Preface

The Foreign Relations of the United States series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.

Public Law 102–138, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, established a new statutory charter for the preparation of the series which was signed by President George H.W. Bush on October 28, 1991. Section 198 of P.L. 102–138 added a new Title IV to the Department of State’s Basic Authorities Act of 1956 (22 USC 4351, et seq.).

The statute requires that the Foreign Relations series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the Foreign Relations series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the Foreign Relations series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editor is convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Structure and Scope of the Foreign Relations Series

This volume is part of a subseries of the Foreign Relations of the United States that documents the most significant foreign policy issues and major decisions of the administrations of Richard M. Nixon and Gerald R. Ford. Five volumes in this subseries, volumes XII through
XVI, cover U.S. relations with the Soviet Union. As the last of the five, this specific volume focuses entirely on United States policy toward the Soviet Union during Gerald Ford’s two and one-half year presidency, from August 1974 to January 1977.


This volume represents a continuation of the coverage adopted for the four previous volumes on relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in the Foreign Relations series for the Nixon administration. Rather than focus exclusively on bilateral relations, the current volume presents documentation on the full range of issues that affected Soviet-American relations during the presidency of Nixon’s successor, Gerald R. Ford. This approach allows the reader to see how matters as diverse as strategic arms limitation, European security, the Middle East, Jewish emigration, and Angola intersected to influence the course of Soviet-American relations—or, perhaps more accurately, how the United States and Soviet Union both tried to establish or exploit the intersection of such issues in an attempt to influence bilateral relations for their own interests. Much as these issues were related at the time, this volume must be seen in the context of other volumes in the Nixon-Ford subseries. The reader, for instance, should consult Volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976; Volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, 1973–1976; Volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976; Volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1979; and Volume XXXIX, European Security, 1969–1976 which, to the extent that they overlap, document events in depth that the current volume documents in breadth. This volume presents extensive documentation on SALT II, which the subject volume, due to space limitations, could not. Those interested in the extent to which Ford’s policies continued those of his predecessor should consult the contents of Volume XV, Soviet Union, 1972–1974.

The continuity in Soviet affairs was represented—and personified—by the man Ford asked to continue as both Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs: Henry Kissinger. During the Ford administration, Kissinger retained his central role in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy on the Soviet Union. From meetings with Ambassador Dobrynin in Washington to meetings with Soviet leader Brezhnev in Moscow—and meetings with Soviet foreign minister Gromyko everywhere in between—Kissinger carefully managed all aspects of the relationship between the superpowers. His influence remained undiminished in meetings between Ford and Brezhnev at Vladivostok in November 1974 and at Helsinki in August 1975. Documentation on these summit meetings, and on Kissinger’s preparations beforehand, constitute the essential backbone of this volume. Kissinger’s efforts resulted in the Vladivostok Accords,
which established the basis for what would become the abortive SALT II Treaty. The record shows, however, that his efforts were not always as successful.

This volume documents how Kissinger, contrary to his experience during the previous administration, frequently found his margin for action to determine the course of détente limited by Congress, notably by Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson. Although unaccustomed to dealing with Congress, Kissinger was forced to negotiate with Jackson to conclude an informal agreement on the so-called Jackson-Vanik amendment to the Trade Act of 1974, which linked the extension of most favored nation status to an increase in Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. This volume devotes considerable space to the negotiations leading to this informal agreement in October 1974 and to the eventual Soviet rejection of its terms in January 1975. The episode demonstrated that détente with the Soviet Union had become an important issue in domestic politics as well as in foreign policy.

The struggle in Washington between politicians and policymakers over détente lasted throughout the Ford administration, illustrated by the controversy over Ford’s initial refusal to meet with Alexander Solzhenitsyn in July 1975 and subsequently influencing the course of the 1976 presidential election campaign (and Ford’s prospects for election). The domestic political effect, as well as the diplomacy of détente is, therefore, a central theme throughout this volume. Finally, although the Secretary of State was the driving force in Soviet affairs, the documents reveal the President also played an important part in these developments by giving Kissinger support and direction to pursue their objectives. Ford, however, not only supported Kissinger on Soviet policy but also supported consultation with Congress. This volume documents how the President not only briefed members of Congress but also listened to what they had to say on the subject. In this regard, Ford—at least in style, if not in substance—suggested anything but a continuation of his predecessor’s approach to foreign policy.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance from the General Editor and the chief technical editor. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of histor-
ical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editor for each document included in the volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in the documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words or phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume. In telegrams, the telegram number (including special designators such as Secto) is printed at the start of the text of the telegram.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations series. The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the prepara-
tion and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes, as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

**Declassification Review**

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 12958 on Classified National Security Information, as amended, and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this volume, which began in 2008 and was completed in 2011, resulted in the decision to withhold no documents in full, excisions of a paragraph or more in 1 document, and minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 13 documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the record presented in this volume provides an accurate and comprehensive account of the U.S. foreign policy towards the Soviet Union from 1974 to 1976.

**Acknowledgments**

The editor wishes to acknowledge the invaluable assistance of the archivists at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan, in particular Donna Lehman and Helmi Raaska, but also Karen B. Holzhausen and Geir Gundersen. Special thanks are due to John Earl Haynes of the Library of Congress for facilitating access to the Kissinger Papers, which the editor was able to use with the kind permission of Henry Kissinger. The Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense provided full access to their records.

David C. Geyer collected the documentation for this volume, made the selection, and annotated the documents under the supervision of M. Todd Bennett, Chief of the Europe and Global Issues Division, and Edward C. Keefer, General Editor of the series. Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Susan
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Weetman, Chief of the Declassification and Publishing Division. Erin Cozens did the copy editing. Do Mi Stauber prepared the index.

Bureau of Public Affairs
May 2012

Dr. Stephen Randolph
The Historian
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Sources for the Foreign Relations Series

The 1991 Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the Foreign Relations series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation on major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State Historian by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files ("lot files") of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department's Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and memoranda of conversations between the President and Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All the Department's indexed central files through July 1973 have been permanently transferred to the National Archives and Records Administration at College Park, Maryland (Archives II). Many of the Department's decentralized office files covering the 1969–1976 period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred or are in the process of being transferred from the Department's custody to Archives II.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series also have full access to the papers of Presidents Nixon and Ford as well as other White House foreign policy records. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign affairs-related documentation from the Department of State and other Federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Dr. Henry Kissinger has approved access to his papers at the Library of Congress. These papers are a key source for the Nixon-Ford subseries of the Foreign Relations series.
XII Sources

Research for this volume was completed through special access to restricted documents at the Ford Library, the Library of Congress, and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still classified documents. The Ford Library staff are processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication.


In preparing this volume, the editor thoroughly mined the Presidential papers and other White House records from the Gerald R. Ford Library in Ann Arbor, Michigan. This repository proved the most important source of high-level documentation on the Ford administration’s conduct of relations with the Soviet Union. Many of the most valuable records are in the National Security Adviser files, and the most valuable of these are in a collection called “Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions.” This collection contains records of meetings between U.S. and Soviet leaders, including Ford’s meetings with Brezhnev at Vladivostok (November 1974) and Helsinki (July–August 1975), Kissinger’s trips to Moscow (October 1974 and January 1976), Gromyko’s visit to the United States in September 1975, and Kissinger’s meetings with Gromyko in Vienna (May 1975) and Geneva (July 1975). The Presidential Trips, Kissinger Trips, and Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits Files provide additional documentation on these and other high-level meetings. Since the Secretary of State often conducted business “on the road,” the Kissinger Trips File is also an important source of documentation on decisions he made away from Washington, including those related to the Soviet Union. Ford frequently discussed Soviet-American relations in his meetings at the White House with Soviet and American political leaders, as well as with leading members of his administration, in particular Kissinger himself. The Memorandum of Conversations file is the most comprehensive source for records of these meetings, providing the necessary context for decisions made in both normal and less formal channels. The Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada—specifically the Country Files for the USSR—document the basic day-to-day decision-making on the Soviet Union in the White House and National Security Council staff, including not only memoranda to Kissinger and Scowcroft on the sub memoranda to the President.

Important documents on the Soviet Union are scattered throughout the files of the National Security Adviser, including in the Presidential Transition File, Presidential Name File, and Subject File. A more concentrated collection of materials on the Soviet Union is in the Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, in particular, the Gromyko File and the so-called “D” File, the latter consisting largely of
notes exchanged in the “confidential channel” between Kissinger and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. This collection also includes a file of Kissinger-Dobrynin Telcons, i.e. a selection of transcripts of their telephone conversations. A more comprehensive set of transcripts of Kissinger’s telephone conversations not only with Dobrynin but also with many U.S. political leaders, officials, and journalists is available on-line at the Department of State’s Electronic Reading Room.

The formal decision-making process on the Soviet Union—notably relating to the SALT II negotiations—is documented in the National Security Council Institutional Files (H-Files) at the Ford Library. These files contain minutes, memoranda, and related documentation on the deliberations of the National Security Council itself, the Senior Review Group, the Washington Special Actions Group, and other interagency committees; also included are records relating to National Security Council Study and Decision Memoranda (NSSMs and NSDMs), as well as similar decision-making documents.

The files on the “confidential channel” between Kissinger and Dobrynin are unfortunately incomplete. Despite considerable effort, including consultation with the archivists at the Ford Library and with records managers in the Department of State, the editor was unable to locate any memorandum of conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin, even though the two regularly met to discuss international affairs in general and, more specifically, Soviet-American relations. At this point, it is unclear whether the files were misplaced, destroyed, concealed, or, even less likely, never existed. This much, however, is clear: these records were crucial for documenting Soviet-American relations during the Nixon administration; their absence for the Ford administration is no less consequential.

During the early years of the Nixon administration, the White House excluded the Department of State from decision-making in Soviet-American relations. This exclusion began to change once Kissinger became Secretary of State in September 1973 and he brought both his policy advisers and his bureaucratic authority to the Department. By the time Ford succeeded Nixon in August 1974, the Department was already central to the formulation and implementation of policy on the Soviet Union. This change is well reflected in the records for the period, especially the retired office, or lot, files for the Department, now maintained at the National Archives. The most useful, and, in this volume, most frequently cited, source on the Soviet Union are the Records of the Office of the Counselor (Lot File 81D286), that is, the files of Helmut Sonnenfeldt. More than any other official in the administration, Sonnenfeldt was responsible for the day-to-day conduct of its Soviet policy. His files include not only his daily memoranda to Kissinger but also copies of high-level documentation often difficult to find else-
where on such issues as SALT, European Security, and Jewish Emigration. Winston Lord, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, regularly analyzed Soviet affairs both over the long term and from a different perspective. His analyses and less analytical records on the subject are in the Directors’ Files of the Policy Planning Staff (Lot File 77D112). Kissinger, of course, maintained his interest and involvement in Soviet-American relations. Memoranda of his conversations with Soviet and other foreign leaders, as well as related documentation, are in the Records of Henry Kissinger (Lot File 91D414). The Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meeting (Lot File 78D443) also provide a revealing look “behind the scenes” at the content and context of the Ford administration’s Soviet policy. Many of the telegrams to and from the Department are available on-line in the Access to Archival databases through the National Archives and Records Administration.

The Kissinger Papers at the Library of Congress generally duplicate the documentation found in other collections. As previously mentioned, the Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts are now available on-line in the Department of State’s “Electronic Reading Room.” The records on the Soviet Union in the Geopolitical File are generally copies but nonetheless constitute a useful source whether the originals prove difficult to find elsewhere.

The editor also had access to the records of the Nixon Intelligence Files at the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Department of Defense. The files of the Central Intelligence Agency, particularly the NIC Registry of NIE and SNIEs, were essential for intelligence reports and assessments on which the Nixon administration based its policy decisions. Many of the estimates on the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War, including during the Ford Administration, are publicly available.

The following list identifies the particular files and collections used in the preparation of this volume. The declassification and transfer to the National Archives of the Department of State records is in process, and many of these records are already for public review at the National Archives. In addition to the paper files cited below, a growing number of documents are available on the Internet. The Office of the Historian maintains a list of these Internet resources on its website and encourages readers to consult that site on a regular basis.

Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.
Lot Files. See National Archives and Records Administration below.
Electronic Reading Room

Transcripts of Telephone Conversations of Secretary of State Kissinger in Declassified/Released Document Collections
National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Central Files
Central Foreign Policy Files, 1973–1976
Part of the on-line Access to Archival Databases: Electronic Telegrams, P-Reel Index, P-Reel microfilm

Lot Files
Lot File 78D443, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings
Minutes of Secretary of State Kissinger’s staff meetings, 1973–1977

Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor
Files of Helmut Sonnenfeldt, 1957–1977

Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77
Nodis memoranda of conversation of Secretary Kissinger and related documents, September 1973–January 1977

Lot File 77D112, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Director’s Files (Winston Lord)
Records of Winston Lord, 1969–1976, as member of the National Security Council Staff and then as Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State

Gerald R. Ford Presidential Library, Ann Arbor, Michigan

Richard B. Cheney Files
General Subject File

John O. Marsh Files
General Subject File

National Security Adviser
Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions
USSR Memcons and Reports
Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files
D File
Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons
Gromyko File
Jackson/Vanik Trade Bill
USSR
Memoranda of Conversations
NSC Meetings File
“Outside the System” Chronological Files
Presidential Briefing Material for VIP Visits
Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada
France
USSR
Presidential Name File
Presidential Subject File
Presidential Transition File
XVI  Abbreviations and Terms

Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger
  Kissinger Trip File
Trip Briefing Books and Cables of President Ford
  Presidential Trips File
National Security Council Institutional Files
  Ron Nessen Files
    Presidential Media Interviews
Ron Nessen Papers
  Foreign Guidance for Press Briefing
    Subject File Accretion
President’s Handwriting File
  White House Central Files Subject File
White House Office Files
  President’s Daily Diary

Central Intelligence Agency

Electronic Reading Room
National Intelligence Council Files
  Job 79–R01102A

Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Washington, D.C.

Papers of Henry A. Kissinger
  Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule
  Congressional Hearings, Senate

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Current Digest of the Soviet Press.


Abbreviations and Terms

AASO, Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization
ABM, anti-ballistic missile
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
AD, Anatoly F. Dobrynin
AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor–Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFP, Agence France-Presse, French news agency
ALCM, air-launched cruise missile
Amb, Ambassador
AP, Associated Press
APAG, Atlantic Policy Advisory Group
ASAP, as soon as possible
ASM, air-to-sea missile
ASW, anti-submarine warfare

B, Brezhnev
bpd, barrels per day
BW, biological weapons

C, Office of the Counselor of the Department of State
CBM, confidence-building measure
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CCD, Conference of the Committee on Disarmament
CDT, Central Daylight Time
CDC, Control Data Corporation
CDU, Christian Democratic Union
CDU/CSU, Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union
CEA, Council of Economic Advisers
CEP, circular error probable; circular error probability
CES, Conference on European Security
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
COCOM, Coordinating Committee on Export Controls
CPSU, Communist Party of the Soviet Union
CSCE, Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSU, Christian Social Union
CTB, Comprehensive Test Ban
CW, chemical weapons

D, Democrat; also Anatoly F. Dobrynin
DCI, Director of Central Intelligence
Dept, Department
Deptel, Department of State telegram
Dissem, dissemination
DOD, Department of Defense
DOS, Department of State
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam

EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
Abbreviations and Terms

EB, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/EWT, Office of East-West Trade, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EB/ITP, Office of International Trade Policy, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State
EC, European Community
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time
Emb, Embassy
EPB, Economic Policy Board
ERDA, Energy Research and Development Administration
ESC, European Security Conference
EST, Eastern Standard Time
ETA, estimated time of arrival
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Exdis, exclusive distribution (extremely limited distribution)
EXIM (or Ex-Im), Export-Import Bank of Washington
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBS, forward-based systems
FEA, Federal Energy Administration; Federal Environmental Agency (West German)
FNLA, Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola (National Liberation Front of Angola)
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FYI, for your information
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR, German Democratic Republic
GNP, gross national product
GPO, Government Printing Office
GRF, Gerald R. Ford
GVN, Government of (South) Vietnam
HAK, Henry A. Kissinger
Hakto, series indicator for message sent from Henry A. Kissinger while away from Washington
HE, high explosive
H.E., His Excellency
HEW, Department of Health, Education and Welfare
HK, Henry Kissinger
IBM, International Business Machines Corporation
ICBM, intercontinental ballistic missile
ICCM, intercontinental cruise missile
IEA, International Energy Agency
ILO, International Labor Organization
IMARSAT, International Maritime Satellite
INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/REA, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/RES, Office of Research and Analysis for Europe and the Soviet Union, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
INR/PMT, Office of Political-Military and Theatre forces, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Abbreviations and Terms  XIX

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
K, Kissinger
KGB, Komitet gosudarstvennoy bezopasnosti (State Security Committee)
km, kilometer
kt, kiloton

LBJ, Lyndon B. Johnson
LDC, lesser developed country
LNG, liquefied natural gas
LTBT, Limited Test Ban Treaty

MBFR, Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
Memcon, memorandum of conversation
MFN, Most Favored Nation
MIA, missing in action
MIRV, multiple independently-targetable re-entry vehicle
MM, Minuteman (missile)
MPLA, Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola (Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola)
MRV, multiple re-entry vehicle
MT, megaton
MTN, multilateral trade negotiations

NAACP, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Corporation
NIE, National Intelligence Estimate
Nodis, no distribution (other than to personas indicated)
Noforn, no foreign distribution
NPT, (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA, National Security Agency
NSC, National Security Council
NSCIC, National Security Council Intelligence Committee
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum

OAS, Organization of American States
OAU, Organization of African Unity
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
OPEC, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries

P, President
PA, Public Affairs
PA/M, Office of Plans and Management, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PFLP, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine
PL, Public Law
PLO, Palestine Liberation Organization
PNE, Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
POW, prisoner of war
PRC, People’s Republic of China
prepcon, preparatory conference
PRG, Provisional Revolutionary Government
Abbr. and Terms

R, Republican
R&D, research and development
Ref, reference
RG, Record Group
RPV, remotely piloted vehicle
RSA, Republic of South Africa
RV, re-entry vehicle

S, Office of the Secretary of State, or Secretary
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks
SAR, South African Republic (Republic of South Africa)
SAM, surface-to-air missile
SCC, Standing Consultative Commission
septel, separate telegram
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SLBM, submarine-launched ballistic missile
SLCM, submarine-launched cruise missile
SOTU, State of the Union
Sov, Soviet
SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
SRAM, short-range attack missile
STR, Special Trade Representative
SU, Soviet Union

TASS, Telegrafnoe Agenstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union)
telcon, telephone conversation
Tohak, series indicator for message sent to Henry A. Kissinger while away from Washington
TTB, Threshold Test Ban

UAW, United Auto Workers
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNEF, United Nations Emergency Force
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNITA, União Nacional para e Independência Total de Angola (National Union for the Total Independence of Angola)
US, United States
USDA, United States Department of Agriculture
USDel, United States Delegation/Delegate
USIB, United States Intelligence Board
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

V–E, Victory in Europe
VFW, Veterans of Foreign Wars
VIP, very important person
VP, Verification Panel; Vice President

WH, White House
WHCA, White House Communications Agency

Z, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Abrasimov, Pyotr A., Soviet Ambassador to the German Democratic Republic
Akalovsky, Alexander, interpreter, Department of State
Aldrich, George H., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State
Aleksandrov-Agentov, Andrei A., Member of the Secretariat of the General Secretary, Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Brezhnev’s foreign policy adviser)
Allon, Yigal, Israeli Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anderson, Robert, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations (Department of State spokesman)
Arbatov, Georgi A., Director of the Institute of the United States of America, Russian Academy of Sciences; also Senior Foreign Policy Advisor of the Foreign Department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Armitage, John A., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Ash, Roy L., Director of the Office of Management and Budget
al-Asad (Assad), Hafez, Syrian President
Atherton, Alfred L., “Roy,” Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Barry, Robert L., Deputy Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Bell, Richard, Assistant Secretary of Agriculture for International Affairs and Commodity Programs
Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali, Pakistani Prime Minister
Blackwell, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Maritime Affairs
Blackwill, Robert D., Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State
Blake, Robert O., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs
Borg, C. Arthur, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State from July 12, 1976
Borg, Parker, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Boverie, Richard T., Major General, USAF, Senior Member of the National Security Council Staff and Director for Program Analysis from November 1975
Brandt, Willy, Chairman of the Social Democratic Party of (West) Germany; former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany
Bremer, L. Paul, III, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State
Brezhnev, Leonid I., General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Brown, George S., General, USAF, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
Brown, L. Dean, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management until February 23, 1975
Buffum, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until December 18, 1975
Bunker, Ellsworth, Ambassador at Large; Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
Burns, Arthur, Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
Bush, George H.W., Head of the U.S. Liaison Office in Beijing (Peking) from October 21, 1974 until December 7, 1975; Director of Central Intelligence from January 30, 1976
XXII  Persons

Butler, Malcolm, Staff Member of the Office of International Economic Affairs (responsible for trade, East-West economic issues, aviation, and maritime issues), National Security Council staff
Butz, Earl L., Secretary of Agriculture until October 4, 1976
Byrd, Harry F., Jr., Senator (I–Virginia)
Byrd, Robert C., Senator (D–West Virginia)

Calhoun, Jesse M., President of the Marine Engineers’ Beneficial Association
Callaghan, James, British Foreign Secretary until April 5, 1976; thereafter, Prime Minister
Carter, James E., “Jimmy,” Governor of Georgia until 1975; candidate for the 1976 Democratic nomination for President from December 12, 1975; nominee of the Democratic Party for President from July 14, 1976; President-elect from November 2, 1976
Castro, Fidel, Premier of Cuba
Ceaușescu, Nicolai, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania
Cheney, Richard B., Deputy Assistant to the President until November 1975; thereafter, Assistant to the President (White House Chief of Staff)
Chernenko, Konstantin U., Chief of the General Department in the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; also Full Member of the Central Committee
Church, Frank F., III, Senator (D–Idaho); from March until June 1976, candidate for the 1976 Democratic nomination for President
Clements, William P., Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense
Clerides, Glafkos I., acting President of Cyprus until December 1974
Clift, A. Denis, Senior Staff Member of the Office of Europe, Canada, and Ocean Affairs, National Security Council Staff
Connally, John B., Jr., Secretary of the Treasury from 1971 until 1972
Culver, John C., Senator (D–Iowa) from January 3, 1975

Davis, Jeanne W., National Security Council Staff Secretary (Director of the National Security Council Secretariat)
Davis, Nathaniel, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from April 2 until December 18, 1975; thereafter, Director General of the Foreign Service
De Gaulle, Charles, President of France from 1944 until 1947, and from 1959 until 1969
Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-p’ing), Vice Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China
Denktash, Rauf Raif, President of the Turkish Cypriot Federated State from February 13, 1975
Dinitz, Simcha, Israeli Ambassador to the United States
Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States; Full Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Dulles, John Foster, Secretary of State from 1953 until 1959
Dunlop, John T., Secretary of Labor from March 18, 1975 until January 31, 1976

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Executive Assistant to the Secretary of State; also Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from May 14, 1975
Eberle, William D., Special Representative for Trade Negotiations until December 24, 1974; also Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy
Elliott, David D., Senior Staff Member of the Office of Scientific Affairs, National Security Council Staff
Ellsworth, Robert F., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until December 22, 1975; thereafter Deputy Secretary of Defense
Enders, Thomas O., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs until December 22, 1975; Ambassador to Canada from February 17, 1976

Evans, Rowland, Jr., co-author of syndicated newspaper column with Robert D.S. Novak

Fahmy, Ismael, Egyptian Foreign Minister

Faisal ibn Abd al-Aziz al-Saud, King of Saudi Arabia until March 25, 1975

Feldman, Mark B., Deputy Legal Adviser, Department of State

Firyubin, Nikolai Pavlovich, Deputy Foreign Minister of the Soviet Union

Fisher, Max M., Detroit businessman and philanthropist

Ford, Gerald R., President of the United States; candidate for the 1976 Republican nomination for President from July 8, 1975; nominee of the Republican Party for President from August 19, 1976

Fosdick, Dorothy, senior member on the staff (foreign affairs) of Senator Henry Jackson

Frelinghuysen, Peter H.B., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R–New Jersey)

Friedersdorf, Max L., Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs

Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D–Arkansas); Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee until January 1975

Funseth, Robert L., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Press Relations and Spokesman of the Department of State

Gammon, Samuel R., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State

Garment, Leonard, Special Consultant to the President; Representative on the UN Human Rights Commission from May 1975

Garrison, Mark J., Director of the Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Genscher, Hans-Dietrich, Foreign Minister of the Federal Republic of Germany

Gierek, Edward, First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party

Giscard d’Estaing, Valéry, President of France

Gleason, Thomas, “Teddy,” President of the International Longshoremen’s Association

Goldman, Nahum, President of the World Jewish Congress

Gompert, David C., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State

Grechko, Andrei A., Marshal, Soviet Minister of Defense and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union until April 26, 1976

Greenspan, Alan, Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers

Gromyko, Andrei A., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and Member of Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Habib, Philip C., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from September 27, 1974 until June 30, 1976; thereafter, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs

Haig, Alexander M., Jr., General, USA, Assistant to the President (White House Chief of Staff) until September 1974; thereafter, Supreme Commander, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command

Hall, Paul, President of the Seafarers International Union

Harriman, W. Averell, Governor of New York from 1955 until 1958

Hartman, Arthur A., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Hartmann, Robert T., Counselor to the President

Helms, Jesse, Senator (R–North Carolina)

Hills, Carla Anderson, Secretary of Housing and Urban Development from March 10, 1975
Hinton, Deane R., Deputy Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy; Ambassador to Zaire from August 21, 1974 until June 18, 1975 (declared persona non grata); temporarily assigned to the Office of the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs; Representative to the European Communities from January 29, 1976

Holloway, James L., III, Admiral, USN, Chief of Naval Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Holton, A. Linwood, Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs until January 31, 1975

Hormats, Robert D., Senior Member of the Office of International Economic Affairs, National Security Council Staff

Hummel, Arthur W., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from July 12, 1976

Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr., Senator (D–Minnesota)

Hyland, William G., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until November 24, 1975; thereafter Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Iklé, Fred C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

Ingersoll, Robert S., Deputy Secretary of State until March 31, 1976

Jackson, Henry M., “Scoop,” Senator (D–Washington); from February 1975 until May 1976, also candidate for the 1976 Democratic nomination for President

Janka, Leslie A., Senior Member of the Office of Legislative and Public Affairs (press liaison office), National Security Council Staff, until October 1976

Javits, Jacob K., Senator (R–New York)

Jenkins, Kempton B., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations

Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States from 1963 until 1969

Johnson, U. Alexis, Ambassador at Large; Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)

Juan Carlos I, King of Spain from November 22, 1975

Katz, Julius L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Resources and Food Policy until September 1976; Assistant Secretary of State for Economic and Business Affairs from September 23, 1976

Keating, Kenneth B., Ambassador to Israel until May 5, 1975

Kekkonen, Urho, President of Finland

Kelly, John H., Politico-Military Affairs Officer, Office of Disarmament and Arms Control, Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State, until March 1975; thereafter, Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State

Kendall, Donald M., Chairman of Pepsico, Inc.

Kennan, George F., U.S. diplomat, political scientist, and historian; Ambassador to the Soviet Union (1952) and Yugoslavia from 1961 until 1963

Kennedy, Edward M., Senator (D–Massachusetts)

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from 1961 until 1963

Kenyatta, Jomo, President of Kenya

Khaddam, Abd al-Halim, Syrian Minister of Foreign Affairs

Khalid bin Abdul Aziz, King of Saudi Arabia from March 25, 1975

Khrushchev, Nikita S., First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Party and Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers from 1953 until 1964

Kirilenko, Andrei S., Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee

Kirkland, Joseph Lane, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL–CIO

Kissinger, Henry A., Secretary of State; also Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975
Komplektov, Viktor G., Deputy Chief of the United States of America Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Kornienko, Georgi M., Chief of the United States of America Department and Member of the Collegium in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs until October 1975; thereafter Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman (Premier) of the Soviet Council of Ministers; also Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Kovalev, Anatoly G., Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs and Head of the Soviet Delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
Kozlov, Mikhail M., Colonel General (Major General), Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union
Kraft, Joseph, syndicated columnist for the Los Angeles Times
Kreisky, Bruno, Chancellor of Austria
Kuznetsov, Vasily V., First Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs

Laird, Melvin R., Secretary of Defense from 1969 until 1973
Laise, Carol C., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until March 27, 1975; thereafter, Director General of the Foreign Service
Leigh, Samuel W., Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State, until December 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from December 24, 1975
Lodal, Jan M., Senior Member, National Security Council Staff, and Director of the Program Analysis Staff until August 1975
Long, Russell B., Senator (D–Louisiana); Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee
Lon Nol, General, President of the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) until April 1, 1975
Lord, Winston, Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Lynn, James T., Director of the Office of Management and Budget from March 1975

Makarios III, Archbishop, President of the Republic of Cyprus from December 7, 1974 (former President from August 16, 1970 until July 15, 1974)
Makarov, Vasily G., Chef de Cabinet to the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Malik, Yakov A., Soviet Permanent Representative to the United Nations until December 12, 1976; also Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mansfield, Michael J., Senator (D–Montana); Senate Majority Leader
Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party until September 9, 1976
Marder, Murrey, columnist and diplomatic correspondent for The Washington Post
Marsh, John O., Jr., “Jack,” Counselor to the President
Mathews, Forrest David, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare from July 22, 1975
Mathias, Charles McCurdy, Jr., Senator (R–Maryland)
Maw, Carlyle E., Under Secretary of State for International Security Affairs until September 17, 1976
McClellan, John L., Senator (D–Arkansas)
McCloskey, Robert J., Ambassador at Large until February 20, 1975; Assistant Secretary of State for Legislative Affairs until September 10, 1976
McFarlane, Robert C., Lieutenant Colonel, USMC, Military Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs; Special Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Meany, George, President of the AFL–CIO
Mikhailov, Valerian V., Deputy Chief of the United States of America Department in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Miki Takeo, Prime Minister of Japan from December 9, 1974 until December 24, 1976
XXVI Persons

Miller, Israel, Chairman of the American Jewish Council on Soviet Jewry
Mintoff, Dom, Prime Minister of Malta
Molotov, Vyacheslav M., Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs from 1939 until 1956
Mondale, Walter F., “Fritz,” Senator (D–Minnesota); nominee of the Democratic Party for Vice President from July 14, 1976; Vice President-elect from November 2, 1976
Morgan, Thomas E., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Pennsylvania); Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee
Moro, Aldo, Prime Minister of Italy
Morokhov, Igor D., First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Utilization of Atomic Energy; also head of the Soviet delegation to CTB and TTB/PNE talks
Moyohian, Daniel P. Ambassador to India until January 7, 1975; Permanent Representative to the United Nations from June 30, 1975 until February 2, 1976
Mulcahy, Edward W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until March 1976; Ambassador to Tunisia from May 31, 1976
Nasser, Gamal Abdul, President of Egypt from 1956 until 1970
Nessen, Ronald H., White House Press Secretary from September 20, 1974
Neto, Antonio Agostinho, leader of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA); President of Angola from November 11, 1975
Newhouse, John, Counselor of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of (South) Vietnam until April 21, 1975
Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from 1969 until August 9, 1974
Novak, Robert D.S., co-author of syndicated newspaper column with Rowland Evans, Jr.
Oakley, Robert B., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State; Senior Staff Member of the Office of Middle East and South Asian Affairs, National Security Council Staff, from September 1974
Olszowski, Stefan, Polish Foreign Minister and Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers’ (Communist) Party
Pastore, John, Senator (D–Rhode Island)
Patolichev, Nikolai S., Soviet Minister of Foreign Trade; Full Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Percy, Charles H., Senator (R–Illinois)
Peres, Shimon, Israeli Minister of Defense
Perle, Richard S., senior member on the staff (national security affairs) of Senator Henry Jackson
Peterson, Peter G., Secretary of Commerce (1972) from February 29, 1972 until February 1, 1973
Podgorny, Nikolai V., Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; also Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Pompidou, Georges, President of France from 1969 until 1974
Qaddafi, Muammar, Colonel (Muamar Gaddafi), Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council of Libya
Rabin, Yitzhak, Prime Minister of Israel
Reagan, Ronald W., Governor of California until January 7, 1975; candidate for the 1976 Republican nomination for President from November 20, 1975 until August 19, 1976
Redman, Charles E., Executive Secretariat, Operations Center, Department of State
Reston, James B., “Scotty,” Vice President of The New York Times
Rhodes, John J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R–Arizona): House Minority Leader
Ribicoff, Abraham A., Senator (D–Connecticut)

Robinson, Charles W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until April 9, 1976; Deputy Secretary of State from April 7, 1976

Rockefeller, David, Chairman of the Board, Chase Manhattan Bank; also Chairman of the Board, Council on Foreign Relations

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Vice President of the United States from December 19, 1974

Rodman, Peter W., Staff Assistant to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Rogers, William D., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from October 7, 1974 until June 18, 1976; thereafter, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs until December 31, 1976

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State from 1969 until 1973

Roosevelt, Franklin D., President of the United States from 1933 until 1945

Rourke, Russell A., Special Assistant to the Counselor to the President (Marsh) until January 1975; thereafter Executive Assistant

Rumsfeld, Donald, Assistant to the President (White House Chief of Staff) from October 1, 1974 until November 3, 1975; Secretary of Defense from November 20, 1975

Rustand, Warren S., Appointments Secretary to the President and Director of the White House Scheduling Office from September 1974 until November 1975

al-Sadat, Mohamed Anwar, President of Egypt

Sakharov, Andrei D., Soviet physicist, dissident, and human rights activist; researcher at the Lebedev Institute of Physics, Soviet Academy of Sciences; founder and member of the Moscow Human Rights Committee

al-SAqqaf, Omar, Saudi Minister of State for Foreign Affairs until December 1974

Saunders, Harold H., “Hal,” Deputy Assistant Secretary of State of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs; from December 1 1975, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research

Sauvagnargues, Jean, French Minister of Foreign Affairs until August 26, 1976

Schauffele, William E., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from December 19, 1975

Schechter, Jerry, Moscow Bureau Chief for Time Magazine

Scheel, Walter, President of the Federal Republic of Germany

Schlesinger, James R., Secretary of Defense until November 19, 1975

Schmidt, Helmut, Chancellor, Federal Republic of Germany

Scott, Hugh D., Senator (R–Pennsylvania); Senate Minority Leader

Scowcroft, Brent, Lieutenant General, USAF, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975; thereafter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Seamans, Robert C., Jr., Administrator of the Energy Research and Development Administration

Seidman, L. William, Assistant to the President for Economic Affairs; Executive Director of the Economic Policy Board

Semenov, Vladimir S., Deputy Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs; also Chairman (Ambassador) of the Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)

Shchukin, Aleksandr N., Deputy Chairman of the Committee for Lenin Prizes and State Prizes in Science and Technology; informal member of the Soviet Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II)

Sherer, Albert W., Jr., “Bud,” Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on European Security and Cooperation negotiations

Shinn, William T., Jr., Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State

Sidey, Hugh, Washington Bureau Chief for Time Magazine

Sihanouk, Norodom, Cambodian Head of State from August 19, 1975 until April 2, 1976 (previously Head of State from 1960 until 1970)
XXVIII  Persons

Simon, William E., Secretary of the Treasury
Sisco, Joseph J., Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until June 30, 1976
Sober, Sidney, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Sokolov, Oleg M., Chief of the American Section, United States of America Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Solzhenitsyn, Aleksandr I., Russian novelist, playwright, and historian
Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, “Hal,” Counselor of the Department of State
Sparkman, John, Senator (D–Alabama)
Springsteen, George S., Jr., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department of State until July 14, 1976
Stalin, Josef I., General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union from 1922 until 1953
Stevenson, Adlai E., III, Senator (D–Illinois)
Stoessel, Walter J., Jr., Ambassador to the Soviet Union until September 13, 1976
Strauss, Franz Josef, Chairman of the (West German) Christian Social Union
Sukhodrev, Viktor M., Counselor, Second European Department, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
Suslov, Mikhail A., Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union; also Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee
Swiers, Peter B., Special Assistant to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff
Sytenko, Mikhail D., Chief of the Middle East Division and Member of the Collegium in the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Tanaka Kakuei, Prime Minister of Japan until December 9, 1974
Tekoah, Yosef, Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Teller, Edward, Professor of Physics, University of California at Berkeley
Teng Hsiao-p’ing. See Deng Xiaoping
Terrell, Norman E., Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State
Theis, Paul A., Executive Editor, Editorial Staff, White House, from August 1974 until January 1976
Thieu. See Nguyen Van Thieu.
Thorton, Thomas P., Member of the Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Thurmond, Strom, Senator (R–South Carolina)
Timmons, William E., Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs until December 31, 1974
Tito, Josip Broz, President of Yugoslavia
Toon, Malcolm, Ambassador to Yugoslavia until March 11, 1975; Ambassador to Israel from July 10, 1975 until December 27, 1976; appointed Ambassador to the Soviet Union November 24, 1976; presented credentials January 18, 1977
Trimble, Philip R., Assistant Legal Adviser for Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Vance, Cyrus R., Deputy Secretary of Defense from 1964 until 1967; Secretary of State-designate from December 3, 1976
Vanik, Charles A., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D–Ohio)
Vavilov, Andrei, Soviet official, United States of America Department of the Soviet Foreign Ministry
Vest, George S., Director of the Bureau for Politico-Military Affairs, Department of State
Vinogradov, Sergei, Chief of the Soviet Delegation to the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
Vorontsov, Yuli M., Soviet Minister Counselor to the United States
Wade, James P., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs; Director of Department of Defense SALT Task Force

Waldheim, Kurt, Secretary General of the United Nations

Wallace, George C., Jr., Governor of Alabama; from November 1975 until June 1976, also candidate for the 1976 Democratic nomination for President

Wade, James P., Jr., Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs; Director of Department of Defense SALT Task Force

Wilson, (James) Harold, British Prime Minister until April 5, 1976

Wright, Robert B., Director of the Office of East-West Trade, Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs, Department of State

Zamyatin, Leonid M., Director General of the Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS)

Zarb, Frank G., Administrator of the Federal Energy Administration

Zhou Enlai (Chou En-lai), Premier of the People’s Republic of China until January 8, 1976
Soviet Union,
August 1974–December 1976

President Ford and the Jackson–Vanik Amendment, August–October 1974

1. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, August 8, 1974.

Your Meeting with Vorontsov

You will want to make the obvious points at the outset—continuity etc.—but without seeming to be overly concerned that the Soviets will embark on something in this time of transition.2

(Note: The message from President Ford to Brezhnev will be on its way,3 and you may want to give Vorontsov a copy or at least alert him to its transmission through our Embassy. Brezhnev is in the Crimea.)

Points to Emphasize

You recognize that some in Moscow may have linked the attack on the policies of détente to Watergate; there may be a misapprehension that the outcome of the Watergate affair will impact directly on foreign policies.

—Our policies toward the Soviet Union are founded on hard headed analysis of what is in our national interests; true, they have been challenged, and of course President Nixon played a central role in maintaining the course he set with the General Secretary;


2 In a televised address to the nation that evening, Richard Nixon announced: “I shall resign the Presidency effective noon tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn in as President at that hour in this office.” For the full text of his speech, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, No. 244.

3 Document 4.
—President Ford in his message has already re-affirmed his intention of pursuing President Nixon’s course in relations with the Soviet Union;

—Thus, no basic change is involved; indeed, the fact that our improved relationship rested on a foundation of agreements is a guarantee that personality changes need not lead to policy changes;

—You have discussed this with the new President; indeed, he has participated in the formulation of this policy toward the USSR since the outset and has vigorously supported it in the Congress;

—You will remain as Secretary of State, at the President’s request. Thus there will be no break in continuity and the general approach that you discussed in Moscow on European Security, on economic relations, on SALT and other arms control questions all remain valid.

In particular, we reaffirm the invitation to the General Secretary to visit the US next spring–summer.

—As for an earlier meeting than was discussed in Moscow, the new President will have to give that more thought.

—The Soviet leaders, we are sure, will understand that in the next months the new President will be besieged by many problems of transition. We do not rule out an early meeting, but let us come back to it later.

We are preparing our position for the next round of SALT, but this too might slip though only by a few weeks; otherwise no changes in scheduling or substance are involved.

—PNE talks to begin around November.

—We will work with our allies on a CSCE position, but Soviets should take a hard look at some way to move MBFR.

A very personal and private note for Vorontsov to convey to highest levels:

—In this country we intend to carry on with our policies, but it is naturally a time of difficulties; many in the Congress and the country were mounting an assault on Soviet-American relations; this will not end simply because of a change in the Presidency.

—You will make a major statement on détente within the next ten days which will commit this administration.4

4 Kissinger was scheduled to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on August 8 on the status of détente with the Soviet Union. “That being the very day that Nixon announced his intention to resign,” Kissinger later recalled, “my testimony was postponed until the middle of September.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 244) During a meeting on August 7 to prepare his testimony, however, Kissinger offered another explanation for postponement: “Because I don’t think this is a first-class statement.” “I also didn’t want to enter the debate and exacerbate already exalted feelings,” he added. “I would have to kill myself to get this into shape, and tomorrow it would hit in a bad atmosphere. I think we ought to let the domestic atmosphere cool down.” (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 9, Nodis Memcons, August 1974, Folder 4)
—The leaders in Moscow must know that their actions will be scrutinized with microscopic care by everyone in this country, for any action that might be cited as taking advantage of our problems.

—Berlin is already being cited, and we are witnessing increased attacks in Vietnam.

—And, of course, the Soviet position on Cyprus—which we believe has been restrained—will be taken as an indicator.

You are only making this point so that Moscow understands the situation not because we have any special concerns.5

5 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Vorontsov in the White House on August 9 at 3:25 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.

2. Talking Points Prepared in the Department of State1

Washington, undated.

Soviet Chargé

Yuly Vorontsov—Minister Counselor

Background

Ambassador Dobrynin is on leave at home.

The Soviets have tended to see Watergate in the context of US-Soviet relations and to attribute domestic attacks on President Nixon to “forces” opposed to détente. Consequently, they have shown some uneasiness about the implications of the events in this country for the future of our relations.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Transition File, 1974, Box 1, President’s Talking Points for Calls by Ambassadors, 8/9/74. Secret; Sensitive. The talking points were prepared for President Ford’s meeting with Vorontsov on August 9. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. A draft, however, is in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Presidential Transition, 1974. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford and Kissinger met Vorontsov in the Oval Office on August 9 from 3:41 to 3:54 p.m.; Scowcroft also attended the meeting. (Ford Library, White House Office Files) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.
Nevertheless, in the aftermath of the last summit,\(^2\) the Soviets have been actively interested in arranging a series of follow-up negotiations on (a) various bilateral cooperative projects such as housing construction, and artificial heart, etc., (b) several of the arms control issues agreed on in principle at the summit, such as controls over environmental warfare techniques and over chemical warfare, an agreement on inspecting peaceful nuclear explosions to ensure they are not used militarily (this was an issue left over in the underground test limitation treaty signed in Moscow) and (c) SALT, where the summit resulted in an understanding that we would seek an agreement running through 1985 to follow the interim offensive agreement that lapses in October 1977.

The Soviets will want reassurance that we are prepared to proceed with these and other negotiating projects. They will also be looking for some assurance that we will succeed in getting a Trade Bill that permits EXIM credits to continue and MFN to be granted. They have officially resisted the link to their emigration policy stipulated in the Jackson amendment but have privately been prepared to provide some assurances that harassments and other impediments to emigration will be moderated if the economic agreements go forward.

Most fundamentally, Brezhnev has acquired considerable stake in his détente policies and in his relationship with President Nixon. He is bound to be in a sensitive position at a moment when many in Moscow may see these relationships in jeopardy.

There may also be some in Moscow who see this as a time to test our resolve on some issue, especially since the Soviets have not done well in the Middle East and Cyprus crises; any such notion will be most effectively countered by the demonstration that our policy of firmness when challenged but reasonableness in negotiations will be continued.

**Talking Points**

*In your comments, you may wish to make the following points:*\(^3\)

—You supported President Nixon’s policies in the Congress and participated in the preparations for the last summit;
—You are therefore committed to their continuation and will put the authority and prestige of your office behind it, including in the Congress;


\(^3\) Ford underlined several words and phrases in the points below, including: “President Nixon” in the first point; “continuation” in the second; “General Secretary Brezhnev” in the third; “Conference on European Security and Cooperation” in the fifth; “restraint” and “respect” in the sixth; and “Brezhnev here next spring” in the seventh.
—You have written General Secretary Brezhnev on this score and wish to reiterate it orally and directly;
—You are aware that there is much follow-up work to be done after the last summit: on arms control, on SALT, on bilateral cooperation; you are taking a personal interest in all of these and expect our delegations to be ready to meet with their Soviet counterparts over the next several weeks, as already agreed between Dobrynin and Secretary Kissinger;
—You will also continue the efforts of President Nixon to achieve an early and satisfactory outcome of the Conference on European Security and Cooperation;
—Generally, you think the most important point to bear in mind as we move into the period ahead is that our relations must be based on restraint and on respect for each other’s interest; that is the best way to continue avoiding crises and to maintain the recent positive trend in our relations;
—You look forward to seeing Brezhnev here next spring and have reaffirmed the invitation in your letter to him.

3. **Letter From Secretary of State Kissinger to Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko**

Washington, August 9, 1974.

Dear Mr. Minister:

I am taking advantage of the close personal relationship we have enjoyed to send you a private message to explain certain points with utmost frankness. You are free, of course, to share them with the General Secretary who will receive a communication from our new President.

Regardless of what you may hear or read in the next few weeks, I can assure you personally that President Ford intends to continue and

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 16, USSR (1). No classification marking. According to a handwritten note on the first page, the letter was “handed to Min. Vorontsov 8/9/74—3:15 p.m. by HAK.” Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of the letter to Kissinger on August 8 with the following typed note: “Attached is the letter to Gromyko which you may want to hand to Vorontsov or let Stoessel deliver. In any case, you should look it over, because I have given it a slightly different twist at the end.” Kissinger approved the draft without revision. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Presidential Transition, 1974)
develop further the policies that have guided our relations with the USSR under President Nixon. He has asked me to remain in office, and to devote special attention to Soviet affairs. He will be a strong President, and you will see that he will take command immediately and assert his authority and responsibility over foreign affairs. You may rely on his assurances, and the approach to the issues we discussed in Moscow and since my return will be carried through.

You will realize from your long acquaintance with this country, that the coming period will be one in which the President will be engaged in a review of our position in many areas and on many issues—but this will not affect Soviet-American relations.

Thus, I will probably return to Moscow this fall as we discussed if the President’s schedule permits me to be away. In any case, we expect to meet you should you come to the UN General Assembly this year.

Let me make one further point, and I do so in the spirit of candor that had characterized our many discussions.

The change in the Presidency will not end the criticism that our policy toward the Soviet Union has been subjected to over this past year. I will soon make a major speech on this subject, which will commit the new Administration to the process of improving Soviet-American relations. But I hope that in Moscow the most serious thought will be given to the substantive issues facing us—in CSCE, MBFR and SALT—so that there will be no loss of momentum when these negotiations resume.

It will be of more importance now, in the new circumstances, to demonstrate that what we have achieved is in fact a solid foundation for the future.

Warm regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

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2 Kissinger addressed the national convention of the American Legion on August 20 in Miami. For the text of his speech, see Department of State Bulletin, September 16, 1974, pp. 373–378.
4. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, August 9, 1974.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

Upon assuming office as President of the United States, I wanted to be in immediate contact with you to share my views on the importance of continuing along the course of Soviet-American relations that you and President Nixon have charted in your summit meetings, in the agreements that our two governments have reached, and in the general spirit of cooperation we have established. I have naturally participated as Vice President in the discussions prior to the most recent meetings with you in Moscow and discussed the results with both President Nixon and Secretary Kissinger. As you are no doubt aware, I have consistently supported in our Congress the foreign policy of President Nixon throughout his administration. Thus, I can confirm without qualification that American policy toward the Soviet Union will continue unchanged in my administration.

I share the worthy goals that were set forth in the communique’s of the summit meetings in Moscow and in this country, and the approach to our relations that you and President Nixon have elaborated in your private discussions. I firmly believe that in the nuclear age a policy of mutual restraint and of respecting the interests of all is the only course open to responsible statesmen. I am committed to that course. I will also give closest attention to the many negotiations already in progress between our governments or projected for the coming weeks. My administration will continue to approach these negotiations with the utmost seriousness and with determination to achieve concrete and lasting results in the common interest of our two countries as well as the world at large.

I value the intimate and open exchanges that have been carried on in the interim between the summit conferences. I would like to assure you that the channels of communication that have been established remain open at any time.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 16, USSR (1). No classification marking. In telegram 174035 to Moscow, August 9, the Department forwarded the text of Ford’s letter to the Embassy with the instructions: “Please deliver immediately following message from the President to General Secretary Brezhnev. If he is not available, deliver to highest official available.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Presidential Transition, 1974)
I have asked Secretary of State Kissinger to continue in office so as to ensure continuity in the conduct of our foreign policies. He has my full confidence and support.

Finally, Mr. General Secretary, I want to reaffirm the invitation to you to visit this country next year. Please convey my regards to your colleagues, President Podgorny, Premier Kosygin, and Minister Gromyko.2

Sincerely,

2 Printed from a copy that does not bear Ford’s signature. Stoessel reported in telegram 12279 from Moscow, August 10, that he delivered the message to Andrei Kirilenko at 10:30 a.m., August 10. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files) In a memorandum to the President on August 10, Kissinger further reported: “Upon receiving your message (delivered through Brezhnev’s second-in-command in the Politburo who phoned him in the Crimea), the General Secretary underlined that Soviet policy toward the US would remain consistent and unchanging; in addition to conveying congratulations to you, he wished you success in a difficult task and stressed the importance of continuing on the course on which the US and USSR had embarked; formal congratulations will be sent in the next day or so. The significance of this is: the high level attention to the receipt of your message; it is the first time our Ambassador has ever been received at the Central Committee, rather than the government office; moreover, Brezhnev’s response was conveyed through his probable successor, Andrei Kirilenko.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Transition File, 1974, Box 1, Letters to and from World Leaders—Memoranda to the President)

5. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford1

Washington, August 9, 1974.

SUBJECT

Exchanges With Senator Jackson Regarding His Amendment to the Trade Bill

Background

The Jackson amendment to Title IV of the Trade Bill (Tab D) in effect would make it impossible to grant most-favored-nation tariff treat-

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 23, Subject File, Trade (1). Eyes Only. All tabs are attached but not printed. Haig forwarded the memorandum to the President on August 11 with the following typed note: “You may wish to discuss the Jackson position on the Trade Bill in your 9:00 a.m. meeting with Secretary Kissinger tomorrow. The memorandum is lengthy primarily because of the sensitivity of the issue but well worth your detailed reading.” A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.”
ment to the USSR or to continue its eligibility for EXIM Bank credit facilities because it would first require you to make a detailed report on the status of Soviet emigration and a finding that the Soviets do not deny their citizens the right or opportunity to emigrate and do not penalize persons who seek to emigrate. Such a finding could clearly not be made at this time.

For the past several weeks, I have tried to reach an understanding with Jackson (together with Senators Javits and Ribicoff) concerning the standards that we would apply in judging Soviet emigration practices and a means whereby MFN and credits could go forward at least for an initial period so that the Soviets would have an incentive to improve their emigration performance.

In conducting my talks with Jackson I was able to base myself on discussions I had with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin. The issue is obviously one of great sensitivity for the Soviets, the more so since they agreed in writing last year to suspend their special emigration tax only to find that it gained them nothing.

**Understanding with Soviets**

In their talks with me the Soviets agreed that the Administration could provide Jackson with certain broad assurances that any harassment, punitive action or unreasonable impediments against those wishing to leave the USSR would be contrary to Soviet law and would therefore not be permitted by the Soviet Government. The Soviet leaders were also willing to have us express the expectation that the emigration flow would increase to 45,000 a year (from about 35,000 in 1973). Jackson and his supporters had demanded an emigration level of 100,000. More recently, the Soviets have backed away from being associated with any numbers.

**Negotiations with Jackson**

A. *His Terms*

Although the Senators seemed impressed with this movement by the Soviets, Jackson subsequently provided me with a draft of a letter to him from me containing extremely detailed and stringent conditions, although he reduced the number of annual emigrants to 75,000. The problems with this text (which is at Tab B) were its detail, peremptory tone, legalistic formulations and requirement that the Soviets furnish us with all their laws and regulations pertinent to emigration. This not only went far beyond what I could in conscience assert the Soviets had promised, but what any sovereign state would tolerate having another government say about its internal order.

Moreover, the Jackson approach would have left his amendment basically unchanged and merely have added to it a waiver authority for
the President in terms such that the President could only exercise it if the Soviets were in full compliance with all the detailed provisions of the Jackson letter.

B. Effort to Compromise

Despite these difficulties, I later furnished Jackson with an amended draft letter which retained the substance of Jackson’s points but in condensed and less peremptory and legalistic form. This draft also in effect gave 45,000 emigrants as a floor and as our “hope” as a result of Soviet adherence to the standards set out in the letter. (This draft is at Tab A.)

In subsequent discussions with Jackson’s staff, they sought to reintroduce many of the details of the original letter. We pointed out that the standards and practices outlined in our letter were already so specific that the Soviets would have difficulty with them, as a matter of prestige even if they were ready to live up to them.

We noted that it would be clear after a few months whether harassments, obstacles and punishments persisted and we could readily monitor the flow of emigration and thus would know whether there was adequate performance.

We would also be ready to have language in the legislation that would permit the President or Congress itself to cut off MFN and credits if after some specified time the Soviets failed to perform. Greater precision would serve little purpose, except to affront the Russians, since we are dealing with readily observable facts. The Jackson people agreed to make an effort to tone down their formulations, but we have not yet heard from them.

Attitude of Jewish Leaders; Issues

Meanwhile, we also supplied our proposed text to three Jewish leaders. They thought it showed substantial progress.

—They were concerned about any reference to numbers lest it become a ceiling. More likely, their problem, like Jackson’s, is that their prestige is tied to the publicized demand for 100,000. But the leaders have indicated that there might be some private understanding that under conditions of declining restrictions and harassment a rate within the 45–75,000 per year range would be taken by us as a rough performance

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2 Stanley Lowell, Chairman of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry; Rabbi Israel Miller, Chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; and Max M. Fisher, a prominent Detroit businessman and Jewish philanthropist. Leonard Garment, Counsel to the President, briefed the three Jewish leaders on the proposed texts of the letters during a meeting in New York on August 5. (Memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, August 6; National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 9, Trade Bill, August 1974)
standard. Jackson, too, is apparently thinking of such a private understanding. This might be a way out on this problem.

—The Jewish leaders also want to see the references to Soviet practices tied more directly to explicit assurances from the Soviets. (You will note that in the letter at Tab A, we use euphemisms like “we have reason to believe.” This is also a preoccupation of Jackson’s. We might solve this problem by a general statement that all the points in the letter are based on discussions with the Soviets and then use some phrase like “we believe” or even just flat assertions.

—Both the Jewish leaders and Jackson oppose the reference in the first point to the fact that punitive actions against those trying to leave according to existing laws and regulations would not be permitted by the Soviets. The argument is that as long as we do not have precise knowledge of Soviet laws and regulations this language gives the Soviets a free hand. But the Soviets have made the point to me that they cannot be expected to permit illegal departures. We may have to get the Soviets to swallow omission of this clause.

—Both the Jewish leaders and Jackson still insist on Soviet performance prior to any exercise by the President of the authority we seek in Title IV. This is a prestige point for them and Jackson’s people have indicated some possibility of flexibility if there is some initial test period.

Next Steps

Although these are in the main issues in my current efforts, we must anticipate that Jackson’s next draft will still contain more specifics than we, and above all, the Russians will find acceptable. It should also be noted that the EXIM authorization bill will have in it a number of restrictions on credits for the USSR on grounds other than emigration. Consequently, Soviet incentives to perform on the emigration issue will be reduced.

One possibility, which Jackson’s people are considering, is that Jackson might make a private response to our letter setting forth particulars, such as numbers, that would serve as more precise performance standards. We could then respond with a brief letter stating that we would agree that these standards would be applied by us also. We have to recognize, however, that there are likely to be disagreements about Soviet performance, particularly if numbers do not rise rapidly.

If another round of exchanges with Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff does not get us within reach of an acceptable set of formulations, we will have to consider whether to deal with other Senators, less driven by concerns with highly committed constituencies. We have after all proposed a set of standards unprecedented in relations between sovereign states and sufficient to judge performance.
6. **Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State**

Moscow, August 10, 1974, 1747Z.

12296. Subj: U.S.-Soviet relations and the Presidential transition.

1. Summary. I have little doubt that the Soviets believe President Ford will continue our policy of seeking a closer and more stable relationship with the U.S.S.R. and I expect no major shifts in Soviet foreign policy either toward the U.S. or in the international arena as a result of President Nixon’s resignation. Nor do I think Nixon’s resignation will have much effect on Brezhnev’s position within the Soviet leadership. We can expect the Soviet regime—with Brezhnev at the helm—to remain on a détente course toward the U.S. and the West in general. End summary.

2. Brezhnev has felt most comfortable when dealing with Western leaders with whom he has developed a personal relationship. Nixon, Brandt, and Pompidou were the three with whom that relationship was strongest. Now all three are gone. The departure of Brandt and Pompidou caused some initial Soviet nervousness about the commitment of their successors to détente, accompanied by public and private Soviet assertions that Moscow’s course would be steadfast. We expect the same to be true in the U.S. case as the Soviets adjust to a new President.

3. Fortunately, two factors in the U.S. situation should encourage the Soviets in a continuing overall belief that the U.S. remains committed to bilateral détente. First is the fact that Secretary Kissinger will remain in office. In his person he exemplifies the continuity of U.S. foreign policy and—on a psychological level—he is known and respected by the Soviet leadership.

4. Second is the fact that the Soviets have had time to prepare for the present situation. While it took them longer than many to fully

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files. Confidential; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Belgrade, Berlin, Bucharest, Budapest, Leningrad, London, Paris, Prague, Sofia, Warsaw, Bonn, US Mission NATO, USDel CSCE Geneva, and USDel MBFR Vienna. In an August 12 memorandum, Kissinger briefed the President on this telegram: “Ambassador Stoessel reports from Moscow that the Soviet assessment of the Watergate drama will cause them to revise upward their view of Congressional power. He does not foresee any major shifts in Soviet foreign policy as a result of the resignation. Rather, he expects the Soviets to remain on a détente course toward the US and the West in general. Furthermore, he does not expect Brezhnev’s association with Nixon to affect Brezhnev’s own leadership position.” Ford initialed the memorandum. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Transition File, 1974, Box 1, Letters to and from World Leaders—Memoranda to the President)

2 French President Georges Pompidou died in office on April 2; Willy Brandt resigned as West German Chancellor on May 7.
comprehend the possibility of Nixon’s fall, the writing on the wall has been visible to them for several months. Nixon did not depart in the full flood of his personal relationship with Brezhnev. By the time of the summit meeting the Soviets probably had begun to consider him something of a wasting asset, and several times during the visit they side-stepped too personal identification with him. After the summit Soviet sources privately asserted to Westerners that more could have been accomplished in the strategic field if the President were not in domestic difficulties. There is a large self-serving element in the claim, but it is also likely that some Soviets believed it. If so, Moscow may be prepared to take a more serious and businesslike approach to SALT in the period ahead, feeling that President Ford has the Congressional base to get approval of agreements reached.

5. The slow erosion of Nixon’s domestic position also gave the Soviets time to persuade themselves that Nixon’s policies were almost certain to survive him. Through discussions in Moscow this spring and summer with Kennedy and Harriman on the Democratic side—and Scott and Richardson on the Republican—they could measure for themselves the continued strong support for the normalization process in the U.S.

6. Thus, I believe the Soviets are reasonably well satisfied that we will keep on a détente course. This does not mean there will be no adjustment problems. Given their innate conservatism and neophobia, they may have some initial difficulty getting used to the new President. They probably have some concern about the President’s earlier political orientation, which they may see as conservative in nature. More basically, they simply don’t know him very well. The message I delivered today got things off to a very good start. An early meeting between the President and Dobrynin (when he returns) would also help. It is possible, of course, that Brezhnev may be reluctant to seek with President Ford the kind of strong personal relationship he had with President Nixon (and with Brandt and Pompidou). The departure of all three has no doubt sobered him about the durability of personal ties with Western leaders. Thrice bitten, he may be inclined to move toward a somewhat more formal relationship with the U.S. President. This is not his natural bent, however, and the evidence thus far does not indicate any change in his approach.

7. A more complex problem involving Soviet perceptions of the U.S. is how they will assess the entire Watergate drama in terms of its

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3 Senator Edward Kennedy visited Moscow in April; former Governor W. Averell Harriman in May–June; former Attorney General Elliot Richardson visited the Soviet Union in July–August.
4 See Document 4.
effect on the authority of the Executive branch of the U.S. Government vis-à-vis the Congress. Just as the MFN travail has educated the Soviets on the strength of Congress, so should the Watergate affair cause them to revise even further upward their view of Congressional power. They may therefore be concerned that Watergate—and its culmination in the Nixon resignation—has had the effect of strengthening the hand of those in Congress who are ill-disposed toward the Soviet Union. They will have to balance such a concern against the knowledge that the President starts out with an excellent relationship with Congress based on his long experience there. This mixture of factors will make the Executive–Congressional relationship of consuming interest to the Soviets.

8. What of the effect of the Presidential transfer on Soviet policy toward the U.S. and in the overall international sphere? Will there be an effort to take marginal advantage during the time of initial adjustment? Or, on the contrary, a Soviet effort to give President Ford a honeymoon period? I doubt that either will happen. The circumstances of the resignation and succession should allow a transition of unique smoothness in the foreign policy field. Our foreign policy apparatus is already in place and as capable as before of responding to any heightened Soviet challenge. Moreover, I doubt that the Soviets would want—particularly at first—to risk actions which in their view might push the new President in a more hawkish direction. Conversely, I do not see any particular reason to believe that the Soviets will do President Ford any favors. They will, for example, continue to press their interests vigorously in such areas as the Middle East, Cyprus and the Mediterranean. In sum I expect Soviet foreign policy to continue—as ours will—on a “business-as-usual” basis, unaffected in any major way by the succession.

9. Finally, will Nixon’s resignation affect Brezhnev’s own position in the leadership? It seems doubtful. While Brezhnev had been closely identified with Nixon, the personal angle has been progressively muted for some time now and in any case Brezhnev never depended on it. His policy toward the U.S. and the West rested on the assumption that a closer relationship is in the Soviet national interest. Unless U.S. policy changes, that assumption is not likely to be challenged as a result of Nixon’s resignation.

Stoessel
7. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford

Moscow, August 11, 1974.

Dear Mr. President,

First of all I would like to congratulate you on the occasion of your assuming office of the President of the United States.

I received your message of August 9. Saying it straight, I and my colleagues were gratified to see your determination to continue the policy of maintaining and developing further all the good progress which was achieved in relations between our countries during the administration of your predecessor, President Nixon.

Such an approach concurs with our course in Soviet-American relations. I wish with all firmness to underline to you, Mr. President, personally that we are full of determination to build further our relations with the United States on the basis of long-range and stable perspective. To maintain with the United States the relations of peace and cooperation on the basis of full equality and mutual benefit is the line of principle for the Soviet Union and this line remains invariable.

Thus we are convinced that the better and more stable are the relations between the USSR and the US as the most powerful countries, the more lasting will be peace on the earth, the more realistic will be the possibility of eliminating completely the threat of nuclear catastrophe, and consequently the better it will be for all the peoples of the world.

It is well known that it took energetic and pointed efforts of both sides to make possible the turn which has been achieved in the relations between the USSR and the US during last years. It is also clear that further advance along the road of détente and improvement of relations between our countries is not a simple task. But we make from this only one conclusion: it is necessary not to relax but to persistently multiply efforts directed at securing what has been achieved, at further developing and deepening the reconstruction of Soviet-American relations.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 27, USSR, The “D” File, Items #1–4 (8/9/74–8/11/74). Secret. A copy of the letter in Russian, initialed by Dobrynin, is ibid. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger returned a telephone call from Dobrynin at 10:37 a.m. on August 12. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76) No substantive record of the conversation has been found. During a meeting in his office at 11:30, Kissinger remarked: “Dobrynin has come back. I will see him at noon. He has a message from Brezhnev to the President.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, Box 5, Nodis Memocons, Aug. 1974, Folder 5) No record of the noon meeting has been found. In addition to Brezhnev’s reply to Ford, Dobrynin probably also delivered Gromyko’s letter to Kissinger (Document 8).

2 Document 4.
Judging by your message, by your confidential words which were reported to me, and also by public statements made by you already in your capacity as the President of the United States, we have between us a common understanding exactly in the main thing—where to lead to in Soviet-American relations. And this is very important. Let us, Mr. President, act jointly in this big and important cause.

And we do have established channels for frank exchange of opinion on all questions which may arise. On our part we consider these channels quite effective and, like you, intend to further use them.

I thank you, Mr. President, for reaffirming the invitation to come to the United States next year with official visit. I intend to take advantage of this invitation. Concrete time of my visit to the United States can be agreed upon later. Of course, we proceed from the assumption that after this you also will make an official visit to the Soviet Union.

At the same time I also believe, like you, that a working meeting between us before the end of the year and somewhere on, so to say, neutral ground would be in the best interests of the cause. Experience shows how useful and valuable are personal contacts. There will be no difficulties, I think, to agree upon details of arranging such a meeting with due account of the development of events.

In conclusion I would like to tell you, Mr. President, that I and my colleagues understand full well the enormous responsibility which the leader of a great country has to shoulder, and we wish you successful and fruitful activity in your high office.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev³
Dear Mr. Secretary,

I received your private message which was handed through our Chargé d’Affaires ad interim in Washington. I was gratified to note the assurances in your letter concerning continuity of the US foreign policy and intention of President Ford’s administration to consistently pursue the line towards further improvement of Soviet-American relations.

We were also satisfied to know that you are going to continue your activity as the Secretary of State and as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. On this occasion I express to you my sincere wishes of success.

On my part I would like to express to you frankly some considerations in connection with your letter.

Much has been done in the development of Soviet-American relations; the success is obvious. At the same time it is clear that our countries face quite serious tasks, for the completion or solution of which we have yet to do substantive joint work.

As you have noted—and we agree with that—here we should not lose momentum in order not only to secure the success we have, but to proceed from this foundation further towards new frontiers, towards achieving new agreements and understandings.

I am sure that all this is quite attainable. Experience convincingly shows that when the USSR and the US act jointly, when they set before themselves realistic common objectives, then any, even most complex, problem turns to be quite soluble. If we ensure continuation of coordinating our efforts, if both sides act energetically and in the spirit of good will, then we undoubtedly will achieve even more significant results.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1974. No classification marking. A copy of the letter in Russian is ibid. Kissinger’s office forwarded both the English and Russian texts to Sonnenfeldt on August 28 with a written request for a draft reply “if you believe that one is necessary.” Sonnenfeldt wrote on the note: “No answer needed.” According to marginalia, one of Kissinger’s special assistants thought “Dobrynin handed this to HAK but doesn’t know when.” Dobrynin probably gave Kissinger the letter during their meeting on August 12; see footnote 1, Document 7.

2 Document 3.
On our part we are ready as before to do all what is necessary to facilitate further progress of the initiated big cause, to move consistently ahead along the road of mutually acceptable decisions in the interests of our countries, in the interests of strengthening peace and international security.

In conclusion I would like to stress that we appreciate businesslike confidential relations, which exist between us, and we are ready to develop them further.

Sincerely,

A. Gromyko

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

9. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 12, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule and Cyprus.]

[Kissinger:] On the Middle East problem—you will be seeing a number of Middle East ministers over the coming weeks. The actors: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan are the principals. Then other Arabs. Then the Soviet Union. Then the Europeans and Japan. Our job is to find a policy which relates all those problems to each other.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 4. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met Kissinger from 9:07 to 10:35 a.m. Scowcroft also attended the meeting. (Ibid.) The full memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Document 95.
First, after 1967 I operated on the basis of the historical illusion that the Arabs were militarily impotent, and U.S. support was firm. Rabin told me, “We never had it so good.” That was true as long as they could defeat the Arabs and we supported them. I had a misconception of our strategy. Between 1967 and 1974, Egypt and Syria were essentially Soviet satellites. In Egypt we had a low-level Interests Section and in Syria we had nothing. Our strategy during this period was . . . we always try to have a simple strategy but complicated tactics. We like complicated tactics, not for their own sake because we want the other parties committed first so we can sell our support to keep things fluid. We try to create a need for an American role before we give it—to ensure that both parties are ready. That we changed last spring. This was good strategy except with the Soviet Union, where we have to be simple, direct, and clear. In the Mideast before the October War, we tried to create such frustrations that the Arabs would leave the Soviet Union and come to us. We didn’t want the impression that Soviet pressure produces results—that it had to be us. The Soviets could give only arms.

We didn’t expect the October War.

The President: But wasn’t it helpful?

Kissinger: We couldn’t have done better if we had set the scenario.

The President: Even the heavy Israeli losses helped, didn’t they?

Kissinger: Once the war started, we helped Israel stabilize the situation. But it was not without a cost they couldn’t sustain. Their casualties were enormous and had enormous impact. But they restored the situation and reversed some Arab cockiness—but the Arabs know Israel can’t stand attrition.

The most moderate Arabs are the Jordanians. The most consistently moderate are the Egyptians. They almost broke with the Soviet Union and will be bellwethers to future progress. The most erratic are the Syrians. For them—radicals—to sign a document with Israel was a monumental event.

The other players—Saudi Arabia. Faisal is a kook but a shrewd cookie. He is in a position where all Arabs come to him.

The President: Is it him or his advisors?

Kissinger: It is him. He used to be the Foreign Minister. He has a standard pitch on Jews. The first time I went, his speech to me was that all Jews are bad. They are cowards, who are mentioned unfavorably in the Koran. The second time I went, he pointed out he recognized the difference between Jews and Zionists. The third time, the Foreign Minister said he didn’t consider me a Jew but a human being. [Laughter] You might consider inviting him next year.

The President: Has he ever been here?
Kissinger: The second time over.² With Nixon. On the left, there is Libya and Iraq. Algeria is a key. We will try to use your accession to re-store diplomatic relations.³

Then the Soviet Union. They lost Egypt and they are in trouble in Syria. It is becoming a movement in Iraq. Egypt was an enormous commitment of prestige and they have suffered badly.

It is not true that they started the October War—they opposed it but didn’t try to stop it. The problem was they supported the Arabs but not enough. They tried to work a line between supporting the Arabs and not antagonizing us. We can’t let Israel win the next war too heavily. Soviet intervention would be almost inevitable.

Europe is fearful of oil pressures and is eager to restore their former position in the Middle East. Right now they are in check because they are afraid if they interfere with American policy things will go bad and the embargo will be imposed again.

The Arabs’ demand is for the 1967 frontiers. Israel considers that these would be the end of Israel. The country was only 12 kilometers wide in some places. Almost all of Israel would be under SAM coverage.

The Palestinians’ rights are undefined and Jerusalem very complicated.

The basic strategy has been this: Israel can’t stand and we can’t handle dealing with all these issues at once. That is what the Soviet Union wants. That would guarantee a stalemate and a war. We must move step by step, which will make further steps possible. Israel says another Golan move is the last one. That is impossible but it is very difficult. To keep that last, we must move with Jordan or Egypt.

I have the instinct Rabin wanted to pull with Nixon what he did in 1971—produce a stalemate with abstract proposals and rely on American public opinion. They don’t mind the Arabs being with the Soviet Union as long as it is not extreme. From 1967 to 1973 the situation was ideal for Israel. The Arabs can’t make peace because they don’t know how to settle the Palestinian issue. Israel can’t either, because Jerusalem would burst their domestic structure. But they would like Sadat to formally end belligerency. Egypt can’t do it, but maybe they can take the appropriate steps without a formal statement.

The President: Such as?

² King Faisal previously came to the United States in May 1971 for an official visit, including meetings with President Nixon at the White House on May 27.
³ The United States re-established diplomatic relations with Algeria on November 12.
Kissinger: No blockade; Israeli cargo permitted through the Suez Canal.

The President: How is the Suez clearance going?

Kissinger: It can be completed by the end of the year. Sadat wants our advice on whether to hurry or delay. A delay is not worth it.

The Soviets want Geneva to open quickly. We don’t because the Soviet Union will try to maneuver us into being Israel’s lawyer. The last time, we opened and closed quickly, but it will be tougher the next time. So we want to set something up beforehand. But we can’t humiliate the Soviet Union. We have to open Geneva by November, but keep it in a low key.

I told Dinitz that Rabin should ask to see you. They don’t want to, because they are afraid you will pressure them to move and they don’t want to. We can’t stall till hell freezes over, like Israel wants.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the Middle East and U.S. energy policy.]

The President: I got involved in the Kudirka case. They wanted me to talk to Nixon.

I talked to John Dean—someone told me to. Dean told me to write a letter to Dobrynin.

Kissinger: May I suggest the following: They will turn down a formal proposal. But when Dobrynin comes back, I will do it quietly as a personal request.

The President: That would be most helpful.

Kissinger: If it doesn’t get into their bureaucracy.

We have great opportunities with the Soviets now.

The President: Dobrynin never answered and I didn’t follow up.

Kissinger: We have a channel privately and not in writing. I think we have a good channel with the Soviet Union on everything. They are waiting for a specific proposal on SALT. I think they will want to settle in ’75.

The President: That would help the election in ’76.

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4 On November 23, 1970, Simas Kudirka, a Lithuanian sailor aboard a Soviet fishing vessel, attempted to defect after jumping on a U.S. Coast Guard cutter operating in U.S. territorial waters off Martha’s Vineyard. Later that evening, the U.S. captain allowed Soviet naval personnel to board his ship and to use force in regaining custody of the defector.

5 John W. Dean III, President Nixon’s White House Counsel.
10. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Brezhnev’s First Message to You

Brezhnev’s response to the message you sent him immediately after you were sworn in is friendly and positive in tone. He picks up the theme of continuity contained in your message.

As was to have been expected in this first exchange, Brezhnev’s letter is couched in generalities. His most specific points relate to the continuation of personal contact; thus, he accepts again the previously extended invitation to him to visit the U.S. next year which you had confirmed, and he reaffirms his own interest in the idea of a working meeting on “neutral ground” before the end of this year. He also in effect invites you to the Soviet Union in 1976. In addition, he also endorses continued use of confidential communication channels. All these points reflect Brezhnev’s continued personal stake in the relationship with us.

While strongly affirming Soviet interest in continued improvements in our relations, Brezhnev on the whole avoids the millenial rhetoric he sometimes uses in this regard. There is, in fact, a note of realism in his letter: he notes that the road of détente is not simple and requires persistent effort.

There is no overtly contentious note—in recent communications to President Nixon, Brezhnev was quite polemical concerning Cyprus, and the Soviets displayed impatience over the delay in resuming the Geneva conference on the Middle East and in our extending them MFN. The closest he comes is to insist that our relations must be based on “full equality and mutual benefit.” These are standard terms but are sometimes used as euphemisms for Soviet complaints against us.

In referring to the idea of a working summit meeting, Brezhnev is evidently prepared to await developments. While he no doubt would welcome an early get-acquainted session, he probably does not want to crowd you so early in your term by making a specific proposal. He


2 Documents 7 and 4, respectively.
probably also anticipates that some of the issues now under negotiation, or in preparation for negotiation, will take some time to become ripe for summit-level consideration. Gromyko’s visit here for the UN General Assembly and my own projected visit to Moscow later in the fall would be part of this process. (I referred to both of these in a message I sent Gromyko immediately after you assumed office.)

In sum, the initial written contact between you and Brezhnev, reinforced by the talks with Vorontsov and Dobrynin, leave US-Soviet relations essentially on course. Brezhnev seems reassured that the change here portends no change in policy and he himself is intent on reassuring you of continuity in Soviet policies. These themes are also evident in public Soviet comment. This in itself does not solve the knotty problems we confront on such issues as SALT and MBFR or even Cyprus, should that crisis erupt actively again. But it gives us a base for maintaining the momentum in dealing with these issues.

Attached at Tab A is Brezhnev’s message to you; at Tab B is a copy of your message to Brezhnev; and at Tab C is a copy of my letter to Gromyko.

In your talk with Dobrynin, you should express gratification at the positive tone and content of Brezhnev’s message, note what Brezhnev says about the “road of détente” not being a “simple task” and stress your determination to pursue negotiations vigorously in the coming weeks while dealing with critical issues, like Cyprus, in a spirit of restraint and respect for each other’s interests.

3 Document 3.
4 The tabs are attached but not printed.
11. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 14, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of U.S. defense policy and Cyprus.]

[Kissinger:] Few words about the Dobrynin meeting. He will try to cover the waterfront. Keep it a half hour. It’s best if they don’t really know where they are standing. Be very friendly, maintain an interest in keeping the private channel open—between Dobrynin and me to the President. You agree with the principle of having more frequent meetings. You are intrigued with the idea of a Vladivostok meeting but it should wait until after my October trip. Your first meeting should not be a negotiating meeting. One or one-and-a-half days there would be plenty. The big meeting should be here in ’75. You could say Dobrynin and I should work out the time, based on negotiating developments.

On substance, he raised joint action on Cyprus. I gave him a lot of double talk.

President: I will just reaffirm your talk with him.
Kissinger: Don’t encourage joint action.

On the Middle East, if he raises it, say we are engaged in consultation; we have found no ideas yet and we will keep him informed.

Tell him you have a keen interest in the SALT talks because you have big budget decisions to make and that they will depend on SALT progress.

President: Should I say that I am pleased with the talks so far?
Kissinger: No. There is no progress now. You hope the October trip will provide an opportunity.

On CSCE, you can affirm that we will try to move things along and you don’t exclude a summit.

President: Where do we sit?

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum, which is misdated August 24, was transcribed from an attached set of Scowcroft’s notes, dated August 14. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met Kissinger in the Oval Office on August 14 from 9:15 to 10:20 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

2 See Document 12.
Kissinger: Over there. Focus on the Brezhnev letter.\(^3\)

There is a lot of debate here on détente based on misunderstanding. It is the toughest policy sustainable in this climate. We have used it to paralyze the left. We are attacked from the right now, but they are confused and have no issue. But the left is politically dangerous and you would have the *New York Times* and the liberals on your back. Jackson is actually helpful with the Soviet Union. Keep him out in front; he is a good negotiating weapon.

The Soviet decision-making process is slow and usually 36 hours behind in a crisis. We send a letter and by the time they can answer we have made another move. We have used détente to act very tough. We need some carrots. Some of the economic deals are in their favor, but in politics we have been pushing everywhere. The critics say we are weakening the Alliance. But it’s better if Europe is right-wing rather than left-wing in its criticisms of us. When Nixon came in, every European would stand up and say he was going to Washington to calm the American madmen down. The press is now not trying to link foreign policy with Watergate.

President: It’s almost a love affair. When Wilson calls, I’ll just thank them.\(^4\)

Kissinger: Thank him for his efforts, praise Callaghan. Say we will keep close together.

President: You come in at 12:40 with Fahmy.\(^5\) Could you stay after Dobrynin?

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\(^3\) Document 7.

\(^4\) Wilson called Ford at 12:10 p.m. (Ford Library, White House Office Files, President’s Daily Diary)

\(^5\) Ford met Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy in the Oval Office from 1:01 to 1:24 p.m. (Ibid.)
MEETING WITH SOVIET AMBASSADOR DOBRYNIN

Wednesday, August 14, 1974
11:00 a.m. (30 minutes)
The Oval Office

I. Purpose

The Soviets are eager to establish prompt direct contact with you to assure themselves, after a period of uncertainty, that our relations will continue on an even keel. Your purpose will be to reassure them on this score—as you have already begun to do in your message to Brezhnev and talk with Mr. Vorontsov—while leaving them in no doubt that this is no time for them to take liberties with our interests.

II. Background, Participants, Press Plan

A. Background: Soviet Views. The past months have been a period of uncertainty for the Soviets in their relations with us. They tended to see our domestic difficulties largely in terms of attacks on the President by “forces” hostile to détente. They saw President Nixon as hampered in negotiations by his declining influence on Congress. They were uncertain about your own attitudes. At the same time, they have seen our influence rise and theirs fall in an area of great interest to them and where they have traditional ambitions: the Middle East. They have been

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1973–1977, Box 16, USSR (1). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In an August 12 memorandum requesting the appointment on August 14, Kissinger commented: “Ambassador Dobrynin has asked to see you to present a message from General Secretary Brezhnev. Dobrynin has just returned from the USSR, where he has been since mid-June. Since that time, he probably mixed business (including a Central Committee plenum on July 24) and pleasure (his annual home leave). The message from Brezhnev is probably a personal reply to your message to him upon taking office last Friday.” (Ibid., White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 50, CO 158, USSR Executive) In a memorandum to Scowcroft on August 12, David Parker, Special Assistant to the President, requested “an appropriate briefing paper for the President’s use at this meeting.” (Ibid.)

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford and Kissinger met with Dobrynin in the Oval Office on August 14 from 11:09 to 11:38 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

3 Document 4.

4 See Document 2.
largely impotent in the Cyprus crisis. They were irritated by the successful NATO summit in Brussels.\footnote{The North Atlantic Council met in Brussels June 25–26. During the meeting, President Nixon briefed Allied leaders on his upcoming trip to the Soviet Union.}

Brezhnev’s reply\footnote{Document 7.} to your first message seems to reflect a sense of reassurance that you will pursue the basic policy lines of the past two years.

Our View. Our own interest remains in keeping the Soviets on a constructive course through an admixture of incentives (such as benefits from trade) and potential penalties for aggressive behavior.

You should therefore \textit{again underline} your basic commitment to the policies and agreements resulting from the three summits since 1972. You should stress not only continuity in general but note your strong interest in ongoing and projected negotiations, such as SALT, MBFR, peaceful nuclear explosions. Without being overly explicit, you should stress that it is basic to constructive US-Soviet relations for both of us to operate internationally with restraint and conscious of each other’s interests. Although our respective influence may fluctuate in one or another part of the world, neither of us should set out deliberately to damage the interests of the other.

While stressing the central role of US-Soviet relations, you \textit{should avoid} any implication of interest in condominium. You should also avoid any suggestion that we are prepared to collaborate with the Soviets against China.

Brezhnev has a personal stake in good relations with us. Thus, \textit{you should assure Dobrynin} that you want to maintain personal contact and continue to use existing confidential channels of communication. Brezhnev has already accepted your invitation to him to go through with the previously projected visit to this country next year. He is also interested in an interim working summit and you should confirm your own interest in such a meeting when there is concrete business to transact.

\textbf{B. Participants:} Ambassador Dobrynin and Secretary Kissinger.

\textbf{C. Press Plan:} The meeting will be announced and photographs will be taken.

\textbf{III. Talking Points}

1. I am pleased to take this early opportunity to confirm that American policy toward the Soviet Union will continue in this Administration along the positive and promising lines already established. I said
this in my written message to Mr. Brezhnev and address to Congress,⁷ and I welcome Mr. Brezhnev’s positive response.

2. I have vigorously supported this policy both in the Congress and as Vice President.

3. I endorse the goals that have been set forth in the joint communiqués of the Moscow and Washington summits, and the approach to our relations as elaborated in the discussions between President Nixon and General Secretary Brezhnev.

4. I have asked Secretary Kissinger to continue both as Secretary of State and as my Assistant for National Security Affairs. One of his foremost tasks will be to ensure that on the US side we maintain the desired momentum in our relations. The NSC is actively preparing for negotiations with the USSR.

5. The US approach, as discussed in Moscow, on issues such as the European Security Conference, on SALT and other arms control questions and on our economic relations remains positive. I expect that negotiations will proceed as scheduled.

6. As you know, on Monday night I called on the Congress to take quick action on a Trade Bill acceptable to the Administration. We are actively working on a compromise on the emigration issue.

7. At the same time that I reaffirm our policy, I will be frank in pointing out that within the United States there will be many people watching for signs of any action that might be cited as taking advantage of this transition period.

8. For this reason, it is all the more important that the US and USSR continue to work toward improved, mutually beneficial relations. Restraint and respect for each other’s interests are the key.

9. I value the exchanges that have been conducted at the highest level between summit conferences, and you should assure General Secretary Brezhnev that the channels of communication remain open. The exchanges we have already had show this.

10. As I said in my message of August 9 to the General Secretary, I am looking forward to his visit to the United States in 1975. I am glad he has confirmed his intention to come here. I am prepared to consider a working summit before year-end. We can plan for it when we see how negotiations are progressing and after talks with Foreign Minister Gro-

⁷ Reference is to the President’s address to a joint session of Congress on August 12. In addition to his remarks on the Trade Bill, Ford declared: “To the Soviet Union, I pledge continuity in our commitment to the course of the past 3 years. To our two peoples, and to all mankind, we owe a continued effort to live and, wherever possible, to work together in peace, for in a thermonuclear age there can be no alternative to a positive and peaceful relationship between our two nations.” For the full text, see Public Papers: Ford, 1974, No. 6.
myko when he comes here for the UN. I will also look forward to visiting the USSR in 1976.

Ambassador Dobrynin’s biography is at Tab A.⁸

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. No record of the conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin on August 15 has been found.

² Attached but not printed.
SALT

On SALT, there have recently been intelligence reports of alleged Soviet second thoughts regarding their summit position. One report, probably stemming from Arbatov, has it that the Soviets now feel they should have been more flexible. Another, on the contrary, has it that the Soviets are undertaking a major study of US MIRVs; if they find they cannot catch up soon, they will make a reasonable proposal; if they judge they can catch up, they will stay rigid.

Whatever the case, you should tell Dobrynin that we are busy trying to put substance into the concept of a 1985 agreement. We think it essential to get overall ceilings in an agreement so that there is at least a sense of limitation. If launcher/bomber ceilings are equal, it might require us to add to our forces, since Soviet levels are running so high. We prefer not to do this and to go no higher than presently projected levels (2250). Then, if the Soviets insist on playing out their own projected levels (ca 2500), we will have to have disparity in MIRVed launchers. We remain greatly concerned about the SS–18; what would it take to limit or stop it altogether? We think it important to make a start on reductions: what about a trade of Polaris and Y Class boats (maybe 10 each)?

You should try out the idea of concentrating in Geneva on elements of an agreement and concepts: overall levels, MIRV levels, special limitations on new heavy weapons, reductions. I think it is premature to talk about the FBS/MBFR link via the nuclear package.

Tab 1


TALKING POINTS FOR MEETING WITH DOBRYNIN

SALT

I sent you a memo on the resumption of the talks earlier this week (Tab A). If you approve of the mid-September starting date you should tell Dobrynin:

3 Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Kissinger wrote on the top of the first page of Tab 1: “Sonnenfeldt” and “Ratification of ABM.”

4 A copy of the August 13 memorandum is attached but not printed. On the original memorandum, Kissinger initialed his approval of delaying resumption of SALT II talks in Geneva until the week of September 16. Sonnenfeldt notified Johnson on August 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, June–September 1974)
—We are prepared to reconvene SALT in Geneva in mid-September. Alex Johnson will be in touch with the Soviet Embassy on the details.

—We believe the most constructive approach to this phase of Geneva talks will be a broad exchange on the concepts which might underly an agreement.

—If the Soviets agree with this approach, we would propose that neither side table concrete proposals, but be prepared rather to address the conceptual framework for further limitations.

**Chemical Weapons**

You have tentatively agreed to have US/Soviet consultations on chemical weapons in August. Vorontsov gave us a draft convention (Tab B)\(^5\) last month to serve as the basis for discussion. It is simply the Soviet position to ban development, production, and stockpiling of all lethal CW which you turned down in Moscow last March. We are doing a joint NSC/State analysis of the Soviet draft, which will be ready within a few days.\(^6\)

You should say to Dobrynin:

—We are now analyzing the Soviet draft CW convention, but at first reading we are struck by the sweeping nature of the proposal and by the absence of reliable verification provisions.

—After we complete our analysis, we will have more definitive views for the Soviets.

—Owing to the press of activities connected with the transition, we may find it more convenient to meet in September rather than in August. We will be back in touch on this.

**Environmental Warfare**

Last month the Soviets proposed a joint US/Soviet initiative in the UN based on the Soviet position we thought we had talked them out of in Moscow. You suggested to Vorontsov that both sides defer a UN approach until after our agreed consultations in October.\(^7\) Nevertheless, the Soviets have gone ahead with their UN initiative unilaterally (Tab C).\(^8\) You should tell Dobrynin:

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\(^5\) Attached but not printed at Tab B is a copy of a letter from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, dated August 6. The original letter, including the attached Soviet draft convention, is ibid., Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1974.

\(^6\) David Elliott and Michael Guhin of the National Security Council staff analyzed the Soviet draft convention in a memorandum to Kissinger on August 22. A copy is attached to a September 5 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger. (Ibid.)

\(^7\) Kissinger underlined “in October” and wrote “Moscow” in the margin.

\(^8\) Attached but not printed at Tab C is telegram 2752 from USUN, August 8.
—We do not believe the Soviet UN initiative was constructive in light of our agreement to discuss environmental modification bilaterally in October, and our expressed wish to defer steps in the UN.

—We are concerned that a UN debate will invite uninformed and exhorbitant proposals from other countries.

—We are prepared to go ahead with our bilateral talks in October.

—in the meantime, we hope the Soviets will join us in deferring formal UN consideration until after our bilateral discussions.

NPT/PNE Talks

The Soviets have proposed that talks dealing with Article V of the NPT and Article III of the TTB be linked in a single series of meetings in Moscow in late September.9 We have no particular problem with this, but we would like to wait until the interagency study is further advanced before responding.

You should tell Dobrynin:

—We have under active study both the NPT preparatory talks and the discussions on handling PNEs in the context of the threshold test ban.

—We will be back in touch shortly regarding the timing and venue for these talks.10

Bilateral Issues

The Soviet Desk has been discussing with Vorontsov timing and other details on our various bilateral talks. A status report is at Tab D.11

You should tell Dobrynin:

—I understand the Department and the Embassy have been working out details for talks under the various bilateral cooperation agreements.

—I do not believe there are any problems, but if there are, let me know.

9 Kissinger wrote and underscored twice “Yes” in the margin after this sentence.

10 Kissinger wrote “NPT paper” in the margin by this point, but then crossed out the “T” in “NPT.” The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons was signed by the United States, Soviet Union, and United Kingdom on July 1, 1968. (21 UST 483; TIAS 6839) The Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, also known as the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, was signed at Moscow on July 3, 1974. For text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 29, 1974, pp. 216–218.

11 Attached but not printed at Tab D is an August 14 memorandum from Wells Stabler, Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, to Sonnenfeldt on follow-up to the June–July summit in Moscow, including a proposed schedule of talks on an energy agreement, housing and other construction, a long-term economic agreement, an artificial heart agreement, an electro-transport project, biosphere reserves, and consulates general.
CSCE

We persist in our efforts through the Geneva recess to convince the Allies to define precisely what would constitute an acceptable CSCE Stage II outcome, and the Nine\textsuperscript{12} continue to resist such a specific definition of our objectives. The Soviets are hanging tough and Brezhnev, in making a familiar pitch for a CSCE Summit to Moro in Moscow in late July, asked rhetorically what would happen if CSCE failed since he did not believe people would welcome a return to the Cold War. The Allies are not yet ready to face Brezhnev's point, and there is a good possibility that CSCE Stage II will drag on in divisive debate in Geneva through the end of the year. There is probably nothing to be gained by raising CSCE with the Soviets before Gromyko's visit to UNGA.

MBFR

Until we have completed interagency studies looking toward a revision in our opening negotiating position in Vienna, we have nothing new to say to the Soviets on the subject.

Berlin

Problems on the autobahn associated with the FEA have died out and never represented more than a ritualistic Soviet assertion of their ability, which we never doubted, to hinder Allied access to Berlin.\textsuperscript{13} I see no point in your raising the subject with Dobrynin.

\textsuperscript{12} Reference is to the nine members of the European Community: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and United Kingdom.

\textsuperscript{13} In late July and early August, East Germany, supported by the Soviet Union, disrupted ground access to and from West Berlin for one week to protest the establishment there of the West German Federal Environmental Agency.

SUBJECT
Next Steps on Letter to Senator Jackson Regarding Soviet Emigration and the Trade Bill

Jackson’s office has now sent a memorandum commenting on our last draft of the proposed letter of understanding (Tab A). The memorandum, in which Senators Javits and Ribicoff concur, makes all the points we had anticipated from contacts with the staff.

Basically, Jackson still wants more specificity in the recital of actions the Soviets must not take in the future to prevent emigration or to harass and punish those seeking to emigrate (for example, he is especially insistent on including the cessation of the use of parental consent as an obstacle);

He wants more explicit assurances that the fact that a potential emigrant holds or held security clearances will not be used for a prolonged period or indefinitely to prevent him from leaving;

He wants to eliminate a reference to emigration in accordance with Soviet laws and regulations (since we do not know their detailed and total content);

He wants our proposed procedures for making inquiries and lodging appeals with the Soviets to apply to all the assurances rather than only the first (not an unreasonable proposal);

He wants a clear understanding on numbers, even if it is not included in the formal letter;

He still wants to use a waiver procedure rather than reformulating Title IV\(^2\) in a way that would permit a trial period for MFN and credits (Jackson’s staff, however, suggests that he might accept an effective

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 16, USSR (1). Eyes Only. All tabs are attached but not printed. In a covering memorandum to Ford on August 15, Haig suggested: “You may wish to scan this before this morning’s breakfast.” A note on both memoranda reads: “The President has seen.” Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum from Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to him on August 12 with a recommendation that he review the package and “indicate any changes you wish to have made and any other material you may wish to have prepared for your next meeting with the Senators.” Kissinger approved the memorandum without revision. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 9, Trade Bill, August 1974) See, however, footnote 3 below.

\(^2\) That is, Title IV of the Trade Bill.
date some 3–6 months after enactment so as to permit the Soviets to show at least a trend of compliance).

Jackson further wishes to have some additional interpretive statements, including an agreement on numbers, incorporated in an additional letter from himself which a further letter from us would endorse as corresponding to our understanding.

Jackson is also concerned about the trial of Viktor Polsky which is to begin August 15. Polsky is a leading dissident, organizer of emigration and himself an applicant for emigration since 1968. He has been charged with a traffic violation (Tab D). Jackson wants us to tell the Soviets to be lenient and permit Polsky to leave.

In oral comments, Jackson’s staff emphasized his concern with having something about "good faith" written into the letter—Soviet good faith as much as the Administration’s. This is intended as pressure on the Soviets but presumably would serve also to protect the Senator with his constituency.

Jackson also wants to cover the East European problem which Title IV at the moment lumps with the USSR. His proposed criterion for permitting MFN and credits to East European countries is action by them on our Representation Lists (which we submit periodically to obtain emigration of persons we consider US nationals and other hardship cases).

Jackson would like us to redraft our letter in the light of his comments and, preferably, to see it before the next meeting.3

Next Steps

While the tone of the Jackson memorandum (and his staff) is more reasonable than in the past, the totality of his requirements still takes us

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3 In a memorandum to Kissinger on August 12, Sonnenfeldt reported that Jackson wanted to see “any new draft of the proposed letter” before his meeting with the President. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 9, Trade Bill, August 1974) Two days later, Sonnenfeldt raised the issue with Kissinger again, noting that “Jackson and the others are worried about coming to a possible meeting with the President tomorrow unprepared (i.e., without having seen our latest draft).” (Ibid.) According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, Sonnenfeldt called him at 12:43 p.m., presumably to discuss the draft letter. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76) Later that afternoon, Sonnenfeldt sent a draft to Kissinger with the following covering note: “This is the revised version of the letter to Senator Jackson containing the changes you wanted. This text should be substituted for the undated one in the Presidential package at the Tab marked ‘B—New Draft of Letter.’ It is being delivered to Jackson, Ribicoff and Javits.” Sonnenfeldt wrote “done” in the margin, indicating that the previous draft had been replaced as an attachment to the memorandum for the President. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 9, Trade Bill, August 1974) Despite the instructions described above, the revised draft letter was not added to the memorandum for the President.
well beyond what would be tolerable for the Soviets or feasible for us to make commitments on.

Still, there may be points on which our last letter could be improved to take account at least of the ostensible concerns of Senator Jackson. Thus, in the end there is probably little difference between various possible formulations for articulating the performance standards. Jackson himself says he can live with “we are satisfied that.” There is also merit in making our commitment to undertake representations apply to all the issues rather than only to that of punitive action. There would also be advantage in trying to get a private understanding on numbers.

In terms of our strategy in this exercise, it may well be desirable to have one further round of drafting to demonstrate our determination to settle this issue.

Accordingly, at Tab B, there is a redraft of the letter to Jackson. Its main new elements are the following:

—To finesse the problem of how to formulate our assurances and expectations, the second paragraph (“To advance the purposes . . .”) has been changed to become a general introduction to all the specific points, using the phrase “we are satisfied that . . .” The individual points are then stated as flat assertions.

—One of the references to “existing laws and regulations” in the first point has been deleted;

—The recitation of punitive actions in the first point has been made to sound less inclusive and more illustrative (“such as, for example, ”);

—The obstacles generally mentioned in point two are now amplified though still without further specificity (“obstacles of the kind frequently employed in the past”);

—In point three the matter of informing persons with security clearances of when they will be let go has been made more affirmative;

—A new sixth point has been introduced to make the appeal procedure that we may utilize applicable to all the points in the letter, rather than only the first; the language would allow us to raise indications of obstruction and harassment not specifically enumerated in the text. (This is to protect against new forms of obstruction, etc., and to cover points only mentioned generally in the text);

—There is no explicit reference to a number but only to an increase in the rate. (An understanding of what would be regarded as numbers consistent with the criteria and practices cited would be subject to a separate understanding.)
—The final paragraph has been rewritten to include our position that the Trade Bill must somehow permit trade to go forward. (This problem will have to be finally settled in the redraft of Title IV.)

15. **Note from the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger**¹

Washington, August 14, 1974, 11:30 p.m.

Mr. Secretary:

Attached is a counterdraft from Jackson, et al. plus additional memorandum on interpretations, numbers and other issues.² These were delivered by Perle late this evening.

I have done comments on this material in the form of a memo from you to the President, should you wish to hand it to him.

As noted in that memo, the drafting changes in the basic letter are not too serious, though they naturally tend to raise the demands upon the Soviet Union some more.

The interpretations, which would be incorporated in a letter of response to which you, in turn, would respond with an acceptance, pose the familiar problems of excessive detail and specificity.

The additional issues involve complex arrangements with other Communist countries, the dubious waiver procedure and the absurd point about not counting emigrants leaving the USSR under agreements with countries other than the U.S.

I think the President should use his current political clout to tell the Senators we have run out the string. The letter is barely tolerable and the interpretations go beyond what can be asked explicitly of the Russians. If we are going to have a compromise, our letter should do it and adequate review language in the legislation will protect everybody’s interests.

Sonnenfeldt


² The draft letter from Kissinger to Jackson and the memorandum, both dated August 14, are attached to Sonnenfeldt’s draft, printed below, but not printed. A typed note on each indicates that both were from Senators Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff.
Attachment

Draft Note From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford


Mr. President:

Late last night, Senator Jackson sent us a revised draft of our proposed letter, plus a memorandum on the interpretative response the Senator would make to the letter and some other issues.

The revisions in the basic letter (attached at Tab A) are not too serious and could probably be accepted by us. They do, however, in each case place a somewhat greater burden on the Russians in meeting the proposed performance standards and thus make the likelihood of actual Soviet compliance in practice that much less.

The proposed interpretations (attached at Tab B) pose more serious problems. In each case, the Soviets would be obliged to accept stringent definitions of impermissible or required practices. It is doubtful that we could do more than intimate to them the nature of the demand; they would almost certainly decline to provide the required assurance, whatever their intention regarding compliance.

The Senators are prepared to reduce their earlier demand for a 75,000 per annum rate to 60,000, but would regard this as a benchmark for measuring progress to the eventual level, which they define as “corresponding to the number of applicants.” (Jackson currently claims that there are some 300,000 potential emigrants and that they would wish to leave within some four to five years. This would mean an annual rate of some 60–75,000 by his requirements.) There is little or no chance that the Soviets would associate themselves with this arithmetic.

Jackson also raises a series of other issues (attached at Tab C), which involve difficulties.

First, he demands that the number of emigrants resulting from our arrangements with the Soviets must not include emigrants leaving the Soviet Union by virtue of arrangements with other countries, such as the FRG. (Several hundred ethnic Germans leave the USSR each month.) We could probably accept this as an internal U.S. interpretation, but it would hardly wash with the Soviets.

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3 Eyes Only. The note is unsigned; no evidence has been found to indicate whether or not Kissinger gave it to the President.

4 Attached but not printed.
Second, Jackson wants us to negotiate separate emigration arrangements with all East European countries (and presumably China) affected by Title IV of the Trade Bill before they could qualify for MFN and credits. In these instances, however, Jackson’s requirements are less stringent than for the USSR; they would deal mostly with dual nationals and special hardship cases.

Third, the Senators stick to their waiver approach. That is there would have to be a finding that the USSR is in compliance with the terms of our letter plus interpretations before the full terms of Title IV could be waived for no more than one year at a time. (Jackson’s staff continues to imply that the Senator might be flexible on this concept if the rest of the deal is acceptable.) Our concept is that the Bill should permit at least a trial period during which MFN and credits could be granted and Soviet performance would be tested. I see no chance of Soviet compliance until we first deliver MFN and credits (which the Soviets believe, correctly, were promised them as part of the comprehensive trade agreements of 1972).

Henry A. Kissinger

16. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 15, 1974, 8 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. William E. Timmons, Assistant to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Senator Henry M. Jackson
Senator Jacob K. Javits
Senator Abraham A. Ribicoff

President: The Trade Bill is a matter of highest priority—not only for our own benefit but for all the world.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5. Secret; Nodis. Transcribed by Peter Rodman from Scowcroft’s attached handwritten notes. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the first-floor private dining room at the White House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted until 9:18 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)
Number two is to get a better handle on Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union. As I tried to say on Monday—the House bill. I didn't identify the amendment, but you know what I mean.

Russell Long is going to campaign. I don't know why. Russell tells me everything is going well. If agreement here can be reached he sees little trouble on the floor.

I am familiar with the discussions Dr. Kissinger and Scoop have had on the letters. Dobrynin came in yesterday. He had planned to stay in the Soviet Union until September or October. He cut his stay short in order to indicate their interest in the continuation of their policy. He spent most of the time telling us that Brezhnev said that if harassment and difficulty with numbers continue, Brezhnev could take personal responsibility with the President. The President could complain directly to Brezhnev. Remember, Scoop, they previously said we had to bring it to the proper authorities, but never to Brezhnev.

Jackson: I think we are making good progress. The Russians are giving. The reports back from the Soviet Union are that they now consider there are 300,000 wanting to leave. They could handle that in 4–5 years. We got some letter changes last night. We three are in agreement. I want to touch base in the Senate, and talk to Meany. He is uptight about it. The labor people are fighting the hill.

Javits: The Trade Bill. This indicates their hangup.

Jackson: With this in the bill you will get more support from those who will push it for emigration.

Kissinger: In the text of the letter—we can't bother the President just about a legal clause. For example, it will cause no trouble with the Soviet Union to say “as frequently happened in the past.”

Jackson: There are two areas. One is harassment. This is not just for the Jewish emigrants; it's all of the ethnic groups. The others are tough, but not well organized. They are hot on this.

President: I know, I have 5,000 Latvians in my old district.

Jackson: The big problem is harassment. If you apply, you get harassed.

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3 See Document 12.
4 See Document 15.
5 The relevant passage from the latest draft letter (as received from Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff the previous evening) reads: “no unreasonable or unlawful impediments will be placed in the way of persons desiring to make application for emigration, such as interference with travel or communications necessary to complete an application, the withholding of necessary documentation and other obstacles, including kinds frequently employed in the past.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 9, Trade Bill, August 1974)
Kissinger: They have specifically said those practices wouldn’t take place. They may not keep the agreement, but that is something they have specifically assured us.

President: I can assure you that, if we get an agreement, if there are violations of it, it won’t take me 24 hours to cut it off.

Ribicoff: There has been much quiet cooperation among us. We are at the last issue—the 60,000 figure. Is that realistic?

Kissinger: I am worried. If Jackson’s figure is right, it is okay, but we don’t know that. They don’t want to have to expel people to meet a quota. They say the applications are dropping because of the Middle East situation. Would we know if harassment continues?

Jackson: Not necessarily. The subtle forms are the toughest. They are out to avoid quotas. The scheme is the letter, the response, and the interpretation. Our letter would say emigration would rise promptly from what they were.

Kissinger: That we can live with.

Jackson: This avoids your being associated with a quota. We must have the 1973 figures because this year is lower.

Kissinger: If you relate that to the number of applicants, and if there is no harassment, it should work if they keep their word.

Jackson: They are moving on security clearances. A cable I have here says they could leave after three years. There is general movement, Mr. President, which shows that the Soviet Union is in economic trouble. We don’t want to push them into a corner.

MFN is a source of pride to them. The credits are a touchy area because they don’t have anything to sell that doesn’t require US capital. Oil, aluminum. They have hydroelectric power and Kaiser is putting up a plant. Forty percent of producing an ingot is power. But it is Kaiser capital.6

President: If good authority for MFN is given, with Presidential authority to cut it off for violations with the assurances they and I have given, we have a club to insure performance.

Jackson: Yes, what we would do is leave it hang but with waiver authority. [He reads from the draft]. This is enough language. This is also your club with the Soviet Union.

President: Is the House bill a denial of authority?

Javits: The House language is onerous.

President: Let me propose. The general authority would cover all. Then a denial could apply to any one country who denied emigration.

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6 Kaiser [Aluminum] Industries.
Javits: That’s not good either. You don’t want to force you or us to break with the Soviet Union. We shouldn’t be put in a place where it has to be proved that there are violations. The renewal obligation makes it an affirmative action, not a cut-off.

Jackson: By this method we would share the burden.

President: Let’s see, I make a 12-month report and ask for an extension. Congress approves by a majority vote. How do we avoid a bottle-up?

Jackson: We could write in a must vote within so many days. We would grant it—this is a big concession—immediately. The Soviet Union wants MFN immediately and we make this big concession.

Timmons: It applies to credits also.

Jackson: Everything.

Kissinger: What worries me is this: If Congress has to renew your authority every year, we can have this kind of debate every year.

Javits: We could write a line that the President has the right to waive and then say this will continue for one year.

President: It’s a cumbersome procedure which is like the one on chrome. If we go this route we would have to have prompt resolution.

Jackson: We would have provisions to insure prompt action.

Kissinger: We can just get by with the letter. The interpretive statements overload the circuit. We have shown them this letter. There was no disagreement, on what the performance must be, but just on how to write it.

Javits: The interpretive letter is best.

Ribicoff: But Dr. Kissinger has to show it to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: We have to distinguish between the objective and what we write down.

Javits: Take the non-proliferation treaty. We issued an interpretation about the French and British nuclear forces and the Soviet Union issued just exactly the opposite. Let the Soviet Union say what it wants.

President: How will the one-year affect business contracts?

Javits: Even if we cut it off, contracts made will continue.

President: What worries me is that you identify a particular country by this.

Jackson: No, just non-market states.

Kissinger: How would it apply to East Europe?

Jackson: It’s the same for all of them.

Kissinger: How about Romanians?

Jackson: You would have to seek some assurances. The Romanians say they won’t have any problem.
President: Supposing Romania performs and the Soviet Union doesn’t. How would we handle that?
Jackson: We would work that out.
Javits: Abe and I talked to Ceausescu and he said it was no problem. I think they stopped because the Soviet Union didn’t want them to set bloc policy. The PRC isn’t yet an issue.
Kissinger: Because they want to keep MFN from the Soviet Union. Scoop has a great future in the PRC.
Jackson: They say the threat will come through Europe. Chou wants to talk to Mansfield on this.
Javits: The complaint in the Jewish community is that the Soviet Union has cut the rate and they should restore the rate before we move to show good faith. I said no. The same on the high visibility trials. They also fear numbers, as a possible quota. I don’t buy this because with artful language we can make it okay.
Jackson: We don’t want a bilateral agreement between West Germany and the Soviet Union to affect this. This argument is for about 1000 a month. We wouldn’t want any other agreements to count against this quota.
President: I am worried about the language. I would prefer blanket authority with a right to cut off.
Let’s get the technicians together and see if we can’t work it out.
Jackson: This is so designed that Congress has to retain some authority.
Javits: I think I can work something out on a waiver if he [Kissinger] believes it is viable to keep the Jackson Amendment with some positive or negative waiver. We need to try this.
Kissinger: How about a waiver subject to Congressional veto? It is the affirmative vote that worries me.
Jackson: Let’s go back and work more—We are determined. I am a strong supporter of the trade bill. We are getting strong pressures from pressure groups.
Timmons: I have three points I would like to make quickly. On the other ethnic groups, how does this apply?
Renewal—how would it be done? And what do we say to the press?
President: That it was a very constructive meeting. Momentum is now under way for one of the most important pieces of legislation on the calendar.
Jackson: We will praise the President for constructive efforts for a solution. But don’t say it is settled. We don’t want to let the Soviet Union think we capitulated.
Javits: Also, we are determined, if it is humanly possible, to have a trade bill.

Jackson: You and Abe cover that.

Ribicoff: You are in a great position here with the change of President.

We will have no problem knowing about harassment. The most important thing is numbers. Once we have established that, and the exchange of letters, I am not worried.

Once we know that harassment is ending and people are leaving, we are in good shape. They should go ahead with mark-up and amend on the floor to add the waiver.

Kissinger: If I may summarize, the three Senators are saying that if we keep the Jackson Amendment, they can be flexible on waiver authority. Let us look at this.

Jackson: We will ensure there can be no delay or filibuster. We will get our drafting people on this to get the language right. We had little time and this is only a rough idea and formulation.

President: The ExIm Bank lawyers don’t understand all the legislative procedures.

Jackson: We should look at the options.
17. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 15, 1974, 9 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of Saudi Arabia, Cyprus, and Cuba and Rhodesia.]

Kissinger: On the Soviets—we are brutal when they step over the line. They will test you and we should keep this in mind. LBJ dosed out power; I believe if we use American power it should be massive.

In 1970 they started building a submarine base in Cienfuegos. State wanted to wait until the base was finished. Nixon told me to make a strong statement and put a destroyer off the base.

Our experience is hit them early and hard when they threaten.

Their power structure is cumbersome. You have much more flexibility.

Scoop doesn’t understand—he thinks you can keep squeezing them.

Cyprus is another humiliation—it is being settled without their participation. We send them letters so they can’t say we are freezing them out. Their frustration has to rise. That is where the trouble comes in. Dole it out so it eases the problem but doesn’t make a strategic difference. The Dulles idea of talking tough can’t be sustained in practice. We talk softer than our actions. The Left is strong in Europe; we paralyze them by talking soft. That is what you are up against with McClellan.

The President: If I were the Soviets, I would use the Congress.

Kissinger: These numbers games on SALT miss the point. The firm approach means we must sustain a 10 to 15 percent budget increase, be prepared for crises like Berlin, and so forth.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the meeting lasted from 9:18 to 10:30 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

2 Senator John L. McClellan (Democrat, Arkansas). On August 13, McClellan, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Defense of the Senate Appropriations Committee, announced cuts in the Department of Defense appropriations bill, including reductions in military assistance to Vietnam and in the research, development, and procurement of air defense aircraft. (“2 Senate Panels Cut Funds for Arms and Foreign Aid,” Leslie H. Gelb, The New York Times, August 14, 1974, pp. 1, 15)
I wanted to use this peculiar year—with liberals going conservative—to get a ceiling on strategic forces beyond which we wouldn’t go anyway.

We couldn’t sustain an arms race.

The President: Without a direct threat.

Kissinger: The Liberals will soon say we have too much. If we need more, it is in the tactical area.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on defense policy and personalities.]

[Kissinger:] On CSCE—we never wanted it but we went along with the Europeans. It includes some basic principles, something on human contacts, no change of frontiers, and what they call “confidence-building measures.”

The Soviet Union wants it as a substitute for a peace treaty. They more or less have that. The big hang-up is on freedom of movement. It is meaningless—it is just a grandstand play to the left. We are going along with it.

What you will face is whether to conclude it at the summit level or foreign minister level. My guess is the Europeans will decide on a summit. We have positioned with the Soviet Union, so we look like we are ahead of the Europeans.

The President: What is the timetable?

Kissinger: Maybe next March. The Soviet Union wants it this year, but that is not possible. If you meet Brezhnev in December, they won’t want it before that.

There are no decisions to make now.

When you meet Gromyko the end of September you should give him the impression we are trying to be helpful.

There is no implementation in the treaty.

On MBFR—we made an absurd proposal which couldn’t fly. Now we are modifying it. The Soviets should cut more than us, but not so much. Then we should add the nuclear package—32 Pershings, 54 F–4, 1,000 nuclear warheads. It is strategically insignificant, but it does have the consequence of establishing some ceiling on our nuclear forces.

But we don’t have targets for the nucs anyway.

Also we have to take care of FBS. To do it in SALT causes alliance problems. If we could get the Soviets to do it in MBFR, it would satisfy our allies and give the Soviet Union a facesaving way out.

Your coming into office will give a big boost. They will be looking for a success, especially if you make a meeting in December conditional.
The President: I have told Brent MBFR is more popular here than SALT.

Kissinger: At the VFW, you might give a tough Defense-oriented speech.\(^3\) It would be good for the Soviets.

The President: I have been doing that, and with no apologies.

Kissinger: We can probably get a 15–20,000 cut in MBFR. Maybe in December. We will have to manage with the allies so it doesn’t look like bilateralism.

I will focus with Dobrynin on SALT and MBFR.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Israeli military capabilities.]

\(^3\) Ford addressed the annual convention of the Veterans of Foreign Wars in Chicago on August 19. For the text of his address, see *Public Papers: Ford, 1974*, No. 16.

18. **Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Ford\(^1\)**

Moscow, August 15, 1974.

It is believed in Moscow that there is an urgent necessity to exchange opinions with the President on the question of Cyprus which has gained particular acuteness in view of the recent events.\(^2\) Addressing the President on this question it is assumed in Moscow that the Soviet Union and the U.S., being guided by high goals of strengthening peace and international security, have agreed on the importance of the prevention and the removal of situations which can bring about complications dangerous to peace.

As is known, hostilities have been resumed on Cyprus, with the conflict endangering to spread beyond the limits of the island. Such de-

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\(1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 5, Nodis Memcons, 1974, Folder 5. No classification marking. According to typed marginalia, the note was delivered to Scowcroft at 5:30 p.m. on August 15.

\(2\) On July 15, members of the Cyprus National Guard, backed by the military government of Greece, overthrew President Archbishop Makarios III. Five days later, Turkey invaded Cyprus to defend its interests and those of Turkish Cypriots; Turkish military forces staged a second invasion on August 14 and eventually occupied approximately one third of the island. On July 20, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 353, calling for an immediate cease-fire, the removal of all foreign military forces, and the restoration of the Cypriot constitutional order. Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom began formal peace talks in Geneva on July 25. Fighting resumed on August 14 when the talks broke down.
development of events runs contrary to the trend for relaxation, which is being established in international relations, and can create a new dangerous hotbed of international tension. The Security Council decisions aimed at stopping the foreign military intervention in Cyprus, at ensuring the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus and legitimate interests of the Cypriot people, are not being implemented.

On the other hand, the approach, which was used at the Geneva talks, to solve the question of Cyprus in the narrow circle of some powers, in camera, have gone bankrupt.

It is becoming still more and more evident that the situation on Cyprus and in connection with the developments there, is demanding active and purposeful actions directed at the liquidation of the conflict.

It seems to us, that an important step, which under the present circumstances could produce the greatest effect, would be a joint effort of our two countries for the purpose of implementing the Security Council Resolution 353 of July 20. We have in mind a solution of main problems of the settlement as that Resolution demands.

In this connection we have the following considerations to which we would like to draw the attention of the President. The joint effort of the USSR and the US could provide appropriate guarantees of our both countries aimed at securing the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Cypriot state, as well as creating necessary conditions for the Cypriots to settle themselves their internal affairs without any outside intervention. We would be also prepared to consider a possibility of providing such guarantees on the part of the Security Council.

Along the same lines, in our view, a special group should be established, composed of nonpermanent members of the Security Council, representing all main geographic areas. The functions of such group, small in its composition (representatives of 5–6 states), could include observing, on behalf of the Security Council, the situation on Cyprus, the implementation of the decisions of the Security Council on the question of Cyprus, as well as the promotion of a just, peaceful and democratic settlement of the problem of Cyprus, including a direct participation in negotiations.

Undertaking this initiative, we express our readiness to cooperate closely with the US in implementing measures both those mentioned above and possible others, aimed at preserving Cyprus as a sovereign and independent state.

It is hoped in Moscow that the US Government will regard our considerations with full attention. On our part we are ready, of course, to consider the views that the American side may have.
19. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
SALT

Introduction

The progress of SALT is a key element both in our relations with the Soviet Union and in determining our future defense programs. Although US–USSR relations have withstood the lack of progress in SALT quite well over the past two years, a breakdown in SALT and an unchecked Soviet arms buildup would jeopardize the entire range of US-Soviet political relations. Furthermore, if the Soviet buildup continues, and the prospects for a long-term agreement fade, we will have to consider seriously major budget commitments to new strategic weapons.

While we must take care to avoid giving the Soviets any indication that we are anxious for additional SALT agreements, we must realize that unnecessary delays in concluding further agreements may work against us. Without new agreements, the Soviets could easily move ahead of the US in most measures of strategic capability by 1985, even if we move forward with all our present strategic programs (and it will be difficult to convince Congress to do even this). Numerically, the Soviets could catch up in total numbers of strategic nuclear weapons (at about 15,000 each). They could have 16 million pounds of throw weight to about 10 million for the US and 2700 total strategic launchers to about 2200 for the US. A buildup to such a level of forces, which would represent a total destructive potential of three to four times that present on both sides today, could present a major threat to the essential equilibrium that now exists.

The Soviets, on the other hand, undoubtedly have a contrary perception of these issues. From their perspective the United States has a lead in number of warheads, MIRV technology (particularly in the submarine area) and bomber development and deployment. They see themselves as engaged in a program to redress these imbalances. These

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, June–September 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum is an uninitialed copy. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt and Lodal forwarded it to Kissinger on August 15 “for use in your series of foreign policy briefings.” No evidence has been found to indicate whether or not Kissinger gave it to the President.
fundamental differences in perceptions on the two sides are an underlying factor in the difficulties we have encountered in SALT.

Since the first SALT agreements were concluded two years ago, we have concentrated our efforts on limiting the development and deployment of new MIRVed missiles. The new Soviet MIRVs represent the major threat to the present balance; they also constitute the most significant threat to the survivability of our land-based Minuteman ICBMs. Thus, in attempting to limit these programs, we were hoping to reduce or delay Minuteman survivability problems, to slow the Soviet buildup, and retain some bargaining flexibility as a result of our large advantage in warhead numbers.

To date, this approach has not been successful. While the Soviets have acknowledged the central importance of MIRVed missiles, the two sides have not been able to agree to a formula seen as equitable by both sides. For example, given their large ICBM forces, the Soviets clearly plan to offset a strong US superiority in SLBM MIRVs with a larger ICBM MIRV program than that undertaken by the US. However, since ICBM MIRVs represent the major threat to the survivability of our Minuteman force, we have pushed for stringent limits on the size of the Soviet ICBM MIRV buildup. But such limits are unacceptable to the Soviets since they would leave the Soviets in a clearly inferior numerical position to the US during the next five to seven years.

There are other similar asymmetries in our approach and objectives. Our present task is to find concepts and approaches which will permit us to reconcile our different viewpoints. This may become easier now that the uncertainty caused by Watergate is ended. (There have been intelligence reports which, while inconclusive, tend to confirm Soviet hesitancy in their exchanges with us before and during the last Summit.)

Background

By 1969, the US had lost the clear-cut superiority in overall strategic capabilities it had maintained since the end of World War II and a state of parity was emerging. In particular:

—The US had stopped building additional ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and was concentrating on qualitative improvements such as MIRVs. US MIRVs were intended both as a counter to projected Soviet ABMs and to provide targeting flexibility.

—The USSR, on the other hand, was engaged in a dynamic buildup of both ICBM and SLBM launchers, which would give them a numerical lead in these forces by the early 1970s. While the US had a more effective SLBM force and a substantial advantage in heavy bombers, the Soviet ICBMs were generally much larger and could carry significantly heavier payloads (i.e., they had a significantly greater "throw
weight”). With MIRV technology, the Soviets would eventually be able to use this throw weight advantage to eliminate the present 3 to 1 US lead in total strategic warheads. Furthermore, Soviet weapons would generally be of higher explosive yield than US weapons.

—Both sides were engaged in the initial stages of ABM deployment. The US planned to give priority to the defense of ICBM sites, while the Soviets were building only a defense of Moscow. In general, the US ABM program was more dynamic and gave the US leverage with which to negotiate limitations on ICBMs and SLBMs.

—The US and USSR also had asymmetries in their so-called “non-central” systems. The US had SLBMs based at Holy Loch and Rota and nuclear-capable aircraft deployed at both bases abroad and on aircraft carriers. These are the so-called “forward-based systems” (FBS) which are within reach of the USSR. The Soviets had medium and intermediate-range missiles and bombers capable of attacking our bases abroad and our allies.

Results of SALT I

These various asymmetries between US and Soviet deployments shaped the outcome of the first set of SALT agreements, reached in 1972.\(^2\)

—Since both sides were in a very early phase of ABM deployment, an effective limit was possible and, by precluding large-scale area and city defenses, was in the interest of greater strategic stability. The ABM Treaty limited each side to two sites, one for ICBM defense and one for defense of its capital. (The 1974 ABM Protocol further limits each side to only one site.)\(^3\)

—Despite Soviet resistance to linking ABM limits with constraints on offensive forces, we succeeded in getting the five-year Interim Agreement, which froze ICBM and SLBM levels. While this placed a check on the momentum of the Soviet programs as we estimated them, no US deployment programs were affected. Specifically, the deployment of the very large SS–9 ICBM was stopped at about 300, although replacement missiles such as the SS–18 were permitted. Soviet SLBM forces were subjected to a ceiling which, while quite high, was below indicated Soviet capabilities and required scrapping of older Soviet ICBMs to be reached. US and Soviet strategic forces at the time the Interim Agreement was signed were as follows:

\(^2\) For the English texts of the agreements, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems (23 UST 3435; TIAS 7503), the Interim Agreement on Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and the Protocol to the Interim Agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, June 26, 1972, pp. 918–921.

\(^3\) For the English text of the protocol to the ABM treaty (27 UST 1645; TIAS 8276), signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on July 3, see ibid., July 29, 1974, pp. 216–218.
FBS and heavy bombers were not limited by the Interim Agreement and remained to be dealt with in a follow-on comprehensive agreement on offensive forces.

**SALT II**

The US attempted two basic approaches to a SALT II agreement: a permanent agreement based on equal numbers of ICBMs, SLBMs and bombers, and a separate MIRV agreement with an extension of the Interim Agreement. Both approaches were hampered by basic differences in strategic perceptions on the two sides.

The Interim Agreement numbers registered the existing Soviet advantage in total launchers (ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers) of some 2500 to 2200. The US wished to equalize these figures for the period after 1977, but finding an appropriate level was difficult. At the lower number the Soviets would have had to undertake unilateral reductions to come down to our level. The US, on the other hand, had no programs to build up to the Soviet level—and the Soviets knew it. Our proposal for equality was therefore met by a Soviet proposal to carry over the Interim Agreement numbers into a permanent agreement.

The second major problem in reaching a permanent agreement was the treatment of forward-based systems. Although these systems represent no more than about 10–15 percent of US capability versus the Soviet Union, the Soviets took the position that they should be withdrawn and their bases liquidated on the grounds that they were strategic systems that could attack the Soviet Union with nuclear warheads. Any approach to a solution on our part proved extremely complex and difficult because of the dual mission (conventional and nuclear) of many of these systems, their role in our NATO and other alliance commitments, and the problem of how to treat Soviet medium-range missiles and aircraft targeted on our allies.

Meanwhile, during the summer of 1972, as preparations for SALT II were underway, the Soviets had begun testing a new family of ICBMs, some with MIRVs. In the succeeding months it became clear

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4 (Up to 950 allowed if 210 older ICBM launchers were dismantled) [Footnote in the original.]
their ICBM MIRV program was both faster-paced and more extensive than we had originally anticipated. It involved four systems:

—The SS–X–16, a Minuteman-size, unMIRVed missile that may be intended for use as a mobile ICBM. It will be ready for deployment next year.

—The SS–X–17 (in MIRVed and unMIRVed versions) and the SS–X–19 (MIRVed). These missiles have about three times the throw weight of Minuteman and will begin deployment either this year or next. They are rival follow-on candidates to the 1000 SS–11s, the major Soviet “medium” missile.

—The SS–X–18 (MIRVed and unMIRVed versions), with about six times greater throw weight than Minuteman. This is the follow-on system for the 300 SS–9s.

If these systems were deployed in large numbers, we would face the prospect that the Soviet launcher and throw weight advantages, acceptable in the context of the five-year Interim Agreement, could be translated into a large force of heavy and accurate MIRVs capable of threatening the survivability of Minuteman.

We therefore began concentrating on a second track in the negotiations—the limitation of Soviet MIRVs. Our basic goals were to prolong the period in which the Minuteman force would be survivable against a Soviet first strike and to stop the most dynamic aspects of the Soviet strategic buildup. Our proposals went through several successive stages:

—We first proposed an interim freeze on the MIRV programs on both sides, which would have held the Soviets to no MIRVs, since their deployment had not started.

—Second, after the Soviets rejected this, we proposed permanently limiting each side to equal MIRVed ICBM throw weight. With expected Soviet deployments this would have given us an advantage of about 550 MIRVed ICBM launchers to 360 for the Soviets, but would have given each side about the same number of ICBM re-entry vehicles (RVs or warheads), since the heavier Soviet missiles could each carry a larger number of RVs. However, the US would have retained a very large SLBM advantage.

—Finally, we explored the possibility of a separate MIRV agreement based on a numerical difference in MIRV launchers in our favor, combined with a 2 to 3 year extension of the Interim Agreement to 1980. We also asked for some adjustment in the U.S. numerical limit under the Interim Agreement to permit us to deploy the initial Trident submarines. Our rationale for this approach was to cap the Soviet MIRV program in return for a limited continuation of the numerical disparities in the Interim Agreement.
Under the last concept we advanced various numerical combinations and various ways of dividing the numerical MIRV limits between land-based MIRVs and sea-based MIRVs. Our own forces were divided about 50–50 between MIRVed ICBMs and MIRVed SLBMs. We attempted to gain Soviet agreement to a similar balanced deployment, so that a large portion of the Soviet MIRV force would be in relatively light and inaccurate SLBMs. The Soviets, however, would not accept this concept since they did not have a successfully tested SLBM MIRV ready for deployment and were unwilling to commit themselves to stop their ICBM MIRV program short of planned levels, in exchange for paper rights to numbers of sea-based MIRVs they had no intention of deploying during the period of the agreement.

The only concrete Soviet MIRV offer, made in March of this year, was 1100 US MIRVs to 1000 Soviet MIRVs, with no sublimit for ICBMs. This was unacceptable to us because it would have cut off our Trident program, except as a replacement for Poseidon, provided too small a numerical disparity, and had us standing still on MIRVs while the Soviets built up. The absence of a sublimit on ICBM MIRVs would have meant the Soviets could have taken the bulk of their 1000 limit in large ICBMs and proceeded to deploy large numbers of submarine MIRVs after 1980.

Our efforts to find a compromise culminated in the proposal President Nixon presented to Brezhnev at the June Summit:5

—An extension of the Interim Agreement to 1979, rather than 1980. This would eliminate the US need for changes in the Interim Agreement numbers.

—A limit of 1150 MIRV missiles for the US (our programmed force) and 750 for the Soviets (our estimate of their approximate program).

—A ban on MIRVs deployed on heavy ICBMs (the SS–18). This would somewhat reduce the importance of the Soviets’ throw weight advantage.

The Present Situation

The Soviets have had three fundamental perceptions that prevent them from accepting our approach to the MIRV problem. First, they want to gain the developmental and operational experience that will permit them to match the US in this major technology. Second, they wish to correct the existing three-fold US advantage in warheads, which can be accomplished only by MIRVing. Third, they do not want their ICBM MIRV program stopped short of planned levels.

As the June Summit drew to a conclusion, we faced the fact that our two major approaches to a SALT agreement—a permanent agreement and an extension of the Interim Agreement combined with MIRV limitations—had both been unproductive.

Both sides were aware that a summit communique’ with no substantive results on SALT would be seen very unfavorably throughout the world. Thus, in order to provide some substance to the results, the two sides agreed to a change in approach. We would no longer try either for a permanent agreement or for a short-term extension of the Interim Agreement. Rather, we would work toward a new Interim Agreement expiring in 1985.6

This agreement—to work toward an agreement with a 1985 expiration date—was not purely cosmetic. A 10-year time period offers several advantages over either a permanent agreement or short-term extension of an Interim Agreement. The 10-year period avoids the long-term technological uncertainties and innumerable complex trade-offs which make negotiation of a permanent agreement almost impossible. A short-term extension of the Interim Agreement also avoids this problem, but creates other difficulties. In particular, such a short-term extension would expire in the middle of each side’s current modernization program, making it difficult to consider the total current plans of either side. Through a ten-year agreement we would attempt to stabilize the strategic relationship toward the end of the present deployment cycle, reducing the incentive for another round of force improvements and deployments.

Next Steps

The interagency review of SALT now underway is focusing on several key issues:

—At what levels can total numbers be limited so that we will not have to build up or the Soviets take excessive reductions?

—How should we approach the asymmetrical advantages each side has in various strategic measures, e.g., the US lead in warheads (5 to 2 by 1977) and the Soviet lead in missile throw weight?

—What constitutes “essential equivalence”? This question embraces both of the two problems above—overall numbers and asymmetries. It goes to the issue of political perceptions expressed in the joint congressional resolution to the SALT I agreements calling for an agreement that “would not limit the US to levels of intercontinental strategic forces inferior to limits provided for the Soviet Union.”

6 For the text of the joint communique’ signed by Nixon and Brezhnev in Moscow on July 3, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1974, No. 209.
—How can MIRVs be limited in a 1985 agreement?

As these issues are clarified, we will develop options for your decision. The SALT delegations will then return to Geneva in mid-September for an exploration of broad concepts. Then, during my planned trip to Moscow, I would seek to establish enough common ground to permit detailed negotiations in Geneva of a concrete agreement.

20. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: We shouldn’t accept that interpretation of the Nuclear War treaty.\(^1\) We can send them back a soft reply, maybe tomorrow so it gets there over the weekend. We are drafting something to say. We can say we appreciate their message;\(^3\) we are concerned about the Eastern Mediterranean; we support peace and the independence of Cyprus. They want us to put some pressure on the Turks. We may need to do something against the Turks, but not with them. We should tell them about the note—it doesn’t force us to do anything.

President: Does the Soviet Union think we would fall for this?

Kissinger: They never cease trying shifty ploys. The first time I went there they tried to fiddle with the communique after we had agreed. Gromyko tried to tell me Brezhnev was unavailable and so it couldn’t be changed back. I said, “All right, I’ll make a public statement

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5. Secret; Nodis. The memorandum was transcribed from an attached set of Scowcroft’s handwritten notes. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Kissinger there from 9:10 to 10:14 a.m.; Scowcroft joined the meeting at 9:34. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

\(^2\) Reference is apparently to a proposal in the U.S. Senate on how to interpret the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, signed in Moscow on June 22, 1973. (24 UST 1478; TIAS 7654)

\(^3\) Document 18.
about what happened.” He called Brezhnev and got it changed.  

President: Does Dobrynin personally try to play a role?

Kissinger: He knows the Politburo and is a diplomatic Communist. But he understands foreign psychology. Brezhnev when he comes will be great the first day, then start to sulk. He will get worse and worse. But if you hold, everything will break at the last minute. They accepted all our points on SALT at the last minute in 1972. Their method of negotiation is very unpleasant—they are unpleasant. They are anxious for good terms with you, though, and we should capitalize on that. This note is a B+ one.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, including U.S. relations with Jordan, Israel, Egypt, Syria, and the Palestine Liberation Organization.]

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21. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Aftermath of President’s Breakfast with Three Senators on Trade Bill

Subject to specific things that may have been said by the President and you to Dobrynin, I think yesterday’s public statements by Jackson et al. are going to raise some serious problems in Moscow. If I were Brezhnev, I would either have to assume that the new President has virtually accepted the Jackson amendment (implying also identification with him on other matters) or is a total cynic who is making commitments he cannot expect to keep (and which the Soviets know he

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2 See Document 16.
cannot keep, since they are the ones who have to deliver). Jackson’s press conference is at Tab A.3

I think we ought to review the bidding once more before this road is further pursued. Moreover, apart from the immediate impression in Moscow, there is also a time bomb down the road. For whatever the precise solution of the waiver issue, a year after enactment of the Trade Bill—say about the end of 1975—MFN and credits for the USSR would quite probably have to be stopped. How this might affect SALT negotiations, or Congressional consideration of SALT agreements that might have been concluded at next year’s summit, is hard to say. But in any case we could be entering an election year with a serious disturbance in US-Soviet relations.

It seems to me that against the background of what has happened so far, we should somehow try to get agreement that the assurances and interpretations, and the legislation itself, are objectives and that annual findings should be used to measure substantial progress toward reaching them. MFN and credits would be withdrawn when the President finds that the state of compliance with the standards we have agreed on falls appreciably short of the basic goal of the legislation: non-denial of the right and opportunity to emigrate.

This should be expressed not as a waiver but as a discretionary authority for the President, subject, possibly, also to separate action by Congress in the form of a Joint Resolution, to extend MFN and credits for some initial period and thereafter if he finds at a specified annual date that the state of compliance “substantially promotes the objectives” (Jackson’s language) of the Bill.4

I am no lawyer or expert on legislative drafting, so if this is at all in the ball park, perhaps we should get Aldrich and Eberle to do some drafting.

Of course, there would have to be another tough round with the Senators, possibly by the President.

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3 Attached but not printed is a transcript of the news conference, which was held in the White House briefing room at 9:31 a.m. on August 15. When a reporter asked for a “little more detail” on Ford’s initiative on the Trade Bill, including his meeting with Dobrynin on August 14, Jackson replied “that the significant development is the President’s direct participation and as a result of that participation and with Mr. Dobrynin’s return here, there has been movement. Mr. Dobrynin had not planned to come to Washington at this time, but he has made a special return trip early and he has addressed himself to this specific problem in our relations with the Soviet Union. That is the significance of it.”

4 Reference is to a new subsection in Title IV of the Trade Bill, which Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff proposed in their August 14 memorandum (see Document 15 and the attachment thereto). The full text reads: “The President is authorized to waive for a period not to exceed one year the provisions of this Section only after finding, and reporting to Congress, that the exercise of such waiver will substantially promote the objectives of this section.”
Recommendation

That you indicate whether you wish to have this matter pursued in the manner indicated above.

Agree, get Aldrich and Eberle into it.\(^5\)

Other

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\(^5\) Kissinger initialed his approval of this recommendation. Aldrich proposed several alternative drafts of the Jackson–Vanik Amendment in a memorandum to Sonnenfeldt on August 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 9, Trade Bill, August 1974)

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22. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Follow-up to Presidential Breakfast with Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff;
Conversation with Perle

As you asked, I called Perle and told him (1) that you had had a further discussion with the President and as a result had asked me to pass on the following: (2) the basic letter would probably be acceptable as revised, (3) the interpretive response would be treated by us as reasonable targets and objectives to shoot for in judging Soviet compliance with the terms of the basic letter, (4) we cannot accept annual re-enactment of Presidential discretionary authority (or waiver authority) but would instead want to rely on annual Presidential findings of compliance or non-compliance plus Congressional findings of non-compliance, in which case the authority would be suspended, (5) both of us should do drafting so that we have texts to work from when the next meeting occurs.

Perle asked whether I had the promised information on the “national security” problem, i.e., what assurances the Soviets would give as to their informing persons with security clearances when they will

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be permitted to leave. I said I could only say that since the basic letter would probably be acceptable, this also covers the clause dealing with that point. Perle said he had the impression they would be given more specific information concerning Soviet intentions.

Perle stated further that the distinction we were making between the basic letter and the interpretative response would pose problems. The Senators had always regarded these interpretative points as integral to the agreement. I said we had always pointed out the problem with excessive specificity and we would therefore have to make the distinction and regard the interpretations as goals, progress toward which would be part of the annual findings. Perle again said this would be a major problem.

Perle asked whether our position on the waiver had been thought through. Jackson had felt the President’s reaction to annual reenactment had not been considered but instinctive. The point to consider was that it would be easier for the Executive to deal with the Soviets on the basis that new Congressional enactment was required rather than being in a position to have to cut off the authority by Executive action. I said for the Soviets this concept was unacceptable since it meant that they risked failure by Congress to act positively on extraneous or capricious grounds and therefore never could plan more than a year at a time even if they were in compliance with our understandings. Perle said perhaps the Congressional reenactment could be based solely on Soviet compliance with the agreement, with all other matters excluded. I said I doubted the Soviets would accept even this. I added that under our concept Congress would also have the right of ending the authority and this should meet the point that under some circumstances the Administration might find it awkward to act to end MFN and credits. Perle urged that their arguments be thought through again since they really intended to help the Executive avoid the potentially difficult decision.

Finally, Perle said that Labor had reacted angrily to yesterday’s events and was accusing Jackson of a sell-out. Meany had raged personally at Scoop. This argues for getting the deal wrapped up as quickly as possible before Labor could mount a major campaign. I said the best way to proceed was for both of us to do our drafting promptly on the waiver/discretionary authority matter. He agreed.

I have asked Aldrich to work up alternate versions of the waiver and also the text of a reply to the interpretative statements along the lines I gave to Perle. I will get these to you as soon as I have reviewed them.2

2 See footnote 5, Document 21.
Scoop may call you directly on the problem with the interpretations.

Do you have anything from Dobrynin on the security clearance cases?

23. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, August 16, 1974, 4:15–4:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Dinitz: I have some regards indirectly from the Senators who met with you yesterday [on the Jackson Amendment].
Kissinger: Yeah, but we can’t do what they want.
Dinitz: They said only one sentence is a problem.
Kissinger: The letter is all right, but the Soviets can’t possibly live up to that interpretive statement. We have assurances that the harassment will stop, that Brezhnev will make himself personally responsible. The interpretive statement can be a statement of objectives, but not as a detailed commitment.

Dinitz: I think they came towards you.
Kissinger: How?
Dinitz: They made it a monitoring amendment.
Kissinger: Yes, but it can’t be something they will harass us with a year from now. Would you accept it if you were a sovereign government?
Dinitz: I don’t harass people, that is the first thing. But if it is a new turn in relations . . .

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, Box 9, Nodis Memcons, Aug. 1974, Folder 4. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office at the Department of State.
2 Brackets in the original. Dinitz is referring to the August 15 meeting; see Document 16.
Kissinger: But if they stop harassment, it will show in the numbers. If they don’t want to do it, you can’t solve it with a document. I am assuming there is a power struggle there, just like here. Look at Schlesinger: one day he is to the right of me, one day he is to the left! We will accept the letter. We will ask for a revision of the interpretive statement or we will use it as guidelines. We will want it for the President to have discretionary power subject to Congressional veto, not to have to ask for it every year.

Dinitz: I know Jackson is anxious to compromise.
Kissinger: Jackson’s press conference was unhelpful.
Dinitz: Unhelpful?
Kissinger: It was helpful in giving the President the credit; that was a good face-saving thing. But it was unhelpful in relations with the Soviet Union.³

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East and U.S.-Israeli relations.]

³ During a meeting in the Oval Office on August 17, Ford and Kissinger discussed the Trade Bill, Soviet emigration, and U.S.-Israeli relations: “President: I’m glad Scoop moved. Kissinger: We called him yesterday and he was conciliatory. You might consider talking to him again next week. I told Dinitz he had to help us here and that Rabin had to come in early September. President: We have to give Scoop his amendment. Kissinger: If you get waiver authority, that Congress would have to veto, it’s okay. President: What he wants is his amendment. The supporters don’t understand the waiver authority. Kissinger: The Soviet Union won’t buy going in every year for legislation. They will complain about this, but will go along with it. A Member of Congress last night said they want a compromise. President: If we can pull it off and get the bill, it is the best thing we can do.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5)
24. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, August 17, 1974, 10:45 a.m.

[Omitted here is an exchange unrelated to U.S.-Soviet relations.]

K: Anatol, I am sending over an interim answer on that Cyprus thing.\(^2\)

D: Yeah. Is it official text or just your oral explanation, so to speak.

K: An oral explanation.

D: So what is it about? We are going tomorrow to make joint intervention in Cyprus?

K: Absolutely.

D: I think it will be very nice.

K: We just want to get your— If you send us the disposition of your forces in southern Russia, we will then give you an advice on how to do it.

D: I think you’d even want our disposition in the north? Not in the south of Russia.

K: Why in the north?

D: For us it’s much more easier to jump over—you know, when you have a [missile] along the range, it’s very difficult to use it on a short range. It is better to go all right, so our divisions there used to use a _____ that goes for 10,000 kilometers, not three or two.

[Laughter]

K: Okay, Anatol, I’ll send it over.

D: You will send with your messenger?

K: Yeah.

D: What is the main idea, just without arguing the question.

K: Well, the main idea is that we are willing to exchange ideas—

D: Yeah. About original guarantees, you mean?

K: Well, at the UN.

D: Yeah.

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. Blank underscores indicate omissions in the text. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger placed the call; the conversation lasted until 10:50 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76)

\(^2\) Document 25.
K: And maybe do some parallel things, but not necessarily joint right now.

D: [inaudible 3–4 words] But, in general, Henry, the idea of now that you know that it’s really quiet—Will you not, I mean, I gather or I understand there are some difficulties in the UN, but including you and me too maybe to have certain kind of guarantees after they have settled their problems where there will be unfinancial (?) [inaudible] I don’t know. Those kinds of things.

K: Well, let’s exchange some more ideas on that.

D: You propose something or you’re just saying in a sense—

K: No, we’re proposing to continue the exchange of ideas.

D: Of ideas. There at the United Nations?

K: We haven’t really thought it completely through yet.

D: I understand. So it’s your answer still saying that we will continue on in next week, yeah?

K: Exactly.

D: Because as I mentioned to you, some of my people . . . very tough. They have the idea that well, why don’t we in a friendly way do something together. You see, there is real politics and there is certain [laughs]—which sometimes which maybe you, I mean, off-the-record, don’t quite understand. Some really have good intentions saying: It’s rather simple. Why we shouldn’t sit down and do something which will be really wonderful things for both so we have good personal relations on a top level. You understand?

K: Yeah.

D: So this sometimes happens. It’s not really any specific tricks or not. So this is just on background I’m saying. Well, I will look through it and send immediately to Moscow for Brezhnev and Gromyko.

K: Right.

D: But the idea of continuation of ______, yes? I mean, the idea of exchanging of views.

K: Right.

D: Of views?

K: Right.

D: Henry, you’re not going anywhere. I heard somewhere that you are planning to go somewhere outside Washington or for the time being here?

K: I’m staying here.

D: Next week too?

K: Oh, yeah. Oh, that idea of Cyprus—total nonsense!

D: Well, this is the point. I heard that you’re going there just to shuttle in between.
K: No, look, I can’t make a joke anymore. I was walking through the hall of the State Department when a newsman came up to me and he said: Are you going to Cyprus? I said, “What I want is to shuttle between Nicosia and Limassol.”

D: Laughter.

K: And I thought this was so absurd so they write, “Kissinger is going to Cyprus.”

D: Yes. Good thing you didn’t say exactly between where you are going to shuttle.

K: Well, because they probably didn’t know where either place was.

D: [Laughter.]

K: There is no intention whatsoever of my going to Cyprus.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: What would I do on Cyprus?

D: No, no, I agree with you. I was surprised very much because on the radio I heard that you—

K: Anatol, when I go some place, it is usually prepared. I don’t go to a place where I don’t know what I’m going to find.

D: That’s why exactly because you go there and many feel that it’s a chance of rather great success. But once you stay there and be involved in this—

K: Well, or maybe even I get caught in a slow process like last time in the Syria-Israeli thing.

D: That’s true.

K: But I won’t go unless I know what the possible outcome can be.

D: This is true. I know this is exactly—you’re using I think the only right [exit] . . . not ours but to know where you go.

K: The conditions are absolutely not right for my going to Cyprus.

D: This is my impression too. That’s why I was (laughter) surprised.

K: Absolute nonsense. Okay.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Thank you.

D: Bye, bye.  

3 In a meeting with the President at 9:20 a.m. on August 24, Kissinger presented a different perspective on the Soviet role in the Cyprus talks: “We must keep the Soviets out of the negotiations. We must try to keep the UN Conference from happening or make sure that nothing comes from it. We must show the Greeks they can’t use the Soviet Union against us.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5)
25.  **Note From President Ford to the Soviet Leadership**¹

Washington, undated.

The President appreciates receiving the detailed Soviet views on the Cyprus situation. In the spirit of our agreement to consult closely on situations capable of raising international tensions, the President wishes to respond promptly to the considerations set forth in the Soviet communication of August 15.²

We agree of course that everything should be done to achieve an end to the conflict and a just settlement. It now appears that a ceasefire, as called for by the UN Security Council resolutions which we both support, can be established today. When this occurs, the next objective must be to bring the parties together as soon as possible to undertake immediate efforts toward a settlement. The President has carefully considered the advisability of the joint initiative proposed and elaborated in the Soviet communication of August 15. In the present delicate situation, the President feels that it may be wiser for our two countries to continue to use their diplomatic influence, with the parties as well as in the UN Security Council, to ensure that the ceasefire will remain effective and that the parties make a maximum and prompt effort to bring about a settlement acceptable to all concerned.

We should of course remain in close contact as the next phase develops to determine how we can most effectively contribute to achievement of this common goal. As our ideas develop, we shall communicate them to the Soviet side.

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1974. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the note was delivered to the Soviet Embassy at 11:30 a.m. on August 17. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft of the note to Kissinger on August 16. (Ibid.)

² Document 18.
26. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Apparent Deadlock with Jackson on Waiver of Title IV Provisions

As I informed you in my preliminary memo of August 22, Jackson has sent us an amendment to his amendment of Title IV of the Trade Bill which would require annual affirmative action by Congress to renew the waiver. The language of this Jackson text is extremely complex and convoluted, using the War Powers Resolution as a model. It seems to me that there has to be another high-level discussion with the Senators because we are simply not on the same wavelength on this matter. The only move on our part that I can see at this point is to modify our own waiver language such that the President’s action could be vetoed by only one House rather than both.

As I mentioned in my earlier memo, Jackson’s reading of the President’s position was that the only concern related to the possibility of filibusters or time gaps which would permit the waiver to lapse for a period of time. This problem appears to have been taken care of in the elaborate provisions and safeguards written into the Jackson text. Jackson does not acknowledge that the President rejects the entire concept of affirmative Congressional action after the first waiver.

Following is a more detailed analysis of the Jackson text which I have done with the assistance of Phil Trimble of L. If, by some off chance there were a disposition to go along with Jackson’s concept there would have to be a detailed negotiation of his provisions by qualified legislative experts.

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2 In his August 22 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger on his talks with the Senator’s staff, including possible revisions to the amendment and to the related exchange of letters. (Ibid.)

3 Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, or War Powers Act of 1973 (Public Law 93–148), on November 7, 1973, over President Nixon’s veto. Under Section 5 (b) of the Act, the President was required to remove U.S. armed forces from hostilities within 60 days, unless the Congress passed either a formal declaration of war or a resolution authorizing the use of force. The President could extend the period of deployment up to 30 days, however, by formally notifying Congress of an “unavoidable military necessity.”
ANALYSIS OF THE JACKSON DRAFT

(Text at Tab A)\(^4\)

The Substantive Difference

The principal difference between our draft (Tab B) and the Jackson draft is that, in substance, under our draft the waiver would be effective unless Congress acted to override it, whereas under the Jackson draft the waiver would not become effective unless and until Congress acted to make it effective. Thus, in the event of Congressional inaction, the waiver would go into effect under our draft but not under Jackson’s proposal. The Jackson draft contains elaborate provisions, modeled on the War Powers Resolution (where troops must be withdrawn after 60 days unless Congress affirmatively acts), to assure that Congress will in fact act on the issue and not simply ignore it. Although these provisions would, if followed, result in expeditious Congressional consideration of the issue, they do not provide any firm assurance of Congressional consideration on which we can rely because they can be changed without executive participation and, second, they can be ignored (in which case the waiver would not go into effect and there would be no legal recourse for the executive branch).

Explanation of Jackson Draft

Each waiver would be based on a determination that it will substantially promote the objectives of the section (the same as in our draft). Unlike our draft, each waiver must be accompanied by a detailed report of the reasons for the waiver. Perle says they will agree not to require a report with the first waiver so that, for the first year following enactment of the Trade Bill, a waiver could become effective simply on the basis of a Presidential determination, without detailed reports and without Congressional action.

After the expiration of the one year period following enactment of the Trade Bill, a waiver can be made only if a joint resolution has been adopted permitting a waiver for the particular country involved. The joint resolution contemplated must be readopted each year. In effect the joint resolution will specify a one-year period during which a waiver is authorized for all affected countries except those named. Once the authority lapses for a particular country, apparently it cannot be reinstated. However, the President may extend the effectiveness of a waiver for 60 days beyond the standard one-year period if, at the end of the one-year period, either House of Congress is considering a joint resolution to extend the authority.

\(^4\) Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
Procedurally, a proposed joint resolution must be reported out of Committee, either favorably or unfavorably, at least 30 calendar days before the start of the one-year period involved (there is no provision for the situation where the resolution is not referred to the Committee more than 30 days prior to the one-year period, as, for example, where a joint resolution is passed by one House in that 30 day period and only then referred to the other House). The 30 day requirement can also be changed by roll call vote. There is also no provision for what happens if the Committee simply fails to report the resolution as required (which could happen, for example, if the Committee were deadlocked).

After the joint resolution is reported out of Committee the House involved is required to vote on it within three days, although, again, that requirement can be changed by roll call vote. If one House passes a joint resolution, the other House is required to vote on it (and not its own version), although there are no mechanical provisions dealing with Committee referral and voting in this situation (unlike the War Powers Resolution—this may simply be a drafting oversight). In the case of a disagreement on a joint resolution passed by both Houses, conferees are required to be “promptly” appointed, a report must be filed within six days after that appointment (not counting weekends and holidays), one House has to vote on it within three days after it is filed (not counting days when that House is not in session), and the other House must vote on it within three days (not counting days when that House is not in session) after that vote.

Possible Compromise

One compromise between the Jackson draft and our draft (although rather favorable to us) would be to permit either the Senate or the House to veto continuation of a waiver (our draft would require both Houses to veto it). This would have the advantages of permitting the Senate to act alone, and is the procedure already embodied in the Trade Bill for trade agreements on nontariff barriers, certain proclamations of quotas and orderly marketing agreements.5

5 In a subsequent memorandum to Kissinger on August 23, Sonnenfeldt reported: “Perle telephoned at 2:45 p.m. and said that the President and Jackson had agreed on the phone that we were deadlocked on (1) the waiver issue and (2) the public use of the exchange of correspondence, and that there would therefore be a hiatus while Jackson is out of town for the recess. Perle said they hoped there would be nothing said publicly. I said we had always been completely buttoned up on this subject and would remain so. I take it this is an accurate version of the phone call between the President and Jackson and that nothing further should be done at this time.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 9, Trade Bill, August 1974) No record of the telephone conversation between Ford and Jackson has been found.
27. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹


Ambassador Dobrynin has just given me the following message relating to Simas Kudirka.

“Kudirka has been released from detention as a result of a Pardon. He is given the possibility now to return to his home in the Lithuanian Republic and to get employment. The question of further possible steps concerning Kudirka in connection with President Ford’s request is under continuous consideration. For the personal knowledge of the President, Mr. Brezhnev would like him to know that he is keeping this question within the scope of his personal attention.”²

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Transition File, 1974, Box 1, Subject File, Letters to and from World Leaders—US–USSR Exchanges, 8/9/74–11/5/74. Secret; Eyes Only. The President wrote at the bottom of the page: “Thanks/keep me posted/I am most interested. GRF.”

² In a memorandum to the President on September 4, Kissinger relayed the following update from Dobrynin: “As a result of disagreement which occurred in his family, Kudirka up until now has not applied to the local authorities about his wish to emigrate permanently to the United States. When he does so it will take several days to consider his application and to process the proper documents. After that has been done, Kudirka and those members of his family who so desire will be able to leave the Soviet Union and go if they like to the United States.” (Ibid.) During a meeting at 11 a.m. on September 5, Ford and Kissinger briefly discussed Soviet emigration: “President: I notice the Soviets are making efforts to let some specific cases go. Kissinger: Yes, and releasing Kudirka is a special favor for you.” (Ibid., Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5)
28. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, September 5, 1974, 4:35 p.m.

SUBJECT
Draft Statement before Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Détente

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
John Newhouse, ACDA
Mark Palmer, S/P
Robert Blackwill—C (Note Taker)
(Jerry Schecter of Time, Inc., was also in attendance.)

Kissinger: Is Larry\(^2\) here? I have been thinking of the 19th for the détente thing—what do you think?

Hyland: Have you re-read the statement since the last time we met?\(^3\)

Kissinger: That’s what I wanted to discuss with you. Do I need to do it at all now?

Sonnenfeldt: I think you’ve got to do it.

Kissinger: (to Eagleburger) What are you going to do about my schedule tomorrow? Are wives supposed to come?

Eagleburger: I’ll check.

Kissinger: I can’t possibly go to that.

Eagleburger: I know.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 3, HS Chron—Official—Aug–Oct 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Drafted by Blackwill. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s office at the Department of State.

\(^2\) Lawrence Eagleburger.

Kissinger: I’ve got to see him.

Eagleburger: Yes.

Kissinger: That has to wait until Saturday.

(Eagleburger leaves.)

Sonnenfeldt: You can’t not do it. The entire hearings are built around you.

Kissinger: That’s my view too. When the resignation occurred, I had worked my way through the first section, then we worked it again. My concern is that we are giving the Russians assurances by having an all-out détente statement so soon after the change of Administrations.

Hyland: That doesn’t bother me. But much of the language is geared to the previous Administration . . .

Kissinger: That all has to be changed. That’s why I am seeing you.

Hyland: We have to decide whether we want this to be a pledge of continuity or a candid discussion of the difficulties of détente.

Kissinger: There are two separate problems. First is the content—the long defense in the statement of what the Nixon Administration did will have to be condensed. And the emphasis now needs to be changed. We need not be so defensive now. For example, the section called the Administration’s perception of East-West relations, that section can’t be called that, whatever else it is called. The analysis of that section is correct, and should be retained, but much of the rest of it can go.

Sonnenfeldt: We have to affirm the strategy and analysis of our position . . .

Kissinger: That’s what I am saying, where it dominates the issue we should state it, but we don’t need to be so historical. The first two sections are very good. What is the third section? My folder is such a goddamn mess. Balance of risk? The first two are fine. We can refer to 1969, but we should do it in an analytical way not historical. 1969 was a watershed but whether we want to go through the history in Section 3 is another thing. I don’t think we need that. What we need is . . . Palmer, do you know you will be a pain at cocktail parties the rest of your life?

Palmer: How’s that?

Kissinger: You’ve worked on food problems, détente, all in one week. Condense the history in section 3. Use the analytical part at the end of section 2 and relate it to 1969 and 1971 without going through the events that got us there. What do you think Hal?

Sonnenfeldt: I think that section can be summarized.

Kissinger: In section 3, from pages one to six, we can condense them to two pages. Then at point C, the principal elements of détente, our bilateral cooperation, economic cooperation, the definition of principles can be in a separate section. In pages one to six the historical
treatment can be condensed to 1½ pages. Now on the strategic issues we have two papers.

Newhouse: What you have on the strategic questions has been boiled down from 19 pages.

Sonnenfeldt: That’s what’s in here now.

Kissinger: I’ve got to mark that up. The problem with the strategic statement is that it is too essayistic. The others are analytical. We have to reconcile the style of the two and bring them closer. But I want to look them over again.

Newhouse: I’m not sure I see the distinction.

Sonnenfeldt: The section is more expository than the others.

Newhouse: But I think in order to explain this complicated subject you need more exposition.

Kissinger: Your part is more elegant than these less-cultured creatures have been able to produce, and also in some cases less precise. Let me read it in detail. But it is least in need of detailed discussion right now. I went over the first three sections carefully before the interruption in our political process and made some remarks in the margin.

Sonnenfeldt: Can we get those typed up?

Kissinger: It won’t do much good. What about the next section? Does it need revision?

Hyland: I think it is pretty good.

Kissinger: Did you write it?

Hyland: No.

Lord: I think it will hold up without much change.

Kissinger: Who wrote it? Sonnenfeldt, did you write it?

Hyland: He wrote most of it.

Lord: We all worked on it.

Kissinger: No wonder, Sonnenfeldt, you thought it was good, you wrote it.

Sonnenfeldt: As a matter of fact, you re-wrote part of it yourself, especially the questions.

Hyland: We have to do something about the defensive tone.

Kissinger: When this was written it was essentially an answer to Jackson. But he hasn’t attacked recently and maybe I should wait for him to attack before I respond. The first few pages are fine. But take the defensive tone out of it. It’s not necessary now. We could make the questions expository sentences instead and that would tone it down a good deal.

Sonnenfeldt: The questions can be re-written as “do we run the risk”—that change will make them less polemical.
Lord: That problem can be easily fixed.

Sonnenfeldt: But the analytical material is worth keeping.

Kissinger: Who is going to do what? What we need most now is an agenda for the future. We should put out some challenges to the Soviet Union. This was written pointing to the end of an Administration in 1976 and should now be changed to reflect the beginning of a new Administration. Yes, détente has been good, but it has to be more than simple atmospherics, and these are the challenges for the future: you should mention arms control issues, the impossibility of political relaxation existing in the climate of an all-out arms race, the importance of restraint in crisis, and so on.

Hyland: Those should be the main points at the end.

Kissinger: We will agree to the 19th. I have to go to this bloody Business Executives meeting. When could we have this revision? I don’t want to hurry you because I want a good product.

Sonnenfeldt: Why don’t you do the strategic part and we’ll work on the rest and have it ready by Monday night.4

Kissinger: OK, I’ll work on the strategic part but the changes will be editorial and not substantive. I will propose the sort of minor changes I made in the next to the last draft.

Lord: It will help.

Kissinger: OK. (shuffling through papers in folder) I was working from the wrong draft. The period of confrontation can be condensed to one page. Then the elaboration of the principles, the political dialogue, economic cooperation—all of this should be kept. Maybe it could be condensed a bit and tied less to specific events. So we need to re-do section 4, the end, re-do the beginning. Make the entire statement a defense of the new Administration’s policy. Emphasize the beginning, building on the achievements of the Nixon Administration. I’ve got to go now. (To Sonnenfeldt, pointing at paper.) What’s this? Will you stay behind for a moment.

4 September 9.
29. **Memorandum of Conversation**¹

Washington, September 6, 1974.

**PARTICIPANTS**
- President Ford
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Nelson Rockefeller, Vice President-Designate
- Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

**SUBJECTS**
- Visits; 40 Committee; NSC Meeting on Israeli Requests; Preparation for Rabin Visit

[Kissinger: I think inviting the cosmonauts to a picnic would be overdoing it a bit. Dobrynin would make a big deal of it, and this is the sort of thing the French put in speeches.

President: I’d kind of like to do it. It wouldn’t be similar to the others.

Kissinger: The problem is not the cosmonauts, it’s Dobrynin.

President: Let Dobrynin come if he wants.

Kissinger: Okay.²

[Dr. Kissinger then described the projected attendance at the NSC meeting on the Middle East.]³

[Omitted here is discussion of publicity on CIA operations, especially in Chile in 1964 and 1970.]

[Kissinger:] At our meeting today I will go into the Israeli arms requests, then CIA will brief, then I will explain the strategy. The CIA will have charts showing the forces the Arabs can bring to bear.

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² On September 7, Ford hosted a reception at the White House and a crab picnic in Alexandria, Virginia, for the Soviet cosmonauts and U.S. astronauts. Dobrynin and his family were invited and attended both events. For his memoir account, see Dobrynin, *In Confidence*, pp. 325–327.

³ Brackets in the original. Ford and Kissinger both attended a meeting of the National Security Council that afternoon on military assistance to Israel. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) No minutes of the meeting have been found.
What is it we are trying to do? What are the others trying to do? What are some of the problems?

We want to guarantee the security of Israel, but we want to prevent the coalescence of the Arab states—that would create an unmanageable situation for us. We also want to prevent the resurgence of Soviet influence. We want to prevent an Israeli-Arab war and the consequent confrontation with the Soviet Union. If negotiations stall, or if there is a war, there will be an embargo. That would push Europe over the cliff. The Europeans’ response to the Cyprus business shows their mood. There would be a massive anti-U.S. blow-up. The same will happen in Japan. The Soviet Union has suffered because they operated too cautiously in the past. They were too much in the middle. They won’t be caught doing too little again. That makes an Israeli victory more dangerous than an Israeli defeat. Last time we had a massive airlift and a massive showdown, and we would have lost the ability to present ourselves to the Arabs as a means to a solution.

As for the Israelis, another war would result in world pressure for the ‘67 borders. It would be tough for the U.S. alone to resist, and the result would be demoralizing like what was done to Czechoslovakia in ‘38.

We have been giving the Arabs the feeling that each of them had something to gain—Egypt immediately; Jordan in the mid-term, and Syria somewhat later. The Syrians know that Israel doesn’t want to move; they also know that the more the others are satisfied the more isolated they will be, so they will work to lump everything together. With massive effort we can head it off. We can defuse the Soviet Union with your Brezhnev meeting.

We are operating at the edge of the margin with the Arabs. We have been stalling. The delivery dates on equipment for Egypt are so late that they are turning to the Soviet Union. The Syrians are restive because they got nothing. Geneva hasn’t met for a year—we held off, because it brings all the Arabs together and it lumps all the demands, and makes the Soviet Union the protector of the Arabs and us of Israel. But we can hold that off only with some Arab help.

Israel has an unbelievable domestic structure and a vicious group of politicians. They have a Jewish community here which vicariously tries all the time to prove its manhood. The same people who were doves on Vietnam are hawks on Israel.

President: I know. I saw it in the House votes.

Kissinger: Israel has to give up some territory. What they get in return is the process, not a specific quid pro quo. Strictly militarily it is unequal; but in the bigger context it is Israel’s salvation.

The Israelis also have to prove it is being raped by us before they can yield. They have developed the strategy to state something for
peace which looks very reasonable to Americans. In ’67 they wanted an Arab signature on a piece of paper. Then they wanted a direct negotiation. The only one who dealt directly was Jordan—who has done worse than any others. Now they are talking about wanting a comprehensive settlement. That is unattainable now. But we have gotten the Arabs off our back on the ’67 borders. That is in their interest.

The Israelis figure they can play the President and Vice President against me. It didn’t work before because of Nixon, and they couldn’t get to him. Also we supported them in order to frustrate the Arabs.

President: They think I am closer to the Jewish community.
Kissinger: Yes, and Nelson also. They also count on me basically.

But we can’t risk everything for a suicidal policy—one which would bankrupt them. And no President can easily order another airlift. And while the leadership approved the alert, it was only as long as no American troops were involved.

President: That was made clear.

Kissinger: We were afraid the Soviet Union was going to put its troops in, and we were thinking of paratroopers in the Sinai. We were playing high stakes poker.

President: I don’t think the American people will ever stand for another Vietnam.

Rockefeller: The oil would be impossible in another confrontation.

Kissinger: We might have to take the oil.

Rockefeller: They couldn’t ship it if the Soviet Union didn’t want to.

[Omitted here is further discussion of military assistance to Israel and the upcoming visit of Prime Minister Rabin.]
30. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 9, 1974, 3:17–4:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: Jackson claims the ball is in your court [on the Trade Bill and emigration]. That’s nonsense. He was going to call. I think you should call and tell him you can’t go any further. Then either I meet or we all meet to finish it.

President: Which do you think? Would Javits and Ribicoff be there?

Kissinger: That would make it harder for him to say no to you. He is difficult. He took shots at you on television yesterday.

President: I think it would be better at a breakfast.

Kissinger: I can be nastier than you . . . and then you could make a concession after my meeting.

President: If we are going to give a little, that is better.

Kissinger: We can’t give too much. How about calling them saying you can’t give much more and suggest we get together?

President: Did you see that article in the New York Times?

Kissinger: It had to come from Jackson. I still don’t think we should agree to release . . .

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The memorandum indicates the meeting began at 9:30 a.m., which is an error. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Kissinger and Scowcroft in the Oval Office from 3:17 to 4:20 p.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files) See also footnote 4 below.

2 Brackets in the original. In a memorandum to Kissinger on September 6, Sonnenfeldt reported: “Eberle, like apparently everyone else in town, has been in touch with Javits and his people. They told him that Jackson’s people are taking the position that the ball is in the President’s court. I told Eberle I was not certain about that since my understanding was that Jackson wanted to talk to Meany and then get back to the President.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974) See Document 26.

3 Reference is to an article published in The New York Times on September 8 that reported: “At least 60,000 Jews and others could emigrate yearly from the Soviet Union under a compromise plan now under the final stages of negotiation between the Administration and Congress.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Devises Plan for Rise in Flow of Soviet Jews,” The New York Times, September 8, 1974, pp. 1, 9)
President: I’ll call.4 Tell him we have been seeing stories that we are reaching agreement and I hope the language I approved is what he agrees to because I can’t go any further.

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s upcoming trip to Japan and Korea, as well as of Chile, the Middle East, Cyprus, and military assistance to Turkey.]

President: He says he is meeting with Meany Thursday.5 Can you get word to Meany?

Kissinger: Meany is against the Trade Bill but he’ll do what we say. He wants his man on ILO and we have been supporting a UAW guy. I would go with Meany.

President: Give me the choices. If we can help George, we should.

Kissinger: He also wants to send someone to Africa.

President: Find him a place. We need George on our side. Get to Meany. Jackson said he would call after he sees Meany.

[Omitted here is further discussion of military assistance to Turkey, the President’s upcoming speech to the United Nations, and food assistance.]

4 Jackson called Ford at 3:46 p.m. (Ford Library, White House Office Files, President’s Daily Diary) Although no substantive record of the conversation has been found, a parenthetical note in the omitted passage below reads: “Senator Jackson calls on Trade Bill. The President asks for a positive veto. He is told Congress has to override.”

5 September 12.

31. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger1


SUBJECT

Jackson Amendment

Perle called late last night to say that to follow up the President’s telephone conversation with Jackson yesterday,2 Jackson will write the


2 See footnote 4, Document 30. No other record of the telephone conversation between Ford and Jackson has been found.
President a letter detailing the advantages of Jackson’s waiver approach. Perle claimed that after the phone conversation it was still not clear whether the President was against affirmative Congressional action because of fears of delays and the introduction of extraneous considerations or whether he opposed it in principle. If it was the former, Jackson would make clear that all concerns could be taken care of through the language of the amendment. It would be made clear that Congressional action would have to be on the same criteria used by the President in making his own judgments (i.e., the terms of your exchange of letters). Perle said if the President’s objection was on principle, then there was probably an unbridgeable gap. I said that as I understood it the President was opposed to affirmative Congressional action as a matter of policy. Perle said Jackson would in any case write a detailed explanation of the advantages of doing things his way.

Perle also said that their lawyers would change one point in their proposed amendment, to make it absolutely clear that the first Presidential waiver would not require any finding of Soviet compliance with the terms of the letters.

Perle also confirmed that Jackson would talk to Meany on Thursday.³

Meanwhile, Eberle has sent you, Haig, Timmons and Scowcroft a memo (Tab A)⁴ to the effect that he wants to take over the Title IV issue and settle it this week. He wants to negotiate a deal whereby the President would send his annual determination to continue MFN to House Ways and Means and Senate Finance where it would lie for 90 days and, failing negative action, MFN would continue for another year. In the event of a negative decision by either committee, it would then be submitted to the Floor. Until the appropriate house votes, MFN would continue.

Eberle requested authority to proceed by Wednesday morning but I gather Scowcroft is trying to reach him and fill him in on the latest President–Jackson phone conversation.

Perle professed to be upset by the press leaks and said they must stem from Executive Branch briefings of Jewish leaders.⁵

³ September 12.
⁴ Dated September 9; attached but not printed.
⁵ In another memorandum to Kissinger on September 10, Sonnenfeldt further reported: “I called Perle this afternoon and told him that the President objects to Jackson’s waiver procedure on policy grounds and that this is a firm position. Perle said he would report this to Scoop and assumed that this made a letter to the President explaining the advantages of the procedure pointless. I said that was correct.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974)
32. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 11, 1974, 11:30 a.m.–2:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador of Israel
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Israeli Embassy
Mordechai Gazit, Director General, Prime Minister's Office
Brig. Gen. Ephraim Poran, Military Advisor to the Prime Minister
Eli Mizrachi, Deputy Director General, Prime Minister's Office
David Tourgeman, Counselor, Israeli Embassy
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Robert Ingersoll, Deputy Secretary of State
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. Ellsworth Bunker, Ambassador at Large and Chief US Delegate to Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
Amb. Kenneth Keating, Ambassador to Israel
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern & South Asian Affairs
Walter B. Smith, II, Director, Israel & Arab-Israel Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[Rabin, Kissinger and Dinitz first conferred alone in the Secretary's Office from 11:30 to 11:45 a.m., when the plenary meeting convened in the conference room.]

[Omitted here is discussion of bilateral relations and of the Arab-Israeli peace process.]

[Rabin:] I don't want to raise now the question of emigration from the Soviet Union. I know it's in the stage of negotiations between you and a group of Senators. I hope a solution will be found. It's an important source of immigration for us.

I brought a letter from the families of prisoners. The harassment should stop, and there is a cut in the numbers up to now.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 9ID414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 20, Classified External Memcons, 9/73–4/74 (Folder 2). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room and the Madison Room in the Department of State.

2 Not found.
Kissinger: Due to the behavior of the Jewish community in America.

Rabin: I don’t think the Russians will do anything for goodwill.

Kissinger: First we had the assurance that they’d keep it at 35,000 . . .

Rabin: It is not being kept.

Kissinger: No, but because . . .

Dinitz: It is more complicated, Mr. Secretary, because the harassment issue wasn’t solved.

Kissinger: We can debate. We brought it from 400 to 35,000 before the pressure started, then the pressure started. Some of those who did this may not be so interested in the issue—that doesn’t apply to the Jewish community.

Dinitz: We wanted that on the record.

