it necessary to cut back our defenses in favor of competing programs and priorities; that we are building unneeded, redundant weapon systems which we can no longer afford; and that many of our overseas commitments are really one-way commitments that contribute little to the defense of the US. At the same time, there are charges that we have cut the defense budget too deeply while the Soviets are rapidly increasing their spending; that we have moved from a position of superiority to parity and now to inferiority relative to the Soviets; and that we have pumped so much military equipment into Vietnam and Israel that our own arsenals are seriously depleted. A coherent Presidential review process would help us answer these criticisms.

Outside critics aren't our only problem; we also find ourselves tangled in messy internal problems which could be headed off, at least to a degree, if we had a routine, rational review process. Typical of such problems are those caused this past year by largely unguided and uncontrolled DOD action on the Nunn Amendment reports; theater nuclear force deployments, drawdowns, and modernization; carrier drawdowns; nuclear acquisition policy (DOD has on its own simply decided not to complete NSSM 191), and out-year defense spending requirements. We can expect these same kinds of problems and others in the coming year, if we do not develop a workable interagency review process.

A Proposal for the Review Process—A Regenerated DPRC

I believe the best way to tackle the review problem is to regenerate the DPRC—to establish a DPRC process which is geared to the times and the current leadership, and which avoids the pitfalls of the past. To have a successful DPRC, I believe there are three essential preconditions:

—The President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and yourself must agree to make the process work.

—The DPRC must focus on major strategy, force posture, and budgetary issues of Presidential concern, and stay away from details which are best left to internal DOD management.

—The structure must be streamlined and specifically designed to avoid massive working groups at the staff level (such as are normally associated with NSSMs) which could only bog the process down with quibbling over trivia and relentless advocacy of rigid institutional views.

4 NSSM 191, “Policy for Acquisition of U.S. Nuclear Forces,” January 17, 1974, is published ibid., Document 32.
Therefore, unless there would be a reclama to the decision to have the Sec Def chair the DPRC\(^5\) (an option you may wish to consider seriously), I believe that what is needed is a process somewhat analogous to the current Verification Panel process. The system would work like this:

—DPRC principals would meet under the Chairman’s auspices to determine what issues should be addressed.

—A *small, informal, highly select* working group would draft a paper on the issue(s). In recognition of the fact that the DPRC is an NSC mechanism, the working group would be chaired by an NSC staff member, who would be responsive to the DPRC Chairman through you.

—The draft paper would be circulated by the NSC Secretariat to DPRC principals (DepSec State, DepSec Def, CJCS, DCI, Director OMB, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs) for comment.

—If necessary, the DPRC would then meet to discuss the issue(s).

—When appropriate, an NSC meeting would be held subsequent to the DPRC meeting.

Using an approach analogous to that of the VP would help maintain the integrity of the NSC system, fend off criticism that the “fox is in the chicken coop”, and indicate consistency in the Administration’s review techniques. Thus, it could encourage understanding and acceptance of the process within and without the government. Additionally, it might generate the psychological atmosphere conducive to insuring that the DPRC Chairman recognizes he is working as an NSC member, not as an agency head and advocate.

Finally, to underscore the Verification Panel analogy, the DPRC could be renamed the Defense Program Review Panel (DPRP).

*The DPRC (or DPRP) Work Agenda for FY 1976*

_The end objective of the DPRC (DPRP) for CY 1976 should be an overall review of the proposed FY 78 defense program and budget prior to consideration by the President (perhaps at an NSC meeting)._ In preparation for that final review, the DPRC (DPRP) should start by addressing selected individual issues of concern. Potentially the list could be very long, but it would be important to keep the number of topics to a minimum at the beginning. We would not want the process to sink at the outset under the weight of a multiplicity of projects. Therefore, I recommend that the initial work agenda include only the following central issues:

—*Review of our conventional force structure.* Our conventional forces are the most difficult to analyze objectively, are the highest cost ele-

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\(^5\) No record of this decision has been found.
ment of our defense posture, and will be the primary determinant of out-year budget changes. They touch most directly upon our overseas deployments and commitments and, in an age of rough strategic parity, could most directly affect our ability to manage future crises. Two broad questions should be addressed:

- **What conventional ground and air force levels are needed?** Defense has made a major effort to increase the overall combat capability of our air and ground forces within existing manpower levels—moving toward a force structure of 16 army divisions and 26 tactical air wings. In the wake of our Southeast Asia experience, the lethality of any future European battlefield, and the questionable stability of the third world, we need to examine what kind of capabilities we will want from our air and ground forces over the next decade—both from the standpoint of sizing the overall force and insuring that it contains the proper mix of mission capabilities at the lowest possible cost.

- **What naval force levels are required?** The size and composition of the fleet are going to be major factors in Defense procurement budgets over the next few years. We need to look at alternative ways of performing naval missions, different mixes of ship types, overall force levels (e.g. should we have a 550–600 ship Navy?), and the associated costs and risks. We will have to decide soon on the extent to which we should rely on nuclear propulsion in our surface combatant fleet. We are also going to have to look at the future of the carrier—its role, force size, and characteristics (e.g. Nimitz-size or midi-carrier?).

— **Review of our theater nuclear force posture.** Force acquisition and deployments have been made with little strategic basis. We are only just beginning to understand the role of these forces and to develop a doctrine for their use. We should continue to examine our concept for the employment of tactical nuclear forces and begin to evaluate our current delivery systems and warhead stockpiles, trying to identify alternative force postures and deployments that are more consistent with the emerging employment doctrine. Since most of the existing work has been limited to the NATO setting, we probably need to pay special attention to the role of tactical nuclear forces in other regions and contexts.

Additionally, we could begin undertaking a **review of our strategic force posture**, given the out-year implications of cruise missile, mobile ICBM, and B–1 development. However, this review need not initially be as intensive as the others because: (1) our strategic force posture is increasingly defined by SALT and is less subject to gross changes in the near term, and (2) the strategic posture would be addressed anyway in the overall wrap-up review of the defense program.
Recommendations

I personally recommend that there be a reclama to the recent decision on the DPRC Chairmanship. If there is to be no reclama, or if you want to get things moving in any event, I also recommend that:

—The DPRC be regenerated using a Verification Panel analogy, and that the DPRC be renamed the Defense Program Review Panel.

—The CY 76 work agenda include an overall review of the FY 78 program and budget, preceded by preparatory reviews of our conventional force posture, theater nuclear posture, and possibly strategic force posture.

Your Decisions

Prepare a reclama to the DPRC Chairmanship decision.

Prepare a memo to the President which recommends chartering a revitalized DPRC (DPRP) along VP lines and tasking a CY 76 program.

Prepare talking points for use with the President, Secretary Kissinger, or Secretary Rumsfeld on:

Reclama possibility
Restructuring DPRC along VP lines, plus tasking CY 76 work program

Do nothing further at this time.
Other.

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6 There is no indication that Scowcroft approved any of the recommended options. However, the working group of the newly-constituted Defense Review Panel (DRP), which replaced the DPRC, first met on January 30 to discuss a contingency plan in the event of SALT’s failure. A summary of that meeting, prepared by Boverie, is in the Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 21, Defense Review Panel Meeting, 4/7/76—SALT (1). The DRP itself first met on April 7. The record of that meeting is published in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXV, National Security Policy, 1973–1976, Document 76.
183. **Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Vest) to Secretary of State Kissinger**

Washington, April 15, 1976.

Establishment of an Arms Transfer Board

*The Problem*

In a recent inspection report of “The National Security Function in the Department of State,” S/IG has included the following recommendation: “The PM Bureau propose to the Secretary the establishment of an interagency Arms Transfer Board, with the Under Secretary for Politico Affairs as chairman, to decide or make recommendations to the Secretary on all major arms transfers, following NSC-style procedures with staff support provided by PM or its successor.”

*Discussion*

In the general area of military relationships between the United States and foreign governments, there are basically two separate, but often related, processes. One concerns availability of funds, either grant or credits, to be used by the foreign government to acquire military equipment and services from the USG. The other process concerns the provision of the equipment and services.

The funds allocation process is based on that provision of the Foreign Assistance Act which specifies that “Under the direction of the President, the Secretary of State shall be responsible for the continuous supervision and general direction of economic assistance and military assistance programs, including but not limited to determining where there shall be a military assistance (including civic action) program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the United States is best served thereby.” Allocations of FMS credit and guaranty funds are made under authority of a similarly worded provi-

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1 Source: Department of State, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976, P760070-2328. No classification marking. Sent through Sisco, Maw, and Eagleburger. Drafted by Thomas Stern (PM) on March 16 and retyped on April 15. A draft was cleared by Assistant Legal Adviser for Politico-Military Affairs James H. Michel (L/PM).

2 Not found.

3 The bureau proposal has not been found, but see Document 181.
sion in the Foreign Military Sales Act.\(^4\) Several years ago, we estab-
lished, under the chairmanship of the Under Secretary for Security As-
sistance, an interagency board called the Security Assistance Program
Review Committee (SAPRC). All major program recommendations on
military assistance and FMS to you and the President have emanated
from this body. The day-to-day program decisions have been made by
the Under Secretary, with PM functioning as his staff.

By contrast to the highly structured mechanism for allocating secu-
rity assistance funds, procedures for approval of arms transfers are
varied and disparate. Decisions on sales to most countries under the
Foreign Military Sales Act are cleared with State, but some sales are
made by DOD without our prior knowledge. Most individual transfers
under the grant military assistance program are not cleared with State,
although the general composition of each country program is approved
in the SAPRC.

There is no central board or committee which acts in this way to
monitor or control the *commercial sale of arms*. There is no comparable
body to the SAPRC in the FMS sales process. The Inspectors believe
that “a forum for systematic interagency deliberations leading to arms
transfer decisions by the Secretary is urgently needed”, that is, a forum
responsible for military sales and assistance.

The Department’s involvement in arms transfers has increased
dramatically in the last two years. The Inspectors’ criticism that we
have not performed in a comprehensive manner is probably justified.
Not only are the number of agencies legitimately interested in the issue
increasing, but within the Department, there are also more factors (e.g.
human rights, UN votes, etc.) which must be taken into consideration.

In addition to the issues raised by the Inspectors, we face further
difficulties in light of the 1976 Security Assistance bill, which will prob-
ably be passed by Congress in the very near future.\(^5\) Included in that
legislation are a number of reporting requirements, which although
singly applying to differing aspects of arms sales, in total must present
a comprehensive and cohesive picture. We have no single reporting
channel from the Administration to the Congress, but the recom-

\(^4\) S. 2662, the FY 1976 Foreign Military Aid bill, capped all arms sales at $9 billion
per annum and gave Congress the power to terminate aid to nations found in violation of
internationally accepted human rights standards. This followed the 1974 passage of P.L.
93–559, legislation that gave Congress the authority to reject government-to-government
weapons contracts of $25 million or more proposed by the Executive Branch. (*Congress

\(^5\) The conference report for S. 2662 was approved by the House and the Senate on
April 28 but vetoed by President Ford. Realizing that it did not have the votes to override
the veto, the Congressional leadership introduced a new bill (H.R. 13680) removing,
among other things, the $9 billion ceiling. The revised bill was signed into law as P.L.
94–329 on June 30. (Ibid., pp. 875–876)
amended Arms Transfer Board could serve as the organizational vehicle
to review the reports before transmission and thereby insure some
consistency.

The new legislation also mandates a ceiling of $9 billion in 1975
dollars on FMS sales and on defense articles and services that are li-
censed or approved for export by PM/MC. Central management of this
ceiling is essential if we are to avoid major difficulties and embarrass-
ments. This is another function that could be handled by the Arms
Transfer Board.

We must expect some resistance from other agencies if we attempt
to structure the present system. Some (particularly DOD) will see it as a
further encroachment on their responsibilities. Within the Department
itself, the Board will not be received unanimously as a great blessing.

Options (on establishment of Board)

1. Reject specific S/IG recommendation, but improve coordination
in the sales process to insure that at least all relevant Department orga-
nizations and ACDA are involved in the decision-making process.

   Pro
   —Would be least disruptive to present arrangements and there-
   fore would not create bureaucratic conflicts.
   —Would still achieve the minimal coordination required.

   Con
   —Would not be the most effective mechanism.
   —Might not be entirely satisfactory to Congress.

2. Establish an Arms Transfer Board consisting only of State De-
partment and ACDA.

   Pro
   —Would at least increase the viability of the State position in any
   interagency forum.
   —Would make a rational case for our use with any critics.

   Con
   —Would not be as comprehensive as might be desirable.

3. Accept S/IG recommendation.

   Pro
   —Would make the most organizational sense.
   —Would insure that all relevant views be taken into account.

   Con
   —May create bureaucratic frictions.
Options (if Board and Chairmanship to be established)

1. Combine Board and SAPRC, with chairmanship rotating between P (for arms sales) and T (for security assistance programs).
   
   Pro
   — Probably simplest approach.
   
   Con
   — Does not fully resolve question of chairmanship.

2. Maintain separate Board and SAPRC with
   
   (a) SAPRC chaired by T and Board by P; or
   (b) both chaired by T;
   (c) both chaired by P.

Recommendations:

1. That you authorize us to proceed with interagency negotiations for the purpose of establishing an interagency Arms Transfer Board.

2. That you designate the Under Secretary for Security Assistance (Mr. Maw) as the chairman of this new Board.

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6 Kissinger initialed his approval of both recommendations on May 7.
184. Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger) to the Assistant Secretaries of State for the Regional Bureaus, the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs (Greenwald), the Director of the Bureau of Personnel (Laise), the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration (Thomas), and the Director of the Foreign Service Institute (Broderick)1


SUBJECT

Establishment of a Regional Resource Attaché Program

In view of the growing Government-wide interest in commodities questions, and in accordance with the PPG’s recommendations,2 I have concluded that a Regional Resource Attaché Program should be established.

The principal elements of the program, which were outlined in the attachment to my earlier memorandum on the same subject dated September 23, 1975,3 and the responsible action bureaus and offices, appear to be as follows:

1. Existing minerals and petroleum attaché positions should be designated “resource attaché” positions, and a new skill code for resource attachés be established by PER.

2. New regional resource attaché positions should be established at five additional posts, largely through redesignation of existing economic/commercial positions. As a result of negotiations between the Department of the Interior and EB, it has been tentatively concluded that these be Tokyo, Bangkok, USEC Brussels, Jakarta, and Algiers. Only the Algiers position would be new. A final determination on the location of the five new positions should be made by EB in consultation with the Department of Interior, the geographic bureau concerned, PER and M/MO.

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1 Source: Department of State, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron April 1976 E. No classification marking. The regional Assistant Secretaries were: Rogers (Inter-American Affairs), Hartman (European Affairs), Habib (East Asian and Pacific Affairs), Atherton (Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs), and Schaufele (African Affairs).

2 Not further identified.

3 Eagleburger’s September 23, 1975, memorandum to the regional Assistant Secretaries and the Director of INR asking for comments on a paper proposing the creation of a regional resource attaché program is in the National Archives, RG 59, General Administrative Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, Box 3, M Chron September 1976. The referenced paper, however, was not attached and has not been found.
3. EB should develop a plan to organize a coordinating office to provide reporting guidance and evaluation and general backstopping for the Resource Attache Program. I would appreciate a copy of the plan for my information and for the use of the Reports Coordinator.

4. EB should, in cooperation with A/BF and concerned regional bureaus, extend to regional resource attachés the present procedure for earmarking funds for travel and should require the attachés to file annual travel schedules to be monitored by the backstopping office.

5. An appropriate training program for regional resource attachés should be prepared by FSI, in cooperation with interested bureaus, for review by the Board of Professional Development.

These steps are essential if the Department is to fulfill its responsibilities in this major new field of resource diplomacy. Of special importance and interest is reporting on the political/economic context in which decisions on commodities are made; at the same time we should develop deeper and more current information on the statistical and technical side of commodities production and trade. Much good work is already being done by our posts abroad. What is needed is greater emphasis and clearer focus on commodities reporting and negotiations. Despite the difficulties and delays in developing this program we can help achieve our national objectives in this vitally important field through effective management of the program we are now establishing. I will appreciate your full cooperation.

185. Memorandum From the President’s Special Counsel (Raoul-Duval) to the White House Chief of Staff (Cheney)¹


SUBJECT
Terrorism

Background
The current Executive Branch mechanism for coordinating U.S. response to terrorism is the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, chaired by

¹ Source: Ford Library, Papers of Michael Raoul-Duval, Box 11, Intelligence Coordinating Group Papers, Terrorism. Administratively Confidential. Attached to a memorandum proposing the creation of a Terrorism Special Action Group (TSAG) within the NSC system to provide advice and assistance to the President and “develop decision options related to crises generated by terrorist activities.” The TSAG was to be chaired by Scowcroft and comprised of the Deputy Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Deputy Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and the Director of the Domestic Council.
the Secretary of State. The center of gravity of this group’s activities concerns terrorism abroad.

The Cabinet Committee has a Working Group\(^2\) which is active and has produced a series of doomsday-type papers showing the potential of substantially increased terrorism activities throughout the world and here in the United States. I personally believe that most of the current rash of news reports on the terrorist potential has been triggered largely by the work of this group.

*The Problem*

Terrorism will increase worldwide and in the United States over the coming years. It is possible there could be an increase in the United States this year, starting with the 4th of July and continuing through the Presidential election. It is impossible to rule out the possibility of a major terrorist attack in the United States.

The current Executive Branch organization (which was set up by former President Nixon) to combat terrorism, i.e., the Cabinet Committee and Working Group, is not adequate. There should be a reorganization of this effort reflecting the changed circumstances and President Ford’s priorities. The entire effort needs to be geared more to protecting U.S. interests within the United States.

Any action taken by the President in this area is subject to great risk. Anything he does publicly could itself trigger terrorist action, although this is a far-overrated threat. Also, great caution is needed in this area because some of the abuses alleged to have occurred in the Intelligence Community during the late ’60s and early ’70s were in response to anti-terrorist activities. The Attorney General is very concerned about how our foreign intelligence activities to combat terrorism interface with domestic law enforcement responsibilities. Finally, terrorists are very difficult to deal with, and therefore the President can easily appear impotent in any given specific situation.

*Recommendation*

I think the President should move very quietly to strengthen Executive Branch efforts to combat terrorism. I think he should take action now before a major incident turns this latent problem into a major public issue.

He must, however, move very carefully. One staff recommendation within the NSC is that the President create a Terrorism Special Action Group under the chairmanship of Scowcroft. This may be a good idea.

\(^2\) Created in October 1972, the Working Group was chaired by the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of the Office for Combating Terrorism.
I recommend that you call a meeting of the following: Marsh, Burchen, Scowcroft, Cannon and myself. The purpose of this meeting would be to assign action to a very small, in-house (White House staff only) group to develop an options paper for the President.³

³ There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. A draft NSDM is attached but was never issued, although an Executive Group on Terrorism was created under the chairmanship of L. Douglas Heck. On July 23, Heck was appointed Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Coordinator of the Office for Combating Terrorism, elevated to Director with the equivalent rank of Assistant Secretary on August 1. The Executive Group included one representative each from the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense as well as the NSC, FBI, and CIA and held its first meeting on December 1. The substance of that meeting is discussed in a December 3 memorandum from Robert B. Plowden, Jr., of the NSC Staff to Hyland. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–301, Staff and Committees [1 of 3])

186. Action Memorandum From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management (Eagleburger) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, August 8, 1976.

Department Organization for Human Rights

Background

The new security assistance authorizing bill creates in the Department a “Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs,” who is to be appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate.² The legislation states that the new Coordinator will be “responsible to the Secretary for matters pertaining to human rights and humanitarian affairs (including matters relating to refugees and


² The International Security Assistance and Arms Control Export Act was signed by President Ford on June 30. (P.L. 94–329; 90 Stat. 748) The position was previously titled the Coordinator for Humanitarian Affairs following its creation on April 25, 1975.
prisoner-of-war/missing-in-action) in the conduct of foreign policy,” and that the “Secretary of State shall carry out his responsibilities under Section 502B of this Act through the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs.”

The Coordinator is to “maintain continuous observance and review of all matters pertaining to human rights and humanitarian affairs in the conduct of foreign policy” including: (1) gathering detailed information regarding human rights in each country for whom we are proposing security or development assistance; (2) preparing the statements and reports required by Congress; (3) making recommendations to the Secretary and the AID Administrator regarding compliance with the Foreign Assistance Act; and (4) performing other responsibilities which serve to promote increased observance of internationally recognized human rights by all countries.

Section 302 of the new bill also makes the Coordinator responsible for assisting in the preparation of reports to Congress on discrimination against American citizens in foreign countries where we furnish security assistance. The Conference Report states that the conferees intend that the Coordinator shall be available to the HIRC and SFRC when called upon to report on human rights and discrimination matters.

These new organizational and policy prescriptions originated in the Senate and were designed to require greater emphasis on human rights in the administration of security assistance programs. Initially, the Senate proposed that there be a “Director of Human Rights” exclusively concerned with foreign assistance aspects who would have semi-independent-status and be answerable both to the Congress and the Administration. (The House had no comparable provision.) While we were unable to eliminate entirely a provision for a statutory office, we were able to convince Senate human rights champions of the undesirability of establishing a new and untried bureaucratic entity independent of the chain-of-command, who would have an unduly narrow, and essentially negative role. We argued that the existing D/HA structure could accommodate the expanded human rights duties the legislation specified. This concept was finally accepted by Senator Case whose floor amendment essentially validated the existing Departmental humanitarian affairs mandate (human rights, refugees and POW/MIA’s). The legislative history of this idea indicates clearly, however, that Congress intends that the Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs shall be given sufficient staff and resources to carry out his enhanced responsibilities with requisite bureaucratic clout. What this means in terms of bodies and money will have to be worked out between the new Coordinator and the PPG. The overall question of integrating the Coordinator into arms transfer decision-making is under study.
Recommendation

That you authorize M to take necessary steps to process the nomination of James R. Wilson as Coordinator for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs to be approved by the President and submitted to the Senate.3

3 There is no indication of approval or disapproval of the recommendation. However, Wilson was appointed Coordinator on November 17 and began his duties November 29.

187. Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Robinson to President Ford1

Washington, September 17, 1976.

SUBJECT

Establishment of an Arms Export Control Board

The topic of security assistance and arms export control is one of increasing complexity and public and Congressional concern. The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976, which you signed on 30 June, reflects this heightened Congressional involvement, mandating sweeping changes in arms transfer processes and reporting.2

Secretary Kissinger believes the time has come to establish an interagency Board to advise you and him in discharging your statutory responsibilities for security assistance and arms export control programs and policies. In his absence he has directed me to inform you of his views and to make the following recommendations in his name.

As he envisages it, such a Board would:


2 See footnote 2, Document 186. The legislation gave Congress the power to review commercial arms sales for the first time and extended veto power on government sales of military equipment valued over $7 million. Moreover, it prohibited private companies from selling directly to foreign governments any military equipment valued over $25 million. (Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976, Vol. IV, p. 875)
—serve as a forum and a mechanism for all the interested agencies to provide their views in an early and orderly way so as to facilitate the development of coherent security assistance and arms export control policy formulation and execution.
—provide general policy oversight and guidance in the transfer of defense articles and services to ensure that such transfers are fully coordinated with and supportive of the foreign policy of the United States.
—review and provide recommendations upon security assistance plans and programs, including economic ones, and recommend resource allocations and budgets therefor.

Without infringing upon any statutorily assigned responsibilities, such an advisory forum would both strengthen our internal processes in the Executive and help meet the demand in Congress for a more comprehensive approach to security assistance and arms export controls. Additionally, he believes your creating such a Board would provide an initiative which would undoubtedly be well received by the media and public.

Secretary Kissinger has prepared the attached draft NSDM establishing such a Board, which takes into consideration the comments of Defense, NSC Staff, ACDA, AID, OMB and Treasury, the agencies principally interested. All these agree with the general concept of the Board and its general, overall mandate, although Defense, Treasury, OMB, and AID have some specific reservations as footnoted on the

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3 Attached but not printed. The draft NSDM outlines the creation of a Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Board (SAAECB) under the supervision of the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the NSC. Chaired by the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, SAAECB’s permanent membership was to include the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the Director of the ACDA. The Under Secretary of the Treasury, the Associate Director of OMB, and the Administrator of AID were to be members when SAAECB considered matters related to their responsibilities.

4 On July 7, Maw sent a draft mandate to Robinson, Habib, Rogers, Eagleburger, Vest, State Department Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh, and Lord, for their comments. (Department of State, Administrative Correspondence Files 1969–77, Policy and Procedural Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management: Lot 79 D 63, M Chron July 1976 B) Their responses were summarized in a July 13 memorandum from Dennis H. Wood (D) to Robinson. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson, 1976–1977, Entry 5176, Box 9, Arms Control Export Board) A similar memorandum requesting comments was sent on July 15 to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, the Chairman of the JCS, the Director of ACDA, the Associate Director of OMB, and the Under Secretary of the Treasury. (Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 63, Establishment of an Arms Export Control Board) Responses from the NSC are ibid.
draft mandate. In view of the importance of timeliness in this initiative, and in light of the general consensus on the Board and its functions, the Secretary believes you should now proceed to create the Board.

Recommendations:

That you direct the establishment now of a Board along the lines of the draft NSDM and Mandate.

Alternatively that you approve in principle the establishment of an interagency Arms Export Control Board, with details of its character and functions to be finalized without delay through the NSC process.

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5 The draft mandate is attached but not printed. On September 27, Bush wrote to Robinson requesting that the DCI be added to the list of permanent members of the SAAECB. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson, 1976–1977, Entry 5176, Box 3, D—Chron September 1976) Amos A. Jordan, Acting Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance, recommended to Robinson in an October 11 memorandum that the DCI be added to the Board “whenever it considers matters pertaining to their responsibilities.” (Ibid., Box 4, D—Chron October–November 1976) Robinson concurred and signed a memorandum to Bush inviting CIA participation on this basis. (Ibid.)

6 There is no indication that Ford approved or disapproved the recommendation. The NSDM was never issued.

7 There is no indication that Ford approved or disapproved the recommendation. On January 18, 1977, President Ford signed Executive Order 11958, giving the Secretaries of State and Defense the authority to review proposed arms exports in consultation with the Secretary of the Treasury, the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency, and the Director of ACDA on matters pertaining to their respective responsibilities. For the text of Executive Order 11958, see Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, Vol. 13, No. 3, January 20, 1977, pp. 66–67.
188. Telegram From the Department of State to Selected Diplomatic Posts

Washington, October 28, 1976, 2319Z.

266442. For Chief of Mission from Deputy Secretary. Subject: Mission Activities in Support of the USG International Narcotics Program.

1. Drug abuse in the United States remains a serious national problem despite various programs to reduce it. The President and the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Control (CCINC), chaired by the Secretary, continue to place high priority emphasis on drug traffic control in our bilateral relations with those countries that figure significantly either as producing nations or major transit nations in the flow of illicit drugs toward the United States. The programs of the CCINC, since its formation in 1971, have had a significant impact in cutting into some of the flow of illicit drugs. However, the extent of the demand in the US, together with the very high profits of this illicit commerce, have limited the effectiveness of our efforts as measured by the availability of illicit narcotics in our country.

2. We are, accordingly, constantly searching for ways in which the Department of State role in the Federal effort can be made more effective. This is a matter which is examined, among other things, at the annual regional conferences of Embassy Narcotics Control Coordinators. The most recent of these conferences was held in London for the EUR area on September 21–22. The regional Narcotics Coordinators conference for the NEA area will take place at Islamabad on November 15–16, 1976 and that for the ARA area at Guatemala City on December 9–10, 1976. Chiang Mai has been asked to host the EA area conference in mid-January, 1977. The purpose of this message is to identify several steps which need to be taken and to request that you assure they are taken, as appropriate in your Mission’s context.

3. The problem of achieving improved intelligence servicing of our international narcotics control effort has been examined at each of the regional conferences and is a subject of continuing interagency examination in Washington. We are working toward more effective arrangements here. At the same time our inquiries have revealed the need at

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most posts for better coordination and utilization of all of the narcotics information gathering capabilities present at the post. This relates primarily to narcotics intelligence, other than individual case data, which is important for our assessments of the significance of a country to our narcotics control interest and which, of course, is most valuable when accompanied by recommendations as to what should be done. That information is basic to Washington decisions on the deployment of personnel and financial resources in the overall program.

4. Our inquiries indicate that at a number of posts there is inadequate coordination of narcotics intelligence reporting by various Mission elements and also that some Mission elements having specialized expertise or capabilities germane to this type of reporting are not contributing them to the effort to the extent desired. One factor to be considered is that dissemination in Washington should be assured for reports of general interest. (SecState should thus be addressee.) Our concern is primarily, though not solely, with those countries clearly known to be of present significance in the drug production and trafficking picture. We are in the process of drawing up a number of specific intelligence tasking questions for these countries in an effort to fill gaps in our knowledge. Every effort will be made to assure that information requested has not already been reported.

5. It will be appreciated if you would assure that all appropriate resources are being applied to the narcotics intelligence effort. We believe that a standing intelligence coordination mechanism, such as a subcommittee of the Country Team Narcotics Committee, should assure that each Mission element concerned is aware of and has opportunity to comment on what the other is reporting and that periodic analytical assessments are prepared. Information as to the desired frequency of analytical narcotics reports will be included in the messages to the individual posts referred to above.