Rabin: The Russians have not contributed to a political settlement in that area. They have done everything to create an atmosphere of tension. They will continue—through Syria, through Iraq, through the PLO, maybe through certain elements in Egypt—to prevent movement towards peace. Détente has not moved to the Middle East, in their sense.

To sum up, there will not be a new status quo. It is either way—war or political settlement. We are ready to participate in a political settlement, either overall or interim—we see no possibility of interim with Syria—but we do it from the position of strength and we need the fulfillment of the present commitment.

Kissinger: Let me make a few observations. I’ll start with the latter issues first.

First, with respect to the Syrian Jews. There were no conversations with the Syrians in which we didn’t raise it. But there is no escape from the conclusion of your own analysis that the Syrians have the least to get from the negotiations. We don’t object. But this diminishes the Syrian incentive. Maybe through economic relations with us, it is possible. But we support your desires regarding Syrian Jews.

I must say the Syrian analysis of the condition of the Jews there isn’t the same! Realistically, I don’t expect progress. There is no issue between us.

On the Soviet Jews: The American Jews—Lowell, Rabbi Miller—are not a problem. But it has become a political issue. The question for some here is getting credit for it. The Soviets told us there would be no restrictions, no harassment, and no exception except cases of national security, which can in no case be more than 1% of the total. They will either keep it or not keep it. We will know. Maybe not. But now some want to go into excruciating detail about administrative regulations.
But in a police state there is no legal way to force compliance. One Senator wants a document that will look good in the U.S., but will have no practical effect.

The other issue is waiver authority. We agreed to leave the Jackson Amendment in the bill, which is a great concession for us, but with waiver authority. They want the waiver to be renewed every year. We want the waiver to continue subject to Congressional veto every year.3

Third, they want to publish the letter from me to Jackson. It has already leaked, which isn’t fatal, but the publication of a formal letter will force the Soviets to do things.

It really depends on U.S.-Soviet relations. We can write letters until we’re blue in the face. We can write a beautiful document and they can still find administrative ways to keep people in if that is what they want.

We’re willing to take it out of domestic politics. They can have the credit. If the Soviets prize détente, particularly with the new President who may be in office for six years, they may do it. We saw it in one case of one man [Kudirka]. Otherwise the number can drop.

They [the Senators] want us to write down a number—60,000. If we want a demagogic game, we can do it. If we write a number which leaks . . .

You have good enough contacts with the Jews in the Soviet Union to know how it is being implemented. They told us there would be no geographic discrimination—they won’t all be from Georgia or Moldavia. If they stop harassment, the numbers should go up. If the number doesn’t increase, we’ll know why.

A new system should be established as early as possible in the new Administration, so there will be a substantial increase and then we will have a higher yardstick to measure by. If it takes a year, a year and a half, it will go down to 12,000 and that will be the yardstick.

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3 Ford and Kissinger raised the issue during their meeting with Rabin at 12:15 p.m. on September 13: “President: We would like help on the Trade Bill. Rabin: I had a meeting with the Senators. I kept out of it, and said we couldn’t speak to the trade bill. Kissinger: The Soviet Union won’t accept a positive renewal each year. President: If Dinitz could help. We want a bill. Rabin: Jackson and Javits said they were on the verge of agreement. President: Not exactly. We need some help.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5) In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled: “In frustration, I appealed to Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin to intercede with the Senators. It was, of course, somewhat degrading for a Secretary of State to have to ask a foreign leader, however friendly, for help on what was essentially an American domestic issue.” “But Rabin, who might need the Senators for the annual vote on Israeli appropriations and as a safety net in the event of disagreement with the administration, was too prudent to get involved.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 257–258)
On the substance, we’re close enough to reach an agreement now. Some want to put in details which can be significant only in domestic politics.

The three months now are the best time to establish this emigration figure.

You don’t have to answer—it is not an Israeli problem—but you ought to know our thinking.

The Jewish groups have been allies.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Arab-Israeli peace process.]

[Kissinger:] Now, the overall situation. One problem is that your Ambassador’s intelligence system is so good that he calls me with a critique 15 minutes after every Congressional presentation. So you know our strategy.

If there is a stalemate, it will lead to a coalescence of all the forces and there will be another war, with very serious consequences for the U.S. and disastrous consequences for Israel.

You see what Europe did in the Cyprus crisis. Europe will be unanimous against Israel, and hostile to the U.S. The Soviet Union will be infinitely more active, and we will have to resist it in conditions more precarious domestically and in Europe. Whether it will be possible politically to restart an airlift on the same basis as before . . .

Rabin: If you supply us now, there will be a reduced need for an airlift, though we can’t foresee the future.

Kissinger: I’ll get to that in a minute.

So we agree with you that some progress is necessary. What do we mean by progress? It is essential, even more for you than us, to prevent Soviet influence in the area, and perhaps reduce it. I don’t agree that détente has not spread to the Middle East. The Soviet Union as a result of détente paid a substantial price in the Middle East. The correct statement is that the Soviet Union, which is led by mediocre . . . statesmen, did enough to make war possible, but not enough to take a commanding position. Since ’73, they have not done enough to prevent American actions. They tried, but somewhat incompetently.

Unfortunately, I think they’re now listening more to Dobrynin than to Gromyko. So they’ve been more subtle. Gromyko would charge ahead with legal . . .

You know we dragged them through two summits. They weren’t unrestrained; they will be less restrained in the future.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the Arab-Israeli peace process and of military assistance to the region.]
33. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, September 13, 1974.

SUBJECT

Jackson’s Letter to the President on the Trade Bill

This, as you know, is the letter that Jackson wanted to send after his recent telephone conversation with the President in order to explain the advantages to the President of Jackson’s proposed waiver procedure. I had thought that after I told Perle that the President’s objections were on substantive policy grounds rather than merely mechanical, the letter would not be sent. But evidently Jackson decided to proceed.

As regards the proposed legislative language, there are two significant changes from the earlier version. The first is the most substantive, stemming from my earlier negotiations with Perle: it makes clear that the first Presidential waiver will not require a detailed report on Soviet compliance. (I had repeatedly rejected Jackson’s position that even the first waiver had to be preceded by Soviet “good faith performance.”)

The second change involves making the proposed Congressional action a Joint Resolution rather than a Concurrent Resolution. This is for constitutional reasons. It does not affect the basic problem.

Jackson’s letter itself makes all the expected arguments in favor of his procedure—shared responsibility between President and Congress, additional leverage for Communist compliance because they have to satisfy not only the President but Congress as well. In the process of making his case, Jackson underplays the Congressional role which we have provided for in our version, i.e., a Congressional veto.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974. Eyes Only. Sonnenfeldt forwarded this memorandum and the enclosed letter from Jackson to Ford, as well as the most recent draft correspondence, in a September 16 memorandum, to prepare Kissinger for his meeting two days later with Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff. “Jackson has apparently told Max Fisher, who has told Garment,” Sonnenfeldt reported, “that the President’s main concern is with technical aspects of the Jackson draft and that the three Senators are willing at once to sit down with Administration representatives to improve the Jackson text so as to preclude (1) any lapse in the authority because of Congressional delays or failure to act, and (2) action by Congress that is not exclusively based on the criteria and considerations in your exchange of correspondence (i.e., extraneous issues of one kind or another).” (Ibid.) Sonnenfeldt also included the same attachments in a September 18 memorandum to prepare Kissinger for his meeting the next day with Gromyko. (Ibid.)

2 See Document 31.
Jackson’s letter reflects his twin suspicions that (1) the President would not hold the Soviets to strict performance standards and (2) that the President would try to use unrelated issues (e.g., a crisis somewhere, or a promising negotiation concurrently in progress) to pressure Congress not to veto even if compliance is inadequate.

As regards the various safeguards written into his legislation to ensure that Congress will in fact act and that the waiver authority will not lapse by default, these are what we had previously seen. They seem to meet those problems as far as mechanics are concerned; just what the legal situation is if Congress nevertheless fails to act is hard to say.

In short, this letter leaves the situation as deadlocked as before, if not more so since Jackson is now on the written record with the arguments for his position.

Apart from the issue of what tactics to follow to break the deadlock or indeed whether to try at this time to break it, there is the question of whether to answer Jackson in writing. I can see nothing to be gained by doing so. If it were nevertheless desired to reply, the question is whether this should be largely in terms of justifying the President’s proposed waiver procedure, or largely in terms of rebutting Jackson’s arguments, or both. I would opt essentially for the former. Or there could be a rather brief acknowledgment noting the Senator’s language and arguments but stressing, with very brief reasons, why the President prefers his own.3

No reply for now
Draft possible reply rebutting Jackson
Draft possible reply arguing for our version
Draft possible reply doing both
Draft possible reply with brief acknowledgment

In terms of Dobrynin, you may want to bring him up to date and tell him we are standing firm on the veto procedure.

3 Kissinger did not indicate any decision on the options.
Attachment

Letter From Senator Henry M. Jackson to President Ford


Dear Mr. President:

I am enclosing a draft of legislative language which, together with the language passed by the House and contained in Title IV of the Trade Reform Act, should satisfy your concern that trade benefits granted to the Soviet Union (or other non-market economies) could, if justified, be extended beyond one year in a timely and expeditious manner and without fear of procedural impediments or delay. At the same time, the President could, of course, decide not to recommend an extension beyond one year; or he could terminate any benefits at any time.

Under this proposed formulation the President would be in a position to extend most-favored-nation treatment to the Soviet Union or other non-market economies by waiving subsections (a) and (b) of Title IV in cases where he determines and reports that “the exercise of such waiver will substantially promote the objectives” of free emigration as defined in Title IV. The assurances that have been conveyed in our draft exchange of correspondence constitute an agreed basis upon which to make and report that determination. According to the enclosed formulation, the President could propose annual extensions of the authority to waive subsections (a) and (b). Congressional action on any such Presidential request would proceed according to carefully drawn procedures which, I am confident you will agree, assure timely and expeditious action.

This formulation will enable a first waiver to be extended without a detailed report. Subsequent requests by the President to have the waiver authority extended for an additional year by joint resolution would have to be reported by the appropriate Congressional committee at least 30 days prior to the date of expiration of the previous one year waiver authority and would become the pending business of the house to which reported. Time for action on the floor would be limited to three days; and, in the event of differences between the houses, a conference report would have to be filed within six days and acted upon within three days after the filing. If for any reason there should be

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4 No classification marking.
5 Enclosed but not printed.
a delay, the President would be enabled to extend by Executive Order for up to 60 days the period of the then existing waiver authority.

In developing this proposed formulation, which effectively rules out legislative delay, we have sought to safeguard your interest in assuring that there would be no unintended interruption in the authority to continue trade benefits. At the same time I believe that the Congress, within which the effort to associate a free flow of people with a free flow of commercial goods originated, should continue to share responsibility for determining that its legislated purpose will be carried out.

The issue before us is this: should the authority to waive the provisions of the “Jackson amendment” continue indefinitely unless rescinded or should it expire after one year (and annually thereafter) unless renewed by safeguarded, affirmative Congressional action?

In my judgment it would be most unwise for the President alone, without further Congressional action, to assume the burden of deciding each year whether an extension of the waiver is merited. It would inevitably weave the issue of compliance with the humanitarian provisions of Title IV into the whole fabric of bilateral international relations covering a great variety of issues and concerns on which the Administration, unlike the Congress, is involved in ongoing negotiations. It would subject the Administration to great pressure to assess the implementation of the understanding on emigration in terms of unrelated issues.

In my judgment the incentives to live up to the agreement would be greatly enhanced by requiring affirmative Congressional action. At the same time, the temptation of a country to fall short in implementing the assurances would be significantly increased if the country in question had to convince only the Administration that it merited a continuation of trade benefits. The role of the Congress would be relegated to an essentially negative one. The requirement of affirmative action to renew the Presidential authority will strengthen the Administration’s hand in securing continuing compliance from the countries in question.

While I am confident that the enclosed formulation guarantees uninterrupted annual re-enactment in cases where the assurances are lived up to, I feel strongly that it is not in the national interest—and certainly not in the humanitarian interest we have sought to secure—to require the Congress, as its only option, to withdraw existing waiver authority from the President in the event of non-compliance. In terms of its impact on our foreign relations there is a great difference between the Congress failing to renew authority, on the one hand, and moving to withdraw it on the other. I hope you will agree that, in the event of non-compliance with the terms of our understanding, it would be far better for Congress to allow the authority to expire than to require that
the Congress be forced to the divisive act of removing continuing authority.  

Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Jackson

6 During a meeting in the Oval Office on September 13, Ford and Kissinger discussed how to proceed on Soviet emigration and the Trade Bill: “Kissinger: The Jackson letter. It is in bad faith. The Soviet Union won’t buy it. I don’t even know if these could stick. President: In the House, one Congress is not bound by the previous Congress. Kissinger: This procedure means that every year we would go through this. Javits thinks it should be a regular veto by one House. President: He told me that. I wouldn’t buy that until we have fought for the other. Kissinger: We could get up a breakfast or just say it is unacceptable and see. President: I would want to know that Ribicoff and Javits are okay. Kissinger: Why don’t I call him and meet again before you meet with them. President: We’ve got to make sure about Javits and Ribicoff. Kissinger: They are afraid to stand up to him. The Jewish community looks okay. President: Can I get the precise language I want before the meeting.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5)

34. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 18, 1974, 8 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The Secretary
Senator Henry Jackson
Senator Jacob Javits
Senator Abraham Ribicoff
Mr. Helmut Sonnenfeldt

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974. Eyes Only. Drafted by Sonnenfeldt. A typed notation indicates that the memorandum was an excerpt of the conversation. The meeting was held in the White House. In an attached memorandum to Eagleburger, Sonnenfeldt reported: “This record should be maintained in a manner so that it can be referred to if this issue should come up later. I have made no distribution, but I assume you will wish to send a copy to Scowcroft in addition to whatever disposition the Secretary wants to make to it here.” Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes of the meeting, including discussion of the proposed waiver and publication of the exchange of correspondence, are ibid., Box 5, Misc. Memcons. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Jackson, Ribicoff, Javits, and Sonnenfeldt for breakfast from 7:48 to 9:03 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968-76)
Kissinger: There are two issues I would like to discuss. The first is the waiver, the second is a moral question. Let me take the second one first.

This has to do with our exchange of letters. I can fully justify my letter to Scoop from our talks with the Soviets—last April in Moscow and then confirmed in June in Moscow at the summit. I can also accept your interpretations as reasonable extrapolations of the points in my letter. But I can't apply this to the numbers. My view is that if they (the Soviets) live up to the understandings and there is a certain number of applicants then the number of applicants should rise substantially over what it was before. But I can't say that the Soviets accept the number (in Jackson's interpretive letter). And I can't be responsible for that number.

(Jackson: There is also the business about the three-year provision for security cases.

Kissinger: Well, I don't have a reaction yet from Dobrynin on that.)

Kissinger: Dobrynin's position is that the letters are my business but that they are consistent with the talks we had with Gromyko and Dobrynin. (Kissinger then mentioned some details of the Kudirka case.)

Kissinger: On the numbers we will do our damndest but we can't take responsibility for the specific number.

Javits: Well, as far as I am concerned the President's pledge is the most important: he will do all he can to get Soviet compliance and he will cut off the trade benefits if necessary.

Kissinger: That we can do. But the number is a different problem.

Ribicoff: It really is up to Scoop. What is he going to say publicly? People do expect a certain number.

Kissinger: Our position is that if there is no harassment, if there are no obstacles to applications then the number should be all right. I have gone over the harassment and related problems with Gromyko and he accepted it all. On numbers he first said (in Geneva) that 45,000 was reasonable assumption. Then two weeks later he confirmed it in Cyprus. But then in Moscow at the summit he said a number is not compatible with their self-respect, and he refused to give a number.

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Javits: Well, we need a figure so we can make a judgment. The Soviets must not stop after say 100,000 have come out.

Kissinger: That is true. Lowell says he has pretty good information on total numbers and on what is happening. That is of course unless they cut off telephone communications.

Jackson: Yes. But if communications break down, it would be very bad.

Kissinger: That’s right.

Javits: I can justify the arrangement we have made to the Jewish Community—and remember I am up for election.

Ribicoff: Well and we three will be here if the Russians violate it. (Scoop gets re-elected with 80% plus and Jack and I will be back.)

Kissinger: All of us will be here.

Jackson: What was it that Gromyko said about the 45,000?

Kissinger: That it was a reasonable estimate.

Javits: But we don’t want a quota. That has a bad connotation and goes back to the old business of restrictive quotas.

Jackson: That is why we wrote it the way we did.

Kissinger: Well, I will raise the whole issue again when Gromyko comes this week: the numbers, the three years on security cases.

(Other discussion dealt with the waiver issue and the problem of whether and how to publish the exchange of correspondence.)
35. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 20, 1974, 10:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Senator Henry Jackson
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: It's now down to the last stakes. I appreciate your letter and I have asked Secretary Kissinger to study your suggestion.

The practical problem we face as Americans is that we both want the Trade Bill and Jewish Emigration as high as possible. I think we face two alternatives; one is very good and one is very bad. The worst is if there is no Trade Bill—we would not be able to negotiate with other nations around the world—and to have Jewish emigration turned off. The best thing is the Trade Bill and emigration without harassment with a friendly attitude from the Soviets.

Kissinger: And this you could confirm again with Gromyko.

President: I have had it from Brezhnev through Dobrynin and will do it this morning.

We would have the right to negotiate and to give them MFN without the uncertainty as to what Congress will do substantively and procedurally. But there are smart people up there who can use parliamentary details to stall things. Yours is complicated and highly technical and people would invariably take advantage of it.

The furthest I can go is to submit a report each year straight from the shoulder. If it isn’t up to standard I will cut it off, but if I don’t, Congress could come with an affirmative vote that the report is not adequate.

Jackson: The ExIm Bank has passed the information around saying we can have credits without the Trade Bill.

To go back a moment, after I sent the letter I went to the Parliamentarian and I think I have a rascal-proof arrangement. I know your conc-

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 5. Top Secret. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Jackson and Kissinger until 11 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

2 See the attachment to Document 33.
cern, and in the spirit of compromise I have drafted something. What this could change is to have our expiration date of April 1, 1976—that would give you a full 18 months. We have limited debate, etc., and provided for a final debate by which it must be voted up or down. This would force adjudication by the House and Senate. I think this would do it. Labor is out to kill the bill, and they will do it if we don’t retain some authority.

The only other item is the length of time they can delay in “national security” cases. I would like to have it three years but I could go to four.

Kissinger: The Soviet Union has said it wouldn’t be more than one percent of the total. I mentioned three years to them and they haven’t answered.

Jackson: Let’s leave it at three. I suggest we sit down and hammer out this draft. We must retain some authority. I’ve gone as far as I can. I am under pressure. I agree there must be a final date for action.

President: That gets back to this: If they modify the rules to accommodate this, they can change the rules back. I can’t veto rules changes. I would have nothing to say about rules.

The Congress would have control under our proposal. They can move in in a set period to veto my recommendation. Look what happened yesterday on the pay matter. I want to make both Houses veto, but I will accept a one-House veto but can’t accept affirmative action by Congress. That produces too much uncertainty and indecision.

To show our flexibility, I would accept a one-House veto. I am going a long way by this. Look what they did yesterday. This shows they can certainly do it on MFN. You can be guaranteed a veto and I will go half way and say only one House. This is an established procedure. Congress understands and accepts this way.

Jackson: I want to get it settled. Look at the Soviet Union running bulldozers through the art exhibit. I see trouble ahead on this. I see clashes, and the question of duress, and harassment. I see problems for both of us.

Kissinger: I agree with Scoop.

President: You could have a hell of a speech defending my plan and using the example of yesterday.

3 On September 19, the Senate rejected the President’s proposal to combat inflation by delaying for 3 months a pay increase for Federal government employees.

4 On September 15, Soviet officials used bulldozers and other vehicles to disperse an unauthorized outdoor exhibit of non-conformist art in Moscow.
Jackson: We need more than one half the Congress on ExIm.\(^5\) We took away the veto.

Kissinger: The ceiling bothered us more than the veto.

Jackson: We really worked on this; we had a terrible time. We took out the veto. You have to submit it to the Senate. That veto really would have limited your flexibility. Another would have killed the whole thing. Schweiker\(^6\) wanted the going interest rate. The mood is bad and I must deal with it. What we need to finish in the draft is a final date certain. I see complaints that we have delegated our authority. It is a question of the will of Congress. I understand your position, but I think you are in need of having your hand strengthened by my proposal.

President: I don’t mind the heat. I’ll take it when I submit the report with my recommendation. Congress would keep control. Look at the pay thing. All I can do is recommend. Congress has negated what I proposed. This is an established procedure and it works. It guarantees a veto and, following this concept, insures that we don’t put something over on you.

Jackson: Our concern in the Senate is retaining control. This would give an 18-month trial period; we have protected the credits, and I think we should give my plan a trial. We are so close to a solution.

President: I agree, and we could end up with the worst of both.

Jackson: The feeling on credits in this country is really bad; with the credit situation in this country. Word of the projects proposed would really rile the country. It cuts party lines across the board. The Soviet Union will get credits, and then this bulldozer thing.

Kissinger: You will see Schmidt offering large credits when he goes to Moscow.

Jackson: There is a gap between us and Europe. They can’t get our technical forces in Europe.

President: I would hate to have this collapse over the Soviet Union and credits when we need it for broader progress. We can control the

\(^5\) In a memorandum to Kissinger on September 17, Linwood Holton, Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations, reported that Jackson and other Senators had reached agreement on draft legislation to authorize an extension of the Export-Import Bank, abandoning a Congressional veto on credits but imposing a $300 million sub-ceiling on loans to the Soviet Union for two years. “It is our judgment,” Holton concluded, “that this is the best we can hope for out of the Senate and, in fact, is better than we expected to get. We retain our freedom of action in the conference and are strengthened by the fact that the House conferees are well disposed toward our position. There is a reasonable chance, for example, that the sub-ceiling for the Soviet Union can be dropped in the conference.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 8ID286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974) The Senate passed the legislation on September 19.

\(^6\) Senator Richard S. Schweiker (Republican, Pennsylvania).
credits. Don’t forget the Soviet Union can turn off emigration tomorrow.

Jackson: The Soviet Union is in deep economic trouble. We have the chips—the gap between us in science, technology, and business management. It is terrible.

Kissinger: But that is not remedied by any amount of help. You know, their system requires them to specify production goals of, say, locomotives by weight or by number. They base everything on quotas, and so they produce as little as possible to keep quota low, and they stockpile materials.

Jackson: They still have terrible agricultural problems.

I have tried to get movement with this proposal. Let me think over the weekend if there is anything else we can do.

Kissinger: It would be good to do it while Gromyko is here.

Jackson: I hope we can act. We ought to act on Rockefeller too.7 We will, I hope. The House will.

President: Peter [Brennan]8 said he would do his best.

Jackson: I am trying to calm labor down. Meany and Abel9 are both up tight. It is a Commie issue. The clothing workers—that affects Javits. They want a Congressional tether.

President: Why don’t you take credit for having it so that it only takes action by just one House?

Jackson: That isn’t really the issue. Most of them think the Soviet Union just can’t do those things and they want a short string on it. I think we’ll have problems—not with people who get headlines—but the little people.

President: But they can turn it on and off. They will be tough if one doesn’t take some affirmative action.

Jackson: Tell Gromyko I played a key role in keeping out with the veto on credits. The credits are what matters—MFN is just face. This gives you the opportunity to negotiate with the Soviet Union.

President: Please think it over. We have made a big concession.

Jackson: I think I have too. We will talk over the weekend.10

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7 On August 20, Ford nominated Nelson A. Rockefeller, Governor of New York, to be his Vice President. After extended hearings in Congress, the Senate approved the nomination on December 11; the House on December 19. Rockefeller was sworn in later that day.

8 Secretary of Labor.

9 I. W. Abel, President of the United Steel Workers of America.

10 No record of a meeting has been found.
36. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko

Background

This meeting will be of considerable importance for the next phase of Soviet-American relations. Soviet policy is in a sort of holding pattern: there are a number of indications that they are uncertain about the course of Soviet-American relations; for their part, they are hesitant to take initiatives that might suggest a détente is more important to them than to us or to reinforce their public commitment to “détente.” There may well be divided counsels in Moscow in the wake of the change in the US Administration. Our own debate on the benefits of détente probably has its counterpart in Moscow. Thus, Gromyko’s report to the Politburo on his impression of your policy will carry great weight.

Despite some apprehensions in Moscow, the factors that lead the Soviet Union to the present stage in relations with us—economic problems at home, the risks of strategic competition, and the dangers of tension on both the Soviet Union’s European and China front—are still operative and work to limit any major swings in policy. Moreover, Brezhnev’s personal position is linked to proving the improvement of relations with the US has been justified, and thus should be maintained and expanded. We are therefore not the supplicants; there are at least equal pressures on the Soviet Union to make further progress.

A wide variety of issues with the USSR, whose outcome will determine relations between now and the next summit, are now in flux: the Conference on European Security, the talks on mutual force reductions in Central Europe, and the Geneva SALT talks are resuming, and a US delegation will go to Moscow in early October to discuss the issues involved in permitting peaceful nuclear explosions in a manner compatible with the new treaty limiting the threshold of underground nuclear weapons tests as of March 31, 1976. The resolution of the Trade Bill and Jewish emigration question, of course, are of critical importance for the

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 16, USSR (2). Secret; Sensitive. The date, September 20, 1974, is handwritten at the top of the memorandum. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt forwarded it to Kissinger for approval on September 18. An attached access control form indicates that the President saw Kissinger’s memorandum.
Soviets. And the further course of Middle East diplomacy and a Cyprus settlement will confront us with potentially explosive issues in Soviet-American relations. Each of these issues will be dealt with on their merits; progress will be uneven; taken together, however, they constitute the hard core of Soviet-American relations and a test of whether we can move ahead. Because we are confronted with difficult and interrelated issues in European security and arms control there is a risk of a general stalemate. Added to this possibility is the fact that in both the Middle East and Cyprus our policies must be designed to keep Soviet involvement to a minimum.

Your Objectives

There are no concrete issues that must be settled in your discussions with Gromyko, though it would be desirable to get the Trade Bill resolved while he is here. Your objectives are: (1) to reassure Gromyko, and through him Brezhnev, that the general direction of our policy has not changed; but (2) to impress upon him that the Soviet Union bears a burden for moving ahead in critical areas such as the arms control issues—in other words, you will be looking for signs of continuing Soviet interest, especially in SALT negotiations and the talks on force reductions in Central Europe.

—In SALT, our aim is to achieve agreements at the highest level for a 1985 agreement which can then be negotiated in detail in Geneva. This will be the aim of my trip to Moscow.

—In the Vienna talks on reducing armed forces in Central Europe, we want a breakthrough and we may offer a new package that will include some reductions in nuclear forces, either in a first phase reduction of Soviet-US forces or in a subsequent phase when European forces are cut; the quid pro quo we would want is Soviet agreement to begin the process with US-Soviet reductions of about 5–10 percent.

—We are not pressing in the European Security Conference (CSCE), because of Allied hesitations; we may use the deadlock as leverage for Soviet action in the force reductions talks. We can agree to an early conclusion of the European Conference (probably early next year) and a final meeting at the summit level, but our position is that we need to show simultaneous progress in mutual force reductions, lest the Soviets achieve a pan-European sanction of the political and territorial in Europe, while maintaining their massive military presence in East Europe. (Although the Europeans display toughness on these issues, they are quite soft: Schmidt will almost certainly agree to a CSCE summit-level conclusion when he goes to Moscow in October.)

—In the Middle East, we are trying to combat Soviet meddling; they are pushing recognition of a Palestinian state and Palestinian participation in a resumed Geneva Conference; they know this disrupts
the negotiating process and makes the strategy of step by step disengagement extremely difficult. Their aim, of course, is to reconvene the Geneva talks, where they can influence the situation, and press for a final solution, which can only maintain tensions. We want to avoid any commitment to return to Geneva, or act in complete unison with Moscow.

—Similarly, in Cyprus, we want to keep the Soviets out of the mainstream; they want a UN conference of Security Council members and the interested parties, a settlement that maintains the neutral status of Cyprus, and a Soviet-American guarantee of the Island’s status—which gives Moscow a right to political intervention.

**Gromyko’s Objectives**

It is doubtful that Gromyko will go into the details of various issues. He will probably make a general presentation on the desirability of continued détente. He will look for you to do likewise. However, he may have instructions to propose an early meeting with Brezhnev, as suggested in recent communications in your channel.

He will almost certainly stress the need for joint or parallel action in the Middle East, and on Cyprus; his main theme will be that the US pays lip service to cooperation with the USSR, but in practice follows an independent course.

—He will complain of the “tyranny of the minor powers” in blocking the completion of the European Security Conference; he may claim he already has Chancellor Schmidt’s agreement, during Gromyko’s stopover in Bonn,2 to a completion of the Conference by the end of the year with a final summit meeting.

—He will take the position that in European force reductions, we are being unrealistic in expecting disproportionate Soviet or Warsaw Pact reductions that would change the “correlation” of forces, and that any cuts must be taken by all the countries involved, and apply to all forces, ground and air, and that the process could start with a symbolic reduction of 20,000 on each side.

—On SALT, he may not have any fresh ideas or instructions; he will claim that it is up to us to explain what we want in a 1985 agreement because it was our initiative; he will probably say that there are factors outside of the negotiations—the position of third countries—that have to be taken into account (i.e., giving compensation to the USSR for China, France and the UK), and that our geographical advantage in forward basing is a key concern in Moscow that cannot be ignored.

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2 Gromyko arrived in Bonn on September 15 for 2 days of talks with Schmidt and Genscher on European security, economic relations, and Berlin.
—On economic relations, his main point will be that there are major cooperative projects that the US could join—exploitation of natural gas and oil reserves in the USSR—and even the possibilities for large Soviet purchases of US consumer goods, but that we are blocking progress by linking it to internal affairs; he will avoid detailed formal commitments, and be very chary of explicit assurances on the rate of Jewish emigration, though the Kremlin obviously understands the general arrangements we have been discussing. Gromyko should be prepared to confirm Brezhnev’s assurances that there will be no impediments to emigration.

He will not expect detailed agreements with you on any of these issues, but he will interpret your responses as an indication of your general attitude toward “détente.”

**US Strategy**

Our strategy has been to induce a prolonged period of restraint in Soviet international conduct by constructing a series of incentives for such conduct while at the same time keeping the penalties high for regression from it.

The Soviets themselves have seemed to have no precise strategy and have operated opportunistically, testing our resolve in some instances and trying to tempt us with piecemeal negotiations in others.

We have no illusion that the Soviets see any period of relaxation as a permanent change. Our calculation is that through a combination of benefits, incentives and threatened penalties we might over time make it increasingly hard for a Soviet leadership to revert to openly aggressive international behavior.

Almost certainly, our opening to China, while rousing their suspicions, confirmed the Soviets in the broad decisions they took in early 1971 since it raised the spectre of a US-Chinese combination against the USSR. It remains one of our principal sources of strength in dealing with Moscow.

As the Soviets have moderated their conduct in crisis areas and showed a readiness to negotiate seriously on major issues—e.g., SALT, Berlin—we have proceeded to implement our strategy of “linkage” by agreeing to negotiate a series of bilateral cooperative agreements on one or another aspect of science and technology and on trade in which the Soviets were interested. This broad network of negotiations was intended to stimulate interest in détente among the various constituencies that make up Brezhnev’s political base.

Brezhnev himself, we have found, had developed a considerable stake in relations with us and we gave this impetus through the summit meetings and an active personal exchange in confidential communications channels, as well as by a series of broad principles defining our re-
lations with which Brezhnev was personally identified in solemn ceremonies.

The problem we face now in pursuing this strategy is that from the Soviet standpoint the results of the last two years of détente look increasingly questionable: in the Middle East a combination of inept Soviet policies, deep-seated Arab suspicions and US diplomacy have led to significant reductions in Soviet influence; in Europe, our Alliance relations have recently been solidified; despite their best efforts, the Soviets have not succeeded in achieving any appreciable reduction of US military power around their periphery; in their bilateral relations with us, our inability thus far to go beyond rather modest trading relations is clearly disappointing to Moscow; and in relations with the West generally, the Soviets have encountered increasing pressure on them to modify their domestic system as the price for continuing détente.

In short, that element in our strategy which was intended to provide continuing incentives for the Soviets to remain on a course of restraint has been brought into question.

The issue here is not whether to provide the Soviets with unilateral benefits, but whether to maintain a balance in our policy whereby the Soviets will see continuing advantage in restraint rather than meeting with frustration in all their major objectives. If the latter were to happen we could easily witness a reversion to more rigid policies and to more active pressures against us and our Allies which Western societies are not in the best shape at present to deal with.

At this stage in our relations, therefore, our strategy will have to emphasize the incentives for continued conciliation. We need to hold out promise for expanding economic relations, and use our EX-IM credits, to the extent Congress permits, as a flexible instrument for encouraging the trends in Soviet policy we favor, and similarly to hold back from commitments when Soviet behavior warrants it. In addition, on those areas where we have some freedom of action—in SALT, in the force reduction talks, and in the European Conference—we need to establish a general interrelationship to maximize our bargaining leverage and ensure an outcome that protects our interests.

Thus, in the coming phase we will stress the need for simultaneous progress in European security, both politically in the European Conference, and militarily in the Vienna force reduction talks. The concession we may make in the force reduction talks—i.e., including some reduction of nuclear forces—should be exploited first in the SALT talks to end the debate on our forward based systems. Moreover, in SALT, we will have to make a proposal that is as realistic as possible, rather than a set of maximum demands from which we will inevitably scale down.

The reason for this tactical scenario is that by late fall we may face another Middle East crisis—and by then we want the Soviets to be
deeply engaged in a diplomatic process with us that will ensure, to the extent possible, their moderation in the Middle East. As part of this strategy, we will emphasize that another summit is planned and that, as its predecessors, it will be an opportunity to bring together a number of issues for high level review and resolution.

[Omitted here are talking points for Ford’s meeting with Gromyko.]

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37. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 20, 1974, 11:10 a.m.

SUBJECT

Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Call on President Ford

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Side

Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

U.S. Side

The President
Secretary Kissinger
Ambassador Stoessel

The President: It is very nice to have you here, Mr. Foreign Minister, so that we can get better acquainted and can talk about serious things.

Gromyko: First, let’s agree that half of the conversation will be through the interpreter. I don’t need an interpreter when you speak,
but I will speak through an interpreter. Let’s also agree—since we have a number of questions to exchange views on—to take them up one after the other. Of course, we can comment as we wish on each question.

The President: That sounds fine.

Gromyko: First, I would like to begin by transmitting to you, Mr. President, the greetings and best wishes of Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The President: Thank you. I was very grateful for his message\(^2\) and I look forward to meeting him.

Gromyko: Yes, I agree that the message was good and that it sheds light on the general situation with regard to relations between our two countries. I hope you noticed the evidence in that message of the permanency of our line of policy toward the US.

In connection with the changes which took place in the US leadership, we asked ourselves within our leadership—and this was true personally of Mr. Brezhnev—whether the US would hold to its line of policy toward the Soviet Union which it had adopted in recent years or whether there would be some changes. I should add that we noted your message,\(^3\) Mr. President, to Leonid Brezhnev, and your public statements, and we came to the conclusion that your line aimed at détente and improving relations with the Soviet Union probably will not change. I would appreciate it if you could confirm this.

Regarding our own policy, it remains as it has been with regard to US-Soviet relations. This has been expressed in the joint documents approved by our two countries and is aimed at achieving détente in our relations.

The Secretary: Mr. President, you may have noted that the Foreign Minister said our line “probably will not change.” He is not a man given to rash statements. (The Secretary recalled an incident which took place last year at the UN Secretary General’s dinner for the Security Council.) Sometime, I would like to hear one unqualified statement from Mr. Gromyko. He has a diabolical ability to phrase double negatives. I’m too obvious about this, but he is not.

The President: As Ambassador Dobrynin and his predecessor knew, I was a hardliner in Congress in 1949. But I want to emphasize that, as our new relations developed under the label of détente, and as I became acquainted with the benefits of this policy to our two countries and to the whole world, I changed my views. I want to assure you, Mr. Foreign Minister, that I will continue the policy of President Nixon.

\(^{2}\) Document 7.

\(^{3}\) Document 4.
You noted correctly that in my speech to the Congress I emphasized my support of this policy and I wish to reiterate that. I thought it would never be possible to develop it, but I support it. It has been very effectively developed by Secretary Kissinger and we will continue this.

I don’t have to tell you that we are most fortunate to have Henry Kissinger as Secretary of State. He has convinced me about our policy toward the Soviet Union and of the importance of building on the new relationship. I feel we have a good basis on which to build and good prospects for the future. You should know that my relations with Secretary Kissinger are close and I back him fully.

Gromyko: I have listened to your statement with satisfaction, Mr. President. It is quite natural that what interests us first and foremost is the political line of US policy toward the Soviet Union. We consider this most important; it is the soul of the relations between our two countries. We’ve seen ups and downs over many years—over 50 years—and we have experienced periods of lessening of tensions and of increasing tensions. However, in the last several years, we have noted that our relations have evened out and have shown more stability. It is not that we are on a smooth, paved road; maybe there will be problems in the future in connection with our assessments of the phenomena of political life, but it is true to say that what has happened in our relations is historic and has never happened before. Of course, we worked together in World War II, but this was a special period. The level of our relations which we have achieved is of paramount importance, especially considering the role we two great powers are destined to play in the world. Therefore, we can only hear your statement with pleasure. If this line indeed will be observed, then we can look with confidence toward the future.

The President: Our line will continue from our point of view, and I gather the same is true from your point of view. We won’t be able to solve all problems. As you know, we have some difficulties domestically in the United States about our policy, but, overall, our people feel that our policy toward the Soviet Union and our relationship with you have been beneficial. I feel the American people will support me in this policy.

Gromyko: Now I would like to go to some concrete problems. As you know, the Soviet Union and the United States on several occasions have emphasized the significance of restraint in regard to the arms race. This is a big problem involving the military and security interests of both sides. In recent years, this problem has been a central issue between the US and the Soviet Union. It has attracted the attention not

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4 See footnote 7, Document 12.
just of our peoples in general but also the leadership on both sides. It is regarded as the most topical and the most important of the problems between us.

Much has been done in regard to this question already. You of course are familiar with the accords which have been reached between us. They are important for our two countries and also for the world. I want to say that our interest in finding ways to solve this problem has not lessened.

You probably have heard of our statements made at various levels, and especially at the highest level, on this subject, particularly in connection with the high-level US-Soviet meetings. We believe that serious efforts are required to achieve agreement where this has not yet been achieved. This means that all possible preparations should be made for further agreements, in particular to replace the Interim Agreement in the period after 1977.

We know you are working on this question. Talks took place between Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev and also on the highest level at the last summit meeting. We are ready and fully determined to move forward to find common grounds for an agreement on this major problem.

This is a complex question and I am sure you also are aware of the complexity. It affects the fundamental interests and security of both the US and the Soviet Union. Therefore, the work which must be done must be detailed and subtle; it will take patience and a broad outlook to find a solution acceptable to both countries.

In discussing this, I don’t plan to set forth any detailed scheme or numbers. I don’t know if you have such details either; if you did, we would gladly hear them. But I wish to emphasize the need for both sides to prepare thoroughly. Any agreement must take into account on an equal basis the interests of both sides so that there will be no harm to the security of either side. This is the cornerstone of any agreement in this field. If this is observed, then there will be a good chance of finding agreement.

I want to express our determination to continue and to redouble our efforts to find a solution on those aspects of the problems where there has not yet been a solution. We will do everything possible to find such a solution. We hope the US will act in the same way.

We know that you have various shades of opinion in the US on this subject. This is obvious to anyone who reads the press. It is you, Mr. President, who must bring all of this down to a common denominator. It is for you to decide. We know that we are dealing with the President of the United States. We assume the US will be guided by the principle of equal security for both sides. This must be the basis for any agreement, that neither side will be harmed by an agreement.
I don’t want to go into more detail at this time on this subject. There are many factors to be taken into account. One of them is geography. Also, so far there are only two of us dealing with this subject. You and we can talk and try to find an agreement, but other states are sitting and watching us. There are some who criticize one or the other of us, and some don’t even like either side. This complicates the situation.

We could be pessimistic or fatalistic about the outcome, but we are not. We believe there is the possibility of an agreement which would be acceptable to both sides.

The President: There is no diminution on our side of the desire to make progress. We want to double and redouble our efforts. We feel we can handle the problem of the Interim Agreement and achieve a longer term agreement.

I’m in the process of working with the Secretary and others to determine a position which will be safe for both countries yet will be aimed at reducing the problem of destabilization which would occur if both of us went down the path of developing more arms.

As you know, Secretary Kissinger will be going to Moscow.

The Secretary: They don’t seem to want me—they can’t agree on a date. Sometime around the end of October or early November seems probable.

Gromyko: We do want him!

The President: I hope he can lay the foundation for a longer term agreement which can be worked out in the course of the next 12 months.

I am faced with a domestic problem. I feel the US people want real progress on the arms question. If I didn’t feel that we could make progress, my actions regarding the military budget which I must submit in December would be different. But I am reassured by what you say, Mr. Foreign Minister, and my recommendations to Congress will be different. If I were disappointed in your position, I would have to take a stronger line. But on the basis of your assurances and the prospects of progress, it will be easier for me to convince the US Congress and the people that we can get results.

The Secretary: And, of course, much will depend on what we can accomplish in Moscow in October.

The President: Yes, as well as in the arms negotiations. I have to think of dollar appropriations and details. If Henry comes back from Moscow with concrete results, it will be most important and helpful.

Gromyko: On both sides, let us give earnest thought to this. We should endeavor to get a longer term agreement, at least to 1985. This
could ease the situation and would help in considering variants of a solution; this is why we agreed to this approach at the last summit.

At some point, all of this must be reduced to concrete figures. This is a crucial and topical issue. It is of paramount importance that the principle of no harm to the security of either side will be observed closely.

We’ll be prepared to discuss all of this in detail with Secretary Kissinger in Moscow.

The Secretary: Mr. President, I’ve told Ambassador Dobrynin on your behalf of our general approach. We will discuss a rough order of magnitude. It is conceivable that you and the General Secretary could then announce this in Vladivostok when you meet toward the end of November. Then, when Mr. Brezhnev comes here next June an agreement could be concluded. This could also fit into your Congressional schedule. Before you go to Vladivostok there would be concrete progress going beyond general statements. This would anchor the policy in the public mind before rational debate becomes difficult in the period preceding the 1976 elections.

The President: That is correct. It would be better to achieve an agreement in a non-election year. If we could achieve it in May or June, based on Dr. Kissinger’s trip and my own meeting, then it would be out of the political arena.

The Secretary: Practically speaking, we won’t have an agreement in June unless there is agreement in principle in November.

On two occasions, we’ve attempted to achieve rapid agreement on SALT. This is too difficult a procedure. If we can’t get an agreement in principle, then we can’t get agreement in 1975.

The President: And we can’t get it in 1976.

The Secretary: Those are the realities.

Gromyko: It follows from what the President and the Secretary have said that we must seriously try to find a solution. We are prepared to do this and we trust the US is also. If, before my departure from the US, you have any more details to offer—some kind of preliminary material for discussion—we would hear them with interest. This would facilitate consideration of the matter before the Secretary comes to Moscow.

The Secretary: Maybe we could discuss this next Tuesday\(^5\) night at dinner in a very preliminary way. This would be just a concept.

Gromyko: What we need is something material, which can be touched.

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\(^5\) September 24.
The Secretary: You see, Mr. President, he’s on his good behavior!
I have told the President, Mr. Foreign Minister, that you are a man of great ability, a tough negotiator, but also completely reliable.

The President: And also that you are the best professional in the business.

Gromyko: Now I would like to touch on European affairs, including European security. Much has been done by the US and the Soviet Union acting together with regard to policy concerning Europe.

The President: I agree. I also feel there are areas where we could make more progress, but please proceed.

Gromyko: There was a time in the history of our relations when we were partners in a joint struggle against the aggressor and we shed blood for a common cause. This is imbedded in human memory and always will be. Now, we have reached a level which shows the advantage of cooperation between the Soviet Union and the US in connection with European security in our own interest and in the general interest of other countries. This should not be weakened in any way and nothing should be allowed to disturb this. We feel that together we can do much more which would entirely meet the interests of strengthening European security and improving our own relations.

First, about the conference on European security and the successful completion of its work with positive results. As you know, the second stage is now in progress in Geneva. I would like to say, for the Soviet leadership and for Leonid Brezhnev personally, that we attach great importance to finishing the work of the conference with positive results.

However, we see some artificial and unjustified delays in the conference. We feel that the completion of the conference, and especially holding the third phase at the highest level, would give a new impulse to security in Europe as well as to US-Soviet relations.

We know that some say that the US and the Soviets are acting together in unison. Even if people do say this, we don’t feel we should give up our cooperation or sacrifice the advantages which could accrue from such cooperation.

Secretary Kissinger can confirm that when we have reached an agreement and find a common language, then things move forward as a rule. But when we don’t have agreement, then there is no progress, and we go in circles.

Lately, there have been some hitches in our cooperation in Geneva. We ask ourselves whether this means a change in US policy about what has been agreed or whether this is a chance occurrence. We would like to work for a successful completion of the conference with good results. We would like to urge you to cooperate with the Soviet Union to bring
the conference to a successful conclusion. We have many other things to do after the conference and we want to get to them.

The Secretary: I think Ambassador Dobrynin has a microphone in our office!

The President: When I said that we could do more, I had in mind the security conference and also the force reduction talks. I feel we can work together even better than we did in the war. I am not familiar with the difficulties you mentioned at Geneva, although I know there are some problems about Basket III.

The Secretary: I will talk at lunch with the Foreign Minister about this. The trouble, Mr. President, is with our European allies. Speaking very frankly, every country wants to extract something from the Soviet Union. I've told all of them that the Soviet Union won't be overthrown without noticing it, and certainly not because of things like increased circulation of newspapers and so on. I don't know how many projects have been submitted in Basket III, but there is a big pile. We've tried to reduce that and to explain to our allies that the Soviet Union has difficulty in making concessions on one issue when it doesn't know what else it may be asked to concede on.

We've had enormous difficulties with our friends to get one document; now they are going through all of the projects and reading them. There is no deliberate policy on our part to slow down the conference. We remain on the course as we discussed it at the summit.

This whole thing is one of the weirdest negotiations I have ever seen. I talked with one foreign minister in Europe and said we needed one position. I didn't care what it was, but we needed one position. He objected that the Russians would find out about it. But, of course, that's the point—we want them to!

We do need more flexibility from the Soviet side, but I also see the Foreign Minister's problem. He has to know what he is dealing with.

Gromyko: Two or three issues at Geneva have become barriers which have not yet been surmounted.

First is the inviolability of frontiers. We have been in agreement with the US on this going back to the time of Kennedy. Of course, Roosevelt's position on this was known. At the conference in Geneva, everyone agreed on one formula. But lately, we have heard that some don't like this formula and we have heard that the US wanted to change it.

The Secretary: That's not true!

Gromyko: We should talk further about this matter.

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6 See Document 38.
Second is the question of military movements. Some countries want us to build a great accounting house and to devote all of our efforts to this so that when one division moves from one place to another we can report on it, as if we had nothing else to do. What does this have to do with security in the present day—what does this contribute to confidence? Initially, we knew Secretary Kissinger’s position on this, but at Geneva, unfortunately, the voice of the US has not been heard. I repeat, that the movement of one or two divisions from one point to another does not affect the real security of a country.

I think the US is under pressure from Luxembourg on this.

The Secretary: We see you are being pressed by Bulgaria!

Gromyko: A country like West Germany, for obvious reasons, is cautious on this and other similar questions. However, they say that we might solve this question with a voluntary exchange of observers on the basis of reciprocity. The Germans mentioned this to me in Bonn in passing.

To conclude on this point, we hope we can work more closely together and achieve greater mutual understanding at the conference.

The Secretary: On the security conference, I would say, first, that you have to be a Talmudic student to understand it. On the question of the inviolability of frontiers, this is a German issue and not a problem for the US. Following the change of government in Germany—in which Eastern Europe was not totally uninvolved—they asked for a change. We gave two versions to you but didn’t get an answer.

On troop movements, the issue is the size of the unit and the area. It is no secret that our means of information are better than those of our allies.

Gromyko: We proceed from that assumption.

The Secretary: This is primarily a European problem. We don’t know what the Germans said to you. If they come to us there will be no problem. I have had instructions from the President to work on the basis of our previous understanding.

The President: That is right. There is no change in our policy. The lack of progress on Basket III seems to be holding things up.

The Secretary: If we could get something on these other points, it might help on Basket III.

Gromyko: On Basket III, I have always favored shaking some things out of the basket, but I believe the issues essentially have been resolved.

The Secretary: Some of our allies have to show that they have extorted from you what you already have agreed to.

Gromyko: Now about the reduction of forces and the Vienna talks. This is a very important issue. You agree that it is complicated and we
feel it is, too. Its solution obviously requires time and I feel our efforts should continue. But we believe the Western participants must give up the idea of some kind of a common ceiling for forces on both sides. Some say they don’t like Soviet tanks in Europe. They say there are too many of them and that we should withdraw a full tank division. We should take 1700 out.

The Secretary: I’m for it!

Gromyko: The Western participants say we should reduce our forces twice as much as reductions on the Western side. But they refuse to reduce their air force, nuclear arms and bases in Western Europe. We could demand that these be removed, but we don’t take that approach.

We should scrupulously observe the principle of no harm to the security of either side and we should preserve the co-relation of forces in Western Europe today.

We favor a reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. We should go in this direction. We should make the best effort we can.

The Western participants say that only the US and Soviets should reduce and the others should be left as they are. Reductions for them would come in the indefinite future in a second phase. There is nothing precise about this and no figures are given. Everything will be subject to negotiations.

We should think more about all of this. Perhaps in the next meeting with Secretary Kissinger we could try to find a new approach to the whole problem which would serve our common interests.

The President: As I recall, we offered to take out 29,000; you should take out 68,000. I also recall that the Soviet Union talked in terms of a 5% reduction.

The Secretary: The Soviet Union has gone through an evolution on this point. In the Brezhnev–Nixon meeting in 1973, Brezhnev proposed a rapid 5% reduction to get things started. Since then, the Soviet position has evolved in a more complicated way.

Gromyko: Brezhnev’s suggestion did not constitute a broad program of action. It covered only a partial aspect. It was an illustration of the possible dimension of a first step involving US and Soviet forces.

If the US and Soviet sides reduce, it won’t help if the others increase their forces.

The Secretary: But the Foreign Minister knows that if we reduce, there must be a ceiling on the forces of the others. Whatever either of us reduces cannot be replaced by increases by the others.

Gromyko: It is not enough to talk about US-Soviet reductions and a concurrent freeze of the others. We should agree on a definite stage for the reduction of the forces of the other countries.
Also, a first step reduction of US-Soviet forces with concurrent conditions poses very complicated problems. In subsequent meetings we should discuss this.

The Secretary: The President met with Stanley Resor on Saturday and you can also read what I said in my testimony yesterday. It is hard to attest to the success of détente if armed forces are always going up.

All of this really doesn’t make much difference in practical terms. However, we are looking at new approaches.

Gromyko: Your argument works both ways.

The President: I am glad you brought this question up. We are interested in new approaches and this is something we should discuss later.

Gromyko: About the Middle East. Our concern about events there has been rising lately. We are apprehensive that the present period might be a prelude to a flare up of fighting. It would be useful if we could coordinate our efforts. We know that the US doesn’t always take a positive view in practice of our suggestions for cooperation. But we are realists. We want a firm peace in the Middle East and neither of us should fear coordination of our efforts.

Concretely we would be grateful if you could give us answers to two questions.

First, how does the United States Government now assess the situation in the Middle East? Should the Arab countries continue to be occupied or should Israel withdraw?

Secondly, about Palestine. Does the US recognize the just Palestinian aspirations for their own national statehood? I don’t want to discuss where this might be.

We’ve both acknowledged the need for our two countries to cooperate. The Middle East constitutes a big problem which affects our relations. Your comments would be of significance for the meeting in Vladivostok and for Secretary Kissinger’s talks in Moscow.

The President: It is obvious that we both have an interest in resolving the issues which have arisen in the Middle East. Both of us have tried to prevent or solve the problems there in the past. What we have to do in order to work together is to receive concrete views from you about how to solve specific problems. For example, between Israel and Jordan, between Israel and Syria, or the Palestinian question.

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8 See footnote 3, Document 28.
If we are to work together, we need your concrete suggestions so that we can then decide how to approach a solution of these problems.

In this kind of exchange today I don’t want to go into details about frontier lines or about Palestine. Dr. Kissinger can get into these matters. On Palestine, of course, there is the problem of the Palestinian view versus the Jordanian view.

Our assessment of the situation is that it could be very serious. It could erupt. We will use our maximum influence to prevent this. We will welcome working more closely with you to this end. To solve the territorial problems and to recognize the rights of others, we need something more concrete from you.

Gromyko: Thank you for your comments. The problem is really a very serious one and I hope we will be able to discuss it later with Dr. Kissinger. I favor continued cooperation with the US in this matter. We don’t quite understand why the US is reticent about cooperation with the Soviet Union in the Middle East. We feel it would be in the interest of both our countries. Also, we can’t retreat from our position of principle about the complete withdrawal of Israel from occupied lands.

As far as Israel itself is concerned, we have said many times we favor the continued existence of Israel as a sovereign state with all possible guarantees. We are prepared to participate in such guarantees together with the US, or under the Security Council.

Now I would like to say something about two questions which are quite different and about which we would like to hear your views.

First, on the question of trade and MFN. We value your efforts and those of Secretary Kissinger very highly in this regard. This is the view of our entire leadership and of Leonid Brezhnev personally. We would like to know how you assess the situation and the prospects.

Secondly, we have noted your statements and the statements of others that the US favors détente and that things are moving in this direction. However, you also have said that the US must be second to none and must be first in armed strength. Frankly, this puzzles us. We could take the same position and say we want to be first. It is obvious that if we claim to be first there will be no end to the race. We believe the logic of things should persuade us not to give impetus to the arms race. We feel that the interests of the US and the Soviet Union are best served by restraint, restraint and more restraint until the time when we can turn back the arms race altogether. We feel that a continuation of the arms race is against your line and by and large against Secretary Kissinger’s statement.

The Secretary: That is the highest praise!

Gromyko: We feel that we should try gradually and steadily to eliminate the arms race.
The President: What you have said emphasizes the need for negotiations on arms. This will be discussed by Secretary Kissinger when he goes to Moscow, in Vladivostok and also here in 1975.

The statements I have made about the US position should be understood in terms of the US domestic situation. But we have a complete and total dedication to the objective of limiting the arms race.

On the Trade Bill, I’ve worked with Senator Jackson and Secretary Kissinger has done so also. The Trade Bill is ready for agreement if we find a parliamentary method by which we can be sure that Congress cannot delay or easily destroy what we want—MFN. The struggle is between the Congress and the President. The Congress wants more control.

I was rather disappointed with our talk this morning with Senator Jackson. We made some progress, but not enough. We made a proposition which is reasonable. He also made a proposal, but we cannot accept it. He said he would consider the matter and we hope we will have something by Monday. We will keep on trying.

We need the most firm assurances on emigration, such as have been given through Ambassador Dobrynin. I am convinced by the words of Mr. Brezhnev. Our problem is to convince the members of Congress who have less faith than I do.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Some figures on emigration have been mentioned in the press. This never was mentioned in our discussions.

The Secretary: I want to discuss this further at lunch. I’ve never given any figures to the Senators.

Briefly, Mr. President, to recapitulate our understanding: it is understood that, on the Soviet side, there will be no restrictions on applications for emigration; there will be no harassment, and there will be no restrictions on exit visas except for reasons of national security. If all these conditions are met, then everything will depend on the number of applications. The Soviet Union has no responsibility to produce applicants. If 100,000 apply, then 99,000 will get out. If 9,000 apply, then 8,000 will get out. We have made all of this clear to the Senators.

You told me this, Mr. Foreign Minister, in Moscow and in Geneva. There have been no new concessions on your part. The Senators can think anything they want about numbers, but this has not been discussed with them.

Gromyko: Are you hopeful?

The Secretary: Yes, I think we’ll work this out sooner or later.

The President: I didn’t give an inch to Jackson this morning.

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9 See Document 35.
Gromyko: Mr. President, I appreciate very much the time you have
given to me this morning. Also, I should tell you that I appreciated your
statement at the UN, particularly your words about détente and coopera-
tion with the Soviet Union.

The President: I meant every word.

The meeting ended at 1:30 p.m.

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10 During his address to the UN General Assembly on September 18, President Ford
declared: "We are committed to a pursuit of a more peaceful, stable, and cooperative
world. While we are determined never to be bested in a test of strength, we will devote
our strength to what is best. And in the nuclear era, there is no rational alternative to ac-
cords of mutual restraint between the United States and the Soviet Union, two nations
which have the power to destroy mankind." For the full text of the speech, see Public Pa-
pers: Ford, 1974, No. 81.

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38. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 20, 1974, 3–4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Soviets:
H.E. Andrey Gromyko, Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs
H.E. Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
The Honorable Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Chief, USA Division, Soviet
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counselor and Interpreter, Soviet Ministry
of Foreign Affairs

U.S.:
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Walter Stoessel, American Ambassador to USSR
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs

Secretary: We certainly described all the nuances of CSCE to the
President but I think he was a little confused by Basket III.2

Gromyko: Yes, I’d like to cut the bottom out of that Basket.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the
Counselor, Box 8, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1974. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Hartman on
September 21. The memorandum is a corrected draft that includes handwritten changes
from several officials, notably Hartman himself. These changes are not substantive and
have been incorporated into the text. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.

2 See Document 37.
Secretary: Have you heard the news that Mao has been appointed either Commander-in-Chief or Defense Minister?\(^3\) That seems strange to me after looking around for three years that he would make himself Defense Minister. By the way, is he going to be in Moscow when I’m supposed to be there? Is that the reason for the conflict?

Gromyko: No.

Secretary: It certainly is unusual that he should take such a post.

Gromyko: Does General Haig have four stars? Do any of your Generals have five stars?

Secretary: Omar Bradley is the only one still alive.


Secretary: I have a lot of applications from Colonels now who want to be Generals. You can see what being a Deputy to me does for your military career. Have you ever seen General Bokassa?\(^4\) He wears medals on his back he has so many of them.

Gromyko: Yes, I have seen him.

Secretary: Have you ever met General Amin?\(^5\) When I talked to your Syrian allies they told me when General Amin was in Damascus he insisted that his dreams be broadcast on the radio each morning. He said that that was what they always did for him at home.

Gromyko: I like Kaunda.\(^6\)

Secretary: Seriously, on CSCE, can we discuss that a little further? I was a little confused by something you said when we were talking to the President. You said that the Germans mentioned something about voluntary observers.

Gromyko: Yes, they said that the observers would be invited by the country in which the maneuver is taking place. Then there is the question of troop movements. Can’t we agree that that matter can be postponed for later discussion and study?

Secretary: We’re relaxed about that problem. We know what you’re doing anyway. We think that the size of the force which should be notified for maneuvers should be a reinforced division of, say, 40,000.

Hartman: I think you mean 20,000. A division is about 15,000 and a reinforced division would be roughly 20,000.

\(^3\) According to recent press reports, Mao was named commander of the armed forces in the draft of a new Chinese Constitution. (“China Said to Name Mao Defense Head,” The New York Times, September 21, 1974, p. 11)

\(^4\) Jean-Bédel Bokassa, President of the Central African Republic.

\(^5\) Idi Amin Dada, President of Uganda.

\(^6\) Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia.
Gromyko: That is an artificial number. It would be impossible. We would have so many clerical problems.

Secretary: Do you move a division that often?

Gromyko: What importance does this have to Luxembourg? This is like using a microscope.

Secretary: How can we proceed in CSCE?

Gromyko: We have to agree on the question of maneuvers and troop movements. On the latter we should put it off for further study. Maybe we should examine this question of voluntary observers. This would be a moral obligation and would be much more flexible.

Secretary: Are you saying that a moral obligation is heavier than a legal one or are you saying if it’s moral you don’t have to carry it out?

Gromyko: As a rule it will be carried out.

Secretary: Just when you maneuver with nuclear weapons and we want to observe, you will not want us to.

Gromyko: As a rule it will be carried out. I have a feeling that the Basket III problem is behind us.

Secretary: Why?

Gromyko: Because we agreed on the Finnish compromise which makes it easier. Then we have the question of the relations among the principles. We think that the formulation should be “the principles should be equally strictly observed.”

Hartman: We have been talking about the equal validity of the principles.

Gromyko: Equal validity is nonsense. How can you say that the question of frontier inviolability and giving visas are equally important. Some of the principles are fundamental.

Secretary: All of the principles are equal but you are saying equally strictly observed. The thing that concerns us is that they be observed. I would be willing to examine your formulation. What did Genscher say?

Gromyko: Genscher’s attitude was positive.

Secretary: I am not intelligent enough to understand all these matters. To me it sounds all right. I will take it up with Callaghan and Genscher.

Gromyko: On the peaceful change formula you have now tabled a new text which seems to imply that the most important purpose of international law is to change frontiers. That is the current U.S. draft.

Secretary: Where did you get that this was a U.S. draft? What did Genscher say?

Gromyko: He said that it was an American proposal.
Secretary: You can see that Hartman has a lot to learn about diplomacy. Historically, let me say that we pointed out that it would be difficult to change the language we had originally agreed. This change is a German proposal. They are the ones who have the main concern. On maneuvers we will look at the problem again and I will talk to you on Tuesday. On the MBFR negotiations in Vienna, you made the observation which implied to the President that if we include air and nuclear forces you would be willing to include a tank army. Is that correct?

Gromyko: Other countries must be prepared to reduce their forces.

Secretary: In the first stage?

Gromyko: If not in the first stage, then we should define the second stage and specify what will happen.

Secretary: You mean that we should decide what is the end result of the second stage? For example, we could agree that the first stage has a certain numerical reduction or are we just talking about the principle of the second stage?

Gromyko: No, we would have to have numbers and precise times.

Secretary: Then we are talking about negotiating both the first and the second stage.

Gromyko: If numbers are not mentioned, then when will we reach agreement on this? My idea is to agree to reduce X and then X should be multiplied by 10.

Secretary: In practice you would then be negotiating both stages but there would be a difference of timing.

Gromyko: What we would be doing is leaving some details for later decision, for example, the kinds of forces and armaments.

Secretary: What you are saying is that following the reduction of this first stage, there would be a second stage. The only difference is timing.

Gromyko: It will be a question of fulfillment and the degree of specificity.

Secretary: If you are worried about escaping obligations, you want to specify what happens in the second stage.

Gromyko: Yes. Otherwise we are talking generalities. There should be a general obligation to reduce by all countries.

Secretary: I don’t believe we are going to finish this year. We haven’t even begun to look at the second stage.

Gromyko: It would be helpful in getting through the CSCE to be able to have progress in Vienna. Politically, it would help us. Why is that difficult?

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7 September 24. See footnote 3, Document 43.
Secretary: Are you prepared to accept a common ceiling at the end of the second stage?

Gromyko: At the end? That would depend on the ceiling. I do not reject it.

Secretary: If you can accept that we can discuss this in greater detail, we are prepared to include tactical air if that would help.

Gromyko: What kind of ceiling are you talking about? Is it possible to avoid a ceiling? You could have American and Soviet cuts and then other countries could reduce numbers as well. After that, it would be much easier to discuss a ceiling.

Secretary: I am talking about a common ceiling.

Korniienko: What the Secretary means by a common ceiling are equal forces on both sides.

Gromyko: No, that is not what I mean.

Secretary: But then you are offering me nothing. Obviously if you agree to a cut there is a ceiling but you cannot argue in the strategic field that we have more warheads than you do and therefore must cut greater numbers, while at the same time you argue that you cannot cut your forces more when you have greater numbers. We are prepared to be realistic and specific in the categories where we have an advantage. If we are ahead, we make a greater cut. For example, in air forces and nuclear forces we would cut more in such a program—that would not be excluded. This is not a proposal but I am just citing an example.

Gromyko: The general idea of an equal ceiling I do not like.

Secretary: But as I said that is no concession. You are just talking about an agreed ceiling.

Gromyko: Yes, an agreed ceiling.

Secretary: It is not clear to me how we can consider both stages if at the end of the second stage we don’t reach agreement on a common-equal-ceiling.

Gromyko: That is impossible. Maybe after five stages. Why, after the second stage?

Secretary: We could have a first stage only or we can have a first stage plus agreement to a second stage whose ultimate objective is a common ceiling.

Gromyko: At the end of the second stage? How long would that take?

Secretary: We are open-minded.

Gromyko: I do not see the possibility. This would be against our security interests because we will reduce more than you.

Secretary: This is not just a common ceiling of U.S. and Soviet forces. This would be the whole NATO area versus the Warsaw Pact.
Gromyko: You would have all of the advantages. You tell us we have more tanks.

Secretary: We do not insist on an equal ceiling in all parts including equipment. What we are talking about are equal numbers of personnel. Maybe you have a tank for every three men and maybe we have a tank for every ten men. It is up to each side.

Gromyko: I do not think this will facilitate an agreement.

Secretary: Maybe we shouldn’t agree on a second stage but agree on a first stage and no principles and say that the negotiation of the second stage would begin in three to six months.

Gromyko: What if it doesn’t come about?

Sonnenfeldt: We have no interest in stopping because we are interested in moving toward a common ceiling.

Gromyko: With a common ceiling we go down more.

Secretary: How can you maintain the principle of equality in the strategic area and not here. I remember your General Secretary telling us that we have 10,000 warheads and you only have 3,000 warheads. He insisted that we move toward a common level.

Gromyko: We like equality but we mean equal security.

Secretary: In the strategic field you tell us that we are ahead in a ratio of three to one and that we should move to an equal level.

Gromyko: No, we wish to take in many factors. What we must do is to define the correlation of the numbers. We want equal security, not equal numbers of personnel.

Secretary: We will have to look at all this again. Now let us turn to SALT. Over the long term, the basic point I was trying to make in my statement yesterday is that it would be impossible to maintain a realistic détente while increasing armaments. The arguments which we would have to use to increase our defense position are inconsistent with détente. People would begin asking why we should trade with you just in order to help build your military strength.

Gromyko: We will have to take a fresh look and then come to some conclusions. The West wants an equal ceiling especially in the beginning but we don’t reject this concept for later. We will continue to examine it. We attach importance to this problem. Do not be pessimistic.

Secretary: (Reading from a ticker): My colleagues at the State Department have just released the information that I have flown an average of 500 miles a day since I became Secretary of State. They say I have flown 200,000 miles since I became Secretary.

Gromyko: I am sure it will become a million.

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8 See footnote 3, Document 28.
Secretary: Let me tell you about the status of my talks with Senator Jackson. We would send a letter which would say that our understanding of the Soviet position is that there would be no restriction on applications, no harassment and no serious restriction on national security grounds. Dobrynin told me that these are only one percent of the cases.

Dobrynin: That’s right. I gave you the figure.

Secretary: You said one to one and a half percent. The Senators also want something about harassment—there will be no loss of apartments, jobs or other punitive action. What we plan to do is as follows: 1. We will write a letter to the Senators embodying our understanding of the Soviet position; 2. They will answer that letter; 3. I will write that I understand what they have said. Then they will agree to a waiver provision in the Jackson Amendment. The real dispute is internal and does not concern you. Jackson wants to have the Congress vote each year to extend the waiver. We want the waiver to be extended subject to a veto by Congress. Now what do we need? You can say that the Americans can publish whatever they like. But you cannot say that what we have published is a lie.

Dobrynin: Are you going to put figures in?

Secretary: Jackson may say in his letter that he has a yardstick in his mind of 60,000.

Gromyko: If he mentions a figure, that’s just an estimate, his guess.

Secretary: He will say that he has a figure in mind and play that into a guideline. We will not mention a figure and we will not be bound by his figure but it will be in his letter.

Dobrynin: But he will say after a year, when the figures are not as high as his, that the agreement has not been fulfilled.

Secretary: Let’s be realistic. If we can show that our relations are improving and he cannot positively show restrictions or harassments, he can’t very well insist on a figure.

Gromyko: If a figure is mentioned by Jackson or others that is his responsibility. The Soviets have no responsibility. There is no harassment. There has been no harassment and there will not be any harassment. Some people may say that there is. Person X will write or make a statement that he lost his job but maybe he just doesn’t like to work. He prefers to make propaganda and politics. But the charge will be made that he has lost his job because he wanted to emigrate. But the reality is different. We cannot take responsibility for such acts. Certain actions might be called harassments but maybe they are criminal acts but these will always be limited cases and we should not be held responsible. It is not harassment.
Secretary: I think that is clear but it is important that we understand certain things. First, there is no question that Jackson will try to make trouble but if our relations are good—if we make progress on SALT, CSCE and MBFR—then he won’t be able to make any arguments in favor of stopping the waiver. Jackson will be looking for examples. A few of them won’t hurt us but if there are 500 we will be in trouble. Second, something must happen to the numbers. If the total drops significantly or if there is evidence that people want to come and can’t come then we will have difficulties. Third, we could also drop the whole idea. The Senators want to put in a special provision that denial of emigration for security reasons can only go on for so many years, three or four. They want to put that in their letter.

Dobrynin: How long is it before you let your classified scientists leave the country?

Secretary: There are various categories but you give us the number of years.

Gromyko: I saw Jackson at the White House.9

Secretary: I saw that you spoke to him. Think what you could accept on the national security point.

Gromyko: We have to look at concrete cases. This could come up in a hundred forms.

Secretary: Maybe you could agree to review the security status of applicants from time to time.

Gromyko: That might be possible. Some people have already received permission. Some are connected with production or other occupations in restricted fields. But time passes. Five to ten years and they have lost their skill. Who is to judge when the security problem disappears? We are the ones who will judge that. But it could be reviewed. Three years ago it might have been impossible for a person to leave but today it is possible. That may happen. In practice it takes place.

Secretary: We will leave this up to them. I think we have carried this as far as we can. We will have a longer talk Tuesday night.

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9 According to a newspaper account: “Mr. Jackson, a long-time skeptic of détente with the Russians, was introduced to Mr. Gromyko on his way out of Mr. Ford’s Oval Office at the White House. They shook hands and exchanged pleasantries.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Ford and Gromyko Join in Vowing ‘Continuing Efforts for Middle East Peace,’” The New York Times, September 21, 1974, p. 9)
39. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 21, 1974, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affair

[Omitted here is discussion of Latin America, in particular the President’s meeting that morning with Argentine Foreign Minister Vignes.]

[Kissinger:] With Gromyko, I would make it only half an hour. I would push SALT a little bit. As you talked about yesterday, if the arms keep multiplying, that will affect our relations over the coming period. So the next three months are critical. We can’t justifi to the American people this racing. And in a race it is difficult to say you are even, and the attempt will be to keep an edge.

On emigration, they won’t accept the numbers and they won’t specify a delay time in national security cases. You might think about getting Javits, Jackson and Ribicoff in before you finalize. Termination in April ’76 would be politically hard. Jackson is putting out that we are close to an agreement.

President: This morning he said it had broken down.

Kissinger: You must be on record with them on what you can do and what you can’t do.

Gromyko said the Jews are great at raising a public relations crisis for publicity.

President: I couldn’t see the relationship of the bulldozer story.

Kissinger: The Russians are crude boors—but abstract art is banned and it was therefore moved off.

You must get it into their heads you are a tough guy. They are measuring you for a crisis.

But you should tell them if there is a race we must be first.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Kissinger there from 10:35 to 11:50 a.m.; Scowcroft joined the meeting at 10:40. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

2 See Document 37.

3 See footnote 4, Document 35.
[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s schedule, including Ford’s meeting that afternoon with Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka.]

40. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 21, 1974, 12:15–12:39 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.

U.S.
President Gerald Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[The conversation began with greetings and initial pleasantries.]

Gromyko: Kissinger follows me very closely. I cannot afford to make a mistake.

The President: I enjoyed our talk, and Secretary Kissinger has filled me in on his talks with you.

Kissinger: Just before this meeting, Gromyko gave me a response to the suggestion that we agree on nuclear reactor safeguards. That is very important.

The President: Would this have to be an agreement?

Kissinger: Yes, because the problem now is that each country sells reactors competitively.

Gromyko: On this, non-proliferation is a problem that is as important as it was ten years ago.

The President: Maybe so.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 See Document 37.
3 See Document 38.
Gromyko: Two-thirds of the states have ratified it, but the remainder haven’t. It would be good if we two did our best to get more states to ratify.

The President: I hope we could work effectively on this. I’m interested, Congress is, and if we could stabilize this . . .

Kissinger: These are two points. One is the spread of reactor technology. Maybe we can do something on this. The other is, the Foreign Minister wouldn’t want some of his allies to get the impression of condominium.

Gromyko: If you mean our real allies [smile], it is no problem. No one can predict how someone might act irresponsibly.

Kissinger: Speaking frankly, France has sold four reactors to Iran and we don’t know what safeguards there were. If we two can agree on safeguards, then we could go to the Europeans.

Dobrynin: Do you have sufficient safeguards?

Kissinger: In the Egyptian case, we have, we think, foolproof safeguards. If we two can agree and if we get the Europeans to agree, we can control the situation. We will tell you our safeguards—maybe you have better ones.

Gromyko: Sometimes Japan and Brazil are mentioned. What do you think?

The President: Japan has its own problems . . .

Kissinger: The line between weapons and peaceful uses is vague. The Indian explosion obviously has military implication. The Japanese have a big nuclear program but have not done any explosion yet. If they moved this way, they would go like India and could be a big power very quickly.

The President: The Japanese are having trouble with their ship.

Dobrynin: Leakage on their nuclear vessel.

Gromyko: Fukuda told me Japan would not do it.

Kissinger: We have no idea they are moving.

Dobrynin: In the PRC they have a new Commander-in-Chief.

The President: One of the points we discussed yesterday. I agree with you and I think it was a constructive speech. I was looking over the report on our defense appropriations—that was my expertise in Congress. And Congress has given us a good list with what we need to move ahead. I want you to know that despite the strength they gave me to move ahead, we want to cooperate with you—but if we have to com-

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4 India tested its first nuclear weapon at Pokhran on May 18.
5 See footnote 3, Document 38.
6 See footnote 10, Document 37.
pete, we will. The American people will accept a planned equality, but if we are going to compete, the American people will want me to—and I will—keep the country in a strong position.

Gromyko: There are two ways to go: if we move ahead while negotiating. We could say to our peoples we will work on some areas. The first way is to say: stay strong while negotiating; the other is to say: the main task is to find areas for cooperation. When you go the first direction, we ask how we should report to our people. Now we prefer the second approach.

The President: We believe in restraint. But we must assure the American people that while we go through this process, our strength is adequate. I must assure that the American people are not in jeopardy.

Gromyko: It is difficult to find a way to cut the knot. Partial solutions are the more practical way to approach the problem. We just discussed non-proliferation.

The President: Competition which drains you and us is not useful. But until we can see the progress which can be made, I must preserve our security. The American people want us to move forward, but want to be secure also. Don’t feel what I’m saying is to upset what I am talking about, but it is to assure the American people that as we move ahead our people are adequately protected.

Gromyko: I can assure you we will carry out our policy. We don’t like some things we see on the U.S. scene—like Jackson—but it will not dissuade us. The summit conferences and any other talks will continue. The U.S., Soviet Union, Europeans—and even the PRC—do not want tension. But we won’t give up what belongs to us. But we want to help be good neighbors. It is nothing directed against the United States. We want good relations with Europe—and with China, but we will not give up territory which belongs to us. We proceed from that assumption. We are not against your good relations with Eastern Europe, if it is based on mutual respect and security.
41. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and David Binder of The New York Times

Washington, September 21, 1974, 3:21 p.m.

K: Why are you calling me instead of the Danish Ambassador?
B: I haven’t talked to him lately. I wonder if you could tell me something about the Gromyko meeting?
K: We reviewed the whole relationship to see if we could make progress.
B: Did you see any signs for progress with SALT and the Middle East.
K: This is off-the-record. I think our relations are in pretty good shape.
B: Is this trade thing locked up?
K: It will take another week.
B: Is this with the Russians or with Jackson?
K: The Russian thing is in check.
B: It is really to settle it between the administration and Jackson. And that will take a week.
K: I guess. I don’t know.
B: How about the Middle East? Is that a tour d’horizon?
K: Yes, it is a tour d’horizon. Ok. I have to run.
B: What about Argentina. Is that something ______?
K: It is in terms of the OAS meeting.
B: Ok. Thank you. Goodbye.
K: Goodbye.

1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. The blank underscore indicates an omission in the original.

2 In his article on the meetings between Ford and Gromyko, published in The New York Times the next morning, Binder reported: “There has been mutual interest in continuing relations between the two countries that were developed by President Richard M. Nixon and the Soviet party chief, Leonid I. Brezhnev, a high official of the Ford administration observed. The official said after the meeting that relations with the Soviet Union were ‘in pretty good shape,’ although more time was needed to work out an agreement on strategic arms. He also said he expected the Administration to reach agreement with Senator Henry Jackson, the Washington Democrat, on a package linking adoption of a new trade bill with freer emigration from the Soviet Union. Agreement on this problem was reached earlier between the United States Government and the Soviet leadership, the official added.” (David Binder, “Gromyko and Ford Complete 2 Days of Discussions,” The New York Times, September 22, 1974, p. 10)
42. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 26, 1974.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Secretary Henry A. Kissinger
Senator Mike Mansfield
Senator Hugh Scott
Senator William Fulbright
Senator George Aiken
Senator Hubert Humphrey
Congressman Thomas O’Neill
Congressman John Rhodes
Congressman Thomas Morgan
Congressman Peter Frelinghuysen
L/General Brent Scowcroft
Mr. William Timmons

SUBJECT

Bipartisan Leadership Breakfast with the President

[Omitted here is discussion of Cyprus and military assistance to Turkey.]

The President: Let’s spend just a minute on Jackson–Vanik. I met with Scoop last Saturday. My position is to have a waiver. If, at the end of the year the Soviet Union hasn’t performed, I would kill MFN. The Soviet Union has agreed they wouldn’t interfere with applications and any applicant could leave, except for security cases.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s about 1 or 1-½% of the total.

The President: And no harassment. If they stick by that, I would so certify and MFN would continue. We propose to Scoop a procedure like we had on the pay bill. Scoop wants affirmative action by the Congress under a complicated system he says will ensure the Congress will act.

Senator Fulbright: That won’t work.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6. Secret. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Family Dining Room in the Residence at the White House. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the bipartisan leadership breakfast lasted from 7:55 to 10:08 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

2 September 21. The reference, however, is in error; Ford met with Jackson on Friday, September 20. See Document 35.

3 See footnote 3, Document 35.
Senator Scott: No, it won’t.

The President: Scoop has worked out a complicated procedure, but you know it can be circumvented.

Why we would even be willing to let it be a one-House veto.

Senator Humphrey: What has Javits said about all this.

Secretary Kissinger: What the President described is what the Soviets have told us. But they won’t guarantee a specific figure and they claim emigration is down because of the Middle East situation. There is probably something to that (described Belgian action on re-emigrators). We would communicate all these understandings in a letter to Scoop and he would answer back with his clarifications.

Senator Humphrey: To Scoop? And how about the rest of us?

Secretary Kissinger: Scoop would write back and say he understands 60,000 is what we could expect as an adequate figure. The Soviets will not agree to that. And you know there is no way for the Soviet Union to live up to every detail of these requirements, so Jackson could use every isolated example to scream bad faith. (Described how we couldn’t require typed applications.)

No government could or should live up to this intrusion.

Senator Fulbright: We certainly wouldn’t.

Secretary Kissinger: But we would certainly know through the Jewish network of systematic violations. And Brezhnev sort of has promised personal attention to individual cases. But the Soviet Union has not agreed to 60,000 and Jackson at the end of the waiver period could scream trickery. We do not accept his specific number.

[The President mentioned the Kudirka case to show Soviet cooperation.]

Senator Humphrey: I’m glad to hear they are human. If you think the Greeks have pressure, we have more from the Jews. You’ve got to get the top Jewish leaders in and tell them what has been done. The President has an ironclad case on this.

Senator Scott: We have made these points to the Jewish Community. The Israeli Government has to . . . (interrupted).

The President: If the Jackson–Vanik Amendment comes up, we can’t buy it. So there would be no trade bill and probably no Jewish emigration. The way to go is our way so we can get a trade bill and emigration.

Senator Mansfield: I couldn’t vote for the bill as Henry has described the process.

Congressman Frelinghuysen: Would you leave Scoop’s letter unanswered?
Secretary Kissinger: We would reply saying we understand this is your view—a waffle. But he would always claim trickery.

Senator Humphrey: Why not spell out this to the leadership? Why to Scoop? I am mean too. We know the President won’t let non-compliance turn into a political football. It is absolutely safe. Democratic politics will be wild in 1976. The President should spell out the understandings—or Henry, but not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: If sentiment here is opposed, just tell Scoop what the leaders think.

Secretary Kissinger: We could put in a letter from me what I have described.

Senator Humphrey: Someone should spell it out to the committees, not to Scoop.

Senator Scott: Tell Scoop there should not be a private treaty.

Secretary Kissinger: There are two choices—if we write a letter to the leadership and he replies, he is just one Senator. But if we write him and he replies, it is part of the legislative record.

Congressman Rhodes: A letter should go to Senator Long.

Senator Humphrey: A letter should go to Long. Then, anyone can send a letter back who wants to. If Scoop gets a letter, others who may have certain ambitions will want one.

The President: We brought this up because we are here working hard on this problem and I wanted the leadership to know the precise situation. I hope Scoop won’t feel we undercut him.

Secretary Kissinger: The Soviet Union says they can’t accept MFN if affirmative action is needed every year.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, foreign assistance, and energy policy.]
43. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, October 2, 1974, 8:10–10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Israel
Ambassador Simcha Dinitz, Israeli Ambassador to the US
Ambassador Yosef Tekoah, Israeli Permanent Representative to the United Nations
Dr. Meir Rosenne, Legal Adviser to the Foreign Minister
Mordechai Shalev, Minister, Embassy of Israel
Eytan Ben-Zur, Assistant to the Foreign Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Harold H. Saunders, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Robert B. Oakley, National Security Council Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

SUBJECTS

Jackson Amendment; Cyprus; Palestinian Question in UNGA; Next Phase of the Negotiations; Syrian Jewry/Body Searches in Egypt

[Omitted here is a brief exchange of pleasantries, including discussion of published reports that Dinitz might be “out of favor” with Rabin.]

Jackson Amendment

Allon: I read the speech of your great ally Gromyko. It said nothing in particular. He was trying to impress the American people
that Russia is reasonable. Just one little hint about restoring diplomatic relations. Do you attach importance to it?

Kissinger: I don’t attribute any importance to it. They see things going their way and they just say enough but not so much that they’re blamed for what happens. I think they have some interest in restoring contacts with you. I don’t attach importance to it. When Gromyko saw me, he had a list of questions for us, which I couldn’t give answers to, which he could then tell the Arabs. Which we believe he’s done.

I don’t think the Soviets will affect the next two to three months. They won’t alleviate things, but they won’t make things much worse.

Allon: They have a special attitude to our problems: In one respect it may be important: For a Russian Jew, an Israeli Embassy in the heart of Moscow means something. To the Free World, it doesn’t make sense.

Kissinger: The negotiations with Jackson may break down.

Allon: Break down? I thought there was an understanding.

Kissinger: Once Richard Perle and Dorothy Fosdick realize they’re dealing with Americans instead of with a foreign government. . . . Let me tell you where it stands. I’m prepared to write a letter saying what Gromyko tells me, which should be a good basis for emigration—no harassment, everybody gets a visa, and national security cases can be no more than one percent of the total.

Allon: No figure.

Kissinger: No figure, because they’re a sovereign and can’t determine the number of applicants. He wants to write a letter saying what he thinks this means: sixty thousand. So in 1976 he’ll accuse us of trickery.

We can’t confirm things that the Russians never told us.

And the leadership wants me to write a letter to them so Jackson doesn’t get all the credit.4

Sisco: Tell them about the waiver issue.

Kissinger: He wants Congress to decide positively by a vote in April 1976—in the middle of a Presidential campaign.

December 1975 is better for us than April 1976. December 1976 is better. From the American domestic political point of view, there is no candidate who won’t make it an issue. And we can’t accept a Congressional vote—that will start it all over again. We’re willing to give them a Congressional veto, which is already too much.

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4 See Document 42.
He’s done things which are outrageous. He says he’s gotten concessions the Russians hadn’t given to us. This is not true. In the letter, there are things we got from the Russians in March. The only thing new is the President called him in and put himself behind it, which President Nixon didn’t do.

Dinitz: But you yourself said you didn’t mind his getting the credit.

Kissinger: Up to a point. He’s saying the incompetent Administration got us into a mess and how he has gotten the figure up. We had emigration at 38,000; now he’s got it at 12,000. It’s the Jackson Amendment that got us into the decline. If the Russians carry out what they promised me—which I don’t guarantee—there will be no harassment, that everybody gets an exit visa, and that no more than one percent are delayed on national security grounds, then an increase in emigration is inevitable. We have enough contact with the Jewish Community in Russia to check it. If we try to enumerate what harassment means, everyone knows the Russians will find new ways of doing it. But we’ll spell out what they’ve told us.

He wants national security cases delayed no more than three years. Gromyko says they can’t do that, because it depends on each case, and they’ll review it at regular interviews.

We don’t have an answer yet. They’re already claiming betrayal.

Allon: It may have an effect on détente.

Tekoah: I’m not dealing with this, but from my experience in dealing with the Soviets, I have to say the crucial point is to get some number. Because when I was there, we always heard there were “no restrictions”—but they said there were no applications. There has to be some number.

Kissinger: They were willing to say 38,000.

Dinitz: At one point they said 45,000.

Kissinger: They even said we could say 45,000, but they tricked us. The only firm number has been 38,000. When I wanted to pin it down, they said I misunderstood them, even though I have a verbatim transcript.

Dinitz: He said this in Cyprus.

Kissinger: In Geneva, then he repeated it in Cyprus.

[Secretary Kissinger gets up] I’m more worried about the Fahmy visit than about Gromyko. [The party then went to the room next door for breakfast at 8:30 a.m.]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to U.S.-Soviet relations.]

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5 Tekoah served as Israeli Ambassador to the Soviet Union in the early 1960s.
44. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 2, 1974.

SUBJECT

Trade Bill/Jackson Amendment: Conversation with Richard Perle, October 2, 1974, 10:30 a.m.

Perle telephoned to say they were at a complete loss to understand the turn of events in regard to the Trade Bill. (He was referring to Scowcroft’s conversations with Miss Fosdick last night and this morning.)

Perle said the issue of the waiver procedure was not immaterial since the agreement on which it rests was evidently off. The “third letter” had always been integral to the agreement. Perle said the only interpretation of events that they could make was that “Kissinger had got out on a limb and sold an agreement he did not have.” They just could not accept that the rug should be pulled out from under the agreement because of some off-hand remark by Hubert Humphrey at the leadership meeting. You (the Secretary) know how integral the third letter has been to the agreement. Without it there is no possibility of a deal; Jackson would look ridiculous because the deal would be a phony by leaving the second letter as no more than a series of unilateral statements. But unilateral statements vis-à-vis the Russians, Perle said, are worthless as demonstrated by SALT! Perle added they would say this publicly and recount the whole “experience” with unilateral statements in SALT.

I told Perle I would report his remarks and strongly urged that there be no public statements from them. Perle said they would wait before going public in hopes that there has been a misunderstanding.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974. Eyes Only. According to marginalia, a copy of the memorandum was sent to Scowcroft.

2 In a memorandum for the President on October 2, Scowcroft reported that, at Kissinger’s request, he informed Fosdick by phone that, rather than approve Jackson’s proposal on the waiver/veto procedure, the President had decided to adopt the approach he had outlined to the Senator at their last meeting. Scowcroft also told Fosdick that Ford had decided that two rather than three letters was sufficient. According to Scowcroft, Fosdick later called him back to relay Jackson’s initial reaction: he was outraged by this “betrayal” of their understanding on the three letters; he was inclined to terminate “all efforts to get agreement” on the amendment; and “he would probably be compelled to go public with the details of how he had been ‘double-crossed.’” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 18, Jackson/Vanik Trade Bill) For the full text of the October 2 memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 217.

3 See Document 42.
45. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 2, 1974.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Perle: New Version of “Third Letter” (Tab A)

As arranged with Scowcroft, I called Perle around 4:15 p.m. and told him a new version of the third letter was being sent up to him shortly. He asked what it said: I told him to look at it when he got it but that it was phrased more broadly than the old version. He said he foresaw great difficulty, and asked why the change. I said that you had pointed out at the last breakfast meeting (September 18) that you could accept the Jackson letter as an extrapolation of the first letter but that you could take no responsibility for the numbers contained in Jackson’s letter. In other words, the Administration could not stand behind the degree of specificity in the Jackson letter. The new third letter reflects this fact. Perle asserted the numbers issue had been settled with the President. I said I had not heard this.

Perle said that perhaps it was better to let the Trade Bill pass with Jackson–Vanik and then pick up the pieces on emigration afterwards. I said that this would kill Soviet incentives to move on emigration at all since they would have neither MFN nor credits. Perle said he tended to agree but he was reflecting Jackson’s mood. The Senator just felt he had taken so many blows on this issue that he was throwing up his hands and would just have to explain how the Administration had walked away from an agreement.

I said I could not see what blows Jackson had taken. The Administration’s proposed letter was a far-reaching document that set up very clear standards which would provide a ready basis for deciding whether the Soviets were performing adequately. Perle said that without the Jackson letter and a reply, the Administration letter was vague and meaningless. I disagreed. I repeated that a new version of the third letter was being sent up shortly.

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2 The draft letter attached at Tab A reads: “Dear Senator Jackson: I have noted the views set forth in your letter of (date). The President will consider them in determining whether the purposes sought through Title IV of the Trade Bill in regard to emigration practices of non-market economy countries are being fulfilled and in exercising the authority provided for in Section _____ of the Trade Bill. Yours sincerely.”

3 See Document 34.
Perle said he doubted it would be acceptable.

Perle called at 5:30 to say he had received the letter and it was obviously unacceptable. He said unless I insisted he would not even give it to the Senator because he knew what the reaction would be. I said that this was a valid communication for the Senator and should be treated as such. Perle said that in that case he guessed he would give it to Jackson but there should be no doubt what the reaction would be.

Note: Perle’s reference to passing the Trade Bill just with Jackson–Vanik should be seen in the context of Long’s statement at markup today that Jackson had told him he had a deal, that the Finance Committee should report the Bill with Title IV as amended by Jackson–Vanik, that Jackson would take care of further amendments (waiver) on the floor and that Jackson would have an explanatory exchange of correspondence with the Finance Committee. Perle told me this was essentially what Jackson and Long had discussed yesterday, before the Scowcroft–Fosdick conversation, though Jackson had told Long that he “almost” had a deal. Jackson may well seek to have Long go through with this scenario in any event since it would give him the added leverage of having Jackson–Vanik on the books in the Senate Bill.

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46. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Jackson Amendment: Perle Reports Jackson’s Rejection of Third Letter

Perle called around 10 a.m. this morning to say Jackson’s reaction to the changed version of the third letter had been “predictable.” He considers it an insult and they want to be sure we expect no further response.

I said there should be no doubt this had come from the President. Perle said this had never been in question but even if it had come from the Almighty the answer would have been the same. Perle added that if

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2 See footnote 2, Document 45.
there had to be a breakdown it could not have come on a better issue than a “last-minute withdrawal” by the Administration from something previously agreed.

I said there had always been an issue about the Administration’s view of Jackson’s interpretations. It had always been made clear that while the Administration stood behind its own letter and while it viewed Jackson’s interpretations as not unreasonable it clearly could not stand behind the latter in the same way it stood behind its own statements. Moreover, you had made explicitly clear that the Administration could not accept the numbers in Jackson’s interpretations. Hence the formulation in the acknowledgment contained in the new version of the third letter.

Perle said Ribicoff and Javits were both “stunned” by what happened.3 I said I found this difficult to believe since I had myself heard Javits say (at the last breakfast I attended on September 18)4 that as far as he was concerned the main thing in the whole deal was that the President would personally hold the Soviets to the no-harassment and no-punishment assurances and stop the trade measures if there was non-performance. I said this Presidential role had in no way changed. Perle said Javits’ comments had just been Senatorial talk from a Republican Senator up for re-election who was relieved he had a new President. They should not be taken seriously and in any case Javits now was outraged and felt let down. Perle said the “poor President” had come into this thing late but he had clearly agreed to the letters at the joint meeting with the Senators5 except only for the item on how soon scientists with security clearances would be permitted to leave. And on this last issue you had indicated in the meeting between the President and Jackson alone6 that it too was settled. I said I found this hard to believe and that in any event you had made wholly clear on September 18 that the Administration did not accept the numbers.

Perle said it was not up to “you” to decide whether you want a Trade Bill; there would be no further response from Jackson. The Senators were stunned as were outsiders who had heard about the devel-

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3 In a memorandum to Kissinger on October 3, Sonnenfeldt reported that he also called both Peter Lakeland and Morris Amitay, legislative aides to Javits and Ribicoff, respectively, and stressed the President’s role in recent decisions on how to handle the Jackson–Vanik Amendment. Sonnenfeldt added: “Both Lakeland and Amitay said there would be an explosion in the Jewish community over what had happened and charges of bad faith would be hurled at you.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974) For the full text of the memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXI, Foreign Economic Policy, 1973–1976, Document 218.

4 See Document 34.

5 See Document 16.

6 See Document 35.
opments. I asked how outsiders could hear about them. Perle said Max Fisher had been in to see them and he knew about what happened, so they talked to him about it. I said I could not understand how outsiders like Fisher would know about it unless it was from the Congressional end.

Perle said the only purpose of his call was to be sure we understood that there would be no further response. I replied that I would report what he had said.

47. Memorandum From Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Immediate Action Needed to Cancel Soviet Grain Purchase

—The Soviets today signed a contract with Continental to purchase 1,000,000 tons of corn. They have also indicated to Continental that they wish to purchase 2,000,000 tons of wheat, and to Cargill that they wish to purchase 500,000 tons of wheat.

—Drought and now frost have reduced the US corn crop to the point that we will find it difficult to meet domestic and traditional export demand at politically tolerable prices. Wheat is less of a problem, but the market is still tight.

—EC and Japan have been asked, and have agreed, to reduce demand this year in order to avoid higher prices and consequent pressure for export controls in the US.

—Similar representations have been made to the Soviets. The Soviet response was to ask us what we believed would be a reasonable export figure. State and Agriculture agree, and were prepared to respond officially to the Soviets next week, that we could eventually sell 500,000 tons of corn, but that the Soviets should not make any purchases for the next 6–8 weeks; we would then know what the crop looked like and how much we could spare. State and Agriculture also agreed that it would be inadvisable for the Soviets to make any wheat purchases for a

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couple of months. Butz has privately told Dobrynin that it would be disruptive for the Soviets to make any grain purchases in the US at this time.

—In view of the poisonous residue of the 1972 Soviet purchase, news of this purchase would almost certainly result in immediate Congressional action to prohibit exports to the USSR, if not to all foreign markets. (FYI: It would also kill any food aid program in corn, wheat, and soy.)

—The Soviet crop is the second largest in its history, although somewhat below mid-summer estimates. The Soviets do not need to make these purchases at this time. Like the US, the Soviets can draw down stocks and slaughter cattle if they wish to reduce demand for feed. Resort to imports avoids this course of action, but only by making an already bad situation in the US much worse, and as the result further complicating political relationships. (The fact that this is so close to our Congressional election will also put the Administration in an extremely embarrassing position).

—It is extremely important for the Soviets to cancel the contract signed with Continental and refrain from any grain purchase for the next 6–8 weeks. At that time, we will know what availabilities are and would be willing to discuss with the Soviets what might constitute a reasonable purchase in the US market.

48. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, October 4, 1974, 9:58 a.m.

D: Hello!
K: Anatol.
D: Oh, good morning, Henry.
K: Anatol, it was good to see you yesterday.²
D: It was really nice to see you, Henry, because you are spending so lot of time. Is it true you met 75 minutes in Paris somewhere?

¹ Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Brackets are in the original.
² No record of a meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on October 3 has been found. According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger returned to Washington from New York that afternoon. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76)
K: [Laughter] I don’t know whether it is true—it is such a ridiculous statement.
D: Yeh, I know. It is like a notorious play in chess.
K: That’s right.
D: . . . sitting with a whole row of foreign ministers . . . and you just going from one to another.
K: Well, on the Greek side you know I could do a little bit. We can’t do serious work in New York.
D: I understand.
K: Anatol, we have some problem with grain purchases you are making.
D: What kind of purchases?
K: The problem we have is that it is probably our people’s fault in that they have triggered you into doing something.
D: Yeh.
K: And what I wanted to point out is this: we are having a great difficulty with corn and I understand that your people have placed an order for a million tons.
D: For how many?
K: A million.
D: One million?
K: Yes.
D: Yes, but I also . . . one million.
K: Yes, but with frost and with the new difficulties. Our people think that 500 thousand is really the maximum we can handle. And we wondered—you see otherwise if you go through with it and if this gets announced then we have to do something about restricting exports which we don’t want to do.
D: I don’t know whether Butz reported to you or whether he was doing everything on his own. I already discussed with him and with Moscow authority and everything and it remained on a high order.
K: I am absolutely positive, Anatol, that it is our fault. I am positive that you responded to us.
D: Everything he asked me—so the last time he was with me—about five days ago—if it is not more than one million, okay, but not more than one million, so I said to Moscow all right. So now it’s changed in the past three days. He came to the Embassy and said exactly not more than a million.

3 No records of the meetings between Butz and Dobrynin have been found.
K: I haven’t the foggiest idea since—it is the last time he will come to your Embassy without permission—believe me.

D: Yes. I don’t complain he came to me.

K: I am telling you he is not coming to your Embassy again without permission. Or we may have a new Secretary of Agriculture.

D: [laughter] Really he asked me several things and on all exchanges it was a positive answer. So I reported everything this way. Now he is telling me a different kind of thing.

K: Another thing he also placed for a million tons of wheat—was that also arranged with Butz?

D: He said about one million—we didn’t discuss exactly with . . .

K: Well a million we can probably handle on wheat if you don’t go above a million.

D: So what is your . . .

K: Oh, you have already ordered two?

D: I don’t know. I don’t know.

K: Well on wheat we can handle a million altogether. On corn we can handle 500 thousand.

D: You mean by the end of this year or before the elections?

K: Before the election there shouldn’t really be anything.

D: They didn’t discuss it really—it was a question where it was announced.

K: Well, it is going to be announced very soon and if this isn’t—if we can’t get some understanding on it. Well let me get back to you within an hour. Let me check with the Agriculture Department.

D: Please give me what is your explanation because I am a little bit confused now.

K: Okay.

D: Okay, Henry.

K: Right.  

4 As soon as he hung up with Dobrynin, Kissinger called Sonnenfeldt to discuss how to proceed: “I’ve got guys running around like chickens without heads—after all it is all in the same country—we are all speaking English. Can somebody find out what the hell happened before we put the lid on it. Dobrynin says—and I didn’t volunteer it with Dobrynin—Dobrynin told me his assessment—that he doesn’t know what it is all about. That Butz personally called on him without asking—without being asked to come.” Sonnenfeldt agreed to “try and find out” what happened. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations) According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger called Dobrynin twice that afternoon. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76) No substantive record of either conversation has been found.
49. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, October 5, 1974, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisers
Roy Ash, Director, Office of Management and Budget
William D. Eberle, Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Council of International Economic Policy
L. William Seidman, Assistant to the President
Dr. Arthur Burns, Chairman, Federal Reserve Board
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Soviet Grain Purchase

Kissinger: There are three interpretations of the Soviet actions: (1) They are trying to disrupt the market; (2) they misunderstood the signals we gave, or (3) they see the prices going up and want to beat the increase. Dobrynin proposes to know nothing about this.\(^2\)

President: What is the Soviet situation?

Simon: Pretty good. They are down a bit in feed but they are okay in feed. So this is something of a surprise.

Kissinger: Dobrynin said they were told they could have 1 million tons. I told him they could have 500,000 tons of corn and 1 million tons of wheat but after November and spread over a long period. We would announce it but say we would hold it in abeyance.

President: How about licensing?

Simon: It still would cut off PL 480 for those crops, and it just shifts the demand. So you would have to impose export controls and ask Congress for an exemption for PL 480.

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6. Confidential. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Kissinger (from 9:05), Simon and Seidman (from 9:27), and Eberle (from 9:45) until 10:05 a.m., when he went to the Roosevelt Room for a meeting with Simon, Butz, and executives from both Continental Grain Co. and Cook Industries, Inc. to discuss the sale of corn and wheat to the Soviet Union. (Ibid., White House Office Files) No record of the latter meeting has been found.

\(^2\) See Document 48.
Kissinger: Ohira\(^3\) said that Butz told him there would be absolutely no export controls.

Simon: We could put in licensing, tell Japan it is an anti-Soviet move and they would get what they need and ask Congress for the PL 480 authority.

President: What would this do for PL 480?

Kissinger: It would create disquiet. We have been using PL 480 in lieu of aid to Egypt.

Simon: We would even have a helluva job selling it to the Congress—even 500,000 tons of corn and 1 million tons of wheat.

Kissinger: Why would that push the price up if it was held in abeyance?

Burns: Because it means the Soviet Union is in the market. That is a new factor in a skittish market.

[There was a brief discussion of the 25 September Food Committee Meeting and its sequel.]

President: We have two options: One is to impose licensing with prior notification. The second is to get the Soviet Union to back off—either back off or slow delivery.

Simon: I think we have to announce the cancellation by Monday\(^4\) if the market is not to go wild.

Kissinger: We may be able to work out a lower sum with the Soviet Union, but it puts us in a dangerous situation. No MFN, no EXIM credits, and now licensing against them. This is economic warfare and they haven’t done a thing.

President: Did we notify the companies that we wanted to approve these purchases?

Eberle: Butz said so.

Greenspan: Licensing will create a two-tiered pricing system in the world, with drastic price increases in Europe and Japan.

President: But I suspect we would face dramatic action in the Congress for licensing to stop deals like this.

Simon: I recognize the two-tier problem. It’s a mess. But if we move to licensing ourselves, we have a chance to save PL 480.

Ash: But Congress may impose a whole new series of restrictions in the PL 480 option.

Kissinger: It could push Sadat over the edge.

Simon: That is why I would tell the Soviet Union to cancel.

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\(^3\) Masayoshi Ohira, Japanese Minister of Finance.

\(^4\) October 7.
Kissinger: It's easier for the Soviet Union to have the contract cancelled through our licensing than for them to voluntarily cancel.

President: I think we must find out whether Butz or the companies did the wrong thing here.

Eberle: We have no legal lever over the companies.

Seidman: Can we avoid an announcement today?

Simon: We will be accused of being devious.

Kissinger: But for a good purpose.

Eberle: From the market point of view we have until Saturday afternoon, but we have a credibility problem.

President: We have to make the announcement, as Henry has indicated. Get Butz back here.

Kissinger: I think the Soviet Union will consent to things imposed on them better than to take initiatives themselves.

President: We should be tough on the companies. Get them and Butz in a room and sort this out.

Kissinger: But the contracts have to be cancelled—by the companies, the Soviet Union, or by us through licensing.

Eberle: Getting the companies in should be part of the press release.

Kissinger: If we publicize getting companies in and we cancel the contracts, that should help.

President: We should also say that the companies must get prior approval in the future for contracts of an unusual size.

Kissinger: We had better get some cables drafted to the affected countries.5

5 After Ford's meeting with the grain executives, Butz announced that both Continental Grain and Cook Industries had voluntarily agreed to cancel shipments of corn and wheat to the Soviet Union. Butz expressed his hope, however, that some of the sales could be reinstated during Simon's upcoming trip to Moscow. In a press statement released that afternoon, the White House explained that the cancellation had been made at the request of the President, who "expressed his strong concern about the potential domestic impact such sales could have at a time when the United States is experiencing a disappointing harvest of feed grains." (Philip Shabecoff, "2 Dealers Cancel Soviet Grain Sale at Ford's Behest," The New York Times, October 6, 1974, pp. 1, 43)
50. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Bernard Gwertzman of The New York Times

Washington, October 5, 1974, noon.

G: It’s on the Jackson . . .
K: We’re talking background.
G: A senior State Department official . . .
K: Just say State Department official.
G: It’s such a complicated thing. My understanding is from the Senators’ source primarily.

K: Let me tell you what happened. We had discussed 3 letters with the Senators. The first letter contained the assurance I received. If I had received more assurances, I could have put them in my letter. The 2nd letter, what he thought those assurances should mean, including numbers, which I told the Senators were never given to me ______. We then sent the letters to Senate leadership, chairmen and ranking members of the Foreign Affairs Committee. If we had been able to make those assurances to begin with—I told everybody from the beginning how these assurances translate into ______.

G: I’m told you did say that 45,000 would be acceptable to the Russians and I gather they came back with 75,000 and 60,000 was sort of agreed upon.

K: This assumes that I can make Jews leave the Soviet Union. We say 75,000 therefore let’s compromise on 60,000. It’s ridiculous. What the hell can I do about it.

G: The question is, which was more troublesome. If this was the case why was the letter drafted in the first place?

K: It was also said the wording of these letters—we would have to go over again and was an idea that the 3rd could be interpreted to mean that we would do our best. The more it was studied, the more people who believed it was a commitment.

G: That was my impression and that was the Jewish impression.
K: You find me one leader of the Jewish community to whom I said I could specify numbers.

G: They got their information from the ______.
K: The Senators kept saying it will be 60,000.
G: When you saw (Gromyko), he would never confirm anything like that?

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Blank underscores indicate omissions in the original.
K: Never. I thought that if they could state a number and I could use it as a yardstick ______. I cannot say something that will be used against us. It’s getting to be pretty tough to be humanitarian. Why would I want to direct them.

G: Some of them think perhaps you could get more out of Russia.

K: Why would I do it in 3 letters if I had all the assurances to begin with.

G: I could see why if there was something to say perhaps—so profit minded.

K: I told them at every meeting I could not deliver a number. I told them ______ to a substantial increase and I still believe it, but what the increase is, I don’t know how many applications there will be.

G: What’s the situation?

K: I’m planning a meeting with them on Monday² and see what can be worked out.

G: Great expectations were built up—certainly in the Soviet Union.

K: I think if you see those letters, you will say my ______ we ______ carried out.

G: I gather in your 1st letter, we have assurances that certain criteria will be carried out.

K: No restriction on application, all of which is somewhat changeable.

G: Jackson’s letter is full of detail.

K: Which I was never given.

G: Do you think there’s an honest problem here—that there was a misunderstanding?

K: A problem that could have easily been worked out. I said from the beginning we want to work out in good faith. If I signed this letter and a year from now it will ______.

G: The letter has sat on the table for more than 2 months.

K: It was the unanimous opinion of the leaders that this letter would be taken as a commitment. And they said you better not send that letter.³

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² October 7. See Document 51.
³ In an article on the Trade Bill and Soviet emigration, published in The New York Times the next morning, Gwertzman reported: “Highly reliable Administration and Senate informants said the compromise appears to have broken down because the White House declined to give written assurances to Congress that it believed the details of the agreement would be carried out by the Russians. There had been an earlier understanding of such assurances. A State Department official said the Administration had to drop the earlier promise because the Soviet Union had never given assurances that a specific number of persons could emigrate. The official said the understanding with Congress had been more a hope than a certainty.” “According to a State Department official familiar with Mr. Kissinger’s views,” Gwertzman added, “the Russians did not commit themselves to a specific number of emigrants.” (Gwertzman, “Talks on Soviet Jews’ Emigration Periled,” The New York Times, October 6, 1974, pp. 1, 8)
51. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 7, 1974, 12:15–1:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Max Fisher’s Group of American-Jewish Leaders (List at Tab A)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Leonard Garment, Counsel to the President
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Fisher: Did the press give you a hard time [at the press conference preceding the meeting]?

Kissinger: No.
I meet with you periodically to bring you up to date on what concerns Israel and the Jewish community.

I don’t have any special concerns to give you, but there are three things I do want to discuss.
—First, the relationship of the Israeli Ambassador to this building, and to me.
—second, my trip to the area.
—third, just a few, brief comments on the Jackson Amendment.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 5, Nodis Memcons, Nov. 1974, Folder 1. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State.

2 Attached but not printed at Tab A is a list of 18 Jewish leaders. In addition to Fisher, the attendees included: Elmer Winter, President, American Jewish Committee; Melvin Dubinsky, Chairman, United Israel Appeal; Rabbi Israel Miller, Chairman, Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations; David Blumberg, President, B’nai B’rith; and Charlotte Jacobsen, World Zionist Organization-American Section, Incorporated.

3 During his press conference on October 7, Kissinger answered a question on the status of his talks with Senators Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff on the Trade Bill and Soviet emigration: “[T]he negotiations between the Senators and myself, the difficulty, such as it is, arises from the fact that there are some assurances that have been given to me that I can defend and which I can transmit. There are some interpretations of these assurances which some of the Senators would like to make. And that is their privilege. And we understand that they would apply their interpretations as a test of Soviet good faith. What I cannot do is to guarantee things that have not been told to me. And so the question is whether we can work out something which makes clear that we take the Senators’ views very seriously but which does not put us into a position of having to guarantee something beyond what has been discussed.” (Department of State Bulletin, October 28, 1974, pp. 567–568)

4 Kissinger left Washington early on October 9 for a one-week trip to the Middle East, which included stops in Damascus, Amman, Tel Aviv, Riyadh, Cairo, Algiers, and Rabat.
[Omitted here is discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations and Kissinger’s upcoming trip to the Middle East.]

[Kissinger:] Let me say a brief word on the Jackson Amendment. I have never wanted to put this group into the position of choosing between Jackson and the Administration. Second, I’ve never said anything but supportive things of him. I can’t say the same on his side!

The problem is this: We have assurances on no restrictions on applications, on harassment and on administrative procedures which, if carried out, assuredly will lead to an increase. But the Soviets won’t give figures.

I can give assurances that they haven’t given. We have enough communication with the Jewish community there to know when there is harassment. If we ask for numbers, that is such an interference in their domestic affairs that they may disavow the whole thing.

The issue is the third letter. I’m delighted to get anything I can get from the Russians. One Senator said to me, “They offered 45,000 but we want 75,000. Let’s compromise on 60,000.” How can I compromise on this?

We don’t want a victory for the Administration. We are prepared to give him credit—although, to be honest, all the assurances we have now we had in March and he has held it up for months. We will leave it in legislation, labeled the Jackson Amendment. So it is a soluble problem. We will work something out. I’m meeting with them tonight. We will go in with the attitude that we will do the maximum that is possible, but not what I haven’t got. We will work something out—especially if Jackson doesn’t bring his staff members. I’m not asking you for anything.

Miller: You say you’re not asking us for anything. And we have no advice to give you, except that the people who have suffered all this time aren’t you or the Congress, but the people in the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: I agree.

Miller: So we hope this will be settled this evening. Not only will it give a lift on your trip . . .

Kissinger: Not in Riyadh. [Laughter]

Miller: But in one corner of it, plus a great hope for the Jews in Russia. So we hope you will be flexible.

Kissinger: I can sign anything today, but my concern is this: Jackson wants to publish the letters. That may be unavoidable, because it will leak anyway. But if this happens and then the Soviets disavow it, we are worse off. The other concern is if next year the Soviets don’t live up to it, we don’t want to be accused of misleading the Congress. Between these two limits, I will agree to any solution.

Mrs. Jacobsen: If you can’t give assurances on these, how are we better off?
Kissinger: No, they [the Soviets] were prepared to give an assurance of 35,000 and it was rejected. Second, they have agreed to no restrictions on applications and no harassment, such as losing jobs or an apartment.

Mrs. Jacobsen: I see.

Kissinger: Some of them now want other refinements—to specify that parental consent can’t be used to block it. They [Soviets] also agreed that we can call specific cases of harassment to attention. If we enumerate 20 pages of administrative regulations and they want to keep the Jews in, they will find ways. We can’t take them to court. It really depends on the state of our relations. I have the impression there is enough contact with the Jews in the Soviet Union so we would know. I’m counting on this group, and the Conference,5 to tell us whether it is being met.

Blumberg: In the meeting we had with President Nixon,6 you said there were some things which depended on trust. Is that true on this one too?

Kissinger: My view is that Soviet actions will depend on their self-interest. I don’t trust the Russians. But we had it at 35,000; now it is 15,000. So we would like to get it up as high as possible.

At one point they said 45,000, which my verbatim records confirm. Then they said we misunderstood them, and that they can’t agree to a number as a matter of principle.

They agree it should be higher than 35,000. They claim—which I can’t judge—that the number of Jews who want to go to Israel is down.

Mrs. Jacobsen: Then they should agree.

Kissinger: But they say a number is a matter of principle.

If they agree to no harassment, no restrictions, and a limit on the number of national security cases—which is the third problem—it should be clear what is happening.

Fisher: We hope you can work it out today.

Kissinger: But I have to tell you, as a friend, I don’t find the Soviets particularly honorable people, and the result depends on the state of our relations. When Dobrynin met with President Ford,7 I must say he brought a reaffirmation of the assurances we had had since April, from Brezhnev. That was a new element in a sense.

[Omitted here is further discussion of U.S.-Israeli relations.]

5 The Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.
7 See Document 12.
52. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Washington, October 8, 1974.

SUBJECT

Jackson Amendment to the Trade Bill

I had a session with Senators Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff following your speech at the Capitol today.\(^2\)

On the matter of the third letter acknowledging Jackson’s interpretations of the Administration’s assurances, the Senators agreed to drop such a letter. Instead they presented a modification of the basic Administration letter in which it would be noted that Senator Jackson had submitted certain guidelines and in which the Senator would be advised that these guidelines would be “among the considerations” to be applied by the President in exercising a waiver authority. In short, the Jackson letter would not constitute a commitment on the part of the Administration.\(^3\)

Concerning the number of emigrants, we agreed that it should correspond to the number of applicants and that good faith Soviet performance on the assurances we have received would have to result in substantial increases in applications.

Jackson pressed hard on the question of Soviet use of security clearances as an impediment to emigration. I pointed out that we had received no assurances on that point, but were, of course, in a position to use the appeals procedure with the Soviets if it appears that security clearances were being used unreasonably to prevent emigration.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974. No classification marking. The original is an uninitialed copy. In an attached note to Sonnenfeldt, Marilyn Biery, however, reported: “The Secretary signed off on this. No changes.”

\(^2\) On October 8, the President delivered his “Whip Inflation Now” speech on the U.S. economy to a joint session of Congress. Although no formal record of Kissinger’s meeting with the Senators on October 8 has been found, Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes are ibid., Box 5, Misc. Memcons. Excerpts from his notes, transcribed by the editor, are provided in the footnotes below.

\(^3\) The revised letters are attached but not printed. The texts are essentially identical to the letters exchanged between Kissinger and Jackson on October 18. See Documents 60 and 61.
I believe the letters as now drafted are acceptable. They are attached at Tab A. I recommend your approval.

On the question of the waiver procedure, I pointed out your strong reluctance to accept Jackson’s proposal for Congressional initiative. I also noted your concern that the Jackson “compromise”, whereby his procedure would be used after the initial 18 months and the veto procedure thereafter, could result in major controversy in the middle of the 1976 Presidential primaries.

It was left that Jackson would be authorized by the two other Senators to take this matter up directly with you.

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4 According to Sonnenfeldt’s notes (see footnote 2 above), Kissinger explained that the redrafted exchange of letters might be acceptable: “I can live with this letter. But all I can promise—I hate to be fussy—is that emigration will rise with applications. With at most 1½% less for security clearances. All Gromyko said in long lunch was that individual security cases can be raised with them.” Kissinger subsequently sounded a more positive note: “I will propose [to Ford] to accept your redraft. Can get word [to Senators] tomorrow. Not asking [for] redraft on national security, just telling you what Soviets said so we understand each other.” “My word will weigh” with the President, Kissinger assured Jackson. “[I] would be astonished if he rejected.”

5 There is no indication of the President’s approval or disapproval of the recommendation.

6 According to Sonnenfeldt’s notes, Kissinger stated that Ford was “adamantly opposed” to an 18-month waiver, arguing that it would “fall into maximum contention period,” i.e., the 1976 Presidential campaign. The meeting also included the following exchange: “Kissinger: On waiver, [you] should talk to President who knows better than I. Ribicoff: Trade Bill won’t come up till after recess. So time. Javits: Should try to settle & get tranquility on this issue. We are both with you (Scoop). If President wants 2 years rather than 18 months, [it would] give you refusal after election. Jackson: Don’t want 2 years. Trust went down [in] grain deal when Soviets refused to give data. 2 years too long. Kissinger: Well, President feels strongly. He knows how it works. I don’t. He fears big acrimonious argument.”

7 In a memorandum to Scowcroft on October 9, Sonnenfeldt reported: “I talked to Jackson’s people; he, himself, was not available. Apparently Henry called Jackson before he left last night and agreed to the letters. In any case, I confirmed that point again.” Sonnenfeldt added: “Perle says that if the Bill should be reported out, it would of course be with the original Jackson–Vanik Amendment. The waiver amendment would be introduced from the Floor by Jackson. This could not occur before the recess and consequently Perle says there would be time for the Administration and Jackson to work out the precise language, based on whatever agreement is reached between the President and Jackson. Perhaps you should report these considerations to the President and see how he feels about it.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974)
53. **Note From President Ford to the Soviet Leadership**¹

Washington, undated.

The United States believes that major progress toward a new agreement limiting strategic offensive arms through 1985 should be made during the discussions with Secretary Kissinger in Moscow. Our aim is to lay the groundwork for agreement at the highest level on the principal objectives of a new agreement; this would provide the delegations in Geneva with a framework for developing a final agreement during 1975.

In this light the US side suggests that the following general approach to a new agreement be discussed in the Moscow talks.

1. Both sides would agree to make a maximum effort, primarily through a combination of reductions and other limitations, to establish a viable strategic balance.

2. This approach would require a phased reduction in the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers:
   a. The numerical limits of the Interim Agreement would remain in effect without change until October 1977.
   b. Over a five year period beginning at that time (October 1977), both sides would agree to reduce their ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers to no more than 2350 by 1982. Between the end of the Interim Agreement and 1982, the total number of ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers cannot exceed 2500, and the total number of modern large ICBMs cannot exceed 300.
   c. By the end of 1983, both sides would reduce to 2200.
   d. By the end of 1983, both sides would reduce to no more than 250 heavy systems, including both heavy missiles and heavy bombers.

3. Both sides would limit the number of ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with MIRVs to 60 percent of their reduced forces, that is, no more than 1320 MIRV missiles; MIRVs will be banned on heavy ICBMs, and air-to-surface missiles with a range greater than 3,000 km will be banned from deployment on heavy bombers.

4. Both sides would agree to limit their total deployment of new ICBMs and SLBMs and heavy bombers, including those deployed for purposes of replacement or modernization, to no more than 175 missiles and bombers combined in any one year.

5. This provision as well as the numerical limit on missiles equipped with MIRVs would enter into effect with signing of the new agreement.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, October 1974. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the note was handed to Dobrynin by Scowcroft and Sonnenfeldt at 2:15 p.m. on October 9.
6. There would also be agreement that the provision of the Interim Agreement prohibiting the construction of new ICBM silos should be incorporated into any new agreement.

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54. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


RECOMMENDED PHONE CALL

To: Senator Henry M. Jackson
Recommended by: Brent Scowcroft

Background:

Senator Jackson is expecting a call from you to discuss the waiver procedure for the Jackson–Vanik Amendment to the Trade Bill.

Your suggestion to Jackson in your last meeting was that your waiver authority would continue for one year, at the end of which you would make a new determination regarding Soviet performance on Jewish emigration. The Congress could veto your determination by concurrent resolution within a 90-day period. You subsequently offered as a concession to Jackson to allow veto by one House only.

Jackson proposed to you an initial waiver period of 18 months, following which you would be required to request that the Congress extend your waiver authority for an additional year. In order to insure prompt Congressional action on the request for renewed waiver authority, Jackson proposes a number of legislative safeguards (his draft language is at Tab A).³

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Name File, 1974–1977, Box 2, Jackson, Henry M. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Timmons. In an attached handwritten note, Ford instructed Scowcroft: “Brent—Talk with me on this Sat. [October 12] if possible.” According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford called Jackson on October 11 at 1:38 p.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

² See Document 35.

³ Not attached.
In your discussion of the Trade Bill with the Bipartisan Leadership at breakfast on September 19,\(^4\) you described the procedure proposed by Jackson. The general sentiment of the Leadership seemed to be that it was not workable. Instead, there was general agreement that your proposed procedure was one which was clearly understood by all and which obviously operated satisfactorily, as demonstrated in the case of the Congressional rejection of your pay raise deferral action.

**Talking Points:**

You may wish to reiterate to Jackson the Congressional control which your proposed waiver authority affords, as tested and proved in practice in the recent pay raise action.

You might also wish to point out that the sentiment of the Bipartisan Leadership was that the procedures which Jackson proposes were not workable.

**Action\(^5\)**

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\(^4\) The reference is in error; Ford’s breakfast meeting with bipartisan Congressional leaders took place on September 26. See Document 42.

\(^5\) There is no action indicated on the original. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Jackson in the Oval Office from 3:55 to 4:15 p.m. (Ford Library, White House Office Files) In message Tohak 29 to Kissinger, October 11, Scowcroft reported: “The President met with Jackson alone. He told me that he proposed to Jackson that we would let Jackson put his version of the waiver authority in the Senate bill if Jackson would guarantee that he would recede in conference and accept our version of the waiver procedure. Jackson said he would have to think about it over the weekend and he would call the President on Monday. We are now checking to see whether or not it is legislatively possible to accomplish a maneuver like this.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 1, Kissinger Trip File, October 8–13—Middle East, TOHAK (2))
PARTICIPANTS

Yitzhak Rabin, Prime Minister of Israel
Yigal Allon, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs
Shimon Peres, Minister of Defense
Simcha Dinitz, Ambassador to the United States
Mordechai Gazit, Director of Prime Minister’s Office
Gen. Mordechai Gur, Chief of Staff, Israel Defense Forces
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Amb. Kenneth Keating, U.S. Ambassador to Israel
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

SUBJECTS

Immediate Defense Needs; U.S.-Soviet Détente; Negotiating Strategy; Long-Term
Arms Supply; PLO Vote in the UNGA

US-Soviet Détente

Allon: Shimon said if we had European neighbors, we could cut
our weapon necessities by half. In fact we do have a European neighbor
—the Soviet Union. By its political presence and military advice, parti-
cularly in Syria. This raises two questions. Give me a lesson. Does
détente cover the Middle East or not? I mean, can you on behalf of the
spirit of détente approach the Soviet Union and say “You can’t outflank
Europe?”

Kissinger: Détente covers the Middle East partly in the sense we
are substantially competitive. In the situation in the United States,
which may make it the case that any serious foreign policy can’t be con-
ducted, our strategy was to create a network of risks so they would
have to give up something if they run the risks. There is a campaign in
Congress to cut off everything positive we could do, plus the intellec-
tual community is destroying détente. I have no illusion about the So-
viet Union. Our policy is the most anti-Soviet policy that can be sus-
tained. To avoid what happened with Vietnam.
When Schmidt goes to the Soviet Union, he will give substantial credits to the Soviet Union. This is my prediction. Then we will be in the brilliant situation where we have gotten the Europeans into an economic relationship with the Soviet Union and will have gained no leverage for us. The gas deals would take fifteen years, giving us constant... The credits—we have only given $250 million. What can we tell them they will lose? We can confront them, but that we could do in the Cold War. They cut off credits; we barely managed to save the Trade Bill.

Take the European Security Conference. The Europeans will cave the first time there is a crisis. If there is a Berlin crisis, they will rush to Moscow. We can’t even deliver the end of the European Security Conference because the Europeans scream treason. It is the biggest fraud. The Europeans think they can undermine the Soviet system without the Soviets noticing, by newspapers and exchange of families. When I lived in Nazi Germany you could buy the London Times in the train station of Fuerth, for God’s sake. They are undermining détente, the very people who don’t have the guts to see it through. If SALT fails, the New York Times and Post and Senator Church will deluge us. Like Vietnam. If Jackson prevails, there will be a polarization of our society.

In the last war, we got the Soviets to behave more cautiously than we had reason to hope for. They sent Kosygin to Cairo; certainly it is the Arab perception the Soviets didn’t do enough. If there is a next war, they will be more risk-taking. How they will do it, I don’t know—whether ships, troops are sent to Syria. I don’t base this on Macovescu. Allon: This puts us in a dilemma. We accepted détente as a good thing for the world.

Kissinger: But the Jews in America worked against it.

Allon: I am afraid the only victim of a far from perfect détente will be Israel.

Kissinger: Why? Suppose there is no détente, what will be different?

Allon: You have important interests with the Arabs, which I understand very well. I know some in the US begin to doubt after the Yom Kippur war whether we were an asset. But if we had lost the war, God forbid, everyone would go to the Russians, not the Arabs, for oil.

I must say very frankly, when we negotiated with the Syrians, the Presidential assurances on military supply, financial obligations and the Golan Heights were the decisive thing. Now we have to bargain

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2 Senator Frank F. Church III (Democrat, Idaho).
3 Gheorghe Macovecu, Romanian Foreign Minister.
over every weapon. And I think we did the right thing, but the Syrians needed it at least as much as we.

We had to act like beggars, not allies. We would like to feel more at home in Washington. We know better than all your experts on the Arabs. It is good to know we have the same interests. The bloody Europeans are trying to get the best of both worlds, with the Arabs, the Soviets, because they know you will do the dirty work.

You are going to Russia.

Kissinger: On the 22nd [of October].

Allon: I was speaking in New York at the Council of Foreign Relations. There was a question about the October alert, from an oil man.

Dinitz: McCloy.⁴

Allon: He was suggesting we were dragging the US into a major war. And I said that it saved America’s position as a world power. Therefore to avoid another alertness [sic], I say as a friend that you should tell them any Soviet involvement will mean a confrontation with America. Otherwise they will delude themselves that America has gotten soft.

Kissinger: If America has gotten soft, it is because the very groups that accuse us of selling out are the ones who are opposing America’s strength. We can’t be strong only for Israel. Our policy has been that whenever Russia puts a toe across the line, we cut it off. We have to do a complex policy. We have the best potential for being tough by seeming to be soft.

Where have the Soviets gained anything? They know what’s happening in the Middle East. Jewish newspapermen and Jewish congressmen are more responsible for America’s weakness. They [the Soviets] believed the alert because they had seen Nixon and me behave like maniacs. We are falling into a Kennedy period, if there is the impression that we are weak and our authority is undermined. If we had been able to carry out our policy of two years ago, to build a network of relationships, and there was a war in the Middle East, what could we say we could cut off? Congress already cut it off, for nothing.

If the Soviet Union intervenes in the Middle East, we will react. They will know it. Our credibility in the US now—what would you conclude? Under Nixon, even in Watergate, the people thought he might be crazy. I’m serious. They thought he might do something.

Now take this Chile thing. What is wrong with undermining a Communist Government in Chile. The other Latin Americans are re-

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⁴ John J. McCloy, former Chairman of the Council on Foreign Relations; as a partner at Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy, he also represented a number of multinational oil companies, including Exxon.
lieved! Only Americans are complaining. We just found out the Russians put $2 million behind the Communist Party in Greece. We can't do it, because our people are scared to death.

The alert—it’s absurd. They sent a message, which you saw. I called Dobrynin to say, “Don’t do anything, we are having an NSC meeting.” He didn’t say they wouldn’t do anything. I called him three times—he had three opportunities to say they weren’t doing anything. He said only “I’ll report to Moscow.”

In 1970 we did an alert, better. This time some Pentagon guy called AP. An alert can’t get out in two hours. In 1970 it came out when the crisis was over.

Our policy was to be of one piece. [to Rabin] We always agreed if we lost on Vietnam we would lose in Israel.

Allon: With the Egyptians we can see the beginning. With the Syrians we are moving to confrontation. The Russians will be more active.

Kissinger: That is my judgment.

Allon: That makes it easier. Help us!

Kissinger: You can’t face the Russians. With the Lance missiles even. We will make a major effort if the Soviets behave threateningly. That has always been my strategy. If we have the right psychological climate. If we want to move, we are better off doing it from a posture of having been betrayed, because then peaceloving Americans will be with us. Don’t you think?

Keating: American Jewish writers are the main troublemakers against détente.

Dinitz: Church and Eagleton aren’t Jewish!

Kissinger: Richard Perle.

Dinitz: Just so the record doesn’t show the Jews are responsible for World War III, let it be clear there is no connection between Jews and anti-détente or Israel and anti-détente.

Keating: There are right-thinking and highminded Jewish leaders who back détente.

Kissinger: Forget what the Jews do or not do. It is in the interest of the peace of the world and of this country that the authority of the American Government not be impaired. Not just this Administration.

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5 The decision to move U.S. forces to a DEFCON III alert was made in an NSC/JCS meeting the night of October 24/25 after the Soviet Union warned that it might take unilateral military action in the Middle East. For a record of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1973 War, Document 269.

6 Senator Thomas F. Eagleton (Democrat, Missouri).
Omitted here is discussion of the Arab-Israeli peace process, military assistance, and representation for the Palestine Liberation Organization at the United Nations.

56. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Algiers

Washington, October 14, 1974, 2300Z.

Tohak 57/WH42809. Ref: Tohak 54.2 The President met with Butz, Enders, Seidman and me to discuss the Simon grain cable.3 He came up with the following proposed cable to Simon:

Begin text.

1. After reviewing the Soviet proposal and your recommendation, the President has directed that you offer the following to the USSR:

—500,000 tons of corn for firm contract now;
—500,000 tons of corn for purchase during the summer of 1975, contingent upon crop reports received at that time;
—1.2 million tons of wheat for immediate contract;
—deliveries scheduled out through July 1975.

2. Total would thus be 2.2 million tons. This is 700,000 tons above what Secretary Kissinger told Dobrynin on October 4.4 In no repeat no circumstances do we envisage committing ourselves now to the full 3.2

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 1, Kissinger Trip File, 10/8–13/74—Middle East, TOHAK (4). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Flash.

2 In message Tohak 54, October 14, Scowcroft advised Kissinger: “The President has just called an urgent meeting to discuss the Simon cable on the Soviet grain deal (Moscow 15510).” (Ibid.) In telegram 15510 from Moscow, October 14, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Parsky reported that, as a result of a “lengthy discussion” between Simon and Patolich, the Soviets were flexible on the means but not on the ends of a grain agreement. “Throughout the discussion,” Parsky added, “the Soviets made the convincing argument that a contract is a contract and that it was extremely important to their commercial community and to future trade relations with the U.S. that we maintain the integrity of our contractual relations by holding to the total of 3.2 million tons. Simon strongly recommends that it is important to honor this contract. This is a political problem, not an economic one.” (Ibid., “Outside the System” Chronological Files, 1974–1977, Box 1, 10/10/74–10/16/74)

3 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Butz, Seidman, and Scowcroft in the Oval Office from 4:45 to 5:25 p.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

4 See Document 48.
million tons the Soviets had contracted for. In response to the Soviet argument on sanctity of contract you may wish to point out that at no point did US representatives envisage more than 1 million tons of corn, and then only contingent on favorable crop reports.

3. Request you present this position to the Soviets. If they accept it, announcement should be the subject of further consideration but subsequent to renegotiation of the contracts. Should they reject the offer, you should tell them you will report their views in Washington. End text.

The rationale for this middle ground is as follows: Butz argued that 1 million tons of corn was about as high as we should go but that there was no problem on wheat. He said we could give them as much as 2.2 million tons of wheat, thus maintaining the 3.2 total for which the Soviets had contracted. The President felt that maintaining the 3.2 million total, after all the fuss we had made about cancelling the Soviet contracts, would be very damaging politically. The press would be likely to ignore the change in composition of grains and it would look as if Simon went to the Soviet Union and caved. The proposal quoted above is essentially what Simon’s instructions were previously, except for the addition of 200,000 tons of wheat. Simon has not yet, however, offered to them the “perhaps” second 500,000 tons of corn, which he would now do. The President feels that this is about as far as he can go, at least before elections.

The President is ready to send the above cable to Simon but I wanted you to see first what is envisaged. If you have strong views contrary to this, I feel certain the President would entertain them. Simon is scheduled to meet with Brezhnev tomorrow morning (Moscow time), so we will need to get a cable out to him tonight.5

Warm regards.

5 In message Tohak 60 to Kissinger, October 15, Scowcroft reported: “Further to my previous message on the subject, you should know that the draft instruction contained therein has now been sent to Secretary Simon.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 1, Kissinger Trip File, 10/8–13/74—Middle East, TOHAK (5))
57. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Rabat

Washington, October 15, 1974, 2205Z.

Tohak 75/WH42833. The Parliamentarian has informed the President that his scheme for getting rid of Jackson’s waiver provision in conference in favor of ours is not possible. The President told me to call Jackson, tell him that, and explain that the President thought he had done his best and he now recommended that Jackson accept his (the President’s) waiver procedure with a one-house veto.

Jackson said that he wanted to check the Parliamentarian’s findings but that he thought the President should accept his waiver procedures, with an 18-month initial period, and he proposed that he, Javits and Ribicoff meet with the President on Thursday.

The President had departed on his campaign trip before I got this response from Jackson.

Warm regards.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 1, Kissinger Trip File, October 8–13—Middle East, TOHAK (5). Secret; Eyes Only; Flash.

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford called Lewis Deschler, the Parliamentary Consultant for the House of Representatives, at 5:31 p.m. on October 11. Scowcroft and Timmons were both in the Oval Office when the President placed the call. (Ibid., White House Office Files) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

3 October 17. They met the next day; see Document 59.
58. Memorandum From the Executive Director of the Council on International Economic Policy (Eberle) to the President’s Assistant for Legislative Affairs (Timmons) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)\(^1\)

Washington, October 17, 1974.

Attached is a resolution to the procedural problem in Jackson/Vanik which is acceptable to the Senators involved—provided that it is acceptable to the President. If it is not acceptable to the President this is a non-paper.

If it is acceptable, the Senators would like to resolve this with the President Friday morning\(^2\) (Jackson leaves town for the recess at 2 PM). To resolve this it will be necessary to:

1. Sign and exchange the letters
2. Issue a public statement that the principles of agreement on procedures are as outlined herein.

We need to promptly get a Presidential decision on this matter.\(^3\)

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974. No classification marking. According to an attached note, Scowcroft forwarded this copy of the memorandum to Sonnenfeldt on October 17 “per our telephone conversation at 7:15 p.m.” The President’s copy of the attached paper, as revised during his meeting with Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff on October 18, is in Ford Library, White House Central Files, Subject File, 1974–1977, TA Executive. Ford returned his copy to Scowcroft after the meeting. Ford’s revisions to the paper are noted in the footnotes below.


3 In a memorandum to the President on October 17, Cheney reported: “Per your approval yesterday, Timmons is prepared to set up a meeting for you with Senators Jackson, Javits and Ribicoff on a possible compromise on the Trade Bill. Prior to that meeting, Secretary Kissinger needs to brief you on the substantive compromise proposal. If you approve the proposal, the meeting can be held Friday morning. If you disapprove the proposal there is no need for a meeting at this time. The pressure for a meeting is due in part to Senator Javits’ desire to reach an agreement prior to the election and also to the pressure from Senator Jackson for a quick agreement.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974)
Attachment

Washington, October 17, 1974.

Principles of Agreement on Proposed Waiver of Jackson–Vanik Amendment

1. 18-month authority in trade bill to waive Jackson–Vanik amendment on determination and report to Congress that waiver with respect to any country will substantially promote the objectives of the Jackson–Vanik amendment (trade bill section 402).

2. After the 18 months, the waiver authority shall be renewable only upon adoption of a concurrent resolution extending the authority for one year. If an extension is desired, a request shall be made by the President no later than 30 days prior to expiration of the 18-month period.

3. In the event that the Congress has not acted by the end of the 18-month period, the President may extend the waiver authority for up to 60 days after the end of the 18-month period.

4. In the event that Congress fails within 60 days after the expiration of the 18-month period to adopt a concurrent resolution on the issue of extending the authority, the authority will nevertheless continue in force unless either House of Congress (within 90^4 calendar days of the expiration of the 60-day period) passes a simple resolution of disapproval of the continuation of the waiver authority.

5. The waiver may be further extended by executive order at one year intervals upon a Presidential determination and report to Congress that such extension will substantially promote the objectives of the Jackson–Vanik amendment, provided neither House of Congress (within 90^5 calendar days of the issuance of the executive order) adopts a resolution of disapproval of the extension.

6. The statutory language to implement this proposal shall permit the concurrent resolution or the simple resolution of disapproval to exclude one or more countries from the extensions of the waiver authority. In addition, the concurrent and simple resolutions provided in the draft shall include procedures designed to expedite a vote by each House of Congress.

7. The statutory language of the proposed amendment will be drafted in concert by the Congressional and Executive Branch staff and

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4 "90" was crossed out here on Ford’s copy of the paper and changed to “45.”
5 "90" was crossed out here on Ford’s copy of the paper and changed to “60.”
an agreed statement of legislative intent reflecting the procedures outlined herein will be formulated and made part of the record.

59. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 18, 1974, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Gerald Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Senator Henry M. Jackson (D.–Wash)
Senator Jacob Javits (R.–N. Y.)
Congressman Charles Vanik (D.–Ohio)
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: Is the Congress going to quit today?
Jackson: We are already out. We passed the continuing resolution on a voice vote. We didn’t have a quorum.

[The press comes in and takes photographs and is then dismissed.]
President: I understand we initially are over the brink.
Jackson: I understand there is one question on whether Congress should act in 30 or 90 days. Let’s compromise on 60.
Vanik: We can’t turn around in 30 days.
President: In a compromising manner let’s make it 45.
Jackson: There is a growing feeling we will get a reaction on this. Byrd² is increasingly opposed.
Vanik: We can’t make it in 30 days.
President: But 45 days is a month and a half.
Javits: The first period is long. Let’s make it 45 days, since it is in full career. After that, when it is an annual matter, make it 60 days.
Jackson: You would change the 90 to 45 days in the first time around, and have the periodic vote at 60 days?
Javits: Yes. Is that okay, Mr. President?

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 6. No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Jackson, Javits, and Vanik until 10:25 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)
² Senator Harry F. Byrd, Jr. (Independent, Virginia).
President: Let’s run through the paper.3

Jackson: Paragraph 1. If Congress hasn’t acted within the 18 months, you can extend to 60 days. Then if Congress doesn’t act it will continue unless there is a veto within 45 days. Thereafter it is annually.

Javits: Then it would be 60 days. In paragraph 5.

President: And 45 days in paragraph 4.

Kissinger: Really 60 days and 45 days in paragraph 4.

President: What is the procedure in the Senate? Will this be done in committee or on the floor?

Jackson: I will offer this on the floor.

President: You will chair with Mike and you [Javits] with Hugh.4

Jackson: Yes.

Javits: Yes.

President: What about Long?5

Jackson: There is no problem with him. The problem is the trade bill itself.

President: You can help there.

Jackson: I have kept Long informed and Javits has Bennett.6 If we did it in Committee, it would get botched up.

President: You will let us see the language?

Jackson: We will work it out together.

President: It is complicated and we have to make it foolproof.

Javits: We will call a meeting of all our co-sponsors to explain this. Then we will do it in the House and Vanik can explain that.

Jackson: It strengthens the bill in the Senate.

President: I have to send a request 30 days before expiration. Then you must act within 60 days.

Javits: Yes, and if Congress doesn’t act within 45 days, after 45 days after the 60 days . . .

President: Then if we get by that, the 12 months starts after the 45 days?

Javits: Yes.

President: Then it goes back to 60 days as a regular matter.

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3 Attached to Document 58.
4 References are to Senate Majority Leader Michael J. Mansfield (Democrat, Montana) and Senate Minority Leader Hugh Scott (Republican, Pennsylvania).
5 Senator Russell B. Long (Democrat, Louisiana), Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee.
6 Senator Wallace F. Bennett (Republican, Utah), ranking Republican on the Senate Finance Committee.
Jackson: The whole thing is for five years.

Javits: This is historic. It’s like Moses leading his people out of bondage. It’s not only that Scoop made this, but it’s a whole change in Soviet policy to open this to us.

President: I would like to thank Secretary Kissinger for working this out with Scoop. I agree it is a breakthrough. But this deal with Brezhnev . . .

Jackson: I won’t bring the Soviet Union in. I will talk about you and Dr. Kissinger. Brezhnev didn’t help with that foul statement.7

It is the first major effort in bipartisan policy in your Administration. You deserve a lot of credit.

I will make an opening statement, then Jake and then Charlie.

Vanik: I have been having my own problems.8

[The conversation ended.]

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7 At an October 15 dinner in Moscow for Secretary Simon and American businessmen attending the annual meeting of the Directors of the U.S.–USSR Trade and Economic Council, Brezhnev warned that the imposition of “utterly irrelevant and unacceptable” stipulations on U.S.-Soviet trade relations were “attempts at intervention in internal affairs” that did “nothing but harm.” (“Soviet Warns U.S. on Trade Strings,” The New York Times, October 16, 1974, p. 59)

8 By prearrangement, Jackson held a press conference in the White House after his meeting with the President both to announce the agreement on the Trade Bill and Soviet emigration and to release the text of his exchange of letters with Kissinger. In his statement to the press, Jackson declared: “The agreement is based on, and the Secretary’s letter conveys, the assumption that the rate of emigration from the USSR will begin to rise promptly from the 1973 level—and that it will continue to rise with the number of applicants. We have agreed with President Ford that a ‘minimum standard of initial compliance’ will be the issuance of 60,000 visas per annum. I wish to emphasize that this figure is not a quota. It is my judgment that, if the agreement is implemented in good faith, the actual number will exceed 60,000 per annum since there is abundant evidence of a current backlog in excess of 130,000, and the agreement calls for the number to rise to correspond to the number of applicants.” (Ford Library, Nessen Papers, Box 125, Foreign Guidance for Press Briefing, Trade)
60. Letter From Secretary of State Kissinger to Senator Henry M. Jackson

Washington, October 18, 1974.

Dear Senator Jackson:

I am writing to you as the sponsor of the Jackson Amendment to the Trade Bill (H. R. 10710) which is currently before the Senate and in whose early passage the Administration is deeply interested. As you know, Title IV of that Bill, as it emerged from the House, is not acceptable to the Administration. At the same time, the Administration respects the objectives with regard to emigration from the USSR that are sought by means of the stipulations in Title IV, even if it cannot accept the means employed. It respects in particular your own leadership in this field.

To advance the purposes we share both with regard to passage of the Trade Bill and to emigration from the USSR, and on the basis of discussions that have been conducted with Soviet representatives, I should like on behalf of the Administration to inform you that we have been assured that the following criteria and practices will henceforth govern emigration from the USSR.

First, punitive actions against individuals seeking to emigrate from the USSR would be violations of Soviet laws and regulations and will therefore not be permitted by the Government of the USSR. In particular, this applies to various kinds of intimidation or reprisal, such as, for example, the firing of a person from his job, his demotion to tasks beneath his professional qualifications, and his subjection to public or other kinds of recrimination.

Second, no unreasonable or unlawful impediments will be placed in the way of persons desiring to make application for emigration, such as interference with travel or communications necessary to complete an application, the withholding of necessary documentation and other obstacles including kinds frequently employed in the past.

Third, applications for emigration will be processed in order of receipt, including those previously filed, and on a non-discriminatory basis as regards the place of residence, race, religion, national origin and professional status of the applicant. Concerning professional status, we are informed that there are limitations on emigration under Soviet law in the case of individuals holding certain security clearances.

but that such individuals who desire to emigrate will be informed of
the date on which they may expect to become eligible for emigration.

Fourth, hardship cases will be processed sympathetically and
expeditiously; persons imprisoned who, prior to imprisonment, ex-
pressed an interest in emigrating, will be given prompt consideration
for emigration upon their release; and sympathetic consideration may
be given to the early release of such persons.

Fifth, the collection of the so-called emigration tax on emigrants
which was suspended last year will remain suspended.

Sixth, with respect to all the foregoing points, we will be in a posi-
tion to being to the attention of the Soviet leadership indications that
we may have that these criteria and practices are not being applied.
Our representations, which would include but not necessarily be lim-
ited to the precise matters enumerated in the foregoing points, will re-
ceive sympathetic consideration and response.

Finally, it will be our assumption that with the application of the
criteria practices and procedures set forth in this letter, the rate of emi-
gration from the USSR would begin to rise promptly from the 1973
level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of
applicants.

I understand that you and your associates have, in addition, cer-
tain understandings incorporated in a letter dated today\(^2\) respecting
the foregoing criteria and practices which will henceforth govern emi-
gration from the USSR which you wish the President to accept as ap-
propriate guidelines to determine whether the purposes sought
through Title IV of the Trade Bill and further specified in our exchange
of correspondence in regard to the emigration practices of non-market
economy countries are being fulfilled. You have submitted this letter to
me and I wish to advise you on behalf of the President that the under-
standings in your letter will be among the considerations to be applied
by the President in exercising the authority provided for in Sec-
tion \(^3\) of Title IV of the Trade Bill.

I believe that the contents of this letter represent a good basis, con-
sistent with our shared purposes, for proceeding with an acceptable
formulation of Title IV of the Trade Bill, including procedures for peri-

\(^2\) Document 61.

\(^3\) Statutory language authorizing the President to waive the restrictions in Title IV
of the Trade Bill under certain conditions will be added as a new, as yet undesignated
subsection. [Footnote in the original.]
odic review, so that normal trading relations may go forward for the mutual benefit of the US and the USSR.

Best regards,

Henry A. Kissinger

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4 Printed from a copy that bears Kissinger’s typed signature with an indication that he signed the original.

61. Letter From Senator Henry M. Jackson to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 18, 1974.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

Thank you for your letter of October 18 which I have now had an opportunity to review. Subject to the further understandings and interpretations outlined in this letter, I agree that we have achieved a suitable basis upon which to modify Title IV by incorporating within it a provision that would enable the President to waive subsections designated (a) and (b) in Sec. 402 of Title IV as passed by the House in circumstances that would substantially promote the objectives of Title IV.

It is our understanding that the punitive actions, intimidation or reprisals that will not be permitted by the Government of the USSR include the use of punitive conscription against persons seeking to emigrate, or members of their families; and the bringing of criminal actions against persons in circumstances that suggest a relationship between their desire to emigrate and the criminal prosecution against them.

Second, we understand that among the unreasonable impediments that will no longer be placed in the way of persons seeking to emigrate is the requirement that adult applicants receive the permission of their parents or other relatives.

Third, we understand that the special regulations to be applied to persons who have had access to genuinely sensitive classified information will not constitute an unreasonable impediment to emigration. In

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Name File, 1974–1977, Box 2, Jackson, Henry M. No classification marking.
2 Document 60.
this connection we would expect such persons to become eligible for emigration within three years of the date on which they last were exposed to sensitive and classified information.

Fourth, we understand that the actual number of emigrants would rise promptly from the 1973 level and would continue to rise to correspond to the number of applicants, and may therefore exceed 60,000 per annum. We would consider a benchmark—a minimum standard of initial compliance—to be the issuance of visas at the rate of 60,000 per annum; and we understand that the President proposes to use the same benchmark as the minimum standard of initial compliance. Until such time as the actual number of emigrants corresponds to the number of applicants the benchmark figure will not include categories of persons whose emigration has been the subject of discussion between Soviet officials and other European governments.

In agreeing to provide discretionary authority to waive the provisions of subsections designated (a) and (b) in Sec. 402 of Title IV as passed by the House, we share your anticipation of good faith in the implementation of the assurances contained in your letter of October 18 and the understandings conveyed by this letter. In particular, with respect to paragraphs three and four of your letter we wish it to be understood that the enumeration of types of punitive action and unreasonable impediments is not and cannot be considered comprehensive or complete, and that nothing in this exchange of correspondence shall be construed as permitting types of punitive action or unreasonable impediments not enumerated therein.

Finally, in order adequately to verify compliance with the standard set forth in these letters, we understand that communication by telephone, telegraph and post will be permitted.

Sincerely yours,

Henry M. Jackson
Kissinger’s Trip to Moscow, October 1974

62. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, October 18, 1974.

Your Moscow Talks

This almost certainly is a time of considerable uncertainty in Moscow.

—There are probably arguments that now, with the change of Presidents, it is time to revitalize Soviet-American relations.

—But a Soviet leader could also argue that prudence dictates a strategy of procrastination—at least until the outlook for the Ford Administration’s survival is clear and the impact of the “crisis of capitalism” is clearer.

As best as we can judge from all the evidence the decision, if there is one, is to proceed with the atmospherics of détente, but to reserve on the substance. In other words, Brezhnev probably has no urgent incentive to make the concession now that he withheld at the last summit, or that he can offer later.

Thus, a major, and perhaps insurmountable, problem is how to create an incentive for the Soviets to move.

—Since they are guaranteed a summit—which is probably all Brezhnev needs to justify his past record—we have no particular leverage, except the leverage inherent in each issue.

—Unfortunately, even linking Soviet desires, on CSCE and economic credits for example, may not be too effective, because events are probably moving their way in any case:

Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 5, Nodis Memcons, 1974, Folder 6. Secret; Sensitive. Attached but not printed is telegram 15849 from Moscow, October 18, which briefed Kissinger as follows: “Your visit comes at a time when the Soviets—in Brezhnev’s meeting with Secretary Simon and in authoritative articles in Pravda and Izvestiya—have reaffirmed their détente course and the special importance they attach to U.S.-Soviet relations. It is also, however, a time of continuing Soviet uncertainty about the depth of the U.S. commitment to the momentum of improvement in our bilateral relationship. There is particular malaise about U.S. strategic policies. What you have to say on SALT is likely to be taken as the most important indicator since President Ford took office of his Administration’s orientation toward the USSR. In addition to SALT, we expect the Soviets to look for a U.S. assurance that the focus of Middle East diplomacy will soon return to Geneva. They will hope for a positive report on the MFN/emigration issue. And they may again seek to enlist U.S. support for bringing CSCE to a conclusion at the summit. They will also be watching closely for clues about your own future.”

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—CSCE seems destined to finish next spring, unless we actively
work against it;
—Soviet dependence on credits may be lessened by the substantial
increase in hard currency earnings they have made from oil prices.

If, in fact, your leverage is not strong, then your first decision is
whether and to what extent you want to turn the SALT talks into con-
frontation, by insisting and pressing for a breakthrough. Alternatively,
if we allow SALT to slide, there is the risk that the meeting will be re-
garded as a “failure”, and the divisions in Washington will then be ag-
gravated by a debate over Soviet intentions. Moreover, there is no guar-
antee our bargaining position will improve.

You do have some cards to play, the principal one being
Brezhnev’s own identification and involvement with the policy. He can
not deliberately want to see a deterioration. He must at least hedge
against it by continuing to play up the external signs of good relations.
This suggests that you should bear down on the need to produce sub-
stantive progress by the time of the meeting in Vladivostok, which, in
essence, means at least a May 20th type SALT agreement.2

A more delicate aspect is whether you wish to attach your own po-
sition to the outcome—whether you want to warn that failure to make
progress in SALT will feed your critics. This could have an impact but
also could be dangerous: you cannot know whether Brezhnev might
prefer a weaker American administration, or whether he thinks you
may be leaving in any case.

In sum, you probably have no choice but to press for substantive
progress—particularly in SALT and to a lesser extent on MBFR—and
the TTB—since we might as well find out now whether Brezhnev is ex-
ecuting a gradual turn in policy. What follows, therefore, presumes you
will press your view on SALT, and suggest some linkage among issues,
and play on the importance of making the first Ford–Brezhnev summit
more than a get-acquainted session.

SALT

Though we have a feeling that Brezhnev will stonewall, the evi-
dence from the Geneva talks does not confirm this. Indeed, one could
conclude that there is a new Soviet NSDM, and that it represents some
softening of positions. Naturally, it is a position very favorable to Mos-
cow, but allowing for the normal bargaining fat built into all Soviet po-
sitions, one could conclude that we are at least in the same ball park:
they agree on ceilings and on some reductions, they agree on numerical

2 Reference is to the joint announcement on May 20, 1971, by President Nixon and
Chairman Kosygin of their desire to come to an agreement on SALT. See Foreign Relations,
MIRV limits in percentages, they want “restraint” in deployments. On the other hand, they propose to perpetuate the Interim Agreement numbers, count FBS, count some bomber armaments as interchangeable with MIRVs, minimize reductions, dismiss throw weight, and eliminate “new” modern submarines and bombers.

The question is whether the present position is partly for show in Geneva, or represents the Politburo—in the latter case, Brezhnev may be frozen into a very unacceptable position.

Your main tactical problem is whether and when to play some of the concessions, primarily Holy Loch, Rota, and Option III in MBFR.3

The other problem is how you might respond to a tentative offer along the lines of “offsetting asymmetries”, if it should emerge from the bargaining.

As you are well aware, you can expect one session in which Brezhnev will counterattack against your proposal, and another session to see if we have softened, and probably a final round to see if there is enough agreement to proceed à la May 20.

**MBFR**

If you introduce Option III, you will want to stress that it represents a major concession to Soviet concern and is conditioned on (a) removing FBS from SALT, and (b) a Soviet counter concession on a first phase agreement. You will not want to specify that we will withdraw 48 F–4 nuclear capable aircraft, 27 Pershings and 1000 nuclear warheads, but that a nuclear reduction can be part of the package that includes Soviet tank reductions.

You will want to stress the importance of a viable conventional balance in Europe and that we expect the Soviet side to be responsive to our concerns and the concerns of our Allies over the Soviet preponderance of armor and ground forces in Europe.

**CSCE**

CSCE should be treated in the same strategic context. If the Soviets expect us to subscribe to a series of agreements embracing a political settlement in Europe at the highest level, we must have assurances that the military balance will be a stable one. We should therefore tell them that we want to move forward in both CSCE and MBFR. This means substantive progress in MBFR must be made before the CSCE summit.

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3 Reference is to a U.S. proposal for a 20 percent reduction in Soviet armored forces in Europe in exchange for a 20 percent reduction in U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. This and other options were the subject of NSDM 211, April 16, 1973; printed ibid., volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 137.
TTB

The TTB is largely unrelated to these issues and it provides no real leverage for us. However, unless we can reach agreement on PNEs with adequate verification the TTB will stand little chance of ratification. It is thus essential to convince the Soviets of the need to tackle Article III of the TTB as a first priority. As a possible concession to the Soviet view, however, we might say that after we have crossed this first hurdle, we would be willing to consider the broad scheme for cooperation in stemming the proliferation of nuclear weapons under Article V of the NPT.

Economic Issues

Finally, economic issues might give us some leverage. You will be able to claim credit for breaking the deadlock on MFN and point to the successful outcome of the EX-IM Bank bill as a sign of our good intentions. While we cannot be very positive on the Yakutsk natural gas deal with the Japanese because of Congressional opposition, chances are that the Soviets may be having second thoughts on this as well. However, the sale of computers and aircraft are another matter, and if the licensing problems should be resolved by the time you arrive in Moscow, the notice of approval might be used to good effect during your talks. You might also tell the Soviets that we remain prepared to help out as best we can on grain deliveries within the constraints of our own domestic situation, but that they simply must play by our rules in our markets.

Middle East and Cyprus

The Middle East and Cyprus pose the delicate problem of how to keep the Soviets at arm’s length, but convince them that what we are doing does not threaten their interests. This means giving them your assessment of the situation and perhaps sharing more delicate information than otherwise, since they are probably getting it from the Arabs and the Greeks.

Finally, there is the question of announcing a summit meeting with President Ford. Should it result from your trip? Be announced at the end?

Subject: Trade Bill.

1. I tried to reach Jackson in Washington state immediately upon receipt of President’s statement on trade bill. But I missed him and he is moving around. Consequently, I had text read to Jackson’s office here which will continue to try to track him down.

2. Meanwhile, Perle called separately to say that Jackson had been informed earlier this morning via McCulloch of Xerox, who had got it from Kendall and Flanigan, that in view of references to numbers Soviets would have to repudiate agreement. Jackson wanted us to know that this would “ruin the bill” and that he would be obliged to publish list of 120,000 known Soviet applicants for emigration to prove that 60,000 was minimum if emigration would indeed rise to correspond to applications. I told Perle I had been shocked by gloss placed upon agreement by Jackson and his office which in my view was bound to produce Soviet reaction. I added that in any event, President would be issuing statement clarifying nature of correspondence in effort to save...
the agreement. I repeated that situation need never have arisen if they had permitted correspondence to speak for itself.

3. After President’s statement had been dictated to Jackson’s office, Perle called back to say they would not have to make response if (1) statement referred to your letter’s phrase on emigration rate corresponding to applications and (2) last sentence is revised to say “in exercising waiver authority which will be provided for . . .” I told him I could make no promise on any changes. He argued that your letter while not containing specific numbers did contain crucial reference to that issue which is key to agreement. I said I could only try to convey his views to you in President’s traveling party.

4. Please instruct if you wish me to do anything further.6

Warm regards.

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6 In a subsequent message to Kissinger on October 21, Sonnenfeldt reported that Jackson had issued his own statement on Soviet emigration, “which Perle says was intended to be helpful.” “You will note that Jackson’s rejoinder below is not bad,” Sonnenfeldt commented, “until the last sentence where it again goes beyond the ‘among other considerations’ language to imply agreement on numbers and characterizes Soviet policy as a change from the past.” The last sentence in Jackson’s statement reads: “The 60,000 figure mentioned in my letter is a benchmark, ‘a minimum standard of initial compliance,’ to be used, by the Congress and the President, in judging the good faith of the Soviets in the transition from their present restrictive policy to the future liberalized policy to which they are committed by the assurances in Secretary Kissinger’s letter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974)
64. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 11 a.m.–2 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev, General Secretary and Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member CPSU Politburo
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General Secretary Brezhnev
Georgiy M. Korniyenko; Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

SUBJECT

Secretary Kissinger’s Visit to USSR, October 1974

Introductory Remarks

Kissinger: (Shaking Brezhnev’s hand) You’re looking well.
Brezhnev: I keep getting younger. You know, when you get as old as I am, it becomes natural. I see that you have placed Ambassador Stoessel to your left (seated at table).
Kissinger: That’s true.
Brezhnev: You know, we would never criticize your Ambassador. He is highly respected.
Kissinger: We’re seated this way because I am to the left of Sonnenfeldt.
Brezhnev: Ah, everyone in a position of advantage.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow. Top Secret; Nodis; Sensitive. Drafted by Clift. The meeting was held in the Old Politburo Room in the Council of Ministers Building, Kremlin. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes of the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
Kissinger: I’ve told the Ambassador that he is the first one whom we tell everything.

Brezhnev: How does he know? We tell him everything.

Gromyko: We tell him everything until there is no more to tell him.

Kissinger: That I’m sure of.

Brezhnev: How is Mrs. Kissinger?

Kissinger: She is fine, and she very much appreciates your hospitality.

Brezhnev: The first thing that came to my mind when I got up and looked out the window this morning was that the weather is so bad. I thought: This will spoil Mrs. Kissinger’s sightseeing. The second thought was a pleasant one: This time, too, Dr. Kissinger won’t get to Leningrad (laughter).

Kissinger: At least I will know now that Leningrad exists. But this will make me even unhappier.

Brezhnev: Maybe on your next visit I’ll take your wife around Moscow, and you’ll go to Leningrad.

Kissinger: You will negotiate with my wife?

Brezhnev: I am sure she would be easier to negotiate with than you are.

Kissinger: I saw what you told Secretary Simon about me.2

Brezhnev: That was a good discussion; I liked him.

Kissinger: Yes, he’s a nice man, but you told him I don’t make concessions.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you are starting out our conversation by saying what isn’t true! I did say what I thought of you to Secretary Simon and Mr. Kendall . . .

Kissinger: I know, it was very friendly.

Brezhnev: To both I said very positive things.

Kissinger: I appreciated it.

Brezhnev: It’s no secret. I said what I did in the hope that it would be brought to the attention of your President. I am sure Secretary Simon and Mr. Kendall will bring it to his attention.

Kissinger: Your views were reported to the President, and I appreciated it very much.

Brezhnev: That makes me very pleased.

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2 During his visit to the Soviet Union October 12–16, Simon attended the meeting of the U.S.–USSR Trade and Economic Council Directors; he also met with Brezhnev in Moscow on October 15. The Embassy reported on the visit in telegrams 15607 and 15664 from Moscow, both October 16. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) See also footnote 7, Document 59.
Kissinger: I was touched personally.
Brezhnev: You know, it wasn’t said as a deliberate or pointed remark. The subject came up naturally.
Kissinger: I appreciated it very much, and they did report your remarks to the President.

General Review of Bilateral and International Issues

Brezhnev: We are today beginning our eighth meeting. May I first voice my satisfaction at this fact. Let me again say from the outset that, as in our other meetings, we have a very responsible mission—that is, to agree on various matters relating to further improvement in the relations between our countries in all fields.

I am deeply conscious of the great trust invested in me by our Central Committee and our Government in that I have been authorized to conduct these complex, difficult discussions with you. Our discussions have steadfastly served to advance relations between our countries. I trust you will appreciate that it is my intention to make every effort in that direction.

Of course, negotiations are negotiations. Each side is equally free, as in the past, to set out our points of view. The important thing is the results in negotiations. In the course of our talks there can be arguments and disputes. On the whole, our talks since 1972 have played a positive role—and continue to have such a role—in improving our relations. I would say in brief that, on the whole, relations between our two countries have developed in the spirit of the accords negotiated in the past few years.

Since our last meeting, there have been quite a few important events both in the United States and, indeed, in the world. I would like to start out by saying a few words on this. Then we can move on to easy subjects such as warheads and missiles and other bilateral matters.

Kissinger: The General Secretary taught me much about warheads during our meetings in March.3

Brezhnev: You know, I think I’ll tell you something about them that you don’t know this time, again. In fact, some of these things I have learned from your experts.

Kissinger: I’m glad they’re telling someone.
Brezhnev: I have nothing but words of gratitude for them. Well, what I would like to say first is that from our very first meeting and until today, I believe that the U.S. side has no grounds to reproach us

for any lacking in good faith to fulfill our obligations. And, this is something I relate not only to our agreements but also to our general line of policy and the official statements made both by myself and my colleagues. We have never made any statements in any way interfering in internal U.S. affairs. Even when there have been some complicated events, we have never exploited them.

Kissinger: I wish I could say that the same was true on our side.

Brezhnev: For the time being, I have no reproaches to make, but if you are patient we will come to all of that in good time.

I wish to stress that in all of our official statements, our public statements, I have had several opportunities to emphasize to our Party and to our Government to follow the line of seeking improvements with the United States in all fields.

Naturally, this cannot involve such things as matters of ideology, but, in that line, we have even made references to and cited Lenin in discussing US–USSR relations. I emphasized this principle in my speeches to the German Democratic Republic, Alma Ata and Kishinev, and in other statements I have made in the past period. I also emphasized this point in my remarks to the US–USSR Trade and Economic Council. Our aim is the achieving of a steadfast improvement in relations. This is something you can see in our public statements and in our press, although the press does criticize certain aspects of your policy. Of course there have been on our part certain critical remarks, not on domestic matters but on questions of international policy.

Every time I have met with you I have understood our meetings to mean that I am meeting with the official representative of the United States Government—whether you were in the position you held or in the position you now hold. I saw our meetings as discussions between two States.

Most Favored Nation Treatment

Brezhnev: And now, Dr. Kissinger, I would like to turn to certain matters, features to which our attention cannot fail to be attracted.

Now I do not know wherein lie the reasons for the United States’ failing to live up to its obligations and agreed positions. I don’t know how you will explain this, but I would like to say we have been concerned and we have been put on our guard by several factors. While we have followed the course of improved relations, the United States has taken actions not following that line.

I would like to start by mentioning the first fact, a fact on which we had agreement between the two sides. Proceeding from a reciprocal desire to improve relations between our two countries in all spheres and from the principle of equality between the two sides, we reached agreement sometime ago that the Soviet Union was to be accorded Most Fa-
vored Nation treatment. And, in return, we agreed to repay the Lend-Lease debts. Everything was agreed and crystal clear two and one-half years ago. Yet we do not see any part of that agreement fulfilled. Several days ago, I read that the United States had decided to accord MFN to several countries including China. But, regarding the Soviet Union, MFN would be accorded only as a special favor and only for 18 months. Let me say frankly that we cannot accept that “gift” (hits table with hand). We see it as a discriminatory practice that we cannot agree to. I wish to emphasize that!

Middle East

Brezhnev: That is the first question. Now, there is another fundamental issue that I also wish to mention. You will recall . . .

Kissinger: (As Sukhodrev begins translation) I’ve already got the interpretation, and I don’t want to hear it.

Brezhnev: Sonnenfeldt, don’t divert his attention. You will recall Dr. Kissinger the conversation we had at San Clemente on the Middle East—not the details, just the gist. At that time, maybe I was tactless in being as insistent as I was—as the guest—but I felt I had to stress the dangers of the situation. I said that there could be no peace in the Middle East without a genuine settlement of the problem. Now, as a politician I suppose I should have been happy to receive subsequent confirmation from your side that I was right. But, that didn’t make a settlement any easier.

We felt that through the United Nations framework that had been developed, we had achieved an understanding on an approach that could settle the Middle East problem with due respect for the legitimate rights of all states in the region, including the rights of Israel.

The situation took a different turn. You began your travels. You played upon countries to disunite them. I believe you have now convinced yourself that nothing will come from such attempts. Your side violated an understanding on an agreement in that region.

Grain Sales

Brezhnev: Now, turning to a third fact—one that is virtually unprecedented—that of our purchases of grain in the United States. We
had signed contracts when your President announced that he was nullifying the contracts.\(^6\) This is difficult to conceive of, but even more so when both sides want improved relations. Even then we gave a positive reply. We displayed patience; we pretended it was unimportant. We proceeded from the desire not to complicate the situation for the President but to help him.

**Facilitation of Business**

Brezhnev: Finally, we are doing our best to assist U.S. businessmen in the Soviet Union. We are allowing them to make the visits they want, to meet the people they want, and we are facilitating the signing of contracts. Much has been done. We have a trade turnover of some $1 billion. But, we have noticed of late that our business representatives, who used to be accorded cordial treatment in the United States, have not been allowed to visit open engineering plants—plants that have nothing to do with war production. All of this cannot help but influence our thinking about the direction that U.S. policy is taking toward the Soviet Union.

**Soviet Emigration/Soviet Jewry**

Brezhnev: And now, a few other matters. I am not alone in observing the progress that has occurred in US–USSR relations. Our Party and our people follow these events. (Brezhnev puts on glasses and reads document). Here we have an exchange of letters between Senator Jackson and you.\(^7\) These letters are written in clever diplomatic terms, but the undertones are that the Soviet Union has given an undertaking concerning the departure from the USSR of Soviet citizens of Jewish origin—a figure of 60,000! You know that the Soviet Union has not given an obligation in terms of numbers. We have said we would not erect barriers; we are not. (Brezhnev reads document, then holds it up to Secretary Kissinger across table.) I have official proof on this from our Minister of Internal Affairs. This is as of this October. Even if I were to allow all who want to to leave, I see that only 14,000 want to go. This document also says that there are 1,815 applications pending. Even if I add those figures, I still get 15,000 whereas Jackson cites 60,000. Where am I to get those applicants? I will have a copy of this given to you—\(^8\) the latest official figures regarding emigration. The import of this is that Jackson has won a great victory over the White House and that he has managed to extract certain concessions from the Soviet Union.

Now, I want to return for a moment to the MFN question.

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\(^6\) See Document 49.
\(^7\) Documents 60 and 61.
\(^8\) Not found.
Kissinger: (As Sukhodrev begins translation) What burns me up is that a lot of what the General Secretary has said is true.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you must know me well now after eight meetings. I never take things out of thin air; what I have said has substantial grounds. And also, what I have said makes me think that the United States is not doing all it can to improve relations. We do see difficulties of a domestic character on the U.S. side. That is why we disregard minor issues. However, there are some issues which by their nature affect relations between states. This is an occasion when one state talks to another state.

Returning to MFN, there are some groups and individuals in the United States who pretend that we are begging for MFN as some kind of special concession that we can’t get by without. Of course, we can both note the increase in trade that has been of benefit for both sides—an increase of $1 billion with contracts for several billion dollars signed. It is very doubtful that a U.S. businessman would sign a contract that is not to his advantage. I would go on to say that we have broad, long-term economic relations with the Europeans and with Japan. With them we have dozens more contracts than with the United States. This is a factor to be taken into account. I would emphasize the interests of the United States and of U.S. businessmen in business relations with the USSR.

Returning to the Middle East, the method you have chosen can only in the final analysis confuse matters, cause them to be more complicated than they were before the October war. At one stage what you were doing seemed not too bad. But now when you analyze Arab interests, you have to conclude that there can be a new flare-up, worse than October. We believe that only through the understanding we reached earlier can we bring our influence to bear and work to bring peace. In the past, this proved true in Vietnam. The situation there is still complicated, but there is no war. I could show you official documents from the Vietnamese saying that they won’t violate the Paris Accords. If we did it in Vietnam, we can do it in the Middle East.

CSCE

Brezhnev: One last matter affecting us is that of the All European Conference. If you have any reproaches regarding our position I’m sure you will make them. There are no hidden dangers in the USSR position, no one-sided advantages. The Conference must serve the interests of all the participants. But, how is the United States acting?

I don’t want to criticize your President. But, in practice, we don’t feel that at Geneva the United States is acting vigorously with the Soviet Union to bring the Conference to a successful conclusion. I am sure that if the United States and the President wanted to act, agreement
would be achieved rapidly. The United States and Soviet Union would not be showing hegemony, but would be safeguarding peace in Europe. If the United States took a stand, your friends would act. Now we have new delays, another interval. Then they will say it is too cold, then too hot. It is being dragged out. We feel the United States is far too passive. In words, the United States says it wants to act. At the conference, the United States sits in silence. France takes one position. The FRG has its position. We think the United States should take a resolute position. The Netherlands, Turkey and others are dragging it out. But, when questions regarding our territory to the Urals are raised, then European Security is really not the subject.

Please excuse me for discussing these questions and leaving easy matters such as nuclear issues, but all that I have raised here has an important bearing on confidence between the two countries. It has not all been negative. Some of your statements we have valued. Your statement to the Congress\(^9\) and your statements to newsmen, those we have valued highly indeed.

Dr. Kissinger, I must ask your forgiveness for starting out with all these questions. I got carried away. I forgot to ask you to give our very best regards and respects to the President and to express my appreciation for the fact that in the first day of his Administration he sent me a message expressing his desire to continue the improvement in our relations. I sent him a reply at the time of Foreign Minister Gromyko’s visit to the United States.\(^10\) Please put these remarks at the first place in our conversation.

Kissinger: I thought the General Secretary was going to say that after these introductory remarks he would move into substance.

Brezhnev: We can do that after lunch.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, first of all . . .

Brezhnev: Really, Dr. Kissinger, there have been some major events. Every month there have been new events that we cannot disregard. And, I do not regard as ordinary, run-of-the-mill events what has happened inside the United States. Whether we want it to or not, all of this affects our relations. These problems depend on the position each side takes.

I have no need to describe the events in this country. Things are very normal. We regularly publish figures regarding our economic affairs. We are now developing final figures for the fifth Five Year Plan for 1975. We have discussed this plan and had a meeting of the Council

\(^9\) See Document 28.
\(^10\) The President’s message is Document 4. It was Dobrynin, not Gromyko, who delivered Brezhnev’s reply on August 12. See Document 7.
of Ministers which I attended and addressed. In some fields there are, perhaps, certain hitches. Everyone wants to be allocated as much money as possible. Some have overfulfilled the plan, and, of course, we don’t punish them for that. At the close of the Five Year Plan, we will have a Party Congress, at the end of 1975 or in 1976—we haven’t decided. During our Congresses we review not only foreign policy but also domestic affairs.

In short, if I were graphically to portray the basic trends—and Ambassador Stoessel can bear me out—the line would be an upward one. We would prefer an even steeper upward line, but the trend of the line will without question be upward. And, as we develop economically, we are broadening and expanding our economic and commercial relations with a number of nations.

On October 15, it was ten years since I was vested with the great trust of our Party and became the head of the Central Committee of the Party. I received thousands of congratulatory letters and messages, but that is not what I wish to emphasize. And, in this 10 years—a little more than 10 years—we have had no rise in retail prices in such staples as bread, butter, sugar, rice and other staples. Not by one Kopek has there been any rise in rent, and this is something we take pride in. I say this not in any way to contrast the situation in this country with other facts . . .

Kissinger: There has not been one cent of increase in my salary during the same period.

Brezhnev: That is bad! How severely they are exploiting you. Dr. Kissinger, I have to complain that in these 10 years my salary hasn’t increased one Kopek. They are all exploiters.

Kissinger: Dobrynin or Gromyko?

Brezhnev: Dobrynin is a nice man.

Kissinger: Gromyko is always at his country house.

Brezhnev: We should lower Kissinger’s and Gromyko’s salaries.

Gromyko: Dr. Kissinger’s point was misunderstood.

Secretary Kissinger’s Response to Points Raised

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I appreciate the frankness of your presentation. When I arrived at the airport yesterday I said I was coming here to meet friends. In the 7 or 8 times I have been here there has developed a relationship of confidence that enables us to speak frankly. Secondly, I had intended to congratulate the General Secretary on the October 15 anniversary.

Brezhnev: Thank you.

Kissinger: I believe the General Secretary will go down in history as someone who has done much for his people and for the peace of the
world. I want to say that while we have spirited debates, we know his commitment to peace and to improved US–USSR relations.

Brezhnev: Let me interrupt to say that you need have no doubts in that regard. I still have some more life—at least 20 years—and throughout I will be steadfast.

Kissinger: I was going to say that when we meet on his 20th Anniversary he will have even greater accomplishments.

Brezhnev: I agree. Then we will not drink tea but cognac.

Kissinger: I have been asked by President Ford to convey his warm regards . . .

Brezhnev: Thank you.

Kissinger: He is firmly committed to the continuation of the policies already established. He is looking forward to meeting you in Vladivostok.

Brezhnev: I am looking forward to it also.

Kissinger: I think your Ambassador will already have given you his own judgement. But in terms of personalities, I believe a constructive personal relationship can be developed.

I am sure that by the time you visit the United States next summer, Mr. General Secretary, many of the problems you have mentioned will have been substantially overcome. At any rate, a cardinal principle of the foreign policy of the Ford Administration is that we want to make relations between the United States and Soviet Union irreversible. And, when we have difficulties and occasional disagreements, we should keep in mind that since 1972 we also have made enormous achievements.

Now, before returning to the specifics of your points, I want to thank you for receiving me when you have another visitor from abroad.11 I know that this adds to the difficulties of your calendar. It is a courtesy we appreciate very much.

With regard to your remarks, Mr. General Secretary, let me group my answers in two categories—those issues that more or less result from the American domestic situation and those issues which more or less reflect the international situation.

In the first category, I place MFN, grain, visits to factories and Senator Jackson. If you can make Senator Jackson a foreign problem for me I would be delighted (laughter). We would be glad to arrange for his emigration without reciprocity, as a unilateral concession to any country. If he comes here you can keep him on national security grounds without problem.

I do not doubt, Mr. General Secretary, that your Ambassador has given you a good description of the U.S. domestic situation. And, of course, it is also clear that the U.S. domestic situation is not what the foreign policy of the Soviet Union can be based on. It is also true that the Soviet Union has shown extraordinary restraint in commenting on the U.S. domestic situation. I should like to say a few words so that the General Secretary can understand the context of the actions taken.

First, I was, as you know, a close collaborator of President Nixon. I believe, as I have said publicly, history will treat President Nixon more kindly than have his contemporaries. It is true, for whatever reason, that the last phase of his Presidency created so many tensions that in the U.S. Congress much of this is only becoming evident today. The Congress is traditionally controlled by the personal popularity of the President. This balance wheel was removed during the last year. Therefore, it was difficult. Many things have been done by the Congress in the last months that would never have been possible in a normal Presidency.

Brezhnev: That we have noticed.

Kissinger: I say this not to change the facts but to help in understanding. When the new President came in, he was immediately caught up in an election campaign for the new Congress. But, I want to tell the General Secretary the following. I think, as you will see for yourself, my personal relationship with the new President is at least as close as that with his predecessor. You will judge that yourself. We are both determined as soon as the election is over to have a showdown with the Congress on who controls foreign policy.

Brezhnev: That will be this fall?

Kissinger: It will really begin after the meeting in Vladivostok, really in January 1975. There is no sense in fighting with the old Congress. The old Congress comes back November 18 for two-to-three weeks. We will get the Trade Bill from the old Congress. But, the fundamental issues will be fought in January.

In your assessment of the situation, bear in mind that the President until the election had to be a transition President. But he has already started on a much tougher set of speeches yesterday. It is important to understand that starting in January we will be going back to 1972 conditions instead of the conditions you saw in 1973–74.

That is why your meeting in Vladivostok is of importance.

Now, let me speak of the domestic issues you raised—in increasing order of importance. For example, visits to factories by Soviet personnel. I consider a universal law unaffected by ideology the stupidity of bureaucracy. While you were talking, I was raising hell with my associates, left and right, and neither I nor they had ever heard of it.
It certainly does not reflect a new national policy. I would suggest Mr. General Secretary that rather than spending time here we have the following understanding. Any visit to which either the General Secretary or the Soviet Government attaches importance, if the Ambassador calls me, and unless there are reasons such as looking at the warheads of our missiles, we will, of course, approve.

Brezhnev: There can certainly be no question of us wanting to look at warheads. Any such authorization would have to come from the Politburo and the Politburo would not approve, and, as the Foreign Minister says, it is not without danger to look at warheads.

Kissinger: That’s true. At any rate, if there is any visit to which the Ambassador attaches importance you can be certain it will be arranged. And, if it is refused at a lower level, that refusal will not be final. I should add that our Agricultural Delegation complained that it could not see certain things during its recent visit—it’s not one-sided.

Brezhnev: I don’t know about it.

Kissinger: Let’s leave it that if either side attaches importance, we will notify each other through our Ambassadors.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: I assure you there has been no change in policy.

On the subject of grain purchases, I suppose Secretary Simon has explained what happened. We were confronted with a situation where, in the judgement of our people, if the contracts had been agreed to there would have been a sharp increase in prices. This would have led the Congress to impose export controls which would have meant no grain for the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: I don’t think we should spend time on this issue here. The fact is that from the press reports we know that the United States sold China 10 million tons and you sold to others. Why was it that there was no problem with regard to those countries but only with the Soviet Union? Perhaps it wasn’t 10 million tons, five million, it doesn’t matter. The crux of the matter is in the unprecedented nature of this action. To some countries you sell grain; with the Soviet Union you discriminate.

We have contracts, up to $2 billion in contracts with your companies. The question in our mind is: If the President vetoes the grain deal, then, perhaps, he will veto others of these contracts. That is what is important, not the precise tonnage of wheat or corn. We ship grain to Poland, the GDR, Bulgaria, one million tons here, 600 thousand there. The point is that this is unilateral discrimination.

Kissinger: In the field of grain I don’t want a debate. One of the useful roles I can perform is to help us understand motivations.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you will recall we took a calm attitude; we gave a calm and quiet reply.
Kissinger: We appreciate this, and the General Secretary will know from the Ambassador that I made a public statement saying that the fault lay with the United States and not with the Soviet Union.\textsuperscript{12}

Let me make a concrete proposal on the subject of grain. First, I want to make clear we have no wish to discriminate against the Soviet Union. Let us set up a mechanism by which the Soviet Union tells us ahead of time how much it wishes to purchase over one year. We will do our best to meet the Soviet demand. In any event, we will give you a precise figure. In the face of world shortages and inflation in our country we must plan distribution, and if a sudden order comes in it has a very disturbing effect.

We are prepared to do this either on a medium-term or a year-to-year basis. We would keep the amount of your planned purchases confidential; it is for our own planning. You could continue to place orders with individual companies. (Discussion among Brezhnev, Gromyko and Dobrynin.)

Kissinger: (To Sukhodrev) Would you please explain that the figure would be for our own planning and that the Soviet Union would place the orders with the companies.

Brezhnev: By and large, I have heard of that proposal before. We are giving it consideration and we haven’t given you our reply. This is not because of sinister designs. We are not yet ready to give you our calculations for five years.

Kissinger: We don’t need five years; one is OK. If you do it for five years we can arrange to include a margin for subsequent crop adjustment. We can do it on either basis.

Brezhnev: Well, the basic reason for no reply thus far is that we are in the process of compiling the next Five Year Plan and we haven’t determined the sums we will allocate for the development of agriculture. I believe that before you leave we will be in position to give you a reply.

We received a request to inform you of the total yield this year. We weren’t able to give you this figure because the harvest is only 59% complete. The harvest is not yet in in the East or the South. Perhaps in a couple of weeks we can give you those figures. Just to give you one example. This morning I signed a telegram of congratulations to the farmers of Krasnodar. They haven’t finished and the Ukraine is bringing in the corn crop. That is the reason why we couldn’t say what the total yield would be. With the final harvest and correct figures we can. And, we didn’t want to be untruthful.

\textsuperscript{12} Kissinger made a statement to this effect during his press conference in Washington on October 7. For the full text of the press conference, including the Secretary’s statement on grain, see Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, October 28, 1974, pp. 565–572.
Kissinger: On agricultural purchases, if we can plan systematically—with no sudden orders—we are prepared to solve this in the spirit of our overall relations and not simply as a commercial transaction. If I may suggest so, in addition to addressing this at the talks here, we should plan on spending a little time on it at Vladivostok, particularly if you can make preliminary proposals before Vladivostok. The major point for the General Secretary and his colleagues is that for us it is a question of planning. It has no political significance. On the contrary, we will give due weight to political considerations in making such decisions.

I am giving a speech in Rome which explains our global concerns with respect to food and why we think that systematic planning is necessary, even if it broaches some principles of the Soviet system.¹³ Now, should I go to MFN?

Brezhnev: Not to continue this discussion, but I just remember that the United States sold several million tons to Iran.

Kissinger: Let me tell you that an order was placed for 400,000 tons at the time of your order. We stopped that order together with yours.

Brezhnev: I was talking about general background sales to Iran and China while the Soviet order was vetoed.

Kissinger: No, no. We vetoed all foreign orders. We reduced Iran’s order to 200,000 tons. You’re getting 2.2 million tons.

Dobrynin: It is a small country.

Kissinger: But an ally.

**Most Favored Nation Treatment**

Kissinger: Our attitude on détente was stated in my statement to the Congress. Secondly, it is true that as part of the general Congressional difficulties, the opponents of US-USSR relations have organized very active opposition.

On MFN, it was in this room, or a similar room, that we agreed on MFN and Lend-Lease together in 1972. I had never heard of the Jackson Amendment at the time. Nor had I ever mentioned Jewish emigration. I have stated publicly on numerous occasions that we have a moral obligation on these issues quite independent of any other consideration. And, almost anything Senator Jackson does to the Soviet Union he has done to me. He doesn’t only claim he has defeated the Soviet Union; he claims he has defeated me.

What happened last Friday was a trick of Jackson’s.¹⁴ We didn’t know what he would do when he stepped on the White House press

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¹³ Kissinger addressed the World Food Conference in Rome on November 5.

¹⁴ October 18. See footnote 8, Document 59.
podium. That doesn’t make us look good, but I can assure you we won’t get tricked twice.

On the substance of the matter, Soviet officials never said anything to us other than what you have said today. You have said, Mr. General Secretary, and your Foreign Minister has repeated numerous times, that no obstacles would be placed in the way of those seeking either applications or visas.

Gromyko: Except on grounds of national security.

Kissinger: Exactly correct. You have consistently refused to give a specific figure. In the letter I wrote Senator Jackson, no figure was used. My letter said what is true, that visas would be issued in relation to applications received. Jackson then said that this meant 60,000. The White House issued a statement on Monday,15 which I do not know whether you have seen, in which we stated specifically that the Soviet Union had never given us figures, that all the Soviet Union had done was to give us the principle for applications and visas. We said that we are not bound by the Jackson figure, that we would only take it under consideration. The Administration, under extremely difficult circumstances, attempted to fulfill a promise to the Soviet Union, and I regret the behavior of Senator Jackson. I want to assure you on behalf of the Administration that the figure of 60,000 is not our figure, nor do we consider it your figure. All you have told us is that no obstacles would be placed in the way of applications or visas, except national security.

Brezhnev: And that we are fulfilling scrupulously.

Gromyko: But, generally, the formula used by the White House in saying it takes into consideration the Jackson figure gives grounds for a one-sided interpretation of the Jackson figure.

Kissinger: No, no. Jackson said that the Congress would apply certain standards. We said that we would take that into consideration.

Gromyko: All you have said is in the statement, but it does give grounds for interpretation. I have just read it.

Kissinger: I want to make clear that as far as the Administration is concerned our understanding is that no obstacles will be placed in the way of either applications or visas, except for security, and I repeat that as far as the Administration is concerned, the only thing that governs visas is the number of applications. That has been our understanding. The Administration has no other position. If there are no other interferences, the Administration has no right to any objections.

Brezhnev: There is also reference in the letter to harassment involving the applicant and his job.

15 See footnote 2, Document 63.
Kissinger: I was told this by your Foreign Minister.
Gromyko: There is no harassment.
Kissinger: I didn’t say there is harassment.
Gromyko: I deny having said it.
Dobrynin: But there is the implication in the letter.
Kissinger: The intention of the Administration was to state those things we had been told in order to make MFN possible. There is a mistake that I made, in retrospect. I have believed and have said publicly that it was a mistake for the United States to involve itself in an internal Soviet issue.

I never briefed the press on our discussions. If I had it would have been apparent that he yielded to your point of view, not vice versa. We told him that if necessary he could refer to the letter in the Senate, but not release it at the White House. His manner is as humiliating for me as it is for you (hits table with hand). The press is saying that Kissinger has been defeated by Jackson. I’m as angry as you are. (Secretary Kissinger leaves the room for three minutes.)

Gromyko: Should we continue after lunch, at 5:30 p.m.?
Kissinger: You’re saying that you’re ending this discussion in the middle of my most eloquent speech?
Brezhnev: I have just been handed a most sensational document. At last I can expose Dr. Kissinger (Sukhodrev reads following text of proposed statement on first day’s talks):

“Talks Between Leonid I. Brezhnev and Andrei A. Gromyko and Henry A. Kissinger

“On October 24 talks started in the Kremlin between the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid I. Brezhnev and member of the Politbureau of the Central Committee of the CPSU, USSR Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko and the U.S. Secretary of State, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry A. Kissinger.

The sides exchanged views on the current state and prospects for the further development of relations between the USSR and USA, notably in the light of the understandings and agreements reached in the course of the Soviet-US summit meetings.

Taking part in the talks, which proceeded in a business-like and constructive atmosphere, were: on the Soviet side—one the U.S. side—”

Kissinger: Front pages of newspapers all over the world will have to be redone.
Brezhnev: Yes.
Kissinger: Can we tell our press some of the subjects that were covered?
Brezhnev: We want to make it public at 9:00 p.m.
Kissinger: We would just mention a few headings.
Gromyko: Without details.
Kissinger: Can we say that we discussed trade and agriculture and that special attention was paid to Senator Jackson?
Gromyko: If you just say trade and agriculture, you lose the political aspects of the discussion.
Kissinger: A good point. We will say that we did not discuss SALT.
Gromyko: Say that the two sides summed up the developments in their relations to date and that the talks will be continued.
Kissinger: We will say that we did not discuss SALT, but that we touched on the Middle East, CSCE and had a general review of relations.
Brezhnev: Say that the talks will continue this evening.
Kissinger: I will say a few things about CSCE and the Middle East when we meet later today. I want to tell the General Secretary that those issues that have been caused by internal problems we are determined to overcome and will overcome.
Brezhnev: Tonight we will complete those questions we have been discussing so that we can turn to the main discussion tomorrow.
Gromyko: The easiest one.
Brezhnev: To give you something to sleep on, I’ll ask you two questions.
Kissinger: You won’t tell me now?
Brezhnev: Not before lunch?
Kissinger: We would like to make the Vladivostok announcement on Saturday while I am here, at noon.
Brezhnev: I agree.
Kissinger: So, we will work out a text—very simple and moving.
Brezhnev: Later on, I will tell you the technical details (of the Vladivostok arrangements).
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, on a personal basis, I believe this meeting between you and President Ford will be very important. You will have a longer meeting next summer, but it can affect events in the interim. Perhaps we can have a few words on how to do it so that it is most successful. You can count on me to do everything toward this end.
The President is going with good will. His methods are different than his predecessor’s, as your Ambassador will have told you.
Brezhnev: I am as before.
Kissinger: You two will get along well. Don’t you agree Anatol?
Dobrynin: Yes.
Brezhnev: One question: Mr. Ford intends to bring you to Vladivostok?
Kissinger: What is the Soviet recommendation?
Brezhnev: What’s yours?
Kissinger: The intention was to bring me along. Although, it is being said that if I go to Siberia I would not be able to leave.
Brezhnev: I expect that the President will go with you.
Kissinger: I have that impression. Probably Mrs. Ford and Mrs. Kissinger will go.
Brezhnev: There is one detail. From the airport we will have to fly in two helicopters for 50 minutes to the residence. The terrain is hilly. That is why the airport is not closer to the city. We guarantee absolute safety.
Kissinger: I’m not worried, but our security people will raise hell and will insist on our helicopters.
Brezhnev: You’ll be welcome. I know your helicopters in the United States. If you could have seen the helicopter I used with Brandt. His face turned as white as this napkin. The only kind of helicopter they had was the kind that their police use. The whole thing was vibrating.
We will work it out.
Kissinger: As long as it doesn’t land on Chinese territory.
Brezhnev: But I don’t think your Secret Service could believe I want to lose my life in a helicopter crash!
Kissinger: We will work it out.
Brezhnev: You have a lunch to go to; you’re late. Mr. Gromyko is a punctual man.
Gromyko: I have to be there first to receive the guests.
Meeting ended at 2:00 p.m.
Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his first session with General Secretary Brezhnev.

“I had initial three hours with Brezhnev this morning. While his tone was generally friendly and the meeting ended on upbeatt note, the result of the session was taken up by Soviet grievances against recent US policies.

“Our session took place in the Kremlin conference room rather than in Brezhnev’s office as in the past. Gromyko, Dobrynin and Brezhnev’s Assistant Aleksandrov were the principal Soviet participants, although Brezhnev, of course, did virtually all the talking. He did not use notes and was obviously briefed in detail. The atmosphere was relaxed despite its largely critical content, with Brezhnev stressing that this was the eighth such meeting we had had. But he was less inclined than on past occasions to interrupt with jokes and anecdotes and kept the conversation on substance virtually throughout the three hour period. He was confident and more disciplined than in the past in making his presentation.

“The Soviet perception of the US is the most negative I have encountered in the last two years, based on what they regard as our failure to live up to obligations regarding MFN and on what they believed was a deliberately staged humiliation on emigration issue by Jackson’s White House performance. Brezhnev also seems to question my authority to speak for US policy and, more broadly, whether we are capable of delivering on policy commitments. He thus seems to question entire credibility of the new administration. Atmospherics, which remain cordial, may therefore be misleading.

“More specifically, Brezhnev cited the failure to date to grant MFN and complained bitterly about Jackson’s performance in publishing emigration letters at White House. He was bitter about reference to 60,000 annual emigrants, citing alleged number of applicants as currently no more than 15–16,000. He rejected conditions for MFN, implying the Soviets might not accept it under current circumstances. His other grievances related to supposedly discriminatory cancellation of

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow. Secret; Sensitive.

2 See Document 64.

3 See footnote 8, Document 59.
grain contracts, Soviet exclusion from Middle East diplomacy (a long-standing complaint), US foot-dragging at the European Security Conference and some minor bilateral problems. While the Soviets frequently try to place negotiating partners at moral disadvantage with complaints, there is no doubt that recent developments in the US have fed Soviet suspicions that policies of past two years are undergoing change. Soviet sensitivity to anything smacking of discrimination was also evident.

"I sought in my response to confirm your commitment to continued cooperative policies and assured Brezhnev that we will make a determined effort with the new Congress to restore the momentum to previously agreed policies. I stressed the importance you attach to the Vladivostok meeting in this connection and Brezhnev warmed noticeably in response.

"At a cordial lunch for eighty people, Gromyko made a generally friendly toast.

"In a second meeting later today I expect to review Middle East and European Security. Brezhnev indicates he wants to turn to SALT Friday but we might have a preliminary talk today.

"My feeling is that Brezhnev wants my visit to have a positive public outcome in preparation for meeting with you in November which according to present plan is to be announced Saturday. But as indicated above we should not underestimate the negative effect on Soviets of recent trends in US as they see them.

"I will send you further reports promptly after our next meeting."

4 October 25.
66. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 6–9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)
Oleg Sokolov, USA Dept., Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., US Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Jackson Amendment; CSCE; Middle East; Nuclear War

Kissinger: I am sorry I’m so late. There is absolutely no excuse. Your Chief of Protocol told our people you were ready, and no one told me.

Brezhnev: No problem.

Kissinger: It is a problem. I’m profoundly embarrassed.

Brezhnev: Did Gromyko give you soup for lunch?

Kissinger: About eight courses. I had enough energy to get here, believe me.

Brezhnev: I was able to get some work done.

Kissinger: I thought the meeting was being delayed, and I was getting some of my work done. There was no reason for me to delay. Your Chief of Protocol told three or four of my people, and each of them thought someone else was telling me.

Dobrynin: They’re all afraid of Henry!

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Old Politburo Room in the Council of Ministers Building, Kremlin. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes on the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
Brezhnev: Jackson would accuse the Soviet Union. I’m not angry.
Kissinger: You should be angry at me. But I’m not well disposed towards [this].
Brezhnev: Let’s talk about logic, then. You remember we once discussed whether it was a science.
Kissinger: Yes. I don’t remember what conclusion we came to.
Brezhnev: That it was a science.
Kissinger: I studied logic, symbolic logic. Military logic I always had my doubts about. Wars are always lost by some general whose logic looked good at the beginning.
Brezhnev: Everyone loses.
[Brezhnev’s alarm bell goes off in the center of the table.]
Kissinger: I need one of those. Is it to stop people when they talk too much?
Brezhnev: No, it’s to start businesslike discussions.
At the end of this morning’s meeting,² you named four points you wanted to comment on.
Kissinger: Well, I commented on the points that dealt with the domestic situation.

Jackson Amendment

Brezhnev: Incidentally—[he gestures to the notetakers]—this isn’t for the record; don’t write it—how is the domestic situation now? Is the fever all over?
Kissinger: Your Ambassador is a better judge of it than I am. My judgment is that the high point of the fever has now passed. After the resignation of President Nixon, it continued to rise for a few more weeks. But now the high point has been passed, and as I pointed out earlier, after the [Congressional] elections we will be in a much stronger position. Regardless of the outcome. The Democrats will gain some seats, but I think we have public support on foreign policy.
Brezhnev: That’s interesting.
[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev that the elections are for the whole House and one-third of the Senate.]

What is your forecast as to the Congressional elections?
Kissinger: One-third of the Senate and all of the House of Representatives will be elected.
Brezhnev: How many in the Senate?
Kissinger: It’s 100, so 33 or 34 are up for election—I don’t know which number is up this year. And the Democrats will make consider-

² See Document 64.
able gains. But this doesn’t prove anything for the conduct of foreign policy, because they will make their gains largely on the domestic economic situation. On the other hand, there was a recent poll in the last two weeks—which shows on foreign policy—in which my personal popularity was at 80%—which is extraordinary for a non-elected official. Or an elected official.

Dobrynin: Number one in history.

Kissinger: So that enables us, when we can make an issue in foreign policy, to be extremely effective. You cannot do that in a Congressional election because each representative runs in his own district, separately. So I think you will see a much stronger assertion of executive authority as soon as the election is over.

We would welcome, . . . for example, if we came to an understanding on strategic arms, we would welcome a debate on that issue to get started in America.

Dobrynin: After the election.

Kissinger: For example, when I made my statement on Soviet-American relations,3 we invited Senator Jackson to reply to it, because we wanted to get a debate started. And he refused to reply, because he was afraid of a confrontation. So I say this to you privately—we intend to provoke a confrontation at an early date on foreign policy. But not before the elections.

Brezhnev: There is one thing I really fail to understand: What are really the underlying motives behind the individuals and groups that oppose the betterment of Soviet-American relations?

Kissinger: I’ll give you my analysis. There are the conservatives, who have always been anti-Soviet, who represent the Dulles4 position of the 1950’s. There is the Jewish Community, for two reasons: One on the question of Jewish emigration, and secondly, because they accuse me—which you may find amusing—of conducting our Middle East policy in too close cooperation with the Soviet Union. They would like a situation in the Middle East in which the Soviet Union is on one side and the United States is on the other side, so then there is unlimited support for Israel. Thirdly, there are the intellectuals, who were anti-Nixon and who had to find a reason to be against whatever he was for. And all these people combine for different reasons. And the intellectuals also because of what they claim is happening to intellectuals in the Soviet Union. But I don’t rate intellectuals all that high.

So these are the different forces that are for different reasons at work. But I think they can now be defeated, because they are not

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3 See Document 28.
4 John Foster Dulles, Secretary of State, 1953–1959.
dealing with a President who has no public support. Our problem has been, with the pardon, inflation and the election, that we have not been able to get sufficiently organized to launch a counterattack. But there is no question that between now and the beginning of the year we can get our position organized.

Brezhnev: Does the President or Secretary of State have any opportunities to influence the results of the election in this one-third of the seats?

Kissinger: The President is campaigning, and he will probably reduce the defeat.

Brezhnev: I was asking just to clear my mind about the workings of the American political system.

Kissinger: I could have a big impact—perhaps more than the President because I’m not considered a partisan political figure. But it would be extremely dangerous. If we had an issue on foreign policy, on which we could start a debate . . . This was my intention during the summer, to start a debate on détente. I nearly succeeded, because at that time Senator Jackson agreed to debate. I could have hurt him badly. But the debate was supposed to start during the week President Nixon resigned. And then Senator Jackson used that excuse to avoid the debate.

For me to participate in a debate, there has to be an issue. I cannot appear against a candidate. But if I can identify a candidate with an issue, and I debate on the issue, I can be very effective for a candidate—or against.

For example, suppose we came to a SALT agreement in principle in Vladivostok. The strong probability is Senator Jackson will attack it. Then I can go around the country and defend the agreement, and thereby attacking Jackson. Or any other issue. But for me to be politically effective I have to have an issue; I can’t just attack him.

[To Dobrynin:] Do you agree with my analysis?

Dobrynin: Yes. But it’s not a question of the election, really, but of a public issue.

Kissinger: Yes, if I have a public issue, I’ll almost certainly win.

Brezhnev: Can we help you in any way, by throwing in a problem or two? [Laughter]

Kissinger: The best way is if you and I are on the same side and Jackson is on the other.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: Then we’ll almost certainly win.

Brezhnev: Excuse me for this digressing, but I think it was useful. Now let’s return to the questions you enumerated this morning.

Kissinger: On the issues the General Secretary mentioned, there were two I didn’t reply to—one was the European Security Conference and the other was the Middle East.
Brezhnev: And MFN?
Dobrynin: He covered that.
Kissinger: I thought I covered MFN, but let me cover that too.
With respect to MFN, the reason we exchanged these letters was to make it possible to pass the Trade Bill before the end of the year. And we can be confident now the Trade Bill will pass before the end of December.
Brezhnev: The end of December.
Kissinger: Before the end of December, which will provide MFN as well as credits again for the Soviet Union.
Dobrynin: There are limitations there.
Kissinger: The limitations on credits were substantially eliminated. It has to be a Presidential determination . . .
Dobrynin: And there is a ceiling, over which the President has to go to Congress.
Kissinger: To report, not for approval.
Korniyenko: A $300 million limitation.
Kissinger: That was eliminated.
Dobrynin: Our impression is that that remains.
Kissinger: But you don’t understand. We have to notify Congress, but not for their approval.
Dobrynin: But they can raise it.
Kissinger: The point is, Congress has no mechanism for disapproving it. It’s not subject to Congressional vote.
Dobrynin: But to notify Congress, each Senator can say “look at this.”
Kissinger: But so what? What can he do?
Dobrynin: They can raise objections.
Kissinger: No, there are several ways Congress can give an opinion. Congress can give an opinion in an affirmative vote. Not here. Or stop something by a negative vote. Not here. Here all we do is inform them. So therefore this has no practical consequence.
Dobrynin: [To Brezhnev] Information.
Kissinger: As a practical matter . . . the ceiling is a different matter. There are two separate questions. We have no intention of paying attention to what we’re told up to $300 million. Beyond $300 million, we have the right to go back for more. Normally an authorization is limited, but this gives us the right to ask for more.
Dobrynin: They will have to vote again.
Kissinger: That is right.
[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev.]
Our intention is, as soon as this Trade Bill is passed, to begin entertaining requests for credits, and to deal with them in the most expeditious and constructive manner. And we’re prepared to ask for an extension beyond $300 million. But we expect this to pass by the middle of December. The Bank has already passed; the Bank is tied to the Trade Bill.

Brezhnev: I’ve only mentioned the fact earlier: the trouble is that some countries get trade concessions without strings attached, and there are some strings attached to the Soviet Union.

Dobrynin: He is speaking about MFN.

Kissinger: I’m not sure MFN will be granted to China, as the General Secretary asked about.

Brezhnev: I mean the 18-month clause.

Kissinger: There is no question the Jackson Amendment is intended to be discriminatory against the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: That’s clear.

Kissinger: I have fought it for two years, as the General Secretary knows, and as you can read in the American press this week, it’s now described as a defeat for me. I say this only so the General Secretary knows my own personal views. It is our conviction that in the present Congressional situation this is the best we can do. And of course we have every intention, and I think every expectation, of renewing it when it comes up for renewal. And I’m sure President Ford will confirm this when you meet him. Nor do we have any intention—and I can assure of this now—of linking the renewal of MFN to any other conditions.

Brezhnev: All right, but as I understand it, the 18-month clause does relate only to the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: It relates technically to “non-market countries,” which means all socialist countries.

[Dobrynin explains to Brezhnev that it’s technical language and the Soviet Union is not named.]

The great anti-Communist Jackson is in favor of Most Favored Nation status for China, without conditions. Despite the well-known fact that emigration for China is absolutely free. But it is true there are no Jews in China who want to emigrate.

Brezhnev: Just the other day I heard there are about 200 million Chinese who want to emigrate to the United States.

Kissinger: [Laughs] If this were true, it would stop the emigration agitation immediately.

Gromyko: What would be the effect of 100 million Russians emigrating to the United States?
Kissinger: I tell you, if all your Jews wanted to emigrate to the United States, it would be a massive problem. It is true. I don't think Congress would let anyone immigrate.

As far as Most Favored Nation with China, I'm not aware of any discussions with China about giving them Most Favored Nation status. We haven't had any with them.

Brezhnev: Be that as it may, it is a fact—and let's admit that in this narrow circle—that the discriminatory attitude toward the Soviet Union does remain, and this does run counter to the understanding we have reached on basic attitudes in each country towards each other.

Kissinger: I do not defend this particular arrangement, but it's the best we can do, and we're convinced we can continue it indefinitely.

Brezhnev: That doesn't mean we must accept that.

Kissinger: No. Unfortunately, the question of credits also has been tied to the question of Most Favored Nation.

Brezhnev: That is true.

[Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt confer.]

I don't want to run too far ahead; that would be wrong. But if we were to look 5–7 years ahead, the general picture—including energy, oil, gas, etc.—can change drastically.

Kissinger: I don't get the point. Could you repeat that?

Sukhodrev: If we look ahead 5–7 years, we can see the general picture—with respect to energy, oil, gas—can change drastically.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I do understand the general situation, and your situation, Dr. Kissinger. Let's end the discussion of that and turn to whatever you want to say on the Middle East or European Security Conference.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Kissinger: Let me turn to the European Security Conference.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: The General Secretary stated we were insufficiently cooperative.

Brezhnev: That's not right; I said “not enough activity [aktivnost’].” There is cooperation; “activity” is another question.

Kissinger: One of the difficulties, quite frankly, on the European Security Conference, is that some of the issues are so absurd that it's very hard to apply political influence to them. On some issues there are only three people in the world—in whom the Foreign Minister belongs—who understand what they're all about. I frankly, even after a night's reflection, Mr. Foreign Minister, don't understand the difference between “each principle has equal validity” and “each principle
should be equally observed.” I tell you now I will accept either formulation if the other participants agree, whichever it is.

Gromyko: That is only part of the general formula being suggested. Because there is also “equally valid and interdependent,” which the Germans want.

Kissinger: [To Sonnenfeldt] Why do the nutty Germans want “interdependent?”

Sonnenfeldt: [To Kissinger] It’s a French point.

Gromyko: Actually we understand the line pursued by proponents of that formula. When they say the principles should be interdependent—actually it’s “each principle should be equally valid and interdependent”—they mean that if someone says, say, that a humane principle isn’t being observed, for example, means that the others should not be observed.

Kissinger: But it works both ways.

Gromyko: It’s like little wheels in a watch. If one stops revolving, the others do.

Kissinger: If you claim one isn’t being observed, you can also say the others aren’t applicable. It’s much more dangerous to the Germans than to you.

Gromyko: Our point of view is different. We believe that even if somebody doesn’t observe one principle, it doesn’t mean an end should be put to observance of all the rest. Let’s say some shouter, say in West Germany—but let’s not name any countries—says because some principle, say a humane principle—someone is refused an exit visa—then all the other principles, like inviolability of frontiers, shouldn’t be observed either. The objective position would be to say that all principles, from A to Z—10 or 11 or what have you—should be equally strictly observed.

Kissinger: My difficulty is I don’t understand half of the issues being argued about. I understand this one, but let me be perfectly frank. If you have a concrete negotiation, you can go and use influence. But when the issue is where to place one phrase, whether to put it before or after another one, it’s extremely difficult to use the prestige of the United States to put pressure and be accused of betraying an ally. What’s happened with the European Security Conference is that every government is using it for purely domestic purposes, proving how tough it can be because it’s running no risk. In Ottawa I told them what the result would be. But it’s impossible to put pressure on a stupid point.

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Gromyko: Tell them more energetically.

Kissinger: I don’t want to go through all this before the General Secretary. Let me give you my own prediction. I believe it must be wound up. It’s impossible to keep it going on these issues. It’s an affront to logic. Probably the end of March is a reasonable time it should be wound up. Thirdly, what are the issues? On the principles, it’s “peaceful change” and this point about “equally observed” and “equal validity.”

Gromyko: That’s two separate questions.

Kissinger: That’s two separate questions. These are essentially German questions. No one else is interested in them. Then there is Basket III, and there is Confidence-Building Measures. Confidence-Building Measures will be settled, whatever the proposals are, because the difference between 50 and 100 kilometers, and between 20,000 and 40,000, can be compromised. So we’re talking about Basket III and peaceful change.

With respect to Basket III, after the first reading, we have the approval of our allies to develop a common position. Until there is a common position, we understand your reluctance to compromise.

Regarding the two German points, Mr. Sonnenfeldt is leaving to see Schmidt before Schmidt comes here. He will express my personal view.

Gromyko: [To Sonnenfeldt] We will look at you!

Kissinger: And he may even be on time for Schmidt.

And you’ll see President Ford, and he will see Schmidt in Washington. We think it has to be brought to a conclusion. And he’s between you, us, and Schmidt. Maybe also Giscard, whom we’ll also see on the 15th. December will be a good time to work this out.

I wonder whether the Foreign Minister’s fertile mind, aided by Korniyenko, can come up with an idea on peaceful change—even if it’s only to move the word “only” around in the center. So Genscher can say he’s got a victory on something. I frankly don’t believe that at the level of the Foreign Offices this can be settled, so when President Ford and Schmidt and Giscard meet, it can probably be settled.

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we shouldn’t now endeavor to go into every detail on this. Perhaps you and Gromyko and Korniyenko can spend some time on it before you leave.

Kissinger: [To Sukhodrev] Did you translate what I said about the end of March?

Sukhodrev: Yes. The conclusion of the Conference.

Kissinger: All I can do is repeat: The President and you will discuss it at Vladivostok, and by the end of December we can bring it to a concrete point.
Brezhnev: Since the United States is also a participant in the European Security Conference, we have a very earnest desire to write into the European Security Conference that the United States should notify us about all movements of its Navy and all movements of its troops in the United States all the way to California.

Kissinger: Dobrynin knows it anyway.

Brezhnev: Dobrynin hasn’t told me about it. Because otherwise you say it doesn’t concern the United States; that it’s a German question, a French question. Let’s all build confidence.

Kissinger: But the summer house where Dobrynin spends all his time has more electronic equipment . . . It goes out to the Atlantic. You want to cover California too?

Brezhnev: All the way to California.

Kissinger: I think the question of military maneuvers will be settled.

Brezhnev: You know, the unfortunate thing is, I turned out to be the author of this proposal about notification of troop movements. It sometimes happens that a man proceeds from the best of intentions and makes a mistake in not predicting what form it takes in someone else’s eyes. I am admitting it very frankly. We had a discussion with the late President Pompidou at Zaslavoye, and the question didn’t even exist then. I said to him, “Let’s do something to strengthen confidence. After all, any army doesn’t just live in barracks and go out to mess room. They conduct maneuvers; they move tanks and planes. Let’s invite your representatives, and anyone’s representatives, to attend these maneuvers to observe them, and that would strengthen confidence.” No sooner did I say this than it was turned into an idea of opening up the whole Soviet Union, to the Urals. The question didn’t exist before I mentioned it.

Aleksandrov: You let the genie out of the bottle!

Brezhnev: I let the genie out of the bottle, and now every country is coming back at me—the Greeks, the Turks, the Dutch, Belgium.

Kissinger: Anyone who can get the Greeks and Turks to agree on anything has already accomplished something.

Brezhnev: If that is so, we have to report to you and Canada about any troop movement.

Aleksandrov: Let you and Canada report!

Kissinger: We already know what you’re doing.

Brezhnev: Of course.

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6 Reference is presumably to the 2-day meeting between Brezhnev and Pompidou on the Black Sea in March 1974.
Kissinger: Not every company, but every substantial movement.

Brezhnev: In the last ten years, we’ve had no more than two major military exercises, “Dniepr” and “Dvina.” One was “Dniepr,” when the Kiev Military District was supposed to mount an offensive against the Belorussian Military District. Who won, I can’t say, because there was no real firing. But all the general officers there watched the Air Force come in with correct precision, and other movements. So if Grechko favors the Kiev Military District, he just announces Kiev has won. If for some reason he supports Belorussia, he announces they won. Thank God I wasn’t present; I’d have said they both won.

The only extenuating factor for me is that I came out for that proposal guided by the noblest of intentions. But now others have turned it into a principle.

Kissinger: I’m aware of the differences of opinion that exist.

Brezhnev: Anyway, I raise the point by way of suggesting voluntary observers—that is, if we want to invite them, we do, and if we don’t, we don’t. In short, I think we should at some point discuss it in greater detail, especially taking into account your view of reaching a solution.

One thing that troubles me is that you seem to agree with those who emphasize the great difficulty of reaching agreement on peaceful change of frontiers.

The second point is I’m sick and tired of endless delays in bringing the Conference to a close. It was once to be ended in 1972. Then it was supposed to be in 1973, then in 1974. Now we hear it’s March 1975.

Kissinger: I myself think March 1975 is realistic. Don’t you?

Gromyko: If that is so, it’s only because there are some who artificially cling to that time limit, who try artificially to hold back on it.

Kissinger: There is no issue between the United States and the Soviet Union. If I had a major concern here, I’d insist on it. The General Secretary knows I’m not exactly bashful about stating my views. So it’s a question of how between the two of us we can manage the ending of the Conference. It’s now practically impossible to do it in November.

May I make a concrete proposal, Mr. General Secretary?

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: We will make an effort in the next two months to move our allies to a conclusion. You will see Schmidt and Giscard, and you let us know what you discussed with them with respect to this Conference. We will see Schmidt and Giscard, and we’ll let you know what we discussed. So as to avoid confusion. Then early in January, you may wish to send Korniyenko, or maybe you’d send Gromyko, to America, and we could after all these discussions see where we are.
Gromyko: The important thing is that in our contacts with Schmidt and Giscard we should act from one and the same position and not in different positions.

Kissinger: I agree. But I think we should do it in parallel, but not give the impression we have an agreement.

Gromyko: The French would be overenthusiastic if they felt we were acting jointly with you.

Kissinger: They would be delighted.

Brezhnev: I certainly agree we don’t need to use virtually the same words in expounding our position with Giscard and Schmidt, but we should act in parallel and in one and the same direction.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Perhaps you could have a word or two with the Foreign Minister.

Gromyko: The basic thing is to talk in parallel.

Kissinger: Our basic talk with Schmidt is not when Sonnenfeldt is there, but when the President meets with Schmidt in Washington. But I’ll send a message to Schmidt through Sonnenfeldt that we believe the Conference should be brought to a conclusion.

Brezhnev: When I say we should act along the same line, I mean while you are here in Moscow, you and Gromyko should agree on the main principles. Because if those basic principles are agreed on between us, Sonnenfeldt can be given more explicit instructions.

Kissinger: We can have a talk, but in our view the realistic time to make progress is when the President sees Schmidt.

Brezhnev: It’s certainly true that more concrete results can be achieved in a summit, but at the lower level some preliminary work can be done.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: And I certainly could not conceive of this question not being touched upon when I meet President Ford.

Kissinger: No question. We are prepared to discuss it.

Are we finished with this question?

Gromyko: In effect, you were replying to the observations made by the General Secretary this morning.

Kissinger: That’s correct.

Gromyko: Because the questions we did mention regarding the European Security Conference are the issues that are now holding up the Conference.

Kissinger: I agree. And my point is that your basic problem is not the United States.
Can we have a two-minute break?
Brezhnev: Yes. Then we can take up the Middle East.
Kissinger: I don’t insist on it!
Brezhnev: Then tomorrow morning we can start with an easy sub-
ject—SALT. Things are simpler there.
Kissinger: All right.
Brezhnev: And Dr. Kissinger, if you’d like to have a break now . . .
Kissinger: Good.

[There was a break from 7:45–8:02 p.m.]
Brezhnev: I used the time in our interval to joke with my Secretary,
Galja. I’m in a better mood.
Kissinger: I wish I could speak Russian.
Brezhnev: No, that’s not for you anymore. Please.

Middle East

Kissinger: Should I say something about the Middle East? Of
course you have had contacts with the Middle East more recently than
I, so your information is more current.
Gromyko: [Laughs] Your contacts were broader!
Brezhnev: True, I met with Fahmy recently and with Asad before
that.
Very briefly, what I learned during my contacts with Asad was, his
basic philosophy is that he believes the problem of the Middle East has
not been concluded yet. And according to him, Israeli troops and
Syrian troops have dug in and are sitting in their trenches opposite each
other. He asked us for assistance in the form of certain types of arms,
and spares. But I did not discuss any specific matters with him in terms
of such assistance. I asked him about his opinion on the fulfillment by
us of deliveries on old contracts, and he said he was quite satisfied, and
that’s all. And I didn’t meet with him again on his way back from
Korea.
Kissinger: I’ve never heard him express a complaint about the So-
viet Union.
Brezhnev: He certainly had no complaints about anything done
under the old contracts. But when he was here last—I don’t remember
when it was—he said he would look into what further requirements
Syria had and he would send us any additional requests.
One thing that both Asad and Fahmy said was that the United
States had not only restored Israel’s military might—that is, replaced
equipment that was damaged during the war—but also considerably
increased Israel’s military strength, to the tune of several billion dollars.
Since it’s a very delicate matter, I didn’t question him about the types of
arms the United States is supposed to have delivered to Israel, but that is what he said anyway.

As regards Sadat, you and I both know about as much about his position, because he has on many occasions stated that the airlift by the United States to Israel was much more intense than the Soviet airlift to Egypt.

Kissinger: If he didn’t say that, he would have to admit his army was defeated. It is easier to blame us than to accept the responsibility. Or to blame you.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I’m just relating in good faith the gist of what he told me; I’m not going into questions such as the motives he had for various statements or whether he’s playing a double game.

Kissinger: [Laughs] No Arab would play a double game in this. [Gromyko suppresses a smile.]

Brezhnev: As I see it, Fahmy’s main question which he set out to settle was my visit to Cairo. The question is not a new one. They have been raising this question for quite a few years, without linking it outwardly to the military aspect. You know, aside from the military aspect, we also have economic cooperation. Sadat raised the issue of my visit to Egypt on several occasions, in writing and verbally, saying “I’ve been to the Soviet Union five or seven times, so why can’t Comrade Brezhnev come to Cairo?” True, I’ve never been to Cairo. So we discussed the question and decided I should perhaps go sometime in January.

Kissinger: I think it’s a good idea.

Brezhnev: There has to be some contact.

Kissinger: I think that’s right.

Brezhnev: Of course, in questions of principle nothing will change according to the place where we conduct talks, whether here where you’re sitting, or there—the question of the principle of settling the question. There was troop disengagement, and quite some time has passed since then, and we have been repeating our position all along. You have been able to see we don’t change our policy from week to week.

Kissinger: From our point of view, we have no problem on your going to Egypt, and we have told this to the Egyptians.

Brezhnev: I took this decision in consultation with my comrades. I had no wish to compete with representatives of other countries who go there often, like Dr. Kissinger. We don’t see it as competitive.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have both seen fluctuating events in the Middle East in the last ten years. I in any event don’t believe in gratitude in foreign policy—but especially in the Middle East. I think neither of us can gain a permanent advantage at the expense of
the other, and any attempt by either of us to do so is going to be entirely futile.

Brezhnev: We have never wanted to, not even as a distant objective.

Kissinger: And we don’t want to either.

Brezhnev: We have emphasized and reemphasized the need for all states in the region, including Israel, to be given guarantees of . . .

Kissinger: We noticed in the Foreign Minister’s address at the UN7 . . .

Gromyko: I took part on behalf of the Soviet Union in working out the establishment of the State of Israel in 1947.

Kissinger: I noticed also in the speech of the Foreign Minister at the UN a reference to that. I think the Foreign Minister should visit Israel, because the demonstrators shouldn’t have only me.

Brezhnev: You didn’t pay attention to what I said?

Kissinger: I of course pay attention to what you said.

Brezhnev: You pay attention only to Foreign Ministers.

Gromyko: If I go to Israel, the Israelis will send me to Golgotha.

Kissinger: No, the reason is that there are groups of demonstrators there. The same groups that applauded President Nixon will be brought out to applaud the General Secretary in Cairo, and the same group that demonstrates against me in Israel will be employed against Minister Gromyko.

Brezhnev: If only we even contemplated acting against the independence of Israel, it would surely wreck our prestige in the whole world.

Kissinger: Let me make a few observations about the Middle East. Brezhnev: If I may say two words, Henry.

Kissinger: Please.

Brezhnev: What I feel to be abnormal is this: You and we agreed on certain principles to end the conflict and establish peace in that area. We are grateful to the United States for having together with us, so to say, formalized our desire to seek a settlement in the Middle East through Security Council decisions and to seek a solution through the Geneva Conference formula. But then, gradually, this agreement began to be violated, and it is even now my view that a line is being taken to postpone the Geneva Conference and even to prevent it from taking place. But what alternative is there?

There is also a practical aspect of this question. You’re familiar with the situation in the Middle East—you have been there often

7 See footnote 2, Document 43.
enough—and I think you will agree with me that the explosiveness of the situation is still very much in evidence. What the explosion will be, I can’t say for the moment, or what consequences it will have for the general climate of peace. But a new explosion is certain to raise all the issues of war and peace, and accusations against the United States or the other side. Whether it will happen in one or two years, I can’t say. But the powderkeg is still there, and I must raise this for us as great powers. In short, I’m merely repeating what we asked Comrade Gromyko to communicate both to you and President Ford when he was in Washington.\textsuperscript{8}

Kissinger: And this he did, with great . . .

Brezhnev: And what we have to do now is not to seek justification for our actions but find ways to solve the problems, because things are bound to move in the direction of war if no solution is found. Of course, if President Sadat or President Asad have given you their agreement to something we don’t know about, that is something else.

Kissinger: President Sadat and President Asad are so busy watching each other, they don’t have time to give agreements to third parties.

Brezhnev: That is a fact too. President Sadat thinks in one way and President Asad doesn’t agree with him. The Palestinians too are in disagreement with certain things. But they are a people, and their problem has to be resolved.

Kissinger: I have one achievement in the Middle East, which I claim as an American achievement, not under joint auspices. Which is that King Faisal says he prays for me five times a day, and I doubt he prays for the General Secretary.

Brezhnev: I don’t suppose he does, though they do of course pray a lot.

Gromyko: The question is which God to pray to, the right one or the wrong one.

Kissinger: He doesn’t pray for Gromyko either.

Brezhnev: I don’t know who it was, but a couple of years ago there was a high-ranking Libyan who was here negotiating with Kosygin. In the middle of his meeting he said, “Excuse me, I have to go to pray.” And right in Kosygin’s office he fell on his knees to pray. [Laughter]

Gromyko: By coincidence he chose the corner where there were busts of Marx and Engels!

Kissinger: Considering all the arms Libya got, this must be an effective method of negotiating with Kosygin.

\textsuperscript{8} See Documents 37 and 38.
Brezhnev: It must be. 15–20,000 tanks, 9–10,000 planes, and God knows how much else.

Kissinger: They will pave the Western Desert so they can keep it all there.

Have I ever told the General Secretary what Asad said to me? He told me the reason we arm Israel is because we don’t want Russian arms to defeat American arms. Therefore he says we should give him American arms, so then American arms would be defeating American arms and we would have no reason to intervene.

Brezhnev: That’s what you should do.

Kissinger: And I’d be impeached the next day!

Once I told him we would discuss strategic arms in Moscow. And he thought the best solution was that both of us deposit all our strategic arms in Syria, and Syria would be the trustee and would find good use for them. I accepted. But I told him your missiles were so much heavier than ours that you probably couldn’t move them down there.

Brezhnev: Their territory is too small.

Kissinger: [Laughs] That is true.

Brezhnev: And yet, Dr. Kissinger, the problem is still with us and it is a serious one. And joking apart—though joking has a role to play in our discussions—we should really have a serious exchange of views on what we should do to prevent a new war with unforeseen consequences.

Kissinger: I agree. I agree the situation is dangerous. And I’ve told the General Secretary that his analysis in San Clemente [in 1973] was more correct than ours.

Brezhnev: On my honor, I did not at that time know there was going to be a new war on that date. I had no discussion with the Arabs, either at that time or any other time, up to the beginning of the October war. I simply saw the situation developing.

Kissinger: I personally believe it, though there are many in America who do not.

Brezhnev: You certainly have my word.

Kissinger: No, I believe it. And I’ve had our intelligence people do an analysis of all the information we can piece together, and I believe it.

Brezhnev: Nothing. Nothing. [Nichevo]

Kissinger: We think you knew about three days before.

Brezhnev: Even less than that. We were simply notified, at such a time and in such a form that we were absolutely deprived of any possibility of doing anything about it. And added to this should be the fact that you knew for three years before that happened, that even though we helped the Arabs we did our best to moderate the Arab position. In
the hope that we would find common language with the United States and act jointly. But unfortunately you didn’t take that position.

Kissinger: My honest belief is that until San Clemente you attempted to restrain the Arabs. After San Clemente you made no further effort to restrain them, but you did not particularly know they were going to attack. You even mildly encouraged them, but without specific knowledge they were going to attack.

Brezhnev: I deny even a mild form of encouragement. You know the events that occurred. Sadat by his own volition asked us to withdraw our military advisers. And we did it without a word. And that was a political action.

Kissinger: That we didn’t know about. Mr. General Secretary, let me go back to the subject.

Brezhnev: Let us indeed discuss ways to really ensure peace in the area so there is no detriment to Arabs or Israelis.

Kissinger: We would like to solve the problem, and whatever we have done has not had any intention of hurting the Soviet Union. Supposing tomorrow the United States would succeed alone, without the Soviet Union, to restore the ’67 boundaries, the West Bank, and Jerusalem, and return of the refugees. From your knowledge of the Arabs, do you believe this would give us any permanent advantage? I don’t. I don’t believe gratitude gives any lasting advantage. Now we give some economic aid to Egypt; for a few years you had a monopoly on economic aid to Egypt. Does that make us permanently more influential in Egypt? I doubt it. Whenever anything goes wrong in an Arab country, they blame their benefactors. And the only people for whom they have a nostalgia are their opponents.

I say this to you, Mr. General Secretary: You have to separate the tactical issues from the strategic issue. If we look at the situation realistically, in ten years we will both be present in the Middle East. And we are prepared to respect this and we assume you are prepared to respect this. That is the strategic fact.

Let me say a word about the tactical situation. In the tactical situation, we face a problem of unusual complexity which you probably cannot understand. We face the problem that we have a minority group in America of unusual economic and political influence. And therefore the problem of a solution in the Middle East has for us domestic connotations that it cannot have for you. I speak to you in great candor, so that you understand our problem. Secondly, we have a very particular relationship to Israel. And therefore it is inevitable that we have to proceed step by step.

If I review the negotiations before the October War between your Foreign Minister and us, there are two attributes to them. Your Foreign
Minister has produced plans of great complexity and great detail, and secondly, their practical effect was that it was the United States that should impose them on Israel. So you’re asking . . . The end result was that the United States was asked to plunge itself into a major domestic crisis, for what? And since there was no difference between that plan and the Arab plan, why shouldn’t we deal directly with the Arabs? Since they were all asking us the same thing. So we have always had great difficulty understanding what it is that the Soviet Union was adding to the discussion. On the substance it supported every Arab position, and on the tactics we were forced to impose it unilaterally on Israel.

There are many objectives on which we agree with you. But it is a necessity of our situation that we proceed step by step. This is not a diabolical American maneuver. In fact I enjoyed foreign policy much more before I became involved in the Middle East. In fact for five years I refused to touch the Middle East. But then when necessity impelled us into it, I had to find a way to ease matters, and to avoid an unmanageable domestic situation.

I’m speaking very frankly with you; I could give you a long theoretical speech. I hope you reestablish diplomatic relations with Israel so you can have the privilege of dealing with the Israeli Cabinet at some point. I don’t know why I should bear it alone.

But this is the problem. So if we can ever work out concrete measures that don’t lead immediately to a comprehensive attempt to handle all the issues, we don’t exclude the Soviet Union from a settlement, let alone from the Middle East. We couldn’t anyway.

And since I’m certain every Arab tells everything to everybody, you know we’ve never said anything anti-Soviet to any Arab.

So this is the problem. We are willing to discuss a possible solution to it.

Brezhnev: [thinks] All right, well, what can I say to that? In fact I heard the gist of this explanation before.

Kissinger: From me?

Brezhnev: From our various exchanges of correspondence, from the actions taken in the Middle East, from the general state of affairs. But that isn’t the crux of the matter. No one wants to exclude anyone from anywhere. And every state decides for itself whom and in what measure it wants to deal with. You maintain relations with dozens of African States and so do we, and that question doesn’t arise. But here aggression has been committed, and Arab lands seized, and there has been war. And great hopes are being pinned on us, especially since we both came out before the world in favor of a joint position. We have taken the role of guarantors of a peaceful solution. Nowhere has it been
said it would be done at galloping pace, and it was only by way of a statement of principle that it was said that both sides would act as guarantors of a peaceful solution.

You have been explaining, in fact, a different kind of problem, when you say that for domestic reasons you are acting on a different tactical plane. But those same domestic problems existed at the time we reached the agreement on those principles. Nothing has changed. There was a certain number of American citizens of Jewish origin, and that number continues to exist—maybe it’s increased a little, but they are still there. But now, instead of giving an explanation on the substance of the issue, you have been discussing something completely different. Instead of explaining why there cannot be joint efforts in the Geneva Conference, you talk about somebody trying to exclude somebody. But that’s not the crux of the issue.

Now you say you’re now giving economic assistance to Egypt. But we’ve never uttered a word of protest, because long before you, we have given economic assistance—the High Dam, and plants. When the President visited Cairo,9 we uttered not a word of complaint; Sadat is planning a visit to the United States, and we have uttered not a word of protest. We didn’t try to talk him out of going to the United States. So what the important thing here is, we should agree basically to joint and concerted action to bring peace to the area.

Kissinger: But this requires . . .

Brezhnev: [Interrupting] But all you’ve been saying just now leads me to the conclusion that you think nothing further can be done.

Kissinger: This is not my conclusion. My conclusion is . . .

Brezhnev: Although I appreciate the existence of your domestic difficulties in the area.

Kissinger: My conclusion is we should proceed step by step . . .

Brezhnev: That’s what we say—go step by step.

Kissinger: . . . and we shouldn’t be the only ones asked to exercise pressure on one party.

Gromyko: No matter how we discuss the Middle East—and here I agree absolutely with what Comrade Brezhnev has said—we should not bypass the paramount issues. What we’ve heard today is basically repetitions of your previous issues—your observations made to us in the past—and American Presidents have made observations to us in the same vein.

But basically there are two pivotal issues around which the Middle East issue is revolving: One is the withdrawal of Israeli forces from the

9 President Nixon visited Cairo in mid-June 1974.
territories they occupy, and second, the problem of the Palestinians becomes more and more acute and their rights must be restored. This is something you didn’t mention, and we would be interested in hearing any position you have. Our position you know well; it was set out in San Clemente and subsequently. It would be very good if you could set out the American position on these issues.

And there is a third problem—what prospects you see for joint action on these matters. Will matters continue to develop on the same basis, that is, your separate actions, or will we act in a concerted manner? Those are the questions you have so far omitted to discuss.

Brezhnev: Maybe, judging by what time it is, we should end for today—though not our discussion of this issue, because we may continue tomorrow. But night brings counsel. In any event, I’ll discuss it tomorrow.

Kissinger: I think we should discuss it further. We are not determined on isolated action in the Middle East. We don’t exclude joint concerted action in the Middle East. But we have to know for what. Maybe that’s what we can discuss when we return to it.

Brezhnev: We are prepared to discuss any aspect of this subject, frankly and confidentially and honestly.

And now I suggest we recess. Dr. Kissinger, you know Mr. Bhutto is in Moscow.

Kissinger: I really feel very guilty. I know it puts an additional strain on the General Secretary.

Brezhnev: I was to have been the main negotiator on this side, but I did my best to meet your schedule. You realize I cannot refuse to see him. I therefore did my best to find a way to incorporate a conversation with him but not to interfere with ours.

Kissinger: Maybe he could join these discussions. It would certainly liven it up.

Brezhnev: Maybe he could help with a solution. Maybe he should join the strategic arms discussions. [Laughter]

Nuclear War

Brezhnev: Let me say this in conclusion: We for our part believe the Administration and Secretary of State Kissinger and in fact the business community of the United States, and Congress by and large, and the majority of Americans, who supported the reelection of President Nixon, want to continue the improvement of US-Soviet relations in all spheres and in the interests of our peoples.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: And I feel we understand one another equally well.
In this connection, I’d like to ask you one question: What does it mean, and how should we react to, statements emanating from various US officials, including some Government leaders, that the United States must be second to none in terms of strength and only then will peace in the world be secured? [Dobrynin corrects the translation: “Samii Silhhee” means “strongest of all.”] How are we to understand such statements? If a practical import is ascribed to such statements, then tomorrow morning, while you are in your house on Lenin Hills, I could come out with a statement that only if the Soviet Union is stronger than any other state will peace be secured. Why add this element to the situation? We have not reacted to these statements. We have given our commentators no instructions on this score. Don’t look for information in your briefs; it’s something I thought to bring up. It’s something I wanted to bring up, taking the occasion of this personal meeting.

My second question is, since tomorrow we will be taking up the question of strategic arms: do you believe or admit of the possibility of atomic war between our two nations? Or the possibility of atomic war anywhere in the world, for instance in Europe or elsewhere? Hearing my question, you would be entitled to ask me my view. On that thought, I wish you pleasant dreams.

Kissinger: Without hearing my answer?
Brezhnev: No, not today.
Kissinger: But now suspense will make you very sleepless.
Brezhnev: No, I’ll sleep.
Kissinger: I’ll answer tomorrow. I’ll ask Sonnenfeldt.
Sonnenfeldt: Now I can’t sleep!
Kissinger: I’ll cable Washington for instructions.
Brezhnev: Tomorrow I think we should resume our discussions in the morning. Maybe at 11:00, as we did today.

Kissinger: Good, and I will be on time. Really, my apologies. It was inexcusable. It’s the sort of mistake that, after it happens, is inexplicable.

Brezhnev: This is what happens when you involve too many people.

Kissinger: I was sitting upstairs thinking you had delayed the meeting.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I think 11:00 would be most convenient so we don’t drive each other to extremes of exhaustion, taking into account the time difference.

Kissinger: [Everyone rises from the table.] At the toast today I said I’m always among friends here.

Brezhnev: I don’t want to complicate things. Always clarity. So I’m acting in the framework of our previous agreements.
Kissinger: Both the President and I are committed to carrying out the policy we began.


[Secretary Kissinger’s party then departed for the Guest House in Lenin Hills.]

67. **Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)**

Moscow, October 24, 1974, 1649Z.

Hakto 1. 1. Please get immediate approval to following message from President to Brezhnev and then deliver urgently to Vorontsov. Explain to President that message is essential to make clear to Brezhnev President’s direct concern with talks here. Full report follows. In first meeting today Brezhnev tended to play down President’s interest and his personal backing of my mission.2

2. **Begin text:** Dear Mr. General-Secretary: As you proceed with your conversations with Secretary Kissinger, may I share with you some of my views on the future course of Soviet-American relations.

First of all, I wish to make clear that Secretary Kissinger is speaking for me with the same authority as on all previous visits and I hope with the same good results. He has, as you know, my full confidence.

I recognize that in recent weeks we have encountered certain difficulties, but these are not fundamental in nature. What is fundamental is our mutual agreement that the improvement of Soviet-American relations is in the mutual interest of our two countries and must and will be continued under my Presidency. This is the main point in my instruction to Secretary Kissinger.

The talks you are beginning will, of course, be frank and candid and may even reveal areas of difficulty, but whatever temporary ob-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 3, Kissinger Trip File, October 20–November 9, 1974—Europe, South Asia, & Middle East, HAKTO (1). Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only; Flash.

2 In message Hakto 7, October 24, Bremer advised Scowcroft: “Secretary asks that the message in Hakto 1 be delivered immediately even if the President is out of town. He needs to have message for tomorrow’s meeting.” (Ibid.)
stables may arise, I am confident that, with patience and devotion to our joint objectives, we can make substantial progress; I recently asked Secretary Kissinger to set forth in considerable detail the view of my administration on Soviet-American relations. Whatever else may be said or written about Soviet-American relations, my posture is clear: We believe that a positive, constructive relationship can be made permanent, and thus irreversible. I have instructed Secretary Kissinger to conduct his negotiation in this spirit.

I will not go into the details of your agenda, but permit me to underscore one basic point. As you may know, I have had several meetings with my National Security Council on matters of strategic arms control. On this I have emphasized to my advisors the necessity to bring competition under control through agreements that are equitable and realistic; for we cannot hope for, or expect that our relations will flourish in an atmosphere of unrestrained military tensions. Thus, I have authorized Secretary Kissinger to discuss with you the cardinal elements of a new agreement which we might address in our forthcoming meeting. No other action would demonstrate the transitory nature of our differences and the permanent character of our mutual interest.

Indeed, I am looking forward to our meeting in Vladivostok. It is a testimony to the new course of Soviet-American relations that this meeting is regarded on both sides as a natural development.

I have been travelling recently and unfortunately did not have the occasion to convey these thoughts to Ambassador Dobrynin before he left, but I wanted you to have my views personally. Sincerely, GRF. *End text.*

3. Warm regards.
68. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.2

"I had a further three and a half hour meeting with Brezhnev this evening. The atmosphere and tone were again relaxed and friendly but much of the discussion continued in the same serious basically aggrieved vein. Brezhnev continued an accusatory line on MFN, Middle East and ended the meeting with ‘two questions’ he had obviously written out for himself and with which he sought to dramatize his concerns. He delivered them crisply and even somewhat theatrically and said he wanted me to sleep on them before answering. They were, in brief, (1) what is the meaning of US assertions that it must be the strongest power in the world and (2) do I think there is a possibility of nuclear war between us or anywhere in the world? The implication of Brezhnev’s questions seemed to be that despite all the progress of the last two years, our recent policies have reopened these basic questions.

"In earlier portions of the meeting, Brezhnev first requested my private assessment of US domestic scene, something again showing his concerns and unusual for him. I explained the nature of the coalition opposing détente, indicated we will welcome debate on the issues and had every expectation of building consensus once election is over. Brezhnev seemed encouraged when he heard you were actively campaigning. He asked why I was not in the hustings and I explained that it is against our custom for the Secretary of State to inject himself into political campaigns as such.

"Brezhnev continued to bridle at MFN developments, again implying that the 18 month provision in the waiver may not be acceptable to the Soviets. (The original Trade Agreement called for an initial three year duration of MFN.) He also expressed disappointment at Exim Bank authorization terms. I told him we had done the best we could. This will remain a very touchy set of issues for the Soviets, but assuming general progress in our relations, they will probably go along.

"On the European Conference, Brezhnev pressed for more US activism. I explained the problems with the Allies but expressed hope


2 See Document 66.
that the conference will be ended by March. I also assured him you would be prepared to talk about it in Vladivostok. We left it that after the forthcoming series of East-West and Intra-Western summits in the next two months, we would take stock with the Soviets and see how we can expedite matters. I told Brezhnev frankly that many issues in Geneva had become absurd and were largely the result of domestic politics in Western Europe. But I thought it best on this issue to give him some reassurance that we would try to be helpful.

“We then had a pretty tough Middle East discussion in which Brezhnev complained about our unilateralism and warned of a new war if no progress is made through joint efforts. I told him rather bluntly that as long as Soviets parrot Arab proposals we might as well deal with the Arabs directly, and have no incentive to join with the Soviets, the more so since Soviet positions require us to put pressures on Israel that are bound to be rejected and cause domestic anger in the US. But I assured him of our readiness to coordinate policies on a concrete step-by-step basis and denied we had any intention or capacity to exclude USSR from Middle East. The discussion remained inconclusive and will be resumed. I found it psychologically interesting that Brezhnev, in recalling his vehement warnings of possible war at San Clemente in 1973, denied any advance knowledge or collusion with Arabs in Yom Kippur War—something supported by our intelligence. Charges to this effect clearly still touch a sensitive nerve with Brezhnev, one of whose traits is his need to have his moral purity certified at regular intervals. He did, however, acknowledge, as Dobrynin had previously implied, that the Soviets had had some kind of notification just before outbreak of war but could not pass it on for fear of provoking Israeli preemptive war.

“This inconclusive exchange on the Middle East then led to Brezhnev’s posing his two questions mentioned above. All of this is a prelude to what Brezhnev keeps referring to as the key discussion of SALT which is to begin Friday. 3 Although I have continued to get some positive noises regarding our proposal, Brezhnev’s evident desire to delay discussion suggests he does not expect conclusions during my visit. This is speculation, but he may want to await our election outcome and clarification of our domestic situation before he commits himself to a SALT approach.”

3 October 25.
Moscow, October 25, 1974, 11:05 a.m.—1:28 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee, CPSU
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the USA
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to General Secretary Brezhnev
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief of USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Interpreter)
Mr. Kochetkov (Notetaker)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State & Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Jan M. Lodal, NSC Senior Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
SALT

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I just received a complaint against you from the President [President’s letter to Brezhnev, October 24, at Tab A.].² It must be about you. Who else does he have to complain about? Me? Gromyko?

Kissinger: I’m working against your getting together, because once you do, I have no possibilities any more.

Brezhnev: I’m glad you have had time to rest. Because you can go to the theatre . . . Once again, you will not go to Leningrad. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Never. I’ve never been in the theatre. I have to bring the President here in order to do it.

Gromyko: The trouble is, by the time we finish, the theatre is finishing. The swans are about to wave their wings for the last time.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (2). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Old Politburo Room in the Council of Ministers Building, Kremlin. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes on the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.

² Text in Document 67.
Brezhnev: I was honest when I said I haven’t had time to read this, because it just arrived a few minutes before.

Kissinger: Once when I was on my way here, President Nixon sent a message giving me complete authority, depriving me of any possibility of delaying. It was a great diplomatic triumph.

Gromyko: You told me.

Dobrynin: The Communique we gave you yesterday is okay? [The announcement of the Vladivostok summit meeting November 23–24]³

Kissinger: Yes, and we will release it tomorrow at noon Washington time. Seven o’clock Moscow time.

What does the phrase “in vicinity of Vladivostok” mean? Are you building a new city?

Gromyko: It means the same as “in vicinity of Washington” would mean.

Kissinger: We had a message from the Chinese saying they want to send someone to greet us, to welcome us to Chinese territory. [Gromyko and Dobrynin smile; Kissinger laughs.] A formal diplomatic note.

We won’t be in Vladivostok?

Gromyko: If you would like to . . .

Kissinger: I understand the night life is very good there. That’s where the Dutch want a cabaret too.

Gromyko: It’s the taiga. It’s the only place where we have taiga.

Dobrynin: A nice house in the taiga.

Brezhnev: Let us continue, Dr. Kissinger. I’m waiting for replies to my questions of last night.

Kissinger: You asked, Mr. General Secretary, first: What is the meaning of the American statements about military power? And can I conceive of the possibility of an atomic war?

Brezhnev: Not exactly that. My first question was not regarding military might but whether the United States had to be stronger. And the second question wasn’t about atomic war generally but atomic war between us.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Someone else could trigger it—Burma, or someone.

Kissinger: It is the Burmese nuclear arsenal that we’re concerned about. No, I understood your question.

³ No drafts of the communique have been found. The final text was released on October 27. See footnote 5, Document 74. The two sides also announced on October 26 that Brezhnev would host Ford at a summit meeting in Vladivostok November 23–24. (Christopher S. Wren, “Meeting of Ford and Brezhnev Set for Vladivostok,” The New York Times, October 27, 1974, pp. 1, 16)
The General Secretary said we wanted to be superior. This isn’t, strictly speaking, what is being said. What is being said is that the United States should be second to none.

Brezhnev: I want a specific answer to my question: What do you mean by the statement that the United States has to be stronger for there to be peace in the world? And Henry, please don’t think I’m in any way irritated when I say that; I ask in a friendly way.

Kissinger: I understand. But first I want to say what is being said, and second is the objective reality to which it refers. First, what is being said is that the United States should be second to none. But I won’t stick on that quibble; I now want to explain the objective realities of American defense planning.

With respect to the first point, for many years American strategic policy was dedicated to the proposition of stability. It doesn’t make any difference—whether we said we should be stronger or not, I want to explain to the General Secretary the realities of American strategic planning. For many years, our strategic policy was dedicated to the proposition of stability. By stability we meant a force that was large enough to pose a plausible threat to the Soviet retaliatory force. Now the General Secretary has often referred to the number of warheads we have, but the General Secretary also knows that the vast majority of these warheads—nearly two-thirds of them—are on submarines. He knows that the size of the warheads on the submarines is relatively small. And very small compared to the Soviet warheads. And finally the General Secretary knows that to coordinate an attack from submarines dispersed all over the ocean—to coordinate a plausible attack—is so difficult as to be virtually impossible. In fact, I think the General Secretary should understand that even the number of warheads on the submarines was in reaction to the Soviet program; they were developed when we wanted to be able to penetrate anti-ballistic missile defenses and we wanted to have enough warheads on the submarines to survive these defenses.

Now, therefore, basically our strategic forces are still designed not for an attack but to prevent an attack. We are now—I have to be very frank—at the point where . . .

Brezhnev: Against France? Against Germany?
Kissinger: Against the Soviet Union.
Brezhnev: We have no intention of attacking you.
Kissinger: But you have a force capable of it.

Brezhnev: Even if you take the period of 20 years ago, you couldn’t find a document in which we intended to attack the United States. I must admit, however, that Nikita Khrushchev sometimes allowed him-
self certain liberties. One of his favorites was that we had rockets that could hit a fly. It didn’t mean anything.

Kissinger: The question was whether it could hit anything else! When one of our generals says he has a plane that can shoot down another plane, at 70 miles, I say, “Fine, but can it hit another plane at two miles?” But since, to speak frankly, twenty years ago you had no capability to attack the United States, but now you have the capability . . . I’m not saying you have the intention, but you clearly have the capability. And I’m not arguing with you, Mr. General Secretary. I’m trying to describe in a dispassionate way the reasoning behind our strategic forces. It is one of the features of the current period that our two countries cooperate more than others, and I’m planning to say this in a speech I’m planning to give. But we also build some forces designed to destroy each other. It is one of the paradoxes of our relationship.

So our present force is not a force designed for attack on the Soviet Union. Now, when we look at the Soviet force, we observe some disquieting phenomena. Your missiles are larger than ours; the warheads of each missile are larger than ours.

Brezhnev: Not bigger, but fatter, thicker.

Kissinger: They weigh more.

Brezhnev: They are fatter.

Kissinger: All right, fatter. They can deliver a heavier payload.

Brezhnev: I’ll reply to that later.

Kissinger: They can deliver a heavier payload, and as Minister Grechko explained to me the last time I met him, they have greater accuracy than we expected.

Brezhnev: If it’s a missile, it has got to be accurate.

Gromyko: How else do we hit a fly?

Kissinger: With accuracy of 200 meters, Mr. Foreign Minister, and a one megaton warhead, you’ll kill every fly. And you’ll give a nervous breakdown to every fly within 10 kilometers. I think they would notice something has gone off.

At any rate, the design of your strategic forces is such that they represent a very grave threat to our land-based forces, whether you plan to use them that way or not.

In this generation, say until 1981 or ’82, you still don’t have as many warheads as we do. But that’s essentially irrelevant, because beyond a certain point there is no conceivable use you could have for them. But after 1981 or ’82, you can multiply your number of warheads because you have this great throw-weight.

Now let me go back to our forces. Within the next six-to-nine months we have to make decisions on the designs of our strategic
forces. If we’re in a situation of essentially unrestrained competition, then we protect ourselves against the dangers I’ve described to you. This is not for purposes of superiority but for the purpose of defense. We will then build much larger missiles, and probably larger numbers. And you remember, if you look back to the late 1950’s, Mr. General Secretary, your predecessor made certain threats growing out of his somewhat impetuous nature. When we perceived that we might be threatened by a possible missile gap, we began a very large program of missile production which produced several thousand missiles in a few years. And this genuinely occurred because we thought we were falling behind. And there is a similar possibility now.

Brezhnev: You mean you were indulging in autosuggestion.
Kissinger: In a way this is true.
Brezhnev: It happens some time.

Kissinger: I think you had only about 50 missiles in all of Russia. At that time. In 1958. It was, you are quite right, a case of autosuggestion. This time it’s not autosuggestion because we know what you’re building. And the reason I’ve been so insistent on promoting an agreement on strategic arms is that if we don’t, I know what is going to happen. We will certainly increase our forces and modernize them dramatically. You will certainly increase your forces. At the end of this process, neither of us will be decisively ahead. But while we go through this process, it will be very difficult to keep détente going. Because each side will have to tell its public that the other is threatening its survival in order to justify the large military expenditures.

So this is the meaning of the first question. We do not aim for superiority. In fact, I said in Moscow, when I was here with President Nixon, that I don’t believe significant superiority can be achieved by either side. And therefore our problem is to see whether we can find some means of stabilizing the situation.

Now, with respect to your other question: Do I believe in the possibility of atomic war between us? I do not believe, with the present forces and with foreseeable forces, that a leader can make a rational decision for an all-out attack on the other. Whether, if conditions of unrestrained competition would resume, either side would ever get into a position where it might be possible—I don’t think it’s possible. After all, in every war, the military plans of one or the other side turn out to be wrong. And in a thermonuclear war, a military leader would have to convince a political leader that missiles that have never been fired, whose accuracy is untested against real targets, would have to be fired against targets whose hardness is unknown, and be assured that the targets would not be launched on warning—and I think this requires a degree of confidence that could hardly be achieved.
On the other hand, it’s conceivable that if local tensions continue and if local conflict between the United States and the Soviet Union develops, given the arsenals on both sides, such a war could develop, even without the intention. Because presumably neither side will let itself be defeated.

So these would be my answers to your questions.

Brezhnev: Any conversation on any subject is always useful because it gives each side the benefit of the other’s experience. So whether the question is cooperation in building a dam or in irrigating lands, or about aircraft, any conversation is useful. All the more so, any conversation about thermonuclear war is useful. I can fully apply that to our conversation, because I feel I’ve been enriched to a certain extent.

I’ve often thought about the difference between the politician and the diplomat. One is often hard pressed to see the difference, because their aims and problems are the same. But it is clear to me that a politician in the proper sense of the word should be straightforward in pursuing a line of policy. But the diplomat sees the task as passing over the subject in silence or shrouding the question so as to prevent the other side from seeing his thoughts. I see you’re a skillful diplomat, and from every meeting I see it’s more and more the case. Instead of giving me a direct answer, you give me a long train of thought.

In our Interim Agreement we didn’t include anything about MIRV’s because we had none but you did, although you didn’t tell me anything about it. You tell me you know what we’re doing, and we know what you’re doing. Though we know nothing about intentions. So you dodged my questions and switched over to warheads. And I’m not loathe to do that.

You explained that in locally-developing situations, atomic war between us is conceivable. But if such a war breaks out—and I can assure you a war like that would never break out from our starting it—it would be the last holy war for the Soviet Union, if not for Latin America or Africa. I would say from my part, very directly, there can be no such war between us. So if you were to address my question back to me, whether I believe in the possibility of atomic war between us, I would reply I do not believe in such a possibility. I would say that regardless of who heads the American Administration, because it depends not on who leads a country but the people of a country. Because there are many people, including scientists, who know what such a war would mean and how many would die. So I don’t admit the possibility of either side taking a decision to launch such a war, of the possibility of such a war. There are some insane people who might say, “Let’s commit suicide,” but they’re a minority of the world’s population.

So that is my answer. When I asked it of you, I said I would be prepared to give my answer.
Of course we have to discuss other issues. I am prepared to discuss them today and tomorrow. Indeed, let’s do that.

Let’s talk about the number of warheads available to either side, and what advantage there is—whether it is better to have one or five, or to put them on aircraft or whatever. After all, several years ago, in negotiating and concluding the first provisional agreement on strategic offensive arms, it was not fortuitous that you were prepared to give us a certain apparent outward advantage in, say, the number of submarines—62 and 41. Because you did this deliberately, and you at that time had MIRV’s, though you didn’t tell us anything about it.

Then you began to reproach us for building weapons of this type. And you said that since we’ve tested them we already had them. But you know from your experience what the distance is between testing it and having it. An engineer has to test 200 engines before it is reliable or operative. You know we have begun to deploy MIRVs, but you’ll complete that process much sooner than we have.

So it’s quite wrong to say we have more missiles than the United States. We shouldn’t mislead the other side. I’m prepared to vote in favor of a new strategic arms treaty. The first one has played a useful role and I’m sure a new one will play a useful role, and not from the point of view of giving any advantage over the United States.

Dr. Kissinger, if you agree, we could end this general debate and pass to a discussion of the specific issues concerning the form, content and substance of a new strategic arms limitation agreement, first agreeing that our first one will continue to be valid until 1977 and that the new one will, so to speak, cover the old one, and be a new factor restraining both sides.

Kissinger: I agree. And I agree the old agreement with these numbers will remain in effect until October 1977.

Brezhnev: Yes, we can consider that is agreed. The old agreement remains in force until it runs out in October 1977.

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: Let me just say this paper I received just before I met you is a message from President Ford [Tab A] in which he says he has been busy travelling around various states, which is why he didn’t send a message with you, but he does now to confirm the invariability of the line between the United States and the Soviet Union to make it irreversible. And while there may be various difficulties and ups and downs, he is committed to continue it, and Dr. Kissinger has instructions to negotiate. And I will of course reply to it. And I appreciate the constructive spirit of it.

Kissinger: I will report that. And let me say the President appreciates the special channel that exists between the President and the General Secretary.
Brezhnev: I certainly appreciate that too. The channel certainly has demonstrated it is very useful indeed. Unless something really untoward happens, I will not complain to the President about you.

Kissinger: I’m terrified.

Brezhnev: I’ll make no final conclusion yet, because there are two days left.

Kissinger: That’s blackmail.

Brezhnev: No, it’s diplomacy. There has to be some differences between the politician and the diplomat.

Gromyko: Politics covers diplomacy the way the new agreement covers the old one.

Kissinger: We also praise Gromyko, which is why he feels so secure.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, we’re therefore beginning a serious discussion on what is to be a new agreement between us on a very important issue. And here it is important to reach agreement on quantities, time limits, a new approach, and concrete formulations.

Kissinger: Right.

Brezhnev: I would like you to set out your considerations on these issues, and I’ll give you my views.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we have submitted to you on basic ideas on this subject, to permit you to study it before my arrival. [The U.S. note of October 19, Tab B.]

We attempted to take into account the difficulty of defining unequal numbers, one for MIRVs and one for total numbers, as we did in the Crimea. Now what we therefore attempted to do is define three periods—the period between now and October 1977, the period between October 1977 and October 1982, and the period between October 1982 and the end of 1983—although this can be summer of 1984; we’re not set on this.

Between now and October 1977, in effect the Interim Agreement would continue. With the existing numbers.

From 1977 to October 1982, the following situation would arise: By October 1982 both sides would be entitled to have 2350 total systems, that is, ICBMs, submarine missiles and long-range bombers. However, since both sides would be introducing some new systems and still have some old systems, in the interval between October 1977 and 1982, the number can be as high as 2500. So in other words, between October 1977 and October 1982 it can go up to 2500 and then down to 2350.

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4 The reference is in error. The note, Document 53, was given to Dobrynin on October 9.
that five-year period. At the end of that five-year period it will be 2350, but in between it can be 2500. In that five-year period, the limit of the 1300 MIRVed systems would be reached, that is, October 1982.

Sukhodrev: The figure of . . .

Kissinger: 1300 MIRVed systems. It’s not compulsory; you can have less! By the end of 1983, or June 1984 . . .

Dobrynin: For both sides?

Kissinger: Yes. We’ve tried to base it on equality throughout. By the end of 1983—or June 1984; we’re willing to talk about this—the total number on both sides should reach 2200 systems. By that time too, heavy systems of both sides should be limited to 250. That means we would not deploy more than 250 B–1, and you would not deploy more than 250 of what we call your heavy missiles—what we call the SS–18, or SS–9.

You would agree not to put MIRV on heavy missiles and we would agree not to put long-range air-to-surface missiles on our heavy bombers.

And then we’re also proposing that both sides agree not to deploy more than 175 missiles or bombers in any one year, and this provision would go into effect immediately.

And finally we propose that the provision of the Interim Agreement prohibiting the construction of new ICBM silos should be incorporated in the new agreement.

Brezhnev: Very simple proposals. It is a very serious question. Could we not perhaps complicate it a bit in substance? How many MIRVs—you’re completing your MIRV program next year—would the United States have next year?

Kissinger: No, we will not complete our MIRV program until the 1980’s. In fact, it depends on what you call our MIRV program. Our presently planned MIRV program we will not complete well into the 1980’s. In the absence of an agreement, we will plan many more MIRVs, so it depends.

Brezhnev: And also what sense will there be in all that?

Kissinger: Sense in what?

Brezhnev: Ultimately we can, acting in that way, reach a situation where we’ll have one MIRV for every human being.

Kissinger: Without an agreement, that’s theoretically possible; but that’s why we are proposing to limit them.

Brezhnev: I don’t remember who it was, maybe an American scientist, who said the Soviet Union already has seven warheads for every locality in the United States. Dr. Kissinger knows full well that is not so. Why don’t you go out and expose such inventions?
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I have been the leading figure in America arguing for the limitation of strategic arms.

Brezhnev: That’s who I am.

Kissinger: So I have tried to explain the situation as I saw it and why I believe limitations are necessary.

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, this is generally so delicate a subject that without complete frankness and straightforwardness in stating one’s position, neither side can sign any treaty. And I’m sure you yourself agree with that proposition. And we neither of us can allow each other to give differing interpretations to one and the same fact. We had a discussion on this subject in March. We don’t consider that conversation a waste of time. But we were not at that time able to reach an understanding, because quite a few of the facts were unknown to us. You kept on reproaching me for our so-called heavy missiles, and we talked about the United States doing something new to your old rockets. That was the kind of conversation we had at that time, the kind that can’t lead to any specific results. We have to speak on this subject in the spirit of frankness and confidence.

Let’s say if instead of Minuteman I you deployed your Minuteman III, how are we to treat that? One can interpret it as one and the same kind of missile, or can interpret it as deploying a heavy missile.

Kissinger: No.

Brezhnev: Otherwise what sense would there be in doing it?

Kissinger: If we’re going to use that kind of argument, we would treat your SS–17 and SS–19 as heavy, and you would have nothing but heavy missiles. We both know the characteristics of the missiles and can make distinctions according to weight.

Brezhnev: No, because the weight is not yet an indication of the capacity of that missile, and weight only indicates power capacity and range—whether it can shoot longer or shorter distances. Of course distance is also a factor to be taken into account. If I want to shoot shorter distances I can put a greater payload on that missile. If, for instance, a Minuteman I can carry MIRVs with a capability of 0.2 megatons, Minuteman III can carry MIRVs with a capability of 0.4 megatons.

Kissinger: Well . . .

Brezhnev: A lot depends on the type of fuel, the quality of metal that is used in building the fuel tanks, and so forth. So it would be wrong simply to say that if one rocket weighs 36 tons and another weighs 37 tons, the second is the more powerful weapon. And there are different guidance systems, and so on.

Kissinger: And that’s why we have defined heavy missiles as ones with throw-weight of 10,000–15,000 pounds, which includes the SS–9.
And we did not count your SS–17 and 19, which are three times as large as your SS–11. So we were not playing games.

Secondly, it is true that weight can be translated into range. But once a missile has intercontinental range, it would be foolish to use its weight for range, and from then on, weight is used for payload. So while you can’t make a distinction of a few hundred pounds or one ton, you can make some approximate distinctions.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, under the old agreement, we agreed that each side could, within certain limitations, improve its missile systems, that is, but not increase beyond a certain limit the diameter of the silo and increase the number of missiles. You’re improving your missiles and we’re not saying anything about it, but when we start to improve our missiles, including not increasing the diameter of the silos and even decreasing the diameter, why do you say we’re developing new heavier missiles?

Kissinger: No, Mr. General Secretary, there is a misunderstanding. Let me explain where this misunderstanding is. There is always an explosion when I explain to my Soviet colleagues what they’re building.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: You’re putting new missiles into the SS–11 holes—slowly, not very rapidly—missiles which we call either [SS–]17 or [SS–]19. Even though those missiles are heavier than the SS–11, we are not treating them as heavy missiles for purposes of our proposal. Among your 1300 MIRVed missiles, you could include as many [SS–]17’s and [SS–]19’s as you want.

Brezhnev: Yes, but we’re doing that just as you’re replacing your Minuteman I with Minuteman III. And we’re doing it openly.

Kissinger: That’s right. And we’re not criticizing you either.

Brezhnev: But you’re covering it with netting, and we’re not doing that. We made one representation—3, 4, or 5—so you could be doing anything. [He gets up.] As soon as I cover one of my silos with netting I’m sure I’ll get a representation from you that I’m violating the treaty. But I’m not doing that.

Kissinger: He’s got a point there.

Brezhnev: And I certainly have all the grounds to wonder why Dr. Kissinger has suddenly started covering his silos with netting. We make a representation through Dobrynin, and all we’re told is that it’s the result of some kind of misunderstanding. We could do all sorts of misunderstandings. I don’t think it’s just to ward off rain.

Kissinger: Strangely, that’s what it is for. They’re putting in a new type of concrete.

Brezhnev: Excuse me, I’ll call Grechko and tell him to put new netting on.
Kissinger: It’s new concrete being put on, and until it’s dried, they put netting on.

Brezhnev: Also something is being done to those silos. And we place whatever rockets into the same silos.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I’m not arguing with you. I’m not sure Viktor’s translation makes that clear. I’m not accusing you of violating the Interim Agreement. I’m not trying to limit the number of missiles you can put into the SS–11 holes according to the Agreement. The 250 heavy limit that we put on applies only to those that are already limited to 300 by the Interim Agreement. And on our side we’re applying it to heavy bombers, or heavy missiles.

Brezhnev: What is the limit of the range of air-to-surface missiles on your heavy bombers?

Kissinger: We said it would be 3,000 kilometers.

Brezhnev: And how many Trident submarines do you want to build?

Kissinger: Within the total limitation of the 1300 MIRVed missiles, we would have the right to put all on Tridents if we wanted. The Trident is smaller than your SS–17 and SS–19. [Brezhnev’s bell goes off in the center of the table.]

Brezhnev: Excuse me.

Kissinger: Bhutto has a new proposal. Maybe we should bring him into the meeting.

Brezhnev: Will they criticize me for calling you Comrade Henry?

Kissinger: They’ll criticize me. They are already doing it.

Brezhnev: That’s something I’d like to see.
Dr. Kissinger, you have set your views on the provisions of a new agreement. Naturally I have seen the proposals you’ve handed to us beforehand. As they are now, we don’t believe them to be appropriate.

Let me make two comments:

—I’m against having an interim period; I’d like to have it run from 1977–1982.

—And secondly, for the upper limit we would propose for the United States 2000 and for the Soviet Union 2400, taking into account all the factors known to you.

This is something I’d like to leave to you for food for thought. I’d like to recess now to meet Prime Minister Bhutto, and we can meet tonight, and I’ll leave the whole day for you tomorrow.

Kissinger: All right.

Brezhnev: And also, the last time we didn’t discuss limiting the number of bombers and limiting our Typhoons and your Tridents. That’s something we can leave until later. I believe out of these very difficult negotiations will come a very good treaty.

Kissinger: With slightly different numbers.

Brezhnev: That’s your desire too, I trust.

Kissinger: That’s my desire, as I’ve expressed publicly on many occasions—to the great displeasure of many of our military people.

Brezhnev: I won’t comment. They’re insatiable.

Kissinger: You’ve noticed that we have agreed to limit the number of heavy bombers in our proposal.

[The U.S. side confers.]

I’ve explained to my colleagues what the Typhoon is. I explained it was your counterpart to our B–3.

When the General Secretary said 2400 and 2000, did he mean missiles? Or all strategic systems?

Brezhnev: Total systems.

Dobrynin: Do you prefer otherwise?

Kissinger: I don’t think the President will be pleased that I obtained this on the first attempt. Without a struggle.

Brezhnev: So, bon appetit. Did Mrs. Kissinger go to Leningrad?

Kissinger: By tomorrow we will have confirmed the existence of Leningrad. Thank you for arranging a plane for her.

My children too are still talking about their visit to Moscow.

Brezhnev: I remember your son very well, especially. My great granddaughter resembles him a little bit.

[The meeting thereupon ended.]
70. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Brezhnev this morning.2

“I had another two and a half hours with Brezhnev in the Kremlin with the same participants as yesterday. He had just received your message3 which he read through in my presence and then commented on very positively. He said he liked its positive spirit and would answer, probably after our current meetings are finished. He reverted to the message a second time later in our session, again with favorable comment saying he laid great stress on his relationship with you.

“Brezhnev today was in a dark blue suit and white shirt, probably because he is to meet Bhutto later today. He was not at his most cogent or precise and in fact at times seemed almost frivolous in his banter. He failed to focus seriously on our SALT proposal,4 though I finally had an opportunity to give him a detailed summary of it. Before that I spent about an hour answering Brezhnev’s ‘two questions,’ whether we wanted strategic superiority and what I thought of the prospect for nuclear war. I explained our strategic force planning and concerns about Soviet weapons developments and noting the irrationality of initiation of nuclear war by either side, I stressed that if the Soviet strategic build-up continued in the absence of a SALT agreement we were certain to match it and, given our technological lead, probably exceed it. Thus, this was a crucial moment for coming to an agreement. I did point out the danger of local conflicts resulting in escalation.

“In his typical debating style, Brezhnev complained of the technical nature of my responses and then launched into a rambling response of his own, the upshot of which was that there can be no nuclear war. In the process he complained about our MIRV programs and rejected the assertion that the Soviets have more missiles than we. It was rather defensive and amateurish performance, though delivered without rancor.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (2). Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. According to a handwritten note, the President saw the memorandum.

2 See Document 69.

3 See Document 67.

4 See Document 53.
“Brezhnev raised virtually no serious and systematic issues about our SALT proposal but what he did say seemed to reflect a misapprehension that we are trying to curtail Soviet SS–17 and SS–19 programs by our proposed restriction on ‘heavy’ Soviet missiles. He was also apparently leading up to rejecting MIRV prohibition for the SS–18. Again in typical style, he diverted our discussions to complain about our placing netting over our silos.

“Finally, after his desultory comments he did make two specific comments on our proposal: (1) he did not like our breaking up the period until 1984 into stages and wants a single stage from 1977–1984; and (2) he objected to our equal 2200 aggregates and proposed instead 2000 for us and 2400 for them. He will take this up later this afternoon in greater detail.

“We are to continue at 6:30 this evening but I must say from Brezhnev’s performance today I find it very difficult to see how even a set of principles can be worked out before your meeting with him in November. Brezhnev has stalled and his comments have been unfocussed, sometimes even frivolous and uninformed. So far, they have not even been calculated to draw me out. This may change in three remaining sessions but even then we would have to break all past records to arrive at meaningful conclusions by Saturday night.5 I do intend to impress on Brezhnev the need for concrete progress if we are to avoid new U.S. programs in reaction to major Soviet building programs now underway, a point I have already made explicitly. If this remains the Soviet position it is clear that we are paying a price for our domestic disarray, especially the Congressional irresponsibility. The Soviets may calculate (1) that Congress has circumscribed our ability to give them credits and trade by placing a ceiling on credits and by the Jackson Amendment which they consider a profound insult; and (2) that Congress will not vote increases in the Defense Budget so that they risk nothing by stonewalling on SALT.

“In these conditions a $1 billion cut to meet our $300 billion goal would reinforce their convictions.”

5 October 26.
71. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 25, 1974, 7:30–10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev, General Secretary and Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Member CPSU Politburo
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General Secretary Brezhnev
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Suhodrev, Counselor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Jan M. Lodal, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

Introductory Remarks

SALT

Brezhnev: (Autographs photograph taken during first day’s meeting for Secretary Kissinger) I’ll write out the figures of the missiles we’re supposed to have and that you’re supposed to have. In the meantime, I’ve received another complaint about you from the President! I think that that augurs well for Vladivostok.

Kissinger: At least you and the President are united.

Brezhnev: Yes, we’re agreed.

Kissinger: One item for the communiqué is agreed.

Brezhnev: Basically. Now, we agreed that at this meeting we would talk about specific figures. You have named the main figures on your side, figures based on your own plan rather than as you said they

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Clift. The meeting was held in the Old Politburo Room in the Council of Ministers Building at the Kremlin. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes on the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
would be based on the possibilities of our plan. Well then, in that case, how many warheads are in your arsenal, and how many are we supposed to have in ours?

Kissinger: That depends on how many warheads you put on your missiles.

Brezhnev: Well, you put five or six on yours; we will put two on ours.

Kissinger: That’s up to you. Since each side is to have the same number of missiles, there is no reason why they should not have the same number of warheads. But, we would be prepared to discuss limitations on the number of warheads.

Brezhnev: Well, today, due to the lack of time, I was not able to talk these matters over either with Grechko or our other comrades. Therefore, I am talking on the basis of my own calculations which, however, I am sure are 99.99% accurate.

Kissinger: As I told the General Secretary, he opened a new approach to me on this subject last March.2 I am serious. He raised considerations I hadn’t even analyzed before.

Brezhnev: Which considerations are those?

Kissinger: There were two. First, I hadn’t analyzed the warhead problem sufficiently. Second, I hadn’t analyzed your deployment of submarine MIRVs in terms of the time period before our discussion.

Brezhnev: I don’t recall our discussion on that in too great detail.

Kissinger: No, no, but we mentioned it.

Brezhnev: You’re right in saying that that was the time it arose, when you learned that we, too, had the secret.

Kissinger: I knew it six months before.

Brezhnev: You’re a very penetrating man. I envy you. I can only be pleased with myself for having a good memory. And, my health isn’t too bad. Otherwise, I have quite a few problems, first with Dobrynin, then with Gromyko or Grechko, and Kissinger keeps coming up with something that causes me trouble. You won’t even let me die quietly.

Kissinger: We have an interest in keeping you alive!

Brezhnev: I realize that I may not be the best possible man to have across the table, but there can be worse. I have goodwill.

Kissinger: Seriously, Mr. General Secretary, you have demonstrated your devotion to improving US-Soviet relations. That is recognized and appreciated in Washington.

Brezhnev: If what you say were in the form of a winning card, you could lay any stake on it. Rockefeller wouldn’t stand a chance with you.

2 See footnote 3, Document 64.
Gromyko: You could live on the interest.

Kissinger: I’m not too modest. I will settle for what Rockefeller has.

Brezhnev: I’m not all that interested in the material side of things either. I’ve wanted to get a winter coat made now for the third year running, but I have no time for the tailor. Two years ago, I was having a jacket made by a tailor, but there was no time for a fitting. Now, for the meeting with the President I will need a new suit, but I’m not sure I’ll make it.

Kissinger: He’ll insist on a new suit.

Brezhnev: I’d like to have something, if I don’t (he looks at and fingers his suit) maybe this will do.

When I worked earlier in Moscow, at the Supreme Soviet, I had to meet the President of India—who was he, yes, Radhakrishnan. I put on a new dark suit, double-breasted were in fashion then and I never liked them. But, I had one made—it was in the summer—and we were driving from the airport in an open car with jump seats. And, you know the kind, the backs of the seats fold up and down. There was the movement of the car; we were standing; and the back of this seat was down. I sat down and tore my pants. I got worried about how I was going to get out of the car at the Kremlin. I had to hold the tear in my pants when I got out. I needed two suits (laughter).

Kissinger: Or two pairs of pants (laughter).

Brezhnev: And then what happens if you sit on another hook? Well, the facts of the situation are that the United States, at present, has a very big advantage in MIRVs. We will gradually be fulfilling our own program in that field, which you can readily conceive of. And, as the years go by, provided the United States does not go still further ahead in the development of the MIRV program, we may even out the situation.

But, here we must bear in mind one circumstance we cannot bypass. And, that is the fact that in calculating the number of missiles that we can install on our submarines, we are allowed a total of 950 warheads. To have this we will have to remove a certain number of land-based missiles and report to the United States that we have done so.

Now, if we accept your proposition (offers sausages and mustard to Secretary Kissinger), apart from those missiles we will have to remove to compensate for those we are installing on our submarines, we will also have to remove a certain quantity of land-based missiles. Therefore, not only from the arithmetic point of view but even from the point of view of the principle we have agreed upon, that is something we cannot do.
And, this is not even to mention the question of third countries, for example, Great Britain, or the question of forward bases which appear to be a certain given quantity which up to now are not even mentioned.

Kissinger: Let me understand: The figures which we gave the General Secretary say that you have to dismantle missiles beyond those which already have to be dismantled?

Brezhnev: Yes, indeed!

Kissinger: But those would all be old missiles—and so do we have to dismantle missiles.

Brezhnev: Well, what rockets would you have to dismantle? You are modernizing your rockets and we have stated no objection.

Kissinger: ... Under our proposal ...

Brezhnev: You can’t dig any new holes, but neither can we.

Kissinger: No, no. But we would have to dismantle ...

Brezhnev: At present, you have more bombers than we have.

Kissinger: We have 429 B–52s—maybe more counting those in storage. We would have to eliminate all of those under this proposal. And, we would keep—rather we would confine our B–1s to 250, not build more than 250.

Brezhnev: But, then, you would increase your missiles. Otherwise you wouldn’t get to 2,200. You have 1,700 missiles now. How do you get to 2,200?

Kissinger: By keeping our Polaris submarines when we put in Trident.

Korniyenko: So you would increase your numbers?

Kissinger: Yes, but without an agreement we are planning that anyway. By putting a limit on 1,300 MIRVs, we are putting a limit on the number of Tridents that can be deployed—by putting a ceiling on the number of MIRVs, a ceiling on the number of Tridents and keeping 10 Polaris.

Brezhnev: Comrade Brezhnev mentioned two factors, and correctly so: first, forward-based weapons, and second, third countries—many of your allies.

Gromyko: Surely we are entitled to raise the issue of compensation.

Kissinger: We are not asking compensation for your allies.

Gromyko: But you know that your question is wide of the mark, because our allies don’t have those means of warfare—as does, for example, Great Britain.

Kissinger: But you have allies which have these means of warfare. Gromyko: That is a subject I am approaching. That does have to be taken into consideration. We will raise that. It’s O.K., if you wish, to
joke, even with that ally, but take the year 1983 and the figures you propose. This would mean a reduction of our weapons and an increase of yours. You don’t say that the question of heavy missiles doesn’t exist? Let us discuss the question of heavy missiles. You introduced a second figure. You know the numerical figure you are suggesting. That is why Comrade Brezhnev says it is a double figure: one, submarine-based, and two, heavy air force. How can we be optimistic about that concept?

Kissinger: There are already limits on heavy missiles.

Gromyko: But now we’re dealing with new figures going beyond the provisional agreement. Surely, now we’re dealing with new figures going beyond the provisional agreement. Surely, now there is more to resolve since there are more factors involved, the time limit is longer, and there are a greater variety of combinations possible. You mentioned this when you were here with your former President. Now we are going beyond this and the figures are different.

Then there is the question of third countries—what about forward bases? Has that factor disappeared? If you took that factor into account in the first agreement, why not now? Has it disappeared? Surely forward bases haven’t disappeared. You haven’t reduced allies. If the situation has changed, it has changed in reverse—take Great Britain. The figures are different than when the first agreement was negotiated. The situation has changed for the worse for us. Try to look at the situation through our eyes. Try to sit in our seats and look through our eyes.

Kissinger: As a factual matter, Great Britain has not changed its force at all since the first agreement.

Gromyko: When we discussed the first agreement, we spoke in terms of Great Britain having two or three, now they have five or six.

Kissinger: The UK has four submarines and 64 missiles of an old type.

Gromyko: Our information is five or six.

Kissinger: I assure you that the UK has four submarines.

Gromyko: But, how many launchers?

Kissinger: Sixty-four. Just a minute. The UK has 64 missiles, and we could come to an understanding about not counting them MIRVed. They’re not MIRVed now.

Gromyko: Take the geographic factor; consider the distances involved—the distances your floating objects have to cover and ours.

Kissinger: Not your new missiles. They have a range of 4,300 miles. You can hit the United States from port. To me the miracle of technology is that the longer the range of the missile, the more complicated becomes the submarine to carry it—and it can fire from port!

Gromyko: But such miracles cannot happen overnight.
Kissinger: We’re talking 10 years.
Gromyko: We’re talking seven.
Kissinger: The only thing to remember is that you have to remove the covering from the submarine before you fire from port. Geographic range is not important after 1980. Both sides will have missiles that can fire great distances. Why would you come all this way across the Atlantic?
Gromyko: This is a process!
Kissinger: I said 1980.
Gromyko: I’m sure you won’t say we could do it in a month’s time.
Kissinger: By 1980. By the time these numbers become effective, there will be no significant geographic advantages.
Gromyko: It’s not a convincing argument if for no other reason than the fact that all cannot be reduced to submarines.
Kissinger: No, but we’re talking about submarines.
Gromyko: That’s true. Then, of course, you are omitting from view the existence of different kinds of third countries. I have mentioned one; there may be others. You did, in fact, mention this as a factor in the past.
Kissinger: Let’s take the case of China. Right now, in the United Nations they attack you more than they do us—two unfavorable sentences for you to every one for us.
By 1985—or ’83 or ’82—that can change.
Gromyko: But the difference is that you are taking a hypothetical case. We are talking reality.
Kissinger: You can solve your nuclear problem with China by means of weapons that would not be counted in the agreement, shorter range weapons.
Gromyko: We understand, but you also know that the Chinese have a plan to build an underwater fleet—a big fleet.
Kissinger: We don’t know their plan. We have only seen one boat. We have been told that they may accelerate.
Gromyko: Maybe you’ve failed to collect the necessary information.
Kissinger: Our information is that we know of one submarine they are building that has strategic missiles. What is your information? Do you think they have more than one?
Gromyko: China has a very big program. Since that is so, surely our leadership has to take it into account.
Kissinger: If China is building a fleet—I’m not going to debate the point with you—that subject would be useful to exchange information on.
Gromyko: That’s another question. But that is my reply to your remark about our using weapons other than strategic weapons against the Chinese.

Kissinger: It doesn’t make any difference how many submarines they have. If you have 2,000 missiles you can cover most of China.

Gromyko: That’s true, but we’re talking about Chinese submarines operating beyond Chinese territory. The types of weapons you are referring to wouldn’t do.

Kissinger: If you are planning to hit submarines with missiles, it’s a new approach to strategic warfare.

Gromyko: Well, they have to be based somewhere.

Kissinger: Yes, but you can hit the bases. (Looks at the U.S. side) Some of my colleagues may have heart attacks over this discussion.

Gromyko: In short, there are very serious problems involved that have to be answered, that have to be buttressed by weighty answers not brief replies, because they have to be based on material factors. We could broaden the list of third countries; I’m sure you know what I mean. Let me just mention ... 

Kissinger: I admit that the argument regarding the UK and France has validity, but to take countries like China and India, we should understand that they are equally dangerous to both of us.

Gromyko: Yes, but you have to consider them in combination with the state’s policy. There are no statements from China about war against the United States, but there are different kinds of statements about the Soviet Union. Surely the Soviet leadership, responsible for Soviet security, has to reckon with this.

Kissinger: On our side, as a practical matter it is politically impossible to agree to a final figure that either gives equality in numbers or that compensates for inequalities, for example in MIRVs.

On the other hand, our proposal has complicated aspects, but it permits certain advantages. For example, if you accept the various time limits we have given, you, for example, would be permitted to have 2,500 total systems until 1982. And, while we would have the same right, we could achieve an understanding that we wouldn’t build to 2,500. This is the reason why we put a bulge in the figure.

Gromyko: You didn’t comment on the proposal made earlier by Comrade Brezhnev on the difference of 400.

Kissinger: That’s out of the question.

Gromyko: But even that is less than enough; even that wouldn’t amount to a solution. The next question is that of heavy missiles.

Kissinger: Each side has its own realities. Your Ambassador would agree that it would be quite impossible for the United States to agree to
such an inequality in numbers. The only basis on which we can agree to inequality in total numbers is if there is an inequality in other aspects such as MIRVs. You see, if there is no agreement, we will achieve equality in numbers in any event. Each side can do what we want.

Gromyko: Well, what you’re suggesting for the period up to 1985 is that we eliminate the numerical advantages that we have by way of compensation for the factors you mention.

Kissinger: We gave you a numerical advantage in the provisional agreement because it was provisional.

Gromyko: Not only because of that.

Kissinger: Secondly, as I testified before a Committee of the Congress, we had multi-warheads while you had only single warheads.

Brezhnev: Well, that is exactly why at that time you gave us a numerical superiority in launchers.

Kissinger: That’s correct. I said so publicly.

Brezhnev: You didn’t say so then.

Kissinger: But, you knew that we had been installing MIRVs since 1971.

Brezhnev: But, we didn’t know! We would have talked a different language.

Kissinger: I said so publicly in June 1972. It was in our budget, which your Ambassador studies more carefully than I do. It was part of a public debate which caused one of Ambassador Dobrynin’s friends to introduce a resolution banning MIRV testing—Senator Humphrey—and we have defeated him every year. So, it couldn’t have been unknown to you.

Brezhnev: We learned about it after the signing of the agreement. Your public statement was made after the agreement.

Kissinger: Whenever you learned about it, Mr. General Secretary—it must have been a slowness in the Soviet system—the fact is that we could afford a differential in numbers because . . . (Korniyenko brings a paper to Kissinger; they discuss the joint statement to be issued at the end of this session of talks) . . . Do you realize that our press says that you said the first day’s talks were constructive and businesslike and I said they were friendly. Now they say that you are taking a cooler approach than we are?

Gromyko: This will be unilateral, for the sake of atmosphere . . .

Kissinger: If I say friendly and you don’t they’ll say that I exaggerate.

Korniyenko: Let’s say nothing about atmosphere.
Kissinger: We’ll take care of it at the lunch. We’ll have some correspondents there. (Again, looking at paper) This is fine. Everyone knows that if Sonnenfeldt is at a meeting it couldn’t be friendly. (Gromyko and Brezhnev consult for seven minutes).

Kissinger: (Aside to Sukhodrev) Lord has a Chinese wife.3 We have to be careful about Chinese submarines. He absolutely denies that they exist. You know, we get our press excited by bringing them over here and then not letting them in on the picture.

Brezhnev: If I might have a respite from these figures and return to a question: I want to get clear in my mind if we need an interim period until 1983, and then 1985, or perhaps just one phase until 1985. We would then rid ourselves of the need for further discussion.

Kissinger: We don’t insist on the end of 1983. We could say the summer of 1984. Let me explain our reasoning. The final level shouldn’t be reached at the same time that the agreement expires, because then there would be great uncertainty for the first two years of the agreement as to whether either side will, in fact, go down to the numbers agreed upon. It can be October 1984; that’s possible.

Dobrynin: October—three months?

Kissinger: Well, six months. When would the agreement lapse; the middle of 1985?

Brezhnev: There would be the same time period for both.

Kissinger: My idea is that the agreement should be signed when you visit the United States next year—May or June.

Brezhnev: Good.

Kissinger: It would then be approved by the Senate in July—that would take four-to-six weeks. So, the agreement would lapse in August or September, 1985. I’m just estimating. So, on that assumption, we could have the final level reached in October 1984.

Brezhnev: Well, what happens, in what way would it be bad if we reach the final levels in October 1985.

Kissinger: Because, for the whole last year there would be accusations about not reaching the final level. Then both sides might keep more missiles as insurance against the agreement lapsing. There would be no penalty once the agreement has expired.

Look, if you say you can keep 2,500 but in the last month you will pare down 300, at the precise moment you would be in violation the agreement would lapse. I don’t think we’re at the decision point for six to ten months. It depends on the factor of how big the bulge is. (To Dobrynin) We’re troubled by one thing. You propose 2,400 while we ac-

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3 Bette Bao Lord.
cept 2,350 by 1982. You say 2,400, and we say 2,350 by 1982. It’s not a huge difference. Since I have said that while we go down the road we might agree that when we reach the 2,200 level, we might then not exceed it.

Dobrynin: The problem is still third countries.

Kissinger: The British and the French together have 112 missiles. Our estimate is a total of five boats.

Dobrynin: They have four already.

Kissinger: Their boats will be obsolete. They are worse than our first Polaris boats.

We will have twice as many warheads on one Trident boat as the entire British and French warheads! If we go to war, these boats will make no difference. If we don’t go to war, they are useless.

Dobrynin: Doesn’t Great Britain have a special targeting role in NATO?

Kissinger: Look, you have told us we have 15,000 warheads. If we have a general war, what will be left to shoot at? France has a survival of exactly six minutes! (To Sukhodrev) Victor, please explain this to the General Secretary: My point is that he has asked for 2,400 and we have said 2,350—this difference is no problem. We are willing to have an understanding that we won’t go above 2,200 although we would have that right. So, you would have nine years to get down to that figure.

(A break for five minutes)

Brezhnev: Well, so by way of continuing, let’s assume we agree that as of October 1982, we could have a total number of launchers amounting to 2,400—ICBMs and SLBMs. What would the figure be for the United States?

Kissinger: 2,200. We would have to do it the way we did with President Nixon. That is, we had the right, but we didn’t exercise it. We would find some binding formula to express it. I would have to look into it.

Gromyko: It would be juridically valid?

Kissinger: Yes. We’ll find a formula—either as a letter or as part of the agreement.

Brezhnev: And, this could be incorporated in some way?

Kissinger: I will have to study this, Mr. General Secretary, but clearly as it goes beyond the Presidential term, there will have to be a written expression. If we agreed on the principle, we would find the formula, and we would let your Ambassador know prior to the Vladivostok visit.

If we agree on a final figure of 2,200, we will even include it as part of the agreement. But, I will have to check that.
Brezhnev: Well, assuming that we pursue this line, what will be the situation regarding MIRVs?

Kissinger: The same number can be MIRVed by both sides.

Brezhnev: Any kind of missiles—land-based or sea-based?

Kissinger: Yes. Except with one exception. We will not put MIRVs on U.S. bombers, and there will be no USSR MIRVs on the SS–18—what we call the SS–18.

Brezhnev: I can’t suggest anything better for now than to announce a recess. The positions are so far, so very far apart I don’t see evidence of a desire to achieve equality for an agreement. In line with the question I asked yesterday: Why does the United States want to be stronger than the Soviet Union—to have an advantage? Even though Dr. Kissinger has replied skillfully, the situation hasn’t changed.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we are in no sense seeking superiority over you. I think we have gone quite far. Any analysis of the U.S. scene would show that I alone have kept open the possibility of an agreement. Every proposal made to you in the last year has been made by me against the opposition of the majority in the U.S. Government.

This is my third visit to the Soviet Union this year. If there is no progress now, it would without any question be described as a failure in the United States. We will certainly not make a more forthcoming proposal. My prediction is that there will be an interval while we both see what happens. I say this with great regret because I am dedicated to coming to an agreement. But, if you have a counter-proposal we are prepared to study it to see what we can do.

Brezhnev: I said yesterday that an agreement is necessary. But, I don’t think anybody could accept an agreement on this basis; we certainly cannot. Why shouldn’t I be allowed to put a MIRV on a certain type of missile? By what right am I denied the right of this possibility?

Kissinger: We are giving up the possibilities of air-to-surface missiles and heavy missiles.

Brezhnev: But you have no need for them.

Kissinger: But, you have asked us not to build air-to-surface missiles.

Korniyenko: Our proposal was that you not build air-to-surface missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers. Now you are considering 3,000 kilometers.

Kissinger: If we accept the principle, we can negotiate the distances.

Gromyko: I don’t understand, Dr. Kissinger, how you could have lost sight of the geographic factor and the factor of third countries even though we have drawn your attention to it. Because, if you take the Chinese factor, you say why do we need long-range missiles to parry
the Chinese. But, if that factor is taken into account, we need numbers
to counter the Chinese. What you say about military strategy is not ap-
propriate. And also (he laughs wryly) to build that type of submarine
in connection with the Chinese, we would have to make big outlays. It’s
no pleasure for us.

Kissinger: There is no law of strategy which says if you are at-
tacked by a submarine you have to retaliate with a submarine.

Gromyko: Yes, but I’m answering your argument as to why we
need to build land-based missiles for use against submarines. It makes
a certain degree of sense, but there are several components—
land-based, sea-based and strategic air force.

Brezhnev: Now, before we recess, I would like to introduce an-
other element. When we signed the first provisional agreement, we
both agreed and mentioned in subsequent statements that both sides
would convert the agreement into a permanent agreement. Now we are
taking a different stance. We are prolonging the agreement. Who will
believe us when we say we want to seek ways to limit dangerous
weapons, thermonuclear weapons? Under the new agreement, the
number of weapons will be higher and it will be another interim
agreement.

Kissinger: The ceiling’s lower. Under the interim agreement, the
ceiling for the Soviet Union is 2,350. We might be prepared to seek a
longer agreement than 10 years. We are prepared to consider looking at
it for 15 years.

Brezhnev: When you talk of levels and say they will be lower
under the new proposal than they were under the interim agreement,
you are leaving aside the question of MIRVs.

Kissinger: True, but we’re prepared to consider 2,000 if the General
Secretary agrees. That would be significantly lower.

Dobrynin: The point he (Brezhnev) wants to make is that if you
take the interim agreement and the new agreement, overall they offer
nothing for public opinion.

Kissinger: When we talked to you in Yalta you were willing to give
us a differential on MIRVs for a differential in numbers. Now you
want a differential in missiles for an equality in MIRVs!

Brezhnev: A question: How many Tridents would there be under
your program?
Kissinger: It depends on whether or not there is an agreement.
Brezhnev: Yes, under an agreement.

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4 See footnote 2, Document 2.
Kissinger: If we do have an agreement, we can consider a limit on the number of Tridents.

Brezhnev: What, roughly, would be the number? If you’re going to spend so much money to build the Trident surely it wouldn’t be just two.

Kissinger: The Chinese have just one. Under the agreement we might limit Tridents to ten.

Brezhnev: As I see it personally—not speaking officially on behalf of my comrades—whatever kind of agreement, whether to your advantage or not, it would not be in line with our responsibility to assure the security of the peoples, our responsibilities to counter the possibilities of thermonuclear war.

(Brezhnev speaks again. Sukhodrev pauses, questions him concerning what he has said, then translates.) I trust you are familiar with a certain idea I put forward in my discussions with former President Nixon in the Crimea. Then, I discussed it at the Embassy (Spaso House) in your presence.5

Kissinger: Yes, I remember.

Brezhnev: Now, that would be a stroke of genius, because anything else we do or reach agreement on would merely look in the eyes of those who know like we are doing an arms balancing act. I had a general discussion with President Nixon on this. I don’t know if there was greater detail. If so, I would like to discuss it tomorrow in a smaller group—on our side, that is. Of course, you could have anyone you wish.

Brezhnev: Then, if I could suggest that we resume our conversation at 11:00 a.m. tomorrow?

Gromyko: There is too little time in the morning. Let’s have lunch (at Spaso House) at 2:00 p.m.

Kissinger: (To Sukhodrev) Do you think that if I presented my case well, you would accept 300 MIRVs in return for our 1,400?

Gromyko: We’ll stick to our original procedure. We’ll have the luncheon at 1:00 p.m.

5 Reference is to a tête-à-tête between Brezhnev and Nixon at the beach house in Oreanda on June 30. No record of the conversation has been found. In the third volume of his memoirs, Kissinger recalled: “On that occasion, Brezhnev had proposed that the two superpowers establish what would amount to nuclear tutelage over the rest of the world. A few days later, at a dinner Nixon hosted at Spaso House, the American Embassy residence, the President called me over and, with Brezhnev sitting beside him, described the Soviet leader’s proposal. In effect, it was that the United States and the Soviet Union should cooperate to quell the nuclear ambitions of any other country by agreeing to act together militarily against any country using nuclear weapons. Nixon called it an ‘interesting idea’ to be explored further between me and Dobrynin or Gromyko.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 280) See also Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, pp. 1173–1174.
Kissinger: We’ll start the toasts the moment we get there.
Gromyko: Forty-five minutes for me; 10 for you.
Brezhnev: We’ll start at 11:00; a 1:00 p.m. lunch; and then we’ll proceed.
Kissinger: Should Korniyenko and Sonnenfeldt get together on the communique?
Brezhnev: Good.
(A U.S. text is passed to the Soviet side)\(^6\)
Gromyko: How many pages, 16?
Dobrynin: We should publish all our figures in the communique (laughter).
Kissinger: I must say seriously that if the press sees the third trip as a failure it will have serious consequences. (To Dobrynin) You know this. We will have to say something on background.
Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I would like you tomorrow to explain your thoughts as to the possibilities and versions of concluding an agreement for 15 years—to see what we can build.
Kissinger: (Laughs) I’ll do it, but I’m afraid that every time we meet we will extend the deadline. The next time it will be 20 years.
Brezhnev: I would agree in Vladivostok to speak in terms of 15 years.
Kissinger: Let me make some observations tomorrow.
(Meeting concludes)

\(^6\) Not found. See footnote 5, Document 74.
72. Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger has asked that I pass you the following report of his meeting with Brezhnev this evening.2

"After an hour's delay I had another two and a half hours with Brezhnev this evening. Meeting was again in a paneled Kremlin conference room with green felt conference table and pictures of Marx and Lenin watching. Brezhnev was more serious and to the point than this morning. His briefings on our SALT proposal clearly have predisposed him to see it as designed to freeze Soviets into a disadvantage. Gromyko, who has only slightly better grasp of technical issues involved than Brezhnev, reinforces Brezhnev's prejudice. The main thrust of Soviet comments on our proposal was that they ignored special Soviet requirements due to capabilities of their countries—especially China—geographic position and our forward bases. They also saw our 2200 aggregate as allowing us to increase our present numbers while they would have to cut theirs—a statement which is essentially true. They continued also to stress our warhead advantages. Thus basic Soviet response was quite negative, even after I noted that under our concept Soviets might have 2–300 missile/bomber advantage over us in 1982 before both of us go to equal 2200 level. Brezhnev reacted with special emotion against our proposed prohibition on MIRVed SS–18s. Judging from Gromyko's almost obsessive references to Chinese threat, Soviets may be looking to SS–18 as their long-term weapon against China.

"After about two hours of argument on above issues, during which Soviet group huddled several times, Brezhnev folded up his papers and announced we were far apart because U.S. was seeking an advantage. I responded that we had no such intention and stressed that this would be third Moscow meeting in a row that would end in failure. I said this was regretful for me personally since I had been staunch advocate of a new agreement and had labored hard on our proposal despite much opposition in our government. I said there was bound to be a hiatus in efforts to find arms limitations and we would just have to see what happens next.

"This produced somewhat more positive manner in Brezhnev but he again flatly rejected our proposal. But he then asked whether we

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2 See Document 71.
might consider a 15-year agreement. I agreed to consider it. Brezhnev then alluded to a proposition he had raised alone with President Nixon at the last Summit3 and said he wanted to discuss it with me privately tomorrow. Scowcroft can brief you on essence of that proposition which Brezhnev might possibly view as precondition to any SALT agreement this year and he may try to get you to approve it at Vladivostok. This is a matter I will have to discuss with you orally on my return.

“For now I see little prospect of progress on SALT for the reasons mentioned in my previous reports. But we will have several hours more tomorrow which may give me a clearer basis for an assessment. It is clear to me that if the deadlock remains, our only possibility of getting the Russians to move will be through a substantial increase in strategic budget in the coming fiscal year.”

3 See footnote 5, Document 71.

73. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 26, 1974, 4:30–6:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Side
General Secretary Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Gromyko

US Side
Secretary of State Kissinger
Counselor of the Department of State Sonnenfeldt

Interpreter
Viktor M. Sukhodrev

Brezhnev: There is always good and evil in the world. I am the epitome of good. Gromyko and Sonnenfeldt are the epitome of evil.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (3). Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Brackets are in the original. The memorandum was transcribed at the time from Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, Nov–Dec 1974) The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office in the Kremlin.
Kissinger: Gromyko is the chief obstacle to SALT.

[Brezhnev gets up and goes to his desk and brings back to the conference table a model of an artillery piece which he points at Secretary Kissinger.]

Brezhnev: I don’t know how to operate this thing.
Gromyko: It is a good thing there are no correspondents here.
Kissinger: They do want a picture [referring to the fact that no US correspondents were allowed into the opening conference for pictures].
Brezhnev: We will let them.
Kissinger: [Referring to the gun] It has a bullet in it?
Brezhnev: It is supposed to be operational but I don’t know how to work it. You know I haven’t missed once since I got the Colts. I am like Chuck Conners.2
Gromyko: But you only shoot once a year.
Brezhnev: Did you have a good lunch?
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: The Foreign Minister made a long toast.
Brezhnev: We missed the morning discussion today and I trust Gromyko explained the reason to you and you understand it.3
Kissinger: No—of course I understand. I have so much work along with me anyway.
Brezhnev: I have given up work.
I have been doing some thinking. We should not get involved in a 15-year treaty [on SALT].
Kissinger: I agree completely.
Brezhnev: Let’s begin now the private conversation I had with President Nixon.4 I would like to know your view.

Kissinger: President Nixon never explained to me fully your proposal. I would appreciate a more detailed explanation of what you told

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2 Brezhnev was a fan and friend of Conners, the former star of a western series on American television. The two men met during the U.S.-Soviet summit at San Clemente in June 1973 and again in Moscow in December 1973.

3 In message Hakto 26 to Scowcroft, October 26, Kissinger reported: “Please inform President that this morning’s meeting was cancelled because of Politburo meeting lasting apparently four hours. Gromyko told me at lunch that they had reached a basic decision to get agreement on SALT by the time of next summer’s summit based on our proposals. However, they continue to have trouble with heavy missile MIRV ban, phasing of reductions and, possibly, method of counting bombers because of number of missiles they carry. We need detailed negotiations on these topics. I am meeting privately with Brezhnev later this afternoon and then will continue broader meeting on SALT.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of President Ford, 1974–1977, Box 4, Presidential Trips File, November 1974—Japan, Korea & USSR, HAKTO (2))

4 See footnote 5, Document 71.
him. President Nixon told me that you had talked about an agreement for mutual cooperation but he did not quite explain the details before he resigned.

Brezhnev: As always, I want to be absolutely frank. I too at that time did not go into great detail. I suggested an idea which never left my mind since. There were no selfish aims. I was guided only by the desire to jointly do something in the world which would forever exclude atomic war or any war in general. The gist of the conversation was this: even in the presence of the agreement between us—and we sincerely believe in it—to the effect that we would not use nuclear weapons against each other, could we not also agree . . .

[Brezhnev throughout his remarks and the translation had been manipulating the artillery piece. Kissinger: I have never been shot at by the General Secretary. Brezhnev trains the gun at Sonnenfeldt. Gromyko: You should train it at your own Foreign Minister and not frighten the Americans. Brezhnev inserts a shell into the gun and pulls the lanyard. Nothing happens. Brezhnev: I have to ask Sadat for spares. Kissinger: He probably has them in the wrong guns.]

[translation resumes] . . . could we not give thought to the possibility of our two powers who possess for the foreseeable future immense strength, especially in the military realm, achieving a treaty or an agreement in some form, in the interest of all mankind, and bearing in mind the threat of nuclear weapons to all peoples, to the effect that, in the event of an attack on either of us by any third power—we could even name it—each side, in the interest of keeping the peace, would use military power in support of the other. This would also apply to allies—say an attack on the FRG or Italy—we would also come to the assistance of them. Surely this would be a warning against those tempted to use nuclear weapons against us or our allies.

That was the purport of the proposal. I am not suggesting a military bloc of any kind. And this would respect national sovereignty, but it would solve the problem of preventing thermonuclear war between us or other countries. All this could be formulated in a way to be sure that all parties understand that it is not a diktat but meets the interests of all in peace.

At the time, President Nixon indicated he considered it a very interesting idea and seemed to support the general concept underlying it. He added that he took interest in the idea and in another couple of months would be in a position to give a reply to my propositions. We did not go into greater detail and what I have said is in effect a quotation of that talk. I give you my word, and Sukhodrev is responsible with his life, that I never showed the memorandum of the conversation to anyone. Even today, quite some time after the meeting with President Nixon, I still think in the same way. I am not prompted by fear or
hostility toward anyone. Why should anyone object to the proposition that no one will ever touch them with weapons—Belgium, Holland and the rest.

Kissinger: Let me understand. Suppose the FRG attacks the Soviet Union. We would then support the Soviet Union militarily under this idea?

Brezhnev: Yes. [Keeps pulling lanyard on the gun.] Equally, assume that the Czechs or someone would attack you or your allies or friends with nuclear weapons, we would come to your help. It would primarily apply to an attack with nuclear weapons since the time of conventional weapons has passed. In a preamble to such an arrangement, it would be said that it is not directed against anyone and it is in the interest that each State has against the use of nuclear weapons . . . [to Sonnenfeldt: you should stop taking notes. Kissinger: This is only for President Ford and I assure you it will not leave the White House. Brezhnev: That is impossible in the United States.] . . . it would be a sign of great success for us and our allies. It would not be necessary to make a reference to the parties who might attack. I am just talking about principles now.

Kissinger: The principle is this: If either of us or one of our allies is attacked with nuclear weapons the other one would come to his assistance.

Brezhnev: [Keeps pulling lanyard on the gun and this time the gun goes off with a loud bang.] Now they will say you are under duress.

Kissinger: I once stepped on a certain button in the President’s office and all the Secret Service came charging in. It was early in the Nixon Administration.

Brezhnev: This was originally made to fire paper caps like children’s pistols but it wouldn’t fire. So then they developed blank shells. I got it as a souvenir.

Kissinger: It is more impressive than the bell you rang downstairs yesterday.

Brezhnev brings more shells from his desk.

Kissinger: You already fired a few.

Brezhnev: No, just one. They have no warheads like in the United States. They just make noise. I just got to the bottom of how this thing works; there is a little lever.

Gromyko: We will MIRV it.

Brezhnev: Well, I just wanted to amuse you. [Pushes gun aside.]

Brezhnev: [Responding to Kissinger’s last substantive statement.] Yes. I don’t have in view the mention of a specific country. And we are
not doing it on a bloc basis. Our allies do not have nuclear weapons, though yours do. Such an agreement could generate conditions to warn anyone that no one has the right to attack anyone so all nations should live at peace with each other. I value the life of every Soviet citizen, of every United States citizen, and the citizens of other countries. If we do not do something like this we will raise our military potential and raise suspicions. As I said yesterday, others will say: Here are the United States and the Soviet Union. They had an old agreement on strategic arms with certain ceilings. Now they have a new agreement with higher ceilings. It means that they closed their eyes to their obligations. My proposal meets all the needs. I have never shown the memorandum of conversation to anyone. I put it forward as a personal idea, as a useful idea. I am not for blocs. We each have friends, though one bloc is defensive and the other is military. That is why I asked those questions of you the day before yesterday. I had written them in my own handwriting in my notebook.

To ensure that people will understand it clearly, I suggest that Dr. Kissinger formulate the preamble and we could just sign it. So no one would think it was a new bloc.

Kissinger: Let me ask this so I understand completely: It is between us and applies to us and our allies. Suppose China attacks India, which is not an ally. Does it apply? And it applies only to nuclear weapons?

Brezhnev: The very fact that the preamble would say that the agreement is directed against nuclear war on the planet—without mention of China, India, etc.—would imply that everyone could be sure there would be no nuclear war. If for instance China wants to attack us—maybe, who knows, in five years they will attack you—the agreement would be subordinated to the interest of peace. There should be no reference to “allies.” Who knows who will be allies?

Kissinger: So any nuclear attack on anyone we would jointly oppose, including an attack on ourselves?

Brezhnev: What I suggest be said is that we will jointly retaliate against an attack on you, on us, on an ally, so that people understand that nuclear weapons cannot be used with impunity. On us, or allies. It would mean in effect that our two powerful nations, who won’t be overtaken for 50 years, would guarantee a world free of nuclear war. So that many problems will fall away.

Kissinger: But then we would have to extend it to other countries; that is my point. Otherwise any country could attack a country which is not your or our ally.

Brezhnev: So far the only nuclear powers are you, us, your allies, and China, and who knows whose ally it is?

Kissinger: And India.
Brezhnev: Oh, India—it doesn’t change the substance. The main thing is that there be no attack on the United States, the Soviet Union, or our respective allies. This is just my private thinking and it must not be repeated. Don’t think I will assemble the leadership tomorrow. I just advanced it on my own.

Kissinger: This is only going to President Ford. No other official in the United States Government will get it, nor of course any foreigner. Let me say that it is a very interesting and far-reaching concept and I will discuss it with President Ford now that I understand it. Maybe we will have a brief talk in Vladivostok.

Brezhnev: We are now bargaining about 20, 100, 200 rockets and about whether to MIRV them or not. This doesn’t accord with the idea of converting the Interim Agreement into a permanent one. What are 100 rockets when we have thousands?

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: After all, what difference does it make for any American or Soviet man what he died from, one million or half a million tons. In practice, as the situation is today, one group of states pins its hopes on US nuclear weapons and another group pins its hopes on Soviet nuclear weapons. We spend lots of money and we argue. Surely it is no solution.

Kissinger: As I said, it is an extremely far-reaching and comprehensive approach. I had told President Ford generally that there were discussions between you and President Nixon. I will discuss it with the President when I return and of course well before your meeting at Vladivostok.

Brezhnev: Please understand. This is not an alternative to the detailed proposal we are discussing. It is simply a deeply felt idea. So, report it to President Ford not as a condition. Maybe he will see his way clear to achieving this with us. It would be a great hope for the world and eliminate all the charges of US hostile intent. So I made it very confidential with just one additional person on each side and Sukhodrev who doesn’t exist. [Brezhnev brings a large, youthful looking photograph of himself from his desk.] This is me as I will look in 1985—it was taken on my 65th birthday.

Kissinger: It is a very nice picture.

Brezhnev: I will have it on my new Party card. They could have made me look still younger. [Pointing to a globe.] This shows the best line of attack against the United States. Of course we have a less intricate net than you have.

Kissinger: I recognize that these two subjects, SALT and your proposal, are not dependent upon each other. On the other hand, what you propose doesn’t make sense if the arms race continues.
Brezhnev: I agree. But it is also true, in terms of this idea, that in 50 years it is very hard for anyone to catch up with us.

Kissinger: No, I meant an arms race between us.

Brezhnev: We should end the build-up. What you have, especially in MIRVs, is quite enough.

Kissinger: I will discuss it with President Ford.

Brezhnev: We could easily and calmly agree that if you need them you add three more submarines and so could we, as long as it is by agreement. Meanwhile, we would divert the funds we need for arms from domestic uses. It means billions of rubles. One B–1 costs seven billion.

Kissinger: No. 70 million. But your point is the same anyway.

Brezhnev: On a personal basis, we couldn’t invent anything better than this proposal. I am speaking my mind but you are a diplomat. Now, really what is your view?

Kissinger: This is the first time I have heard it in detail. It would have a revolutionary effect on the international situation. It would certainly prevent nuclear war against any other country.

[Brezhnev lights his cigarette lighter and holds it near Sonnenfeldt’s note pad, as if to burn it.]

Brezhnev: That is exactly what I want. No one should be tempted to start a nuclear war. In that case we would not be interested in B–1s and all that. It would put the whole question in a different light. It would make no difference then if we agreed to add three submarines or five rockets on each side. But in the other case, we engage in all these calculations and no one knows what they come to.

Kissinger: It is certainly a very radical solution.

Brezhnev: The older you become the wiser you are. I don’t wear a wedding ring but I play with this signet ring. It says in here “To Leonid Brezhnev from Novorissisk.” It is a memento of one full year I spent when we were allies. Three hundred days of battle with no step back. That is why Novorissisk is a hero city. I had the honor to present the award. On that occasion I was presented this ring. It is not just any ring. It represents a whole epoch when we fought fascism.

Kissinger: It is very moving. I have always been convinced of the General Secretary’s deep emotional commitment to peace. I remember the story he told me of his father.

Brezhnev: I am by nature an emotional man. Whenever the war comes up I read and re-read. Tears come to my eyes. It may be difficult for some to understand. This is not to say that I don’t set great store by the contributions made by those who remain in the rear. But I don’t forget those who lost their life in battle, on mine fields or barbed wire. Or barbarities like burning people alive or that Jewish people were
herded into ghettos—ghettos right?—and were destroyed. My own family saved many Jews from bandits during the Civil war. To this day I have great respect for them, those who are really honest. Basically it is this abhorrence of war that prompted the peace program of the 24th Congress. I cited Lenin when I put forward that program and the economic program. I just recently addressed the US-Soviet Trade Council and I quoted Lenin: We must have good relations with all countries, especially the United States. I would like to be only one tenth as perspicacious as Lenin. But people like that are born just once in a century. That is why it is so hard to conduct negotiations as we have done in the last two days, since they will result in raising arms levels. Its ideas [of the Party Congress] are supported by an overwhelming number of people. Fifty million in the Party and Young Pioneers and millions more. So this is really a matter of substance not just of emotion. When Napoleon, who was a great warrior, got to Moscow he said he had lost the war. It is a small step from the great to the ridiculous.

Kissinger: There is no military solution to contemporary problems.

Brezhnev: No temporary military victory could lead to a solution of the desires of the peoples. I am sure you could draw the conclusion from your own trip to the Middle East that there can be no military solution. When a new flare-up will occur is hard to say but the situation is still a dangerous one. I am not alone in thinking of the need to ensure peace. I have been in the leadership for 23 years and even with Khursheev’s ramblings this has always been true.

Kissinger: I think the overwhelming problem is that of peace, and the General Secretary has made a far-reaching and interesting proposal.

Brezhnev: Comrade Gromyko, who is a member of the Politburo, knows that on more than one occasion I have said to our colleagues that to lead means to predict not just to note. One has to see through the fog. It is in that context that I talked about the Middle East the other day. We have solved nothing. Only the firing has stopped.

Kissinger: I agree. The problems continue to exist.

Brezhnev: Especially since they are young states headed by very emotional statesmen who are very devoted to sovereignty, they have never said they want to destroy Israel. They just want their territory back.

Kissinger: Assad could be convinced to destroy Israel. It would not take much to persuade him.

Brezhnev: I would be against it.

Kissinger: No, I know. I heard what the Foreign Minister said at the UN and I recognize the Soviet position.
Brezhnev: In all my statements I have always stressed that Israel should not be destroyed. We have espoused it since it has been created. And with Bhutto yesterday, he raised the Middle East and spoke in favor of legitimate rights of all the people, including Israel. I agreed with him. He had raised it himself. I can’t say that I have contact with all the non-aligned, but India, Yugoslavia, Algeria, they all support a settlement in the Middle East. That is why we favor joint action. We do not want to push anyone out. We need no oil and they have no gas, just Oriental bazaars. I recall a conversation with the late Nassar.5 I told him to talk more to the people, to use radio and TV. He said all right, but the real way is to put on a fez and go to the bazaars and talk to Ahmed and the others. That is the way.

Kissinger: You will soon see yourself.

Brezhnev: I already have an idea. Nassar was here and Sadat has been here several times. [Sukhodrev gives Brezhnev the Kalb Brothers’ book on Kissinger with an inscription in Russian to Brezhnev from Marvin Kalb.6 Brezhnev looks at the photographs in the book. Brezhnev: Ha, Zavidovo. You know I would like to take you to Dneprodzerzhinsk where I was born. Kissinger: Very moving.]

Brezhnev: What now?

Kissinger: Maybe the others should join now?

Brezhnev: After our peaceful discussions here, I don’t know.

Kissinger: We have practical problems, leaving aside your great project. We have the SALT delegations in Geneva and we are going to call ours home because there is nothing more to talk about.

Brezhnev: Well, there are people downstairs you can talk to—Gromyko, Aleksandrov.

Kissinger: The problem is that if we would like an agreement in 1975, we have to find a concrete method of negotiations.

Brezhnev: I wonder what we have on tonight. Football maybe?

Kissinger: We were going to go to the Ballet, but is there a football game? I am a great fan.

Brezhnev: Is Mrs. Kissinger at the Ballet? How nice to know Dr. Kissinger isn’t getting there again.

Kissinger: It’s okay. I know the plot.

Brezhnev: I guess we have got to go downstairs. But not for endless bargaining. We can’t conclude an agreement today.

Kissinger: No, but the principles of how we go to an agreement.

6 Reference is to Marvin and Bernard Kalb’s biography of Kissinger (Boston: Little Brown, 1974).
Brezhnev: The only thing to do would be to agree on some basic principles for an agreement to be signed when I go to Washington.

Kissinger: I don’t know what you would want to say at Vladivostok.

Gromyko: The discussions can continue and then there would be a further continuation after that.

Kissinger: Partly in Geneva and partly in the Channel.

Brezhnev: I surely would love to go to Zavidovo. [Brezhnev brings over photos of him and Tito hunting in the Ukraine.]

[The meeting ends at 6:45 p.m.]

74. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, October 26, 1974, 7:10 p.m.–midnight.

PARTICIPANTS

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary and Member of the Politburo, CPSU Central Committee
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs; Member CPSU Politburo
Anatoly Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to United States
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Aide to General Secretary Brezhnev
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Chief, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
(Olperter)
Oleg Sokolov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
Jan M. Lodai, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council
A. Denis Clift, Senior Staff Member, National Security Council

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Drafted by Clift. The meeting was held in the Old Politburo Room in the Kremlin. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes on the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
(The meeting began at 7:10 p.m. following a 4:30–7:00 p.m. meeting in General Secretary Brezhnev’s office involving Brezhnev, Gromyko and Sukhodrev on the Soviet side and Kissinger and Sonnenfeldt on the U.S. side).\(^2\)

Brezhnev: Our colleagues don’t know what we decided on. I want to review it. Tomorrow morning, we’re leaving for Zavidovo for a hunting trip. It was Sonnenfeldt’s idea. Dr. Kissinger agreed; I was very pleased. I certainly wouldn’t mind if all the others present joined us.

Well, unfortunately because of other matters, we weren’t able to meet this morning, but we didn’t lose too much time. Since the basic objective of this meeting is to debate the principles which could form an agreement, we should talk about the principles. The details can be elaborated later, but not the major issues. So, if you agree, we can spend some time discussing those principles.

Kissinger: I agree.

Brezhnev: Do you have anything new to tell me for the U.S. side?

Kissinger: I have given you the substance of our position yesterday, Mr. General Secretary.

Brezhnev: No, I meant maybe something more interesting that may have happened in the United States. I haven’t been able to follow events there. Maybe Jackson’s invented something new. Maybe you have something new by way of instructions.

Kissinger: Any instructions that Jackson sent me would have to be sent to our Secret Service first. They might explode.

Brezhnev: So, in short, there has been nothing new in the United States since our last meeting—anything new in Ethiopia, perhaps?

Kissinger: The Emperor is still alive and well.

Brezhnev: You’re a very humorous man.

Kissinger: The Emperor of Ethiopia makes the longest toasts of any man.

Brezhnev: I’ve met him, but I’ve never had the occasion to hear his toasts.

Kissinger: His private conversation is like his toasts. His speech is like King Faisal’s.

Brezhnev: I haven’t had the pleasure of listening to it.

Kissinger: Faisal or the Emperor?

Brezhnev: The Emperor.

Kissinger: I can tell you that King Faisal thinks that Moscow is run from Jerusalem.

\(^2\) See Document 73.
Brezhnev: I liked the photo of you two.
Kissinger: He made an exception for me.
Brezhnev: See the privileges you enjoy!

Well, let’s get down to the specifics we wanted to discuss. First, by way of summing up, from the political point of view we can state that both sides reaffirmed their determination to make every effort to improve relations between their countries in accordance with previous agreements, and to endeavor to make that progress irreversible. And, I feel that this is in line with the President’s wishes.

And, secondly, as I see it, to those ends, both sides will do all they can not only to develop their bilateral relations but also in international matters to closely coordinate and maintain a parallel line with respect to the European Security Conference and the Middle East.

And, thirdly, we agree that the agreements signed in 1972 and 1973 retain full validity. The two sides underline their determination strictly to observe them, especially so far as the question of strategic arms is concerned, without allowing any violation of those agreements through the very end of their duration. And fourthly, the two sides have agreed for the purpose of preventing the danger of thermonuclear war and in the interests of peace not only between the two countries but also the peace of the world, to prepare for signing next year a new agreement on strategic arms to run until 1985. The following basic principles should underlie that new agreement. Each side should by the termination of the duration of the new agreement—i.e., by the end of 1985—have an equal quantity of strategic arms vehicles, that number to be 2,200 (corrects himself) that number to be 2,400 strategic arms vehicles.

The Soviet Union, considering the geographic and other factors, will be entitled to carry out its program of vehicles to a limit of 2,400 strategic arms vehicles, choosing at our discretion where those vehicles are to be placed—that is, land-based, sea-based or placed on bombers.

Within the same period, the United States will fulfill its program or plans de facto of 2,200 strategic arms vehicles with the same right of choice as to how they are to be distributed, but with the understanding that by the end of 1985 the total quantity of strategic arms vehicles on each side should be equal.

The United States and the Soviet Union agree that the total quantity of MIRVs should be equal by the end of 1985 and amount to 1,320 on each side.

Each side undertakes in this period to act in accordance with previously concluded agreements and not to violate previous agreements on either side by including new strategic arms vehicles. But both sides shall be entitled in accordance with previous agreements to carry out
modernization and improvement of existing land-based ICBMs as provided for in the agreement of 1972.

(Brezhnev: Do you understand this, Sonnenfeldt?
Kissinger: We understand. We are awed by your ability to do it without paper in front of you.
Brezhnev: Well, everything is so clear, one doesn’t need any paper.
Kissinger: I’m impressed.)

Brezhnev continues: After the end of the duration of the previous accord—that is, after 1977—the United States will be entitled up to the end of 1985 to build other, more modern submarines of the Trident class to the amount of 10 such submarines. The Soviet Union in the same period of time will also be entitled to build 10 modernized submarines of the Typhoon class.

The number of missiles on these submarines on each side should be part of the total quantity of strategic arms vehicles provided for in the agreement.

The United States will build its B-1 bombers carrying missiles with a range of not more than 3,000 kilometers. The total number of missiles of these bombers will be determined by the United States, but also will be part of the total number to be included by the end of 1985. The Soviet Union will be entitled to take a decision at its own discretion as to whether to build a strategic bomber capable of carrying nuclear weapons vehicles, or instead to deploy such vehicles on land or in submarines. The proportion of these numbers may be subject to additional understandings which, for example, in substance means that if one aircraft can carry 20 missiles this does not mean that if they are not used on planes they must be replaced by the same number of land-based launchers—for example, there may be 15 or less.

The two sides have agreed that the total number of missile-armed vehicles should be equal on both sides but with due account taken of the third country vehicles of such countries as are allied with the United States by the end of 1985.

The aforesaid has been initialled by Kissinger and Gromyko to be subsequently signed by President Ford and General Secretary Brezhnev.3

(At the conclusion of Brezhnev’s presentation in Russian, the following dialogue took place—prior to Sukhodrev’s translation.)

Brezhnev: After you have heard this, we can ask for some cognac to be brought in and some hot frankfurters and have a drink. It’s worth drinking; I have forwarded such a mutually worthy agreement.

3 A copy of the Soviet proposal on SALT is in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, October 1974.
Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, without having heard the translation, my colleagues and I are extremely impressed over the way you have all the elements of such a position in your head. We would have to draw diagrams.

Brezhnev: This is easy. There are more complicated things.

Kissinger: Before I have heard the translation . . .

Brezhnev: I don’t think we should argue about one rocket here, 17 there, where the cement dries quicker—yours doesn’t seem to dry at all. However, I am sure your concrete is quite dry by now. I’m sure it won’t rain while you install new missiles.

Kissinger: Dobrynin, who reads our Defense Budget, knows we are not putting new missiles in silos.

Brezhnev: Pity poor Comrade Dobrynin having to write reports about Comrade Kissinger having a net over his house. What’s the matter; is your roof leaking?

Kissinger: Will you translate, or should I sign it in Russian?

Brezhnev: Let’s do that! (He offers Secretary Kissinger a pen.)

(Sukhodrev then translates Brezhnev’s SALT proposal, as set forth in the paragraphs above.)

Brezhnev: We can say the sides have agreed to be guided by the aforesaid principles in their further working negotiations on this issue.

Kissinger: Let me first ask a few questions.

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: First, this is a serious proposal which gives us a basis for discussion, and obviously serious work has been done which also tries to understand our point of view. There are aspects which give us difficulties. But, it gives us a framework in which to talk.

You say that by the end of 1985 the figure for the Soviet Union should be 2,400. The U.S. figure . . . and so will the U.S. figure . . . by the end of 1985, but not before then. Before then you say it will be 2,200. My question is: Can I understand this to mean that at no time between 1977 and 1985 will the Soviet force exceed 2,400?

Brezhnev: It will not exceed 2,400.

Kissinger: So, in the whole period from 1977 through 1985, the Soviet force will be 2,400? And in this whole period, the U.S. force will be no more than 2,200? That’s an important question.

Dobrynin: You have 2,200.

Kissinger: And will at no time have more than 2,200? I just want to have an understanding.

(Gromyko, Dobrynin and Korniyenko and Brezhnev consult.)

Kissinger: (Aside to Aleksandrov) Aleksandrov must have worked on this.
Aleksandrov: I was present.
Kissinger: They couldn’t have done it all this morning.
Aleksandrov: (Nods affirmatively)
Kissinger: We can’t accept all of it but we can work from it.
(The full meeting resumes after 15 minute break.)
Kissinger: What is the answer to my question?
Brezhnev: Well, do you want to ask me all your questions first, making it easier? Otherwise, you’ll start undressing me article by article.

(Brezhnev gestures as if stripping off his clothes.)
Kissinger: No, no. I’m not debating. My first question is that you say 2,400 for you and 2,200 for us. That means that at no time can we exceed these numbers after the end of 1977. My second question: You said there could be partial modernization of land-based missiles provided for under the agreement as under the interim agreement. How about sea-based missiles other than the 10 Tridents? We understand that only 10 Trident boats can be built, but what is the coverage of other boats?

Brezhnev: Well, we will be guided by the principle established in this regard—until 1977, building the submarines we are allowed and installing the same rockets we are building already. You will install new missiles on your Trident and we will install new missiles on our new boat. But, it’s hard to say now how many rockets will be installed on your Trident or the Typhoon in our case. But, speaking informally, and being frank, my personal estimate is that the number of missiles on our Typhoon will be less than the number on the Trident.

Kissinger: We know how many we will have—24.
Brezhnev: Again, informally, we will not have as many on our Typhoons. Although I said that I was mentioning this informally I don’t rule out absolutely the possibility of an equal number of missiles on the Typhoon, but, in no event will there be more.

Kissinger: It counts against the total so it does not matter.
Brezhnev: Of course. Equally, it doesn’t worry us. You can have 26 if you like. Any way, the old agreement says we have 950 missiles until 1977. It makes no difference whether they are all on one boat or spread out on 50.

Kissinger: That’s right.
Brezhnev: Obviously, you will scrap part of your old submarines and so will we. You’ll say: What the hell!

Kissinger: But then, there’s a question: If one scraps old submarines can one replace them with submarines of a comparable type?
Brezhnev: Practically, that’s out of the question.
Kissinger: Why?
Brezhnev: Because they’re not up to the mark in terms of their size. They’re morally obsolete.
Kissinger: Morally?
Brezhnev: Morally, although it is true you are installing MIRVs on your Poseidon, the agreement stipulates nothing on missiles for that boat, and I, of course, have nothing new to add to a treaty which I have already signed.
Kissinger: As I understand it, each side is free to compose a force up to 2,400.
Brezhnev: Yes.
Kissinger: But, if you can’t build new silos and if you can’t replace old submarines, you have not got a choice. I am not arguing; I am trying to understand.
Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger . . .
Kissinger: I’m not debating; I am trying to understand.
Brezhnev: To be absolutely frank, let me explain why we want our total number at 2,400 and yours at 2,200. You will realize that unless we set those levels we will have to scrap a certain number of our land-based missiles.
Kissinger: I understand that.
Brezhnev: That’s all there is to it.
Kissinger: I understand . . .
Brezhnev: So there will be factual equality even if it will appear on paper that we have more than you do. That’s the mechanism. There it is laid bare before you.
Kissinger: One other question: I don’t understand this business of missiles on bombers. Would you count any missile? Supposing there is a missile with a range of 100 kilometers, does that count too?
Brezhnev: Well, (Brezhnev confers with Gromyko and Korniyenko) well, Dr. Kissinger, in our previous agreement there was no mention of bombers. So when I mention bombers today I did not mean old types of bombers; I was referring to nuclear, missile-carrying bombers.
Kissinger: In other words the B–1?
Dobrynin: The B–1 type. Now you don’t have a B–1 type with nuclear missiles.
Kissinger: You won’t count B–52s in this program?
Brezhnev: Generally speaking that is one point we should give additional thought to. (He again confers with Gromyko, Korniyenko and Dobrynin.) So, since it is a new matter not covered in the previous agreement, we need not elaborate right now.
Who knows, maybe as we go into the program further you might want to scrap your program and we might not go ahead with our program.

Kissinger: I understand. Let me . . .

Brezhnev: Because, I guess that one of the reasons why under the previous agreement we were given a certain advantage in the number of missiles was because you had an advantage in bombers.

Kissinger: That’s correct. I understand. May I have an answer to my first question?

Brezhnev: You have no further questions?

Kissinger: I have questions for technicians, but no other questions worthy of your attention.

Brezhnev: There are no questions in your mind about MIRVs?

Kissinger: We have noticed that you have said nothing about heavy missiles.

Brezhnev: They shouldn’t be mentioned.

Kissinger: That is something we can negotiate.

Brezhnev: I don’t think we should end our discussions as to the number of 1300. On your bombers, you may want to have MIRVed missiles. You may want one heavy instead of smaller ones. Let’s consider it settled.

Kissinger: Don’t assume that the things about which I ask no questions are agreed. I have to discuss them with my associates. It just means that I understand it. As I told you, there are many positive elements in your proposal.

Brezhnev: Well then, how do we end our work?

Kissinger: First, can we get your proposal in writing?

Brezhnev: Your associates have it in your notebooks.

Kissinger: That’s an unreliable way of proceeding, but we can take it from our notebooks.

Gromyko: Well you didn’t give us any formal documents.

Kissinger: No, but we gave a written document to Dobrynin.4

Gromyko: At some stage this can be done.

Kissinger: It just makes it harder for us to study, but we can put it together from our notes.

Brezhnev: Well, Dobrynin will have this as a working paper.

Kissinger: Good enough, a working document.

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4 Reference is presumably to Document 53.
Brezhnev: He hasn’t the right to alter a single word but he will have the... One question: How many missiles do you plan to put on the B–1’s. I ask this out of curiosity, not subject to controls.

Kissinger: Yes, but you count them.

Brezhnev: Of course. What they are are airborne launchers. Come here. (Brezhnev gestures to Secretary Kissinger; they both rise and Brezhnev leads the way to a large wall map of the world. He points to the USA and the USSR.) They can enter either from your own territory or the territory of your allies. You fly to a certain point and launch your missiles. They cover a certain part of the territory and thus they are airborne launchers.

Kissinger: But that is not the purpose of the B–1, because if so it wouldn’t be built as a supersonic bomber. If we wanted to shoot a missile with a range of 5000 kilometers we would stay out here (he points into an area in the vicinity of the United States).

Brezhnev: That’s exactly what I say, they are nothing but an airborne launcher. Another thing you can fly over the Pole like we can; that’s a reply to your question.

Kissinger: I have to get to the hot dogs before Sonnenfeldt does.

Brezhnev: I have a question: Why fly at all?

Kissinger: You mean, why should we fly when we can launch a missile from the United States?

Brezhnev: Why build the B–1?

Kissinger: I have been asking our Generals that one for years.

Brezhnev: That’s why I say if you want it go ahead. That’s why I said we will be entitled to build an equal number.

The other point to further confuse matters, what about installing rockets in the Arctic and covering them with snow?

Kissinger: We have a bomber which plays the national anthem of the country it is flying over. (They both return to the table.)

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, your question is really warranted. Your question about us giving you a piece of paper with our position set out. I told you Comrade Dobrynin would have a piece of paper. I agree that at some point you will have such a paper.

Kissinger: It doesn’t have to be signed. It would enable us to study your proposal.

Brezhnev: So, so, please don’t understand me as having said there will be nothing in writing.

Kissinger: Would you answer the first question: At no time after 1977 will you have more than 2,400?

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, by the end of 1985 the total number on each side will be the same. We will be equal. Throughout that period
we will not have a number in excess of 2,400, but account will be taken of the missiles at the disposal of your allies.

Kissinger: How?

Brezhnev: In the total quantity of missiles.

Kissinger: On whose side?

Brezhnev: Both. Our allies have neither missiles or submarines capable of carrying nuclear arms.

Kissinger: The Chinese do.

Brezhnev: That changes things. If we have reached that point then let’s have a drink, a toast. Sonnenfeldt! (Sonnenfeldt downs his drink) That’s an honest man; all the others have nets over their glasses. (To Hyland): Are you the guy who puts the nets over the missiles?

Kissinger: What is the compensation for the missiles of the allies you’re thinking about?

Brezhnev: There’s no compensation; we will count them in the total number.

Kissinger: (laughs) On your side or on ours?

Brezhnev: Your side. Now, if and when Mr. Wilson comes to the Soviet Union and tells me Great Britain is going to join the Warsaw Treaty, then we will add his missiles.

Kissinger: Does that mean we are to deduct France and Great Britain from the 2,200, or is that deducted before?

Brezhnev: No, they are already incorporated in the 2,200.

Kissinger: I understand. My question is: Under those 2,200, can we have 2,200 U.S. systems or 2,200 minus the French and British?

Dobrynin: The 2,200 can all be American.

Brezhnev: We regard that as the total number of rockets aimed against us.

Kissinger: 2,200 minus the 64 British?

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, we unfortunately don’t have any ally we can either add or subtract.

Kissinger: I wonder by what theory you explain an advantage of 200, and then subtract the British force.

(A 25-minute recess)

Brezhnev: This recess has deprived us of all of our pleasure. Let me make a correction as to numbers and in doing so reply to your questions as to what 2,200 means—that is, purely U.S. or not. By way of equalization, the 2,200 will be purely American missiles after the numbers have become equal.

Kissinger: I understand: 2,400 minus the U.K. force. Mr. General Secretary, may I make a suggestion. I believe we should proceed as
follows. I will speak frankly, and I believe Dobrynin will confirm the correctness of what I say. If we put this proposal in its present form to our bureaucracy, it will lead into a process in a way most unfavorable to the Soviet Union—and not useful to the talks at Vladivostok. I propose that Ambassador Dobrynin is given a rough piece of paper when he comes to Washington and that we keep the discussion for the time being entirely in this channel. Because then we can refine many considerations. I think there are positive elements in your proposal that we can take seriously. There are some considerations that we have that you may take seriously. I would prefer to handle this in the channel until after the meeting in Vladivostok. I propose that Dobrynin and I have a number of meetings in Washington about this—not to negotiate, but to clarify points. Then you and the President can talk in Vladivostok. And, I do this in order to prevent those people who are looking for difficulties to cause trouble because I believe there are many aspects here we can take very seriously. And, I will work on it only with my closest collaborators—all who are in this room. But, we will say you haven’t given us a formal proposal; this is a sign that we are taking you seriously. Otherwise, we will have Senator Jackson. You know what will happen—he will hold hearings.

Brezhnev: I agree with you on one condition: That whatever amendments you make will not be in the nature of fundamental new proposals or new in principle. Because, I don’t want this forthcoming—this first—meeting with the President to begin with a dispute.

Kissinger: If it looks difficult, we will eliminate it from the agenda and have further discussions. There would be no surprises at Vladivostok. I can give Dobrynin our considerations and then, if it looks difficult we will just defer it. But, we are not intending to come up with anything radically new. I think we have come closer together in this visit than ever before. And, our intention will be to narrow the distance further, not to widen it. But, if on analyzing your proposal we find difficulties we will defer discussion. But, my expectation is that we will come closer together. Our considerations will be in the area in which I have asked questions; so they will be quite predictable.

Brezhnev: You did understand what I said about the B–1’s?

Kissinger: Yes, but we will have to study it because I don’t have a precise answer. I want to study the range of missiles and other matters. For example, I know we have some missiles that are only air defense, short distance. This is why I would like to analyze it before giving my reply. But I understand the principle.

Brezhnev: When I refer to the B–1’s, I was referring only to bombers carrying strategic missiles.

Kissinger: I understand, but this is what I would like to study.
Brezhnev: Of course. Then I will have one question to ask Dr. Kissinger face to face. Here, I would like to express appreciation and satisfaction that we have worked constructively and usefully.

Kissinger: I believe we have worked seriously and that we have made good progress. We will try to work by all available means to come to an agreement by the time you visit the United States in 1975, and we will do our utmost to make the meeting in Vladivostok a success—and the beginning of close cooperation between you and President Ford.

Brezhnev: Thank you. That is what I want!

Please do not forget not only the substance of this discussion on missiles but also what we discussed on the first day. I know you have not forgotten, and I won’t discuss it any more. I endeavored to set out our position as clearly as possible, and I trust you will not disagree.

Kissinger: I take it seriously. I talked with your Foreign Minister at luncheon telling him, for example, there is a chance I will visit Ankara next week, and I promised to be in touch afterward.

Brezhnev: Good. Those very small minor amendments to the overall communique\(^5\) we’ve made in the belief that it might be useful in terms of Vladivostok.

Kissinger: I agree. You understand our problem on MBFR.

Brezhnev: We can accept it.

Kissinger: And we accept. If you make many more concessions like this you’ll have Alaska by next year.

(Sukhodrev translates; Gromyko translates again and Brezhnev and Soviet side laugh.)

Kissinger: On the timing of the communique release—(asks U.S. side) what’s the time difference between Delhi and here (two and one-half hours)—can we say 9:00 p.m. in Delhi and 6:30 here? That way I can give out the communique on the plane.\(^6\)

Now, Sonnenfeldt and Hartman are going to talk to Schmidt, then we will talk to Schmidt when he comes to Washington. If we keep each other informed on how that concerns CSCE we can make some progress.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: We’ll keep you informed.

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\(^5\) For the text of the final communique on Kissinger’s visit, released in Moscow on October 27, see Department of State Bulletin, November 25, 1974, pp. 703–704.

\(^6\) Kissinger was continuing on to New Delhi on the second leg of a 3-week trip, during which he visited India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, Romania, Yugoslavia, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Israel, and Tunisia. He returned to Washington on November 9.
Dobrynin: One suggestion for the communique; one phase (relating to the Middle East): The two sides have agreed to make efforts to bring about the early convening of the Geneva Conference, without mentioning any dates.

Gromyko: Otherwise we will have lost the Conference.

Korniyenko: The sides have agreed to make efforts to obtain the early convening of the Geneva Conference.

Brezhnev: Otherwise, there would be an unfavorable reaction in the Arab world, and with respect to you and us.

Kissinger: The two sides agree to make efforts to bring about the convening of the Geneva Conference at an early, appropriate date. Can I discuss this with my Middle Eastern expert and call Korniyenko at home?

Brezhnev: Let’s try to meet a position.

Kissinger: As far as I can see this is your position, and I have given you a compromise. (Further give and take in the communiqué language.)

The two sides agree that the early convening of the Geneva Conference could play a useful role in finding such a settlement.

Gromyko: Should play.

Kissinger: O.K., should play.

Brezhnev: (The General Secretary gets up and walks around to the American side of the table.) It remains to shake hands. (He shakes the hands of the U.S. participants.)

Kissinger: And to say that we will meet in one month’s time.

Brezhnev: I attach great importance to that meeting, and I appreciate that the President wants to have a working meeting. It is a big step forward toward my visit to Washington, and I believe that the meeting will be instrumental in terms of the political situation in the United States.

Kissinger: That’s no longer so important.

Brezhnev: The important thing is that Ford and Kissinger shouldn’t be under fire—only Sonnenfeldt!

(The meeting concluded at 10:20 p.m., and Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev then had a private discussion.)

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7 See Document 78.
Letter From Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary of State Kissinger

Moscow, October 26, 1974.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I consider it necessary to draw your attention to the matter of publication in the USA of materials known to you regarding the exit from the Soviet Union of a certain category of Soviet citizens.

I must say directly that the cited materials, including the correspondence between you and Senator Jackson, create a distorted presentation of our position and of what was said by us to the American side of this question.

Clarifying the real situation, we stressed that in itself this question relates entirely to the internal competence of our state. We told you beforehand in this connection that we have acted and will act exclusively in accordance with our present legislation on this subject.

But it is precisely this that has not been mentioned. At the same time, there are attempts to give our clarifications the nature of some kind of assurances if not obligations on our part concerning the exit procedures for Soviet citizens from the USSR. Certain figures are even given concerning the supposed number of such citizens. There is talk of an expected increase in this number in comparison with previous years.

We decisively reject such an interpretation. What we said—and you know this very well, Mr. Secretary—concerned only the actual situation on this question. And if, in informing you of the actual situation, the conversation turned to figures, then it was only about the reverse observed tendency toward a reduction in the number of persons wishing to leave the USSR for permanent residence in other countries.

We consider it important that in this whole matter, in view of its importance of principle, that there should not remain any lack of clarity with regard to the position of the Soviet Union.

A. Gromyko

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Soviet Union, Oct. 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The original signed letter in Russian is attached to this English translation. In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled: “The other shoe dropped the next morning, October 27. On the way to the airport, Gromyko handed me a letter dated the previous day. It was a strange document, written not on Foreign Ministry stationery but on plain brownish paper, almost as if it were a personal letter.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 284)

2 Documents 60 and 61.

3 The translation bears this typed signature and an indication that the letter in Russian was signed.
76. **Note From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger**¹

Moscow, undated.

HAK:

Re Gromyko Letter on Jackson Exchange.²

It seems to me there are two choices:

(a) to treat this as a statement for the record, which was to have been expected after the hoopla in the US, to ignore it and to let matters take their course.

(b) to treat it as a repudiation of the idea that there will be an improvement in Soviet handling of the emigration issue, including an increase in numbers of emigrants; to so inform Jackson et al and to let the compromise lapse.

My inclination is to do the former, certainly as long as nothing similar is said publicly by the Soviets. (The letter does not ask you to make a public disavowal of the objectionable parts of the exchange with Jackson.) There is the risk, of course, that after the Bill passes nothing for the better happens and that the Soviets would reject any representations we make on this or that case, as provided for in your letter to Jackson. And the Soviets will have this letter to demonstrate that in this case there was no bad faith on their part.

But the risks of course (b) probably outweigh those of course (a) because of the political impact and associated effects. Moreover, the pressures will in fact be on the Russians to do better once the Bill passes and assuming things like SALT move forward.

I do not believe that any bargaining or nitpicking with Gromyko about just what the Soviets did or did not tell you makes any sense.

So, I think you should file this letter and see what happens.

Sonnenfeldt³

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, Sept–Dec 1974. No classification marking. In an attached note, David Gompert, Kissinger’s Special Assistant, returned the note to Sonnenfeldt for his files.

² Document 75.

³ Printed from a copy with this typed signature.
77. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, October 27, 1974.

Secretary Kissinger asked me to pass you the following report on his Saturday afternoon meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.

“I had seven and a half hours with Brezhnev starting at 4:30 p.m. The first two and a half hours were in his office, with only Gromyko on his side and Sonnenfeldt with me. The session was entirely devoted to recapitulation of the proposition Brezhnev made to President Nixon privately at the last summit, which is too sensitive for cable traffic. Brezhnev demonstrated his rather bizarre sense of occasion by spending virtually the entire time he was talking also fidgeting with a model artillery piece, training it now at me, now at Sonnenfeldt. He eventually succeeded in loading it with a dummy shell, but several tugs at the lanyard produced no result until about an hour and a half into the conversation, when a loud bang sounded.

“A three and a half hour meeting with the larger group in the conference room resulted in a major Soviet SALT proposal evidently put together in the Politburo this morning. Brezhnev recited it from memory, a rather remarkable intellectual feat which came as quite a surprise after his undisciplined performances earlier. The essence of the proposal involves equal aggregates by 1985 at 2400, but a Soviet advantage of 2400 to 2200 throughout the process. The final aggregate would also involve a deduction for the U.S. equal to the British force. Other features are equal MIRVs as in our paper, but no prohibition on heavy MIRVs. The most complex and difficult aspect relates to bomber armaments, for which the Soviets would demand some sort of compensation. I will give you more details on my return when I also expect to have from Dobrynin a more precise rendition.

“This proposal is a major step forward toward a SALT agreement in 1975, and perhaps a significant announcement at Vladivostok. However, in its present form it would be shredded by DOD, leaked to the press and Jackson, and destroyed before we can shape it. I am reason-

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (3). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. According to a handwritten note, the memorandum was transmitted at 1607Z on October 27 to the President, who saw it.

2 See Documents 73 and 74.

3 See Document 74 and footnote 3 thereto.

4 Reference is presumably to Document 53.
ably confident that we will be able to distill a sensible proposal out of it that DOD will buy, but only after I return. I therefore propose to have Scowcroft tell Schlesinger that the Soviets responded in a conciliatory fashion to considerations you gave him, but they will not give us a formal reply for several weeks.

“In a further hour and a half, Brezhnev tried to get me to accept the Soviet SALT position on the spot; I simply told him we would examine the Soviet position, viewing it as a serious response to our ideas, and that I would have some considerations to provide before Vladivostok.

“My assessment is that the Soviets did make an effort to bring their position closer to ours and that we may have some possibility of developing agreed principles on aggregates, MIRVs, and possibly a few other issues during your meeting with Brezhnev. For now, I think it is essential that elements of the Soviet position be kept totally outside interagency process until I have had an opportunity to analyze it further and discuss the next steps with you.

“I believe on the whole that my Moscow visit has had more positive results than I thought likely, in that the Soviets were willing to respond substantively on SALT. Brezhnev himself was explicit in saying that he wanted to avoid disputes with you in his first meeting, suggesting that he remains interested in maintaining forward movement in our relations. But it remains to be seen whether sufficient flexibility can be mustered on both sides to bring SALT positions into real negotiating range.”

78. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, October 27, 1974.

Following the session with General Secretary Brezhnev on Saturday,\(^2\) Foreign Minister Gromyko spoke privately with Secretary Kissinger regarding the Jackson amendment to the trade bill. Henry’s re-

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, October 27, 1974—Kissinger/Brezhnev Talks in Moscow (3). Secret. Sent for information. According to a handwritten note, the memorandum was transmitted at 1608Z on October 27 to the President, who saw it.

\(^2\) October 26. See Document 74.
port of that conversation follows and the text of a letter which Gromyko handed him at the same time is at Tab A.3

“Last night after our meeting, Brezhnev and Gromyko took me aside to tell me privately of their total outrage at Jackson’s behavior. It has put them in an impossible situation, since they are being publicly described as having yielded to U.S. pressure tactics on a domestic matter covered by their domestic laws. They find this intolerable. In addition, they said it is causing them problems in their relations with the Arabs, which they consider extremely important.

“All of this shows that what I predicted and warned Jackson about for months has now happened.