6. It was evident at the London conference that some Embassy Narcotics Coordinators, notably those more recently assigned to the function, were not fully aware of the importance of the drug abuse issue, the reporting requirements, and their role in the Mission in regard to them. A number of circular messages from the Department concerning our narcotics control effort have been sent out over the past two years. A key message in this series is State 119686 on narcotics: The Role of the Embassy Narcotics Coordinator, dated May 22, 1975.2 A

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2 Telegram 119686, May 22, 1975, directed that the Embassy Narcotics Coordinator was to act as the key assistant to the Chief of Mission in order to assure “that the activities of all mission components are directed appropriately to attain the goals of our international narcotics program expeditiously and effectively.” The Coordinator’s responsibilities included keeping abreast of host government actions and attitudes as well as following the narcotics program activities of all participating agencies at the mission. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1975)
listing of the other principal circular messages on narcotics control matters is being sent separately. I would like you to assure that all designated Narcotics Coordinators, and their supervisors, familiarize themselves with these messages.

7. Also, I am confident that you will give your Narcotics Coordinator the full support and direction needed to bring all concerned Mission elements together. As seen from here, this is particularly important in respect to intelligence gathering and assessment. And, in those countries where the US is conducting a narcotics assistance program, coordination is essential to effective program development, implementation and evaluation.

Kissinger

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3 Telegram 271544 to the same addressees, November 4. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

189. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Military Assistance Advisory Groups

The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 required a reduction to 34 MAAG’s by September 30, 1976. In addition, the Act requires specific Congressional authorization for MAAG’s existing after September 30, 1977. In response to this requirement, an NSC review of the worldwide requirement for the continuation of MAAG’s was initiated. At this time, the required reduction for FY 1977 has been made, and the study on MAAG requirements has

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been completed.\textsuperscript{2} The study contains two options for MAAG presence after September 30, 1977.

Both options recommend that security assistance functions be performed:

—by Foreign Service Officers in countries with the very smallest programs;
—by Defense Attaché Offices (DAO’s) in countries where programs are small but require occasional in-country military expertise;
—by three-person Offices of Defense Cooperation (ODC’s—which do not require specific Congressional approval) in countries with small programs which nonetheless require full-time attention;
—by Congressionally-approved, MAAG-type organizations (Defense Field Offices (DEFO’s) or Military Groups) in countries with large programs and where U.S. foreign policy interests necessitate a group of more than three members of the U.S. armed forces.

In addition, both options recommend that the law (which now prohibits use of DAO’s in a security assistance role) be amended to allow DAO’s to perform this function.

Beyond these broad areas of agreement, there are differing positions on the number of MAAG-type organizations to be retained, the Manning levels needed in various countries, and the costs involved to support the recommended positions. A summary of the key features of the two options is at Tab C.\textsuperscript{3}

\textit{State/Defense Option}

The State/Defense option recommends that 34 MAAG-type organizations be proposed to the Congress for FY 1978. Although this represents no reduction in the number of organizations from the FY 1977 level, the option does reflect significant manpower and cost savings. State and Defense believe the resulting structure permits efficient management of our security assistance programs, and retains sufficient flexibility to meet intelligence and diplomatic responsibilities.

Twenty of the organizations proposed for retention would be redesignated Defense Field Offices and both the size and function of each office would be reduced. The remaining 14 organizations are the traditional military groups in Latin America, many of them going back to World War II days. State and Defense propose that these offices continue to operate as they have, in a primarily representational capacity, with security assistance functions performed as a collateral duty. This traditional representative role has fostered interservice ties and closer relations between the host country military and the United States, and

\textsuperscript{2} The study on MAAG requirements for FY 1977, NSSM 243, October 19, is published ibid, Document 103.

\textsuperscript{3} The table, “Proposed MAAG Presence—FY 1978,” is attached but not printed.
State and Defense believe the resulting relationship has made, and should continue to make, a significant contribution to U.S. policy interests in these countries. Therefore, they propose that specific legislation be sought to retain all 14 offices, although many would be reduced in size.

State and Defense also believe that the current ceiling of three military personnel who may be assigned to chiefs of U.S. diplomatic missions for security assistance tasks without further congressional approval is too restrictive and inflexible. They propose that authority be sought to increase this number to six, where there is a clear need to do so. If accepted by Congress, this proposal would reduce the number of MAAGs requiring specific congressional approval by eight, leaving 26 MAAG-type organizations in FY 1978, six of which would be in Latin America.

**OMB Option**

OMB proposes to reduce the number of MAAG-type organizations to 20 in FY 1978, continuing them only where (1) major security assistance programs exist, (2) U.S. forces are present and a representational function is required for the MAAGs, or (3) major U.S. foreign policy interests would be significantly damaged by elimination. The remainder of the countries would be served by Offices of Defense Cooperation with up to three military personnel, or existing DAO arrangements.

OMB’s alternative is based on the following considerations:

- The original mission of the MAAGs was heavily oriented toward implementation of the grant matériel program and field level training and advisory functions, which have become less relevant, given the shift in our military assistance program from grants to sales.
- The need for a military-to-military representational function for MAAGs has decreased because foreign governments rely more on direct contacts with Washington concerning sales cases and training programs.
- Because of the congressional requirement to terminate MAAGs except where specifically authorized, requesting continuation of virtually all the existing MAAGs carries the risk that the Congress will take arbitrary actions restricting the Administration’s flexibility and effective management of the security assistance and sales programs.

OMB’s option would eliminate a number of small MAAGs and several Latin American MILGROUPs, which State and Defense propose to retain. OMB believes that ODCs of three military personnel, augmented where necessary by additional civilians and periodic visits by mobile training teams, can adequately perform the necessary in-country security assistance functions.
I believe the State/Defense option will satisfy the congressional desire to phase down the worldwide MAAG presence, while avoiding the repercussions which could result from OMB’s sharper cuts. In addition, bearing in mind that a proposal similar to this must be made to Congress each year, the State/Defense option leaves considerably greater flexibility for subsequent years.

**Recommendations**

That you authorize me to issue the NSDM at Tab A, establishing organizations to perform security assistance functions according to the State/Defense option. (ACDA and CIA concur)\(^4\)

Alternatively, that you authorize me to issue the NSDM at Tab B, establishing organizations to perform security assistance functions according to the OMB option.\(^5\)

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\(^4\) Ford initialed his approval. The signed NSDM at Tab A is Document 190.

\(^5\) Ford initialed his disapproval. Tab B is attached but not printed.

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190. **National Security Decision Memorandum 342\(^1\)**


TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Organizations to Perform Security Assistance Functions

The President has reviewed the study of the Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs on *MAAG Requirements* and has noted agency views.\(^2\) The President has decided to establish or continue in the countries indicated the following organizations to perform

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 68, Institutional Files—NSDMs, NSDM 342—Organizations to Perform Security Assistance Functions. Confidential. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 189.
security assistance functions in Fiscal Year 1978. Personnel and funding levels will be those established in the President’s Fiscal Year 1978 budget request.

Defense Field Offices

Ethiopia  
Greece  
Indonesia  
Iran*/**  
Japan  
Jordan  
Korea

Kuwait*  
Liberia  
Morocco  
Pakistan  
Philippines  
Portugal  
Republic of China

Saudi Arabia*  
Spain  
Thailand  
Tunisia**  
Turkey  
Zaire

Military Groups

Argentina  
Bolivia  
Brazil  
Chile**  
Colombia  
Costa Rica***

Dominican Republic**  
Ecuador**  
El Salvador**  
Guatemala  
Honduras**  
Nicaragua

Panama  
Paraguay***  
Peru**  
Uruguay***  
Venezuela

* The Defense Field Office will be replaced by an Office of Defense Cooperation if an adequate level of reimbursement can be obtained from the host country.

** Six or less members of the U.S. military will be assigned to the Defense Field Office or Military Group.

*** Three or less members of the U.S. military will be assigned to the Military Group.

Offices of Defense Cooperation

Australia  
Austria  
Belgium  
Denmark  
France

India  
Italy  
Netherlands  
Norway  
United Kingdom

Federal Republic of Germany

The Secretary of State, in close cooperation with the Secretary of Defense, should propose legislation which will:

• Authorize establishment of Defense Field Offices in the countries specified above.

• Provide for continued operation of the Latin American military groups based on their traditional role of representation.

• Permit, without specific congressional approval, the assignment to the chief of each U.S. diplomatic mission of up to six military personnel to perform security assistance functions.
- Allow Defense Attaché Offices to continue to perform security assistance functions in countries where either manpower and cost savings are effected or political sensitivities are paramount.

If these amendments to the existing law are not forthcoming, Office of Defense Cooperation will be established or Defense Field Offices will be proposed where necessary.

Brent Scowcroft

191. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Robinson) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)


SUBJECT
State–Treasury Relations

You have requested my views on State and Treasury roles in international economic matters. Accordingly, I have outlined below:

—a rationale for State Department involvement in international economic policies,
— the need for more effective interagency coordination on economic matters, and
— my views on the respective roles of State and Treasury on specific economic issues.

International Economic Policy

The design and direction of U.S. foreign policy must be founded on the reality of an expanding economic interdependence between nations. The development of the world political order has become inseparable from the evolution of the international economic system; thus foreign policy has become inseparable from economic policy.

Organization of the Executive Branch for the conduct of foreign policy must recognize the increasing difficulty in distinguishing between:

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—what is domestic and what is international in economic issues, and
—what is political (or strategic) in the traditional sense and what is economic in the conduct of foreign policy.

Thus we are faced with the dilemma of how to adjust traditional State Department approaches to foreign policy which has an increasingly important economic component. Only with major adjustment can we moderate the natural tendency for other key agencies (such as Treasury) to encroach on State’s coordinating role in foreign affairs.

Need for Interagency Coordination

It is clear that the White House should be increasingly involved in key international economic issues where basic U.S. interests are at stake. Thus regardless of the respective roles of State and Treasury in this area, there is need for a more effective mechanism within the White House to assure proper coordination of the interests of all agencies involved. This could be achieved by various alternative means:

(a) a modified NSC with an economic staff to balance the political (or strategic) staff, thus providing for a fully coordinated foreign policy;
(b) a revitalized Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) reporting to the President to coordinate with an NSC limited to political (or strategic) policies.
(c) an Economic Policy Board—chaired by Treasury as employed during the Ford administration. (Treasury domination during the Ford administration prevented this from serving as an effective coordinating mechanism on foreign economic issues.)
(d) a more active and involved Council of Economic Advisors to coordinate domestic and international considerations in economic policies.

Whatever the mechanism, it should serve only for coordination and should not inhibit State (or Treasury, where appropriate) in the generation of economic policy initiatives; nor should it interfere with the implementation of these policies by the appropriate agency.

I would favor alternative (b) with an active and effective CIEP providing the necessary coordination on economic policy issues. This could provide the added benefit of bringing the Special Trade Representative (STR) under appropriate Administration control—the lack of which created serious problems for the Ford administration.

This approach would clearly serve State’s interest; however, I suspect that alternative (a)—an expanded NSC—is a much more likely solution.

State/Treasury Relationship

It is difficult to generalize on State/Treasury relationships on economic policies as these cover a wide range of issues, each requiring a
somewhat different blend of responsibilities. To illustrate, there are listed below a series of issues involving varying State/Treasury roles.

In most international economic issues, State should lead with Treasury playing a supporting role. These include:

1. **Harmonization of economic policies among the major industrialized nations.** Interdependency has generated the need for a more cooperative effort amongst the industrialized nations to harmonize national economic policies. This can be accomplished through:
   - Economic summit meetings in which the six or seven key industrialized nations are represented at the highest levels;
   - Effective use of OECD for intensified consultation for coordinating national economic growth planning; and,
   - Expanded bilateral contacts between key industrialized nations at foreign policy and economic planning levels.

2. **Cooperation in dealing with energy problems.** Both Treasury and a new Energy Czar\(^2\) will push for increased control of our relations with industrialized and OPEC nations on energy issues. Their participation is essential to assure coordination of domestic and international considerations, but in view of the important foreign relations implications, State should provide the leadership in both planning and implementation of international energy policies.

3. **Building economic and technical links with Eastern Europe and the USSR.** This calls for both consultation and coordination with our Western partners and increasing contact with the Soviet Union and its satellites, both bilaterally and through multilateral negotiations, with State having the primary responsibility.

4. **Global Food Issues.** Both Treasury and increasingly the USDA will push for an expanded role in dealing with global food problems. However, this effort must fulfill U.S. moral obligations to support the needy and serve U.S. foreign policy objectives which argues for a continued leadership role for State.

5. **Rationalizing the North-South dialogue.** The quadrupling of the number of independent nation states since the end of World War II has created the need for a new structural relationship between industrialized and developing nations. This is one of the critical challenges of our time and the future of our world can well depend on our successful response. State has taken the lead in confronting these issues—including bilateral programs for economic assistance, through the UN and its agencies such as UNCTAD and in the Conference on International Economic Cooperation (CIEC). State should continue this leadership role

\(^2\) The heads of the various offices managing energy policy, beginning with John Love in 1973 (see footnote 3, Document 161), were known as the Energy Czar.
in the future. (There are specific issues such as debt rescheduling in which Treasury must lead.) This will call for a new and more effective mechanism for coordinating State/Treasury positions in the future.

6. *Commodity Issues.* These involve negotiation of individual commodity agreements and participation in multilateral efforts to establish a common fund to support commodity buffer stocks.

7. *International Trade.* Although STR has prime responsibility for actual negotiations and Treasury is directly involved in administering protective provisions of U.S. law, State must have over-all responsibility in foreign trade policies. This is an area which demands more effective coordination than has been the case to date to assure protection of domestic interests, but in a manner which also serves our international objectives.

8. Other important issues in which State must lead but with important Treasury participation include:

—Multi-national corporations—investment guidelines and codes of conduct;
—Technological cooperation to support economic and social development abroad;
—Law of the Sea treaty negotiations where Committee One on deep seabeds exploitation involves complex economic problems; and,
—Joint economic commissions established to strengthen our relations with selected countries in the Middle East through expanded economic and technical cooperation.

Although close coordination is essential in all international economic programs, there are certain areas in which Treasury must lead:

1. *Monetary Affairs*

Treasury has the prime responsibility for representing the U.S. in multilateral monetary issues. However, State should have a more important participation in these activities than in the recent past to assure effective coordination of foreign policy.

Treasury has dominated decisions in the IMF and IBRD which has resulted in U.S. positions which, although fiscally sound, do not reflect over-all foreign policy goals. State must select Alternate Directors for—and direct and influence the policies of these institutions—if they are to serve broader U.S. interests.

Beyond current operating policies we face a major challenge in adjusting the current system to the demands of a changing world. Our global monetary structure—born three decades ago at Bretton Woods—has served us well; however, it is simply inadequate to deal with the financial stresses resulting from:

—the sudden rise in energy costs,
—the proliferation of independent nations with at best, marginal economic viability, and
—the inflationary pressures which appear to be endemic in our global political structure.

The U.S. must lead the way in developing new multilateral institutions with increased “shock absorbing” capacity to deal with world wide financial strains. Treasury will lead in this effort but State must play an important part to assure full consideration of foreign policy objectives in both planning and implementation.

2. Debt Rescheduling

State and Treasury must coordinate closely in this area which is destined to become increasingly important in our relations with the developing world; however, the actual negotiation of debt rescheduling is an appropriate task for Treasury.

3. Capital Flows

We face a major problem in moderating the political risks which now inhibit capital flows into the developing nations, and thus prevent rational development of the earth’s resources. State has proposed the International Resources Bank to meet this challenge; however, Treasury is the appropriate agency to lead in the planning and implementation of this program.

4. National Financial Crises

Critical financial problems such as those faced by the UK, Italy and Portugal today call for innovative solutions to preserve international economic stability. Treasury must be responsible for negotiating solutions but these should be closely coordinated with State to insure proper consideration of sensitive political issues.

Summary

With global interdependency, comes increasing government involvement in international economic (and energy) affairs. It is inevitable that all government agencies will seek to expand their involvement in the international dimension. This will continue to challenge State’s traditional role in the conduct of foreign policy. It appears likely that this problem will be magnified in the Carter administration with an aggressive internationally oriented Treasury organization—a strengthened NSC, a new Energy Czar and determined experienced leadership in the CEA.

To assure a proper State role in the coordination of all foreign policy it is first essential to develop an effective internal organization. No longer can State win the day by crying “foul” on foreign policy terms. It must develop a new capability to tackle all economic (and energy) issues across a broader front. There is need for strengthened analytical capability in the economic area—greater sensitivity to the needs of a changing world—and more creativity in resolving increasingly complex international economic problems.
To achieve these objectives, it is essential to develop a seventh floor capacity to anticipate impending economic problems and an ability to organize an effective response. State must also mobilize existing resources more effectively:

— for planning new approaches to economic problems,
— to direct interagency coordinating efforts, and
— to implement new policies abroad.

Failure to achieve these goals will lead to serious erosion of State’s proper role in the conduct of foreign policy.

192. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Robinson) to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Habib)¹


SUBJECT
State–Treasury Relations

I have reflected further on two aspects of my memorandum of December 24 on this subject² and offer the following additional suggestions:

Interagency Coordination Mechanism:

My basic point in that memo—the growing congruence of international and domestic policy and of foreign policy and economic policy—is fundamental to the question of Departmental and interagency organization. With that in mind, I suggested the possibility of a revitalized Council on International Economic Policy (CIEP) for neutral coordination of economic policy. I felt that this would protect against Treasury (and/or NSC) domination of economic policy and resolve the problem of an uncoordinated Special Trade Representative (STR); however, I also indicated that this was not a likely possibility.

After further thought I now believe that consideration should be given to a further option which may be more viable given the an-

² Document 191.
nounced cast of characters in the economic field. This would call for reconstituting the EPB under the leadership of the Chairman of the CEA, with standing committees chaired by State, Treasury, Commerce, Energy, STR, etc., as appropriate. This would work so long as the CEA was headed by a broad-gauge, action-oriented chairman, as seems to be the prospect with Schultze. He would need a senior CEA associate strong in international economic affairs and a small augmentation of the CEA staff.

CEA chairmanship of EPB would minimize the risk of dilution of State’s control of foreign policy, as compared with the other options. This risk is particularly high if EPB is given a broadened role and Treasury (Blumenthal) is in the chair. Not being an operating agency, CEA would be less likely than Treasury to exploit this power base to invade State’s rightful place in the conduct of international economic relations. CEA chairmanship also would be most consistent with the concept of Presidential control.

State Department Organization

More important than interagency mechanisms are the people who hold the key positions in the participating departments/agencies. State’s ability to maintain a leading role in economic policy-making and policy-execution—indeed, effective U.S. leadership in international arenas—depends on the personal equation. The Secretary of State and his key associates, employing the great resources of this department, can work successfully with a less than ideal interagency coordination system. Even with the best interagency system, the Secretary needs an economic policy team with the kinds of capacities I outlined on the final page of my December 24 memorandum.

I left unstated in that memorandum the point that the Under Secretary for Economic Affairs, while only one of several members of the Secretary’s economic team, is critical to the Department’s influence and performance. He must be able to lead on three fronts:

— in directing (not just coordinating) for the Secretary this department’s work on major economic issues;
— in advocating and defending State’s positions in interagency bodies, particularly with senior Treasury and White House officers; and
— in conducting major international negotiations and consultations.

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3 Charles L. Schultze was nominated by President-elect Carter on December 16 to be the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers.

4 W. Michael Blumenthal was nominated by President-elect Carter on December 14 to be the Secretary of the Treasury.
These requirements suggest criteria for selecting the man to fill this position; they also bear on his relationship with the Assistant Secretary for Economic and Business Affairs.

Charles W. Robinson
The National Security Council System

193. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Parker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
NSC Meetings

With regard to meetings of the National Security Council, the ex officio members (Attorney General and Secretary of the Treasury) are no longer to be included unless the substance of the meeting requires their presence. USIA Director Jim Keogh, however, should be invited to attend all NSC meetings.

These instructions were passed to us from the President today.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1052, Institutional Materials, NSC Institutional Papers—February 1973. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Davis and Scowcroft.

2 These instructions were repeated in a memorandum from Tom Hart of the White House Staff to Scowcroft on April 12 after Shultz inquired about the Treasury Department’s attendance at future NSC meetings. (Ibid., Box 1053, Institutional Materials, NSC Institutional Papers, April 1973 [2 of 2])

194. Memorandum From Secretary of the Treasury Shultz to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)


SUBJECT
Treasury Representation in WASAG

In light of the new emphasis on economic assistance for the reconstruction of Vietnam, I believe it would be desirable for the Treasury
Department to be represented in the Washington Special Action Group (WASAG).

I understand that WASAG has in the past been the forum for discussion of the more important problems relating to Vietnam, and that this role is likely to continue in the future.

The Treasury has, as you know, made some suggestions regarding the modalities of multilateral assistance for North Vietnam, a field in which we can be of considerable assistance because of our relationships with all the principal national and international financial institutions.

I am suggesting Treasury representation only at WASAG meetings involving Vietnam. Unless other problems scheduled for consideration in that body have major economic implications, there would be no need for us to participate.

If you agree to attendance by a Treasury representative, I would nominate Deputy Secretary Simon, with my Special Assistant, John Hart, as Alternate.2

George P. Shultz3

2 Although no response from Kissinger was found, the Department of the Treasury was not granted WSAG representation.
3 Printed from a copy that bears this stamped signature with an indication that Shultz signed the original.

195. Talking Points Prepared by the National Security Council Staff4

Washington, undated.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION-MAKING PROCESS AND THE ROLE OF THE NSC THEREIN

History

—The NSC was created in 1947 in recognition of the increased complexity of national security issues in the post-WWII period and the

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 85, Davis, Jeanne W.—Personal File, NSC Organization and Administration (4). No classification marking. The talking points were prepared for Scowcroft’s May 18 briefing of 93 Allied officers attending the Army Command and General Staff College. Davis forwarded the paper to him under a May 17 covering memorandum.
necessity for coordination of political, military and economic factors in developing and implementing a national security policy.

—The NSC is exclusively the instrument of the President. He may use it in any way he wishes and does not have to use it at all if he chooses. It has been used quite differently by different Presidents:


Presidents Kennedy and Johnson: Used NSC practically not at all. Preferred smaller, more flexible, less formal arrangements. Convenient for President; smaller groups encouraged greater candor and fewer leaks. However, President on occasion did not hear all appropriate voices. Because of informality of procedures with little in writing, there was often bureaucratic confusion over precise nature of decisions.

Present Role of NSC

—Present Administration has tried to combine orderliness of Eisenhower period with flexibility and candor of Kennedy/Johnson periods.2

—At present, the NSC is the principal forum through which major foreign policy issues are brought to the President for decision.

—There is no such thing as an NSC decision. It merely provides the mechanism for defining the issues and US objectives, developing alternative courses of action, and obtaining views and recommendations of the Departments involved in the foreign policy process.

Requirements for Policy Development and Implementation

In his first Report to the Congress in February, 1970, the President laid down the requirements for the management of national security issues in the 70s.3 These requirements are the raison d’être of the NSC system:

—Creativity: More than reacting to external events and emergency situations, we should clarify our view of US objectives and design our policies to achieve these objectives.

—Systematic planning: Our actions should be product of thorough analysis, forward planning and rational and deliberate decision.


3 For the text of Nixon’s report, US Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy for Peace; A Report to the Congress, see Document 95, ibid.
—**Determination of facts:** Intelligent discussion and wise decision require the most reliable information available. If a set of facts can be interpreted in more than one way, this also should be known.

—**Range of Options:** The President must know the full range of real options open to him. The various policy choices must be debated and differences of views identified and defended rather than buried or papered over in “agreed language.” The views of all departments must have a fair hearing.

—**Crisis Planning:** We should be prepared to deal with crisis situations over which we have little or no control by systematic contingency planning and by ensuring that, in time of crisis, our actions in the diplomatic, economic and military areas are properly coordinated.

—**Implementation:** Effective implementation of policy decisions requires continuing review and coordination. If circumstances change so that a decision cannot or should not be carried out, the issue should be brought back to the President for review.

**Structure of NSC**

NSC: President is Chairman. Statutory members are Vice President, Secretaries of State and Defense. Chairman of JCS is military adviser. Director of Central Intelligence is intelligence adviser. Mr. Kissinger is chief supervisory officer of the NSC system. President may invite anyone he wishes to attend NSC meetings. Other Department heads are often invited depending on issue to be discussed.

**Three sets of sub-groups:**

1. **Interdepartmental Groups**—six groups, one for each geographic area and one politico-military. Each chaired by appropriate Assistant Secretary of State and comprise representatives of all appropriate agencies. Foundation stone of the system. Draft basic papers defining issues, objectives and options with pros and cons of each option, which serve as basis for subsequent discussion of issue.

2. **Intermediate Groups**—four groups at Deputy Secretary level chaired by Mr. Kissinger:

   **Senior Review Group:** Work-horse of system. Policy oriented. Reviews work of IGs to be sure issues, options and agency views are presented fully and fairly.

   **Verification Panel:** Deals with important strategic issues including arms limitations, capabilities and potential adversaries, means of verifying compliance with possible agreement in this area. Major role in preparation for SALT talks and consideration of MBFR.

   **Defense Program Review Committee:** Reviews major defense policy and program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic and economic implications in relation to overall national priorities. For first
time defense budgeting process considered in interdepartmental environment.

*Intelligence Committee:* To determine the intelligence needs of the top policy makers and to provide guidance to the intelligence community. Advises on quality, scope, and timeliness of the intelligence input to Presidential decisions and on steps to improve it.

3. **Operational Groups**

*WSAG:* Chaired by Mr. Kissinger. Responsible for coordination in crisis situations. A high-level crisis management group which operates within a framework of policy decisions made by the President. Normally becomes operational following an NSC meeting.

*Under Secretaries Committee:* Chaired by Deputy Secretary of State with responsibility for overseeing implementation of President’s decisions and setting forth operational programs and recommendations.

*NSC Staff*

Less than 50 substantive officers of whom more than half are assigned to the staff by member agencies. Appropriate that interdepartmental operation should be staffed largely by representatives of participating agencies. Avoids creation of separate bureaucratic layer with vested interests of its own. Reassures departments, facilitates close working relationships at all levels, maintains intellectual honesty and objectivity of NSC staff members.

*Operation of System*

—Flagging of issue requiring Presidential decision. May originate with President, Secretary of State or Defense, NSC staff. NSC staff prepares NSSM (183 since January 1969) setting out terms of reference of study, assigning to particular group to prepare, setting due date, indicating which intermediate group will review study.

—IG drafts basic paper with issues, US objectives, options with pros and cons of each, estimated budgetary impact if appropriate, and illustrative operational consequences that might flow from decision.

—Paper is considered by SRG (or VP or DPRC if appropriate) to ensure that options and agency views are fully and fairly stated.

—If there is agreement among the agencies to recommend a particular option to the President, the matter can then be handled in a memorandum to the President, drafted by the NSC staff and cleared with the agencies, which lays out the issues and the options and reports the consensus recommendations of the foreign policy community.

—If there is disagreement among the agencies as to the recommended option, the matter will go to a full NSC meeting. NSC staff requests written statements of views by Department heads and prepares
briefing book for President containing basic paper, analytical summary if required, and statements of agency views.  

—NSC meeting commences with intelligence briefing. Mr. Kissinger lays out issues and options and President asks each member for his views and recommendations. Each member states his own views and, as the meeting develops, has an opportunity to rebut the views stated by others. Meetings can be long and detailed with President asking many questions. President does not decide at the table, but considers written and oral material, discusses issue with principal advisers and reaches a decision.  

—NSC staff prepare NSDM (217 since January 1969) spelling out as specifically as possible President’s decision, and containing directives for operational activity and for reporting on implementation. NSDM approved by President and issued.  

**Strengths of System**  

—Ensures that President is hearing all appropriate voices.  
—Dissent and disagreements are surfaced, not stifled.  
—Provides systematic analytical treatment of major issues and deliberate decision making.  
—All agencies notified in writing of Presidential decisions.  

**Conclusion**  

There is no right way or wrong way to operate in this area. The only criterion for effectiveness or success of such a system is whether or not it suits the style of a particular President. Each President requires some independent coordinating mechanism for dealing with major problems cutting across Departmental lines of responsibility, but present system is not a panacea and would probably be adjusted by subsequent President to suit his particular method of operation.
196. Memorandum by the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the President’s Assistant for Legislative Affairs (Timmons)¹


MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Legislative Coordination in National Security Affairs

The President has directed new efforts toward insuring that the Congress receives all appropriate information to assist it in the discharge of its responsibilities in the area of national security affairs. To accomplish this task, the President has directed the reactivation of the Legislative Interdepartmental Group (LIG).² The LIG will be responsible for recommending, coordinating and expediting information to be provided the Congress, and all national security matters having inter-agency impact or agency matters having significant policy implications will be cleared by the LIG before being presented to the Congress.

The responsible departments and agencies will be represented on the LIG by their Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs or equivalent officer. The Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs is designated as Chairman of the LIG and the Special Counsel of the National Security Council Staff as Executive Secretary.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Legislative Interdepartmental Group File, Box 3, Chronological File, April 1971–October 1974. No classification marking. At this time, General Walters was Acting DCI after Schlesinger’s resignation on July 2 and until Colby’s swearing-in on September 4.