“Gromyko has written me a letter, which is attached, laying out their perception of the situation. One possible reading of the letter is that it does not repudiate our understanding. It simply asserts that it is not new but a continuation of existing practice. On that basis, we could see how they actually operate. But a second interpretation could be that the letter might be used to show that now no change in Soviet emigration policies will take place.

“I believe there is not an insubstantial danger that the Soviets will publish Gromyko’s letter or let it become known. However, they have agreed not to publicize it before I return—first, because of the potentially harmful impact it might have on Javits’ campaign, and second, because in any case the trade bill is not up for consideration until November.

“However, I do believe we should plan to get the three Senators in after my trip to discuss with them how we now proceed in light of the Soviet letter. We have two choices: (1) To stick by our exchange of letters and see how it works in practice; or, (2) To cancel the whole effort. I favor the first course because basically the Soviet emigration policies will be determined not by the letters, but by their desire to protect their relationship with you. The worst that could happen is that the Soviets will get MFN for 18 months for nothing. I think they will perform quite well for fear of strengthening Jackson.”

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3 Printed as Document 75.
Washington, October 28, 1974, 1505Z.

Tohak 48/WH42948. 1. The President asked me this morning to thank you for your reports of your discussions in Moscow.² He said that he summed up the overall import of your reports to be very cautiously optimistic. He was encouraged mostly, he said, that Brezhnev had not rejected our proposal out of hand.³ At least we had now some concrete positions on which the subsequent discussions could focus. He was also very interested in your descriptions of Brezhnev and his personality. Obviously with the view toward his own meeting, he asked whether Brezhnev’s sharp changes of mood were typical or unique to this encounter and also whether Brezhnev was given typically to sessions devoted largely to critical harangue. I told him that it was fairly standard procedure for him to “rake you over the coals” in at least one session and that, indeed, his moods varied sharply from one session to the next. The President seems in a very good mood and said he got a good rest over the weekend at Camp David. He asked that I tell you how pleased he was with the way you had conducted the Moscow discussions and he hoped that you would not let yourself get too exhausted with the arduous “whistle-stop” days ahead of you.

[Omitted here is a brief paragraph unrelated to U.S.-Soviet relations.]

Warm regards.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 3, Kissinger Trip File, 10/20–11/9/74, Europe, South Asia & Middle East, TOHAK (3). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only; Immediate.

² In message Hakto 22 to Scowcroft, October 25, Bremer reported: “Secretary has asked if there has been any reaction from the President to his reports.” (Ibid., HAKTO (1)) For Kissinger’s reports on his trip to Moscow, see Documents 65, 68, 70, 72, 77, and 78.

³ The SALT proposal in Document 53.
80. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Islamabad

Washington, October 31, 1974, 2310Z.

Tohak 96/WH 43021. 1. WHCA has just informed me that the Cairo hotline is now in operation.

2. Don Kendall called to tell me of a telephone conversation he had had with the President, reporting on his recent meeting with Brezhnev. He told the President Brezhnev had told him he had heard conflicting rumors about the situation in the U.S. and, more specifically, about the President and you, and he was wondering what the situation was and what might happen. Kendall said that he told Brezhnev that the President had assured him that U.S. policy would continue and that you would continue to play the key role you had in the past. Kendall said that Brezhnev had also mentioned that he had heard talk about splitting your two jobs, such talk emanating from people close to the President like Laird. At that point, Kendall said, the President interrupted him and said that he wanted Kendall to know and to tell Brezhnev when he next saw him that he had total confidence in you and that he felt that you had confidence in him, in the sense of giving him the freedom to run things. The President said that you would continue to have his total support. About the Laird aspect, the President said that when the transition team made its report to him, one member had mentioned the possibility of splitting the jobs. The President said he had responded that that would not happen and he wanted no further discussion of it. He made it clear, he told Kendall, that that is the way it was and would remain. The President added that so far as Mel Laird was concerned, he does go around talking a lot, but he is not as close to the President as he thinks. He talks too much and “goes around telling people about his influence with me (the President)—and that he does not have.” Kendall went on to say that Brezhnev had made clear the deep reliance they placed on you as the symbol of U.S. policy and of relationships with the Soviet Union. Kendall said he conveyed all this to the President and the overall impression he had was very very reassuring with respect to you—both on the Moscow end and on the White House end. Thought you would like to know.


2 No other record of Kendall’s telephone conversation with Ford has been found.

3 See footnote 4, Document 63.
[Omitted here are points on the President's schedule and proposals to revise the Geneva Protocol.]

Warm regards.

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81. **Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford**

Moscow, November 5, 1974.

Dear Mr. President:

It is with great attention that I have studied your letter of October 24 and I consider it constructive. I have in mind, first of all, the central idea of your letter which is entirely consonant with our thoughts and aspirations regarding the necessity that the process of positive development of the relations between our countries becomes permanent and irreversible. We appreciate the fact that you so definitely state your intention to continue the improvement of Soviet-American relations.

I would like to tell you once again, Mr. President, that on this road you will meet from our side complete reciprocity and firm determination for cooperation and most close interaction. Our agreement with you concerning the further course of the relations between the Soviet Union and the United States inspires confidence in the success of that really historic endeavor which was jointly started by the leadership of our countries in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples, in the interests of peace and well-being of all peoples of the world.

I received your letter during my talks with Secretary of State H. Kissinger who came to Moscow. Naturally, we took notice of what was said in the letter—that Mr. Kissinger enjoyed your full confidence and was authorized to speak on your behalf.

Mr. Kissinger undoubtedly has already informed you about the contents and the results of the talks. On my part I would like to express to you the following considerations in this regard.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, Nov–Dec 1974. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the letter was “Delivered by Amb. Dobrynin to Gen. Scowcroft at 10:45 a.m., Wed., 11/6/74 (Wired to HAK 11/6/74).” Kissinger was in the Middle East on November 6, with stops in Cairo, Riyadh, and Amman.

2 See Document 67.
I believe that those talks were fruitful and useful from the point of view both of searching for a solution of the concrete questions in essence and of the importance of continuity of the active political dialogue which has been established between us. We consider the talks as an important preparatory stage for our forthcoming working meeting.

We regard as important the agreement by both sides, confirmed in the talks, that on the whole the relations between our countries continue to shape up in accordance with the course taken with the aim of their improvement. At the same time we believed it necessary to draw attention to a number of aspects of a negative nature as well, which, by the way, are also mentioned in your letter. In that case we proceeded from the assumption that a timely exposure and removal of all kinds of difficulties and misunderstandings are equally in the interests of both countries and prevent unwanted complications in our relations. I hope that you too adhere to the similar opinion.

You, Mr. President, know that the questions related to further limitation of the strategic offensive arms were central in our talks with Mr. Kissinger. We have thoroughly gone over those questions with due regard to those considerations which were recently forwarded by the American side. In the course of the talks we have expounded both a general concept of a long-range agreement and its possible concrete substance by basic components. In our proposals we proceed from the assumption that in this matter there cannot be a simplified approach, that the agreement should be based upon a realistic evaluation of the security interests of the sides both at present and in the perspective for the years to come.

I hope that you will duly appreciate the position set forth by us in the talks with the Secretary of State on the questions of limiting strategic arms. We are ready to continue to discuss these questions through the confidential channel so that later to reach final understanding on major provisions of a new agreement at our meeting at the end of November.

I must say that in general we attach a great significance to this meeting having in mind that it should provide a new impulse to the development of Soviet-American relations.

Sincerely yours,

L. Brezhnev

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
82. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Letter from Brezhnev

General Secretary Brezhnev has sent you the November 5 message at Tab A responding to your message of October 24 (copy at Tab B). Your message was sent at the time of Secretary Kissinger’s visit to Moscow, and the General Secretary expresses his satisfaction with those talks—describing them as useful, fruitful and an important preparatory stage for his meeting with you later this month.

In his message, the General Secretary reaffirms the determination of the Soviet Union to work with the United States in “that really historic endeavor” of improving US-USSR relations. He expresses appreciation for the fact that you have so definitely stated that this is your intention. The General Secretary notes that the principal focus of his talks with Secretary Kissinger was on SALT—specifically, the further limitation of strategic offensive arms. He says that during these talks the Soviet side proposed a concept for a long-range agreement together with the components for such an agreement. He expresses the hope that you will give due consideration to these proposals, and he adds that he is willing to continue exploration of the SALT negotiations in this channel in the hope that it will be possible to reach an understanding on the major provisions of a new agreement at Vladivostok.

The General Secretary also tells you that he took the occasion of his talks with Secretary Kissinger to discuss current negative aspects of US-USSR relations, with the hope of removing difficulties and misunderstandings. In closing, the General Secretary says that he and his colleagues attach great significance to his meeting with you in the belief that it will provide a new driving force to Soviet-American relations.

No reply is required to the General Secretary’s message as it is in response to your earlier message.

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2 Printed as Document 81.
3 See Document 67.
The Vladivostok Summit, November 1974

83. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, November 9, 1974.

The Chinese Overture to Moscow

Peking’s offer to Moscow of a non-aggression treaty coupled with military disengagement from “disputed” border areas may be an important shift in the Sino-Soviet conflict. Unfortunately it is difficult to judge what it really means.

It is a shrewd maneuver, on the eve of a Vladivostok meeting and your trip, to create an impression of possible lessening of Sino-Soviet tensions:

(a) it strengthens the Chinese tactical position vis-à-vis the US, since it was their initiative;
(b) it is consistent with Chinese propaganda trends over the past year downgrading the threat from the USSR;
(c) it also might have the effect of complicating Brezhnev’s hand in that he has another incentive for caution in how far he goes in dealing with us.

The major unknown is whether, in addition to being sharp tactics, this move also reflects a deeper shift in Chinese policy.

—The fact that it coincides with Chou En Lai’s withdrawal from active leadership could mean that it is the harbinger of a more far-reaching shift in Chinese policy. But this is very speculative.

—The fact that it occurs under the nominal tutelage of Teng Hsiao-ping is the more remarkable because he continues in private to be quite anti-Soviet.

—Nor is it plausible that a radical Shanghai group would seriously tilt toward Moscow in Mao’s lifetime.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 5, Nodis Memcons, 1974, Folder 6. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; the attached paper (see footnote 4 below) was drafted by Galen W. Fox in INR/REA and Igor N. Belousovitch in INR/RES.

2 A National Intelligence Bulletin provided an initial assessment of this development in Sino-Soviet relations on November 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 77D112, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Box 375, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–1977, China Sensitive Chron: Oct. 16–Dec. 31, 1974)
Moreover, it seems likely that the Chinese want to counter Soviet efforts to arrange an international Communist conference to excommunicate the Chinese. Thus Peking counters with an ostensibly reasonable public offer making the Soviet case weaker by neutralizing Soviet revelation that the Chinese totally ignored Moscow’s proposal for a non-aggression pact in 1971 and 1973. (The Soviets had reiterated their non-aggression proposal in their October 1 national day message; thus the Chinese are answering in kind.)

A further argument that the Chinese move is tactical rather than strategic is the parallel with a similar Soviet move last year. You will recall that Brezhnev engaged in a similar tactical ploy by offering the Chinese a non use of force agreement shortly before coming to the US in 1973, at the very time he was completing negotiation with you on the prevention of nuclear war agreement.

The net effect, in any case, is that the Chinese seem to be following the logic of the gradual change in their public position toward the US and USSR; they have claimed that the main Soviet threat is in Europe, partly to persuade us that Soviet pressures do not force Peking’s exclusive reliance on the US; now they seem to be saying that the Soviet threat to China is, in fact, not so great or tensions so high as to preclude some normalization of relations with Moscow. This can only make us worry and the timing, just before the trip to the Far East, was probably compelling.

Nevertheless, agreement on the terms of any Soviet-Chinese accord has caused a total breakdown in the border talks in the past, and this new offer still includes the proposal for Soviet disengagement from disputed areas: Moscow cannot accept this without acknowledging the principle that the areas are in fact “disputed”, and also not without reducing the leverage derived from its large military force posed on the border.

It may be that the Chinese perceive the international situation as in such a state of flux that it could work against their interests.

—They have hoped that the US, Europe, NATO, etc. would continue to be a strong adversary for Moscow relieving pressure on Peking.

—They could now see that the West is, in fact, not posing much of a problem for Moscow, that economic problems are splitting the Western coalition, weakening cohesion, etc., that the US is not a counterweight to Soviet pressures.

—in July, before President Nixon’s resignation, a Chinese foreign policy analysis concluded: “In the current international situation US power is showing signs of weakening and the Americans are reluctantly having to curtail their former global reach... China desires a
strong, united West Europe both as a bulwark against Soviet expansion and as a future rival, and even a possible substitute for the US.”

In this case, the Chinese might reason that Brezhnev, having neutralized this Western “bulwark”, will turn back to the Chinese problem, and resume the aggressive course of 1968–69, in a vastly stronger military position.

Thus, Peking might see Vladivostok in this light, and therefore they are beginning a highly complicated and subtle maneuver to tie Brezhnev’s hand, and simultaneously force the US to draw closer to China.

In any case, whether tactical or strategic, the Chinese maneuver carries the message for us that the Sino-Soviet conflict is not a permanent state of affairs. Of course, decades of hostility, of which border problems may not be the most important cause, will not be resolved in the near term. And the Chinese analysis quoted above concludes that “of the two superpowers it is evident that the US poses the lesser threat to China.”

But the present state of Sino-Soviet tensions cannot be taken for granted—certainly not in the fluid period of post-Mao–Chou China, or in an international economic situation that causes most of the main actors to reexamine their interests and alignments.

Attached is a longer INR analysis.

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3 Not further identified.
4 Dated November 8; attached but not printed.
84. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Armitage) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, November 9, 1974.

Impact on Vladivostok Talks of New Chinese Initiative

The background on the Chinese initiative has been spelled out in the INR paper on the subject. EUR agrees that one likely effect will be to add a further measure of caution to Soviet positions vis-à-vis the US. But we regard the Chinese move as something of an opportunity for Moscow rather than a dilemma. A Soviet gesture toward Peking need not conflict with their continuing to seek détente with the US; on the contrary, it could help by putting Moscow back into the triangular play, thus improving the Soviet bargaining position vis-à-vis the US. We therefore would expect the Soviets at Vladivostok to take some advantage of the Chinese move in order to shift to us a greater share of the burden of maintaining momentum in the détente relationship.

The mere fact of a positive response, however hedged, to Peking would in atmospheric terms put Moscow back into the play. Such a response would not need to deal with the troop withdrawal question but could simply welcome Chinese willingness to talk about a nonaggression treaty and propose talks on this and related questions without preconditions.

While we would expect that talks would quickly get hung up on the troop withdrawal question—possibly even before an agreement to talk was reached—the fact that talks were possibly in the offing would itself serve both Soviet and Chinese interests vis-à-vis the US.

A major change in the Sino-Soviet relationship could have an obvious bearing on Moscow’s third-country argument in SALT, but the present Chinese initiative does not warrant a judgment that such a change is in the offing. Thus we see no significant impact on SALT discussions at Vladivostok.

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2 See Document 83.
85. Memorandum of Conversation

Camp David, November 10, 1974.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Vladivostok Summit with Brezhnev

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on foreign policy and domestic politics.]

[Kissinger:] The Vladivostok meeting is very important. You can’t be too nice to him—be tough and confident.

The liberals will scream foul when you attack; but when you don’t, you won’t get any kudos.

President: I think we must bite the bullet and let the chips fall where they may. If we are right, we will win some and lose some.

If the Congress doesn’t keep up with us . . . They have to be a partner now, and if they don’t measure up . . .

Kissinger: We have to have a team, not a bunch of prima donnas.

President: I agree. Where do we start?

Kissinger: Let me start with mood. Brezhnev is very upset by some of the things which have happened. He thinks we are trying to make them look weak. I think we must show the three Senators2 the Gromyko letter [warning of a repudiation of MFN].3 We had this for a year—except for Brezhnev’s personal assurance to you. This looks like a humiliation to them. And for what? They get $300 million in credits in 2 years, when Schmidt gave them $360 million at one crack. And even if they do it, they get MFN for only 18 months. They think we let them down on the corn deal because Butz led them on.

On the other hand, they are eager to have a good relationship with you. But they can’t figure us out—Rockefeller, my position, etc. They must ask themselves how many chips they can put in their pot.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 7. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original.
2 Jackson, Javits, and Ribicoff.
3 Document 75.
In ‘72, I could kick them around because we were strong—I could
give or withhold a billion in credits and clobber North Vietnam. Now
what can we do?
I asked to see Brezhnev alone Friday, and I said to him this will be
the third meeting in Moscow this year. If it is a failure, Ford is not tied
to détente—I am. I can go home and say I tried and failed and my
course doesn’t work. He called a Politburo meeting the next day.

But we know it’s a bluff.

While we have détente, the Democrats can’t get together between
the Jacksons and the Kennedys. If we fail, we will be back like ’69 where
the Democrats will push for unilateral concessions and they will
follow. [He described the Soviet SALT proposal].

President: What about throw weight?
Kissinger: There are no limits on throw weight. But that is a fraud
because we can build a bigger missile legally, under the agreement, and
put them in the same silos.

Brezhnev asked for 180 SS–18’s to be MIRVed.

I think we could manage the proposal by getting a disparity in our
favor in MIRVed missiles while they have a disparity in their favor in
overall numbers, but by the date of 1 January 1984.

We would give them 180 SS–18’s MIRVed and they won’t count
our missiles or bombers.

[He argued the futility of the B–1.]
I think you can’t let the Defense Budget be prepared on the basis of
interservice bargaining.

To go the Schlesinger route on SALT is I think impossible. You
would have to put SALT on ice for two or three years and go on a build-
ing program. I think if you are tough at Vladivostok and we give them
my counterproposal, I think we can get a deal. It won’t be a glorious
deal. The danger is we won’t be able to get from 2200 to 2400. But we
would have that problem anyway.

The Soviets are already committed to their program. We aren’t.

President: Can I see the counterproposal?
Kissinger: By Tuesday.

President: This would be for signing in June 1975?
Kissinger: Yes. You will get flak from the right and the left. The
right will say they can build up their MIRVs; the left will say that it is no

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4 For a record of Kissinger’s private meeting with Brezhnev and Gromyko on Oc-
tober 25, see Document 78.
5 See Document 74.
6 November 12.
arms control agreement at all because it requires us to keep building. But you can say that they can otherwise MIRV everything, and this will put a cap on it.

President: I want to be fully briefed and up to speed on everything.

Kissinger: Yes. I need to tell you about Brezhnev also. At Vladivostok we could announce that we have agreed to reach an agreement by June based on equal aggregates and equal MIRVs. The JCS may just want equal aggregates, but then they could MIRV everything.

As a practical matter, the Soviet Union couldn’t MIRV more than about 8–900 on ICBM.

It will be a bitch of a negotiation, because he hasn’t focused on the fact that if any missile is tested as MIRV’d, all of them must be counted as MIRVed.

My impression is they want the SS–18 against China. I think we should ask for 12 Tridents so as to keep the production lines open.

For us to get to 2400 and keep within 1300 on MIRV’s is tough, because all our systems are MIRVed. But you can make an announcement. I would leave the heavies out of it for now.

Schlesinger will complain, but you can say that his way would take a heavy program for two to three years and we can’t get the money for it. Schlesinger asked today for my support to keep a $95 billion budget for ’76.

We must project an image of brutal toughness. Your misfortune is that you are paying the price for Watergate.

President: We have to plan what is the vehicle to get the Turkish aid thing repealed. Better do this next week.

Kissinger: Brezhnev has made us a proposal of, in effect, an alliance. If either one of us were attacked by nuclear weapons, or one of our allies, the other would come to our aid. It is really directed against China.

President: What if Israel launched a nuclear attack on Syria?

Kissinger: Technically, neither are allies of ours. But it would drive all of them to become allies to get the protection. It is rather clever. Obviously it is unacceptable, but you may not want to kill it at Vladivostok.

[Omitted here is a wide-ranging discussion of Europe, the Middle East, energy policy, Turkey, Latin America, and domestic politics.]

Kissinger: Your meeting with Brezhnev is important. You must be tough and decisive.

President: I would like a summary of where we stand on the main issues.
86. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Memorandum for the President for Vladivostok

Attached is the President’s Briefing Book for Vladivostok which contains a memorandum to him for your signature, as well as comprehensive background material on all the major subjects likely to come up at the talks. This briefing material is fully consistent with our conversations this week. We will also be carrying four other more detailed briefing books on SALT, other arms control problems, multilateral and bilateral issues, with us to Vladivostok.

Recommendation

That you initial the Memorandum for the President for forwarding to the White House.2

Attachment

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting in Vladivostok4

There are three important aspects to this meeting:

2 Kissinger did not indicate his decision on the memorandum.
3 Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The original is an uninitialed copy. Sonnenfeldt and Hyland forwarded a first draft of this memorandum to Kissinger on November 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, Nov–Dec 1974) A revised draft, with substantial revisions to the section on SALT, is ibid., Box 6, SALT, Nov–Dec 1974. Sonnenfeldt also forwarded a copy of the final version to Scowcroft on November 14. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of President Ford, 1974–1977, Box 2, Presidential Trips File, November 1974—Japan, Korea & USSR, Briefing Book—Vladivostok (1))
4 A paper describing the locale of Vladivostok is at Tab A. [Footnote in the original. None of the tabs is attached.]
1. It is an opportunity for a personal encounter with Brezhnev, who sets considerable store by face-to-face exchanges.
   —He is a highly visceral, instinctive politician, whose judgments are influenced by personal chemistry.
   —Moreover, he values the intimacy of a personal dialogue with world leaders, and relishes the fact that he is in “regular” contact with the President of the US.
   —Finally, he has a tendency to judge policies in light of his assessment of leading personalities.

2. There is the symbolic or atmospheric aspect that surrounds any meeting between leaders of the two strongest world powers.
   —The fact of the meeting, therefore, is in itself an important indicator of policy.
   —Since Brezhnev sought this encounter, much of the burden for its success is on him.
   —To a great extent an early meeting with you commits him personally to continuity in building good relations.
   —This is of particular importance at present, since my discussions in Moscow indicate there is a residue of distrust and apprehension in the Soviet leadership, as well as some temptation to wait for a shift to more favorable balance of politico-economic forces in the international arena.

3. There is the real substance of this meeting, which revolves mainly around SALT, but which also will embrace the general character of Soviet-American relations and their future direction.
   —On this point the evidence is not conclusive on Brezhnev’s willingness to make concessions and commitments that will lead to a SALT agreement and, therefore, to real progress.
   —In my talks in Moscow, and in his recent letter to you, Brezhnev has signalled a readiness to do business on the key elements of a new SALT agreement.
   —In my view, he seems to be operating within a fairly narrow technical and strategic framework; he may not have much political freedom for bargaining.
   —On balance, he cannot afford to leave Vladivostok with a public impression of stalemate or failure, but he cannot pay too high a price in SALT and he may not feel under pressure to do so, especially if he is convinced that we are in a weakened political position and that the Western coalition is falling into economic disarray and impotence.

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5 Document 81.
Your Objectives

On the personal level, your main aims are:

(a) to demonstrate that you are completely in charge and that you alone will set American foreign policy;
(b) that Brezhnev must deal with you and your policies, regardless of what he may hear or read about the Congress, domestic critics, or future political swings in the US; and
(c) that you are prepared to build a constructive relationship and meet him half way.

Brezhnev’s style is to soften up an adversary by employing a gamut of tactics ranging from indignation and pique to jokes and maudlin sentimentality. Background papers on Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders you may encounter are attached at Tab B.6

—Basically, Brezhnev is not very competent, is inclined to impatience with details, and is often poorly prepared (not to say misinformed). He covers these traits by various histrionics and diversions, though at bottom he is a tough, ruthless opponent, not given to paying off for mere good will.

—He will be wary of you because he does not know you, and also because he has a healthy, instinctive respect for the power of the US and of your office.

Your best approach is to lay out frankly and soberly our position and let him absorb it:

—He may want to get you alone for an intimate chat, in which he will sincerely pledge himself to good relations; but there will be overtones of condominium; in effect, he will be testing to see whether you show any interest in such a relationship—which, in practice, is directed against China.

—While he knows full well that this is a fruitless effort, you will want to be careful not to reject his approach too brusquely.

—There is a certain leverage in letting him believe that we do not rule out some of his more Utopian ideas about the US and Soviet Union acting jointly on all major issues.

Your second objective is to bring Brezhnev to negotiate an agreement in principle on SALT.

—Your main theme is that SALT has now become a precondition for progress in Soviet-American relations.

—You should argue that we are not arbitrarily setting such a precondition, but that neither the American people nor the Congress will understand a détente that coexists with massive arms buildups.

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6 For the background paper on Brezhnev, see Document 87.
—You must make new and major budgetary decisions on our strategic forces and what happens in SALT will be critical to such decisions.

—You might say we do not aim to be stronger than the USSR but that in no circumstances will we be weaker—either in fact or in appearance.

*Your final objective* is to hold out the prospect of significant improvement in relations, particularly in the economic sphere, assuming that the Jackson affair remains resolved.

—He may charge bad faith and complain about interference in internal affairs, and discrimination in such matters as grain deals.

—Your position is that in MFN and Ex-Im credits you have gained 18 months in which constructive developments can take place.

—You will want to make the point that you are perfectly willing to take on critics on the issue of détente, but you can only do so if Soviet-American relations are seen to be in the mutual interest, with benefits to both sides, and are flourishing in arms control negotiations, in bilateral relations and are not contradicted by inflammatory international positions, especially in the Middle East.

—You are prepared to proceed on this basis, and you start from the premise that Brezhnev agrees.

*The Major Issues*

There is no set agenda, but the talks may proceed along the following lines:

1. a general exchange, with Brezhnev making a formal opening statement followed by your reply;
2. probably a discussion of international issues—European Security and the Middle East, and a discussion of economic relations;
3. a serious exchange on SALT.

There will be a communique that, for this particular meeting, should be more general than previous summits unless there is agreement on SALT.

*A. The Status of Soviet-American Relations*

Your opening statement should feature the following themes (I will prepare a draft):7

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7 Kissinger forwarded a draft of the President’s opening statement in a memorandum to Ford on November 20. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of President Ford, 1974–1977, Box 4, Presidential Trips File, November 1974—Japan, Korea & USSR, General (24))
(a) the value of previous agreements and meetings, and our intention of proceeding from this basis in further development of our relations;
(b) the continuity of American foreign policy;
(c) the importance of agreed principles, in particular the necessity to act with restraint in international affairs and to work for the reduction of the dangers of war—as provided for in the 1973 agreement (this will be pointed toward the Middle East);
(d) the critical impact of progress in arms control: in SALT, in the threshold test ban negotiations and in non-proliferation.

You will want to impress on Brezhnev that 1975 is a critical year:
—Soviet-American relations, détente, SALT may be campaign issues in 1976.
—You are prepared to take the offensive next year and you are confident that the American people will support a policy of peaceful and constructive relations with the USSR.
—But it will be fundamental to your efforts that you demonstrate that progress is being made in every aspect: this means a new SALT agreement, responsible behavior in international issues, mutually beneficial economic relations developing in an orderly way.

In this light Brezhnev’s visit next year will be an historic milestone and you are prepared to work to make it a decisive event in our relations.

Our new Congress may be anti-Defense; but it may also be anti-Administration and hence anti-détente if détente is not seen to produce positive results. If the latter happens, the 1976 campaign may get turned into a debate about new military programs and “standing up” to the Russians.

B. SALT (A separate analysis is at Tab C)

To recapitulate our discussions, the status of the major issues is:

1. On overall aggregates:
   —We proposed an overall limit of 2200 by 1983 to be reached through an intermediate step of 2350 in 1982.
   —Brezhnev proposed a limit of 2400 to be reached by 1985, but in the interim limits of 2400 for the USSR and 2200 for the US, arguing that this differential was because of Allied SLBMs.

   In the near term, the limit of 2200 has virtually no effect on our weapons programs: it permits 1000 MM, all of the Poseidon force (496) and all of the Trident (240) and B–1 (240), plus the retention of some B–52 and older Polaris submarines.
   —The main issue is the appearance of inequality for several years, and acknowledging the principle of counting Allied forces.
2. On MIRVs:

—We proposed a limit of 1320 for both sides linked to equal overall numbers; this incorporates our plans for the Trident, Poseidon and Minuteman.

—Brezhnev accepted this.

These limits are below Soviet capabilities, and will force them to choose between about 800–900 land-based MIRV plus 400–500 sea-based or putting them all on land-based ICBMs and foregoing SLBMs MIRV.

—In either case, the limits would be significant restraints compared with maximum capability.

—The main problem in the Soviet approach would be the inconsistency between equal MIRV limits and unequal total numbers in the period 1977–1984.

3. Other SALT Issues

Brezhnev also proposed that we limit the number of Trident SLBMs giving both sides the same rights, i.e., if we built 240 SLBMs on 10 submarines the USSR could do the same.

—in principle this is an acceptable limit on the modernization of the Soviet SLBM program. We will want to set the limit at about 288 (12 boats) to permit us to reach the 2400 aggregate in 1984/1985.

Brezhnev rejected a ban on heavy MIRV ICBMs in exchange for a ban on missiles of more than 3000 km on modern bombers.

—This may not be a final position; he may be prepared to bargain over a sublimit on the number of new heavy ICBMs (SS–18) equipped with MIRVs, and we may want to settle for a numerical limit on B–1s and heavy missiles, without regard to MIRVs or bomber armaments.

Counterproposal

A. Our best counter is to propose that equal numbers be reached earlier, beginning in 1984, which would permit us to reach the 2400 level by extending Trident and B–1 production. This would also have the advantage of having active programs in the last years before expiration.

B. In addition, we could propose a MIRV differential, say 1320 to 1120, during the period through 1984 when overall numbers would be unequal.

—Thus our advantage in warheads would more than offset an advantage in unMIRVed systems.

C. To limit Soviet programs, we can also define sub-limits on new systems: 288 SLBMs on Trident, 250 new bombers, and 180 heavy missiles.
The outcome of SALT in Vladivostok should be a public agreement signed by you and Brezhnev that settles (a) the question of ceilings and aggregates for the new agreement; (b) the MIRV levels; and, if possible, sets sublimits on new submarine launched missiles on Trident-type boats, new bombers, and new heavy ICBMs.

The negotiation would resume in Geneva on this basis after the first of the year, with the aim of working out a full agreement in 1975, possibly by the time of Brezhnev’s visit.

C. International Issues

1. The Middle East

Brezhnev will no doubt take the offensive; he is rather cocky about having predicted in San Clemente in 1973 that there would be a war—though he disclaims any advance warning. His solution is simply to reconvene the Geneva Conference—in which he would expect to become the champion of the Arab cause including the PLO. He would expect a “joint” Soviet-American position.

At the end of the October War the USSR joined the US in sponsoring UN Security Council Resolution 338, which called for both a cease-fire and negotiation of a peace settlement. This was the first time that either the Soviets or the Security Council had explicitly endorsed the idea of an Arab-Israeli negotiation. It was agreed at that time that the US and USSR would jointly sponsor a conference at Geneva as the framework for the peace negotiation.

The Soviet purpose in agreeing to this arrangement was to involve itself in the evolution of whatever political system evolved in the Middle East as a result of the October War. Despite the initial success of Arab surprise attack, the Israeli counter-offensive mounted with the support of a massive US airlift showed that the clients of the USSR were getting the worst of it. By their involvement in the peacemaking, the Soviets sought to stay in the competition for position in the Middle East.

On our side, it was judged that it would be better to have the USSR nominally involved in the process than it would be to have the Soviets left outside to join forces with the radical Arabs to undercut whatever peace efforts might be possible.

At the opening session of the Geneva Conference last December, it was decided that the first effort of the conferees would be to try to negotiate military disengagement agreements. This effort was launched under the aegis of a Military Working Group set up under the umbrella of the Geneva Conference. In January, however, because of the desire of

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8 Resolution 338, adopted by the UN Security Council on October 22, 1973, called for a cease-fire in fighting between Egypt and Israel and for negotiations for a political settlement in the Middle East in accordance with Resolution 242 of November 22, 1967.
President Sadat for a quick agreement, it proved possible for US shuttle diplomacy to produce the Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement, and again in May the same procedures produced the Israeli-Syrian agreement. These were put nominally under the Geneva Conference, but the Soviets were furious at the success of US diplomacy and the obvious impotence of the USSR even to appear to be involved. During that period, we made a show on occasion of consulting with the USSR but the Soviets—with reason—complained that we were giving them only the form and none of the substance of the consultations, and very little of that.

During President Nixon’s summit meeting in Moscow last June–July, Brezhnev pressed for Soviet involvement. We argued very strongly the importance of continuing our step-by-step approach and agreed that we would consult with the USSR following consultations that both of us would hold separately with the negotiating parties over the summer.

During my last visit to Moscow, the Soviets did not press as hard on the Middle East. The reason for this may well be that they judge that US efforts to make peace have run up against the intractabilities of the Arab-Israeli problem and will probably fall of their own weight. The Soviets have apparently judged that, if they just bide their time, they can move in and pick up the pieces following a US failure. Meanwhile, they have strengthened their support for the Palestinians, whom they judge to be an important movement with wide popular support in the Arab world, and they have actively encouraged Arabs to feel that the US has not delivered either on the progress toward regaining Israeli-occupied territory which American diplomacy promised to deliver over time.

Our view is that, if one more effort at a bilateral diplomacy appears unlikely to succeed, we should throw the negotiations into the Geneva context. The reason we have not done so far is that we feel a stalemate is inevitable there because pressures will mount to resolve issues that cannot be resolved all at one time. However, if there is to be a stalemate anyway, it may have a calming effect to have something going on at Geneva, and it may be possible in the Geneva context to put a better face on stalemate. It seems desirable also, if there is to be a stalemate, for the US to broaden responsibility for it.

It is too soon to commit ourselves to the Soviets on any particular approach because we will want time to see whether at least one more major step between Egypt and Israel can be taken. We will have a better idea on this in December. However, it may be wise to open the door for possible reconvening of the Geneva Conference early next year. Therefore, you will want to appear willing for more active consultations with
the Soviets and possible reconvening of the Conference without actually committing us to them.

In this connection, it may be worth establishing now the idea that, if the Geneva Conference is to be reconvened and have any hope of success at all, some way will have to be found to make the Palestinians a respectable participant in the Conference. The formula might be that, if the Soviets want the Conference to be reconvened, the price will be pressure on the Arab governments and on the Palestinians to take a position (a) that the issue of Palestinian participation should not be raised at the outset and (b) that the Palestinians are prepared to negotiate peace with Israel. Otherwise—and maybe not even then—the Israelis will remain completely unwilling to negotiate with the Palestinians in any form. We do not want to promise that Israel will agree to PLO participation, but it is sure that they will not unless this requirement is met.

Your main points to Brezhnev should be:

— We are prepared to cooperate and coordinate positions with the USSR, but Brezhnev’s position is simply a carbon copy of the more radical Arab demands.

— There can be no effective cooperation, if this means the US accedes in Soviet sponsored positions that are certain to lead to a Congressional revolt, a dangerous deadlock and increase the danger of war.

— In the early stages of peacemaking, we have felt it desirable to move in a series of small steps in order to condition both sides to the idea of negotiating with one another and to the idea that a political process leading toward withdrawal and peace is possible. We believe a useful beginning was made in the two disengagement agreements.

— During the summer, we have conducted a series of bilateral consultations, as has the Soviet government, to determine how best to proceed now following the first disengagement agreements. The Rabat Conference has created a situation which both the Arabs and the Israelis need a little more time to sort out but we should have a clearer picture of how they want to proceed in a few weeks.

— The problem created by the Rabat Conference is that it thrust the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) into the negotiating situation prematurely. Israel refuses to negotiate with an organization that does not recognize Israel’s existence. Any negotiation on the West Bank has now been delayed indefinitely by this Arab move.

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9 At the Arab League Summit held in Rabat October 26–30, Arab leaders issued a communiqué that called for the creation of an independent Palestinian state and recognized the Palestine Liberation Organization as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.
—We are quite prepared to see a resumption of the Geneva Conference at an appropriate point, but any attempt to force PLO participation there will stall the conference too. Thus, if the conference were to resume, we would have to have some Soviet understanding that PLO participation would not be pressed at the outset. The USSR and US have agreed previously that the conferees would agree on any other participation from the Middle East. (This was agreed when the US and USSR issued the invitations to Geneva and again in the Nixon–Brezhnev communiqué in July.) The issue is not whether Palestinian interests should be woven into the negotiating process but how this can be done effectively.

2. European Security

The 35-nation Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), involving every country in Europe except Albania as well as the United States and Canada, began in 1972. The Soviets had sought since 1954 to enlist Western support for a “European Security Conference” to freeze the post-war territorial status quo. We and our Allies finally agreed to participate in CSCE following an easing of differences over Germany, with implementation of the 1971 Berlin Agreement and the FRG–GDR basic Treaty.

At present, the negotiations in Geneva are creeping along in all four CSCE agenda items (or “baskets”) which deal respectively with political/security questions, economic and scientific relations, humanitarian cooperation, and post-CSCE follow-up arrangements. This slow pace is partly because the Soviets themselves are stonewalling on issues that would impact on their internal structure, and partly because negotiations involving 35 countries have become a tangled web of nationalistic positions that have only marginal interest for the US.

Thus, we and the Soviets are not really the main protagonists; most of the issues—such as the principle providing for “peaceful change” of borders—are of importance to the West Germans and other West Europeans.

—We cannot force our Allies to accept outcomes that are domestically unpalatable to their political leaders.

—On the other hand, we cannot exert pressure on the Soviets to yield on issues that are so complicated as to be barely intelligible to the general public (for example, there is a debate on whether the agreed political principles to be adopted by the final conference are to be regarded as all “equally valid,” or to be “strictly and equally applied”; this is a disguised dispute between the Germans, the EC members and the Soviets on whether the principle of non-violability of borders is equal to the principle of peaceful change of frontiers—both important only in the question of German unification and eventual European unity).
In the drafting of a CSCE Declaration of Principles, the Soviets have concentrated mainly on gaining Western acceptance of a “clear-cut” principle of frontier inviolability, which they regard as an important aspect of the legitimation of the European status quo. On military security measures, they agree with us that CSCE should limit itself essentially to two agreements—prior notification of military maneuvers and the exchange of observers at those maneuvers. On issues of economic and scientific cooperation in basket 2, the Soviets have permitted slow, but steady, progress, and Moscow has used CSCE in its drive to obtain MFN and greater access to Western technology. Regarding the sensitive East-West contacts issues of basket 3, they agreed in October to an important text on access to printed information, and accepted simultaneous drafting on several human contacts items. On basket 4 follow-up questions, the Soviets have been down-playing support for creation of a permanent committee to carry forward CSCE consultations in the future, but we expect them once more to press for such a committee toward the end of the Geneva talks.

We support German efforts to obtain a reference to peaceful border changes in the principles declaration, which the FRG needs in its effort to keep alive the hope for eventual reunification of the German nation. We are backing a French initiative to ensure that Four-Power rights in Berlin and Germany as a whole are protected in the CSCE final documents—an issue which will doubtless be discussed when Brezhnev visits President Giscard d’Estaing in early December. In our tacit agreement with Moscow on limiting confidence-building measures to notification of maneuvers and exchange of observers, we also concur that it would be unwise to attempt to reach agreement on notification of large-scale troop movements. We are satisfied with the overall progress in basket 2, where virtually all Western objectives will soon be realized, including a balanced formulation on MFN. In basket 3, the Allies’ principal goal is to achieve agreement on a text on family reunification, a subject of considerable interest to Western parliamentary and public opinion, but they also seek a variety of similar agreements to strengthen East-West human contacts. On post-Conference follow-up activities, we support the EC Nine’s cautious position against immediate agreement on a permanent East-West committee, but we are studying various follow-up proposals before taking a final decision on this matter.

Brezhnev will not be prepared to discuss any of these details, and they are not worthy of your time and attention, during the talks; he will complain of foot dragging and of interference in Soviet internal affairs. The main points you should stress are:

—We will use our influence to work for the conclusion of the Conference by next spring.
—In your talks with Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard, you will urge them to find mutually acceptable compromises, but on the understanding that the USSR will be prepared to compromise.
—We will remain in contact through Dobrynin.
A more detailed treatment of CSCE is at Tab D.

3. Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

The Soviets are more or less stalling the Vienna talks because they want the political settlement at the European Conference completed before they seriously address military disengagement.

We have constructed with our allies a starting position that would call for:

(a) Soviet-American reduction of about 15 percent of ground manpower (29,000 US and 68,000 USSR) including the withdrawal of a Soviet tank army with 1700 tanks, followed by a second stage of
(b) reduction to a common ceiling for NATO–Warsaw Pact ground forces at 700,000 which would entail further Soviet and Warsaw Pact reduction of about 160,000 and only about 50,000 for NATO.

The Soviets have countered with a symbolic reduction of 20,000 for both sides the first year, followed by reductions of five percent in the second year, and 10 percent in the third year. In all three stages, reductions would be taken by all direct participants and would include ground, air and nuclear forces and related equipment.

Recently, the Soviets have isolated their first step of 20,000 reductions suggesting that it be taken first in a 10,000 US-Soviet cut, then 5,000 German and Polish forces, and 5,000 on each side for all others.
—Our approach seeks to reduce the large disparity in manpower and tanks in Central Europe and would lead to a significant change in the conventional military balance, whereas the Soviet reduction would perpetuate the current ratios of forces at somewhat lower levels. Thus far, we have held off from introducing any nuclear reductions—which might tempt the Soviets to accept asymmetrical conventional reductions—until the FBS issue is resolved in SALT.

You should not offer any specific proposals in Vladivostok for changing the Alliance position because we have not yet worked out any such proposals with our Allies. However, if MBFR is discussed and Brezhnev wants to make progress you could either indicate your willingness, under certain conditions, to include US nuclear elements in the negotiations, or discuss a small, bilateral US/Soviet reduction which would precede any multilateral agreement:
—If you choose to raise nuclear elements you should remind Brezhnev of our suggestion to Gromyko before the October Moscow trip that we would be willing to reduce US nuclear elements in MBFR under certain conditions. We perceive the large disparity in troops and
tanks in the central region as being the most threatening and potentially destabilizing element. The Soviets have insisted that our superior nuclear forces threaten them and provide a balance to the conventional force disparity. If the Soviets are willing to reduce this disparity in Central Europe, we would propose to our Allies that the US should reduce its nuclear capability in Europe through MBFR. This would place negotiation of theater nuclear force reductions in the proper forum and provide an offsetting reduction of “most threatening elements” which should move MBFR off dead center.

—If you choose to seek a small bilateral reduction agreement you should stress that the US and USSR have a unique responsibility as leaders of the two alliances to take the first step in reducing their forces. We are prepared to begin with a cut of roughly five percent of our two forces (10,000 US and 20,000 USSR), and ask our allies not to increase their forces while negotiations continue for further reductions by all parties. This step would not prejudice the negotiating positions of either side but would be carried out as a “good faith” gesture to try to break the current deadlock. We cannot accept a reduction of equal numbers for the US and USSR because Soviet deployment in Central Europe is too disproportionate (460,000 Soviet ground forces vs 190,000 US). The Soviets are not likely to accept this proposal because of the 2:1 reduction ratio. Anything less, however, would surely prejudice the Alliance case for subsequent reductions to achieve manpower parity in Central Europe. Moreover, this step might not satisfy Congressional demands for US reductions and would be hard to verify. (Background at Tab E.)

D. Other Arms Control

1. Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions

The test ban treaty signed in Moscow at the last summit limits nuclear weapons tests to no more than 150 KT, beginning in March 1976. When it was negotiated, there was the unresolved question of how to deal with peaceful nuclear explosions, and it was agreed that further negotiation would be held to resolve the question. These talks started in Moscow in October, and are now in recess.

Our basic purpose in the PNE negotiations is to achieve restrictions and verification provisions that would give us assurance that the Soviets could not violate the Threshold Test Ban (TTB) Treaty by conducting weapons development tests under the guise of PNEs.

Our studies have shown that we must distinguish between two types of restrictions: (1) for contained (i.e., completely underground) explosions, a yield threshold no higher than the 150 KT in the treaty; (2) for cratering, i.e., those explosions used in excavations that cause a sur-
face crater, either to agree on a yield threshold for such explosions or on a rather intrusive on-site observation system to verify their level.

In the first round of negotiations we proposed a 100 KT threshold on “contained” PNEs, but we have been unable to elicit specific Soviet verification ideas on either contained or excavation PNEs.

—The general Soviet line has been that, while verification provisions are necessary, the overall thrust of the PNE agreement should be permissive rather than restrictive.

—This difference in viewpoint reflects the fact that the Soviet PNE program is relatively active and ambitious (for digging canals, for underground gas cavities), while ours is dormant.

—Specifically, the Soviets have linked adequate verification provisions (including observers) to a US/Soviet cooperative PNE agreement, which would provide for joint studies, joint projects, and eventually, joint provision of PNE services to third countries.

This approach, of course, has serious political implications for our relations to third countries.

In preparing for the next round of talks, our principal decision is whether the Soviet approach to a PNE broad cooperation is of interest on its own merits, or, if we reject it, can we expect to gain Soviet agreement to sound verification procedures. We will also have to decide whether the more technical issue of proposing specific verification proposals on excavation PNEs or insisting on a Soviet proposal, since they, not we, want these explosions. Further background material is at Tab F.

In Vladivostok you may want to emphasize that:

—We are committed to seeking Senate approval of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, but this can be done only if we present Congress simultaneously with an agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions assuring that such explosions cannot be used for weapons purposes.

—As to US/Soviet PNE cooperation, this idea is now under study. But we do not want to distract the PNE negotiators from their primary goal of seeking adequate verification provisions for PNE under the threshold treaty.

—We urge the Soviet side to make specific proposals on verification so the work on a PNE agreement can be completed.

—Remind Brezhnev that he suggested a system of observers last June.

2. Nuclear Exporters Conference and Non-Proliferation

We are seeking Soviet agreement to participate in a proposed conference of key nuclear exporters. The goal of such a conference would be to achieve multilateral agreement on export restrictions to prevent nuclear equipment, technology and materials from being diverted by non-nuclear weapons states from civil to weapons purposes. The So-
viets have said they favor taking part in a conference, but we have not yet received official Soviet Government agreement.

During recent discussions, the Soviets showed a tendency to focus the discussions in a bilateral channel and to expand the agenda to go beyond export control questions into a wider range of non-proliferation issues. It is in our interest to confine the subject matter to concrete multilateral export controls, since this is the most pressing and most practical non-proliferation problem we now face. The Soviets have somewhat reluctantly agreed to this approach. They have, however, requested that we establish regular consultations in Moscow on the whole range of nuclear and non-proliferation issues.

In addition to the Soviets, we have also asked the FRG, UK, Canada, France and Japan to join in an exporters conference. The FRG, UK and Canada have replied positively. The Japanese will probably accept as well. The key to going ahead with the conference is the French; they have been negative on such ideas in the past, but we have indications that the Giscard government may be willing to reverse that policy and join in the conference. I also raised the subject of export controls with the Indians, who appear receptive to the idea. More detailed background on this issue is at Tab G.

*If this subject comes up in Vladivostok, you may make the points that:*

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—As the Indian experience has shown, the main practical problem we now face in non-proliferation is preventing the diversion of nuclear exports into nuclear explosive programs.

—Export controls must obviously be exercised by all suppliers or they will not be effective.

—A conference of key nuclear exporters would focus our non-proliferation efforts on this practical problem in a way that would give the best chance of success.

—We, of course, are willing to continue consultations with the Soviets on broader non-proliferation questions, but we would like to concentrate for now on export control problems within the framework of a multilateral conference.

3. **Environmental Modification for Military Purposes**

We have just completed six days of talks in Moscow on Environmental Warfare.\(^{10}\) They were held in accordance with a Joint Statement signed at the last summit; this statement was preempted when the So-

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\(^{10}\) The text of the joint statement issued at the end of the November 1–5 talks was transmitted in telegram 16802 from Moscow, November 5. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
viets introduced their own draft convention at the United Nations. It is extremely broad and could jeopardize activities such as ASW.

Our position, which you have approved, calls for banning the most dangerous, though still theoretical, forms of environmental modification for hostile purposes, while retaining tactical forms such as rain-making and fog dispersal. At Moscow, the Soviets showed little give in their position, pressing for their draft convention as a basis of the talks. A second round of bilaterals will probably be held in Washington. Meanwhile at the UN we tried without success to persuade the Soviets to revise a resolution which would refer their multilateral convention to the CCD in Geneva. The matter did not come up during my talks in Moscow. Further background is at Tab H.

If this subject arises in Vladivostok, you should say:
—We were disappointed that the Soviets introduced a resolution and convention on Environmental Warfare at the United Nations before we had an opportunity to begin our bilateral talks agreed to at the last Summit.
—The recent discussions in Moscow nevertheless helped define the issues and we hope progress can be made when the next round is held in Washington.
—We reaffirm our commitment to seek the most effective measures possible to overcome the dangers of environmental modification techniques for military purposes.

4. Chemical Warfare

At the last summit, we agreed to consider a joint initiative in the CCD for an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare. The Soviets gave us a draft convention in August which calls for sweeping measures to prohibit the development, production and stockpiling of lethal CW and has inadequate provisions on verification. We have not scheduled bilateral talks pending a decision on whether to produce binary chemical munitions. We also want to take another look at the verification problem. This question did not arise in my Moscow discussions. If Brezhnev raises the matter, you should tell him:
—In accordance with the Joint Communiqué at the last summit, we will be prepared soon to suggest concrete dates for talks to consider a joint initiative in the CCD on an international convention dealing with the most dangerous, lethal means of chemical warfare.
—We appreciate receiving the Soviet draft CW convention given to us in confidence in August. At first reading however we are struck by its sweeping nature and by the absence of reliable verification provisions. As we have previously made clear the absence of such verification is a basic obstacle to attaining comprehensive limitations.
E. Trade and Related Issues

1. Overview of US-Soviet Trade

US-Soviet trade has grown rapidly since the trade agreement and lend-lease accord were concluded in 1972. In 1973 it reached a record $1.4 billion, more than twice the level of the previous year. Total trade between the US and the USSR should be approximately $1 billion this year, despite the sharp decline in US exports of agricultural products. US imports are expected to exceed the level of any previous year; this should please the Soviets, who were concerned about last year’s US export surplus of almost $1 billion. The two countries should exceed the goal announced at the June 1973 summit: a total trade turnover of $2–3 billion during the three-year period 1973–1975.

2. The Trade Bill

The Trade Reform Act should be reported out of the Senate Finance Committee shortly after Congress reconvenes on November 18. Assuming no setback because of Gromyko’s letter to me, an amendment reflecting the compromise with Senator Jackson in the October 18 exchange of letters will be introduced from the Senate floor. The bill will then go to Conference. The following amendments of concern to the Soviets are now in the Senate bill:

—Jackson/Vanik—this will almost certainly require us to include language in an exchange of notes with the Soviets taking into account our inability to assure them of MFN treatment for the full three years called for by the original agreement. The Soviets may balk.

—Gurney/Chiles—this would require us to submit a report on Soviet cooperation in securing an accounting for our MIA’s in Southeast Asia, including the repatriation of any remaining prisoners.

You might tell Brezhnev that:

—I hope that passage of the trade bill will facilitate the further development of trade which we both desire. The important thing is that the bill grants MFN treatment to the USSR. This was not easy for us to obtain. However, I supported it strongly, as had my predecessor.

—As you know it was necessary for us to accept the Jackson/Vanik amendment in order to attain MFN for the Soviet Union. When MFN comes up for renewal in 18 months, we have every expectation it will be renewed and that this will not be linked to any other conditions.

—As for the issue of Soviet emigration policy, both the Secretary and I have made clear on frequent public occasions that we will be

11 Document 75.
12 Senators Edward J. Gurney (Republican, Florida) and Lawton M. Chiles, Jr. (Democrat, Florida).
guided on this issue only by what you have told us numerous times, that is, that the rate of Soviet emigration will correspond to the number of applicants. We deplore Jackson’s statements on this issue.

3. Export-Import Bank

The Ex-Im Bank bill has been approved by a House-Senate Conference, but Senator Byrd with considerable Senate support has blocked Senate approval of the Committee report and will attempt to defeat it. This would force another Conference. In its present form the bill:

—bans new credits to the USSR until the Trade Reform Act is enacted;
—calls on you to make individual “national-interest” determinations on loans to communist countries of over $50 million;
—the Bank is authorized to extend new credits to the USSR of only $300 million, but you may waive this limitation.

After the recess, there may be attempts to introduce amendments which would:

—prohibit the Bank from financing energy projects with the USSR;
—create a strict $300 million ceiling on Bank exposure to the USSR;
—place a two-year limit on business with communist countries.

You may wish to tell Brezhnev that:

—We are optimistic that the Ex-Im Bank legislation will pass and that it will permit the Bank to play a constructive role in furthering our commercial ties.
—We are prepared to proceed promptly in entertaining requests for credits when the Bill has passed in an expeditious and constructive manner.

4. Yakutsk Project

The project for exploring and exploiting the natural gas reserves near Yakutsk in Siberia is to proceed in two phases. The first phase is exploratory, would be a joint project with the Japanese and would require US Ex-Im Bank loan of $49.5 million as our share of the total cost of $250 million. The second development phase would result in building a pipeline, liquefaction plant and related port facilities at a cost of about $5 billion or more with equal participation by the US and Japan. The Soviets would repay the credits with shipments of one billion cubic feet a day of LNG to both the US and Japan, beginning in the early 1980s and continuing for 25 years.

The Soviets are currently working on a long-term development plan for Siberia and they view long-term cooperative ventures with us as an important justification for détente. However, we have not yet determined the desired role of LNG in our energy balance or the desirability of obtaining it from the Soviets. The Yakutsk project faces strong
Congressional opposition. If the Soviets raise this matter you should say:

—We are basically in favor of participating with the Japanese in the Yakutsk exploratory project; however, a final decision on credits must await Congressional action on the Ex-Im Bank Bill.

—In the interim we have no objection if the Japanese decide to move ahead with the project on their own.

5. Computer Sales

The Soviets want US computers for the Kama River truck plant foundry, for an Intourist reservation system (IBM) and for an Aeroflot reservation system (UNIVAC). We have interagency agreement to go ahead with the Kama River computer, subject only to establishment of appropriate safeguards. The Intourist and Aeroflot cases will take more time.

Although we must still obtain the approval of our Allies to the Kama River sale through COCOM, news that our own decision is favorable will be highly welcome to the Soviets. The Kama River project is intended as the showpiece of the Soviet Five-Year plan and the computer is vital to its success. The plant will be the largest in the world and its production will equal that of all heavy truck plants in the US. Already over 110 contracts have been concluded with US firms, exceeding $320 million.

You should tell Brezhnev that:

—We are favorably disposed to approve the sale of IBM 370/158 computers for the Kama plant, subject to an agreement on standard safeguards.

—The Aeroflot and Intourist cases are more complex; we are studying them to see if a way can be found to allow their export under our existing legislation and procedures.

6. Aircraft Cooperation

On aircraft, US companies are anxious for sales and the Soviets want, in exchange, to sell their YAK–40 small jet, and helicopters in the US, plus US participation by a US firm in equipping a Soviet integrated aircraft production facility and joint design and development of a new and advanced commercial aircraft. We have made an airworthiness agreement required for the sale of Soviet aircraft contingent on purchases of US aircraft. Our policy, moreover, puts tight limitations on participation of US firms in the design or construction of an integrated aircraft manufacturing facility in the Soviet Union and precludes joint design and development of aircraft.

We have tried to get talks underway on a bilateral airworthiness agreement for certification of the YAK–40. However, the Soviets’ pri-
many prospective partner in selling the aircraft, Rockwell International, recently pulled out of the deal.

If he raises these questions, you might tell Brezhnev:
—Within our export control guidelines, there is considerable scope for US-Soviet cooperation in civil aviation.
—We are willing to continue discussions on a bilateral airworthiness agreement with the expectation that other US companies may pick up the YAK–40 project and on the condition that the Soviets will purchase US-manufactured wide-bodied aircraft.

7. Sale of Grain to the USSR

On grain sales, the Soviets don’t seem to appreciate fully our difficulties in meeting domestic needs and balancing foreign requirements in an equitable way. As things now stand, we have agreed to sell the Soviets one million tons of corn and 1.2 million tons of wheat for delivery during the current crop year. We have also offered to supply an additional one million tons of wheat out of next year’s crop or to have it delivered by US firms from other exporting countries.

You should tell Brezhnev:
—Our grain situation is tight. We have been forced to cut back on exports across the board. For example, we estimate feed-grain exports to Japan will be cut from 10.2 to 9.5 million metric tons and to the EC countries from 11.1 to 8.2 metric tons from the period 1973–74 to 1974–75.
—Maximum cooperation is needed, particularly in this period of world food scarcity, between our countries. Misunderstandings could be avoided if we exchange forward estimates on grain production and foreign trade as we agreed to do under the Agricultural Agreement.13

[Omitted here is a list of attachments.]

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87. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Style

By way of background information for your Vladivostok visit, this memorandum seeks to capture the flavor and style of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev. It is based both on my encounters with Brezhnev and on our observations of his interaction with other leading Soviet officials.

The Personal Importance of Vladivostok

For Brezhnev, and the other Soviet leaders for that matter, the Vladivostok meeting is an important one. The Russians set great store by personal relationships with foreign leaders; their curiosity about you will not have been satisfied by Foreign Minister Gromyko’s report following his September meeting with you.\footnote{2 See Document 37.} [1 line not declassified] statements you and I have made vowing to continue the Nixon foreign policy have been reassuring to the Soviet leaders but, just the same, they are reserving judgment until they can assess you personally.

Brezhnev’s interest in this meeting with you has another, more personal side. Ever since Stalin, Soviet leaders have seen an encounter with the American President as a boost to their authority and a recognition of their stature. Brezhnev, like his predecessor Khrushchev, finds this useful in terms of the never-ending power struggle within the leadership. And whether he recognizes it consciously or not, to be seen in the company of the U.S. President or closeted with you in secret sessions fills a deepseated Russian need to be accepted as an equal.
The Personal Side of Brezhnev

With experience and exposure in dealing with Western leaders, Brezhnev has gained assurance. He has come to enjoy the perquisites of office—he enjoys fancy cars, natty clothes and a certain elevated lifestyle. In short, he has some of the characteristics of the nouveau-riche. Yet he is proud, as Khrushchev was, of his proletarian background and of his successful march up the ladder of power.

Brezhnev clearly enjoys power, and [less than 1 line not declassified]. He revels in the role of leading a great power.

Like many Russians, Brezhnev is a mixture of crudeness and warmth. Yet, self-conscious about his background and his past, he eschews Khrushchevian excursions into profanity. He has the Slavic love of physical contact—back slapping, bear hugs, and kisses. His anecdotes and imagery, to which he resorts frequently, avoid the language of the barnyard. His humor is heavy, sometimes cynical, frequently earthy.

Brezhnev prides himself on being a sportsman. He mentions ice-skating, skiing, cycling, and parachute jumping as former pursuits. He vows he will never give up hunting, and he remains an avid soccer fan, attending matches at Moscow stadiums. Prior to the important concluding session of our SALT discussions in the Kremlin two weeks ago, he suddenly suggested that we adjourn instead so that I could go to the ballet while he took in a soccer match.

Another passion is automobiles; he enjoys getting behind the wheel of one of his collection of foreign luxury cars whenever he has the chance for a fast spin. He likes to be with the “boys” and in the past made it a practice to gather up his Ukrainian colleagues for hunting parties, weekend retreats and vacations.

Brezhnev enjoys a drink but exercises restraint in public. He smokes strong cigarettes at a rate distressing to his doctors. The Soviet party chief cultivates an image of vigorous well-being in public, but privately he shows tender concern for his health. He is given to incessant complaining to his colleagues about minor ailments, the work load he is bearing, and the strain he is under. [2 lines not declassified] These same complaints, in bantering fashion, have emerged in my meetings with him.

Brezhnev’s health, in fact, appears none too good. He has a number of cardio-vascular problems. He suffers from high blood pressure and is reported to have had two heart attacks in the past and possibly a stroke. While he is still vigorous, he does tire more easily than a year ago. In addition, he has long been plagued by hoarseness, which causes him difficulties during long speeches, and he has serious dental problems.
Brezhnev is a nervous man, partly because of his personal insecurity, partly for physiological reasons traced to his consumption of alcohol and tobacco, his history of heart disease and the pressures of his job. You will find his hands perpetually in motion, twirling his gold watch chain, flicking ashes from his ever-present cigarette, clanging his cigarette holder against an ash tray. From time to time, he may stand up behind his chair or walk about. He is likely to interrupt himself or you by offering food and drink. His colleagues obviously humor him in these nervous habits.

He can put in long hours when necessary, [2 lines not declassified].

As he has gotten older, Brezhnev has permitted himself to wonder aloud about his reputation. He wants a “good” image, although he probably does not mind in some respects the older image of a brutal man, and he wants to be seen as good for Russia in the history books. He will talk about his family, being especially proud and fond of his granddaughter who grew up in his house. (She recently presented him with his first great-grandchild.)

As with other Russians, the War remains an earth shaking experience for him. He has taken to having his role inflated in publicity. He is proud of his service, of having been a general, of being a veteran. He knows something of the human disaster of war—one should credit him with genuine abhorrence of it, though, of course, he uses fear of war in others to obtain political ends.

*The Negotiator*

Brezhnev attaches importance to striking a direct human rapport with his interlocutor, and he has been known to spend considerable time in preliminary talks with a foreign leader trying to establish a personal relationship and take the measure of the man. For his own part, Brezhnev comes across as a vigorous, vital person, with an inquiring mind and intuitive perceptions about men and situations.

Brezhnev probably will remind you of a tough and shrewd union boss, conscious of his position and his interests, alert to slights. He will be polite sometimes to the point of excessive warmth. He may lapse into orations, sometimes standing up to deliver them. He will be knowledgeable, but uninterested in detail (though his underlings will be extremely careful with fine print). He may try to test you at some point with a vigorous and ideologically-tinged statement of his position, but he will let you do the same, though perhaps trying to get you off-stride by offering you tea and sandwiches when you break for interpretation.

He will try to flatter you, usually when he wants you to be “statesmanlike” and “generous”, and in fact he sometimes betrays an almost reverential view of “the President.”
When he wants something, Brezhnev will be voluble in explaining how much in your own interest a certain position is; he may intimate that it took a great deal of effort to get his colleagues to agree to a concession; he may even brag that he overruled this or that bureaucratic interest group—he likes to poke fun at his Foreign Ministry, although in fact Gromyko and several of its members do a great deal of Brezhnev’s backstopping. He will invite you to “improve” on his own efforts and tell you how much the history books will praise you for the effort.

Typically Russian, when Brezhnev thinks he has made a major concession or breakthrough, he will get impatient to get the matter wrapped up. He may stall interminably, but once he moves he will want things settled at once so as to take up the next subject. He almost certainly will not want to get involved in drafting exercises or the shaping of precise formulations himself, preferring to delegate this to his associates, probably Gromyko.

While Brezhnev will keep the center stage and generally demonstrate that he is the master of his brief, he relies heavily for expert support on his growing staff of personal foreign policy advisors, particularly the senior of these, Aleksandrov. Aleksandrov treats the boss with politeness but does not hesitate to break in if he feels his chief is getting confused or has made a serious mistake. There is in fact an air of informality in Brezhnev’s office, and his aides are not reluctant to approach him.

Though impatient with details, Brezhnev clearly masters the significant issues and understands Soviet interests. He has stopped his earlier practice of bringing copious notes to meetings, except for formal documents he plans to hand over. Although these are obviously drafted by his staff, he is familiar with their contents, presumably having participated in Politburo discussions of them.

The Politician

Brezhnev seems to operate fairly comfortably within the constraints of collective leadership, although he has not hesitated to advance his own interests at the expense of his colleagues. He appears to prefer the human interaction of a closely-knit working group to the more complex and abstract rewards of the solitary leader. His career has been based primarily on his long years as a regional party leader. He is an expert at finding a consensus to lead.

Although the boss, Brezhnev still gives the impression of being highly sensitive to the needs of the collective, constantly reassuring himself that his colleagues can have no conceivable grounds for complaint or soliciting their compliments. [5½ lines not declassified]

Brezhnev is free to expound an agreed position of the collective, perhaps adding some nuances and emphases of his own, but once he
has exhausted his guidance he evidently is required to go back for more, as well as for any changes necessitated by the course of negotiations. He also seems to be under some obligation to report back. At the same time, if Brezhnev believes a particular change in position is necessary, it appears he has the authority to persuade the Politburo to agree to it. In any case, situations could well arise where Brezhnev will say that he must check back with his colleagues. This may be a tactic, but may also reflect the actual situation.

The attached briefing book\(^3\) contains maps and photos of the Vladivostok area and background papers on the Soviet leadership.

\(^3\) Printed as Document 86.

88. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of Israel and U.S. policy in the Middle East.]

Kissinger: Dobrynin says the impact on the Soviets of Rockefeller is very bad.\(^2\) He keeps saying there is stability domestically but they don’t understand. For a Rockefeller to go through this after 40 years in politics, four times elected governor, they can’t believe it.

President: It is a vicious partisan jugular operation.

[Omitted here is discussion of domestic politics.]

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 7. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Kissinger and Scowcroft from 10:50 a.m. to 12:10 p.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

\(^2\) Presumably a reference to the extended and contentious Congressional hearings on Rockefeller’s appointment as Vice President. No record of a conversation between Kissinger and Dobrynin as described here has been found.
[Kissinger:] [less than one line not declassified] We must discuss how to discuss with Brezhnev the Middle East. Gromyko is hard-line because of his bureaucratic experience. I told Dobrynin we are fighting for our domestic lives here—if we wanted a stalemate, we would go to Geneva.

Dobrynin asked about you. I said you were more direct but your instinct was more to the right than Nixon. It is better to have them worry a bit. We lost two years with Kennedy because they thought he was too easy and rattled. If you could show you had an option and an instinct to go to the right . . .

President: I have a tough and bombastic side . . .

Kissinger: I wouldn’t do that. I would show him still just a bit then throttle it. Be firm but friendly.

President: How many will be in the meetings?

Kissinger: With President Nixon, we had very few.

President: I would prefer no private meetings for two reasons: I want to show we are close and friendly. This is the big league.

Kissinger: You are in the Brezhnev league right now. I wouldn’t worry about your meeting him alone, but we should have a record of it.

President: I want them to know we are a team and would prefer not to meet alone.

Kissinger: Let’s see how it goes. You shouldn’t let it look like you are afraid to deal with him alone. You could speak alone and say stay in touch—we both have pressures but we must do our best. Take the Middle East: we must not let the Arabs play us against each other. We eventually have to go back to Geneva.

President: Yes, especially if there is a stalemate. They would prove worthwhile only if we could make progress.

Kissinger: You don’t have to worry about comparison with Nixon. He was a poor negotiator. He was tough in private, but last June he hardly knew what the subject was. Nixon never liked to say no face-to-face. The Soviets respected him not for the negotiations but for his toughness, his daring to mine Haiphong just before his meeting with them.3

President: I supported all those hard decisions.

Kissinger: The Soviets didn’t respect Kennedy—they thought he was weak. [Described SALT I crises and Nixon being mad.]4 I wouldn’t

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3 President Nixon announced on May 8, 1972, less than 2 weeks before the Moscow summit, his decision to mine Haiphong harbor in an effort to stop the North Vietnamese Easter offensive.

4 Brackets in the original.
get into specifics with him head to head. If you two confront each other, there is no one to fall back on.

Their normal pattern is to start out friendly, then have one tough session, where you just stay calm and strong.

I think he wants a SALT agreement. He wants to be able to report he has established a relationship with you; third, he will want to assess you in a crisis.

President: If you see things heading the wrong way, don’t hesitate to set it straight.

Kissinger: We have a tough problem on the Middle East, and they do have a point. The theme in general for you to hit is that we are willing to cooperate in many areas. Be blunt with them in the crunches.

President: Can I say I hope they don’t get the impression that the American people are in bad shape?

Kissinger: You shouldn’t do it that way. Act confident. You can say that we always have a unified country in foreign policy on major issues—and that you have great flexibility. You can mention the right-wing problems, and Jackson. You can reaffirm all our commitments and say we have to consider each other’s needs. Tell them you expect to be in until 1980 and our election was on internal issues. Ask him what is on his mind right at first.

Japan I am not worried about. Hit them on the energy thing. You won’t get a full endorsement, but this is an opportunity to mobilize the West like anti-Communism was.

You could mention to Brezhnev the danger of a Japanese-Chinese alliance. Say that is why we want to keep Japan tied to us and that is why we support Japan in Siberia.

The Chinese aren’t with us because they like us. They are cold-bloodedly using us. For 10 years we should support the Chinese, then we may have to join the Soviet Union. The Japanese are a great danger. In all their history they’ve never had permanent alignments.

The Japanese can do anything. They have such an unusual society that they can adjust to anything. The basic structure of their society can accommodate to any kind of system.

If we decline in world power, we will lose the Japanese. They have no psychological understanding of other societies—they do every insensitive thing while being very sensitive themselves. Don’t give Brezhnev all this but let him know there are things that only you two can do.

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5 President Ford made a State visit to Japan and stopped in Seoul, South Korea, before continuing on to Vladivostok.
Your big problem will be the alliance thing. You should say you share the interest in preserving nuclear peace. Don’t be too negative. You agree with the objective but this is a monumental issue. I will write out some questions for you to give him.

89. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford


SUBJECT

Soviets Spread Dangerous Misinformation; Points to Make with Brezhnev

During the past few days, we have had reports that the Soviets are spreading false and potentially dangerous misinformation concerning the Middle East situation and Cyprus.

—They told Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy that they had independent information of Israeli mobilization in preparation for an attack on either Syria or Lebanon, beginning November 15;

—Dobrynin falsely told me that Egypt had given the Soviets reports about the next stage of Israeli withdrawals from the Sinai and the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo told the Egyptians falsely that I had told the Soviets about the next stage of Israeli withdrawals.

—They told Cypriot leader Clerides that they had information of an impending Turkish commando attack on the South of the island;

—We have an intercept that indicates that Gromyko sent word to the Syrians that the Israelis were planning an attack.

—Dobrynin gave the Greek Ambassador in Washington a distorted version of the US position on Cyprus, including an allegation that we clearly favor the Turkish position and would confine ourselves to merely making friendly suggestions to Turkey.

Soviet allegations of supposedly impending Israeli military actions are particularly mischievous since they could easily trigger a chain of hasty Arab and Israeli military actions. (The Arab-Israeli war of 1967 began in large measure because of Soviet rumor-mongering.) The alle-

gation of Turkish invasion plans against Cyprus can only hinder the delicate political and diplomatic efforts to resolve the crisis. Soviet misinformation concerning our role on Cyprus and on the next stage of Middle East diplomacy is obviously designed to compromise our efforts at mediation on both situations.

All the instances cited above—and there may be additional ones which we have not heard about—are contrary to the letter and spirit of our understandings with the Soviets concerning consultations on issues of mutual concern. While they may to a certain degree reflect Moscow’s frustration over its exclusion from diplomatic efforts in the areas involved, they are nevertheless disturbing and potentially quite dangerous. I believe you should draw Brezhnev’s attention to these occurrences and would suggest that you consider making the following points to him:

1. The United States has sought to remain in close touch with the Soviets on both the Cyprus and the Middle East crises; we have scrupulously lived up to our joint commitments to consult on matters of common concern.

2. We believe that it is particularly important to consult about information indicating that there may be a danger of hostilities in these explosive areas. It is especially important that neither of us disseminate unverified rumors about possible military actions since what we as great powers say inevitably is given important weight.

3. We are consequently deeply disturbed by highly reliable reports we have received of Soviet representatives alleging that Israeli military action against Syria or Lebanon is imminent and that a Turkish move against Cyprus is imminent.

4. Soviet concerns in these instances were never communicated to us and no opportunity was provided to exchange assessments and to consult, as stipulated in agreements signed at the summits of 1972 and 1973.

5. Furthermore, we have noted with regret that Soviet representatives have misrepresented our position with respect to a Cyprus settlement and have also incorrectly attributed to us information concerning next steps in Middle East settlement efforts. We can only interpret this as intended to discredit our position with the parties to the Cyprus dispute and with the parties to the Middle East conflict. This, too, is not in the spirit of our agreements.

6. Mr. Brezhnev should consider these matters carefully and should be clear that mutual confidence can only be maintained if consultation is a two-way street and if no efforts are made to undermine the position and credibility of the other side. We had thought this sort of thing was a thing of the past and would hope that Brezhnev personally will ensure that actions such as those cited above do not recur.
90.  Memorandum of Conversation

Vladivostok, November 23, 1974, 2:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US:  USSR:
The President  General Secretary Brezhnev
The Secretary of State  Foreign Minister Gromyko
Amb. Stoessel  Amb. Dobrynin
Mr. Akalovsky, Department of  Mr. Sukhodrev (Interpreting)
State

SUBJECT

General Discussion (US-Soviet Relations, SALT II, Middle East)

The Secretary: Mr. General Secretary, this is a historic event, it is the first time in history a US President and the General Secretary are meeting in the Far East.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Indeed it is, and the eyes of the entire world are fixed on this event. You also have representatives of the American press here so that the press in the United States will have a lot to write about.

The President: Our press writes a lot, and some of it is good and some bad.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I remember when I once talked to Nasser he told me that as far as the Egyptian press was concerned their newspapers had people on the first floor who blamed Nasser, those praising him on the second floor, and those blaming the USSR on the third floor. I told Nasser he could put out accurate news through the radio and TV, but he replied that the market place was where people usually gathered the news.

The President: I think that the good news usually comes from the countryside.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, there are always good-wishers and ill-wishers. There have also been a lot of stories about me, and many of them are totally wrong. For example, I recently saw a story in an American newspaper saying that I live on Lenin Hills, but I never lived there. The story also talked about my having two daughters, but I

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, November 23–24, 1974—Vladivostok Summit (1). Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting took place on board the train between Vozdvizhenka Airport and Okeanskaya Sanatorium near Vladivostok. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes on the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
have only one. It seems to me the author was a quite inexperienced writer.

The President: In the United States, there are also people who write deliberately against me, but that’s how the press is.

General Secretary Brezhnev: There are all kinds of correspondents, of course, some respectable and some less so. Would you like some tea or coffee, Mr. President?

The President: I would rather have tea, because I think we in the States generally drink too much coffee.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You know, Kekonnen\(^2\) drinks an unbelievable amount of coffee. Not only that, but he also makes you suffer by compelling you to do the same. When he visits the Soviet Union, he usually goes to see a few factories and always asks for coffee while there. I, of course, have to join him but in my mind I pray God for tea.

The President: Have you ever had New Orleans coffee? It is very heavy and strong.

General Secretary Brezhnev: No, but I know that the Bulgarians like very dark and strong coffee.

The Secretary: The General Secretary, unfortunately, had no chance to travel around the country when he visited the United States last time. I hope that he will be able to do some travelling when he comes again in the spring.

The President: You saw only Washington and San Clemente, Mr. General Secretary, didn’t you? It would be good if you could see the heartland of the United States, for example Chicago, because the East and West coasts do not give an accurate perspective of our country.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I have seen a number of travelogues about the United States, and I know that you have many beautiful and interesting places. But when one is on an official trip, the trouble is that one is always surrounded by protocol. I have always wanted to bury protocol but somehow I have had no success. Gromyko and Kissinger are always around and insist that protocol be observed.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It’s not we who invented and developed protocol, it was the Vienna Congress.

The Secretary: When the Westphalian Treaty was signed, they had to install a door for each Head of State so that all of them could enter simultaneously the room where the treaty was to be signed.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes, in Vienna I saw the hall where there were four doors so that four emperors—the Russian, the British, the Austrian, and the French—could all come in at the same time.

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\(^2\) Urho Kekkonen, President of Finland.
General Secretary Brezhnev: And you, Gromyko, were the Czar at that time, weren’t you?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: No, merely an observer.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Oh, one of those nonaligned ones!

Mr. President: Yes, I have already noticed that you have a lot of beautiful mountains here, they look rugged and strong.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes, it is a hilly area.

The President: I noticed that some of the hills have their tops leveled. Is the flat area being used for agriculture?

General Secretary Brezhnev: I really don’t know about this. But in general, there are a lot of natural disasters in this region. There’s too much water, and floods are a frequent occurrence. This of course affects our soy bean crops.

The President: Is this a good area for hydroelectric plants, since you have so much water here?

General Secretary Brezhnev: No, not really.

The Secretary: But in general, the area east of the Urals has enormous potential.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes. We have done a lot to develop it, but there are still many places with enormous untapped resources. Many areas are still what could be described as virgin land.

The President: Do you have a short crop period in these areas?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, the spring is very short and so is the fall, and a lot depends on the weather.

The President: Is the soil good?

General Secretary Brezhnev: The soil is good, so that provided the weather is normal we can have a good harvest. This year, Siberian crop was not too good, although in the rest of the country it was quite good.

The President: Does spring come late in these areas?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, the spring is rather capricious, sometimes it rains, sometimes it’s very dry and sometimes it snows. But in general, the winter is too long.

The President: We had some serious problems in our country this year because we had a very rainy spring followed by very dry spells. This affected our harvest with respect to wheat, corn and soy beans, so that while the crop turned out good it was not as good as had been expected.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I have studied your agricultural conditions and believe that they are more favorable than ours. Your winter temperature is 5°C on the average, whereas in our country the average winter temperature in certain areas is −30 to 40°C. You have 500 to 600
mm of precipitation in the summer, while we don’t have enough water in a number of areas. Under our current 5-year plan, we are engaged in a major land improvement program. In some areas we are draining the soil while in others, where this is necessary, we are putting in irrigation facilities.

The President: I see you are very well informed about our agricultural conditions. We, too, are seeking to improve them through more effective use of fertilizers, by expanding agriculture in areas where land is still unused, and by irrigation. As a result, we expect to create very fertile areas in Arizona, California, Utah and Montana, where thus far many areas had been without water and completely arid.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In Central Asia, all the water they have comes from irrigation. In that area, cotton is the primary crop, and this year they had great problems with water supply. Nevertheless, they produced a record harvest this year. 5.4 million tons of cotton were produced in Uzbekistan alone, and the total cotton crop was 8 million tons.

The President: As far as our agriculture is concerned, about 65 to 75% is without irrigation. However, we are expanding irrigation and also improving the soil through more effective fertilizers.

Mr. General Secretary, I would like to ask you how you would like us to proceed in our discussions. I have been looking forward to meeting you, and perhaps you would like us to expand our personal acquaintance. On the other hand, there are some subjects which we could usefully discuss in either a smaller or larger group.

General Secretary Brezhnev: This depends on the two of us. I don’t think we should limit ourselves to any narrow scope of issues. At the same time, we should be realistic and recognize that we cannot cover everything. So I would suggest that we discuss our general relations, then further measures concerning strategic arms limitation, and finally some international questions. I am sure that you, Mr. President, are familiar with many issues and with our position on them through Dr. Kissinger. I believe this will facilitate our discussion. Some issues probably cannot be solved immediately. This will make Dr. Kissinger very happy, because he always gets some special pleasure out of the fact that there are still some problems to be resolved.

The Secretary: Well, I’ve never seen Leningrad, and now that my wife has confirmed its existence, I will need a reason for visiting the Soviet Union and trying to see it at long last.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Any of the issues we shall touch upon affects not only our two countries but also the world at large. World public opinion clearly expects positive solutions from us, and we must find such solutions. It is not a matter of you or me personally, but history itself has brought about a situation where the United States and
the Soviet Union are the two most powerful countries, both militarily and economically. It is clear that the world is looking at us, and that world public opinion is most interested in the question of peace, the question of how to ensure that there will be no nuclear war.

The Secretary: The General Secretary is always so eloquent that I find myself nodding even before I have understood the entirety of his remarks.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let us speak not as diplomats but as human beings. Both you and I fought in World War II. That war was child’s play as compared to nuclear war.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I agree with you in two respects. First, I agree fully with the agenda you have suggested. Certain issues we might want to discuss in a more restricted group, and I do hope that we will discuss strategic arms limitations. I also agree that what our two countries do diplomatically or militarily is of tremendous importance for the rest of the world. What has been achieved in US-Soviet relations in the last three years is a great tribute to you, my predecessor, and both his and your associates. I want you to know that our foreign policy will be a continuation of the policy pursued by President Nixon. I believe in it and its beneficial effect not only on our respective constituencies but on the entire world. World War II experiences were hard, but you are so right in saying that the consequences of a nuclear war would be incomparable. They would be indeed unbelievable. Thus, we have responsibility for our two countries, but we also have to look at the world at large.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Thank you for your kind remarks, Mr. President. I would also like to thank you for the message you sent me when you took office. I, and my colleagues as well, were very happy that the American policy of 1972 would be continued. Dr. Kissinger also told me this on your behalf, but now this must be shown through deeds. The world is looking at us, and we must not disappoint it and act in such a way as to safeguard peace. I wouldn’t want to discuss secondary issues but only those of major importance. We have a number of differences, for example, as regards ideology. But Mr. Nixon and I agreed at the very outset on one thing—not to interfere in each other’s internal affairs. We like our system and you like yours, and we hold this principle of non-interference sacred. We appreciate your evaluation of what has been achieved. We too believe that a good foundation has been laid. This was not only a matter of personal respect—although this also played a role, and I wouldn’t want to hide the fact

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3 Document 4.
that there was personal affinity between me and Mr. Nixon—but we also proceeded from the standpoint of world interests.

The President: I know that Mr. Nixon and you had very warm personal relations. I saw him for eight minutes recently, when he was very ill. He was most interested in the issues facing our country, especially those in the area of foreign policy. He asked me to convey to you his best wishes, and he hoped very strongly that I would continue a foreign policy that would fit the pattern of the past several years. I assured him that I would convey his greetings and that I would pursue the policy he had initiated, a policy that has the broadest implications not only for our peoples but for the entire world.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Thank you very much, Mr. President. When he ceased being president and you were already in office, he sent me a very cordial letter in which he indicated very warm feelings about you and assured me that you would pursue a policy that would be of the same spirit as his. I appreciated the difficulty of his situation and was therefore particularly grateful that he had found strength to send me this letter.

As regards our agenda, let me say first that we endeavor to abide scrupulously by our 1972 agreements. One of the most important issues we have to address is further limitation of strategic arms. We spent a lot of time on this issue with Dr. Kissinger. Off the record, I am of the opinion that we have proceeded incorrectly, along a wrong course. We have not achieved any real limitation, and in fact we have been spurring the arms race further and further. That is wrong. Tomorrow science can present us with inventions we cannot even imagine today, and I just don’t know how much farther we can go in building up so-called security. This does not mean that I am not prepared to discuss numbers or levels, but I do want to say that this arms race is fraught with great danger. Today we may have new submarines, tomorrow missiles launched from the air, and, who knows, maybe the day after tomorrow the arms race will reach even outer space. The people don’t know all the details, otherwise they would really give us hell. We are spending billions on all these things, billions that would be much better spent for the benefit of the people.

The President: I am interested, Mr. General Secretary, in your statesmanlike approach to this problem and I think we could talk in

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4 On November 1, during a campaign trip to California, Ford visited Nixon at a hospital in Long Beach, where the former President was recovering from surgery for a blood clot in his leg and massive internal bleeding.

this broader context at a later time. But I believe it important at this meeting to discuss these issues in specific terms and step by step. I think our proposal and your counterproposal could be a good basis for continuing the legacy of the 1972 agreement. I believe that what we should concentrate on is the building block of the Interim Agreement and move forward from it. I would be very pleased also to discuss the broader matter which you raised and which I believe is of worldwide interest. In my view, it is important not only to develop a relationship between ourselves such as the warm relationship between you and President Nixon—and this is the way I intend to proceed in the context of our conditions and political situation—but I also think that we have some things before us that are quite specific. Hopefully not only as regards strategic arms limitation but also in broader international affairs we can come to a meeting of the minds that would be beneficial to our two countries and to the rest of the world as well.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am prepared to discuss all questions frankly and straightforwardly. It is very hard to discuss issues that are not clear. As to my personal relationship with you, Mr. President, I have nothing but respect and best feelings for you.

The President: I fully reciprocate, Mr. General Secretary.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Thank you. In any event, it is Kissinger who is to blame for all the problems we have.

The Secretary: That’s true. I love to come to Moscow, where I get so well fed and taken care of.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes, I noticed that you love pirozhki.

The Secretary: Well, I’ve gained 25 pounds as a result of détente.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I don’t notice that you have gained weight.

The President: I think we have sugar shortage because of Dr. Kissinger.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Anyway, sugar prices are going up. Mr. President, I remember Mr. Nixon’s words at the very outset of his visit in 1972. We had a short tête-à-tête conversation which I will attempt to reproduce. He said that as regards our different systems he liked his and I liked mine, but that the main question was to secure peace. He then said that we had accumulated such amounts of weapons as enabled us to destroy each other seven or ten times over. I understood what he meant, and this is the way we proceeded. But now the situation appears different. It seems to me that we are departing

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from this approach and are whipping up the arms race. I would be prepared to discuss this matter. The Middle East problem is also likely to prove difficult for both of us. Dr. Kissinger will remember that while in San Clemente I talked with Mr. Nixon all night and told him that we had to prevent another war in the area. But then war did break out, and not because we or you wanted this to happen. Now it may break out again, and it will be hard to stop. So we must find a way to solve this situation. If we don’t, it will come back to us, if not to me personally then to someone else who will be in my position.

The President: I fully agree that the Middle East situation is a most volatile one and causing great concern. It has all the elements of a most serious situation dangerous for peace. War can recur and we should discuss this problem. But perhaps we should approach the issues before us on a one-by-one basis. Perhaps today, after dinner, we could discuss strategic arms limitation and then tomorrow the Middle East. Also, tonight we could discuss in a more restricted group the broader issue I mentioned earlier.

I should tell you, Mr. General Secretary, and you may have already heard this from your Ambassador and Foreign Minister, that I intend to be a candidate in 1976. I believe it most important, therefore, to have coordination of our foreign policies, coordination which I am convinced benefits not only the United States and the USSR but also the entire world. I am apprehensive that if others were elected the policy of 72–76 could be undercut. I believe the American people support this policy and intend to continue it.

The Secretary: The Soviet Union is working for Jackson, because Mondale withdrew after his visit to Moscow.

The President: I was wondering about that too.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Mondale didn’t link his withdrawal with his visit to Moscow.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I didn’t meet with Mondale.

Ambassador Dobrynin: That’s why he withdrew.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I’m for Jackson.

The Secretary: Our intelligence reports say so.

The President: Seriously, I believe that in the time before ’76 we can build on the policy of the preceding several years. My objective is to

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7 See footnote 5, Document 64.
8 Senator Walter Mondale (Democrat, Minnesota) met in Moscow with Kosygin on November 14 and with Gromyko on November 15. The Embassy reported the highlights of these meetings in telegram 17371 from Moscow, November 16. (National Archives, RG 59, Entry 5339, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, Nov–Dec 1974) Mondale announced on November 21 his withdrawal from consideration for the 1976 Presidential nomination of the Democratic Party.
have our policy fully supported by the American people. In our system, people such as Senator Jackson have the right to disagree, but I believe the American people wish us to pursue our present course. If we can agree in this 75–76 period, there will be better chances for continuing our policy until 1980. If we fail to agree, such chances will diminish. I also want to point out that 1975 is a crucial year, because an election year is not the best time for the US President to engage in some serious negotiations. This is why I stress the importance of 1975.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That seems to be true. According to the press, the people are interested in our two countries establishing a good relationship. Much will depend on what we do to strengthen confidence not only between us two but also between our two peoples. In this connection, I would like to note, perhaps off the record, the public utterances of your Secretary of Defense during his recent visit to the FRG. In his statement, he talked about introducing into the FRG two brigades with nuclear weapons. We didn’t say anything, but our people did notice this development and are now wondering what their leadership is doing when arms aimed against our country are being increased. How should one explain this—on the one hand, we speak of détente and, on the other hand, we see such actions. How can one reconcile this? There are, of course, also other things happening which I don’t want to mention now, but this is a living example of such things. It is really difficult to understand why such things are done. Recently, Schmidt was here. He has his own views on the question of troops, and I did not raise the issue with him.

The President: Such statements are obviously ill-advised. As to actual facts, I would personally discuss this with the Secretary of Defense and strongly tell him that public statements of this kind are not conducive to solution of matters we want to resolve, such as strategic arms limitation. In this connection, Mr. General Secretary, it seems to me that there are also other issues, for example MBFR, which we should discuss, although perhaps not on this occasion but later. I believe MBFR is an important issue. If we succeed in resolving it, that will counter such statements as the one you referred to.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The basic point is that the foundation of our policy is that we do not intend to attack anyone. We do not lay claim to a single piece of territory anywhere. But we are constantly compelled to talk about new bases, a brigade here, a brigade with nu-

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9 Schlesinger visited West Germany November 4–6, meeting in Bonn with Schmidt and West German Minister of Defense Georg Leber. During a German television interview on November 4, he addressed U.S. troop levels and military equipment, including the arming of two brigades with tactical nuclear weapons. The Embassy reported his remarks in telegram 17424 from Bonn, November 6. (Ibid., Central Foreign Policy Files)
clear warheads there. So we have to react; it is a protective reaction, as it were. As a result, we are becoming belligerent ourselves. I told Dr. Kissinger at one point that we are prepared to have a referendum on our foreign policy and that I am sure that it will obtain the fullest support of our people.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, public speeches and comments for the press are not helpful for our efforts to solve important issues. Our discussion over the past hour and a half has been very helpful in that it lays the foundation for our further talks on specific issues. I am very pleased to have met you and I believe that after this preliminary discussion we can proceed to specific, and I hope constructive, negotiations on the issues before us.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I also enjoyed meeting you, Mr. President, and share your hope as regards our further talks.

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91. Memorandum of Conversation

Vladivostok, November 23, 1974, 6:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US: The President
The Secretary of State
Ambassador Stoeessel
Mr. Sonnenfeldt
General Scowcroft
Mr. Hyland
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR: General Secretary Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Aleksandrov, Special Assistant to Brezhnev
Mr. Kornienko, Chief, USA Division, MFA
Mr. Oleg Sokolov, USA Division, MFA
General Mikhail M. Kozlov, Soviet General Staff
Mr. Makarov, Assistant to Gromyko
Mr. Detinov, Member of the CPSU Central Committee Staff
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreting)

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov–Dec 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held in the Okeanskaya Sanatorium, near Vladivostok. Sonnenfeldt's handwritten notes of the meeting are ibid., Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
General Secretary Brezhnev: You know, Mr. President, we were just mentioning Pepsi Cola and this reminds me of the fact that when Mr. Kendall was here he gave me a belt with a Pepsi Cola buckle.

The Secretary: You should wear that belt with the two colts you have.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, did you have lunch?

The President: Yes, thank you. I had a very light lunch.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We’ll have more to eat tonight. There’s all the more reason for doing so because I see that Dr. Kissinger has lost so much weight.

The President: I’m looking forward to it, thank you. Incidentally, I see no sweets on the table for Dr. Kissinger.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We’ll have some brought in, so as to keep Dr. Kissinger busy and thus prevent him from interfering with our talks. You know, the more I meet with Dr. Kissinger the better I get to know him. In fact, I have here a whole dossier on him.

The Secretary: They used to say of Dewey, who was running for President at one time, that one could not dislike him until one got to know him.

The President: Dewey would have been a good President, but he never made it.

The Secretary: He was a good lawyer, but not a very good politician.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes, he was not a very clever politician.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, to open the discussion, I would like to recall what was said during our last conversations with Dr. Kissinger. First, we want friendly, stable, and mutually advantageous relations with the United States. Not only I but our entire party, government, and all of our people want friendly relations with the United States. What is required to achieve this is that we, our governments, do everything in our power to ensure that things proceed in that direction regardless of what some people may say or write. During the past several years, I had numerous conversations with different US personalities except, of course, Jackson.

The President: I have also had differences with Senator Jackson.

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General Secretary Brezhnev: I may be mistaken but my firm impression is that American businessmen, congressmen and other personalities I’ve talked to want good, businesslike relations with the Soviet Union.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, this is the consensus of all the American people, including businessmen, the majority in Congress, and the American people at large. I would like to reaffirm what you said about your last discussion with Dr. Kissinger.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I would like to return to our conversation on the train.³ It was perhaps somewhat disorganized, but let me return to it just the same. We want to respect, value, and even assist the President who wants to continue the American policy vis-à-vis the USSR pursued over the past several years. Therefore, we promptly responded to the letter you sent us.⁴ We will continue our policy of friendly relations with the U.S. This was the second point I made to Dr. Kissinger. Thirdly, we will do all we can to prevent war from ever breaking out between our two countries. My fourth point is that the interim agreement on limiting strategic arms remains in force until 1977, with each party observing it faithfully. A further point is that our next meeting should produce an agreement on strategic arms limitations until 1985, an agreement that would show our peoples and the entire world that we are pursuing a course of not only limiting but also reducing strategic arms. I mention only these points of our discussion with Dr. Kissinger at that time, although there were other points as well. But it is these points that I wish to emphasize now. Dr. Kissinger was in agreement with us and said that our suggestions contained much that was reasonable and that could be taken as basis for a future agreement. We did not discuss the domestic situation in our countries. When we come to other questions, I will tell you what we said on them in our meeting with Dr. Kissinger.

As regards strategic arms limitation, we believe that the best variant would be to prolong the duration of the present agreement. Frankly speaking, however, on this point we had arguments with Dr. Kissinger. We raised the question of how the forward based systems should be dealt with, but we finally agreed to leave that issue aside. As a result, we ended our discussions with Dr. Kissinger by agreeing in principle on certain points which I’m sure Dr. Kissinger has faithfully reported to you. But since this is a very serious matter we also decided

³ See Document 90.
⁴ Documents 81 and 67, respectively.
to send you in writing what we thought we had agreed upon with Dr. Kissinger.\textsuperscript{5}

The President: Mr. General Secretary, what you have just recounted was reported to me by Dr. Kissinger. May I say, and this goes back to my comment on the train, that it seems to me that we have made substantial progress since 1972, and that we have momentum for further progress. It is important to determine if we should follow this momentum or stop it and proceed along a different path. As far as we are concerned, we are generally optimistic. Therefore, before I left Washington, I deferred certain decisions regarding our defense budget so as to see first how our present discussions will end. I would prefer to base my decisions concerning the defense budget for the next year and the following years on a successful outcome of our discussions. Otherwise, obviously I will have no choice but to make different decisions. In this connection, it must be recognized that we must proceed on the basis of the specific political situation in the United States. As your Ambassador and Foreign Minister probably have told you, an agreement to be acceptable must be based on the principle of equivalence. Anything different would be politically impossible in the United States. But the proposition you gave Dr. Kissinger and our counter suggestions fit in that pattern. If we were to reach agreement we could gather such momentum for 1975, '76 and '77 that would permit me to continue the movement in our general relations with the Soviet Union. This would be in the best interests not only of our two countries but also of the entire world. But if the possibility for agreement in principle exists, then this momentum is irresistible.

Dr. Kissinger just indicated to me that our last proposal had been transmitted to you.\textsuperscript{6} I believe that the combination of your and our suggestions gives us a foundation on which to build future negotiations.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, a basis exists, but the latest U.S. suggestions make the United States' position as we discussed it in Moscow more stiff. That is the situation.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The United States' position has stiffened on a number of points.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, it is perhaps true that our point regarding the last 200 missiles makes a stronger position, but as I indicated earlier, in order to make an agreement politically acceptable and to satisfy our experts it is essential to include those 200 missiles and

\textsuperscript{5} See footnote 3, Document 74.

make the aggregate number 2400 for both sides. It is extremely important for me, in order to get full support for an agreement from Congress and the American people, that we have numerical equivalents as indicated in our latest proposal handed to Ambassador Dobrynin.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Throughout our discussions on this subject, your side spoke all the time about heavy missiles. But both your side and ours are permitted under the existing agreement to improve their missiles within the limits of the diameter of existing silos, although they are prohibited from making new silos. It would not be entirely forthright on your part if you were to deny that the United States is converting its medium-size missiles into heavy ones within the 10 to 15% limit allowed under the agreement, but also even beyond that limit. On the other hand, what we are doing does not involve any widening of the silos. As a matter of fact, in modernizing our missiles—including the so-called heavy ones—in many instances we are even making the silos narrower. Thus we are fully abiding by the agreement.

The Secretary: But you are making your silos deeper.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I don’t know if our silos are being made deeper or shallower. What we have talked about was only that the silos shouldn’t be widened, and certainly not beyond the 10 to 15% limitation.

The Secretary: We have made no accusation that you are violating the agreement as regards the width of the silos.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We know it for a fact that you are converting medium missiles into heavy ones. We have remained silent, however, because we believe that you are entitled to do so under the provisions regarding modernization.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I want to assure you that we are acting in every respect strictly in accordance with the existing agreement. I can assure you of this with full responsibility because I was personally involved in this matter.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Thank you, but I don’t really need your assurances because you can see what we are doing and we can see what you are doing.

The Secretary: It is incorrect to say that we have heavy missiles, at least in comparison with Soviet missiles. But such missiles are bound to appear if the Soviet programs continue.

General Secretary Brezhnev: As you know, we agreed not to build any more heavy missiles. This whole issue arose because of the fact that with respect to MIRVs the United States was somewhat ahead of us. The question was what to do after ’77. The United States would have completed its own program whereas we would be continuing to build our MIRVs. Dr. Kissinger should be honest about this.
The Secretary: I don’t think that was the main issue. It is true that we were temporarily ahead of the Soviet Union as regards MIRVs. It is also true, however, that the Soviet Union can very soon deploy its MIRVs and even accelerate such deployment. It is incorrect to say that we cannot continue MIRVing after ’77. We could also continue MIRVing a number of missiles every year. The fact is that any agreement we reach with the Soviet Union will make it possible for the Soviet Union to reach parity regarding MIRVs and would therefore be criticized in the United States. Nevertheless, the President has authorized a proposal on this basis because he wants to put a lid on the arms race. There’s no law that we must stop in 1977. We have 450 Minutemen we could put MIRVs on and we could continue this process indefinitely.

General Secretary Brezhnev: And what are we supposed to do? We could do the same!

The Secretary: Of course. We believe that the basic point in the proposal we gave you is that it offers the Soviet Union the possibility to reach equality regarding MIRVs. Also, as I explained to Ambassador Dobrynin, our proposals would put a ceiling on most of our current programs—MIRVs, B–1’s, and Tridents. So even if we are ahead in one field or another, during the period of the agreement the Soviet Union will be able to catch up with the United States.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I don’t see how.

The Secretary: You don’t see what?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Equality.

The Secretary: Well, the Soviet Union would have the right to have 1320 MIRVed missiles by 1985, and we believe that you could easily accomplish that by 1985.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, even if there is a differential at the present time, there’s nothing we can do at this table to change the situation. But we believe that the Soviet Union has the capability to catch up quickly with the United States and eliminate this MIRV differential. We don’t want such differential.

(Long pause, with Brezhnev looking very pensive.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: Under the United States proposal, you would have the right to build new silos, although you have the possibility of placing heavier missiles in existing silos and also building additional 180 heavy missiles. Moreover, when we discussed the Trident and Typhoon programs, we started with three for each side, but then the number of 12 appeared. That means 288 launchers.

Ambassador Dobrynin: The latest proposal is for 10 submarines, which would mean 240 launchers.
The Secretary: One should keep in mind, however, that these 288 launchers would be counted against the total MIRV level and the aggregate of 2400 launchers. So what we are talking about is certain levels and organization of our forces. This has to do with some analysis in Washington, where it was felt this was needed. On the question of 180 new ICBM’s, you are right that careful reading of our proposal suggests that, but we have no such intentions.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Your formulation isn’t very clear.

The Secretary: The Secretary General is correct in reading our text, but we can refine this formulation to make it clear that we have in mind only such new missiles as would fit in the existing silos permitted under the current agreement and that there would be no new silos. Thus, the United States would in effect have no heavy missiles.

(Turning to Dobrynin, Gromyko said that the United States would probably deepen its silos. Dobrynin replied that deepening the silos was permitted in the Interim Agreement but Gromyko maintained that such a proposition should not be accepted.)

The Secretary: Let me make this clear once again. I agree, Mr. General Secretary, that your interpretation is reasonable, but we are not asking for the right to build 180 heavy missiles. We will not build 180 new holes. What we may do within the Interim Agreement is put heavier missiles in the existing holes during the duration of that agreement. In any event, we would not build weapons of the SS–9 or SS–18 category—and given my previous experiences I’m now leery of describing Soviet weapons—during the duration of the agreement.

(A lengthy consultation on the Soviet side of the table, with General Kozlov drawing diagrams for Brezhnev to explain how the U.S. is deepening its silos.)

(In a further exchange among members of the Soviet group, Dobrynin and Kornienko explained to Brezhnev that the United States formulation was misleading but that it had now been clarified. Brezhnev argues that the Soviets could see the silos and the missiles but not the number of warheads on the missile. Dobrynin—and Gromyko, who now seemed to understand the U.S. proposition—pointed out that the number of warheads was not an issue and repeated that the U.S. side had now clarified the meaning of its formulation. Brezhnev said that in that case the Soviets could agree. Gromyko and Dobrynin commented that on this point they could. General Kozlov then drew a diagram for Brezhnev to explain how heavier Soviet missiles can fit in existing silos, pointing out that this involved reducing the gap between the top of the missile and the silo cover. Brezhnev then got a lengthy briefing from Aleksandrov but its contents could not be overheard.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, Dr. Kissinger, what do your calculations tell you?
The Secretary: That we are in bad shape.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I just wanted to offer you some tea, but now you’ll get just plain water.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps we should turn to stronger drinks.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In Moscow, I thought we were coming closer to reality but now I see that the United States position is stiffening.

The Secretary: In practice, we are close to what was discussed in Moscow. My instructions then were not to accept any MIRVed heavy missiles but then the General Secretary gave me in a private conversation some figure which he said could serve as a basis for agreement. I believe that we are close to what was then discussed. Our amendments to the Soviet proposition do not affect the situation as regards the aggregate number of launchers or the level of MIRVs.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let us have some tea, or else these military men will take us God knows where.

The President: I’m scared of all these calories.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Don’t worry, one day you eat too much, another day you eat less, so the weight stays the same.

The President: Unfortunately, it doesn’t even out.

General Secretary Brezhnev: My weight doesn’t change.

The Secretary: I believe you’ve lost some weight since two years ago.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Then I weighed 82 kilograms, and now I weigh 79 kilograms.

The Secretary: That’s what I would like to achieve.

Ambassador Dobrynin: By 1985?

General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s easy to do. Just add 400 missiles and Dr. Kissinger will become skinny right away.

Mr. President, the reason I have been meditating is that we’ve been saying that we want to limit strategic arms and that in so doing we should have that many MIRVs, that high an aggregate, etc., whereas what we should be doing is ensure mutual security. I remember Dr. Kissinger telling me in one of our conversations that once the United States detected one Soviet missile with three warheads, it assumed that all Soviet missiles had three warheads. In fact, I think Dr. Kissinger even talked about five warheads. But this is not so. Moreover, as an experienced man, Dr. Kissinger must know that if one were to put five warheads on a missile, one would lose some of its range because of the added weight. Also, you are paying very little attention to what we said
regarding the geographic factor and the forward based systems. They
do exist and should be taken into account.

(Dobrynin prompted Brezhnev to mention the strategic capabilities
of third countries as well.)

The Secretary: Maybe I did not make myself entirely clear, maybe I
spoke in my professorial way. What I meant was that if we detect a
MIRVed missile—we don’t care if it has three or 23 warheads—we
have to count it as a MIRVed missile regardless of the number of war-
heads. Perhaps that number is 3 today and will be 23 tomorrow, de-
pending on the purpose of the missile. You said that our MIRVed mis-
siles have 12 warheads. This may be true theoretically, but in practice it
is not. We distinguish between single-warhead and MIRVed missiles. If
it is a single missile we don’t care about the weight, if it is a MIRVed
one, we don’t care about the number of warheads.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Not every missile can carry the same
number of warheads.

The Secretary: We are not counting warheads, only missiles. Nor
are we prescribing how many warheads there should be on each
MIRVed missile.

The President: Perhaps we should arrange for something on a
somewhat different basis. Today the Soviet Union has a throw weight
that is greater than ours. Perhaps we should base our concept on this
factor.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We tried but nothing came out of it.

The Secretary: The basic concept is that we are counting MIRVed
missiles but not the number of warheads on such missiles.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Correct, but MIRV warheads cannot
be counted anyway. The basic point is that we are not allowed to widen
our silos. I can assure you, and perhaps I should take you somewhere
to show you, that we are not widening our silos even by one centimeter.
In fact, we are making them narrower.

The Secretary: But you are deepening them?

General Secretary Brezhnev: No, we are using a different principle.

The President: We have both assured each other that the agree-
ment is not being violated.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I must say that in the initial stage the
United States acted with greater foresight than we did. You have Min-
utemen in silos that are 25 meters deep. Since the missile is only 18
meters long, there is five meters left. (sic) So what you are doing is
using that extra space for an enlarged engine. As a result, you’ve got a
new missile without changing the silo. Your missile used to weigh 35
tons and now it weighs 120 tons. What should that missile be called—
light, medium or heavy? Outwardly, you don’t violate the agreement,
but in effect you have a new missile, and this makes a tremendous difference that cannot be swept under the rug. At first you were bashful and put nettings over your silos—Dr. Kissinger said that this was to protect cement from rain while it was drying—but now you’ve stopped doing that. Nevertheless, the difference between 35 and 135 tons (sic) is there. But we are not complaining, because if we have agreed that modernization is allowed, so be it. In fact, however, the United States is gaining advantage, not to speak of the fact that you don’t want to take account of the forward based systems. You say that France is out of NATO, but it is us and not you whom French missiles can reach. We want to make the Mediterranean a sea of peace, and you reject that proposal. Nor do you want to take account of your bases in Japan. But I don’t want to create an impasse, I want to find a solution. So after my remarks have been translated, let us have a ten-minute break so that both our and your groups could consult. Before we break up, however, I would like to ask why you have suggested the intermediate date of 1984 and not simply 1985.

The Secretary: We have an interim date because, as Ambassador Dobrynin will surely confirm, for internal reasons we will have to show that we have reached equivalence in terms of aggregate levels and MIRV levels. Moreover, our additional 120 missiles would be of inferior quality, not capable of being used against the Soviet Union. In other words, we are giving the Soviet Union a differential for the longest period possible in the context of our domestic situation.

The President: Also, while we are permitting a differential to the Soviet Union, we want that differential to be eliminated by 1985. This differential is a major problem from the standpoint of our domestic situation but I believe the situation will be manageable if equivalency is apparent by 1985. I think it is a good idea to take a 10 or 15-minute break.

(After the break, the meeting reconvened with only the President, the Secretary, and Mr. Akalovsky on the U.S. side, and Brezhnev, Gromyko and Sukhodrev on the Soviet side, in attendance.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger has thought out everything, I’m sure. I have a lot of experience negotiating with him. He always starts by asking too much, but then eats cake and softens up.

The President: I’m glad you told me how to soften up Kissinger.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But sometimes he doesn’t soften up, perhaps when he has had too much cake.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps Dr. Kissinger is angry when he is hungry.

The Secretary: If I eat too much I get sleepy.

General Secretary Brezhnev: In any event, we must look for a solution. I personally and my colleagues both here and Moscow, highly
value your statements that you intend, Mr. President, to continue a policy of improving relations between our two countries. This is very important and we will do everything to support a United States President who wants to follow this course. Now, what could we do after our earlier discussions? After all, we are important world statesmen and should not waste our time arguing over trivia. So perhaps we could agree on 2400 launchers for each of our two sides, provided we get a letter from you regarding the 200 pieces about which Dr. Kissinger has probably reported to you. But by the end of 1985 you will get the full 2400 aggregate. That means that you do not actually build those 200 but by the end of 1985 you will have 2400. I carefully recollected what Dr. Kissinger had told us. Now, how does this look to you?

The Secretary: You say by the end of 1985 we can have 2400. But there has to be a time when we can go ahead, and that’s why we included the date of January 1, 1984. Since we will need one or two years for moving forward, why not make this point in the agreement instead of a letter.

The President: That would be much more preferable.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I don’t know if I understood Dr. Kissinger correctly, but I actually repeated what was said in Moscow.

The Secretary: I know that the General Secretary proposed in Moscow to include 2400 in the agreement but with a letter from the President that we would not have 2400 by 1985. This would be extremely dangerous given the present political situation in the United States. Therefore, we have proposed that since we will have the right to have 2400, we should provide time for building them. This is the reason why we included the interim date in the proposed agreement. In fact, this would be better even from your standpoint because the agreement would go beyond President Ford’s tenure. A letter, on the other hand, would not necessarily be binding on President Ford’s successor. Moreover, since all the important systems will be limited in practice, if you analyze the situation you will see that, in order to reach the 2400 level, we will have to keep some older systems because we will not be able to build new ones by the end of the agreement. In any event, we are accepting disparity for the longest possible time before 1985, given our political situation.

General Secretary Brezhnev: How then should we proceed?

The Secretary: I believe that a letter from the President during a ten-year agreement would be dangerous. It might not bind the future President, especially if the Congress didn’t know about it. So that’s why we are proposing an agreement with a differential for a maximum period of time, in fact even longer.

General Secretary Brezhnev: President Ford should simply stay in office, why should he go?
(Gromyko whispered to Brezhnev that a U.S. President cannot serve three terms.)

The President: Thank you very much. I would certainly be much more interested in a détente that would indeed serve U.S. and Soviet interests rather than in some of the alternatives that are sometimes discussed. Mr. General Secretary, here is our problem. In the United States, there is strong insistence on the part of public opinion, also reflected in the Congress, that we have equivalence in final figures. Therefore, it is of utmost importance to have such equivalence by 1985. If we were to have 2200 until 1983 and you 2400, it would be very difficult to sell this to the American people and Congress. But if we state in the agreement that we can achieve equivalence by 1985, that—coupled with the MIRV differential the Secretary referred to—would make the proposition much more practical and I believe I could convince the Congress and the American people to accept it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, what do you think of a variant that would involve a differential in both launchers and MIRVs?

The Secretary: For the entire period?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes.

The Secretary: I have to tell you honestly that from the strategic standpoint of the United States I would personally prefer it. Speaking very frankly, if we have equal numbers, our last 200 would not be very good systems. They could be used perhaps against China or God knows whom but not the USSR. But from the domestic standpoint such an arrangement would not be possible. The President knows that I had suggested to him the proposition you have just made.

The President: Let me supplement what the Secretary has just said. I agree with him on substance. But have to crank into it the political aspects of the situation, and they involve the question of which administration in Washington can ensure irreversible détente. Without mentioning any names—and you can imagine whom I am talking about—if the United States Government were to accept an agreement on the basis of disparity, that would be extremely difficult to sell to the American people, and in the political environment in Washington such an agreement would be severely criticized. It could be used against me and against détente and could bring in the elections an administration that would not be as committed to pursuing détente on a continuing basis. So I do have to take the political aspects into account.

The Secretary: Besides, we look at this as being two agreements. Until 1983, the Soviet Union would have advantage in launchers and we in MIRVs. After 1983, both sides will reach equivalence in terms of both launchers and MIRVs. But I would like to repeat that some of our systems will be old, for to reach the aggregate level we will have to retain some B–52’s and Polaris submarines.
The President: It really comes down to the point you made, and I agreed to, regarding the need for momentum and irreversibility of détente. In order to achieve this, an administration in Washington like mine, just as the one under Mr. Nixon, has to succeed politically. If one looks at substance, your suggestion makes sense. But our variant takes account of broader political factors, including the need to continue and develop détente.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Mr. President, you say that if the levels were unequal, you would be asked various questions at home. But we, too, would be asked many questions if the agreement were to include the numbers suggested by you. After all, people will say, what about the forward based systems, the United States bases in Europe, the nuclear weapons possessed by France and the UK, the United States fleet with nuclear weapons in the Mediterranean, and the U.S. submarines with nuclear weapons in Western European ports? So we have much more reason to invoke the domestic factor. Our people can ask many questions. Thus, when you invoke such factors you are being one-sided, for we, too, would have to face questions. You should try to see the situation from our standpoint, because these questions would surely be asked of our leaders and certainly of comrade Brezhnev, who would sign the agreement.

General Secretary Brezhnev: This has been a very pleasant conversation, the friendly tone of which I certainly appreciate, and I am very happy to have made your acquaintance. But, unfortunately, no solution has yet been found. And I would like to find it. In Moscow, it seemed as if we had almost agreed, but this stiffening of the United States position seems to be breaking apart everything we had agreed upon.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: The finale in Moscow seemed to indicate that a basis for agreement had been found.

The Secretary: We have accepted your thesis regarding what should happen until 1983. We only ask you to accept a change for the remaining two years for the reasons indicated by the President.

The President: I understand the arguments of Mr. Gromyko. But my understanding of Dr. Kissinger’s conversations with you, Mr. General Secretary, and your Foreign Minister was that the forward based systems would not be included in any agreement. In the spirit of mutual understanding, however, I would be willing to give up our naval base in Rota in 1984. I believe this would meet some of the problems Mr. Gromyko referred to. I must say that I’m doing this with some reluctance—in fact, most reluctantly—but I am taking this step to further détente and to achieve other things we’ve talked about. Of course, you know that this is a nuclear submarine base.

General Secretary Brezhnev: One of the points of principle is that we must agree that neither the Soviet Union nor the United States will
build a single additional silo. We should even discuss reductions, and certainly we must not build any additional ones.

The President: We can agree not to build new silos.

General Secretary Brezhnev: If so, perhaps a solution could be found through a differential between the levels of launchers and MIRVs. This is a very important statement you made, Mr. President.

The President: Of course, Mr. General Secretary, you must understand that our military would much prefer to put new missiles in new silos. But in order to promote and strengthen détente, I am taking a position which does not necessarily accord with that of our military.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I don’t know about your internal procedures in the United States, but in our country the military cannot determine policy. They can determine the doctrine, but policy, including military policy, is decided at the political level. In other words, the military decide what to shoot at while the political leadership decides whether or not to shoot. But it is true that the military always want more.

The President: Do you also have this problem?

General Secretary Brezhnev: The military always want as much as they can get. I don’t think there are any holy people in the military.

The President: If we were to agree not to build additional launching sites would the Soviet Union do the same?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Without any question. Neither side should be allowed to do so.

The President: I just wanted to make this point clear.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Both sides, yours and ours, would be allowed to modernize. You will modernize, and we will also do some modernizing. However, we will not violate the agreement in the process. You are, of course, widening your silos but this is a question of different technology.

The Secretary: May I correct you? We are not widening our silos.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You should not cover your silos with netting! I want to stress that we would not be building any new silos whatsoever. We would not allow any violation of the agreement. When such important issues are involved, we intend to treat our agreement as a gentlemen’s agreement to be observed scrupulously.

The President: I can reaffirm fully Dr. Kissinger’s statement. We have not violated the agreement. I looked into this personally because I had heard allegations to the contrary. In the future, too, we will abide by the agreement 100 percent.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe you. But I have another suggestion. You should convince Dr. Kissinger that we should become
allies in the field of nuclear weapons, and then everything else would fall into place. Then we could make a concession and sign the agreement not here but in Washington. Then there would be no problem about nuclear weapons since we would be allies and our respective allies would also be reassured.

The President: Let’s do it step by step. We are already cooperating in many areas and are doing so even in space. So we never know where we might go.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Our joint strength would suffice for 100 years—I will make a concession and say even 200 years—and there would be no need for any new holes.

The Secretary: As the President said, when we finish this, this is a topic on which we should spend some time.

General Secretary Brezhnev: If we were to reach such an understanding, everything would be clear.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, do I understand correctly that until the end of 1983 we would have 2200 and you 2400 launchers, and that after January 1984 we would go to 2400 and reach that level by 1985? Given the MIRV differential that would be easy to get approved. There would also be no new silos and no widening of existing silos. It seems that we agree on everything, that there is nothing more to do.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I have a question. How can you reach 2400 by 1985 without building new silos?

The Secretary: Let me explain this to you. It is a very good question, because we ourselves had to think it out. What we would do is slightly delay our Trident and B–1 programs. Because if we were to put these in before ’83, we would have to take out some B–52’s and Polaris submarines. Then, after 1983, we would increase the B–1 and Trident systems and keep some B–52’s and Polaris.

The President: Which are older systems!

(Following an inaudible conversation between Brezhnev and Gromyko, the former excused himself and left the room.)

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Dr. Kissinger you are going to China. Will you brief the Chinese on our discussions?

The Secretary: That depends on you. Any success here will make them unhappy. But I will not tell them anything beyond what’s published here.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Your answer makes sense. Another question. Do you believe that Japan will sign a treaty with China?

The Secretary: Perhaps. But I want to tell you that we ourselves would view with great misgivings close relations between China and Japan. I’ve already talked with Ambassador Dobrynin about this. Perhaps we can discuss this further next spring. A combination of
Japan and China would be a very unhappy one, because it could acquire racial overtones. Do you agree?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes, I do.

The President: Dr. Kissinger has discussed this problem with me.

The Secretary: What we should keep in mind is not tactics. Tactical problems, such as Cyprus, for example, will solve themselves. But this issue—I have discussed this with President Ford when we were in Japan now—is of historical, not tactical significance.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Will Tanaka resign?

The Secretary: Yes. Quite frankly, we know that he will resign within 48 hours of President Ford’s departure from here.

(There followed a brief exchange between the Secretary and Gromyko on who was most likely to succeed Tanaka.)

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Do we understand correctly that, as the President seems to have indicated to Dobrynin in Washington, that the United States favors expansion of economic cooperation between the Soviet Union and Japan? I’ve in mind such things as gas and oil exploration, etc. Or was that just an off-the-cuff remark?

The President: That is correct. Incidentally, I seem to have read in one of the newspapers that you have reached agreement with one of our companies on an arrangement involving the Export-Import Bank.

The Secretary: That agreement has not yet been consummated. But in principle we favor such arrangements and the Senate will have to be turned around on this issue after the Trade Bill is passed.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Will you embrace Chou En-lai?

The Secretary: I do that only to the Arabs. I’m told I’ll see him, but he is ill.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Do you know the new Foreign Minister?

The Secretary: Yes. He’s a very close collaborator of Chou, and he is a very intelligent man.

The President: I met him in 1972.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: China is a big boiling pot.

The Secretary: It is really hard to figure out who is doing what to whom there. During my last visit there, I told Chou at dinner something philosophical about Confucius and he got excited, which he seldom does.

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7 Miki Takeo replaced Tanaka Kakuei as Japanese Prime Minister on December 9.
8 Presumably a reference to their August 14 meeting. See Document 12.
9 Qiao Guanhua replaced Ji Pengfei as Chinese Foreign Minister on November 15.
Foreign Minister Gromyko: This subject has been so artificially pulled in that it is obvious it is being used for personal rather than ideological purposes.

The Secretary: Frankly speaking, I believe that what Mao is pursuing is modern day Confucianism. Confucian ethics call for regulation of every aspect of human life, and so does Mao to fit his ethics. I’m going to China, but I don’t know whom I’m going to talk to over there. Perhaps Teng. Incidentally, do you know anything about how Lin-Piao died? Was he dead before the plane crashed, was the plane shot down?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Generally, the circumstances were quite mysterious, but it seems clear that the plane simply crashed.

The Secretary: Lin-Piao was not a special friend of the Soviet Union, was he?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, when we knew him, he was rather friendly to us.

(At this point Brezhnev returned to the room.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: I’m very sorry, this was a forced pause in our discussion. What is the time in Washington now?

The Secretary: 8:00 a.m. Saturday.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When do you normally get up, Dr. Kissinger?

The Secretary: I normally get up at seven and go to bed at one. I want you to know, Mr. General Secretary, that now everything is settled, because while you were out, Gromyko agreed to everything.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, Gromyko is very unreliable, he softens up too easily.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But Dr. Kissinger told me that after his trip to China our relations would improve radically. So how could I resist?

General Secretary Brezhnev: I feel sorry for Dr. Kissinger. He constantly travels all over the world to improve relations. Isn’t he tired of that?

Well, Mr. President, what can we do? I fully appreciate the fact that your internal situation differs from ours, but I would also be asked questions, such as why there is no equal degree of security. So let’s do it this way—we’ve had a tranquil discussion and obviously we can’t settle everything in two days. What we should do, however, is attempt to agree in principle on the following: 2400 launchers for you and 2400

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10 Lin Biao, once Mao Zedong’s heir apparent, was killed in an airplane crash in Mongolia on September 21, 1971.
for us; 1320 MIRVed missiles for you and 1320 MIRVed missiles for us. With Mr. Nixon, we proceeded from the premise that we should do everything on the basis of equality. In fact, we even delivered our speeches and wrote our papers on that basis. Both you and we could easily explain this to our peoples. Of course, it is always possible that some people will nitpick, but it will be difficult to argue against such complete equality of security. In any event, these figures are of no practical significance to you because we don’t intend ever to attack you. But from the standpoint of military concept, nothing better can be devised. So let’s agree and have dinner.

The Secretary: Certainly. But would the 2400 figure be for the entire duration of the agreement? Because a side letter would be impossible.

The President: So 2400 and 2400 for launchers and 1320 and 1320 for MIRVs. But do you have in mind to get there at any time during the agreement?

General Secretary Brezhnev: After ’77.

The President: As far as your comment about your intentions, we also do not want to attack the USSR. What we want is to cooperate.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Under this proposal, there would be no need for a letter, because the ceiling could be reached at any time until 1985. Both you and we will reach the levels of 2400 and 1320 during that period. So you can return and report to your people that you have reached agreement on the basis of full equality.

The Secretary: No other restrictions?

General Secretary Brezhnev: None. I’ve always said—and we have a record of that—that the primary question is not that of missiles, that the main point is peaceful cooperation between our two countries. So in any communiqué we might write, we should start with this cardinal point and then go down to this specific issue. We want to write this tomorrow, and we could state that by June or July next year both sides will finalize an agreement based on the principle of equal security. Then President Ford could return home with achievements no less important than those Mr. Nixon had brought back. But I want to add that neither side would be allowed to build new silos, except for such modification of the existing silos as is allowed under the Interim Agreement.

The Secretary: Under these conditions I believe a separate document on SALT should be put out.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Agree. Then the world would see that our intention is to strengthen peace and not to whip up the arms race.

The Secretary: May I ask a few questions? How about limitation on B–1 bombers to 250—do we retain this?
General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe we should discuss aircraft separately. You would be allowed to build B–1 bombers but they would have to count against the ceiling.

The Secretary: No sub-limit? You remember, Mr. General Secretary, that we had talked in a preliminary way about restricting B–1’s to 250, Trident launchers to 288, and MIRVed heavy missiles to 180.

(Gromyko prompted Brezhnev to the effect that there should be complete freedom to mix.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: It seems that we will have to discuss this separately, for it appears that you will need more aircraft or Tridents to reach the ceiling. Also, we must discuss aircraft from the standpoint of whether they will carry one or ten missiles. As to submarine and land-based launchers, there would be full freedom to mix for both sides. Both the United States and the USSR would also be free to MIRV either submarine or land-based missiles as they wish. Regarding aircraft, it is obvious that an aircraft with one missile is different from an aircraft with six missiles. If we see six bottles on the table, we cannot say we see only one. So we must distinguish between launchers with single missiles and those with several ones. I shall be happy to inform my colleagues of your intention to dismantle Rota; that will reduce this talk about United States aggressive intentions.

The Secretary: The President said we will do it after 1983.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It should be stated “in” 1983, because “after” could mean the year 2000.

The Secretary: No, what we have in mind is between ’83 and ’85. General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s fine.

The Secretary: How about the limit of 180 for heavy MIRVed missiles? We do not insist on your building them but we want to clarify this point.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: This was in the context of the differential of 200 launchers.

The Secretary: I understand, but I just wanted to clarify this point. Could I suggest a short break?

The President: This has been a very encouraging session.

(After the break, the meeting resumed in the same composition.)

The President: I think we can agree, but we need to have an understanding on two sub-limit problems. It is very hard for us to agree that there be no limit on heavy MIRVed missiles. And, therefore, in return for our concession on this point, we would need your agreement that there be no limitation on bomber armaments. We are making a concession on a very difficult issue, and it would be only fair if you made a concession to us as well. Otherwise, I believe we can agree as regards the aggregate and MIRV levels, that is, 2400 and 1320. If we can agree
on this basis, we would have made great progress in this field and for peace in general. I think that with this kind of agreement and the announcement we would make on it the world would breathe more easily and the heritage of the agreement would be very significant.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I cannot understand one thing. How can we fail to impose limitations regarding bombers? Each missile on aircraft would count against the ceiling, so if you build more bombers, you will have to reduce Tridents, just as we will have to do if we build Typhoons. I think, Mr. President and Dr. Kissinger, we should not discuss aircraft today. In principle, we know that you will build bombers, but we will have to clarify whether they will carry five or ten missiles, which might be the case in a year or so. But we can now reach agreement in principle on levels.

The Secretary: The President did not say there should be no limit on bombers. What he said was that there should be no limit on armaments carried by bombers.

The President: To compare a bomber with a Trident or Typhoon is like comparing apples and oranges. We would consider a bomber as a unit within the 2400 ceiling just as we would consider each Trident missile within that ceiling.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Without taking into consideration the range or the number of missiles on aircraft?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, do you really believe this is a fair proposal?

The Secretary: If there is no limitation on heavy missiles, this is a fair proposal.

The President: To drop limitations on heavy missiles is a great concession on our part but we are prepared to take this risk. However, we believe that there should be compensation and we are therefore asking you to make a similar concession.

General Secretary Brezhnev: You’ll have the right to build aircraft and deploy missiles on them but if there are 10 vehicles on an aircraft, how can you count them as one? This would be very difficult to explain.

The President: But don’t you have the same problem with heavy missiles with greater MIRV capability? And you do have missiles that are heavier than ours and with greater MIRV capability. So there is no equality.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But we have given up the 200 differential on missiles. This is an enormous concession on our part. Before we had 2200 for the United States and 2400 for the Soviet Union. But now we have equal levels, and this is a great concession.

General Secretary Brezhnev: 200 missiles is of major significance.
The President: It is unfortunate that we are getting into arguments back and forth of this kind, but since the Foreign Minister has mentioned your giving up 200 missiles, I can say that we have abandoned the limit on your MIRV capability with respect to heavy missiles. I believe that to reach an understanding, you will have the right to do what you want with heavy missiles. We know they are important to you. But we, for our part, will need flexibility regarding our missiles on aircraft.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Perhaps we are already tired and should resume tomorrow morning.

The President: That would be alright with me.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am really tired. I had a hard day yesterday in Khabarovsk, where we were forced to land because of snowfall here. Do you have any fixed time for departure tomorrow?

The President: I am very flexible.

The Secretary: Whenever the President leaves, he’ll arrive in Washington before he leaves here.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I am going to Mongolia the day after tomorrow.

The Secretary: So we will remain close to each other.

The President: I’ve never been to Mongolia, but I’m sure that in some ways it is more pleasant than Washington, D.C. But we trust you will come to Washington next year—in fact, we are counting on it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I consider myself having been invited and I have responded to that invitation positively.

The President: I’m sure your visit will be a great contribution to the development of détente. So I assume tomorrow morning we’ll continue our discussion of this subject, then take up that separate matter that exists, and then other issues of mutual interest.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Agreed.

The Secretary: I want to mention one thing. I promised to meet briefly with the press after we break up here. I intend to talk about the atmosphere in the spirit of the communique. Would it be appropriate for me also to say that we had a lengthy discussion on strategic arms limitation and have made progress. Our newsmen have something of a problem because in order to make the Sunday papers they have to file now.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s alright with me.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: If Kissinger says more, he’ll have to be punished.

The Secretary: No trip to Leningrad?
Foreign Minister Gromyko: Right.
The Secretary: Well, now that I’m in the East I can slowly move westward.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, I believe that today we should put it in somewhat more modest terms and say something like this: We have discussed the principles for a new strategic arms limitation agreement, the discussion was in a friendly and businesslike atmosphere, and our talks will continue tomorrow.

The Secretary: The communiqué to this effect is already being put out. Our problem is that whatever we say today will be in the Sunday paper and what we say tomorrow won’t appear for a day and a half.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But there’s some advantage in saving good news for the end, it would then have more impact.

The President: Alright, I’m more interested in substance.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We had planned to give a dinner in your honor tonight, but now it’s late in the night so perhaps we could have that dinner before you leave tomorrow afternoon.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: When do we start tomorrow, at 6 a.m.?

The President: Why do you want to begin so late?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Gromyko’s got it. He asked for it.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, again a big concession on my part.

The Secretary: I would like to see Gromyko negotiate with the Israelis.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: It is you who has been depriving me of that pleasure.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Shall we meet at 10 a.m. tomorrow?

The President: Agreed.

(The meeting ended at 35 minutes past midnight.)
92. Memorandum of Conversation

Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, 10:10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US:
The President
The Secretary of State
Mr. Akalovsky

USSR:
General Secretary Brezhnev
Foreign Minister Gromyko
Ambassador Dobrynin
Mr. Sukhodrev (interpreting)

SUBJECT

SALT II, Cyprus, Middle East, CSCE, Trade Bill

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I have consulted with not only Dr. Kissinger but also others. In a spirit of progress in the area of strategic arms limitation as well as other areas in our relations, we considered the various issues before us, including that of bombers. I know you have deep concern about counting ballistic missiles on aircraft. In the spirit of progress in our negotiations and broader aspects of our relations we can agree to count any ballistic missile with the range of over 700 kilometers within the 2400 ceiling. This in effect will mean a serious limitation on our capability to use such systems.

General Secretary Brezhnev: So what you are suggesting is that any ballistic missile over 700 kilometers in range should be counted as one launcher?

The President: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, I have here a small souvenir for you. We also have some more souvenirs elsewhere, but I know that you are a pipe smoker and I thought I would give you this one now. It is a set of pipes and a pipe stand, which I hope you will enjoy.

The President: I will very proudly have this on my desk. I really don’t know how to thank you.

General Secretary Brezhnev: There will also be a souvenir for Mrs. Ford from Mrs. Brezhnev.

The President: Thank you very much. I talked with Mrs. Ford this morning and I told her that we were having very constructive discussions in an excellent atmosphere. She is looking forward to meeting Mrs. Brezhnev in the United States.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov–Dec 1974. Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Drafted by Akalovsky. The meeting was held in the Okeanskaya Sanatorium, near Vladivostok.
General Secretary Brezhnev: For our part, we would be very pleased to see Mrs. Ford in Moscow and we will accord her a very warm welcome when she comes here.

The President: When you come to the United States, I would like to take you to the Merriweather Post Estate in Florida. I’ve never been there myself but I’m told it’s a most beautiful place. It was given by Mrs. Merriweather Post to the American government.

The Secretary: To be used as a government guest house.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, where is your home?

The President: I was born in Nebraska, but the home where I was born has been torn down. I didn’t live in Nebraska too long and spent most of my life in Michigan.

General Secretary Brezhnev: The house in which I was born was an apartment building housing a number of families, including ours. Later, when I was on the City Council in my hometown, I once told that there was a house in very bad repair and that in fact it was a hazard for the fifteen or so families living there. So I went to look at the house and it turned out to be the one I was born in. As I inspected the house, I saw props in the basement to support the first floor, then props on the first floor to support the second floor, and so all the way up to the top floor. When I said let’s get trucks and move out everybody, however, all those families came to me and demanded three room apartments.

The President: When I went to Omaha, Nebraska, I found just an empty lot where my house of birth had been. It had been leveled by a bulldozer.

Mr. General Secretary, I hope you will recognize that over strong objections of many of my people, although not all, I have made a really significant move which is in the spirit of what we want to achieve here. It is a major shift on our part when we agree to include in the aggregate ballistic missiles on aircraft. Frankly, this move is not unanimously approved on our side, but I made this decision myself in order to break the impasse we got into last night after five or six hours of generally constructive talks.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When I went to bed last night, I had difficulty falling asleep and kept thinking about our talks. I thought they had been fruitful and reflected a spirit of frankness and respect, both personal between ourselves and between our two nations. As I was thinking, all kinds of figures came to my mind, although in some respect I believe it is really regrettable that we have to discuss atomic arms at all. Personally, I did not have the impression that we were in an impasse. After all, these issues have many serious implications and we should not make hasty decisions. Last night, we did not specify bombers, we discussed them only in general terms. Today, you put for-
ward an interesting suggestion. What we have in mind is that bombers, specifically the B–1’s, carrying missiles with a range of up to 600 kilometers be counted as one launcher. Bombers carrying missiles with a range from 600 to 3000 kilometers should be counted according to the number of missiles they carry. All bomber-carried missiles over 3000 kilometers should be banned. Perhaps this could resolve this entire problem, and then we could say that we have made a great contribution to détente. I believe this golden medium could solve this problem.

The Secretary: Ambassador Dobrynin is an expert as regards the design of our weaponry.

General Secretary Brezhnev: He’s your chief designer!

Ambassador Dobrynin: What the General Secretary has just suggested is basically what you, too, have in mind; the only difference is whether the lower range should be 600 or 700 kilometers.

General Secretary Brezhnev: This would be a beautiful solution, especially for your side.

The Secretary: If we abolish the B–1, it would sound even better!

The President: Mr. General Secretary, a total ban on anything over 3000 kilometers is a principle that is very hard for me to accept. It would look as if we had capitulated in an area where I believe many of our people think we should go forward. As far as counting as one unit missiles from 600 to 3000 kilometers, I don’t think that should be any problem. But I know that a total ban on everything over 3000 kilometers would be seriously objected to by some of my advisors. In order to come to what I believe is a fair proposition in this very important, indeed vital, area I would make a counter-proposal that I think would fit very well into what we want to achieve. I would suggest that there be a limit of 200 on your MIRVed heavy missiles so that while we would give up aircraft-carried ballistic missiles with a range of over 3000 kilometers, you would limit the number of your MIRVed heavy missiles to 200.

(At this point, the members of the Soviet group engaged in a lively discussion among themselves, with Dobrynin arguing in favor of the President’s suggestion and Gromyko, on the contrary, telling Brezhnev that a limit on Soviet heavy missiles with MIRVs was out of the question.)

The Secretary: To be quite candid, the problem of strategic missiles is both strategic and political. Strategically, whether you have a limit or not—whether you have 200 or 300 heavy missiles with MIRVs—would make no difference as regards the strategic equation. Politically, however, our limit on B–1’s should be counterbalanced by your limit on heavy missiles. This would be of great help politically and of significant symbolic importance in the United States. In principle, you could retain 300 heavy missiles but MIRV only 200 of them.
The President: I believe you should recognize that I am making a very basic decision in banning missiles over 3000 kilometers on our bombers. Many of our experts will object to this, but I believe I can make this move provided I can say that you have agreed to limit the number of your heavy MIRVed missiles to 200.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But the principle of equal security is not observed under such an arrangement, and this is a very important point.

The Secretary: How is that?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Missiles over 3000 kilometers can reach from Leningrad to the Urals. The distance from Moscow to Kiev is only 700 kilometers. Moreover, frankly speaking, such long range missiles would be launched from an area not covered by our anti-aircraft defenses. The fact is that bombers could fly 5000 kilometers, and if you add the range of the missile, which is over 3000 kilometers and could be even 5000 kilometers, you can see that our entire country would be covered. After all, the distance from Moscow to Vladivostok is 9,000 kilometers! So there would be no equal security.

The President: But, Mr. General Secretary, we would count ballistic missiles on aircraft as part of the aggregate of 2400 missiles. So I don't understand the strategic difference, because in order to put a missile on a bomber we would have to give up a land-based missile. Our land-based missiles have the same range capability, so that it is only a question of choice on our part.

The Secretary: I have the impression that Mr. Gromyko is rejecting the General Secretary’s proposal. Let me sum up the President’s suggestion.

On the lower end, the difference is 600 versus 700 kilometers. I’m sure we could find a solution to this 100-kilometer problem very quickly, perhaps in 5 minutes. Then you said that everything over 3000 kilometers should be banned. The President said that this would be all right provided there is a limit of 200 on your MIRVed heavy missiles. But we would still count everything between 600 and 3000 kilometers as part of the aggregate of 2400. So the only problem is the limit of 200 on your MIRVed heavy missiles. I don’t believe you want to MIRV more than this number anyway. So this is the only issue. You should keep in mind that if there are 10 ballistic missiles on an aircraft, and those missiles have a range of over 700 kilometers, they will count against the aggregate.

(At this point, members of the Soviet team again engaged in consultation among themselves, with Dobrynin pointing out that the Secretary was right that the USSR would not want to MIRV more than 200 heavy missiles. Brezhnev, supported by Gromyko, maintained that
while this might be so, the Soviets should retain the right to exceed that number.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Could we have a fifteen minute break?

The President: No objection.

(After the break, the meeting resumed with Mr. Sonnenfeldt joining the U.S. group. The break lasted almost an hour.)

The President: I smoked one of the pipes you gave me, Mr. General Secretary, and I find it excellent.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Doesn’t a pipe have to be broken in?

The President: Yes, it has to be done slowly.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I have the following question: how would the liquidation of one of your submarine bases, that is Rota, we agreed upon yesterday be implemented in practice after 1983?

The Secretary: We would give you a letter just as we did as regards the 54 Titans. That is our intention.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When would you give us such a letter?

The Secretary: When we sign the agreement, in the summer.

The President: Our intention is to preclude the use of Rota by nuclear submarines.

The Secretary: You would get a letter from the President that our intention is not to use Rota after 1983 for submarines equipped with nuclear weapons.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, do you believe that the new agreement should be signed in Washington?

The President: Yes.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Alright, so let’s sum up. The U.S. would have the right to have 2400 launchers of all types, on land, on the sea, and in the air. The same would apply to the Soviet Union, which would be entitled to 2400 launchers of all types, land, sea and air. As regards MIRVs, the United States would have 1320 MIRVed vehicles, and the USSR would also have 1320 such vehicles. United States aircraft carrying missiles up to 600 kilometers would count as one launcher, whereas aircraft carrying missiles over 600 kilometers in range would be counted according to the number of missiles they carried. In other words, if an aircraft carried 15 missiles, it would count as 15 launchers—if it carried 20, it would count as 20 launchers. All this would be counted against the ceiling of 2400. Under this arrangement, we would

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2 See Document 91.
meet each other half way. As regards heavy missiles, there would be no limit either for us or for you. Also, as was agreed yesterday, neither we nor you would build new silos. Nor would there be a limit on our heavy missiles as regards MIRVing. This is what you proposed this morning.\footnote{Reference should presumably be to the meeting the previous evening. See Document 91.}

The Secretary: But these limitations regarding bombers would apply to both sides, wouldn’t they?  

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course, on the basis of reciprocity.  

The President: There would be no limit on our capability of over 3000 kilometers?  

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Correct, but each missile over 600 kilometers would be counted within and against the ceiling.  

The Secretary: I just whispered to the President that I would be willing to bet any amount that the Soviet Union will not MIRV over 200 heavy missiles and the United States will not build air missiles with a range of over 3000 kilometers. But it seems that weapons designers have won.  

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, each side will retain the right to proceed in these areas.  

The President: This is fine with us. I would suggest that Dr. Kissinger come to the Soviet Union sometime in the spring, prior to your visit, Mr. General Secretary, so that there would be no difficulty later.  

General Secretary Brezhnev: Agree.  

The Secretary: But this time I will go to Leningrad! I believe we should give this agreement in principle to our Geneva negotiators to work on it for two or three months in order to develop all the details, and then we can finish whatever is left when I come to the Soviet Union in the spring, so that the agreement can be signed in the summer.  

Foreign Minister Gromyko: When would Dr. Kissinger come to Moscow?  

The Secretary: Perhaps in early April.  

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That would be all right with us.  

General Secretary Brezhnev: So, Mr. President, this meeting was not in vain!  

The President: Certainly not, it has been very constructive.  

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, we have another souvenir for you, this time from a local artist. It is a portrait of you made of inlaid wood.
The President: Thank you very much, but this portrait makes me much more handsome, and Mrs. Ford will think she is married to a new man. It is really amazing how an artist can find different shades of wood to render the color of the skin, hair, and eyes. This is really true art!

Ambassador Dobrynin: Well, Mr. President, this man found a picture of you in a newspaper, and frankly speaking not a very good picture, and did this portrait from it. He then sent the portrait to comrade Brezhnev and asked him if he would like to present it to you.

The President: Well, I would like to meet the artist and thank him personally, if that is possible.

Ambassador Dobrynin: I don’t know where he lives, but I’m sure we can find him. Mr. Aleksandrov can do that.

The President: But I don’t want to make too much trouble for you, so perhaps you can find out his address and I will write him a note.

Ambassador Dobrynin: Yes, that might be simpler.

The Secretary: Time is getting short, so may I raise a few practical questions before we move to the next topic. My impression is that you, Mr. President, and the General Secretary have agreed that a separate statement on strategic arms limitation will be issued in addition to the communiqué.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s right.

The Secretary: We can ask Sonnenfeldt and Kornienko to work on this.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That would be fine. We have a draft of such a statement that is based on the draft you had given us.

The Secretary: We should release this statement a few hours before the President departs, so that our press can use it.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Simultaneously with the communiqué?

The Secretary: Yes, at the same time. Then, perhaps during the banquet, I can brief the press. Our press will leave with the President and won’t have opportunity to file unless it gets the statement before then.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: That is entirely up to you.

The Secretary: Perhaps we can release the communiqué sometime around 3 o’clock with an embargo until 5 o’clock?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: No, that would be too early. I suggest that the embargo be until 6 o’clock, because otherwise our press in Moscow, given the time differential, will have problems.

The Secretary: That wouldn’t make any difference to us.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, then, it will be still better if we embargo until 7 o’clock local time.
The Secretary: No problem. Where is the signing of the communiqué going to take place?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Here, in this room.

The Secretary: As regards numbers, Mr. President, my instinct is that you will have to brief congressional leaders. Thus the figures will come out, but only 2400 and 1320 and not those about bombers.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: This is not a good idea, because there is much yet to be clarified. After all, the agreement will be signed only in the future.

The Secretary: But we can use the language we suggested without figures, can’t we?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes.

The Secretary: All right, but after the President talks with congressional leaders the numbers are bound to come out.

The President: The document we’re issuing will have to refer to equivalence regarding both missiles and MIRVs.

Mr. Aleksandrov (who had just joined the group): We have language on this point.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps Mr. Sonnenfeldt can now meet with Kornienko to work on the text.

The Secretary: As regards the communiqué, there are two points that are still unresolved.

(At this point the Secretary asked General Scowcroft to join the U.S. group.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: Perhaps after our return to Moscow and Washington respectively we could exchange, through our embassies, aides-mémoire on the figures we have arrived at.

The Secretary: Yes, that is very important.

The President: We will do this as soon as the Secretary returns from his trip.

The Secretary: A week from tomorrow, would that be all right?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Agree.

The Secretary: We would state it exactly as the General Secretary has summed it up.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Yes.

The Secretary: To return to the communiqué, perhaps we could complete it now and then we could discuss other subjects. I know that the President and the General Secretary also want to discuss a restricted subject.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Then Sonnenfeldt and Kornienko should come back to the room.
The Secretary: Sonnenfeldt yes, but not Kornienko! But maybe they deserve each other!

General Secretary Brezhnev: They sure do! Mr. President, may I excuse myself for 10 or 15 minutes, I have some personal business to attend to.

The President: I’ll also leave the room for a while.

(At this point, Ambassador Stoessel and Assistant Secretary Hartman were invited to join the U.S. group.)

Foreign Minister Gromyko: In the draft communique, you have a bracketed reference to strategic arms limitation. I think we should drop it, now that there will be a separate statement on this subject.

The Secretary: I think the communique without any reference to the most important subject of strategic arms limitation would look rather peculiar. I believe we should have some language stating that the subject was discussed and that a separate statement on it is being issued.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: All right, perhaps we can have a sentence reading as follows: “A joint statement on the question of limiting offensive strategic arms is being published separately.”

The Secretary: That sounds all right.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: As regards Cyprus, perhaps we could use your text but add to it that both the United States and the USSR oppose territorial division of Cyprus. Such an addition could be included in the sentence which speaks of territorial integrity of Cyprus.

The Secretary: How would you do it?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Perhaps we could add a separate sentence, something like this: “They expressed themselves against territorial division of Cyprus in any form.”

The Secretary: I believe the point is made in the sentence as it stands now, and I don’t think we should prejudge the results of their negotiations regarding possible federal or cantonal arrangements.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But the Turks can partition without saying that they are doing so.

The Secretary: Our formulation takes care of territorial integrity and independence. Also, the UN resolution is against partition,⁴ so the problem is covered.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: But the Turks say that they are acting in accordance with the UN resolution although in fact they are not. We

⁴ Presumably a reference to UN General Assembly Resolution 3212, adopted on November 1.
know that what the Turks are doing is not what those who voted for the resolution had in mind.

The Secretary: I believe both sides are about to engage in negotiations, and we should not make their work more difficult.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: My point will strengthen the position of both sides.

The Secretary: Considering that our two principals will have no opportunity to discuss Cyprus, I believe this is as far as we can go.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Well, perhaps we could add to your sentence at least the words “and will make every effort in that direction.”

The Secretary: That I could accept.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: What about withdrawal of troops?

The Secretary: I believe this is as far as we can go. So now you can tell the Greeks that we oppose withdrawal, and that will make you very popular with them.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: May I suggest a three-minute break before we turn to the Middle East section of the communique?

The Secretary: Sure.

(While Gromyko was consulting with his associates, the President came back into the room. In talking with Sukhodrev, the President recalled his 1958 trip to Moscow, during which—although he was a junior member of the Congressional group he was with—he and Mrs. Ford were given the plushest accommodations at the Ukraina Hotel. The President commented that the only explanation one could think of was that whoever was making the arrangements on the Soviet side thought that Congressman Ford from Michigan must be related to Henry Ford from Michigan. When Brezhnev also returned to the room, in the course of a chat with the President he suggested that they go sightseeing in Vladivostok. The President accepted the invitation.)

The Secretary: Could we establish a schedule for the rest of the day.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I believe we should finish discussing the basic issues and then have lunch. Thereafter, I would suggest that we allocate an hour or so for visiting Vladivostok.

The President: That would be excellent.

The Secretary: Perhaps the Foreign Minister and I could come along, in a separate car?

General Secretary Brezhnev: All right, let’s go together.

The Secretary: I’m simply trying to figure out the time when I can brief the press, so that they can file their stories.

General Secretary Brezhnev: When would you like to do it?
The Secretary: At 3 or 3:30. Perhaps while you are having lunch.

General Secretary Brezhnev: No objection.

The Secretary: So I’ll brief the press at 3:30 with a 7 pm Vladivostok time embargo. When would the signing take place?

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Right after lunch.

The President: All right. And afterwards we would go to Vladivostok and then depart?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Yes, after Vladivostok we will go straight to the train. Shall we discuss the Middle East now?

The President: May I suggest that we discuss that special matter first. During that discussion, I would like only Dr. Kissinger, General Scowcroft, and myself to be present.

General Secretary Brezhnev: On our side we’ll have only myself, Gromyko, Dobrynin and Aleksandrov.

(This discussion lasted from 1340 to 1405, with General Scowcroft taking notes. The meeting then resumed with Messrs. Hartman and Akalovsky returning to their seats. Somewhat later, Mr. Rumsfeld also joined the U.S. group.)

General Secretary Brezhnev: The Middle East question is a complex one. We faced its complexity a long time ago, at the outset of the conflict. When I was in Washington, I told Mr. Nixon, with Dr. Kissinger present, that this was a very explosive area and that measures should be taken to achieve a just solution. That statement was not sufficiently taken into account and ultimately war broke out. Dr. Kissinger knows well that for a long time we have been taking a position of restraining the Arabs and have never instigated anyone. It is no accident that after the war had broken out we both acted in the Security Council, which then passed a resolution. Thus we became in effect guarantors of peace in the area. At that time we acted both together, but later this fell apart. I don’t want to offend anyone or to make any complaints, but Dr. Kissinger apparently thought he could do it himself. There was a time when the Arabs, too, perhaps were hoping that a solution could be achieved and made certain concessions. But it is now quite clear that unless a solution is found, there will be war again. I was ill when the Rabat Conference took place but read the communiqué later. That conference reaffirmed the Arab position regarding a peaceful settlement, territorial integrity, and so forth. If we act together vis-à-vis both the Arabs and Israel, we can find a fair solution—if we don’t, there will be war. Of course, you may disagree. But the fact is that this is a very large area, which includes many countries—Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Algeria, Is-

5 See Document 93.
6 See footnote 9, Document 86.
rael. We should really have pity for the people in that area. As for the USSR, it has no special interests there. I need not tell you that we are not buying or selling anything special in that area. The fundamental issue is that of Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. This is a complex problem and we ought to find out who will make what concessions. This is why the Geneva Conference should meet as frequently as possible. (Dobrynin whispered to Gromyko that Brezhnev should have said “as soon as possible” rather than “as frequently as possible” because the Conference had not yet begun, but Gromyko retorted that Brezhnev’s formulations covered that point too.) I’m sure a solution can be found at the negotiating table.

The President: I share the view that political cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union is absolutely important in this extremely volatile area of the world. We did cooperate in preparations for UN Resolution 338, and we do believe that joint efforts of all nations to solve all the problems in this area are possible and perhaps necessary. At the same time, however, we believe that it is necessary first to lay the groundwork for such efforts. So we are not against the Geneva Conference, but believe that it should convene at the proper time. Total involvement by all is also not possible for our domestic political reasons. If we can agree on cooperating as we did in the past, and if groundwork is laid at the outset, we can move to the Geneva Conference at an appropriate time.

The Secretary: It is not correct to say that we thought we could do it all alone. We always knew there was a limit to what could or should be done by us alone. We only thought that by our efforts we could achieve a certain disengagement of forces, also involving some withdrawal of Israeli forces. So we did not believe that a global solution should be sought from the outset. And never did we have any idea that we were competitors of the Soviet Union in the area or that it should be expelled from there. I discussed this with Ambassador Dobrynin many times on behalf of the President. In the final analysis, it is we and no one else who has to pressure Israel, but every time we do it, there are political difficulties. That is why we cannot push for a 40-point program. We have to keep our opponents divided.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Well, what should we do? What can we do to prevent another war?

The President: We have the same objective of preventing another war in the Middle East. I believe we should resume an active exchange of ideas between Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin regarding our further actions, because time can escape us. We must discuss the

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7 See footnote 8, Document 86
tactical situation in the Middle East and how to handle it. I think this should be in the hands of Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin.

General Secretary Brezhnev: There would be no harm in that, but we at the highest level should know what to do. Neither Dobrynin nor Kissinger could do it alone. You and I ultimately will have to decide what to do.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I believe both of us recognize the danger in this situation and we agree that there is a great need for political cooperation between you and me. We agree that at least some preliminary steps are required for the Geneva Conference. If we agree on this framework, then Ambassador Dobrynin and Dr. Kissinger could develop the details in exchanging information as to what to do to prevent another war.

(Brezhnev whispered to Gromyko that perhaps he should agree because he could not see what else could be done.)

The President: To keep it at a high level, let us exchange letters that would serve as guideposts for the Dobrynin–Kissinger exchange I suggested.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I do not exclude this possibility but I must admit that I have a feeling of dissatisfaction. It seems clear that we do not have the same appreciation of the problem and that our approaches to it differ. The situation in this area is poisoning the general atmosphere of détente, which—whether we want it or not—affects both of us.

The President: I don’t agree that the approaches we are suggesting are so different that they should destroy the atmosphere of détente. We can and will cooperate and I don’t think that relatively minor disagreements in this area could have such a negative effect on détente and its development.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Of course, what is of a fundamental, worldwide, importance are our basic relations and accords. Nevertheless, the situation in this corner of the world must be peaceful, because—as I said before—there are many states in that area.

The President: Of course, the situation there does worry me, because any throwing of fuel on the fire in that area affects negatively our cooperation there. Just as you said, I don’t want to offend or accuse anyone either, but it is imperative to recognize that greatly controlled restraint is required in that area. And we do want to exercise such restraint. So I believe that if we could exchange letters and pursue the Kissinger–Dobrynin channel, we could lower the temperature in the area and prevent war. One final point. We have a very difficult problem at home with which I am sure you are familiar. If we are to move towards a solution and prevent war in the Middle East, we have to
work with that group. I suggest, Mr. General Secretary, that perhaps we should now turn to the question of the European Security Conference, a subject in which we both are very interested.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Let’s do that.

The President: We hope that there can be some real movement in this area. I believe we have to work between ourselves to reach possible solutions, and I think we can do it. What is your view as to what should be done to move the Conference to its final successful conclusion?

General Secretary Brezhnev: Mr. President, I would like to turn this question back to you. There are a lot of artificial, invented issues in Geneva. All issues regarding security have been practically solved, but what is braking progress is the so-called Basket III. Let’s clean up that basket and everything will be solved. What is the United States concern in this area?

The Secretary: I would like to see that Dutch cabaret opened in Moscow so that I can visit it.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Give us time to build it.

The Secretary: May I ask what you discussed with Schmidt,8 since he will be visiting the President in a couple of weeks. As I told you in October, we would be prepared to talk with Schmidt and Giscard to expedite matters. But in order not to work at cross purposes, it would be useful to know what you discussed with Schmidt.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Generally speaking, Schmidt did not object to concluding the conference. In essence, what the Germans are concerned about is the question of reunification. (Gromyko corrected Brezhnev’s terminology by saying that the issue in question was that of peaceful change of boundaries.) So the question is where to place this point in the document. The basic principle is that borders should be inviolable and that states are to remain independent. A reference to peaceful change of boundaries could be placed somewhere, but the Germans came up with language the effect of which is to suggest that the primary purpose of international law is change of boundaries.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: I fully agree with comrade Brezhnev’s comments. I must also say that as of late the United States influence on the conference has diminished and that somehow the United States has become passive in Geneva. We regard this as part of United States policy. When the United States wanted to give a push to the conference, it did it rather well. Dr. Kissinger will remember that when the ques-

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8 Brezhnev and Schmidt met in Moscow during the latter’s official visit to the Soviet Union October 28–31. For the condensed English text of their joint statement, issued at the conclusion of the talks, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVI, No. 44 (November 27, 1974), pp. 12–13.
tion of principles was discussed, more specifically that of non-interference, the United States acted together with us and we succeeded in persuading others. But recently the situation has deteriorated. To turn to specific issues, I want to point out that neither in joint Soviet-American nor in separate United States documents is there specific reference to the United States endorsing the holding of the third stage of the conference at the highest level. Even in today’s communique there’s no such reference. This is my first point. My second point is that United States representatives in Geneva either don’t have or, if they do, are concealing and not implementing instructions to bring the conference to an end as soon as possible. All delegations should be instructed to conclude the conference by say January 1 or 15, or some other specific date. Many delegations are looking to you for taking the lead.

The Secretary: Here’s another complaint in addition to several others. Never before did I hear praise for our cooperation, but at least today, several months later, we heard that we had done something. But may I return to the statement on strategic arms limitation and raise one question. As I understand, the Soviet side does not wish to say that both sides have agreed to “equal aggregates” and is prepared to say only “certain agreed levels.”

General Secretary Brezhnev: What’s wrong with this formulation, what is your difficulty with it?

The Secretary: We can accept it, but you will have to understand that in the press briefing today and in the President’s meeting with congressional leaders we will have to say that the numbers would be equal, for otherwise there would be an explosion.

General Secretary Brezhnev: But you won’t mention any figures, will you?

The Secretary: We will state no figures, but we will have to say that they will be equal. Otherwise, even before the President returns home, there will be a great deal of criticism, which will destroy the effect of what we achieved last night and this morning.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: This is your business.

General Secretary Brezhnev: That’s right, that’s up to you.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: To continue, all delegations in Geneva should be instructed to finish the conference by a certain definite date. It would be good if we here could agree to act in such a way as to end Stage II by January 1 and have Stage III take place at the highest level sometime in January. As regards Basket III, the United States has demonstrated some sober judgment. But why do certain countries insist on imposing on others foreign institutions, even organizations managed by foreigners? Why should someone come as guest if he is not invited?
We will have a cabaret if we want it. That’s my third point. My fourth point is regarding the question of borders. The main aspect of this problem, that is inviolability, has been agreed upon and there are no difficulties. As to peaceful change, one question is where to place that point. But then a new formulation appeared and the Germans told us that it was the United States who had proposed it. In his conversations with us, Dr. Kissinger was indignant and said that this was an FRG and not a United States proposal. Nevertheless, this new language has been floating around ever since, and its thrust is that the main purpose of international law is change of borders. Let us jointly convince the FRG not to drag out this issue. Now let me turn to my fifth point. It relates to the issue of the significance of principles. Some maintain that all principles, be they on cabarets or on inviolability of borders, are of equal significance. Of course, one cannot agree to this proposition. But this is exactly what some are trying to impose on us. In our view, all principles should be strictly observed, so let us both pursue this line, not only in the corridors but at the negotiating table as well. Now to my sixth point. In Geneva, certain measures relating to military détente have been under discussion. They pertain to such things as maneuvers and movement of troops. As regards movement of troops, it seems that this issue is being left for the future, but on maneuvers some people want us to give information about everything that goes on in the area up to the Urals, even as regards the activities of small units. In our view, a solution of this problem should be such as would lessen tensions and suspicions. But the approach I just referred to would have the contrary result. Long ago, we agreed on exchanging observers at maneuvers, but now this issue threatens to become an obstacle, because it is artificially exaggerated. So efforts should be made to resolve all these issues. Otherwise, the conference will not be concluded.

The Secretary: I will not give a six-point answer, partly because some of the issues are so complicated that I have a hard time understanding them. In fact, I believe that Mr. Gromyko is the only Foreign Minister who understands all the issues. My comments will relate to three points: first, principles; second, Basket III; and third, movement of troops. The problem of principles is essentially a German problem. The issue of equal validity or placement is a mystery to me, it is one that required Kantian education to understand. We do not believe that it can have any effect on the real situation, because no one will change the borders merely because the word “only” appears at the end of a CSCE document. As the President said, he will raise this question with Schmidt and try to convince the Germans to review their position. Then we will inform you.
The President: I will meet with Schmidt and Giscard and will discuss these CSCE issues with them in order to try to develop a method for solving all the points raised by the Foreign Minister.9

General Secretary Brezhnev: I’ll make only a few brief comments, since comrade Gromyko has made a full presentation on this problem. I was pleased to see in one of your letters, Mr. President, the statement that you will seek the earliest conclusion of the Geneva conference and then sign the documents at the highest level. I’m a businesslike man and I believe you. I hope, therefore, that every effort will be made to this end. Do you think that the conference could be concluded by January 1, with the final stage at the highest level taking place in January?

The Secretary: Absolutely impossible.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Why?

The Secretary: Let’s be realistic. The second reading of Basket III has not yet been completed. In fact, you still owe us some formulations regarding that Basket. So, realistically, the conference could be concluded by the end of March, with Stage II terminating by the end of February and Stage III taking place in March or April.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: Can we agree that Stage II should end in the second half of February?

The Secretary: With a major effort, perhaps that might be possible, but we will be able to give you an honest estimate after our discussions with Schmidt and Giscard. To be perfectly frank, there is not one United States objective for which we would want to prolong the conference but, on the other hand, we don’t want to antagonize our allies. We believe the conference has been dragging too long and that by now no one really understands the issues, except perhaps Gromyko.

General Secretary [Foreign Minister] Gromyko: Can we have at least a tentative date?

The Secretary: Perhaps March or April.

The President: I will talk with Schmidt and Giscard and attempt to get them to move in this area.

(At this point, Assistant Secretary Hartman left the room.)

The President: Mr. General Secretary, time is pressing and I would like, therefore, to turn to some other matters. Regarding our Trade Bill, as you know, I worked personally on the Senate to get that bill moved. The problem that was holding it up fortunately has been resolved but then, unfortunately, one of the members of the Senate mentioned some

9 Ford and Schmidt met in Washington during the latter’s official visit to the United States December 4–6; Ford and Giscard met in Martinique December 14–16. For Ford’s discussion of CSCE with Schmidt and Giscard, see, respectively, Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Documents 263 and 267.
figure neither you nor I had agreed to. I want to assure you that I did not authorize any figures, because in our exchanges no figures had been mentioned. We only proceed on the basis of three principles. One, that there will be no limit on applications; two, that there will be no refusal except for security reasons; and three, that there will be no prosecution of applicants. But we do not assume any specific figure. Now that the Trade Bill has passed the House Finance Committee, I will push it in the Senate. I will also push the Export-Import Bank bill so as to resolve the credit problem.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I want to tell you that we are doing no such things—no one is being punished, detained or harassed, and no tax is being levied. But I must point out that the number of applications has diminished. In fact, over the past 10 months it has dropped 50% as compared with last year. We will give comrade Kissinger information on this subject through Dobrynin. I called Dr. Kissinger comrade because we know him so well—we have had something like nine meetings with him already and I believe that he’s quite satisfied with the way things have been going. But to return to our subject, the problem is that now there is this figure of 60,000 mentioned by Jackson and we don’t have as many applications, although I don’t have the exact figure at hand.

In looking back at our discussions, Mr. President, I find them extremely useful and productive. I’m very glad to have met you personally, and I think that such meetings can greatly help us in pursuing improvement of relations between our two countries.

The President: I fully agree, Mr. General Secretary, and I’m very grateful for your generous hospitality.

General Secretary Brezhnev: Before we break up and go to lunch, I would like to mention the fact that next year will mark the 30th anniversary of victory over Germany. We have a number of ideas as to how to commemorate this event. Through Dobrynin we will communicate to you our views on such activities as could be conducted on a joint basis, for example exchange of delegations, appropriate press coverage, etc.—in short, some activities of a public and political nature. After all, we were allies during the war.

The President: This has great merit and I believe we can work out something. Now, Mr. General Secretary, I would like to say that I believe that this first meeting has made it possible for me not only to meet you but also to establish a relationship with you that I hope will grow and receive new impulses at our future meeting. I heard from Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger about your dedication to peace on the basis of détente between our two countries. Everything Mr. Nixon and Dr. Kissinger said has been borne out in these 24 hours. This gives me great hope that in the future we will be able to develop détente and do what I
believe both our countries need. Everything I heard about your humanitarian approach proved to be true on the basis of my personal encounter. Of course, we have some differences philosophically and politically but I hope they can be overcome through progress in all areas of relations between our two countries.

General Secretary Brezhnev: I’m very pleased to hear this and I want you to know that I reciprocate in every respect. I believe Dr. Kissinger will confirm that if I say something, I always keep my word. I can argue and debate, but once I give my word, I stand by it. It is on this basis that mutual respect and confidence can thrive. It’s too bad we have been so busy that we had no time for telling jokes, something we used to do at our previous meetings.

Foreign Minister Gromyko: We can do it at the next meeting.

The Secretary: The General Secretary has a big store of jokes.

The President: Thank you again for the beautiful pipes, you see that I’ve started breaking them in.

General Secretary Brezhnev: We have some additional souvenirs which we will deliver at the airport, both for you and your wife. Please convey our best wishes for her recovery.10

The President: You were very kind in sending her best wishes at the time of her operation. Thank you very much.

(At this point, at 3:55 p.m. Brezhnev invited the President and others to join him for lunch in an adjacent room.)11

10 On September 28, 2 days after a diagnosis of breast cancer, Betty Ford underwent a mastectomy at Bethesda Naval Medical Center.

11 After this meeting, Ford and Brezhnev attended a ceremony in the conference hall at Okeanskaya Sanatorium, where they signed the joint communiqué for the 2-day summit in Vladivostok. The two sides also released a joint statement on the limitation of strategic offensive arms. For the text of these two documents, see Public Papers: Ford, 1974, Nos. 257 and 258. They were also published in The New York Times, November 25, 1974, p. 14. Kissinger also held a press conference at 4:18 p.m. to discuss the substance of the summit. For the text of the press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, December 23, 1974, pp. 898–905.
93. **Memorandum of Conversation**

Vladivostok, November 24, 1974, 1:40–2:05 p.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU  
Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR  
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States  
Andrey M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary  
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Interpreter  
President Gerald R. Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
Ambassador Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

**SUBJECT**

Nuclear War

President: Shortly after I became President, Dr. Kissinger briefed me some on what you and President Nixon discussed. I would like to know more about what you told President Nixon, and then I would like to ask some questions. There are some things I have to get straight in my mind. Then we could go to negotiations, or whatever. But first I need to know more about what you discussed.

Brezhnev: This was in the Crimea. As I am at all times, I was guided by the basic principle that there would be no nuclear war between us or nuclear war in the world in general. I told President Nixon that there are some countries which had not joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty and do not observe it. Therefore a situation could arise where you or we could be threatened with a nuclear attack. I thought it might be good for us to conclude a treaty dealing only with a nuclear attack on one of our countries. In the event of a nuclear attack on one, the other would come to its aid with all the resources at its disposal.

President Nixon, I recall, said that this was interesting and that he would look further into it. I had some further talks with Dr. Kissinger.
on this [in Moscow on October 26], but for various reasons nothing came of it. That is where we stand.

In the preamble we could say something like: we are aware of what a nuclear war would mean in such circumstances and, desirous to avoid such an event, the two sides, et cetera. We could do it so as to avoid giving offense to allies—and in fact it would give a reassurance of protection to our allies.

President: As I told you, I was briefed on this in general terms. I want to ask a couple of questions, and then Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko can discuss it further.

I agree with President Nixon; it is an interesting idea. One question is, does it mean strategic nuclear attack, tactical nuclear attack, or any nuclear attack?

Brezhnev: Under the treaty we would each agree not to use nuclear weapons against anyone.

President: They would be defensive only?

Brezhnev: Yes.

I agree to Dr. Kissinger continuing with subsequent discussions. My concept is related to any use of nuclear weapons. What is the difference whether they are tactical or strategic? Because in either case there would be a nuclear war, and we want to prevent that.

President: I asked because I wanted to know if it were a tactical nuclear attack whether it would be an “all-force reaction,” and I wondered whether the response to different kinds of attack should be different. That is of some importance.

Brezhnev: The important thing is not to have a nuclear attack on us or our allies. If we entered this kind of an arrangement, nuclear war would be impossible for decades to come. The basic thing is to talk the general concept. We can then work on the details and go into it deeper.

President: Let me ask: what about an attack by a nuclear power on a third party that is not an ally? What would be the situation?

Brezhnev: It is hard to give a precise answer. Perhaps we could agree to enter consultations as the best course. A lot would depend on who attacked whom. This proposal hasn’t been elaborated in detail. But since the United States and the Soviet Union are the most important powers, an agreement like this between us would eliminate nuclear war for many years to come.

President: We do want to prevent nuclear war, and your country and mine have a great responsibility. We should talk further. Mean-

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3 See Document 73.
while, I think we should make a major effort to get the laggards to sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty. There are some laggards.

Brezhnev: I fully agree.

President: Let’s have it between Dr. Kissinger and your Ambassador to work on that.

Brezhnev: We are putting the Non-Proliferation Treaty into the communiqué.

Let’s think about it little by little. It should be discussed energetically.

[The private conversation ended and the principals rejoined the larger meeting.]

4 See Document 92.

94. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 26, 1974, 9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Bipartisan Congressional Leadership
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: Thanks for coming. I appreciate the kind remarks and the actions taken while I was away. I appreciate what has been done on Rockefeller and the Mass Transit bill.

We have a full plate this morning. I can give you an overview of the trip, and I want to talk about the Aid Bill, the Export-Import Bank, and the budget.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 7. Confidential. The meeting was held in the White House Cabinet Room. A list of attendees is attached but not printed.

2 The Senate Rules Committee voted unanimously on November 22 to recommend Rockefeller’s confirmation as Vice President. The Senate passed the National Mass Transportation Assistance Act on November 20, the House on November 21. Ford signed the bill on November 26, after this meeting with Congressional leaders.
The trip was strictly a working 8 days. I am glad the wives didn’t go—there was not much for them to do. They had us in a compound in Vladivostok.

[Omitted here is the President’s report on his trips to Japan and Korea November 19–23.]

The most important aspect of the trip, of course, was Vladivostok. I will give you the figures, which I hope you will keep off the record, because it is just an oral agreement. As you know, they have a big program under way. As a result of about 12 hours of hard bargaining, we reached an agreement which is in accord with the language set forth in the Senate language on equivalence. We agreed on a number of 2400 strategic weapons. It is within our program and requires a reduction in the Soviet program. It puts a cap on the launching capacity of the United States and the Soviet Union. On MIRVs the figure is 1320 of the 2400. On bombers, a ballistic missile with a range less than 600 kilometers would not be counted; one with a range over that would be.

The net result is a rigid ceiling on bombers and MIRVs. Those figures are responsible; it does coincide with the Congressional requirements for equivalence. The Secretary of Defense agrees with it, Chairman Brown agrees with it and Secretary Schlesinger assures me the JCS will. This position was worked out with Kissinger, Schlesinger, Brown and it meets the Congressional mandate. As far as I know it meets with the wishes of the people.

Are there any questions?

Rhodes: Is it 1320 warheads or launchers?

President: Launchers.

Thurmond: What will be the means of verification?

President: National means.

Pastore: How will we know about their MIRVs?

President: We watch their testing program and we will count any new missile installed as MIRV’d if it is a type they have tested with MIRVs.

Question: How much delay is there in getting the agreement? You will be involved.

President: We will have a written agreement in principle within a week. It will be worked out by next summer.

Pastore: What do we have to do to match them? A lot of people have asked us.

Byrd: How about freedom to mix?

President: There is complete freedom to mix within the constraints of SALT I.
Thurmond: Jackson was on the radio saying it should have been 1700 not 2400. Can you answer that.

President: They wanted the higher figure. This was the best we could get. Scoop will argue this is not an ones [onerous?] reduction—but it is below their present program. And this won’t preclude further negotiations on reductions. You have to start somewhere, and this puts a cap on it. This puts a ceiling on planned development. Their program was substantially more than 2400.

McClellan: This is a reduction below their existing and planned program.

President: Particularly what was planned.

McMarhan: Was it wise to restrict the B-1 missiles?

President: The military think so.

Cederberg: Why a 600 km limit?

President: Beyond that it’s treated as a strategic weapon.

Frelinghuysen: Why did they agree?

President: I think they are concerned about an unending arms race. This is enough for security and it is stabilizing.

Whip: Did you detect anything more hopeful this time compared to their previous attitude?

President: I think he was genuinely concerned about an arms race.

Rhodes: How about limiting other weapons? Like naval expansion.

President: Not this time. We had only a limited time available.

Scott: Did you discuss energy and Siberian development?

President: Yes, and with the Japanese, too. The Japanese are negotiating on the Yakhtusk project. There were no firm discussions.

Sparkman: You mentioned some concern about the EXIM and foreign aid. I hope we can work out something on foreign aid today. The EXIM conference report comes up today. There is considerable opposition. I hope it will be supported.

President: I hope you will support the conference report.

I hope the Senate will act on the Trade Bill. We have a confidential arrangement on Jewish emigration and Brezhnev has reaffirmed his commitment. There will be no harassment, no limitation on applications, and no restrictions except on grounds of national security.

Pastore: How much can we say?

President: I told the Soviet Union I had to give you the figures. I hope you will not talk about the numbers.

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3 This is an obvious error. The speaker could have been McClellan or Congressmen Mahon or Morgan, both of whom were present.
McClellan: This will be formalized within a week?
President: Yes.
Rhodes: Can we say that it is a figure that is below the Soviet program?
President: Yes.
Now Roy has the bad news about the budget.
[The meeting continued on budgetary topics.]

4 Brackets in the original.

95. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, November 27, 1974, 5:04–5:48 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
George Meany
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[The President greeted Mr. Meany. There was some small talk about Mr. Meany's hip, steel pins, etc.]
The President: I thought you might want on a personal basis to get the results of Vladivostok. I know of your concern for national defense. You know I am a hawk. I wanted to tell you what was done, why it was done, and why it was a good agreement.

First, let me tell you the background. We had three NSC meetings on this. The different agencies had different approaches but we finally submitted an approach to the Soviets. They came back, and Secretary

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 7. Confidential. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. In a briefing memorandum to the President on November 26, Scowcroft explained: "As head of the AFL–CIO, George Meany has commented frequently on the substance of previous arms control agreements. You will be seeing Meany to elicit his support for the recently concluded agreement." Scowcroft also provided talking points for the meeting. According to an attached correspondence profile, however, Ford saw the memorandum on December 2, after his meeting with Meany. (Ibid., Presidential Name File, 1974–1977, Box 2, Meany, George)
Kissinger took the revised one to Moscow [in October] and it was refined again before we met with them at Vladivostok.

What we wanted was to reduce the overall numbers and the numbers of MIRVed launchers particularly. Any agreement had to be based on equivalency.

Mr. Meany: Which was what we lacked in SALT I.

The President: We finally came down, after hard bargaining, on 2400—which includes ICBMs, SLBMs, bombers, or any mix of these. That is a bit higher than our own plan.

Mr. Meany: What we have or what we plan?

General Scowcroft: Both.

The President: For the Soviets, it is below, not what they have, but what they plan.

Mr. Meany: What about MIRVs?

The President: 1320 out of the 2400 launchers can be MIRVed.

Mr. Meany: How many do they have now?

General Scowcroft: They have none actually operational but they have three new missiles almost ready.

Mr. Meany: At least we have equivalency. But no reductions?

The President: No. Scoop wanted us to go to 1700, but the Soviets wouldn’t do that.

Mr. Meany: When you get that high, what’s the difference between 1700 and 2400?

The President: On the bombers, there’s still disagreement on what missiles you can have on them that would count in the 2400.

Mr. Meany: It looks to me as if we achieved some equity which we didn’t have before. It’s a great step, but you’ve got to watch these fellows that they stick to it. The other thing that worries me is our whole national defense. You can’t deal with these guys unless you are strong. I am worried about these Congressmen taking things out of the defense budget. I think you’ve got to let the American people know this is a great step but only if we maintain our strength.

The President: I agree. We must maintain at 2400.

Mr. Meany: I don’t think we should throw any bouquets at the Soviets. It is their obligation, if they feel any, to contribute to world peace as much as they contribute to arms.

The President: It is our plan to build the ten Tridents and the 240 B-1s. We can change the mix if we want.

Mr. Meany: Come January you have to ram it home to Congress that we need a strong defense. Some of these new guys are saying to cut
out the Trident. Mike\(^2\) doesn’t help. He is sometimes an isolationist. But we in labor are realists. We are sometimes characterized as hawks. We went along with Vietnam—we were taken a little and not told everything—but that’s water over the dam. Let’s see what they do on the Middle East.

The President: We talked about the Middle East. They want to have all the parties in one big Geneva conference. That won’t work. We told them we would continue our step-by-step approach.

Mr. Meany: They say the Israelis won’t give. They will give plenty for one thing—a guarantee of their existence. Israel is fighting for its life. They would give up a lot if the United States and the Soviet Union would guarantee their borders.

The President: The Soviet Union won’t go that far. I think if we can make some progress with Egypt we can forestall the Soviets getting back in.

Mr. Meany: Egypt is easy—the others are the tough ones.

The President: They reaffirmed the emigration deal—they said there’d be no harassment. But they wouldn’t give us a commitment on numbers.

Mr. Meany: I want to see them live up to that!

The President: There were two other key points in the agreement: First, our forward-based systems don’t count in the total, and the forces of the British and French don’t count. It was just theirs and ours. That’s a big concession.

Mr. Meany: I think it is progress. SALT I bugged me—it looked like we were swindled.

The President: Schlesinger and Brown were pleased with this.

Mr. Meany: He told me. We work closely with him on the Hill. He is on the firing line.

The President: We will have trouble with the Congress.

Mr. Meany: What do we have to ante up? Do we need Trident?

The President: We need all our new programs.

Mr. Meany: So if we don’t do it we will be giving away the store.

The President: We will have a bigger defense budget but it’s mostly for inflation. But it will be a strong budget and I know I can count on you.

Mr. Meany: We will go down the line with you.

[Omitted here is discussion of the U.S. economy and labor unions.]

\(^2\) Senator Mansfield.
Soviet Rejection of the Agreement on Jewish Emigration, December 1974–January 1975

96. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs (Laise) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Déttente Has Come Home: American Opinion on Relations with the Soviet Union

Déttente with the Soviet Union enjoys broader national support today than at any time in the post-war period. Based on our review of editorial and public opinion surveys conducted over the last twenty years, we conclude that support for the principle of détente also extends to particular aspects of policy—arms control, in particular, but also trade, and scientific and cultural cooperation. We believe Vladivostok is receiving comparable approval.

Momentum in favor of improved US-Soviet relations has built up gradually. Popular readiness for better relations was slowed during the Berlin-Cuban crises period, and temporarily again during the summer of Prague. But by the time President Nixon made his 1968 campaign promise to strive for an “era of negotiations” with the Soviet Union a clear majority of Americans had come to accept the desirability of détente. By the end of 1973, as many as 86% of representative Americans expressed themselves in favor of America’s new relationship with the Soviet Union (according to the Minnesota Poll whose findings are consistently close to those of nationwide polls).

Significant conclusions about American reactions on détente are:

—There is a strong and steady trend in favor of progress toward détente among Americans in general and among editors in particular. The foundation is so strong that further progress towards détente can be made on the assumption that steps toward improved US-Soviet relations will enjoy popular acceptance.

—Support for détente in general is duplicated by popular support for the building blocks of détente—arms control, trade, and scientific and cultural cooperation.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 77D112, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Box 347, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Dec. 1974. Unclassified. Drafted by H. Schuyler Foster and Frank G. Wisner II in PA/M. The original is an uninitialed copy that Laise forwarded to Lord on December 11. In a handwritten note on the covering memorandum, Lord instructed his special assistant, Peter Swiers: “Peter—Make sure deputies, [Thomas W.] Simons, & speechwriters see this. WL”
Proportions Favoring US-Soviet Agreement in Various Fields

(Harris Surveys)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Field</th>
<th>Pre-1969</th>
<th>1969</th>
<th>1972</th>
<th>1973–74</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Limit Atomic Weapons ('68)</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>(80%)*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expand Trade ('63)</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exchange Programs ('63)</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>69</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Exploration: Space</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*April 1974 poll by Potomac Associates

—American belief in the feasibility of détente slipped during the Czech crisis but recovered fairly soon and went on to new heights, according to a series of Harris surveys:

“Do you think it is possible for the United States and Russia to come to a long-term agreement in the world which will work, or do you feel it is not possible for that to happen?”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Possible to Happen</th>
<th>Not Possible</th>
<th>Not Sure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 68</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aug 68</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dec 68</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

—The pace of acceptance of détente may have slowed to some small degree when Americans realized several of the more negative aspects of the 1972 grain deal. Editorials made clear that Americans wanted continued progress towards détente but they wanted a clear definition of quid pro quo in future agreements.

—Actions such as Senator Jackson’s linking the issue of Jewish emigration to the Trade Bill do not command widespread support. A year ago, fifteen of 30 commenting editors in the nation’s more important daily papers opposed Jackson’s idea, and only 5 supported it.

—Americans are sophisticated and subtle in their suspicion that progress toward détente does not necessarily mean progress toward the end of strained relations with the Soviet Union, or even the end of the Cold War (65% said “probably not” in a 1972 Harris Survey).

—Thus, the public also wants America to be adequately armed. A 1974 poll for Potomac Associates finds that when Americans contemplate the possibility that the United States might become militarily weaker than the Soviet Union they wish the U.S. to maintain a strong security structure.

“Taking into account the need to protect America’s security and interests, but also the high cost of more defense and military forces, do you think on balance that over the next few years the total military
power of the United States should be increased, kept at the present level, or reduced?"

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Option</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kept at present level</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduced</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don't Know</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

—At the same time, popular desire for arms limitation is strong. Support for arms control was evident throughout the long negotiations which culminated in SALT I. Even during the Czech crisis when the public was reserved about the pace of détente, there was continued strong support for arms control negotiations (Minnesota Poll—September 1968). The SALT I accord and movement towards SALT II have received continued public and editorial support. Most Americans believe disarmament agreements are possible and as many as 80% support further steps to control nuclear armaments (Potomac Associates 1974). Our initial reading of editorial reactions to the Vladivostok agreement indicate this latest development is receiving comparable approval.

**Summary.** On the basis of available data, we conclude that the public is clear-eyed when it comes to assessing the difficulties in a relationship with the Soviet Union. Americans want the Administration to pursue an active arms control policy but at the same time are prepared to support a strong defense establishment.

97. **Aide-Mémoire**¹


**AIDE-MÉMOIRE**

In accordance with the agreement reached during the meeting between President Gerald R. Ford and General Secretary of the Central

Committee of the CPSU L.I. Brezhnev on November 23–24, 1974, agreed provisions enumerated below will be followed by both sides in working out a new agreement on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments.

1. A new agreement will be completed as soon as possible, with the objective of signing it in 1975; it will cover the period from October 1977 through December 31, 1985, and will incorporate relevant provisions of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972, which will remain in force until October 1977.

2. Based on the principle of equality and equal security of both sides, the new agreement will include in particular the following limitations which will apply for the duration of the new agreement:

   a. During the time of a new agreement each of the sides will be entitled to an aggregate number of delivery vehicles of strategic arms not exceeding 2400. This number includes land-based intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBMs) launchers, ballistic missile launchers on submarines (SLBMs), and heavy bombers if the latter are equipped with bombs or air-to-surface missiles with a range not exceeding 600 kilometers. When a bomber is equipped with air-to-surface missiles with a range over 600 kilometers, each of such missiles will be counted as one delivery vehicle in the aggregate number (2400).

   b. Within this overall limitation each side will be free to determine the composition of the aggregate subject to the agreed prohibition on the construction of new land-based ICBM launchers.

   c. Both sides will be limited to no more than 1320 ICBMs and SLBMs equipped with multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicles (MIRVs); within this total number each side will be entitled to determine the types and numbers of missiles equipped with such warheads.

3. The provisions of Articles I and II of the Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972 will be incorporated into a new agreement. The Agreed Interpretation and Common Understanding dated May 26, 1972, relating to limitations on increasing the dimensions of land-based ICBM launchers by greater than 10–15 percent will also be incorporated into the new agreement.

4. Subject to the provisions of Articles I and II of the Interim Agreement, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive armaments, covered by the new agreement, may be undertaken.

5. A new agreement could also provide for additional limitations on deployment of new types of strategic arms during the period of its effectiveness.

6. A new agreement will also include a provision to the effect that no later than 1980–81 negotiations should start on further limitations and possible reductions of strategic arms.
7. Negotiations between the delegations of the US and USSR to work out a new agreement will resume in Geneva, in January 1975. A precise date of their resumption will be agreed upon in the near future.

98. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Results of Brezhnev–Giscard Summit

Summary: General Secretary Brezhnev returned to Moscow on December 7 after a three day working visit to France. Early reports on the results of the visit suggest that Brezhnev probably was satisfied with Giscard’s promises of continuity with the Pompidou/De Gaulle foreign policy and clearly reassured at the extent to which France is proving willing and able to participate in large-scale, long term economic cooperation. The French seem pleased that Giscard has reaffirmed the “privileged interlocutor” status which Pompidou had with Brezhnev. Apart from CSCE, discussions on the Middle East and other international subjects seem to have been limited to routine exchanges, stressing large convergence of views. The bilateral economic agreements which were signed, while broad in scope, are vague on specifics and contain no surprises. Giscard will make an official visit to the USSR in 1975, probably around September–October.

The principal results of the meeting were as follows:

—CSCE: Brezhnev succeeded in changing France’s heretofore non-committal attitude toward a CSCE summit, apparently without making any binding concessions on Basket III issues. CSCE apparently occupied a large part of the tête-à-tête meetings, during which Brezhnev obviously made a major effort to bring Giscard around. In gaining Giscard’s agreement on a summit, Brezhnev achieved something always

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 17, USSR (6). Confidential. Sent for information. The memorandum is based on reporting from the Embassy in Paris, in particular telegram 29492, December 9. Clift forwarded a copy of the telegram and a draft of the memorandum on December 10 to Scowcroft, who made minor revisions to the text of the latter. (Ibid.) Ford initialed the memorandum. According to an attached correspondence profile, the President saw it on December 14.
beyond his grasp with Pompidou. The French take the view that their position is a “yes, but” on the summit question; nevertheless, the communiqué wording is distinctly favorable to the Soviet view.2

—**Bilateral Economic Issues:** Brezhnev and Giscard signed a five year economic cooperation agreement.3 Originally, it was not planned that they personally would sign it, but the change was made at Soviet insistence. The agreement is vague and merely states that the two sides will cooperate to augment exchanges. Soviet Foreign Trade Minister Patolichev and French Finance Minister Fourcade signed three agreements: a ten year industrial cooperation agreement, a credit agreement, and an agreement for the purchase of Soviet natural gas.

—**Middle East:** Discussion seems to have been confined to a routine exchange stressing a close convergence of views. The Middle East portion of the communiqué contains no new elements. The French seem to have resisted Soviet pressure to call for the creation of a Palestinian state as rapidly as possible. Both sides called for the earliest possible reconvening of a Geneva peace conference.

—**Brezhnev’s Health:** Several alterations in the program, late starting of several meetings and, in particular, Brezhnev’s non-attendance at Giscard’s December 6 luncheon, led inevitably to further speculation about Brezhnev’s health. Brezhnev’s schedule was in fact deliberately lightened on December 6. Brezhnev showed signs of fatigue after the tête-à-têtes, and his speech seemed more slurred than usual at his departure. In the absence of more persuasive evidence, however, the likely explanation is simply that he is weary from a recent heavy schedule—including his meetings with you and a major visit to Mongolia—which would take its toll on any man of 68.

—**General:** Overall, there is no evidence of a measurable shift in Franco-Soviet relations as a result of the summit. If Brezhnev was a little anxious when he arrived, he had every reason to be satisfied when he left. He presumably was pleased by Giscard’s give on CSCE and by the warm tone of the meetings, and reassured that the new French government has the same basic attitude toward the USSR as did the governments of De Gaulle and Pompidou. On the French side, the visit served to bolster Giscard’s image as he turns this week to the EC summit and his meeting with you in Martinique. Nevertheless, some press commentary contained more than a hint that Moscow got the better of

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2 The joint communiqué was issued in Paris on December 7. The Embassy forwarded the text in telegram 29497, December 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

the exchange. It is too early to measure the impact of the meeting on France's relations with its European allies, but the possibility of a lasting negative impact exists.

99. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
George Kennan Speech on Détente

On December 11, George Kennan, former U.S. Ambassador to the USSR, gave a luncheon address at the Smithsonian Institution in which he strongly criticized Congressional and journalistic opponents of the Administration’s policy towards the Soviet Union. The text of Mr. Kennan’s speech is at Tab A.2

Mr. Kennan began his address by reviewing and countering two major criticisms of détente—that the U.S. has gained little and given up much and that the Soviets have failed to liberalize their internal system. With regard to the former, Kennan discusses the de facto recognition of the division of Germany and US-Soviet trade and concludes that in both cases the United States has gained a great deal while conceding very little. On SALT, he underlines the importance of the ceiling established from which the sides can work downwards. Kennan observes, moreover, that the mere maintenance of steady communication in strategic matters has great value because it promotes better understanding of each other’s motives. He regards assertions of Soviet superiority in certain strategic areas with “complete contempt” in view of present levels of over-kill. Kennan contends that anyone who thought détente would lead to liberalization of the Soviet system wholly misunderstood

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2 Attached but not printed.
its purpose and possibilities, and adds that the Soviets could not be ex-
pected to connive at internal developments aimed at the destruction of
their own regime.

Kennan points out that the present Soviet leadership—which
offers favorable prospects for improving US-USSR relations and pre-
serving peace—should not be regarded as an unchanging quantity, and
warns that although we do not know the cast of mind of its successors,
the younger generation does not seem as committed to a policy of rap-
prochement with us. In brief, he argues that we should make the best
use we can of the present favorable disposition of the older people who
now run Russia—“take what we can get while we can get it.”

Kennan states that what bothers him most about the rejection of
détente is the depressing and dangerous nature of the only visible alter-
natives. He calls upon opponents of détente to state honestly that their
alternative is in fact uncompromising opposition to the Soviet Union at
every turn, even if it means heightened danger of nuclear war, antag-
onizing smaller countries everywhere, alienation of liberal opinion and
of our allies throughout Europe and elsewhere, and giving new
strength to hardline elements in Russia. He cautions that between the
oil crisis and the Middle East, the U.S. may soon find itself in situations
of great difficulty and embarrassment and that the Soviets can either re-
frain from attempts to exploit this situation to our detriment or can re-
vert to earlier behavior and attempt to take maximum advantage of our
discomfiture. He warns those impelling the Soviets in the latter direc-
tion—which he argues some opponents of détente are now doing—that
they take very grave responsibility upon themselves. Mr. Kennan con-
cludes that there would be no greater mistake than to believe that
Moscow has no attractive alternatives to its search for accommodation
with us or that these alternatives would not be greatly worse for us
than what we have today.
Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Talk with Perle, December 18, 1974, 6 p.m.

Perle called to say that the passage in Anderson’s statement on the Gromyko letter today, which said there were no assurances on numbers, could be read as meaning that you repudiated the statement in your October 18 letter to the effect that emigration numbers would rise to meet applications. I said that nothing said by the spokesman affected your letter of October 18, the President’s statement in Tucson on October 21 and your Senate Finance Committee testimony. Perle said he thought this would take care of “Scoop’s concern” on this but Scoop may want to nail it down in writing. I said this was absurd.

He then asked me why I thought the Soviets had done what they did. I said I could only speculate: the Gromyko letter itself undoubtedly was a reaction to the unfortunate White House press conference by Scoop after his meeting with the President; publication of the letter was probably a further reaction to weeks of additional commentary in the arguments over the trade bill and to the steady whittling away at the ExIm bill. There had just been a Central Committee meeting in Moscow and it may well have been argued to Brezhnev that there were now such minimal benefits in trade with the US that it simply was not

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2 Robert Anderson, Department of State spokesman, released the following statement at 4:30 p.m. on December 18: “The private communication from Foreign Minister Gromyko to Secretary Kissinger of October 26 which was published by TASS today does not, in our view, change the understandings referred to in the Secretary’s letter to Senator Jackson of October 18. The Administration has always made clear, most recently in Secretary Kissinger’s testimony to the Senate Finance Committee on the Trade Bill, that there exists no understanding or agreement either with the Soviet government or with Senator Jackson concerning numbers of emigrants from the Soviet Union.” (Ford Library, Nessen Papers, Box 125, Foreign Guidance for Press Briefing, USSR) Gromyko’s October 26 letter is Document 75. The Secretary’s October 18 letter is Document 75. For Kissinger’s testimony, see U.S. Senate, Committee on Finance, Emigration Amendment to the Trade Reform Act of 1974: Hearing Before the Committee on Finance, United States Senate, Ninety-Third Congress, Second Session, December 3, 1974 (Washington: US GPO, 1974). On December 18, TASS also released an official statement, rejecting “as unacceptable any attempts, from whatever source, to interfere in affairs that fall wholly within the internal jurisdiction of the Soviet state and involve no one else.” For the text of the TASS statement, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVI, No. 52 (January 15, 1975), p. 5.
3 See footnote 2, Document 63.
4 See footnote 8, Document 59.
worthwhile to make concessions on emigration and to have a constant barrage of pressures and intrusions into their internal affairs. I said that if this business persisted the Soviets might just tell us to go to hell on MFN so that they would have no commitment of any sort on emigration. Perle said that if the Russians do that “we will cut off technology—we have the votes; not a single item will get to them.” I said he was doing great trying to run our foreign policy and he would probably get his reward when the next Middle East war breaks out. Perle merely said “so you blame us for that as well.”

(In an unpleasant encounter at Georgetown yesterday, at a SALT discussion, I had pointed out to Perle that his position would have the effect of reinforcing opposition to the Defense budget and to our ability to use the flexibility allowed for in the Vladivostok agreement to meet Soviet strategic weapons development. I had also pointed out to him that his SALT proposal would allow the Soviets over 1700 MIRVed missiles, including large numbers of SS–18s, against the 1320 agreed to at Vladivostok and would thus be highly destabilizing.)

101. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: Laird has been holding press conferences again. He said I absolutely won’t be around in ’76. I don’t need reassurance.

President: It was in the Post or Times this morning. He talks about the Cabinet, about you, etc.
Kissinger: On Egypt, everything that has been done is too late. Now Sadat says there has to be some withdrawal on all fronts. We probably should have moved before the [scheduled] Brezhnev visit [to Cairo]. I think we have to elicit something from Sadat and then tell Israel they have to give oil and the passes. Then we could move on the authorization with the argument that they need to buy more oil.

We have a serious problem on Ex-Im with the Soviets. It’s not just that Brezhnev looks like a fool on energy—with Peterson and Nixon, they were talking billions. We have lost our leverage. What do they lose if we kick over détente? They won’t do anything for $300 million. The basic trade bill is so appalling.

President: I object to the procedure on the energy projects. The $300 million I don’t like. I would have no compunction about a veto.

Kissinger: I doubt they will accept MFN under these conditions. Even if they do, it isn’t worth it. Dobrynin said they are faced with a position where there is shift of Executive power to the Congress.

President: If we veto the Ex-Im bill, maybe the businessmen will put some pressure on the Congress.

Kissinger: One theory with the Soviet Union was that we would create vested interests so that their bureaucracy would protest upsetting it. Also, we can stand these vested interest connections, but if they are made with Europe, I don’t know if Europe is strong enough to handle it.

My nightmare is that so far we have bluffed them out of every crisis; what if they take the next one further down to the wire? If they put three divisions in, we couldn’t meet them.

President: Let’s take a look at the bill and give me your recommendation.

Kissinger: I will talk to Dobrynin again today.

President: We will have to mobilize Don Kendall and the others.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on U.S. representation abroad.]

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3 On December 30, the Soviet Union and Egypt announced their decision to postpone Brezhnev’s trip to Cairo, which had been tentatively scheduled for January 1975.

4 Peter G. Peterson, former Secretary of Commerce.

5 In a memorandum to Kissinger on December 17, Sonnenfeldt briefed the Secretary on his scheduled luncheon meeting with Dobrynin the next day. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, Nov–Dec 1974) No record of the meeting has been found.

6 Kissinger called Dobrynin at 6:24 p.m. on December 19 and reported: “I just got a note here that says the Communist diplomats in London are saying that the publication of the Gromyko letter is the beginning of a general attitude by me on the Kremlin.” Dobrynin suggested: “You shouldn’t rely on such information.” “On this matter,” Kissinger replied, “I have been trying to defend the Soviet point of view.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)
102. Memorandum of Conversation\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, December 19, 1974, noon.

SUBJECT
Meeting with Academicians

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
William G. Hyland
Jan Lodal
Paul Doty—Harvard
Jack Ruina—MIT
Wolfgang Panofsky—Stanford
William Kaufman—MIT
Foy Kohler—U. of Miami
George Kennan—Woodrow Wilson Center
Robert Osgood—SAIS
William Bundy—CFR
Marshall Shulman—Columbia
Henry Owen—Brookings
Richard Garwin—IBM
Norman Terrell—C (Notetaker)

The Secretary: (To Shulman) I liked your speech very much.
Shulman: Thank you.

The Secretary: Before I talk about Vladivostok, I would like to say something that should be made clear to the members of the academic community dealing with Soviet affairs. That is we are running out of time. We are using up our capital at a very fast rate, particularly in the last years and the last months. Some of you can disagree, but it has been an assumption of the debate that the Soviets are committed to détente and that we can pile on conditions and conditions. It is assumed that we have made all the unilateral concessions, never defined. But we forget the 50’s and the 60’s. The Soviets have also had major adjustments. And theirs is not at all an irreversible policy. There are two problems to address. First, the general terms of US/Soviet relations, and second, this particular SALT agreement.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov–Dec 1974. Secret. Drafted by Norman Terrell in C. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room. In a briefing memorandum to Kissinger on December 19, Sonnenfeldt suggested: “Apart from reviewing the elements of the Vladivostok agreement, I think you should hit these people hard about the character of the public debate—its distortions, polemical nature and frequent air of unreality.” (Ibid.)
Now, take the Trade Bill. I had a long talk with Dobrynin yesterday and called his attention to the TASS item on the Trade Bill. From his point of view, the Soviet attitude is not wrong, but quite right. Since 1969 the Administration has been under pressure—including many of the academic community—to expand trade with the Soviet Union as a means of improving US/Soviet relations. We said we would expand trade if the Soviets carried out a responsible foreign policy and we were being attacked by those who said we should take a responsible attitude, that trade will ameliorate political relations.

So let’s look at 1972. In Viet-Nam the Soviets were not unhelpful. They concluded an agreement in Berlin that made that situation fairly stable and calmed down a source of trouble. When we analyzed the Middle East, we found the Soviets were in an extremely difficult position. You can see from our continuing trouble with Israel that it is absurd to think the Soviets merely kick around the Arabs. In 1973 the Soviets tried hard to prevent an outbreak. They did not encourage the Arabs to go to war; they discouraged them. They didn’t know war was coming. And when they finally saw what was going to happen, they got out of the way. The Arab leaders told the Soviets they were going to attack 48 hours before it happened. And the Soviets evacuated. It is not their fault if our intelligence did not interpret this correctly. Thus, we do not believe the Soviets behaved irresponsibly even in the Middle East, although they did not show much foresight.

For the past few years we have been conducting negotiations to give the Soviets MFN. We made them settle lend-lease. On our part, we agreed to extend them credits. Then what happened? The Trade Bill is tied to intrusive demands on Soviet internal matters that we ourselves could not accept. We would not settle for commercial relations with a foreign power under terms like that.

Look at what the Soviets have done in terms of Jewish emigration. They went from 400 to 35,000 quietly. And that was before Jackson. There was no public pressure exerted on them; just quiet conversations. Then we had this formal Congressional pressure. And the Soviets paid in a way we would not pay. They gave us assurances on the practices they would follow in granting permission to emigrate. I repeat that I would not put up with it if Dobrynin came in here and made demands about Angela Davis. No Secretary of State would.

Next, Jackson steps out of the meeting at the White House. We told him, “when you step out, just say we agreed.” But then he released the

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2 See footnote 5, Document 101.
3 See footnote 2, Document 100.
4 Angela Y. Davis, an African-American activist, professor at UCLA, and member of the Communist Party.
exchange of letters and said, “this proves what you can do if you hold firm.” And now he and others are saying about Vladivostok, “you should go renegotiate this agreement.” But the Soviets met 90% of our demands. The terms of the agreement are ours, not theirs. When we say we can’t renegotiate, Jackson says, “no, that’s not true, that’s what you used to say about emigration.”

I think the Soviets still would have taken it if the ExIm Bill had not been loaded down like a Christmas tree. We have now put a restriction on commercial credits to the Soviet Union of 300 million dollars in a four-year period. I would like to see someone try to put a restriction of 75 million dollars a year on Israel. And on top of that, there is a special requirement of not more than 40 million dollars on credits to develop energy sources.

The Soviets were better off in the Cold War. In the Cold War, the Government at least had authority to give the Soviets trade, but didn’t. Even in 1970 and 1971 we could talk to them about energy projects. The President, the Secretary of Treasury and the Secretary of Commerce all held out the prospect of trade; now that’s been taken away. If we have another crisis in the Middle East next year and the Soviets are not cooperative, I will say to them that they are threatening détente. They will ask, “what have we got to lose?” I suppose I can say that if they aren’t good we will get mad. But they are used to it. We got mad in 1961.

In all our dealings with the Soviets since 1969 it has been clear to me that everything Brezhnev agrees to has to be taken to the Politburo. Now the Politburo must think either that the United States cannot keep its commitments or that Brezhnev is a fool.

I am not saying that the Soviet Union is necessarily good. But never before have two nations had the power to destroy humanity. To argue whether the strategic force levels are 2400, 2350 or 1760 is intellectual purism that is extraordinarily dangerous. The damage has been done, and now all that is left of détente is SALT. What we wanted to do was establish linkages and vested interests in the bureaucracy. But that has been substantially eroded. And it was done for nothing. We got nothing for it.

We who are concerned with US/Soviet relations should take this seriously. If the Soviets change course, don’t think they will change back easily. They will cling as tenaciously to a new policy as they have to five years of détente. If Brezhnev is discredited, his successors will believe they cannot make themselves dependent on American decisions. They concluded agreements with an American President who won the greatest electoral victory in our history, and who a short time later left office discredited. (As for the Chinese, this is also not a settling phenomenon.) This is the basic problem we should look at before we
hack away at Sakharov, Solzhenitsyn,⁵ and so forth, in what is basically an immoral system. We should give some thought to this over-all problem in addition to looking at the details of Vladivostok.

Now, as to Vladivostok, you know the agreement and I won’t explain its terms. I will discuss its significance and deal with some of the criticisms that have been leveled against it.

I myself was not a wild advocate of equal aggregates within the United States Government. I preferred unequal aggregates in favor of the Soviets and unequal MIRV’s in favor of the United States. However, that was not attainable at an acceptable price domestically, although it is intellectually better. The Soviets would have accepted unequal aggregates and unequal MIRV’s, but the idea of unequal aggregates was ours and its presence in the agreement is their concession. I do not know why equal aggregates assumed such a symbolic significance in the Pentagon and why there was such a domestic debate over it. The JCS conceived the perceptual impact of unequal aggregates in foreign relations terms as unacceptable. If it seemed okay to the Secretary of State, I don’t know why the JCS couldn’t accept it. But since unequal levels would have been subject to the same kind of Congressional treatment as the Trade Bill, we pursued the less intellectually supportable goal of equal levels, so we could have the widest domestic consensus on this agreement.

We could have had another deal of 2400 launchers for the Soviets and 2200 for us, along with 1300 MIRV’s for us and 1100 for the Soviets. However, there is no difference strategically between this and equal levels.

The significance of equal aggregates and a MIRVed ceiling is that for the first time in the post-war period we have a fixed ceiling for ten years under which the planning of the two sides can take place. We have deprived the military on the two sides of the rationale for planning on the basis of unknown actions by the other side ten years hence. Second, at these levels you can make no plausible demonstration that either side can achieve strategic superiority in this period. It is true that the qualitative race will go on. But quality unrelated to quantity cannot make a strategically significant difference. (The most likely qualitative improvement over this period is some breakthrough in strategic defense.) I don’t see that improving accuracy from one-tenth of a mile to a fraction of one-tenth of a mile is important. That will not change the vulnerability of fixed land-based ICBM’s. When one questions vulnerability, he must consider the proportion of the force in fixed land-based ICBM’s. Hence, the Soviets will be more vulnerable in the 1980’s than

⁵ Physicist Andrei Sakharov and author Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn were prominent Soviet dissidents.
we will. This creates a substantial incentive to move the strategic force into more stabilizing forces.

The MIRV ceiling establishes constraints on what the Soviets can do with their MIRV’s. The Soviets must soon choose between converting ICBM’s for MIRV’s or putting MIRV forces at sea.

The ceiling of 2400 as it now exists means the Soviets will have to get rid of 200 launchers. If land mobiles come in, that means another reduction. Moreover, the Soviets will have to retain a large part of their force in SS–11’s and SS–9’s because of the MIRV ceiling. Into the 1980’s these forces will become obsolescent, which will in itself make reductions easier. Just as there is no strategic difference between 2400 and 2200, it will be safe during this period to go from 2400 to 2000, because this will mean no sacrifice of strategic capability.

The agreement has been criticized because no reductions will be possible before 1985. This is not true, no matter how the statements were drafted at the Vladivostok meeting. This inference has been eliminated from the aide-mémoire. Reductions can start any time the two sides agree.

Ruina: Will the aide-mémoire be made public?

The Secretary: The criticisms about the “secrecy” of the aide-mémoire are also serious. I will say something about that later.

First, I want to address the criticism that the negotiations were hasty and the agreement was sloppily drawn. We had two years of negotiations to reach this agreement. This summer we and the Soviets did a detailed analysis of the possibilities that were open to us. We exchanged information on military capabilities that would have meant treason in the Soviet Union earlier; the accuracy of missiles, deployment levels and so forth. Thirty years ago information of this kind would not have been exchanged even between France and Britain. It became obvious that both sides were protecting against a breakout. We would be in the middle of our B–1 and Trident deployments and the Soviets in the middle of their new MIRV programs just at the end of the Interim Agreement. It would therefore be easier to make decisions for 1985 than for 1977 or 1980. Then we went to the Soviet Union in October and we had many exchanges with the Soviets following that. Therefore, there was nothing hasty about this agreement.

Concerning the aide-mémoire, I have frankly dug in on a point I think George Kennan will appreciate. You cannot conduct foreign policy if the temperature of the negotiations is taken every day. You cannot do it if, while you are negotiating, every Senator tells you how to conduct the negotiations on every aspect. Everything in the

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6 Document 97.
aide-mémoire has been made public, except the precise language. It has
been submitted to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the
House Foreign Affairs Committee for their information. But I have up
to now resisted making it public. There have been irresponsible charges
leveled about the delay in drafting it. The fact is, however, that I went
to China, then there was a draft, then a counter draft, and so on. But
there was no dispute. I felt we were in no hurry. We should do it prop-
erly. Finally, it sat on my desk for three days and I didn’t bother to get it
done. Before I left for Brussels for the NATO meeting, Dobrynin called
and asked whether we should do it now or after Brussels, and we ini-
tialed it the day I left for Brussels. There were no real disagreements,
we wanted some details on verification, they had some other points.
But it was the most normal negotiation I have conducted for a long
time, not at all contentious. I am reluctant to release the aide-mémoire
because the Soviets will not be happy if every time they say something
to us they must worry about a public debate. They would have to con-
sider not only what they tell us, but also how it looks in the papers.
However, if we are beaten up on this, we will make the aide-mémoire
public. I will be glad to show it to any of you. However, it is drawn
mostly from the Vladivostok communique.\textsuperscript{7} The 1985 date for reduc-
tions is out; one or two points are made more precise.

Panofsky: Does it still say that negotiations will commence before
1980 or 1981?

The Secretary: Yes. But we can start anytime. We don’t have to
wait until 1980.

Garwin: There is a point I want to take up regarding secrecy. The
relations between Congress and the Administration are in disarray.
The Senate is after all the Senate. The Administration in Nixon’s time
did many things to Congress. Nixon is gone, but many of the Cabinet
are the same. There is no confidence in the Administration on the Hill.
They do not know what you are doing.

The Secretary: It was leaked.

Garwin: Wouldn’t it be better if it were published?

Owen: It would be good if you could bring out that the negotia-
tions for SALT III could start soon, not long after SALT II is completed.

Panofsky: That particular point would be very valuable.

The Secretary: That is an easy thing to say. We will have hearings
on Vladivostok before Jackson and others and we can make that point.

Owen: I don’t think it is so important whether the aide-mémoire it-
self is made public.

\textsuperscript{7} See footnote 11, Document 92.
The Secretary: I will not die on the barricade not to publish the aide-mémoire. But in the daily press briefings we have inquiries: “Has it been signed? Has it been signed?” There was no problem. We were carrying out regular procedures. In any event, the Congressional committees have the aide-mémoire and in a couple of days it will leak.

Owen: Can you agree with the Soviets on an early starting date for SALT III?

The Secretary: Another point I want to make is that everyone should not only compare his ideal SALT agreement with this SALT agreement, but also no SALT agreement with this agreement, and decide what we are ready to do if this agreement is not ratified.

Garwin: The other damaging thing that is being said is that this agreement will force us to build up. Ford said we had an obligation to do so.

The Secretary: I wish we could stop the methods of debate of the Viet-Nam war. Any President, and especially a President new in his job, is not going to give his final thoughts on the subject in answer to a press question. We are under no obligation to build up. In fact, if we are willing to live with some disparity, it is going to be easier if the Soviet level is 2400 than if it is 2600, and easier still than if it is 2900 or 3000. The very ones who yelled the loudest for equality are now yelling about an agreement that provides equality.

Garwin: Don’t misunderstand. I am a supporter of this agreement. But your supporters need tools.

The Secretary: We will decide on our strategic forces on the basis of our national interests. But we should not engage in the pursuit of formal equality for its own sake. It was phony before we had this Agreement, and it is phony now. The ceiling we have set on Soviet forces make rational decisions easier.

Ruina: It would be valuable if we could now say that we will slow down Trident and B–1. This would make an important public impression.

The Secretary: For your information, it is in our interest to slow down now so we will have our production lines open toward the end of this period. Then if the agreement were not extended, the Soviets would know that we can accelerate. Our deployments should not be complete in 1985.

Ruina: Can you start negotiations on further reductions next year?

The Secretary: After the agreement is ratified, it should be easy.

Shulman: I agree with what you said about détente. In support, I would refer to the Western European economic situation. At this time, the Western Europeans should not have to raise questions about the Soviet position.
I also have a question. Do I understand you to say that if we had unequal MIRV’s in our favor, it would be at the price of unequal aggregates?

The Secretary: Yes.

Shulman: Although I do not like the idea of unequal overall levels, I am sorry that you had to give up on the MIRV ratio. The arguments about the Soviet throw-weight advantage would be much easier to answer if the MIRV levels were in our favor.

The Secretary: I don’t know how we could have got unequal MIRV’s with equal aggregates, excluding U.S. forward-based systems, Allied strategic systems and compensation for Chinese forces—all of which the Soviets had earlier demanded. In the Crimea, Brezhnev mentioned to us a very high number of warheads that could be targeted on the Soviet Union. I said that didn’t sound right and he said go check. Well, he was right if you approached the question from the Soviet worst case viewpoint, counting every aircraft carrier, every F–4, etc. I tried saying to him that FBS was no good, that it could not get through to the Soviet Union. Then Grechko took me aside and showed me the lines in the Soviet Union where our various systems could reach. He said your F–4’s would attack targets up to here, your aircraft carrier planes up to here, and so on. It was done well. Then he said that would free your missiles to reach deep into the Soviet Union. The point is we are geared for a second strike and we tend to write off our FBS. They must take account of a possible first strike, and for them FBS is not totally irrelevant. I have the impression that the Soviet military is not totally satisfied with this agreement. There were two Generals sitting behind Brezhnev in Vladivostok, who had also been in the Crimea. Every time we said something about ceilings, they would jump up and pass him a note telling him what that meant they would give up. Then after the first session at Vladivostok, Gromyko came and suggested we limit our discussion to three per side. I agreed and that meant the two Generals were not seen again until the departure ceremony. The point is that once the Soviets threw in the sponge on FBS and third-country forces, they drove the level up.

Shulman: However, equal MIRV’s opens the way to the throw-weight issue.

The Secretary: If you analyze throw-weight, it is not important if you also include yield, accuracy and a specific target system. For instance, throw-weight does not help on sub-limits. The Soviets are now testing four warheads on the SS–17, six on the 19 and around 8 on the

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5 Reference is to the meeting on June 30 in Oreanda during the Moscow summit. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XV, Soviet Union, June 1972–August 1974, Document 190.
18. We can assume those numbers will be deployed in the next years. That means by the 1980’s, fixed land-based ICBM’s will be vulnerable regardless of throw-weight. I think it is reckless of the Soviets to rely on land-based silos. However, if we want throw-weight, we can get it by putting new missiles in our Minuteman silos. I found that out by accident a few months ago. I asked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff how much our throw-weight would increase if we increased silo dimensions by 15%, as we are allowed under the Interim Agreement. He said, “we needn’t bother; we can put a heavier throw-weight missile in the existing silos.” But we must recall that increasing our throw-weight does not help make U.S. forces invulnerable; it hurts Soviet vulnerability. The U.S. intellectual community can help bring about an understanding of this. As I said, unequal aggregates and unequal MIRV’s would have led to other debate like the Trade Bill, and that would have been used to undermine our position with our Allies. Finally, it does not make any difference. Even if we had an advantage of 200 MIRV’s, that would not help.

Ruina: I agree that equality helps in the presentation of this agreement.

The Secretary: We came to the same conclusion and gave up on the more intellectually satisfying concept.

Panofsky: There are two areas where public perceptions cause problems. One is the misunderstanding of what our options are to begin the next phase of negotiations. The second is the misunderstanding that we are under an obligation to go up to higher levels. If you can explain this thing, it would be good.

The Secretary: That is easy. We can make clear we will do our utmost to move rapidly on reductions.

Ruina: Will DOD agree to that?

The Secretary: Yes. Even though there are some over there who allegedly support Jackson’s level of 1800. But Jackson’s 1800 has no sub-limits. It would mean 1800 MIRV’s or 1800 SS–18’s.

Mr. Owen: There are two things that would help on the first point—follow-on negotiations. It would be good if not just the U.S. said it was willing to have an early SALT follow-on, but if the Soviets would agree with us on a concrete date. It would also be good if we could have an annual review conference with the Soviets, so that each year we would look at our programs under this agreement.

The Secretary: I would be wary to go to the Soviets and ask them now for additional assurances in light of our economic relations.

Owen: In that case, if you can say that the U.S. is ready for early negotiations.

The Secretary: That we can do.
Doty: If I understood you, the numbers from the Soviet view relate to their concessions in FBS. Does that mean the numbers could be further reduced, and we could have reductions earlier, if the U.S. counted FBS?

The Secretary: The Soviets never explained why they dropped FBS. In Moscow they dropped FBS and agreed to equality to be achieved in 1985. But they said we would have to count UK and French forces. Next, we gave a complicated formula that would start with unequal aggregates and unequal MIRV’s and then go to equality during the agreement. Finally, in Vladivostok the Soviets agreed to drop everything and have across-the-board equality. I have the impression that Brezhnev just found the whole thing too complex. But we may never be able to explain. Hence, we will have equal aggregates and equal MIRV’s from the beginning. When we get into reductions and get down to 1800 or 2000, I have an idea that this will re-open FBS.

Doty: Will SALT create conditions for other nuclear powers to enter into negotiations and thus assist in the general problem of nuclear proliferation?

The Secretary: In 1973 the Soviets made a point of getting China in. They said that otherwise we would weaken ourselves while China grows. They felt that in about 10 years China would be a serious problem. I think that if China does not join in strategic arms control, and continues to build up, they will become a factor in the future. I have the impression the Soviets are not as worried about France or the UK.

Ruina: If this is ratified, I think a next step more important than reducing numbers is to slow down the pace at which new systems are introduced.

The Secretary: I agree completely.

Shulman: How have the Soviets reacted to limits on flight testing?

The Secretary: It has not been raised. I think they would be allergic to it.

Garwin: If there are systems which are not limited in the next agreement, it seems to me they must be banned. I am thinking, for example, of intercontinental cruise missiles. In that case, limits on flight testing can be used as an aid to verification.

The Secretary: I can’t predict how the Soviets would react to such measures, although I personally favor them. We tried something like that. We know the number of SS–18’s the Soviets intend to MIRV, unless Brezhnev lied. I proposed that we just write that down and put it in the agreement. We were even willing to pay a little price for it. But I think it got hung up somewhere in the Soviet military. It is logical the Soviets will want to keep some SS–9’s, which is a unique system. The
MIRVed SS–18 is not that significantly different from any other MIRVed missile. However, the Generals in the back room did not want to give up the right to MIRV all the SS–9’s. Just like our Generals wanted equal aggregates, even though they will probably not build up. On both sides the military forewent restraints on the other side, in order to keep options open.

Owen: I don’t understand your remark about the SS–9. Does that mean the Soviets will be reluctant to give up second line forces in SALT III?

The Secretary: The point is that the SS–18 offers nothing significant over and above the SS–19. There is no real difference between, say, a warhead of one megaton and a warhead of one and a half megatons. But the SS–9, with its very large warhead, could be used against China, or against mobiles in area coverage. If they keep their large missiles, it is logical that they will want to keep some of them as single warheads. When they go into further reductions, I think they must get rid of the SS–11’s.

Osgood: Do you think the Soviets will go to sea?

The Secretary: In the 1980’s they will have 85% of their throw-weight in ICBM’s, which must become vulnerable. I think the wise Soviet weapons designer will want to make his force mobile, either by air or by sea. I have no proof, but that is my view.

Panofsky: In the past, defense programs have been looked on as bargaining chips. Since the perception of Vladivostok will mean more than the numbers, I think two things are important. First, the actual increases requested by the Administration in next year’s budget hearings, and second, the oratory that accompanies the Administration requests. These things will affect ratification in July or August.

The Secretary: The rhetoric that issues from this building and the White House will not be excessive. I cannot speak for the Government, as the Government is not as monolithic as when George Kennan was in it. We now have a number of independent satrapies here and there. However, whatever the rhetoric is, it will be justified by ratifying this agreement. Look at the intelligence projection on what Soviet forces will be if this agreement is not ratified. There will either be a large gap between our levels and theirs, or a large increase in our defense budget to keep up. Even if the only result of this agreement is that we stick to our present programs, it will be the first 10-year period in which there is no increase in planned programs. Perhaps Bill (Kaufman) can make sure we don’t make exorbitant claims on the DOD budget.

Kaufman: You have given a picture of precarious relations with the Soviets.

The Secretary: Yes. Largely because of our actions.
Kaufman: Given the anticipated DOD budget, how should we play the Soviet angle?

The Secretary: I would make two points. First, we should stick to the DOD budget at least through the summer, until we have this agreement ratified. Second, if we have another Middle East crisis, we must conduct it without Soviet influence. We now have no economic restraints on Soviet conduct. I think there is a 50–50 chance the Soviets will reject MFN.

Shulman: Because they wanted ExIm credits?

The Secretary: That’s right. And for everyone else MFN is indefinite. They only have it for 18 months. That means we must go back to them to change the trade agreement.

Shulman: What is your view of the Kennedy/Mathias/Mondale resolution?

The Secretary: I have asked them to let it die and reintroduce it. We don’t care if it is the sense of Congress that we should have follow-on negotiations for certain purposes. However, it is impossible to go back to the Soviets and re-open the aggregate levels right now.

Doty: Can we re-open a ban on all mobiles?

The Secretary: If we don’t spend too much time on it. If we try it, and it flies, that would be fine. But we cannot fool around with the numbers.

Shulman: Do you worry about verification?

The Secretary: The Government is no longer what it was. Everyone will now try to cover his own rear. I don’t know what the intelligence community will come up with. Until recently it was the unchallenged judgment of the intelligence community that the SS–17, 18 and 19 could be deployed only with silo modifications that take about six months. We would then count the new missiles as MIRVed whenever they would be deployed in the modified silos. There are now rumblings in the intelligence community about additional “collateral constraints.” I’m not exactly sure what that means, but I don’t take it too seriously. The question of SLBM MIRV deployment will be a little more difficult, and I am not sure the Soviets are on board on that. On the land-based MIRV’s, however, we have told them often enough how we will count MIRV’s, and that should be feasible unless we come up with something else on constraints.

Ruina: Is every Minuteman counted as MIRVed?

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9 Senators Kennedy, Mathias, and Mondale had recently proposed a Congressional resolution supporting the Vladivostok accords but also calling for actual reductions, not merely limitations, in strategic nuclear weapons. See also footnote 8, Document 113.
The Secretary: I think the Soviets have a pretty good idea of what we have MIRVed so far. There is a complication concerning some covers the Air Force puts on the Minuteman silo when they are working on it. Try explaining to Grechko that the covering is just for rain.

Panofsky: The Air Force has changed all the silos so they can take Minuteman III.

The Secretary: The Soviets have not raised that yet. If they do, we will be in a hell of a mess. Hal makes the point that, if they accept our definition of what is MIRVed, they must count all 1000 Minutemen.

Ruina: Why not say we count all their silos as SS–17, 18 or 19, and they count all our silos as Minuteman III?

Panofsky: It looks like a fundamental problem to me.

Osgood: One of the more important aspects of this agreement is its effect on the Soviet domestic debate. Implicit in what you say is the situation Brezhnev finds himself in. Can you be more explicit?

The Secretary: I have no interest in the survival of Brezhnev as a person. But he has made a major political commitment to improved relations with the U.S. I don’t know why that means so much to the Russians: perhaps it has to do with a feeling of inferiority. Everything Brezhnev has done has been submitted to the Politburo, so we are not dealing with just one faction. Now, you can say that the Soviets are engaged in a great confidence game. But they are not that complicated. They are not saying, “let’s pretend we want to have good relations with the Americans and then attack them.” They don’t talk that way. They may believe that certain long-term trends favor them if they go for peaceful relations with the United States. Brezhnev has made a lot of speeches in support of improved economic relations with the United States. And as economic relations improve, political relations expand, and create another network of relationships. The evidence for this is that in crisis situations the Soviets have not been irresponsible: not imaginative but not irresponsible. In 1971 we said that if they would do this, we would do the other thing. But now we look less decisive, more muscle bound. I do not believe that for the next two years of this Administration any dramatic worsening in Soviet policy will take place. But there will be a slow erosion, a slow questioning of the United States. Ask yourself how does the United States look to foreign countries as a functioning political phenomenon. Better than the Europeans, of course, but not good. That is a profound concern of mine. As I say, I think I can see nothing dramatic through the next elections. Short of a Middle East war, I don’t think anything catastrophic will happen. But if we keep on acting the way we do, someday the Soviets will face us down. Do you agree, Bill?

Hyland: Yes, I do. And another point is that this is the last phase of Brezhnev. Soon we will have new leadership in the Soviet Union.
The Secretary: In 1973 the Soviets implored us to settle the Middle East. We fended them off on the theory that they had no military option in the Middle East. The Israelis were strong and if they destroyed the Arabs, our position would improve. We could not exert ourselves for the domestic price we would have to pay. The Soviets restrained the Arabs until 1973; they did not egg them on. Sadat says he kicked the Soviets out because the presence of 20,000 Russians would keep him one way or the other from going to war. Now we are driving Sadat in the other direction, even though he doesn’t like the Russians. And that worries me. In any case, the Soviets are not irresponsible, albeit not creative. And Brezhnev would have liked to leave something irreversible to his successors. Brezhnev and his group have a fear of war in their bones. They behave with a timidity all out of proportion to their strength. Time and again, we have bluffed the Soviets out when the objective correlation of forces was not in our favor. But the young generation might play the game a few steps further. And if they do, we will see this as another lost opportunity.

Kennan: To give you my personal impression, if the policy changes, Brezhnev will go; and if Brezhnev goes, the policy will change. The consequences could be serious. I haven’t heard any arguments about SALT comparable in importance to a general change in Soviet policy. It is evident that the Soviets want détente not just for practical advantages. They also want the appearance of détente (and this is typical) and so they gave their people the hope that détente will become a reality. We underestimate the degree the Soviets are committed to their own propaganda. They can change, but they cannot change too fast or too sharply. Their internal commitment is very real.

The Secretary: In our public debate we assume détente is a one-way street, where we give and the Soviets receive. But there are benefits to us. For example, in Europe we are no longer seen as an obstacle to peace. That is much healthier, because before the left wing could rally in opposition to the United States. The same is true in Japan, and to some extent in our country as well. If it comes to the point where the question arises whether the U.S. risked all this for nothing, it will be bad. The Soviets could use the energy crisis and economic problems more ruthlessly. If the Soviets did, we could have a massive structural problem in Western societies.

Kohler: The Soviets do not want war.

The Secretary: The younger generation?

Kohler: It is being instilled in them. When they see economic chaos in the West we do not see any dramatic about faces. I don’t see them reversing their policy all that much.

The Secretary: Not in the immediate future. But they are more dubious now than they have ever been.
Kennan: And there are lots of dividends for them in playing the anti-American note. It is a popular thing. They have not thrown themselves into it in recent years.

The Secretary: I don’t know where to leave this. You will all be involved in the debate on this. I will be glad to meet again and exchange ideas. We should not confine ourselves to SALT. Perhaps the end of January.

Bundy: Is ExIm out of reach?

The Secretary: I was not warned here in the building. All the focus was on the Trade Bill, and they kept loading ExIm up like a Christmas tree.

Bundy: Who did it?

The Secretary: Jackson, Stevenson, Harry Byrd, Proxmire, Church. The usual new coalition of liberals and conservatives. Mindless.

Sonnenfeldt: The problem was the supporters of the bank were interested in somewhere else, and were willing to accept the restrictions on the Soviet Union.

The Secretary: Casey\textsuperscript{10} did not fight. Had we fought . . . Credits limited to 300 million dollars over 4 years, no energy projects over 40 million dollars subject to individual approval. It gives us no leverage. It is humiliating to the Soviets.

Bundy: Can it be amended?

The Secretary: We are considering a veto and then starting over again.

Owen: We should not leave without thanking you very much for having us and for being so candid. We would like to meet with you again. The next time we will meet toward the end of the day, so we can have more time. We’ll try the end of January.

\textsuperscript{10} William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.
103. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Western Credits to the USSR

You asked for a summary of credits extended recently to the USSR by major industrialized countries.

Earlier this month France agreed to provide the Soviets with a $2.5 billion credit for 1975–79. The acknowledged interest rates will vary between 7.25% for orders in excess of $90 million and 7.55% for smaller purchases.

Japan has provided the Soviets with roughly $1 billion in long term credits for the development of Siberian forestry and coal. Interest rates vary with the type of purchases, with machinery and equipment at 6.375%. Recently the Japanese have stiffened their demands on the interest rates.

The West German Government has continually refused to subsidize export credits to the Soviets. German banks frequently subsidize loans but are repaid by the German firms which benefit from the export; such firms then raise the selling price to the USSR to offset this payment to the bank.

Britain has traditionally provided subsidized interest rates to the Soviets, but in October 1974 she raised the rate from 6% to 7%, thereby incurring an unfavorable reaction from the Soviets.

Italy recently rolled over a large debt to the Soviet Union at less than commercial rates of interest.

The U.S. Ex-Im Bank has approved roughly 470 million in credits to the Soviets at 6% interest. New loans, with minor exceptions, vary at between 7% and 8%.

The total outstanding Soviet medium term and long term debt to the West totals roughly $4.2 billion. It is fair to say that a large portion of that credit has been provided at lower than commercial rates of interest. Virtually all Western countries have consented to lower than market interest rates. In October the U.S., Japan, U.K., Italy and France

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 17, USSR (6). Confidential. Ford initialed the memorandum. According to an attached correspondence profile, Scowcroft forwarded the memorandum to Ford on December 24. The memorandum is largely based on an intelligence report, also entitled “Western Credits to the USSR,” prepared by the CIA on December 20. (Ibid.)
concluded an agreed “minute” on export credits, which included a statement of desirability on policy for a 7.5% floor on interest rates for government support export credits. This should help in avoiding destructive competition among Western countries.

104. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford

Moscow, December 25, 1974.

Dear Mr. President,

I would like to express to you in a frank way some considerations of mine and of my colleagues on the question which is the matter of principle for the relations between our two countries.

The question is of the state of affairs which is shaping up in the field of trade and economic ties between the USSR and the US. Due to both purely practical and—to no lesser extent—to political reasons, this question was constantly a subject of exchanges of views including those at the summit meetings—from the first one in 1972 and till the latest our meeting with you in Vladivostok.

We, of course, remember the statements of former President R. Nixon, and then your statements to the effect that you definitely stand for the removal of earlier introduced in the US discriminatory limitations for the Soviet Union in the questions of trade and credits.

Moreover, both sides also undertook legally defined clear obligation to discontinue unconditionally—I emphasize, unconditionally—the discriminatory practice and to develop commercial and economic relations on the generally accepted basis of most favored nation status.

However, the results of the discussions in the US Congress of the new legislation on trade and credits in its part dealing with the Soviet

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the letter was delivered to the White House on the afternoon of December 25. In his memoirs, Kissinger recalled: “On December 25, Brezhnev addressed a personal letter to Ford, the first time he had done so since Vladivostok. At once blustering and melancholy, Brezhnev once more rejected congressional legislation linking East-West trade to Jewish emigration. The Soviet Union would not accept the waiver or any form of conditionality other than the settlement of the Lend-Lease debt.” (Kissinger, Years of Renewal, p. 305)

2 The Trade Act of 1974 (Public Law 93–618) was approved by both Houses of Congress on December 20.
Union cannot but raise questions and—to say even more—firm objections on our part. Any attempts to condition the removal of discriminatory limitations with various kinds of artificial demands like the one for "freedom of emigration" from the USSR etc., cannot fail being considered as nothing but a clearly expressed intention of interfering in the affairs of our state, which are of no concern either for American legislators or anyone else.

In fact, a direct attack was waged against the very basis of our relations—the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of each other. Of course, we cannot but react to such matters, we cannot assume an air as if we do not notice them. And we, as you know, have said our word on this matter in the TASS statement, published several days ago.³

It would seem that in our days nobody will seriously believe that it is suffice to have a wish to interfere in the affairs of the USSR and it will be allowed to do so. However, in the US, as one can see, there are still people who think in such absurd categories. At that, whatever efforts these people may try to use to cover their actions aimed against normalization of Soviet-American relations with pseudo-democratic, pseudo-humanitarian motives, in reality there is nothing of humanism or democratism in their actions.

If to take such a road, we also could, as a condition for dealing with the US in trade and economic matters, introduce a number of demands. For example, we could say that we shall not buy goods in the US until the racial discrimination is eliminated there. And in this case we would be guided by really the most humanitarian and noble motives. Or in solidarity with millions of American unemployed we could tie up the questions of our trade with the US with easing their situation. But is it not clear what will happen, if all such questions are to be introduced into our state relations.

The fact remains that agreement to the effect that trade and economic ties between the USSR and the US should be implemented on the basis of equality and non-discrimination has not yet been fulfilled by the American side. And this fact cannot but raise the question on our part and, probably, in the US as well as to how sure one can generally be of the implementation of what both sides agree about.

As a result of the aforesaid actions by the appropriate authorities of the USA, the questions of trade and economic ties between our countries—and we have to face the truth—have turned out to be unresolved at the present time. Moreover, in many respects the situation in this area became even worse to-day than ever before.

³ See footnote 2, Document 100.
To avoid any sort of ambiguity in this respect, we consider it necessary to state officially that the very basis of trade and credit legislation adopted by the US Congress in its parts dealing with the USSR is unacceptable for us on the abovementioned grounds. This, of course, relieves the Soviet side as well of the obligations which has been taken by it in a comprehensive complex of agreements on trade and credit questions.

Thus, our trade and economic relations have undoubtedly been seriously damaged, and that by no means helps the development of Soviet-American relations in other areas either.

In this connection we would like to know, Mr. President, your views with regard to improving the existing situation.

On our part, we shall do everything what is necessary to move further forward in our relations in the areas which so far have been the subject of our keen attention and to which both sides have devoted so many efforts. It applies both to bilateral Soviet-American relations and to the international problems touching upon the interests of our two States. We believe that this very approach will be the correct one.

The cause of relaxation of international tension and of strengthening peace is of too great importance and responsibility to retreat from it or to get discouraged on the account of forces which counteract this cause. We are deeply convinced that to do so would not be in our common interests. In any event, as far as the Soviet side is concerned, I can definitely say that this is not our intention.

In other words, we would like to view the future with optimism as before, supporting it by our joint efforts. We hope, Mr. President, that you share such an approach and that in practice the American side will act accordingly.

In conclusion, I would like to say that the degree of mutual understanding revealed during our meeting in Vladivostok and agreements reached there on certain concrete questions create not a bad basis for further intensive work with the purpose of completing the business we began, in the interests of the Soviet and American peoples, and in the interests of all mankind.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

SUBJECT
Brezhnev’s Letter of December 25

Brezhnev has written you a long letter commenting on the trade–emigration issues and their impact on the general state of US-Soviet relations.²

He makes the following points:
1. The US has failed to meet its commitment to end trade discrimination “unconditionally” (as provided for in the October 1972 agreements);
2. The USSR is thereby relieved of its obligations in a “comprehensive complex of agreements on trade and credit questions” (he is referring, first of all, to the lend lease agreement, which was conditioned on granting of MFN);
3. US actions raise questions about the validity of other agreements;
4. The USSR, however, intends to move forward in both bilateral relations and on international issues in light of common interests, and will not “retreat” from its responsibilities.
5. Brezhnev solicits your view on how to improve the “existing situation”, and expresses the hope that you share his intention not to become discouraged but to carry out “joint efforts” including the Vladivostok agreements.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 27, USSR, The “D” File. Secret; Sensitive. Ford initialed the memorandum. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Hyland forwarded it to Kissinger on December 26. In his covering memorandum, Hyland commented: “Brezhnev is putting the ball back in our court: (1) by stopping short of a clear-cut denunciation of the trade/lend lease agreements (similar to the TASS statement of December 18); (2) by soliciting the President’s views on how to improve the ‘existing situation’; (3) by reaffirming his commitment not to retreat from the cause of relaxation of international tensions, and specifically, offering to build relations on the ‘degree of mutual understanding’ revealed in Vladivostok; and (4) by expressing the hope that the President shares Brezhnev’s approach. He would seem to be inviting a conciliatory reply, which he may need in his own internal debates; indeed, this overture of Brezhnev’s, despite some of its polemical points, is rather mild considering the circumstances.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, Nov–Dec 1974)
² Document 104.
The letter has some polemical language:
—Economic relations are described as having been seriously damaged, and as being worse than “ever before”.
—He alludes to the possibility of the Soviet Union imposing conditions on trade—such as ending racial discrimination in the US or unemployment—but these are rhetorical points, which he dismisses.

Comment
Brezhnev is obviously required by his own domestic political situation to take a strong stand on the emigration question. Yet, he stops short of rejecting the previous agreement completely, and leaves open the question of how to proceed.

The main purpose of the letter seems to be to provide you with reassurance that he does not intend to let the MFN–emigration issue escalate into a major shift in Soviet policy:
—He is particularly careful to ask for your views, and emphasizes his intention to continue along constructive lines.

I have already discussed Brezhnev’s letter with Ambassador Dobrynin who assures me that no immediate reply is necessary. He will inform General Secretary Brezhnev that a reply will be forthcoming after you have had a chance to study the contents of the letter and consider the issues raised.

3 No record of the discussion between Kissinger and Dobrynin has been found.

106. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting

Washington, January 3, 1975, 8:10 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of the management of joint commissions, Eritrean security, India and PL–480, and Latin America.]

Mr. Hartman: We have a memo coming to you today on the procedures to be followed on the Trade Act, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, and Romania.²

Secretary Kissinger: Can I have that by Monday?³ And also I want to see you for a minute.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: You will get it today.

Secretary Kissinger: Procedures amending the Trade Act Agreement with the Soviets?

Mr. Hartman: What the trade bill says is the steps that you have to go through.

Secretary Kissinger: Don’t we also have to amend the Trade Agreement with the Soviets?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: We have to have an exchange of notes, which could be a vehicle for doing it.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think the Soviets will do it?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: No.

Mr. Hartman: That is the subject of another memo—which they might do.

Secretary Kissinger: Can somebody give me a memo of what I am supposed to say to the Soviet Union about our intentions with respect to trade?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The most urgent operational problem is the President’s statement at the signing today,⁴ which we have been unsuccessful in trying to get hold of. I think the rhapsodic statements about the trade bill have been entirely uncalled for in general—the public statements.

Secretary Kissinger: What do you mean—you have been unsuccessful in getting it?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: It is kicking around over in the White House someplace. I tried to get it from the NSC staff.

Secretary Kissinger: Has the NSC staff got it?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think Bob Hartman probably has it now. But I don’t know if anybody other than STR, which has its own slant on matters, has had a chance to look at the substance of it.

² Reference is presumably to a memorandum from Hartman to Kissinger, January 3, entitled “The Feasibility of Credits for the Soviets Minus MFN and Lend Lease.” (Ibid., Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975)

³ January 6.

⁴ During a ceremony in the East Room that afternoon, the President signed the Trade Act of 1974 with the following caveat: “I will, of course, abide by the terms of the act, but I must express my reservations about the wisdom of legislative language that can only be seen as objectionable and discriminatory by other sovereign nations.” For the full text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 2.
Mr. Hartman: Some time ago I think we sent over contributions.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: But I have not seen—
Secretary Kissinger: We ought to make strong objections to the restrictions on OPEC, to the restrictions on the Soviet Union—and what else?
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I gave Hormats a sentence or two on the latter part yesterday. But I have no idea what happened to it.
Mr. Ingersoll: Czechoslovakia.
Secretary Kissinger: I thought we won on that.
Mr. Ingersoll: No.
Secretary Kissinger: When I write my book on the Department, somebody will explain to me why we are all so excited about Czechoslovakia, but not about Chile, Turkey and other things.
Mr. Ingersoll: I don’t know how the Trade Bill affects Chile.
Mr. Hartman: There is another item—
Secretary Kissinger: If we have to be brutal to some country, and stupid, Czechoslovakia is an excellent candidate. I think it is a stupid amendment. But of all the amendments that they have passed, the one on Czechoslovakia bothers me least. Thirty percent PL–480 restriction bothers me enormously, Chile, OPEC, Turkey. Those are all disastrous things.
Mr. Ingersoll: But only one of those is in the trade bill.
Secretary Kissinger: I don’t give a damn where they are.
Go ahead.
We need to get on top of that.
Mr. Hartman: One other thing I discovered as we went through the procedures was that the final form of the trade bill requires a concurrent resolution in order to put the Romanian trade agreement into effect or any new trade agreement. So we are going to have quite a little time I think—although—
Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute. A concurrent resolution to put into effect the MFN?
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: This is after the ninety-day period.
Secretary Kissinger: Wait a minute. It goes for ninety days and then you need a concurrent resolution? You need both?
Mr. Hartman: You need a positive concurrent resolution.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Not for the Soviets, because we already have a trade agreement with them. But any new trade agreement.
Secretary Kissinger: With anybody?
Mr. Hartman: The only one you would need would be for Eastern Europe.
Secretary Kissinger: Is it now for any trade agreement with any country that you need a concurrent resolution?

Mr. Hyland: Communist country.

Mr. Lord: We need it for China.

Secretary Kissinger: Supposing we make a trade agreement with China.

Mr. Hartman: It does say “trade agreement.” But it may be in the context of extending MFN.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I am sure it is in the context of extending a non-discriminatory tariff agreement.

Secretary Kissinger: An agreement with China would need a congressional resolution within ninety days, and then they could hang their amendments on it.

Mr. Hartman: I think in the House it is difficult. But I think their procedures on concurrent resolutions would make it very difficult to attach conditions and amendments to it.

Secretary Kissinger: Still they could kill it.

Mr. Hartman: Yes.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: They always had that—

Mr. Hartman: Originally it was a negative power. Now it is a positive one.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Now they could kill it by non-action.

Secretary Kissinger: The very fact that we counted on that in the past to implement it—they can now use that to kill it. In the past the difficulty of getting a concurrent resolution to kill it was that it was used to pass it. Now the difficulty of getting it can be used to kill it.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I don’t think the Rumanian case is going to prove serious, because they have independent support. With China it may be a different matter later. But it does indicate with the other East Europeans we would be spending an awful lot of capital purely in congressional relations—

Mr. Hartman: They would be examining the President’s determination, that in fact people are able to emigrate freely. Because that applies to all of these now. A determination will have to be made in each one of these cases.

Secretary Kissinger: It is impossible.

Mr. Hartman: I think the determination can be made. When we have presented lists, when we have been able to see some action, some progress on those lists, I think a determination can be made.

Mr. Hyland: It is impossible for China to say there is free emigration from China.
Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The Jackson–Vanik waiver applies to all of them, if you want to use it. So for eighteen months you can make a determination that it supports the purposes of the title. And then you also have to assure them, and you have to communicate that you have received certain assurances for the first tranche. But in the case of the East Europeans, all these debt settlements will be scrutinized, going back into the fifties.

Mr. Hartman: We saw several of the Jewish leaders about East Germany, including Nahum Goldman. And I was struck by the fact that one of them volunteered—

Secretary Kissinger: We are not a Jewish agency. And I will be damned if we conduct the foreign policy of the Jewish agency here.

Mr. Hartman: Yes. No—we have told them we want to be aware of what they are doing with the East Germans. They came in to report. I advised them on the one matter where they asked us to intervene, that I thought it would be better from their point of view if they continued to do this on their own. They are going back through the East German Ambassador in Switzerland to continue the contact with the East Germans.

But what I wanted to say was that one of them volunteered that they had gone too far and they were getting very worried about the Soviet reaction—

Secretary Kissinger: You're damned right they have gone too far. We have been telling them for two years. What are the Soviets getting out of it? They are paying $700 million in lend-lease debts over ten years, for which we give them $300 million in Export-Import Bank credits for four years. They are just about breaking even.

Mr. Hyland: They can get more credits if the President goes to the Congress and asks the ceiling be lifted.

Secretary Kissinger: And get 500 amendments.

Mr. Hartman: I think he would be going in the circumstances where there are particular deals in the offing—

Secretary Kissinger: Do you think any Soviet leader, after they heard what they heard from Nixon and Connally and Peterson about the prospects of trade—and what would happen if they did certain things—will believe that Congress will take certain measures? They would have to be crazy. They were never even told there was a possibility of congressional difficulty.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think it is highly unlikely that you can get more than $300 million.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it is highly unlikely that you can get it.

Mr. Hyland: It depends on what happens with Jewish emigration. If it goes up from the present towards 30,000 in the next 12 months, I think the pressure against Russia in the Congress will relax.
Secretary Kissinger: I doubt that seriously. We had it at 35,000 and the pressure built up. We forget it was 35,000 two years ago. We haven’t had it back. Ever since Jackson’s negotiations, it has been going down.

Mr. McCloskey: Jackson is never going to let up on his own figure of 60,000.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: The larger the number, the larger the number of applicants, and the more likely there will be incidents of harassment.

Secretary Kissinger: I think he is going to be hurt by this—because it now will become very clear that his method did not work. I don’t think the Soviets are going to agree to an amendment of the Trade Act. Two years ago, when the Soviets started negotiating with us, we had the unlimited right to give them Export-Import credits, and we were even discussing a separate facility, so that we could give them more than the Export-Import thing would carry. And they didn’t have MFN. There was never any question that they would get Export-Import credit at that time. The only question was, how we would be able to give them the large loans that were being discussed—whether it could be done without over-taxing the Export-Import facilities, or whether one should set up a separate bank. And they were going to get MFN, which was a sort of a marginal thing.

Now they have got a sort of a half-baked MFN and in effect no Export-Import credits. $300 million over four years is in effect no credit. $300 million over four years with a $40 million ceiling on energy projects means nothing. Try it on Israel. Try a $75 million ceiling on credits on Israel and see what the reaction is.

I don’t think that Jackson’s exchange will ever be implemented, do you, Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Not the way he interprets it.

Secretary Kissinger: The way he interprets it, under no circumstances.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I think that at least this year the emigration will go modestly up. But I don’t think there will be any flood of emigrants. And I think there will be continued cases of harassment.

Secretary Kissinger: We can’t give them MFN unless we agree to amend the trade agreement.

Mr. Hyland: It depends on how we handle it; we rub their noses in it and demand that they accept an exchange of notes that repudiates the old agreement and so forth. But if we do it skillfully—

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Legal has done the various possible formulations.

Secretary Kissinger: Let’s give them the least offensive one.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: I will give them to you in a minute.
[Omitted here is discussion of the military situation in Vietnam and Cambodia.]

107. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Will The Soviets Go Along With The Trade Act?

Public and private Soviet comment since passage of the Trade Act suggests that Moscow is contemplating refusal to cooperate in bringing the 1972 Trade Agreement into force. They have in any case threatened to repudiate the Lend Lease Agreement.

The mechanics are such that the Soviets will be required to make a positive decision to bring the Trade Agreement into force. An exchange of notes is required, and we will have to seek Soviet agreement on language in the note to take account of our inability to assure that the USSR will receive MFN for the full three-year duration of the Agreement as it now stands. Thus it is not possible for Moscow simply to acquiesce silently in a train of events that would bring them MFN with no further action on their part.

The TASS announcement of December 18, and the concurrent release of the Gromyko letter, which undercut the concepts of assurances and a rising level of emigration, showed that the Soviets were prepared to risk upsetting the compromise achieved in the Congress.

It can be argued that, having taken the risk and won, the Soviets are now in a favorable position: they can get MFN and credits, having promised nothing publicly regarding emigration. They can now allow a certain increase in emigration levels over 1974 (not 1973), shrug off complaints about harassment, and expect that the 18-month waiver

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975. Confidential; Exdis. Drafted by Garrison on January 2 and cleared by Armitage, Wright, Trimble, Carl W. Schmidt (EB/ITP), and Kenneth A. Kerst (INR). The memorandum was forwarded through Sonnenfeldt; according to a handwritten note, it was intended to “By pass” normal channels in S/S.

2 See footnote 2, Document 100.

3 Document 75.
will be extended in 1976 because no US political leader will want to take the onus of stopping the flow of emigration by ending MFN.

There is however in the continuing Soviet comment an undercurrent of feeling that too much principle is being sacrificed for too little concrete gain. Two recent examples:

—TASS chief and sometime Brezhnev spokesman Leonid Zamyatin published an article on December 28, calling limitations in the Trade Act “far worse” than those of the Cold War. 4 He termed these limitations “in essence interference in internal affairs of other nations” and thus an encroachment on the “Basic Principles” signed at the 1972 Summit. 5 And, referring to the 1972 Trade Agreement which called for unconditional granting of MFN, he warned that in this situation the failure of one side to honor its commitments “cannot but affect the commitments assumed by the other side under a series of commercial and financial agreements”—obviously meaning Lend Lease.

—The Soviet Army’s chief political officer, General of the Army Yepishev, sought out our Army Attaché in Moscow at a reception on December 23, and, brushing aside an inquiry about the Middle East, plunged into a long tirade about the Trade Act. He said it was interference in Soviet internal affairs and a step backward from détente. By all indications, this unusual outburst was not feigned. It probably reflects the attitude of a great many Soviets in leading positions.

At the same time, various Soviets have made the point that they want détente with the US to continue. This was made clear by Korniyenko to Ambassador Stoessel on December 16, 6 just before the TASS announcement. While he strongly criticized the Trade Act and threatened to go back on the Lend Lease agreement, Korniyenko took the initiative in a positive discussion of other aspects of our relationship. Other Soviet officials have commented privately along similar lines.

The Soviets may still be studying the legislative and political details before making a decision. Judging from their comments and actions, their calculations include the following considerations:

—Détente with the US is still a cornerstone of their policy.

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4 The article by Zamyatin, entitled “Trade, But Without Discrimination,” was published in Sovetskaya Rossia. For excerpts from an English translation, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVI, No. 52 (January 15, 1975), p. 7. The Embassy commented on the article in telegram 19142 from Moscow, December 30. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

5 The “Basic Principles” of relations between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, at the end of the summit. See Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, No. 177.

6 The Embassy reported on the meeting between Stoessel and Kornienko in telegram 18645 from Moscow, December 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
—The political price set by the Trade Act has become very high in relation to the economic yield, particularly in view of the outcome of Ex-Im.

—It thus seems advisable to separate the complex of problems surrounding the Trade Act from the general question of political détente. They may calculate that economic questions can be settled easier at some later date if they stand now on the principle of non-interference.

—Their calculations certainly include an assessment of the impact of their actions on the US domestic political scene. They would wish to avoid giving any political assistance to Senator Jackson and if possible to undercut him as a Presidential candidate.

On the basis of incomplete evidence, the Soviet decision appears likely to be a close one. There are persuasive arguments favoring each of the two major options available to them.

1. Acquiesce in an exchange of notes which implements the Trade Agreement:

—would minimize rocking the détente boat.
—would remove the psychological irritant of the specific discrimination against Soviet goods.
—would provide some potential economic benefits for the USSR, including MFN but more particularly credits (especially if the Administration seeks sizeable additional credits and gains Congressional approval).
—could conceivably undermine the position of Senator Jackson in mid-1976 (for example, if emigration proceeds at 35,000–40,000 level but Soviets had been unresponsive re other elements of the amendment, would the Senator then reject MFN and risk the decline of emigration or acquiesce in “unsatisfactory” Soviet performance?).
—having made their points publicly about no commitments on emigration, the Soviets could feel free of obligation to comply with specific requirements and could feel they had put the onus on the Administration to hold down overt manifestations of US interference in Soviet internal affairs.

2. Decline to renegotiate the duration of the Trade Agreement:

—technically, would put the onus on the US for failing to stand by the terms of the Agreement.
—could put a stop to the tendency of some US circles to greet each Soviet concession on internal matters with a new demand. Digging in their heels now might give the Soviets a better negotiating atmosphere in the future.
—it could help dampen the militancy of Soviet citizens who wish to emigrate and of political dissidents.
—Moscow might conclude that it would be better, in terms of impact on the US domestic political scene, to take a negative move now rather than having emigration and the Trade Agreement become a political football in the summer and fall of 1976, at the end of the first waiver period.
The Soviets would be under no obligation to begin the regular annual payments on Lend Lease of about $25 million, which are linked to MFN. (They are obligated under the Lend Lease Agreement to make the third of three obligatory payments in July, 1975; they could conceivably, however, repudiate the Lend Lease Agreement in its entirety, including the third payment, on the ground that it was part of a package which included the Trade Agreement, although this might damage their reputation for always meeting financial commitments.)

The Soviet decision may already be foreshadowed by the highly negative public commentary on the Trade Act. While Moscow does not have to cope with public opinion as we know it, the press commentaries are probably solidifying elite opinion against accepting US dictation on Soviet internal affairs; this could make it difficult for Moscow to justify signing on to a trade agreement which gives them MFN for about one year and implies acceptance of onerous conditions.

Nevertheless there may still be some room for influencing the Soviet decision. In order to persuade them to cooperate in putting the Trade Agreement into force, we could note the realities posed by the Congressional action and point out that failure to move ahead now and utilize the opportunities provided by the Trade Reform Act could cause the beginning of a downward psychological spiral in US-Soviet relations which could affect political aspects of détente, including the domestic US political situation. We could note that we are doing our best to minimize public statements and activities on the US side which would pose difficulties (e.g., the postponement of Congressman Fish’s visit). We could note that there are positive economic benefits to be gained from moving ahead, particularly in credits; we would expect to go back to the Congress for authority to finance mutually beneficial projects if we exhaust the lending limits now set. And we could suggest that in the period ahead we work together toward resolving the issues and helping them to simmer down.

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7 Hamilton Fish, Jr. (Republican, New York).
108. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Next Steps in Trade Relations with Soviets; Reply to Brezhnev Letter on Trade Bill; Your meeting with Dobrynin, January 6, 1975

1. This package contains a reply to Brezhnev’s recent letter to the President for your review (Tab A). The incoming letter is at Tab B. If you approve the draft, I will get it typed final and have it sent to Scowcroft for signature.

2. Further, there is a memo from L detailing precisely what has to be done to implement MFN for the Soviet Union and Romania (Tab C). As you are aware, under the law there must be an exchange of notes and this in turn would probably have to be the vehicle for taking account of the law’s 18 month provision. L makes three suggestions for formulating this point. I believe the formula in paragraph 1.b. has the most promise.

3. There now also is a question whether the President could satisfy the law’s requirement that in requesting a waiver of Jackson–Vanik the President must report to Congress that “he has received assurances that the emigration practices of the USSR will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of the amendment.” The issue is whether the Gromyko letter of October 26 and other Soviet statements (including the still secret Brezhnev letter of December 25) vitiate your letter to Jackson of October 18. Even if the President chose to take the view that he is still in possession of the pertinent assurances he would run the risk of a formal Soviet statement denying the existence of “assurances,” and of Congressional inquiries as to the basis for his report.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. None of the tabs is attached. An uninitialed copy of the memorandum, including attachments, is ibid., Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975.

2 Printed as Document 104.

3 At Tab C is a copy of a memorandum, December 31, 1974, from Hartman and Aldrich. The original is in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975.

4 The formula in this paragraph reads: “As contemplated by Article 9, the Agreement shall remain in force for three years from the date hereof, except that it is understood that the obligations of the two Governments under this agreement shall be suspended during any period in which either Government does not have domestic legal authority to carry out its obligations thereunder.”
4. A further issue is raised by Brezhnev’s contention that the Soviet Union is relieved of the obligations it took in the various associated trade agreements. (Soviet Embassy officials have begun making similar statements to US journalists.) This may only apply to Lend-Lease; if so, it is redundant since the Lend-Lease agreement itself relieved the USSR of the requirement to pay the first “Regular Installment” in 1974 and others thereafter if there is no MFN. Presumably, if MFN is extended—and the Soviets accept the terms of it as imposed by the Trade Bill—then they will be required to pay Lend-Lease as long as they retain MFN. If Brezhnev’s statement applies to the articles of the 1972 trade agreement dealing with matters other than MFN, the Soviets, while implementing some of them de facto, were never legally obliged to do so since the agreement never went into effect and would do so only when MFN is extended. Consequently, it would be desirable to determine just what Brezhnev’s assertion was intended to mean. (Incidentally, the proposed reply to Brezhnev does not refer to his seeming repudiation of Soviet obligations. One could ask facetiously whether he meant to say that the USSR would not pay off credits already granted by EXIM.)

5. This package also contains

—a memo from Art Hartman assessing probable Soviet courses of action (Tab D);6
—a telegram from Stoessel suggesting you raise with Dobrynin strident Soviet anti-Zionist propaganda in connection with the Trade Bill (Tab E).7

6. Dobrynin Meeting8

Basically, you should try to determine what the Soviets are up to

—will they proceed with MFN on the basis of what the Trade Bill requires with respect to an exchange of notes and the 18 month caveat?
—will they let the President make the two certifications required in order to use the waiver authority without further public repudiations?
—what, if any, is the meaning of Brezhnev’s repudiation of Soviet obligations?

5 In a memorandum to Kissinger on January 3, Sonnenfeldt noted that according to Marilyn Berger and Murrey Marder of The Washington Post: “Dobrynin on December 18 informed you that the Soviets were no longer bound by obligations previously entered into in the trade field, and that the USSR would not accept MFN or credits under conditions stipulated in the Trade Bill; and that these oral remarks thus went beyond the published TASS statement and Gromyko letter.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Counselor of the Department, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975) Marder reported on this and other matters related to the Soviet position on the Trade Bill in a front-page article in the Post on January 4.

6 Printed as Document 107.

7 At Tab E are telegrams 42 and 106 from Moscow, January 2 and 3, respectively.

8 No record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 6 has been found.
Secondly, you should correct the slightly inaccurate version of the 300 million dollar EXIM credit grant that has been current: it does not mean $75 million/year but can be extended more rapidly; thereafter the President can ask for more, albeit with Congressional approval.

Third, you might note that if the Soviets elect to decline MFN, reject further EXIM credits, repudiate the Lend-Lease Agreement (as distinct from simply not paying their regular installments, as they are entitled to), repudiate other measures already in effect such as business facilitation—all in order to demonstrate that there is no agreement on emigration, this might lead to additional punitive legislation (e.g., on technology, commercial credits, etc., etc.).

Fourth, you should state our conclusion that on balance it would be best to proceed on the basis we have got, together with a modest rise in emigration, to get ourselves over the present hump. (We cannot delay a waiver request for too long since without it EXIM credits would fall also.)

Finally, you should walk Dobrynin through the procedures enumerated in the L memo at Tab C and try out the 18-month formula (para 1.b. of Tab C) with him.

You may also wish to show him the proposed reply to Brezhnev and get his reaction.

109. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt)\(^1\)

Washington, January 5, 1975, 8:10 p.m.

K: I have been reading the material on the talk with Dobrynin tomorrow\(^2\) and what I want to check is the section on the trade agreement making an exchange of words. Does it require an exchange of notes beyond that one paragraph of which you gave me three versions.

S: Well, that is ok.

K: That particular paragraph is [omission in the transcript] by the Trade Bill . . .

S: To say that the constitutional process has been gone through and the thing would now go into effect.

\(^{1}\) Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking.

\(^{2}\) See Document 108 and footnote 8 thereto.
K: That has always been in the international agreement.
S: Those 3 paragraphs are alternatives to take care of 18 months problem.
K: Could you give me the text of the entire exchange of notes that should take place with him and give it to me before I see him.3 What is your judgment on what is going on in the Soviet Union?
S: I am beginning to think there is a succession problem going on as well.
K: In the sense that Brezhnev is on the way out?
S: It is probably a longish process and it may be he’s getting telescoped a little bit. So that these various issues may be—we may now be moving into a period of delay and procrastination and not taking a lot of risks and gambles so that for them on this issue we are just talking about simply a delay in the finesse. Maybe the simplest and controversial in terms of debate.
K: I will tell you from my own point of view—I wouldn’t mind it if the Soviets got a little tough. It would bring a security to our operation.
S: One of the difficulties is how it spills over into the Middle East problem. Well they seem to be getting tougher there too. Don’t you think that is the area where their toughness can have the most without any dramatic effect.
K: Sure, but that is what I have been trying to keep understood with [omission in the transcript] and all these wise guys and sob’s. Now we will see how tough we can be.
S: I think in many ways it can have a salutary effect. I am not sure we can stand a tough period with the Soviets.
K: If I didn’t think we could, I would not have pursued the policy I am.
S: So I don’t know where it leaves us in the Trade . .
K: Yes.
S: It is really a terrible period. Why I guess we are to blame because of the rhetoric of the past year and President Nixon. I am really confused by the issues. I can’t delay what you have said to the SFRC . . . what you have said on the [omission in the transcript] past two years.
K: (Inaudible)
S: If that had only been better understood we might not have come into this case.

3 In a memorandum to Kissinger on January 6, Sonnenfeldt presented a draft exchange of notes for implementing the trade agreement in case the Soviets decided to proceed with previous arrangements. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975)
K: In Jackson’s case, he should have had the sense to understand. Do you know that the sob has attacked my oil statement.4
Anyone reading that statement—it was the minimum I could say.
S: It may be the issue [omission in the transcript] arrive without putting you at the front of it.
K: But I regret the part I said about the Europeans. Are they blowing at all or have they been fairly quiet.
S: I gather that the press has been blowing a bit but that will blow over.
K: Should I have a spokesman say tomorrow for Christ’s sake read the Business Week and don’t blow this into an international crisis.
S: I don’t think you need to say anything about this. I think it ought to be permitted to (blow over). I will get you this other thing tomorrow.
K: Right.

4 Reference is presumably to Kissinger’s interview on December 23 with representatives of Business Week magazine. Although the interview was published in the January 13 issue of the magazine, the Department of State released a transcript to the press on January 2. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, January 27, 1975, pp. 97–106.

110. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, January 6, 1975, 9:34–10:40 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President: Here is a letter which emerged from the meeting with the Jewish leaders.2 [The President hands the letter to Secretary Kissinger.]

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with American Jewish leaders in the Cabinet Room from 12:04 to 1:10 p.m. on December 20, 1974. (Ibid., White House Office Files) Neither the letter nor a record of the conversation has been found.
Kissinger: In retrospect, I am sorry we ever negotiated with Jackson.

Domestically, we would be better off if the Soviet Union rejects it than if it accepts, because there is no way the Soviet Union can live up to the two letters. If it doesn’t work out, Jackson will say “I told you so”; if it does work, he will say that shows what you can get with toughness. You have seen the change in the Soviet press accounts of the U.S. Something is happening.

Here is my analysis: We have made foreign policy look so easy that the American people think you just go to Vladivostok and make a deal. They don’t know the work behind it, the precariousness of it. Of course, the Democrats would like both détente and anti-Communism.

From the Soviet standpoint: we bombed one of their allies to smithereens and they did nothing; we quieted Europe; they have been quiet in the Middle East—not cooperative, but quiet. We rebuffed the Soviets in the 1973 summit on the Middle East.

What have we gotten out of détente? We have de-fanged the left in Europe and their argument that friendship with the U.S. jeopardized the relaxation of tensions. The same in the U.S. The Left is belligerent now, but let détente fail and they will swing to the Left again.

What have the Soviets received? In SALT I they got only ratification of existing situation. We stopped their programs. In Vladivostok they fell off FBS, and they have to give up 100 systems to get down to 2,400. We have no restrictions on our programs.

They are now facing the prospect of same dramatic haggle on SALT as they had on trade. They wanted Vladivostok to be a big achievement to bolster you and they were taken aback. We have to defend Vladivostok by showing what the Soviets gave up, and that’s bad. In 1972 we were talking about large scale economic cooperation. We were thinking that Ex-Im was too small and maybe a special bank would be set up. Now the Trade Bill and the Ex-Im legislation is an insult to them. The authority to go back to Congress is a joke—you can always do that. So they are worse off in credits and only marginally better in trade.

The Politburo people are ambitious like anyone. They will tell Brezhnev, “Look what you told us would happen and look what happened.”

There are two things which have to happen: the exchange of notes with the Soviet Union cutting the length of the trade agreement. There is only a 50–50 chance they will agree to that. Then you must submit a

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3 Documents 60 and 61.
4 North Vietnam.
letter assuring that the purposes of Vanik will be met. I doubt that the Soviets will let us say there are assurances.

In the State of the Union, you should talk about Congressional intrusion into foreign policy and go for relief from the OPEC and Ex-Im ceiling. I can give Dobrynin two choices: give up on trade or try to make it work. But honestly, I think we are better off if it fails than if it succeeds. Let the Jewish emigration get cut off. If they hit me with letters, I will say I fought for a year and then went to what I thought were the outer limits. It may have worked if Jackson hadn’t gloated; then with the Ex-Im piled on top, it is just too much.

Each time some Soviet Jew protests, you will get pressure to cut off trade. I don’t think it will work and I regret having gotten into negotiations with Jackson. If Jackson would have let it go without gloating, it may have worked. With your permission, I think this should be my strategy with the Soviet Union. But we may be in for a tough time with the Soviet Union. On the Middle East, they are now offering a joint guarantee of the ’67 borders. That means we push Israel to the ’67 borders. A U.S.-Soviet guarantee means Israel would have to want Soviet troops in; they could paralyze a joint action.

[Omitted here is discussion of negotiations in the Middle East, during which Kissinger commented: “If there is a war, we must keep the Soviets out at all costs and it is probably in our favor to have Israel win. But afterwards, we would have to impose ruthlessly a peace.”]

111. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: Mike [Mansfield] is basically an isolationist, except on China and Sihanouk.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
I spoke to Dobrynin, which confirmed what I said yesterday. There is severe disillusionment there with the United States. They won’t change their policy but they will change their expectations. They will be more matter-of-fact. The press had been ordered not to criticize us and the economic ministries had been ordered to steer business to us. Dobrynin called home, and he says they most certainly will not accept the MFN and credits under the Trade Act as it is now.

You must give a double assurance—that the quantity of emigrants will promote the purposes of the Act and that you have been given assurances that liberalization is taking place.

Dobrynin suggests a warm letter on détente and the things which have to be done on the Trade Act. I think you should write a warm letter and express your disappointment with the Act and say that Kissinger will describe the details. There is no reason for them to reply.

The Congress is forcing us into renewed risk of confrontation.

In the State of the Union Address, I would add a paragraph on Executive-Legislature partnership, but say that it won’t take the form of extreme detailed intervention in the conduct of policy.

I have been thinking of a conciliatory speech, detailing these Congressional restrictions and saying we have to be sensitive to Congress but they also have a responsibility to discharge.

[Omitted here is discussion of international economic policy and domestic politics.]

Kissinger: The Soviets have to keep détente going for political reasons, but our hold on them is gone. These economic projects would have gotten our hooks into them for ten years. The Chinese will be less scared now, and we will have a rockier time with the Soviet Union. We must put a stop to the disintegration of Executive authority on foreign policy.

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, during which Kissinger commented: “It is now becoming more clear that the reason Brezhnev cancelled [his trip to Egypt] was that Sadat wouldn’t give up on the step-by-step process.”]
112. Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Brezhnev’s Position

The increasingly wild speculation about Brezhnev’s health has apparently prompted Dobrynin and other Soviets in Washington to start countering any impression that the illness is serious or holds political implications. Today, TASS attacked Le Monde for speculating on “changes of leadership.”

We are preparing a longer analysis of the events leading up to the visit cancellation and an evaluation of the situation in Moscow, but here are some preliminary musings.

—While it is probably true that Brezhnev’s current illness is not all that serious, a review of his record, as reflected in sensitive intelligence, makes one wonder whether he does not have some chronic or organic malady that at least raises a question about his future; in October, November, December, he has been virtually out of commission, working only a few days at his office, and spending most of his time out of Moscow at his Dacha, before and after travelling. He has been stopping continuously at the clinic.

—It is difficult to see how the Politburo can tolerate a part-time General Secretary.

—They might do so if other factors were unchanged, but in the face of setbacks on personal and policy issues over this past six months—beginning with the Brandt resignation through the trade bill embroglio—some serious questions may be raised about both his policies and his position.

—The fact that Brezhnev is rumored to be thinking about organizing an “orderly” transition or graceful retirement apparently after the 25th Congress (March 1976), may have aggravated the situation, even if he is not seriously ill.


2 Reference is presumably to the cancellation of Brezhnev’s trip to Egypt. See footnote 3, Document 101. The longer INR analysis has not been found.
—Yet, if there is trouble in the leadership, you have to bet on the man in power, and not on some group of unidentified opponents.
—For the last years, it has not seemed that Brezhnev has pursued his policies in the face of consistent or organized opposition.
—Foreign policy disputes, in contrast to domestic ones, are not the likeliest source of a power struggle.
—The growth of Brezhnev’s authority, as expressed in the external trappings (i.e. describing him as head of the Politburo) continues through the present period.

On the other hand, any review of détente or foreign policy cannot be aired in Moscow without implicitly reviewing Brezhnev’s stewardship.
—His letter to the President had a rather plaintive tone, and seemed to be, in fact, two letters: a formal complaint, and a personal appeal.3
—The release of the Gromyko letter4 coincided with a Central Committee meeting, where some behind-the-scenes discussion of emigration, the trade bill, etc., must have occurred.
—If they do turn down MFN/EX-IM, it tilts Soviet policy in a different direction than Brezhnev has been striving for; it has to be something of a setback for him, even if he favors doing it.

Finally, I am struck by the bizarre episode of the death of Brezhnev’s mother:5
—Izvestia was held up for four hours in order to publish the message of condolence from the Politburo, all of the candidate members and the secretariat—each member being listed by name as a signatory.
—In the past ten years, two such condolences have been issued on the death of Kosygin’s and Suslov’s wives.
—The message to Brezhnev says “we are with you as always . . .”
—Every Soviet apparatchik must read this episode as a sign that Brezhnev is still in charge of the Politburo, that all members are still in their jobs, and that there is solidarity.
—On this basis Brezhnev would seem to have arranged a demonstration of strength.
—Yet, that he felt compelled to do so is in itself a sign that the situation is fluid.

3 Document 104.
4 Document 75.
5 TASS announced the death of Natalya Denisovna Brezhneva on January 7, but did not report any details about either her life or death, merely noting that members of the Politburo had sent a condolence letter to Brezhnev. (The Washington Post, January 8, 1975, p. A18)
113. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
- President Gerald R. Ford
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: Clements is not an intellectual, but he is a square shooter. We used to have fights, but he never bore grudges or leaked. I like him.

President: Let’s talk to Don about it.

Kissinger: I have drafted a letter to Brezhnev. I made it general so that if he refuses, he is not rejecting you. State can then tell Dobrynin what has to happen.

The more I think about it, the better I think a Soviet rejection would be good. Byrd thought that a rejection would hurt Jackson. I told him the consequences—they’d get credits from the Europeans—and he said, “if you can get that across to the public, many Senators will breathe a sigh of relief.”

Perle is a psychopath. You know the emigration issue will be a running sore. Even if Brezhnev’s intention is good, you know there will be discrimination.

President: If they reject it, what will Jackson do?

Kissinger: He will try to cut the unused credits and claim it is a gigantic swindle.

President: How about the Jewish Community?

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 William P. Clements, Jr., Deputy Secretary of Defense.

3 Donald Rumsfeld.

4 Sonnenfeldt gave Kissinger a draft of the letter on January 4; see Document 108. Kissinger called Sonnenfeldt at 2:34 p.m. on January 7, however, and reported: “The letter isn’t what I need. I need a letter which is heavier on détente and lighter on trade legislation . . . half a sentence, but I wouldn’t rub it in so hard because they are not willing to proceed. Can you do it this afternoon?” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations) In a memorandum to Kissinger later that day, Sonnenfeldt forwarded a revised draft to Kissinger, who wrote in the margin: “I want to take Brezhnev letter to White House.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975)

5 Reference is presumably to Senator Robert C. Byrd (Democrat, West Virginia).
Kissinger: They won’t take the blame. They will be shocked and
begin to blame us. The leaders who met with you were already making
demands on when the restriction would be lifted. It can’t happen fast. If
you had $2 billion in credits to offer them, the Soviets might push, but
not for $300 million.

I said all along that the word “assurances” would get us into
trouble. We will come under attack but I think we can easily turn it.

President: This is all involved in Democratic politics and personal
ambitions.

Kissinger: I got the impression that Byrd is no great friend of
Jackson. The letter to Brezhnev just restates the détente policy, really.

President: Go ahead and send it.

Kissinger: Jackson wants to have hearings on the Vladivostok
agreement. He wants to cover ... [reads from paper].

My point is, first, this is a total invasion of Executive authority. The
Congressional function is to approve treaties, not to participate in their
negotiation.

President: We can’t do that. He would want the notes of the NSC
meeting.

Kissinger: He wants to know every bureaucratic position and why
you made the decisions you did.

President: I think our strategy should be—if Jackson comes up
with a renegotiated resolution we should get our friends to add a
clause that if we tried and the Vladivostok agreement failed, the sup-
porters would vote for additional funds for defense.

Kissinger: Mondale and Kennedy have a resolution that is good. It
puts the additional negotiation after the agreement is signed. I think
you should put out firm instructions to all witnesses as to what they
can say.

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6 In a memorandum to Kissinger on January 7, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland discussed
Jackson’s intention, as Chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Armed
Services Committee, to hold hearings on SALT in order to review the terms of the Vladi-
vostok accords. Kissinger wrote in the margin of a covering memorandum: “SALT paper
for President’s meeting tomorrow.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records
of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Jan–June 1975)

7 President Ford is presumably referring to the meeting on December 2, 1974,
during which he briefed the NSC on the agreements reached in Vladivostok. (Ford Li-
brary, National Security Adviser, NSC Meetings File, 1974–1977, Box 1)

8 The resolution, sponsored by Senators Kennedy, Mondale, and Mathias and sup-
ported by Kissinger, implicitly linked ratification of the Vladivostok accords to the an-
nouncement of negotiations on the reduction, rather than the mere limitation, of strategic
nuclear arms. In a memorandum to Kissinger on January 8, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland re-
ported on their meeting that morning with Mathias to discuss the resolution. (National
Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT,
Jan–June 1975)
President: Would you draft them?

Kissinger: You may have to do it orally—but maybe it should be in writing and confront the issue. If we don’t do this, Jackson will unravel the whole thing. Jackson will rake us over the coals. [Described his experience.]

President: Let’s do it by letter.

Kissinger: The witnesses shouldn’t testify to anything but the final agreement, not internal positions or other options presented to the Soviets.

On air-to-surface missiles, I disagree with Schlesinger. You can’t preempt Jackson this way. And if we try to change air-to-surface, the Soviets will ask for inclusion of subsonic cruise missiles. Maybe that is good, but my people think we are ahead in that.

President: I told Schlesinger that cruise missiles only survived because you insisted.

Kissinger: If we need cruise missiles for bomber penetration, they can be on ships and submarines timed to penetrate simultaneously. If we have to show how we screwed the Soviets, Jackson could sink the Vladivostok accord.

[Omitted here is discussion of international economic policy, the Middle East, and Vietnam.]

114. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, January 8, 1975, 7:49 p.m.

D: Hello.
K: Anatol.
D: Oh, hello, Henry. How are you?
K: Okay. Two questions. First, can we move the dinner with the Vice President to Wednesday² rather than Thursday?
D: No problem.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger-Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 31, Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons (1). No classification marking. Brackets are in the original.
² January 15.
K: You don’t give a dinner for the Israeli Ambassador then?
D: No. We have only on Saturday with him.
K: No, Saturday is a Jewish holiday.
D: That’s why we have a dinner with him on Saturday. [Laughter]
K: None of these anti-Semitic remarks or we’ll get another Amendment passed.
D: Next Wednesday, fine. Eight o’clock.
K: Eight o’clock. And I’m going to see what kind of caviar the Vice President gets, probably better than I.
D: Well, each egg will be bigger size but it will be less number of eggs.
K: Now, Anatol, on the question of trade. I mean, on that letter, I deliberately did not want to put in the letter—I told you we are prepared to go back to the Congress.
D: Well, this will be very fine if you just mention.
K: But what I want to say to you is this—A number of things you said to me the other day, I understood very well. It really is up to you to make the decision on how you handle the immediate problem.
D: No, as for immediate I don’t argue with you. But the question really is—
K: Let me tell you this—Let me tell you orally. We are determined to restore—to bring about the situation envisaged in 1972.
D: Yeah.
K: Now by what procedure we get there, by whether you should accept the present situation and we then ask for an amendment or whether you should reject the present situation and we then go back to Congress a year later.
D: Yeah.
K: That is really up to you to decide.
D: Well, I understand. No, I mean, as for the question, for instance—
K: Now you can tell Brezhnev formally from the President that it is our intention to bring about the situation envisaged in 1972.
D: Why the President couldn’t say—maybe not in a precise way but that the Administration is thinking how to conquer the situation.

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3 In a letter to Dobrynin on January 8, Scowcroft forwarded an advance copy of the proposed letter from Ford to Brezhnev. According to marginalia, this package was delivered to the Soviet Embassy at 2 p.m. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975)
K: All right. I’ll send over a sentence which you can put in there. D: I think this will be better. K: All right, we will indicate where to do this. D: Yeah. Because now it sounds that you are prepared to do direct within the limits. I already mentioned to Brent. K: Yeah. But now, Anatol, we have a concrete problem. We have to bring this to a decision because we can do nothing with Congress until you formally inform us one way or— D: I couldn’t give you now any answer because I am sure—I mentioned to them what you discussed, what you’re expecting but at the same time I mentioned to them that in two or three days will be the letter of the President so they are waiting for the letter of President. Only after then, I will issue oral reply. K: Okay. Well, all right. I will send over a sentence and I will indicate to you where to put it. D: Okay. K: I will do that within the next half hour. D: Okay. I definitely will try to get answer within a few days. K: Well, I think the way to handle the other matter—the formal matter. How would it be if I asked Hartman to call in Vorontsov and just walk with him through the steps I did informally? D: On what steps? K: What it takes to put the Trade Agreement into effect. D: Except—I mean, the letter which you discussed, yeah? K: The letter and the assurances we have to give. D: I think there is no problem. Let them. Because then, after all, it’s matter nothing because . . . K: Then if you refuse it, we can say we have put it formally to the— D: Yes! K: You see what I mean? D: Yes, of course. K: And if you refuse it at the Hartman level, then they can’t say it was a slap at the President. D: No, no, because in this case—Oh, you mean from—Okay, I don’t mind . . . but not ask him now until I receive reply.

4 In a follow-up letter to Dobrynin on January 8, Scowcroft forwarded a revised last page of the President’s letter, which includes the following inserted sentence: “I want to tell you also that we consider ourselves morally committed to the principles enunciated in 1972, and we will do our utmost to convince the Congress to agree to the practical implementation of those principles.” According to marginalia, this package was delivered to the Soviet Embassy at 8:37 p.m. (Ibid.)
K: Okay. Because what we plan to do is this: You get me a reply from Moscow informally.

D: Yes. Then we will discuss with you how to proceed from that reply when it will be.

K: And then you give me an informal indication. Then we will find a low formal level in which to put into effect.

D: Yes. Into . . . And why really you couldn’t think for instance about at least a formal way to present before the Congress about some amendments about trade. I know it is very little chance of any—if any—of giving the Congress a few . . .

K: Anatol, you made an analysis to me the other day.

D: I know, I know this.

K: You know you are free to make your own analyses but I must say that I could see the logic of your argument.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: And it makes a lot of difference whether we ask for an amendment if you accept it.

D: Yeah, I understand this.

K: Or if we ask for an amendment if you refuse it.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: And paradoxically it may be easier in one case than another.

D: This is my point. So I am speaking about—

K: Yeah, but I cannot tell you what we will do until you’ve done it.

D: Yeah, I understand.

K: You understand?

D: I understand. But please look about the sentence along the line you mentioned.

K: Yes.

D: Okay.

K: Right.

D: Okay, I will await yours.

K: Right.

D: Okay.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have studied your letter of December 25, 1974, with great care. I appreciate both its frankness and the constructive spirit in which you view the further development of the overall relations between our countries. In this regard, I welcome particularly the statements in the last several paragraphs of your letter in which you reaffirm the Soviet Union’s continued commitment to the course of improved relations and further relaxation of tensions.

Let me state categorically, Mr. General Secretary, that we for our part will continue to pursue vigorously the policies charted in recent years. I firmly believe in the benefits of increasingly intensive bilateral contact and cooperation in all the numerous fields in which we are already implementing agreements and joint projects and in any additional fields that both our governments may consider desirable.

Further, it will remain the clear policy of my Administration to work with you for the settlement of remaining international disputes, the elimination of crisis situations and the building of a peaceful and cooperative world order. Such important efforts as the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe, in which we are jointly engaged along with many other countries, must in my view be brought to a successful conclusion and we will certainly work energetically to that end. I well recall our discussions on this subject at Vladivostok and we will proceed firmly on the basis we agreed to at that time.

I noted with satisfaction what you said about the understandings we reached in Vladivostok on other concrete issues. In particular, I would like to affirm that I regard the understandings on strategic arms limitation as having the highest importance. Within our government, at the present time, we are conducting painstaking preparations for the resumption of the Geneva negotiations so that the basic terms worked out in Vladivostok will be translated into a detailed, binding agreement in the coming months. I agree with you that we created a sound basis...
for this in our talks and I am optimistic that the remaining work can be completed by the time you next visit our country later this year. That visit, Mr. General Secretary, will, I am certain, be another major landmark in the historic evolution of our relations. It is not too early for our representatives to begin to discuss plans for our meetings at that time.

I would like to tell you frankly that I have been disappointed by recent developments with respect to trade relations between our countries. Like you, we have always viewed the development of mutually beneficial commercial and economic relations as a central element in our overall relationship. Whatever my Administration has felt obliged to do in connection with the legislation recently adopted by our Congress was done solely for the purpose of overcoming or minimizing the obstacles that had arisen. I have publicly expressed my concern about certain of the provisions included in our legislation which I consider unsatisfactory. I note your own remarks about these matters. I would like to say that for our part we are prepared to proceed with trade relations even within certain of the limits that our laws now impose upon me. I strongly support your own attitude of not becoming discouraged and of looking to the future with optimism and a sense of responsibility. I want to tell you also that we consider ourselves morally committed to the principles enunciated in 1972, and we will do our utmost to convince the Congress to agree to the practical implementation of those principles.3

May I use this occasion to reiterate my gratitude for your hospitality in Vladivostok and my profound gratification with the spirit that pervaded our talks there. I believe that the candor and mutual confidence which marked our conversations is of great importance in moving ahead and it is for that reason that I welcomed your letter in a personal sense as well.

I was distressed to learn of the death of your mother,4 and Mrs. Ford and I would like to extend to you and all the members of your family our profound sympathy at this sad moment for you.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

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3 This sentence was added to the letter after Kissinger’s telephone conversation with Dobrynin the previous evening. See Document 114.

4 See footnote 5, Document 112.
116. Memorandum of Conversation¹


PARTICIPANTS
  President Gerald R. Ford
  Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
  National Security Affairs
  Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National
  Security Affairs

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on negotiations in the Middle
East.]

[Kissinger:] We have a SALT problem. [He hands the President a
ticker item.]²

President: This is what Schlesinger talked about.
Kissinger: This will be the focus of the Jackson hearing—loopholes,
sloppy drafting.
I am not sure we want to omit cruise missiles—it leaves a huge
loophole. It also could lead to a ban on ship-launched ones.
The best for us would be to have them only on aircraft.
President: [Described the Vladivostok discussion] My quick reac-
tion is that it makes no difference.
Kissinger: Our record is ambiguous. Dobrynin says his record is
ambiguous. But you can’t put something over on them with a shyster
trick.
President: If we review everything—payload, etc.—and decide
after R&D maybe not to go into production . . .
Kissinger: Yes, but the major thing is to stop leaks like this. This
will give Jackson the handle he needs. Schlesinger is also jumping on us
on Israeli military supplies. He also wants to meet with the Jewish
leaders.
President: Israel Miller said I have six months before they lower
the boom on the Trade Bill. You were right.
Kissinger: The best thing would be for the Soviet Union to reject it.
President: I agree.

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations,
1973–1977, Box 8. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indi-
cate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
² Not further identified.
Kissinger: Fisher\(^3\) says Jackson would be a dead hero if the Soviet Union rejected the Trade Bill.

President: How soon will they act?

Kissinger: A couple of days informally; then we will go through the formality.

President: What should our posture be? Disappointment?

Kissinger: We should point out that we were warned all along the way. I think they will reject it.

How is the letter to Brezhnev?\(^4\)

President: Good. It is well written.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to Soviet-American relations.]

\(^3\) Max Fisher.

\(^4\) Document 115.

117. Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Ford\(^1\)

Moscow, January 10, 1975.

As it was already stated in L.I. Brezhnev’s letter to President Ford of December 25, 1974, the very basis of the trade and credit legislation adopted by the US Congress in its parts dealing with the USSR is unacceptable for us on the grounds which were laid down in that letter.

This legislation is in clear-cut contradiction not only with an agreement reached between our countries in 1972 on an unconditional elimination of discriminatory restrictions in trade, but also with the principle of noninterference into the domestic affairs of each other.

That is why we, of course, do not intend—we repeat it again—to accept a discriminatory, loaded with all kinds of political conditions status of trade between the USSR and the United States.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975. No classification marking. Dobrynin called Kissinger at 12:10 p.m. to report the arrival and gist of the Soviet note; Kissinger asked him to send the text to the White House. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 31, Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons (1)) Dobrynin then forwarded the note under a brief covering letter to Scowcroft; according to marginalia on the letter, it was delivered at 1 p.m.
In this connection the Soviet side considers itself relieved of those mutual obligations which have been taken by it in a comprehensive complex of the agreements of 1972 on trade and financial questions.

We reject a suggestion to put into force the Agreement between the USSR and the United States Regarding Trade of October 18, 1972, in conjunction with the new trade legislation adopted in the United States, as it was made in a draft letter handed by the Secretary of State. It also goes without saying that any statements, if made, about alleged assurances from the Soviet Union concerning its internal legislation would be resolutely denied by us as not corresponding to the reality.

We leave it to the discretion of the President how he will inform the US Congress of the position taken by us in connection with the adoption of a discriminatory [sic] towards the Soviet Union trade and credit legislation. It is important only that our position is set forth precisely, in the very way it has been stated by us to the President earlier and in the present communication.

118. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Soviet Rejection of Trade Agreement Note

The operational significance of the attached paper (Tab A) from Dobrynin is

(1) that the Soviets refuse to exchange notes that would put the 1972 trade agreement into force;
(2) that they will repudiate any statement made by the President in connection with the exercise of his waiver authority that he has received assurances from the USSR. While the Soviet statement refers to “assurances . . . concerning internal legislation,” which would not be the precise phrase used by the President in his waiver justification, this is a quibble and the Soviets would undoubtedly issue a denial that would be interpreted as vitiating the President’s affirmation.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2 Printed as Document 117.
Thus, we seem to have confirmation of Soviet refusal to proceed with the trade agreement and of their decision to forego EXIM credits.

In the remainder of the Soviet statement, Moscow again states that it is relieved of obligations stemming from the “comprehensive complex of the agreements of 1972 on trade and financial questions.” This raises various issues as to the obligations involved and just how the Soviets will give expression in practice to their unilateral assertion. The lawyers, for example, are clear that the 1975 installment on the old pipeline lend-lease account remains a valid Soviet obligation. The first “regular installment” on the lend-lease debt, originally due in 1974, is of course excused by the terms of the lend-lease agreement itself if MFN has not been extended. The broader question is whether the Soviets are calling the whole lend-lease agreement null and void (so that it would not even be reinstituted if the MFN issue were eventually resolved).

Further, the 1972 “complex” of agreements included the original EXIM finding and the subsequent agreement between EXIM and the USSR implementing it. The Soviets have been extended some $480 million of credits on this basis, of which they have drawn some $70 million. Obviously, from our standpoint, Soviet obligations in this regard (e.g., to service the credits so far drawn, even if the remainder is never used) must remain.

The maritime agreement, likewise, was part of the 1972 “complex.”

To the extent the Soviets have obligations under the 1974 long-term cooperation agreement, their statement appears not to apply.

Our lawyers are currently compiling a list of obligations under existing agreements and the effect upon them of a failure to implement the 1972 agreements.

I have previously pointed out, and the lawyers confirm it, that the Soviets are incorrect in claiming that Jackson–Vanik violates the “unconditionality” clause of the MFN article in the 1972 trade agreement. Unconditionality referred to the treatment of products with respect to certain technical rules of trade. But it probably is not worthwhile to assert a formal US view on this point.

Presumably, before anything further is done we should await Brezhnev’s answer to the President’s latest letter. But the Soviet position seems firm. Even if we should succeed in getting revised EXIM leg-

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3 The U.S.-Soviet Maritime Agreement was signed on October 14, 1972, and renegotiated as of December 19, 1972. For the text of the agreement, along with memoranda of understanding and exchanged letters, see 23 UST 3573; TIAS 7513.

4 Document 115.
islation, we cannot expect to get rid of the waiver requirement. Hence it is doubtful that the Soviet position would change, though we might get some political brownie points for trying to get an EXIM revision. But this, too, has a problem: as soon as it becomes known that the Soviets will in any case repudiate a Presidential assertion concerning “assurances,” Congress will not be likely to change the EXIM law (unlikely, in any case).

The most immediate decision, therefore, seems to be how to inform Congress and the public of these developments. One way would be to include a statement in the State of the Union address.

119. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 11, 1975, 9:25–10:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: We had a reply from the Soviets. They will not agree to modify the trade agreement. They will reject any statement that MFN helps emigration. It is a tough note, saying they are dispensed from their obligations under the 1972 agreement.

President: This throws out the lend-lease payment.

Kissinger: Absolutely. Now we must figure out how to notify the Congress. Their rejection is just in your channel. We could do it formally through Art Hartman; then you could inform the leadership. Or we could put it out through State.

President: My inclination is to notify the Congress through a note about the notification to State.

Kissinger: We have to worry about Jackson. Javits says he is the most ruthless politician he knows. He may try to put on even more restrictions, but will have lost his following.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 8. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 Document 117.
I will have to think about how to put it out. I am meeting with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Thursday.\(^3\)

President: You shouldn’t announce it there.

Kissinger: Maybe if we could get it in the paper Thursday morning. I told Javits it might fail and he said hold up for a month and he would try to get a billion.

President: I don’t think we should. This is a good way to highlight the problem with the Congress that we are trying to point out.

[Omitted here is discussion of foreign economic assistance and domestic politics.]

\(^3\) January 15.

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120. Statement by Secretary of State Kissinger\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

Since the President signed the Trade Act on January 3, we have been in touch with the Soviet Government concerning the steps necessary to bring the 1972 US-Soviet Trade Agreement into force.

Article 9 of that Agreement provides for an exchange of written notices of acceptance, following which the Agreement, including reciprocal extension of non-discriminatory tariff treatment (MFN), would enter into force. In accordance with the recently enacted Trade Act, prior to this exchange of written notices, the President would transmit to the Congress a number of documents, including the 1972 Agreement, the proposed written notices, a formal proclamation extending

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 17, USSR (7). Kissinger read the statement during a news conference at the Department of State at 6:30 p.m. on January 14. For the text of the conference, see Department of State Bulletin, February 3, 1975, pp. 139–143. Kissinger’s statement was published in full in The New York Times, January 15, 1975, p. 4. During a telephone conversation at 1:06 p.m. on January 11, Kissinger told Sonnenfeldt that an initial draft of the statement was “much too defensive.” “I want it to imply that it’s none of their business.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations) Sonnenfeldt forwarded a redraft to Kissinger on January 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975) During a telephone conversation with Dobrynin at 10:25 a.m. on January 13, Kissinger agreed to forward that draft to the Soviet Embassy for review. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)
MFN to the USSR and a statement of reasons for the 1972 agreement. Either House of Congress would then have had 90 legislative days to veto the Agreement.

In addition to these procedures, the President would also take certain steps, pursuant to the Trade Act, to waive the applicability of the Jackson–Vanik amendment. These steps would include a report to the Congress stating that the waiver will substantially promote the objectives of the amendment and that the President has received assurances that the emigration practices of the USSR will henceforth lead substantially to the achievement of the objectives of the amendment.

It was our intention to include in the required exchange of written notices with the Soviet Government language, required by the provisions of the Trade Act, that would have made clear that the duration of three years referred to in the 1972 Trade Agreement with the USSR was subject to continued legal authority to carry out our obligations. This caveat was necessitated by the fact that the waiver of the Jackson–Vanik amendment would be applicable only for an initial period of 18 months, with provision for renewal thereafter.

The Soviet Government has now informed us that it cannot accept a trading relationship based on the legislation recently enacted in this country. It considers this legislation as contravening both the 1972 trade agreement, which has called for an unconditional elimination of discriminatory trade restrictions, and the principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. The Soviet Government states that it does not intend to accept a trade status that is discriminatory and subject to political conditions and, accordingly, that it will not put into force the 1972 Trade Agreement. Finally, the Soviet Government informed us that if statements were made by the United States, in the terms required by the Trade Act, concerning assurances by the Soviet Government regarding matters it considers within its domestic jurisdiction, such statements would be repudiated by the Soviet Government.2

In view of these developments, we have concluded that the 1972 Trade Agreement cannot be brought into force at this time and that the President will therefore not take the steps required for this purpose by the Trade Act. The President does not plan at this time to exercise the waiver authority.

The Administration regrets this turn of events. It has regarded and continues to regard an orderly and mutually beneficial trade relation-

2 In a memorandum to Kissinger on the evening of January 13, Sonnenfeldt reported that, according to Vorontsov, Dobrynin thought “our rendition of Soviet arguments was too brief—and made it appear that the Soviets were being the difficult ones.” Sonnenfeldt attached a revised text, taking into account these concerns. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975) That text is nearly identical to the final version printed here.
ship with the Soviet Union as an important element in the overall improvement of relations. It will, of course, continue to pursue all available avenues for such an improvement, including efforts to obtain legislation that will permit normal trading relationships.

121. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Talk with Perle

Perle was calm enough. He started by asking about the sequence of events leading up to your announcement. I simply recited what you said last night. Perle implied we did not have to go through the various steps but I pointed out to him the requirement for an exchange of notes and for taking account of the 18 month duration of the waiver. He asked for a text of the Soviet note. I said we had paraphrased it last night and I did not think that we were planning to make the actual text available, though the Soviets might of course publish something themselves.

Perle then asked whether the Soviets had seen the contents of the October 18 letters before they were issued. I said they had seen the contents. He said that had been Jackson’s assumption. It seemed therefore that the Soviets had been prepared to accept on October 18 what


2 See Document 120. In a memorandum to Kissinger that morning, Sonnenfeldt reported that Perle had requested the meeting to “talk about what statement they will make.” “I won’t volunteer any suggestions for their statement,” Sonnenfeldt added, “but, depending on what they propose to say, point out how conciliatory you were last night. If they want to charge either you or the Russians with bad faith on emigration I will urge them not to and point out that that can only lead to mutual recrimination. If they want to threaten additional punitive legislation or hearings, I will point out the consequences of that. In short I will try to get them to follow your lead of last night, so we at least have a record of having tried. If Perle asks for the Soviet written note, I will refuse and simply say that your statement summarizes the Soviet position.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975)

3 Document 117.

4 Documents 60 and 61.
they refused to accept now. I said that was probably not how the Soviets would describe the situation. Things had changed since October 18: public statements had been made about the letters, there had been victory claims and statements how toughness produced results, there had been changes in the legislation that were discriminatory and invidious.

Perle said he had always assumed that the EXIM bill had made the difference. I said that certainly was a major factor and we regretted the things that had been written into the bill. Perle said they had not been active on that, in fact Jackson had voted for cloture during the Byrd filibuster. I said I would not speculate on what motivated Stevenson.

Perle said he hoped there would be no backgrounding along the lines of "we told you so" and "you overplayed your hand." I said that the long-standing doubts of the Administration about the wisdom of the methods used over the last two years were on the public record. We can't control what journalists write. There also was a record of backgrounding since October about Jackson's victories as well as some implications of bad faith. You had been conciliatory and factual last night and avoided all recrimination. But there would be a response if there were any recrimination. I said I strongly urged them not to issue a recriminatory statement in any direction.

Perle said he thought their statement would give the sequence of events leading up to the letters and the waiver—"factually."5 I said we'll see but we can only urge in the strongest terms that all charges or implications of bad faith were avoided. Perle said there would be none against you. I said that a broadside against the Russians could only lead to further difficulties.

Perle asked what the Russians have said about what happens next. I said that had not been discussed. We would hope, as you indicated last night, to continue on an even keel. Many parts of the trade agreement had been implemented independently and we hope that will continue. On lend-lease the agreement itself stipulated what would happen.

Perle asked what we meant by seeking new legislation. I said this had not been decided but you might seek advice from the Foreign Relations Committee. Perle said that if the Russians thought we might seek improved legislation they might turn the heat on the Jews to show how tough they were. If so, Jackson will immediately move to stop technology. I said we had no information on Soviet plans; you had made

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5 Later that afternoon, Senators Jackson, Ribicoff, and Javits and Congressman Vanik released a joint statement that called Soviet rejection of the Trade Bill "a disappointing development." (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 8, Trade Bill, 1975)
clear our fundamental view on emigration. But any threats of further punitive action could have very serious results at a time when it must be in our interest to contain the effects of what happened. I said they should think twice before they try to remove what few instrumentalities we have left for influencing Soviet conduct. Perle said he was just telling me privately what they would do if there is new repression. I said I hoped they would not set out to provoke the Russians.

I concluded by saying again that you had given the lead last night in looking to the future and engaging in no recrimination. This line will hold as long as there is no provocation. We have our own view of what happened and why but that is past and we now need statesmanship all around. He again mentioned backgrounding. I said I had told him our position.

My guess is there will be a recital of events from Jackson which highlights Soviet change in position since October 18, with stress on Jackson’s "assumption" that the Soviets agreed to the October 18 letters.
122. Memorandum by President Ford


MEMORANDUM FOR

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Secretary of Agriculture
Chairman, Export-Import Bank

It is extremely important in the days ahead that U.S. officials, if called upon to make public comment on the recent developments in US-Soviet trade relations, adhere strictly to the Administration position as enunciated by the Secretary of State on January 14, 1975.

In particular, there should be no speculation concerning the impact of these developments on overall US-Soviet relations, except to indicate that we have no evidence that the consequences will extend beyond trade matters. Specifically:

— There should be no speculation concerning the effect of recent events on other agreements or obligations involving the Soviet Union;
— There should be no speculation concerning the motivations of Soviet decisions beyond the reasons given by the Soviets themselves;
— There should be no recrimination or effort to assign blame for what has occurred.

All agencies should follow carefully such additional guidance as may be contained in public statements authorized and released at the White House or at the Department of State. Any question as to meaning or interpretation should be referred to the White House (Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs).

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 17, USSR (8). Confidential. Copies were sent to Schlesinger, Lynn, and Eberle. According to another copy, Ford, Kissinger, and Scowcroft drafted the memorandum on January 16. (Ibid., “Outside the System” Chronological Files, 1974–1977, Box 1) In a memorandum to Ford on January 18, Kissinger forwarded the final version and explained that following his “low key” announcement on January 14 (Document 120), “our approach has been successful in muting press speculation as to the impact of this action on our broader relations with the Soviets. I believe it is important, however, that we carefully control both public comment by the Administration and any follow-on steps with the Soviet Union. To insure that the Administration speaks with one voice and that agencies do not begin piecemeal to pick up the threads of trade negotiations with the Soviets, I believe it would be helpful for you to issue a directive to that effect.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 17, USSR (8)) According to an attached correspondence profile, the memorandum was dispatched on January 20.
No initiatives are to be taken with respect to negotiation of trade issues with the USSR without my approval.

Gerald R. Ford

123. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I want to take the occasion of Ambassador Dobrynin’s departure for Moscow to reiterate one fundamental point of my policy: my determination to continue on the course of the improvement of US-Soviet relations as charted at the historic summit meetings over the last three years. As I explained in my letter of January 9, 1975, this principle applies to the enhancement of our cooperation in economic and other fields of bilateral relations, and also to our continued cooperation in the international political field. There is no question but that our two countries, as a political reality, share a special responsibility for the peace of the world.

In addition, in the spirit of consultation which marks our relations, I want to convey to you some of my thoughts about the current situation in the Middle East.

The United States has always been conscious of your nation’s interests in this area—its strategic importance to you and your natural role as a friend of many countries in the region. Our joint role in the area was stated in the understandings reached in Moscow on October 22, 1973, which produced Security Council Resolution 338, the Geneva Peace Conference, and the unprecedented and hopeful process of peaceful settlement that was launched.

No final settlement in the Middle East can be achieved or could endure without the support and cooperation of the Soviet Union. The United States and Soviet Union must work together in the closest cooperation in such a settlement. In the meantime, it is the responsibility of

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975. No classification marking. According to a typed note, the letter was “delivered to Soviet Embassy by NSC messenger 1/21/75, 6:45 p.m.”

2 Document 115.
both our countries to act in a manner that eases tensions and facilitates the search for peaceful solutions. As you have so often pointed out, Mr. General Secretary, the situation in the Middle East remains difficult. Until achievement of a final and comprehensive settlement, the danger of an outbreak of hostilities remains and cannot be ignored.

The United States is therefore currently attempting to see if there are any preliminary steps which can be taken to moderate the tensions in the area. We are under no illusion that any such steps constitute a lasting solution. It is our hope, however, that they will facilitate the process of moving to achieve more comprehensive political solutions.

In the interests of ensuring that every possible step which could ameliorate the situation in the Middle East is taken, the United States would be prepared to consider any suggestions you may have for possible cooperative action between us to achieve further interim progress once the steps the US is presently engaged in have been completed. I believe a discussion along these lines could be fruitful. If the Soviet side is receptive to this idea, I would be grateful to hear your ideas, Mr. General Secretary, on ways in which such a discussion might proceed. I believe there are many unexplored possibilities of constructive cooperation.

In the meantime, let me reiterate another point I made in my letter of January 9: that the candor and mutual confidence of our conversations in Vladivostok represent a firm basis for our moving ahead over the range of our relations. I am asking Ambassador Dobrynin to convey to you personally my own high expectations for our successful collaboration in the months ahead. He will bring you also my personal best wishes for your health and happiness.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford
124. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Dobrynin Meeting with U.S. Communist Party Chief Gus Hall

A sensitive FBI source has provided a detailed report on a meeting between Soviet Ambassador Dobrynin and U.S. Communist Party General Secretary Gus Hall in Washington on January 2. With surprising candor, Dobrynin discussed Brezhnev’s health and postponement of his Middle East trip, US-Soviet trade relations, the Vladivostok summit (and Soviet appraisal of you), and Brezhnev’s projected trip to the U.S. this year.

Brezhnev’s Health and the Middle East

Dobrynin said that Brezhnev is tired and not feeling too well, and thus it could be said that he is “ill.” He added that postponement of the trip to Egypt was in part political and that there are problems and some disagreements in Soviet-Egyptian relations—but they are not as bad as depicted in the “bourgeois” press.

US–USSR Trade

Most of the discussion between Hall and Dobrynin concerned US–USSR trade relations. Dobrynin read Hall the text of Brezhnev’s letter to you: Brezhnev waited until the last moment to see if you would veto the Trade Bill, reminded you of his previous conversations with you, President Nixon and me and of previous US-Soviet agreements, charged that the U.S. is now reneging and violating these agreements, asserted that the USSR could not accept conditions which represent interference in the internal affairs of other countries, and cautioned that the USSR might well begin raising the “oppressed state” of blacks in the U.S. if the U.S. persists in its course.

Dobrynin intimated to Hall that unless there is some clarification of U.S. policy regarding trade with the USSR, the Soviet Union may raise some legal problems contained in the previously signed Soviet-American agreements. Furthermore, Dobrynin said the USSR

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2 Dated January 15. (Ibid.)
3 Document 117.
intended to take additional action immediately. He said that the USSR would not “crawl or beg” for trade with the U.S. and that in the absence of clarification soon, the USSR will immediately enlarge its trade with Western Europe and Asia “in a big way.”

The Vladivostok Summit

Dobrynin emphasized that the proposal for the meeting originated in Washington, not in Moscow. The Ambassador observed that you and Brezhnev “hit it off from the very start” and that you understood each other. Dobrynin expressed his view that Brezhnev does not underestimate you as an “independent” man and that you know what you are talking about. According to Dobrynin, Brezhnev said he felt more at ease with you than with President Nixon. He added that the Summit was all business from the very start and that you and Brezhnev were constantly engaged in important discussions and in working out concrete proposals. He told Hall that the two of you agreed that if détente is to develop, you must not slow down the momentum and must reach some consensus on armaments.

Brezhnev’s Visit to the U.S.

Dobrynin informed Hall that agreement was reached at Vladivostok that Brezhnev will visit the U.S. perhaps in April, but not later than May, 1975. He asked Hall if he could visit the Soviet Union and meet with Brezhnev before then in order to brief the General Secretary for this summit. Hall said he thought he could do so in March.

This report of the Dobrynin–Hall conversation is forwarded for your information. No action is required on your part.
Moscow, January 27, 1975.

Dear Mr. President:

I have received and carefully studied your letters of January 9 and 21, 1975.2

I would like to say first of all that I appreciate and share your reiterated determination to continue vigorously the political course in the relations between our countries, which has been chartered in recent years and has already brought about very important results.

Your expressed intention to move steadily ahead in the development of bilateral Soviet-American ties as well as to work together for the elimination of sources of international tension and conflicts, for strengthening peace and the relaxation of tensions is in complete consonance with our own intentions and aspirations which you are well aware of and which—I would like to say it again—remain intact.

Consequently, the question now is how to provide for further practical steps in each of those wide fields of relations between our two countries on the basis of the common understanding of aims that we presently have with you.

We, like the U.S. side, attach, as before, the highest importance to bringing to an end and to translating into a concrete agreement the understanding reached in Vladivostok on strategic offensive arms limitation. We also believe that the preparation by joint efforts of a final text of the agreement by the time of our forthcoming meeting is quite a realistic thing, and that the agreement should become one of its main results. This is what we should bring matters to, in our view, at the talks which will resume in several days between our delegations in Geneva, that have to give the form of a mutually acceptable agreement to what we have agreed upon with you.

There is also no doubt that the common actions of our countries in the completion of the Conference for the Security and Cooperation in Europe should be made active to the maximum extent in the forthcoming weeks. A successful completion of this major event with the

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2 Documents 115 and 123.
signing of the final documents of the Conference at the highest level could also be an important contribution to the Soviet-American relations. Therefore, we expect that the American side in the spirit of the assurances given in your letter and in the spirit of our understanding on this question reached in Vladivostok will make every effort to facilitate achieving exactly such an outcome. Yet even to-day, Mr. President, not everything is going on smoothly in this respect.

As for the situation which has arisen in the field of our trade and economic relations you are already aware of our position in connection with the adoption in the USA of new discriminatory legislation on these matters with regard to the Soviet Union. You also understand, we believe, that this position could not be any different. We take note of the assurances of the American side to the effect that it will continue working towards correcting this clearly abnormal situation.

Now, about the Middle East. In your letter of January 21, you justly acknowledge that no final settlement in the Middle East can be achieved or could endure without the support on the part of our two countries and that the USSR and the USA must work together in close cooperation in such a settlement. We have always adhered and adhere now precisely to this point of view. We have said it not once, and in Vladivostok too.

But let us see what the situation is in practice regarding the cooperation and coordination of our efforts in the matters of the Middle East settlement. I must say it straight that here the practical steps of the American side are in complete opposition to what has been agreed between us. We have not yet managed to achieve proper cooperation and coordination.

We have been receiving for some time information about various kind of steps in the Middle East being worked out with the participation of the US. Meanwhile the American side has so far told us nothing about those steps. Even now, while speaking about its readiness to discuss with us possible measures of cooperative nature, the American side proposes to do so only after the “steps, in which the United States are presently engaged in have been completed.”

Why, may we ask, that should be done after but not before some steps are implemented and why not to take these steps with joint participation of our countries? I shall put it straight, we had the right to expect a different approach in these matters.

As for the idea set forth in your letter about having a meeting between our respective representatives after the completion of certain steps now in preparation with the US participation, we naturally would like to know what could be its purpose? Isn’t there an intention to confine it to informing us of what has been already done? The matter is not that opportunities are lacking for exchanging opinions. Such op-
opportunities do exist: there is our Embassy in Washington, and yours—in Moscow; there is also the established confidential channel through which an exchange of opinions is possible at any moment, if there is a wish to do so.

We are not against the discussions which you have proposed, nor are we against a special meeting between A.A. Gromyko and H. Kissinger, say, somewhere in Europe (for example, in Geneva or Vienna) for exchanges on the Middle Eastern matters. We are ready to discuss any aspects of the Middle East settlement including, as it was earlier, possible partial, intermediate steps which would be aimed at solving key questions of that settlement: liberation of all Israeli occupied Arab lands and giving the Palestinian people an opportunity to create national home of their own, as well as providing all the peoples of the area including the people of Israel with the opportunity to live in peace and security. Simultaneously the question could be discussed about the most effective use of the machinery of the Geneva conference, the expediency of which you have rightly noted at your recent press conference.³

I considered it necessary to sum up once again our approach to the issues of the Middle East, it could be that here we have not used all the possibilities for our cooperation.

Those, on the whole, are, Mr. President, the considerations which we have in connection with the letters received from you.

I appreciate your personal good wishes. Please accept my best wishes to you.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev⁴

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⁴ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
126. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Brezhnev’s Reply to Your Letters

You wrote to General Secretary Brezhnev on January 9 and January 21 reiterating your desire to continue the positive course of US-Soviet relations. (Tab B)² Your letter of January 21 pointed out that the US was pursuing some preliminary steps in the Middle East to ease tensions and promote a settlement, and you asked Brezhnev for his suggestions for ways in which we and the Soviets could cooperate.

Brezhnev has now replied. (Tab A)³ He first touches on various topics briefly:

—He is confident that a SALT agreement can be finalized by the time of his visit here.

—He reiterates his hope for common action for a CSCE Summit. However, “not everything is going on smoothly in this respect.”

—He notes your assurances that you will work to correct the “clearly abnormal situation” with respect to trade legislation and economic relations.

He then turns to the main topic, the Middle East. The tone of the letter becomes very sharp: “I must say it straight that here the practical steps of the American side are in complete opposition to what has been agreed between us. We have not yet managed to achieve proper cooperation and coordination.”

—He says he has been hearing for some time about “various kinds of steps in the Middle East being worked out with the participation of the U.S.”, about which the U.S. has thus far told the Soviets nothing.

—He complains at length that we have offered to discuss US-Soviet cooperation, but only after the present steps we are engaged in are completed. “I shall put it straight we had the right to expect a different approach.”

—He says there is no shortage of channels for us to exchange opinions. Nevertheless, in response to your willingness to have further

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² Printed as Documents 115 and 123.

³ Printed as Document 125.
discussions, he says he would not object to a meeting between myself and Foreign Minister Gromyko somewhere in Europe. He says the Soviet side would be willing to discuss “possible partial, intermediate steps,” as well as “the most effective use of the machinery of the Geneva conference.”

My inclination is to agree to a meeting with Gromyko, perhaps in Geneva, but not until the end of my forthcoming trip to the Middle East.\(^4\) I have assured Sadat that I would not see Gromyko until after I have stopped in Cairo first to review the situation and discuss how to handle the problem. Since Gromyko is set to visit the Middle East before I go there, we can respond to the Soviets that Gromyko and I can meet to compare notes after our respective exploratory trips.

\(^4\) Kissinger was in the Middle East February 10–15 to discuss a second Egyptian–Israeli disengagement agreement.
From Geneva to Helsinki: SALT, the Middle East, European Security, February–August 1975

127. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Your Meeting With Gromyko

Introductory Note

Gromyko is likely to be testy: the trade issue continues to rankle, as do the Middle East and Cyprus. The Soviets are also again itchy about Berlin because of the location there of the EC vocational training center. But in the end he will presumably be ready to talk seriously about the various issues. Although there are reports that Gromyko’s authority has risen, we doubt that this is true in any but the technical sense that with Brezhnev out of commission, Gromyko carries the brunt of foreign contacts. He still is not your real interlocutor. Consequently, we doubt the value of extensive philosophizing about our relations. This paper, therefore, reviews issues for your use with Gromyko. We think you should be pointing to your next visit to Moscow, presumably sometime during the next two months. That will be a better occasion for basic review.

For the present we have to proceed on the assumption that recent uncertainties surrounding Brezhnev’s position and Soviet policy will not lead to a major shift and that the Soviets still want to pursue better relations with the US, including a successful summit meeting. At the same time, we have to recognize that the uncertainties may be growing—in the form of both the succession question and a potential Soviet political backlash against détente; this may make the Soviets more difficult to deal with and perhaps less inclined to make concessions. Much will depend, of course, on how the Middle East develops, and what you can offer, if anything, to Gromyko.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The memorandum was drafted to prepare Kissinger for his meetings with Gromyko in Geneva February 16–17. It bears the incorrect handwritten date of “2/7/74.”
The consequences of the present situation are that we have to (a) identify those issues, including any areas in which we may want to take some initiative, in the short term in order to hedge against a hardening of the Soviet line, but (b) to persist on the more critical issues—especially SALT to ensure that we do not get another trade bill fiasco here. The main variable is the trade/emigration question, and whether we can make any moves.

The other issues, are, first, SALT; second, the conglomerate of security questions—CSCE, MBFR, the threshold test ban, chemical weapons, environmental warfare, and, third, bilateral projects.

1. We need to examine the obviously contentious SALT issues produced by the Soviet draft, and anticipate which way the negotiations will need to develop if we are to have a SALT agreement at the summit (this timetable in itself should be considered more seriously, lest we risk another charge of a quick fix).

2. We need to devise a general strategy that embraces all the lesser security/arms control questions, and relates them to the pre-summit period and the summit meeting itself.

3. We need to decide more precisely how to disentangle the knot of problems surrounding the trade bill, and some Soviet assistance is going to be required.

4. Finally, you may want to isolate 1 or 2 cooperative projects that would be prepared for the Summit (this should be a more limited effort than heretofore, to avoid a synthetic build-up of the summit simply for the sake of matching the Nixon–Brezhnev summits).

Your talks with Gromyko—leaving aside the Middle East—will thus be a very important first step in developing an overall scenario for the summit and beyond.

I. SALT

By far the best use of your time with Gromyko on this issue is to impress on him in elementary terms, so that he can convey them accurately to the leadership, what we believe to be the main issues that have to be resolved before the summit, and to ask him to reply in the private channel with their views.

A. Verification of MIRVs

—You should stress that we must have a comprehensive system—not necessarily identical or symmetrical for both sides—that assures us that we can count both MIRV ICBMs and MIRV SLBMs.

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—You should explain our willingness to designate specific areas for ICBM deployment by location and numbers including those fields where the deployment will be partial (Malmstrom)—then, explain we must count every modified (not modernized) silo for the SS–17, 18, 19s as MIRVs, and, if possible, we would like for them to designate specific areas that will include MIRV, and agree to rules for non-MIRV fields.

—Explain why we must count all SLBMs for a submarine class; if they intend to object to this approach then the burden is on them to propose a satisfactory compromise for counting only partial deployment.

—Explain that MIRV counting rules must be written down in a separate protocol (allowing the Soviets not to publish it if they choose), so that we have precise guidelines that will satisfy the skeptics in the Congress.

On the basis of the foregoing, the Soviets might try a draft for you that we could analyze, and if we agree they could introduce it in Geneva.

B. Air to Surface Missiles: Cruise and Ballistic Missiles/Sea and Air

The Soviet Draft Treaty lays out the following position:

—all missiles of over 600 km range, on bombers will be counted in the 2400 aggregate;
—all such missiles will be banned on any aircraft other than bombers;
—intercontinental cruise missiles (presumably over 3000 km?) will be banned;
—sea-based cruise missiles over 600 km are banned;
—ballistic missiles of a range over 600 km on all waterborne vehicles, except submarines, are banned;
—MIRVs on ASMs are banned.

This was to be expected, but it forces us to face some choices:

—since the deployment of 480 Tridents and B–1s will force a reduction of only 323 older systems, we still have some head room for counting air to surface missiles; even a deployment of 100 air mobile ICBMs becomes difficult, however, if they have to be put only on bombers which already count as one unit; counting all cruise missiles is even more ludicrous and amounts to a virtual bar.

Thus we have to decide whether we want to keep an option for air mobile ICBMs on non-bombers or concede and count ballistic missiles as now agreed; and how hard should we press for non-countable cruise missiles on bombers.

Perhaps the best approach is to be straightforward and press Gromyko for an early answer to the question: under what conditions would the Soviets agree to permit cruise missiles up to 3000 km and not count them? This may lead to a proposal to ban completely air mobile ICBMs.
C. **Backfire**

At this juncture you can only hold firm on counting this aircraft, if only to preserve some bargaining leverage. Eventually, however, we will probably not be able to count every Backfire without counting some FBS aircraft.

D. **Separate FBS Third Country Negotiations**

You should complain on this one, as a breach of faith, because it raises in a different guise an issue that was settled between Brezhnev and the President. The Soviets should withdraw it, (but they won’t) so you might suggest that they consider a non-circumvention formula, rather than separate negotiations. You could also point out that if the Soviets really insist on linking FBS to reductions in follow-on negotiations we will be obliged to inspect all Soviet systems capable of reaching the US on one-way missions and thus get into a hopeless morass.

E. **Trident/Typhoon Deployment Limits**

You should make the point that this was laid aside in Vladivostok; by raising it again (as Dobrynin has with some Senators) are they reopening the debate on a sub-limit on heavy missiles which we tied to the question of deployment restraints? (Do not be too quick to reject this Trident limit since it looks increasingly as if the Trident schedule will be prolonged to 1985 in any case).

F. **Lower MIRV Limits?**

If Trident is, in fact, prolonged then should we reconsider the MIRV limits?

—You are aware of the Congressional and other agitation on this question, and it might be better not to shift our position for this reason;

—On the other hand, if in fact our outer limit on MIRVs is 1286, and as rumored the Pentagon would go even lower, then now is the time to raise it, not later.

II. **Security Arms Control Issues**

All of these issues are proceeding more or less on their merits with no overall strategy.

—Somewhat surprisingly CSCE may be accelerating, even though the Soviets are still intransigent, because the allies are growing weary.

—A CSCE summit in the late summer may not be avoidable, if matters take their course.

—The introduction of Option III in MBFR will take considerable time to work through the Allies; any impact on the Soviets will probably be lost through leaks, and, in any case, if this move is to break the impasse, it almost certainly has to be introduced in your channel now.
—Negotiations will resume this month on the Threshold Test Ban (PNEs) and Environmental Warfare, and the CCD in Geneva will resume on March 4 where CW will be revived.

We ought to work out a scheme for holding or moving these various issues. A possibility might be:

1. Make a firm promise to Gromyko for a CSCE summit in September (if necessary we can make concessions on CBMs because the allied position is collapsing).

2. Foreshadow to Gromyko that we will make a move on nuclear weapons in MBFR, without going into specifics, in return for which we expect agreement, in principle before the Summit, to a first stage US-Soviet reduction that will also include air forces.

3. Agree to try to work out an Environmental Agreement before the Summit but ask Gromyko to hold off on both Environment and CW in Geneva, until we have had more time to consider how to respond to their CW draft agreement (you might want to surface the idea of an interim moratorium on CW production, rather than a treaty).

4. On the Threshold Test Ban, the real issue comes down to our toleration for excavation PNEs over 150 kt with non-firm guarantees. If this is not supportable in Washington, can we strike a bargain to limit all PNEs to 150 kt, if we enter into a “cooperative arrangement” with the Soviets (which has strong overtones of a nuclear condominium).

—Since the outcome of this negotiation is bound to lead to a new controversy, there is no reason to force the pace. On the other hand, it would be appropriate to announce at the summit that the issue is resolved.

A. CSCE

At CSCE, the Soviets have maintained their inflexibility on both CBM’s and the remaining Basket III issues while continuing to argue that the major issues of the Conference have been settled and that it should end soon at the highest level. This Soviet intransigence can contribute to your current strategy of stretching out the negotiations and delaying Stage III and our final agreement to a summit until after Brezhnev’s visit here, but it also depends on the Allies not giving in prematurely.

Gromyko can be expected to complain that we are not being active enough in pushing the Allies toward more “realistic positions,” and not carrying through on the Brezhnev–Ford agreement at Vladivostok to work together to conclude the Conference at the earliest possible time.

—You should say the US has accomplished a good deal since last fall—both in the Principles Declaration and in Basket III—in moving the Allies along, but that the Soviets must accept that further compromises will be necessary on their part, especially on the peaceful change
language, CBM’s, and the unresolved Basket III issues. (You have a detailed memo on CSCE issues in your briefing book.)³

B. MBFR

You may decide to raise Option III, as follows:

—It is our impression that if we included air and nuclear forces in our proposals, the Soviets would be willing to include the withdrawal of a tank army.

—In the interest of moving the talks forward, we are considering certain proposals on air and nuclear elements. In particular, we are considering an offer to withdraw a significant number of nuclear weapons from the NATO Guidelines area (along with 29,000 ground forces).

—In return, we would have to have Soviet withdrawal of a tank army consisting of 68,000 men and 1,700 tanks in Phase I and agreement on the concept of a common manpower ceiling within the area as the goal for reductions in Phase II.

—However, we would be interested in obtaining the reaction of the Soviet side in these channels as soon as possible.

C. Environmental Warfare

Our first series of talks in Moscow November 1–5⁴ only pointed up the differences between the Soviet catch-all approach, as set out in their draft convention tabled earlier at the UNGA, and our strictly limited “Option II” position, which would not include limits on “tactical” uses of environmental modification such as rainmaking. We will be meeting with the Soviets again at the experts level in Washington on February 24, and are working on a counter draft convention to give them at that time. Our immediate objective is simply to maintain the dialogue and forestall tabling of a Soviet draft in Geneva by extending the bilaterals into the period when the CCD is in session. If you offer an agreement by the Summit, the Soviets might see it in their interest to subscribe to our more limited approach (especially since it is not a serious issue).

D. Chemical Warfare

The Soviets have been pressing us for bilateral talks on chemical weapons, citing our agreement in the July 3, 1974, summit communiqué to consider a joint initiative in the CCD. Vorontsov gave you a draft convention last August⁵ which is too broad in scope, inadequate on verification, and by limiting CW agents above a certain level of lethality, would catch all agents in our stockpile while leaving most of

⁴ See footnote 10, Document 86.
⁵ See Document 13 and footnote 5 thereto.
theirs untouched. In the SRG of January 27 you asked for more work on the question of whether we should produce binary weapons. Until these studies are completed and a decision taken, we are not in a position to respond to the Soviets.

Meanwhile, however, we should urge them not to table their draft convention in the CCD, which reconvenes March 4, pending bilateral discussion with us. You may want to suggest that since a formal treaty is unverifiable, a moratorium for say 5 years limiting stockpiles could be undertaken: a production ban may be inevitable if we have no programs.

E. Threshold Test Ban and PNE’s

The second session of the TTB/PNE talks will be in progress when you see Gromyko. There are four key issues that will have to be worked out if—as the Soviets wish—we are to have an agreement by the Summit.

—Yield Limit of Contained Explosions. We are proposing a 100-kiloton limit and on-site observers. However, we have some flexibility to move the yield up or to drop the observers.

—Verification of Excavation Shots. Here we have proposed a yield limit of 150 kilotons (with a salvo limit of 500 kts), observers and a very low limit on the fissile yield of the device (say one-half kiloton). Eventually our verification needs could be satisfied either by the overall yield limit or, if the Soviets want explosions over 150 kilotons, by limiting the fissile yield of each shot. This is going to be difficult for the Soviets either way, however, because a 150-kiloton threshold may constrain to some extent the Pechora–Kama project while the fissile yield limit will require fairly intrusive on-site observer activity.

—LTBT. Any excavation program is likely to violate the LTBT. The Soviets will probably want explicit or tacit help from us in getting around this problem. This will be very difficult for us to do because the Senate is unlikely to ratify any TTB/PNE arrangement which looks to modification of the LTBT.

—PNE Cooperation. The Soviets want us to conclude a broad cooperative agreement on PNEs. We can probably go along with a modest program of cooperation covering domestic PNE applications, only on condition that our verification concerns are fully met. However, we

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7 The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space, and Under Water was also known as the Limited Test Ban Treaty. The treaty was signed by the United States, United Kingdom, and Soviet Union at Moscow on August 5, 1963, and went into effect on October 10, 1963. (14 UST 1313; TIAS 5433)
cannot accept the Soviet idea of joint US/Soviet PNE services to third countries because of the over-all political implications of superpower condominium.

The most valuable message you could leave with Gromyko is that verification is a very serious problem for us which, if it is not solved, will make it impossible to obtain the needed Congressional support for ratification of the TTB.

F. Non-proliferation

The Soviets have agreed to attend a multilateral nuclear exporters meeting. On the other hand, they are very strong supporters of universal NPT adherence and the closest possible links between safeguards and the NPT. We are concerned that a conspicuous and inflexible public posture on the NPT will make it very difficult for the French to engage in meaningful cooperation on safeguards. Thus, if the Soviets are not willing to tone down their NPT position, we will lose both ways: the safeguards problem will get out of hand without French cooperation and the NPT rhetoric will not succeed in gaining NPT adherence by France and the other countries that matter.

III. Trade/Emigration

We are not sure how you intend to proceed with the Congress, but Gromyko will certainly want to know your strategy.

At this time you might make the following points to Gromyko:
—We want to preserve the general institutional structure of economic relations, and we should both be careful not to allow it to erode or be dismantled.
—We will definitely seek new trade legislation, but we cannot forecast a timetable, because we will first have to work quietly with key Congressional leaders.
—Meanwhile, the Soviets must realize that however sensitive the issue may be, their policies and performance on Jewish emigration is still a real issue in the Congress. In particular, a major decline in emigration will make the worst possible atmosphere for renegotiating the trade bill.
—At some point, the President will have to make a public statement that he believes that emigration is proceeding according to Soviet law and without interference. Even though it will be in no way binding on the Soviets, something along this line cannot be avoided.
—A possible first step might be to break the link between MFN and the EXIM credits, but we might have to compromise by accepting a higher ceiling, and some other restrictions on energy related credits.

(Optional: It would be a very helpful gesture if the Soviets did not renege on the next Lend Lease payment, which is due in July, and could
indicate publicly that they will not invalidate the agreement in the hope of straightening out the trade mess. This may be too much for Moscow, but would be useful in Washington.)

**IV. Bilateral Cooperation**

We have no new shopping list, and indeed, it may not be advisable to try to work up essentially phony topics just for a summit. Yet, the Soviets always have a few ideas that we might accept. You might simply ask Gromyko for one or two items they would like to see developed for the Summit.

The effect of the *Middle East, and even Cyprus* is incalculable, but may well further aggravate relations with the Soviets. There is little doubt that they are working against you on both issues. On *both the Cyprus question and the Middle East*, you will want to be careful not to give Gromyko the impression that because of the trade bill fiasco, we are so concerned that we will not oppose their tactics.

*Cyprus*

You are aware of Soviet agitation with Makarios and Athens and Ankara. We can only conclude that they want to prevent a US-sponsored settlement and maintain Greek-Turkish tensions.

—You should be brittle with Gromyko on Soviet meddling, especially in promoting the "internationalization" scheme.

—You should point out that the Security Council cannot resolve this dispute, and that the net result of Soviet strategy will be to ensure permanent partition if not enosis which is what the Soviets claim they fear.

—You might want to go as far as saying that on *both Cyprus and the Middle East* that Soviet policy would guarantee a deadlock, which makes us wonder what their real motive is.

*Middle East*\(^8\)

The Soviets are also sharply criticizing your phased approach, e.g., “It is clear that the architects of the phased plan are relying on the fact that by this method they will succeed in undermining the UN supervision over the implementation of its resolutions . . . Israel’s willingness to withdraw from some territories is to set the foundation for procrastination for an indefinite time.”

They are making the point that the Soviet-Syrian commitment to reconvene in Geneva in late February will “put an end to talking about

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\(^8\) In a memorandum to Kissinger on February 8, Atherton also briefed Kissinger on the Middle East in preparation for the upcoming meeting with Gromyko in Geneva. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 14, Briefing Memos, 1975, Folder 5)
peace and commence the practical application of the demand” for Israeli withdrawal, etc.

It may be that the Soviets have accepted the possibility of a successful Sinai disengagement, but want now to head off another Syrian round, and guarantee that even Sadat cannot avoid Geneva.

Frankly, we do not know what you have in mind, but you should anticipate that the Soviets will want to spoil your diplomacy. If a Geneva conference is inevitable, then offering it to Gromyko now may be the way to cause them to moderate their agitation in the Arab world.

On the PLO, it is interesting to compare texts of the Syrian and Egyptian communiqués;9 neither went as far as mentioning a PLO “state,” as Gromyko did in his speech in Damascus. The Syrian communiqué suggests some nuances of differences with Moscow, but it certainly went much further than the Egyptian one, suggesting that the Soviets failed to get very far with Sadat.

If you have to discuss something substantive on the Middle East with Gromyko, a candidate might be the subject of guarantees: If Geneva convenes, the result of a quick meeting of the parties might be to set up a working group of US and USSR alone, or including Egypt and Syria and Israel, on guarantees for a peaceful settlement—this could be dangerous, but it is difficult to see what less might buy off the Soviet pressure for the PLO issue to be addressed.

Cambodia

You may wish to discuss with Gromyko your thinking on how a negotiated settlement might be reached in Cambodia and the role which might be played by various actors including Prince Sihanouk.

Your book includes extensive backup on all the foregoing.

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9 Gromyko met with Assad and Sadat during official visits to Damascus (February 1–3) and Cairo (February 3–5). For the English text of the official joint communiqués, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 5 (February 26, 1975), pp. 15–16. Gromyko also met with Arafat in Damascus on February 2.
128. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, February 16, 1975, 8:15–11:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Andrey Vavilov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
CSCE; Cyprus; China and Japan; Germany and Berlin; Emigration; SALT II

[The conversation began in private, for a discussion of the agenda.]

Gromyko: You know Prime Minister Wilson is in Moscow. I can
inform you that he and the General Secretary will probably agree on
three documents. First, a joint statement on the visit. Then a document
on consultations, similar to what we have with the Canadians.

Kissinger: But stronger.

Gromyko: On the usefulness of consultation.

Then a document—which is in agreement with your position—in
favor of strict fulfillment of the Non Proliferation Treaty.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: That would be helpful. We are very glad the British are
attaching importance to this.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: Until now, we and you—we don’t know if you were
working at your full capacity—but we and you were working on this.
And it would be helpful to say something jointly.

Kissinger: I think it’s a good idea. It is in our interest to do some-
thing against proliferation.

I’m glad to see your General Secretary was back.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Who was the man who was traveling in the Middle
East? Was it you?

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the
All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

2 Wilson was in the Soviet Union on an official visit February 13–17. For the English
texts of the joint communiqué and of five bilateral agreements reached in Moscow, see
Gromyko: Do you have information on this? I will check?
Kissinger: There must be a leadership struggle in the Soviet Union.
Gromyko: What?
Kissinger: Because I read the General Secretary attacked somebody who was traveling in the Middle East. Was it you? I told our press it must have been you.
Gromyko: No, he didn’t say it.
Kissinger: I read it in a toast.
Gromyko: I haven’t read it.
Kissinger: The General Secretary is well?
Gromyko: Yes, he’s much better. He did not have anything serious, and he negotiated from the beginning to end with the British. But probably he will take a rest for a week or two weeks.
Kissinger: President Ford wants to send his very warm regards to the General Secretary.
Gromyko: He will appreciate it.
Kissinger: And he wants to affirm that he is determined to continue the policy on which we are embarked—not only the Vladivostok agreements, but all the policy.
Gromyko: What position do you want to adopt? Shall we talk tomorrow about the Middle East?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: Let’s take up principal subjects tonight—bilateral relations.
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: Then the European Security Conference.
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: And then maybe Cyprus. If you don’t mind.
Kissinger: I’m prepared to discuss ... I want to say a few words about SALT—not to negotiate, but just some general principles. We can talk—we can do it tomorrow if not tonight—about the General Secretary’s trip to the United States.
Gromyko: And we can discuss some other matters tomorrow if we have time.

[At 8:22 pm the group moved to the dining room to join the rest of the party for dinner. Attending on the Soviet side were Foreign Minister Gromyko, Deputy Foreign Minister Kovalev (head of Soviet CSCE delegation), Amb. Dobrynin, Mr. Korniyenko (head of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Mr. Makarov (aide to Gromyko), and interpreters Vavilov and Krokhalev. On the American side were Secretary Kissinger, Amb. Stoessel, Under Secretary Sisco, Counselor Son-]
nenfeldt, Assistant Secretary Hartman, INR Director Hyland, and Mr. Rodman.]

[The Secretary told the story of the bravery decoration he received at the end of the war.]

Kissinger: We occupied this town and I put up a poster advertising for people who had had experience in police work. This fellow came to me and I asked “What experience have you had in police work?” He said, “Staatspolizei.” So I said, jokingly, “Geheime Staatspolizei?” And he said, “Jawohl!” So I had to arrest him. His feelings were very hurt. He said, “What can I do to show my loyalty?” I said, “Well, you can help us round up your colleagues.” He said, “Fine.” So he and I rounded up all his former colleagues. We arrested more Gestapo people in that town than all the other occupying forces did. I got a medal for it, but he did the work.

Gromyko: Could we discuss the European Security Conference over the blini?

Kissinger: Could I tell one story about Vladivostok?

Kovalev: It seems that the texts at the European Security Conference are being done much more slowly than the blini.

Kissinger: Could I tell one story about Vladivostok? The Foreign Minister was explaining the difference between “equal applicability of principles” and “equal validity of principles,” and the President turned to me and said, “What the hell is he talking about?” [Laughter. Gromyko looks slightly embarrassed.] My trouble was I couldn’t explain it to him either. [Laughter] You’ve ruined my prestige! Now the President has lost confidence in me.

Gromyko: The Americans at the highest level decided they’re above principles!

Kissinger: We’re going to enter a reservation that they don’t apply to the U.S.

Sonnenfeldt: Good idea.

Gromyko: When we spoke with President Sadat in Cairo, I sat on the divan and he asked me, “What is your secret? Why are you so young?” I gave him an answer—a serious answer. I said “I’m stable. I’m following a policy which is stable.” And I advised him to stick to the same kind of policy. In good humor.

Kissinger: And what did he say?

Gromyko: Everyone was in good humor.

Kissinger: Next time I see him I’ll give him the same advice. [Laughter]

Gromyko: [Raising his glass] The vodka is here; I forgot. It’s my responsibility. Vodka is my weak point! To the Secretary and our guests.
Kissinger: Thank you. [Everyone toasts.]

Dobrynin: When you say vodka is your weak point, in English it sounds very strong.

Kissinger: I was going to give a press release on it.

Kissinger: I’m going to England, to discuss what Wilson discussed in Moscow.

Dobrynin: Are you going to Paris first?

Kissinger: No, I go from here to London. And I have dinner with Wilson and Callaghan. Then I go to Zurich to see the Shah and I’ll be in Paris Tuesday night\(^3\) for dinner. Wednesday morning I go back to the United States.

Gromyko: There was a legend of three strong men in old Russia. I just read it in our magazine “Science and Life.” One of them was Alexander Popovich. Recently there was discovered an ancient chronicle, and we dug according to the chronicle and found a feudal settlement.

Kissinger: So the legend was true.

Gromyko: Yes, the legend was true. He was very strong, Alexander Popovich—though the legend lifted him to supernatural. He was brave too—as you were when you arrested those German generals. [Laughter]

Kissinger: You think I have a future?

Dobrynin: You have a great future.

Gromyko: You know we have mammoths in Siberia. Our scientists have concluded that in the old times, 100,000 years ago, the climate was different and warm. Because mammoths are like elephants and belong to warm climates.

Dobrynin: According to predictions, all the U.S. will become frozen and Siberia will become a very nice place.

Gromyko: It has to have been warm; otherwise the biological conditions wouldn’t exist.

Kissinger: Do you have petroleum in Siberia?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I knew you had natural gas.


Dobrynin: We have diamonds.

Gromyko: The main deposit is Yakutsk.

\(^3\) February 18.
Kissinger: I’ve read analyses that the climate has changed fundamentally since ancient times. As late as Roman times, they grew wheat in Egypt. Now the climate is impossible.

Gromyko: They do some.

Kissinger: But in the desert.

I’ve read analyses that in classical times, the climate in the Mediterranean was different. Slightly cooler. First of all, the whole area was still forested, so there was more rainfall.

Dobrynin: During Roman times?

Kissinger: The time of Alexander.

Dobrynin: It was so cool so he looked for warm weather, to conquer.

Hyland: A warm water port!

Sonenfeldt: There is a theory that you can’t be a good imperialist without cold weather.

Dobrynin: That is a new thing.

Kissinger: Did you take a vacation yet this winter?

Gromyko: Not yet.

Kissinger: Will you go to the Crimea?

Gromyko: Probably not. There are sanatoriums closer to Moscow.

Kissinger: It is one of the most beautiful sea coasts in the world— the Crimea.

Dobrynin: You have a state residence now, the Merriweather Post residence in Palm Beach?

Kissinger: We were thinking of—seriously—inviting the General Secretary to stay there. [To Hartman] Is it open yet?

Hartman: Yes.

Gromyko: Vladivostok may become a resort area.

Kissinger: Isn’t it too cold?

Gromyko: But it’s healthy. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I liked the city of Vladivostok.

Gromyko: It reminded me of San Francisco.

Hartman: The hills.

Gromyko: And the Bay. You weren’t too cold there?

Kissinger: No. I’ve never been here in real winter.

Dobrynin: You were in Zavidovo in March.

Kissinger: No, May.

Gromyko: That is where Sonnenfeldt distinguished himself with the boar. He was wounded.

Sonenfeldt: A boar attacked me and the glass slipped in my hand.
Kissinger: I was with Brezhnev.

Gromyko: [To Stoessel] Have you gone to that place near Zavidovo where the diplomatic corps can hunt boar?

Stoessel: I haven’t gone. I was invited, but I couldn’t go.

Hyland: Diplomatic bores. [Laughter]

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)

Kissinger: What about the European Security Conference? We can settle it over the sturgeon.

Gromyko: If we speak seriously about this subject of the European Security Conference, I would say that after a certain rise in activity there, which was not sufficient, and happened before the last interval, a certain tranquility has set in.

Kissinger: [Interrupts the translation] Especially in the Russian delegation, I’m told.

Gromyko: Of course, we think this is connected with the policy of certain countries. And this is not by accident. The European Security Conference reflects the state of mind of certain capitals. And we can conclude that not all possibilities are being utilized. Perhaps I’m being too frank.

Kissinger: Since I know the Foreign Minister isn’t talking about Washington, I wonder what capitals he is talking about.

Gromyko: After a year, it’s being relegated to next year, and then a third year, and then a fourth year, and then a fifth year. This cannot but reflect on policies in other areas.

Kissinger: Let’s be concrete—what capitals?

Gromyko: I’ll give an answer to that. We have a definite view that the FRG in certain questions is playing a negative role, and certain negative impulses proceed from her representatives. We’ve said the same thing as we say to you to representatives of the FRG at the highest level—to Chancellor Schmidt and Minister Genscher. And the same thing we said to the British, at a high level—to Prime Minister Mr. Wilson and Foreign Secretary Mr. Callaghan. I do not know how the British Government will conduct itself in the future, but up until now on many questions, I would like to say their attitude was negative. We thought for quite a long time about the differences between the line of the Labour Government and the Conservative Government on questions of European security and in particular the European Security Conference, and up to now not noticed the great difference. However, I should make a reservation—we have detected signs of perhaps a greater degree of interest in the talks in Moscow on some matters which are of general interest to countries and on certain matters signs of interest in a positive outcome of the Conference. And we hope cer-
tain practical steps will come out in the future. And we have told this to
the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary. Of course, we said this to
them to a greater extent than to you now.

And I would like to mention about one more capital: Washington.
I’ve spoken to the leader of our delegation, Comrade Kovalev, who is
my Deputy. And so we feel the pulse of the European Security Confer-
ence. On certain questions there are good contacts between our repre-
sentatives. Our representatives feel that when there is desire on the part
of the American representatives to help promote progress on certain
questions, this makes results. We do not always feel this desire. And
sometimes we feel that the attitude of your representatives is some-
what like the attitude of observers, people who look at things happen
and wait and see how things proceed.

In a nutshell, we think not all possibilities and opportunities are
being utilized, and it’s not by chance. The reasons are not clear but we
think it has reasons. Perhaps you can answer. We think you can give
more help. Sometimes there are impulses to help but the impulses go
down and weaken until the next cycle.

Kissinger: No, Mr. Foreign Minister, sometimes toward the con-
clusion of a negotiation which is where we are now, the questions left
to the end are the most difficult ones, and this is what is happening.
Secondly, I’d be interested to hear what specific issues you’re talking
about, because there is no directive from Washington to slow down co-
operation. On the contrary, our intention is unchanged to speed up co-
operation. So I would appreciate hearing what issues you refer to.

Gromyko: I can answer that. We believe today there are a number
of questions which are blocking further movement. Three. Or four
perhaps. The first is formulations which pertain to the right of states to
change frontiers peacefully only by agreement and in accordance with
international law. Second is the measure of military détente or confi-
dence. Third is the question of the correlation of principles. That
problem, by the way, is the one that created liveliness on the part of cer-
tain of the Vladivostok participants. In a good mood.

Kissinger: It was deliberately designed to undermine my prestige.
Gromyko: I can’t question the intentions of the President. That is
not my responsibility. [Laughter]

Then there is the Third Basket. There are certain remnant questions
in this Third Basket, not all of the same character, but they are blocking
progress. Some countries probably are trying to show strong character,
but it blocks progress.

Kissinger: Can I give you my impression of these issues? On
peaceful change, we can give you another formulation tonight—or to-
morrow. But it is a matter of principal interest to other countries, as you
know, and connected to their domestic politics. So it’s not an issue on which the U.S. is the principal agent.

Second, on the equal validity of principles, I frankly thought this was on the way to being solved. And there was the IPU Conference in Belgrade which had yet another formulation. So I thought it was moving toward a solution.

Gromyko: Not yet.

Kissinger: Isn’t the Belgrade formulation acceptable?

Gromyko: [To his colleagues] What is the Belgrade formulation?

Kissinger: We had the impression perhaps that that formula... .

Gromyko: We can’t negotiate it in Belgrade.

Kissinger: No. Tomorrow we’ll give you the two formulas that we thought will lead to a solution.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: We’ll give them to you. In our internal discussions we genuinely thought those would solve it. We’ll have it for you tomorrow at 10:00. Our Ambassadors will discuss it. Ours will be handicapped by the fact that I genuinely don’t understand it.

Gromyko: Even after Vladivostok.

Kissinger: You expressed it, didn’t explain it.

Gromyko: [To his colleagues:] What is the Belgrade formulation?

Dobrynin: [To Kissinger:] No one on our side is familiar with it.

Kissinger: We’ll give it to you.

Hartman: There was another one which was discussed at the Conference.

Kissinger: [To Hartman:] What made you think it was acceptable?

Hartman: Because their delegation was there and accepted it, and it was advised by their Foreign Office.

Kissinger: Maybe it was an honest misunderstanding. Our people genuinely thought, then the IPU accepted it and your delegation was there... .

Gromyko: We weren’t interested in this matter at Belgrade at all.

Kissinger: There is no point debating it; why don’t our Ambassadors give you the two formulas on which we genuinely thought a convergence of views was developing? We’ll do it tonight. And you look at it, and see.

Gromyko: Of course.

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Kissinger: On Confidence-Building Measures, didn’t the British discuss this with you in Moscow?

Gromyko: Callaghan said that maybe information about maneuvers can be exchanged on a voluntary basis.

Kissinger: Movements?

Hartman: No, both.

Gromyko: Maneuvers too. We didn’t think it was against your line of thinking. We discussed it once.

Kissinger: I know.

Gromyko: He wasn’t specific but it was worthy of consideration. Then, what is the point from which states should proceed when they exchange information?

Kissinger: The number of days?

Gromyko: The number of troops.

Kissinger: Number of troops and . . .

Gromyko: For Luxemburg, maybe one regiment is a terrible force. For us, if five divisions are going from their winter to their summer quarters, we don’t notice them.

Kissinger: We don’t notice them either, as long as they don’t come West.

On this issue, if we’re willing to show some flexibility on both sides . . .

Gromyko: This is not an important general matter. We think this was introduced rather artificially. In the long run it can be considered. It’s possible to consider other problems. In a sense it’s a symbolic one, they said. But if symbolic steps should be considered, reasonable ones should be done.

Kissinger: What do you think?

Gromyko: We think it should apply to all countries equally and 100 kilometers from the borders. 100 kilometers. All this fantastic part about the European part of the Soviet Union and 500 kilometers, is fantastic. This is supposed to be about confidence but all this undermines confidence.

Regarding the number of troops, we think a corps. Do Americans have a corps?

Dobrynin: A corps or Army.

Gromyko: In the neighborhood of 30,000–35,000. This is not a terrible force. Otherwise you and probably you and we can report every day. And you should build skyscrapers to accommodate the staff who shall be engaged in such unproductive business.

Kissinger: Well, we have no agreement on this point. But I have always believed it was a point on which a solution should be possible.
And I think if we both look again at the figures we gave to each other and try to find a compromise between the two positions, we’d be willing to cooperate. And if you want to instruct your Ambassador to be flexible, we’ll instruct ours.