² The LIG was established in April 1971 by representatives of the White House Congressional Relations Office and of the congressional relations offices of the CIA, the NSC, and the Departments of Defense, Justice, and State. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 145. Meetings were held monthly or bimonthly until September 1972 when regular activity ceased, with the exception of a meeting held on June 22, 1973. Records of these meetings are in the Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Legislative Interdepartmental Group File, Boxes 1–3, Meeting Files.
The LIG will meet fortnightly or more frequently as required.3

Henry A. Kissinger

William E. Timmons

3 Following the LIG’s reactivation, meetings were held every other month until May 1974. With the beginning of the Ford administration in August, the Group resumed this schedule until February 1975. Thereafter, the LIG met only three times: April 14, 1975; September 12, 1975; and January 13, 1976. Materials related to these meetings are ibid., Box 3.

197. Memorandum From Lawrence S. Eagleburger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1


SUBJECT
Organization of the NSC and State If Certain Things Happen

Some time ago I promised you some thoughts on how to structure State and the NSC, if you should move on to “other things”.2 Here they are. They are relatively brief and intended to outline the problems you need to think about, with potential solutions, rather than as a detailed plan.

The NSC Staff

You must not give up your present title or authority. You will, however, want to back off somewhat from the direct involvement you exercise today. It will be difficult enough to make the system work while you wear two hats (with Mel Laird in Defense I doubt that it

1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 88, Department of State, Administration, Transition, Organization, Aug. 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

2 Rogers submitted his resignation as Secretary of State to Nixon on August 16. Although Kissinger had been discussed as Rogers’ possible replacement for months, Nixon did not inform Kissinger that he intended to nominate him as Secretary of State until August 21. Nixon announced the nomination on August 22, noting that Kissinger would also continue as the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. (Public Papers: Nixon, 1973, pp. 710–711) Kissinger’s confirmation hearings began in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 7. Kissinger was confirmed by the Senate on September 21 and sworn in as Secretary the following day. For more on the transition from Rogers to Kissinger, as well as the personnel changes in the NSC and Department of State following Kissinger’s confirmation as Secretary, see Document 117.
would work at all). Without some shifts in your own activities, other agencies—particularly Defense—are going to feel the deck is grossly stacked against them.

As to the NSC Staff itself, I recommend that Brent [Scowcroft] take over your residual functions here, sit in your office, run the Staff, and be the only authorized official point of contact between the Staff and other elements within the White House. Once you leave the premises I predict Brent will have a son-of-a-bitch of a problem keeping others in the White House from seeking to use the Staff resource and, thereby, slowly displacing you in fact if not in name. Brent will need all the authority you can give him, and your absolute backing—particularly in the first months.

An apparently easy answer would be largely to disestablish the Staff (or most of it), move it to State, and let Brent manage a skeleton operation here. I think that would be a mistake, although I do think the size of the Staff could be reduced somewhat. It is important, I believe, that issues relevant, for example, to the VP and DPRC be handled at the White House—not the State Department. Also, Presidential correspondence, etc., will need to be handled here. But the important thing will be to have a Staff in being at the White House to act as conduit for the inevitable memos to the President (as well as other less formal communications) from Schlesinger, Shultz, et al. The Staff can assure that you get these communications for coordination or comment; but you can’t expect a Cabinet member, in the absence of this mechanism, willingly to send his memos through you (as SecState) to the President.

One final word on the Staff: Brent is absolutely superb—intelligent, loyal, and efficient. He is the only man I would think of recommending you ask to run the operation in your absence.

The NSC System

This is the really tough one. On the one hand, you should not—under normal circumstances at least—act as Chairman of the SRG, VP, DPRC, WSAG, etc., and also be Secretary of State. Other Departments, rightly or wrongly, would argue that you simply cannot be impartial. On the other hand, your absence from such sessions would—with no flattery intended—lower the intellectual quality of the debate by some 500%.

There is no totally satisfactory solution to the problem, so I shall not bore you with options. I suggest the following as the best (or least unsatisfactory) course to follow:

—You continue to chair those few SRGs, VPs, and DPRCs that deal with first-level issues such as SALT, perhaps MBFR, nuclear strike options, etc. If your schedule permits, I suggest these meetings continue to be held in the Situation Room rather than in State.
—Brent should chair other meetings of the SRG, VP, or DPRC when they deal with lesser issues such as the Horn of Africa, etc. He could meet with you first for guidance, but should be given as much opportunity as possible to assume your Chairman’s role. There will be some grumbling by the Departments because of Brent’s “rank”, but you can certainly control State, and Clements will behave himself.

—To the degree possible, shift from inter-departmental meetings to memoranda from relevant Secretaries on issues for decision. This will permit the NSC Staff to capture the documents, summarize the differences, and present you with either issues for decision or a memorandum for the President which lays out the issues for him.

The above procedure, which should be managed either by you, or by Brent in your name, would fall under the Assistant to the President area of your responsibilities. Your functions as Secretary of State, though in fact expanded, would in appearance remain largely as they now exist. Thus, I would not recommend any changes—at least until you have had several months experience with the system—in existing NSDMs relating to the NSC structure (e.g., NSDM 2). 3

The one possible fly in the ointment is the WSAG. Your presence will probably be necessary when the objective is to energize the bureaucracy. It is less necessary when the purpose is to work up a series of discrete action proposals for your consideration. Thus, I stick with my original proposals. Let Brent run it for the latter purpose; you chair it for the former. Alternatively, you may want explicitly to transfer chairmanship of the WSAG to the Secretary of State at the outset. I would suggest a few weeks trial period as is, however, first.

I make no judgments on things such as the 40 Committee, etc., since I know so little about them. I can’t help but believe, however, that they can be handled much like the rest of the inter-departmental apparatus.

*The State Department*

Here, again, I shall run over only what I consider to be the crucial problems.

*The Seventh Floor*

I assume Rush stays.

As we discussed, the demands of the Secretary’s time are enormous, and reducing them runs the risk of unintended slight. The only way to begin to solve this problem is a decision that the Deputy

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will take on a whole host of responsibilities from the Secretary. More important, a public announcement to this effect should be made within days of taking over. The concept should be that of the Secretary for Foreign Affairs idea that was bruted about some years ago, with the Deputy assuming many of the functions of the Secretary of State. (Since no legislation was ever sought to give effect to this idea, however, no public analogy should be drawn.)

In this manner you can get out of much of the cocktail-national day circuit, as well as the receiving of Ambassadors (except for the few you will want to keep in touch with). You can probably send Rush to most international meetings you would normally attend (e.g., CENTO), but I doubt that you can skip NATO (at least at first). I have similar doubts about the UN, at least at first, but know you don’t share them.

A major problem will be the Congress. I doubt that Rush will do for major issues. In fact, you could harm yourself by being too hard to get. All I can say here is that the question will have to be decided case-by-case, but don’t expect to be able to avoid any and all appearances.

As to running the Department, the first need is your own people in key spots. To my mind those are (exclusive of the Deputy slot):

1. Under Secretary for Political Affairs
2. Under Secretary for Economic Affairs
3. Deputy Under Secretary for Management
4. Director General of the Foreign Service
5. Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations
6. Director, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs
7. Executive Secretary of the Department

I have not included either the Counselor or the Director of the Planning and Coordination Staff (the old Policy Planning job). They are not now important, but can be if you want. You have mentioned whom you have in mind to fill them—both would be good. I’ll talk a bit later about how they work into the system.

Nor have I included the Under Secretary for Security Assistance (Tarr), or the Inspector General of the Foreign Service. Right now they are nothing jobs. But they could be more. I discuss them below.

The first thing I suggest for the seven positions I have listed above is that all (with the possible exception of Cy Weiss in P/M) be removed. A little blood on the floor early in your term would have a generally salutary effect on the Department and the Foreign Service, and would go far to remove the lethargy of the place. Further, I urge you to pay a great deal of attention to personnel in the first week or two. It is a sine qua non to an effective Department, but after you get well into harness you will never again have time to devote much attention to it.
The Porter job\(^4\) is crucial, not only because it is the place you should turn for oversight of serious operational problems, but because it is the paterfamilias of the Foreign Service. The man you put in that job will tell the FSOs more about your approach than any other appointment. Thus, I recommend an FSO. I would love to see Graham Martin in the job, despite the hole it would leave in Saigon. Graham is tough, nasty, devious, bright, and a first-rate operator. You could not count on total loyalty, but having him handy for substantive advice, operational oversight and counseling on personnel is worth the risk.

If Graham is out, then think about Dean Brown (now in Jordan and scheduled to come back as Director General of the Foreign Service). He is young and a very good operator. While he’s not in Graham’s league (he’s nicer), he would give the Foreign Service a shot in the arm, and be proof that you were moving away from the old crowd.

Another possibility is Joe Sisco, although I would fear his tendencies toward an overactive thyroid. A good Embassy (Moscow?) or the Management job would be better.

As things now stand, the Casey job\(^5\) is fourth in the hierarchy. There is something to be said for elevating it to Number 3 if you want State to play the role it should vis-à-vis Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, CIEP, et al. But the crucial question is the man in the job. He should, ideally, have a reputation in the international banking or business community (domestic business or banking isn’t enough), and have the intellectual muscle to make others listen to him. Unfortunately, I have no reasonable names for you. I suggest you talk to people like David Rockefeller, George Ball,\(^6\) etc., for suggestions.

Incidentally, the Economic Bureau (E), which provides most of the staff backup for the Undersecretary for Economic Affairs, stinks. It needs a wholesale revamping. You might think about having Chuck Cooper move into the Assistant Secretary slot with carte blanche to build the Bureau up.

The Management job, now held by Tarr, deserves better.\(^7\) In addition to overseeing the everyday administration of the Department (budget, recruitment, etc.) the position—along with the Director General—controls senior assignments and the general personnel and pro-

\(^4\) A reference to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. William J. Porter held this position from February 2, 1973, to February 18, 1974.


\(^6\) David Rockefeller was then Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations, one of his many business and philanthropic positions. George Ball was Under Secretary of State from 1961 until 1966.

\(^7\) Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance Curtis W. Tarr was acting as Under Secretary of State for Management at this time.
motion system. Again, the Department (and particularly the Foreign Service) will judge you by how you handle this appointment.

Again, Graham Martin would be superb (and, I know, next to the Political Undersecretary slot, would like to get this job). He might, however, be a bit too Machiavellian for the orderly working of the system (which after Macomber) is needed. Dean Brown would be good, as would Sisco.

Another fellow for whom I have great respect is Bob Komer. He is, of course, closely identified with LBJ and Vietnam, but he is bright, tough, and energetic. He is now with Rand, and has fathered the first-rate study on “Restructuring NATO Forces” that Phil Odeen and I have mentioned to you.

Although Fulbright refused to move on his confirmation as Ambassador to Turkey late in LBJ’s term, I doubt that he would now have confirmation problems with the Senate (so long as the job was not Vietnam-related). I cannot predict how your friends in the White House might react.

I urge him on you as worthy of serious consideration in any of a range of jobs; he could certainly do the Management job with great skill and imagination. Most important he would not be a captive of the system—either in terms of his future career or his mind set.

The Director General’s job (now held by William Hall) has principal responsibility for the personnel system, including senior assignments and ambassadorial appointments. Again, the Foreign Service will watch you closely on this one.

Hall is a good example of all that is wrong with the Service. He tends toward cronyism, and puts high emphasis on time in service, age, etc. Almost universally, the middle-to-upper level younger officers detest him. Further, he has done a great deal of poor-mouthing of you and the White House for holding up ambassadorial nominations.

You will have to steer a careful course in choosing a replacement for Hall. I think you need to let the old folks know they no longer control the Service, but you should be careful not to give too much aid and comfort to the Young Turks (of whom there is a growing number). What you want is an outstanding senior officer who is relatively young and very hard-headed. My candidate would be Tom Pickering, who presently is Executive Secretary. He is good and tough, and reasonably young (early 40’s). Another good man would be Dean Brown, who is now slotted for the job.

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8 Before serving as Ambassador to Turkey from December 1968 to May 1969, Komer served as Deputy to the Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam, for Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS), and Special Assistant to the Ambassador to Vietnam with the personal rank of Ambassador.
The Congressional Assistant Secretary slot is presently occupied by an idiot (even though he once worked for you). Marshall Wright knows little of substance, is constitutionally incapable of saying no to Congressional requests, and is—in every way—a light-weight.

I, unfortunately, have no names to suggest at the moment. But what you want is someone well versed in foreign affairs and with good Hill contacts—and preferably a Democrat. There may be some good possibilities on Committee staffs; there may also be some good people in the Department—though that’s less likely.

If you decide you want to move Wright out, you will need to do some head-hunting. The place to start would be by talking to Fulbright, Mansfield, Scott, Ford, et al. Lehman9 may also have some suggestions. You might also want to see whom Bill Macomber and Bob Hill (both once had the job) would recommend.

Cy Weiss now has the Politico-Military job.10 He is very bright and articulate, but extremely conservative and rigid, and far more likely to be an ally of the JCS (particularly on SALT) than either an opponent or a moderating influence. I doubt that you would want that; I also wonder whether—institutionally—you want someone in State who would probably be to your right, unwilling to budge on major arms control issues, and leaking to Jackson.

All this is not meant to denigrate Weiss’ intelligence. He clearly is very good. But he is better in a devil’s advocate role than as a manager or policy maker.

My recommendation for a replacement—should you decide to move Weiss—would be George Vest. He was Bob Ellsworth’s and David Kennedy’s DCM at NATO, and now heads the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE. He is relatively low-key, very intelligent, pragmatic, and gets along well with the military without being their patsy. He knows the politico-military world well, and is a superb manager.

The Executive Secretary slot is key to how well the Department is kept in step with your thinking. Thus, I feel strongly the occupant must be someone in whom you have confidence, and someone you will be prepared to let—within limits—work quietly to keep the bureaucracy informed. Given what you have already said to me, I am somewhat constrained in going further. But I will do so on the understanding that no commitments have been made and that I will fully understand if you opt in some other direction.

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9 John F. Lehman, Jr., member of the National Security Council Planning Staff.
10 Seymour Weiss was the Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs from August 6, 1973, until January 17, 1974.
To oversimplify grossly, State has failed for years to link three essential elements: dissemination of information; policy formulation; and policy implementation. There is a massive bureaucracy centered around INR to produce and analyze information, but it produces too much, analyzes it poorly, and focuses too little on the needs of the “Seventh Floor.”

“Policy,” in today’s State Department, is largely made in response to cables, and usually generated from the bureaus. That, inevitably, would change if you take over. Under those circumstances the problem would be to assure that what the bureaucracy needs to know gets to it.

Finally, there is now no real instrument for assuring that policy, once made and transmitted to the operators, is implemented properly (or at all).

The only instrument I can discern for beginning to bring these three elements together is the Executive Secretary. Not that he or the Secretariat can do all three jobs; in fact he can do none. But he can serve as the point at which all three functions converge.

Which leads me to talk, as I promised earlier, about the policy planning and counselor positions (and INR).

The Planning and Coordination Staff has had virtually no impact on anyone—not just in this Administration, but under Rusk as well. The reason is that it is outside the operational chain, spends its time doing think pieces that no one reads, and has no contact with the Secretary on a day-to-day basis.

If you are going to change all that, Lord is going to have to have close contact with you, and he and his staff (he will want to change a good many faces) will have to have access to the flow of paper in and out of your office. Otherwise, over time—and no matter how much you talk directly to Lord—the Planning Staff will return largely to its present atrophy, and the operators will continue to live in their own little world, oblivious to policies around them. The way to avoid this is to see that the Executive Secretary and the Director of Planning and Coordination Staff live in each other’s hip pockets. If the Executive Sec. is careful to see that action instructions downward have the ok of the Planning Director and, conversely, that recommendations upward to you are cleared through him, then the planning apparatus can begin to have some impact. Obviously, not every action or recommendation needs to be handled this way (nor can the process be permitted to lead to unnecessary delay); decisions will have to be made on a case-by-case basis.

As to the Counselor, the position has been little more than senior trip and speech coordinator throughout the Rogers period. It has had periods of great power and influence, but generally it has been one of
those eddies that so often occur when there is no staff and no line responsibility.

There are two or three roles particularly fitted for the job. First is the devil’s advocate role. A major problem that every Secretary faces is that of finding some way to force the operational side of the house to face tough questions as to purpose, strategy, and tactics before proposals reach the Secretary. The Counselor can perform this function.

Second is the role of gad-fly. The bureaus need to have someone looking over their shoulder, pushing them to face tough questions—questions that are often not important today but that will become so if left unanswered. Again, the Counselor can play a part here.

And finally, there is the role of inspector—the man who follows up to see that policy is being implemented properly, the man who keeps an eye on how well the bureaus perform. This latter job also can be done by the Counselor, although I would not recommend it.

In any or all of the three roles described above it will be essential that the Counselor and the Executive Secretary work as closely as the latter with the Planning Director. In both cases, it is the Executive Secretary who will have the information and apparatus without which neither of the others can function effectively.

To return to this question of information briefly. INR needs to be revamped; it ought not be abolished (as some—particularly in CIA—will inevitably propose to you). You cannot be totally dependent on other institutions either for your information or your analysis. On the other hand, INR does not need to spend the resources and hours it now does writing analyses for itself and those few line officers with sufficient leisure to read their product. INR needs to be shrunk, and it needs to be forced to focus much more on Seventh Floor needs—particularly on the Secretary and Deputy Secretary.

Now let me return for a moment to the inspector’s role I mentioned above. There is a crying need to institutionalize some form of substantive inspectorate. The Inspector General’s office now devotes its time to assuring that Embassies and the Department function according to the book, and little more. Nor could it do more with the type of personnel now in the office.

What is needed is a small unit with perhaps five or six top flight officers who can be sent out on your instructions to look into problems either in the Department or in Embassies. For example, if Embassy Phnom Penh is not working the way you think it should, send out a couple of officers from this unit to take a look and report back to you with their findings. In short, you need an institutionalized Moose–Lowenstein equivalent (don’t gag).

This outfit could be managed by the Counselor; the Inspector General’s operation could be restructured to accommodate the function; or
the task could be assigned to the Executive Secretary. I think the latter
the best course, but with no strong sense that it must be done this way.
That it needs to be done by someone is, in my view, clear.

Several closing random thoughts (I know, you think what I’ve al-
ready given you was random).

Much as you will hate it, you really must set a reasonable amount
of time aside for meeting with your senior staff. Otherwise the six floors
below you will simply float away down their own rather muddy
stream of consciousness.

Also, I agree that you should spend a goodly period of time in the
White House (and at San Clemente or Key Biscayne). But Brent and
someone in State (the Executive Secretary?) will need to keep each
other informed more fully than now is the case about what the other is
doing. And I think you should have someone from State with you to
work with Brent when you are in California (and perhaps Florida). (I
don’t think Brent agrees with the last point.)

A final point: you will want to think about who you have in State
to perform the Campbell role.¹¹ There are now two slots assigned—one
senior and one junior assistant. One of the two ought to be an FSO who
knows the Department. The other ought to be someone close to you like
Campbell or Rodman.

¹¹ Presumably a reference to Richard Campbell, a member of the National Security
Council Staff. In his memoirs, Kissinger referred to Campbell (along with Sonnenfeldt,
Odeen, Hyland, and Rodman) as a member of his NSC “team.” (Kissinger, Years of Up-
heaval, p. 230)

HENRY:

You asked for thoughts on how the system could work in the possible new situation. The attached attempts to describe real and potential problems and to deal with them by some restructuring.

There is no easy or wholly satisfactory solution but it can work. The optimum structure described is precisely that—it does not resolve all problems but rather attempts to retain as much of the essential elements of the existing system as possible with the least number of disadvantages.

The two absolutely key issues are the amount of time you yourself will be able to devote to the system and the role of the NSC staff in it. The pressures on your time will be far greater than they now are (however, impossible it may seem) and the pressures from your own people in State and others in the bureaucracy to short circuit the NSC staff will grow inevitably.

Attachment

Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff


SUBJECT: RESTRUCTURING THE OPERATION OF THE NSC SYSTEM

I. Assumption:

An organization for National Security Affairs in which the same individual would occupy the positions of Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.


2 See footnote 2, Document 197.

3 Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the paper. A shorter, 4-page analysis of five potential structural models for the operation of the NSC system is also attached but not printed.
II. Dimensions of the Problem:

*Conceptual Problem.* There is no wholly satisfactory restructuring or concept of operation of the NSC system in this circumstance:

— The strength and effectiveness of the system as it has evolved since January 1969 have rested on two basic factors:

- **Objectivity**—the fact (clearly perceived as such by all of the participating agencies) that each agency has an opportunity at a senior level to present and argue its views without being constrained or overridden by any other (e.g. State). [This is precisely the argument for the present system, and against the previous administration’s SIG concept embodying State executive chairmanship, which was presented in the pre-inaugural consideration of alternatives.]  
- **Personal participation and chairmanship by the Assistant to the President**—which has provided the essential intellectual stimulus and conceptual guidance; has given directions and approaches consistent with and supporting broader and longer range conceptions and goals; and has assured the drive needed to break log jams, make decisions, and force action.

*Institutional Problems.* Whatever solution is conceived, the sense of objectivity and some measure of the essential “devil’s advocacy” which have characterized the system inevitably will be lost or at least significantly diminished.

— For, whatever role the Secretary/Assistant to the President personally plays in respect to the major sub-groups of the system, and even in the NSC itself, all agencies will see his participation as that of an advocate of State’s view. And their participation will be conditioned by this “fact.”

— However strongly and genuinely the incumbent pursues an objective role in the system as Assistant to the President, as differentiated from his role as Secretary of State, no other agency will wholly accept that objectivity on its face—not even the representative of the Department of State (the Secretary after all does head the Department). To make the appearance of total objectivity and detachment from State credible would almost surely require a relationship in interagency forums between the Secretary/Assistant to the President and his own senior State Department assistants which would be unacceptable and very likely institutionally damaging.

The institutional problem will exist to an extent in all of the senior sub-groups of the existing structure. Its proportions will be most serious in the DPRC and the Verification Panel where Defense interest is predominant and where Defense and State have the most serious differences of view. The Secretary of Defense can be expected to fight

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4 Brackets are in the original.
(probably overtly but at least by sabotage) any concept which would give the incumbent (who, whatever his stated role in the committee, is still the Secretary of State) chairmanship of a committee (DPRC) whose purpose is the examination of the Secretary of Defense’s programs—his own department would press him to prevent it. Both DOD and, more particularly the JCS, also would fight “State predominance” over SALT and MBFR in the Verification Panel.

Aside from the interdepartmental “conflict of interest” issues (as they will be portrayed by others), there is the real problem of the availability of *time for participation* by the incumbent in the necessarily intensive schedule of meetings (averaging three each week when the system is actively engaged and most effective). It is a major burden for one man occupying one position—the burden will be even greater under the assumed situation. But only when the senior sub-groups meet regularly does the system achieve the high level of success of which it is demonstrably capable.

The role of the NSC staff in relationship to the sub-groups in the system also becomes, at least to a degree, anomalous. Who do they represent? If they represent the Assistant to the President, who does the State member represent? This problem is not insurmountable, but it must be faced. It is an extension of the question: Who and what institution does the Secretary/Assistant to the President represent at the various levels of the system and its functioning?

Lastly, there is the potential for *mischief by OMB*. They have long wanted a bigger role in National Security Affairs. If afforded an opportunity they will move to fill any vacuum in the White House arena which may even seem to develop. They will portray themselves as working to serve the President in ways in which a diminished NSC staff (either in size or stature) cannot be expected to do.

III. *Alternative Approaches:*

With the foregoing considerations in mind, and assuming that the basic concepts and structure of the system should be preserved to the extent possible, there are several possible structural arrangements:

1. Continue the present structure and membership unchanged (a variant would be with fewer meetings of the senior subgroups, leaving more issues for consideration by (1) the NSC itself, and (2) by memorandum reflection of departmental views for Presidential decision.)

2. Upgrade the membership of the principal sub-groups of the system to the Agency-head level with Chairmanship remaining with the incumbent in his role as Assistant to the President. (This would in effect be an NSC without the direct participation of the President or the Vice President.)
3. Continue the present structure but with Chairmanship of each
group to be determined by its principal function (e.g., the SRG–State;
DPRC–Defense; NSCIC–DCI; etc.).

4. Continue the present structure with membership at a lower orga-
nizational level and chaired by a Deputy Assistant to the President.
(The Chairman would act essentially as a moderator and “devil’s advog-
cate” seeking full expression of views and alternatives, and deter-
mining the degree of consensus and difference, but not giving action
direction.)

5. Reconstitute the SIG concept under State direction and chair-
manship. (The Under Secretaries Committee would simply be char-
tered as a policy formulating and decision-making body referring unre-
solved differences to the President; its present responsibility for
supervision of execution would be retained.)

These alternative structural arrangements are discussed in some
detail and as to their relationship to the existing senior sub-groups of
the system in the attachment. None would provide a wholly satisfac-
tory solution applicable across the board. But each offers some reason-
able prospects for at least minimally effective operation of one or more
of the senior sub-groups of the system. It should be recognized, how-
ever, that in every case some measure of the important appearance of
total objectivity is sacrificed—the greater the level of direct participa-
tion by the Secretary/Assistant to the President, the more this is so. Yet
his participation is what “makes it go.”

An Optimum Structure. If each senior sub-group is cast against the
general models, the structure which best preserves the integrity and
values of the present system would look as follows:

Senior Review Group

—Operation should follow two tracks as decided by the Assistant
to the President based on the nature of the issue.

  • Major issues—continue as at present with Assistant to President
    in chair (Defense should be given option as to whether the Secretary
    should attend).
  • Lesser issues—present membership (at Deputy Secretary level)
    except the chair occupied either by Deputy or Under Secretary of State or
    by Deputy Assistant to President with a paper prepared, written views
    of Department heads sought and then submitted to the President (via
    Assistant to President).

DPRC

—Continue as at present with Assistant to the President in the
chair and Defense represented by Secretary if desired.
An alternative would be to keep present membership but give the chair to the Secretary of Defense (meetings would have to be held at the White House)—this would have the advantage of engaging and providing incentive for Defense but would still leave ultimate control in the hands of the Assistant to the President who would forward the papers to the President for decision.

Verification Panel

—Continue as at present with the Assistant to the President in the chair.

NSCIC

—Chaired by DCI with NSC membership by Deputy Assistant to President. (Paper describing consensus and differing views would be submitted to Assistant to President.) (This would relieve Assistant to President of potentially time-consuming activity, assure more frequent meetings needed for movement by the group, and retain control by Assistant to the President.)

WSAG

—A two-track approach:

• Contingency planning and normal crisis management activity—continue as at present but with Deputy Assistant to President in chair. (Contingency planning is done in Working Group and referred to Principals.)

• Major issues/crisis management—continue present membership with Assistant to President in chair.

40 Committee

—Continue as at present (handle most matters by memo prepared by NSC staff for Assistant to President. State view to be resolved between Deputy or Under Secretary and Secretary.)

Under Secretaries Committee

—No change (do not broaden charter).

Interdepartmental Groups (IGs)

—No change—NSC staff member participates as at present.

IV. Operational Imperatives:

In the foregoing structure (or indeed in any other possible configuration) the following will be essential:

—Fewer meetings of the senior sub-groups (inevitably there will be some loss of direction).

—More frequent meetings of the NSC.

—More issues presented for Presidential decision by memoranda.
Meetings of the senior sub-groups of the system must continue to be held in the White House Situation Room. This will impose a time burden on the Assistant to the President. But if the meetings are held at State (or, if the DPRC were chaired by the Secretary of Defense at Defense) the last vestige of objectivity will be lost—no one will believe that the Assistant to the President is holding a meeting in the Secretary of State’s office. When the element of objectivity is so compromised there will be no longer any real hope of more than a pro-forma system—dissidence will result in paralysis.

If the NSC staff is to function effectively in support of the Assistant to the President, the Council, and the President, its role must be clearly defined:

—It should continue to prepare the analytical summaries and talking points for the Assistant to the President for his participation in meetings of the senior sub-groups and the NSC. This will be increasingly difficult because:

• The NSC staff will be physically separated from the Assistant to the President.
• The NSC staff must know whether the State-prepared paper and/or statement of views on the paper represent the views of the institution or the Secretary/Assistant to the President, or both.

—The NSC staff members must be present at the meetings of the senior sub-groups to perform their function of interdepartmental follow up and guidance. But there inevitably will be pressure from the Department of State to increase its own attendance at the expense of the NSC staff.

—The Deputy Assistant to the President will have to be empowered to forward papers to the President, and the range of matters on which he will be so empowered should be defined at the outset. But the question on such matters will be: To whom and how will the NSC staff member concerned present his views prior to the formulation of a recommendation for Presidential decision?