But these talks should be kept quiet.

Gromyko: Naturally they should be quiet, but it seems we’re remaining at the same old positions.

Kissinger: No, if your Ambassador is instructed to show some flexibility, ours will, and we should find a compromise between the numbers and the distances. And if we agree, we can use our influence with other delegations.

Gromyko: Why not report to them tomorrow?

Kissinger: [To Hartman] Is Sherer5 here in Geneva?

Hartman: Yes.

Kissinger: All right, we’ll do it tomorrow.

Gromyko: Do not discount this idea of voluntary.

Kissinger: They’ll meet tomorrow.

Gromyko: The remaining two principles: On borders—we’ll comment when we receive the text.

Kissinger: Then Basket III—it’s too intellectual for me. There is a French text and there is a Russian text, so it’s between you and the French. As for the rest, our people aren’t causing any trouble, are they? Seriously, our people aren’t causing any delay. We’re staying out of it.

Gromyko: It’s true. And we don’t reproach you with creating difficulties. And it seems you have a more realistic approach to the problems than some others. But you seem to act as observers.

Kovalev: Sometimes they give help and sometimes they’re passive.

Kissinger: It’s a difficult problem for reasons with which you’re familiar. We can’t block the proposals of others in that area. Our impression is your delegation perhaps hasn’t made all the efforts it could make in that area.

Gromyko: I think we have exerted so many efforts that if you read a memorandum of our concessions in the field of cultural contacts, information contacts, no one should wait for concessions only from the Soviet Union and the Socialist countries. Other countries may have a less flexible attitude than you, and we agree, but compromise should be the prevailing factor. We don’t think you will worsen your relations when you pronounce your authoritative word. Because we have stated

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5 Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of the U.S. Delegation to the CSCE negotiations.
our view. And I can quote certain examples. There was a whole constellation of islands in the Pacific and there was a moment when the Soviet Union after the Second World War actively supported trusteeship by the U.S.—the Marshalls, the Marianas and the Carolines. I remember; I voted for this in the UN. But it was not an easy matter to explain, and public opinion was opposed. But it was a matter of allied relations and both of us were speaking of peaceful cooperation in the world. This was a striking example. In comparison with this, the questions being discussed now are extremely small.

Kissinger: As the Foreign Minister said himself, we have supported the Soviet view on several issues in Basket III and we have not opposed it on any issue in Basket III. And we’ll be genuinely cooperative. But it is a difficult situation for us, given our domestic situation, to be too visibly active.

Gromyko: What can I say to that? We would like to express the hope that the U.S. will be more active than before on questions relating to culture, information and humanitarian contacts. It is up to you whether it should be tied to domestic considerations and to what extent. In a word—and we have a record of exchanges with you—we think you operate lower than your possibilities.

Kissinger: Frankly, our people think the same of you.

Gromyko: Read the list of what we’ve done and what others have done.

Kissinger: Let me review the subject. It eludes me from time to time. I read it before, and I will see what can be done.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: What other issues are there?

Gromyko: It would be good to clear up these European matters.

Regarding the timing of the final stage of the Conference at the highest level, it doesn’t seem that people are sticking to the dates discussed. There was agreement, and two months have passed and there is no agreement. This doesn’t bring benefit to anybody when they are not complied with. The agreements bring some tranquility to public opinion, but the reaction is sharp when they are not complied with. Not much time has passed since Vladivostok.

Kissinger: I don’t understand. Not much time has passed?

Gromyko: Only two months—and now we see the agreement is going to be broken.

Kissinger: That was a sarcastic remark.

Gromyko: Perhaps we’ll sit together in the next room with notetakers and discuss this question.

Kissinger: About the Security Conference.
Gromyko: It is unlocked. They will not bind us.

Dobrynin: He’s a flexible man.

Kissinger: [To Dobrynin] You know your deputy is developing a very active press policy.

Dobrynin: What?

Kissinger: He’s now releasing Brezhnev’s correspondence to the Washington Post.6 He told them about a letter Brezhnev sent in December. Now Jackson wants to see it. Murrey Marder. Your Deputy told Marder that Brezhnev wrote the President a letter December 28.

Dobrynin: Did he?

Kissinger: If you’re going to release the dates of letters, we’ll have Jackson asking for them all. We never acknowledge these letters.

Dobrynin: Vorontsov is a man of discipline.

Kissinger: Because we don’t want to release this correspondence.

Gromyko: I don’t know of it and didn’t hear it.

Dobrynin: The Minister speaks for himself, but I have no knowledge.

Kissinger: Where could Marder hear of the date?

Dobrynin: Vorontsov has no such instruction.

Kissinger: He also told the New York Times that you would have preferred a lower MIRV limit.7 We have taken the position that nothing at Vladivostok is renegotiable. Because if something is possible in one category, Jackson will say it’s possible in another.

Gromyko: It could not be. I would know this.

Kissinger: Lots of our Congressmen have the impression . . . If you say you’re willing to have lower MIRV’s, the Congressmen will say we have to have lower total numbers. We just maneuvered this Kennedy Amendment8 so it supports the Vladivostok agreement. If you say you’ll do it in one category, Congress will try it in another.

Gromyko: You’re right.

Kissinger: Seriously, no one in your Embassy should talk to our Congress about lower numbers.

Gromyko: You’re absolutely right. It is not in our interest to do so.

Kissinger: I agree completely.

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7 Not found.

8 See footnote 8, Document 113.
[Secretary Kissinger, Minister Gromyko, Mr. Vavilov and Mr. Rodman adjourned to the next room at 10:10 p.m. to continue the discussion privately.]

Kissinger: I am told we have given you a formula on a peaceful change and you didn’t answer yet officially.

Gromyko: Where?
Kissinger: A few weeks ago.
Gromyko: Ah! Two words you changed place.
Kissinger: Let us give you a new one tomorrow.
Gromyko: Two words don’t change anything.

I would like to tell you, Henry, we are very unhappy with the progress at the European Security Conference. This is a great contrast with the Vladivostok meeting which, you are aware, was of very great significance.

Look how many years this has been going on now. As we see the situation, the procrastination being done is artificial and this doesn’t correspond to the interest of the whole cause. We think there are some political calculations, and it is happening not by chance. Maybe I am being too straightforward.

Kissinger: No, I appreciate it.
Gromyko: If you think it isn’t right, maybe it’s London, Bonn, but we don’t understand why this is being done.

This is the personal feeling of our leadership and the personal view of General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, whom I saw yesterday before I left.

Kissinger: Tell him my personal regards. I admire him for his courage.

Gromyko: Even now it is not known when the Conference will end. Let us settle the date of the final ending at the highest level.

Kissinger: I want to say first of all that when I saw the toast of Leonid Brezhnev\(^9\) when he referred to the European Security Conference I was somewhat surprised, because I thought things were going normally—not quickly but normally. Because with so many countries there, I thought it was progressing toward a conclusion this year.

Perhaps one mistake we made was to give deadlines which are too short, given the procedures and readings that are required. Let’s discuss a realistic date. Look, we agree there will be a summit, without

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\(^9\) Reference is apparently to Brezhnev’s remarks during a luncheon for Wilson in Moscow on February 14. For the condensed English text, see *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. XXVII, No. 7 (February 12, 1975), pp. 1–3.
clauses. Let’s find a date—say, late July or early September—a firm commitment. Or what is your idea?

Gromyko: I must say what you said about dates puts us on our guard. You remember the dates we discussed some time ago. Now you want July, September. I must say the Soviet leadership is discouraged with the situation—for want of a stronger word; I won’t mention it. We think there is a possibility to finish the conclusion of the European Security Conference two months earlier. Look at—it’s now half of February, so June or July means five months. Should we continue it five months? We don’t understand this.

Kissinger: Your idea is June?

Gromyko: We think it is better in April, or at least May. It is better in April. This is possible. This is possible. Work remains for two weeks that is all.

Kissinger: It is not possible. I mean the third stage.

Gromyko: To complete the second stage, a couple of weeks are needed. Of course we are talking about the third stage. To conclude the second stage, we only need a couple of weeks. Maybe there is no wish. The orchestra is too large. Some countries do one thing; some do another.

Kissinger: Our people thought the second stage, with all the readings, couldn’t be done until mid-April.

Gromyko: Today, one country inserts one comma, tomorrow another country inserts another comma.

Kissinger: Can we do this? I’ve noted what you say. We have no interest in a delay. Why should we create suspicion in the minds of the Soviet leadership? It is not a substantive issue. We agree there will be a summit.

Gromyko: I appreciate what you say.

Kissinger: So the only issue is the time. I’m seeing Giscard and Wilson in the next three days. Let me be in touch with you no later than a week from today with a proposal.

Gromyko: By the way, Giscard considered April.

Kissinger: May I be in touch with them? I’ll give it to Vorontsov and it stays in our channel. But we will make a firm commitment for a realistic date.

Gromyko: I’m glad you say there are no calculations. We were guessing. We thought for basic reasons, Washington should not delay.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: But we thought there were some reasons we do not see from Moscow.

Kissinger: What do we gain?
Gromyko: Within a week?
Kissinger: Next Monday I’ll give a proposal.\(^{10}\) Then you can reply to me.

Gromyko: I spoke on this with Callaghan.
Kissinger: What do they say?
Gromyko: They are having a Common Market referendum in June, and so they say they will be busy April and May. I said it’s only two or three days; he didn’t have another date. He said he would think over the matter. We have the impression—not the only impression—that if Washington gave the word for April, it would be accepted by London and Paris and the FRG—and Italy.
Kissinger: Let me get their views.
Gromyko: All right. All right.

Regarding the question we discussed in the dining room, on frontiers. One can look at the matter and say: “Let Bonn and Moscow settle this.” You are saying this and Britain is saying this and not only they. But the question of borders is a very important one. Remember World War II started over the question of frontiers. It is not right to say that countries should settle the issue among themselves. World War I too started on the sorrowful question of frontiers. It is not accidental that the Kennedy Government and the Johnson Government and the Nixon Government took a stand on this very positively. The Ford Government hasn’t made any clear presentation on this matter, but we believe it should have some interest in the matter.

Kissinger: It is only neglect. We stand by the statements of our predecessors. We will mention it in the next letter. Within the next two to three weeks, he will write again.

Gromyko: Good. I’ll be waiting for a reply from you. I only wanted to express our deep anxiety and to underline the huge importance of the matter—the date of the ending of the second stage and of the third stage at the highest level, and in particular the resolution of the questions of frontiers and Confidence-Building Measures and measures that pertain to it. So we will be able to come back to these questions tomorrow when I see your formulas on the peaceful change of frontiers and Confidence-Building Measures.

Kissinger: Confidence-Building Measures . . . well, yes.

Cyprus

Gromyko: Cyprus.
Kissinger: We will sell you Makarios.

\(^{10}\) See Document 130 and footnote 3 thereto.
Gromyko: At a cheap price or a high price?
Kissinger: Cheap. He is a holy man.
Gromyko: He has two offices, a holy office and civilian office.
Kissinger: That’s why he is so potent a figure. He has a deputy whose title is Your Ecstasy.

Gromyko: I can tell you this question gives considerable concern to us, and not only us. There are two reasons. First of all the question itself is acute because it concerns a situation in a very important area of the world. And this area is not far from the borders of the Soviet Union. We wouldn’t like to say here . . . this doesn’t mean the United States is less interested in peace in this area.

Secondly, we are indignant about what has been done in Cyprus, and you know our appraisal. And what has happened in Cyprus didn’t just fall from the open skies; this was done by people. We have spoken about this at length before. There was an exchange of views at Vladivostok, although comparatively briefly.

Kissinger: I remember.

Gromyko: I’ll tell you the most important thing from the point of view of today. Today, in the eyes of the whole world, a state is being torn in two parts. And why is it that this happens? It is simple: because there are some people who sympathize with such a turn of events. It is clear if there was some degree of joint, I mean coordinated actions on the part of the Soviet Union and the United States—either way, and we are obliged to do this by agreed documents—and by actions on the part of our allies and friends, the tragedy could have been avoided. And there were actions by the Security Council and we voted for it.

I know you think it is an advantage to watch from the sidelines. A mistake. A mistake. It doesn’t correspond to anyone’s interest or to peace. It is a breakup of a unified sovereign state and a violation of the rights of that people with the use of armed force.

Some time ago we supported the idea of a federal state in Cyprus and the Turks thanked us—and this could have been a solution in this particular case. So their troops then occupied part of the island and separated it. But this force is only a veneer; their intention was to have a few cantons—two or three on each side—and a Cypriot government which still exists, gave its consent to the idea. But no, the Turks split Cyprus as if with a knife. I don’t know how those who watch at developments from the sidelines—states who watch at developments from the sidelines—can see how their prestige can rise from this attitude. Of course, each state decides by itself how to look to its prestige.

We would like you and President Ford to consider the situation. Maybe we can rectify the situation by joint efforts and save Cyprus as
one state, based on a federal structure but not a pseudo-federal structure.

Kissinger: We favor a united Cyprus and said so. We said it in two statements last week, one in Washington and one by me personally. We do not recognize the new Turkish state as a state and we will deal with the legitimate government of Cyprus. On a solution, we think the Clerides–Denktash talks\textsuperscript{11} are the best method and we believe a federal state should be the outcome. We don’t have an idea of how many cantons, but I have a personal view of maybe three.

Gromyko: On each side?

Kissinger: Three or four altogether. But I wanted to wait and see how the parties and others feel. I don’t think it is a good idea to impose solutions on the parties before they’ve had a chance to negotiate. There have really been only two or three weeks of Clerides–Denktash talks before our cutoff of aid produced the present crisis.\textsuperscript{12} But don’t hold me to numbers, because we will accept whatever number the parties agree to.

Gromyko: But you have seen the outcome: the negotiations have been destroyed practically, and you don’t do anything concrete, it seems to us, to promote a single integrated state.

Kissinger: It is not an easy thing for me to talk about because we have domestic difficulties you are familiar with. We haven’t seen that the Soviet Ambassadors in various countries have been helpful.

Gromyko: In what respect?

Kissinger: I think Makarios has to be more realistic, and the Greeks have to be more realistic—not to accept Turkish plans but to be more realistic. We have the impression your Ambassadors are encouraging Makarios to be intransigent.

Gromyko: I’ll tell you the instructions we are giving to our Ambassadors. Naturally they are transmitting the view of the Soviet Government and the Soviet leadership on this question, to promote the maintenance of the integrity of Cyprus and to do everything for that purpose. Second, we are giving the instruction that the Soviet Union believes it is necessary to implement the decision of the U.N., for which we and the U.S. voted, although we know they can’t be carried out today or tomorrow or at once. This is the problem, but we and you voted for it.\textsuperscript{13} Third, we didn’t utter a single word against the talks of Denktash and Cler-

\textsuperscript{11} A reference to the periodic meetings between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash representing Greek and Turkish Cypriots, respectively.

\textsuperscript{12} President Ford announced the suspension of U.S. military aid to Turkey on February 5.

\textsuperscript{13} Gromyko is referring to UN General Assembly resolution 3212, adopted November 1, 1974.
ides, and Makarios spoke in favor of them, although we had proposals of a broad international conference, and guarantees to maintain Cyprus as an integral federal state. As I say, we are not against the Clerides–Denktash talks and no one can reproach us. And we didn’t push Makarios in any direction. We said we favored a federal system and mentioned no number of cantons. Maybe three or four is right.

Kissinger: That’s not my preference, but my estimate of what may emerge.

Gromyko: We didn’t mention any number. But two—it’s to kill the state. To kill the state, and to cover it with paper.

So how do you estimate the situation there and the line of your Government in the nearest future? Now the situation gives great concern. It will develop on its own, but then blood will be shed and there will be no solution.

Kissinger: We’ll have to review our domestic situation before we can decide what position to take.

Gromyko: Is it possible for us to exchange views, to receive information from you?

Kissinger: Yes. We think it would be better to let the communal talks continue, but we’ll have discussions with our Congress.

Gromyko: Because it’s interrupted.

Kissinger: We’ll review it this week.

China and Japan

Gromyko: How do you think the situation is developing in Asia?

Kissinger: Where?

Gromyko: Southeast Asia, the Far East, and China. How are your Chinese friends behaving?

Kissinger: On China, our impression, based on no information, is that Chou En-lai is back in control. Is that your impression?

Gromyko: I would not go so far.

Kissinger: But his supporters are.

Gromyko: Maybe. We wouldn’t go so far. Some of his backers and sympathizers are back in control but it’s not enough ground to think what it is.

Kissinger: No, because they’re so old. It is in the nature of things temporary.

Our relations have been a nuance better in tone. There have been somewhat more frequent messages. But what they want we can’t do.

Gromyko: They’re in love with you.

Kissinger: It’s not so exuberant! We’re talking about a nuance, a nuance friendlier. But they made no proposals.
Gromyko: So they’re trying to convince you on probably every alternate day that you shouldn’t go for contacts or agreements with the Soviet Union or discussion of certain questions?

Kissinger: Every week, not every day. They were very happy with the trade agreement decision.

Gromyko: [Laughs] No doubt.

Kissinger: You know, their basic concern is the Soviet Union. As you know, they say it publicly. But we’re not planning any particular move or measures with them.

Gromyko: There will be no visits?

Kissinger: The President will go there, probably at the end of the year. If he goes, maybe I’ll go before him to prepare it. But there is no specific agreement.

Gromyko: Are there any agreements between China and Japan?

Kissinger: On oil?

Gromyko: A treaty on political relations.

Kissinger: Yes, on friendship and cooperation. This is not good for either you or us.

Gromyko: Did you tell the Japanese?

Kissinger: Indirectly. But this Prime Minister has an orientation towards China.

Gromyko: Miki. It is his weak point.

Kissinger: We don’t favor it.

Gromyko: You’ll keep it for yourself?

Kissinger: No. They’re thinking of selling printed circuit electronic equipment, which helps in miniaturization. We’re trying to discourage it. This is confidential information.

Gromyko: Can it be used for missiles?

Kissinger: It can be used, but they say it is for television and electronics. This is very personal information.

Gromyko: We appreciate it.

Kissinger: They tried to get it from us but we discouraged it.

Gromyko: Trade between the United States and China is extensive?

Kissinger: It is extensive. It is almost as much as with the Soviet Union. Mostly they buy from us.

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14 Although the negotiations had begun, China and Japan did not sign a treaty of peace and friendship until August 12, 1978.
We’re not fools, Mr. Foreign Minister. It is in no one’s interest to build up a complicated war machine. For five years it’s anti-Soviet; in five to ten years it will be both anti-American and anti-Soviet.

Gromyko: Their military potential is improving. Rockets, and so on.

Kissinger: Rockets, yes. The land army we don’t think is improving.

Gromyko: Are you sure the West Europeans don’t sell to them equipment which can be used for military purposes?

Kissinger: I will check it and let you know. We’re reviewing it, and I will let you know.

Gromyko: We have reports but don’t know how reliable they are. West Germany.

Kissinger: You know Schmidt is going there.

Gromyko: We were following—I can’t say closely—the visit of Strauss. They were waving Strauss like a flag and thought the Soviet Union would be trembling.

Germany and Berlin

Kissinger: Schmidt told me—when we were speaking privately—that Soviet harassment of Berlin before these elections would certainly not help his party.

Gromyko: When did he say this?

Kissinger: Today.

Gromyko: [Angrily] did he use this word harassment?

Kissinger: There were two things. Some Soviet article that spoke of a “third citizenship” for Berlin. And some study group they’re setting up which you object to.

Gromyko: This is harassment? This is the minimum we can do if they set up such an illegal agency. And citizenship—if they say citizenship of West Berlin is part of West Germany, this is a crude violation of the agreement which says West Berlin is not a part of West Germany.

Kissinger: But they’re using West German passports.

Gromyko: A passport is a unilateral action. The only document we recognize is the document which identifies one as a resident of West Berlin. A passport of West Germany is not recognized by the Soviet

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15 During his visit to China, Franz Josef Strauss met with Mao in Beijing on January 16.

16 Kissinger met with Schmidt and Genscher in Bonn earlier on February 16. Memoranda of their conversation are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Germany, 1975. The elections for the West Berlin House of Representatives were scheduled to take place on March 2.
Union. Your people know. Our Consul, if he sees a passport of the FRG, will not take it. The lawful document is the one identifying a person as a resident of West Berlin; this is another document. Then we issue visas and recognize them.

Otherwise, these two points are points on which our opinion differs. But he’s wrong if he says it is harassment. It’s our principled position.

Kissinger: I am of the impression that he wants to have positive relations with the Soviet Union.

Gromyko: We accept this. It is our impression too.

Kissinger: If they’re willing to sign a technical agreement with you . . .

Gromyko: We agreed, when Brandt and Scheel were in power, to sign the scientific and technical agreements. Then Genscher and Schmidt say, “No, only if you agree that citizens of West Berlin are citizens of West Germany.” This we cannot do, even in 100 years. We are inclined to think that someone probably on a lower level determines in reality these questions.

Kissinger: You would be prepared to leave this question open, without saying anything? Do you object to having them covered by the treaty?

Gromyko: Which?

Kissinger: The scientific and technical treaty.

Gromyko: They have our proposals before them. If they drop their proposals on citizens, we’ll sign the agreement. We are ready. The text was prepared. Only one article was dropped, in which they wanted to say we recognized the citizens of West Berlin as citizens of West Germany.

Kissinger: May I tell Genscher I discussed this with you?

Gromyko: Certainly. It’s not a secret. I talked with Genscher on this at the UN. Maybe some jurists and officials who are guided by another conception . . .

But I can tell you we appreciate our relations with West Germany, but maybe we breathe a little bit cooler with Schmidt. I took part in conversations with Schmidt—which was fruitful. They said they adhere to the Four-Power Agreement on Berlin. They made very good statements and we appreciate it. It’s not what took place five, ten years ago, certainly not 20 years ago. The distance covered is very long. But the mechanism of relations is not smooth. Maybe oil is lacking in this mechanism.

Kissinger: Genscher is very legalistic. But Strauss would be very exciting if he became Chancellor.
Gromyko: He doesn’t cover his views.
Kissinger: I know him very well. He’s very intelligent.

Emigration

Kissinger: Can we speak five minutes about trade?
Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: What I’d like to do is to try at the right moment to get this provision reversed. I know your position on emigration; it can’t be a formal position. But at one time you spoke of your legal position and thought the number you had might be maintained. Maybe on a private basis. I don’t want to make an agreement with the Soviet Union and take it to the Senate; I want to make an agreement with the Senate and take it to the Soviet Union. I don’t want the same situation.

Gromyko: There is no figure in any form about the future.

Kissinger: It was difficult for me when you published the letter.17

Gromyko: About the past we mentioned a figure, but about the future . . . Now we have an obvious trend decreasing the number. All the way to Vnukovo airport I told you. Please take into account that what we told you about the past was just for your information. About the future, just the opposite we told you. Even now take into account that the obvious trend is decreasing.

Kissinger: Well, what do we tell . . .

Gromyko: I don’t want to mislead you. We don’t know; probably the trend will continue. I don’t know why. The reasons may be as I said.

Kissinger: Fear of war in the Middle East.

Gromyko: Fear of war in the Middle East. And secondly, they’re used to our conditions. For medical aid they don’t pay anything; for an apartment, only a symbolic payment. For an apartment, there they pay maybe 500 rubles, in Moscow, you can get a three-room apartment for 10 rubles. My daughter, in Moscow, pays maybe 12 rubles. This is difficult for them to accept. They go for sentimental national reasons—“a Jewish state, so we’ll go”—and then they come back to Vienna and ask for [return] visas. And they tell not only us but others, and it spreads and spreads, so many in the Soviet Union now know this.

The first is fear of war; the second is living conditions.

Kissinger: But our impression is that if applications were generally known to be available, applications would be generally as they were before.

17 Reference is to the October 26, 1974, letter Gromyko gave to Kissinger on their way to the Vnukovo airport, Document 75. The Soviet Union released the letter on December 18, and it was published in The New York Times the next day.
Gromyko: We can’t say this. We don’t want to mislead you. Any other reason is not a cause to give a visa or not to give a visa—the only reason is security. But what the number will be, I can’t say. Those are the two factors. Maybe another factor is fresh information.

Kissinger: We’re not talking about going up, but about the level it was—about 35,000.

Gromyko: Can the Soviet Union give a promise to advance such a proposition? We cannot; it is beyond human capacity. We cannot. What do you think—we should use force for compulsory emigration? What should we do? [He laughs] Compulsory emigration?

Of course, we determined this event in the United States . . .

Kissinger: We’d like to have Title IV abrogated, as well as the [ceiling on] credits, as a matter of principle. We realize a formal exchange of letters would be impossible. But just some informal understanding, not part of the record . . .

Gromyko: More than I said, we cannot say. I hope you understand.

Kissinger: Why don’t we stay in touch on this question? Because we’d like to go back to the spirit of the trade agreement and remove the restrictions.

Gromyko: Let me ask you: As for regular commercial credits, are there any restrictions in fact?

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: Not legally, but there is informal advice?

Kissinger: I’d recommend it be done quietly. We’d be willing to talk to some banks, if Dobrynin will give me some information about what you want. We will encourage it. Of course, it will be a commercial problem. But we will encourage it, not discourage it.

Gromyko: What is your economic situation? We follow it.

Kissinger: We believe it will stabilize in the summer and turn up in the third quarter.

Gromyko: Turn to the better?

Kissinger: Yes.

**SALT II**

Can I say one word about SALT? It’s premature for you and me to go into details—unless you have a specific problem.

Gromyko: Have you read my toasts?¹⁸

Kissinger: You added a number of provisions that are not in the Vladivostok agreement. 240 missiles on new submarines, for example.

¹⁸ Not found.
We had discarded that in Vladivostok and you reintroduced it in your agreement.

Gromyko: Yes, this was our agreement.

Kissinger: But you reintroduced it in your draft—10 new submarines or 240 missiles.19 You can keep it now, but . . .

Gromyko: What do you expect?

Kissinger: That you’ll drop it. Since Senator Jackson will hold hearings, I want to take the position with him that it can’t be renegotiated. If he sees you introducing new points, he’ll say, “Why can’t we change other things?” We’ll stick to the position that only elaborations can be done.

All the submarine limits were eliminated.

We’ll have some disagreement about cruise missiles.

The second point is we must have some criteria for how to count MIRV’d missiles. We have some detailed proposals. We will listen to your ideas. But we must have something more than declarations.

Gromyko: We thought it was a good idea to introduce drafts.

Kissinger: It was a good idea.

Gromyko: It is better than general philosophical discussions.

Kissinger: You want us to submit a draft?

Gromyko: [Laughs] I do not ask you. But we thought it good to discuss a draft.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: We think substantive questions will not arise because they are covered by the Vladivostok agreement.

Kissinger: Let’s let the negotiations go a few more weeks and see what problems arise.

Is the General Secretary still planning to come to us? We expect him.

Gromyko: [Laughs] We proceed from the understanding reached. The only question is the time.

Kissinger: We are thinking of June.

Gromyko: We are not thinking of any particular time; we leave it open. But we proceed from the understanding.

Kissinger: You want to leave it without a particular time?

Gromyko: We will decide it.

Kissinger: So, ‘till tomorrow? At 10:00.

Gromyko: If that is convenient.

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19 See footnote 2, Document 127.
Kissinger: You’d prefer 10:30?
Gromyko: 10:30. Then lunch.
Kissinger: Lunch at 1:00.
Gromyko: Then we can talk until 4:00 or 4:30.
Kissinger: All right.

[The meeting ended. The Secretary and the Minister rejoined the rest of the party in the next room for brief farewells.]

129. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, February 17, 1975, 10:15 a.m.–3 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Amb. Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of USA Division
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Member of the Collegium of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Chief of Near East Division
Amb. Sergei Vinogradov, Chief of Soviet Delegation to Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East
Vasili Makarov, Aide to Minister Gromyko
Andrei Vavilov, Interpreter
Oleg Krokhalev, Interpreter

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. Walter Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCE; Middle East

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Intercontinental Hotel. Tabs A and B are attached but not printed.
Photographers were admitted briefly and then dismissed. Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko chatted privately from 10:15 a.m. on the sofa. The meeting then convened at the table.

Kissinger: I just looked over the draft statement. I think we will come to an agreement on it. [See marked-up Soviet draft, Tab A]

Dobrynin: You didn’t accept it yet?

Kissinger: There will be minor modifications. I noticed Korniyeko managed to get “rights of Palestinians” in. We have never gone beyond “interests.”

Gromyko: It is much too short. It should be 10 to 15 pages.

Kissinger: I’m prepared to strengthen the reaffirmation of the trends of our policy.

Mr. Foreign Minister, I welcome you—I can’t say to our territory, but President Ford very much welcomes these exchanges. I want to reiterate before my colleagues what I said to you privately: We read a lot about difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations. We regret what happened in the commercial field through actions of the Congress which we opposed. We reaffirm the agreements that were reached, especially the ones that were achieved in 1972 and 1973. We want to build on them and, to use the word of your leadership, to make them irreversible.

Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe

Kissinger: We believe we made progress last night. We are prepared to speed up the work of the European Security Conference and already gave instruction to our Ambassador to stay in close touch, and who will today meet with your people.

I know we will start with the Middle East, but I wanted to make these few points.

Gromyko: I have listened with interest to your remarks and would like to say the following: With regard to the general trend of our relations, I would like to say on behalf of the Soviet leadership that we reaffirm the trend of U.S.-Soviet relations and will continue to pursue this course. And this is why I note with satisfaction that you have the same opinion.

We should look into the future and we should exert efforts to find on the basis of cooperation a resolution of outstanding problems. Some of these problems pertain to the situation in Europe and the European Security Conference. I agree our exchange yesterday was beneficial, but we should bring the exchange to a final end. All questions pertaining to normalization of the European Security Conference should be finalized. I believe it would be good to have another look at these formulas. After lunch.

I believe now we can pass over to the problem of the Middle East. It is one of the easiest. [Laughter]
Kissinger: Well, we’ve both taken trips to the Middle East, and perhaps we should inform each other of these trips.\textsuperscript{2}

Gromyko: I read in your eyes a message that you would like to make a statement. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I believe we should do it in the sequence of trips. [Laughter]

Gromyko: It is accepted. We will follow the same pattern. It is up to you.

Kissinger: To bring each other up to date on the sequence. Perhaps you will give your impression.

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: Whenever we bring Bunker you know we’re getting very serious.

Gromyko: I would like to start by saying we attach great importance to this problem, as before it was taken up by General Secretary Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev in the United States; there was an exchange on the subject in San Clemente and in Moscow and in Vladivostok.

As regards the general situation in the area, we believe the situation is fraught with grave dangers. It is true that guns are not firing and tanks are not firing now, but the situation is such that anything can happen. We continue to believe the main reason for this situation is the occupation by Israel of the Arab territories.

I would like to say our position at this stage we can formulate in the following way. There are three main considerations:

—First, the full liberation of Arab territories from Israeli occupation.
—Second, the maintenance of the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine, up to the creation of an independent state formation.
—Third, guaranteeing to the fullest possible extent of the rights of each state in the area, including Israel, to independent existence and development.

And all these three provisions are parts of a unified whole. And without a settlement of any of those parts, there can never be a real settlement of the Middle East problem as a whole. There is much being said in the press, and not only in the press—perhaps you are better aware of that—on partial steps in the Middle East, for example, disengagement of forces. You know our attitude to this approach. We do not find it effective.

\textsuperscript{2} Gromyko traveled in the Middle East February 1–5; Kissinger February 10–15.
Kissinger [to Sisco]: Sisco, you’ve been making statements again? [Laughter] [to Gromyko]: The Foreign Minister does not approve of this?

Gromyko: We do not know exactly what are these plans or projects—perhaps you are better aware—but our attitude to them is negative. We think it is a method of using sleeping pills and cannot be effective.

Now, regarding the conduct of these affairs, we are against separate actions by a country or group of countries in this affair. Time and again we underline the existence of joint interests of the Soviet Union and the United States in this matter. We think the most effective efforts are joint efforts—and we underline “joint efforts.” Not that we meet once or twice a year and have a good talk; even if it is a good talk, joint efforts should not be reduced to this.

We don’t see why such common actions should harm the United States. Can we imagine a situation where we act jointly and promote a final agreement and a final agreement will harm the United States? Nobody will take a decision through voting. We think no country, including the United States, has anything to fear from this. Frankly, we are at a loss and can’t understand the position of the United States government and cannot align it with the position of the Soviet Union and other countries.

This leads us to the question of the Geneva Conference. What is the Geneva Conference? Of course, it is not some icon in front of which one should pray; it’s a method of negotiation. Otherwise, in violation of what was agreed upon, everyone will act in different directions.

I don’t think by participating in the Geneva Conference harm could be produced for Israel or the United States. Every participant could move proposals he thinks are viable; it could be proposals which are broad or narrow or all-embracing—whatever one thinks are viable. It is a forum for international negotiations and no one could be harmed from such a procedure. And it would be consistent with the common line of U.S.-Soviet relations.

During our trips to the Middle East—and this was mentioned in statements by leaders of the Soviet Union and personally by Leonid Il’ich Brezhnev—we underlined that one of the main principles should be a guarantee of the right of independent existence of all states in the area, including Israel. Israel is aware of this and we believe there is no country which pursues this principle more than we do. We supported this principle outside of the Conference in other forums and will support it in the Conference when it resumes. In Egypt and Syria I spoke about this principle quite openly, everyplace, on behalf of the Soviet Union.
Do you think that when we travel in the Middle East we don’t do anything except place mines everywhere and undermine proposals for partial and first steps to a settlement? No, we are trying to place everything in its place. We think every step should be part of the whole. It should not be a sleeping pill; it should be part of an effort for a stable settlement in the Middle East. And if you go to Egypt and Syria, you can ask them. I have said we are ready to discuss any proposal, whether a narrow or broad proposal. We are ready to discuss with Egypt, Syria, Jordan—but at a table. We place no taboo on this.

Kissinger [to Sisco]: We will let him handle the Israelis.

Gromyko: So we would like that what has been agreed in theory and proclaimed several times at summits should be practically implemented. Unfortunately it has not been carried out.

Kissinger: What agreement?

Gromyko: Understandings about common efforts. This affects us and creates a certain imprint on the relations between our two countries, in relation to the importance of the Middle East problem and maybe more. It is difficult to localize and have a clear idea of this harm—whether it is 15–20%, it’s hard to say—but it radiates in many directions and produces an imprint on them. There can be no harm to the interests of the United States—not one iota. This can be excluded.

This is our impression of the Middle East.

Kissinger: Thank you, Mr. Foreign Minister. I’ll reply in one minute. But I understand you stayed in the same house in Damascus which I stayed in. I just wanted to know if that minaret is still going at 4 o’clock.

Gromyko: Certainly. I was enthusiastic to hear it!

Kissinger: Because I usually go to bed at 2:00 a.m. there, and I wondered.

Gromyko: They say it is a record.

Korniyenko: It’s at 5:00 a.m. now.

Kissinger: In the summer it was 4:30. Of course, your religious feeling may be more highly developed than mine. [Laughter]

Let me speak frankly about what our concerns are in the Middle East.

I want to congratulate your associate here [Sytenko] for giving such an illuminating presentation to our Ambassador.³ It was a masterpiece of diplomatic evasion.

³ Stoessel reported on his meeting with Sytenko on February 12 in telegram 1964 from Moscow of the same date. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
Let me give you our understanding. I’ve noticed statements made in recent days about sleeping pills or soporifics. I wonder who they could be talking about.

I must make clear our position. First, regarding the allegation that we are violating an agreement. What was our understanding? That we would bring together the Arabs and the Israelis, not that we would refuse to talk to either side if they asked us. The record will show that we have taken no initiative without, and everything has been done at the request of the parties.

The Foreign Minister says Soviet actions were not directed against the United States. Why should they be? Similarly, U.S. actions are not directed against the Soviet Union. Why should they be? Experience shows that gratitude for services rendered in the Middle East provides no motive for action in the future. We have no illusion about countries who have switched from side to side in the Middle East, that they will not continue to do so again. And it is not our intention. We have no intention to try to achieve a dominant position in the area, nor could we.

We recognize that every partial step is partial and no partial step could be a final one. Each partial one brings a more difficult problem. By definition it’s partial. No party can declare a partial step final. Nor do we have the intention of using a partial step as a substitute for a final one.

Nor is there any danger of anyone in the area falling asleep. The danger is the opposite one—that they’ll keep us all awake! On the airplane I was asked what was my dominant impression of my trip—I said that after I leave my job I’ll be qualified to run a lunatic asylum.

Regarding U.S.-Soviet relations, we have no desire to retain a permanent position—nor would any temporary visibility have any permanent effect. So this isn’t the issue. If the Foreign Minister would like to spend several days with the Israeli Cabinet and try to persuade them to withdraw from territory, I’ll gladly cede this to him. It’s no blessing.

What is the American position? The American position is to act in a manner consistent with the rights and interests of all states in the area. Second, the situation is so complicated that unless it is approached through whatever is achievable at any time, it will lead to another deadlock. And any deadlock will lead to a war, and history has demonstrated that any war in the Middle East has consequences for relations between the United States and the Soviet Union and regardless of the intentions of either side can lead to situations of confrontation.

So we would like to move carefully enough for our domestic requirements. If you look at the record, I am sure you cannot cite one instance where United States action did not result from the initiative of the parties.
Frankly, certain recent Soviet statements do concern us. What is the result of statements about “sleeping pills” and “certain individuals traveling about the Middle East”? First, it hurts the feelings of the French Foreign Minister\(^4\) who’s just been traveling.

Gromyko: Prove it, what individuals are referred to.

Kissinger: That’s why I said it. The French Foreign Minister is very sensitive.

Gromyko: We did not call anybody a villain.

Kissinger: You just shoot a few across the bow. The next one will hit!

But the objective consequence of the statements is to prevent what can be done. For what benefit? If it succeeds, there are benefits for the peoples concerned; if it doesn’t succeed, it creates a bad feeling between whoever is mentioned and the Soviet leaders. And it is unnecessary. We recognize that the Soviet Union must participate in any final settlement. But we have never been given by the Soviet Union any proposal to ease the steps along the way. All we hear is Geneva. There are many in the United States who agree. Why? Because they want a stalemate. Many Jewish groups in America would like a stalemate. And a stalemate will create a war. What will be the first issue on the agenda? The PLO. What issue is Israel least able to deal with now? The PLO. Jordan won’t come. So we have Egypt, Syria and the PLO as candidates.

There is no particular interest of the United States to proceed alone and exclude the Soviet Union. And we believe it is even in the Soviet interest to help defuse the situation. If the Soviet statements are taken seriously and have their effect, Geneva will meet in a crisis atmosphere, with a high danger of explosion. That cannot be in the American or Soviet interest.

Many statements of the Foreign Minister we agree with. But the Soviet side has never made one concrete proposal to help something be achieved. This is our dilemma. I am speaking frankly. This is what happens when you make statements about sleeping pills.

Gromyko: I did not understand your statement that we have not been proposing any concrete proposals. I just said that in talks with your participation or our participation, any proposal could be proposed—broad or narrow. If you have any such proposal, make it, and we are prepared to cooperate. What kind of proposals? We are also free to move proposals; we have said we are prepared to sit at the table and discuss. You said the Soviet Union was not giving any proposals.

Kissinger: I said the three points of the Foreign Minister— with which in principle we do not disagree; well, on the Palestinian point, it

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\(^4\) Jean Sauvagnargues.
requires some consideration—nevertheless are not attainable in one nego-
tiation right now. And the endless repetition of them only defines a
deadlock, and does not define progress.

Gromyko: It’s our policy.

Kissinger: I don’t object to the policy. The Soviet Union has every
right to have a policy. As a policy, it is not one which presents un-
bridgeable difficulties with the United States. But to insist on imme-
diate implementation of those three principles is to lead to difficulties.

Gromyko: This is the policy of the Soviet Union, but we’re willing
to consider any proposal which you’re free to submit, or Egypt or Syria.

Kissinger: As you know—as I assume you know; we have urged
every country in the area to keep you informed—at any rate, you know
we don’t make any proposals. We don’t come in with American plans.
We go to Israel to use our special influence to see what can be achieved,
and we go to the Arabs to see if it can be reconciled. Always recog-
nizing that partial steps won’t solve it and will only bring nearer the
date when a final settlement will be necessary.

Gromyko: We are not aware of what you’re discussing in the
Middle East. Perhaps certain variants are being discussed, maybe the
essence of certain narrow partial solutions. If these proposals can be
discussed between the participants, why can they not be discussed
with the participation of other nations of the Geneva Conference?
Perhaps it can be discussed at the negotiating table. We would not like
to shut anyone’s mouth; everyone is free to move proposals—you, the
Egyptians, Jordan, Syria. If you don’t, perhaps others do. Every country
can move a proposal in the appropriate forum.

Kissinger: There are two questions—the forum and the content.
On the forum, our concern is to achieve progress and reserve the gen-
eral issues for the general forum. Given the complexity of the problem
and of the domestic situations in various countries, the question is what
is the most efficient. Our concern is to proceed in the most efficient
way. And we fail to see why the Soviet Union is hurt by any progress in
the Middle East. Why should it hurt the Soviet interests? We certainly
aren’t going to sell arms to Syria.

Gromyko: If you assume and recognize our interests in main-
taining peace in the area, you can’t say it doesn’t hurt the Soviet Union,
because without the Soviet Union separate negotiations are being held.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, you took a trip and I took a trip;
that does not constitute a separate negotiation. At this stage, as far as
my trip is concerned, its basic point was to convince the Israelis that
some step had to be made. That is a step which unfortunately can only
be taken by the United States, and that is a step we would gladly cede
to the Soviet Union. No decision has been taken yet for moving. So we
are at the stage that was quite preliminary, not yet a partial step. It seems to us that another step in the area would have a calming effect on a Conference. If the Conference meets in a crisis, everyone will pay for it. If it meets after there has been progress, there will be time for further considerations as the Foreign Minister pointed out.

Gromyko: You see the role of the Geneva Conference as some sort of front, a parade function, as a final stage once the job is done. But we see it as having a function at every stage. Why do you give the Geneva Conference the role of a front? We didn’t agree on this before; it was meant to be a forum for settlement. So we understand you are pursuing the line of separate negotiations and separate deals and you are against a solution by the participation of all sides including the Soviet Union. And I’d like to say again we deplore this deeply.

Kissinger: First, the Foreign Minister’s characterization is incorrect; therefore he deplores prematurely.

Gromyko: If it is prematurely, tell me why this is so.

Kissinger: It is premature because it is in no sense our intention to transform Geneva into a front organization. Second, it’s in no sense our intention to use Geneva only to ratify a final settlement. I think every Marxist knows that at some point quantitative changes turn into qualitative changes.

Gromyko: It is one of the laws of dialectics.

Kissinger: Qualitative changes will have to be achieved at the Conference. And it’s my judgment anyway that we are coming to the end of the possibilities of partial steps. And if the next partial step should succeed, the next phase must be a discussion of a final settlement. I have said so publicly. So there is no possibility of excluding the Soviet Union from what will be the major part of the settlement.

So why have we placed emphasis on the partial? As your Ambassador can testify, my domestic situation can be eased immediately by abandoning partial steps. Most of the opposition comes from certain religious groups who don’t want to see Israel withdrawing. We won’t have any lasting benefits. Experience shows the countries will shift back and forth. We wanted to get people used to the process of negotiating to get Israel used to the process of withdrawing. All of this will be seen to be in the common interest.

So it is incorrect we want a soporific that will stop progress. Second, it is incorrect that we want to exclude the Soviet Union. Third, even the next partial step will still leave four-fifths of the job to be done. Wherever the line is in the Sinai, two-thirds of it will still be in Israeli hands; wherever the line is in the Golan, three-fourths of it will still be in Israeli hands. And the issue of the Palestinians has not even been considered. So my judgment is that we’ve come to the end of the partial
steps even if this partial step succeeds. But we feel another partial step will ease the atmosphere for a general one. And we have never supported any Israeli position that puts a terminal date on progress. And if the Israeli Defense Minister\(^5\) wants to go to Geneva, as he has said, it certainly isn’t to make progress.

Gromyko: Now we have a clearer view than before that the United States is against convocation of the Geneva Conference and consideration by this Conference of all the questions of the Middle East with the participation of the Soviet Union.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, you know this isn’t true.

Gromyko: Syria has given its agreement to the immediate convocation of the Conference; Egypt has given its agreement to the immediate convocation of the Geneva Conference. Jordan will go and the Palestinians will go. You know the Soviet Union’s position. So we have to say the United States, for reasons that are not quite clear to us, is against consideration by the Conference with the participation of the Soviet Union of all the questions of the Middle East. Maybe you didn’t like the word “parade” or “front”. Perhaps the word “formal” is better, but this word doesn’t change the situation at all.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, you know very well I’ve said just the opposite of what you’ve described. I have enough trouble defending the positions I do take. I have not said that we oppose the Geneva Conference. I have said we favor the Geneva Conference. I have said these issues make up 85% of all the issues in the Middle East. Perhaps the United States has contributed disproportionately to the solution of 15%, but all of them are consistent with your three principles and therefore are not contrary to any Soviet interest. If another 5% is now done, I have said we favor a discussion at the Geneva Conference; I have said we consider it a serious matter. If it leads to stalemate and confrontation, this cannot be in the interests of the Soviet Union and the United States.

Incidentally, our information is that Jordan is not willing to go to Geneva; the Palestinians may be willing to go but they are not ready to recognize the existence of Israel. While Israel’s readiness to make concessions is unlimited, they are not willing to negotiate about their existence. I’m being sarcastic when I say the Israeli willingness to make concessions is unlimited—I just want Moscow to know when it reads the record.

It is not true that we’re not ready to convene the Geneva Conference.

\(^5\) Shimon Peres.
Gromyko: What is the basis for your saying all questions of the Middle East settlement should be split? On one side there are the narrow and partial questions to be settled outside the framework of Geneva and without the participation of the Soviet Union. And the other questions are for Geneva. Who split these issues?

Kissinger: We didn’t do it. The parties did it.

Gromyko: No, because Syria and Egypt both said they favor the immediate reconvention of Geneva. The United States is opposing it.

Kissinger: The precision of Arab Foreign Ministers is not their most apparent characteristic. You think I went to Cairo and was faced with a President and Foreign Minister who pleaded and begged to go to Geneva and I said no? You really think this happened?

Gromyko: They favor it.

Kissinger: I thought I saw a statement by the Egyptian Foreign Minister—who goes to Moscow more than to Washington—that Geneva will be—what?—June. In a Beirut newspaper.

Gromyko: We have a joint official document: the Soviet-Syrian statement. And an Egyptian document. We don’t know if they said any statement contrary to this later.

Kissinger: Why do you suppose, then, that they invited me to come and talk with them?

Gromyko: I don’t know; you didn’t inform us.

Kissinger: We gave you more advance notice than you gave about your trip.

Gromyko: We agreed with the Syrians to publish the announcement the next day and the Syrians went ahead the same day. That’s a fact. My telegram was ready to go to Washington.

Kissinger: We’re not complaining. Why should I be the only one to talk to the Syrians? It’s a pleasure I could share.

Gromyko: But you out-talk us! You’ve been there 18 times; I have been there only three times.

Kissinger: But you stay longer. We stay only a few hours, because of the minaret. And you stay overnight. I have two objectives—one, to avoid sleeping there, and the second is to avoid eating a meal there. [Laughter]

Gromyko: The Syrians violated the understanding and went ahead and announced it right away.

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6 Ismail Fahmy.
7 See footnote 9, Document 127.
Kissinger: We’re not complaining. The privilege of sitting in a room with green velvet curtains from which you can’t see outside is one I would share.

I did not debate with any of my Arab colleagues on the Geneva Conference. We discussed only their view of the next steps. If it fails, we’ll sustain a stalemate anywhere.

Gromyko: Could you touch upon the substance of your discussion with Egypt, Israel and Syria?

Kissinger: Yes. Could I take a five-minute break?

Gromyko: Yes.

[There was a break from 12:24 to 12:30 p.m. The meeting then resumed.]

Kissinger: For us, the best time for a communiqué is 7:30 London time, so we can give it to our press on the plane at 8:30 here.

Gromyko: We should avoid separate actions. [Laughter]

Kissinger: We agree completely.

As to where we stand in the Middle East, it’s not in our interest to operate behind your back. But we will sum up our position, so that if you deplore it you’ll deplore it precisely.

Gromyko: Did I say “deplore?” [The Russians argue about the translation and debate whether Gromyko said “deplore” or “regret.”]

Kissinger: “Regret” expresses sorrow; “deplore” expresses moral condemnation.

Gromyko: I said “regret.” [k sozhaleniyu]

Dobrynin: In this context, there is no difference. [Laughter]

Korniyenko: You may combine it and say “reglore.”

Kissinger: Let me sum up, because I don’t think there is such difference in our positions. First, in fairness to the Arabs, we didn’t discuss your communiqué. We didn’t criticize it or discuss it. We discussed their view—and came at their request—that if there was another step it would improve the atmosphere for the Conference. This was their view, including the Syrians.

We agree the Conference should be convened to consider all the issues. The only difference is our belief that another partial step would be desirable. But it is a question of only six weeks, not three months.

Third, we are prepared to keep you fully informed. If you wish, I would be prepared to meet you again before I go into the Middle East, or during, if you would like.

Therefore, the general principles you advanced we don’t quarrel with.

Now where do we stand on that partial step? My analysis—and we’ve told the Arabs the same thing—is we think it’s extremely impor-
tant to keep some momentum going, in order to prevent a situation again as in '73 when the General Secretary was right and we were wrong, in which there developed such frustration and despair in the area that the war arose. Incidentally, I don’t subscribe to the view in America that you contributed to the war.

The Israeli Cabinet is extremely divided, as you can read. An additional difficulty is that any concrete proposal immediately gets into the papers. Washington is a haven of secrecy compared to Jerusalem. So they have developed an effective defense mechanism so that we’re afraid to offer a proposal. So I spent my time trying to convince them that another step is necessary and also told them that after the next partial step we go to Geneva.

Gromyko: Afterwards.

Kissinger: My view is if the next step is done, implementing steps can be done in Geneva, and everything else can be done at Geneva.

Gromyko: Implementing steps?

Kissinger: Let me explain. The Israelis—practically everything they’ve demanded they’ve stated publicly. They demand the end of belligerency. We believe it’s not possible for an Arab leader in honor to agree to an end of belligerency while Israel occupies his territory. But still there should be a quid pro quo because otherwise it is insupportable in the Israeli domestic situation—and in our domestic situation. We don’t want other Congressional resolutions preventing what we’ve negotiated. One reason I’m going home is to begin to organize our domestic situation so further progress is possible.

I have said to Asad and Sadat that the United States has no interest to split the Arab world or to stop the process. We are doing it to give momentum to the process. What we do for one side we are prepared to do for the other side.

In both places our talks were largely conceptual. There were no details or maps. But concretely what the Egyptians feel they must have is the oil fields and at least a substantial part of the passes. What the Syrians will settle for is Jordan and Israel. Seriously, what the Syrians say they want is impossible. They want the Israelis off the Golan, as a partial step.

Gromyko: What is the final?

Kissinger: That is a good question.

Gromyko: All the Arab territories.

Kissinger: The Israeli basic position is that if they really make peace, they could have an Israeli Ambassador in Damascus. The Syrians said even if they made peace, they would prefer to have the same relationship as they had with us between ’67 and ’73—no Ambas-
sador! But I think it’s as you say: They want all the Arab territories returned.

Gromyko: I don’t think they want Israel to be sunk into the sea.
Kissinger: But they won’t prevent it if it sinks by itself!

I pointed out to the Syrian Government that if they want that much, they must think of some quid pro quo. My experience is that the Syrians do not begin a negotiation with their minimum position. For a partial step, maybe they will settle for less. For a final settlement, I believe it is a principled position and they won’t settle for less than ’67.

As for content . . .

Gromyko: What do you mean by an agreement made? An agreement in principle? Or worked out?

Kissinger: Suppose there were an agreement that said—let me give it in the Egyptian case—

Gromyko: I raise it—what is the role of the Conference? It’s the same problem; you want to make it a parade.
Kissinger: I’m answering it.
Gromyko: Where do you see the borderline?
Kissinger: I’ve also said we’re talking about the last partial step.
Dobrynin: Supposing . . .

Kissinger: Supposing Israel said, “We’re willing to give up the oil fields in this and this manner, and sign this document.” Then there will have to be implementation, because it’s of great complexity.

Gromyko: What do you mean implementation?
Kissinger: To work out the details of the agreement.
Gromyko: I don’t think we would be present at the Conference to sign this.

Kissinger: I’m just telling you our judgment. You don’t have to attend. You have a perfect right to prevent anything and to bring a stalemate. We have lived with a stalemate before. It will make us very popular in America—particularly if we can blame you.

I’ve told you what we were doing. I’ve told you we see it as the last partial step. I’ve told you it’s moving in the direction of your principles. If it’s blocked, I have plenty of other subjects to occupy myself with.

Gromyko: I’d like to ask what is your impression? Are Syria and Egypt determined to go together in this question of considering partial steps, or do you assume the possibility of a partial agreement with Egypt which would be separate from an agreement with Syria?

Kissinger: I assume such a possibility. Having experience with the Syrians, I also know their negotiating tactics tend to be more prolonged than the Egyptians.
Gromyko: Can you tell us now your position on the Palestinian issue? I assume you are aware of our position. We like to say this position remains the same as we’ve explained to you. On the question of the main rights of the Palestinian Arab people, we today had something to say, and on Geneva, we support the participation of the Palestinians in Geneva from the very beginning.

Kissinger: In the spirit of our warm conversation I can tell you that the United States will not prevent a partial settlement between the Palestinians and Israel.

Gromyko: We accept this remark as a joke, but speaking more seriously, what is your attitude in principle regarding the Geneva Conference? We would like to know your present view. The Palestinians debate this matter themselves, and the Arabs discuss. It seems to us their discussion is proceeding in a positive direction.

Kissinger: Positive towards participating?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: But what will they propose when they participate?

Gromyko: I would like to know your own position. We think they should participate from the beginning. And the Arabs likewise.

Kissinger: Let me give you my psychoanalysis of the Israeli Defense Minister and the Jewish groups in America. They think that when Geneva convenes you will propose the immediate participation of the PLO, and they will therefore be able to combine the Jackson line—the anti-Soviet line—and the anti-terrorist line.

Gromyko: You think we should abandon a principled stand?

Kissinger: I’m telling you what their reasoning is. It requires an evolution, and it is not ripe on our side. My view is we should defer the resolution of that question to a later stage. We can discuss it at an early stage. That’s my view. But we can live with a stalemate.

Gromyko: What stage would it be?

Kissinger: I’ve not thought it through. But they have to state some goals vis-à-vis Israel that will make it possible. The position Arafat took in New York was not conducive to this.

Gromyko: You really think the view of their leadership is against recognition?

Kissinger: My personal view—not an official view—is that they are moving toward a more moderate position and are divided, and can’t make a formal statement.

Gromyko: You’re right.

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8 Arafat addressed the UN General Assembly on November 13, 1974.
Kissinger: But then we have to consider how it will be presented in America. I personally didn’t think Arafat’s statement was that extreme—but from the point of view of the propaganda that can be made, it was extreme enough.

Sisco: The two key points are the giving up of their policy of terrorism, and second, explicit recognition of the right of Israel to exist, which is, as a matter of fact, Soviet policy since the creation of the state.

Gromyko: I can explain my views.

Kissinger: You know them [the Palestinians] much better than we do.

Gromyko: Our position is . . . I talked with Arafat five times.


Gromyko: That is not his fault. I talked with him three times last year and twice this year. My conviction—not only personally—is I think that he—and that means the majority trend—is definitely in favor of the rights of Israel. You’re right, they are divided. There are extremist groups, but the trend is in favor. The trend that determines it is in favor. If there is nothing in the future course of developments which would nourish these extremes.

Kissinger: In the context of Geneva, I recognize that you and the Syrians and the Egyptians have to demand the participation of the Palestinians. I recognize you have to. Incidentally, I don’t think the Jordanians will come, after talking with them.

Gromyko: Why not?

Kissinger: It’s the Rabat decision. They have nothing to get back.

Gromyko: For Arab solidarity they could go.

Kissinger: Then why not Iraq?

Gromyko: They are not directly involved.

Kissinger: And I’ve always wanted to meet Qaddafi. We will do nothing to discourage them. We’ll even send a joint invitation to them. We won’t discourage them.

Gromyko: The answer to my question of what stage . . .

Kissinger: Rather than let the whole Conference be hung up for months on that issue, we would then defer consideration for some months until we have a conclusion on frontiers. Because the question of the PLO won’t arise practically until there is a question of the authority on the West Bank.

Gromyko: It will arise.

Kissinger: It will unavoidably arise.

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9 See footnote 9, Document 86.
We’re not asking the Soviet Union not to introduce it. We think that, after the initial resolutions are introduced, there might be some merit in deferring it.

Gromyko: Our position is in favor of their participation from the beginning. To irritate them on the question of participation is to nourish the extreme groups. Why do this? If Egypt and Syria, and maybe Israel and the US—if they don’t take a position different from you . . .

Kissinger: You should meet the Israeli Cabinet!

Gromyko: We’ve always said we were for the strongest guarantee possible for the existence of all states in the area. If they join the Conference, it presupposes they’ll take this position.

Kissinger: What exactly is the “strongest guarantee”?

We did that in Vietnam, and haven’t even received a reply. We wrote to thirteen countries [of the International Conference] and only five have replied.

Gromyko: That’s very different. It’s a different matter, about which opinions divide.

Kissinger: Where? In Russia?

Gromyko: On both sides, North Vietnam and South Vietnam.

The guarantee can be by the US and Soviet Union, or the US and Soviet Union plus the Security Council. If there are other possibilities, we are open.

Kissinger: If one visualizes the situation after a settlement, the danger is not likely to be Arab armies across the border, but the fedayeen across the border. Given how the Security Council has operated in the past . . .

Gromyko: After a settlement?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: You exclude the possibility of having a provision on this matter?

Kissinger: That’s an interesting point.

Gromyko: When I spoke with Nasser, he said that for Egypt it was not a problem.

Kissinger: But for the Palestinians it may be a problem.

Gromyko: But if it’s a complete solution and the Palestinian national aspirations are fulfilled, they won’t happen.

Kissinger: Suppose they happen anyway?

Gromyko: You’re talking about provocations from thousands of miles away. Remember the Japanese came to Israel and shot several people and killed some and wounded many.
Kissinger: They will kill every one of us yet.
Gromyko: They were not friends of the Arabs.
Kissinger: The problem of guarantees has two aspects—we should think about it. One is the sort of political endorsement you indicated, to give political and legal status to a settlement. The second conception of guarantees is who protects the parties against a violation? How do we discourage those who would violate it?
Gromyko: Perhaps a detailed agreement could be worked out to cover this.
Kissinger: When Dobrynin comes back, could he and Sisco have a discussion of how guarantees could be worked out?
Gromyko: Good.
Kissinger: And I will participate, in our luncheons.
Gromyko: Good.
Kissinger: It might help when Geneva convenes.
And I want to make clear it’s a guarantee of a final settlement.
Gromyko: Yes.
Kissinger: Not of the status quo. I just want to make sure it’s clear.
Why don’t we go to my room for a drink while they set up for lunch?

[At 1:15 the group breaks up. Dr. Kissinger and Minister Gromyko sit down again and discuss a new formula for the “peaceful change” provision for CSCE. Then everyone leaves the room and proceeds down the corridor to the Secretary’s suite for drinks. There was intermittent discussion of the CSCE formulas and the final communiqué. At 2:00 p.m., the party returned to the meeting room for luncheon. Excerpts from the conversation follow.]

Gromyko: I just learned that three documents were signed in Moscow with the British.10 There was a short joint statement, then the document we mentioned yesterday about nonproliferation; and the statement on consultations.
Kissinger: What did the statement on consultations say?
Gromyko: It was like the Soviet-Canadian.
Kissinger: On preventing nuclear war? [Laughter]
Gromyko: On questions of mutual concern.
Kissinger: One Arab Foreign Minister said to me, “We know you are lying to us.” I said, “How do you know that?” He said, “We compared the letter you wrote to us with the letter you wrote to all the other

\[10\] See footnote 2, Document 128.
Arabs. It was identical. So we know you couldn’t be telling the truth.” [Laughter]

In Saudi Arabia, Saqqaf once told me it was the best meeting with the King. I said I thought the opposite. He said, “He told you he would lift the oil embargo.” I said he told me the opposite. He said, “That is proof! He couldn’t tell you because he didn’t want you to leak it.” [Laughter]

Gromyko: I knew the Saudi King when he was a prince. I met him in 1946, I think it was.

Kissinger: Did he talk to you?

Gromyko: Yes. I met him at the first General Assembly.

Kissinger: When did he discover that your foreign policy comes from Jerusalem? He said it to me again—there is a combination of Zionists and Communists.

Sisco: And who wants Geneva? “It is certain that it’s the Israelis and Soviets,” he said.

Kissinger: That’s right.

He has a huge reception hall, almost as big as St. George’s. The first time I came, 150 princes were there.

Dobrynin: All his sons?

Kissinger: Many of them. He takes a half step forward; then I had to take 99 steps. We moved through the whole hall.

He gave me his 45-minute speech about how the Jews first took over Russia, then sent them to Israel, and are now taking over key positions everywhere else. I figured I better change the subject. [Laughter] So I spotted a picture on the opposite wall. I forgot that for Moslems it’s forbidden to use pictures for a decoration. I asked him, “Is that the Arabian Desert?” He said, “It’s the holy oasis”—and he sat morosely for the rest of the meal. It’s like asking a devout Catholic if the picture of the Virgin Mary is a picture of his maiden aunt. [Laughter] That’s why the oil embargo stayed on.

May I at this informal occasion say that these meetings are always important. These meetings between the Soviet Union and the United States are of extreme importance. On our side, we on our side will never forget that these relations are a central aspect of our foreign policy.

This meeting has been positive. We are now in a position to move forward in all areas, including the Middle East.

Gromyko: You know better.

Kissinger: That is why I say it. So I would like to propose a toast to the friendship between the Soviet Union and the United States. [All toast.]
Gromyko: If speeches are to be delivered, then two will be delivered. It is good that we have met and explained to one another on a number of questions. I agree that on a number of questions on which we had an exchange of views, our positions to a large extent coincide. It would be a good thing if on those questions on which there are differences, these differences would narrow. We believe objectively it is possible if the two sides work in this direction. It is possible if the United States and the Soviet Union are guided by supreme interests on which there are appropriate understandings and agreements and which have been put forward in the appropriate Soviet-American documents.

I would like to conclude by saying that the position of the Soviet Union and of the Soviet leadership is absolutely firm, and it is the following: that the Soviet Union will continue to follow the course which was clearly formulated and defined by the Soviet Union and the United States as a result of the efforts of both sides. It is found in many documents, particularly those which were adopted at the highest level, in particular in a speech of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev at the reception in honor of British Prime Minister Wilson.\textsuperscript{11}

Kissinger: That is one I am mentioned in.
Stoessel: There are many aspects to that one!
Gromyko: To the Secretary of State, and—I can’t say guests—but hosts. [He raises his glass and all toast.]
Kissinger: My father keeps a scrapbook. If there is an unfavorable article, he gives a columnist two chances and then banishes him from the book.
Rodman: The book is shrinking.
Kissinger: What would you say to the press?
Gromyko: On the plane, I have to say something to the press. On [the visit of] Brezhnev, I will say an understanding exists and not go beyond that statement.
On the Middle East, I would like to say our views on the Geneva Conference are converging, which is in fact the case.
On background, on the plane.
When we go down to your car, we can say a few friendly words.
Gromyko: All right. Do we have time?
Kissinger: We can talk some more.
[The Foreign Minister is handed a draft of the communique.]
Gromyko: There are two amendments.

\textsuperscript{11} See footnote 9, Document 128.
One, “they assume the results [of CSCE] permit”—we don’t need “will permit.” Second, on Cyprus, it should be “the only legitimate government.”

Kissinger: I accept to drop “will.” But “only legitimate government”—we don’t need it. “Only” is a provocative word for us.

[The final text of the joint communiqué is at Tab B.]12

[The meeting ended at 3:00 p.m. Secretary Kissinger and Minister Gromyko went to the Secretary’s suite to confer privately for another hour.]13

12 For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 10, 1975, pp. 291–292.
13 See Document 130.

130. Memorandum of Conversation1

Geneva, February 17, 1975, 3:07–3:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Andrei Vavilov, Interpreter
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

CSCE; Cyprus; Middle East; Economic and Energy Consultations; Europe; MBFR

CSCE

Gromyko: I would like to summarize some things, and on what questions we would be awaiting your considerations or replies. Questions that have been opened.

First, the question of Confidence-Building Measures. You promised you would give a certain formulation.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s suite at the Intercontinental Hotel.
Kissinger: I told Hartman to meet with Kovalev this afternoon and see if you can work it out.²

Gromyko: You promised to give formulations and to consult with allies. When you are ready, you can use the appropriate channel. When can we expect them?
Kissinger: After I talk to Hartman. Within the next two weeks.
Gromyko: Fine. Then you understand the sooner the better.
The second question is peaceful change of frontiers. You said you would be talking with Schmidt. But you are going to Paris, not Bonn.
Kissinger: I will write to him.
Let me sum up: You are prepared to put the phrase either in the section on sovereignty or on inviolability of frontiers.
Gromyko: We will consider it. When approximately can you do this?
Kissinger: Within ten days. I hope. It will give the Germans a sense that they accomplished something.
Gromyko: This question is not agreed on at all, and we want a definite answer and we will consider it. If some frictions remain, we will go back to our previous position.
Kissinger: I understand.
Gromyko: With respect to the date of the ending of the European Security Conference, I have put forward our views on the dates but I expressed a negative attitude on June and July. You promised to consult and reply next Monday.³
Kissinger: By the end of next Monday.
Gromyko: The third question is the question of correlation of principles. You promised to think it over and express your views to us.

Cyprus

The fourth is the question of Cyprus. As I remember, you did not mention any time, but you promised to consider the situation and to consult on it.
Kissinger: No consultations; I said we would consider it within our government.
Gromyko: We would like the period to be as short as possible. You shouldn’t consider it an impregnable obstacle.

³ February 24.
Middle East

Gromyko: (continued) On the Middle East, I will say the following: we had an exchange of information and appraisals and how we understand the aims and about the role of the Geneva Conference. I will say again that if it develops that everything will be done and we will only be invited and have photos taken, then we won’t take it seriously.

If we will contribute to a negotiation that is either partial or complete, that is another thing. But do not think we will tear something from the role of other countries.

We do not walk about with an extended hand. We just stated our position.

Kissinger: On this I want to say we appreciate the spirit of your remarks, which I consider conciliatory. We are in any event coming to the end of any partial steps. Even in these we will consider how to make more explicit a joint role, so you are not just asked to stamp something, which I agree is not appropriate.

In any event, I will go back to the Middle East. I have no specific program. But we will now move rapidly toward joint efforts. It is not a matter of months but weeks.

Gromyko: So we will await more specific considerations from you. The sooner the better. I have put forward certain considerations. We believe both of us should meet our affairs in such a way so as to prevent reproaches from this or that side—that on one side it is said there is an understanding to stop the arms race and on the other side that we are promoting it.

I don’t want to repeat what I have already said. I would like to say we attach importance to this question.

Kissinger: I understand.

Economic and Energy Consultations

Gromyko: We also attach importance to international questions such as economic cooperation in the broadest sense of the word. You know certain complications have arisen; we are aware certain forums exist where these questions are being considered. Don’t you think there is certain room for our consultation on these? We are interested, not as observers. You can’t say we are not affected. We are considering it first from the point of view of peace and détente. If you have any comments.

Kissinger: What specifically do you have in mind? In principle we are prepared to have consultations.

Gromyko: I am posing this question in a broad sense as a matter of principle. There are the questions of oil, prices, the price of raw materials, and economic relations in a broad sense. You know in the mone-
tary system there are problems and many countries have an interest. I do not await any proposal but just state the principle.

Kissinger: In principle we are prepared to exchange ideas and even explore cooperation. May I make a suggestion? I have a new Under Secretary for Economic Affairs.\(^4\) I could send him, and the Assistant Secretary who handles energy, to Moscow to exchange views. I have no ideas in mind, but they could exchange ideas.

Gromyko: We will consider that.
Kissinger: Let me know.
Gromyko: We will inform you.
Kissinger: They are both outstanding men.

Europe

Gromyko: What are your views on Europe, on the Common Market? Do any doubts arise, or is everything proceeding normally in Europe?

Kissinger: The big question is whether Britain will stay in.

Gromyko: What is your estimate?

Kissinger: 51–49. To stay in. It will be very narrow.

Gromyko: When will this be?

Kissinger: June. Very narrow. Callaghan will be in favor; other ministers will be against. The Prime Minister will be on the winning side.

Gromyko: What is your view of West Germany? Privately.

Kissinger: Yes. In West Germany, with unemployment, there are two problems. One is a series of elections in which the governing parties may lose. Or lose votes. If it happens, Gensch’s party may get into difficulties. So their domestic stability will be in difficulty. But later this year their economy, like ours, will recover.

In the CDU, whether or not Strauss is Chancellor, he will be the dominant personality.

On European cooperation, we are neutral. We don’t take part in it and don’t encourage it.

Gromyko: What is your estimate of Schmidt’s winning?

Kissinger: It is a slight possibility on the positive side. There are two elements. One is whether the Socialists win; the other is whether the Free Democrats stay above 5%.

Gromyko: I think it is good that we exchange views.

\(^4\) Charles W. Robinson entered on duty as Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs on January 3.
MBFR

Kissinger: On the Vienna negotiations on force reductions, we are now considering some reduction of new nuclear weapons and aircraft, but which has the positive side of not only a reduction but of a ceiling.

And I wondered if it is of interest.

Gromyko: Of course, certainly. It is one of our ideas.

Kissinger: If the principle interests you, we will then proceed to inform our allies.

Gromyko: We are interested.

Kissinger: Then we will present it to our allies.

Gromyko: It depends on the nature of the proposal and the relation to other elements.

Kissinger: Of course. But we are considering it in addition to other elements.

Gromyko: The General Secretary asks me to send his warm regards to President Ford and his best wishes to him and his wife.

Kissinger: Thank you. He will write in the next ten days.

Gromyko: And to you and Mrs. Kissinger.

Kissinger: I think this was a positive meeting.

[The meeting ended and Secretary Kissinger escorted Minister Gromyko down to the main lobby, where they addressed the press briefly. Their remarks to the press are attached.]5

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5 Brackets in the original. The remarks to the press are attached but not printed.
131. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 19, 1975, 4:10–5:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
Secretary Kissinger's Report on His Trip to the Middle East and Europe

[The press was in briefly, and then dismissed.]
Kissinger: Gromyko was very reluctant to talk about his trip. Something is funny. I think Congress has ripped it, and it was the reaction here to Vladivostok which did it. They had thought they were doing you a favor.

Wilson said they said they wonder whether there is anyone in the U.S. who can make a binding commitment.

[The group moved to seats at the President's desk.]
The President: I appreciate being kept up to date.

Kissinger: It is almost too much—Israeli obstructionism, and Syrian, Saudi, and Soviet as well.

Everybody abroad appreciates what you said in your speech. You are coming on as a strong courageous leader.

[Omitted here is further discussion of Kissinger's trip to the Middle East.]

[Kissinger:] The Likud is sort of Fascist. Like Perle. That reminds me—Jackson is making an issue about Romania. He is insisting no MFN without a specific number on emigration. I think we shouldn't buy it—let him kill it.

If I told the Soviet Union we favored a step with both Egypt and Syria, but would only do Egypt separately and do Syria at Geneva, that would get Faisal off our back. To do it ourselves would be a horrible negotiation and a confrontation with Israel.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 See footnote 9, Document 127.

3 Reference is presumably to the State of the Union address, which the President delivered on January 15. For the text, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 28.
The President: I don’t think we can divert you that long.
[Omitted here is discussion of international economic policy and domestic politics.]
Kissinger: On the Soviets. They have noticeably cooled. They didn’t give us a date for the Brezhnev visit. We gave a little on CSCE and they merchandized it in their tawdry way. We have hooks to keep them on the reservation with CSCE and the summit, but the Europeans are going to move to pal up with them. Wilson was floating on air—he is a pal. They are giving the Soviets $2.5 billion in credits; the French are too. And none of it is tied to projects.

The President: Can you mention it tomorrow?4
Kissinger: They are also worried about the Chinese. Gromyko asked me if we would sign a security treaty with the Chinese. The change in our relations is just a nuance—they are still good.

We could have gotten 38,000 Jews out, but now Gromyko won’t promise any figure at all.

On Vladivostok, we are still okay. I also gave him Option III. He liked that very much. I pointed out that the effect would be a ceiling even if only one plane is removed.

I thought maybe we should avoid two meetings close together and have CSCE in July and the summit in September.

The President: That may give us more time on MBFR.

Kissinger: We can work that out as things develop.
[Omitted here is further discussion of international economic policy and domestic politics.]

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4 During a breakfast meeting with the President on February 20, Kissinger briefed Congressional leaders on his trip to the Middle East. A memorandum of conversation is in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9.

Soviet Overture to Senator Jackson

The Soviets recently made an indirect overture to Senator Jackson inviting him to Moscow and blaming the trade bill failure on Ambassador Dobrynin’s inept handling.1

The channel chosen, according to an FBI report (Tab A),3 was the notorious Victor Louis, who is widely believed to be a KGB agent, with considerable freedom to operate in sensitive areas.

—Louis told a member of Jackson’s staff (unidentified) that the present impasse on the trade bill could have been avoided through a face-to-face meeting with Senator Jackson, which would have dispelled any questions Jackson might have had about Soviet intentions.

—In a long harangue, Louis criticized Dobrynin for his ineptness, and suggested that Dobrynin’s reading of the American political situation was defective and thus contributed to the present state of affairs.

—Louis suggested that the Senator come to Moscow, but was evasive about promising a meeting with Brezhnev.

Comment: Louis is generally used to launch trial balloons that Moscow can easily disavow. Given the strident campaign against Jackson in the Soviet press, perhaps Moscow thought it prudent to establish a channel that would keep open a line to a man who might become President.4 Nevertheless, it is ominous that Dobrynin should be

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2 In a memorandum to Kissinger on February 24, Sonnenfeldt reported: “Dobrynin told me at dinner in Geneva that they had been considering what to do about Jackson in Moscow especially in light of all the stories that they are trying to kill off his candidacy. Dobrynin said the Soviet conclusion is that the US does not have policy options significantly different from those being followed by the present Administration and that whatever Jackson says now, he as President would sooner or later come to the same ‘realistic’ conclusions as Nixon. So, said Dobrynin, they were relaxed. As you are aware, there already are Soviet nibbles at the Jackson staff. I think more can be expected. While Dobrynin’s story is more relaxed than is probably the actual case, it basically rings true.” (Ibid., Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975)

3 Not attached and not found.

4 On February 6, Jackson announced his candidacy for the 1976 Democratic nomination for President.
made the scapegoat, since this line scarcely encourages further dealings with him, and suggests that some quarters in Moscow have lost confidence in him. In any case, contacts of this sort allow Jackson to claim that he has a line to Moscow other than the Embassy, and reinforce his argument that the Soviets, not he, must be blamed for the failure of the trade bill.

The Soviets are obviously playing a double game at present. —On the one hand, they are setting up Jackson in public as the scapegoat for the failure of détente; this in itself is worrisome since it suggests that, in fact, the Soviets may anticipate a breakdown in relations, and are constructing a rationale to explain it and to exonerate themselves.

—On the other hand, the Soviets must know that they cannot refuse to deal with whomever becomes President, and that a means of contact may be prudent insurance.

The unanswered question is whether the Soviets are angling to settle the trade bill stalemate behind the Administration’s back.

Taken together with other oddities on the Brezhnev visit, the relations between Gromyko and Dobrynin, and Dobrynin’s absence from Washington—all add to the mystery of what, indeed, is going on in Moscow.5

5 During a meeting at 10:22 a.m. on February 25, Kissinger briefed the President on the Soviet overture to Jackson and then added: “Now there is another report that Brezhnev gambled and lost on the trade bill, playing into the hands of Suslov and others—who are saying ‘I told you so.’ Jackson then went to Dinitz to ask his opinion about going to the Soviet Union as Louis suggested. An unbelievable symptom of our times—that a senior Senator would do this rather than coming to the President or the Secretary of State.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 9)
Dear Mr. General Secretary:

In the past few weeks I have given much thought to the state of American-Soviet relations, reflecting on the views you expressed in your recent letters and the extensive discussions held in Geneva between Secretary Kissinger and Minister Gromyko. On the fundamental point of preserving and building on the improvement of our relations and the relaxation of international tensions, we are in full agreement. It is on this basis that we can address some of the problems that are currently under negotiation or discussion between us.

First of all, we are committed to make a serious, sustained effort to translate the agreement on strategic arms reached during our meeting at Vladivostok into a full agreement, and to have the final documents ready for signature at the time of your visit to the United States. I have instructed our delegation to conform their position scrupulously to the Vladivostok agreement and the aide-mémoire agreed thereafter. There are, of course, issues of importance that our delegations must resolve. Some of these, such as the essential verification provisions, can be technically quite complicated. But with some patience and good will these can be resolved.

I am concerned, however that neither side should advance positions that differ from our understanding and discussions at Vladivostok. On some points our delegation will explain to the Soviet side why the current Soviet proposals seem to us to go beyond the Vladivostok agreement. Secretary Kissinger has already presented certain general considerations to Mr. Gromyko in this regard. Again, these matters should be resolved without difficulty.

As you have pointed out, the work in another area of negotiation—the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe—has been slower than anticipated. In part this is because so far the most difficult
issues have been left open. But as a result of the recent discussions between Secretary Kissinger and your Foreign Minister, we have already made some substantial progress on one of the most difficult of the remaining issues—the question of peaceful change of frontiers.

As I see it, the Conference will still require some weeks to complete all the details, and then the results can be referred to governments for final consideration. I anticipate no difficulties, and the United States will raise no problems during this interval. Then, as agreed with you, the final stage can be convened at the highest level of participation for the closing ceremonies. This leaves only the problem of when, precisely, the final stage of the Conference should be convened. After some discussion with our friends and allies, it seems that with good will on all sides the most realistic date would be sometime in July. If this is an acceptable target date, we should commit ourselves to an appropriate work schedule.

In any case, the successful conclusion of this Conference, occurring during the year of the 30th anniversary of the end of the Second World War will be a signal accomplishment for which you, Mr. General Secretary, will deserve great credit. Unlike the situation that led up to both World Wars, we have within our grasp the means for building cooperation and ensuring security in Europe. The inviolability of frontiers, in particular, will be among the key elements of a solemn document. As you know, the United States has long since accepted the frontiers and territorial integrity of all European states, and I reaffirm this position without qualification.

I hope that the spirit of cooperation that has marked our work in the European Conference could also animate our respective policies in the Middle East. The situation there, of course, differs in principle from that in Europe. Territorial and political questions are still explosive issues and the situation remains dangerous.

We have had our differences, but as a result of the very thorough exchange in Geneva between Secretary Kissinger and Foreign Minister Gromyko I am persuaded that our differences are not unbridgeable and, indeed, our views may be converging. We share the same ultimate aim—just and lasting peace. Our differences have been limited to the most effective method of moving toward this goal.

As you are aware, Dr. Kissinger will be returning to the area in the next few days, and is prepared to meet again with the Foreign Minister of the USSR.  

4 During his trip to Europe and the Middle East March 6–23, Kissinger did not meet with Gromyko; he did meet with leaders in the United Kingdom, Belgium, Egypt, Syria, Israel, Turkey, Syria, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia.
ence would be convened. The Conference would then convene in an atmosphere most conducive to progress, rather than meeting under the threat of crisis and with the promise of stalemate.

I would like to close on a personal note: I was very pleased to learn that you had recovered from your recent illness. Mrs. Ford and I are looking forward with great anticipation to being your hosts in the United States in the near future.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

134. Telegram From the Department of State to Secretary of State Kissinger in Aswan

Washington, March 13, 1975, 0125Z.

Tosec 420/56179. Subject: Analysis of Recent Soviet Behavior. Ref: Secto 187. For the Secretary from Sonnenfeldt and Hyland.

1. Our basic estimate is that collapse of Trade Bill, following unexpected backlash in the U.S. against Vladivostok, led to a review of Soviet policy and a limited shift to a less conciliatory posture in dealing with us. This has been reflected both in the stiffer tone of Soviet communications to us and in their positions in CSCE, SALT, the Middle East and Cyprus.

2. Since this period also coincided with Brezhnev’s long absence and Dobrynin’s return for an alleged policy review, we were inclined to speculate that a more extensive change and further hardening might be in store, perhaps associated with circumscribing of Brezhnev’s freedom of action and authority.


2 This reference is in error. In telegram Secto 178/428 (not Secto 187) from Jerusalem, March 12, Sisco passed the following instructions to Sonnenfeldt and Hyland: “Secretary would like your analysis of recent Soviet moves and your judgment as to whether these amount to a pattern. Secretary mentioned in particular: the tone of Soviet reply on CSCE; the absence of a reply to his offer to meet with Gromyko; their sending their Geneva PermRep Vinogradov around the Middle East without prior notice or discussion with us; and the reply on SALT. Believe you should also have a look at Soviet press treatment in general as well as in particular to the Middle East.” (Ibid.)
3. In the past few weeks, however, we have not detected any particular pattern in Soviet moves and statements that would point to a major change beyond that initiated at the time of the Trade Bill. On each of the issues, the Soviets seem to be following tactics that were more or less predictable last winter, and that flow largely from nature of issues rather than concerted effort to shift to a new policy line.

4. On CSCE, the tone of the last letter is curt and hectoring; moreover, it ignores several other issues raised in our communication. On the other hand, at Vladivostok Brezhnev had already begun to intensify the effort to complete CSCE. This must now seem within reach, and he is determined to nail it down once and for all. The reasons are the obvious ones. The desultory discussions and prolonged haggling have robbed the conference of some of its value to the Soviets. With other schemes afoot, including WW II celebrations, meeting of European Communists, Brezhnev’s travels, etc., it is not surprising that Soviets (including Brezhnev personally) are increasingly irritated and frustrated by their inability to get a firm Western commitment. Also, Soviets must realize that as long as CSCE remains open, it is a hostage against their behavior elsewhere, including the Middle East.

5. We also feel that the Soviets are becoming more worried about Europe. The Soviets have never been as happy with Schmidt–Genscher as with Brandt–Scheel. On top of that, CDU gains in FRG Land elections, and the critical impact of elections in Westphalia could at some point lead to CDU–CSU return to power. Given the CDU position on CSCE, and even on the interpretation of the Eastern treaties, the Soviets would naturally be worried about such a change in German governments. This concern would be greater in light of lessened weight of French influence over Bonn under Giscard, compared with the DeGaulle–Pompidou era.

6. In this connection return of Abrasimov as Ambassador to East Berlin may reflect a decision to maintain tighter controls over Berlin developments and over GDR–FRG relationship.

7. In addition, there is probably some dismay in Moscow over the “crisis of capitalism” and what it means; they must be encouraged by a weakening of the Western coalition, by divisiveness of energy issues, by the collapsing southern flank of NATO. At the same time they are also concerned that internal instabilities not lead to a return to 1930’s.

8. On SALT, we think that the negotiations in Geneva are about where we expected. The Soviets’ opening position was, of course, the old tactic of trying to squeeze out a few more gains than warranted by

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3 See Document 135 and footnote 3 thereto.
4 Document 133.
Vladivostok. Nevertheless, Soviets have also wanted us to table a draft and then to begin more systematic work. They will study our draft and probably send some new instructions.

9. Until then it is difficult to say how serious the differences may be, though of course we have anticipated that there will be major resistance on Backfire, ASM’s and intricate MIRV verification. The only new note in the last week was the apparent lack of urgency in Soviet comments which had been a theme at opening of negotiations. This may reflect less about SALT than about timing of Brezhnev visit.

10. Indeed, lack of precise timetable on the visit is becoming an interesting indicator in itself. (You will recall Gromyko’s stout refusal in Geneva to mention it in the communiqué.) Soviets seem to be holding back, and it may be that commitment on CSCE has become a precondition to setting a date for the visit. It thus may be that Soviets have relaxed in SALT on the grounds that they have longer period for bargaining. But this could change if a commitment is made on CSCE. (Note: There is in fact a good deal to recommend a late summer or autumn Brezhnev visit: (1) have time for SALT; (2) more incentive for Soviet restraint if CSCE ends by July; (3) scheduling problems.)

11. In the TTB talks, Soviets seem to be moving toward U.S. position, and taking position that talks should be finished soon. In effect, Morokhov has accepted “in principle” a low fission-yield limit on excavation PNE’s, a yield limit of 150 kt on contained PNE’s and the need for observers. Given the clear evidence that Morokhov conducts these negotiations on his own, it is doubtful that this development reflects a leadership decision on the technical specifics. It is likely, however, that Morokhov is operating under some overall political guidance to work seriously toward wrapping up the TTB/PNE issue by the time of the next summit.

12. In MBFR, we have rather good intelligence that Soviets are stalling pending CSCE. They anticipate the introduction of Option III, and are worried by the difficulties in handling it. Since Brezhnev is on record favoring an agreement in 1975, the Soviets may want to move later this year.

13. On other arms control security issues—environmental modification and chemical weapons—Soviets are behaving reasonably. They are not agitating against us on CW in Geneva, and want to wrap up the CCD rather quickly. Environmental warfare talks here in Washington also went about as expected; an agreement could probably be reached whenever a high-level decision is made.

14. On substance of CSCE, the Soviets are continuing to dribble out modest concessions.

15. In short, we can see that Soviets are clearly becoming more difficult to deal with but their position is not notably harder than it might
have been had there been no setback on trade. They have a clear self-interest in preserving an element of détente in Europe and in pursuing SALT and in registering gains for Brezhnev’s peace program at 25th Party Congress. Hardening of Soviet policy, if it comes, therefore is more likely to be in reaction to significant deterioration in our position, or in response to developments in the Middle East, or on the Trade Bill. On the latter, the decline in emigration, and the more caustic comments by Alkhimov, suggest the Soviets may have greatly lowered their expectations for any serious movement. However, Alkhimov, in Izvestia, claims that you explained to his group the “measures” the administration was undertaking to fulfill our “pledges.” Moreover, when Alkhimov was here, he made clear Soviets will not default on obligatory July 1975 Lend-Lease installment or unravel business facilitation they have undertaken since 1972. We also note the alacrity with which the Soviets accepted the Robinson visit and pressed for Simon and the U.S. Senators to come. Soviets are thus not burning trade bridges, no doubt because they still consider them beneficial.

16. On the Middle East, the Soviets continue to be very critical about “partial solutions” and “one-man diplomacy,” but have avoided substantive comment on the Middle East negotiations. References to your role are, however, becoming more explicit and with clearly disapproving overtones. There are numerous assertions that the Western press is exaggerating the potential of the present round of talks, but there is no clear effort made to disrupt or derail them in Soviet commentary.

17. The Soviet public position remains essentially that enunciated by Brezhnev in his February 14 comments to Wilson (minus the criticism on “soporifics,” which has disappeared):

—Partial accords and separate agreements will not guarantee implementation of UN decisions or restore peace to the area. They are “useful” only as integral parts of a total Mid-East settlement.

—Resolution of the Palestinian question is a sine qua non and requires some form of Palestinian national administration on the West Bank. Most suitably the PLO should form it, in keeping with the Arab decision at Rabat.

—Speedy resumption of the Geneva Conference is the only way to ensure sustained momentum toward an all-embracing solution.

5 On March 5, Izvestia published an interview with Vladimir S. Alkhimov, Soviet Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, who had recently returned from a meeting in New York of the Executive Committee of the U.S.–USSR Trade and Economic Council. The Embassy in Moscow reported on the interview in telegram 2996, March 6. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) For the condensed English text, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 9 (March 26, 1975), p. 7.
18. The focus of Soviet attention at the moment is unquestionably the Palestinian factor. Perhaps in this connection two Soviet fact-finding missions have just turned up in the area. Vinogradov arrived in Damascus Monday, and on the 11th was received by the Jordanian Prime Minister in Amman. Moscow did not announce the visit. The Egyptian Embassy in Amman reported that Vinogradov might “attempt to achieve a reconciliation between Jordan and the PLO” (sic). (This is a sensitive source.) More probably he is gathering facts for Gromyko to use if he meets you.

19. Simultaneously, a Soviet Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization delegation headed by Victor Kudryavtsev is in Damascus and Beirut, ostensibly to discuss Palestinian issues with the PLO. The AASO is normally the PLO’s host when the latter visits the USSR and a Soviet Parliamentary delegation was in Amman prior to Vinogradov’s arrival.

20. Thus, the Soviets may be seriously groping for an approach to the Palestinian issue—which they insist remains the crux of any successful defusing of the Middle East crisis. Evidently this is the one area where they see leeway for themselves regardless of the outcome of your trip. In any event, they appear to be acting on the assumption that (as one prominent Soviet commentator wrote last week) U.S. diplomacy does not intend to prompt Tel Aviv to embark on talks about the Palestinian issue, or take it upon itself to find a solution until at least 1977, after the U.S. elections, and as a result, there is already a trend toward freezing this key problem. The fact-finding missions suggest that Moscow is determined to block any inclinations toward such a freeze, and hopes to use the PLO as its instrument.

21. Soviet agitation, in public and behind the scenes with Makarios, is well known to you. In recent days, however, our impression is that Soviets have decided to go along with whatever scheme seems most likely to put them on majority side in New York. Obviously, formal role for Waldheim has appeal for Soviets, since it gives them at least indirect influence over talks. In any case, it is not our impression that Soviets have any clear line on the issues other than to maneuver to keep some influence in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia, and block a settlement arranged by you.

22. Developments in Southeast Asia have been virtually ignored in Soviet propaganda, and there is no sense of gloating. But Cambodian developments have probably caught Soviets off guard, and created a dilemma since they have maintained their Embassy in Phnom Penh. In this connection, we note surprise visit by Firyubin to Hanoi and Vientiane this week on what is probably mission to inform Soviet leadership.

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6 March 10.
what future holds for them. Obviously, Soviets will pay careful attention to Congressional outcome, if only as indicators of strength of executive and mood of this country. They cannot be pleased at prospect of return of Sihanouk, who told AFP today that China is Cambodia’s best friend.

23. In general, a degree of Soviet irritability with us is not surprising, in view of the buffeting their détente line has taken and particularly since they may be grappling with their own leadership problems. They are clearly trying to show that Brezhnev is operating normally again, and will continue to do so through the U.S. and CSCE summits. We have no new evidence of leadership instability but still think it likely that succession question has been opened and may have to be resolved before the Party Congress.

24. Our sense of present Soviet attitude is that they are watching us unusually closely and are particularly sensitive to any indication that we are not living up to past promises. Obviously, they are well served in dealing with us and the Congress by taking a stance of the injured party. But the top leaders surely have a genuine concern about whether the U.S. side can sustain a policy of détente.

25. We expect that over the coming weeks and, indeed, for the balance of the year, the Soviets will be probing us more sharply, and weighing more carefully their overall attitude toward us. Specifically, we should be prepared for: serious problems if we do not produce a CSCE summit by July; increased trouble-making on the Middle East, particularly on the PLO; perhaps mild pressures on Berlin issues; and growing pressure on the administration to show it is able, or at least willing, to produce a turnaround on trade legislation.

26. More basically, whatever the fluctuations in style and tone, we think it unlikely that the Soviets have changed their overall perception of their interests. Even if their more ambitious expectations concerning economic and technological cooperation have had to be lowered, they must know that a broadly positive relationship with us is essential. After all, their economic problem, China, Eastern Europe and the other factors that led to the decisions of 1971 have not significantly changed. This is not to say that they could not change: major blows to the U.S. position in Southeast Asia and the Eastern and Western Mediterranean, the likely disenchantment of China with us that this might entail, domestically immobilized U.S. administration, failure or frustration on CSCE, SALT, PNE’s and other negotiating projects with which Brezhnev is identified, economic disruption and hence political turbulence in the industrialized world (not to mention the outbreak of a new Middle East war)—all this and more could represent such fundamental change in the world environment that even the inert Soviet leaders would be bound to take notice to see what historic opportunities beckoned. This
merely goes to show that U.S.-Soviet relations do not occur in a vacuum and that a “déjà vu” that is in our interest cannot be isolated from the rest of our policies. For now, however, whatever the evidence of Soviet irritation and brittleness, we do not see a sea change in Soviet conduct.\(^7\)

Ingersoll

\(^7\) In telegram Tosec 802/62810 to Kissinger in Jerusalem, March 20, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland stated that their previous assessment of Soviet-American relations “may have been somewhat optimistic. While we think our basic analysis is sound, we may underestimate the adverse impact of an accumulation of actual and potential problems and incidents, some of which have come to light even since we sent you our assessment.” The two men then cited a series of recent developments, including those related to Portugal, SALT, CSCE, and the Middle East. (National Archives, RG 59, Entry 5339, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975)

135. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Letter to Brezhnev on CSCE

On March 1 you sent a letter to General Secretary Brezhnev in which you summarized the state of U.S.-Soviet relations, with particular reference to issues which remain outstanding in the SALT and CSCE negotiations (Tab C).\(^2\) In the latter context, you expressed optimism that the remaining areas of disagreement could be resolved and that discussions with our allies reflected consensus that the Conference could be concluded at a Summit meeting in July.

On March 8 the General Secretary replied to your letter (Tab B).\(^3\) In his letter Brezhnev expresses concern at your suggestion of July, believing that this represents an unnecessary delay. He expresses the view that “it is important to establish at last the final date of the completion of the Conference and then not to depart from it.” Brezhnev


\(^2\) Printed as Document 133.

proposes that the concluding stage commence on June 30 in Helsinki. Brezhnev also sent similar letters to Prime Minister Wilson, Chancellor Schmidt and President Giscard d’Estaing.

Although not all issues have been resolved, we remain confident that agreement can be reached on the terms of an agreement that would justify a concluding session of the CSCE at the Summit level. Because the remaining negotiations will be difficult, and in view of other commitments on your schedule, we believe it would be wise to remain firm on your original proposal for a mid-July conclusion to the Conference. We have consulted with the European allies at a restricted meeting of the North Atlantic Council yesterday. They have agreed with our position and will respond to Moscow accordingly.

At Tab A is a letter to Brezhnev which expresses appreciation for his March 8 message and reiterates your preference, and that of our allies, for a July conclusion at the Summit. The letter also states, once more, our position that the final outcome remains dependent upon the satisfactory resolution of the remaining issues.

Recommendation: That you sign the letter to General Secretary Brezhnev at Tab A.\(^4\)

\(^4\) Not attached. Printed ibid., Document 278.
136. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 25, 1975, 5:15 p.m.

SUBJECT
Robinson's Trip to Moscow

PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Under Secretary Robinson
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary, EUR
William T. Shinn, Jr. (Notetaker)

Robinson: Mr. Secretary, you have before you the instructions which you have approved for my trip that Hal sent you by telegram. I am leaving in half an hour and would like your guidance. What should I avoid in my talks with the Russians?

Kissinger: I would just discuss the means of strengthening our trade relations. You should do this on two assumptions: that it will be possible to change the Trade Act, or that this will not be possible.

Sonnenfeldt: This gets into a different area. In your conversation with Gromyko you said Chuck would concentrate on our activities in multilateral negotiations.

Kissinger: I agreed with Gromyko that you would talk about two things: our trade and the multilateral aspects. Who are you going to see?

Sonnenfeldt: First Deputy Trade Minister Kuz'min, the Deputy Chairman of the State Planning Commission Inozemtsev, and . . .

Shinn: The third is Morozov of the State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations.

Kissinger: I wouldn't get into price fluctuations. I can never see the sense of telling the Soviets about our problems. You should avoid mentioning the price fluctuations of raw materials.

Robinson: I will do that. However, I think I could put a positive cast on this question by talking about new relations with the LDC's.

Kissinger: You shouldn't pour your heart out.

Robinson: I don't propose that we tell them everything.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Shinn. The meeting was held in the Secretary's office.

2 Not found. Robinson met with Soviet officials in Moscow March 27–28.

3 See Document 130.
Sonnenfeldt: It would be proper to discuss the wheat, cocoa, sugar and tin matters, however, since the USSR is a member of these agreements.

Kissinger: When you talk it should be with a tone of confidence. I would be openminded on how they fit in—not in the IEA but the producer-consumer meeting.

What do you think, Hal?

Sonnenfeldt: Chuck should express interest but make no commitments. This is, of course, provided the Soviets make a specific request.

Kissinger: The trick is to seem cooperative but not to give a hell of a lot. Is anyone going with you?

Robinson: Bill Shinn here will be accompanying me.

Kissinger: On bilateral trade, this depends on political questions.

Robinson: We had a problem with Simon. He wanted to take some Senators with him to Moscow.4

Sonnenfeldt: You should say we will try to get a legislative consensus, but this will have to flow up naturally.

Kissinger: We will be glad to explore the possibilities but this has to be done the second half of this year.

Sonnenfeldt: We have made some soundings on the Hill, but it’s best not to push the matter yet.

Kissinger: We should be ready to start in June. Hal, how is SALT going?

Sonnenfeldt: There are three basic problems: verification of MIRV’s, bomber armaments and Backfire. I am concerned that the discussions in Geneva seem to be degenerating into polemics over who is most faithful to Vladivostok.

Kissinger: We must move carefully in Congress.

Sonnenfeldt: Regarding the two hypotheses on trade, there is a growing interest in private bank financing.

Robinson: I had a good conversation with Tom Clausen5 on this.

Sonnenfeldt: In general, you should be friendly, forthcoming and . . .

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4 In message Hakto 44 to Scowcroft, March 14, Kissinger opposed Simon’s request to include Senators on his trip to Moscow, stating that this would be “extremely unwise.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975) Simon chaired the fifth meeting of the U.S.–USSR Joint Commercial Commission in Moscow April 10–11; during the visit, he also met with Brezhnev and Patolichev. A report for the President on the meeting is in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 23, Subject File, Trade (2).

5 A. W. “Tom” Clausen, President of Bank of America.
Kissinger: and confident. Don’t hesitate to snap back at them.
Robinson: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.

137. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Dobrynin

Dobrynin has hurried back to Washington in the wake of the suspension of the Middle East talks, and he probably has instructions to take up the Geneva Conference, the state of bilateral relations, and such particulars as CSCE timing, SALT prospects, and the Brezhnev summit.

—Dobrynin may be under somewhat of a cloud for his misestimate of the situation since the trade bill (the submarine salvage operation will certainly not have helped those in the Politburo who are arguing in favor of good relations with the US though it may impress even the hardliners).

—More important, the Soviets have been passing through a period of some uncertainty themselves, brought on by the Middle East, Brezhnev’s illness, and the outlook for US-Soviet economic relations, and political developments in the US.

Thus, Dobrynin may prove to be a more difficult interlocutor, and he will have to report more carefully on your general mood and the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Soviet Union, January–March 1975. Secret; Sensitive. All tabs are attached but not printed.
2 No record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on March 29 has been found. See, however, Document 140.
3 On March 23, after meeting with Rabin in Jerusalem, Kissinger announced that he was suspending his efforts to help negotiate an interim agreement between Israel and Egypt.
4 On February 7, the Los Angeles Times and The New York Times published stories on the Glomar Explorer, a failed intelligence operation to raise a Soviet submarine from the bottom of the Pacific Ocean.
outlook in light of recent setbacks to our policies. The Soviet leaders cannot help but speculate on your tenure in office, on President Ford’s prospects in 1976, and the impact of a range of foreign policy problems that seem to shift the locus of decision-making toward Capitol Hill and put the President’s ability to deliver in doubt.

While we still believe there is no persuasive evidence for a shift in Soviet policy, there are accumulated irritants, some potential problems in the negotiations underway, and in evolving situations.

In sum, the Soviets may feel that at this particular juncture, we may need “détente” more than they do.

—You will want to disabuse Dobrynin of any notion that we feel under pressure to repair Soviet-American relations, or that Vietnam, Cambodia and the Middle East and Cyprus put us in a weakened position vis-à-vis Moscow. In particular, you may want to complain of their failure to restrain Hanoi, and their agitation against your Middle East effort.

On the Middle East:

Dobrynin will want: (a) some debriefing on your talks; (b) your views on the timing and procedural problems of Geneva; (c) whether you wish to begin the dialogue on “guarantees” suggested to Gromyko, and whether we intend to collaborate with them in addressing the issues.

—You ought to put the Soviets on the defensive at the outset, by asking precisely how they propose to proceed: timing, invitations, participation, UN role, etc.; this will reveal that they will press the PLO, which will allow you to point out the immediate deadlock (you may want to say that both sides are reconsidering step-by-step, but only if your strategy is to prod the Soviets).

—In general, you have an opportunity to put the burden on the Soviets by taking the line that as the champions of the Geneva conference they now have to face dangers of a potential deadlock over the PLO questions and the gloomy outlook in the area for any real political progress; ultimately, the Soviets will have to accept the fact that only the US can influence Israel and serve as the mediator between the sides; thus, the Soviets will have to be aware that sooner rather than later they will have to come to us.

—On the question of bilateral talks about guarantees, we think you should pull back and save this for trading material later; a discussion of guarantees at this point will be exploited by the Soviets to show the Arabs that they are already moving on the major issues and that they have influence over the outcome; later, you might want to agree to discuss guarantees as a concession in the maneuvering that will be involved over the PLO, etc.
You ought to raise SALT, if Dobrynin does not, in order to register your disquiet over the Soviet position.

—Under “instructions from the highest level,” the Soviets have now formally rejected our MIRV position; however, the Soviets have not even hinted that they have an alternative, other than “national technical means”; indeed, they have said that they have none. They have said publicly that they plan to deploy the SS–18 in both modes but they will not permit us to count the single-warhead ones as MIRVed.

—The Soviets are still insisting, of course, that (a) all ASM’s over 600 km range carried on bombers must be counted, not just ballistic missiles, (b) that Backfire is excluded, (c) that there should be restraint in the form of a 240 limit on new types of SLBM’s, and (d) bans on ASM’s on non-bomber aircraft, on intercontinental cruise missiles and on ballistic missiles on surface ships and on the seabeds.

—They have also hinted that the delegation’s work is now a matter of “months” rather than weeks, suggesting that the summit is not imminent, and in any case, is linked to the outcome of SALT.

—Finally, the Soviets still maintain that there must be another negotiation that includes FBS, and they also continue to press their sweeping non-transfer position.

In sum, SALT is making little progress on major issues but inching forward on minor ones. (Summary of Geneva negotiations at Tab A.)

—You should take the same line with Dobrynin that you did with Gromyko: namely, that attempts to go beyond the Vladivostok accord threaten to reopen the entire range of issues; point to Jackson’s proposal for a limit on 700 “older” systems that would not be modernized as only an opening wedge for such questions as sub-limits on heavy ICBM’s, limits on throw-weight, etc.

In particular, you should make the following points:

1. There must be adequate MIRV verification, lest the agreement fail in the Senate, where there are already questions about SALT I compliance.

—Our draft protocol on MIRV verification is not necessarily the last word, but it raises the issues that you have explained to him and to Brezhnev: (a) that we must count missiles as MIRVed that have been so tested, (b) that we must count all modernized silos as MIRVed, since

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5 At Tab A is an unnumbered and undated telegram to Kissinger, drafted on March 21.

6 Jackson unveiled his proposal in a speech from the Senate floor on March 26. Sonnenfeldt and Lodal assessed the proposal and provided press guidance in a memorandum to Kissinger the same day. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, “Outside the System” Chronological Files, 1974–1977, Box 2, 3/21/75–3/31/75)
that is their ultimate purpose, and we must count all SLBM’s MIRV’s by general classes.

—Our basic point is that we cannot distinguish between a MIRVed and unMIRVed deployment, if the ICBM’s and SLBM’s launchers involved are deliberately constructed to take MIRVed missiles.

—If the Soviets can make some counterproposals, we might be flexible.

2. If the Soviets persist in their effort to limit Trident, we will have to counter with some sublimits on their new ICBM’s and SLBM’s, thus creating a new deadlock.

3. In general, the Soviet delegation should work for completing a draft agreement, leaving the 2 or 3 major issues for discussion either in your channel or in Moscow later.

—Stress that there is some risk that SALT will be seen as deadlocked, and then there will be a series of unavoidable and damaging leaks in Washington.

Threshold Test Ban:

We have no major reasons for complaining, since the Soviets have moved some distance toward our position. (Summary of TTB talks at Tab B). Indeed, it is possible that the next round, about a month from now, could reach an agreement, or narrow the issues to the political questions of “cooperation” in PNE’s.

The issues are:

—Can we accept the Soviet counterproposal for a 150 KT limit on individual contained PNE’s (versus our 100 KT proposal); can we accept a higher aggregate for several simultaneous shots?

—Can we accept modification in our position on excavation PNE’s: we proposed a salvo limit of 500 KT, and an unspecified limit on individual explosions, whereas the Soviets proposed a 500 KT limit on individual shots, and perhaps a 1 MT limit on salvos.

—On the sublimit of 0.2 KT on the fission yields, the Soviets have been surprisingly receptive, but have not proposed a specific limit.

The outstanding political issue is whether, in order to clinch an agreement on observers, we will agree to “cooperate” with the USSR, which will suggest a condominium toward non-nuclear states, and perhaps pressures on nuclear ones.

In any case, you can tell Dobrynin we were satisfied with the last round, and can now see a final agreement: the question is whether to sign a PNE agreement at the summit, or to do so at whatever time the

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7 At Tab B is an unnumbered and undated telegram to Kissinger, drafted on March 20.
negotiations are completed. (You might consider whether you would sign a protocol during a Moscow visit, if the agreement is ready.)

Robinson in Moscow:

Chuck’s talks got off to a positive start March 27 with a Soviet team headed by First Deputy Foreign Trade Minister Kuzmin. The entire first session was devoted to IEA and domestic US energy policy (reporting telegram at Tab C).8

CSCE:

On CSCE, if Dobrynin brings it up, you should say that we believe it should be possible to hold the Stage III finale in mid-late July and that it will take that long to complete Stage II negotiations and preparations for the summit. The Soviets have recently shown some flexibility on the maneuvers CBM, indicating they could accept purely voluntary notification (you have a separate memo on this), and you should tell Dobrynin that we are working on our Allies to bring them around. (They will accept Soviet position with no pressure from us.) Summary of CSCE talks at Tab D.9

Portugal:

You might simply allude to the situation, emphasizing that the USSR must be mindful that simply because they can expect a more favorable attitude in Lisbon with communists in the government, that any effort to take “unilateral advantage” of it will impact on our relations with the USSR. (Cable from Walt Stoessel on Portugal and USSR at Tab E).10

Finally, at Tab F is a summary of MBFR talks at Vienna; at Tab G is an outline of our V–E Day discussions with the Soviets; at Tab H a rundown on recent minor bilateral irritants; and at Tab I a brief summary of current bilateral issues.

On the Brezhnev summit, it is clear from a number of indicators that the Soviets see it after CSCE; thus as a practical matter it would probably be after Labor Day (and before the UNGA(?)), or possibly, late July after CSCE.

—Since the CSCE is one of our last remaining carrots, it may be that the best strategy is to point for a Brezhnev summit in September which allows time for SALT and for a consideration of the trade bill.

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8 At Tab C are telegrams 4258, March 27, and 4326 and 4327, March 28, from Moscow. See also Document 138.
9 At Tab D is an unsigned and undated paper on CSCE.
10 At Tab E are telegrams 4097 and 4207 from Moscow, March 26 and 27, respectively. Although the former telegram is on the Soviet Union and Portugal, the latter is on Soviet policy toward Indochina.
—Depending on your assessment of how to play the Middle East, and whether we need some reinsurance, you could propose that we begin to plan for a September visit.

(An interesting sidelight is Korniyenko’s comment that this summit should not come up with new agreements, but concentrate on improving existing ones; this would give the summit a different character than the Nixon meetings, and might be the best approach.)

In sum, the outlook might be as follows:
—Geneva Middle East Conference—April–May.
—Your visit to Moscow—June?
—CSCE—July.
—Brezhnev summit—September; after which the SALT and TTB treaties are submitted to Congress.
—Ford visit to China?
—Ford visit to Moscow—May 1976
This would keep something in the foreground through the next year.

[Omitted here is a list of attachments.]

138. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting

Washington, March 31, 1975, 8 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of Nigeria.]

[Secretary Kissinger:] Chuck, how about Moscow?

Mr. Robinson: Well, I think the discussions went well. I think there’s clear evidence that the Soviets want to develop a closer economic tie with us and they want to become involved in multilateral economic deliberations. I was very encouraged that we made progress.

Secretary Kissinger: Why would you be encouraged about their wanting to be involved in multilateral economic deliberations?

Mr. Robinson: I think they realize they can’t go it alone, and this is evidence—

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Box 6. Secret. According to an attached list, the following officials attended the meeting: Kissinger, Ingersoll, Sisco, Robinson, Maw, Eagleburger, Sonnenfeldt, Davis, Rogers, Habib, Hartman, Atherton, Hyland, Lord, Enders, Anderson, Vest, Buffum, Jenkins, Leigh, Springsteen, Gompert, and Bremer.
Secretary Kissinger: Do you feel we could throw a monkey wrench on them, like energy or OPEC?

Mr. Robinson: I’d be very careful about them in the energy area, but—

Secretary Kissinger: Well, you mention one area in which they do us any good.

Mr. Robinson: Well, the fact they recognize the need to become involved, I find, is a positive factor.

Secretary Kissinger: O.K.—if it does us some good. Name one negotiation where it does us some good.

Mr. Robinson: Well, I think there are opportunities for—

Secretary Kissinger: I’m all for bilateral talks with them.

Mr. Robinson: This is what I’m talking about. They are looking to us as a channel in which they would be kept advised, in which we could be apprised bilaterally. And we could play this to advantage; this is my basic conclusion.

Secretary Kissinger: Unless they’re talking to 15 others bilaterally.

Mr. Robinson: I’m sure they are talking to the French, although our reports would indicate they went into much more detail with the French than us.

Secretary Kissinger: What specifically do they want?

Mr. Robinson: They want extension of trade on a multilateral basis.

Secretary Kissinger: What does that mean?

Mr. Robinson: Well, that means they want to develop basic resources for sale—export. In exchange for that, they want machinery, equipment.

Secretary Kissinger: But that’s bilateral.

Mr. Robinson: I’m talking about bilateral. But their desire to become part of the world economy I think is a recognition of the weakness of the present system.

Secretary Kissinger: But recognition of the fact that there’s an aggressive role.

Mr. Robinson: But that could; but they also have serious economic problems—shortage of credit, shortage of technology—and they recognize that unless they become a part of the world economy that they’re going to limit their future development.

It just seems to me there was evidence—

Secretary Kissinger: Yes. But given the attitude of most of our allies, I’m not so eager to have them at multilateral meetings. At oil meetings they’re going to join OPEC. At GATT meetings they’re going to get Europe against us. So at what forum will the Soviet Union add a bloody thing to us?
Mr. Robinson: Well, I have prepared a report, which I will get to you today, arguing against multilateral deliberation. But I think their desire and their interest in having us as a channel of communication gives us some opportunities.

Secretary Kissinger: That I agree with. Do they have any ideas on bilateral trade?

Mr. Robinson: Well, they didn’t raise the question on the trade bill, but that obviously is very much on their mind. But they are going to push forward in supporting U.S. business activities in the Soviet Union, and they’re going to move more aggressively to market their mineral and energy resources. And their men are prepared to sit down and talk about how we do that.

Mr. Hartman: I talked to a banker the other day and he said they are beginning to mobilize the credit now with their bank in London.

Secretary Kissinger: Is Sonnenfeldt here?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes, sir.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you want to do an analysis—you and Bill—of what these conversations mean and what our possibilities are, as you see them?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Why don’t you get together with Chuck and the three of you do something?

Mr. Sisco: They weren’t very concrete on their side; were they, Chuck? Did they have any concrete ideas?

Mr. Robinson: Except they wanted an invitation to the producer-consumer—

Mr. Sisco: I mean in terms of details of trade and so on.

Secretary Kissinger: But they don’t consider that pleasing, the producer-consumer meeting; and they sure as hell are going to join the producers.

Mr. Robinson: No question. They outlined what their position is. Secretary Kissinger: What is their position?

Mr. Robinson: They want to bring in the LDC commodity issue. And I told them that these were matters in which we had great interest but we felt that the LDC question would not contribute to any satisfactory solution to the energy problem but the fact that they feel dependent on the rest of the world and they want to become involved and they want to use us or work with us—

Secretary Kissinger: It depends entirely on what terms—

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2 A copy of Robinson’s report is attached to Document 139.
Mr. Robinson: Yes, I agree.

Secretary Kissinger: If they want to use us to maintain high oil prices and link it to LDCs, we can do without that cooperation.

Mr. Robinson: Absolutely. I argued against it; and I think they have a recognition of the weakness of their system and their society; and they made a commitment to become involved in the international economy in a different way than in the past. That gives us an opportunity to look at it.

Secretary Kissinger: I would like someone to do a paper within the next 48 hours of what Soviet involvement in the international economy means—whether that’s a good thing or a bad thing for us and how they’ll use it.

Mr. Robinson: I’ll get that.3

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t know. I have no strong views.

Mr. Lord: We wrote a paper looking to the NATO planning meeting in two weeks, on this very subject.4

Secretary Kissinger: They have already joined the NPT! (Laughter.)

Mr. Lord: NPT isn’t mentioned in the entire paper! (Laughter.)

Secretary Kissinger: What objectivity! (Laughter.)

Mr. Lord: It’s precisely on this subject that we’re talking about—Secretary Kissinger: What conclusions had you come to?

Mr. Lord: The conclusions are they’re very ambivalent at this point.

Secretary Kissinger: I don’t give a damn what they think. I want to know what the impact is on Soviet participation.

Mr. Lord: We don’t have all our thinking straightened out yet.

Secretary Kissinger: I would just like to understand it for my own benefit. (1), what is the impact? Secondly, how could they use it for good or ill? Third, what can we do within the framework that Chuck discussed?

I agree the tone of your conversations, of your reports, couldn’t have been better; so I think that was very positive.

Mr. Robinson: Patolichev made a very strong point of the importance of continuing this kind of dialogue, and Kuznetsov throughout the meetings was clear that he felt this was the starting point for something to do, to be continued.

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3 See Document 139.

4 A copy of the S/P paper is attached to Document 139.
Now, whether it’s in our interest to continue it or not—that’s another question. But their desire, their sense of need, I think—

Secretary Kissinger: But there are two separate problems. (1), what will they discuss? I mean, are they eager to discuss? Secondly, what is it they want to discuss? That’s the part that I want to get a handle on.

Mr. Robinson: Well, we discussed three basic issues, and they were very much interested in all three—and that’s food, the commodity LDC issue, and the consumer-producer relationships.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s a disaster. What’s their view on food?

Mr. Robinson: On food, we want their evidence of willingness to deal with us bilaterally. But they’re not interested in a multilateral approach to the emergency grain program because they see their aid to LDCs as a way to achieve some ideological objectives, and they don’t see—

Secretary Kissinger: In other words, they don’t want us to subsidize their exports to the LDCs.

Mr. Robinson: Well, they want to handle their program in their own way, apparently.

Secretary Kissinger: But they can’t do it unless we sell grain to them. How about commodities?

Mr. Robinson: On commodities, they are pushing of course for multilateral financing and some stabilization of price that they feel is in the interests of both producing and consuming countries.

Secretary Kissinger: That’s the only one I’m willing to listen to.

Mr. Robinson: Well, I think in the face of what we can accomplish in this area, it might be worth exploring.

[Omitted here is discussion of Turkey, Mexico, Geneva talks, Vietnam, Honduras, Chile, Israel, and Saudi Arabia.]
139. Briefing Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Robinson) and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, undated.

Soviet Participation in International Economic Arrangements

During Robinson’s trip to Moscow the Soviets told us of their interest in the producer-consumer conference and hinted that they would like a role in the MTN.\(^2\) (On grain reserves they showed a preference for bilateral talks with us rather than participation in a multilateral forum.)

We and some of our allies have advanced the idea in the past that there may be long-term political advantages to be gained from increased Soviet participation in international economic organizations, and indeed a test of how far the Soviets have come in joining the international system. Now the time has come to have a hard look at this idea. Together with EB and EUR, we have taken a fresh look at their assumptions in the light of what the Soviets said during the trip. S/P has just completed an excellent study for NATO on “Trade and Natural Resources in the East-West Context” which examines many of the same questions and gives additional background and perspective.

There are many differences of opinion about the desirability of encouraging increased Soviet participation in international economic organizations, as there are also about the obverse of the coin—the cost of trying to exclude them. The following tentative conclusions represent our thinking about an issue which needs to be discussed further within the government and with our allies. The NATO planners (APAG) meeting in Paris later this month, which Winston Lord will attend, will give us an informal opportunity to get a preliminary reading on allied thinking.

Conclusions and Recommendations

—Soviet interest in participating in multilateral economic arrangements is selective but growing.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 10, POL 2 USSR—Trade (MFN, Ex-Im). Confidential. Drafted by Barry and Lorimer (EB/ITP/EWT) on April 3 and cleared by Katz (EB) and Hartman. Although the original is uninitialed, an unidentified handwritten note to Sonnenfeldt reads: “we initialed for you.” Tab A, Robinson’s report on his trip, and Tab B, an S/P paper for NATO, are attached but not printed.

\(^2\) See Documents 137 and 138.
—At the same time Soviet interests run counter to the kind of consensus we are trying to build in some economic undertakings and the asymmetries of Soviet and Western economic systems pose difficulties in others.

—We should not exaggerate the influence the Soviets can bring to bear on established trade and monetary organizations nor should we expect that these institutions will have a great effect on the evolution of Soviet society. At the same time we must recognize that a concerted effort to oppose Soviet participation in these arrangements can have an adverse effect on our bilateral relations and on Soviet behavior on the international economic scene.

—Our multilateral economic effort is part of a larger policy of building a new international system. In this sense we cannot proceed too far without taking account of the Soviet Union and, ultimately, China. But in the short term there is little doubt that Soviet interests are inimical: they will certainly manipulate any multilateral organization to pit the LDCs against the industrialized West. Moreover, they can be expected to introduce political considerations that will be divisive. Finally, unlike bilateral efforts which are under our control, we cannot use multilateral efforts as leverage against the USSR. If there is some concern in the USSR about being excluded from major undertakings, Soviet participation on a constructive basis is more likely later as that concern grows.³

—Politically, the argument for encouraging this tendency is similar to that for facilitating expanded bilateral trade. In some instances it can create a web of interests conducive to restraint and relaxation of tensions. In other instances, however, the Soviets may find opportunities for advancing their political interests without accepting obligations and responsibilities. In general we should actively encourage Soviet involvement only where their economic interests would dictate responsible and constructive participation, or where such participation would require the Soviets to adjust their policies along lines suitable to our long-term interests.

—Soviet involvement in multilateral economic organizations could force them to take positions on subjects where their ideological and practical interests diverge, and could expose them to criticism by the LDCs.

—These considerations dictate a case-by-case analysis of the pros and cons of Moscow’s participation in various fora. In some cases this analysis would lead us to take the lead in encouraging them; in others it

³ EUR does not agree with this paragraph, believing that the balance of the memo offers the accurate perspective. [Footnote in the original.]
would argue for bilateral and multilateral consultations aimed at clarifying conditions under which they might participate; and in others it would suggest gently fending them off, at least for the time being.

—In the specific areas raised by the Soviets with Robinson:

At the moment we see a clear benefit to U.S. economic interests from encouraging Soviet participation in international grains arrangements.

We believe we should offer to discuss the MTN with the Soviets in Washington. We would plan to stress to them that the participants would expect them to offer reciprocity, including, where appropriate, binding concessions suitable to their economic system.

At this stage we see little benefit and considerable risks in Soviet participation in the producer-consumer conference. At the same time we should continue to discuss the possibility of their participation in multilateral discussions of energy matters with the Soviets bilaterally as they may desire.

Hyland has seen and concurs.

140. Oral Message From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford

Moscow, April 10, 1975.

Leonid Brezhnev has attentively considered what was said by Dr. Kissinger on behalf of President Ford during the conversation with the Soviet Ambassador on March 29 regarding the firm intention of the United States Government and of the President personally to continue the policy of relaxation of tensions and also regarding the fact that the President did not intend to undertake any actions either of an internal or international nature which might bring into conflict the United States and the Soviet Union or harm their relationship. Leonid Brezhnev and his colleagues in the leadership take note of the Presi-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Apr–May 1975. No classification marking. According to a handwritten note, the text of the message was dictated to Kissinger by Vorontsov at 5:15 p.m. on April 10. In a memorandum to Kissinger on April 14, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland commented on the message from Brezhnev: “As you have said, there is a sense of linkage among the various dates and events, especially the Brezhnev visit: the timing of the visit itself is linked directly to the close of the CSCE.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 137.
dent’s assurances in this respect and on their part would like to reemphasize that their own intentions are also the same. Of this, the President can rest firmly assured. We have always stood and stand for the deepening and widening of mutual understanding and cooperation between our countries; we are for the removal by mutual efforts of all that hinders at times the constructive and stable development of Soviet/American relations.

An important part in this matter is assigned to the new Soviet/American summit meeting, this time in the United States. An agreement in principle on such a meeting was confirmed in Vladivostok. Now, the matter is to clarify the time of holding this meeting and to prepare it properly.

In determining the most convenient and mutually acceptable time of the visit of Leonid Brezhnev to the United States, we and the President naturally have also in mind other major international as well as internal engagements which are planned for the current year.

With due account of this and taking into consideration what was expressed by the President, we believe that an approximate timetable of important meetings this year with the participation of both our countries could be as follows:

1) Renewal of the Geneva Peace Conference on the Middle East. June is, in principle, acceptable to us but, of course, this question should be agreed upon by all the interested parties.

2) Final stage of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. July, and we consider this time agreed upon with the United States side.

3) Visit of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU Leonid Brezhnev to the United States. Approximately two months after the close of the work of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. More precise dates of the visit could be agreed upon later.

As to a new meeting between Andrei Gromyko and Henry Kissinger for exchange of opinions on the Middle East problem and other questions of interest for both sides, this meeting could take place in Moscow, say on May 20–21.

It goes without saying that when needed bilateral exchange of opinion on all arising questions will be continued as before on a regular basis through established channels.
141. Minutes of the Secretary of State’s Staff Meeting

Washington, April 16, 1975, 8 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, Greece, Turkey, Philippines, Latin America, and a cheese dispute between the United States and the European Community.]

[Secretary Kissinger:] Incidentally, Phil, about the Reston article today, is there anything we can get from Hanoi, other than a demand for surrender?

Mr. Habib: I haven’t read the article.

Secretary Kissinger: He says we are not using Moscow and Peking as we should.

Mr. Habib: I don’t think we can get anything from Moscow and Peking beyond what Hanoi has offered. What Hanoi has offered at this stage is if the Vietnamese government will change its character, they will be prepared to treat with it—within their definition of what the Paris Agreement calls for. That you could have had without the Russians. And maybe you could have had it without the Paris Agreement, but I doubt it.

Secretary Kissinger: You could not have had that—their definition of what the Paris Agreement calls for is exactly what they proposed before. The National Council for Reconciliation is the tripartite group they have been proposing all along; the PRG, those who stand for freedom, peace and independence—which is again the PRG; and other forces. Then that group is going to negotiate with the PRG. So two-thirds of the PRG is going to negotiate with three-thirds of the PRG. It’s going to be a rough negotiation. That is what they proposed before the Paris Accords.

Mr. Habib: If they pursue their military course, and gain the real military upper hand, which is quite possible, that is what they will do. Because that permits them to take it over with an aura of legitimacy.

Secretary Kissinger: Exactly. But there is nothing Moscow and Peking can do.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 78D443, Transcripts of Secretary of State Kissinger’s Staff Meetings, 1973–1977, Box 6. Secret. According to an attached list, the following officials attended the meeting: Kissinger, Ingersoll, Sisco, Eagleburger, Sonnenfeldt, Davis, Rogers, Habib, Hartman, Hyland, Lewis, Katz, Anderson, Vest, Buffum, Leigh, Springsteen, and Bremer.


3 Reference is to the agreement to end the war in Vietnam signed in Paris on January 28, 1973, by the United States, South Vietnam, North Vietnam, and the Provisional Revolutionary Government.
Mr. Habib: I don’t think so. If you get to that stage, they may be prepared to facilitate that sort of an arrangement, yes.

Secretary Kissinger: But to make an approach to Moscow and Peking now would just get us kicked in the teeth.

Mr. Habib: It will get you the same answer you have gotten for the last two or three months.

Secretary Kissinger: Do you agree with that?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Not necessarily. I don’t know about Peking.

Secretary Kissinger: Well, will you draft what we would say to the Russians, Hal?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Yes.

Secretary Kissinger: Seriously.

Mr. Habib: It would be interesting if there were something you could say at the same time to them, if it would move this thing away from the course it is on.

Secretary Kissinger: I would be interested to see it. What would we say?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Well, I don’t think anything we say is going to make any difference in Moscow. I think they have to see it in terms of other interests.

Secretary Kissinger: But what would we ask them to do?

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: Well, presumably what you are asking them to do is to stop the fighting and have some kind of a negotiated outcome, which means the end of Thieu in the process—that is clear.

Mr. Habib: You don’t need Moscow to do that.

Mr. Sonnenfeldt: There is a difference between a precondition and an outcome.

Secretary Kissinger: There would be something wrong if we left one of our friends standing.

Mr. Habib: They require it as a precondition.

Secretary Kissinger: The only one we missed is Souvanna Phouma.4

[Omitted here is discussion of the Azores, Sikkim, Vietnamese refugees, and a proposed visit by Egyptian Foreign Minister Fahmy.]

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4 Souvanna Phouma remained in office as Prime Minister of Laos until December 2.
142. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Moscow, Peking and Vietnam

The line taken by James Reston may become an increasingly strong one in coming weeks. Both Liberals and Conservatives seem to agree that we should invoke “détente” with Moscow and Peking: the Liberals see our objective as arranging the “elegant” demise of the South Vietnamese Government, while the Conservatives simply want to discredit the policy of rapprochement. There are several problems with any new démarche to Moscow or Peking:

—There have been no genuine signals from Hanoi, as reported by Reston; on the contrary, the North Vietnamese/PRG line is basically intransigent; even the precondition of Thieu’s removal is couched in proclamations that the tide is irreversible, that “total victory” is obtainable, and that there must be a general uprising.

—Even if Peking and Moscow were disposed to be of assistance for reasons other than Vietnam, their ability to influence the situation is questionable; Hanoi’s offensive is gathering momentum once again, and unless its military forces are checked in the next several days, the prospects for making a “deal” are virtually nil; moreover, why at this moment of success should either Peking or Moscow jeopardize its position in Hanoi, which each has been so careful to protect all these years?

—On the other hand, if some dialogue should develop, what would our position be: we would be in some danger of dealing for the removal of Thieu, at the very moment we are trying to gain support for stabilization; if either Moscow or Peking should, by some chance, respond with assurances that negotiations could begin immediately after Thieu’s removal, then the Restons will raise the cry for just that. We should bear in mind that after Lon Nol departed, there was absolutely no genuine effort made by any party to negotiate a humanitarian end in Phnom Penh. Moreover, the PRG representative recently made it clear

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Apr–May 1975. Secret; Eyes Only. Sonnenfeldt initialed the memorandum; Hyland did not.

2 See Document 141 and footnote 2 thereto.
to Don Fraser\textsuperscript{3}—whom he had every reason to want to conciliate—that they would not accept a ceasefire.

—Finally, Soviet (and Chinese) inaction in response to urgings from us that they play a constructive role can be used to discredit détente even more perhaps than our failure to call on the Russians to live up to it in the first place.

(One might also make an “objective” argument: ever since 1972, if not indeed since 1969, it has been clear that we were disengaging from Vietnam and that in the end this would lead to the takeover of the country. Our early approaches to the Russians as well as the Chinese could be seen as in the first instance designed to facilitate our withdrawal. In a sense the new relationships with both the USSR and China can therefore be said to have been based on the presumption of the “loss” of Vietnam. At any rate, that is how it must have seemed to Moscow. On this interpretation it would be an incongruous act for us now to hold it against the Soviets (or Chinese) that history is taking its long-anticipated course and to challenge one of the original premises of détente. Again, on this interpretation, the Soviets would be violating the premises of détente only if they sought to create a special, advantageous position for themselves in the place we vacated.)

The arguments against the Reston line therefore are: (1) neither Moscow nor Peking are in control; (2) neither has any incentive to deliver Hanoi on anything but terms of GVN capitulation; (3) we would jeopardize our entire strategy by becoming involved in a negotiation to remove Thieu; (4) no such bargaining can even be contemplated in the face of a massive offensive which is clearly beginning again; (5) our détente policies would be ever more discredited once the Soviets and Chinese had ignored or rebuffed our initiatives.

Against all of this, on the other hand, we should ask: do we have an interest in establishing a record to answer criticism such as Reston’s?

—It can be argued that we will turn détente into a farce if we refuse to invoke it, even if we know it to be in vain; can we expect any respect if we allow both Peking and Moscow to escape any and all responsibility?

—Even if they could not foresee the debacle of last month, it is completely inconceivable that they did not know that Hanoi would embark on some offensive, which regardless of its limited nature would be a violation of the Paris agreements (both Peking and Moscow had high-level military delegations in Hanoi in December and received notes from us in February).

\textsuperscript{3} Representative Donald M. Fraser (Democrat, Minnesota) was an outspoken opponent of U.S. involvement in Indochina.
—While it may be naive to criticize Peking and Moscow for maintaining supplies to Hanoi, that is not the same as allowing them to evade action now that Hanoi has occupied much of South Vietnam.

—In other words, another appeal on a ceasefire as the prelude to some form of negotiations could be made; it would also be an opportunity to make the record that demands for Thieu’s dismissal were totally unacceptable and completely phony.

—The final argument, as far as Moscow is concerned, is that if, in fact, there is some nervousness in the Soviet leadership about our ultimate reaction to Indochina, then this may be an opportune moment to make a démarche (the removal of Shelepin indicates that Brezhnev is certainly still in charge, but, at the same time, that the politics of succession are also being activated). Not coincidentally, the firing of Shelepin, of all people, could have been intended by Brezhnev as a sacrifice on the altar of détente.

(There may also be an “objective” argument that is the reciprocal of the one cited on the first side of the ledger: if one of the premises of détente is that we would disengage from a position like Vietnam then perhaps it is equally a premise that someday somewhere the Soviets will be expected to do likewise [Cuba?]. A way might be found to confront Brezhnev with this implication.)

Thus, on balance, a warning shot on Indochina probably ought to be made, to reduce our vulnerabilities on Soviet and even Chinese policies. A sophisticated presentation to Gromyko could be made by Stoessel, which would give it more visibility.

Stoessel’s presentation could concentrate on the following points:

1. Moscow has a responsibility to weigh carefully the implications of a blatant violation of agreements to which it is a signatory; the argument that Thieu violated the accords can in no way justify a massive military attack; both Hanoi and Moscow were at liberty to seek redress through diplomatic channels.

4 Aleksandr N. Shelepin, Chairman of the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions, was ousted as a member of the Politburo at the meeting of the Central Committee on April 16. Shinn assessed this development in an April 18 memorandum to Sonnenfeldt, which noted that the meeting “may well have marked the denouement of an intensive internal Soviet debate on détente. Brezhnev clearly came out on top and his policies were reaffirmed. The rejection of a more doctrinaire, assertive posture was epitomized by the removal of his antagonist of long-standing, Shelepin, from the Politburo. At the plenum, a consensus was struck on continuing the ‘peace program’ of the 24th Congress, which was carefully justified in orthodox, ideological verbiage.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Apr–May 1975)

5 Brackets in the original.
2. The USSR is committed to avoid any action that encourages the use of force in two solemn agreements with the US; while we are not charging Soviet connivance in the offensive, we are insisting that the USSR take action now to halt further military action.

3. To insist on the removal of Thieu is merely a disguise for refusing a ceasefire and the opening of any negotiations; if this is the real Soviet position, we can only assume that they prefer a military outcome.

4. The Soviet leaders must recognize that in the US many voices are being raised questioning the value of détente, if it does not lead the USSR to use its influence in favor of ending the fighting and urging negotiations, without unrealistic conditions.

5. Our ability to conduct a positive policy toward the USSR cannot help but be affected by how American opinion interprets Soviet behavior in this crisis.6

In sum, there are pros and cons to making any further approach to Moscow beyond the general démarche sent in the wake of the President's speech.7 On balance, there would seem to be some slight advantage in making a stronger record, rather than remaining vulnerable to attacks on our passivity, provided that we make a fairly straightforward case, as outlined above.

There is also an argument to be made for approaching the Chinese along the same lines; we would presumably want to add the note that if the Chinese expect us to deal effectively with the Soviets in Europe, then it cannot be in their interest to support a major catastrophe in Saigon, that will arouse latent criticism of our China policy (e.g., Reston) and drive us toward isolationism.

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6 No evidence has been found that Stoessel delivered such a démarche in Moscow.
7 Reference is to the President's address before a joint session of Congress on April 10 to review U.S. foreign policy, including the crisis in Vietnam. For the text, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 179. On April 10 and 11, the United States delivered identical notes to the Soviet Union, China, the United Kingdom, France, Hungary, Poland, Indonesia, and Iran, calling on those governments to support an immediate cease-fire in Vietnam. For the text of the note, see Department of State Bulletin, April 28, 1975, p. 539. Stoessel handed Gromyko the note in Moscow on April 11. (Telegram 5069 from Moscow, April 11; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
143. Oral Note From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, April 18, 1975.

The President wishes the following brought to the urgent attention of General Secretary Brezhnev.

For the past three years Soviet-American relations have proceeded from the Basic Principles of May 1972, and above all from the principle of restraint. The situation in Viet-Nam has now reached a point, that the United States and the USSR must consider the long term consequences of further developments there for Soviet-American relations and for the international situation as a whole. There is little to be gained from a debate over the origins of the present situation or over which parties must be held responsible.

Under present circumstances our overriding concern is to achieve controlled conditions, which will save lives and permit the continued evacuation of American citizens and those South Vietnamese to whom we have a direct and special obligation. This can only be achieved through a temporary cease fire.

We urgently request that the Government of the USSR use its good offices to achieve a temporary halt to the fighting. In this connection, we are prepared to discuss the special political circumstances that could make this possible. We request the most expeditious answer.

Talking Points
—We are not going to the Chinese or any other intermediary; nor are we willing to approach the DRV.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Apr–May 1975. No classification marking. The date is handwritten. According to marginalia, the note was “given by HAK to Dobrynin 4/19 9:30 a.m., with agreement that bracketed clause can be omitted by D when transmitting to Moscow.” The talking points that follow the note were presumably prepared for Kissinger’s use during the meeting.

2 Ford and Kissinger discussed the oral note during a meeting at 9:12 a.m. on April 18: “President: What about China and the Soviet Union. Kissinger: I think we should send them a message. Say they have responsibility for what they put in. We have responsibility because if we had held our end up, what they sent wouldn’t have mattered. I think we should go to them and say we are interested in getting our people and some Vietnamese out and we are prepared to discuss the situation. President: How about Thieu? Kissinger: I think we should keep Thieu there until we get a response from the Chinese and the Soviets. Thieu will go in any event, but it may be followed by chaos. We could approach the Chinese and Russians tomorrow and then see about Thieu. We could have a three to four week holdout, but the fear in South Vietnam could mean three to four days.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11)

3 Kissinger bracketed by hand the previous words in this sentence: “of further developments there for Soviet-American relations and.” See footnote 1 above.
—We are going to Moscow because it is in our long term mutual interest that the situation be brought to its conclusion in a manner that does not jeopardize Soviet-American relations, or affect the attitude of the American people toward other international problems.

—If there is a temporary cease fire, we would be prepared to convene the Paris Conference immediately, or we can consider alternatives that the Soviet Union might work out with Hanoi.

—During the period of a temporary cease fire we would be willing to halt military supplies.

—But we are concerned that there will be attacks on the airfields, that will make it impossible to continue an orderly reduction in American citizens.

—Moreover, we have detected Soviet surface-to-air missiles within 50 miles of Saigon; any attack on passenger aircraft would create a most dangerous situation.

—In light of the developing military situation, we need to know now whether there is a chance for a temporary halt in the fighting that might permit a political process to start.

[—The Soviets’ answer will have a significant bearing on our relations.]4

4 Brackets in the original.
144. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, April 24, 1975, 4 p.m.

K: Anatoly.

D: Hello Henry. I received the following message from Brezhnev to President Ford. He asked me to go through you. First I will read it and then I could dictate to your secretary.\(^2\)

K: Alright.

D: As it has already been said to the President, immediately after the message of the President of April 19\(^3\) was received by L.E. Brezhnev we took appropriate steps to get in touch with the Vietnamese side in this connection.

As a result of these contacts now we can inform the President about the following. The position of the Vietnamese side on the question of evacuation of American citizens from South Vietnam is definitely positive. The Vietnamese stated that they have no intention to put any obstacles in the course of military actions to the evacuation of American citizens from South Vietnam and that now in fact favorable conditions have been established for such an evacuation.

At the same time, it was emphasized that in the struggle for achieving a political settlement, the Vietnamese side will proceed from the Paris Agreement. We were also told that the Vietnamese do not intend to damage the prestige of the United States.

Informing the President of the above in a confidential manner, L.E. Brezhnev expresses his hopes that the President will duly appreciate such a position of the Vietnamese side and will not allow any action on the United States’ part which would be fraught with a new exacerbation of the situation in Indochina.

K: What does it mean in practice?

D: There is no obstacle at all to evacuation of United States citizens. None at all and they have established conditions for this particular process and their attitude towards this is positive.

K: Ok.

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. An excerpt from the transcript was published in Henry Kissinger, Crisis: The Anatomy of Two Major Foreign Policy Crises, pp. 497–498.

\(^2\) A typewritten copy of the message that is nearly identical to the text read by Dobrynin is in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 15, Misc. Docs, Tels, Etc. 1975 (Folder 6).

\(^3\) Document 143.
D: And something on the political side too.
K: Can you explain that? They don’t want to go further than the Paris Accords?
D: The basis for a political settlement is still the Paris Agreement.
K: Would you be prepared to ask them what they mean by that?
D: I would ask them . . .
K: No, let me check with the President first.
D: Would you like me to dictate it?
K: Yes, just a minute.4

4 During an NSC meeting on Vietnam evacuation in the Cabinet Room at 4:35 p.m., Kissinger briefed the participants on the Soviet message: “This means, in effect, that if we keep the dialogue going we have an assurance against military action as we pull our people out. On the political side, the tripartite arrangement gives us the hope of a coalition solution which can be better than surrender. We will go back to the Soviets to find out what they mean by implementation of the Paris Accords and to say we will cooperate. We will say we won’t take precipitate action and we assume they won’t.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11)
145. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 9, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Amb. to U.S.
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President: I appreciate the letter from the General Secretary. [Tab A]

Dobrynin: This is just a little memento from the General Secretary. Henry and Brent have seen it.

[General Scowcroft leaves the meeting for a few minutes.]

The President: As I said in the press conference, I am pleased with the state of our relations but I think we have to make substantive progress.

Dobrynin: Yes. I think there are prospects for the European Security Conference, then the summit.

The President: We are hopeful that Congress will take some action, but this one is more difficult than usual. Compared to previous ones, there is a division of leadership. We used to condemn Rayburn for being dictatorial but he looks good compared to this. But from a long-range point of view, the Congress is losing support with the public.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11. Secret. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Dobrynin from 10:04 to 10:19 a.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files)

2 At Tab A is a letter from Brezhnev to Ford, dated May 8, marking the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe. According to a transcript of the conversation, Dobrynin called Kissinger at 11:50 a.m. on May 8 and requested an appointment “tomorrow for five minutes to deliver the letter.” Dobrynin added: “[A]nd maybe you and the President would like to say a few words in reply to the telegram to the President by Chairman [Brezhnev].” Kissinger promised to “see what we can do.” (Ibid., National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, Box 31, Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons (2)) Kissinger met with Ford before the appointment and suggested: “I would be slightly cool to Dobrynin.” (Ibid., Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11)

3 During his press conference on May 6, Ford stated: “I think between now and the end of 1976 we are going to make progress in the negotiations for a SALT II agreement. It hasn’t been finalized, but the atmosphere is good. There is going to be some hard negotiating, but I will approach that important meeting with Mr. Brezhnev aimed at achieving results, and I think his attitude will reflect the same.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 243)

4 Sam Rayburn, former Congressman (Democrat, Texas) and Speaker of the House.
Dobrynin: What do you think of the Middle East? The General Secretary said we would do everything in our power to help. We know you are now reassessing.

The President: We are reevaluating—we will be talking to Sadat and Rabin. In the meantime we hope nothing will erupt, but we cannot tolerate a stalemate. Does the General Secretary feel we should go to Geneva?

Dobrynin: Yes. It is a difficult ordeal, but we should do the whole thing rather than ordeal after ordeal. We have the feeling that more and more people in this country support a complete settlement. It is surprising how few cries there are in opposition now.

President: I think there is a change in public opinion. But that opinion fluctuates. We are getting views from a wide variety of people, but we must move soon because we can’t permit stagnation.

[The President hands Ambassador Dobrynin a letter. Tab B]  
Please give the General Secretary my regards and best wishes on this historical day. Where were you on V. E. Day?

Dobrynin: I was a fighter aircraft engineer. I picked up a rifle only when the Germans were ten miles from Moscow. We had a potato garden and my wife and I dug in the garden.

And here is a letter from our Parliament to all allied Parliaments. [Tab C]

[There was small talk about the future of Vladivostok, and the meeting ended.]

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5 At Tab B is a letter from Ford to Brezhnev, dated May 9, marking the 30th anniversary of the end of World War II in Europe.
6 Attached but not printed.
146. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 14, 1975, 9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: The sponsors of my [Kansas City] speech included NAACP, Labor, and so on, so it just wasn’t conservatives. They were up in arms over the CIA, and worried over Vietnam.

President: On the Middle East?
Kissinger: There was no great support for Israel. No great opposition either. But it is obvious that Israel is after me. [He discussed the Matti Golan book incident.] They must have known about the manuscript but they never told us. How did the documents leak?

President: As I read the articles, I thought we should demand a copy of the book.
Kissinger: Then we would have to confirm or deny it. We should demand a report of the issue. But not even the Soviets have leaked the substance of our discussions, however much it might have been to their advantage.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the Middle East and domestic politics.]

President: I told Sid Yates we would probably have to go to Geneva, and we have warned both of them about making military moves.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 On May 13, Kissinger delivered an address on “Strengthening the World Economic Structure” before the Kansas City International Relations Council. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1975, pp. 713–719.

3 Reference is to a book manuscript written by Matti Golan, an Israeli journalist. On May 13, The New York Times reported that Rabin had told his Cabinet that Kissinger “would probably have to resign and that Israeli-American relations would be seriously damaged if the material was made public.” (Terence Smith, “Israel Bars Publication of a Manuscript Disclosing Secret Remarks of Kissinger,” p. 2) See also Matti Golan, The Secret Conversations of Henry Kissinger: Step-by-Step Diplomacy in the Middle East (New York: Quadrangle, 1976).

4 Congressman Sidney R. Yates (Democrat, Illinois). According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Yates at 12:01 p.m. on May 13 to discuss negotiations in the Middle East. (Ford Library, White House Office Files)
Kissinger: I think I have to tell Gromyko we are prepared to go to Geneva.

President: He asked about Jordan. I showed him what we have given Israel and I said we have no apologies.

Kissinger: Asad replied to your letter of six weeks ago. I’ll send it in—with my MemCon. It is very friendly. You flattered them out of their minds by offering to meet him in connection with CSCE. He will send the Foreign Minister here after Rabin’s visit. We should hear him the end of June and announce the 1st of July.

I would tell Gromyko we wouldn’t have any separate maneuvers before Geneva, but we are not ready to discuss the impact of it before your consultations. Geneva wouldn’t be before late July or August.

President: Would that interfere with the Brezhnev summit?

Kissinger: Brezhnev seems in some trouble again. According to Congressman Bennett, he’s going into the hospital again.

You can’t cooperate with the Soviet Union on the Middle East beforehand or they will preempt us.

On SALT, we have to be careful not to drive the Soviets beyond a certain point. We are better off in coordinating a tough policy by keeping détente.

We would be better off if there was a right wing. Jackson is hurting us badly by going left. I think you are strong now—once you get off the Eastern seaboard you are in good shape. There were 5,000 people standing in front of the Statehouse. These people want to be proud of their President. They want the Republican convention in Kansas City.

President: That’s not a bad idea.

Kissinger: I will have a rocky session with Gromyko because he will want a commitment on the Middle East.

[Omitted here is Kissinger’s briefing for the President’s upcoming meeting with Johannes den Uyl, Prime Minister of the Netherlands.]

5 Kissinger met Assad in Damascus on March 9 and 15 to discuss the Middle East peace process.

6 Charles E. Bennett (Democrat, Florida).

7 During a meeting with Ford at 9:25 a.m. on May 16, Kissinger continued to discuss his upcoming meeting with Gromyko: “The major problem will be Gromyko. He will have three things: CSCE, SALT, and the Middle East. CSCE is out of our hands; we are staying a step behind the Europeans. The only question is the date. The Soviet Union and France want 13 July. I would not spend more than three days. For everyone to give a speech would take 4–5 days.” The meeting then concluded with the following exchange: “[Kissinger:] I’ll agree to the last week of July with Gromyko, if nothing happens. You would come to the last two days and the signing ceremony. President: Can I put in my speech that this doesn’t involve territorial matters? Kissinger: No, it does not affect the Baltic states. We can brief the press on that, but Jackson and the like will hit us on that. On the Middle East, I will be tough with him.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 11)
Vienna, May 19, 1975, 5:05–6:10 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrei Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

[Photographers are let in, then ushered out.]

Kissinger: I’ve lost two kilos in the last four weeks. It’s a great achievement. Fat.

Gromyko: No, just husky.

Kissinger: I’ll be a lot in Austria, during the next two weeks. I’ll give a press conference in Salzburg. Twice before we stopped in Salzburg on the way.

Gromyko: To get accustomed to the time.

Kissinger: In ‘72 on the way to Moscow; in ‘74 on the way to the Middle East.

Gromyko: You have to take a deep breath before starting.

U.S.-Soviet Relations

Kissinger: I notice the Foreign Minister is giving me publicity by name.2 I hope you are not disappointed that I didn’t reciprocate. My father is glad.

Gromyko: But I praised you.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974-1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, May 19-20, 1975—Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Vienna (1). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Marble Room at the Hotel Imperial.

2 Reference is to Gromyko’s speech during a ceremonial meeting of the Warsaw Pact in Moscow on May 14. The Embassy in Moscow provided two lengthy reports in telegrams 6766 and 6767, May 15. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) For the condensed English text of the speech, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 20 (June 11, 1975), pp. 6–8. For an account in the American press, see Christopher S. Wren, “Gromyko Chides Kissinger on Large Defense Budget,” The New York Times, May 15, 1975, p. 3. At Kissinger’s behest, Sonnenfeldt met with Vorontsov on May 15 to “express the Secretary’s surprise at the personal criticisms” in Gromyko’s speech, which were “not only unfair, unreasonable and inaccurate, but also unwise in terms of the debate we are now coping with.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Apr–May 1975)
Kissinger: That paragraph wasn’t reported.

Gromyko: I said Dr. Kissinger made a very good statement in favor of détente. And then a second paragraph I quoted you.

Kissinger: On the defense budget.

Gromyko: I quoted your statement that the President sees no higher duty than guarding against nuclear war. And then I just added one phrase: that perhaps it was a bit hard to bring into line those two good statements with a statement on inflated military budgets. That’s all.

Kissinger: Not an inflated budget; an adequate budget. I never saw the text, only the press reports, which picked out the negative part.

Gromyko: That is what the press did—it was mild, but negative, and the press picked it out.

Kissinger: Must have been extemporaneous.

Gromyko: I got the text, just a half hour before I spoke.

Kissinger: I meant the [St. Louis] speech\(^3\) to be constructive.

Gromyko: If you, for example, were to say in public that “Gromyko gave a high estimate of my statements about détente and diverting the threat of nuclear war, but was not in favor of my statement about military budgets,” I’d be happy if you quoted me.

Kissinger: I avoid naming any Soviet leaders, because I know the tendency of the press to make a conflict out of it.

Gromyko: I certainly see the newspapers have a tendency to pick out what’s to their advantage and leave out what isn’t.

How do you think we should organize our meetings? Let me suggest perhaps today we should start with European affairs and other directly related matters, and tomorrow morning we could take up SALT and also the Middle East tomorrow. These are the three major topics which I’m sure will take up the lion’s share.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: And then other intermediate points.

Kissinger: I agree. That’s a good order. Maybe while we are here, we can have a brief assessment of how our relations are.

Gromyko: I agree. We can do it here, at the outset. Let me start by saying I bring you greetings from Leonid Brezhnev and he asked me to convey greetings also to President Ford.

Kissinger: And so did President Ford ask me to convey greetings to the General Secretary.

\(^3\) On May 12, Kissinger delivered an address on “The Challenge of Peace” before the St. Louis World Affairs Council. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, June 2, 1975, pp. 705–712.
Gromyko: Thank you. If you have something to tell me regarding our bilateral relations, I’ll be happy to reciprocate, and I’ll be happy to hear yours.

Kissinger: Our assessment is that the reasons that caused us to pursue the policy of détente are still valid, and the main line of our policy should be continued. We have a Presidential election next year and we are prepared to defend very hard the policy of détente if our opponent is one who takes a critical view of our relations. We believe the majority of the American people support our policy. I have said many times publicly that if we don’t solve the problems of our relations we will have 10 years of struggle, and somebody else will have to solve it. Neither of us can impose his will on the other. We believe we should use the favorable circumstances now as an opportunity to maintain or accelerate the momentum. President Ford and I are prepared to continue and if possible deepen this relationship.

On the other hand, there have been difficulties, especially in recent months, which perhaps neither of us was aware of. I believe both of us should look at areas where our rivalry could lead to confrontations. In Indochina, whatever the outcome was, it was certainly accelerated by Soviet arms deliveries; in the Middle East we should both play a restraining role. There is no point discussing Indochina; because it’s now past history. I mention it only as an example.

Our objective is to implement the principles we signed in 1972, to make progress in SALT, on the European question, and to start up progress in trade relations. If our relations proceed as we expect, the President is prepared in early summer to go to the Congress again. We should discuss how we can avoid an escalation of the crisis.

This is our assessment.

Gromyko: We can but voice our positive attitude to your statement that the reasons that caused the need for efforts on both sides to better our relations still exist. Therefore the policy of détente which has been pursued by both the Soviet Union and the U.S. has an objectively stable foundation, provided of course that neither side takes steps to make corrections in a negative direction. This is the firm conviction of Leonid Brezhnev and of our entire leadership. We have no intention to take negative corrections; we firmly intend to pursue that policy. What you said in that direction is a hopeful sign, and it means that both sides must take a positive attitude.

Previously President Nixon and later President Ford and you yourself have many times emphasized and reemphasized the fact that a great deal in terms of détente and the conditions of the world climate still depend on the policy taken by our two countries.

Kissinger: We still believe it.
Gromyko: We believe it is still correct, and we believe it brings great responsibility on the two of us. It is a duty rather than a privilege. That is something we recognize. We too recognize that neither of us can impose our policy on the entire world; we certainly don’t attempt to do it, though there are some who do.

Kissinger: They have elevated the adjectives they use about us, without lowering the adjectives they use about you.

Gromyko: We believe we should continue our policy because it is in the interests of the entire world.

[Sukhodrev:] He was talking about China?

Sukhodrev: Yes.

Gromyko: [to Kissinger:] The most characteristic feature of the relationship between our two countries has been the line that you and I just referred to; it must be continued. Neither of us should allow any room for the display of emotions in these relations. Of course, matters will not always follow the course that suits the line of both of us, but we should ensure that coolness and logic should always have the upper hand. But we have noticed in the recent past . . . Perhaps not at all times matters would proceed in a direction that either one or the other of us would like, but we must always be guided by the need to be cool in our thinking and logic must prevail. We have noticed a certain toughness in language and attitude in certain statements by President Ford and yourself, and you must agree that statements of that kind are fundamental to U.S. foreign policy. And certain attempts are made to explain those statements. We believe nothing can justify those statements or the lack of consistency in that line. There is no such change in our behavior towards the United States. And we do not in our own papers or magazines use any such language—or in official statements. So if both sides proceed from the statement that one side can pursue a line and the next week say “we’re not sure the other side wants to take that line,” what would the situation come to if both start taking that attitude? If both of us do that, no doubt that a crack will appear in our relationships and the policy will be shaken and undermined. It will only cause glee on the part of those who attack détente and do not wish good to the Soviet Union and also yourselves.

We believe that all our business should be conducted in a serious and statesmanlike way.

You cannot reproach our side because we never tried to cause doubt on the foundations of détente. But it is a fact that you and the President publicly called the relations into question.

And you have publicly called the Soviet Union an adversary [protivnik]. As if it were night instead of daylight, you just up and call us adversary. Nowhere in the Soviet press will you see the U.S. called an
adversary. And such statements of the United States leaders cause our people to wonder, “how can that be? So many documents have been signed—on the prevention of nuclear war, for better understanding—and then it turns out the U.S. calls us adversary.” We have given no response up to now, even though it’s harder to make no response than to take the initiative. We certainly cannot accept as justification for those statements the existing domestic situation or any other circumstances that may crop up from one time to another.

Kissinger: I agree that we both should exercise restraint both in language and in action. I will take a look at speeches; I am conscious . . . but in January there was intensified treatment in the Soviet press of American difficulties. I called it to the attention of your Ambassador. This was from January to the end of March. There was intensified treatment of the domestic situation and the historical situation of the United States. So serious people began to wonder whether it was a major decision at the Central Committee meeting in December. Since then we have seen, and you have reconfirmed it tonight, that there is no change. But there were statements, not of your leaders but of your public organs, which, however, are not responsive.

Secondly, events this spring have had an impact on public opinion. When the American position in some part of the world is overthrown by Soviet arms, that is an historical fact. You could argue that it would have happened sooner or later, but it was not in our interest that it happen sooner. It strengthened the hand of those who questioned it [détente] from the beginning. But the basic policy laid down in the documents at two summits and reaffirmed by President Ford when he met the General Secretary is the same. But I will pay attention to our public statements.

Gromyko: If there is anything that strikes the eye in an objective study of our press, it’s that the Soviet press and radio and television displayed the greatest restraint in the treatment of the United States. If what you refer to relates to ideological struggle, ideological matters, that’s a different matter. Whatever appears there in the Soviet press, it’s an infinitesimal part of what’s written about the Soviet Union in the United States and in Western Europe. You know a veritable mountain of material appears there, which is essentially hostile. You were right to refer in your speech to differences, but it’s entirely wrong to confuse the two areas, foreign policy and the area of ideology, the struggle of ideology.

Let me say in your remarks that the United States can’t be a passive observer if events have a negative impact on the United States and happen through the existence of Soviet arms. Let me say that wherever there are Soviet arms, on the other side there are American arms. That was the case in Vietnam, in Cambodia, in the Middle East. So wherever
there are Soviet arms there are American arms on the other side—with the sole difference that there are rather more American arms. Take Africa as one case. There are Soviet arms, but again, more American arms. And on a purely commercial basis. When a war starts with the arms of both sides, every time are we to quarrel? Are we to allow that to lead to the heating up of our relations? There is, after all, a basic foundation on which our relationship is built, and that must surely be most important.

That is what I wanted to say in the introductory part of our meetings. I hope you understand the concern of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev and the leadership, and the concern for the great responsibility of the two of us for matters in the world, and that is why we cannot but be concerned. But let me repeat that we stick to the line, and I’m authorized to confirm this, and I hope you report to President Ford.

Kissinger: I appreciate these last remarks and I will report meticulously to President Ford, and he will appreciate it.

With regard to arms, there are different types of situations. In Vietnam, it is not true there were more American than Soviet arms, and ours were on defensive along 700 miles, and yours were always on the offensive.

In Africa, if we look at Somalia, the amount of arms in Somalia is greater than the number of American arms in any surrounding country.

Gromyko: Are you sure?

Kissinger: Yes. And we’re not sending much arms to Ethiopia.

In South Vietnam, South Vietnam did not have the capability and we would not have permitted them, to launch an offensive—maybe harassment but not a general offensive. The North Vietnamese had the capability always for an offensive, and to give more arms in that situation is significant. However we got it, it was bound to have an impact on the international situation and the domestic situation, though we can handle both. The Middle East is a special case, which I will discuss tomorrow. But I think that both sides should show restraint in situations where indirectly it could lead to problems. We have shown great restraint in East Europe. There are many areas where activities take place that could have indirect significance.

Therefore both sides should—on the basis of reciprocity—look carefully at situations where our actions could cause embarrassment to the other.

I had a long talk with President Ford Friday and Saturday before I came. He too wants me to reaffirm that the basic policy remains. He

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4 For the meeting on Friday, May 16, see footnote 7, Document 146. Ford and Kissinger, however, evidently did not speak to each other, either in person or by telephone, on May 17. (Ford Library, White House Office Files, President’s Daily Diary; and Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 439, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule)
wants to work on the remaining difficulties that exist and move forward and accelerate our relations. Perhaps we should focus on these efforts.

Gromyko: Let me just say that we will most firmly keep to the line that has taken shape in our relationships with the United States the last several years. In our view, neither side should allow third countries, wherever they may be situated, to shake that line in any measure. Either through direct influence or indirectly, and no extraneous factors. When I say no third countries, I mean no small countries, no big countries, and no combination of countries should be allowed to shake the line.

Kissinger: We agree with that.

[The private meeting ended at 6:10 p.m. On the way to the dining room, the Foreign Minister gave the Secretary a note quoting the text of the Foreign Minister’s comments on the Secretary’s St. Louis speech. Tab A.5]

5 Attached but not printed. Kissinger and Gromyko met in the Gobelin Saal at the Hotel Imperial from 6:15 to 8:35 p.m. to discuss the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. The memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 284. The two men then met for dinner in the hotel’s dining room from 9 to 10 p.m. A memorandum of their dinner conversation is in Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, May 19–20, 1975—Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Vienna (1).

148. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report on his first day’s meetings in Vienna.

“I met for nearly two hours with Austrian Chancellor Kreisky.”


2 A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Kreisky in Vienna on May 19 is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files, P820124–0443.
“Kreisky was as usual talkative and friendly. We talked mainly about the Middle East and Europe. Kreisky feels strongly that Israelis must show flexibility and he is critical of their failure to do so, which he thinks has cost them much sympathy and bargaining leverage. The Israelis have tried to persuade him with private communications that basic responsibility for the failure of the last shuttle rested with Sadat, but even without my explanation of what actually happened, Kreisky has essentially correct appreciation of the situation. He feels strongly that if we miss the opportunity we may face a decade of turmoil.

“I briefly discussed CSCE summit with Kreisky who strongly agrees it should be brief—no more than two or two and a half days—with speechmaking cut down to minimum time.

“Kreisky is most pleased with your forthcoming Salzburg meeting, as well as mine here with Gromyko, because he sees these kinds of functions as buttressing Austrian security. Publicly and privately, Kreisky expressed warm anticipation of your visit and great appreciation of you.

“I had five hours of continuous discussions with Gromyko in the afternoon and evening.

“I met with him alone first, for over an hour. He complained about the tone of speeches given recently by you and me which seemed to be tougher on the Soviet Union. I assured him that you were committed to the policy of détente and would defend it firmly against opponents in the election year coming up. On the other hand, there were a number of situations around the world where our rivalry could bring us into confrontation and damage the overall relationship. I cited Vietnam several times as an example of a dangerous situation exacerbated by Soviet arms. Gromyko pointed to the American arms on the other side; I made it clear that they had to take responsibility for consequences brought about by their weapons regardless of their intentions. (Later he told me the Soviets had thought the South Vietnamese were as strong as we said they were!)

“He expressed the Soviet leadership’s desire to maintain the line of détente and not to allow third countries, little or big (an obvious reference to China), to interfere with it.

“In formal meeting with Gromyko, we spent virtually the entire time on CSCE. Gromyko remains an inveterate haggler and we were not able to make enough progress on the so-called confidence building measures (advance notice of maneuvers) or ‘basket three’—human

3 President Ford visited Salzburg June 1–3 where he met with Kreisky and Egyptian President Sadat. After his return to Washington, he met with Israeli Prime Minister Rabin on June 11.

4 See Document 147.
contacts and improvements in operation of news media—to meet allied positions or our own requirements. At one point I threw in the point that at this rate it is unlikely that the July deadline for the summit finale can be met. Gromyko agreed to review the latest allied compromise on basket three overnight and to provide me with amendments in the morning. On the whole I am confident that we shall more or less stay on schedule but in the usual ungenerous haggling Soviet way.

“We did make some progress on the matter of follow-up to CSCE, where a compromise seems likely; it will be some kind of review conference of deputies after a year or two to review progress and make recommendations for possible next steps. The Russians, after first proposing elaborate follow-on machinery, have now become very cautious since they fear we will use such machinery to police their performance on basket three. Gromyko also agreed that the summit finale should be no more than three days with speeches as brief as possible.

“Substantive points during relaxed dinner, which I hosted, included (1) Gromyko’s disdain for the Cambodian regime, (2) his expectation that the two Vietnams will be unified after some lapse of time, (3) pessimistic references to Sino-Soviet relations and obvious concern about Sino-Japanese rapprochement. I made point of saying that we are concerned about possible Indian attack on Pakistan; he registered it but changed the subject.

“Tomorrow we go to the Soviet Embassy and expect to have further discussion of CSCE, then SALT and eventually Middle East. Gromyko seems in no haste on latter. On SALT, he has no experts along, apparently, and it is not clear how much he is prepared to deal on it.

“On the whole, Gromyko was much more cordial than when we last met. He seems determined to convey an impression of normalcy and indeed progress in our bilateral relations. This is not against our interests provided we are vigilant and firm enough to resist pressures in peripheral areas.

“We expect to issue normal communiqué tomorrow, which I will send to you as soon as it is agreed.”
149. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 20, 1975, 9:50–10:17 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff
Viktor Mikhaylovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA (Interpreter)

SUBJECTS
CSCE Summit; India–Pakistan

Gromyko: Your press is very ingenious.
Kissinger: But we are going to beat them down. I am going across the country and speaking.
Gromyko: Of the newspapers, which ones do you recommend I read?
Kissinger: In Washington, the Washington Post and New York Times are the most influential because everyone reads them. In the country, in St. Louis, no one reads the New York Times and the Post.
Gromyko: Well, Mr. Secretary, what do you think we should discuss, just the two of us?
Kissinger: I leave it up to you.
Gromyko: After all, in which direction are you and your friends conducting matters at the All-European Conference? Can I tell General Secretary Brezhnev and my colleagues the thing is in good hands, that Dr. Kissinger and President Ford have things firmly in hand and are working toward an early conclusion?
Kissinger: We are working toward a summit the last week of July. What is the Monday?
Sukhodrev: [Checks calendar] The 28th.
Kissinger: No.
Sukhodrev: The 21st.
Kissinger: Yes. We are planning on that week.
Gromyko: Regarding the length of time to be set aside, I have had several occasions to talk this over with the General Secretary, and his

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, May 19–20, 1975—Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Vienna (2). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.
opinion is not in discord from President Ford—that is, two, two and a half, three days. That too is acceptable to us. It should be conducted in a businesslike style. Who needs those speeches?

Kissinger: I talked to Kreisky and he agrees. I’ll talk to Schmidt tomorrow.2

Gromyko: I heard he wants four–five days.

Kissinger: So have I.

Gromyko: But I don’t think he will be very strong on it.

Kissinger: If we can get Schmidt, I think the French and British will go along.

May I tell him this is agreeable to you?

Gromyko: You may. You may.

Another question I have is this: Yesterday you and I discussed certain specific matters regarding the European Security Conference.3 You said you would continue to be in touch with your West European friends—this is our understanding.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Gromyko: Are you sure they won’t cast reproaches on you for being in some kind of collusion? Am I correct you were speaking with their knowledge?

Kissinger: No. It was my best estimate.

Take the confidence-building measures: If we say 30,000, 21 days and 250 kilometers, that I am sure we can get them to accept. If we said less, I can only say we will try. I am not saying it is impossible. It is our best estimate.

Gromyko: I was now asking really about the broad fact. In your estimate, will no one reproach us for collusion?

Kissinger: On what?

Gromyko: On CSCE generally. The French will say, “we are not bound”? I am just asking; because in the past it has happened.

Kissinger: Yes. Look, it is a problem, and it depends how it is handled. If we come to an understanding here and you let us handle it first with them before you approach them . . .

Gromyko: All right.

Kissinger: I think it is better we deal with it.

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2 A memorandum of Kissinger’s conversation with Schmidt in Bonn on May 21 is in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 23, Classified External Memcons, May–December 1975 (Folder 1).

3 See footnote 5, Document 147.
Gromyko: All right. Let me say quite frankly what we would be prepared to accept on these CBM’s. I was quite frank in my opinion yesterday on the depth of the zone. I would like you to understand our situation. And the same with the numbers.

Kissinger: Thirty.

Gromyko: But as regards the time limit of notification, we would be prepared to agree to 18 days. Our private position was twelve. We would be willing to do 18.

Kissinger: Why don’t we talk urgently to our allies, and let you know by next Monday, or Tuesday.\(^4\) We want to move it to a conclusion. There is no sense arguing about two days and 50 kilometers.

Gromyko: All right. Do that.

Kissinger: I think they will find it 50 kilometers too little. But why don’t we talk to them and make counterproposals if we have to?

Gromyko: Up ‘til now we have felt that whenever the U.S. really had the desire, problems were solved to mutual advantage. It happened in many cases, and we feel it will happen in the future.

Kissinger: We will talk to them.

Gromyko: As regards journalists, we have revised your text\(^5\) and made amendments. Korniyenko is supposed to give it to Hartman. But as regards the first part, human contacts, that is for the delegations to go into because I haven’t had time.

Kissinger: Except we should discuss them together. Our delegations can do it. Journalists and contacts together. Let them do it at Geneva. But they will move it.

Gromyko: Yes, but please don’t forget to give your delegation instructions at Geneva. In earlier cases when we reached agreement, sometimes we had the impression they didn’t get instructions.

Kissinger: Sometimes we had the impression your delegation didn’t get instructions. [Laughter] Maybe our delegations are both very cautious. We will do it, in the meeting. It depends really on what instructions you give. We have made a major effort; we would like to see some Soviet move.

Gromyko: Please don’t demand of us the impossible. Surely you don’t want to topple the Soviet system with that document.

Kissinger: I had great expectations. [Laughter]

Gromyko: We don’t try to topple the capitalist system.

Kissinger: If the Soviet system toppled, which I don’t expect by this document or otherwise, I am not sure the successor wouldn’t be more

\(^4\) May 26 or 27.

\(^5\) Not found.
of a problem. The government Solzhenitsyn would establish would be more aggressive.

Gromyko: To us, Solzhenitsyn is a zero within a zero.

Kissinger: On Basket III, we have met several of your points, and made a major effort. On several points of yours yesterday, I told you your positions were reasonable.

Gromyko: On “appropriate” points.

Kissinger: But also it depends on whether you accept some of the other points.

Gromyko: Then on those several points, Korniyenko probably already has given you our final communiqué. He has probably already done it.

Kissinger: It should not be significantly shorter than on the earlier occasion. It can be somewhat shorter.

Gromyko: This is a little bit shorter. It might be hard to go into detail, and not good to repeat formulas.

Kissinger: Let’s look at it.

There is one point I raised at dinner, that is, our view of Indian intentions, especially since India is buying a lot of Soviet arms. I just hope you keep an eye on it. Because so far, we have sold nothing to Pakistan. We have lifted the embargo but sold nothing.

Gromyko: India’s behavior gives us no concern.

Kissinger: If there were another Indian attack, it is something we would not take lightly.

Gromyko: We, generally speaking, are behaving very modestly regarding arms supplies to India. Maybe the information you have is exaggerated. We have absolutely no information that would cause us any concern regarding Indian intentions. There would be no sense for us to ignore any danger there because we are very concerned with the situation there, if there were any. And we say this to India.

Kissinger: And we say it to Pakistan and Iran. There is no danger now. It is for the long range.

Gromyko: We will act in this direction.

Kissinger: Good.

[At 10:17 a.m. the Secretary and Foreign Minister Gromyko joined their colleagues in the conference room for the main meeting.]
150. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 20, 1975, 10:20 a.m.–3:03 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy Fedorovich Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgiy Markovich Korniyenko, Chief, America Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Member of the Collegium of the MFA
Vasily Georgiyevich Makarov, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Chef de Cabinet
Mikhail Dmitriyevich Sytenko, Chief, Near Eastern Countries Department, MFA, and Member of the Collegium of the MFA
Yuriy Yevgeniyevich Fokin, Special Assistant to Gromyko
Oleg Mikhailovich Sokolov, Chief, American Section of American Department
Viktor Mikhailovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA and Interpreter (English)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director of Intelligence and Research
Jan Lodal, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
SALT; Middle East

Kissinger: Let me sum up. On the European Security Conference, I just want to sum up what our instruction will be to our delegation: that they should negotiate simultaneously human contacts, all Basket III together, with your delegation. The speed with which this can be done will depend also on the flexibility shown by your side. We have to start with the fact that we have made a major effort to meet your concerns.

And we told you we have tentatively set aside on the President’s schedule the week of July 21st. But whether we can meet this depends on the flexibility shown by your side.

Gromyko: We have made our comments on your text. And as for contacts, we have not had time to go into that. Let the delegations deal with it.

Kissinger: Our delegation will be instructed to wait until your delegation has something on information and human contacts.

Korniyenko: Our delegation was given instructions on human contacts today.

Kissinger: Then our delegation will be instructed to start today. It's a much better way. But will your delegation also have your comments on information? So our delegation can get it from the Soviet?

And the Foreign Minister also said, on the notification time, that they would increase it to 18 days.

And 155 kilometers. [Laughter]

And we said we would take it up with our allies. All right.

SALT

Gromyko: Now shall we take up SALT, Mr. Secretary?

Kissinger: On SALT we've given you a paper which incorporates our ideas [U.S. Note, Tab A]. Could we have your reaction on that? And then we could comment.

Gromyko: So I see you would prefer us to make a few comments first.

Kissinger: Yes, because we gave you this paper, and there is no point in making additional comments until we hear from you.

Gromyko: All right. Then we will touch upon several matters which you also refer to in your paper and then go on to other matters we do not yet agree on.

The agreement presently in operation and the exchange of views we have had until now regarding the new agreement were based on one major premise—that national means would be used for observation and verification. The issue of any kind of international control measures simply didn’t arise and that is one of the most important premises on which the whole agreement is based. Otherwise no agreement would have been reached.

But we have now noticed, notably from statements by your representative at Geneva, that you are gradually beginning to inject certain elements of an international control into discussions, and this is cer-

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2 Not found.

tainly something that brings in a complicating element of a principled nature.