The conduct of NSC meetings necessarily will be slightly altered. The Secretary of State/Assistant to the President should continue to present the issues and options as the prelude to discussion. But he will have to follow this presentation with a summation of the basic outlines of the positions taken by other interested department heads and conclude with a statement of his own views as Secretary of State. This should pose no real problem since it would follow essentially the pattern which has been used in presenting issues for decision by memoranda to the President.
199. Editorial Note

On August 9, 1974, amid allegations of misconduct related to the Watergate scandal, President Richard M. Nixon resigned from office and was replaced by Vice President Gerald R. Ford. Between 10:47 and 11:10 a.m. that morning, a special session of the Washington Special Actions Group was held to manage the foreign policy aspects of the transition. That afternoon, Ford signed National Security Decision Memorandum 265, which reaffirmed the organization and procedures of the National Security Council system. The following day, August 10, Ford called a meeting of the National Security Council, where he reiterated his decision. For the minutes of the WSAG and NSC meetings and the text of NSDM 265, see Documents 38–40, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Part 1, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1973–1976. President Ford addressed a joint session of Congress on August 12; his remarks on foreign policy are ibid., Document 41.

200. Memorandum From the National Security Council Staff Secretary (Davis) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT
NSC Staff Reductions

I have again reviewed the figures for the NSC professional staff, both NSC-payrolled and on detail, and have developed the following information:
—As of December 1, 1972, there were 58 professional staff members, 27 on the NSC payroll and 31 on detail.
—In January 1973, we were asked to reduce our staff. In response, we outlined a program to reduce the staff by 11—a 20% reduction—primarily by not filling expected vacancies.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–301, Miscellaneous Institutional Files of the Nixon Administration—NSC System, Staff and Committees [2 of 3]. Administratively Confidential.
By March 6, 1973, five officers had left the staff and had not been replaced, for a total of 53.

By June 30, 1973, the staff had been reduced by an additional four officers, to a total of 49—a 16% cut from the December 1972 figure.

The difference between the planned cut of 11 officers and the actual cut of 9 officers was occasioned by the unexpected retention on the staff of a White House Fellow (Don Stukel) and a Fellow of the Council on Foreign Relations (Bill Quandt). Both of these officers had been expected to leave the staff but were asked to extend their duty for an additional year.

Since June 30, 1973, the downward trend has continued: June 30, 1974—45; August 9, 1974—41.

As of November 11, 1974, the professional staff totalled 41, although Commander Gerrish Flynn (TDY for Denis Clift) and Les Janka's replacement will bring the total to 43—18 on the NSC payroll and 25 on detail.

I have prepared a memorandum, with accompanying table, for your signature to Jerry Jones suggesting that in the light of our substantial staff reductions in the last two years, and the increase in NSC activity with the advent of the new President, we be exempted from further mandatory reductions.

Recommendations:

That you sign the memorandum at Tab A.

2 Clift was the NSC Senior Staff member for Europe and Oceans.
3 Beginning in November 1974, Janka was the NSC Senior Staff member for Congressional Relations. Previously, he had been a Press Liaison Officer.
4 Attached but not printed. Scowcroft did not sign the memorandum, but rather communicated its contents orally to Jerry Jones on December 30. An attachment to a memorandum from Davis to Philip Buchen of January 31, 1975, indicates that the number of professionals and clerical/administrative staff detailed to the NSC Staff from other agencies remained at June 1974 levels (44 total personnel). (Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 85, Davis, Jeanne W.—Personal File, NSC Organization and Administration (5))

201. Editorial Note

On June 4, 1975, Representative Robert W. Edgar (D–Pennsylvania) introduced H.R. 7600, a bill amending the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 403) to designate the minority and majority leaders of
both Houses of Congress as National Security Council members. Representative C. Melvin Price (D–Illinois), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, sent copies of the legislation to the NSC for comment on June 13. (Ford Library, White House Central Files, Box 22, Subject File, FG 6–6 7/1/75–9/30/75 Executive) Following review by NSC Staff Secretary Jeanne W. Davis, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs Max L. Friedersdorf, Counsel to the President Philip W. Buchen, the Office of Management and Budget, and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs Brent Scowcroft, a response letter was drafted and sent under Davis’ signature to Price on July 1.

The letter details NSC opposition to the proposed bill: “Because the proposed legislation would blur the constitutional delineation and separation of powers between the Executive and Legislative Branches, and could inhibit the President’s ability to carry out his responsibilities for the conduct of foreign policy and as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, we strongly oppose its enactment by the Congress.”

The letter continues: “In enacting the National Security Act of 1947, it was the expressed intention of Congress ‘...to provide for the establishment of integrated policies and procedures for the departments, agencies, and functions of the Government relating to national security; ...’” [ellipses in the original] It argued that it was clear from the 1947 Act “that Congress created the NSC as an organ of the Executive Branch and designated its membership accordingly. Since 1947, the NSC has been utilized, as the Congress envisioned, as the principal forum through which the President receives the advice and recommendations of his senior advisors on national security matters. By adding four representatives of the Legislative Branch (a number equal to the present statutory members from the Executive Branch) who would be expected to report to their colleagues in the Congress, this legislation would inevitably change the character of this process and would inhibit the candor and completeness of the information and advice essential to the President in carrying out his Constitutional responsibilities.

“As you know, President Ford has repeatedly emphasized his objective of full cooperation and consultation with the Congress. During recent periods of international tension, the President has directed that the Congress be kept informed of developments and has frequently met with Congressional leaders before and after major international meetings and at key points in the decision-making process to discuss with them his policies and plans. We believe that this process of consultation, diligently undertaken in the spirit of cooperation between the two branches, represents the best means of exercising effectively the sharing of power and responsibilities stipulated by the framers of the Constitution for the formulation of our national foreign policy.” (Ibid.)
Ultimately, the House Armed Services Committee did not take any action on H.R. 7600. Representative Edgar proposed two further bills calling for Congressional representation in the NSC on June 25, 1975 (H.R. 8200), and July 31, 1975 (H.R. 9087). Again, the Committee declined to take further action and the bills died in Committee.

202. Memorandum From Leslie A. Janka of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Washington, October 9, 1975.

SUBJECT

Legislation to Designate the Secretary of Treasury a Member of the National Security Council

The Senate Armed Services Committee has reported legislation to designate the Secretary of Treasury a statutory member of the National Security Council.² In all probability, this legislation was prompted by the Murphy Commission recommendation that NSC membership be expanded in this way.³ The Senate may vote on it Friday, October 10.⁴

Since OMB has never been requested to formulate a coordinated Administration position on such legislation, it is currently referring inquiries regarding our position—already being received by the White House liaison people—to this office. Accordingly, some guidance from

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 85, Davis, Jeanne W.—Personal File, NSC Organization and Administration (6). No classification marking. Sent for action. Attached to an unsigned October 17 memorandum from Davis to James Hyde of OMB, reiterating opposition to NSC membership for the Treasury Department, along similar lines expressed below. See also Document 193.

² Reference is to S. 2350, introduced by Senator Stuart Symington (D–Missouri) on September 17.

³ In its final report of June 27, the Murphy Commission recommended adding the Treasury Department to the NSC as the “distinction between foreign and domestic policy is increasingly tenuous, especially with respect to foreign economic policy.” The report continues, “with the broadening of the NSC to include foreign economic considerations, the degree to which domestic considerations must be blended into foreign policy making also expands, and the need arises for an institutional link or bridge between the mechanisms through which domestic and foreign policy are made.” (Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy, p. 34) See also Document 179. For the Commission’s recommendations for the Intelligence Community, public diplomacy, and the Department of State, see Documents 45, 106, and 147, respectively.

⁴ The Senate passed the bill on October 9.
you is essential. You may wish to know that other agency comments on the Murphy Commission recommendation, which the NSC has requested and received thus far, tend to support the proposal (comments attached).\(^5\)

As you may recall, our most recent experience with the NSC membership issue was the proposal to add the Director of ACDA, to which we were opposed.\(^6\) At that time our position was essentially that the concerns of the National Security Council were far broader—primarily focusing on strategic matters—and extended substantially beyond the statutory focus and responsibility of ACDA. At the same time we assured the Congress that when an agenda item of a National Security Council meeting involved the responsibilities of ACDA, the Director had been and would continue to be invited to join in such deliberations. I would think a similar position could be taken in regard to this legislation regarding the Secretary of Treasury in view of the fact the National Security Council does not, on a regular basis, address economic issues. Furthermore, the Secretary of the Treasury is Chairman of the Economic Policy Board on which the Secretary of State sits to ensure integration of international economic policy with foreign policy.

**Recommendation**

That we oppose this legislation along the same lines as we did in respect to the proposal to include the Director of ACDA.\(^7\)

or

That we take no position on this bill

or

That we support the legislation

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\(^5\) Attached but not printed. In addition to Treasury, the Department of Defense also endorsed the recommendation.

\(^6\) Reference is to H.R. 7567, introduced by Representative Clement Zablocki (D–Wisconsin) on June 4 and passed on July 9. The Departments of State and Defense and the ACDA opposed the bill in testimony before the House International Relations Committee. Their objections were discussed in an August 29 memorandum from Janka to Kissinger upon which Scowcroft wrote: “Kissinger discussed w/Pres. Veto signed.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Agency Files, Box 1, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, 8/28/75–11/21/75) No veto was subsequently issued, however, as all references to NSC membership for ACDA were removed before H.R. 7567 was combined with Senate bill S. 1517, the Foreign Relations Authorization bill for FY 1976, on November 4. The omnibus legislation was then passed on November 29 as Public Law 94–141. (Congress and the Nation, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, pp. 872–873)

\(^7\) Scowcroft initialed this option and wrote that he did so “at Presidential direction.”
203. Memorandum From Clinton E. Granger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT
Staff Organization

While the lack of an NSC staff organization chart has been the subject of some considerable humor over the years (and there are many advantages to retaining flexibility through a relatively unstructured organization), I was delighted to hear the announcement that you will be acquiring a deputy in the near future.²

However, the addition of a deputy again raises the question of the overall structure and organization of the NSC staff, and the relative relationships of the various members.

I would assume that your deputy will act for you in an increasing number of actions, hopefully relieving you of minor decisions, and providing you with more time to address significant actions. For organizational purposes, the Assistant to the President and the Deputy would be at the top of any hypothetical organization chart. However, below that the problem remains essentially the same—the span of control is very broad, a rather large number of individuals have direct access to you, take your time, and are not coordinated below your level.

Under one of the older organizational concepts, the NSC Staff had a Director of the Operations staff; this was a coordinator for the geographically/operationally oriented senior staffers. The space is not filled, but it would appear that the operations staff could be better coordinated by a single point of control, who would be responsible to you and your deputy.

I recognize the fact that you may not wish to add to the NSC staff, especially at the supervisor level, at this time. There is, however, an al-

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Outside the System Chronological File, Box 3, 11/3/75–11/11/75. Confidential; Outside System. Sent for information. Scowcroft initialed the memorandum. As part of a sweeping personnel change known as the “Halloween Massacre,” Ford announced Scowcroft’s replacement of Kissinger as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on November 3. At the same time, Ford announced the appointment of Donald Rumsfeld to replace Schlesinger as Secretary of Defense, the appointment of George H.W. Bush to replace Colby as DCI, and Rockefeller’s decision not to seek a second term as Vice President. For the text of Ford’s announcement and the question-and-answer session with the press that followed, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, pp. 1791–1804.

² William G. Hyland succeeded Scowcroft as Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on November 17.
ternative. One individual could serve as a Director of “Planning and Operations,” serving as a single coordinating authority for both staff elements in the Executive Office Building. This would insure closer coordination, centralize the point of contact for actions related to either the planning or operational area, and significantly decrease the present span of control which you must cope with.

This would do several things—

—decrease the demands on your time by filtering out the less significant matters;
—act as a quality control on the staff work being forwarded;
—act to coordinate the various elements of the staff within the Executive Office Building, with the exception of the Program Analysis Staff (where the difference in functional responsibilities would dictate direct access to you on major policy decisions which are not closely related to operational or planning actions in the normal sense).

The organizational requirement is clear, and such a structure would relieve you of much of the lesser matters that now consume your time. In addition, this structure would insure that the NSC Staff would work as a single entity rather than as separate offices often unaware of mutual interests and involvement in the same action. From my own experience, the presence of a deputy will help, but will not materially relieve the basic organizational difficulty of span of control and coordination.

Should you wish, I would be happy to serve you in an expanded role. If you think it appropriate, I would be perfectly willing to retire from active military duty to preclude any criticism of militarization of the NSC staff.3

3 Ultimately, the staffing changes Granger recommended were not implemented. He remained as Acting Director, Planning and Coordination, on the NSC Staff until September 1976.
204. Memorandum From Clinton E. Granger of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹


SUBJECT
Staff Philosophy

At this critical juncture in the history of the NSC staff, I would like to offer a few unsolicited—but hopefully helpful—thoughts on staff philosophy. I recognize that some of our operational techniques are derivative of the personality of Secretary Kissinger, and others are dictated by the overall White House requirements for security. However, the crux of the concern which I believe I share with most of the other staffers is inadequate flow of information on events, even when we may have a primary staff interest.

More than anything else, the staff needs to be better informed on ongoing events and plans, if it is to be responsive and provide the support to you which it can, but does not always, render.

I recognize the requirements to safeguard the very sensitive information to which we are privy. This is not limited to “classified” material in the normal sense, but knowledge of events which are politically sensitive, and which would be counterproductive to the President’s aims if they were widely known. There is no question that both security of classified and unclassified but sensitive material is essential. However, the lack of information available on developing issues and events denies the staff information which is equally essential for planning, and very frequently forces us to seek the data from outside the NSC organization. I think that this is counterproductive, in that it leads to speculation, and to uninformed discussions which can be misconstrued by those outside the NSC staff.

The other side of the coin is the mistaken reaction of some of the staffers who wonder why they cannot be trusted with the information they need. I recognize that this is certainly not the intent, but it is frustrating to our staffers to consistently be told of events in which we may have a vital interest by other agencies of the government. I do not mean to imply that all staffers should be privy to all information. The sensitivity of some programs and projects would, of course, preclude any

wide dissemination at all—but the number of such instances would appear to be rather limited.

I advocate a far more liberal policy of keeping the staff informed, to include the establishment of better mechanisms. Perhaps a different approach to NSC staff meetings where the staff exchanges information on future and on-going events, actions in progress, and related material would be useful. Such exchanges could be conducted by the staff prior to your assuming the chair at the meetings to save your time. The present system of a series of dialogues between you and each staffer present is very frequently incomprehensible to most of the rest of the staff seated in the room, and serves only a limited usefulness.

Inherent in the problem of exchanging information is the necessity for a better feedback on decision papers which are forwarded by the staff. You are certainly well aware of the fact that occasionally decisions are made, and when the subject is raised at a staff meeting some days later, it is equally clear that the decision has not reached those who need to take follow-on action. The same is true of feedback from key meetings and conferences, where the nature of the discussions may shape other on-going events.

While these comments may sound overly critical of the existing system, they are not so intended. We have very fine and competent people who manage the flow of information—but they are limited by the philosophy of compartmented information and the encouraged approach that each staffer play his own cards very close to his chest. Given a change in this philosophy, the system can and would respond very well to a broadened flow of basic information.

SUBJECT

Functions and Membership of NSC Sub-Groups

You have expressed an interest in reviewing the composition and chairmanship of the various committees of the NSC system. There follows a short description of each committee together with its make-up and possible alternative arrangements.

Interdepartmental Groups (IG’s)

There are six geographic Interdepartmental Groups, each responsible for the preparation of regional policy studies. There is also a politico-military group responsible for the study of political and military issues which transcend regional boundaries. These groups draft the basic papers defining the issues, the U.S. objectives, and alternative courses of action, with the advantages and disadvantages of each, which serve as the basis for subsequent discussion of the issue. Each group is chaired by the appropriate Assistant Secretary or Bureau chief at State and comprises representatives of the Department of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, the NSC Staff, and of any other agency with an interest in the particular subject to be discussed by the group.

Recommend continued chairing by appropriate Assistant Secretary/Bureau Chief at State

Other

Senior Review Group (SRG)

The Senior Review Group is the penultimate destination of all foreign policy planning in the US Government except on arms control

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 65, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 326—Functions and Organization of National Security Council Sub-Groups (2). Administratively Confidential (Secret Section on Pages 4 and 5). Drafted by McFarlane. Printed from a copy that Scowcroft did not initial.

2 Neither option is initialed. An undated draft NSDM reflecting the President’s decisions, circulated by the NSC Staff on February 26, 1976, states that the five geographic Interdepartmental Groups would remain under the chairmanship of the appropriate Assistant Secretary of State while the Interdepartmental Group for Politico-Military Affairs would be chaired by a “representative of the Secretary of Defense.” (Ibid.) In a March 3 memorandum to Scowcroft, Rumsfeld suggested specifying the Deputy Secretary of Defense as chairman of the Politico-Military Group. (Ibid.) NSDM 326, however, retained the original phrasing. See Document 208.
matters. It reviews the work of the Assistant Secretary-level Interdepartmental Groups to ensure that the issues, options and agency views are represented fully and fairly before submission of an issue to the President for decision. It was created by NSDM 85, September 14, 1970.3

**Chairman:** Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**Members:**
- Deputy Secretary of State
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Director of Central Intelligence
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Representatives of other agencies as appropriate for the subject to be discussed.

Recommend changing Chairmanship to the Secretary of State
Alternatively, continue Chairmanship of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

**Other**

**Verification Panel (VP)**

The panel is responsible for dealing with arms limitation issues. It has played the major role in preparation for the SALT talks with the Soviet Union and in consideration of Mutual Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR) and nuclear testing policies. It was created by White House memorandum of July 21, 1969.5

**Chairman:** Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**Members:**
- Deputy Secretary of State
- Deputy Secretary of Defense
- Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- Director of Central Intelligence
- Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

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4 None of the options is initialed. However, in both the draft and final NSDM, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs remained as Chairman of the SRG. In a March 5, 1976, memorandum to James Connor, Marsh, and Scowcroft, Buchen recommended ending the SRG’s authorization to submit a paper directly to the President. (Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 65, National Security Decision Memorandums, NSDM 326—Functions and Organization of National Security Council Sub-Groups (2)) Scowcroft incorporated the suggestion into a new draft of the NSDM sent to Connor under an April 9 covering memorandum. (Ibid.)

In order to avoid disrupting current negotiations; to preserve the benefits of personal relationships already established; to recognize the fundamentally diplomatic responsibility for negotiating treaties; and to give greater prominence to the role of the Arms Control Agency (a component of the State Department):

Recommend assigning Chairmanship to the Secretary of State
Alternatively, continue Chairmanship of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alternatively, change Chairmanship to Secretary of Defense
Other

Defense Program Review Committee (DPRC)

Reviews major defense policy and program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic and economic implications in relation to overall national priorities. Created by NSDM 26, October 11, 1969.7

Chairman: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Members: Deputy Secretary of State
          Deputy Secretary of Defense
          Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
          Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
          Director, Office of Management and Budget
          Director of Central Intelligence
          Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Recommend changing Chairmanship to the Secretary of Defense
Alternatively, continue Chairmanship of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs8

6 None of the four options is initialed, although the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs remained as chairman in both the draft and final version of NSDM 326.
8 Neither option is initialed. In his March 3 memorandum to Scowcroft, Rumsfeld proposed transferring the chairmanship of the new DRP to the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as a member of the NSC, a proposal ultimately reflected in NSDM 326. Moreover, he suggested reconstituting the group’s membership to include the Secretaries of State and Defense in place of their deputies; the Chairman of the JCS, the DCI, the OMB Director, and the ACDA Director would attend DRP meetings only at the request of the President or Chairman. NSDM 326 did not include these recommendations.
Intelligence Committee (NSCIC)

Determines the Intelligence needs of the top policy makers and provides guidance to the intelligence community concerning them. Evaluates the quality, scope and timeliness of the intelligence input to Presidential decisions and advises on steps to improve it. Created by Presidential Memorandum, November 5, 1971,9 amended by NSDM 253, April 24, 1974.10

Chairman: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Members: Deputy Secretary of State
         Deputy Secretary of Defense
         Director of Central Intelligence
         Under Secretary of the Treasury for Monetary Affairs
         Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Recommend continue Chairmanship of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Other11

(BEGIN SECRET)

40 Committee

Responsible for policy review of all major and/or politically sensitive covert action programs, including missions of the National Reconnaissance Organization, [less than 1 line not declassified] and the Joint Reconnaissance Center. Created by NSDM 40, February 17, 1970.12

Chairman: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Members: Deputy Secretary of Defense
         Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
         Director of Central Intelligence
         Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

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11 Neither option is initialed. A January 31, 1976, memorandum from Davis to Scowcroft indicates that the Attorney General was proposed as a member of the NSCIC. (Ford Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, Box 65, National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 326—Functions and Organization of National Security Council Sub-Groups (1)) However, the draft and final version of NSDM 326 abolished this organization.

Recommend continue Chairmanship of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alternatively, assign Chairmanship to Secretary of State
Other\textsuperscript{13}

(END SECRET)

Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG)

Responsible for coordination of political, military and economic factors in crisis situations. Acts as a high-level crisis management group. Created by White House memorandum, May 16, 1969.\textsuperscript{14}

Chairman: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Members: Deputy Secretary of State
         Deputy Secretary of Defense
         Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
         Director of Central Intelligence

Recommend continue Chairmanship of Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alternatively, assign Chairmanship to Secretary of State
Other\textsuperscript{15}

Under Secretaries Committee (USC)

Responsible for overseeing implementation of the President’s decisions and for developing operational recommendations and programs. Occasionally is assigned responsibility for preparation of a basic study when the subject is of such importance or complexity that it requires consideration at a higher level than that of the Assistant Secretary-level Interdepartmental Group or when it does not fall within the competence of any one of the Interdepartmental Groups. Created by NSDM 2, January 20, 1969.\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{13} None of the options is initialed. Davis’ January 31, 1976, memorandum to Scowcroft also indicates that the Attorney General was proposed as a member of the 40 Committee. Under Executive Order 11905, signed by Ford on February 18, 1976, this body was abolished and replaced by the Operations Advisory Group. See Document 70.


\textsuperscript{15} None of the options is initialed. NSDM 326 named the Secretary of State as chairman.

Chairman: Deputy Secretary of State
Members: Deputy Secretary of Defense
Director of Central Intelligence
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Other agency representatives attend at the invitation of the Chairman (other agency representatives usually attend, with specific representation depending on the subject matter).

Recommend continue Chairmanship of Deputy Secretary of State
Other\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{17} Neither option is initialed. NSDM 326 retained the Deputy Secretary of State as chairman.

206. Editorial Note

On December 13, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford’s recently-appointed Assistant for National Security Affairs, Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft, was interviewed by American Broadcasting Company (ABC) television journalist Ann Compton on his new role succeeding Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger, for whom he had served as Deputy Assistant since 1973:

“Compton: I would like to ask you how you think the leadership of the National Security Council has changed in character.

“General Scowcroft: It hasn’t really changed in character. There has been a gradual evolution of roles which would take place in any case. When [Kissinger] became Secretary of State, there was a gradual evolution as he became more and more burdened with the duties of State. I have assumed more and more here.

“Compton: You feel then there has been a gradual transition?

“General Scowcroft: Other than the formal transition, there is not much change—a few adjustments but that is all.”

Compton also asked Scowcroft about his relationship with Kissinger and the relationship of Presidents Ford and Richard M. Nixon to the NSC. Scowcroft replied, “It is never easy working for Henry Kissinger. As a matter of fact, it is traumatic. He is a very difficult and demanding person but I am extremely fond of him.”

“Compton: Are your philosophies and view points similar?
“General Scowcroft: Yes. Our general strategic and philosophic outlook is very close.

“Compton: Because of having worked with him?

“General Scowcroft: They are naturally quite coincident. Maybe they have grown closer, I am not sure. But, we do have our differences.

“Compton: Have any of your thoughts on National Security in general changed or grown or developed in your relationship with him?

“General Scowcroft: All my thoughts have grown as a result of him. He has a gigantic intellect. I have learned and benefited immensely.

“Compton: You came here under President Nixon. President Ford has been here a year now. Has the day-to-day operation of the NSC changed that you’ve noticed?

“General Scowcroft: No.

“Compton: There is a continuation from when Nixon was here?

“General Scowcroft: There have been changes in accommodating to the way Nixon and Ford do business. Nixon liked to read. He liked his operations all written out for him and clearly delineated. Then he would take them home and review them. He liked to make policy decisions on that basis. Ford is more people-oriented. He still likes the option paper but he likes to interchange as well. He is much more inclined to talk it over.

“Compton: Do you sense that Ford has any trouble grasping these concepts? As a Congressman, he didn’t have the national security background that Nixon had. He had, I assume, a greater flow and could grasp more information than Ford could.

“General Scowcroft: In general, that is true. But Ford as Minority Leader got involved in these issues—he was quite conversant with defense matters. Secretary Kissinger or myself would brief him when he was Vice President so he came in with a good general background. Naturally, he still lacked the depth and sophistication that Nixon had but it wasn’t a standing start, either.

“Compton: Has he made up for it since then?

“General Scowcroft: Oh yes, he studies the issues and really does his home work. He is very thorough.”

207. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (Lynn) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Enrolled Bill S. 2350—National Security Council membership for the Secretary of the Treasury
Sponsors—Sen. Symington (D) Missouri and Sen. Mansfield (D) Montana

Last Day for Action
December 31, 1975—Wednesday

Purpose
Provides statutory membership on the National Security Council for the Secretary of the Treasury.

Agency Recommendations
Office of Management and Budget Disapproval (veto message attached)
National Security Council Disapproval
Department of the Treasury Approval
Department of Defense Defers to Executive Office of the President

Department of State

Discussion
Under the law, the National Security Council advises the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to national security. Current statutory membership of the Council consists of the President, the Vice President, and the Secretaries of State and Defense. The President may also appoint, with the

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1 Source: Ford Library, White House Central Files, Box 22, Subject File, FG 6–6, 12/1/75–12/31/75, Executive. No classification marking.
3 The Department of State’s recommendation is not noted on the memorandum. On December 18, OMB sought the Department’s views on S. 2350, which the House of Representatives had passed the day before. In response, Deputy Director of Management Operations Donald R. Norland suggested that Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger clear a memorandum to Lynn recommending Department approval of the bill. On December 22, Eagleburger noted to Bremer that he had “no trouble with this” and advised him to ask Kissinger for his opinion. (National Archives, RG 59, Administrative Correspondence Files, General Correspondence Files of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management 1968–75: Lot 78 D 295, M Chron, November 1975 (1)) No record of Kissinger’s response or of further State Department action was found.
advice and consent of the Senate, the Secretaries and Under Secretaries of other executive departments and the military departments, to serve at his pleasure. While this latter provision has never been used, all Presidents since the statutory establishment of the Council in 1947 have invited other department and agency heads to participate in the Council’s affairs when matters pertaining to their responsibilities have been considered.

The enrolled bill would add the Secretary of the Treasury to the present statutory membership of the NSC. The Secretary of the Treasury has never been a statutory member of the Council. Treasury Secretaries have been invited by all Presidents since the Council’s inception, however, to participate in the Council’s deliberations when matters of substantial interest to the Treasury have been considered.

On November 12, 1975, in response to your request, I sent you a memorandum (copy attached, Tab A) on S. 2350, which, at that time, had been adopted by the Senate without receiving Administration views, and was pending before the House Armed Services Committee. Briefly stated, that memorandum reviewed the current statutory provisions relating to NSC membership and set forth my view that the present statutory arrangement affords the President the most desirable degree of flexibility and should be continued. I recommended that you authorize me, on behalf of the Administration, to send a letter to Chairman Price of the House Armed Services Committee expressing a strong preference for no change in the existing law. The NSC concurred in this approach. On December 1, 1975, following your approval, I sent such a letter (copy attached, Tab B) strongly opposing enactment of S. 2350 for many of the same reasons discussed in my memorandum.

In its report on S. 2350, the Senate Armed Services Committee stated:

"The addition of the Secretary of the Treasury to the National Security Council reflects the growing significance of international economics and domestic fiscal affairs in the development of national security policies."

"The presence of the Secretary of the Treasury on this Council would help ensure that fiscal and monetary issues are considered in the discussion of problems relating to our national security."

"This legislation is not intended to reduce our national defense effort or minimize traditional national security considerations; rather it is premised upon a broadened concept of national security which increasingly encompasses economic, as well as military and foreign policy, considerations.

4 Attached but not printed.
5 Attached but not printed.
“The bill seeks to strengthen the national security decisionmaking process by ensuring the participation of the cabinet officer most directly responsible for economic and fiscal affairs.”

S. 2350 was passed in both the Senate and House by voice votes.

I continue to believe that S. 2350 should not become law for the reasons stated in my November 12 memorandum. Since the Treasury Secretary can be, and normally is, invited to participate in NSC matters of substantial interest to him, and since the existing law provides authority for his appointment to the Council if the President deems it appropriate, enactment of this legislation is unnecessary. Furthermore, the Secretary serves as Chairman of both the Economic Policy Board and the Council for International Economic Policy. The Secretary of State also serves on these bodies. Thus, through these additional means, the President is assured of receiving advice which takes into account the proper integration of domestic and international economic policy with foreign policy and national security objectives.

As my memorandum pointed out, the enrolled bill is undesirable as well as unnecessary. First, it would restrict the President’s flexibility to determine the manner in which he shall receive advice on national security matters. Second, statutory membership on the NSC for the Treasury Secretary would not be consonant with the broad range of issues considered by the Council, many of which do not fall within the proper concerns of the Secretary. Third, because a number of executive branch departments and agencies are concerned with international economic policy (e.g., Commerce and Agriculture), the Treasury Secretary would not be able to represent their interests in matters before the Council involving economic policy considerations. Fourth, S. 2350 would set a precedent for statutory addition of other agency heads to the NSC; a bill is now pending in the Congress to add the Attorney General.

In light of the above, I recommend that you disapprove S. 2350. A proposed veto message is attached for your consideration (Tab C).  

James T. Lynn

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6 Attached but not printed. Ford issued the veto on December 31 and S. 2350 was returned to Congress where the Senate overrode Ford’s veto on January 22, 1976. On January 26, the House of Representatives reconsidered the bill, referred it to committee, but ultimately made no attempt to override the veto. (*Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976*, Vol. IV, p. 1122) The Secretary of the Treasury would not be added as a member of the National Security Council until January 20, 1993.

7 Printed from a copy bearing this stamped signature with an indication that Lynn signed the original.
208. National Security Decision Memorandum 326

Washington, April 21, 1976.

TO
The Vice President
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Director, Office of Management and Budget
The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
Functions and Organizations of National Security Council Sub-Groups

I have reviewed the organization and functions of the various sub-groups of the National Security Council and have made the following determinations:

The functions of the Senior Review Group will remain as described in the second and third paragraphs of National Security Decision Memorandum 85. It will continue to be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership will include:

The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

The Verification Panel will continue to perform the basic technical analysis to help develop choices and proposals for strategic arms limitation, approaches to mutual and balanced force reductions in Europe, and other major arms control subjects. This analysis will include the verification requirements which must accompany arms limitations and the capabilities of weapons systems whose limitation is being considered. It will be chaired by the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will include:

Those portions of the Memorandum of July 21, 1969, signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and of National Security Study Memoranda 92 and 128 which relate to the organization or functions of the Verification Panel are superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

The Defense Program Review Committee, established by National Security Council [Decision] Memorandum 26, shall be reconstituted as the Defense Review Panel. The Panel will review major defense policy and program issues which have strategic, political, diplomatic and economic implications in relation to overall national priorities. The Defense Review Panel will be chaired by the Secretary of Defense in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will include:

- The Deputy Secretary of State
- The Deputy Secretary of Defense
- The Director of Central Intelligence
- The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
- The Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- The Director, Office of Management and Budget
- The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Depending on the issue under consideration, other agencies shall be represented at the discretion of the Chairman.

National Security Decision Memorandum 26 is hereby superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

The Washington Special Actions Group will continue to develop options for implementation of decisions during crises and for integrating the political and military requirements of crisis action. It will be chaired by the Secretary of State in his capacity as a member of the National Security Council. Its membership will consist of:

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3 See ibid., Document 65.
4 NSSMs 92 and 128 and related documentation are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–171, National Security Study Memorandums, NSSM 92 (5 folders) and Boxes H–184 and H–185, National Security Study Memorandums, NSSM 128 (8 folders), respectively.
6 For consideration of matters having budgetary implications. [Footnote in the original.]
The Deputy Secretary of State
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

That portion of the Memorandum of May 16, 1969,7 signed by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, which relates to the organization and functions of the Group is superseded by this Decision Memorandum.

The 40 Committee, is hereby abolished. It is replaced by the Operations Advisory Group, established by Executive Order 11905 of February 18, 1976.8

This group will review and advise the President on covert operations and certain sensitive foreign intelligence collection missions. It will be chaired by the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and its membership will be as follows:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Observers:
The Attorney General
The Director, Office of Management and Budget

The Intelligence Committee, established by the President’s Memorandum of November 5, 1971,9 is hereby abolished.

The Committee on Foreign Intelligence was established by Executive Order 11905 and its duties are as described in the Executive Order.

It is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence and its membership consists of:

The Deputy Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
The Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The functions and membership of the Under Secretaries Committee will remain as described in National Security Decision Memoranda 2 and 8.10 It will be chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State.

The functions and membership of the six standing Interdepartmental Groups will remain as described in National Security Decision Memoranda 2 and 8.10

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8 Document 70.
10 See ibid., Documents 11 and 31, respectively.
Memorandum 2. The five geographic Groups will be chaired by the appropriate geographic Assistant Secretary of State. The Interdepartmental Group for Political-Military Affairs will be chaired by a representative of the Secretary of Defense.

Gerald R. Ford

209. Memorandum From Arthur H. House of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)


SUBJECT
Thoughts From Your Fellow (Cherokee)

I. The NSC System

Thoughts on how the NSC system has performed must be offered in the context of what the President wants from both the National Security Council and from his Assistant for National Security Affairs and the NSC staff. Since foreign affairs management was a strong point when President Ford assumed office in the midst of domestic chaos, the NSC has basically followed its previous system and adapted to a new President. There has been little time—nor would it have necessarily been well spent—to examine from a tabula rasa how to organize and use the National Security Council.

In the same vein, your appointment as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs came during the fourth lap of a mile race for the Presidency. Basic policies had been examined. The job for the ensuing year was to try to achieve some resolution of negotiations with the Soviets, to culminate work already in progress (such as Law of the Sea, CSCE and CIEC, intelligence community reform), and to manage the flow of crises. Moreover, the architect/director of the past seven years was still actively at the drawing board, and that unusual circumstance has necessitated adjustment. In sum, introspection and reorganization have rightfully been low priorities. The elections will provide

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that opportunity in one way or the other; these notes are offered to identify some issues for post-November consideration.

II. Structure and Procedure

I think the NSC staff does perform its basic task well: it does channel to the President those foreign affairs matters he should receive from the various departments, and it does so with acceptable speed, without bias and distortion of department views, and with an independent NSC assessment. From my vantage of partial observation, it appears that the system works well from your office upwards to the President; it works less effectively downwards—your office drawing first rate support from the NSC staff. Which is to say that the President is evidently well served by the advice he receives integrating domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security through our provision of action, analysis, and information papers he receives; your office however, could be better served by your staff. I have divided comments into two categories. The first includes improved structure and procedures: matters which might improve the quality of our product and save time for you. The second considers other possible uses of time made available.

The crucial factor in a strong NSC is a first rate senior staff. One of the main problems during this past year has been the cumulative effects of weak spots on our senior staff. Inadequate staff work absorbs too much time on this side of the street: if confidence in the senior staff is low, there is little point in returning a package for improvement. Time spent by you and your immediate staff is often that of the generalist working on a specialized problem and hence not as productive as it should be. While staff deficiencies cause time to be wasted, better staffing should make available valuable time for you.

I would place more burden on each senior staff member than he could probably handle just to see how much work can be farmed out of your office. Two points are relevant here. The first is that whereas the NSC before November was motivated especially by fear and respect without much empathy and by professional pride, its motivation since November 1975 has been the same respect and pride but more empathy and less fear. The fact is that a much more positive motivation and desire to perform for you characterizes the staff from the situation room to the senior staff. Many staff think that they could do much more for you if they were cut in on more of the action. A few close colleagues have offered the view that the senior staff should be the core of our system and either have your full confidence and do your work for you or be replaced quickly. The following are a few observations regarding senior staff.

1. It would be useful to call in each senior staff man for plus or minus 20 minutes every two weeks for a review of the next fortnight’s
work. He could be given guidance and instructions on pending or future projects and receive direction on his own questions. This kind of guidance can save wasted time on both sides. Often the staff needs direction to follow one of various options; having previous guidance produces work closer to the mark you have set.

2. The senior staff wants to be included in meetings with foreign officials, Kissinger–Rumsfeld, or public officials. The problem is that they are often brief, non-substantive meetings at short notice. Nonetheless the sense of staff involvement and ability to perform are enhanced by being in the fray.

3. A difficult problem is the division between what business the senior staff should handle and what should be done by you or your office. I think the NSC is much less status conscious than many parts of the government in accepting telephone calls and inquiries from only equivalent ranked officials. The recent Rumsfeld policy of encouraging contact between your office and his rather than at staff level reduces our staff effectiveness and its ability to perform. It strikes me that the rule of thumb should be to push as much business over to the senior staff as possible. Many telephone calls could probably be referred to our senior staff. Every issue entering your office involves concurrences, contingencies, corrections, and follow-up. The more business a senior staff person handles the better equipped he is to respond to the array of problems in his area. Whether merited or not, most senior staff feel cut off from the main flow of business and would like to have more of the daily work thrown their way, even if a task is required on very short notice.

4. One of the most important requirements for the NSC system confirmed by President Ford was that of “creativity” described by Jeanne Davis in her description of the NSC’s role in decision making as fashioning a positive vision of a peaceful world, clarifying our view of U.S. objectives, and designing policy to achieve them: “more than reacting to external events.” I think that while our staff is strong on analysis and prescription it is weak on initiative. We need to have senior staff who have their own concept of where we are heading and who can give you short papers suggesting changes of course to get there. We must react to the prime movers at State and Defense but we should also prod them to move in the right directions.

5. You and Bill Hyland should be spared the job of action officer as much as possible. If a paper or letter is badly written, I would try noting on it that the English is poor, cool it down, that the analysis is weak, the prescriptions incomplete, whatever—and fire it back down the line for

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2 See Document 195.
immediate attention. That sort of reaction lets the staff know right away what they do wrong and keeps them at work according to your standards. I suspect that most of our senior staff have thick skins from bureaucratic experience and would rather know how to improve a piece of work than to have it be buried. One minor point in this vein, I don’t understand how one can do the jobs you and Bill do and also be fully prepared to chair the working group meetings as he does on the SALT VPWG. It seems extremely difficult to me and not the best use of our heavy artillery, but I am no expert in this field.

A central question in staff management is the role of the staff secretary. It would be useful to reconsider the merits of replacing the strong chief of staff system of the 1960’s with the more confederal system we presently have. I am not sure why Secretary Kissinger preferred to weaken the role of staff secretary, but Jeanne Davis is clearly competent and could handle some of the traffic which comes to your office. With standing guidance on classes of action followed by notification to you of action taken, the paper flow could be reduced. I would also recommend a stronger hand in quality checking of packages before they come across the street.

A position which could be extremely important to quality control and forward planning is that of head of policy planning. Again, the key element is the senior staff member—but a first rate thinker and writer in policy planning could improve the quality of work from other offices, especially the important NSSM and NSDM work requiring coordination. The policy planner can also serve as a link to the academic community in assessing new ideas and possible innovations. I think we could use a renaissance in this department.

Some adjustments in your immediate staff might enable it to serve you better than it presently does. In addition to handling special assignments, Bill Hyland could collect all the perfunctory packages and either sign them himself or review them as a lot with you at the end of the day to separate the routine from those requiring additional attention. Bud’s [McFarlane] job as “right arm” could be more effective if someone on the lower level were given special assistant assignments during the day. From my experience at Bud’s desk it appears that every day there are a few problems requiring an hour or two of uninterrupted attention. Many of these could be given to a special assistant to manage. Some items involve consultation with the senior staff or with other officials outside the NSC, some simply need to be coordinated, some require time to think and write. There are some first rate people on the staff who could take a problem, run with it, and handle the coordination with our senior staff with the discretion required—thereby freeing Bud for all the other things he does. Given the kinds of problems
needing this sort of daily staffing, knowledge of how the government works, especially military and intelligence affairs, would be valuable.

The “package review” job which I had this past year requires a few months before one has the knowledge and experience for additional assignments. The position has the advantage of seeing the overall flow of substantive work and eventually affords the chance to assume other assignments. You might load more work onto the White House Fellow or whoever has the job: speechwriting, rewriting of texts, thinking through problems and suggesting alternate courses of action for staff assignment, and other special assistant tasks.

The staff below senior level have substantively interesting jobs, deal with relatively high level officers of other agencies, and prepare material for you and the President. The negative side of these jobs is lack of recognition for work performed. Some staff spend two years at the NSC without having a chance to work with you or Bill Hyland and thereby earn recognition. There are some possible ways to effect increased contact. A stronger staff secretary could review with you actions taken and work performed, including an assessment of work performance by staff members. If senior staff members were to meet with you to clear the decks once every two weeks in short “check off” meetings, the other staff could occasionally participate. The senior staff members could further give a rundown of who is doing what on his staff. Another help would be to have staff names added at the lower left hand corner of our internal memoranda sent to you and to Bill. The point is that many loyal staff members toil away on the third and fourth floors of the OEOB without much reinforcement to keep up their morale.

III. Other Areas, Time Permitting

It is difficult to suggest uses of time because working style reflects personal habits and preferences. As one preoccupied with language and writing, I admire your ability to write with a simple, direct, and precise style. I also sympathize because you share my problem of spending too much time improving the purity of the language. We are all creatures of habit but it might be useful to consider other uses of one’s time. If there were a way to send memos back for others to rewrite them, to have Larry Eagleburger and other loquacious friends stay off the telephone, to have Jon Howe stop by for long briefings only twice a week—or to clear the desk once and for all of all accumulated business, how could one spend the resulting time for the good of the President?

One area could be to cultivate stronger ties with the key leaders of the House and Senate in the foreign affairs area. A few lunches, occasional meetings, or telephone calls to back up Friedersdorf and Marsh might be helpful. The press (before November 1976 as well as after)
needs direction on a wide range of issues which are not reported to the advantage of the President. You might want to meet with some columnists as well as receive more calls from those who are doing a story and simply want to have our side of it.

By far the main advantage of any extra time would be to plan ahead and direct the senior staff into the position of being ahead of the power curve relative to other agencies. The sheer volume of business can be overwhelming. A stronger staff secretary system, more responsibility thrown back to the senior staff under your guidance, and increased flexibility within your office might make it possible to find some extra time and shorten the day. I am sure that a faithful and dedicated staff is eager to assume increased responsibilities, and you might find that any flexibility made available could be put to good use.

210. Editorial Note

On November 2, 1976, President Gerald R. Ford was defeated in his bid for re-election by the Democratic candidate, former Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter. Three days later, on November 5, White House Press Secretary Ron Nessen announced that Ford had appointed Counselor John O. Marsh as his chief representative in the transition process, to be assisted by James Connor and Michael Raoul-Duval. When asked by a member of the press who would be in charge of coordinating the transition in the National Security Council, Nessen could not confirm whether anyone had been appointed. (Press Briefing, November 5, 1976; Ford Library, Ron Nessen Files, Box 22, Press Secretary’s Press Briefing Transcripts, 9/9/76–11/16/76) Material on the transition process, related largely to domestic concerns, is ibid., John O. Marsh Files, Boxes 33–41, General Subject File.

Unlike the record of the transition at the Department of State, little documentation on the transition process in the NSC has been found. (For more on the transition process in the Department of State, see Documents 211–225.) President-elect Carter named foreign policy adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski his Assistant for National Security Affairs on December 10. No record of any meeting between Scowcroft and Brzezinski or other members of the incoming administration has been found. In his memoirs, Kissinger noted that he provided a briefing to Brzezinski on African policy. (Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, page 1063) An undated briefing and organization paper, presumably prepared by the NSC Staff for the incoming Carter administration, including a com-
plete listing of Ford administration NSC personnel as well as a description of the basic functions of the NSC’s constituent bodies, is in the Ford Library, National Security Council, Institutional Files, Box 85, IFG (Institutional Files—Secretariat), Davis, Jeanne W., Personal File, NSC Organization and Administration (8).
The Transition From Ford to Carter

211. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, July 1, 1976.

Attached is George Bush’s recommendation for providing intelligence briefings to Governor Carter following his nomination. The recommendation that CIA conduct the briefings is sound. It will remove any possibility of policy considerations, with their possible elements of awkwardness for both sides. I am somewhat concerned, however, by the proposal that the briefing be handled by professional intelligence officers. I believe that, at least in the early stages, the briefings should be conducted by George Bush himself. It seems to me important that we retain some political (in the best sense of the word) control over the exact contents of the briefings. If, after several briefings have been held, the situation appears to warrant it, we could move to more junior briefing officers. George’s recommendation may be colored by his perception of his own personal situation, which may lead him to conclude that Carter would consider him suspect and feel we may try to take advantage of the briefings. George is the Director of Central Intelligence, however, and it is my feeling we should treat him solely as that and ignore his antecedents.

I concur with the remainder of George’s recommendations. We might initially think of a briefing approximately every three weeks or more often if the situation warrants.

I suggest that you call Governor Carter and propose intelligence briefings by the DCI with the understanding that:

1. They do not put him under any obligation, but you would ask his cooperation in protecting intelligence operations.

2. Director Bush will treat the discussions with the Governor as privileged.

3. The briefings will be conducted periodically, with the frequency as mutually agreed.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 2, Carter, Jimmy—Intelligence Briefings. Secret; Sensitive. Scowcroft wrote “President has seen” on the memorandum.

2 Georgia Governor Jimmy Carter secured the Democratic Presidential nomination at the party convention in New York City on July 14, 1976, defeating his closest challenger, Representative Morris Udall of Arizona. As his running mate, Carter selected Senator Walter Mondale of Minnesota.
Recommendation

That you call Governor Carter and, making the points above, inform him that Director Bush is prepared to meet with him at his convenience to work out details.3

Attachment

Memorandum From Director of Central Intelligence Bush to President Ford4

Washington, undated.

1. At our meeting with you last Friday we discussed the question of providing intelligence briefings to Governor Carter after his nomination.5 I understand that Governor Carter has since asked you for such briefings. I recommend that you concur in his request and that you charge the DCI with this responsibility.

2. In 1952, President Truman first offered CIA briefings to General Eisenhower and Governor Stevenson.6 Since that time, it has been customary for the President to make such an offer. With the exceptions of Senator Goldwater in 1964 and Senator McGovern in 1972, all candidates have accepted and have been briefed at least once.7

3. There has been no established pattern for the briefings themselves. The number and depth has varied with the individual candidate's interest and the demands of his schedule. In 1952 a CIA officer was assigned to each candidate and was prepared to brief whenever the candidate requested, which turned out to be several times in each case. In 1960 Allen Dulles chose to brief Senator Kennedy himself and had two or three long sessions with him.8 In 1968 I believe President

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3 President Ford's next telephone call to Governor Carter was made on July 15. No record of the substance of the 2-minute conversation has been found. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary's Office, President's Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found.

4 Secret; [handling restriction not declassified].

5 According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting took place on June 25 between 7:45 and 8:15 a.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary's Office, President's Daily Diary)

6 General Dwight D. Eisenhower was the Republican Presidential candidate in the 1952 election; former Illinois Governor Adlai E. Stevenson II was the Democratic candidate.

7 Arizona Senator Barry M. Goldwater was the Republican nominee for President in the 1964 election. South Dakota Senator George S. McGovern was the Democratic nominee in the 1972 election.

8 Allen Dulles was Director of Central Intelligence, 1953–1961. Massachusetts Senator John F. Kennedy won the 1960 Presidential election.
Johnson had a single meeting with Mr. Nixon in which he was joined by Secretaries Rusk and Clifford and Mr. Helms.  

4. To the extent that there have been any ground rules for these sessions, they have been that the briefer would try to stay clear of immediate policy (or political) issues and of intelligence operations, but would otherwise try to give as full and frank a discussion of events abroad as he would provide to the President himself. The candidates in turn have been scrupulous not to exploit what they have learned for political advantage. Rather they have treated the offer in the spirit it was made: to enable them to deal responsibly with questions of foreign policy and to avoid saying things in the heat of the campaign that might be damaging to the national interest. On occasion, a candidate has designated a trusted staff officer to be used as an alternate channel to him.

5. The continuing need for responsible public treatment of sensitive foreign issues, taken with the precedents set by your predecessors, argue that you should extend this service to Governor Carter. If you decide to do so, I believe it would best be handled by professional intelligence officers. This would:

—Minimize political overtones
—Meet Governor Carter’s expressed interest
—Make it possible for him to be briefed on his own schedule and on his own agenda (awkward if Cabinet-level officers are doing the briefing)
—Maintain the proper separation between factual briefings and policy discussions

6. I recommend you call Governor Carter and tell him that I am available to meet him at his convenience to discuss detailed arrangements. You should assure him that we are prepared to make the full range of foreign intelligence information and analysis available to him but that we will be unable to discuss policy matters or sensitive sources and methods. You may also wish to assure him that our briefing officers will be expected to protect him as well. They will not report his particular interests or concerns to you or the NSC Staff. Suggested talking points are attached.

7. When I see Governor Carter I would suggest that we proceed as proposed in Paragraph 5. If he wishes to involve his staff officers in these briefings, I would stipulate that they must receive appropriate security clearances.

George Bush

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9 Clark Clifford was Secretary of Defense, 1968–1969.
10 Attached but not printed.
212. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 1, 1976.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Mr. Robinson, Deputy Secretary
Mr. Habib, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Jock Covey (notetaker)

SUBJECT

Transition

Robinson: I just wanted to talk to you about some of the problems of transition.

The Secretary: Larry [Eagleburger] will do it. The Foreign Service will do nothing. You guys just do your jobs. On January 20th you will shift loyalties to the new President. We will be totally cooperative, but we will be running things until then. There will be no secrets—we will be totally open, but if they want any paper, they will go through Eagleburger.

Habib: We should use the Executive Secretariat as the mechanism and Eagleburger can supervise. I think Eagleburger should be in charge, but they should use the Executive Secretariat to protect you.

The Secretary: The system will be protected by the meticulous execution of the process. We will be totally open, but Eagleburger will be in charge. I will not have those guys dealing directly with our guys.

Habib: This has to do mostly with paperwork.

The Secretary: We will be setting up regular group meetings—a lot like the Africa group meetings and the Executive Secretary will be invited in. But how we work within the Department is nobody’s business. Eagleburger will be the one to deal with Carter—not the Executive Secretary.

Robinson: We are only saying that the Executive Secretary should be dealing in a mechanical sense.

The Secretary: I have no problem with that. If they want a paper on Asia it doesn’t matter if Eagleburger calls EA or if S/S calls EA, just as long as it gets done. But Eagleburger will be the contact.

Why are you all so concerned?

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Habib: We just want to avoid any accusations of “managing” this or of hiding things.

The Secretary: Eagleburger will be publicly in charge. It will be properly done—it is in my interests to do it properly. What do you think I was going to do?

Habib: We just want to protect you from suspicious people.

The Secretary: I am not worried—they are free to have anything in the files. The only question is how to get them read in. But it will be done by someone close to me. If the Secretary of State cannot be trusted to turn over his Department in good order, then we are in very bad shape. But I am telling you, it will be in good shape!

213. Editorial Note

With the outcome of the 1976 Presidential election uncertain, on November 2, Deputy Secretary of State Charles W. Robinson sent a memorandum to Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger stating the need to “move promptly to coordinate the transition process” should Governor Carter win. Robinson attached a proposed organization plan for dealing with the change of administration. The plan anticipated the immediate logistical requirements of a transition team and efforts the Department would need to make to brief incoming appointees. A transition committee, including representatives of the Bureau of Administration (A), the office of the Director General of the Foreign Service (DG), the Executive Secretariat (S/S), and others, was created to oversee this process, coordinate the transition efforts of the Agency for International Development and the United States Information Agency, and work in cooperation with the National Security Council, the National Security Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency. (National Archives, RG 59, Transition Records of the Executive Secretariat, 1959–1977: Lot 77 D 253, Entry 5338, Transition to the Next Administration) With Governor Carter’s victory, Robinson’s plan formed the basis of the Department’s handling of the transition process.

The final outcome of the November 2 election was close. Winning 50.1 percent of the popular vote and 297 electoral votes, Governor Carter defeated President Ford who garnered totals of 48 percent and 240 electoral votes. With several key states too close to call, Carter was not declared the winner until the following morning. At 11 a.m. on November 3, Ford telephoned Carter from the Oval Office to concede and then met with members of the press assembled in the White House

214. Memorandum of Conversation¹


PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Robinson
Under Secretary Habib
Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger
S—R.W. Aherne (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Transition

The Secretary: I have gone over your memorandum (attached).² I want Larry [Eagleburger] to be in complete charge of the transition. He is to be responsible for liaison, and no one else is. He will be in touch with whoever we need to be in touch with.

Robinson: Are the messages okay?³

The Secretary: I have gone over these; the instructions are fine. I want this group, plus Winston Lord, to meet daily—as we do with the African group—even if it’s only for five minutes. Larry will go over problems and report to this group as things develop. (Secretary takes call from Scowcroft)

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy Transition Papers—Chronological File, Feb.–Nov. 1976. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the Department of State.

² Attached but not printed is a draft action memorandum from Robinson to Kissinger outlining recommended instructions to the Department to begin the transition process. The memorandum is printed, as approved by Kissinger, as Document 215.

³ Attached but not printed is a draft memorandum to all Department of State employees designating Eagleburger as the officer responsible for coordinating the transition on behalf of the Department. Draft memoranda from Eagleburger to Scowcroft, to all Assistant Secretaries and Bureau heads, and to all Department employees, announcing his appointment as transition coordinator, are also attached.
The Secretary: We will have to set up procedures, including a way of getting messages back and forth between the President-elect and his colleagues. I am sure he’ll name some sort of liaison people.

Eagleburger: If he follows past practice, he will certainly name one, and soon.

The Secretary: I want Eagleburger to be the point of contact. We can’t keep Holbrooke from running around the building talking to people, but Eagleburger is to be the official point of contact, and the only one.

Eagleburger: We will have to handle requests for information from the Carter people.

Robinson: Do we know anything about who Carter will name?

Habib: No, but . . .

The Secretary: Phil, you don’t know a goddamn thing.

Habib: They have indicated some things, and suggested some names . . .

Robinson: But that’s for across-the-board liaison.

The Secretary: Phil, if you want to do something for the Foreign Service, you can see that they behave with discipline and control in the months ahead. My position is that anything that happens before January 20 is my responsibility, and anything afterwards is theirs. If the President-elect wants advice afterwards from the members of the Foreign Service, that’s fine. But they shouldn’t be sucking around in the meantime, trying to feed papers down there and get their points of view across. It will do nothing but demean them. The best protection for the Foreign Service is to behave with dignity. If they go running around pushing their points of view and obviously looking for jobs, they will have prostituted themselves before Carter and his people ever get to Washington. And if they do that, they will never have any stature with him.

Habib: That’s why we have set things up as we have in the memorandum: to accomplish that objective.

The Secretary: I am not worried about what takes place after the 20th of January. But if we start feeding policy papers down there beforehand, the people in Plains will just ignore them. When I was at the Pierre Hotel (during the ‘68–’69 transition), we were deluged with memos and recommendations from various people in the Department. Larry, I don’t believe we ever read any of them, did we? There were all sorts of papers sent up telling us what we ought to do, and we just never paid any attention to them.

If Carter asks for something, we will do it. But there should be no papers telling our successors how to handle things and what to do. There should be no papers telling Carter what to do after the 20th of
January. Johnson did that in ’69. All sorts of things were sent to us, and we never read them.

Eagleburger: That’s right. In ’69 we got briefing books and papers and so forth and never made any use of them.

The Secretary: If they ask, we’ll do it, but only if they ask. I will only deal with Carter or with the Secretary-designate; Eagleburger will deal with all others.

I must avoid the impression that I am trying to influence their actions. We must meticulously avoid the impression that we are trying to prescribe what they should do. So there will be no Bureau policy papers. If individuals want to slip things down to Plains, that’s their problem. But we will not forward anything from the Department, except through Eagleburger.

Again, Phil, the best protection for the Foreign Service is to do its job carefully and with dignity in the period between now and January 20. I will do the same. I will work closely with the new Secretary. I will bring him in here as soon as he is named. We will do what he wants to do; we will give him what he wants.

I took the same position when I was designated Assistant to the President in 1968. Rostow4 tried to involve me, to give me the cables, to bring me into his decisions. I refused.

Eagleburger: But do we have a reverse obligation now?

The Secretary: No, not necessarily. I will tell the Secretary-designate if he wants to read all the cables and sit in on all my staff meetings and see what I see, he can do it. Whatever he wants to do, I will do. I just don’t want to say to him that he should share in the decisions. But as soon as he is named, we will get him in here, and we will see what he wants to do.

Habib: Wasn’t anything prepared for you in 1969? Not policy papers, but just a description of the immediate problems facing you?

Eagleburger: Yes.

The Secretary: We will prepare a book of procedures.5 We will not tell them that this is the only way that the Department can operate because it’s up to them to decide how they operate, but we will prepare a book for several objectives: (1) it will show them what procedures they will find when they come to the Department; (2) it will give a list of things coming up immediately, issues and events which are already set and which will face them, such as CIEC, Law of the Sea, and so forth.

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5 Not found.
But on issues, we will only give them papers if we are asked. And we will wait until I have talked to the new man. We can do those quickly if they need them, we can do them in two weeks.

Habib: I have no problem with the first, but I think we may have a problem with the second point. We may not be able to do them that quickly. Two weeks starting when?

The Secretary: We will not have policy papers. And the problem with doing factual papers is that the analysis of facts and circumstances in the papers is the essence of policy-making.

Robinson: On page 7, the section on issues and problems . . .

The Secretary: No, we will not do one on the “role of Congress”. That’s just the kind of thing I mean which will turn into a policy paper.

Habib: This was just meant to cover a description of the immediate problems.

The Secretary: There will be no briefing papers. There are two drawbacks: (1) if we give them a list of things which we think ought to be done, I will be able to use it against my successor. I can say we told them these were the things that ought to be done, and they haven’t done any of them; and (2), he will be able to use them against me; he will be able to point to them and say, look at all this they left for us.