You yourselves probably are aware of the complexity of this issue and this is why in our view you are putting forward certain ideas to solve the problem. That is why, in our view, you are specifying that MIRVed missiles be located in certain areas, and this applies to both sides.

Kissinger: This applies only to SS–18.
Gromyko: Yes, yes.
Kissinger: Not to all of them.
Gromyko: We realize that, but that we cannot accept.
Kissinger: You cannot accept? But you appreciate the thought. Our people thought it was your idea.
Gromyko: No. Our answer is definite. It was not our idea.
Kissinger: Then there is a foreigner on your delegation.
Gromyko: No.
Kissinger: We thought Mr. Shchukin thought it was an interesting idea.
Gromyko: No.
Kissinger: We’ll sign it with Shchukin then.
Gromyko: Frankly speaking, in Moscow we were surprised.
Kissinger: Then we have to go back to our original position.
Gromyko: Then the question arose of so-called heavy missiles. You will recall your representatives at Geneva put forward certain considerations in connection with the clause in the existing agreement regarding increasing dimensions by ten to fifteen percent. Your representatives set out certain considerations which are not in line with those agreed dimensions which were included in the existing agreement. You will recall, because it was said directly by our delegation and was in the aide-mémoire we exchanged [Tab B],4 that we agreed to transfer those clauses unchanged from the existing agreement to the new one. And since this understanding was included in the aide-mémoire we agreed, we therefore were surprised this was raised by the American delegation.

Therefore, let me repeat we are in favor of transferring this clause from the existing one to the new one. You will recall, when the original agreement was being worked out, this question took up a lot of time and this solution was found and recognized as the most suitable.

4 Not attached. Printed as Document 97.
Kissinger: Because we never clarified what is meant by 15%—whether it means it can be changed 15% in every direction, or 15% overall. Secondly, we cannot accept that every time there is a new missile you can add another 15%. Fifteen percent you can do once, not every time.

Gromyko: Do you mind if I went through all our comments first, and then you can comment?

Kissinger: It’s a serious test for me. Reluctantly.

Gromyko: We can of course do it one by one, but we will never finish all my points.

Kissinger: All right; I’ll no longer interrupt.

I’ll talk to Sonnenfeldt while you are talking Russian.

Gromyko: So we are in favor of proceeding from the Vladivostok agreement, whose sequel was the agreed aide-mémoire that we exchanged. Further, you will recall the total numbers of missiles were to include all missiles, all air-to-ground missiles over a certain agreed range, which was set at 600 kilometers. But later you introduced another element, so-called cruise missiles. We don’t think that would be appropriate. So on this matter too, we believe it is necessary to stand by what was in the agreed aide-mémoire.

Kissinger: When I nod, it means I’ve understood, not that I agree.

Gromyko: Now, regarding the definition of heavy bomber. For the United States, heavy bombers will be taken to mean the B–52 and B–1. For the Soviet Union, the TU–95 and Myasishchevs [the Mya–4 Bison]. Plus on our side all Soviet aircraft whose characteristics would be analogous to the B–1. Possible aircraft.

Kissinger: How about analogous to the Bison?

Gromyko: I’ve not finished yet. As regards the Soviet aircraft you call the Backfire, we cannot agree they should be included in heavy. They are not heavy. They are not a strategic aircraft. What you people are saying is that it’s not a strategic bomber—it can’t complete its mission and reach its base—but it can be refueled in-flight and therefore should be included in the strategic bombers. But if you start reasoning in that fashion, you can even include fighters, because they could have two, three, four refuelings in the air.

Kissinger: You don’t want me to answer now?

Gromyko: So what your people are saying, the reservation regarding the southern area of USSR, doesn’t help.

[Both sides confer.]

Further, it seems to us indispensable to include in the new agreement a clause which would limit the development of new strategic weapons. We are not sure we have provided for all possible eventual-
ities in our proposal but we believe we should not lose sight of this important matter. As we understand it, in the course of the discussions taking place in the U.S. itself, there are some, for example, in the Congress, calling attention to the need to have a clause limiting development of new strategic weapons, so it is in the spirit of the agreement. But the U.S. proposals bypassed this entirely. Maybe it is by chance, [or] something temporary.

Further, we believe the new agreement should include a clause relating to an obligation not to transfer to other states any strategic arms and not to render any assistance to other states to develop strategic offensive arms. No mention of this is made in your proposals and we think it would hardly be right to lose sight of this question as well.

From time to time the question of mobile strategic systems arises. This question arose originally in the preparation of the first agreement, then was sort of left alone and not emphasized again. But of late, if not discussed too broadly, it is arising. We at this point do not have any detailed comments to make or any elaborated position, but the question does exist. In other words, it should be kept in mind and at some future time there should be a more detailed discussion. If you have comments, we would be prepared to hear them.

Now, on future SALT negotiations, that is, after we sign the new agreement: We are familiar with the general trend of discussion on this in the United States, so we know that quite a good deal of attention is devoted to it in the United States. We certainly too believe it is a question worthy of discussion. We are not against these proposals and believe at some later time we could return to this matter.

Kissinger: You mean about starting in 1977?

Gromyko: Yes. We do not believe it is a difficult issue.

Further, you will recall when you were in Moscow before Vladivostok, in October, there was a question about the number of Tridents.

Kissinger: And Typhoons.

Gromyko: Right. You will recall you had quite a detailed discussion with the General Secretary on that, but it later took a different form when you were discussing not the number of Tridents but the number of launchers, which in effect amounts to the same thing. To switch from generalities to more specifics, we mentioned the number of 240 launchers. You know how that figure came into existence, but we recall you didn’t like that limitation. And you believe there should be no discussion of that question.

Kissinger: It’s also not discussed in the Vladivostok memorandum.

Gromyko: That is true, but we are referring to various discussions before.

Kissinger: That’s right, we discussed it previously.
Gromyko: Now I just want to say, in our view, we could return to this in the context of the general course of the talks. We don’t right now want to build a high wall which would be an obstacle to our further efforts. We could return to this later in the context of the general course of the negotiations.

Further, if we take the ultimate total figure of launchers, that is, 2400, by what time should that figure be reached? There is a question there.

Kissinger: Not in our mind.

Gromyko: You too asked a question about this to the General Secretary, last October. I was sitting opposite you at the same distance as today. So the question was perfectly present. Our general view on this is: It is quite clear that the dates by which the total numbers should be brought in line with this figure should be agreed upon.

Today I merely want to say this date should not be prior to the entry into force of the agreement.

Kissinger: Not prior.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: In other words, not before 1977?

Gromyko: Yes. So obviously the deadline will lie somewhere between the date of entry into force of the agreement and any other date we choose. We have no specific date in mind but at least we hope this question won’t be a serious impediment to the agreement.

Now there is also the question of forward-based weapons. Usually as soon as this question comes up, one usually senses some wariness on the American side.

Kissinger: Sonnenfeldt?

Gromyko: We, on the contrary, believe you should be enthusiastic on this matter.

Kissinger: Do I not look enthusiastic?

Gromyko: Rather indifferent. Rather indifferent.

You may well say that at Vladivostok this point was not included in the discussion as a condition for the preparation and signing of the agreement. To that I would say I agree it was not made a condition for the agreement. But if it was your impression it was discussed as a condition, we would certainly agree with you.

Kissinger: You must have seen my talking points.

Gromyko: So we consider ourselves to have read your thoughts correctly!

But let us be quite clear on one thing: On no occasion have we said as far as the future is concerned that this question does not exist. It does exist and in the future it will be a matter for discussion. So it would be a
good thing, we believe, if in conjunction with the negotiations now under way, we merely indicate this is a topic for future discussion. You would certainly look upon us as quite naive if we failed to mention that matter or if we believed it closed. History, after all, doesn’t come to a close with the end of the duration of the first agreement; neither will it come to an end with the end of the duration of the second.

Kissinger: You will still be Foreign Minister, so I am sure it won’t be forgotten.

Gromyko: We will both meet on it. Our experience will be enriched by it. We will meet at the terminal point of the second agreement!

Kissinger: By 1985 we will be moving towards alliance; that’s my historic prediction.

Gromyko: You are saying this as a historian, not as Secretary of State.

Kissinger: I have to give my associates some hope of a terminal date. When you say I’ll still be Secretary of State by 1985 . . . Look at the expression on Sisco’s face.

Gromyko: So let me just sum up. Let me say I tried to be as brief as possible to set out these questions that have to be considered in a new agreement. And every word said by General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford at Vladivostok remains in force. We feel there is equal interest on both sides for a new agreement to be signed. We will work that way and we hope the United States will act in the same spirit. We trust you will try to be that specific in your comments as we endeavor to be, because we have already spent time on general principles and we should get down to specifics.

Kissinger: I would like to consult with my colleagues, but can you tell me what in your presentation differs from what is already presented at Geneva?


Kissinger: That is my impression.

Gromyko: Regarding the first question, that is, the so-called regional approach to MIRVed missiles, was not presented at Geneva.

Kissinger: But you closed off the discussion.

Let me consult for five minutes. We don’t know which of your concessions to accept first.

[There was a break beginning at 11:15 a.m. Kissinger and Gromyko conferred informally alone from 11:29 to 11:45 a.m.]

Kissinger: All right, Mr. Foreign Minister, let me make two comments, one general and one specific.
The general comment concerns the utility of these meetings at the political level and the purpose we’re attempting to serve. Our practice in the past was that Geneva would proceed at the somewhat technical level, that the Geneva negotiators would explore, and that difficulties would then be solved at the political level after which we give new instructions to our delegations.

The second point was that we would use these meetings to make some progress in political relations, but this requires some substantive progress.

I must say on neither of the two subjects we’ve discussed, CSCE or SALT, has any substantial progress been made. And we will have to consider at the end what to tell the press, so we don’t give a misleading impression.

Even a quick look at your comments on information indicates it will not be particularly helpful.

Now let me not return to the European Security Conference, which we have discussed before. Let me deal with your SALT position.

We submitted a paper to you, which quite frankly was in the category of the discussions of your Ambassador and I. It had no official standing in our Government, and went to the limit of what we thought we could get. If you had accepted part of it, or even made a counterproposal, we could then have pushed in that direction. We made some specific suggestions that went beyond our position at Geneva. You, on the other hand, gave us word for word the same position you had at Geneva. We have to consider the value of discussions in this channel. We had made an effort in preparing for a new position and even made a start last Saturday [by a Verification Panel meeting] in preparing the Government for new instructions for Geneva.

In order to help your colleagues in Moscow, and not to be impolite, there is no chance whatsoever, no matter how long the negotiations go on, that we will accept your position at Geneva. There is no chance whatsoever that we will accept your Geneva position. The agreement will lapse in ’77. If we begin organizing our public opinion for it, we will get support, and there will be no chance of a strategic arms limitation agreement, if we make it a controversial issue.

Now let me go through the individual points.

First, the issue of MIRV verification. We have made clear even before Vladivostok—I know I made it clear to your Ambassador; he didn’t agree but I made it clear—how we proposed to count, that is,

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5 The minutes of the Verification Panel meeting on Saturday, May 17, are in Ford Library, National Security Council Institutional Files, 1974–1977, Box 23, Meeting Minutes—Verification Panel (Originals), April–May 1975.
that we would count any missile of a MIRVed type as MIRVed. The burden would be on you to show it wasn’t. You know your missiles better than we do. That means either you accept it or you give us some alternate criteria that are plausible by which we can determine whether a missile is MIRVed or not MIRVed.

Now neither of these has happened. The idea of complexes we thought was accepting your idea, and we did this in order to help you. Otherwise we prefer our position. Indeed, the purpose of the complex idea was to make it possible to verify by national technical means, a principle which we are not now and have never challenged.

So there has to be some definition by which national technical means can verify deployment of MIRV’s or we cannot make an agreement. It is as simple as that. If our proposal isn’t acceptable, or the complex idea isn’t acceptable, then you have to give us some other criteria. If not, then there is no means of verification, and therefore we cannot have an agreement.

The second point, the 15%. I will not refer to the fact that when the General Secretary spoke to President Nixon, he specifically disclaimed that he was talking about each direction but only in general terms of size. I won’t mention that if you increase by 15% in each dimension, it would mean an increase of 52%. Even when we put forward our definition, it means an increase of something like 30% in volume. This is the maximum we can go to.

At one point in Moscow in 1972 we discussed not permitting any increase at all; we permitted you to back off from that position because 15% wasn’t very significant. We cannot accept that it is more than 15%, nor can we accept that it can be done more than once. This is not in addition to the old agreement; it is a clarification of the old agreement. The old agreement was not very precise on the issue.

Then let us turn to the question of air-to-ground missiles. The issue of air-to-ground missiles was extremely vaguely drawn in Vladivostok. Though it may not have been always clarified in translating, the President was extremely careful to say “ballistic” missile. This was the translation from our side; it wasn’t you, Viktor.

Sukhodrev: It wasn’t actually translated.

Kissinger: Did you do it?

Sukhodrev: Yes.

Kissinger: Be that as it may.

The second ambiguity is the carrier for these cruise missiles, or, to put it another way, where they should be counted. The Vladivostok agreement speaks only of missiles carried on bombers, so missiles carried on transport planes theoretically need not be counted. Third, bal-
listic missiles carried on ships don’t have to be counted. So we in our proposal attempted to close these loopholes.

Again, I have to say, not that you have to accept these, but we attempted to make serious efforts to work out principles that in some cases worked in your favor, or made clear the Vladivostok agreement in an area where we weren’t so clear about in Vladivostok.

Again, I didn’t necessarily expect agreement with our position, but we made a serious effort in our position and were met with your Geneva position which is impossible for us.

On heavy bombers, it is not so simple. The Backfire in range and size is not different from the Bison and is superior in performance. If the Bison is to be counted, logically the Backfire should be counted. If we developed a variation of the B–52 and called it something else, then we would have to count it, or it would be absurd.

We attempted to do the same thing as we did with MIRV verification, that is, we tried to develop criteria, including the deployment of the Backfire and the refueling of the Backfire. This is a position we have not even presented to our or the Congressional bureaucracy. To be presented with simply a repetition of the Geneva position makes it extremely difficult to make progress on this issue.

Again, we went considerably beyond our Geneva position and I regret to say you did not.

Now let me deal with new strategic systems. As far as the general trend of opinion in the United States is concerned, I pay no attention to these kinds of arguments but the trend of opinion that matters is the trend you negotiate with, not Senatorial statements. And it makes a difference whether you are talking about the Trident or B–1 or systems subsequent to the Trident or B–1. If you are talking about the Trident or B–1, it is impossible for us, because we cannot allow you to modernize your whole missile force and we are not allowed to take measures we consider necessary. As for new systems, after the Trident or B–1, we are in principle prepared to discuss it and we are openminded. We think it is better to be handled in the follow-on negotiations; it is not necessary to be treated in the implementation of the Vladivostok agreement.

Now, the next issue is the one of nontransfer. With respect to nontransfer, the Foreign Minister was not very specific. It is an issue we are prepared to discuss, keeping in mind certain existing commitments we have and related matters. But I repeat, we are prepared to discuss this issue. Always keeping in mind any provisions we negotiate would also have to be applied to the People’s Republic of China.

Eight, let me deal with the mobile issues. There are two issues. One is, should they be counted? The second is, should they be permitted?

With respect to the first, should they be counted, there is no question under the Vladivostok agreement that all mobiles beyond a certain range must be counted.
With respect to ballistic missiles and some cruise missiles, there is no question they should be counted. With respect to the second question, should they be permitted, we asked in a note to you. It is a subject on which we would like to hear your views before we take a position. That is to say, should all mobiles except sea-based be banned? We are open-minded; that is, we are prepared to listen to your position.

What is absolutely unacceptable is to ban missiles on airplanes while permitting mobile missiles on land.

With respect to new negotiations, I have the impression you were making some positive statements, and if I understand them correctly, I need to make no comment on them.

With respect to the Trident, I must establish the principle that we cannot go back to the October negotiations and add elements to the Vladivostok agreement. As I understood the purpose of the Vladivostok agreement, it was to eliminate the technical complexities we encountered in October. As I understand it, there were no sub-limits except those in the Interim Agreement.

The next question—by what time should the figure of 2400 be reached? There again, we cannot accept the October discussions which were on a different basis, which included differentials on MIRV deployment. We cannot accept that it takes place sometime between 1985 and the signing. If you need some period to get down to 2400, that we can negotiate, but if you mean years rather than months, it will be unacceptable.

And in the aide-mémoire it says: “During the time of a new agreement each of the sides will be entitled to an aggregate number of delivery vehicles of strategic arms not exceeding 2400.” The only way to interpret that is that it means during all of the time, not during part of the time.

Now, with respect to forward bases, it is not contained in the Vladivostok agreement and therefore cannot be part of this negotiation. We recognize your continuing concern and we recognize you will be free to introduce it in any subsequent negotiation, without prejudice to any position we may take on that subject. Any new negotiation.

Now let me sum up, so there is no misunderstanding. There is no possibility whatsoever of an agreement on the basis of the Geneva position of the Soviet delegation. There is no possibility of resuming the talks on the basis of the Geneva instructions of the Soviet delegation.

So I would like to make three proposals: That we delay the opening of Geneva by three weeks, that we continue discussions in our channel, to see if we can work out new instructions on both sides. And you might consider sending experts on SALT to Washington, or we could send some experts to Moscow. We think it is more efficient for
you to send someone to Washington because we are better equipped there.

We think if we are seriously concerned about reaching agreement in connection with a possible visit by the General Secretary this year, then there must be serious decisions on both sides. If we are concerned about the public discussion of the state of our relations, it will certainly accelerate if there is no agreement on this, coupled also with a possible stalemate in the European Security Conference.

Gromyko: On what you call complexes, certain geographic regions for MIRVed missiles, I have nothing to add to what I've said, nor to the reasons I gave for our position. You expressed your hope we would make serious examination of the reasons you set out in explaining your position; we will certainly study them most thoroughly. And we hope you will seriously study what we have said on this score. But here naturally I proceed from the assumption of which you are fully aware, that the principle you set forward—if you have tested one such missile, you will count all such types as MIRVed—that principle we have rejected all along. So I'm saying nothing new on that.

As regards the figure of the famous 10–15% increase under the first agreement, you may well be right that we did not perhaps fully elaborate the interpretation we would place on those figures when we were negotiating the first agreement. Our interpretation boils down to the fact that we propose that this basic principle be transferred to the new one. So if in your view this means there should be an additional exchange of views to clarify it, we didn’t say we were loathe to do that.

Korniyenko: It was in effect on the suggestion of the American side that the aide-mémoire carried the phrase that this be carried over to the new agreement.

Gromyko: And as we see it, you do not now question the basic principle of carrying it over.

Kissinger: We require clarification of two points—one, that only one modification can be made to an existing silo . . .

Gromyko: You made it clear.

Kissinger: . . . and that we require an understanding of the definition of 10–15%.

Gromyko: That is clear.

On the question of cruise missiles, our understanding of what transpired at Vladivostok is at variance with yours. Our understanding was that it related to both ballistic and cruise missiles.

Regarding Backfire, I have nothing to add to our position. We believe our position to be fully justified.

Paragraph five in the aide-mémoire reads: “A new agreement could also provide for additional limitations on deployment of new
types of strategic arms during the period of its effectiveness.” So we assume you accept the principle of this. And we should agree on what we specifically mean. But the principle is accepted.

Kissinger: That is correct.

Gromyko: Regarding non-transfer and non-provision of assistance to other states, we have set out our position and we consider it an important point. You understand the reasons for it. I’m sure you are aware, unless our two countries undertake certain obligations in this regard, it will not be resolved. I understand you see a problem too, so let’s find a formula.

Kissinger: But one that’s discussable.

Gromyko: As regards mobile systems, you requested us to be more specific. But we have set out our general considerations, and we believe it requires more detailed discussion. We agree that both questions you mentioned do exist, that is, whether to count them or not to count them, and whether to ban them or not. So the basic starting positions coincide.

You correctly understand our position on starting new negotiations. Our position is one that is basically favorable to yours.

So I don’t think we should paint a picture so black.

As regards the 240 Tridents, that is something that is discussable in the general context of further negotiations. Does that make no impression on you?

Kissinger: After 1977. After this agreement goes into effect.

Gromyko: In the general context of further negotiations. In short, we will come back to this. But on this we are not erecting any unsurmountable wall in the path of the agreement.

Kissinger: I understand.

Gromyko: Regarding the time limit for reaching the figure of 2400, do not be wary of our statement there should be some gap before the entry into force and the actual reaching of the figure. We do not proceed from the assumption there should be any overly lengthy period of time. We don’t know who this will benefit, you or us. It is most likely we will both be in an equal position in this. In any event, what we mean is a limited period. Since this is a process, not one single shot in the air, but probably some definite limited period of time will be required.

Kissinger: If it is a question of months, we can probably agree.

Gromyko: On FBS, I have nothing to add. I have set forth our position, and I think you have understood us correctly.

As regards your suggestion that we delay the resumption of SALT, that is a new question, but I don’t think it will cause any great difficulty. So we will return to it. And as to whether Washington or Moscow
would be the more relevant venue for further exchange of views, we will inform you, and also as to what the level of these further exchange of views should be.

I think I should repeat in passing that the colors you mix are all too dense. If they were light colors, I could agree. On many matters, our positions are not too far apart; the situation isn’t so much in the shade. It is not a simple problem; the questions are complicated. On some things we think your position is not objective and is somewhat one-sided. Those questions require in-depth consideration, with due regard for what you said to us and what we said to you. But if we pass too much pessimism back and forth, it will not be helpful. The difficulties were no less in the process of achieving the first agreement; they were all ultimately overcome.

Our interest in seeing a new accord reached has not diminished, and we trust the same is true of your side. I have no intention of elaborating on that, because our position was adequately stated by General Secretary Brezhnev at Vladivostok, as was your position by President Ford.

And I, frankly speaking, did not like your remark that these difficulties on these matters can compound the difficulties already existing on the European Security Conference.

But let us not allow emotions to get the better of us. Let us take a cool and level-headed view.

Kissinger: I didn’t say that. I said the positions advanced by the Soviet side this morning on information did not make me extremely optimistic about the chance of success.

Gromyko: You separated them?

Kissinger: I said the two propositions this morning taken together do not make me as optimistic as I had hoped to be at this point of the discussion.

Gromyko: I am pleased to hear the clarification. Nevertheless, will you please consider our texts?

Kissinger: Our delegation will be instructed to consider your proposals on information and Basket III with a view to completing the negotiation in the time frame we have discussed.

Gromyko: We will be proceeding from the assumption that anything raised from your side that calls into question the domestic legislation of the Soviet Union will not be acceptable.

Kissinger: I have said we will approach it with the intention to meet the deadline, and in that spirit we hope there will be agreement.

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6 See Document 149.
Gromyko: Our delegation in Geneva will have instructions to put forward its views regarding the second part of your views, that is, on contacts, in addition to what we gave you on journalists. But I am puzzled: What we gave on journalists, all your concerns have been taken into account—the conditions of their stay.

Kissinger: I have just taken a quick look. I have not had a chance to study it. We will study it and reply formally. It is not a considered judgment.

Let me sum up.

On strategic arms limitations, we have proposed a delay of three weeks. I have the impression you can’t make a decision now.

Second, we will have discussions in this channel. My definition of this channel is that it will be of a more political level than of experts, and with a greater degree of flexibility and also secrecy than in Geneva. We are prepared to consider your views. We don’t exclude having someone added to the Ambassador’s staff in Moscow.

We do not insist, on the verification issue, that our ideas are final. If you can give us another proposal, another criterion for distinguishing between single and multiple warheads that we can do by national means. It must be something plausible. You can’t just paint a green cross on the warhead and say it is single.

Gromyko: Do we have to open up the warhead and let you see it?

Kissinger: Give us some ideas. And we will try to come up with other ideas.

Gromyko: I have nothing to add. And you have not ruled out holding these talks in Moscow?

Kissinger: If it is in this channel. We prefer to have them in Washington, because it is easier, given how we make decisions.

Gromyko: You mean in established procedures, but not with technical experts?

Kissinger: How you handle it in Washington is up to you. If you want to send technical experts, that is fine. If you don’t, that is fine.

Gromyko: We will think it over.

Kissinger: We would not announce it. We would say only that exchanges will continue. We don’t have to say where or how.

Gromyko: Could we have a break?

[There was a break from 1:17 to 1:37 p.m.]

Middle East

Gromyko: We will have ten more questions to discuss. Which one will the next one be?

Kissinger: Trade.
Dobrynin: Trade with whom?
Kissinger: I suppose you would like to discuss the Middle East.
Gromyko: How can you read my mind? One case of telepathy!
Kissinger: Should we say we should try to finish by 3:00, no later than 3:15?
Gromyko: All right.
Kissinger: I told the interpreter, we have a new proposal from Israel: If Egypt demilitarizes all the way to Mersa Matruh, Israel will move eight more kilometers. If Egypt withdraws to Libya, Israel will give up \( \frac{3}{4} \)ths of the passes.
Gromyko: What is your view of the situation?
Kissinger: When we say we are making a reassessment, it is not propaganda; it is a serious effort to see how progress can be made.
Second, we have made it very clear we will not accept a stalemate. Because we agree with the assessment of General Secretary Brezhnev that he gave us in San Clemente. I am agreeing with your assessment. I’ve told you privately we made a mistake in June 1973.
Three, we recognize and accept that no settlement in the Middle East can be made without the Soviet Union nor can it last unless there is a joint assurance, guarantee, by the Soviet Union and the United States. And we regard some of the remarks by the Foreign Minister when our mutual friend Khaddam visited Moscow\(^7\) to be constructive, and I must say courageous.
Fourth, this is a matter of profound domestic consequence and we are seriously considering the situation.
That is our assessment. President Ford is meeting with President Sadat and Prime Minister Rabin in early June, and will meet with various other leaders of the area. But after mid-June we will be making serious decisions, as I told your Ambassador before I came.
We are considering whether to go for an interim solution or a comprehensive solution or some combination of both. Those are the three possibilities. But we are determined to make some progress and we are determined that this progress be made fairly rapidly.
Of course, there are various details such as when Geneva should be held, how it should be organized, which we are prepared to discuss with you today.

\(^7\) Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam was in Moscow April 23–25 for an “official friendly visit,” including meetings with Brezhnev and Gromyko. For the condensed English texts of Gromyko’s and Khaddam’s speeches on the first day and of the joint communiqué on the last, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 16 (May 14, 1975), pp. 8–9.
Gromyko: But concretely, what are your considerations regarding the Geneva Conference, especially considering the agreement by everyone on the need for it? How, and when should it be reconvened? There is also the question of the participants, and the question of the Palestinians.

Kissinger: We agree it should be convened at an early date. Secondly, we would like to hear the views of all the parties before we make a decision on the precise date. So we would like to reserve our position for two or three more weeks before taking a position.

Third, you and we should have some preliminary exchanges on the substance before a convening. Because it would not be very good.

Gromyko: It would be very bad.

Kissinger: There could be the danger of war in the Middle East, which I will discuss in a minute.

I think the procedure should be the way we did it last time—that you and we would send the invitations.

Gromyko: A simple invitation. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I remember the last time—we spent six weeks with the Israelis to get them to agree to the UN, and then later they refused to meet without the presence of the UN.

Now with respect to the Palestinians. We have to decide whether we want progress or we want issues. Palestinian participation is best for those who don’t want progress. That is one issue on which we can’t get public support and will have to take the Israeli position at least at the beginning.

I’m not sure the Palestinians want to go there, because soon they would have to take decisions there that they would prefer to avoid, like whether to accept 242.

We don’t mind discussing the Palestinians later on. We recognize that no final solution can exist without a final solution of the Palestinian problem.

Gromyko: Let me state our position in brief. Our general assessment is that the situation in the Middle East is a dangerous one. If I went into detail, I would just be repeating statements you have heard from us on many occasions.

Kissinger: I agree with you.

Gromyko: The situation is dangerous because the Arab lands occupied still have not been returned, and second because the Palestinian problem is not resolved. True enough, the guns are silent now, but always before the war breaks out, the guns are silent. Specifically, we believe at present what is needed is a serious approach, and by a serious approach we mean the participation in the consideration of this issue of all the parties concerned.
Kissinger: Not India.
Gromyko: They are not asking as yet.

The forum wherein the problem should be discussed was agreed on; it exists. That is in reply to your question about whether India should be included. It is true, however, that Lebanon has approached us, and probably you, too, but basically their desire is not to participate from the outset but at some point. Basically, the Palestinian problem must be resolved. But I don’t see this as a new problem; it is an old problem. Nuances may be new, but it would be pointless to try to resolve the Palestinian problem without the Palestinians. Whether or not we invite Lebanon and whether or not we recognize Lebanon as a party concerned, it is impossible not to recognize the Palestinians as a party concerned.

As far as we know, the Palestinians want to participate from the very beginning and we appreciate their stand. We do not know whether they would agree to participate not from the beginning. It would depend on the attitude of the other Arab states. All the ones we have talked to have told us they favor the Palestinians participating and from the very beginning.

Maybe Egypt allows of some kind of variation, but . . .

Kissinger: I have to tell you an experience I had. An Arab Foreign Minister told me, “I know you are lying to me.” I said, “How do you know I am lying to you?” “Because you wrote me a letter. And the letters you wrote to all the others were similar. Therefore you are lying.” [Laughter]

What Arabs say, and what they will do, requires analysis.

Gromyko: In short, let me state our position. We cannot fail to support the Palestinians as do the other Arabs if they raise the issue of their participating from the very beginning. However, if the Palestinians and other Arab states generally should agree they will participate not from the beginning, we, the Soviet Union, naturally could not be more Arab than the Arabs. But the Palestinians must participate in the discussion of the Palestinian issue.

Kissinger: We don’t really know the Syrian attitude on Geneva. Do you?

Gromyko: Not 100%.

Kissinger: Our impression is they have said if they go, they would want the Palestinians there. But we don’t have a clear picture.

Gromyko: I’m saying right now if the Palestinians say they want to participate from the very beginning, they will certainly be supported in that by all the Arabs . . .

Kissinger: I agree.
Gromyko: And the Soviet Union would support them in that demand. On the other hand, if the Palestinians say they could participate but not from the very beginning, they would be supported by the other Arabs. But we regard it as a foregone conclusion that the Palestinian question must be resolved with the participation of the Palestinians.

What is necessary right now in our opinion is for us as co-chairmen to send an invitation to the Palestinians to participate, without a date or prejudging the timing of their participation. That we feel is the “A” we should start with. And that would give things a push in the right direction.

Now, regarding your statement that not everything is clear regarding the Syrian position. That is true, not everything is clear. But let me state the Soviet position. Here I want to repeat something I said to you in Geneva: If it is clear the parties are not coming with a serious view but it is clear the Conference is doomed in advance, that we can’t accept. That seems to be the view of the Syrians. If it becomes clear there is any intention the Conference is intended as a coverup for separate steps contemplated in circumvention of the Soviet Union, that we don’t need. We don’t need a screen. If I’m being too frank, you have heard this before. Why do we raise the matter in such a way? So as not to cause harm to the consideration of the entire problem. We don’t want the Conference to fail; the outcome of that would be the outbreak of war. That is why we believe there is a great need for good preparations to precede the Conference. And I and my colleagues therefore agree with the idea of holding prior to the Conference further bilateral exchanges of views so the Conference yields substantive results, an in-depth exchange of views on the substantive issues involved.

That is what I basically wanted to say. And I would appreciate hearing your response to the suggestion that we should, as the “A,” send an invitation to the Palestinians to attend.

Kissinger: Do you want my honest reaction?

Gromyko: There are also possible nuances regarding the possible wording of the invitation. The Palestinians have their own views on the subject.

Of course, I want an honest answer.

Kissinger: My honest reaction is that you asked it because your Ambassadors can then go around the Middle East saying the Americans refused to give an invitation. So I give you that opportunity.

But let me now turn to the serious part. The Palestinians and the Arabs, I think, understand we can’t begin by giving an issue to those who want no progress.

Regarding the second part, I agree we should have an in-depth exchange of views. Secondly, we intend—though the reassessment is not
completed—to conduct the next phase of the Middle East in a more co-operative spirit. As for who does what, when, we have solved problems like this before, as on Berlin. We don’t need both to say something at the same time. So we agree we should have an exchange on the nature, the structure, and substance of the Geneva Conference.

Secondly, should Geneva be a “cover-up”—a cover—it’s a painful word; we’re not so good at cover ups. Anatol, explain it to the Foreign Minister.

Sukhodrev: I did.

Kissinger: I was going to say we should go the modified hang-out route. [Laughter]

We have, at this point, no fixed idea how to proceed, except we would like to have some progress made. We have had no serious exchanges on the next steps because we don’t want to throw ourselves into another negotiation that could fail, or one that even if it succeeds, raises more difficult questions. Any more than you want to go to Geneva without preparation.

So we have had no discussion of separate approaches, or policies.

As I understand you, Mr. Foreign Minister, you’re not in principle opposed to separate steps, as long as there is participation of all the countries concerned in the area. Is that your view?

Gromyko: That is absolutely correct. We’re not against certain intermediate measures, provided they are the result of joint consideration of all the parties concerned and the joint agreement of all the parties concerned, and in the context of an overall settlement. The form of this context is, of course, a matter to be decided, not to build a wall between the general and an interim agreement. Do you agree with this?

Kissinger: I understand it.

Gromyko: Only understand?

Kissinger: I sympathize with it. Let me explain. As I have explained to you in private on many occasions, gratitude for services rendered is not exactly the coin of the realm in international affairs, and certainly in the Middle East. The Soviet Union cannot be excluded, objectively, and it’s in your power to make any interim agreement impossible.

I do have one concern, which I’ll say frankly. It is possible for us to work jointly, but it is possible for you to put yourself one step ahead of us in any negotiation, and while that leads to certain propaganda victories, it also leads to diplomatic stalemate.

Gromyko: Describe it to us.

Kissinger: It’s a concern. It could happen intentionally or unintentionally. It could happen if an approach is too legalistic.
We are prepared to continue our consideration and to consult with you before we make any decisions. We are not designing a diplomacy that excludes you. You must learn this from your own sources.

Gromyko: But Israel could be doing it.

Kissinger: We are not participating in it either. Neither organizing nor participating. Our present intention is to do it cooperatively with you.

Your concern is that we organize a completely separate diplomacy.

Gromyko: Organize . . .

Kissinger: Or participate. See, our concern is what you said earlier, “We agree with the Arabs: if they change, we’ll change.”

Gromyko: How many times we disagree with the Arabs, you know. How many! On recognition of Israel, and so many other questions.

Kissinger: Our problem is we are asked to separate ourselves from Israel; you take the exact Arab position.

Gromyko: That doesn’t exist. The question of Israel’s right to exist . . .

Kissinger: But it goes beyond that. If you take exactly the position of the Arabs, we can deal directly with the Arabs; why should we deal with you?

The existence of Israel is the absolute minimum.

Even on the content of peace, leaving aside the question of territory, the Arab position may not be exactly satisfactory.

We both have an obligation to move the parties.

Gromyko: But if we say yes, yes, yes to all your proposals . . .

Kissinger: Anyone who has dealt with you knows the possibility of your saying yes, yes, yes, is extremely remote. [Laughter]

Gromyko: If you know me, when I say yes, you say no. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I don’t expect you to say yes to all our proposals. At this moment we have no proposals. What we want is for you to take an objective view of the situation and not just ask us to bring pressure on Israel. If it’s just a question of influence on Israel, we can do it ourselves.

Gromyko: There can be influence on the Arabs at the same time.

Kissinger: Exactly.

Gromyko: There are many considerations.

Kissinger: We are prepared to work with you in a cooperative attitude, in details and not just general terms.

We have not made up our minds yet. I think it’s easy to assemble Geneva; it will be hard to keep it from blowing up. Who’ll get blamed if
it fails isn’t at all clear—whether it’s you or us. It will look like impotence before the Arabs.

Gromyko: You’re right, convening Geneva is easier than the success of it.

[Fokin gets up and opens the windows]

It’s as hot in here as in the Arab Middle East!

Kissinger: So if we don’t go to Geneva, we have a problem. If we go to Geneva, and it fails, even if your friends in Iraq like it, we have a problem, because we don’t want a war. We have to proceed in a way that takes care of both our interests. This seems to us the best way to implement the principles of détente. If we have a confrontation, it would be like World War I, where a war starts over the stupidest issue. That is not in anyone’s interest.

We are not now engaged in a serious effort—or any effort—to start up separate negotiations. We’re just listening. You can confirm this—and the press too. Everything we do is in the newspaper—and some things we don’t do are in the newspapers. Generally the Israeli press has accurately what’s going on, which is nothing.

We could have more precise discussions in July.

Gromyko: Wouldn’t we be busy in July preparing for and going to the European Security Conference?

Kissinger: That’s at the end of July.

Gromyko: That means Geneva won’t convene in June.

Kissinger: August.

Gromyko: August is inappropriate.

Kissinger: Maybe September.

Say around July 10, give or take a day. No, July 10 we have a foreign visit. Say July 5th. We should meet just two days in some neutral place.

We haven’t met in Iceland. It’s a nightmare; you can’t sleep.

Or come to Washington.

Dobrynin: There is no night there. You can negotiate two or three nights running. [Laughter]

Kissinger: The last time we were in Iceland it was to meet President Pompidou. Iceland’s Prime Minister threatened to go to war with England, and Rogers pleaded with him not to go to war.

Gromyko: What is your opinion of what we should be doing now, in late May and early June?

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8 Nixon met with Pompidou and Icelandic political leaders in Reykjavik May 31–June 1, 1973.
Kissinger: I’ll tell you what we’ll be doing.

Gromyko: And the outcome of Salzburg. You must have some idea.

Kissinger: No.

Gromyko: There are not any secrets—just the substance. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, you’ve dealt with Egypt. You know that precision of substance is not what made Egypt what it is today. [Laughter]

[Sisco whispers to Kissinger]

Sisco tells me that since Israel is printing a book on what I allegedly said, you’ll probably print one too. My protection is the Arabs won’t believe what’s printed.

We’ve made no propositions; Egypt has made no propositions. We have said we would like their ideas on how to go to Geneva. The President will tell them substantially what I’ve told you. We will want to hear what they have in mind. We have not considered a resumption of step-by-step precisely, or even imprecisely.

Gromyko: What if he begs you?

Kissinger: We’ll still want to know where it leads us, or it would be like in March. We wouldn’t do it to your exclusion. But I don’t expect this to happen. I personally will not agree to get involved unless both sides give me iron-clad assurance of the result. I won’t shuttle around in the Middle East persuading people. It’s not an appropriate way to proceed.

Gromyko: It’s a strange situation. Everyone agrees—you, us, the Arabs, Israel—that it’s dangerous, but yet we can’t sit down and straighten it out. It is a strange situation indeed.

Kissinger: We have been preoccupied since April with other parts of the world and haven’t been able to turn to this systematically until last week. For the Middle East alone, I told your Ambassador, June would have been better for this meeting. But we did this for other reasons. We should all observe restraint.

Gromyko: Restraint on our part is permanent. [Laughter] The situation may cause surprise for both of us.

Kissinger: Not in June.

Gromyko: Better in July?

Kissinger: In July we’ll be in a better position to make a decision.

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9 See footnote 3, Document 146.
Gromyko: How can we explain to public opinion that we were not able to convene the Conference in June? You will be the one to explain.

Sisco: We told them we weren’t ready.

Kissinger: I’ll brief our people on the plane that we’ll continue our exchanges and meet in June or July—on both the Middle East and SALT. That keeps both of these issues in momentum.

But our decisions will be to keep our relationship in terms of cooperation, rather than competition. This you will see.

Gromyko: I do not mind your saying this to the press.

Kissinger: I think it will be helpful.

Gromyko: You can even say we’ll be ready for deeper discussion; more “penetrating” discussion.

Kissinger: That’s fine.

Gromyko: But we should now agree on the text of the invitation to the Palestinians.

[Sonnenfeldt and Korniyenko agree on the communique.]

Kissinger: Can I read it?

I don’t mind putting in the communique that you and I agreed to meet again in the first half of July to continue discussions on strategic arms limitations and the Middle East. It is up to you.

[Gromyko and Korniyenko confer]

Gromyko: Maybe something like that could be said verbally to the correspondents.

Kissinger: Why don’t we both say it when we go downstairs? Or I can say it alone, and you can deny it. [Laughter]

Gromyko: “In the near future” or in the “not distant future.”

Kissinger: Make a plunge! Say, “near future!” I will say on background it will probably be in the first half of July.

Gromyko: From you.

Kissinger: On the airplane.

Gromyko: Fine.

Kissinger: When are we going to release this document [the communique, Tab A], that will rock the world?

Dobrynin: Tomorrow morning.

Kissinger: I think the suspense will cause too much uncertainty in the financial markets of the world.

Gromyko: Will they rise or fall, the financial markets of the world?

[Laughter]

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10 Attached but not printed. For the text of the joint statement, released on May 20, see Department of State Bulletin, June 16, 1975, pp. 810–811.
Kissinger: Why don’t we do it at 7:00 local time, so we can give it out on the plane?
Gromyko: All right.
While you and I are talking, Mr. Schlesinger seems to be declaring war.
Kissinger: What did he say now?
Gromyko: While one Minister is here talking peace, another is talking war. It’s some kind of “polycentrism.”
Kissinger: Suzy Parker\textsuperscript{11} once said she would get her husband to feel totally secure and totally loved, and then let him have it between the eyes.
Gromyko: What do you say about broadening the participation of the Conference?
Kissinger: Let me tell you what we’ll say to the Arabs.
We want Romania there.
Our view is that if we want Geneva started with the least debate, we should take the countries who were there—Israel, Egypt, Syria, Jordan—but without prejudice to others. There are some—Britain, France—who aren’t a concern. Our judgment is a forum must be created for the consideration of issues or else it plays into the hands of those who want to waste time.
Gromyko: When for the Palestinians?
Kissinger: Our judgment is the question can be raised after some months. First, the Conference must be convened. If we and you work together as we did on the Berlin negotiations, there will be progress. If we don’t, there will be no progress.
Dobrynin: Should we put into the communiqué that the two ministers condemned Mr. Schlesinger?
Kissinger: This is not our view of what the Soviet view of détente is. [Schlesinger interview, Tab B].\textsuperscript{12} I did not see the interview before it was published. You will not see it again.

\textsuperscript{11} Cecilia Anne Renee “Suzy” Parker, an American actress and model.

\textsuperscript{12} Not attached. Reference is to an interview with Schlesinger published by \textit{U.S. News and World Report} in its May 26 edition, which included his critical remarks on the Soviet view of détente. The full text of the interview was sent to Kissinger in telegram Tosec 10039/116621 to Vienna, May 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) In a report submitted to Congress in early May, Schlesinger also advocated the use of tactical nuclear weapons to stop a conventional attack by Warsaw Pact forces in Europe. Although the report was classified, its substance was subsequently leaked to the press; a sanitized version was released on May 29. (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. Backs Tactical Atom Arms Against a Soviet Push in Europe,” \textit{The New York Times}, May 30, 1975, pp. 1, 65) Brezhnev protested both Schlesinger’s remarks and his report in an oral message to Ford on May 31. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, June–July 1975)
Gromyko: I have another question, which may perhaps not be topical, but we should have clarity from a long-term perspective. We once discussed in the Middle East, that is, how do you visualize long-term guarantees for settlement? From the Israeli point of view, the best guarantee is a rifle.

Kissinger: At that time we suggested that Dobrynin and Sisco should resume these discussions. I suggest, after Rabin’s visit—say the week of the 12th—they should begin, to prepare for our meetings, and they should begin with guarantees.

Joint guarantees I have a problem with—intellectually. So we should discuss them jointly, or separately. We could give the same guarantees, but individually, if it’s not possible to get an agreement on joint action. If we don’t agree? Therefore we can’t act. Therefore it should be a guarantee that can be implemented by the individual countries.

This is not a final position; this is a thinking-out-loud position. Because I don’t think either of us wants to give the other a right of unilateral intervention.

Gromyko: Let’s have a five minute break, and then spend the last five minutes.

[There was a break, beginning at 3:03 p.m. At 3:10 p.m., the Secretary and Minister Gromyko conferred privately.]
151. Memorandum of Conversation

Vienna, May 20, 1975, 3:10–3:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Viktor Mikhailovich Sukhodrev, Counsellor, MFA (interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

[The Secretary and the Minister began this conversation after a break in the plenary meeting.]

Kissinger: Let me say one word about Schlesinger. It’s as much directed at me as at you. If it’s true what he said about détente, we look like fools. If you’re using it to weaken us, we’re idiots.

It will not happen again. I will put a stop to it.

Gromyko: On the Middle East, in substance, we made no progress, but if you follow the line you describe, that you will be working together with us while working with other parties—to the extent you are ready, that’s a helpful sign.

Kissinger: We should operate on the assumption that we get our information from each other, because the parties in the Middle East are not reliable reporters of what’s going on.

Gromyko: Maybe. The first point is: we are preparing to conduct matters seriously with you if you intend to proceed in accordance with our joint responsibility. That’s what I want to say on the Middle East.

Kissinger: We appreciate it.

Gromyko: Regarding the Palestinian question, it’s definitely our conclusion that without it [the PLO], there is no solution, since there are two million people.

Kissinger: There must be a solution to the Palestinian problem.

We think it would be best not to begin with it. We will reach it in time.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, May 19–20, 1975—Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Vienna (2). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.

2 See footnote 12, Document 150.
Gromyko: On European security, we believe that when it is finally resolved, we will rise one step higher in our own relationships. But what we don’t like is when somebody tries to tread on our feet.

Kissinger: But we have really made an effort in Basket III. We’ll make an effort to meet the deadline. We have already reserved the week of the 21st on the President’s calendar.

Gromyko: So on CSCE we will be expecting to hear from you in the very near future, and we expect it will be positive.

Kissinger: On Basket III, we’ll instruct our delegations to begin immediately. On the military, we’ll let you know by Tuesday of next week.3

Gromyko: Good.

Regarding the [Brezhnev] visit—October, if the schedule we mentioned is followed, but whether it will be the first or second half is hard to say. Is the second 10 days all right?

Kissinger: We are thinking the President’s trip to China will be the end of November, for we don’t want them too close together, and we need some time to prepare for the other.

Gromyko: What follows from that?

Kissinger: That we would prefer the General Secretary to come not later than October 20.

Then I’ll brief our press that we don’t have a firm date, but we’re thinking of the first part of the Fall.

Gromyko: As regards specific timing, it will be our responsibility to put out an agreed statement at an agreed time. What you say is your responsibility but what I said is firm.

Kissinger: We’ll do it in a vague way.

Gromyko: Two words on West Berlin. We were not favorably impressed by your visit to West Berlin, and to boot accompanied by the Minister of the FRG.4 We see that—how shall I say—as a little pebble thrown into our garden.

Kissinger: American Secretaries of State have visited before, and you remember we announced it after my visit in February.

Gromyko: Yes, but there was also a time when our tanks stood facing each other. So, we shouldn’t look at it that way. We also think the three Western powers are taking a position we don’t think is in accordance with the Quadripartite Agreement.

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4 Kissinger and West German Foreign Minister Genscher visited West Berlin on May 21.
That’s all I’d say.

Does the word Rota mean anything to you?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: Have you forgotten?

Kissinger: No, we haven’t found a way of working it out in the domestic situation in the United States.

Gromyko: What you said is still valid?

Kissinger: You care about the de facto, not a piece of paper. If we work it out with the Government of Spain that it will be abandoned by 1980, that meets your needs. But we’ll work it out one way or another.

Gromyko: The important thing is that it not be forgotten.

Kissinger: No, it has not been forgotten.

Gromyko: And the matter of our sunken submarine. We do not regard the matter as having been closed. We don’t regard the reply we received as final. This was a fact that wounded us, though we did not give vent to our feelings, for reasons that should be obvious.

Regarding the Far East, we are observing at a distance what is going on, and we came to the conclusion that China wants, through pressure on Japan, to do something against both of us. What you should do, you are the judge, but neither of us should ignore the information we have on the subject, and neither can afford to underestimate it.

Kissinger: Let me put it this way: In the next 10 years, given our strength, we may often clash. But after 1985, events may drive us into ever closer collaboration, if not alliance. Provided we don’t weaken each other too much. But we should bear in mind the alliance between Japan and China could be directed against either of us, and if joined with other parts of the world, the Third World, it could be worrisome. This is over 10 years. Before then, it is not a danger.

Gromyko: I appreciate this.

Kissinger: This is what I keep in mind in present controversies. Europe destroyed itself over Serbia; we should not destroy ourselves over Syria, Israel and Iraq. Ten years from now it will be irrelevant.

Gromyko: That approach is, we believe, the correct one, and is a far-sighted approach, and in fact, the Soviet leadership always had that approach regarding our relationship with the United States. Whether from time to time events occur in one part of the world that are not to your liking or ours, but trouble comes only if we allow events to close our eyes to the issue.

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5 See footnote 4, Document 137.
We must not let it happen.

Kissinger: We’ll make the maximum effort to prevent it from happening.

Gromyko: That’s the right attitude. You’ll quite soon be in China, and I’m sure the Chinese will sing like nightingales about their attitude to you. We trust you will be realistic about their political and international implications.

Kissinger: We will clearly distinguish between the immediate and the long-range, and the long-range is what I’ve given you.

Gromyko: Regarding the Middle East, we will continue to act in the direction of ensuring a lasting peace, as in Europe and Asia. Regarding various allegations in the press about the alleged intentions of the Soviet Union, we pay no attention, even though 1,000 arms are ascribed to us where we only have two.

Kissinger: Here the next nine months are very important. We would like to anchor détente very firmly before the primary campaign begins next March.

Gromyko: Informally, who will be the next President of the United States?

Kissinger: If the economic situation improves, as all signs are that it will, Ford will be re-elected with a large majority.

Gromyko: Privately, General Secretary Brezhnev, on several occasions after Vladivostok, mentioned President Ford in a positive way, as a very nice man.

Kissinger: Our press in the East is very misleading. When I travel, and I’m not a Presidential candidate, I draw very large crowds. It shows something about the mood of the country. If the economy improves, and it’s almost certain it will, he’ll be elected with a large majority.

Gromyko: In the Senate, Jackson and others of his ilk are still walking with arrows trained against you.

Kissinger: He’s running against you and against me.

Gromyko: 50–50! Or is it 60–40 against us?

Kissinger: I think 60 against me. [Laughter]

Gromyko: 40 is enough for us!

Kissinger: We’ll handle Jackson. If our relationship deteriorates, he will gain. If our relationship improves, we’ll handle him. But he’s the best financed candidate—he has support from Labor and Jewish groups.

Gromyko: To end it, I think this meeting was both necessary and useful. As we say, Moscow was not built at once—it was built brick by brick. More effort will be required. We are prepared to work from our
side. The tunnel must be built from both ends, and this is a longer tunnel than under the Hudson.

Kissinger: We agree it was useful and we’ll meet again in July.

To the press, we’ll say: We will publish a communique and we need not say more. We had good talks, and we will meet again.

[At 3:40 the meeting ended and the Minister escorted Secretary Kissinger to his car. They spoke briefly to the press waiting at the car. See remarks attached.]^6^

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^6^ Attached but not printed. For the text of Kissinger’s and Gromyko’s remarks, see Department of State Bulletin, June 16, 1975, p. 810.

152. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass the following report to you on his second day of talks with Gromyko.

“I spent some six hours with Gromyko today, including two private sessions. The meeting took place in the garish Soviet Embassy built along Stalinist architectural lines. We skipped lunch to allow more time for talks. He continued genial in tone and manner and anxious that our meeting should be portrayed positively in public.

“In the plenary discussions, however, Gromyko was almost completely unyielding on SALT issues. He reviewed all the currently disagreed issues—including inter alia, verification, bomber armaments and cruise missiles, Backfire, mobiles, increases in silo dimensions, timing of follow-on negotiations on reductions—and almost literally re-cited positions already given Alex Johnson in Geneva. The only slight move was to indicate that follow-on reduction negotiations might begin as early as 1977. I responded in stark terms, stating that at this rate there can be no agreement this year and that Soviets were misusing our Presidential channel by merely reiterating unacceptable Geneva positions. I pointed out that in conjunction with unhelpful Soviet positions

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on CSCE, impact could be quite negative on whole détente outlook. I deliberately overdrew negativism of Soviet positions to see if this would smoke out any flexibility. Gromyko himself merely urged that we not overlook hopeful elements in Soviet positions (in fact, there were none in his formal presentation which closely followed a set of handwritten notes). But Dobrynin later spoke to me privately to explain that Gromyko has no leeway inasmuch as SALT issues are largely between Brezhnev and Grechko. He implied that Gromyko’s report to the Politburo of my blunt rejection of their positions will produce movement. In particular, he indicated that Soviets would come around to “complex” approach to verifying SS–18 MIRV numbers, would probably accept counting certain Backfires as strategic bombers within 2400 total, and might be receptive to banning landmobiles as part of a scheme whereby cruise missiles of various types would be free below some range like 2500 KM and counted above it. I had suggested that we might conduct some very private technical talks in Moscow or Washington in the next few weeks, and Gromyko indicated they would agree to doing it in Washington. I also proposed delaying regular Geneva SALT talks for three weeks and Gromyko indicated they would respond shortly, presumably accepting the suggestion. In sum, on SALT, they seem to be having considerable argument in Moscow which hopefully will be speeded toward positive solutions by my blunt rejection of Gromyko’s presentation. My impression is that we will have an agreement.

“On CSCE, Gromyko produced amendments to the western compromise proposals on the rights of journalists. These are extremely restrictive and will require a good deal of further haggling. I agreed that these issues can be reviewed by our representatives in Geneva on condition that Soviets provide comments on the whole western counter-proposal and that all outstanding texts on journalists, broadcasting and human contacts be examined. As I indicated yesterday, I think these matters will eventually be settled, but only after a miserable series of haggles. There also was some slight give on maneuver notification. Gromyko agreed to 18 days advance notice instead of 12—and here too I think after some horse-trading there will be a resolution.

“On the Middle East, my strategy was to hold out the prospect of possible cooperation with the Soviets while making no commitments, so that none of your options would be prejudged for your meetings with Sadat and Rabin. We succeeded in this regard, even though the Soviets sought very specific and concrete indications of our position. The Soviets wanted to move promptly to Geneva, but I made no specific commitment on date. While I said our reassessment has not been completed, I pointed out the dangers of aborting a conference or coming to an early impasse risked confrontation between us if there
were inadequate prior preparations, and I pointed out that you wished first to consult Sadat and Rabin. Gromyko pressed for an immediate invitation to the PLO to participate in the Geneva Conference. The Soviets had an actual draft ready to go. I rejected the proposal for what it was—a propaganda gambit which the Soviets knew we could not take seriously and which they tried just to put themselves in a position of being able to tell the Arabs and Palestinians that they pressed to get a prompt Geneva Conference and PLO invitation and we rejected the proposition. Playing on Soviet concerns that they too could be blamed for an aborted Geneva Conference, I said the PLO issue is something to be decided at a later stage of any Geneva Conference. I thought it necessary and desirable, however, to assure the Soviets that we would pursue detailed talks with them on the Middle East after you completed your talks with Sadat and Rabin. For this reason I offered Gromyko another meeting in July. This would follow your speech on the Middle East (of which Gromyko is of course unaware).

“Gromyko and I agreed tentatively to meet again in July to continue talks on Middle East and SALT. He also indicated that Brezhnev now firmly intends to come to the U.S. in October. This is probably realistic in view of the great amount of work remaining on SALT and the fact that CSCE finale may well not be feasible by late July. Brezhnev’s health is also a factor that was not clear.”

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2 In message Tohak 45 to Kissinger, May 22, Scowcroft reported: “The President said that he had been thinking about Gromyko’s stonewall positions on SALT. He said that if they were a reflection of Soviet attitudes at this point, perhaps we should think about using the leverage of the convening of the CSCE summit conference. I pointed out to him that Gromyko had never been a principal SALT negotiator and that Dobrynin had substantially softened Gromyko’s positions. The President concurred, but said we ought to keep this possibility in mind, because CSCE was for us a minus, not a plus, and there is no reason we should give it away for nothing. I think this reflects the unease which the President has discussed several times with you about CSCE, obviously from the Baltic-American groups.” (Ibid., Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 9, Kissinger Trip File, May 18–23, 1975, Europe and Middle East, TOHAK [5])
153. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: The Holystone operation is a total disaster. [Substantial discussion]
I think maybe we should take it to the public.
The President: How do we get hold of this?
Kissinger: I think someone needs to be fired, whether it is justified or not.
I would get Schlesinger and Colby in and say you want a report and you want someone fired—also Ingersoll.
The President: Get those three in here.
Kissinger: On your trip, we didn’t get to discuss CSCE.
On CBM’s, the issue left is what territory should be included for notice of maneuvers. The Europeans wanted 500 kilometers inside the Soviet Union maneuvers involving 12,000 troops, and notice 96 days ahead. The Soviet Union proposes 30,000 troops, 18 days ahead, 150 kilometers. The Soviet proposals are inadequate.
On human contacts, it is a total fraud. Only Gromyko can understand the language. The language is very abstract, but even this the Soviet Union won’t accept.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 12. Secret; Nodis. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 On May 25, The New York Times published a front-page article by Seymour Hersh on a classified intelligence operation, code-named Holystone, which gathered “vital information on the configuration, capabilities, noise patterns and missile-firing abilities of the Soviet submarine fleet.” According to Hersh, critics of the program, including “past and present members of the National Security Council, the State Department, the Navy and the Central Intelligence Agency,” not only argued that the information could be gathered by other means but also questioned “whether such intelligence operations have any place in the current atmosphere of détente between the United States and the Soviet Union.”

3 Reference is to the President’s upcoming trip to Europe, which included stops in Belgium, Spain, Austria, Italy, and Vatican City. CSCE was an important item on the agenda in Brussels, where Ford attended a NATO summit meeting May 28–31.
As for post-conference machinery, the Soviets previously wanted a permanent Secretariat. We wanted an assessment in two years. Now the Soviet Union is on our side; but they want to delay four to five years since they now are afraid Yugoslavia and Romania will use the machinery against them.

I think your position must be hard-line. No more concessions to the Soviet Union. If they want a conference, let them concede.

The President: Did you see the New York Times editorial?  
Kissinger: It was unconscionable. You should see the editorials they had in '69 and '70. But the Jews are trying to get the maximum polarization with the Soviet Union.

But on CSCE, I would listen and not get engaged. Say if we can get a decent settlement, fine; if not, wait a few months.

The President: If the Soviets are so eager to get a CSCE, can we use that for SALT leverage?

Kissinger: It would be difficult; it could have been done a year ago maybe, but the Europeans would leave you. We should, three years ago, have linked it with MBFR. But if it isn’t finished by early June, there can’t be a meeting in July. Our negotiation can drag just a bit behind the Europeans and slow it up as much as possible.

The President: I think we should hang back. Will the Europeans care?

Kissinger: Yes. Brezhnev said he wouldn’t come here before the CSCE. I told him that is OK; we are better off domestically on our anti-Soviet line.

On SALT, there is no bureaucratic dispute. The issues are SS–18, cruise missiles, Backfire. On SS–18, they want to have both MIRV and non-MIRV’d. They might agree to verification by complexes. This looks manageable. We couldn’t allow this with 17’s and 19’s.

On cruise missiles, we may be cheating a little because they may honestly think Vladivostok settled it. They may agree to 2500 km.

On Backfire, we are out of ideas. We may have to try not counting those in Southern USSR. Or we may have to count F–111’s.

But there is no dispute within the Verification Panel on these issues.

The President: I notice the paper said there were disputes.

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Kissinger: I don’t know about Schlesinger, but not in the VP.

On the Mideast—I am thinking we try for a separate agreement with Egypt, then go to Geneva later in the year with an overall agreement. Rabin may try to tie your hands on an overall agreement in conceding an Egyptian agreement.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the President’s upcoming trip to Europe, including Spain, Morocco, Italy, Poland, the Pope, Greece, and Turkey.]

154. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford


SUBJECT

A Perspective on Brezhnev’s Health and Observations on the Political Struggle for the Succession

[less than 1 line not declassified] a report on Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev’s health, the extent to which his continuing dental troubles appear to be disturbing him, and an inside view in this situation of the struggle for the succession—a struggle in which the recent downfall of Aleksandr Shelepin is described as being significant. The information, while in some respects at odds with other information we have received on the possible succession, warrants particular interest [1½ lines not declassified].

Brezhnev’s Health

[less than 1 line not declassified], Brezhnev’s deteriorating health recently has become more obvious and more a cause of concern to his associates in the Party leadership. Several weeks ago, for example, Brezhnev was walking along a corridor in the Kremlin with several associates, who noticed he was uneasy, nervous and in great pain. Brezhnev suddenly grasped and removed his dentures, flinging them to the floor and shattering them.

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2 Attached but not printed.

3 See footnote 4, Document 142.
Brezhnev frequently massages his jaw and chin, sometimes with both hands. During a gathering of top Soviet officials at the Kremlin on May 8 for the V–E Day ceremonies, Brezhnev’s behavior was odd and irrational. At one point he was observed with tears in his eyes; he removed his glasses, rubbed his face and jaw with both hands, and then began to laugh in a strange and apparently forced manner. At one point during the past several weeks, Brezhnev’s physicians became disturbed about the results of a blood test which showed some kind of abnormality.

When Brezhnev is with close friends and associates, he acts very depressed and does not try to conceal worry about his health. He effectively can maintain a pretense of good health when he is in public, but can hide his pain and emotional distress on such occasions for only limited periods of time.

The Succession

As the signs of Brezhnev’s deteriorating health become more apparent, the behind-the-scenes fight for a commanding position as the leading contender for the leadership of the Party has been intensifying—at a time when the Soviets are preparing for their Party Congress early next year. As of several months ago, the two leading contenders were Trade Union Chief Shelepin and KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov. Andropov, who is loyal to Brezhnev, has been trying to strengthen his own position but without any attempt to undermine Brezhnev. To counter Shelepin, Andropov either had to remove a number of senior KGB officials loyal to Shelepin or remove Shelepin himself. He chose to attempt the latter. Initially in this struggle, Politburo members Suslov and Arvid Pelshe and Party Secretary Kapitonov leaned toward Shelepin, but then wavered and finally supported Andropov. The result was Shelepin’s removal from the Politburo and the complete stripping of his power.4

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4 According to an attached correspondence file, the memorandum was “OBE,” i.e. overtaken by events. Ford and Kissinger, however, discussed the report during their meeting at 9:37 a.m. on June 10: “President: I got that memo on Brezhnev’s health. It is disturbing. Do we know about his possible replacements? Kissinger: The paper mentioned Shelepin and Andropov. Shelepin is gone and it would be a first if Andropov, head of the KGB, were to make it.” After an exchange on the “Malenkov–Beria days,” which was not transcribed, Kissinger commented: “They obviously count on having a CSCE summit in July. Dobrynin says that Brezhnev wants to meet with you there. That would be a good time to make progress on SALT. I can do a little beforehand, but not much.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 12)
Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Solzhenitsyn's Washington Visit

Alexander Solzhenitsyn will be visiting Washington during June 27–July 1.\(^2\) George Meany has written the President to ask that he attend an AFL–CIO banquet in Solzhenitsyn’s honor on June 30 (Tab C).\(^3\) Senators Helms and Thurmond have written the President to ask that he agree to meet with the Russian writer on June 30, and Jack Marsh has endorsed their request (Tab D).\(^4\)

In response to our request for comments, the Department of State recommends strongly against the President's attending the AFL–CIO banquet, noting that it will be an occasion for anti-Soviet rhetoric.\(^5\) I concur with State's recommendation. The memorandum for Jeanne Davis' signature to Warren Rustand at Tab B would recommend against Presidential participation.

State comments that there will probably be pressures from other quarters for the President to meet with Solzhenitsyn. State recommends that the President not receive him for an Oval Office meeting, but suggests that if a meeting with Solzhenitsyn is deemed imperative.


\(^2\) In a note to Marsh on June 20, Rourke reported: “I spoke with Clint Fuller (Executive Assistant in Jesse Helms’ Office) concerning the Solzhenitsyn matter. Clint agreed to send us a letter, detailing the purpose, dates, etc. of proposed visit. I advised him that I had already run this by Brent Scowcroft and that NSC agreed to expedite action on any request we might pass on.” (Ford Library, Marsh Files, Box 30, General Subject File, Solzhenitsyn)

\(^3\) The letter is dated June 18. Lane Kirkland, Secretary-Treasurer of the AFL–CIO, also signed it.

\(^4\) At Tab D are the letter from Helms and Thurmond and a memorandum from Marsh to Scowcroft, both dated June 23.

\(^5\) Attached but not printed is a memorandum to Scowcroft, June 26, in which Springsteen argued: “Not only would a meeting with the President offend the Soviets but it would raise some controversy about Solzhenitsyn’s views of the United States and its allies.” During an appearance on “Meet the Press” on November 9, George Will of National Review cited this passage and asked Ford whether this memorandum was “evidence of the fact that you did worry about offending the Soviet Union when you decided not to see Mr. Solzhenitsyn.” Ford replied: “The initial reaction was not related to détente as an undercutting of it. It was a decision made at that time for various reasons, and I did reconsider it and we did offer to see him.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 666)
that it might take place at a White House social function or a social function elsewhere in Washington. Clearly, the Soviet Government would not be pleased by the President’s meeting with Solzhenitsyn (however, the visit can’t please the USSR in any event). On the other hand, he is a Nobel Prize winning author, a man greatly admired in the United States, and—as noted in State’s memorandum—the Senate has passed a resolution granting him honorary U.S. citizenship.

It is my belief that the President may wish to accede to the Senators’ proposal that he meet briefly with Solzhenitsyn. If this is the case, I believe it unnecessary to contrive a social event. I think one way to handle the matter would be to arrange for Solzhenitsyn to come on a White House tour, during which the President could greet him. If this were to happen, I believe we could follow much the same press line as was followed during the February 25, 1974 White House press conference shortly after Solzhenitsyn’s expulsion when President Nixon said he personally admired Solzhenitsyn as a Nobel Prize winner and as a man of great courage, but that his case was not an issue in current US–USSR relations, that we recognize the differences in our systems, that we will continue to pursue the policy of détente because it is in the best interests of both countries to do so (press conference Q & A at Tab E).  

If you agree that a brief greeting during a June 30 White House tour offers the best solution, the schedule proposal at Tab A would so recommend. (If this is approved, we will, of course, have to follow through with the necessary arrangements to have Solzhenitsyn tour the White House on June 30.)

Recommendation  

1. That you sign the schedule proposal at Tab A.
2. That you approve the memorandum for Jeanne Davis’ signature to Warren Rustand at Tab B.

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6 For the transcript of the press conference, see ibid.: Nixon, 1974, No. 61.
7 Kissinger indicated neither approval nor disapproval of the recommendations. In an attached, undated handwritten note to Clift, McFarlane reported: “The General [Scowcroft] has no strong preference as to who (Marsh, Friedersdorf) or how (in writing or orally) we answer Thurmond et al.” On June 26, Rourke notified Marsh that the NSC staff “would not recommend” a meeting between Ford and Solzhenitsyn. “Apparently, NSC feels that this would be something of an insult to the Soviet Union,” Rourke explained, “in that Solzhenitsyn continues to be a burr under the Soviet saddle. There is no indication how adamant NSC is in their position. This matter must, of course, be acted on immediately. I know you will want to consider the Thurmond/Helms, et al., reaction to a direct request for a Presidential meeting for Solzhenitsyn.” (Ford Library, Marsh Files, Box 30, General Subject File, Solzhenitsyn)

SUBJECT
Solzhenitsyn

Question: Has a final decision been made concerning the possibility of the President visiting with Mr. Solzhenitsyn?

The press coverage we’re getting out of the current situation where Ron’s guidance is simply to say that there is nothing currently on the calendar has created serious problems.

Attached is a Herblock cartoon from this morning’s Washington Post. My own strong feeling is that the President should see Solzhenitsyn for any one of the following reasons:

1. I think the decision not to see him is based upon a misreading of détente. Détente means nothing more and nothing less than a lessening of tension. Over the last several years it has been sold as a much broader concept to the American people. At most, détente should consist of agreements wherever possible to reduce the possibility of conflict, but it does not mean that all of a sudden our relationship with the Soviets is all sweetness and light.

2. I can’t think of a better way to demonstrate for the American people and for the world that détente with the Soviet Union, and the signing of a SALT Agreement does not imply also our approval of their way of life or their authoritarian government. It would be a clear signal that while we do in fact want to sign a SALT II Agreement and the European Security Treaty, that in no way means that we’ve given up faith in our fundamental principles concerning individual liberty and democracy.

Solzhenitsyn, as the symbol of resistance to oppression in the Soviet Union, whatever else he may be, can help us communicate that message simply by having him in to see the President. Seeing him is a nice counter-balance to all of the publicity and coverage that’s given to meetings between American Presidents and Soviet Leaders. Meetings with Soviet Leaders are very important, but it is also important that we

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1 Source: Ford Library, Cheney Files, Box 10, Subject Files, Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. No classification marking. The President initialed the memorandum.

2 Ron Nessen.

3 Attached but not printed.
not contribute any more to the illusion that all of a sudden we’re bosom-buddies with the Russians.

3. Whatever we finally come up with by way of a SALT Agreement will require ratification by the United States Senate. I think that ratification will be easier to achieve if the President is in good shape with the conservative wing of the Republican Party and those who might ordinarily be expected to oppose SALT II. His position in that regard is weakened by our refusal to date to see Solzhenitsyn. Indeed, I think it can be argued that the long-term relationship between the U.S. and the Soviet Union would be enhanced by a Presidential visit with Solzhenitsyn because it enhances the President’s capability to deal with the right wing in America, the group most likely to oppose SALT II.

4. Finally, the decision not to see Solzhenitsyn is totally out of character for the President. More than any President in recent memory, he’s the man who’s willing to see anyone, talk to anyone and listen to anyone’s views, no matter how much they may differ from his own. That same operating principle should apply in foreign policy, just as it does domestically.

If, in fact, there is a potential foreign policy problem here, I would think it can easily be solved by a communication to Brezhnev to let him know the reasons for the meeting and that it is not intended as a slap at the Soviets. They have been perfectly free to criticize us for our actions and policies in Southeast Asia over the years, to call us imperialists, war-mongers, and various and sundry other endearing terms, and I can’t believe they don’t understand why the President might want to see Solzhenitsyn. Secretary Kissinger is about to meet with Gromyko in Europe, and I would think he could certainly lay the groundwork so that the Soviets know that the meeting is being done basically for domestic, not international, purposes.

I would hope the issue could be reopened and debated once again. This time it should be done with a very small group, so that we don’t have the kind of leaks we did last time.
157. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The USSR and Asia

I am attaching a paper on the Soviet role in Asia prepared by a member of my staff as a contribution to our post-Indochina reassessment. It approaches the problem not only from the aspect of US-Chinese-Soviet interaction in Asia but also in terms of the Soviet potential vis-à-vis the individual components of Asia. Although much of the analysis will not be new to you there are several elements in it that you may find interesting.

—In contrast to some other recent studies on this subject, the Soviet potential in post-Vietnam Asia is judged to be relatively modest and less than that potentially posed by China. Although there is new scope for Soviet activities, limitations on Soviet capabilities, combined with the continuing US and Chinese roles and the Asians’ own desire to steer an independent course, probably mean that for the foreseeable future the Soviet role in Northeast and Southeast Asia will not be a major problem for us.

—The Soviets do, however, have two strongpoints: India and the DRV. They probably see the situation in South Asia as a model to be extended into Southeast Asia. Although there are many pitfalls in their relations with Hanoi, their association with the most dynamic regime in Southeast Asia is a definite plus for them.

—Soviet activities will remain in a fairly traditional framework of state-to-state relations supplemented by regional approaches such as the Asian Security proposal. The Soviets have neither the assets nor the incentives to attempt the overthrow or radical reorientation of existing governments. This means that the regional states have considerable scope for setting the terms on which the Soviets will be involved.

—Based on the assumption that the US role in Asia will be one of ensuring that neither the Soviets nor the Chinese gain dominance, the paper urges that we avoid a grand strategy of alignment with either side. There is no short-term need to support one against the other, but

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2 Drafted by Thornton on July 8, the 16-page paper, also entitled “The USSR and Asia,” is attached but not printed. Kissinger wrote in the margin of the covering memorandum: “Excellent paper. HK.”
this requirement could arise later. In South Asia we might have to throw our weight in against the Soviets; in Southeast and Northeast Asia, however, it is more likely that the Chinese will be the threat to be guarded against.

—Although our relationship with the USSR is our prime political concern, it need not be the determining factor in our approach to Asia. There are many other factors involved (including China) that are at least as important in devising an Asian policy that will maximize our position in Asia and, hence, globally. In particular, we should avoid polarization of the type that we have encountered in the Middle East and South Asia.

—Obviously the key to a policy of this sort is a strong and continuing US role in Asia so that we are seen as a credible alternative by both the Chinese and the Soviets and by the Asian nations themselves.

—Finally, we must accept the fact that even while we remain the strongest outside power involved in Asia the Soviet role will grow. We can no longer unilaterally set the terms on which others will participate in Asian affairs. We will have to make a careful assessment of what specific kinds of Soviet activity are unacceptable and exert our influence to counter these; and acquiesce in levels of Soviet involvement that either may be unwelcome but not dangerous to our interest, or perhaps even helpful if they contribute to regional stability (e.g., support of neutral regimes in Southeast Asia).

158. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹


SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Gromyko

This could be a rather bizarre encounter: barring progress on SALT—and the signs are not promising—this meeting will be largely atmospheric, with a risk that the Middle East or CSCE or an accumula-

tion of bilateral irritants could produce some recriminations and acrimony. Given probable Soviet chagrin over American Middle East diplomacy and apprehension over the rise of anti-Sovietism, perhaps the most you can do in this meeting is:

— to provide some reassurance to Gromyko that recent events (discussed below) do not portend a deterioration of the Administration’s commitment to détente;
— to stress that we regard Brezhnev’s visit and another SALT agreement as a new turning point;
— to explain that the President’s prospects for reelection are growing stronger;²
— and that both our elections and their Party Congress can become opportunities to confirm for an extended period the improvement in relations, if there is a solid basis in SALT, the TTB, and movement in MBFR.

— You ought to point to your Atlanta speech³ as a significant re-statement of the Administration’s position (particularly since you can expect some quarrelsome complaints from Gromyko).

But you should point out that Soviet policy also gives ground for concern, permitting critics of détente to charge that the improvement in relations is largely one-sided: stonewalling in SALT, obstructionism in the Middle East, complete intransigence over emigration, an erratic performance in Vietnam, exploitation of unsettled situations (such as arms supplies to the MPLA in Angola, the Soviet base in Berbera, considerable clandestine support and sympathy for the Portuguese communists), needling over Berlin, intractability in MBFR, and interminable haggling for minor gains in CSCE. You could point to the numerous articles on SALT violations as an indicator of disquiet; critics who raise questions about Soviet compliance with the spirit of SALT I (i.e., the size of the SS–19 compared to the SS–11) will not be silenced unless the next agreement is a sound one.

Since both sides may have reasons to be apprehensive or dissatisfied it is important in the period leading up to the General Secretary’s visit that some genuine substantive movement be made in our relations.

² Shortly after noon on July 8, Ford announced his candidacy for the 1976 Republican nomination for President.
³ On June 23, Kissinger delivered an address entitled “Constancy and Change in American Foreign Policy” before the Southern Council on International and Public Affairs and the Atlanta Chamber of Commerce. For the text, see Department of State Bulletin, July 14, 1975, pp. 49–56. On the same day, Scowcroft forwarded a copy of the address to the President, who commented in the margin: “Excellent speech.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 9, Kissinger Speech, 6/24/75)
Your Main Objectives:

—To determine whether the conciliatory remarks about SALT at the end of your last meeting will lead to any movement;\(^4\) of the main issues, verification probably is the softest Soviet position.

—To decide which direction the PNE talks will take: as suggested in your unanswered note proposing 150 KT and lesser verification, or as developed in the formal talks, with different thresholds and extensive verification.

—To foreshadow an expectation of a Soviet response in MBFR if we make a new proposal.

—To dampen somewhat expectations of an early Congressional breakthrough on trade.

—To keep the Soviets at arms length in the Middle East, while offering some face-saver.

The Current Soviet Mood

One could expect that the Kremlin may be dismayed and certainly irritated (as their recent private notes suggest) about the tenor of American comments and behavior toward the USSR:

—There have been a series of leaks concerning American intelligence and reconnaissance activities including the most recent allegation that a US submarine collided with a Soviet submarine near Petropavlovsk.

—There was the highly publicized arrest of two Americans for espionage, with charges against three Soviet UN officials; plus accusations about Soviet embassy intercepts of US telephone conversations.

—There was the publicity on the Soviet base in Somalia.

—There was the statement by Schlesinger about a “first strike”\(^5\) which Brezhnev allegedly told Brandt could not be forgotten. (No doubt Gromyko will bring this up.)

—There was the reception of Solzhenitsyn in Washington attended by Cabinet officers.

—There was the acrimonious exchange between the Soviets and the Humphrey–Scott delegation\(^6\) concerning the link between emigration and trade.

—There are probably Soviet suspicions about our foot-dragging in CSCE and certainly suspicions that we have once again out-maneuvered them in the Middle East.

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\(^4\) See Document 150.

\(^5\) See footnote 12, Document 150.

\(^6\) On the visit of U.S. Senators to Moscow, see Document 167.
In sum, there are ample reasons for the Soviets to conclude that in the US there is a perceptible hardening of opinion against détente, particularly in the wake of Vietnam, and that this trend is being weakly resisted by the Administration. Indeed, our Embassy suggests that the Soviets may be having second thoughts about President Ford and, of course, they are apprehensive about Jackson’s candidacy.\footnote{The Embassy provided background for Kissinger’s upcoming meeting with Gromyko in Geneva in telegram 9426 from Moscow, July 7. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)}

On the other hand, and perhaps related to this general apprehension, the Soviets have been rather conciliatory on a number of secondary, though not unimportant, issues, particularly in the period since you saw Gromyko:

— they moved fairly quickly to meet our demand on CSCE;
— they wrapped up the Environmental Modification talks along the lines we proposed;
— they began to loosen up their position in the Threshold Test Ban talks;
— on some bilateral issues they have been accommodating;
— in their public pronouncements, and in their treatment of the US Senate delegation, they have been conciliatory;
— they are planning a considerable show in connection with the space launch and rendezvous.

Thus, there has been no wholesale reaction to accumulated grievances; most likely the top leadership still wants to project a favorable image of US-Soviet relations and to make the Brezhnev visit a success (the fact that it is now being referred to regularly in public print is a strong indicator).

Your basic bargaining position has thus not deteriorated and, ironically, may have even improved because the Soviets are apprehensive about a post-Vietnam shift in American opinion. They must regard you and the President as the best guarantee that any such shifts will not lead to a strategic change of course.

For this reason, you need not feel constrained to placate Gromyko, and you may be able to build up some further pressure, particularly on SALT.

CSCE

Unfortunately, we cannot predict the status of the issue—CSCE—that is of most immediate concern to Gromyko and Brezhnev. By Thursday morning\footnote{July 10.} it could be virtually wrapped up (the most likely) or it could be a chaotic mess, or still a cliff hanger. All of the major powers seem to be planning in their own minds for a meeting about July 28,
or even the 31st, but none of the Western powers wants to bear the onus for bludgeoning the other participants. In any case, none of the remaining questions are at issue between the US and USSR.

—If things are, in fact, turning sour, you could point out to Gromyko that the Soviets have themselves to blame: the concessions they made in June on CBMs and Basket III could have easily been made months ago; their sharp tactics have, in effect, backfired.

—On the other hand, there is no reason not to take some credit if things are proceeding to a conclusion in July—which is, after all, the basic promise that we made.

—In either case, you may want to warn Gromyko that the Soviet’s treatment of the final stage in Helsinki ought to be modest, and not play into the hands of critics in Europe and in our Congress, who are increasingly skeptical of CSCE and are ready to attack the final documents if they are interpreted in a distorted manner by the Soviets.

—Our own position will be forward-looking, emphasizing putting principles into practice, rather than trying to give them any particular interpretation.

Middle East

On the Middle East you are in the catbird seat: since only you will know the real prospects for another interim agreement.

—Your main problem is that Gromyko has some reason to believe that this meeting was to be a pre-Geneva planning session, where the substance of a comprehensive settlement would be discussed.

—The record shows, however, that you left open the possibility of an interim step.

—In any case, the Soviets have been remarkably quiet since Salzburg.

—They maintain a fine distinction between step-by-step agreements and shuttle diplomacy, which presumably is outside the Geneva framework.

—The trick is, thus, to persuade Gromyko that your current effort is not outside Geneva, because of a deliberate attempt to exclude Moscow, but is something both parties obviously wanted, and thus could not be turned aside simply because the forum was not the one desired by the Soviets.

—Perhaps a more basic question is whether, faced with another interim agreement, the Soviets will throw their weight against some step in the Golan, where they may be able to exert some influence or make it a condition for the Sinai being ratified in Geneva.

—If prospects are not so bright for an Egyptian-Israeli agreement, then you may want to draw the Soviets into explaining how their no-
tion of a final settlement differs from the propagandistic position they have taken and why Israel should have any incentive to make the required concessions; about all you can do is put the Soviets on the defensive about their official position.

SALT

As you well know, Gromyko is a poor interlocuter on this issue. Since you last saw him, Dobrynin has complained about the difficulties in arriving at a Soviet position; while this could well be true, it is also likely that the Soviets are stalling, awaiting CSCE; they purposely passed up a chance to send someone to Washington.

—Judging from Semonov’s opening remarks at the resumed meetings,9 he has been given no new instructions (this could be meaningless, since Gromyko may want to bargain with you); yet, it is strange that rather than waffling for a week, Semonov felt free to come out strongly on Backfire, cruise missiles and verification as “firm positions” on the very issues you discussed with Gromyko.

If there is to be movement, it is mostly likely to come in the MIRV verification area.

(1) it costs the Soviets little to accept some sort of complex approach on SS–18, if in fact they intend to deploy 100 or so single warhead versions; the real problem will be if they extend the complexes to SS–17 and SS–19;

(2) concessions on the Backfire would revolutionize the meaning of the 2400 ceiling, costing the Soviets dearly; thus there is practically no room for Soviet concessions, and they are likely to go down to the summit wire, if need be, to avoid the implication that this bomber qualifies in any way as strategic;

(3) concession of the cruise missiles is conceivable, but it is highly unlikely that the Soviets can go as far as we propose.

Thus, unless Gromyko shows some unanticipated flexibility on Backfire or cruise missiles, you ought to stress that if this channel fails to make any progress, there will be a stalemate well through the summer and the chances of completing an agreement will recede.

At a minimum, the political channel has to provide some instructions that will break the deadlock on verification.

It is possible that Gromyko will make only a tentative response and propose carrying on the negotiation between the President and Brezhnev at Helsinki. While you cannot refuse such a proposal, at a minimum Gromyko should agree what, precisely, should be discussed, given the time constraints in Helsinki.

9 The SALT II talks resumed in Geneva on July 3. In telegram 214 from Geneva, the U.S. Delegation forwarded the text of Semenov’s statement on the occasion. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
—It would be very unwise and risky to have a wide ranging SALT discussion that ended in no progress at the Helsinki summit.

—A better procedure would be for you and Gromyko to isolate one issue and, if at all possible, agree on the general concept for solving it, thus allowing the President and General Secretary to confirm it, and perhaps discuss how to proceed over the summer.

In sum, your main point is that in the political channel it is now imperative to break the logjam and make progress on at least one issue—verification—and preferably agree on a general direction for resolving the cruise missile issue.

**PNEs**

We have had no answer to the proposition you put privately in a note through Dobrynin June 12, namely, that we could forego our more stringent verification requirements, if the Soviets could accept a 150 KT limit on individual PNEs, both excavation and contained. Under this approach we could also agree to higher aggregate yields for salvos, providing we agreed on adequate verification procedures to assure verification of individual shots within the salvo.

—This has the virtue of not permitting high yield individual shots which the Soviets propose, as high as 500 KT for excavation PNEs.

—The verification techniques are not all that valuable compared to the controversy generated by an agreement to limit weapons tests to 150 KT, but encourage other “peaceful tests” well above this threshold.

Ironically, as this note was passed through your channel, the Soviets began to make concessions to our verification demands, accepting the idea of a fission yield limit for excavation shots, agreeing on exchange of data, agreeing to the technique of collecting “melt samples” at the site to verify fission yield, and to drilling back for such samples.

—Thus, if the talks continue in this vein we will soon have to decide on the remaining question concerning yields of excavation shots and contained shots.

*In the formal talks the positions are:*

**Limits on Contained PNEs.** The US has proposed an upper yield limit of 100 KT for single contained PNEs while the Soviets propose 150 KT. The Soviets have argued that higher aggregate yields are needed for some applications. The US has responded it could accept aggregate yields up to 500 KT provided that each explosion can be distinguished and its yield determined (i.e., the Soviets must accept observers, infor-

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Information exchange and the electrical yield measurement technique called SLIFER).

**Limits on Excavation PNEs.** Our delegation has proposed a *salvo* yield limit of 500 KT on excavation PNEs but, as instructed, has not specified an *individual* yield limit. The Soviets have recently proposed a 3MT limit, but indicated privately earlier that 1MT might be acceptable. The Soviets have proposed a limit of 500 KT on *individual* excavation shots and have also indicated they have some flexibility in this figure.

The Soviets have argued that a small number of higher yield shots above this figure should be permitted noting in private discussions that pending resolution of some legal problems, you and Gromyko agreed to such a provision. (In October 1974, we returned to this issue and agreed privately that there should be a small “mistakes” quota for the TTBT of perhaps two or three tests per year that might exceed the threshold by perhaps 30 percent.)

The US has proposed a 0.2 KT limit on the *fission yield* of each excavation device. The Soviets have been receptive, although they indicated a preference for stating such a limit in terms of a range rather than a single figure.

**Verification.** The information exchange requirements are now largely agreed as is the depth-of-burial limit. The Soviets have accepted the concept of collecting and analyzing *melt samples* to verify the fission yield limit, but insist that the analysis be carried out on the host-side’s territory which would be acceptable to us. They have not addressed in detail the SLIFER technique we have proposed. The principle that on-site observers will be required as an integral part of verification is now firmly accepted for contained events near the threshold, and near or above the threshold for excavation and for any salvos where the individual yields cannot otherwise be distinguished. However, the detailed rights and functions of observers are still under discussion.

The point to emphasize to Gromyko is:

—While either course—as indicated in your note or as delineated in the Moscow talks—is acceptable, we have a *political preference* for the former; it would reduce the opportunities for criticism in the Congress and elsewhere that the TTBT was not really very effective. *You should press for an answer through Dobrynin.*

**Environmental Warfare**

We have agreed on a draft treaty, and only a few minor issues remain to be cleaned up. The Soviets were uncertain whether it would be best to hold this agreement for the summit, or to table it in the current CCD session as a joint draft. Because of American press leaks, it would be difficult to withhold the agreement from the current CCD session,
especially since an experts meeting on the subject is scheduled for early August.

You might ask Gromyko for his views on procedure. It might yet be possible to announce the agreement at the summit as a joint initiative for tabling in the CCD, thereby following up the joint statement on environmental modification signed at the summit a year ago.

Chemical Warfare

We are still not in a position to make any proposal to the Soviets because no decision has yet been made by us on production of binaries. We have attempted to hold off the Soviets by asking a series of questions on a draft Vorontsov gave you last August. The Soviets recently responded to our questions and asked for expert talks in Geneva at the CCD. We were forced to say such talks would be premature.

If Gromyko raises the issue, you should tell him that we are studying the replies to the questions on their draft and will be back to them soon.

MBFR

Discussions in NATO on Option III are proceeding apace. The Soviets obviously know about and are waiting for Option III (you hinted in February on our readiness to introduce nuclear elements into the talks).

—You might note that we hope to make a new proposal but before proceeding we need a more definitive idea of a Soviet response. While this is not a summit item per se the Germans and British have broached the idea that we raise Option III on behalf of the Alliance with Brezhnev when he comes to Washington. We have told the British that we might be willing to do this during the summit, but not necessarily at the level of the President and Brezhnev.

—You could say that in light of Soviet insistence on including a nuclear element, we will be reluctant to take this step, unless we have a clear idea of Soviet counter-concessions, and that you would appreciate a Soviet reply through the Dobrynin channel.

Berbera–Indian Ocean

This general subject is not scheduled to be pursued, but it is possible that Gromyko will upbraid you about all the American publicity over Berbera. Why the Soviets have gone so far in their public denials is rather strange, but in any case it is possible that they will try to turn this issue around by reviving the Indian Ocean arms control idea.

—If this should be raised, you could respond that it is impossible to discuss this, if the starting point is an established Soviet base in Somalia.
—You could point out that a “zone of peace” etc., means nothing, unless we know whether we are dealing with the removal of bases, or with restrictions on number of ships, or kinds of ships, etc.

—But in any case, we are not going to freeze the status quo of a Soviet permanent presence in Somalia, while we discuss how to negotiate.

Trade

Our commercial relations with the Soviets have proceeded smoothly in recent weeks. On July 1, they paid their third obligatory installment on lend lease. Meanwhile, we have obtained COCOM clearance for two of the three computer deals—for the Kama River factory and Aeroflot. A third computer sale—for Intourist—is still under interagency consideration, but prospects look good. The Soviets have not followed through with their earlier expressed intention to award the air traffic control contract to a non-US firm. The LNG projects look less promising, mainly because of Congressional concerns. It is still uncertain whether private financing will meet the Soviet condition for US participation in the exploratory stage of Yakutsk project, and on North Star, we have counseled the US firms involved to delay signing their Letter of Intention with the Soviets.

The Soviets remain adamant on the emigration–trade link. They are aware of the President’s letter, and the Administration’s intention to seek a revision of the Jackson–Vanik amendment. But it is crystal clear that the Soviets will not make a concession on the substance. Thus, it may be risky to build up hopes that there will be an acceptable compromise.

—If, in fact, there is little hope for a resolution of this issue until after the American elections, the most that you might do is ask Gromyko whether the Soviets would prefer some easing of MFN, or EX-IM credits, since it is hopeless to expect to roll back both.

—Finally, you should use the Humphrey conversations to underline the depth of Congressional sentiment on the Jewish issue, and to remind Gromyko that two years ago they spoke in terms of maintaining a rough level of emigration, and that the continuing decline only worsens an already bad situation.

11 Reference is presumably to President Ford’s May 1 message to Congress transmitting the Annual Report on the Trade Agreements Program. For the text, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 226.
159. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 10, 1975, 6:55–9:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador to the US
Mr. Makarov, Assistant to Gromyko
G. M. Kornienko, Chief of American Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, State Dept.
Walter Stoessel, American Ambassador to the Soviet Union
William Hyland, State Department
Jan Lodal, NSC Staff

Gromyko: Well, on Europe we may have to raise other matters after we have gone over these basic matters. In any case, we want to return to the CSCE later but now let’s take up SALT.

That it is now an important problem is now quite clear to both sides. There is no need to speak at length about this, to emphasize the great importance of it. The stage of emphasizing is now behind us. I believe that in the same spirit that we discussed this question in Vienna, in this spirit is the way to implement the Vladivostok Agreement and we should continue discussions today. And it would probably be good to begin now where we left off in Vienna and have in view the substance of discussions since then. But I think that in the meantime there have been no momentous developments.

Kissinger: No, we have not had extensive discussions since then.

Gromyko: I would ask you to say a few words to start off. You are our guest and I will take advantage of that fact.

Kissinger: I said that there were three major problems: first, the problem of verification; second, the problem of cruise missiles; and third, the problem of Backfire. And there is the additional problem of how to define the upper limit of a heavy missile. If each generation of missiles continues to grow, then the distinction we made at the time of

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 10–11, 1975—Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Geneva (1). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Mission.

2 Kissinger and Gromyko discussed the CSCE during meetings at 5:15 and 10:15 p.m. on July 10. Memoranda of conversation are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Documents 313 and 314. See also Document 160.

3 See Document 150.
the Interim Agreement between light and heavy missiles will completely disappear.

Dobrynin: But you had not raised that in Vladivostok.

Kissinger: No, but it was raised in Geneva. I gave your Ambassador a paper on our ideas with respect to verification, with respect to cruise missiles, and some ideas on Backfire and on mobiles, the last in the form of a question. With respect to verification, we tried to meet Soviet concern with respect to the one missile that has been tested with two warheads. With respect to cruise missiles, however ambiguously it was handled in Vladivostok, it is clear that it did not cover sea-based platforms. But we are prepared to put sea-based platforms under the same restrictions that we gave you on cruise missiles. And on Backfire we gave you some ideas on basing and on tankers. We asked for your thinking with respect to mobiles, both land and air-based. This is where we stand.

Gromyko: Yes, those questions did arise and they still exist. Other questions also exist. You named the problems, as in your previous communication, but do you have anything to add to the substance.

Kissinger: No, we are waiting for your reaction and to analyze your reaction and then we can make this a point of departure for further discussion.

Gromyko: Let us now discuss the questions one after the other. First go over one and then go on to others. Obviously, in the discussion of appropriate questions we will discuss one in the context of others, that is, speaking for the Soviet side.

Kissinger: Yes, of course.

Gromyko: We have given very careful thought to the variants you put forward under the first question of verification.

Kissinger: And you have decided to destroy all your land-based missiles. That is one idea that occurred to us but I was saving it.

Gromyko: And is this the moment for raising it.

Kissinger: You seem to be in the right mood.

Gromyko: Let’s climb the staircase one step at a time and start with the question you named as the most important. We have given careful thought to the two variants of this question that you raised as No. 1. Under the first variant you suggested that the total number of MIRVed missiles include all types tested at least once as a MIRV; specifically you were referring to all three types of missiles that you term the 17, 18 and 19. Under the second variant you made an exception for the heavi-

Reference is presumably to the memorandum Scowcroft gave Dobrynin on May 10. See footnote 3, Document 150.
est missile, specifically for what you term the 18. Since that was tested as both a single and a MIRV missile, you suggested that the missiles with MIRV be deployed separately in one area and in another area the missiles with single warheads be deployed. All of these proposals were based on information available to you as to which missiles were tested only as MIRVs and which missiles were tested as single and as MIRV. The Soviet side did not agree with this information but, in any case, we gave careful thought to it and have come to a conclusion. But before I set out our proposal I want to put it in context of another issue. I want it to be in context of cruise missiles. What I will say in reaction to your proposals with respect to the first question should be treated as a complex.

Kissinger: In other words, as a condition. We cannot take one without considering the other.

Gromyko: Yes, all of these problems are so very complex.

Kissinger: Your normal procedure is to make concessions in each category.

Gromyko: I will take that as only a semi-joke. But this is the tactic you have resorted to, but in other matters. Some matters are interlocked, hanging as links in a chain.

Kissinger: You have learned the lesson too well. Dobrynin used to lecture me on what a bad practice this was, but now you are not only doing it, but you are giving me a lecture about it.

Gromyko: I never lectured you.

Kissinger: No, I was referring to your Ambassador.

Gromyko: But the subjects then were different.

Kissinger: I can now look forward to: first, links within SALT, and then second, linking SALT to other matters.

Gromyko: That is another matter, but let’s climb the staircase. You know of the agreement reached on air-to-ground missiles at Vladivostok and you know how that is reflected in the Aide-Mémoire.5

Kissinger: Somewhat ambiguously.

Gromyko: In our view it does not reflect ambiguity but we are familiar with your interpretation; you spoke of it in Vienna. We can’t make any exception for cruise missiles. We believe it was agreed in Vladivostok to count in the 2400 ceiling all air-to-ground missiles with a range over 600 kilometers. This should stand and should include cruise missiles as well. Taking a very different point of view cannot succeed. It would be suicide to leave outside of the agreement and give great freedom to development of these weapons. It would be tanta-

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5 Document 97.
mount to building a dam against a stream and then letting the stream break through to the left and right. This approach would mean a new development of the arms race which neither side needs and we cannot accept it. This is not a hitch in the negotiations but something to which we attach paramount significance. Therefore, the agreement reached at Vladivostok includes ballistic and cruise missiles and we bear in mind other cruise missiles, sea-based and on the surface of the water, apart from those submarines on which agreement has already been reached, that is, ballistic submarines.

Kissinger: Nothing was said about this in Vladivostok.

Gromyko: But Vladivostok should be expanded, proceeding from the logic of the situation. That being accepted, we are prepared to reach agreement on a basis that will constitute a radical step with respect to the first variant. We are prepared to include in the established ceiling of MIRVed missiles of 1320 all missiles we have tested as a MIRV, that is, 17, 18, 19, those specific missiles. In that event your second variant does not apply.

Kissinger: You are saying that every SS–17, 18 and 19, that we are permitted to count them as MIRV, even if deployed as a single warhead, that would be your problem, but we count them all.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: This constitutes a considerable step.

Gromyko: Yes, but the question arises of how to go about the modernization of missiles. The logical conclusion is that regarding the replacement of outdated other types of missiles tested only as a single warhead, that we will replace them with missiles only tested as a single warhead.

Kissinger: So that any missile tested as a MIRV, like the 17, 18 and 19, would then count as a MIRV; but on the other hand, if other missiles were tested as a MIRV, then deployed for modernization, they would be counted?

Gromyko: No, you have turned it upside down, substituting cause and effect; in the process of modernization only that missile tested as a single warhead would replace older missiles tested as a single warhead.

Kissinger: You can replace old, single warhead missiles with single warhead missiles and those new missiles are not tested as a MIRV?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: You have the right to modernize all your missiles.

Gromyko: Yes, at some time.

Kissinger: I mean that under the agreement you have the right to modernization. Those missiles tested as MIRVs count as a MIRV, those tested with only single warheads count as a single.
Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: I see no problems; I think that sounds reasonable. Those missiles tested as a single warhead you want to replace with a single warhead.

Gromyko: The way you frame it sounds less advantageous to you. But you understand it?

Kissinger: Yes, I understand it; you want to be able to replace old missiles with new ones, but not be counted as MIRV. But they would not be of the same type (as MIRV)?

Gromyko: Of course not of the same type.

Kissinger: Single warhead missiles would be replaced by missiles of a different type, but with single warheads.

Gromyko: We would replace older missiles for modernization only with types tested as a single warhead of a different type.

Kissinger: So all 17, 18 and 19s—all would be counted as a MIRV; but if you decide to develop, say a missile called the 20, 21 or 22, with a single warhead, it would be counted as a single warhead.

Gromyko: Yes, by way of modernization. We will install missiles of a single type that would be tested only as a single warhead.

Kissinger: But not of the same type as the 17, 18 or 19?

Gromyko: You think this is too good to be true?

Kissinger: No, I understand, but this is linked to counting all cruise missiles over 600 km in range. I have no moral scruples against linking, but your Ambassador used to go around Capitol Hill lecturing against linkage.

Gromyko: All of this is mutual, it applies the same for the US; it is reciprocal.

Kissinger: We have come to very sorry states if you have to insist on reciprocity, and not do this out of good will. But let me go back; I want to understand what this means for us: we have the Minuteman II and the Minuteman III, the first as a single warhead and the latter is MIRVed; if we want to modernize the Minuteman II we have two choices: either replace with a MIRV within the total ceiling, and then have to dismantle other MIRVs, or replace with a missile that has a single warhead.

Gromyko: I would reply yes, but in respect to these missiles other terms apply, that is the silo capacity in the first agreement cannot be increased by more than 10–15%.

Kissinger: The Vladivostok agreement says that missiles on bombers with a range of over 600 km would be counted, but does not say that missiles on transports or ships; with respect to submarines, sea-based ballistic missiles on submarines are covered, it does not refer
to ships. Is your proposal conditional on counting all cruise missiles or only those on bombers, which is a literal reading of Vladivostok.

Gromyko: This is what we are proposing: the rule of logic must apply to warships and transport aircraft; the only exception is strategic bombers and the previously mentioned ballistic missile submarines.

Kissinger: You are saying cruise missiles on ships and submarines . . .

Gromyko: Only torpedo submarines.

Kissinger: . . . will be counted.

Gromyko: No, banned, not to be deployed.

Kissinger: So your proposition is that cruise missiles can only be deployed on bombers and be counted, and then ban . . .

Gromyko: (Interrupting) of a range over 600 km . . .

Kissinger: all cruise missiles with a range over 600 km.

Gromyko: with a range over 600 km are banned.

Kissinger: Let me sum up your proposals: all cruise missiles with a range over 600 km on bombers are counted; all cruise missiles with a range over 600 km on ships, or submarines or transports are banned.

Gromyko: Yes, excluding ballistic missile submarines.

Kornienko: And ballistic missiles on surface ships.

Kissinger: What about cruise missiles based on land.

Kornienko: You mean intercontinental range cruise missiles.

Gromyko: The land-based intercontinental cruise missiles would be listed under a separate heading, because it is of a new type. On land-based missiles we propose to ban them.

Kissinger: Ban or count them?

Gromyko: We want to ban them; ban.

Kissinger: Let me sum up; I am not being pedantic, but trying to clarify what you are saying: first the only vehicles permitted with cruise missiles over a range of 600 km is a bomber; if it has a range over 600 km it is counted if on bombers.

Gromyko: Counted in the 2400.

Kissinger: If on other movable platforms, ships, land, submarines, transports or sea turtles, with a range over 600 km they are prohibited.

Gromyko: Maybe an exception could be made for sea turtles.

Kissinger: We are training 325 of them.

Gromyko: You have understood correctly, unless you build a platform and call it a sea turtle.

Kissinger: On land-based, everything above 600 km is banned, or only intercontinental range.

Gromyko: Only land-based intercontinental range cruise missiles (are banned).
Kissinger: What is the definition of intercontinental, about 5300 miles.

Gromyko: Those termed intercontinental are defined under the previous agreement.

Kissinger: Land-based cruise missiles with a range shorter than intercontinental are permitted, and not counted?

Gromyko: Our proposal relates to intercontinental—the definition agreed that you speak of is regarding the definition that covers one point in our territory to another point in your territory; the figures were resolved in the agreement.

Kissinger: They are prohibited? Let me understand, for example, a cruise missile of 2000–3000 km would be permitted on land.

Gromyko: Yes, that is a different category, limits do not apply; in short, that is not an intercontinental range missile but that is an intermediate range—that is both cruise and ballistic.

Kissinger: Let me repeat: your position on cruise missiles with a range over 600 km on movable platforms will be counted, but a cruise missile on land, of intercontinental range, banned but less range not counted, except on strategic bombers which are counted.

Gromyko: Yes, counted.

Kissinger: Let me sum up: all cruise missiles on strategic bombers of a range greater than 600 km will be counted . . .

Gromyko: (Interrupting) Of course.

Kissinger: (Continuing) but all cruise missiles on any other movable platforms are banned over 600 km, and all cruise missiles of intercontinental range on land will be banned, but of a shorter range not counted, and that is all linked to your proposal on verification.

Gromyko: Absolutely linked, organically. You are surprised that a strategic bomber which carries cruise missiles should be counted, but that is because it makes a cruise missile international, because it is on a bomber.

Kissinger: Can I go back to verification, because frankly this is the first comprehensive proposal, and I would like to study it and possibly make a counterproposal. I understand that with respect to land-based, but do you have any ideas on SLBMs. Would the principle apply that missiles tested with MIRV would be counted as MIRV on submarines?

Gromyko: All MIRVed missiles on submarines would be counted as MIRVed. The principle would be valid and operable for both sides. There may be some details to be worked out.

Kissinger: Let me understand it: I understand your cruise missile position, and on verification every missile, land or sea-based, tested as a MIRV will be counted and included in the 1320; this includes the 17,
and whatever missiles you will have begun testing on sea-based. With respect to modernization, for land and sea-based, if you replace a missile with a single warhead, it will be a missile only tested as a single.

Do you have any ideas on Backfire bombers?

Gromyko: Yes, we absolutely rule out the possibility of considering this particular aircraft to be a strategic bomber. It does not possess the characteristics of a strategic bomber. As you know, we feel that you can single out some characteristic and say it is better than some characteristic of another aircraft, but on the whole it does not possess the characteristics of a strategic bomber. Your proposal on locating them in the southern portion of the USSR—we cannot accept that proposal. I repeat that it does not present qualities of strategic bombers, and I am surprised that you regard it so.

Kissinger: Your position on the concrete procedures for verification—it is a very significant step forward, very significant; on cruise missiles we have to study it and give you our counter considerations; assuming we go to CSCE on the 30th, then well before that we can give you our considerations, so that the General Secretary can study them and discuss it with the President. I recognize that they are organically linked, so the problem is not solved. We will study your cruise missile proposal with great care so that the President and General Secretary can discuss it. On verification, I may ask some additional clarifications. You have accepted principles that we can live with. It is a very serious effort; I know it was not easy for you.

Gromyko: It was not easy for us; very difficult. On the question of increase in silo building capacity of missiles: you know the aspect you spoke of in Vienna; it is significant to both sides from the standpoint of avoiding a great increase in silos each time: you spoke of no increase in volume greater than 32 percent. In terms of horizontal dimensions not more than 15 percent, and then we discussed horizontal, vertical and both ways, but we would not exceed 32 percent in volume. We believe that this method could be adopted: at the discretion of the parties one could increase horizontally and vertically or both but not exceeding 32 percent, and of course not more than once; otherwise, every year we would be turning light into heavy missiles. You spoke of the need to agree and we propose to agree not to increase by more than 32 percent.

Kissinger: You are saying that the volume cannot be increased by more than 32 percent—or are you saying that modification can be 15 percent in either direction, but then you can’t go down 32 percent and zero increase in diameter. We want two restrictions: first, as stated in the older Interim Agreement, there cannot be more than 15 percent increase both ways . . .
Gromyko: Let me explain; we have been thinking it over and we are saying the same thing: if you increase horizontally by 15 percent, it boils down to the same thing: an increase in diameter by 15 percent, in geometry it amounts to a 32 percent increase. Now we assume you are not limited to horizontal; say, increase diameter by 10 percent and for the remainder it is allowed to be done vertically but by a figure that will not lead to an increase of volume by more than 32 percent.

Kissinger: But the provisions of the Interim Agreement are maintained, that is you can increase by no more than 10–15 percent, you cannot go in any direction more than 15 percent; you can go in both directions, but the increase cannot be more than 32 percent of the volume.

Kornienko: (Interrupting) No . . .

Kissinger: If you combine say 5 percent one way and 10 percent another, you can, provided that the total does not increase the volume by more than 32 percent; you take the provision of the Interim Agreement and add a provision that it is not permitted to lead to more than 32 percent increase in volume.

Kornienko & Gromyko: No, no . . .

Kissinger: (Continuing) If you go less than 15 percent in one direction, you can go another percentage in another direction, provided the total volume increase does not exceed 32 percent. For example, if 10 percent increase in one direction, you could increase ten percent in another, provided that the volume did not exceed a 32 percent increase.

Gromyko: Let me state it once again. There are specific terms: whatever modification is made, it would not lead to an increase in volume of more than 32 percent. Each party decides on modification, horizontally, vertically, or in both directions, but providing this does not lead to more than 32 percent.

Kissinger: But suppose you did not change the diameter, then you could dig down 32 percent.

Gromyko: No, 32 percent of the volume.

Kissinger: But if the radius does not increase, the formula is length times pi R squared—there would be no change . . .

Gromyko: 32 percent deeper would not be 32 percent in volume . . .

Kissinger: If you go down it does not square the radius.

Gromyko: No . . .

Kissinger: Let me try to solve it simply: to sum up: you cannot go more than 15 percent in any direction, but you can go in either direction in combination, provided you do not increase by 32 percent in volume, but not more than 15 percent in any one direction.

Kornienko: No, the most important rule is not more than 32 percent.
Kissinger: But then the 15 percent limit is abandoned.

Gromyko: That is your reply; that is a one-sided approach; we can’t act to accommodate your understanding. We have other technology. We will stick to volume increase.

Kissinger: We have to study it to see if we understand. You suggest a limit on volume to answer our concern that new generations not grow to heavy missiles. You want to substitute for the Interim Agreement limit of 15 percent a modifying clause to state that 32 percent is permitted. You are saying to replace the 10–15 percent limit with another provision saying no more than 32 percent is permitted. Your proposition is to replace the Interim Agreement limits of 15 percent by a permitted increase of 32 percent.

Gromyko: But the two are different; 15 percent is 32 percent in volume.

Kissinger: For two ways? Can you go 15 percent and 15 percent?

Gromyko: No, that is 52 percent, that is a new idea we can consider.

Kissinger: We can proceed in two ways: if we keep the Interim Agreement, on no more than 15 percent, then add the limit of no more than 32 percent of volume then you could go 15 percent in one direction and 8 in another.

Gromyko: No, no.

Kissinger: Can you explain.

Gromyko: An increase of only 15 percent in diameter gives an increase of 32 percent in volume.

Kissinger: But if you go 15 percent down, you have some percentage left to go sideways.

Gromyko: Yes, if you go 15 percent down then you have something left over for diameter.

Kissinger: But if you keep the Interim Agreement, you cannot go 15 percent more in any direction.

Gromyko: Under the old agreement the increase in diameter gives an increase of 32 percent; but if you go down it gives less, then you can do more.

Kissinger: If this proposition were added there would be no problem; you could not go more than 15 percent in any direction, but not more than 32 percent increase in volume; if we keep the Interim Agreement and add a provision that you cannot exceed 32 percent in volume.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: You can achieve 32 percent as long as you do not increase by more than 15 percent in any direction.
Gromyko: No.
Kissinger: You can go down by 32 percent.
Gromyko: Both sides could go in any direction by . . .
Kissinger: Then you are changing the Interim Agreement.
Gromyko: The Interim Agreement does not specify you cannot go 15 percent in both directions.
Kissinger: Under no conceivable interpretation can you go in any direction by more than 15 percent. No Soviet spokesman has ever taken this position. We can amend it to just volume or keep the Interim Agreement and add a provision.

(Short Break)
Gromyko: You could think it over; you could offer another position. We think you should stick to objective criteria. But if you have revised your position . . .
Kissinger: My answer is that we either modify the Interim Agreement, or add a provision that we will not exceed 32 percent in volume.
Gromyko: That is not what this is about. You say add a provision, but that is not the question. We are merely making it more precise.
Kissinger: We are not arguing. If the Interim Agreement remains in force and this is added, then it is clear that neither side can go more than 15 percent in any one direction; no other reading of the agreement is possible.
Gromyko: That is unacceptable as far as depth is concerned; but in terms of diameter it is 32 percent.
Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, if we reach an agreement on a volume ceiling, then each side is free to increase by anything it chooses, but can never go more than 15 percent in any one direction.
Gromyko: If you can go 15 percent both ways this is new, this is 52 percent.
Kissinger: If we agreed on 15 percent before, it must mean something. You are now proposing that the 15 percent limit be replaced by the 32 percent limit—if so, we can study it.
Gromyko: We thought that you had raised it.
Kissinger: We understand your position, we need to study it.
Gromyko: But if you say you go down 15 percent, then get the remainder in diameter, then either side is free to get the remainder, but cannot go deeper than 15 percent?
Kissinger: Otherwise, we can keep the older agreement.
Gromyko: The 15 percent limit was the starting point for diameter changes.
Kissinger: This is a new interpretation. But let us study it, and we will let you know at the time of the meeting with the General Secretary.
Gromyko: But what we said about one modification to the silos still stands?
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: We also have the question of how far each side can go to increase the capacity of its missiles in modernization. Our position is (reading from document) a heavy ICBM is an ICBM with a starting weight (corrected by Kornienko “a launching weight”) in excess of the heaviest of light missiles deployed by the sides at the time of signing of the agreement.
Kissinger: That would be the SS–19?
Gromyko: We would not quarrel with that.
Kissinger: This is the right approach and we may have a counter-proposal, but taking the heaviest of the light missiles is the right approach. Let us analyze it. Have you also thought about the time period by which reductions would have to take place.
Gromyko: Yes, we are thinking in terms of what you said about months not years. We would say up to 12 months, maybe earlier, but not more.
Kissinger: Let us think about this. Have you also thought about a time when talks on reduction would start?
Gromyko: You said something about this in Vienna, is there anything more?
Kissinger: No.
Gromyko: We are prepared to meet your concerns.
Kissinger: By then Jackson may be President, and you can negotiate with him.
Gromyko: We could start even in the same year as the agreement enters into force. We do this to help the Administration meet its critics.
Kissinger: This will be very good.
Gromyko: I now say what you expect me to say, that when talks start, we will raise forward based systems and presence of weapons in third countries.
Kissinger: Each side can say whatever they please, that is your business but it will not be in the treaty.
Kissinger: Do you have something on mobiles. Let me ask you a question: would you have gone back to Moscow without raising mobiles if I had not mentioned them.
Gromyko: I wondered why you were in such a good mood.
Kissinger: But what is your answer.
Gromyko: That is a secret, but it is likely I would have mentioned something. What is your position?
Kissinger: We frankly have not made up our mind.

Gromyko: So you want to know our position to make up your mind. How long will it take.

Kissinger: About a month.

Gromyko: What will you pay for our position.

Kissinger: Why should we have to pay, we may accept it.

Gromyko: Will you.

Kissinger: Since you have land-based mobiles and we do not . . .

Gromyko: We want to have land-based banned, ban deployment.

Kissinger: And on air.

Gromyko: In Vienna we talked about land only.

Kissinger: Yes, they are permitted on bombers and counted. Your position is that you are prepared to ban deployment of land-based ICBMs but not testing?

Gromyko: Deployment.

Kornienko: (Reading from document) “The parties undertake to refrain for the duration of the agreement from deployment of mobile land-based ICBM launchers.”

Gromyko: And also of ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of over 600 km on all aircraft except for bombers and all other aircraft and ships.

Kissinger: Your proposals represent an advance and are in a constructive spirit and we will make counterproposals in the same manner.

Gromyko: We are certainly pleased to see that you appreciate it was not easy to take the steps we have taken, especially on the complex of the first two matters. I have to say something on new weapons; we speak of new weapons currently such as an orbiting ICBM. I mentioned at the outset that it would be a good thing if the new agreement included appropriate provisions banning new types of weapons of strategic armaments. There are several specifics: (1) cruise missiles of intercontinental range; (2) sea-based cruise missiles over 600 km in range; (3) fixed position in water and seabeds of ICBMs. There are some specifics. It would be good if there could be a discussion in forthcoming sessions on new types of strategic arms and new systems. Our position was set forth in the speech by General Secretary Brezhnev, we attach great significance to this, not because it is a Soviet proposal, but be-

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6 In his speech on June 13 in Moscow, Brezhnev proposed a multilateral agreement on the prohibition of new weapons of mass destruction. The Embassy in Moscow reported on the speech in telegrams 8264, June 13, and 8274, June 14. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
cause it arises in the course of our discussions; new types and new systems of mass destruction. What we mean can be new systems or new weapons in the existing environment—in the subsoil or existing but modernized systems; and of course there can be completely new types, say, a plane that could carry 100 rockets . . .

Kissinger: (Interrupting) How did you find out?

Gromyko: (Continuing) Or a plane that could circle the globe in seconds.

Kissinger: Or a sea turtle.

Gromyko: I can’t go deeper at this time, but we attach great importance to it. Our leadership attaches great importance, and Brezhnev personally. I hope you will bring this to the attention of President Ford.

Kissinger: We will consider it in a positive spirit and study it.

Kissinger: On the seabeds this may be possible.

Kissinger: I have a question: how do we treat this bureaucratically? Do you submit it here (Geneva)?

Gromyko: The three specifics are included in our proposal.

Kissinger: Which ones?

Gromyko: The one on cruise missiles, one on the seabeds, and one on sea-based cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 km.

The ideas mentioned in the General Secretary’s speech could be discussed in the year of the entry into force of the new agreement, but that does not mean we could not discuss it multilaterally, but we will discuss it in the new negotiations, but we would welcome an earlier start.

Kissinger: But I meant on verification, silo dimensions and so forth.

Gromyko: Agreement in principle should be reached in our meetings and then given to the delegation for concrete formulations. But if you prefer, we could tell the delegations, but it is more natural to handle it at this level and then hand it down.

Kissinger: I think that is better, because if we submit it now it will leak. We can make a counterproposal. Do you have your proposals in writing.

Gromyko: No.

Kissinger: We may reduce it to writing and check with Dobrynin, and those other elements in our position the delegations can continue to discuss. On land mobiles, verification and time for dismantling, we may not be able to get to a conclusive point when Brezhnev and the President meet, but they can have some preliminary talks. We can give our preliminary reactions through Dobrynin so that the discussion between the President and the General Secretary can consider the ques-
tions. As Brezhnev said to our Congressmen, he expects me to meet with him before the summit. Before that we can have some consideration of ideas at the meeting in Helsinki and a discussion on how to proceed.

Gromyko: (Reading from message handed him) They say that Mintoff is not answering.

Kissinger: What will we tell the press: we could say that we discussed CSCE and SALT but did not conclude our discussion; otherwise, they will want to know how we concluded; we will say we are continuing tomorrow. We could say the discussions were constructive and in a positive atmosphere.

160. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked that I pass you the following report. [Omitted here is discussion of Kissinger’s meeting with Giscard in Paris.]

I spent over seven hours with Gromyko this evening in very intensive talks on CSCE and SALT. On the former the main problem is now the obstruction of Malta in reaching the decision to convene the summit on July 30. The Soviets tried to enlist our support for some strong-arm tactics to isolate Malta and move to Helsinki without them if necessary. This would be a violation of the consensus rule prevailing in the conference and would be rejected by many of our smaller allies, as well as neutrals. It would also have broader implications for other international groups which we might come to regret. We did, however, assure the Soviets that we support a consensus to move to Helsinki on July 30 and I so stated to the press later. Mintoff is supposed to be heard from about 11 A.M. Friday our time and we will have to review the bidding at that time. Our CSCE ambassador is keeping closest touch with our


2 For the text of Kissinger’s remarks to the press in Geneva on July 10, see Department of State Bulletin, August 4, 1975, p. 188.

3 July 11.
allies to assure we remain in step. On the whole, the Soviets seem pleased with our efforts, which is one of the objects of our tactics in order to keep them generally quiet in the Middle East.

I obtained Gromyko’s agreement to a two and a half day Helsinki summit, if it takes place, beginning about 3 P.M. Wednesday July 30 and ending about 6 P.M. Friday August 1. This will also allow time for two meetings between you and Brezhnev as well as for other travel before the Japanese come. (I have broached possibility of postponing Japanese visit by two days to their ambassador in Washington.)

Three hour middle portion of meeting with Gromyko was devoted to SALT. He asked for restricted session and proceeded to recite Soviet counterproposals to our two month old suggestions on verification, cruise missiles, Backfire, mobiles, silo modification, heavy missile definition, and lesser issues. Proposals clearly reflected major Politburo deliberation, which Gromyko repeatedly described as very difficult. He himself again demonstrated his limitations in this area, sticking strictly to prepared instructions and showing little actual comprehension in depth of technical issues and displaying no authority to depart from his script either for purposes of elaboration or exploration. We will need many further exchanges, including your own talks with Brezhnev but probably also a longish visit by me to Moscow later in the summer.

In essence, the Soviets have accepted our MIRV counting rules. They agree that all SS-17s, 18s, and 19s will be counted as MIRVs and that the rule that a MIRV tested missile once deployed will also count as a MIRV on submarines. They also want provision to permit replacement of single-warhead missiles with new ones as long as these have been tested only with single warheads. This moves us a long step forward, though we need to do further homework on certain technical implications especially for our own Minutemen deployments.

Soviets have, however, tied this promising MIRV proposal to a firm reiteration of their existing cruise missile proposal.

Under this, air-to-surface cruise missiles on bombers with greater range than 500 KM will count against the 2400 ceiling. Cruise missiles on other movable platforms above 600 KM range would be banned. Land-based cruise missiles up to “intercontinental range” (i.e. 5500 KM) would be allowed, beyond that would be banned. We will need careful new look at our whole cruise missile position.

On Backfire, Soviets remained adamantly opposed to counting them, which is not surprising since they already have to reduce to reach the 2400 limit.

On mobiles, Gromyko for first time proposed banning those on land, while counting air-launched ones.

We had a long technical argument about a new Soviet proposal to limit silo modifications to a 32 percent increase in volume. While this
could be accomplished by a 15 percent increase in silo diameter it could also be done by a 32 percent increase in depth, which we have found unacceptable. Gromyko insisted on the right to the latter, though he was highly confused on the matter.

Gromyko proposed a new light/heavy missile definition based not on throw-weight but on the lift-off weight of the missile. Under his formula any missile heavier than the heaviest light missile would be considered heavy and could not be deployed unless one of the present 308 heavies is removed. We will have to give careful study to this.

Gromyko also agreed to begin reduction negotiations in the same year that the SALT II agreement takes effect, i.e. possibly as early as 1977. This is a useful move from our standpoint. Finally, he proposed that the 2400 limit must be reached no later than twelve months from the date the agreement takes effect—again a considerable Soviet move on a minor but politically sensitive issue. We can probably shave a few more months off this.

I may raise some further clarifying questions tomorrow but I think basically Gromyko has exhausted his guidance. We will need to communicate through Dobrynin with some propositions of our own before your possible meeting with Brezhnev in Helsinki to try to narrow at least some issues so that they will be profitable for you to explore and narrow further. In any event, I think we have a quite serious set of Soviet proposals which for the first time since Vladivostok push SALT substantially toward a solution. Success is far from guaranteed, above all because of the amount of work we now have to do at home. I would like to discuss the situation with you in detail and to determine the best way to deal with the complex issues involved in the bureaucracy. Meantime, I am getting some analytical work underway in my own immediate staff so that we have a running start. I am giving Alex Johnson a very general fill-in for now with a strict injunction to keep it to himself until you determine our further course.

Gromyko’s mood was relaxed and friendly. He raised no contentious issues or complaints, though this may still come tomorrow, when we will also touch on the Middle East (he seemed to show no great curiosity), threshold test ban and PNEs and, probably, CSCE again. I consider this one of the most substantive and intensive sessions I have had with Gromyko, reflecting generally the Soviet desire, also voiced to the Senate delegation last week, to maintain the positive line of relations with the U.S. The Soviets may well be counting on your re-election.
161. Memorandum of Conversation

Geneva, July 11, 1975, 10:45 a.m.–1:07 p.m.

 PARTICIPANTS

Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoli G. Kovalev, Deputy Foreign Minister and Chief of Soviet Delegation to CSCE
Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgi M. Korniyenko, Chief of the American Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mikhail D. Sytenko, Chief of the Near East Department and Member of the Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief, American Section of the American Department
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Amb. Albert W. Sherer, Jr., Chief of U.S. Delegation to CSCE
Alfred L. Atherton, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

CSCE; Middle East

[Photographers and press came in to photograph.]

CSCE

Kissinger: Twice I've given briefings in bars in Moscow in the Inter-Continental Hotel.

Mr. Foreign Minister, first let me welcome you to—I can’t say our place. Could we have our Ambassadors here? I see Ambassador Kovalev. Where is Sherer?

[He looks over draft of joint statement.]

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, you are the chairman. You didn’t know you were elected?

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 10–11, 1975—Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Geneva (2). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Carnival Bar in the Intercontinental Hotel.
Kissinger: Oh. I thought Mr. Kovalev would give us a report.

Kovalev: We’ve just received a reply from the Maltese. They are prepared to accept the entire text of yesterday of the Canadian proposal, including the date of July 30, to register all the understandings except the one on the Mediterranean which was the subject of discussion yesterday between the Foreign Minister and Secretary Kissinger. Let me read the text.

Kissinger: To whom did they communicate this?

Kovalev: We received it just now from Mintoff’s special representative, Kingswell.

Kissinger: Did we get it too?

Kovalev: It was virtually two minutes ago.

Sherer: I was probably at the hotel.

Kovalev: “In order to advance the objectives set forth above, the Participating States also declare their intention of maintaining and amplifying the contacts and dialogue as initiated by the CSCE with the nonparticipating Mediterranean States to include all the States of the Mediterranean, with the purpose of contributing to peace”—the amendment is “reducing armed forces in the region”—“strengthening security,” and so on.

Kissinger: The only amendment is “reducing armed forces in the region?”

Kovalev: Right.

Kissinger: Do you have any problem with this?

Gromyko: Why don’t we talk for a minute?

[Kissinger and Gromyko get up and go to corner of the room to confer alone, from 10:57–10:59. Kissinger then confers with Sonnenfeldt, Stoessel, Sisco and Sherer to 11:02.]

Kissinger: I assume if we now accept this, you will not be calling for a nuclear-free zone or disarmament.


Kissinger: I will instruct Ambassador Sherer to call the NATO caucus and discuss it. I foresee no problem. If there is, we can discuss it.

Sherer: There will be no problem.

Kissinger: We should know, say, within an hour. Then we can conclude it today.

[Sherer leaves. Kovalev gets up and talks to Gromyko.]

Gromyko: I’m telling him [Kovalev] to grab Sherer by the coattails.

Kissinger: He’s joining the NATO caucus?

Gromyko: He will be active among our friends and the neutrals.

Kissinger: I think it will be settled in the next hour.
Kissinger: Goodbye. Thank you.

Middle East

Gromyko: Maybe we could now go over to the Middle East.
Kissinger: Great eagerness.
Gromyko: I expect it, greatly expect it.

Maybe you would like to give your assessment of the present situation and give your considerations on the problem. Perhaps you might have some sort of plan to put forward. I say this because at the last meeting you said you would be prepared at the next meeting—this one—to speak in this vein.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I had told your Ambassador that things have moved somewhat more slowly, both in our internal deliberations and in policy, than we had anticipated.

The situation we face is as follows: Egypt and Israel, as is known publicly, are engaged in attempting to see if some agreement can be reached. Contrary to the newspapers, it has not been reached yet. I am seeing the Israeli Prime Minister tomorrow, who will give me the latest Israeli thinking. But with no concreteness. The clarifications Israel is seeking concern mostly our bilateral relations. The basic issue has to do with the lines in the passes and access to the oil fields, in return for whatever can be done for UN forces and passage through the Canal and other similar matters. It will become clear in the next two or three weeks. I am not planning any extended trip in the area. I will let your Ambassador know Tuesday or Wednesday.

The question then is, if there is an interim agreement, how to move to a more comprehensive consideration. We believe we should then move to a more comprehensive consideration of all the issues. We might begin with Syrian matters if that is the preference, but it will be comprehensive.

How to do this raises questions of procedure as well as of substance, as well as of participation. It involves the question of relations of the Middle East countries and our joint conduct. This is my assessment. Do you want to add anything, Joe? [Mr. Sisco, who had been traveling all night, declines.]

This is a preliminary comment.

Gromyko: You know, there is a book by the German author Erich Maria Remarque, which is very popular in our country: On the Western Front, No Changes.
Kissinger: *All Quiet on the Western Front.* In German it’s *Im Westen Nichts Neues.*

Sukhodrev: In Russian, *No Change on the Western Front.*

Kissinger: That’s wrong too. It is a line from their communiqués.

Gromyko: It is my guess this translation was agreed on with the author when it was published originally.

In any case, this expression I think is applicable to the Middle East today. In the Middle East there are no changes. In our view the situation in the Middle East is a dangerous one. Although there is no smell of gunpowder in the air, it could flare up at any time. It is similar to the period before the last flareup, when we gave a warning but were not heeded. I don’t say it is imminent, but it could happen. We are not prophets.

Kissinger: You think we are in a similar situation to 1973?

Because in retrospect . . . we didn’t heed the warnings of the General Secretary.

Gromyko: I say this because there are two basic issues which are not yet resolved. First is the complete withdrawal of Israel from all occupied territories, and second is the recognition of Palestinian rights, which in our view is the formation of a state by the Palestinian Arabs. The third issue is that the agreement must be reached by all the parties concerned to guarantee to Israel the right to free and independent existence.

Of the questions on which we believe agreement must be reached today, these are the following:

At present, the current and most important task is this: Should there be a continuation of the step-by-step policy? Or should there be a joint consideration of all the problems at hand as was agreed upon in the past, at the Geneva Conference? Our view has not changed. The step-by-step approach cannot yield a radical solution to the problem. Steam can be let out of the boiler, but the pressure cannot be ended. You may read in the press that the Soviet Union somewhat abated its interest in Geneva. I can reply this is not so. We are always interested in the work of the Geneva Conference being resumed. We are in favor of its serious work—not as a protocol function or to ratify separate partial steps taken outside the conference and in circumvention of the Conference. It is the comprehensive issues we believe should be discussed—broad ones, and certain narrow ones can be resolved through the Conference too. We don’t see why the U.S. is so apprehensive of the Conference resuming its work.

It is also true we don’t understand all the steps taken by Sadat. This is not a complaint to you about Sadat but a statement of the facts. We say it to Sadat too.
The General Secretary said this to you and I too: If the Soviet Union were to set itself the goal, it could paralyze all the step-by-step attempts. It would suffice merely to supply the requisite quantities of arms to the relevant Arab countries and they would understand what it was in reference to. It is true we supply some arms, but not a great deal. You may read that the Soviet Union is supplying billions of dollars of arms to, say, Libya, but as usual, the sources are Arab sources, and you are quite right in not raising this issue before us and quite right in not paying attention to these quite erroneous reports. We believe you should appreciate our restraint and our cool and level-headed approach in the Middle East. We could supply unlimited arms and we could outdo the United States in this regard, but we are not setting ourselves that task.

In the past you have said you appreciate the restraint and level-headed approach we have taken; lately you have not said this, probably for reasons of your own.

Let me say a few words on the Geneva Conference.

We believe, especially bearing in mind the fact that all previous deadlines for the resumption of the Geneva Conference have passed, it would be correct if in the nearest possible future the Conference be resumed to consider any questions the parties want to raise; they could include broad or partial or narrower issues at hand. There is a forum for discussion of all these issues and we simply cannot understand why apprehension exists about the discussion of this at Geneva. Let me repeat, even narrow and partial issues could be raised.

As for the Palestinians, we have been in favor of their participation from the beginning. As you know, there is an authoritative and capable organization capable of representing them, and you know of the Arab decision about this. We would accept any concerted Arab decision, and of other participants, with respect to their participation in the Conference.

Israel, which has the opportunity to obtain an effective guarantee, is dodging the issue and balking at appropriate ideas and proposals on the subject. Whether it is the result of arrogance or thirst to keep their hands on the Arab territory they have seized, that we don’t know. In the future, people will appear in Israel who can weigh and assess the decisions taken by those in power with respect to the possibility to obtain a guarantee for their existence, and to judge responsibility for those decisions. But that is a matter for the future. The question now is of the Palestinians and their participation in the work of the Conference.

Kissinger: Let me make a few observations on your remarks, Mr. Foreign Minister.

First with respect to the general Soviet attitude. I think it is on the whole characterized by restraint. I have said so on occasions and I have
never said the contrary. I think this restraint isn’t a favor you do to us but reflects common interests. Because the absence of restraint wouldn’t solve the problem but would leave us in the same situation, only after another war. So I think both of us have an interest in exercising restraint. But I agree, the Soviet Union has not done all it could do to exacerbate the situation, and we appreciate this.

As for the step-by-step approach, I have not in recent months spoken on behalf of it with any great intensity. In recent months it is the parties who came to us rather than us encouraging it.

Second, we never saw it as a substitute for a comprehensive approach. We saw it as perhaps a way to make Geneva easier. You put it perhaps right: it lets the steam out of the boiler but doesn’t end the difficulty.

So there is not a big difference between us. Either there will be a step before Geneva or there will be no step before Geneva; there will not be two steps before Geneva. Whether it will be one more step or no step will probably be decided by the time the General Secretary and the President meet at the European Security Conference. Then will be the time for an overall consideration of the issues in any case.

So this is the issue with respect to the step-by-step policy, and we have no difficulty keeping you informed. But we don’t have to, because the Israeli press keeps you informed. In fact, the Israeli press keeps us informed, because we often hear more about the Israeli Cabinet than from the Israelis themselves.

Your Ambassador follows the situation in the United States, and you can see from the statements by the President and me that we share your view that a stalemate means continuing risks for everyone and there must be progress. And I agree with your remark: For Israel it is a big decision to make peace now with adequate guarantees, or risk a new military conflict.

You say, why are we reluctant to have Geneva? We are reluctant to have Geneva because to go there in conditions of frustration, there will be a tremendous pressure to do something rapidly that we may not be able to do. It is hard enough to deal with them individually; all together they intoxicate each other. With the Palestinians, the Syrians, all in the same room. But it has to be faced. If it turns into the kind of discussion we had with your North Vietnamese allies at Avenue Kleber, that also has problems for us, both of us.

With respect to the Palestinians, if you think Israel is trying to gain time through our elections, I can think of no issue better suited for this than the Palestinian issue. In our debate we have turned it to more consideration of the overall issue than at any time since ‘67. But the Palestinian issue would enable them to rally again. It would immediately lead to a protracted stalemate. This is a fact; I’m not making it as a judg-
ment. This is why we always thought the Palestinian issue should be faced later, when more progress has been made and the parties have a commitment to the outcome.

But nevertheless we believe the time is approaching when we believe the process has to be started. About the Palestinian question, I have no answer, except that if it is put on the agenda at the beginning, it will be months before we have progress.

Sisco: Even if it becomes too acute at the UN, this will be true.

Kissinger: Yes. I would be interested to hear the considerations of the Foreign Minister, assuming Geneva starts, how we would move it to progress concretely. If an interim agreement succeeds between Egypt and Israel, we will have to face it. There will be no other step.

Gromyko: [Speaks at length in Russian. Before the translation, rain and lightning start.]

Kissinger: Mrs. Stoessel is on the lake right now taking a boat ride. The situation outside is what the situation in the Middle East looks like. [Laughter] Can we get a light on? [Mr. Sonnenfeldt goes out to find the lights. A few lights over the bar and a pink light over the dance floor come on.]

Partial measures.

Sukhodrev: [Translating the Foreign Minister’s earlier remarks] Now we see more possibility for the Geneva Conference to resume. The participating countries meet and put forward whatever ideas they want to advance for a solution of the Middle East problem. These proposals should relate to the vacating of occupied territories, an end to the war, use of the Canal especially by the Israelis, and use of demilitarized zones and other ideas if necessary—in short, any proposals relating to the evacuation of territories. In addition, proposals relating to the Palestinian state. There is a basis: There are territories not belonging to either Israel or Jordan, namely Gaza and the Right Bank.

Sisco: West Bank. The Right Bank would be the East Bank!

Kissinger: It depends on how you look at it. [Laughter] This is the sort of discussion that goes on at our staff meetings.

Sukhodrev: [Resumes translating] Israel of course would have every right to put forward its proposals on the guarantees it wants.

Kissinger: That would start a war right there.

Sukhodrev: The Soviet Union is and always has been in favor of such guarantees. These should be participated in by the Big Powers. Whether by some or all of the Big Powers, could be discussed, but we believe certainly the United States and Soviet Union should be participants. We are prepared for our part to participate in providing those guarantees.
There is another question that arises with respect to the Geneva Conference but we don’t understand why when we raise it you have bypassed it. The Geneva Conference can and should discuss radical issues, broad issues, because they have to be solved somehow. Ready-made solutions won’t just rain on us from the sky. Maybe our statesmen will find them up there, but if not, the states must do it.

Kissinger: We would not reject them if they did find them there.

Sukhodrev: But the Geneva Conference could consider partial steps . . .

Gromyko: If considered appropriate.

Sukhodrev: . . . steps that you keep wanting. So on no account do I exclude the Geneva Conference taking these up. So alongside the discussion of radical, broad issues, there could be a discussion of partial steps, to contribute to a “de-tensioning” of the situation.

Gromyko: Which ones—that would be discussed.

Sukhodrev: In the context of the overall. In what measure in the context of the overall, could be decided when we discuss. But you invariably ignore our remarks to that effect.

If that approach is taken, then all the parties would be taking a clean approach, a pure one. But we hear some saying “the Soviet Union wants to get in, and we don’t want that.”

That is what I wanted to say, taking account of your considerations.

One other remark: At the Geneva Conference the Soviet Union would act as a moderating factor, and that includes consideration of the Palestinian problem. You know the various trends and currents that exist within the Palestinian movement, so if Israel sees in the Soviet Union a force to which it wants to attribute solely intimidating and negative properties, it is making a mistake. The Soviet Union at the Conference would be carrying out a policy of principle but a moderating policy to a great extent, and this would be a support of Israel’s security—its real security, not illusory security.

Kissinger: Let me say first, I consider your statement a constructive approach.

I would like to ask a few clarifying questions: You said each country should be asked to put forward its proposal of the whole totality of it. Does it mean the Soviet Union and the United States should make a proposal with respect to the totality of it, or should we first ask the parties to make their proposal and then we would do it?

Gromyko: We believe that on this question too we could engage in some preliminary consultation or exchange of views to reach a common position. There are two possibilities: we could hear initially what the parties want to say and propose, and then we could weigh
and assess their proposals and maybe put forward our own viewpoints. Or secondly, they could make their proposals—and they are the appropriate ones to do so since they are the parties directly involved—and the United States could make its viewpoints known, perhaps concerted, and we could put forward our own. These possibilities could be the subject of exchanges of views between us. After all, we have agreed on occasion to consult on these things, and included this in many documents. So we are flexible on this.

Kissinger: We have two approaches that either of us could pursue. Either of us could compete at this Conference to drive out the influence of the other, for advantage. This would, one, have an effect on our relations and two, would immediately produce a stalemate. Or, we could be a moderating influence. The parties have enough complexities without our adding to them. My view tends to be to let the parties put forward their ideas, and we could consult to try to put forward a common viewpoint. This would be the most constructive approach. Because a stalemate would serve neither of our interests.

CSCE

[Kovalev and Sherer return at 12:19 p.m.]

Kissinger: Should we hear from our Ambassadors first?

Gromyko: Can we guess what they have? Augurs used to guess from looking at them.

Kissinger: I think it is now humanly impossible to make the European Security Conference fail. [Laughter]

Sherer: It took a little time to assemble the NATO chiefs of delegation. They were aware of the Maltese amendments. I polled the room to find out how people felt and I think without exception the major powers have to seek instructions before giving any opinion at all.

Kissinger: You should have said that too.

Sherer: And the countries almost all took a generally negative view.

Kissinger: Which? Italy?

Sherer: Italy, France, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany.

Kissinger: Does Germany have forces in the Mediterranean?

Sherer: They all spoke in a generally skeptical way.

Kissinger: Let me talk to Mr. Sherer for a minute.

[Kissinger, Sherer, Sisco, Sonnenfeldt and Stoessel confer in the corner until 12:37 p.m. and then return to the table.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, on the European Security Conference first, as I understand it from Mr. Sherer, all the NATO delegations are asking for instructions and the answer is expected to be negative. I am asking Sherer to ask the delegations to hold an answer until I have a
chance to confer with Schmidt and Callaghan, and I can get in touch with the French.

   I think the Conference will take place on July 30. It is only a question of tactics. It’s a stupid . . . We are only committed to maintain contacts and dialogue on these questions.

   Sisco: It is not operative.

   Kissinger: We are not committed to do anything. I will recommend to them that we stay in low gear on this. [To Sherer] Tell them we construe this only as a commitment to a dialogue, that we don’t construe it as calling for a reduction, and we have no intention on our part to reduce our forces. And I don’t detect a burning desire by my Soviet colleagues to reduce. No, you speak for yourself.

   [The Secretary confers with Sherer.]

   Sherer will proceed as I indicated. I am seeing Genscher tonight and Schmidt tomorrow and Callaghan. I will call Sauvagnargues tonight or tomorrow. I think the Finns should proceed as if it will go forward on the 30th. It is inconceivable to me that it should fail at this late date.

   I’m told the Finns are proceeding anyway on the assumption that it will go forward.

   And our two Ambassadors will stay in touch and we will let you know everything we are doing. We will let Vorontsov know Saturday night or Sunday morning what the results are.

   Gromyko: All right. I think evidently somebody somewhere seems to be not too aware of the consequences of what is going on.

   Kissinger: You are talking about the European Security Conference?

   Gromyko: Yes.

   Kissinger: I think it has become an industry in each Foreign Office working on the European Security Conference. No one asks himself what the purpose is.

   I think of all the countries, Turkey is the most difficult one on this question of reducing forces.

   [Gromyko confers with Kovalev.]

   Gromyko: Yesterday they agreed with the Canadian proposal.

   Kissinger: Yes. But on the Maltese addition.

   Gromyko: We don’t know, since the NATO countries discussed it.

   Sherer: The Turks here will consult their government, but the delegation here had a generally negative attitude.

\[3\] July 12 or 13.
Kissinger: We could cut off arms to them.
[To Sherer] Will they be able to get instructions by this afternoon?
Sherer: The Turks will take a while.
Kissinger: All of them.
Sherer: They are all phoning now.
Kissinger: Let me know the lineup before I leave.
Sherer: All right.
[Exeunt Sherer and Kovalev]

Middle East:

[Gromyko and Sukhodrev confer.]

Gromyko: I was just recapping my last remarks on the Middle East: You said we should discuss whether we should concert to put forward proposals of our own or not.
Kissinger: What is your reaction?
Gromyko: That is a possible mode of action.
We can talk over these questions, but what do we do with the Geneva Conference?
Malta is not a factor.
Kissinger: Wait until your Syrian friends go into action. They will drive us all crazy.
[Sonnenfeldt shows him a draft of the joint statement of the meeting.]
I was prepared to add “constructive talks in a friendly atmosphere.” “Cordial.” I would prefer “cordial.”
Gromyko: “Friendly.”
Kissinger: We will do “friendly.”
Gromyko: Do you have any idea when the Conference should be convened?
Kissinger: We will have a more precise idea when the General Secretary and the President meet in Helsinki, because we will know whether there will be an interim agreement or not. It will probably be some time in the course of the fall, but a more precise date we will know perhaps by then.
Can I ask, for my understanding, one or two other questions?
You said there is a possibility of partial settlements coming out of Geneva. I have no fixed view on it. Should they be made as stages of an overall—that is, first we agree on the overall and then we agree on these as steps in it? Or can there be a partial agreement and then overall?
Gromyko: On this or that partial measure, there could be an agreement on a partial step before there is agreement on a comprehensive.
Kissinger: Suppose there is agreement on an overall, or when there is one, you would also envisage the possibility that it could be carried out in stages?

Gromyko: It is a possibility.

Kissinger: Months, or years?

Gromyko: That is subject to consideration.

Kissinger: We don’t have to agree now.

Some of my colleagues heard you say the Soviet Union would not insist on participating in all phases of partial discussions at Geneva.

Gromyko: Who? The Soviet Union is a participant at the Conference.

Kissinger: It was an unusual statement from the Soviet Foreign Minister. I didn’t think so. You know your view. My colleagues wrote me a note saying they heard this.

Sisco: You said “Some say the Soviet Union wants to be in all of it, but we don’t.”

Sukhodrev: That was a quote. He said “Some say this” that “we”—that is, they—“don’t want the Soviet Union in.”

Kissinger: I understood.

The Palestinian question will be a problem.

Gromyko: On that question, the Arabs themselves should reach prior accord, and we would support whatever proposal they put forward. We ourselves are in favor of their participation from the beginning, but there is as yet no Arab proposal before us. They say there will be a meeting soon between Egypt, Syria, Jordan, and the Palestinians. Maybe you have proposals from them.

Kissinger: No. In any event, the two leaders should discuss it in Helsinki. The two topics I think they should discuss are the Middle East and SALT.

Gromyko: Whether or not you keep us abreast of the partial measures is up to you. You know our view of it.

SALT should be a topic of discussion.

Kissinger: In any event, there should not be a debate about partial measures versus Geneva. It will be this and Geneva, or no step and Geneva. It will not be many more.

Gromyko: The next step in Helsinki?

Kissinger: The next stage of discussion should be at Helsinki. And you and I could meet, if necessary, while the meetings are going on. While Mintoff is speaking. Our Chiefs have to stay there but we don’t.

I fell asleep at the NATO meeting. Did you see those photos? The thing is, I knew the cameras were on me and I knew I was falling asleep, but I couldn’t do anything about it.
162. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Geneva, July 11, 1975, 1:10–2:02 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS
Brezhnev Oral Message; SALT; UNGA; China and Japan; FRG–Brazil Nuclear Deal; Bilateral Relations

Gromyko: [to Sukhodrev in Russian] Give me the letter.

Mr. Secretary, I wish to hand to you an oral message from General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford in connection with the repeated utterances made by your Defense Secretary Schlesinger.² We have called your attention to it. Frankly, we are surprised at this, and all the Soviet leadership, including General Secretary Brezhnev, are concerned at this.

Let me repeat: This is an oral message. Let me give you an official Russian text and a working translation. [Tab A]³

Kissinger: [reads it] It will be brought to the immediate attention of the President. Speaking frankly, it is not unhelpful that you sent this be-

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 10–11, 1975—Kissinger/Gromyko Meetings in Geneva (2). Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in Kissinger’s bedroom at the Intercontinental Hotel.
² See footnote 12, Document 150.
³ Attached but not printed.
cause they don’t reflect the views of the President. Frankly, they reflect an attempt by a Cabinet member to play politics in an election year. But it is not unhelpful.

Gromyko: I would like just to express my hope—and I know this is what the General Secretary would want me to say—that it will be treated with utmost seriousness.

Kissinger: It would not be inappropriate for the General Secretary to raise it with the President at Helsinki, and it will be treated with utmost seriousness.

Gromyko: Our delegations are continuing their talks here on the Strategic Arms Limitation problem. According to the information I have received from Semenov—I don’t know if it is your information—since certain matters of principle are still open—and this is first and foremost what we discussed yesterday—they do not touch them. And it is appropriate that matters of principle be taken up at the appropriate level. And we agreed these important matters of principle will be discussed by General Secretary Brezhnev and President Ford at Helsinki; this is well and good. But Semenov tells me the American delegation is reluctant to discuss even other matters until there is an agreement on the matters of principle that we discussed. So the factual situation is that the delegations have practically nothing to discuss. We think other matters should be discussed by the delegations here, and shouldn’t be kept on ice.

Kissinger: I agree with you. Could we agree on what should be discussed? Or should we have Johnson and Semenov come here after lunch and agree on what they should discuss?

Gromyko: Maybe it would be better if you gave instructions to your representative and I’d give instructions to Semenov, because there are many questions to discuss. If you want to call him, all right, but we can do it.

Kissinger: All right. I’ll give instructions and I’ll let you know Monday what subjects should be agreed.

Gromyko: The important thing is to give instructions. I have already instructed Semenov.

Kissinger: Let’s discuss it with Sonnenfeldt before lunch. Definitional questions, for example, should be discussed.

Gromyko: All right. There are many such questions strewn throughout the drafts—some regarding definitions and other matters.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: Then there is this question: Just before this year’s Regular Session of the United Nations General Assembly there will be a

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4 July 14.
Special Session devoted to international economic problems, continuing the discussions in the UN framework on these topics. What in your view should be discussed there? And would it be a good idea to have consultations on what should be discussed? This is not by way of a positive statement.

Kissinger: No, I understand. I’ll give a speech next week warning against confrontation tactics in the UN, and specifically not regarding the Soviet Union but the new countries. We will be making proposals on raw materials, and so on, which we are prepared to discuss with you. We believe we should not let the new countries dictate on these questions. But we will put forward our proposals—and we will not move from these positions, I can tell you.5

Will you be there?

Gromyko: This is what I want to ask.

Kissinger: I will probably be there. I will not speak twice. I’ll speak either at the Special Session or at the Regular Session.

Gromyko: Probably I’ll be at the Regular Session. It is not a formal decision, but probably.

Kissinger: Being in America, it’s hard for me not to come.

When you visit the UN, of course, you will come to Washington and visit the President. He would be happy to see you.

Gromyko: Thank you.

Earlier you remember we spoke about the possibility of Vietnam joining the UN. You remember?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: What is your view: What do you think about both joining the UN—the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and South Vietnam?

Kissinger: If both Koreas join, we would be in favor of it.

Gromyko: This is still your position?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: If it is done, what about just South Vietnam?

Kissinger: [thinks] I don’t totally exclude this. Let me think about it.

Gromyko: In the Asiatic area, what is happening? With your friends the Chinese and Japanese?

5 Because of a last minute trip to the Middle East, Kissinger was unable to deliver his speech to the Seventh Special Session of the UN General Assembly. Moynihan read it in his stead. For the text of the speech, delivered on September 1, see Department of State Bulletin, September 22, 1975, pp. 425–441.
Kissinger: The Chinese are very anxious to have the President go there. We are thinking now of November or December, maybe late November, and before then I will go there before the President. Six weeks before.

Gromyko: Will there be negotiations with Mao?
Kissinger: We don’t expect any spectacular results.
Gromyko: Will it be a short or long visit?
Kissinger: We haven’t discussed it. They would like a week. We may cut it, less than a week.

Gromyko: Do you have any information about the possibility of an agreement or no agreement between the Chinese and Japanese on friendship? Earlier we discussed what is the intention of the Japanese on this question of . . .

Kissinger: Hegemony.
Gromyko: Hegemony, and what the Chinese have in mind on this question.

Kissinger: My prediction is—and this is not based on information—is that they will probably make this.6
Gromyko: Make this?
Kissinger: Make this agreement.
Gromyko: So the Chinese will succeed.
Kissinger: This is not based on information but on the Japanese character.

Gromyko: The Japanese Prime Minister is not strong?
Kissinger: He is not strong. He will visit Washington in August. We are not encouraging any excessively close ties between China and Japan.

Gromyko: It strikes the eye that Miki rather underrates the sharp edge that China wants to direct against the Soviet Union—you know best the situation as regards the United States.

Kissinger: We have no interest in this.
Gromyko: This surprises us. We have no idea why Miki underrates this. We would have no objection—although we don’t request it—if you could mention our view to the Japanese Prime Minister when you see him. Japan has relations with its other neighbors including the Soviet Union, and it would seem that that would be a factor the Japanese would take into due account. But it seems he is not.

It isn’t that we are so alarmed by this. We have been frightened and frightened again and we can stand up for ourselves! But we would

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6 See footnote 14, Document 128.
like to have normal friendly relations with Japan, and we think it would be the best interest for Japan.

Kissinger: I’ve told you it is important for our two countries to keep a long-term perspective in mind. I am convinced that by the 1980’s the identity of interest will become self-evident. Now it is self-evident with respect to nuclear weapons; by the 1980’s it will be true of many political issues. We shouldn’t lose sight of this fact.

Second, we consider it dangerous to have too close relations between China and Japan. Not normal relations, but an axis between the two would be dangerous.

Third, the hegemony clause could be used some day against us. It doesn’t name the country. I don’t exclude that our relations with the Chinese will be more difficult in five years, certainly in ten. It is a historical accident that our relations with the Chinese are somewhat better now than yours.

Gromyko: Somewhat!

Kissinger: But as China grows stronger, it can become more difficult for us too.

Gromyko: I listened to that with great interest. And I do believe here that we are faced with serious problems, serious both for our leadership and for the United States, and these are questions which should interest the United States too, if you really want to look into the future of your relations with nations of Asia. And I’m sure in your position you do.

Our attention has been drawn to one fact, and trying to assess the significance of that fact we cannot come to any optimistic conclusion—and that is the agreement between West Germany and Brazil to provide nuclear reactors and other equipment. Our assessment is like that of others—that Brazil is on the path to the production of nuclear weapons and wants to use the help provided by West Germany. Am I right that this isn’t a theoretical problem but a problem of practical policy? It concerns our two states as parties to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Incidentally, Germany is party to the NPT, but Brazil is not.

You are located closer to Brazil geographically and politically. And we believe you are more aware of how West Germany is breathing in this matter.

Kissinger: We don’t believe Brazil has decided to build nuclear weapons but this deal creates the possibility and we are concerned for the future. When a complete fuel cycle is provided, it provides the possibility to obtain fuel. But we are concerned and have expressed our concern publicly.
We had hoped this suppliers’ conference would agree on safeguards. But if it doesn’t, we would be prepared to exchange views bilaterally, because it is a dangerous development.

Gromyko: We would be prepared for an exchange of views.

Kissinger: All right. Shall we have lunch?

Gromyko: As regards our bilateral relations, I remember very well what you said to me in Vienna, and I expressed my views and don’t want to repeat myself. We are continuing the line that developed particularly at the two summit meetings. True that there are occasional statements made in the U.S. that are not quite in accord with that line, but the President and you on behalf of the President have reemphasized that that line is the same. This cannot but evoke a positive response on our part. We believe if we continue on the course, our two nations can look confidently into the future and advance confidently on the path we have taken in recent years. It would be in the interests not only of the peoples of the United States and the Soviet Union, but of all nations. In fact, not even Mintoff could distract us from that. I wanted to repeat this view.

Kissinger: We appreciate this. We, too, believe this is in the interests of peace, and the necessity for it will grow, as I said, in the coming years. The position of our President is growing stronger, almost by the week, so by the time President Ford leaves office, in 1981, it will be a permanent feature of the world scene.

Gromyko: You are optimistic.

Kissinger: All the polls show that if elections were held now, he would win overwhelmingly. Unless there is a collapse of the domestic situation. All our people say it is improving.

Gromyko: What is the situation in the Democratic Party?

Kissinger: Humphrey is mentioned. Jackson is still a possibility; Kennedy is mentioned as a possible compromise.

Gromyko: But he has not announced himself. Is it possible?

Kissinger: I don’t think it’s possible, but I don’t exclude it. I think he is waiting for 1980. They will hurt themselves by fighting among themselves while the President is conducting his office.

[Everyone gets up]

Gromyko: For the conference to be finished would make possible many things.

Kissinger: I’ve instructed our Ambassador to tell the other delegations that after two years of effort, to permit one clause to hold it up makes no sense.

Gromyko: What does it mean—“contacts?” Everybody has contacts all the time. Nobody can take decisions.

Kissinger: I agree.

Gromyko: This was a good meeting.

[At 2:02 p.m. the conversation ended and the party joined the rest for luncheon].

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163. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, July 11, 1975, 1553Z.

Tohak 21/WH51212. 1. The President this morning decided that if he gets a question Saturday night at his press conference on Solzhenitsyn, he will say that he would be happy to see him, as a great literary figure. I argued long and hard against it, but in the end I lost. The basic argument presented was that the President not seeing him is building into a major domestic political issue on which the right and the left are joined, the President’s good friends are not with him in light of the variety of other kinds of people he sees, and the whole concept of détente in this country will in the end suffer seriously. One other element raised was that with the Apollo–Soyuz launch, next week will be “Soviet week” and the President’s very high “pro-Soviet” visibility in connection with the space mission will make the refusal to see Solzhenitsyn stand in even more marked contrast and accentuate the criticism.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1976, Box 10, Kissinger Trip File, July 9–12, 1975—Europe, TOHAK (2). Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. On July 11, Kissinger was in Geneva for the meetings with Gromyko; he then went to Bonn for meetings with Schmidt and Rabin.

2 According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford met with Scowcroft on July 11 from 7:42 to 8:03 a.m.; at 10:30 he met for a half-hour with Rumsfeld, Cheney, Marsh, Friedersdorf, Nessen, and several other advisers. (Ibid., White House Office Files) No substantive record of either conversation has been found. In a memorandum to Rumsfeld on July 11, Cheney forwarded questions and answers on Solzhenitsyn for the President’s press conference the next day. (Ibid., Cheney Files, Box 10, Subject Files, Solzhenitsyn, Alexander)
2. As an example of the sentiment and “unholy alliance” which is building on the issue, there was cited the reception on Capitol Hill for Solzhenitsyn next Tuesday, thus far sponsored by 24 Senators. It is being held in apology to him for the President’s unwillingness to meet with him. The sponsors thus far are: Jackson, Biden, Bumpers, Church, Glenn, Humphrey, Inouye, Magnuson, McClellan, Pastore, Ribicoff, Stevenson, Stone, Williams, Case, Brock, Buckley, Helms, Javits, Packwood, Roth, Schweiker, Stevens, Taft and Weicker.

3. I argued against each and every point made, adding that the previous reasons for not seeing him remained completely valid and that it would now in addition be claimed that the President was caving under public pressure. I still lost.

4. If you wish to weigh in again on the issue, I suggest you do so today if possible. If it is possible to dissuade him, you are certainly the only one who can do it.

Warm regards.

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3 A list of 25 Senators who attended the July 15 reception was compiled by Friedersdorf, who forwarded it in an undated memorandum to Rumsfeld. (Ibid., Marsh Files, Box 30, General Subject File, Solzhenitsyn)

4 No evidence has been found to indicate that Kissinger contacted Ford, either by telephone or telegram, before the President’s press conference in Chicago at 11:30 a.m. on July 12. Ford did not receive a question on Solzhenitsyn during the conference. (Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 396)
164. Memorandum From the President’s Counselor (Marsh) and the President’s Deputy Assistant (Cheney) to President Ford


Ron Nessen has read to us the proposed statement concerning Solzhenitsyn. We strongly believe that the correct statement would be a simple indication of your willingness to see him if he wishes to see you.

We feel very strongly that it would be a mistake to issue the statement linking Solzhenitsyn to détente and our relationship with the Soviet Union. Scowcroft agrees that the two should not be linked in a statement.

Marsh and Cheney both feel that it would be better to say nothing at all than to issue a statement which indicates that you are willing to see Solzhenitsyn and which also discusses U.S. and Soviet relations.

Thus our preferred option would be a simple statement indicating you will see Solzhenitsyn. Our second option would be to say nothing at all until next week. Scowcroft would prefer that you say nothing at all.

We all agree that it would be a serious mistake to issue the statement Ron read to us.

Also all agree that the proposed statement would cause a continuing problem and further aggravate the Solzhenitsyn situation.

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1 Source: Ford Library, Cheney Files, Box 10, Subject Files, Solzhenitsyn, Alexander. Secret; Flash. The original is telegram WH51230, which transmitted the text of the memorandum to Ford (via Nessen) in Chicago at 1849Z (12:49 p.m. CDT). The President was in Chicago on July 12 to deliver the commencement address at Chicago State University.

2 The proposed statement, based on suggestions from Ford, Rumsfeld, and Nessen, included the following passage: “the President would not want any misunderstanding, either in the United States or elsewhere in the world as to the interpretations of such a meeting. It should not be viewed, if it takes place, as undercutting the process of relaxing tensions in the world.” Kissinger and Scowcroft suggested another option: “Say nothing.” (Ibid., Nessen Papers, Box 300, Subject File Accretion, Solzhenitsyn Visit)

3 An AP dispatch from Chicago on July 12 (2:47 p.m. EDT) reported that Ford had reconsidered his previous decision, on Kissinger’s recommendation, to veto a meeting with Solzhenitsyn. According to White House sources, if asked at the press conference, “Ford would have expressed willingness to see Solzhenitsyn but also would have emphasized that such a meeting would not constitute an endorsement of the novelist’s views or be aimed in any way at undercutting détente.” (Ibid., Cheney Files, Box 10, Subject Files, Solzhenitsyn, Alexander)
165. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant (Friedersdorf) to President Ford


SUBJECT

Solzhenitsyn

I am concerned about the Solzhenitsyn issue and its impact on the right wing on the Hill.

One possible solution might be to host a meeting, a luncheon or some other type of event as soon as possible for Solzhenitsyn, Nureyev, and Rostropovich.

Both Nureyev and Rostropovich are now appearing in the Kennedy Center before sell out crowds and both are highly publicized exiles but not nearly as controversial, of course, as Solzhenitsyn.

They are all three artists of great talent and the meeting could be held as an artistic and intellectual event rather than any political gathering.

I just don’t think this issue is going to go away with the conservatives and, of course, it has adverse impact with the liberals too.

With all due deference to Dr. Kissinger, I believe that if détente is so fragile that it cannot stand a meeting with Solzhenitsyn, it will fall on some other account.

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1 Source: Ford Library, President’s Handwriting File, 1974–1977, Box 7, Countries—USSR. No classification marking. Ford initialed the memorandum; a stamped note also indicates that he saw it.

2 Rudolf Nureyev, a Russian dancer, defected to the West in 1961; Mstislav Rostropovich, a Russian cellist and conductor, emigrated to the United States in 1974.

3 On July 21, Solzhenitsyn rejected the open invitation to meet with Ford at the White House. He also criticized the President for planning to attend the upcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki, which he called “the betrayal of Eastern Europe.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “Solzhenitsyn Says Ford Joins in Eastern Europe’s ‘Betrayal,’” The New York Times, July 22, 1975, pp. 1, 9)
166. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford


SUBJECT

[less than 1 line not declassified] Report [less than 1 line not declassified]

[4 lines not declassified] provides an insight into Soviet policy on a broad range of questions, along with some very frank statements about a number of countries. Two themes are particularly striking: their continuing obsession with China, and their basic decision to maintain relations with us. Japan and Germany are also major concerns.

The 27-page report is at Tab A. Following are some of the highlights:

Déten t e and U.S.-Soviet Relations

—Déten t e is not absolute, but it is substantial and real. Deliberate war with the U.S. is impossible, but war could come by mistake, or provoked by the Chinese. Déten t e kept the 1973 Middle East War from getting out of control.

—The ABM Agreement of 1972 prevented a technological race in which the Soviet Union would have lost out.

—Present-day Western imperialism, though suffering its most serious economic crisis in a long time, nevertheless has learned much and possesses large enough economic possibilities.

—The U.S. overestimated the Soviets’ need for credits. In the last three years the Soviets got “practically nothing” from America. “After all, 30 million tons of [Soviet] oil are going to the free market.” They can now pay cash for some foreign projects being built in the Soviet Union.

—“We have destroyed Jackson as a political figure. . . . My God, it’s worth the money to keep that swine out of the White House.” The U.S. will probably revise the trade limitations, most likely just before the 1976 elections. But if worse comes to worst, the Soviets can wait for the next Congress.

—The Soviet Union’s peace program is only part of its foreign policy. The main part is the battle for strengthening world socialism.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 17, USSR (16). Top Secret; Nodis. Sent for information. All brackets except those that indicate text not declassified are in the original. Ford initialed the memorandum; a stamped note also indicates that he saw it.

2 Dated June 16; attached but not printed.
The second main part is solidarity with revolutionary movements. The third part is the struggle for détente, for the creation of favorable conditions for the first two parts.

—The “central issue” is the present correlation of nuclear missile power between the USSR and USA. Nixon said to Brezhnev that in view of the equality of our power, we must proceed from the necessity of mutual economy and seek agreement. “And that is now the decisive factor in our world policy.”

China

—The Chinese proceed from the thesis that China will be confirmed as a world power if the Soviet Union and U.S. destroy each other in a nuclear war. Mao allegedly said to Kissinger in November 1973: “The détente between you and the Soviet Union is only apparent. It will generate new conflicts, and China will be on America’s side in these conflicts.” [There is no such quote in the record of my meeting with Mao.]³

—Chinese policy is deeply rooted, and nothing will change when Mao dies. The generation that replaces Mao will be leftists and will kill each other off. Only the next generation after that will be pragmatic enough to talk to. Only then will Sino-Soviet relations be adjusted.

—The West is wrong to think that Chou and Mao have defeated the Leftists. There are now a significant number of leftists in the government; Chang Chun-chiao will eventually be Prime Minister and is already, practically speaking, the number two man in the Army, under Mao. The leftists also still control the Party apparatus.

—The Americans are feeding the Chinese information and disinformation to keep the quarrel going. But America has limited possibilities. The U.S. can prevent a rapprochement but not bring things to a conflict. The prospects of Japanese-Chinese rapprochement are more dangerous. The USSR must therefore bind Japan economically to the Soviet Far East.

Japan

—Miki is a little better than Tanaka. “He will be less inclined than Tanaka to play the Chinese card.”

—Under certain circumstance the USSR would return two of the northern islands to Japan, but not the other two. The development of economic ties with Japan will assume such a character that this problem will somehow disappear of its own accord.

—The Soviets are not bothered too much by the prospect of a Chinese-Japanese Friendship Treaty. This will be a purely political document, much weaker than the Soviet-Indian treaty, with no alliance obligations. The Soviets are saying nasty things to the Japanese to complicate the situation and annoy China, but they can’t prevent such a treaty and should not dramatize it.

Middle East

—If the October War had lasted two or three days longer, the Arabs would have been utterly crushed.

—In a new Middle East war, Israel could easily seize the Persian Gulf. A war would cause a very serious U.S.-Soviet confrontation and “would present us with a number of extremely serious problems.”

—The Soviets are staying involved in the Middle East because the imperialists would fill the vacuum otherwise. “We want nothing more than that.” The first task is to prevent a new war, because the Arabs would be defeated. The second task is not to let the Americans, Sadat and Israel force the Soviets out. The Syrians and Palestinians are a useful “bludgeon.” Geneva, plus the threat of an oil embargo, will in the final analysis force America and Israel to a political settlement. Brezhnev called off his trip partly for health reasons and partly because he didn’t want to be witness to those “backstage machinations being cooked up by Sadat, Kissinger and Israel.”

Europe

—“We gave help to Wilson and the Labour Party in their return to power.” The Labour victory “was advantageous to us, and we are assisting it.”

—Pompidou’s departure was “not advantageous” to the USSR.

—Brandt’s departure was “extremely disadvantageous.” If Schmidt had been in power earlier, “we wouldn’t have signed a single agreement with West Germany in the last five years.” Brandt left because the Socialists were losing their position. “But evidently it won’t be possible to correct the situation, and we have to prepare for the advent of a coalition with Strauss.”

—“Brandt’s line is just as imperialistic as Strauss’s. Strauss wanted to frighten Europe with the atomic bomb, but Brandt considers that even the Socialist camp can be broken up by soothing.” DeGaulle once told Adenauer: Recognize those Polish borders, then we will tear Poland away from Russia. That was the intention. “Nevertheless we grasped the positive elements of that policy and … effectively solved our European problems.”

—The imperialists lost heavily in Cyprus. The Greeks and Turks moved against each other, and the NATO Command, according to the Washington Post, discovered that both armies were “trash.”
—“We must keep an eye on the situation in East Germany. They are nourishing some painfully large illusions there about widening relations with the West.”

—“We have no confidence that Yugoslavia will remain a Socialist country after Tito’s death.” The Yugoslav republics will probably start fighting again, and some will seek Soviet help and some will seek American help.

—“The Romanian comrades are getting carried away in the field of foreign policy.” They are seeking to end the big powers’ veto at the UN, are “complicating” the European Security Conference, and are making territorial claims against the USSR. With delicacy, restraint, and patience, the Romanians must be brought to see “they have nowhere else to go.”

Other

—As time goes on, the USSR will receive less and less support from the Third World. Disagreement with them is inevitable, for example, on Law of the Sea. They oppose détente. The food crisis also “creates a number of problems.”

—India is an “imperialistic country.” Iran is “stupefied by the dollar.”

—[early 1975:] 85% of the South Vietnamese population lives in Saigon’s territory, and it is increasing. There will be no political settlement. Perhaps the two sides will set up two parallel governments and be preserved for a while; or perhaps they will slip into a new war.
167. Memorandum for the Record

Washington, July 17, 1975, 12:40–1:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Secretary Kissinger
Secretary Simon
Hugh Scott
Hubert Humphrey
Jacob Javits
Abe Ribicoff
John Culver
Charles Percy
Brent Scowcroft
Hal Sonnenfeldt
Max Friedersdorf
Les Janka (note taker)

SUBJECT

Senators’ Report on Their Visit to the Soviet Union

The President: Thank you all for coming down. I saw some good pictures and heard a lot of reports of your activities in the Soviet Union. Brezhnev is indeed an interesting fellow, and I’m glad that you got a chance to meet with him. I know that you are all here to talk about trade and emigration today.

Senator Javits: Hubert Humphrey and Hugh Scott were the Chairmen of our Delegation and they will open our report to you.

Senator Scott: I took extensive notes on our conversations and I have given a copy to Secretary Kissinger and I hope you will have a chance to read through them.

Senator Humphrey: Hugh’s notes are indeed very extensive and very helpful and I hope you will indeed have a chance to read through

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 10, POL 2 USSR–Trade (MFN, Ex-Im). Confidential. Drafted on July 18 by Les Janka. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Kissinger briefed the President for this meeting in an undated memorandum. Ford initialed the briefing memorandum; a stamped note also indicates that he saw it. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 17, USSR (17))

2 The Senators visited the Soviet Union from June 28 to July 4.

3 The copy of Scott’s record of the parliamentary conference in Moscow June 30–July 2 is attached to Kissinger’s briefing memorandum for the President (see footnote 1 above).
them. Mr. President, we made every effort to prepare ourselves well for this visit. We appointed leaders and speakers on each issue. John Culver covered arms control, Jacob Javits on the emigration problem and partially on the Middle East, and Chuck Percy primarily on the Middle East. It was my feeling that despite the Suslov speech, which we should have expected, our discussions went very well. They were very frank and some of our individual talks with Soviet leaders were very, very significant. The one point I want to make at the outset is about Brezhnev. It is clear that he feels time is running out, and I think that he means this perhaps physically for himself. It is clear that he wants to achieve something in the near future and now is the time for us to put pressure on the Soviets. I see Brezhnev needing results more than we do. The hurry point is more on them than on the United States. At several points Brezhnev mentioned the February 6 Communist Party Conference. It is my honest belief that Brezhnev has been under radiation treatment and he seems to have a persistent cough. There is also a great deal of slurring of his speech, evident even in the Russian language. He also mentioned at several points that men are mortal, that we have an obligation to our grandchildren, and so forth. All of that, I felt, was not just polemics. He is clearly very concerned not only with his place in Russia, but also his place in history.

It was also very clear that President Nixon’s visit to the Soviet Union was a very significant event for him. It was such a high point that he even at one point brought out all of his pictures of the visit to show us.

We also met with Jewish activists and dissidents. These meetings were most productive. I also want to say, Mr. President, that John Culver was simply terrific in the arms control area. He was very well prepared and very persuasive in his presentations to the Russians.

Senator Scott: John made his points very cogently and by doing so, showed the Russians that the President has to consider the view of Congress in formulating our arms control policy.

Senator Humphrey: It was also evident that the Soviet Government is not simply a collective leadership, but that they operate very subjectively with regard to Brezhnev’s leadership. His personal status and personality are very much involved. Much of the restraint in Soviet policy is due to Brezhnev himself. He has a very warm feeling for you, Mr. President, and I want to reiterate that now is the time to bear in on the Soviets.

Senator Ribicoff: Let me say a few words on trade and emigration. I want to start by saying that I am stronger now than ever before on

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4 Suslov’s June 30 speech was reported in The New York Times. (“Suslov Criticizes U.S. Over Détente,” July 1, 1975, p. 7)
 détente. Changes are clearly required in the Jackson and Stevenson Amendments. We need a three-cornered effort between the Congress, the Executive and the Russians. We must work carefully with the Russians on the movement of people. We must also work on the mix of people allowed to leave. There have to be included some of the dissidents who have become a symbol in this country.