And there is a third point: I will not be able to pay attention to the papers. I will not give them papers unless I have looked at them and approved them. But I will not have the time. So the Bureaus will be grinding out papers, and I will not have any impact on them. They will come across as being Department papers, but they will not necessarily represent my point of view.

The first thing is that I must see my successor and talk to him. In any case, he won’t have the time to go through voluminous papers. He will have far too many things to do, with the basic issues of personnel and so forth.

Habib: So we will do “C” and half of “A”—on conferences?

The Secretary: Just list the fixed obligations. I will not give them any policy recommendations. We just want to tell them what will be coming up in the first days that they are here after January 20.

Habib: Well, we can take care of the Congressional problems in that context.

The Secretary: (to Eagleburger) Don’t you think that’s the right approach?

Eagleburger: Yes. Then that means that we should also not have the Assistant Secretaries prepare any briefing material for their successors?

The Secretary: That’s right. Unless I spend all of my time on this, it will not represent my views, it will represent the individual views of
Assistant Secretaries. And you cannot say that our Assistant Secretaries have all distinguished themselves by their good judgment.

Habib: As we describe how the system functions, should we also cover the relationship with the intelligence community, for example?

The Secretary: Yes, of course. And the relationship with DOD and the NSC, and so forth. That’s part of the system, and it has to be shown to them.

Eagleburger: But only as a description, a factual description.

Habib: Well, if you agree then, Winston Lord and I and a few others will get together, and we will hold it very closely, but we will just write a description of how the process works now.

The Secretary: I don’t know how many people you need. I would think the description of the system ought to be within our capability.

Robinson: We do face a question about the role that some members of your immediate staff will play in this . . .

The Secretary: Who?

Robinson: Well, Sonnenfeldt, for example.

The Secretary: This is the group. This group right here is it. I have lived with Sonnenfeldt for eight years. You tell him that there are no substantive papers involved, and he is not part of it.

Eagleburger: What about Winston Lord?

The Secretary: Yes, Lord is okay. He won’t do it to get attention, and he won’t do it because he is looking for a job. This is not a substantive group. Tell Sonnenfeldt there will be no contact with Plains, although he has probably already contacted them. He is probably on the telephone to them this morning.

Eagleburger: I will take care of Sonnenfeldt. I will talk to him.

The Secretary: Tell Sonnenfeldt that there ought to be no substantive contacts with Plains until there are people named.

We must do this in a way that makes it clear that we are serving the country. We must show that we are working in the national interest and not pushing our policies. We have had eight years to push our policies. Now is not the time to be doing it; now we are serving the overall interest.

Habib: I believe you should say the same things to the Assistant Secretaries when you meet with them this afternoon.6 I understand your point, but I think it would be important for you to say it to them.

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6 Kissinger repeated the substance of this meeting during the Secretary’s staff meeting, attended by all of the Department’s principal officers or their designated alternates, held at 3 p.m., November 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Transcripts of Henry Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Entry 5177, Box 11, Secretary’s Staff Meetings)
and to emphasize the need to behave as a professional service. I will do it with some of the younger ones, and I will also do it with the Assistant Secretaries, but I think you should make the point today.

The Secretary: Phil, I want you to understand this is no problem for me. I don’t care what they do. But I believe they would cheapen the Foreign Service if they start running to Carter’s people. Those people in Plains will be so busy with other things that they will not pay any attention to people who are clearly looking for jobs. They will not only not pay attention to them, they will lose all respect for them. This kind of sucking around with the new people will not do the Foreign Service any good, and it will not do the individuals any good.

Eagleburger: That’s absolutely right. In 1969, I had calls from any number of people in the Foreign Service who knew the job I was doing, and who were looking for something out of it. I got to the point where I just had nothing but contempt for those who called me trying to get into the process.

The Secretary: It’s not only stupid to do that, it’s incompatible with the Foreign Service. If Carter gets the impression that the Foreign Service is a bunch of self-serving time-servers, by the time he gets to Washington, he will be convinced that it should be ignored. But if he sees a professional group, working at the day-to-day business and prepared to transfer their loyalty completely to him on January 20, if he sees a group that behaves with dignity, he will see that he has a valuable instrument in the Foreign Service, and he will use it.

Habib: Of course, we can’t prevent his guys from calling into the Department to talk to individuals that they may know about whatever it is they want to ask about. As I think you did . . .

The Secretary: No, I didn’t. I never took any initiative with the Department. I had one meeting with Nick Katzenbach and Read,7 but I never met with the Assistant Secretaries nor with Rusk. Isn’t that right, Larry?

Eagleburger: That’s right.

The Secretary: I just didn’t feel that I could take the responsibility. It can’t be divided. They offered to send the cables to me, to give me office space in the EOB. I didn’t take it. You can’t push them. They have the responsibility. And I don’t think we should do it in the other direction now.

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7 Nicholas deB. Katzenbach was Under Secretary of State, 1966–1969. Benjamin H. Read was Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department, 1963–1969.
You can’t keep Holbrooke\(^8\) from wandering around this building. And I will understand that any Foreign Service officer that he happens to talk to won’t want to blot his copybook with the Administration by refusing to see him or not saying anything. But the only one that I will talk to is my successor. He will get everything if he wants it. He can get the cables, he can be in the meetings. And if he sees something that we are planning on doing which he thinks will cause him a problem after January 20, I will not do it—unless there is some compelling reason to do so before that time.

Habib: One thing I think we need to focus on is just what you want to do, what you will be taking an interest in accomplishing between now and January 20.

Robinson: I think that should emerge from these daily meetings.

The Secretary: That will take care of itself. We will do the daily business as if nothing else is happening.

Habib: But you have to realize that the people in this building will want to know what they should do. They will want to help you, and they will want to try to serve you as in the past.

The Secretary: Don’t scare me.

Habib: Alright then, we will just do the business as usual, as the memos and papers come up . . .

The Secretary: As things come up and need to be done, just send them in to me, and we will take care of it. Business as usual.

Eagleburger: (to Aherne) Make sure that we transcribe the press briefing this afternoon. It should be sent as a cable to our overseas posts.\(^9\)

The Secretary: Yes, and paragraph 2 of this cable needs to be re-written. We must reflect the fact that the President-elect is entitled to formulate his own policies. We must make it clear that it is not the business of the Foreign Service to pre-empt him by formulating recommendations and advice.

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\(^8\) Richard Holbrooke, who served as a foreign policy adviser to the Carter campaign would serve as Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from 1977 to 1981.

\(^9\) The transcript of the press briefing is attached but not printed. See footnote 4, Document 215.
215. **Action Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Robinson) to Secretary of State Kissinger**


Transition to the Next Administration

We expect that the President-elect will very soon designate one or more persons for liaison with the Department during the period prior to the Inauguration. I believe that the transition should be performed under the direct supervision of Larry Eagleburger.

**Recommendations:**

1. That you sign the memorandum to all employees of the Department at Tab 1, designating Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger as the officer responsible for coordinating the transition on behalf of the Department with the representatives of the President-elect, during the period from now until January 20.

2. That you authorize despatch of the memorandum to General Scowcroft at Tab 2 which informs him of this designation and emphasizes the need to coordinate matters with the White House during this period.

3. That you authorize despatch of the cable to all posts at Tab 3 which informs them of this designation and provides guidance on public statements by our employees during this period.

4. That you approve the similar memorandum to all employees of the Department at Tab 4.

5. That you authorize the memorandum to Assistant Secretaries at Tab 5 which requests that each of them designate a senior officer to act
as Bureau Coordination Officer and ensure that the Bureau meets requirements transmitted to it by S/S during this period.\(^6\)

\[\text{\foreignlanguage{en}{\footnotesize \(6\) Robinson initialed approval on behalf of Kissinger on November 4. Next to the paragraph, Robinson wrote: “Memo signed by LSE 11/4/76.” Eagleburger’s November 4 memorandum, as signed, is attached but not printed.}}\]

216. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, November 4, 1976, 10:40–10:58 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Deputy Secretary Robinson
Under Secretary Habib
Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger
S—R.W. Aherne (Notetaker)

SUBJECT

Transition

Eagleburger: I think we can do this quickly today. There is little to report. Funseth will release today the statement which you approved, and we will send out a cable incorporating that statement to all posts.\(^2\) On the management side, we are preparing papers on organizational structure, on procedures, on budget, personnel, and so forth.\(^3\)

The Secretary: But no substantive papers.

Eagleburger: Right.

The Secretary: Of course we can write substantive papers if Tony Lake wants them. But they should not be done, unless they are specifically requested.

\[\text{\foreignlanguage{en}{\footnotesize \(1\) Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy Transition Papers—Chronological File, Feb.–November 1976. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office.}}\]

\[\text{\foreignlanguage{en}{\footnotesize \(2\) Robert L. Funseth was Special Assistant to the Secretary for Press Relations and Spokesman of the Department of State. For the cable Kissinger approved, see footnote 4, Document 215.}}\]

\[\text{\foreignlanguage{en}{\footnotesize \(3\) A draft of a management paper prepared for the incoming administration was forwarded under a covering memorandum from Eagleburger to Kissinger, November 22. (Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, November 1976)}}\]
Habib: Some of the Carter people seem to be fishing around. Holbrooke called me, and I fended him off . . .

The Secretary: You shouldn’t have fended him off. You should have told him to talk to Larry.

Habib: But he has not been officially designated as having any role. No one has been designated.

The Secretary: Tell anyone who calls to call Eagleburger. Tell them they should tell Eagleburger what they want, and they will get it. What did Holbrooke want?

Habib: He wanted to see me for a general discussion. I would prefer not to see anyone until someone is officially designated. As it turned out, I didn’t have time to see him anyway.

The Secretary: If anyone in Plains calls, they shouldn’t be fended off. They should be sent to Eagleburger.

I am an expert on Holbrooke. He was my chief source of information on the Department when I was designated Assistant to the President. During the last transition period he was leaking stuff to me all the time. He worked for Katzenbach.

Habib: He used to work for me too.

Winston Lord and I are doing factual papers on what will face the new Administration . . .

The Secretary: But not policy papers.

Habib: No, these will be just lists of events which are scheduled to take place in the early part of the new Administration.

Robinson: Are you talking to Bill Rogers in EB and the Bureaus?

Habib: Yes. A member of my staff is working with S/P and with the Bureaus.

The Secretary: If Brzezinski4 or anyone calls, just send them to Eagleburger. If he can’t tell them what they need to know, he can at least direct them elsewhere in the building.

Eagleburger: That should be it for today. Until someone is designated, there isn’t much we can do.

The Secretary: I don’t think that will happen for a while. It’s going to be total confusion down there in Plains. They won’t know what they are doing for a while. That’s the way it was with Nixon. I saw him for the first time . . . I think it was the day after Thanksgiving. Till then, there was absolutely nothing done in foreign policy. Of course, the CIA was all over the place offering us goodies.

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4 Carter would appoint Zbigniew Brzezinski, his principal foreign policy adviser, to be Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on December 16. For more on the NSC transition process, see Document 210.
Eagleburger: You know that’s a thought. The next time you see the President, you may want to mention something to him about the Agency.

The Secretary: CIA was all over us with briefings and maps and all sorts of things they wanted to give us. State was not very obtrusive in that process. But Lehman was one of them from the Agency. In fact, they offered me more then, than they ever did after I got into office.

Robinson: I have an FBI agent coming to talk to me later today about Caspar Weinberger. Do you suppose there is a chance he might come back?

The Secretary: It’s possible.

Eagleburger: That’s another point. We ought to be sure that we are prepared to move immediately on security clearances for liaison people who are named.

The Secretary: I can’t wait to see Winston working for Holbrooke and Tony Lake. Of course, you have to admit that at least Holbrooke has reached some minimum level of intelligence. But he is the most viperous character I know around this town.

Habib: I’m not even sure that Holbrooke is really involved in this thing with Carter. That may be why he called me—he may be trying to get himself into it.

The Secretary: But don’t fend him off, Phil. I don’t want Holbrooke going around town saying I have shut the State Department down from contact with the new Administration.

Habib: That is why I think Holbrooke is not part of the Carter process. That’s why he called me. Anyway, if you read the papers, it looks as though they have designated people already.

The Secretary: Well, you can’t tell from what’s in the papers so far.

Lord: I can’t believe it would be Tony Lake. I mean you have got to have somebody with some clout, with some level—not to mention some intellectual ability.

The Secretary: Well, we can’t worry about that. I think it will be at least one week before they get to doing anything.

Habib: The press says they are going to have an office set up in Washington where they’ll be for a few days each week.

The Secretary: Why? You mean for Carter?

Eagleburger: That’s a mistake.

The Secretary: It’s a grave mistake.

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5 Former Director of the Office of Management and Budget (1972–1973) and Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare (1973–1975), Caspar Weinberger was then the Vice President and General Counsel of Bechtel Corporation.
Eagleburger: The smartest thing you did was to stay in New York during the transition.

The Secretary: Absolutely. The thing about Washington is you can’t possibly avoid the trivia. At least in New York people wouldn’t come up to see you unless they were invited. Why don’t they give them a Government office of some kind?

Eagleburger: That’s the principle that we are operating on in clearing space on the first floor for them.

The Secretary: There must be something we could give them, Decatur House, or something like that.

Robinson: I don’t think we have ruled that out.

Lord: If I could raise another subject. I was invited to give a lecture at Johns Hopkins. I didn’t want to do it before the elections, but I indicated that I would do it afterwards.

The Secretary: On what?

Lord: Just generally on foreign policy. I would give a combination of the Buchan lecture, plus some of your other themes.

The Secretary: Where is it, at SAIS? I just don’t want you giving any prescriptions to the new people.

Lord: Okay. I did not want to do it before the elections.

Eagleburger: I wonder if we shouldn’t set up some sort of clearance procedure on speeches by senior Department officials. Hal Sonnenfeldt has got something he’s supposed to do, for example.

The Secretary: Find out what Sonnenfeldt is doing. I basically feel we ought to shut the place down and not give a lot of speeches. I don’t see how we can go around giving speeches without seeming to be telling them what they ought to do.

Lord: Rogers is going to San Francisco to talk to the Planning Association.6

The Secretary: Okay.

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6 Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs Rogers gave a speech on the future of U.S. economic relations to the National Planning Association’s Committee on the Changing International Realities in San Francisco on November 5. The full text is printed in the Department of State Bulletin, November 29, 1976, pp. 653–660.
217. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Transition to Carter Administration

Mr. Anthony Lake, the head of the Carter Liaison Office for the State Department, met at 3 o’clock today in the Deputy Secretary’s Office with Deputy Secretary Robinson, Under Secretary Habib, Deputy Under Secretary Eagleburger, Executive Secretary Borg, Mr. Bartholomew of S/P, Mr. McManaway of M/MO, Mr. Boswell of M, and the undersigned. The Deputy Secretary greeted Mr. Lake and said the Department had organized a team headed by Larry Eagleburger which intended to help and cooperate fully with the Carter Team, and which was moving forward to meet the requirements which had been levied to date.

Mr. Lake said that he had met this morning with the liaison team for the State Department, which planned to move into the offices in New State on the afternoon of November 18 or the morning of November 19. Besides himself, the team would be comprised of Richard Moose, Dan Spiegel, Don McHenry (recently at the Carnegie Endowment and an ex-FSO who had worked on the 1968 transition), Bill Maines (also of Carnegie) and Paula Stern (who had worked for Senator Nelson and was interested in arms control and détente). McHenry and Maines would be working with the team half-time. There would also be three consultants, Joseph Nye (professor at Harvard), Eddie Williams (former head of the Department’s EEO office, who would advise on personnel matters), and Richard Holbrooke. Mr. Lake said that the Carter press people were not sure yet when these names would be published; he agreed with Mr. Eagleburger that it would be best to release them before they started work here.

In response to a question Mr. Lake said that the consultants would be directly involved in the team’s work and would need security clearances. Mr. Eagleburger noted the need for the team to apply for security clearances here in the Department.


2 According to Bridges’ November 16 memorandum for the record, the meeting actually took place the previous day. (Ibid.)

3 Senator Gaylord A. Nelson (D–Wisconsin).
Mr. Lake said that he had emphasized to his team that they would be guests in the Department and should maintain a low profile. They would be acting as advance staff for the new Secretary yet to be designated (Mr. Lake said he did not know when the Secretary would be named), and they would have the job of assuring that the new Secretary would get the information he would need. They would be working on issues and collecting information, including possible policy choices. The team itself did not intend to make any policy choices, but would present options to the new Secretary. Mr. Lake said that he, along with David Aaron, the NSC liaison official, would take care of any decisions which had to be presented to Governor Carter now. He explained that Aaron was handling such day-to-day business in the foreign affairs field as Secretary Kissinger’s forthcoming meeting with Governor Carter on November 20.4 Mr. Lake added that his team would be handling liaison for both the Department and related agencies including AID, ACDA, OPIC, USIA and Peace Corps. Mr. Lake said that the Defense Department liaison team would be headed by Richard Stedman, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense who had worked on East Asian Affairs in ISA; along with Stedman would be Messrs. Walt Slocum,5 Woolsey, Odine and Lynn Davis, the last-named a Columbia Professor. The consultants would include Messrs. Robert Persilee, Cove and McFadden, as well as, Lake hoped, Graham Allison.

CIA liaison would be handled by David Aaron along with Richard Enderfurth. Fred Bergston would be in charge of liaison on international economic problems. Lake, Aaron, Stedman and Bergsten planned to meet each morning to coordinate their activities. Mr. Lake said that his team would be meeting later today to decide just how to divide their work. In response to a question from Mr. Borg, he said that he would not have a deputy on his team. He hoped that there would be no problem in relationships with people in the Department, but if any should develop, he would like to be notified before the situation became serious. Mr. Lake added that he understood that the Department would like to have Mr. Borg coordinate meetings between the team and people in the Department. He indicated that that was perfectly satisfactory, and said that he would of course be in touch every day.

Mr. Habib said he thought that it was important for Mr. Lake to identify at an early point the issues that he felt would require any considerable amount of work, so that we might avoid a hurried job. He noted that the papers that were being prepared in response to Mr.

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4 See Document 219.
5 See footnote 6, Document 218.
Watson’s initial request were not options papers. Mr. Lake said that he and his team members had already been working with outside experts on the key issues the Administration would face in its first six months or so. He had done a checklist which he would discuss with his team.

Mr. Habib noted that our initial papers had been done by the individual bureaus. Mr. Eagleburger said that we would give the team what we had done, and we could revise these or do new papers as required. The Department was not going to try to tell the team how to suck eggs but would give them what we considered the range of rational alternatives. Mr. Lake commented that the Carter team had solicited about 150 options papers from outsiders. He sensed a continuation of the same phenomenon he had known from the Foreign Service, i.e., the tendency toward a presentation in which Option B was always the one to choose.

Mr. Habib mentioned the new White House memo following up on Watson’s initial request for papers, which indicated that there was a rush to get the papers done. Mr. Lake indicated that he did not believe the papers should be rushed, and suggested that this question be discussed further with him.

Mr. Eagleburger noted that Mr. Lake had mentioned yesterday a wish to meet individually with Department officers. Mr. Habib said that he hoped the team would not give the Department any make-work projects; we had tried to avoid those. Mr. Lake indicated that they had no intention of doing so; and repeated that they intended to keep a low profile.

The meeting ended with Mr. Eagleburger indicating that he would start Mr. Lake on his way to security clearances.

Peter S. Bridges
Deputy Executive Secretary

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6 Jack Watson, former Chairman of the Georgia Human Resources Board, served as the coordinator of Carter’s transition team. (Carter, Keeping Faith, p. 45) Carter’s November 3 letter to Ford notifying him of Watson’s appointment is in the Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, Box 95, 11/1–5/76. Watson’s request, referenced here, has not been further identified.

7 Not found.

8 Bridges initialed “PSB” above this typed signature.
218. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 19, 1976, 3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Secretary Kissinger
Deputy Secretary Robinson
Under Secretary William Rogers
Under Secretary Philip Habib
Deputy Under Secretary for Management Eagleburger
Mr. Winston Lord, Policy/Planning Staff
General Scowcroft, Director—NSC
Mr. Bill Hyland, NSC
Jock Covey, notetaker

SUBJECT

Secretary’s Meeting with President-elect Carter

Kissinger: In the first place, none of these papers will do me any real good. They are all self-serving bureau papers written to tell me how to suck eggs or how to lock Carter into my position.

Lord: They really were intended only to bring you up to speed on certain specific issues like Panama.

Kissinger: Exactly what is the thrust of this Panama paper? All it says is that Ellsworth Bunker wants authority to negotiate the treaty before January. It is total insanity! If I were Carter, I would tell me to go to hell! Why should he tell us to go ahead with this unless it’s just to stick

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1 Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 346, Department of State, Memoranda of Conversations, Internal, November 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

2 The Department produced a series of briefing papers for Kissinger in anticipation of his meeting with President-elect Carter on November 20. Topics covered include Africa, economics and foreign policy, non-proliferation, the Panama Canal negotiations, U.S.-European relations, U.S.–USSR relations, SALT, MBFR, security assistance programs, Portugal, Cyprus, and the management of the Department. The papers are ibid., Box CL 329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy Transition Papers, Meeting, 20 Nov. 1976, Briefing Books, May–Nov. 1976.

3 In a memorandum to Kissinger, November 15, Habib listed subjects “on which it would be useful for the President-elect to make his views known in appropriate circumstances,” including relations with the USSR, relations with the PRC, the Middle East, Southern Africa, Panama Canal, Europe, OPEC, the international economic situation, Japan, Korea, Cyprus, and Vietnam. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 382, Kissinger–Carter Meeting (Mr. Lord) Nov. 1976)

us with the negotiations? Even if he asks us to complete the negotiation, I will say it is out of the question.

O.K. Forget the papers—they are not going to help us now anyway. What is it I want to achieve in this meeting?

Hyland: It should probably be a factual analysis of where we are on the Middle East, on South Africa, SALT . . . maybe China or Europe . . .

Kissinger: My idea was to ask what he wants to hear about. Then I will tell him that if he wants to hear what I have to say then he will have to either reappoint me or start paying me. (Laughter) Let’s go through SALT.

Lord: The basic problem is you don’t want to look like a professor, but if he gives you a lead you should give a broad conceptual description.

Kissinger: I think I should probably give something of the broad historical evolution of SALT. Bill, can you do me a one page paper?5

Lord: I don’t think you want to lecture, but you should try to give some sense of what you have been doing in the past few years on SALT.

Scowcroft: I do not agree. That may be intellectually satisfying, but you don’t want to tell Carter where this administration was going.

Eagleburger: If he has sense, he is going to ask you to go around the world in 10 minutes. Then you can fit the Middle East, SALT, and everything else right into context.

Kissinger: Let’s start with SALT. What key things are we trying to convey?

Hyland: Well . . . maybe you should start with where we stand with the Russians, then go on to what we were going to do. But I am not sure how far you will want to go with him.

Kissinger: I think I should tell him everything.

Hyland: If you tell him what the alternative was that we would have pursued . . .

Kissinger: There is no need to go into that, but I can tell him what the two big issues are. First, the foreign policy aspect; and second, the domestic vested interests that lie in the Pentagon and how they carefully cultivated support on the Hill . . . and that the campaign reflected less of an ideological position than it did a refusal to let outsiders pre-

5 Not found. On November 17, Hyland provided Kissinger with a copy of a July 10 memorandum from Scowcroft to Ford outlining the course of the SALT negotiations with the Soviets since Kissinger’s January 1976 visit to Moscow, as well as the administration’s position on the development of cruise missiles and limitations on the Soviet Backfire bomber fleet. (Ibid.)
scribe force levels . . . the outsiders being the people in State who were doing the negotiating.

Scowcroft: Maybe you should go further and start with SALT I.

Kissinger: Good point. I could lay it all out.

Hyland: I don’t know whether you want to tell him how he can get an agreement.

Kissinger: No, I don’t think I should. He can easily enough get the two options from DOD. And if he asks me what to do, I am not sure I will tell him. After all there is no need to get into a brawl over this. His position is totally opposed to mine.

Hyland: It is a nutty position.

Kissinger: I will tell him for you: “Mr. President-elect, you should know that Bill Hyland, who needs a job in your administration for a couple of months, says that your SALT position is nutty!” (Laughter) O.K. So I start with SALT I and then go on to SALT II—then what?

Hyland: Then you should go into how we tried to solve the problem with the Backfire/Cruise missiles. I will write it out for you.

Scowcroft: Did you see the latest Pentagon leak? It says that the Soviets are building a big-tanker aircraft. That way they can get around the Backfire problem by saying that it doesn’t matter that the Backfire doesn’t have strategic range because they can just refuel it.

Kissinger: There is no way the Backfire can be much better than the Foxbat.

Scowcroft: I can’t argue with you on that.

Kissinger: I bet we will find it has a steel frame, and that it therefore has even less range than we are saying now. And even if it did have the range to get to the U.S., what could it possibly hit.

Scowcroft: Whatever is left after the initial attack. After all, the Backfire carries 40% of the total megatonnage.

Kissinger: But if that is all it is doing it is ridiculous, because even Soviet cargo aircraft and Aeroflot are better equipped to carry that sort of tonnage at low altitudes.

Hyland: It is a complete phony, but don’t say that to Carter.

Kissinger: O.K. What was our last position? (Kissinger, Hyland and Scowcroft outline the details of the last SALT proposal for the U.S. and Russian sides. Then conversation is interrupted by a call from Dobrynin.)

There is proof that he has this office bugged! (Laughter) He was just calling to say that they will give agreement for Toon. That will make us some money with the Israelis.

Habib: What do you mean?
Kissinger: The Israelis will not be sorry to see Toon go. Then they can demand that the next Administration appoint an ambassador who does not speak English—only Hebrew. (Laughter)

Scowcroft: There is no reason not to say that the last negotiations broke down because of the difference of opinion within the bureaucracy.

Kissinger: How did it go again? DOD did not want to go below 2400, even though they had no program above 2150. And they wanted all SLCM’s and Backfire’s outside the agreement. They did not want the Cruise missiles to count for two years. Which happened to coincide with their developing the missile when they would not be able to deploy them anyway. Then those pinko commie bastards rejected it! (Laughter) How could they have done otherwise?

Maybe I should warn him that the Chiefs will be waiting for him with a hatchet about the difference between “nuclear armed” and “armed” missiles. You know a conventional warhead weighs more than a nuclear warhead. They will continue developing conventionally “armed” missiles and say that they don’t have to be counted. Then all they have to do is test the conventionally armed missile at the prescribed range. And if a conventionally armed missile will go 600 miles, you can bet your bottom dollar it will go almost twice as far with a nuclear warhead. This I have not dared to explain to the Russians yet. (Laughter)

O.K. I will just give him the evolution of the SALT position. Then on foreign economic policy, I think I basically understand the issues.

Eagleburger: What about OPEC?

Robinson: The question is whether or not Carter will join with Ford in urging the OPEC leaders to be moderate. He has already said that it is a good idea.

Kissinger: Yes, he should do some letter on his own.

Robinson: The question of Carter coming into this will change the picture for the OPEC leaders. A big increase will lose them leverage with Carter, but then they may just do it in June.

Kissinger: If they were rational, which they are not, they would hit us with a 20% increase right now. Ford really can’t do anything about it. Carter will not be nearly as mad now as he would be in June. We would retaliate less about a 20% increase now than we would about a 3% increase in June. But the real concern has to be the world economy. But my basic view remains that I do not think we should urge him to do anything except maybe in Africa.

Scowcroft: Why in Africa? Why is that so much more important?

Kissinger: It is a totally screwed up conference. What do you think I should say about Africa?
Lord: You should tell him that Ian Smith is not the problem.

Rogers: Give him a rundown on Rhodesia, and then the status of Namibia.

Hyland: Maybe you should go back to Angola—give him a rationale for being involved in Southern Africa in the first place.

Kissinger: Yes. That’s a good idea.

Habib: On OPEC, maybe you should give him an idea of how much increase we can take before we have to retaliate.

Kissinger: Can someone do some minimal talking points for the rest of Africa—Southern Africa I know pretty well. But it is the rest of Africa that I need some sort of overview for.

Hyland: Did you know that Slocum6 is on the DOD transition team?

Kissinger: That is crazy. He is a mad left-winger. You know I told Holaway7 the other day that he would remember these times fondly—that it wouldn’t be too long before he was standing at attention before some Senate committee vigorously defending a SALT agreement for which he would have called me a traitor. (Laughter) He said: “Henry, I think you are going to turn out to be right.” (Laughter)

Robinson: Speaking of your former dropouts—Fred Bergson8 came in to ask about economic assistance. He is on the transition team for foreign economic policy.

Kissinger: You know, every guy I fired for emotional instability has ended up in a key position. How long do you think this will last?

Eagleburger: Maybe two hours.

Kissinger: What if he asks about personnel? If he asks what qualities are needed, I can say what qualities he needs.

Eagleburger: But he won’t ask. Brent, do you think he will ask about the defense budget?

Kissinger: No, no, no. I will avoid the defense budget. But I will say he must have a Secretary of Defense who is responsive to him. The Secretary of Defense must not set himself up as an opposition group.

Rogers: You should tell him the problems he might have with the Chiefs.

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7 Admiral James L. Holloway, III, was Chief of Naval Operations, 1974–1978.

8 C. Fred Bergsten was a member of the National Security Council Staff, 1969–1971. He would serve as Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs, 1977–1981.
Scowcroft: The Chiefs were not the problem.
Kissinger: Brent, the Chiefs are monsters.
Scowcroft: But it remains that they are not the fundamental problem. The Secretary of Defense is supposed to keep them under control.
Kissinger: What should I tell him about the NSC—that he should keep Scowcroft? (Laughter)
Scowcroft: Say that this process is essential, it is what keeps him in control of the federal bureaucracy.
Kissinger: I will tell him that he can do whatever he wants, but there must be some focal points.
Habib: I can remember when the NSC just wrote papers and reported to nobody.
Kissinger: The NSC was strong so long as Nixon was strong. But it started to weaken as soon as his influence waned. A strong Cabinet makes it difficult for the NSC to get ahold of issues because any Cabinet member has a strong personal interest in presenting their issues to the President personally. It makes them much harder to turn down.
What should I say about Cyprus?
Scowcroft: You should start with the coup.
Eagleburger: And say where we are with the Greeks and the Turks.
Kissinger: What about Latin America?
Rogers: You should tell him he starts with two strikes against him—human rights and Panama.
Eagleburger: There is also the Cuba problem.
Kissinger: Yes. I will have to give him a little idea of the philosophy—the importance of power and equilibrium.
You know it is scary. All the maniacs are ready to hit him on January 1. Take Gates9 for instance. A right wing Republican who now wants rapid normalization.
Habib: Maybe you should start with major problems.
Kissinger: No, I should just say I’m here to help, what can I do for you?
Eagleburger: If he is smart, he will then say “Go around the world in 10 minutes.”

Rogers: He may ask about Congress.

Kissinger: I will just say Mondale can tell him better than I can.

I have a lot of meetings until about 7:00. Can you guys come back then?

(Meeting adjourns until 7:15 p.m.)

Kissinger: It is interesting to note that I have here the only three people in the Department who are really affluent enough that they do not need jobs.

Lord: It only appears that there are three. There are in fact only two.

Kissinger: You guys should remember to take care of your friends. Look at Eagleburger, and Scowcroft and Hyland.

O.K. Let’s go over SALT again. People really have forgotten that 210 Soviet missiles were destroyed because of SALT I. All of which would have remained in force.

Hyland: The only option is whether to tell him what you think can be achieved.

Kissinger: No, I will tell him everything about where we are—the two options, what the Russians would have rejected . . . but I will not give my views. I do not want to have them be able to say I came there to sell my views.

Scowcroft: He may ask you what you would do.

Kissinger: No, I will not do that. Especially on the Middle East. I will not get whipsawed between him and the Israelis and the American Jews.

Eagleburger: That would be a good idea to follow for all issues.

Scowcroft: He may raise violations.

Kissinger: I will say every time the Verification Panel met where a Presidential decision was needed, there were leaks to the press. I will also say that the myth of State Department “softness” was not true. And I will tell him what the violations were.

(Kissinger and Hyland go into a technical discussion of what the “violations” were. Listing each in turn and detailing why they never became serious problems.)

Hyland: What if they ask are there any more secret agreements like the G-class submarines?

Kissinger: Then I will blow up. You know that was just a Jackson canard. As I remember it the issue was whether to count them into the total. (Secretary and Hyland go into details of the G-class submarine caper.)

Hyland: Jackson just seized on a loophole.
Kissinger: The real problem was with the moronic military on the Verification Panel.

Scowcroft: I am not sure you should crap on the military to such an extent that press stories leak out about you being bitter and defensive.

Hyland: Anyway there are no secret agreements.

Kissinger: Except that we agreed to drop the Trident submarine in the third year of SALT as a unilateral budgetary decision. (Laughter)

O.K. Rogers, talk for five minutes on Latin America.

Rogers: It is an area of special relations. Most of which is halfway up the development ladder. We have important bilateral and multilateral relations and have made special efforts to improve relations. There are some major issues but the one truly hemispheric issue is Panama.

Kissinger: What about human rights?

Rogers: That is a second common hemispheric threat. It is becoming a real dilemma in our relations and it is becoming increasingly obtrusive. Virtually every country in the hemisphere causes us a human rights problem.

Lord: The problem is to avoid mucking around in human rights. Particularly in this hemisphere.

Scowcroft: It is hard to talk about human rights without taking a position. Better not to discuss it at all and just let them screw it up.

Eagleburger: To the degree you can give a simple description of the problem, he can just give three sentences about it and go on.

Kissinger: If he asks?

Rogers: He says he wants to improve relations but also says he will beat them all about human rights. It is a probable contradiction. There is no truth that bilateral lecturing will improve relations.

Kissinger: And I shouldn’t tell him anything about what to do. If he asks, I will tell him about the new dialogue, the apparent opportunity to improve relations, and of the possibility of war between Chile and Peru—maybe Panama . . .

Habib: And something about Cuba.

Kissinger: And the dictatorial regimes that have emerged as a result of radical pressures. I just don’t know what he is going to ask for.

Eagleburger: The important thing is that he asked for this so he will be serious.

Kissinger: So what. I don’t want anything from him. Every guy he has appointed so far gives me the creeps. Even the guy you like Chuck [Robinson], this guy Bergson, he is very bright but very unreliable and immature.
Eagleburger: What about Dick Cooper?\textsuperscript{10} 
Kissinger: He is at least more mature, but he is also very unreliable. But I must say that both are extremely bright. 

Habib: You should find some way to make it clear that the Department will be fully cooperative. 
Kissinger: There can’t be any question about that. 
Robinson: What about the Mexican financial crisis? 
Kissinger: O.K. Talk for two minutes on the Mexican financial crisis. 
Robinson: Lopez-Portillo is coming into a problem that he does not yet fully understand . . . 
Kissinger: Can you explain this, Bill? 
Rogers: The problem is a lack of confidence in the peso, and the dollarization of the economy. No one wants to hold pesos. They are all buying dollars. You know there was a run on the bank today. 
Scowcroft: Because of the coup rumors. 
Rogers: No, there have been coup rumors running around for three months. The crisis is coming to a head. 
Robinson: The only way to solve the present problem is to expand oil production. 
Kissinger: This I will not tell them. It is much too complex a problem to deal with under this Administration. And if it is dealt with as a government plan we will be back in the same mess with the Mexicans as we were in the ’30’s. They must go directly to the oil companies themselves. 

It is also very clear to me that I should not volunteer what he should do, but at the same time I should be prepared to say something, if he asks. But what can I say? There are no solutions. 
Rogers: No, that is not strictly true. You, at least, have some options. In the first place, you could do nothing. In the second, you could try to work out swaps. A third option would be to put out more public statements about our confidence in the Mexican economy, but this is basically a bad idea. 
Kissinger: Why? 
Rogers: The present problem stems from stories that Lopez-Portillo will be assassinated.

\textsuperscript{10}Richard N. Cooper was a member of the National Security Council Staff, 1969–1970. He would serve as the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, 1977–1981.
Kissinger: Echeverria could legally take over again if that were true. You know he cannot succeed himself, but that way he would not have a problem.

Rogers: They would have to go back to the collegiate process and no one is quite sure how that would work out. Luckily they have never had to test the collegiate process.

Kissinger: No Mexican President has ever failed to survive his term. But you ask a Mexican sometime how the President is elected. They will not tell you. But one thing is clear: they have worked out a way to keep those madmen under control. When they are through with the selection process, the three or four potential candidates have somehow been reduced to one, and the incumbent President has given his blessing.

Rogers: The successful transition depends entirely upon the transfer of the sash. That means everything to them. It is amazing, but it works . . . so far.

Kissinger: The question now is not what we do on December 1.

Rogers: No. You don’t know now what the situation in January will be. The transfer of power may go smoothly and the peso reserves may come flowing back. But then again, it may not go smoothly, and then they will have to consider some pretty stern measures.

Kissinger: O.K. What about Southeast Asia?

Habib: We should start with the fall of Indochina. Tell him how the area has managed to put together a new coalition concerned fundamentally with economic development. You can describe our present communications with Vietnam. I don’t think he will give you any trouble—he was not a problem during the election. The basic point is that we still have a role to play in Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: When I think back to the Kennedy years the problem is not whether we have a role to play in Southeast Asia. The problem will be that these guys will be trying to play a role everywhere.

Habib: It is all developing fairly well. There is nothing wrong with our relations with Southeast Asia.

Kissinger: May I tell him what I really think? That he will pay the price for the fall of Vietnam.

Lord: No. You should say that so far things are going well but the jury is still out on Vietnam. They have the fourth largest army in the world and it remains to be seen where their appetites will lead them.

Kissinger: Right. They have not yet digested South Vietnam, but when they do their potential for mischief will be tremendous.

Habib: The Thai will be the first to come under pressure.

Hyland: A lot of the people around Carter are saying that the first place we should start to withdraw troops is Southeast Asia in order to back-up our commitments to Europe.
Habib: That would be no problem in Southeast Asia. The problem would be troop withdrawals in Northeast Asia.

Scowcroft: You still have a lot of troops in the Philippines.

Habib: Only about 16,000.

Hyland: You know the Brookings [Institution] did a study . . .

Kissinger: This has been a Democratic strain for a long time. You know why Marshall\(^\text{11}\) said the Korean conflict was the wrong war at the wrong time in the wrong place, don’t you? Because it should have been in Europe . . .

Hyland: They think that the only real commitments are to Europe. These guys are committed to pulling troops out of Asia and pulling at least two carriers out of the Pacific.

Kissinger: It takes six carriers to keep two on station. That would mean that we could only keep one carrier on station.

Lord: If you want to drive Peking into Moscow’s arms the quickest way to do it would be to pull out of Asia.

Habib: You should mention Japan, too. The role they play is very supportive of our interests.

Kissinger: Do you think he will just go around the world? That would not be any good. If he asks for a tour d’horizon, I will just say “That is too broad—tell me what your general interests are.”

Hyland: He will want to ask about China.

Kissinger: For me that is no problem. What if he asks about Korean troop withdrawals? I will tell him our strategic position depends upon those troops; otherwise, we would have to increase our assurances, and that would increase a certain area of ambiguity that would have to be tested.

Habib: He doesn’t want to pull all the troops out, according to what he said during the campaign. And he said he would only do so in consultation with Japan and Korea.

Kissinger: What about Europe?

Eagleburger: The Italian Communists will be an issue. Also the UK financial crisis.

Rogers: There are several issues he might raise . . .

Kissinger: I will tell him flatly that I do not want to start an argument with him, but if he comes in with the assumption that relations with Europe are bad, then he is dead wrong. They are having some domestic problems, like those caused by Lockheed, but there are no real foreign policy problems between us and the Europeans.

Rogers: We are entering a period of economic pause. Some consultations will be necessary.

Kissinger: But there is a point beyond which consultations become counter-productive. Like the OPEC letter—that would never have been signed if we had brokered it all over Europe.

Hyland: Carter is the problem in Europe. (Laughter) Some of what he said during the campaign has reverberated very strongly. The Germans are very worried.

Kissinger: I will tell him that Bill Hyland, who will be looking for a job in the new Administration says that Jimmy Carter is the problem in Europe. (Laughter)

Hyland: You should say something about the U.S. propensity to re-examine their commitments.

Scowcroft: Why take him on? You know he wants to re-examine NATO anyway.

Kissinger: I should say I have been preaching for years that if we damage the European psychology we would only contribute to the Finlandization of Europe. And if we set goals that they cannot meet they would be tempted to further drop their defense expenditures.

Any other issues he might raise?

Robinson: CIEC: debt rescheduling, commodities . . .

Rogers: And indexation.

There are really only two tests of manhood in CIEC now: debts and indexation, and I would look for the Democrats to cave on both of those. But I don’t think you want to get into a debate with him.

Kissinger: I will tell him that I am against the meeting. There is nothing we can do and he will be stuck with any positions we make. It should be put off until May.

Rogers: Don’t worry. It won’t happen. Everyone is against it even though no one is willing to get out in front.

Habib: You might want to give him a quick once over on Law of the Sea.

Kissinger: Yes, but I am in good shape on Law of the Sea.

Lord: You might make two points. First, that we should do it as a political issue, not as a legal or technical one, and secondly, that we should make absolutely clear that we are not the only ones who need the treaty, and we don’t need it nearly as badly as a lot of people think we do.

Eagleburger: He may want you to say something about the Third World.

Lord: The first point to understand is, there is no such thing as the Third World.
Kissinger: Right! That will settle it! (Laughter)

Hyland: If you can make that kind of progress, you can get through this whole thing in 15 minutes. (Laughter)

Robinson: We have to begin appealing to the moderates among the LDC’s.

Kissinger: We have to prove that with moderation they will achieve more than through radicalism.

Eagleburger: Cyprus.

Hyland: He is so committed to the Greeks . . .

Kissinger: I should give him a run-down on how we got to where we are now, and ask him what he wants to do about the principles.

Lord: MBFR.

Scowcroft: You should go through the basic problem. What our objectives have been . . .

Hyland: You should say that MBFR was created specifically to deal with the immense pressures for unilateral withdrawals, but the priority is not high. But now that the Germans apparently want to reactivate their Eastern policy and the French too . . .

Kissinger: Yes, the conservatives have driven the Europeans into the Soviet’s arms but in three months they will all be in full cry for détente. And who will be left to put a brake on that? Certainly not Schlesinger, and not Brzezinski.

Lord: You may want to explain CSCE.

Hyland: Absolutely not, unless I am asked.

Kissinger: I should give him a run-down on how we got to where we are now, and ask him what he wants to do about the principles.

Lord: You may want to explain CSCE.

Hyland: You could raise Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.

(Laughter)

Habib: India, Pakistan, Afghanistan?

Kissinger: What should I say?

Habib: Explain how our relations got to where they are now.

Kissinger: Exactly what is worse now, than before? Under Kennedy they wet themselves every time Nehru\(^{12}\) opened his mouth and what was different than it is now?

Eagleburger: But that is exactly what he does not understand.

Kissinger: The interesting thing about the Indians is not their spiritual up-lift but their cold-blooded exercise of power. Look at what Mrs. Gandhi is doing now. But if I say that to him he will tell me to go talk to his mother. (Laughter) I will have to explain what we were trying to do. I will say that there is very little that they can do for us and not much

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\(^{12}\) Jawaharlal Nehru, Indian Prime Minister, 1947–1964.
we can do for them, but that the more we ask them to support us the more it inflates their ego.

Rogers: There is less romanticism in our relationship now than there has ever been before.

Habib: Not among the Democrats.

Scowcroft: That’s right. A lot of those people out there are still pretty mystical about India.

END OF CONVERSATION

219. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, November 20, 1976, 10:30 a.m.–3:30 p.m.

SUBJECT
Kissinger Meeting with President-elect Carter, 10:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. (followed by approximately 45 minutes alone with Mr. Carter), November 20, 1976

PARTICIPANTS
President-elect Carter
Vice President-elect Mondale
David Aaron
Secretary Kissinger
Lawrence Eagleburger

The following is a brief listing of issues discussed:

1. Rhodesia: A brief description of the current state of the negotiations, with emphasis on the centrality of the British role in the current Geneva talks.

2. Panama: A brief description of the issues that have been resolved, and the issues yet to be resolved. The Secretary described our commitment to consultations with appropriate members and committees of the Congress once the USG has worked out the contents of the treaty with the Panamanians. He emphasized that nothing has as “yet been put on paper” and that our commitment to consult presumes that this will take place before the specific language of the treaty is committed to paper.

3. **Mexico and Latin America:** The Secretary described the improvement in relations with the US that could be expected when Lopez Portillo becomes President, the current state of the Mexican economy, and reviewed briefly US relations with Latin America.

4. **SALT:** The Secretary reviewed the history of the SALT negotiations from Vladivostok to the present, and the background to the backfire and cruise missile issues.

5. **Comprehensive Test Ban:** The President-elect mentioned Gromyko’s recent initiative in the UN and the Secretary then discussed its meaning and the nuances of differences between the most recent Gromyko proposal and previous Soviet proposals.

6. **PRC:** The President-elect asked whether we had approached the Chinese about their atmospheric nuclear testing; the Secretary replied that we had only done so elliptically and gave the reasons for this cautious approach. The Secretary then talked at greater length about US–PRC relations, the US–PRC–USSR triangle, and the future of Taiwan.

7. **Korea:** The President-elect asked if the present Korean regime was really as bad as it seemed. The Secretary discussed our relations with Korea over the past several years, our efforts to influence the Korean government’s attitude toward political liberties, and our concern over the instabilities that could be created if we pushed the Park government too hard. In answer to a Carter question, the Secretary said that the PRC publicly calls for the withdrawal of American forces from Korea, but privately indicates that this process of withdrawal could take some time.

8. **Japan:** The President-elect asked what the Secretary thought about an increase in the level of Japan’s “defense capability.” The Secretary talked about the history of Japan, including its rapid move from feudalism to emperor worship following Commodore Perry’s arrival in Japan, and the rapid move from an imperial structure to democracy following its defeat in World War II. The Secretary said that the issue now was how Japan would use its improved military strength should it develop it and indicated that he did not believe it would be wise for the US to push the Japanese to a greatly expanded military establishment.

9. **Non-Proliferation:** The President-elect asked about the French-Pakistan and FRG-Brazilian deals. The Secretary described the quiet work we have done with the French and the current state of French thinking on the issue. He also talked about the discussion he had had with Prime Minister Bhutto in Pakistan and promised to pull together
for the President-elect a report on what we had offered to do for Pakistan if it would withdraw from the nuclear deal with the French.

10. National Security Council: President-elect asked about the National Security Council structure and the Secretary described it to him briefly. There was some discussion about the NSC staff, the role of the National Security adviser and the impact of the NSC system on the decisionmaking process. The subject came up again at lunch and the Secretary talked about the need for a President to be presented with options and choices. There was also some discussion at lunch about the utility of combining the job of Secretary of State and National Security Adviser. The Secretary discussed the pros and cons of such an arrangement.

11. The UK: There was some discussion of the current economic situation in Great Britain, the Lever mission to the US, the IMF, and the role of Treasury, Arthur Burns, and State in the current negotiations.

12. NATO: The President-elect asked whether it would be useful for him to send a message to the next NATO Ministerial meeting through Secretary Kissinger. The Secretary said that this would be useful and it was agreed that Aaron will work out a text and give it to Eagleburger for review.

13. Cyprus: Secretary Kissinger described the development of the Cyprus crisis from the time of the Makarios overthrow, emphasizing the difficulties inherent in the fact that the crisis occurred at the time of the demise of President Nixon, our efforts with the Greeks and Turks, the development of the situation in Cyprus itself, our failure to “dominate” the crisis and the current state of the Cyprus Principles. The Secretary said that he thought it best that the US not now push the Principles, leaving that to the new Administration.

14. OPEC and Iran: The Secretary discussed the OPEC meeting and pointed out that while the Shah may be in the forefront of calling for increased petroleum prices, Iran can have little impact on those prices, while Saudi Arabia is the key factor. Iranian production is now at eight million barrels a day; its maximum production capability is nine million barrels a day. Saudi Arabia on the other hand has far greater flexibility between current production and maximum production, which means that Saudi Arabia, by substantially increasing production, can force a reduction in the price of oil.

15. Appointments: The President-elect said that he owed no one a debt and therefore could appoint “the best” people to our embassies. He wondered whether Secretary’s Rusk’s comment that an appropriate split was 70% career and 30% noncareer was a good one. The Secretary replied that he thought this or something like it was a good mix.

16. Cuba and the Caribbean: The President-elect asked about Cuban activities in Trinidad, Jamaica, etc. The Secretary responded by describing his concern that the Cubans will now attempt to play on the
black communities throughout the Caribbean. He indicated that this is, as well, the concern of the President of Colombia. The President-elect asked about Prime Minister Manley of Jamaica\textsuperscript{3} and the Secretary responded with his views on the gentleman.

17. 

Viet-Nam and the MIAs: The President-elect asked for the Secretary’s views of a proposal that the US send a commission to Hanoi to seek information on the MIAs. The Secretary indicated that he thought this was unwise and warned that while the Vietnamese may have information on a few hundred MIAs, it is very doubtful that they will have information on the 2,500 so often referred to in the US. He indicated that in general he felt the process of normalization with Hanoi was possible in the course of the next year if the US showed no anxiety about it. If Hanoi believes we are anxious for an improvement in relations, they are likely to demand a high price.

18. Middle East: The Secretary concluded with a broad discussion of the state of play in the Middle East, including a discussion of Sadat, Asad, the role of Jordan and King Hussein, Syrian-PLO-Israeli activities in Lebanon, the possibility that Sadat will turn back toward the Soviets, and the Geneva Conference.

\textsuperscript{3} Michael Manley, Jamaican Prime Minister, 1972–1980.
President: The meeting was interesting.\(^2\) I anticipated having only five or ten minutes alone with him [Carter] but he wanted to discuss foreign policy, so we talked for almost an hour. He wanted to discuss the same subjects as he did with you. He wanted to know what problems we would solve—and hoped we would settle Panama. I told him it was very doubtful.

Kissinger: So did I.

President: He was interested in SALT.

Kissinger: He wants to stick us with a freeze.

President: I talked about that and said it was very disadvantageous, that it would leave them with higher numbers.

Kissinger: So did I. He says we have a technological advantage.

President: I told him there were verification problems on that, too.

Kissinger: It is not even necessarily true we are ahead on technology. We might have to trade cruise missiles for Backfire.

President: He didn’t mention Korea.

Kissinger: I told you he mentioned Schlesinger telling him about the Koreans offering us an island and then we could withdraw. I told him that was hogwash.

President: He wanted to know about NSC operations. He asked about the British financial crisis.

Kissinger: [To Scowcroft:] Have we heard from the British?

Scowcroft: Not yet.

[Discussion of the debate with Treasury and the Fed.]

Scowcroft: If we get to a sterling negotiation, you should talk with Treasury and Burns\(^3\) to make sure they follow your orders.

Kissinger: You don’t want to get stuck with sinking the British. Joe Kraft had a piece on it today.\(^4\)

President: On meeting with the European leaders, Carter asked me a question in front of the press. They didn’t report it accurately, but I had to say something.

What is going on with the CDU and CSU?

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\(^2\) Ford met with Carter in the Oval Office between 3:40 and 4:44 p.m. on November 22. (Ibid., Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of the meeting has been found. The briefing book prepared for Ford for his meeting with Carter, November 21, is ibid., President’s Handwriting File, Box 15, President—Transition.


Kissinger: That really changes the political complexion in Germany. It is a power play to get rid of Kohl. It’s a Reagan-like move; it’s Strauss’s last chance.

President: What does it do to the FDP?

Kissinger: It complicates things. If now the CDU moves a bit to the left, it could take votes from Genscher and put him below 5%.

President: After you left the meeting Friday, we discussed oil prices. Then on Saturday Arthur Burns told me he was very worried about the impact of a price increase. He thought a delegation should go there, headed by me or the Vice President. I told him I would talk to the Vice President. The Vice President mentioned the oil deal with the Shah.

Kissinger: We can’t get it now. There is no shortage now. We could have gotten it last summer. It would be humiliating for you to go. You would have to come back with no price increase if you were not to be humiliated. I feel the same way though less so about the Vice President’s going. If you really feel strongly, he could go. If you feel you need it—but the Europeans aren’t doing much, and you have no clout. I just don’t think it is the thing to do.

You could call in the Ambassadors.

President: That as a minimum we should do.

Kissinger: That would be a useful thing to do.

President: Let’s set that up for early next week. I want to be well prepared, with the facts on the economics, political support, etc.

Kissinger: On the economics, you have a tough agreement with the Shah. He will show how we jacked military prices up 80 percent over the past few years. The best is the political argument—that you will have to blast them for an increase and that they shouldn’t put themselves in a bad light when they need our help in the Middle East.

Burns is irresponsible making a recommendation like that.

Scowcroft: He is concerned about the world financial impact. [He described what Burns and Greenspan see as the impact.]

Kissinger: I agree with that, just not with his prescription for dealing with it. Maybe we could get it postponed. I would call in the

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5 Franz Josef Strauss was Chairman of the West German Christian Social Union (CSU).

6 Hans-Dietrich Genscher was the West German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister.

7 According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President attended a November 19 Cabinet Room meeting on the British economic situation between 11:25 a.m. and 12:50 p.m. and then met alone with Burns in the Oval Office until 1 p.m. The next day, he met with Burns and Alan Greenspan from 12:40 until 1:12 p.m. (Ford Library, Staff Secretary’s Office, President’s Daily Diary) No other record of these meetings has been found.
Saudi first. Zahedi, of course, is such a fool. What he will report will bear no relation to what you tell him.

[There was a short discussion of Carter and his advisers.]

Kissinger: I spoke with Dobrynin. He said to get SALT now he would have to insure that Carter was on board.

President: I think Carter would buy almost anything. But to negotiate with him, the Soviets, Defense, and Ikle at the same time.

Kissinger: That Ikle is vicious. [He described a story he gave the New York Times about Kissinger.]

President: Brent knows what I would have done about Ikle had I been reelected.

[There was a discussion of the Washington Star article on NSSM 246.]8

Kissinger: The Israelis want landing rights at Miami. I don’t know whether you want to do that before you leave. You know Carter will do it. The Syrians and Jordanians want landing rights too. That is a good idea but I don’t think you can do it without doing the Israeli thing.

President: Have you heard any rumors about who will be Secretary of State?

Kissinger: The latest is Muskie.

[There was a discussion of Carter’s selection process.]

If it were Muskie, there is the problem of Zbig. You can’t have two Poles in the top jobs.

President: His views are on the record. He’s not strong in foreign policy.

Kissinger: I don’t know how you can have a President who knows nothing about foreign policy and a Secretary of State also.

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8 NSSM 246, “National Defense Policy and Military Posture,” September 2, is ibid., National Security Adviser, NSSMs and NSDMs, Box 2.
221. Memorandum for the Record


SUBJECT

Meeting with Carter Transition Officials

Messrs. Anthony Lake and Richard Moose called at 1700 today on Mr. Borg, who was accompanied by Messrs. Ortiz and Bridges. Mr. Lake gave Mr. Borg the following four papers, copies attached:

1. List of “Coordination Officers for Transition”
2. Lake/Borg Memorandum dated November 24, subject “Request for Information Memoranda/Organization”
3. Lake/Borg Memorandum dated November 24, subject “Request for Information Memoranda/Issues”
4. Lake/Borg Memorandum dated November 24, subject “List of Interview Requests”

Reviewing the list of issue papers requested, Mr. Borg said that some Assistant Secretaries had told him that they hoped to be able to have a look at the list of papers required before the list was put into concrete. Messrs. Lake and Moose agreed that it might be profitable to have a preliminary exchange with bureaus on just what the scope and context of the papers should be. In response to a question, Mr. Moose confirmed that they had decided it would not be advisable to ask for the different bureaus to suggest possible different policy options.

Mr. Moose asked if the papers could be ready for them by close of business Friday, December 3. They would like to receive the papers as they are done rather than have S/S hold them for presentation all at the same time. Mr. Borg said that he thought December 3 was a reasonable deadline, but that he was not sure if we could produce all the papers by then, given the Secretary’s particular interest in some subjects.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transition Records of the Executive Secretariat, 1959–1977, Entry 5338, Box 1, Transition/Admin. No classification marking. Drafted by Bridges.
2 The list is attached but not printed.
3 This memorandum is attached but not printed.
4 On November 30, Lake sent to the Department a revised list of requested transition papers, broken down into first, second, and third priorities. (National Archives, RG 59, Transition Records of the Executive Secretariat, 1959–1977, Entry 5338, Box 1, Transition/Admin) In a Cherokee channel telegram to Kissinger in Mexico City, November 30, Eagleburger recommended authorizing him to “go ahead with tasking the bureaus to respond to the category one priority list without committing ourselves to the transition team on a delivery date.” (Department of State, Files of Lawrence S. Eagleburger: Lot 84 D 204, Chron—November 1976) On December 3, Executive Secretary C. Arthur Borg forwarded the second and third priority lists to all regional and functional bureaus with instructions to complete second priority papers by December 20 and third priority papers by January 3. (National Archives, RG 59, Records of the Policy Planning Staff, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Entry 5027, Box 364, Dec. 1–15, 1976)
would, in any case, give S/CL the papers as they were completed, and we could put them all together into a book later.

Mr. Moose raised the question of AID, noting that he hoped to see Birnbaum\(^5\) in AID on Friday, November 26, especially to discuss the definition of ODA (Official Developmental Assistance). Mr. Borg noted that the AID papers could raise some sensitive issues on which AID might disagree with geographic bureaus. Mr. Borg said that he would want to talk to Mr. Habib about this. We thought that the AID papers\(^6\) might best be folded in with the others, but he hoped that Mr. Moose would let him know if he got any contrary signals from AID.

Mr. Borg raised the question of Mr. Peter Bourne’s\(^7\) contacts with S/NM on narcotics. Bourne had asked for a briefing. Mr. Eagleburger had indicated that this presented no problem. However, we understood that Mr. Bourne might want to take part in the ARA Regional Narcotics Conference. This was fine by us, but if Bourne was to take part, it would be important to ensure that he had a full security clearance before hand.

Mr. Moose said that he would suggest to Tony Lake (who had left the room to take a call from Jody Powell)\(^8\) that Lake should have a talk with Bourne.

Mr. Lake, returning to the room, asked if Mr. Borg knew of any contact between “you and us” on the question of Soviet agreement for Ambassador Toon. There had been press inquiries. Mr. Borg said he knew of none.

Mr. Lake said that he assumed the future Secretary of State would have a general knowledge of foreign policy, so that we would not need to explain why a policy was what it was, but would rather just have to present the facts of what it was. Mr. Borg said that we would quickly convey to the bureaus what S/CL wanted. Mr. Moose suggested, and Mr. Lake agreed, that it might then be useful to have a session at which Mr. Lake could meet with all the bureau coordinators. It was agreed to do this. In response to a question from Mr. Lake, Mr. Borg said that he would of course make sure that Mr. Habib had a look at the list of desired papers.

\(^5\) Philip Birnbaum was the Assistant Administrator of the Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, AID.

\(^6\) Not further identified.

\(^7\) Special Assistant to President-elect Carter.

\(^8\) Press Secretary for President-elect Carter.
The meeting ended after a discussion of the cable to be sent to USUN about appointments for S/CL members in New York.\(^9\)  

Peter S. Bridges\(^10\)  
Deputy Executive Secretary

Attachment 2  

Memorandum From the Head of the Department of State Liaison Office for President-Elect Carter (Lake) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Borg)\(^11\)  


SUBJECT  
Request for Information Memoranda/Organization

We would appreciate receiving, from each bureau or office listed below, a succinct description of that unit. These memoranda will be for the use of the Secretary-designate and his senior appointees. These memoranda should include:

1. A narrative description of the functions and responsibilities of the unit and each of its senior positions. Please attach current job descriptions.

2. A description of its internal organization and paper flow system; an organization chart; and a list of key personnel, at least through Office Director level, with notations as to their status (career/noncareer, end-of-tour date). How are personnel assignments made within the unit?

3. A description of its relationships to other units. To whom does it report? How does it receive assignments? How does it relate to other bureaus and offices in the Department, including the Policy Planning Staff, INR and the Legal Advisor’s office? In what intra-departmental and inter-agency groups does it participate? Which does it chair? Who are the liaison officers who handle day-to-day coordination with offices in other agencies? Who are their primary points of contact in those agencies?

\(^9\) In telegram 288644 to USUN, November 25, the Department informed the Mission that Charles William Maynes, a member of the Carter Liaison Office, wished to meet with officials of the Mission in New York on November 26. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, 1976)

\(^10\) Bridges initialed “PSB” above this typed signature.

\(^11\) No classification marking.
4. A description of how relations with the Congress and press are handled. Who are the congressional members, committees and subcommittees, and staff members most interested in the work of the unit?

5. A list of the key public individuals and groups most interested in the work of the unit. How are relations with them maintained?

6. A summary description of any recent proposals for organizational changes specific to that unit, and the Department’s reaction.

7. A list and brief description of any legislation of which the bureau has cognizance which will or may have to be submitted prior to June 1977, including major budgetary items.12

Bureaus and Offices:

AID M/DG
AF M/FSI
ARA A
CU NEA
D/BFS M/MD
D/HA OES
D/LOS PA
EA PM
EB S/CPR
EUR SCA
H S/IL
IGA S/NM
INR S/P
IO S/PRS
L T
M/CT

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12 The transition papers produced by the bureaus for the Carter transition team are in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Boxes CL 327–329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy Transition Papers, Briefing Books, Series I–III, 6 volumes.
Memorandum From the Head of the Department of State Liaison Office for President-Elect Carter (Lake) to the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Borg)\textsuperscript{13}


SUBJECT
Request for Information Memoranda/Issues

The November 18 briefing book provides a useful overview of the major issues facing the new Administration.\textsuperscript{14} To provide necessary details for the Secretary designate and his senior appointees, we would appreciate receiving individual information memoranda of no more than ten single spaced pages, and preferably less, on the issues listed below.\textsuperscript{15} It is important that these memoranda be as factual and specific as possible, including all relevant and sensitive material, which will be handled appropriately. Recommendations for revisions and additions to this list would be appreciated. Each memorandum would usefully include:

—A very brief description of the current state of the issue—e.g., the situation on the ground, status of any negotiations, principal actors involved—together with some analysis of underlying causes and factors. Some of these issues may raise organizational questions that should be addressed. Particular attention should be paid to action forcing events and opportunities during January 20–July 31, 1977, with specific dates where possible—e.g., a scheduled negotiation, a congressional deadline.

—A statement of current U.S. policy on that issue, including any current contingency plans.

—A succinct history of that policy, including any commitments that may have been made.

—A statement of the relationship between this issue and human rights concerns.

—A summary of congressional action and opinion on the issue.

\textsuperscript{13} No classification marking.

\textsuperscript{14} Not found. Possibly a reference to the briefing papers prepared for Kissinger before his November 20 meeting with Carter. See footnote 2, Document 218.

\textsuperscript{15} The list is attached but not printed. The issues were: Foreign Policy and Defense Posture; Arms Control; the Middle East; Asia; Europe; Africa; Latin America; International Economic Policy; Development Assistance; United Nations; the Oceans, Environment and Science; Global Issues (e.g., terrorism); and Organizational Issues. See footnote 4 above.
—A very brief summary of any recent and relevant studies and recommendations made to the Department by consultants or others, and the reaction of the Department.

222. Editorial Note

On December 3, 1976, President-elect Jimmy Carter announced the appointment of Cyrus R. Vance as his nominee for Secretary of State. Vance, who had earlier served as General Counsel of the Department of Defense from 1961 to 1962, Secretary of the Army from 1962 to 1963, and Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1964 to 1967, had served as a foreign policy adviser to the Carter campaign. Following Vance’s appointment, Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger named Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Philip C. Habib as liaison between the Secretary-designate and himself. Kissinger directed Habib to “make certain that Vance received any and all documentation available on current problems (including all backchannel negotiations) and all outgoing cables that went beyond housekeeping functions.” In his memoirs, Kissinger noted that he met regularly with Secretary of State-designate Vance, “at least twice a week to review where we stood and see to it that, in the performance of day-to-day functions prior to January 20, I did not unintentionally cut across the designs of the new administration.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, page 1064)

On January 4, 1977, Kissinger held a lunch meeting with Vance and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. Although no record of this meeting has been found, briefing material for the meeting prepared for Kissinger by Department of State Counselor Helmut Sonnenfeldt is in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 329, Department of State, Carter, Jimmy, Transition Papers, Vance, Cyrus, Chronological File, 1976–77. Four days later, on January 8, Kissinger and Vance met with the Chief of the Liaison Office of the People’s Republic of China, Ambassador Huang Chen, in the Secretary’s Dining Room at the Department of State. (Memorandum of conversation, January 8; National Archives, RG 59, Records of Henry A. Kissinger, Entry 5403, Box 24, Classified C Material) In addition, Kissinger and Vance met on January 19 to discuss the political situation in Southern Africa. The memorandum of conversation of that meeting is Document 239, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXVIII, Southern Africa.

Additional material related to Kissinger’s interactions with Vance during the transition period as well as documentation created for

223. Briefing Paper Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

Department Organizational and Personnel Issues

In this Department, more than in program-oriented agencies, the fundamental resource is people, and organizational performance depends to an unusual extent on the quality of our personnel and on the way we manage and direct their efforts.

I. Department organization. Purely organizational questions have been treated in numerous external and internal studies. They fall into the following general categories:

A. Organization in the Substantive Area.

The relationship of the Secretary to his six principal assistants, D, P, E, T, M and C, and through them to substantive areas of the Department, varies with his personal managerial approach.

Below the level of the principals, the most important and enduring organizational questions arise from the fact (a) that the Department organizes itself, for understandable reasons, on both geographic and functional lines, and (b) the dynamics of a changing foreign policy agenda force repeated reexamination of our organizational premises. Important new problems therefore often bring with them jurisdictional questions—between the Department and other agencies, between two or more geographic bureaus, between two or more functional bureaus,
or between geographic and functional bureaus. At present, there are no such jurisdictional questions requiring urgent solution, but some issues will require top level attention before long. The major examples:

—Should primary responsibility for the management of the Department’s role in all nuclear matters, both peaceful and military, be located in one bureau, or should it remain divided among PM, OES and geographic bureaus? The House International Relations Committee has tentative plans to hold hearings in February on the “Glennan Report”2 which addresses this issue as part of a general consideration of the role of the OES bureau.

—What is the most effective location of primary responsibility for coordinating Law of the Sea activities, presently handled by several offices, including OES, L and the Deputy Secretary’s office? Attention to organizational issues should precede U.S. participation at the 6th session of the current Law of the Sea Conference which will take place in May.

—What is the most effective structure for coherent and responsive policy formulation and decision-making on the arms transfer question? Policy responsibility is now shared by T, which has responsibility for specific decisions on Mutual Security Assistance transfers and P, which has responsibility for broader policy decisions.

—Should overseas information policy be more closely linked to foreign policy objectives by tightening State’s present general control over USIA policy as the Stanton report recommends,3 or should the present, looser arrangement continue?

—Domestic responsibility for cultural programs lies in State, while USIS has responsibility for overseas implementation. Are coordination problems sufficient to warrant combining both functions in one agency?

B. Organization for Management of Department Resources.

The basic issue is how the Department’s resources can be most effectively linked to the achievement of its objectives. Effective linking of resource management to the annual budget process is a key corollary issue.

The present policy-level mechanism for linking resource management to foreign policy goals is the Priorities Policy Group (PPG), estab-

2 A reference to a report on the use of science in foreign policy operations, produced by a special committee appointed by the House International Relations Committee chaired by former NASA Administrator and U.S. Representative to the International Energy Agency, Ambassador T. Keith Glennan.

3 See Documents 102, 103, and 106.
lished in 1975. The PPG is chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary for Management. Its other members are the Inspector General, the Director General, the Assistant Secretary for Administration, the Director of Management Operations and, from the substantive side, the Counselor and the Director of the Policy Planning Staff. The establishment of the PPG system has provided a needed link between policy objectives and resource management, although the techniques employed should continue to evolve. To provide principals with a more systematic means to link resource inputs with policy outputs, the A Bureau, assisted by S/P, has designed a computer-assisted planning and control system called “POD/RAC”. The system is now being tested, and a senior review group will evaluate the results.

The principal procedure for linking policy to the budgetary process is the Policy Analysis and Resource Management (PARM) Cycle, a year-long series of steps which enables the principal Department managers on the PPG to make key determinations on budget priorities. How to strengthen and improve this process is a second basic issue in the management area. Several amendments to the procedure used in connection with the last budget are under consideration.

II. Personnel.

A. Strengthening Domestic and Specialist Personnel Systems.

Current State of Issues

In order to meet the requirements of today’s diplomacy, the Department needs a versatile, responsive professional corps embodying a wide range of skills and talents. This requires the existence of career systems which will strengthen the competence of our headquarters staff and the corps of specialists who serve both at home and abroad, as well as the traditional Foreign Service Officer Corps.

Following extensive studies, the Department is developing a program to rationalize its personnel structure, using currently available authorities, with three major categories: (a) A Foreign Service Officer Corps to perform diplomatic and policy functions at home and abroad, (b) a domestic service, reestablished under the Civil Service system, to take care of Washington-based requirements, and (c) a more coherent Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps to meet our growing needs for special expertise and management support worldwide.

Implementation of this program is dependent upon several issues, some of which under Executive Order 11636 are consultable with

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4 See footnote 7, Document 144.
5 Issued on December 17, 1971, E.O. 11636 aimed to reform employee-management relations in the Foreign Service. The full text was published in a special supplement of the Department of State Newsletter, January 1972, pp. 1–10.
AFSA and/or AFGE, and some which will require consultation with the Civil Service Commission and the Board of the Foreign Service, depending upon final decisions reached in the Department. The domestic aspects of this program are now under review by senior officials. The nature and scope of the Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps is still under study. Which categories of individuals now in the Staff Corps or the FSO Corps should be included, and whether some slight modification of the Foreign Service Act is required are two major questions requiring resolution.

**Brief History of Policy**

In the mid 1960s, the Administration initiated legislation, introduced by Representative Hays, to unify the Civil Service and Foreign Service under a single Foreign Service personnel system. The main reasons for this proposal were:

— the Department’s desire to administer its personnel system under a single authority related to the foreign affairs field so as to have greater flexibility and efficiency in personnel management; and

— the belief that a single system would provide greater equity to employees and reduce the divisiveness between groups and feelings of second-class citizenship by non-FSOs.

The Hays Bill met strong resistance in the Senate and was defeated. Subsequently an internal task force made a similar recommendation in *Diplomacy for the ‘70s.* In 1971 the Department, without benefit of legislative changes, adopted the single service approach, basing its action on a 1968 law whose principal purpose was to strengthen the USIA career service.

Our efforts to implement this program have not been successful. Serious management and legal questions have arisen which prompted reconsideration of the need for a separate domestic system based on the Civil Service. A careful study of the problem concluded:

— Uniformity has not brought equity or management efficiency. The Foreign Service Act, designed for a generalist, disciplined, mobile officer corps, serving throughout the world, does not fit the career patterns and needs of individuals hired for specialized and essentially home service jobs in Washington. Non-FSOs and FSOs cannot compete on the same basis for promotion. More basically, however, the rank-in-man FSO promotion system does not fit as well as the rank-in-job Civil Service system where individuals serve for long periods in the

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6 See footnote 2, Document 156.
7 See footnote 4, Document 154.
8 See footnote 4, Document 143.
same area: The promotion of Foreign Service employees ahead of their nominal superiors has caused problems in offices where transfers to overseas service are rare.

—Serious legal questions emerged. Because the Foreign Service Act: (1) specifically limits the period of service in the U.S., (2) requires a system of selection out and (3) contains generous retirement benefits predicated on the rigors of service abroad, its application to essentially domestic employees leaves us open to legal challenge and employee grievances.

—FSR hiring practices have come under attack. In foregoing the Civil Service merit systems, we did not develop a coherent competitive system for selecting individuals for the domestic service. Charges were raised in the Congress concerning our ability to prevent non-merit hires under this system. We do not have the resources and expertise to try to create a domestic Foreign Service category parallel to the Civil Service system.

—The loss of some management flexibility is a reasonable cost for improved standards and accountability under a merit system. Competitive standards are clearly in our interest, by assuring quality and equity. Also, they are required when we are held answerable under the EEO Act and our present bargaining requirements.

—The prospects are poor for obtaining legislation to solve legal questions through amendment of the Foreign Service Act. To the contrary, there are pressures to standardize conditions of service and benefits among all Cabinet agencies which make it difficult to maintain an exceptional claim for the Foreign Service when applied to essentially domestic employees. Moreover, the broadening of the Foreign Service to include essentially domestic personnel will undermine our capability of sustaining a disciplined service.

While these considerations constitute a strong case for reestablishing a domestic system using Civil Service authorities, such a move also has drawbacks, and certain management elements within the Department are opposed to the change. They believe:

—that running two separate systems is inefficient and will increase feeling of second-class station within the domestic service.

—that the ability of the system to achieve its ends is dependent on Civil Service approval of a number of super-grade positions. Although the Civil Service Commission has been forthcoming and supportive it will not make a hard commitment that it will approve such positions.

—that a Civil Service component occupying policy-level domestic positions might reduce Foreign Service opportunities to serve at home and lessen the already declining incentive to overseas service.

—that turning again to the Civil Service will lead to loss of the Department’s control and management flexibility during a period of an-
ticipated tight personnel resources; the new system would make the rigidities of the Civil Service system a much greater factor in resource management.

— that the current system has not been given a fair chance in terms of the time it has been in operation or sustained effort to make it work.

— that the legal problems are best solved through amendment of the Foreign Service Act.

We have weighed the costs and benefits of adjusting the Department’s personnel system to conform to the realities of managing current needs within current legislation and authorities, and have decided we have no viable alternative but to resolve our current problems by recognizing the need for a domestic component based on the Civil Service system. The compelling factors in reaching this conclusion were: (1) the real legal question whether we have authority under the Foreign Service Act to run a domestic system and the difficulty, if not impossibility, of a basic modification in the Foreign Service Act in the near future; (2) the perverse effect on people and organizational effectiveness, of trying unsuccessfully to force domestic personnel into the present Foreign Service system; and (3) our conviction that with professional management we, as any other Cabinet agency, can work within the Civil Service system, that it has evolved significantly and that we can manage effectively personnel mechanisms built around clear and rational categories.

Unlike some earlier studies which foundered on broad structural conclusions based on ideal solutions, we have concentrated on determining our actual requirements and on identifying structural flaws which prevent us from meeting them. In this process, we are operating on four principles:

1. We must improve and clarify the definition of the Department’s staffing needs.
2. We must utilize career systems which support those needs.
3. We must insure equity for all people in the Department’s service, and mobility among career categories.
4. We must maintain our goal of an integrated service.

Congressional Perspective

Congress, particularly Senator Pell, has questioned our use of the current personnel system, and has called on the Department to submit a comprehensive plan for improvement and simplification by January 7, 1977.9

9 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY 1977 (S. 3168; P.L. 94–350), Section 117, required the Secretary to address the ongoing problem of reconciling the Civil and Foreign Services of the Department of State and USIA. For the Department’s final report, January 10, see Document 158.
Outside Studies

Personnel system structure has been a major concern of most recent studies of the Department of State and the Foreign Service. Three of six major studies between 1949 and 1975 proposed an all Foreign Service system. The Wriston committee and two of the three most recent, including the 1968 AFSA study and the 1975 Murphy Commission report, proposed a mixed Foreign Service/Civil Service system, an approach which is consistent with that now under consideration.\(^\text{10}\)

B. Professional Development.

Current State of Issue

As part of a thorough examination of its personnel management concepts and systems, the Department determined in May 1975 that improved means were needed to identify its professional requirements and develop policies governing the careers of its professionals to meet those requirements. A Board of Professional Development consisting of the Deputy Under Secretary for Management (M), the Director General of the Foreign Service (M/DG), the Director of Management Operations (M/MO), the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (S/P), the Inspector General (S/IG), the Assistant Secretary for Administration (A), the Director of the Foreign Service Institute (M/FSI), and representatives of two geographic and two functional bureaus, was formed in August 1975 to serve these functions.

Early this year the Board established a working group of inside professionals and outside experts to examine three central questions affecting professional development. The group’s report has since been received by the Board and, at the Board’s behest, considered by the Bureau of Personnel. The three subjects, and the status of the issues raised are:

1. How to improve the Department’s manpower planning so that we can project and track our human resource needs.

Substantial work is now underway both to strengthen systems for identifying professional needs and to predict changing needs. These efforts will require continuing, if modest, budgetary support and, more important, the participation of the policy leadership of the Department.

2. How to meet the Department’s need for specialized functional competence.

Attacking this question involves judgments as to the design and structure of our professional corps, as well as improved definition of

\(^{10}\) For the Wriston Committee report and the AFSA study, see footnote 6, Document 154. For the recommendations of the Murphy Commission on the State Department organization, see Document 147.
our professional needs (Item 1 above). Thus, it can be better addressed when information-gathering has progressed further and when we are better able to grapple with some underlying questions.

3. How to build an effective means of developing top career executives for the Department and the Foreign Service.

As in any organization with professionals who serve in a career system, the Department needs mechanisms to identify, train and develop those who have the capacity to provide policy and managerial leadership. To accomplish this, we need better means of evaluation, better supervision and training, and a better design for selecting and assigning potential executives. The process raises issues of equity as well as of management’s commitment to the development process. However, a basic analysis of the qualities required in senior positions is underway as a means of enabling us to refine our evaluation, development and assignment systems. In addition a number of other proposals for first-phase actions are now before the Board of Professional Development.

Congressional Perspective

At the instance of the House International Relations Committee, the Congressional Research Service has done an intensive study of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy. It faults the Department for inattention to developing personnel to meet these new demands in diplomacy, and it is anticipated that hearings may be held on this and related reports in the new year.

Outside Studies

Many foreign affairs personnel studies devote major attention to this question. The Murphy Commission Report proposed a program similar to the one we are considering: open to all categories of personnel, based on positions identified as key to executive development, utilizing a professional development staff and engaging senior officials. The Murphy approach, however, envisaged creation of a government-wide Foreign Affairs Executive Service.

C. Lateral Entry Into the FSO Corps.

Current State of Issue

Any career personnel system needs the capability to meet new demands, to correct unanticipated shortages, to renew itself, and to upgrade itself qualitatively. Lateral entry into the FSO Corps, both from other parts of the Department and from outside, traditionally has been used for this purpose. With the exception of a special five year program
begun in 1975 for women and minority group members, however, lateral entry from outside the Foreign Affairs agencies has been suspended since 1971.

PER is currently reviewing a proposal for resumption of outside lateral entry, under rigorous quality controls. Primary issues involved are how to bring lateral entrants into the system without unduly distorting career opportunities of those already members; how to insure that those admitted under such a program are fully qualified; and how to determine exactly what kinds of individuals should be sought and admitted. Answers to these questions depend in part upon other current projects. For example, under the proposed three-part officer personnel structure suggested above individuals with certain kinds of skills who formerly might have been recruited into the FSO Corps via lateral entry may more appropriately be brought into the Department as Foreign Affairs Specialists or as domestic employees in the Civil Service System. Similarly, the development of standards and desired qualifications for lateral entrants is partially dependent upon firmer delineation, through our Job Analysis study, of the qualitative traits and experiences which are most germane for senior FSO responsibilities. A final issue is whether this proposed program should be operated separately from the existing mid-level EEO program, whether the two should be merged while retaining an explicit EEO hiring target, or whether they should be completely merged with affirmative action in recruitment but no explicit EEO hiring target.

**Outside Studies**

Virtually all recent personnel studies have recommended a form of lateral entry. *Diplomacy for the '70s* recommended this as “an affirmative recruiting instrument to bring in a selected number of highly qualified persons.” The Murphy Commission Report recommended the active recruitment of lateral transfers, particularly those with needed skills such as economics.

**D. Interagency Relationships.**

**Current State of Issue**

The central issue is the most effective organizational relationship between State and other agencies in the conduct of foreign relations. As domestic and foreign policy considerations increasingly intertwine, the claims of other agencies for influence on policy questions increase and are reflected in inter-departmental organizational issues. These are approached through several structures, the most important being the

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11 See footnote 2, Document 148.
NSC system which is discussed in another paper.\textsuperscript{12} Specifically personnel issues are addressed through several arrangements noted below. Generally speaking, there has been an ebb and flow in the acceptance of the concept that all foreign activities should be conducted within the Foreign Service system under centralized direction.

The Department’s Foreign Service performs functions overseas on behalf of some departments such as Labor and Commerce. These departments are intensely interested in looking over the Department’s shoulders on personnel and management practices which, to a large extent, include personnel assignments. Some 22 other departments and agencies, including Treasury, Agriculture and Defense, have personnel in U.S. diplomatic missions who function under the Ambassador’s direction, but who do not come within the Department’s personnel management system. However, ambassadors are consulted prior to appointment of senior officers. Recent developments have included a vigorous attack on State’s personnel jurisdiction overseas which was mounted by the Department of Commerce in 1970–73 when Commerce attempted to take over the commercial function abroad.\textsuperscript{13} In another recent case, we have proposed to Treasury a new approach to joint staffing for an international financial corps.

The primary institutional mechanism for considering other agency views on overseas personnel matters is the Board of the Foreign Service, a senior non-statutory advisory body on personnel policy and related matters, chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State with representation from Commerce, Labor, USIS, AID, OMB and the Civil Service Commission. Historically, the Board has not been a broad-gauged deliberative body. The reasons may be inherent in the present structure or may be due to the parochial attitudes of the parties.

Interagency control of staff levels (i.e. positions) for all agencies operating under ambassadors abroad rests with the NSC Under Secretaries Committee, chaired by the Department’s Deputy Secretary and staffed by the MODE (Monitoring Overseas Direct Employment) office under M. This system provides ambassadors and State regional bureaus with considerable control over mission personnel/position management, although this is sometimes circumvented by other agencies or neglected by the ambassador himself. A year-long series of special review efforts during 1976 which focused on overseas staffs resulted in the elimination of a number of positions and helped clarify and

\textsuperscript{12} Not further identified.

strengthen the voice of the ambassadors with respect to other agency personnel.\textsuperscript{14}

A related issue is the degree of control which State should have over substantive reporting by overseas representatives of other agencies. As in the case of personnel management, the question is less one of legal authority than of actual practice. State is attempting to increase the managerial role in substantive reporting played by Chiefs of Mission and their deputies, and to fill its own role more effectively in Washington. We are doing so through a Foreign Service Reporting System under the Office of the Reports Coordinator in M. Development of the concept is well under way. State’s leverage rests both on the significance of its own Foreign Service reporting for the needs of end-user agencies in Washington and on the direct personnel mechanisms cited above.

A different type of issue has been posed by the enactment of the 1976 Arms Export Control Act.\textsuperscript{15} One of the Congressional motivations behind the act was reinforcement of the already existing policy that the Secretary of State coordinate U.S. arms transfer policy. One Defense reaction to the act was a recent proposal that State handle all incoming traffic on specific arms transfer requests. The proposed arrangement would require significant personnel additions and would involve State in issues with little or no policy content to the detriment of our consideration of major arms issues. The proposal has not been accepted; instead, discussions have begun with Defense on ways to improve existing procedures which will strengthen policy control over arms transfers but not involve State in routine administrative details.

\textit{Congressional Perspective}

Congressional interest in the question of control of personnel overseas is not high at the moment. There is still some support within the Senate Commerce Committee for a separate commercial service under Commerce. The Foreign Relations Committee and the House In-

\textsuperscript{14} See Document 150.

\textsuperscript{15} On April 28, Congress approved a bill (S. 2662) that extended its veto rights to military equipment sales and established, among other things, a $9 billion per annum limit on total arms sales. Moreover, the measure gave Congress the right to terminate military aid to countries in violation of internationally recognized human rights standards. The bill was vetoed by President Ford who argued the legislation made Congress a “virtual co-administrator” of U.S. foreign policy. In May, a revised bill dropped the $9 billion ceiling. Signed into law on June 30, the Arms Export Control Act (H.R. 13680; P.L. 94–329) specified that no security assistance would be given to countries which violated human rights and created the position of Coordinator of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs within the Department of State. (\textit{Congress and the Nation}, Vol. IV, 1973–1976, p. 874–877)
ternational Relations Committee support continuation of a central direction of the Foreign Service by State.

Outside Studies

The Murphy Commission recommended that overseas representation of domestic departments continue in selected areas so long as their representatives are under the control of the ambassador. It also recommended that the role and function of the Board of the Foreign Service be carefully reviewed. There have been several studies of the economic/commercial function abroad. The most recent, by OMB, recommended that it continue under State; most specific OMB recommendations for improving performance in the economic/commercial area have been implemented.

224. Memorandum From the Secretary to the Cabinet and Staff Secretary to the President (Connor) to Heads of Departments and Agencies¹


SUBJECT

Resignations of Presidential Appointees

The President has requested that the following procedure be followed regarding resignation of Presidential appointees.

1. All Cabinet secretaries and their deputies, administrators and their deputies should promptly submit their resignations to the President, who would accept them effective January 20, 1977.

2. Sub-cabinet officers and other appointees who wish to resign effective at the same date or earlier should submit their resignations to the President no later than January 15, 1977.

3. Other Presidential appointees who would be willing to serve for an interim period past January 20 should submit their resignations by

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Transition Records of the Executive Secretariat, 1959–1977, Entry 5338, Box 1, Code T—1976–1977 S/S Borg to Eagleburger. No classification marking. Borg forwarded the memorandum to Eagleburger under a January 12 covering memorandum, which asked Eagleburger to consider Connor’s second and third points closely and questioned whether it was appropriate for resignation letters addressed to President Ford to be turned over to the new President.
January 15, 1977, effective at the pleasure of the President. These would be turned over to the new President after his inaugural.

4. In order to make certain there is no interruption in responsibility after January 20, President Ford’s transition officer for each department and agency and the President-elect’s transition officer for that department and agency should reach agreement on the designation of a Ford-appointed subordinate officer who would have the power and responsibility of acting secretary until the appropriate officer of the new administration is confirmed and sworn in.

225. Editorial Note

During his final week in office, Secretary of State Kissinger continued to speak on the issues of transition and continuity from administration to administration in American foreign policy. In a speech to the Foreign Policy Association of New York on January 11, 1977, Kissinger praised the dedication and devotion of the Foreign Service and expressed the hope that it would retain its “nonpartisan, professional character.” He emphasized that the United States “must have a group of men and women who represent continuity. We cannot pretend to ourselves that the foreign policy of a great nation can change every four or eight years, and that pretense itself is a factor of instability in the world. We must have, with all the tactical alterations that are inevitable, a large amount of continuity that is required, a great degree of tactical knowledge, and I know my successor, Mr. Vance, whom I admire and who deserves our support, will find in the Foreign Service a dedicated able, and brilliant instrument in the conduct of our foreign policy.” (Department of State Bulletin, January 24, 1977, page 88) Kissinger affirmed these sentiments in his final memorandum to all Department of State employees on January 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Transition Records of the Executive Secretariat, 1959–1977, Entry 5338, Box 1, Transition—HAK)
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