I recognize that all of this will take some months to work out. I’ve talked to Senator Jackson on a number of occasions. He is unhappy but he has to be brought into the process. There has to be an understanding that more people have to come out of the Soviet Union while this process is being worked out. It will have to work like the Romanian process going on now. Romanians have told me that they will move out some 800 people in July, which is up from the normal 300 a month. In the Soviet Union I told Arbatov very clearly that there could be no change in the Jackson Amendment without some movement of people. Most importantly, I think the Russians now understand that in our system of government, they have to satisfy the Congress before something can happen. All of this means that we will need to work quietly and diligently to get this process started.

Senator Humphrey: Mr. President, Senator Ribicoff’s statement to the Soviets was very profound and very moving. I hope you will read it when the Committee’s report is issued.

Secretary Kissinger: I think it may be possible to get an increase in emigration if we do it quietly and do not attempt to make it a public precondition. I don’t know for sure that emigration will increase, but I do think there is a chance if we handle it with some skill.

The President: I’ll be seeing Brezhnev in Helsinki in about two weeks. If we start to make a lot of speeches on this issue, it just isn’t going to work. There will be misunderstandings and roadblocks created for us.

Senator Javits: I support everything that has been said thus far but I do see a danger of our selling out in advance. We must act with dignity and restraint as we approach this problem. I also want to say that I saw great teamwork in our delegation. All members exercised great leadership during the visit, but I want to reiterate that we cannot give away the whole ball game. We have got to get the Russians to come through with some movement of people before we take any final steps. A good example is how the Romanian process is working.

The President: What is the status of the Trade Bill at this time?

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5 The Stevenson Amendment to the Export-Import Bank bill imposed a ceiling for 4 years on new Export-Import Bank credits to the Soviet Union and required a Presidential determination that any transaction with a Communist country over a certain amount was in the national interest.
Senator Ribicoff: Both House and Senate committees have acted but are holding it up to watch for progress on the part of Romania. However, I am ready now to move it forward in the Senate.

The President: What scenario would you suggest for getting changes in the Jackson Amendment?

Senator Javits: We should approve the Romanian MFN as a symbol and a recognition of the progress made. Next the Soviets should let significant numbers of emigrants go. They should also let some of the prominent dissidents out. I would think the number leaving should reach 25 to 30,000. That is a totally practical number. One of the things that Arbatov told us was that they estimated that they had about 100,000 Jews who would want to emigrate if they could do so.

In our discussions with Brezhnev, Mr. President, we discussed this issue just this way, just this frankly. I pledged myself to remove this obstacle to détente, and Brezhnev said that this was a heartwarming move but he also said, somewhat slyly, that we were interfering in their internal affairs. I exercised uncustomary restraint by remaining silent at this point. I also want to say that one thing came through and that is that the Russians have finally gotten the point that moral ideas count in this country; that this trade bill issue is not pure mercantilism. I also want to note that with regard to the Middle East problem, Chuck Percy performed magnificently.

The President: When could we start action in the Congress? Doesn’t trade legislation have to start in the House?

Senator Ribicoff: That is right. It must begin in the House.

The President: Which should move first, the Stevenson or the Jackson Amendment?

Senator Javits: In our discussions with the dissidents we were told that the straw that broke the camel’s back was the Stevenson Amendment cutting off credits; but everyone recognizes that the camel can only be restored by granting MFN, with action on the Stevenson Amendment coming later.

Senator Ribicoff: Trade is very important to the Russians, but the Canadian ambassador to Moscow\(^6\) told me that the only country the Soviet Union respects is the United States and it is important to them that they have equality with us. Therefore, MFN is essential because it involves the element of pride and nondiscriminatory treatment for the Russians.

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\(^6\) Robert A. D. Ford.
Someone in the White House will have to get together with the key actors, with Jackson, Ullman, Schneebeli, Reuss, etc., to set up a working group between the Legislative and Executive Branches to start the ball rolling.

Senator Scott (to Ribicoff): I hope in the Committee’s report you will bring out the dissidents’ comments about the impact of the Stevenson Amendment.

Senator Ribicoff: We cannot relegate the decision making on this issue only to the Executive Branch; Congress has to be involved. The Secretary of State will also have to work in tandem with the Russians. We ought to be aiming for some action by mid-October or November.

The President: I think so too. We can’t do anything because of the recess until September to get the working group going. The earliest we could have any action is mid-October.

Senator Ribicoff: Of course, I can’t speak for the House, but I would think we could assign our staffs during the month of August to start working on language.

Senator Humphrey: You have got to impress Jackson that while the dissidents were grateful for his amendment, now they want some action; they want to see people moving out again.

Senator Percy: I met recently with the top Jewish leaders in Illinois. They too want to see an increase in the immigration numbers and it is clear they are willing to see some change in the legislation.

Senator Javits: Yes, but don’t fool yourselves. The American Jewish community will need a lot of convincing. They have been hot for the Jackson Amendment. Both Abe and I have lost some support because of our stand on this issue. We need to let the example of Romania settle in for a while. We must also stress that a change in the legislation is a major part of the détente process and that progress on the Trade Bill will loosen up a lot of other things across the board. In sum, we are not out of the woods yet on this.

I want to mention that Chuck Percy drew Brezhnev aside at the conclusion of our discussion and told him some things about the Middle East. These comments will probably not be reflected in House notes, but I want you to know what an excellent job Chuck did speaking to Brezhnev.

Senator Percy: I tried to tell Brezhnev how much we had in common in bringing about a peace settlement in the Middle East. I told him that we cannot let third and fourth parties drive us apart, and I told Brezhnev very strongly that the Arabs will have to do some public

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7 Congressman Al Ullman (Democrat, Oregon), Herman T. Schneebeli (Republican, Pennsylvania), and Henry S. Reuss (Democrat, Wisconsin).
things which indicate their public acceptance of Israel and their readiness for peace with Israel. If King Khalid can say that he can accept Israel, the other Arabs certainly can. We have a common goal with the Russians in seeking peace in the Middle East, and Brezhnev confirmed to me that there is no pressure on the part of the Soviets to go to Geneva.

I met yesterday with the Jordanian ambassador to discuss with him what the Arabs can do to stop the movement toward the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. In our talk he recognized what a disaster this would be for the Arabs; that if you put Israel out of the United Nations, then it makes irrelevant Resolution 242 and Resolution 338 that provide the framework for settlement.

With regard to the Trade Bill issue, it was clear to all of us that the Soviets will not back down. They were very tough but we also laid it on the line with them. I showed them a chart of the emigration which shows the great drop off after the Jackson Amendment, and I told them that all that would be necessary is for them merely to keep the trend going that existed before the Jackson Amendment.

Secretary Kissinger: From the foreign policy viewpoint, your schedule for legislative action would match very well with our thoughts for progress in SALT. The President plans for a summit meeting later this year.

We will talk to the Soviets about this. I will tell them that what is needed is for them just to go back to the pre-1973 process, where they increased the emigration numbers without anybody saying anything about it.

The President: We’ve got to get the State Department people working with your staff people. We’ve also got to bring in the people from the House.

Senator Javits: Yes. You should treat the House people as having the primary legislative action. They should see us just as the experts who were in Moscow.

The President: We will talk to Ullman and Schneebeli. We will make clear that we are not preempting their role.

Senator Scott: I took your four letters on the Trade Bill with me and I showed them to the Soviet Parliamentarians. Arbatov advised me to show them to Brezhnev. The Soviets perceive even your letters as movement in the right direction.

I want to add my comments, Mr. President, that this was the best delegation I have ever been on. Everyone worked very hard, there was no free time for anyone, and this was certainly not a junket.

\[\text{8} \text{ Not further identified.}\]
Senator Humphrey: I want to emphasize, Mr. President, as you go to Helsinki that the Russians have to be informed by you that this is a two-way street. A change in the legislation cannot be made to look like weakness on our part. Brezhnev is now in a position where he wants to get things done. He feels time is running out and he has set a program for his country and for himself which he wants very badly to accomplish.

The President: That is the same reaction I received in Vladivostok. Brezhnev feels a personal mission to do something for the Soviet Union as well as for his place in history.

Senator Culver: With regard to our discussions on arms control, I reiterated the United States’ position on SALT and MBFR. I made two principal points: (1) the need for the Soviets to disclose in much greater detail the true nature of their defense budget. I pointed out to them that since we did not know what they were doing, the United States had to base its defenses on a worst case assessment of the Soviet threat. (2) I discussed with them the possibilities of arms control in the Indian Ocean. We were in Moscow during the Bartlett and Stratton visits to Somalia. I tried to ascertain the Soviet willingness to enter into arms talks on limitations in the Indian Ocean. They were not very flexible but in private follow-up talks they appeared to be somewhat more positive. I hope the Department of State can follow up on this possibility.

With regard to the détente process, the perception of the American people is that the benefits of détente have been very lopsided in favor of the Soviet Union. Encouraging this view was the first wheat deal and the first SALT agreement. I would also add that the Readers Digest article on Soviet SALT violations is often cited with regard to détente.

My final point is that in the implementation of détente we have to be extremely careful that in our efforts to keep the détente momentum going we must nevertheless be very precise in the wording of the agreements we sign. We should make every effort to avoid setting in train the potential for later recriminations of “I told you so” that can only hurt the détente process.

The President: We don’t go into negotiations with the idea that we have to have an agreement. Of course, we would like to have one but we will not sell out for a date certain or just for the fact of agreement.

Senator Humphrey: This is a very good point. As we recall in 1972 we were very desirous of just getting something working with the Soviet Union and we, therefore, let some of the details go. We are no

9 Senator Dewey Bartlett (Republican, Oklahoma) and Congressman Samuel Stratton (Democrat, New York).
10 See Document 169.
longer in that position and now we need patience and perseverance and we have to convey to the Soviet Union that they cannot win an arms race. I made this point in Moscow that the United States will win any arms race and that the Soviet economy cannot take such a race. I think we ought to get, and it would be very useful to have, a Congressional expression that while the United States is all for arms control, there is no way the Soviet Union will catch us unprepared or that they can close the gap on our defenses.

The President: That is all very well. The Soviets cannot beat us in the long run but we in the Executive Branch face the problem of selling our arms budget every year, the kind of budget that will keep our momentum going that will not let the Soviets catch up in specific areas. I told Brezhnev at Vladivostok that if we didn’t get an arms control agreement, I would submit a bigger defense budget in January. I think that made quite an impact on Brezhnev. Certainly what the Congress did this year to the defense authorization will be very helpful as we proceed.

Senator Scott: I also wanted to mention the stop in Poland. We met with Foreign Minister Olszowski and First Secretary Gierek in Warsaw. In the discussion they told us that they view themselves as part of the Third World and they are, therefore, very concerned for the process of great power and détente.

The President: Thank you all for coming. The work of your delegation was excellent and this meeting has been very helpful to me.
168. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Amb. Anatoli F. Dobrynin, Soviet Ambassador
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS

Grain Sales; Oil; SALT

President: Congratulations on the successful Soyuz splashdown.²
Dobrynin: General Secretary Brezhnev would like to congratulate both of us for the success.

[He gives the President some Soyuz pins. There was further small talk.]

I just wanted to continue the talks on grain. They want me to inform you we have a climate problem and we want to buy. Up to now they have bought 10.2 million tons. After our talk, our companies have stopped until further notice. Our estimate is that new purchases will not exceed what we have already bought. We stopped buying so as not to disturb the grain markets and to keep things stable.

President: I appreciated your mentioning it the other day and I am grateful you came in today. I think it is valuable that we know about it before it gets into the grain trade. If we can have an understanding that you will let Henry know before you do anything—I say Henry, not the Department of Agriculture. If we have the crops, we should be able to help, but we should use this channel to avoid any kind of problem.

Dobrynin: That is fine. Then we can avoid any publicity and the difficulty of last year.

President: While we are talking: You are buying our grain.³ How would you like to sell us some oil?

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

² U.S Apollo and Soviet Soyuz spacecraft conducted a joint mission, docking in space on July 17. The Soviets returned to Earth on July 21, the Americans on July 24.

³ On July 16, the Soviet Union agreed to purchase 3.2 million metric tons of wheat from Cook Industries Inc. and Cargill Inc.; 5 days later, the Soviet Union also agreed to purchase 4.5 million metric tons of corn and 1.1 million metric tons from Continental Grain Co.
Dobrynin: How would you see doing it—against grain or just straight?
President: We haven’t thought it through. Think it over.
Dobrynin: I’ll tell General Secretary Brezhnev: Maybe he will be ready to say something at Helsinki.
President: Henry has told me about Gromyko’s proposals on SALT. We think there is progress. We are working on it now and we hope to have a good response. We hope to have something by Friday. I think the possibility exists to have détente make real progress.
I think if we can keep it up and show progress on a mutual basis, I think we will be doing fine.
Kissinger: The President and I have met every day on SALT. There are only two issues left, really—cruise missiles and Backfire.
Dobrynin: Without General Secretary Brezhnev, there would have not been the progress we were able to make. He convinced his colleagues to go along with the concessions we made.
Kissinger: We will make a counterproposal to make it closer.
Dobrynin: To narrow it.
Kissinger: We can’t accept your position but I think we can narrow the differences.
Dobrynin: I hope you can, so that we can realize some progress.

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4 See Document 159.
5 July 25.
MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT’S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (KISSINGER) TO PRESIDENT FORD

Washington, undated.

MEETING WITH MELVIN LAIRD
Wednesday, July 23, 1975
1:00–2:00 p.m.

I. Purpose

To discuss Mr. Laird’s recent statements on détente and his allegations of Soviet misbehavior.²

II. Background, Participants, & Press Arrangements

A. Background: In an article published in the July issue of Reader’s Digest (Tab A),³ Mr. Laird argued that the US has made major concessions to the Soviets, while the Soviets have repeatedly committed deliberate acts that mock détente and threaten the free world. Mr. Laird’s allegations of Soviet misbehavior include claims that the Soviets have violated the SALT agreements, reneged on promises regarding civilian access to West Berlin, and engaged in a relentless effort to attain military supremacy. The memo at Tab B⁴ analyzes Laird’s article point by point.

B. Participants: Melvin Laird, Henry Kissinger

C. Press Arrangements: The meeting will not be announced. There will not be a White House photographer.

III. Talking Points

1. I read with interest your article in Reader’s Digest on détente. I believe your article touches on a number of key points in US-Soviet relations, and I would like to discuss some of the points you raised in more detail.


² According to the President’s Daily Diary, Ford and Kissinger met with Laird in the Oval Office on July 23 from 1:10 to 2:14 p.m. (Ibid., White House Office Files) No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

³ At Tab A is Laird’s article, “Is This Détente?” Scowcroft forwarded the article to the President on June 26. In a handwritten reply, Ford instructed Scowcroft: “Would you have someone analyze this—point by point—and give me answers.” (Ibid., President’s Handwriting File, 1974–1977, Box 7, Countries—USSR)

⁴ At Tab B is an undated and uninitialed memorandum from Kissinger to Ford.
SALT Compliance

2. Regarding the question of Soviet cheating on our arms control agreements, as I have stated publicly, we do not believe that the Soviets are in violation of any provisions of the SALT agreements.

3. There have been some ambiguous situations regarding Soviet compliance. You mentioned two of these ambiguous situations in your Reader’s Digest article. These ambiguities arose either because the existing treaty language was not precise enough to deal satisfactorily with all situations which might arise during the period of the agreement or because differences which were never resolved at the time the agreements were signed became significant in the light of new developments.

4. The two issues you discussed in your article—radar testing in an ABM mode and the size of the SS–19—are excellent examples of both these points.

5. Regarding the SS–19, as you know, the two sides were never able to agree on a definition of a “heavy” ICBM. However, because of the importance the US attached to this issue, we issued a unilateral statement at the signing of the Interim Agreement which said that we would consider any ICBM with a volume or throw weight “significantly greater than that of the largest light ICBM now operational on either side” to be a heavy ICBM.

6. The Soviets, of course, flatly rejected the unilateral statement, and we never specified to the Soviets precisely what we meant by “significantly.” Consequently, we have very little basis for claiming a Soviet violation based upon the volume of the SS–19. There simply never was an understanding on this issue in the first place.

7. We have continued to press the Soviets throughout SALT II on the need for an adequate definition of a “heavy” ICBM so an issue like this will not reoccur. This is one of our major negotiating objectives, and we have some indications that the Soviets are prepared to accept a definition of a “heavy” ICBM as part of a SALT II agreement.

8. You also mentioned the issue of radar testing and stated that the Soviets have conducted radar tests specifically forbidden by the ABM treaty.

9. Because of the nature of the treaty language regarding this issue, we raised radar testing with the Soviets in the Standing Consultative Commission to clarify the understanding of the two sides with respect to the treaty language and, if necessary, to ask the Soviets to cease the radar activity in question.

10. We have apparently been successful on both counts. We have clarified the understanding of the two sides regarding the treaty language by stating that air defense radars cannot be tested “in an ABM...
mode” even if they are being used for range instrumentation or safety. The Soviets apparently interpreted such activity as permitted by our unilateral statement defining testing “in an ABM mode.”

11. Even though our intelligence indicated that the Soviets were not engaged in any upgrading of air-defense radars to ABM capability but were using the radar in question for instrumentation purposes at a test range, we nevertheless asked the Soviets to cease the activity in question. We had no intention of permitting ABM testing of air defense radars under the guise of instrumentation, but only of exempting radars used exclusively for instrumentation.

12. The Soviets ceased their radar activity in question shortly after the US raised the issue in the SCC. We have seen no evidence of the radar activity in question since February 18.

Other Issues

13. You raised several other important issues in your article. Regarding Berlin, while there has been some sporadic interference by the East Germans with ground access to West Berlin, the dispute centered on the nature and extent of West Berlin’s ties to West Germany. This has always been the most controversial part of the Quadripartite Agreement.

14. However, since July 1974, when Western protests forced the East Germans to stop their interference, transit traffic has been undisturbed. Consequently, except for some relatively minor harassment which occurred over several weekends in 1974, the Soviets have lived up to the commitment to guarantee unimpeded civilian access to Berlin.

15. On your assertion that the Soviet Union is engaged in an effort to attain military supremacy, this is of course fundamentally an interpretation of Soviet military programs and the intentions driving those programs. Our best intelligence is that, while we doubt that the Soviets have firmly decided to seek clear-cut strategic superiority, they will be opportunistic in seeking to attain a margin of strategic advantage if US behavior permits. Let me emphasize that we will not let our guard down and permit such a Soviet advantage to occur.

16. One final point I would like to make concerns the overall issue of détente: we should not expect that the Soviets will forego political competition with the West. However, it is in our interests to continue working to bring the Soviets to understand that their interests are best served by restraining that competition and will be jeopardized if they do not act accordingly.

SUBJECT

Meetings with Brezhnev

Your Purposes and Basic Line

This is a crucial encounter for two reasons; first, it will largely determine the future course of the SALT talks, and, therefore, the prospects for Brezhnev’s visit; second, and equally important, it will be the opportunity to reestablish a mutual commitment, at the highest level, to improve Soviet-American relations as the basic policy of both sides. The latter is not a question of atmospherics, but a substantive problem in light of growing criticism of détente on both sides.

—Your aim is not so much to reassure Brezhnev about your policies, but to explain frankly and candidly that the relationship has reached the point where problems are emerging, as they inevitably would in any such attempt to alter the basic character of Soviet-American relations as they were shaped for over two decades of bitter hostility.

—Your main point is that détente must, in fact, be reciprocal, a two-way street, that you are committed to this course, but must defend it against a strong residue of suspicion that détente is being exploited; thus Soviet-American relations must be given new momentum; this means progress in SALT and MBFR, a real effort to implement CSCE, and a reaffirmation of the principles contained in the 1972 and 1973 summit agreements.

—You should stress that Soviet leaders should not be dismayed or surprised that certain segments in the US are skeptical, indeed, hostile to better relations with the USSR; after all, a complete turnaround in public and political opinion, whether in the US or USSR, cannot be expected in two or three years; the key is to demonstrate by deeds that the new course of relations is grounded in specific accomplishments bene-
fitting not only the American and Soviet people, but international stability in general.2

—This means that détente cannot be a cover for aggravating tensions, for regional advantage, or for applying differing criteria to various aspects of relations.

At these meetings with the General Secretary you want to accomplish three objectives; (1) to review the course of Soviet-American relations, both bilateral aspects and their impact on international issues; (2) to break the back of the SALT issues, if possible, by referring to the Geneva negotiations a number of issues where positions coincide or are quite close, and by discussing frankly those issues, like cruise missiles, where important differences remain; (3) to discuss the General Secretary’s visit to the US and the accomplishments that can be achieved by the time of, or during that visit.

—On this last point of the General Secretary’s visit, you will want to emphasize the critical importance of tying it to substantive accomplishments, particularly in arms control, so that it will be clear in both countries that the regular summits are a stimulus for reaching achievements.

Brezhnev’s Position

Brezhnev will probably be in a somewhat buoyant mood;3 whatever the criticism abroad, CSCE in his eyes must seem a successful achievement denied all his more illustrious predecessors. Being center stage with a host of his European colleagues cannot fail to appeal to his innate vanity and his pretensions to world statesmanship.

But, at the same time, and more basically, he knows that the Conference has become a contentious issue in the West and that this is symptomatic of a disenchantment with détente. He can only add the controversy over CSCE to a series of events that cause him and his colleagues to question the future potential for the so-called “peace program” which he initiated at the 24th Party Congress in March 1971.

In his view the setbacks to the trade bill last December, following so closely an unexpected criticism in the US of the Vladivostok agreement initiated a trend which he probably regards as ominous. He may point to such occurrences as Secretary Schlesinger’s remarks on a preemptive strike and first use of tactical nuclear weapons, the intelligence activities of the US that have received a great deal of publicity, the outcry against Soviet grain purchases, the anti-Soviet campaign that he cannot fail to see in the publicity to the Soviet base in Somalia,

2 The President highlighted the first half of this point in the margin.
3 The President underlined the phrase “buoyant mood.”
the reception given Solzhenitsyn, the debate over alleged Soviet SALT violations, the attacks on CSCE, our recent statements on the Baltic states, and our policy in the Middle East which seems aimed at the exclusion of the USSR.

In short, Brezhnev must wonder whether the support for détente in the US is weakening to the point that either you will abandon it, or be replaced with a more militant successor.

From his standpoint, however, you are his best bet, and he cannot afford to gamble that other events will weaken the US to the point where he can resume a forward, offensive policy if we back away from détente. Brezhnev’s problem is that he must, in effect, face his constituency in February at the 25th Party Congress; he must defend a foreign policy record that is tied to détente in Europe and with the US, that promises benefits in the encirclement of China, and the strengthening of Soviet influence in Asia and the Middle East.

—In defending his policies, Brezhnev must also recognize that he will almost certainly be making a farewell appearance before his party; he may retire of his own volition, or be asked at some point to step aside, or simply be thrown out. With his ingrained sense of historical perspective, he wants to bind his successor, and define Soviet policy for the next period, and preserve his own positive image in the history books.

—He cannot do this, if his policy is in a shambles; thus SALT, the US visit, the impact on China, the Middle East outcome, US-Soviet economic relations, all assume an importance in the perspective of his Party Congress.

All of this means that you have a strong bargaining position; Brezhnev needs to restore the momentum to détente, he cannot afford to abort his visit or leave SALT stalemated, unless he is also prepared to inaugurate a wholesale shift in policy next spring.

This does not mean, of course, that he can readily make a series of concessions; he must face his colleagues, and his position—for reasons of health and because he is in effect a lame duck—is more circumscribed than in previous summit meetings.

—He is still in charge and can make decisions on the spot, but he must be more solicitous of the collective in Moscow, lest he risk the fate of Khrushchev.

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4 On July 25, Ford and Kissinger met with members of Congress and representatives of U.S. organizations of Eastern European background to discuss the upcoming European Security Conference in Helsinki. For a record of the meeting, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIX, European Security, Document 322. For the President’s public remarks at the meeting, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 430.
Nor can he fail to see elements of strength and opportunity for the USSR in the fact that there is a weakening of the western coalition, especially the southern perimeter, that the industrial west is in some disarray, that Europe is shifting to the left, that there is a debate in the US over the control of foreign policy, and that there continue to be openings in the Middle East and Southeast Asia for the expansion of Soviet influence.

Nevertheless, in a broad sense, your objectives and Brezhnev’s coincide: he wants to make progress on SALT, though not at any price, he hopes for a successful visit to the US (though he may be very wary of his public reception), he wants to demonstrate that détente is reciprocal and that it brings gains to the USSR.

In sum, Brezhnev may be apprehensive, even somewhat truculent about the course of relations since you met him at Vladivostok; but objectively, he has no major options, other than to pursue this course, but he will do so in a more sober manner, looking for weaknesses that can be exploited.

Substantive Issues

A. CSCE/MBFR

The issue here is not so much the wording of documents or who won or lost, but what happens in the future: the Soviets no doubt have a different appreciation of CSCE and a different interpretation of it than we do. For them it is, in fact, a general postwar settlement recodifying the status quo politically and territorially. We can expect Brezhnev to make these points, however subtly, in his address to the conference though no doubt he will clothe his remarks in high-sounding phrases about peace and progress.

—You will want to explain that CSCE should be a guide to future relations, and in this sense a yardstick for measuring conduct.

—We expect to be attacked for signing what appears to many to be a meaningless document, and, as the General Secretary knows, we cannot constitutionally treat these documents as solemn treaty commitments.

—Nevertheless, you will stand behind the results and defend their value in the US, but you will do so in the sense that they establish standards for behavior that should be translated into practice through implementation of bilateral agreements.

—You should remind Brezhnev that we have no territorial issues in dispute and that we long ago accepted the existing borders, subject to our special rights and obligations for Germany and Berlin.

—We have played a key role in this conference, and sought to cooperate with both the Soviet Union and our allies.
—Now that it is completed, it is time to look to the other key negotiations—on mutual and balanced force reductions (MBFR). You may wish to say that we recognize Soviet motives for not proceeding in the MBFR talks until CSCE was completed, but that if MBFR now remains deadlocked, it will only increase the skepticism in the US about the value of European security negotiation.\(^5\)

—You are prepared to initiate some changes in our position, in the direction of meeting Soviet complaints about reduction in nuclear systems, but this must be reciprocal—the Soviets must be prepared to respond to your initiative.

—In particular, the goal of these talks must be one of rough parity, rather than codifying existing imbalances.\(^6\) Moreover, the US and USSR must assume a special responsibility by making reductions first in the first phase.

—You and the General Secretary ought to take this occasion to emphasize the necessity for progress on what he calls “military détente” to provide the substance of the political détente of CSCE.

B. SALT

You will probably have a special discussion on SALT. In general introductory comments you may simply make the following points to set the stage:

—First, you appreciate the serious and comprehensive effort made by the Soviet side in the Geneva meeting between Secretary Kissinger and Gromyko.

—You understand that it was not easy for the Soviet side to reach this new position.

—You have had a thorough consideration of SALT at the highest levels of the American government, and as a result, you have accepted much of the Soviet presentation.

—Some serious issues remain and will have to be discussed with the General Secretary [i. e., cruise missiles and Backfire].\(^7\)

—But overall, you perceive that both sides are seriously searching for solutions that are not one-sided, and will, in fact, lead to an agreement by the time of the General Secretary’s visit.

C. The Middle East

The Soviets have stayed on the sidelines during the latest round. They are probably upset that the US has once again assured itself the

\(^5\) The President highlighted this point in the margin.

\(^6\) The President underlined the phrases “rough parity” and “codifying existing imbalances.”

\(^7\) Brackets in the original.
key role, when it appeared that the scene would shift to Geneva, and permit the Soviets to have a voice. Moreover, they have gone through another deterioration in their relations with Sadat: this time being forced out of their anchorages in Egypt, and drawn into a virtual public polemic with him.

Nevertheless, the Soviets have probably been sobered by the course of events since the Yom Kippur war. When face-to-face with the real possibility of convening in Geneva, they slowed their pace and, in effect, did not press for a strict timetable. They pressed for Palestinian participation, but implied this might be put off until later. They made a fine distinction between partial agreement within the context of Geneva and ones outside, thus leaving themselves some freedom of maneuver.

Apparently, the Soviets have concluded that there is little to be gained in the Arab world by outright opposition to our diplomacy if it seems to meet the desires of the participants. If it fails, they can hope to pick up some of the pieces; if it succeeds, they can take some implicit credit for not blocking progress.

—You will want to make one major point, if only for the benefit of Brezhnev’s record with his colleagues.
—We are not basing our policy on the expulsion or exclusion of the Soviet Union from a legitimate role in the area.
—We recognize that the Soviet Union has genuine security concerns in a region so close to its borders.
—But the key, as you have said, is not to allow matters to stalemate.
—Thus, you have taken every opportunity to maintain a political momentum.
—You want to make the point that the principles of conduct that were signed in 1972 apply to the current situation; we expect the Soviets to act with restraint.
—As occasion presents itself you should stress our opposition to any move to expel or suspend Israel from the UN and note the potentially disastrous effect on the UN were this to be done.
—You appreciate the fact that in recent weeks the USSR has shown statesmanlike restraint, and has not used its undeniable influence to block negotiations between Egypt and Israel, under US guidance.
—Once a new agreement has been achieved—and you will continue working for one—then you are prepared to have Secretary Kissinger discuss with Ambassador Dobrynin how the US and the USSR evaluate the problems of a comprehensive settlement.
—In particular, you can consider how each side could participate in guarantees (probably unilateral rather than joint ones).
—You hope that Brezhnev will use his position and authority among his Arab friends to promote peaceful progress; this would have the most salutary effect on détente.

_Somalia and the Indian Ocean_

You may wish to refer to the Somalian affair, and its relationship to the Indian Ocean:
—You could simply say that the existence of Soviet facilities in Somalia—whether they are called a base or not—is a fact that cannot fail to influence our own decisions.
—We do not wish to inaugurate a major arms race in the area; but we will establish facilities in Diego Garcia.
—We have studied the problems of possible arms limitation in the Indian Ocean, but our distinct impression is that the USSR has no great interest at this time.
—We are not prepared to discuss our facilities in Diego Garcia, independent of Soviet presence in Somalia and India.

Thus, we have two choices: (1) let the matter lie for the present; (2) begin some highly private discussions on what principles might be involved in an arms control agreement affecting the area.

_D. Other Arms Control_

You should take the opportunity to mention progress in the talks on the agreement on peaceful nuclear explosions, which are a pre-condition to submitting the threshold test ban treaty to the Congress.
—You believe that the recent compromise agreement restricting peaceful explosions to a threshold of 150 kt is a major breakthrough; it will be of great importance in putting the entire package to the Congress.
—The technical details can now be worked out, and you anticipate that this agreement should be signed at the time of the General Secretary’s visit.

(Environmental Warfare)

On this issue, our negotiators have reached virtual agreement on a draft treaty:
—We can either submit this for consideration in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament, or proceed bilaterally; probably the former is advisable in view of the great interest of all nations in exotic warfare.
—But you are prepared to sign a document during the Brezhnev visit that will commit our two countries, whatever the outcome in Geneva UN forums.
E. Other International Issues

During the course of your opening discussions, you may wish to allude to the problems in southern Europe, beginning with Portugal and including Turkey and Cyprus.

—The point you may wish to make is that events in Portugal are not of Soviet making, and we recognize this. Nor do we hold the Soviets responsible for difficulties in Cyprus, or in our relations with Turkey.

—Indeed, we believe that the Soviet Union has on the whole acted with restraint in situations which, in other times, it might have sought to exploit.

—Nevertheless, there is a growing apprehension in the US and in Europe, that Soviet influence over Communist parties is directed toward a weakening of the Western Alliance; many in the US suggested that CSCE not be held because of the role of the Portuguese Communists, who in the past have been so closely aligned with the CPSU.

F. Bilateral Issues

The predominant bilateral problem, of course, is the trade bill-emigration issue. Despite the optimistic assessments of some of the Senators on the possibility of Soviet concessions on emigration, there seems little chance that the Soviets will move on this question. They take seriously your commitment in your letters that you will seek a revision in the legislation. But it is doubtful that Brezhnev is in a position to do anything beforehand.

The economic incentive for détente still exists; but the benefits must now seem less attractive, especially since major credits are available in the West in any case. Yet the Soviet vulnerability to bad harvests is a potent reminder that we have leverage if we can use it.

Your major points are:

—You will seek to revise the trade bill, but you must in all candor explain to the General Secretary the limits: with an election year coming and a dispute with the Congress on a range of subjects, revising the Jackson/Vanik Amendment will be a slow, careful going.

—The Soviets should not anticipate a breakthrough.

—Even so, there is a potential for economic growth in both trade and other activities.

—In particular, you will defend grain sales, but you must point out that some mechanisms must be devised, whether it is the private channel, or within existing agreements, to gain some advance notice of

8 See Document 167.
Soviet purchasing plans; otherwise, every sale will be turned into a political football.

—We could consider a longer term agreement providing for regular purchases; but there are technically complex issues involved which we are still studying and will need further private discussions.

Conclusions

From these discussions with Brezhnev you will want to gain:

(1) A strong mutual reaffirmation of commitment to improving Soviet-American relations on the basis of reciprocity;
(2) Some appreciation of the prospects for SALT and perhaps for MBFR; and
(3) A subtle warning to Brezhnev that he cannot free-wheel in tense situations without paying a price in Soviet-American relations.

Above all, you want to impress on him that you are likely to be in charge for the next five years and that your ability to explain and defend a policy of détente depends, not on the atmospherics of communiqués and publicized meetings, but in being able to prove to the American people that this is, in fact, the best alternative, and that the course you are on brings real benefits to world peace.
171. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, July 30, 1975, 9:35 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR:
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the
CPSU and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgi M. Kornienko, Director of the USA Department and Member of the
Collegium, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of
Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Andrei Vavilov, USA Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

US:
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Ambassador to the USSR
Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
William G. Hyland, Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
Department of State
Alexander Akalovsky, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

US-Soviet Relations; Middle East; Emigration; Nuclear War

[The President greeted the Soviet party at the front door. As they
entered the Residence, the General Secretary called out “Where is Son-
nenfeldt?” The President laughed. The group was seated at the table. The
press entered for photographs.]

Brezhnev: You’ve lost weight.
Ford: You look like you have too.
Brezhnev: I’ve been stabilized.
Ford: You look excellent.

Brezhnev: I’m about 78 kilograms. I’m 78.9, 80 at times, but within
that limit. That’s my stable weight nowadays. I’ve been stable the last
six months or so.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR,
China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July
30–August 2, 1975—Ford/Brezhnev Meetings in Helsinki (CSCE). Secret; Nodis. Drafted
Kissinger: I’m stable within a 10-kilogram range. (Laughter)
Gromyko: You’re old acquaintances.

US-Soviet Relations

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, I was saying to the President that we’ve done a very good job in space.
Kissinger: Yes.
Ford: The handshake was indicative of the progress we have been making.
Brezhnev: Your boys came down at 1:00 a.m. in our country, and our TV was still working.
Kissinger: You saw it.
Brezhnev: We saw it live.
Ford: In our country it was after dinner.
Brezhnev: It is really fantastic when you come to think of it. They go up; they meet somewhere in the limitless vastness of space.
Ford: It’s wonderful to know that the technicians and scientists have that capability—to link up hundreds of miles away.
Brezhnev: [fiddles with his pocket] I’ve been thinking—I know Kissinger’s mind works that way—I’ll take a little bomb, put it in my pocket, and . . .
Kissinger: As long as it’s a little one.
Brezhnev: It’s a long-range one.
Ford: I’m glad they were up there, and not you and I.
Gromyko: Those are the MIRVs.
Brezhnev: Of course, that is a very complicated issue, seriously.
[The last of the photographers departed.]
Frankly speaking, Mr. President, the latest proposals we received on the night of our departure for Helsinki. We can’t go into details today. I was just informed of them, and you can’t get to the bottom of them right after getting out of the plane.
Kissinger: You mean on strategic arms?
Brezhnev: Yes. Maybe while we are here we can look them over and discuss them the next time we meet.
Ford: Mr. General Secretary, I’d like to make some comments first about détente.

by Rodman. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the U.S. Ambassador’s Residence.

Brezhnev: Please.

Ford: In the United States, there is a very encouraging overall attitude as to the progress we have made, the Soviet Union and the United States, in moving in the right direction on détente. On the other hand, I think it is fair—and I want to be frank: we have those on the right as well as on the left, who for various reasons, political and otherwise, would like to undermine what we have tried to implement and to destroy détente.

[Mr. Hyland comes in to join the meeting.]

And critics of détente are Democrats as well as Republicans. They would like to slow down or destroy the benefits that come from détente. But I can tell you very forcefully I am committed to détente, and the American people agree with me. I strongly feel our negotiations and our agreements in Vladivostok were pluses, were very successful. I believe the CSCE negotiations, the documents we will sign here, are pluses, and I am confident as we talk about SALT II, we can achieve success in this area. Perhaps as in our country, you have some critics in your own government who don’t believe that Vladivostok, CSCE, and SALT II are in the best interests of your country. But I can tell you in my term of office—and I expect that to be the next 5½ years—my aim, objective and total effort on my part will be to narrow our differences and achieve the benefits for your people, for our people, and I believe for the world as a whole.

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to critics of détente:] The only two people who are against détente are Kissinger and Gromyko. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Because as long as there is no détente, we can keep meeting. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: [interrupts translation at reference to 5½ years:] Why do you say only five years in office? Why not eight years?

[Mr. Akalovsky joins the meeting.]

Ford: Mr. Secretary, of course we have these critics of Vladivostok, the European Security Conference, and SALT, who would like me to have a term of office for 1½ years. But I am convinced beyond any doubt, if we can move the Vladivostok agreement beyond SALT and implement the atmosphere in which CSCE took place, I believe the critics will be pushed aside and the American people will support what you and I want to achieve. If we can make the kind of progress [we seek] on SALT, today and Saturday,3 it would be a great delight for me to have you visit the United States this fall. I was up in Camp David two weeks ago and Mrs. Ford and I were discussing what a beautiful

3 August 2.
place it was. I know you enjoyed your visit there before. But the main point is to make headway that will result in a fruitful agreement, that will be of benefit to your country and mine, and will make possible a meeting in the United States between us some time in 1975.

Brezhnev: [interrupts Sukhodrev’s translation at reference to Camp David:] I did like Camp David.

Ford: It is beautiful in the fall.

Brezhnev: Quiet and relaxing.

Ford: With those general observations, Mr. Secretary, I’d be very pleased to have your reactions and any suggestions or comments you would like to make, sir.

Brezhnev: I, too, want to be perfectly honest—and I trust you will have the opportunity to see that this is so—let me say once again that we received your latest proposals on SALT some time at night, practically before I was due to leave. They need a thorough working on. Let me say a new agreement on that is something you and we need equally. We had no less difficulties working out the earlier agreement, but we worked them out and solved them. I believe this time, too, it should be possible to work out an agreement that would be advantageous to both sides.

Gromyko: Difficulties ought to be worked out and we will solve them.

Brezhnev: Perhaps during the next few days we will have a respite and see things more clearly. Yesterday after I arrived I met with President Kekkonen, leaders of the GDR and Tito, and got back very late at night. These matters are complicated, serious and do not lend themselves to a cursory glance. As for our objectives, they remain the same—Vladivostok determines those objectives. Of course, there are some details to be solved.

I would like in this meeting to turn to other matters of interest to the two sides.

I was a bit surprised to learn that in the United States there were some people who were against the Apollo–Soyuz project, arguing that “their technology is weaker” or something. In the United States, everything is criticized. The only person who is never criticized is Dr. Kissinger, but they sometimes criticize even him for the fun of it. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I was going to say it’s reached the point where even I am criticized. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: I saw a day or two ago some piece in the press that—every paper has certain errors, typographical or letters missing—and every day they print a little note correcting it.

Ford: Always on the back page.
Brezhnev: I often ask, why do they publish this note? They say “it’s for the pleasure of our readers.”

So, Mr. President, if you have no objections, we could turn to other matters, and when we meet on the second [of August]—and we could go into the third if you want—we could discuss the main issue.

The Middle East

Ford: Why don’t you go ahead with the matters of interest to you and we will go ahead on matters of interest to us, and on Saturday when we meet we can discuss SALT.

Brezhnev: I think that’s the right thing to do. There are quite a few questions. There is the Middle East, with its Arab League—there we have to do some thinking about how to act. There are some who are calling for the expulsion of Israel from the United Nations. [Lengthy pause] That is a question that I would call a complex one. It’s not a question that can be resolved by any kind of Assembly—I refer to the United Nations under its Charter. Because if something goes wrong, we can impose our veto or someone else can do it.

Ford: I agree with that. If the Middle East problem hasn’t been solved in the UN for so many years, the prospect of a solution in the UN now is very unlikely. So other means have to be found. I’d be interested in your observations, Mr. Secretary, on procedure and other aspects of the problem, because a solution there is essential. We don’t want a confrontation in the Middle East between our two countries. A solution must come from the people who are there, the nations in the area. However, in the meantime we are doing what we can to bring the parties together, and in this I believe your actions there have been very helpful.

Brezhnev: [Before translation of the President’s remarks] In short we must indeed do all we can to further détente and this must be our very businesslike conversation, and frank.

[Sukhodrev then translates the President’s remarks.]

Brezhnev: When Mr. Kissinger last met Gromyko, he said the United States had not finalized its approach to that problem as yet. So let’s discuss this. Because if we don’t work out a solution, the Geneva Conference will be nothing more than an empty phrase.

Ford: And very controversial, with no possibility of a solution.

We still are in the process of analyzing the benefits and possibilities of the step-by-step approach. We are at the point where either it will achieve another success, or else there is the possibility of a comprehensive proposal that will be presented to the American people and Geneva. It will be a comprehensive proposal that would encompass all of the issues that have festered there for years. So we would appreciate
your recommendations and suggestions as we prepare our final conclusions.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, both at Vladivostok and now, our position has been that the occupied Arab territories must be given up, the Palestinians should be guaranteed their rights, and Israel should be guaranteed, through whatever means possible, to have free and secure existence without any outside interference. There is no other alternative.

[He confers with Gromyko.]

I remember one conversation I had on this with Dr. Kissinger. You'll recall you said to me the step-by-step has certain merits in that it makes some get used to moving back a little, and some to advance a little, so that finally there will be a solution to the complex of issues. I remember this, but this process must be written in the framework of the entire complex of issues. I agree this can't be done in one day.

Ford: The progress made in the step-by-step process will create a more optimistic attitude for that time when we seek a comprehensive solution. The easing of tensions will help create the conditions for a final settlement. So Secretary Kissinger and I see eye to eye on how we can create an environment for a full and final settlement at Geneva.

Gromyko: [To Brezhnev in Russian, not translated] The U.S. is tearing partial solutions out of the total complex of issues. Something gets solved, but what next?

Brezhnev: The only difference between your and our approach, Mr. President, is that in the step-by-step the giving up of occupied lands is in this context divorced from the overall complex, and no specific overall solution is envisaged.

Kissinger: I told—if I may, Mr. President—the Foreign Minister when we met in Geneva that we no longer envisage a number of additional steps, and that after the next step we will have reached the point where a comprehensive approach will be required. Any further steps would be in the context of an overall settlement. So I think we are really reaching the point when we are converging on this issue.

Ford: It is my strong feeling that if we could come to some general agreement on how to proceed in the Middle East [Brezhnev whispers with Gromyko] and on the execution and implementation of the European Security Conference—because the future of the Conference depends on execution rather than on signature—and if on Saturday we can reach an important conclusion on SALT II, then our meetings will have a significant impact on détente, which I intend to pursue in the five and a half years that I intend to remain President of the United States.

Brezhnev: [Before translation] Do you mind if I take my coat off? [All take their coats off.]
Gromyko: Now the Americans and the Russians have a real working appearance. A business-like appearance—still better!

Ford: I believe that was the approach we took at Vladivostok. I believe it is the approach we take here at Helsinki.

[Sukhodrev translates the President’s remarks above.]

Brezhnev: Mr. President. I recall that quite recently you had a direct meeting with President Sadat, and that is one of the important countries involved in the conflict. Did you succeed in moving things one step further to a settlement?

Ford: I was encouraged by the good personal relations I established with him. We talked in generalities of the need for a settlement, for a solution that would encompass a comprehensive settlement in the Middle East. We didn’t get into details—where the lines should be drawn or where action is to be taken. On the whole, it was a fruitful experience in my first meeting with him.

Gromyko: [To Brezhnev, in Russian, not translated:] Israel is holding on to occupied territories. There are the Palestinians—where are they to live? So extremist tendencies are developing in the area. Objectively, the whole problem is ripe for solution, but it’s all a question of politics. How much longer is it to ripen? There have been two wars already, is one more needed?

Kissinger: Is this a private conversation here, or is it directed to us?

Sukhodrev: Private.

Gromyko: Private but not secret. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Is it a private fight or can anybody join? [Laughter]

Brezhnev: This problem is very complicated. It is very complicated for you, for us, and for the Arabs.

Ford: It’s almost unbelievable that some of those nations can’t talk as you and I do, Mr. Secretary. I am sure if they had the same understanding of the need for discussions and the same willingness that we do, then there would be progress towards a solution by them in that area.

Brezhnev: When things get difficult, the best way is to instruct Kissinger to go into the matter.

Gromyko: But only together with us!

Kissinger: I told the Foreign Minister in Geneva that it is really impossible for either of us to reach a solution on its own, that it can only be done on a common basis. I also told the Foreign Minister—on the in-

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structions of the President—that neither of our two sides can achieve a permanent advantage in the Middle East at the expense of the other. And I also said that it would be a tragedy if our countries were drawn into a confrontation because of people whose record is so demonstrably volatile as the people in the Middle East, people who one year are on one side and the next year are on the other. So after the next step, we will have to explore how to move towards an overall solution. If there is a step.

Brezhnev: I laugh, Mr. President—why I say Kissinger should be brought into these problems—[To Kissinger:] Didn’t you get the highest award from President Sadat?

Kissinger: The second highest. [Laughter] President Nixon got the highest.

Brezhnev: I didn’t even get a little medal!

Kissinger: But they took it away from me and will give it to the next visitor, because they have only one.

Gromyko: Mr. President, you made the interesting remark that if the Arabs and Israelis could sit across the table like you and the General Secretary, they would come to a solution. But the hard fact is they can’t. If they did, they would probably start throwing ink wells at each other as in the past. [Laughter] But the Geneva Conference was a forum that was agreed upon by the U.S. and the Soviet Union. You will be present, and we will, and Sadat and the Israelis and the Syrians. So discussions will be a natural thing. We can’t understand why the U.S. is hesitant about such a forum—one, I repeat, that was agreed upon by the U.S. and the Soviet Union.

The U.S. says “let’s make one more effort to get a partial step going.” But you did this once before. Did that step bring the problem any closer to a solution? The step-by-step doesn’t yield results. Your earlier efforts have not brought a solution any closer. There should be a comprehensive solution. There should be preliminary discussions between the U.S. and the Soviet Union—assuming the Israelis and Arabs agree—and then our ideas should be put on the table. All parties will be present in Geneva—the U.S., the USSR, Israel and the Arabs, so no one can bite off what has not been agreed to by all participants.

Ford: I believe, Mr. Foreign Minister, if there is careful preparation, if an appropriate environment is created, then a meeting at Geneva will be of benefit for an overall solution. But I would say what has been accomplished thus far has to some extent created a better environment, and another step, if achieved, will further enhance the atmosphere which is so essential for the successful work of Geneva. A failure in Geneva would have extremely serious consequences.

Gromyko: The Conference and its outcome cannot be any worse than the policies of its participants. So if the participants have a desire to achieve positive results, positive results will be achieved.
Ford: It seems to me we have an understanding of your position, and I trust you have an understanding of our position in this area. We do want a solution. So perhaps as we think it over, and as you think it over, we can reach a common understanding of the procedures and approaches we can take to a solution.

Would you like to pass to another subject, Mr. Secretary?

Brezhnev: All right. Maybe we could talk about this: We complete the European Security Conference. But we should not stop at that. We should make further headway. Relaxation of tensions doesn’t stop with Europe, the U.S. and Canada.

We should extend further. Maybe we should talk about that. I think it was you who said détente is useful not only for Europe but for all the world, and I certainly associate myself fully with those words.

Ford: I agree. In this connection, I want to note that the United States Senators who met with you in Moscow came back with very favorable reactions to the discussions they had with you, Mr. Secretary. And the Senators join with me in the view that détente is the way our two countries should proceed. They were impressed with the very frank discussions they had with you on energy, economy, trade and other areas. Their impression was that there are distinct possibilities for cooperation in these areas. And I was greatly impressed by the hospitality extended by you and your associates during that visit and the frankness and spirit of cooperation with which these were discussed at the time of their visit.

Brezhnev: In Washington, Mr. President, when I met with a large group of Senators and Congressmen and answered some of their questions, there was one man who sat in the back and asked a question about something. He asked the question in a delicate way, and I said “You are not bold enough. You are obviously referring to the Jewish population in the Soviet Union.” When they were in the Soviet Union, he admitted: “It was me.” It was Senator Javits, and we then had an interesting discussion with him.

Ford: Javits sitting in the back of the room? [Laughter]

Gromyko: He admitted it was him. He was sitting to one side.

Brezhnev: [To Kissinger] Were you present in Washington during the meeting?

Kissinger: No. I knew about your meeting. You presented some figures to the Senators in that meeting.

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5 See Document 167.
6 Brezhnev hosted a luncheon for 25 Senators and Representatives on June 19, 1973. No record of the meeting was found, but for a summary of the discussion, see “Some Senators Not Convinced by Brezhnev on Jews,” The New York Times, June 20, 1973, p. 20.
Brezhnev: I have some figures on that for this meeting too. It is soon going to be a veritable tragedy!

Ford: Let me say on that point, Mr. General Secretary. I have indicated to you that I intend to submit legislation as to trade and also as to credits. The handling of Congress is a very delicate problem. As you know, it is dominated in our system by the opposition party, so I have influence but not necessarily control. So the matter of timing when to submit legislation on trade and credits is very important. It is my hope this fall to submit remedial amendments so that we can have trade relations as initially contemplated. I think it was very unfortunate that you were forced to cancel the trade agreement, although I understand the action in Congress might have compelled you to do this. Perhaps by some appropriate action you could help me convince the Congress to approve the changes we will recommend. That would be a very important step, so détente can proceed and we can move in trade relations forward as we anticipated in a constructive way.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, on the whole let me say, there has been no change in our policy. We want as before to have good relations with the United States.

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, a few moments ago you said you had some figures in mind to discuss. I would be most interested.

Brezhnev: I will look. I do have somewhere a brief on this question. We have already added Solzhenitsyn to the list! [Laughter]

Gromyko: What we won't do for the sake of friendship!

Ford: I have heard the name before.

Brezhnev: [Reads over his talking paper and confers with Gromyko] Here are some data. In 1972—the first figures are the number of requests for exit permits—in 1972, there were 26,800 requests. In 1973, there were approximately 26,000. In 1974, there were 14,000. In the first six months of 1975, there were 5,000 requests.

As regards the number of people who actually left for Israel—actually some went elsewhere—in 1972, there were 29,000. In 1973, 33,000. In 1974, 19,000. And in the first six months of 1975, 6,000. Some were carry-overs from the past year; there were only 5,000 requests.

I have another figure. From the start of the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union, which dates back to 1945, until July 1, 1975, a total of 116,000 persons left the Soviet Union. This amounts to 98.4 percent of all requests submitted, 98.4 percent were met. You see, at present there is a process of falling off of requests, and probably it will continue.

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7 Gromyko also gave Kissinger an information report on Soviet emigration; attached but not printed.
your country, there are some to whom you don’t give permission on security grounds; we also have such people.

[Secretary Kissinger gets up to leave briefly.]

Ford: I must say Mr. General Secretary, Mr. Solzhenitsyn has aligned himself—

Kissinger: I am not leaving because you mentioned that name.

[Laughter]

Ford: Mr. Solzhenitsyn aligned himself with those who are very severe critics of the policy I and you believe in, détente. Senator Jackson, Mr. George Meany, President of the American Federation of Labor, have spoken out critically. Meany has embraced Mr. Solzhenitsyn. Some of these critics encouraged Mr. Solzhenitsyn to continue his criticism of détente. As I said before, it is my firm belief that détente must continue and become irreversible if we want to achieve that kind of world which is essential for peace. The figures you mentioned, of course, are very disappointing to those who criticize détente. And any improvement there—in the requests or the figures of those who get permission to leave—would undercut some of the criticism and enhance our ability to proceed with détente as we want to do. But I repeat: détente can and will work and can be made irreversible—particularly if this Saturday we can make headway on SALT.

Brezhnev: I mentioned Solzhenitsyn just in passing. There was some information that he wanted to change his way of life and become a monk or something. Reportedly there was some priest going around with him at some point. He is nothing more than a zero for the Soviet Union. But why do you feel these figures will be disappointing to the people you mentioned?

Ford: In the case of Senator Javits, and Senator Ribicoff, they want to be helpful in Congress to approve the legislation I want to recommend, legislation that will permit trade, to extend credits, that will be very beneficial. If the figures were more encouraging, Mr. General Secretary, they would provide them with arguments for revising legislation that was so harmful to the continuation of détente.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, maybe you didn’t understand me correctly. I said we are reaching the point where there will be a tragedy. But what are we to do? Start talking people into leaving? I merely made a factual statement: The number of applications has been decreasing. The number of applications we have been receiving since I was in Washington has been declining. I am sure you and Dr. Kissinger realize this is so. I know virtually dozens of people of Jewish origin. Am I to go to Dymshits, the Deputy Prime Minister of the Soviet Union, and say “You’ve got to leave?” And Leibman of the Moscow Soviet—should I grab him by the hand and tell him to go?
Ford: Certainly the figure of 98 percent is a good record.
Gromyko: Ninety-eight point four percent.
Ford: That is certainly a good batting average, as we say in the United States. I am not suggesting ways for increasing the number of applications. All I want to say is that Ribicoff, Javits and others must be made to understand that if the revised legislation is adopted, there will be the possibility, if not the certainty—that the figures will be like those of 1974 or 1973. I understand you can’t take people by the hand and tell them to leave, but the perception, the appearance, makes a difference.

Brezhnev: I really can’t understand what I can do in this regard.
Ford: Let me summarize the situation as I see it from the point of view of détente. I came here, Mr. General Secretary, despite the criticism in the United States, because I believe in détente. The portions I have been connected with—Vladivostok and here—have been concrete forward steps, meaningful progress. As I said, the criticism at home has come from elements in America that can be, as I said, brushed aside. Coming here will contribute to détente despite the détente critics. I hope we will achieve in Helsinki what we talked about in Vladivostok. Thinking people in the U.S. know that Vladivostok was a success which serves the interests of both sides. The American people, the majority of the population, hopes for more progress. The majority feels the same way about this conference, and the implementation of the document we sign will be the most conclusive proof that we are on the right track.

So I hope we can make progress in SALT. This will be a good preliminary discussion for what we discuss on Saturday. But I repeat with quiet emphasis, détente must be made irreversible. It was my conviction at Vladivostok. I hope we can leave Helsinki with the same feeling, leading hopefully to a visit by you to the United States this fall.

Brezhnev: [Interrupts the translation] And I appreciate very highly the fact that you came here despite the criticism in the U.S.

[Interrupts the translation at statement that détente is beneficial:] And I agree with you on that.

On the second [of August], we will not have too much time, but I want to devote that day to what is most important.

[He starts reading from his talking paper.] At this point, Mr. President, I would like to mention one thing which relates to our common goals. You and we have an agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War. We both pledged to act in such a way as to prevent a nuclear war between us. And we both, I am sure, agree that nothing should be done to weaken that goal. In this, all aspects are important—economic, political, technical, as well as moral and psychological. The very possibility of a nuclear war between us should be made to be inadmissible in anybody’s mind. So I cannot but call your attention to statements by certain
officials in the United States, notably the Secretary of Defense, that suggest the possibility or even the probability of the United States using nuclear weapons against the Soviet Union. [Translated by Sukhodrev as “call to mind the permissibility or even the inevitability of nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union.”] What he implies is a preventive nuclear blow against the Soviet Union. When our people read that, they can’t but be disturbed [translated by Sukhodrev as “it can only be read one way”]. What if we began replying in kind? All our agreements would go to hell. It amounts to the possibility of preventive attack against the Soviet Union. How are we to take that?

Ford: Mr. General Secretary, I am sure you know that in the United States the President of the United States makes the policy and executes the policy. You and I have said in our discussions, and I have said publicly, that nuclear war is abhorrent to us. I can assure you that I intend to pursue that policy, that so long as I am President, policy will be set by me as I described it to you, publicly and privately.

Mr. General Secretary, I have two questions. Would it be possible to meet at 9:00 on Saturday?

Brezhnev: [Confers with Gromyko] There is the grain question. I think that is an easy one. We have given you the relevant information. I think that will not be a problem.

Ford: The main subject I think we should discuss, of course, is SALT.

Brezhnev: That is the main issue.

Ford: Is 9:00 all right?

Brezhnev: All right.

Kissinger: We have to tell our press something. I propose we just list the subjects we discussed.

Brezhnev: We have something.

Kissinger: You have already got a statement?

Gromyko: A unilateral statement.

Kissinger: I have to brief them tonight. If we don’t mention SALT, they will wonder, because we told them it was the main subject. The Middle East. No content. We won’t write anything.

Gromyko: Unilateral. The Middle East and strategic—these two in particular.

Kissinger: And Europe and bilateral.

Can we say there was a constructive atmosphere?

Brezhnev: We will say we kept fighting all the time. [Laughter]


[The meeting ended. The President escorted the General Secretary to his car outside where the party posed for photographs.]
172. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, July 30, 1975, noon.

PARTICIPANTS
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
President Ford
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)

[Soviet memcon of private conversation reconstructed from scraps of paper retrieved from Brezhnev’s ashtray in Finlandia Hall, Helsinki, after CSCE plenary, by Jan Lodal, NSC staff. Translated and supplemented by Alexander Akalovsky, who also overheard part of the private conversation.]

After a discussion with G. Ford in the presence of others, a short conversation took place eye to eye.

L.I. Brezhnev: I wish to tell you confidentially and completely frankly that we in the Soviet leadership are supporters of your election as President to a new term as well. And we for our part will do everything we can to make that happen.

G. Ford: I thank you for that. I expect to be elected and I think that that meets the interests of the further development of Soviet-American relations, and of the cause of strengthening détente.

L.I. Brezhnev: Yes, on this matter we agree with you that this is precisely how it should be. Unfortunately, however, publicly you call us, the Soviet Union, adversaries, and in your conversations with us you say that we have common goals—transformation of détente into an irreversible process.

G. Ford: I can assure you, in full frankness, that I am absolutely prepared to dedicate all my efforts precisely to ensuring that relations between our countries develop steadily, and that détente becomes irreversible.

[This private conversation took place following the President’s and Brezhnev’s exchanges with media representatives outside the American Ambassador’s residence. As Brezhnev moved to his car, he was overheard asking Sukhodrev if his remarks to the President might have been caught by the correspondents. Sukhodrev assured him that,]

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 30–August 2, 1975—Ford/Brezhnev Meetings in Helsinki (CSCE). Secret; Nodis. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held outside the U.S. Ambassador's Residence after the plenary meeting.

2 The reconstructed Russian document is attached.
in interpreting, he had deliberately lowered his voice so that only the President could hear him.]

173. Memorandum of Conversation

Helsinki, August 2, 1975, 9:05 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

US
The President
The Secretary of State
Walter Stoessel, US Ambassador to the USSR
General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, Department of State
Arthur Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Department of State
Jan Lodal, NSC Staff
Alexander Akalovsky, Department of State

USSR
General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
Andrey Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. G.M. Kornienko, Chief of American Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. A. Aleksandrov, Assistant to Mr. Brezhnev
Mr. K. Chernenko, Member of the Central Committee Staff
General Kozlov, Deputy Chief of General Staff
Mr. Detinov
Mr. V. Sukhodrev, MFA
Mr. A. Vavilov, MFA

Brezhnev: I think the Conference in Helsinki has been received very well by the public.

The President: Yes, I think the press coverage was very good. I have also seen a lot of good pictures in the papers.

Brezhnev: Let’s take off our coats; it will be easier to work that way.

[Everybody takes his coat off.]
Brezhnev: How should we start? Perhaps we should draw lots. If the lot is in my right hand, Gromyko will start.

Gromyko: Perhaps. Why not?

Brezhnev: No, maybe we should ask Dr. Kissinger to start.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, I believe you made an outstanding speech at the Conference. I liked its tone and I believe the emphasis you placed on MBFR and SALT has set a correct atmosphere for today’s meeting. I would like to compliment you on your speech.

Brezhnev: Thank you very much. If your comment is not merely an expression of politeness, I thank you all the more. [Pause] You know, Mr. President, after this conference, it is morally more difficult to talk about increasing our armaments levels, about introducing new types of weapons, and the like.

The President: I believe it is very interesting to note that the only dispute that surfaced during the conference here was not a dispute between the US and the Soviet Union, but one between Turkey, Greece and Cyprus. This is a pleasant change.

Brezhnev: My close colleagues, when they heard those speeches, thought there would be a fist fight.

The President: If there had been one, I believe that from the standpoint of appearance Demirel looked stronger.

Brezhnev: There was also a divine representative there, with a heavy cross!

[Pointing to the cookies which had just been brought in] Dr. Kissinger, this is all for you, you seem to have grown weaker!

[Laughter]

Mr. President, I must thank you for your support and assistance in having this conference precisely at this time. This is something we greatly appreciate and it would be rude of me not to say so. There is also something I would like to say off the record, and those taking notes please don’t do so. Well, we have an agreement, and we also have arms that could put both of us into the grave. After this conference, if we were to make announcements about the introduction of additional arms or of new types of armaments, that would be inappropriate in this atmosphere. But we do need a new agreement. The first one is valid until 1977 and the next one should cover another eight years. This, I am sure, would bring greater tranquility into the minds of our peoples. What we have to discuss is the shape of a new agreement.

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2 For the English text of Brezhnev’s speech on August 1, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 31 (August 27, 1975), pp. 12–14. For Ford’s speech on the same date, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 459.

3 Turkish Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel.
The President: I agree. I hope, indeed I believe, that it is possible to reach agreement, and I am looking forward to your visit sometime in the fall to sign, and if need be, to complete the agreement. I believe Dr. Kissinger and your Foreign Minister have moved a number of issues to a point where technicians in Geneva can work out the specifics. We have made substantial progress on such issues as verification of MIRVs; on submarine MIRVs, I don’t think the remaining differences are very serious; as regards dimensions, it is a more technical problem. We could draw up a check list of the points where differences continue to exist. Perhaps we could proceed in that way. Last Friday, we gave you our communication.4 Perhaps you have looked at it and perhaps this would be a good starting point.

Brezhnev: [Pause] Mr. President, this is the second time I am meeting with you on this problem, which is so delicate and most important for our two countries as well as for the entire world. With Dr. Kissinger, we have had numerous meetings on this problem. I would like to speak openly: have we really done everything correctly? First we talked about throw weight, launching weight, modifications of dimensions by 10 to 15 percent, and a ban on the construction of new silos. That is fine, but the fact is that you and we have different fuels which are not comparable. After all, a cup of tea is not a cup of mercury, because the weight of the two is different. But if missiles are used, the result will be the same: Brezhnev dies and Kissinger dies. From the standpoint of the Pentagon and our Ministry, there may be a difference, but from the standpoint of our people at large there is none.

Now, Dr. Kissinger, what do you want: launching weight or throw weight? I am sure you could not answer this question.

The Secretary: I could try.

Brezhnev: We have made a number of concessions: for example, missiles once tested with MIRVs are all to be counted as equipped with MIRVs, although initially our approach was different. But when we asked you not to build B–1 bombers, you said you would. Also, we asked you not to build the Trident, but you are going ahead just the same and that means that we will have to build our Typhoon. Now we have the issue of cruise missiles, which can be launched from both the ground and the air. This is such a complex and delicate issue that it is very difficult to deal with it. But we must give some basic guidance to our representatives in Geneva so that we can sign a document.

[Pause]

Now, I remember that in Vladivostok you agreed . . . [confers with Gromyko] you indicated agreement concerning B–1 missiles of over

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600 kilometers. I am raising this issue of cruise missiles only reluctantly, not because I would like to bypass it, but because I want to avoid anything that could spoil our relations, so that we could find some compromise.

When Gromyko met with Dr. Kissinger, we made a very big concession on verification of MIRVs, and it was really a major concession that was not easy for us to make. But Dr. Kissinger was told that this was linked with cruise missiles. [Gromyko prompts him] We told Dr. Kissinger that the solutions of the two issues should be treated as one complex of issues. Also, we said that each cruise missile should be counted as one, just as those on B–1 bombers. Furthermore, we said that air-based cruise missiles of over 600 kilometers and land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range should be banned. But I must tell you, Mr. President, that Dr. Kissinger has completely ignored this proposal.

The Secretary: This is a total violation of the President’s instructions. I did all this on my own. If you hadn’t told this to the President, he would not have known it, so now I am in deep trouble.

The President: We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles with intercontinental range. You wanted this and we said OK. We also agreed to limit sea-based cruise missiles to a range of 1500 kilometers, so we have moved towards you on this issue. We have also agreed to include in the ban cruise missiles on transport aircraft.

Brezhnev: When you say cruise missiles of intercontinental range, do you mean land-based ones?

The Secretary: Land-based intercontinental cruise missiles and also cruise missiles on transport planes. You wanted to ban them and the President has agreed.

Brezhnev: It is also good that we have agreed on banning ICBMs based on the seabed and the ocean floor, including inland and territorial waters.

The President: Also in space!

Brezhnev: Yes, that is very good.

We are prepared to refer to the delegations in Geneva the question of the limits on dimensional modifications of silos. There are still some differences on this.

Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Those differences will remain in Geneva as well!

The Secretary: Did I understand you correctly that the points you mentioned previously, such as cruise missiles with intercontinental range, should also go to Geneva? At any rate, let’s make a list of issues.

Brezhnev: No, I don’t think so.

The Secretary: Only silo dimensions?
Brezhnev: Silo dimensions and . . . [prompted by Gromyko] cruise missiles of intercontinental range.

The Secretary: We agree.

Gromyko: The problem is that the differences between our approaches will remain the same in Geneva as they are here.

The Secretary: We are not disputing, we only want to be sure we understand you correctly.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: I would like to give the floor to Gromyko.

Gromyko: There are various issues relating to cruise missiles. On some we have reached agreement, on others we have not. We have agreement on the following points. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles of intercontinental range. So this is agreed and could be referred to the delegations for drafting appropriate language. We have proposed a ban on cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, and we have also proposed that all air-based ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers, except those on heavy bombers, be banned. You have given a positive answer concerning cruise missiles but are passing over in silence ballistic missiles. So that part of this problem which has been agreed could go to Geneva.

The Secretary: We have agreed to count in the aggregate all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers no matter what vehicle they are on.

Gromyko: If you say this, and you have not said it before, then we can state that all ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers are banned from all aircraft other than heavy bombers, but if you say that all such missiles are to be counted, then we still have some differences.

The Secretary: Are you, Mr. Minister, saying “count”?

Gromyko: No, not count, ban. Agreement concerning the counting of missiles on heavy bombers was reached in Vladivostok.

The Secretary: Our concern is how to differentiate between heavy bombers and other aircraft.

Gromyko: But you and we have agreed on what types of aircraft are to be regarded as heavy bombers.

The Secretary: Not completely. There is still one type at issue, although you are correct as regards aircraft on our side.

Gromyko: This is a separate issue. It relates to the Backfire and should be discussed separately.

As regards sea-based missiles, we have proposed banning all missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers from all ships. Here we have an obverse situation: You have replied positively as regards ballistic
missiles but on cruise missiles you have agreed to ban only those with a range of over 1500 kilometers. So here we have agreement on ballistic missiles but not on cruise missiles, and only the first part of this issue could be referred to Geneva.

The Secretary: For clarity, will you please define what you understand has been agreed regarding sea-based ballistic missiles?

Gromyko: All over 600 kilometers are to be banned.

The Secretary: Correct, we agree.

The President: Yes, we agree.

Gromyko: As Comrade Brezhnev has said, there is also agreement between us regarding emplacement on the seabed and on the ocean floor, so this too can go to Geneva. The same applies to outer space.

All issues are important but the issue of cruise missiles is of particular importance. We understood in Vladivostok that missiles included in the aggregate of 2400 are not to be divided in categories of ballistic and cruise missiles. But you started doing so after Vladivostok and this has greatly complicated matters. As Comrade Brezhnev has said, this is a particularly important issue.

The Secretary: On the other hand, nothing was said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers. But we are ready to reach agreement on this as well as on sea-based cruise missiles. So we are prepared to generalize this problem.

Gromyko: Well, in Vladivostok the cruise missiles issue was not even mentioned, so that we could not even conceive of drawing a line between cruise and ballistic missiles.

The Secretary: But there was nothing said in Vladivostok about cruise missiles on ships and aircraft other than bombers. Yet, now we are willing to count such missiles in the aggregate. We have also agreed to ban cruise missiles on all aircraft other than heavy bombers, to ban cruise missiles with a range of over 1500 kilometers on ships and submarines, and to ban ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on ships.

Gromyko: You say nothing was said in Vladivostok on these issues. But it was you who started differentiating between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. If we had proceeded consistently, there would be no division even today. Now, as regards what should be referred to Geneva. The General Secretary has already mentioned this. If no agreement has been reached on some issues at a high or the highest level, no progress can be expected on those issues in Geneva either. On the contrary, their referral to the delegations might make work in Geneva even more difficult.

Brezhnev: In Vladivostok, in the course of two days, we reached agreement on very important questions and principles!
The Secretary: I would like to make two points. First, we should send to Geneva only those items agreed here. There is no point in sending other issues, because if the General Secretary and the President do not agree, Semenov and Johnson won’t either. So I repeat, only agreed items are to be referred to Geneva.

Second, as regards sea-based cruise missiles, most of your sea-based cruise missiles have a range of 300 to 500 kilometers—and I know that your technicians are always angry when I mention specifications of your weapons. With that range you can hit 40 percent of US cities, a great number of which are along the coast. With similar missiles we can’t hit your cities because you very unfairly and inappropriately have located your cities deep inland. So we have a choice: either you give us a longer range or move your cities to the coast.

Gromyko: A very revolutionary proposal! What kind of binoculars do you use?

The Secretary: Our Secretary of Defense proposed moving your cities to the sea coast.

Brezhnev: Put them on barges!

The President: I thought you would suggest moving our cities farther from the sea!

Brezhnev: Not too far!

[A lengthy pause, with Brezhnev reading his brief and then engaging in a long conference with his advisers, only portions of which could be overheard. After reading the paper, Brezhnev waved Kozlov from his seat and asked him what the issue was, commenting that he could not understand it because all missiles were subject to the 600 kilometer limitation. Kozlov, Gromyko and Kornienko explained that the issue was the difference between cruise missiles and ballistic missiles. Somewhat later Brezhnev asked if all SALT I provisions would remain in force until 1977. Gromyko replied in the affirmative but pointed out that if agreement were reached now on new points, the new provisions would come into effect under SALT II. After re-reading his brief, Brezhnev exclaimed that he still did not understand the essence of the issue. Gromyko and Kornienko repeated that it related to cruise missiles. Brezhnev asked if they had in mind land-based cruise missiles, with Gromyko and Kornienko saying that land-based cruise missiles were the lesser part of the problem; Kozlov added that sea-based cruise missiles with the range desired by the US could hit the USSR from the north. Pointing to a paragraph in his brief, Brezhnev asked what the issue of a definition of heavy missiles was all about. Kozlov’s response could not be heard.]

Brezhnev: I don’t want to burden you, Mr. President, with this question, but what is your view of the definition of heavy missiles? Should it be according to launching weight, or throw weight?
The Secretary: We proposed both, but if we had to choose we would prefer throw weight.

Brezhnev [to Gromyko]: I can’t invent anything new here.

Gromyko: You say both. How do you visualize the combination? Can you spell it out?

The Secretary: Your formula for launching weight is that there should be no missiles heavier than the most heavy of the light missiles you now have, that is the SS–19. We say that there should be no missiles with a throw weight larger than the one of the SS–19. We would use these criteria per missile and not overall.

May I make a suggestion. You have been helpful in giving us concrete ideas, and we gave you our proposals. Perhaps you can give us now your views on our recent proposals so we could discuss them with our colleagues and give you our response in a week or so. Then, when the Foreign Minister comes to the US or when I come to Moscow, we could continue our discussion.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: Mr. President, perhaps you don’t know the characteristics of our aircraft, but I want to tell you that what you call the Backfire is not a heavy bomber so that your proposal is completely without foundation.

The President: Our understanding is that the Backfire has sufficient range and arms to be counted as a heavy bomber. Perhaps you could give us some technical information that would show that it should not be counted. We understand that the Backfire is a replacement for the Bison, and the Bison is counted. So the Backfire should also be counted in the aggregate of 2400.

Brezhnev [to Kozlov]: This is not correct, is it?

Kozlov [to Brezhnev]: Myasishchev is a heavy bomber. But this is a medium bomber. It has half the range. TU–22 is a different matter.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, in including the Myasishchev bomber, or what you call the Bison, we gave you a big present. That aircraft is not capable of a two-way mission. But, nevertheless, for formal reasons, we agreed to include it as a heavy bomber. As regards the Backfire, it can’t do even half of what the Bison can do. Ask your experts. This is on the record, and I am responsible for what I say. So how can we include it?

President: Our intelligence tells us that the range and the other capabilities of the Backfire are reasonably comparable with those of the Bison. The two aircraft have a similar range and their other capabilities are also similar. I respect your statement, but our information does not coincide with what you tell me. I would have a monumental problem with our intelligence, and with our Congress as well as the American people at large, to whom I have to account, if I were to accept your
figures. If we could see the figures, that could perhaps help us in finding some possible arrangement, but this would take time. I really cannot dismiss the information presented to me by my advisers. Every time when we encounter technical problems—and they are important—I am reminded of your opening statement on the importance of reaching an agreement that would be in the interests of both of our peoples. So with the time limitation we have, I believe it would be useful if your Foreign Minister and Dr. Kissinger, when Mr. Gromyko comes to the United States, continued discussing this problem. Then, when Dr. Kissinger visits Moscow, he and Mr. Gromyko could further narrow the differences. Then when we meet, we could further refine our views so as to be able to sign an agreement. The differences we have over the Backfire bomber are a very tough problem. Therefore, I would like to ask you if you have anything to say on cruise missiles, so that we could indicate some progress. If you could give us something on cruise missiles that we could take back with us, that would be very useful.

Brezhnev: It is most difficult to discuss these questions. You, Mr. Ford, are President, and I am General Secretary. Your intelligence reports to you certain things that are news to me, so what does it mean when you don’t believe what I tell you? My intelligence reports to me that you are converting light missiles into heavy ones. So you get your intelligence reports and I get mine. But we sit here and don’t believe each other. Perhaps not we, but our intelligence people, should sit here.

The President: You said we should not do anything to disrupt the good relationship we have established. I agree 100 percent with you on this point, and all Europe wants this. This was the opinion reflected in all the statements we heard at the conference. But we have to state our views openly. I rely on my intelligence, and you on yours.

If you could indicate some movement on cruise missiles, then we could say that our two meetings have been productive. We said 3,000 kilometers for airborne cruise missiles. I am willing to modify this, perhaps to 2,500, although this is very hard for me to do. In the case of surface ships and submarines, perhaps we could consider using something less than 1,500, say 1,200. I offer this despite the technical advice I receive to show good faith and to indicate that I make decisions regardless of advice. Again, I recall your opening words about the importance of reaching agreement, which impressed me greatly.

It seems to me that given the excellent environment created in Helsinki and the faith thirty-three nations have put in your and my hands, it would be very unfortunate if we were to walk out of here unable to say that progress has been achieved in this vital area.

Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: This doesn’t solve the issue.

[Lengthy pause]
Brezhnev: You know, to work out a good agreement, an agreement that would be mutually advantageous, considerable time is needed. Dr. Kissinger plans to visit Moscow rather late. This will create great difficulties, because we will be preoccupied with preparations for the visit by Giscard, the Party Congress, etc.

So we should agree on when the next meeting will take place. [Turning to Gromyko] With the President?

Gromyko [to Brezhnev]: Well, maybe we will meet with Dr. Kissinger.

The Secretary: What are your suggestions?

[Pause]

Brezhnev: We should advance the meeting somewhat, although I have had no vacation yet. Also, if you come again with cruise missiles and the Backfire, well then we just won’t be able to get any agreement. So let’s think this over. Gromyko has not only summed up our analysis of the issues, but also has added something to it. I kept silent because it is impolite to repeat the same thing three times.

The Secretary: When is the Foreign Minister coming to New York?

Gromyko: On September 15 or 16. I believe the General Assembly starts on the 16th.

The Secretary: Why don’t we propose a date after the President has reviewed the schedule. To speed up things, perhaps I could come at the end of August.

Gromyko: August is not suitable. There is a great deal of work to be done. Our experts have to study the issues thoroughly.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: I propose a five-minute break.

The President: Of course.

The Secretary: But we don’t want to offend your allies!

Sukhodrev [to Brezhnev]: That is a reference to their departure for Romania.5

Brezhnev: Romania won’t perish!

[During the break, which lasted about 15 minutes, Brezhnev read his briefing papers, underlining certain portions in the process. He also conferred with Gromyko but their conversation was inaudible. Towards the end of the break, Brezhnev stepped out of the room for a few minutes.]

The Secretary [to Gromyko]: Ever since you joined the Politburo you have been even more difficult.

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5 Ford and Kissinger traveled to Romania and Yugoslavia for official visits before returning to Washington on August 4.
Gromyko: I don’t think so.

Brezhnev: Mr. President, when do you believe my visit to Washington would be convenient to you?

The President: I would say the second half of October. Would that be convenient to you? We have some flexibility. What can you suggest?

[Prolonged pause]

Brezhnev: You know, Mr. President, there are many issues that require thorough study: what kind of missiles, what characteristics of missiles, etc. I have not been able to study these matters here because I have had talks every day from morning till evening.

The President: As I said, we could be flexible. You asked for our view concerning the timing of your visit. I believe it is more important to reach a good agreement rather than set a deadline and not be able to meet it.

[Pause]

Brezhnev: In these circumstances, it is apparently difficult to solve the problem before us. But we must issue some kind of a statement.

The President: I have asked Dr. Kissinger to jot down the points we have agreed on, and perhaps he could read them to us. This could be reported to the public. We should not disappoint the public although we should not give it undue optimism. At the same time, we should not destroy the Helsinki atmosphere.

The Secretary: I believe we could say that we have agreed to refer to Geneva certain points on which we have reached agreement without specifying those points. As I see it, we have agreed that: (a) ballistic missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on surface ships will be banned; (b) ballistic missiles and cruise missiles on the seabed, including in territorial waters, will be banned; (c) placing nuclear weapons in orbit will be banned; (d) development, testing, and deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on aircraft other than bombers will be banned; and (e) development of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range will be banned. So all these items should be referred to Geneva, but all we would say to the public is that a number of issues have been referred to Geneva.

Gromyko: With reference to cruise missiles on aircraft other than bombers, do you exclude ballistic missiles?

Secretary: We want to handle ballistic missiles together with land mobile missiles. I don’t believe there are great differences in this area but we are not yet prepared to refer this to Geneva.

Gromyko: Your list of items is correct; we agree on these items.

The Secretary: Thus, the President can say that we have agreed on a number of points to be referred to Geneva. He could also say that we would remain in touch, primarily through an exchange of visits be-
tween the Foreign Minister and myself. In this way, we would not create an impression of stalemate.

The President: I would like to add that Dr. Kissinger could come to Moscow on the 6th or 7th of September rather than in August. And then you, Mr. Foreign Minister, would be coming to New York after his visit.

The Secretary: I am also prepared to go to Leningrad.
Brezhnev: You haven’t been there?
The Secretary: The city may not even exist!
Gromyko: Don’t you believe your own wife?
The Secretary: We are also prepared to refer the verification issue to Geneva!

Gromyko [shaking his head]: No, no. There is no proposal on this matter, so we can’t do it.
Secretary: I just wanted to catch you in a weak moment!

[At this point, Brezhnev, with Gromyko’s assistance, began making changes in the text of the Soviet press statement on the meeting. This drafting session lasted about five minutes.]
Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, the agreed points you have listed are not to be specified. The list is only for our own purposes, isn’t it?
The Secretary: Correct.
Brezhnev: So we could perhaps issue a statement, I mean a unilateral Soviet statement, that would read like this, and you could issue a similar one.

[Brezhnev hands the text to Sukhodrev, who translates it into English.]

“On 2 August, a meeting between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee Leonid Brezhnev and U.S. President Gerald Ford in which member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger took part was held in Helsinki.

“The CPSU Central Committee General Secretary and the U.S. President highly assessed the results of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. It was stressed that the final act of the conference, which embodies the collective political will of its participants, creates a good basis for transforming Europe into a continent of peace and fruitful cooperation and makes a major contribution to the consolidation of world peace and security.

“The two sides continued their exchanges of views on problems of the further development of Soviet-American relations. Great attention was paid to the problem of limiting strategic weapons. The questions on which agreement was reached during the talks will be referred to
the delegations in Geneva for appropriate finalization. Negotiations on the remaining issues will continue.

“Leonid Brezhnev and Gerald Ford expressed satisfaction with the exchange of views that took place, which was of a constructive character, and reaffirmed the great significance of personal contacts between the leaders of the Soviet Union and the United States.”

[Sukhodrev: The text then ends with a list of participants in the meeting.]

The Secretary: After the first meeting, we said that it had taken place in a “friendly atmosphere”. Questions will be asked if there is any difference.

Gromyko: We can include such a phrase in this statement as well. The Secretary: You make no mention of the discussions between the Foreign Minister and myself, but I believe we can say this unilaterally.

Brezhnev: I see no need for mentioning names. Aleksandrov: Dr. Kissinger is asking whether he could tell the journalists about those talks.

Brezhnev: Well, the talks might be with me too! But I have no objection anyway.

The Secretary: If we are asked about the General Secretary’s visit we will say that there has been no change in plans, but we would not say what the plans are.

Brezhnev: So far, no change is envisaged in our plans.

The President: Mr. General Secretary, thank you very much. I believe we have made a little, although not enough, headway and I look forward to further discussions. We value your readiness to seek agreement—we certainly seek it—and I trust that we will be able to reach an agreement that would meet the interests of the American and the Soviet people as well as of the entire world.

Brezhnev: I want to repeat that there should be no public announcement of the points that have been agreed. Otherwise, the question of trust will arise! Now, Mr. President, I would like to have a brief conversation with only you and Dr. Kissinger.

[The meeting broke up at 12:10 p.m., with the President and the Secretary staying in the room for the restricted meeting.]
174. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Helsinki, August 2, 1975, 12:15–12:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
- General Secretary CPSU, L.I. Brezhnev
- Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko
- Viktor Sukhodrev (Interpreter)

US
- President Ford
- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- William G. Hyland, State Dept. (Notetaker)

Brezhnev: Proceeding from the discussion you had with Ambassador Dobrynin,² I want to say a few words on grain. You said that you had no problems with the purchase of 10 million tons, but that this should not be made public.

The President: As I recall, concerning the 10 million that had already been purchased we had no problems; if you phased out additional purchases you should come to Dr. Kissinger first, so that the purchases should be phased over time, so as not to cause a rise in prices; then there will be no problems.

Brezhnev: I realized that we have already bought 10 million, but we are prepared to go further and to purchase another 15 million, and in that conversation oil was touched on; in a little time, I can assure you that we can sell approximately 25 million tons over five years.

[Gromyko (to Brezhnev during interpretation): We could say 17 million tons of grain; Brezhnev replies: No, 15 million for now.]

The Secretary: 5 million tons a year?

Brezhnev: On the average, but not less than 25 million tons; at world prices with no overcharges, at current world prices. Thirdly, we are prepared to conclude a long-term agreement on grain purchases.

The President: For 2 years or 5 years?

Brezhnev: A minimum of five years, or simply say five years.

The President: Our problem is that we will know how good our crop is in about 3–4 weeks. If it is as good as it looks, then there is no

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, July 30–August 2, 1975—Ford/Brezhnev Meetings in Helsinki (CSCE). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Drafted by Hyland. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.

² See Document 168.
problem. But I want to emphasize: do not go to the grain traders before discussing it with Dr. Kissinger. We will agree on how purchases are to be made, so that there will be no price increase; this is in both our interests. If we have a private exchange, and assuming our crop is as good as it appears to be, I will be very sympathetic. There is an additional point on oil. I gather you are talking about OPEC prices, but we have to have a discount, because there is ample supply from OPEC sources. We feel, however, that working out an arrangement on prices and purchases is important to our general relationship.

Brezhnev: What kind of discount do you have in mind?

The President: Pulling a figure out of my hat, I would say 20–25 percent below world prices.

Brezhnev: This is only between us (in this room); we will cooperate through Dr. Kissinger.

Gromyko: Kissinger, the world famous farmer.

The President: Don’t go to the speculators.

Gromyko: No, we will go to Kissinger who charges 25 percent, but speculators only charge 2 percent.

175. Memorandum of Conversation

August 4, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of the Arab-Israeli peace process.]

Kissinger: On SALT, we made no progress. And for him [Brezhnev] to say October is busy because he is seeing Giscard . . . We should
move now to the Chinese. I could go there around the middle of October. We could announce after my trip. Announce your trip after mine. I would call Dobrynin in and lay it on the table. Ask him what their intention is. They held us off in '71 and we moved to China. We could do the same thing again.

President: We have the grain thing too.

Kissinger: Yes. I see Butz says he stopped the sales. Can’t he just shut up?

President: It’s my thought exactly. DOD should prepare a program to present to the Congress on the assumption there is no SALT agreement—a five-year projection. I want it in writing in a week. Send it through OMB.

Kissinger: I don’t think Brezhnev is so strong any more that he can do what he did at Vladivostok.

President: That is what Tito and Ceausescu said.

Kissinger: So if they just say, “Hang tough, it’s just Kissinger,” they are just making you the fall guy. Defense has to get out ahead, not go along grudgingly.

President: The Senate vote should have scared Defense.

Kissinger: The Democrats can’t hurt you from the right. But if SALT blows up they can hurt you from the left, which is where they would then move.

All those guys talking about Helsinki; what frontiers have been recognized? All the frontiers but the German one were signed in ’47–’48—with participation by a Democratic administration. West Germany agreed to the German one.

President: We had more overtures from East European countries than ever before, I think.

Kissinger: Absolutely.

President: Why did the East Europeans want CSCE? To keep the Soviet Union off their backs.

Kissinger: Of course. And whose frontiers have been violated? And by whom?

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2 During an appearance on the CBS News program, “Face the Nation,” Butz announced that there was “practically a hold” on any further grain sales to the Soviet Union until the Department of Agriculture issued a report the following week on the size of the current U.S. crop. (Daniel Morgan, “Grain Sales Held Up for Crop Reports, The Washington Post, August 4, 1975, pp. A1, A2)

President: If we lost SALT, etc., shouldn’t we make a speech saying the borders were approved by the Democrats, and the East Europeans wanted inviolability to protect against the Soviet Union?

Kissinger: How about a 15 minute report to the Nation Thursday? President: That has some merit. Let’s think about it.

Didn’t Tito go farther than ever before?

Kissinger: I wanted to mention that. Tito is a bellwether of European politics. He obviously liked you—he hasn’t gone to the airport for years. His assessment has to be that you are dominant in world affairs.

[There was more discussion of Tito.]

President: Let’s make sure we deliver on the military equipment for Tito.

I have no hesitancy speaking up for CSCE and the whole thing.

Kissinger: Everything on this trip went right. Not a thing wrong. The Brezhnev problem is not your doing; something is going on. But our SALT position is a disgrace. [Describes Backfire and cruise missiles.]

President: Give me what we have agreed, what is outstanding and what the issues are.

Kissinger: The Soviets don’t know how to tackle the issues remaining. I don’t either, but the Soviets have never come up with any idea to break a deadlock.

You have never seen Brezhnev the way he really was. Vladivostok was the last glimmer, but there he wanted an agreement.

President: On the international economic situation. Wilson, Giscard, Schmidt are concerned about their economic problems and the impact. I get the impression my economic advisors are too carried away with our program. I would like an EPB meeting to describe the European situation. Would you prepare a briefing paper on my talks, so I can explain, indicate my sympathy and desire for closer cooperation. If we recover and Europe’s economies don’t, we could be in big trouble.

Kissinger: I want to tell Dobrynin the Soviet oil isn’t enough. It amounts to about 100,000 a day. The Iranian thing is set, but we don’t know how to make it legal.

President: Give me a paper on it so I can see it in writing.

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4 August 7. The President did not deliver a report to the nation.

“Détente Will Not Be a One-Way Street”: SALT, American Grain, Soviet Oil, August–November 1975

176. Memorandum of Conversation

WASHINGTON, AUGUST 7, 1975, 9:30–10:21 A.M.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, White House personnel, and Iranian oil.]

[Kissinger:] On the Soviet deal. It amounts to 100–150,000 barrels of oil per day or 5 million tons per year. Robinson has worked out a swap deal of grain for oil. But if we can get the oil at 25% below the market, I think we should forget a swap and just buy the oil and sell the grain. Greenspan thinks the idea has merit.

President: Is there any way we can put all the issues with the Soviet Union together and discuss the whole thing with them—Portugal, grain, oil, SALT, MBFR, etc.?

Kissinger: I think Portugal is not a Soviet issue. It wouldn’t go away if they stopped putting money in.

President: I agree with you on that.

Kissinger: They are willing to make a five-year grain deal. If we could get a 10 million ton oil deal, we might do it. But I don’t think the Soviets have it to sell.

President: A SALT, oil and grain deal would be helpful. Also, MBFR.

Kissinger: On SALT, you will have to get Schlesinger in line.

I can’t be the soft-on-Communism patsy.

President: I will call Schlesinger today.

Kissinger: I think if we somehow trade off the Backfire and cruise missiles . . .

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
I plan to get Dobrynin in tomorrow and scare the pants off him.² But if all these hot shots think they can keep kicking the Soviets in the pants and keep peace . . . Being a cold warrior in a time of peace is no great achievement. Brezhnev came back from Helsinki humiliated.

President: That is good for my American Legion speech.³ I told Bob to discuss it in detail with you.

Kissinger: We should review it in detail. There is an NSC meeting scheduled for Saturday.⁴ No particular reason for one, except to lay down the law.

President: Is it better to tell Schlesinger privately or in the NSC?

Scowcroft: There is merit in doing it in front of the Chairman. It gives him a chance—if he is inclined to stand up to Schlesinger.

President: Let’s have one.

Kissinger: Sum up, but say that to get a deal we need a new position on cruise missiles and Backfire.

[Omitted here is discussion of Arab-Israeli negotiations, Turkey, Cyprus, the UNGA Special Session, Panama, and Cuba.]

² No record of a meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on August 8 has been found.
³ See footnote 2, Document 179.

177. Action Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹

Washington, August 8, 1975.

Grain Drain on Détente

As you are well aware, détente diplomacy is in trouble. With suspicions piqued by the Helsinki Summit, the US press and public seem

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 77D112, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Box 354, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Aug. 1–15, 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by S. Giltner and Sandra Vogelsang in S/P and cleared by Charles R. Frank, Jr., in S/P. In a separate memorandum to Kissinger on August 8, Robinson added: “Attached is an excellent memorandum from Win Lord to you on Soviet grain purchases. I am in complete accord with the recommendations that he makes, except for his dismissal of the food for oil proposal.” (Ibid.)
set to attack any policy construed as capitulation to the Soviets. Many who saw the CSCE as surrender of Eastern Europe to Moscow now blame rising meat and bread prices on grain sales to the USSR. Yet, latest estimates of the Soviet grain crop make it a virtual certainty that the Soviets will try to make large additional purchases of U.S. grain.

Because such purchases could spur the most immediate domestic challenge to the overall strategy of rapprochement with the Russians—with implications for the MBFR, SALT, and elsewhere—I believe you can follow through on your expressed desire to get a handle on the grain situation and turn it to the mutual advantage of Washington and Moscow. You can do so by (1) helping persuade the President to announce continuation of the present moratorium on grain exports to the USSR for the time being, and (2) assuring that all options are thoroughly explored before any further sales to the Soviets occur.

Background/Analysis

Here, as elsewhere, perceptions may be more critical than reality. If détente suggests more give than get to Americans, that view could prove crucial—particularly as we approach the presidential election. Both the President and our foreign policy could suffer unless we act quickly to change perceptions.

Grain sales to the Soviets provide the most conspicuous current case in point. They are seen increasingly as part of a larger interrelated program for détente. That strategy also encompasses interaction with the Soviets on the CSCE, MBFR, SALT, creation of an international food reserve system, and the Mideast. Negative US reaction to the Helsinki Conference, compounded by charges of a second “great grain robbery” à la 1972, could grow and prompt a costly political backlash—particularly if our negotiations in Geneva and Vienna do not meet domestic expectations. Should grain exports lead to price hikes (as seems likely), U.S. ability to meet world-wide needs for concessional food sales and aid will suffer. The Administration could then draw additional fire from Congress which will condemn subsuming humanitarian concerns to a Soviet sell-out.

Failing to convey more of the tough Yankee trader stance to the Soviets does more than lose U.S. domestic support for détente. Perceived weakness in bargaining with the USSR can undercut our clout with Moscow itself and undermine Soviet incentive to be more forthcoming in the MBFR, SALT and elsewhere. In short, there may be a détente penalty, rather than payoff, for giving the Soviets what they want on grain without exacting a quid pro quo that is clear to them and the American public.

Indeed, seizing the situation of Soviet need for US grain could help reverse anti-détentist momentum. With some foresight and fast action, we might strike a balance among divergent domestic and international in-
terests. We could thus effect a compromise which could mollify (if not please) all parties—farmers and consumers, Washington and Moscow.

To do so, we must first come to grips with both the perception and reality of previous and projected Soviet grain purchases this year. Although the economic and political truth of the matter probably lies somewhere between Earl Butz and Arthur Burns, the important point is not necessarily who is right but whom most people believe. At this juncture, most consumers believe that sales to the Soviets are contributing to double-digit food inflation. They think that the Soviets will be back for more and that demand-pull pressure will intensify.

Latest CIA and CEA projections tend to bear out these fears and suggest a scenario reminiscent, in some ways, of 1972. Effects of drought have cut prior estimates of the Soviet crop from 215 to below 170 million metric tons (that drop equals over one-third of total world grain exports last year). Moscow seems certain to seek further substantial quantities of grain abroad, whatever belt-tightening measures are taken at home, and need could amount to 30–50 million metric tons. It is likely that much of that additional demand will go for US grain, since non-US stocks are low. Crop losses in Eastern Europe and parts of Africa may create additional pressure on the US market. Even with a record U.S. harvest, the CIA predicts that available grain supplies cannot satisfy Soviet needs without “drastic increases in world prices.”

Should the Agency prove right, someone in the White House needs to look more clearly at USDA’s political rationale for the grain sales—again, because it bears directly on our foreign policy objectives.

—the argument that large grain sales to the Soviets are politically necessary to get the farm vote won’t wash. This is not a simple situation of farmer versus consumer. The farm bloc itself is split, with dairy and livestock farmers angry about higher feed costs. The electoral votes of the dairy states (New York, Pennsylvania, Michigan, Wisconsin and Minnesota) far surpass voting clout from the Great Plains grain states.

—By any electoral calculus, of course, consumers outnumber grain farmers.

USDA’s position on the economic impact of large grain sales to the Soviets has been comparably misleading. Although Butz is correct in claiming that grain price increases are just one of several factors contributing to inflation, CIA and INR analyses suggest that their effect is far from “minimal.” Depending on whether record-breaking U.S. crops materialize and how much grain the Soviets seek on their second round of

2 The CIA paper “Prospects for Soviet Grain Output,” which includes this estimate, was sent to Butz on August 5. Copies were sent to, among others, Kissinger and Robinson. (Central Intelligence Agency, Electronic Reading Room)
purchases, CEA concludes that the grain deals amount to “an income transfer from the U.S. to the USSR” and that they are certain to push up the Consumer Price Index (amount still unpredictable)—just when consumers might well have expected prices to drop. We understand that Alan Greenspan is increasingly worried about losing control of domestic economic recovery in general and about facing skyrocketing costs for welfare and the food stamp program in particular, since higher food prices hit the poorest hardest.

Given these domestic realities, there is an urgent need to counteract growing reaction against what is seen as a sop to the Soviets at consumer expense. There is more room for maneuver in that respect than many in the U.S. Government admit—if we act quickly.

The next benchmark is August 11 when the next U.S. crop reports are due. Further grain sales to the Soviet Union are reportedly being deferred at least until their release. There may also be informal understandings for a standstill beyond that date. We hope so, for we concur with others within the Government who oppose any reopening of the export floodgates until there has been a thorough review of what courses serve more general U.S. interests.

Extension of an export moratorium would enable us to modulate sales and effect more constructive leverage with the Soviets. That bargaining power is considerable and need not be viewed as punitive or extortionate by Moscow. Should the President agree to extend the present “gentleman’s agreement” with the export firms to withhold exports—by whatever means—we could then launch a comprehensive review of the tools at our disposal. There is, we understand, already considerable sympathy in the White House for this course, although we do not believe the President has yet reached any decision.

Although we can provide elaboration on potential leverage with the Soviets, you should be aware of some preliminary thinking in this regard—inside and outside State. The diverse scope of leverage includes such illustrative items as linking U.S. grains sales to:

—Quid pro quo—food for fuel—does not appear feasible, given the low level of Soviet oil now available for export, the long lead-time needed to get reasonably-priced access to Siberian natural gas, and Soviet allegiance to the OPEC bloc.

—Jewish emigration—would probably only antagonize the Soviets further.

—Larger political negotiations (SALT, MBFR, etc.)—could be counterproductive if attempted directly; we gain more from the implicit leverage provided by Soviet vulnerability on grain.

—Other measures—such as increased grain prices for the Soviets, drastic cutbacks on sales, or establishment of an international grain clearing mechanism—may deserve further exploration.
At this juncture—reserving elaboration for task force scrutiny—we believe that one of the more fruitful areas for exploration lies in increased US-Soviet cooperation on stabilizing grain supplies and prices. Such a plan might stipulate an annual quota of U.S. grain sales to the Soviets which they could either channel for immediate consumption or move into reserve stock. Provision for a pre-determined level of U.S. grain sales to the USSR could offer the following advantages: please U.S. grain farmers who seek assured, long-term export outlets to sustain or expand production; give Moscow latitude to pursue its own consumer-oriented agricultural policy without undue worry over drought-induced short-falls; provide grounds for greater sharing of information on projected crops and purchases; spur Soviet commitment to a global food watch or international reserve system (a potentially helpful catalyst to follow-up on the World Food Conference); encourage greater and more constructive Soviet participation in a range of multilateral economic arrangements; and contribute to long-term stabilization of grain prices and supplies.

Soviet participation in a grain reserve arrangement may well depend on our making the imposition of export controls a more credible threat. Moscow is not likely to opt for involvement in an international reserve scheme unless and until we make clear that the USSR cannot rely on open access to random, large-scale purchases from the U.S. grain market.

Summary/Recommendations

Given the direct impact of Soviet grain purchases on détente and the need for fast action to limit further anti-détente backlash, we recommend that you:

—Urge the President to declare publicly before the release of the August 11 crop report that there will be a continued moratorium on further grain exports to the USSR. That hold should remain in effect until the U.S. Government has had an opportunity to assess final U.S. crop returns (most harvests will be covered by the September 15 crop report) and to assure that U.S. consumers do not suffer from large-scale exports. Your support for such a move by the President, with emphasis on the foreign policy implications set forth above, would complement other informal efforts within the Administration to defer additional grain sales to the USSR until the State Department has explored options for maximizing our overall national interests.³

³ Ford did not make a public declaration before August 11. Despite a “good crop report,” Butz announced that day that he was calling on the grain companies to refrain temporarily from any additional sales to the Soviet Union. (William Robins, “Butz Calls for Suspension of Grain Sales to Moscow,” The New York Times, August 12, 1975, pp. 1, 39)
—Encourage the President, along the same lines, to use his Iowa speech on grain export policy, August 18, as an occasion to achieve both the appearance and actuality of U.S. control over grain sales to the Soviets. A strong statement in that regard could help mollify U.S. consumer concern and thus defuse domestic discontent with détente.  

—Launch a State Department Grain Export Task Force to evaluate available options and prepare recommendations for a Presidential decision on grain sales to the Soviets by mid-September.

—Backstop this approach to the President and initiation of a State Department review with attention to the Hill. Early consultation with key members of the Congress concerned with foreign policy and farm interests could help clarify understanding of our interrelated foreign policy objectives and deflect criticism of détente.

—Assure the Soviets at the highest level at the time we publicly announce the extension of the moratorium that we are seeking mutually satisfactory arrangements on grain which can buttress the process of détente for both nations. Focus for leverage with the Soviets and choice of approach will, of course, emerge more clearly after the Grain Export Task Force completes its options study.

We suggest that you:

—Proceed to act on the above package.

—Or—call a meeting with Robinson, Enders, Hartman and me to discuss this matter further.

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4 During his speech in Des Moines on August 18, Ford declared: “Looking ahead—and I use these words advisedly—we anticipate further purchases of grain by the Soviet Union. While our crops look good and we expect a record harvest, it is still premature to confidently predict our final production. Accordingly, as Secretary of Agriculture Butz said, we have asked American exporters to temporarily—and I emphasize ‘temporarily’—delay further sales to the Soviet Union. Additional sales to the Soviet Union must be in our best national interest—in the interest of all Americans, farmers and consumers alike.” (<Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 490>)

5 Kissinger indicated neither approval nor disapproval of these recommendations. During a telephone conversation that evening, however, Kissinger and Robinson discussed a possible “grain for oil deal” with the Soviets. According to a transcript, the conversation included the following exchange: “R: We are saying that we will let you [Soviets] in if you give us a discount. We don’t know what the market prices for the grain will be or the price for the oil. K: My understanding from Dobrynin is that it is easier to agree on a swap. R: We can work that out. It makes it more complicated. However, it is a way they can avoid the political disadvantages of saying they are giving us a discount. K: How can we work it out? R: On a volume basis. We will take our chances that grain and oil move the same percentage in the same way. We should take that chance.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)
178. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)**

Washington, August 13, 1975, 6:17 p.m.

D: You leave tomorrow . . . the whole day?
K: Yes.

D: I would like to discuss the general aspects of the situation.
K: How about Friday morning?2

D: I will tell you what I have now. You had me check with Brezhnev about this date. What I will give you today you may receive an answer for Friday. He continues to attach importance to the visit to the United States.

K: Let me get to another telephone.

D: Ok.

D: In the connection of the further development of Soviet-American relations. Specifically in connection with the Paris agreement on SALT talks. In setting concrete dates of this visit we proceed from the fact that by that time of the visit they should be complete. Brezhnev drew the impression that the President adheres to the same opinion in the two things.

K: That’s correct.

D: Brezhnev saw a certain flexibility in regard to the visit in taking into consideration all the circumstances and first of all that both sides should have a greater confidence in successful agreement on the SALT talks. We suggest to the President to agree now that this visit should take place either at the end of November or in December if it is acceptable to the President. The second possibility is thinking first if a December visit would be a little better in the opinion of Mr. Brezhnev. As to the date of the official announcement, in November or the first part of December.

K: What is your definition of the end of November?

D: About the 25th.

K: We do not want to offer you areas.

D: The first part of December in our opinion would be better.

K: Let me check. It is purely a question of dates. Is January out of the question for you?

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2 August 15. No record of a meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin that day has been found.
D: I do not know. I will check.
K: And you check on the first half of January.
D: It is the Party Congress. He will be there.
K: I will check with the President and I will let you know Friday.
D: Ok.
K: Ok, good.
D: I have two unofficial things I want to say to you. What is this all about Solzhenitsyn?
K: Goddamnit! I do not even know who Rustand is.³
D: He is assistant to Nixon.
K: He is an appointments secretary. He knows as much about Solzhenitsyn as your three year old granddaughter. There is nothing to it.
D: Ok. Yesterday your Secretary of Agriculture said it is better to postpone all feed grain deals with my country until September.⁴ Do you agree with this?
K: Let me think it over. I think we can handle it. Have you had an answer to what I discussed with you?
D: No. You just look into this matter from the point of your situation. I am a little bit lost.
K: Let me check it. There is no directive from us to do it this way.
D: Maybe it is public relations.
K: It is exclusively public relations.
D: For my own I would like to know.
K: I will let you know Friday.
D: Ok.
K: I will call your office tomorrow.
D: Ok.

³ On August 12, the Associated Press reported that Warren Rustand, the President’s appointments secretary, “told the Scottsdale Rotary Club that Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger insisted that original agreements made to prevent Solzhenitsyn’s imprisonment had to be maintained before the President’s trip to Eastern Europe.” “Rustand indicated that the incident went further than Kissinger’s concern about the delicate diplomacy questions before Ford’s trip to meet world leaders in Helsinki, Finland. Instead, Rustand said the origins of Ford’s refusal to meet Solzhenitsyn went as far back as the Soviet Nobel Prize winner’s initial exile from the Soviet Union last year.” (Ford Library, Nessen Papers, Box 295, Handwritten Notes, August 12, 1975, Solzhenitsyn Visit) Later that afternoon, the Associated Press reported Kissinger’s denial that there had been any deal “as to how Solzhenitsyn was to be treated in the West.” The report also included a statement by Nessen, who explained that Rustand “told White House officials he was misquoted.” (“Solzhenitsyn–White House Issue Revived,” The New York Times, August 13, 1975, p. 4)
⁴ See footnote 3, Document 177.
Vail, Colorado, August 16, 1975.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: On the détente speech, I told them I didn’t like the explanation of détente. Why don’t you read this page-and-a-half.

Kissinger: I violently object to this phrase about translating détente into English and Russian. It is a tawdry phrase which will drive the Soviets crazy.

[More discussion about the speech.]
To me it is clear what the Democrats are trying to do. I don’t think you have anything to fear from the conservatives.

[The press came in to take photographs and then left.]
President: I would like to look over the part you gave me and decide what to do. I liked what you said on Portugal more than what is here.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 14. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original.

2 Reference is to the President’s address to the annual convention of the American Legion in Minneapolis on August 19. During the speech, Ford outlined his views on détente: “Relations between the world’s two strongest nuclear powers can’t be summed up in a catchphrase. Détente literally means ‘easing’ or ‘relaxing,’ but definitely not—and I emphasize ‘not’—the relaxing of diligence or easing of effort. Rather, it means movement away from the constant crisis and dangerous confrontations that have characterized relations with the Soviet Union. The process of détente—and it is a process—looks toward a saner and safer relationship between us and the Soviet Union. It represents our best efforts to cool the cold war, which on occasion became much too hot for comfort.” “We are now carefully watching some serious situations for indications of the Soviet attitude toward détente and cooperation in European security,” Ford added. “The situation in Portugal is one of them. We are deeply concerned about the future of freedom in Portugal, as we have always been concerned about the future of people throughout the world.” For the full text of the speech, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 492.

3 Reference is to the Secretary’s address to the Southern Commodity Producers Conference in Birmingham, Alabama on August 14. During the speech, Kissinger declared: “the United States has never accepted that the Soviet Union is free to relax tensions selectively or as a cover for the pursuit of unilateral advantage. In Portugal, a focus of current concern, the Soviet Union should not assume that it has the option, either directly or indirectly, to influence events contrary to the right of the Portuguese people to determine their own future. The involvement of external powers for this purpose in a country which is an old friend and ally of ours is inconsistent with any principle of European security.” For the full text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, September 15, 1975, pp. 389–396.
Kissinger: I would recommend you not mention the Soviet Union by name. I did, and to do so a second time I think may be too tough on them.

I can rewrite the Portuguese part to make the same points I did.

President: Good.

Kissinger: You need one positive paragraph. I hate to think where we will be if we have a first-class crisis with the Soviets next year.

[More speech discussion.]

Kissinger (continues): I am worried we are driving the Soviets into a position where Brezhnev may have to turn on us at the Party Congress. If it looks like we are screwing him on détente, he may have to.

President: I want to be tough on intelligence. I think the Greek-Turkish portion is wrong with the Congress. That will be changed.

Kissinger: You shouldn’t sound soft on détente, but it should be tuned to their fears. If they think you are turning on détente, they will want to try to get ahead of you.

[Omitted here is discussion of national security, Greece, negotiations in the Middle East, and Iranian oil. During this exchange, Kissinger interjected: “We are on the edge of what we can get away with on détente. To push much further will force a reversal from the Soviets.”]
180. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, August 26, 1975, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
John Dunlop, Secretary of Labor
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
George Meany
Ted Gleason
Paul Hall
Lane Kirkland
Jesse Calhoun

Meany: The question, Mr. President, is that if we are going to be the major supplier of grain for the world, how can we take advantage of that, at least defensively?

If grain is a scarce natural resource that we control, how can we leave this in the hands of a half dozen private companies operating in their own interest and dealing sometimes with state trading organizations like the USSR? The Canadians have a wheat board which supervises these things. That’s one way to organize it. At least we need some way we can control this asset—again, at least defensively, if not for our own benefit.

We got ripped off in 1972 and the American consumer had to pay for it. We don’t want it to happen again. How it gets done is your [the President’s] problem.

Gleason: I can tell you for a fact that Cooke has been negotiating with the Soviet Union as of last Thursday\(^2\) for three million tons. Reports we have are that the Soviet Union is after 11 million tons more.

Hall: We, the maritime industry, are the first victims of détente, because détente gives the Soviet Union the opportunity to steal maritime jobs. There is no way we can compete. Fesco, a Soviet company, is undercutting freight rates in the Pacific by 20 percent. We introduced legislation to correct it, and the State Department opposed it.

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 14. No classification marking. Brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. Scowcroft summarized the meeting in message Tohak 62, August 27, to Kissinger in Jerusalem. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 12, Kissinger Trip File, August 20–Sept. 3, 1975, TOHAK (4)) Kissinger was in the Middle East August 21–31 for negotiations with Israel, Egypt, and Syria on a second Egyptian-Israeli disengagement agreement.

\(^2\) August 21.
The President: I said to them at a very high level that there should be no more attempts to buy until I had a chance to check on our supplies. Brent, I want you to look into that.3

I think our supplies will be such that we can sell more without substantial impact. So we won’t get ripped off again like 1972. But any lifting of the ban must be on a gradual, phased basis.

The ban on negotiations will stay in effect until we get a better fix on where we are. We will make no more commitments, either to the Soviet Union or PL 480, at least until the September 11 crop report.

Kirkland: An episodic approach to grain sales to the Soviet Union doesn’t serve the American people. We are leaving it that way to four companies and a monopoly trading company. We need to separate our foreign and domestic policy from a handful of private companies. That is the key problem for the long range. There must be a better way.

The President: I will make no further release until September 11 and it may be later. I will stay in touch with you as things develop.

What would you think about an oil-for-wheat deal with the Soviet Union?

Meany: A barter deal? That would be worth exploring.

Calhoun: Then we could cut off the grain if they cut off the oil. And the price should be right.

Hall: I think we should take a look at an arrangement like the Canadian Wheat Board. It is amazing how little anyone knows about how the present system works, and it is uncontrollable.

The President: John?

Secretary Dunlop: Mr. President, there are three questions: One, the long-term arrangements for handling this national asset; second, dealing with the immediate problem of how much to sell; and three, the maritime issues.

Hall: Détente has been bad for the maritime industry. It means the opening up of 42 ports and the use of third-country flags.

3 In message Tohak 62 to Kissinger, Scowcroft added the following comment: “The President was quite upset at Gleason’s report that the Soviet Union was still in the market after he had Brezhnev’s word to the contrary. He asked me to look into it. I plan to call Vorontsov in the morning, tell him we have a reliable report that they are negotiating for more grain and ask for an explanation.” On August 27, Scowcroft reported to Kissinger that he had called Vorontsov to underscore the “tremendous domestic pressures” in the United States regarding grain sales to the Soviet Union. “I also told him of the reports we had received that his government was negotiating an additional three million tons of grain,” Scowcroft added. “He said he had heard nothing of any such negotiation, that if, in fact, it was taking place it was perhaps for non-American grain, and he would look into it right away. He readily acknowledged that discussion regarding shipments of American grain should not be taking place.” (Message Tohak 74 from Scowcroft to Kissinger; Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 12, Kissinger Trip File, August 20–Sept. 3, 1975, TOHAK (5))
The President: Détente will not be a one-way street. Take SALT. If we don’t get it, I will ask for at least $2 billion a year for strategic arms.

Calhoun: Détente for us has a simple definition. It gives the Soviets a chance to steal our jobs.

Meany: There is no way for American private companies to compete with companies like Fesco.

The President: I had not heard before about Fesco. I will look into it.

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181. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Jerusalem

Washington, August 29, 1975, 0151Z.

Tohak 91/WH51697. 1. Vorontsov came by just now to inform me of three items.2

2. First, he said that Moscow was in agreement on your proposal for Robinson to come to Moscow to discuss the concluding of a long-term agreement on the exchange of U.S. grain for Soviet oil. The Soviet side understands that these discussions would be preliminary and confidential. There are a number of important issues which would have to be discussed and clarified, such as how guarantees could be arranged for the long-term sale of grain to the Soviet Union because of the fact that the sellers are private companies; the question of the ratio of the two commodities; terms of delivery; the executors of the agreement on the U.S. side; etc. Moscow suggests that it might be more realistic and correspond more closely to commercial practices to conclude parallel long-term agreements, one for the sale of U.S. grain to the Soviet Union and a separate one for the sale of Soviet oil to the United States. Moscow is ready to receive Robinson at any time and they will await our word. The Soviet negotiator will be Patolichev.

3. The next issue Vorontsov raised was the question of renewal of Soviet grain purchases this year. This subject, he said, was addressed more to the President. The verbal text is about as follows:

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2 The meeting with Vorontsov presumably took place in the evening of August 28.
Begin text:

Moscow remembers the words of President Ford to Ambassador Dobrynin in July. Moscow would be glad to receive U.S. recommendations as to how best to arrange further grain purchases without causing serious political and economic problems for both sides. Moscow has noted the remark made by Secretary Kissinger in his 10 August conversation with Ambassador Dobrynin that a long-term grain-oil arrangement will not affect the amount of grain the Soviet Union could purchase this year. In connection with the publication of data on the U.S. grain crop (I presume he is referring to the September 10 crop report), Moscow would like to get the reaction of the U.S. side on this matter. The Soviet side proceeds from the understanding that the process of buying additional grain this year will not be the subject of discussion by Robinson in Moscow. End text.

4. Vorontsov also mentioned that the Soviet team negotiating maritime freight rates for grain shipments was going back to Moscow. He said it was no big deal or cause for alarm but that they had exhausted their instructions without reaching an agreement. The U.S. negotiators were already scheduled to come to Moscow September 8 in any event, to begin discussions for a renewal of the overall shipping agreement, and freight rate discussions could resume at that time. Vorontsov said that Blackwell, the U.S. negotiator, seemed somewhat upset at the Soviet decision and said he planned to put out a press release saying that agreement had not been reached but discussions would resume on September 9, but adding the statement “the absence of a mutually acceptable rate precludes U.S. flag participation in the recently announced grain purchases by the Soviet Union.” Vorontsov thought that sentence was needlessly inflammatory since discussions were continuing. He said he did not care for the Soviet side but it might provoke another blast from Meany.

5. Warm regards.

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3 See Document 168.
4 No record of a meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on August 10 has been found.
5 In message Tohak 98, August 29, to Kissinger in Jerusalem, Scowcroft reported: “I outlined to the President Vorontsov’s messages (Tohak 91) on grain. He [Ford] said he thought that a grain-for-oil deal might take some of the steam out of the opposition to selling grain to the Soviet Union and could be a device for getting George Meany off the hook. He said that Paul Hall told him yesterday Meany needed some graceful way to back away from the extreme position in which he had placed himself and that we should help him find one.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 12, Kissinger Trip File, August 20–Sept. 3, 1975, TOHAK (7))
182. **Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Jerusalem**¹

Washington, September 1, 1975, 2330Z.

Tohak 121/WH51736. 1. Vorontsov just now (7:00 p.m.) delivered the attached personal message from Brezhnev to the President. Vorontsov made clear that this message had crossed yours to Gromyko and was written without relation to your communication.²

2. This is obviously a troublesome message. Do you wish me to mention it to the President at my meeting with him first thing tomorrow morning?³

3. **Begin text:** For obvious reasons in Moscow [we] attentively follow the negotiations conducted with the US mediation between Israel and Egypt on a partial withdrawal of Israeli forces on Sinai.

The President is well aware of our definite negative attitude towards such separate actions in the Middle East as well as of our principled position on the problem of the Middle East settlement on the whole. That is why we are not going to outline it once more on a broad scale.

However there is one specific aspect on which we consider it necessary to state now for the President our considerations. We have in mind the plans to dispatch American personnel with control functions to the zone of disengagement of the Egyptian and the Israeli forces in

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² In message Hakto 39, September 1, Kissinger asked Scowcroft to pass an oral message to Gromyko on the terms of the disengagement agreement between Israel and Egypt. (Ibid., HAKTO (2)) On September 1, Israel and Egypt initialed a second interim agreement on disengagement from the Sinai Peninsula. The agreement and its ancillary documents are printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXVI, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1974–1976, Documents 226–234.

³ In message Hakto 42 to Scowcroft, September 1, Alvin P. Adams and Paul E. Barbian, Kissinger’s special assistants, reported: “Secretary wants you to show referenced message from Vorontsov to the President, but to take no action until he returns. Also, please show the message to Sonnenfeldt and ask his opinion.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 12, Kissinger Trip File, August 20–Sept. 3, 1975, HAKTO (3))
which the UNEF forces are stationed. The President himself mentioned such plans recently during one of his press conferences.  

In this connection we would like to say to the President with all clarity that if it really comes to realization of such plans then it could not be viewed by us otherwise but as bringing into the Middle East situation a new and complicating element. Such a step would contradict the Security Council decisions by which the UN Middle East control machinery was created and which were based on the understanding of “appropriate auspices” reached between our two countries in October of 1973.

It goes therefore without saying that the Soviet Union would reject any attempts to get its approval—direct or indirect, within the framework of the Security Council or the Geneva Conference—for admitting the said American personnel into the zone of action of the UNEF. We say it frankly and in advance so there will be no vagueness for the American side on this score.

In Moscow we would like to hope that the President will pay due attention to the above considerations of ours dictated by the desire to avoid a new aggravation of the Middle East situation and its negative influence on the relations between our countries. End text.

4. Warm regards.

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4 Reference is presumably to his interview with television reporters in Milwaukee on August 25, during which the President refused to confirm rumors that “American civilians, very limited in number” might be deployed between Israeli and Egyptian forces, primarily to operate technical warning stations in the United Nations buffer zone. “When I say ‘a very limited number,’ Ford added, ‘I am thinking maybe 100, 150, as I have read in the papers, as they would all be civilians and they would be in a U.N. zone, not with the Israelis, not with the Egyptians.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 501)

5 Reference is to the agreement reached during Kissinger’s trip to Moscow October 20–22, 1973, that the United States and the Soviet Union would jointly sponsor a resolution in the Security Council calling for a cease-fire in the Middle East and negotiations between the two sides “under appropriate auspices,” i.e., U.S. and Soviet. UN Security Council Resolution 338 was adopted on October 22, 1973. Documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973.
183. Message From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger

Washington, September 2, 1975, 2323Z.

Tohak 130/WH51754. Subject: Soviet Position on Sinai Agreements.

The note delivered by Vorontsov on the Middle East, which apparently crossed your message to Gromyko,\(^2\) has a high potential for trouble-making. Taken at face value, the note is a warning that the Soviets will publicly oppose the agreement—"reject any attempts to get (Soviet) approval" and, in particular, will oppose the presence of American personnel.

The Soviet options would seem to range from a simple disassociation and public explanation, to more active efforts to upset the agreement: in the latter case, they could resort to extreme political measures, such as withdrawing as Co-Chairman of the Geneva Conference, on the ground that they could not be party to partial actions that postponed a settlement; or they could take a legalistic position and demand Security Council reconsideration of the terms of the UNEF mandate on the grounds that American presence is not provided for, and that new agreement links UN and American personnel in working arrangements, and in some respects makes the UN subordinate to the US, etc.

In short, if the Soviets wish to, they are in a position to insert their opposition into the US Congressional debate on the agreement, to mobilize radical Arab pressure against it, and in effect, to rob Sadat of the rationale that partial steps are linked to a broader framework of a final settlement.

No doubt, the Soviets are genuinely chagrined that the US has succeeded in recovering ground lost in March and once again has commanding political position. This they might swallow, if it were not for the symbolic and strategic significance of actual physical presence of Americans in the Sinai. For the Soviets such a new element may well foreshadow a growing US role, perhaps leading to US guarantees in the area excluding the Soviets altogether. The Soviets are probably still laboring under what they believe, or choose to believe, is a commitment for joint action. Even though they have long since realized that real

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\(^2\) See Document 182 and footnote 2 thereto.
joint action was unworkable, the pretense of “joint auspices” is still important symbolically, as well as a practical opportunity to insert themselves into the negotiating process. Brezhnev’s personal situation may also be affected since he is associated with the whole “joint auspices” operation.

Thus, we may face tricky and potentially dangerous passage with the Soviets in bringing new agreements into force. It appears unlikely that we can conciliate the Soviets with traditional soothing replies. Indeed, if we go too far in the direction of conciliation, we risk contradicting our public and Congressional position which, of course, will have to include positive evaluation of agreement and advantages of American role. We cannot simultaneously play down the agreement or the American role in communications with the Soviets. Nor can we afford to be overly defensive.

Since the Soviets might go public at any time, especially with working group possibly starting as early as September 4 in Geneva, we recommend a quick and fairly sharp reply before the Soviets freeze their position. We would use the points in your message to Gromyko but in a more assertive tone, rebutting the Soviet objections, and making the point that in present critical period leading up to SALT and possible complex grain deal, Soviet position would have a harmful effect on relations. This linkage, which we think affords us real leverage in this situation, is hinted at in the last paragraph of the Soviet message, i.e., “negative influence on relations between our countries.”

Attached is a draft reply to Brezhnev for your consideration.

[Omitted here is the text of a draft note from Ford to Brezhnev; it was sent on September 3; see Document 185.]
Washington, September 2, 1975.

DÉTENTE IN SOVIET STRATEGY (U)

For the Soviets, détente is intended to facilitate their attainment of ultimate, overall dominance over the West. This Estimate examines Soviet progress toward achieving their strategic and tactical goals under détente, and makes judgments on implications and prospects for the future.

Conclusions

A. Détente generally connotes a relaxation of tensions and a process whereby this climate is reinforced. But whereas in the US détente tends to be seen as an end in itself, in the USSR it is seen as a strategy for achieving broader Soviet strategic objectives as well as tactical aims without fueling the sorts of concern that might galvanize the West into serious counteraction. According to the Soviets, détente—or peaceful coexistence—has become possible because the West has been forced to recognize the changing correlation of forces and is therefore accommodating to rising Soviet power.

B. Soviet long-term strategic objectives, which the détente strategy seeks to promote, can be generalized under the heading of “dominance” and include: the breakup of Western alliances; the eviction of the American military presence from Europe and the achievement of Soviet dominance there; and the establishment of Soviet political, military, technological, and economic superiority worldwide. Soviet détente policy has facilitated Soviet strategic nuclear expansion and the canceling out of US superiority, without provoking extensive Western counterefforts.

C. A major tenet of Soviet détente policy is to avoid strategic nuclear war. Although this was more imperative when the US enjoyed strategic nuclear superiority, the Soviets have elevated it to a guiding principle for superpower relations. At the same time they seek to neutralize those areas of power competition where superior US technology puts the USSR at a disadvantage.


2 A Soviet term denoting world balance of power in all its aspects—political, military, economic, etc. [Footnote in the original.]
D. Moscow’s tactical goals of the détente strategy include changing regional balances of power in Soviet favor. The USSR further seeks through détente to isolate China, pending possible opportunities for Soviet exploitation when the current Chinese leaders leave the scene. Détente also serves the Soviet need to avoid a simultaneous confrontation on both the eastern and western fronts.

E. In the Soviets’ view, détente has moved them closer to their strategic and tactical goals. They believe they have going for them:

— a continuing shift in the worldwide correlation of forces in their favor;
— a strategic posture vis-à-vis the US that diminishes the likelihood of general nuclear war and, at the same time, holds the possibility of a politically meaningful strategic edge;
— a steady development of Soviet conventional military capabilities concurrent with a trend in the West to reduce general-purpose force strengths;
— a political environment in which they can win substantial concessions from the West in the various East-West negotiations on arms control and security;
— the recognition of the USSR’s World War II gains in Europe;
— a growing disarray and disunity in the West on strategic policy and security matters;
— a somewhat freer hand in dealing with the “Chinese problem”;
and
— a freer access to Western trade and technology.

F. The Soviet interpretation of détente requires that the West continue to accept certain conditions: the West cannot interfere in Communist states and other areas where the Soviet political position outweighs that of the US. In Soviet terminology, there can be no export of counter-revolution. More generally, the West is expected to act with prudence in any crisis that could lead to superpower confrontation. The Soviets, however, are prepared to exploit crises in pursuit of their objectives to the limits of US reaction, if necessary by threatening military intervention.

G. While there are differences over specific aspects of détente, there is a broad consensus on the effectiveness of the strategy within the Soviet leadership. This consensus notwithstanding, and despite the favorable consequences of the policy to date, Soviet détente strategy can change. If anticipated gains at Western expense by other means appear sufficiently attractive in Soviet calculations, Moscow will compromise on détente or discard the policy and adopt the indicated alternative course. Furthermore, Soviet détente policy could change with Brezhnev’s passing from power and the emergence of new leadership.

H. So far, détente has served Soviet purposes well. For this reason the Soviets will not lightly jettison their détente strategy. Therefore, as long as the USSR is committed to détente, the US can step up its de-
mands in negotiations with the Soviets and need not hesitate to demand a clearly comparable price for every concession the US or the West is prepared to make.  

[Omitted here is the body of the report.]

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3 On October 9, David Binder reported in *The New York Times* (p. 15) that the Department of Defense had circulated this intelligence report “asserting that the Soviet Union is using the policy of détente to gain dominance over the West in all fields.” In addition to providing excerpts, Binder identified both the author and title of the report, which was “believed by State Department officials to represent the views of Defense Secretary James R. Schlesinger.” According to a “high-ranking State Department official,” the report contradicted Kissinger’s position on Soviet-American relations. “I am very surprised,” the official added, “they would put out what is a political estimate.”

185. Note From President Ford to the Soviet Leadership

Washington, undated.

The President wishes the following message brought to the personal attention of General Secretary Brezhnev.

I have received your comments on the new Middle East Agreements, which were apparently written before receipt of Secretary Kissinger’s message to Foreign Minister Gromyko. There are several points in the Soviet communication that I wish to address quite frankly, lest there be any misunderstanding between us.

I am surprised and disappointed that the Soviet Union views the latest Agreements, including the provisions concerning the role of a small number of American civilian personnel, as a complicating element, contradicting Security Council decisions and our understanding about “appropriate auspices.” As the Agreement clearly states, both Parties are determined “to reach a final and just peace settlement by means of negotiations called for by Security Council Resolution 338,

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Aug–Sept 1975. No classification marking. Sonnenfeldt and Hyland forwarded a draft of the note to Kissinger as an attachment to Document 183. Kissinger approved the text with minor changes in message Hakto 50 to Scowcroft, September 3. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 12, Kissinger Trip File, August 20–Sept. 3, 1975, HAKTO (3)) According to marginalia, the note was delivered to the Soviet Embassy by messenger at 2:40 p.m. on September 3.

2 See Document 182 and footnote 2 thereto.
this Agreement being a significant step towards that end.” Moreover, the Agreement commits both Parties to resolve the conflict between them and in the Middle East by peaceful means, not by military force.

It is difficult for me to understand why such statements of intent are not in the interests of all Parties concerned, including the Soviet Union. After all, the United States and the Soviet Government agreed in a solemn document in 1973 that we would be guided in the formulation of our foreign policy by the objective of reducing the threat of war. For Egypt and Israel, who have been such bitter enemies, to undertake to resolve their disputes by peaceful means ought to be considered a significant accomplishment. Your Ambassador was informed in a general way about the progress of the negotiations.

I am also puzzled by the description of these Agreements as “separate actions” which are apparently opposed by the Soviet Government. My recollection of our discussions in Helsinki is that the Soviet side was not opposed to further agreements between Israel and Egypt. Indeed, the General Secretary, at one point, indicated that drawing a new ceasefire line eastward might be helpful in promoting an atmosphere more conducive to taking up the issues of a final settlement. The General Secretary said at that time that he realized all the issues could not be solved in one day, and that time would be required.

As for the presence of American personnel, it must be emphasized that both Parties found this an important element in the Agreement, and a source of confidence that the Agreements would be maintained. As described in the accompanying documents, involvement of US civilian personnel, not to exceed 200, which the Parties have agreed to complements UNEF but is completely separate from it and no way alters the basic character of the UN role or creates any special advantages for the US. Indeed, the US is acting in full consistency with UN Resolution 338.

It is, of course, for the USSR to decide its attitude towards these new Agreements. They are in no sense directed against the Soviet Union. Frankly, I do not understand why the Soviet Union should reject “any approval” of these Agreements.

The United States is still prepared, as I informed General Secretary Brezhnev, to work together to promote conditions for a peaceful and just settlement in the Middle East. With a new step toward peace having been achieved, our cooperation should be more important than ever. As noted in Secretary Kissinger’s message, we look forward to meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko to review the situation and consider how we can work together on the next steps. We will at that time be prepared to agree to a time for reconvening the Geneva Conference.
If the Soviet Union nevertheless decides to campaign actively against these Agreements, this cannot fail to have a harmful effect on our relations. This would be particularly unfortunate in this crucial period, when we are working toward another historic agreement limiting strategic arms, and are discussing the possibility of a significant agreement on the sale of grain and oil. Thus, I am convinced it would be in the best interests of our relationship, of peace in the Middle East, and of world peace, if the Soviet Union would carefully reconsider the implications of its latest communication and avoid taking actions that would cast a shadow over a significant achievement for peace in this greatly troubled and dangerous area.3

3 In a reply to this note on September 8, the Soviet leadership, while denying any intention of campaigning against the agreement, also denied being “a party to any actions which would approve the decisions prepared without its participation and without the participation of other Arab states and contrary to its opinion of the necessity of joint action. This hardly needs special clarification. Let’s be frank, we were surprised at the determination of the US side not to allow participation of the Soviet Union in the discussions of the questions which by the previously reached agreement should have been the subject of joint consideration with obligatory participation of both the United States and the Soviet Union, which was not once solemnly confirmed at the Soviet-American meetings. One more point. We could not be but surprised also at an attempt contained in the President’s message to somehow tie together the question of the Soviet Union’s attitude to the Egyptian-Israeli agreement with some other questions including negotiations on the strategic arms limitation and also some economic problems such as trade in grain and oil. Such an approach cannot promise any positive results from the point of view of the general interests of the Soviet Union and the United States.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Aug–Sept 1975)

186. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant (Friedersdorf) to President Ford1


I have talked to General Scowcroft about the strong indication by Congressman Bill Green (D–Pa.) Chairman of the House Ways and

Means Trade Subcommittee, during the Speaker’s Soviet trip,\(^2\) that he has changed his mind on “Most Favored Nations” status for the Soviets and indicated he would be willing to work for restoration of the MFN for the USSR.

Congressman Green expressed this during formal sessions with the Deputies of the Supreme Soviet and also in private conversations with the Deputies and other Soviet officials.

He indicated to me personally that he would like to start working on this when Congress reconvened and would like the opportunity to discuss it directly with Secretary Kissinger at the Secretary’s convenience.

Green said that he has become convinced that MFN is in the best interest of the United States and the USSR because the current status is costing American jobs and the Soviets are going ahead and making their purchases elsewhere—two points that the Soviets stressed in their talks with the Speaker’s Congressional delegation.

Both Green and Phil Burton\(^3\) indicated to the Supreme Soviet Deputies that they both thought that repeal of Jackson–Vanik in the 94th Congress would be difficult if not impossible, although Green indicated his willingness to try.

The Soviets’ very strong statement to the Congressmen that Jackson–Vanik was posing critical problems in relations with the U.S. and that continuation of it would mean economic losses over five years of $9 billion in American exports to the Soviet and the loss of 240,000 jobs in the U.S., had a strong effect on the Speaker’s delegation and not one member of the delegation disputed the beneficial effects for the U.S. except for a comment that George Meany is worried about imports affecting American labor.

The Soviets emphasized that they are obtaining billions of dollars worth of credit from France, Britain, West Germany, Japan, and Italy and that American insistence on MFN is hurting no one but the U.S.

I believe that when we renew our efforts on MFN for the Soviets we should emphasize the adverse economic impacts more strongly, and indicate to the Congress and public that we are only asking for the same trade conditions that we have with 101 other countries.

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\(^2\) Speaker Carl Albert led a delegation of 18 Congressmen to the Soviet Union August 7–15; the delegation met with Brezhnev at Yalta on August 14. The Embassy in Moscow reported on the meeting with Brezhnev in telegram 11602, August 15. Reports on other meetings the delegation had in Moscow, including one with Jewish activists, are in telegrams 11354 and 11402, August 12, and 11563, August 15. (All in National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

\(^3\) Philip Burton (Democrat, California).
Most of the delegation’s discussions with the Soviets from the American side of the table settled on the insistence that the Soviets live up to the Basket 3 provisions of the Helsinki agreements with major emphasis on the Jewish emigration issue.

The Soviets strenuously objected to criticism on this issue and repeatedly cited figures that 98.4% of the applications are approved. Congressman Sid Yates\(^4\) and other members of the delegation turned over a list of several hundred names to the Soviets and they agreed to review them individually and report back to the Speaker on the disposition.

Chairman Mel Price\(^5\), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, emphasized the necessity for on-sight inspection in the discussion with the Soviets and expressed the opinion that détente could not be fully consummated until the questions of disarmament are settled.

Congressman John Brademas (D–Ind.), Deputy Democratic Whip in the House, was very forceful in all of the discussions and concentrated on the Basket 3 implementation.

Brademas dominated most of the press conferences and seemed to be playing for headlines with strong statements saying that détente could die in 1976 if the Soviets did not adhere to the Helsinki Agreements.

Brademas indicated in a Moscow press conference that Helsinki could become a major partisan issue in the 1976 Presidential election race.

The Soviets insisted, of course, that Helsinki was a great historical document and that the Soviets will abide by its provisions as the U.S. should. The Soviets said that the Helsinki agreements reflected a code of behavior for the participating nations, it represents a principle of non-interference and is a legal document which neither side can choose only the conditions they like, and not abide by the others.

The Soviets insisted that Helsinki represents nothing new in the situation of the U.S. vis-à-vis Eastern Europe because the situation in Eastern Europe could only be changed by force and that the Soviets will abide by the conditions of Helsinki in full.

The Soviets said that the press in America is interpreting Helsinki as some gift given to the Soviets but in fact it represents no gift because the Soviet Union lost 20 million lives in WWII.

The Soviets said that there were no one-sided concessions at Helsinki and that they had reduced by 400 million rubles their military budget because of the improved change in international relations. The

\(^4\) Sidney R. Yates (Democrat, Illinois).

\(^5\) Charles Melvin Price (Democrat, Illinois).
Soviets insisted that the Congressional delegation had no right to question the accuracy of Soviet armament figures any more than the Soviets had the right to question ours.

G.A. Arbatov, Director of the U.S.A. Institute, handled a large portion of the Soviet dialogue and he made some strong and pointed statements as follows:

“We have not lived for 200 years with the protection of two oceans. We have sometimes had to hide our weaknesses by secrecy, but we have now achieved military parity."

“We object to Secretary Schlesinger’s statements about the U.S. using nuclear missiles first; on war heads you have 3½ times our counter-force protection.”

“Secretary Kissinger has no complaints on verification and you have the advantageous geographical components.”

“We have 110 nationalities with no segregation and you have segregation. You are a nation of immigrants and that is nice, but the Zionists through Congress are trying to damage detente.”

“Is the Sinai and Golan Heights more important to you than the security of the U.S.?”

“There are much greater problems than Basket Three such as prevention of a nuclear missile war and a clash between nations. Congressmen should tell the people of the United States that we want no new war and the Soviet Union is sincerely seeking peace.”

“U.S. production of small range cruise missiles which are hideable is destabilizing, as are other mobile systems.”

The Soviets accused the Pentagon of trying to frighten the Congress and the public into higher defense expenditures.

The delegation met for approximately three hours in three separate sessions with 22 Deputies of the Supreme Soviet and also met for over two hours at Yalta with Brezhnev who repeated most of the same comments that we had heard in Moscow from the Supreme Soviet Deputies.

The Congressional delegation was greatly impressed with Brezhnev’s presentation and responses to their questions and their reaction to his physical appearance varied from poor to excellent. Some of the Congressmen thought he looked like a person who is suffering from a fatal disease while others remarked that he seemed to be in robust health.

Congressman Latta\(^6\) seemed to think Brezhnev was extremely tired and seemed to be more fatigued as the talks proceeded.

[Omitted here is further discussion of the Congressional delegation’s trip, including their meetings with Tito and Ceausescu.]

\(^6\) Delbert L. Latta (Republican, Ohio).
187. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 8, 1975, 1:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of Congress, Turkey, and the Middle East.]

[Kissinger:] With the Soviets, we are on the ragged edge on détente. They are getting nothing out of détente. The Middle East is a humiliation, but they would have probably kept it quiet if grain was being shipped. The only thing left is SALT. Since you became President, all the concessions have been theirs. If we don’t give way on something, it may be all over.

I think on SLCM’s we should hold at 600 kilometers. On ALCM’s, we should start at 2,500 and back off to 2,000 if necessary. On Backfire, I think you should go to Brezhnev and ask him for guarantees like deployment, tankers, etc., to insure they aren’t being used strategically. We also need to get something to the Soviet Union so Gromyko has something to discuss with me.

The President: Do we need an NSC meeting?
Kissinger: Either that or just a Verification Panel meeting, and I will take a chance.

The President: I go to New Hampshire on Thursday.
Kissinger: Let’s just do a VP then. But we will have to get the Pentagon under control so they stop singing.

Jackson is trying to make me testify. I plan to refuse, unless you feel otherwise. He wrote me an insolent letter. He said on TV that I shouldn’t be allowed to testify because I am a liar.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 September 11.
3 In his August 22 letter to Kissinger, Jackson, as Chairman of the Arms Control Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, reiterated “the request made repeatedly to your office since last March” that the Secretary testify on the implementation of the SALT I and the negotiation of the SALT II agreements. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, July–Oct. 1975)
The President: He said that? I think we should sit down with Marsh and Friedersdorf to see how we can handle it. He wants to humiliate you—I won’t let that happen. Has he set a date?

Kissinger: No. I won’t answer his letter. I will testify before the full Committee and any other Subcommittee but not with Jackson as Chairman.

I am worried we have nothing to offer the Soviets.

The President: How about grain?

188. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 9, 1975, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: I would moderate your comments on Scoop. We want to beat him on decontrol—that would be another kick in the teeth.

Kissinger: Okay. I was thinking of verging on refusal to appear, but I will just stall.

President: I would. Don’t bait him. Say it is better for you to appear before the full committee.

Kissinger: We have a reply from the Soviets. Their first was belligerent. This one is more plaintive.

President: This is certainly more moderate.

Kissinger: I think we should set a date for Geneva if we can get Israel to agree. We shouldn’t put Israel under pressure on Syria so soon after this. We could tell Syria the Soviets put so much pressure on we agreed to Geneva.

President: When would it be?

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 See footnote 3, Document 185.
Kissinger: The important thing is to agree. Then we could slip the date until January.

If Israel had sense it would agree to a significant move on the Golan. That would get Syria off our back for years. They need some symbolic gesture.

President: Okay.

Kissinger: I didn’t know the Polish and Romanian Ministers of Agriculture were coming here. Butz could have helped us there by stopping them.

President: Don³ said Butz didn’t get my messages so I told him to go back to him and make it clear to him. He did it.

Kissinger: If we could let Brezhnev go to the Politburo and say he got five million more tons because of Helsinki.

President: If we can get a deal on grain and freight rates, we would be in good shape.

[Discussion of freight rates and what we can get.]

[Omitted here is discussion of oil, foreign assistance to Turkey and Egypt, and the U.S. defense budget.]

³ Donald Rumsfeld.

⁴ Brackets in the original.

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189. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Ford¹


SUBJECT

Brezhnev Adviser on US Affairs Defends Détente Against Critics at Home and Abroad

On September 4, Director Arbatov of the USSR’s Institute of the USA and one of Brezhnev’s closest advisers on American affairs pub-

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 18. USSR (21). Confidential. Sent for information. Brackets are in the original. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Ford also initialed it. According to an attached correspondence profile, the President noted the memorandum on September 17. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Clift forwarded a draft to Kissinger on September 10, noting that it drew on “analysis by CIA and Embassy Moscow.” (Ibid.)
lished in *Izvestia*, a major counterattack against criticism by Americans of détente.\(^2\) At the same time, the article betrays a certain defensiveness probably attributable to criticism in the USSR as well. Appearance of the article under such an authoritative byline and its placement on the front page of the Soviet Government newspaper indicate growing concern among proponents of détente in the Soviet leadership that the policy faces serious problems in coming months.

Arbatov’s principal points are as follows:

— A frontier has been reached where it must be decided whether to continue to pursue détente or not;

— Support for détente remains strong in the United States and the strength of opponents to the policy there should not be overestimated;

— Détente has brought the USSR “striking” achievements;

— The notion, however, that only the USSR benefits from détente is wrong. U.S. failures in Asia and its difficulties along NATO’s southern flank are not the USSR’s fault but are due to cold war policies;

— The USSR did not pledge to guarantee the social status quo in the world and to halt the process of national liberation as part of détente; however, the USSR does not regard détente as an instrument for “nudging forward” this process;

— The West cannot use détente to achieve internal changes in the USSR it was unable to achieve by armed force or cold war pressures;

— As borne out in CSCE, if anyone has tried to use détente to interfere in other countries’ internal affairs it has been the West;

— What right do US politicians and journalists have to criticize the USSR or to interpret concepts of freedom and democracy in view of political scandals, abuses of power, corruption, violation of civil rights and political murder by police in the U.S.? The West must “put [its] own house in order first.”

The article is addressed to both Soviet and American audiences. To the Soviet reader, it advises that support for détente in the U.S. remains strong, and that détente has been a source of great achievements for the USSR, does not give the U.S. an opportunity to interfere with Soviet internal affairs, and does not require the Soviet Union to abandon its friends or the revolutionary struggle. To American political leaders, it advises that the USSR is growing impatient with politically motivated criticism of détente and implies related Soviet concern that détente is becoming a major political issue in the U.S. presidential election campaign with unpredictable consequences. At the same time, the article is

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likely a forerunner of more direct criticism of the U.S. role in recent developments—in the Middle East and Portugal, for example—adversely affecting Soviet interests and of the tone of recent Administration statements concerning US–USSR relations.

(That Administration statements have struck a sensitive chord is borne out by a broadcast by the Deputy Director General of TASS in which he complained that “even senior officials in the U.S. Administration sometimes strike the wrong note with clearly misdirected warnings to the Soviet Union not to fish in muddy waters and not to use reduction in tension as a cover for attempts to obtain one-sided advantages.” It has been very rare since 1972 for the Soviet media to so directly complain about Presidential remarks.)

The Arbatov article is a predictable but noteworthy response to criticism here and events abroad during the past two months, beginning particularly with adverse treatment of CSCE. The article would seem to be aimed at countering disquiet among the Soviet elite in reaction to such foreign criticism, events abroad and a perceived harder tone to Administration statements while also cautioning the West that one-sided criticism of détente and admonitions that the USSR should behave will not go unnoticed or unanswered.

This memorandum is for your information.
MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
Thursday, September 18, 1975
4:30 p.m. (90 minutes)
The Oval Office

I. Purpose

This meeting comes at a time when Soviet policy is becoming increasingly complicated because of (1) the Soviet Party Congress in February, where a general line of foreign policy will have to be laid down; (2) the possibility that Brezhnev, voluntarily or otherwise, may relinquish the Soviet leadership; (3) a series of difficulties both domestically and abroad, that at least raise serious questions about the validity of the Brezhnev détente policy; and (4) the implicit linkage of several key issues—SALT, grain sales, the Middle East—the outcome of which could be critical in determining the direction of Soviet policy. At the same time, each of these issues has important implications for US foreign policy and domestic interests.

Your purpose in this meeting is:

— to reaffirm your determination to bring SALT to a successful and mutually satisfactory conclusion so that the General Secretary’s visit will be capped with a significant breakthrough in our relations;

— to impress on Gromyko the difficulties in unilateral American concessions which might break the deadlock, but which in the end would risk the failure of the agreement in the Congress;

— to explain the importance of concluding agreements on grain and on oil that are satisfactory to both sides—i.e. the United States must show some advantage in buying oil from the USSR rather than at world prices from OPEC;
—to emphasize the importance of the grain agreement in breaking down barriers to improvement of economic relations in general—even Senator Jackson seems to support selling grain and buying oil;

— to review the Middle East agreements, emphasizing the point that we have followed the general course you described to Brezhnev, namely, to make progress on whatever front was acceptable to the parties in the overall interest of creating an atmosphere conducive to progress on a comprehensive settlement; to warn against Soviet efforts to exploit the situation, lest the result be a rapid escalation of tensions and a new danger of war; to offer to begin consultations prior to reconvening the Geneva Conference;

— to reassure the Foreign Minister that your general policy remains exactly as you have stated it to the General Secretary: you are prepared to pursue the policy described as détente, because it is clearly in our interest, but you can only conduct such a policy successfully if it is seen by the American people as one that will bring concrete benefits.

In short, Gromyko should leave the meeting with the impression that on all major issues we are making an effort to be conciliatory, but only in the expectation that the Soviets will show flexibility and restraint as well. He should not gather the impression that we are exploiting their poor harvest, but it ought to be clear that we are making firm linkages between grain sales, SALT and the Middle East. In general, he should come away with the understanding that the relationship between our countries is such that we cannot isolate one issue from another; e.g., a long term grain agreement as SALT collapses would be almost impossible to sustain: a SALT agreement concluded while we were confronting each other in the Middle East would be inexplicable in the Congress.

II. Background, Participants, and Press Arrangements

A. Background: This has been a difficult year for Brezhnev: beginning with the collapse of the MFN/credit agreement last December, the failure of his health, the growing dispute with Sadat, the exclusion of the USSR from the major negotiations in the Middle East, the stalemate in SALT, the consequent postponement of his US visit, more recent reversals for the communists in Portugal, and the second disastrous harvest in three years.

On the other hand, the Soviet power position relative to the Western Alliance and China has not declined strategically. The Soviet leaders can see that the southern flank of NATO is in trouble; the industrialized world is buffeted by recession and inflation; there are new op-

3 See Document 171.
opportunities in Asia for the USSR as a result of the end of the Vietnam war; Soviet strategic weaponry is growing stronger and more sophisticated; Soviet military forces, both ground and air, in Europe and the Far East, and at sea are stronger than ever. The Soviet leadership, despite its collective age and uncertainties over the succession, has been remarkably cohesive, and the only recent challenge to Brezhnev (from Politburo member and former KGB Chief Shelepin) was easily defeated.

The most immediate problem for the Soviets lies in charting their future long-term course: how can they arrange an orderly succession to Brezhnev, and make the long term foreign and economic policy decisions required by the Party Congress. They need a clear understanding of where they stand with the US: will the relationship deteriorate? or can it be stabilized and even improved, thus allowing Brezhnev to bind his successor to a firm long term policy of “peaceful coexistence” which would be his historical legacy to the Party.

Thus, in a sense, we are in an ideal position to influence Soviet policy decisions—which, after all, is one of the underlying aims of détente.

—Some observers would argue that we should press hard for better terms from the Soviets across the board, on the ground that they are in extreme trouble.

—Others would argue that the situation in Moscow is too uncertain for pressure tactics to guarantee our objectives, and that an overriding aim must be to commit the USSR, with or without Brezhnev, to a general line of policy that cannot be easily reversed by successors who inherit his mantle and can command an extremely powerful Soviet state. In other words, short term gains we might make could lead to a longer term reversal of Soviet policy toward a more aggressive belligerency.

Your strategy is consistent with the estimate that we should allow Brezhnev some room for maneuver and accommodation and not press him to the wall, but extract concessions that we know he almost certainly will have to make.

B. Participants: Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin, Viktor Sukhodrev (interpreter), Henry Kissinger, Brent Scowcroft and Helmut Sonnenfeldt.

C. Press Arrangements: The meeting will be announced and there will be a press photo opportunity.

III. Talking Points

The major subjects that Gromyko will be eager to pursue are probably SALT and the Middle East, and perhaps force reductions in Europe. He is probably briefed on the grain/oil negotiations, but may be reluctant to get involved in any major way (and the talks are suspended
for a week in any case). You may also, if there is time, take the opportunity to raise CSCE and the Threshold Test Ban talks. Gromyko may allude to the new Soviet UN initiative for a comprehensive test ban, which is roughly the old ploy of isolating China.

Separate talking points follow on:

—General US-Soviet Relations
—SALT
—Middle East
—Grain/oil sales
—Threshold Test Ban and Comprehensive Ban
—Force reductions in Central Europe
—Follow-up to the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE)

[Omitted here are the separate talking points for Ford’s meeting with Gromyko.]

191. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 18, 1975, 3:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: I am pleased to see the progress on the [US-Soviet] grain deal.

Kissinger: It is substantially done, if Seidman, Greenspan and Lynn can keep quiet. The Soviets want five million plus an option for three. Robinson prefers six firm—which is probably better. It gives better leverage.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
President: Can I say something in Oklahoma? “Encouraging progress is being made;” “substantial regular sales on a five-year basis.”

Kissinger: Another question is whether this year’s extra purchase should be part of the five years.

President: I would rather it didn’t.

Kissinger: I agree.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on the Middle East, in particular, Congress and arms sales to Jordan.]

Kissinger: On Gromyko, I would lay the groundwork. Say our two countries, whatever the problems are, have the responsibility for world peace. There have been ups and downs and some problems here which have hurt and which are essentially unassociated with US-Soviet relations. If we could have a summit with a SALT agreement, a Threshold Test Ban and some other things, we would solidify détente.

President: And the grain deal.

Kissinger: On the oil, I didn’t finish. They are proposing 12 million tons. Perhaps it will go to 25 if we will sell them modern drilling equipment.

President: What about the price?

Kissinger: They are refusing a discount now, but Chuck thinks he can get 10–15 percent.

This is the way Gromyko would like to proceed. He is very formal. He said Brezhnev wants to come December 15. On SALT, they have heard 2500 ALCM and 1000 SLCM. I would stick with all that. Don’t mention Backfire or the difference between nuclear and conventional.

On Schlesinger’s proposal: The Backfire proposal gives us an opening. On the other he has given us something except for nuclear versus conventional. If Jim will move 300 to 600—because the Soviets haven’t ever heard 300—we might try his idea of 100 between 600 and 1500.

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2 During his remarks at the Oklahoma State Fair in Oklahoma City on September 19, Ford addressed the status of talks with the Soviets on grain sales: “I am glad to report that encouraging progress is being made on an agreement which will enable us to make additional sales this year and substantial sales on a regular basis over the next 5 years. Neither our Government nor the Soviet Union, its Government, would set the price. The Soviet Union would pay the full amount, the full market price throughout the length of this agreement. I am optimistic that the United States and the Soviet Union will reach this agreement, which will benefit American Farmers and the American consumers, an agreement that will benefit both countries, so that the temporary halt in grain sales can be lifted.” For the full text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 571.

3 Charles Robinson.
The ALCM proposal, by limiting the number of bombers which carry them, we can do it. We can just ignore the nuclear versus conventional and let it surface in Geneva. We may get by with it but it may cause an explosion. I am worried about this issue, because potentially the Soviets could flood us with cruise missiles and we have no defense against them.

President: Where do we stand on when we start the next round?
President: Can’t we do what we can now and take up what is left in 1977?
Kissinger: I don’t want you to get into a brawl with Brezhnev on it. Since they have conventional cruise missiles, they may welcome this ambiguity.
President: If we postpone the conventional cruise missile to 1977, wouldn’t Defense be satisfied?
Kissinger: Sure.
President: Then we would have a better idea of where we are going.
Kissinger: Then I will turn Schlesinger’s idea into a specific proposal.
President: Should we reverse on the land mobiles?
Kissinger: I would let that ride for a few weeks.
President: Can we move on MBFR?
Kissinger: Ask him, but don’t appear eager.
On the Middle East, he will unload on you, but don’t let him nail you. I think we can agree to start a discussion for Geneva.
President: Didn’t we keep them generally informed?
Kissinger: No. He will ask for a commitment that we will make no move without them. You can say it will depend on the parties but we will commit ourselves to keep them informed. Tell him we are willing to cooperate and are willing to discuss the Geneva Conference. Say if the two parties come to us, it is tough to refuse.
I would begin with the Brezhnev visit—after your opening statement.
192. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 18, 1975, 4:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR:
Andrey A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Kornienko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Mr. Sukhodrev

US:
The President
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, State Dept.
Walter Stoessel, U.S. Ambassador to the USSR

SUBJECT

Foreign Minister Gromyko’s Call on The President

The President: How is the General Secretary?

Gromyko: He is in good health and he had a good vacation. (Photographers came in and the President gave Mr. Gromyko an autographed picture for General Secretary Brezhnev showing the General Secretary and the President in conversation during the meeting in Helsinki.)

I want to give you the best wishes and very warm greetings of Leonid Brezhnev. I saw him the day before I left while he was still on leave. He still had a few days to go but, knowing him, I doubt if he will use them.

I am prepared, in my own name and on behalf of the Soviet leadership, to exchange views with you. Speaking for the leadership and personally for the General Secretary, I can say that the Soviet Union is dedicated to the line worked out in the last few years and particularly as a result of the US-Soviet meetings at the highest level and expressed in the relevant treaties and agreements between our two countries. At the outset, I want to emphasize this. I would be happy to hear your views, Mr. President, on our bilateral problems and on broader questions and then I would be pleased to give you our views. Thus, we will be able to touch on the main issues of interest.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, September 18–21, 1975—Talks with Gromyko. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. Sonnenfeldt’s handwritten notes of the meeting are in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Misc. Memcons.
The President: I felt that we had a very good meeting at Vladivostok. This was a good example of how we can work together on concrete problems. I also felt that the meeting in Helsinki was good. Perhaps not as much progress was made as we could have hoped, but still it was a good meeting. We should continue in this way. We have had some disappointments but there have also been good results. Our relations now are far deeper than previously. Hopefully, our relations can be expanded to cover an even wider range of subjects.

I hope we can move ahead on SALT and bring those negotiations to a successful conclusion. If we could do that and also have an agreement on grain, this would be very good. I hear encouraging reports about the grain talks; I hope there can be some relationship between grain and oil as I discussed with the General Secretary in Helsinki.

The progress we have made is in the interest of peace in the world. In general, there is a relationship between all of the various problems.

I look forward to the visit of the General Secretary in 1975. If some of the differences on SALT can be narrowed, I believe it can be a successful visit.

These are my general views and now we could get into some details.

Gromyko: I am pleased to hear your statement, Mr. President, and to know that you and your Administration support the policy which has been worked out over the past 4 or 5 years.

The President: I would add, and Ambassador Dobrynin is very familiar with this, that we do have opponents in the US—not everyone is enthusiastic about our relationship. I won’t name any names in this regard. But I am confident that I will be able to defend our relationship. I want it to continue, but we have to see some benefits from it for both sides. If that is the result, then there is no reason why the vast majority of Americans will not support our policy.

Gromyko: More specifically, the crux of the question is whether we will hold to the path of détente or whether there will be a change from this fundamental policy. We carefully follow developments in the United States and we know what you are talking about. We know that some circles—perhaps for their own tactical reasons including domestic political considerations—do not accept the present policy. But we want to believe, as you said, that the policy of détente and improving our relations will be preserved and developed. We believe this and we will follow this line firmly. If the US does the same, then there will be a reliable basis for our future relations. We favor this policy.

The President: I share this view. We should proceed on this basis.

Gromyko: It is correctly emphasized on both sides that the process of détente should be filled with content. We have done some things to-
gether, for example in Europe, and this has been useful. Progress can be made only if the fundamental line of détente is observed. It is not right to say that everything depends on the Kremlin. In equal measure, much also depends on the White House and on the US in general.

I welcome what you have said, Mr. President. I wish to emphasize again that what I have stated is the view of the whole Soviet leadership and personally of the General Secretary.

The President: You may reassure the General Secretary and your leadership that the US does believe in détente. I feel that it has been to our mutual interest and benefit and the US will follow this line.

To carry this forward with you it is important that the General Secretary and I meet. If our views are shared, as you indicate, then this should be in 1975. For our planning purposes, it will be useful to have some idea of your views about the timing of the visit. Of course, we could be somewhat flexible.

Gromyko: Mr. President, let me make a few observations in connection with our exchange of views on the general need to follow the present course of our relations. We have given attention to two circumstances: I don’t know how you will assess this or whether you will feel my remarks are critical or not, but I would not be frank if I did not say them.

Mr. President, we value your statements as the Head of State and also statements by other official representatives—first of all, by Dr. Kissinger—in support of détente. These have been very clear. But sometimes arguments are marshalled in support of détente which make it appear that one side—the US—is absolutely clean with regard to détente, whereas the position of the other side leaves something to be desired. A shadow is cast on the intentions of the other side. This can only cause harm to our relations.

Secondly, the grain. We expressed our desire to buy a certain amount of grain and the US said it would sell. The situation would seem to be clear—there is a potential consumer and a potential supplier. However, so much noise has been made about this and so much excitement stirred up that ill wishers get food for attacks against the principle of our relations. Shocks and pinpricks are delivered against this policy.

These are thoughts which could not fail to enter our minds.

The President: At the outset, I would say that you must differentiate between what I and the Secretary say and what our opponents say—those who have reservations about détente. I say very emphatically that I and the Administration believe in détente. But we have to put up with our critics who don’t like détente. I have been forthright in support of détente because I believe in it, and I must talk against those
who are against détente, either sincerely or for political reasons of their own. You must put what I say in context. What I say is more important than what the critics say.

I agree about the grain deal—we are a supplier and you a buyer. I support this and so does the Secretary. The Secretary of Agriculture also is a proponent. It would be better for you to believe us—myself and the Secretary—rather than to listen to the wailing words of those who oppose our policy. You should believe us and our words just as we do yours. This is the crux of détente and of our relations.

Gromyko: From your remarks I can see that you clearly understand me. We value highly what you have said.

Now, about the visit of the General Secretary. Up to now, and at the present time, we have been talking in the specific context of a new SALT agreement. There can’t be any doubts that the understanding about a visit to the US remains fully in force. For the leadership and for the General Secretary, I want to confirm this at the outset. I trust it would be correct to proceed on the assumption that a new SALT agreement would be signed at the time of the visit.

The President: This is my assumption. We are making progress and we proceed from the assumption that a new agreement will be finalized.

Gromyko: We too proceed from precisely that assumption. There is a substantive connection here.

So far as the timing is concerned, provided a new agreement will be prepared in December, then the visit could take place in December as you have suggested.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, we suggested December 16.

Gromyko: You said November 15 or December 16.

But what if we visualize a situation where it is impossible to prepare and finalize an agreement by then? If such a situation occurs, then it would be in the best interests of both sides to put off the visit for a while. We don’t see anything wrong in thinking that if an agreement is not reached, then we could visualize an agreement in the spring. Of course, it would be better earlier than later, but if it were in the spring there would be no difficulty in reaching agreement on a date.

The President: In view of the progress we have made, I think it would be far better to do it in December. I feel that 1976 would not be the best time in this country for the culmination of an agreement. I see no reason, as I look at the differences, why, if the General Secretary comes in December, this could not result in an agreement.

Anything which goes into 1976, when our national elections will be on, raises questions about the timing and the atmosphere. It seems to me better to move now and make an agreement in December.
Gromyko: There is no question of what I would prefer. It would be better to finalize an agreement in December and then, of course, the visit should be in December. But we are talking about a turn of events where the agreement might not be ready that soon. However, there is no question about our preference.

The President: I don’t foreclose 1976. I would just point out that the atmosphere in 1976 would be much more difficult in terms of making an agreement. We can do it in 1975. Of course, the agreement is vitally important and it could be postponed and could go into 1976.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course, we assumed that the Foreign Minister, with his usual spirit of conciliation, would fully accept our last proposal!

Gromyko: I will give my views later on that.

We believe that for a serious-minded policy the question of finalizing the agreement at the end of December or in the spring of 1976 shouldn’t cause such a problem. After all, we are talking about an adjacent period of time. So far as the visit is concerned, it is obvious that we in the Soviet Union will do everything possible to promote a new agreement. I assure you that our words and deeds will not be separate on this.

But now if I could say a few words on the substance of the negotiations. I don’t know how much detail we will want to get into on this today. I know I will talk with Dr. Kissinger on the details. But I will speak with you concerning matters of principle regarding SALT.

In Moscow, on the part of the leadership and of the General Secretary, serious questions have arisen concerning the present situation and what is taking place today about the whole matter. When we began these negotiations, we proceeded from the need to block channels for developing new weapons in greater volume and quantities and we wanted to slow down the strategic arms race. The Vladivostok agreement was dedicated to this aim. Now, we have come to the conclusion that the government of the United States has introduced—or is introducing or will introduce; you will know best about this—certain corrections to the line on which Vladivostok was based.

Why does this question arise? Perhaps because you are trying to open up the development of a new type of strategic weapon. Here I refer to cruise missiles. We believe that to proceed along this path would mean giving a unilateral advantage to the United States as compared to the Soviet Union. This would certainly complicate the situation.

We made a major concession on a matter of principle to you. This was on a question which had been personally mentioned by you and by Dr. Kissinger. This involved considering all three types of missiles as
MIRVed because they have all been tested as MIRVs. This was not easy for us to do but we made a concession. We did it in the expectation that you would take a more objective position on other specific questions at issue in the SALT talks. But your position afterwards indicated that you were not taking any step forward to meet our position. This troubles us. Why should we sign a new agreement when it will permit development of a new weapon? It would burst forth like a torrent.

Maybe your military people want this but it is not the basis for an agreement. Our interests must be taken into account. Any agreement must be based on a reasonable compromise. This was the basis for SALT One and for Vladivostok. I hope the US will elaborate a new, more objective position on cruise missiles. Other questions arise as well. For example, the Backfire bomber. Your experts say it is a heavy bomber, but it is not. You will recall that the General Secretary said that at Helsinki. Your people say that various agencies are claiming it is a heavy bomber, but our people know better about our own bombers.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you want to tell us its characteristics?

Gromyko: On the question of range, you will remember that the General Secretary said it was about one half.

Another question involves a definition of when a light missile becomes a heavy missile. Also, there is the question of modification and replacement of missiles.

Dr. Kissinger: You mean silo modification?

Kornienko: Yes.

Gromyko: I would like to call all of these simple questions, but they are not. That is why we ask ourselves if the US can seriously believe that we can accept all of the suggestions made to us.

This is how I would frankly describe the situation regarding the negotiations at present.

The President: It seems to me, Mr. Foreign Minister, that you have touched on the main areas of our differences. There is the problem of Backfire. There is the issue of ballistic (sic) missiles, their range from a bomber or from a submarine. There is the question of the cruise missile, the question of the definition of a heavy ballistic missile, the question of modification. These are matters where we have an area for negotiation.

The Secretary will be meeting with you tomorrow and on Sunday. Rather than get into specifics here, I would say only that I believe there are places where we can be more forthcoming. We have some thoughts and the Secretary will present them to you for consideration by your leadership and by the General Secretary.

2 September 21.
We understand you have made a step forward on the verification question. We believe that our position, as it will be presented to you by the Secretary, can move things forward.

On the Backfire, this should not be irreconcilable.

On the question of range on submarines and bombers, I indicated 2500; whether there should be a ban or whether they should be counted is a matter for negotiation.

On submarines, we started at 1500 and then indicated 1200.

On definition of a heavy ballistic missile, the launch weight and throw weight should be included.

I believe these matters can be resolved. Tomorrow, or more likely on Sunday, you will have our views. I believe they can lead to agreement.

Dr. Kissinger: We have not finally fixed on a position and it would be helpful to get your views on these matters. There is a question of reconciling many different points of view on our side. It is not true that we have not changed our position. We have reduced the range for our cruise missiles to eliminate the possibility of reaching populated areas in the Soviet Union. It would be helpful to have any ideas which you brought from Moscow so that we do not go past each other again in our positions.

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, if we take the proposals you have made, including the latest ones, I would say that they change nothing in comparison with the position which you took previously. Your new position does not alter at all the possibility of achieving agreement. The difference in what you propose is microscopic. But let’s consider this tomorrow or the next day. Should we now take up the Middle East?

The President: I would be glad to do so.

Gromyko: I know you are interested in learning about our position and we want to know yours. First of all, I must say that, in Moscow, we are disappointed with the actions of the US in the Middle East.

The President: You should realize, Mr. Foreign Minister, that we were asked by the parties to participate in the negotiations. We of course are willing to work with the Soviet Union and to lay a foundation to move toward bringing the Middle East situation to Geneva. On the assumption that what we did during the last month materializes, then you and we can move together toward Geneva.

Gromyko: I am sure you are familiar with our position on this matter and I do not need to go into it in detail. But I will say again that there will not be peace in the Middle East unless there is a full evacuation of the occupied territories by the Israeli forces. Secondly, there will not be peace until the Palestinian question is resolved. Today, the Palestinian problem looks different from what it did five or ten years ago—it
has become much more acute. It can only be resolved on the basis of
permitting the Palestinians to establish their own national homeland.

Also, there can be no peace without guarantees of the existence of
all states in the area, naturally including Israel.

I would call your attention to the fact, Mr. President, that there is
agreement between the Soviet Union and the US that all questions con-
cerning the Middle East would be reviewed and considered together
by our two countries. But in fact the US simply decided to ignore the
Soviet Union and its role in that area. But I believe you will agree that
this cannot be done.

The Soviet Union does exist and it does have a policy in the Middle
East.

We ask ourselves why the United States has done this. Perhaps it is
to try to denigrate the policy and influence of the Soviet Union and to
inflate the role and influence of the US in the eyes of public opinion. But
I really don’t want to develop this any further.

Of course, we believe that such actions cause damage to the line of
policy which we discussed earlier today and which has been agreed by
our two countries. It undermines trust and understanding between the
Soviet Union and the United States.

We, of course, expressed our disappointment with these actions. They
cannot be considered as positive simply because they were done
with the consent of certain other parties. We do not believe that the
comments of certain Arab leaders—who do not consider the interests
of other Arabs—can be useful. All of this cannot justify the actions of
the US in the Middle East.

Mr. President, you mentioned the Geneva Conference and said
that this was an area where the two sides could act jointly. But where
are the grounds for joint action? Even if we tried, we couldn’t convene
it. How can it be expected that the Soviet Union could agree to convene
a conference which would be a failure because of actions which have
been taken? A failure of the conference would not be useful to
anyone—to the Arabs, to Israel, or to the US. I consider that the pros-
pects for a Geneva Conference are gloomy.

These are my views about the situation in the Middle East. This is
an area which suffers tremors from time to time. This cannot but affect
relations between us. Of course, some Arab leader can say that the So-
viet Union is bad and the US is good.

Dr. Kissinger: That changes every 10 years!

Gromyko: Time alone will tell how long this situation will obtain.
This is a momentary thing. But the role of the Soviet Union and its
policy is a permanent thing, as distinct from the position of an Arab
leader. I will name no names.
Dr. Kissinger: You shouldn’t speak ill of your Syrian friends.

Gromyko: We want nothing in the Middle East but to see peace. If your military people say that we seek bases there, this is not true—it is nonsense. Everything will depend on the US and the policies pursued by the US. We favor serious, joint actions. We are against policies based on considerations of the moment and steps divorced from the idea of achieving a permanent settlement.

The President: I know the policy of the Soviet Union in the Middle East is based on seeking peace there. We share the same long-range overall objectives. They can be defined in many ways. At the UN, we agreed on resolutions 242 and 338. We believe a settlement based on them would be fair and equitable.

Under no circumstances—and I want to make this clear—was our effort with Egypt and Israel aimed at downgrading the role of the Soviet Union. It was aimed, with the best intentions, at a settlement which we want to participate in with the Soviet Union.

I am not as pessimistic as you regarding what could be accomplished at Geneva. I understand the need to take into account the legitimate interests of the Palestinians. I know there are many issues which must be resolved. I won’t go into details, but the Soviet Union and the United States can help move the parties toward a settlement.

We should review how we can work together. The Secretary will do this in detail with you and he will report to me on how we can proceed together toward common objectives.

Gromyko: Of course I am prepared to exchange views with the Secretary.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe the presentation of the Foreign Minister was very moderate and constructive.

The President: I reiterate, Mr. Foreign Minister, that there was no intention on our part to cut down the Soviet interests in the Middle East. I look forward to sharing the effort with you.

Gromyko: I trust our clarifications have helped you to gain a more complete picture of our intentions in the Middle East and our assessment.

There has been much discussion of the agreement between Israel and Egypt and many have said that the Soviet Union will lead a drive against this. We do not conduct any special campaign against this agreement. But we make our own conclusion about it. We will go on doing this—this is our duty.

Now, about future cooperation in the light of what’s been done recently. On the Geneva Conference, I note that you say that you are more optimistic than we. Well, we will have to see. There are many factors to be considered.
Mr. President, with your permission, I would like to consider briefly several other questions.

First, under the general heading of European affairs, I wish to express the satisfaction of our leadership and of Leonid Brezhnev personally that a significant step was taken in Europe with the holding of the European Security Conference. The General Secretary said this to you directly, but I too want to express my appreciation for the cooperation between the US and the Soviet Union in preparing for the conference and bringing it to a successful conclusion.

Now, about the Vienna talks on force reductions. No substantive progress has been made as yet. I don’t want to go into the details and maybe Dr. Kissinger will talk about this. However, no cracks have yet appeared in the sky because of the lack of progress. We will do our part, but one side cannot guarantee success. We hope that both sides will make efforts to achieve success.

The President: I appreciate your kind words about our position concerning the Security Conference. I fully supported the agreement and defended it in the US. I feel the spirit in which we entered it—if fulfilled—can bring fruits in the coming years.

I am glad you mentioned the Vienna talks. There has not been enough progress there. You feel, and we do also, that we can bring this to a point where there can be an agreement on a reduction. I hope the negotiators in Vienna on both sides will take actions toward this end. I assure you the US will do so.

Gromyko: I appreciate your words, Mr. President.

In Moscow we ask ourselves where things are moving in regard to the arms race. We are conducting negotiations about a SALT agreement which will last until 1985. But other nations are arming themselves. The arms race is continuing in various degrees.

We have made a number of proposals to curb the arms race, but these have not met with a positive response from the US. It is true we have done a few things—the NPT and prohibiting bacteriological weapons. But these are all too few and the arms race proceeds without restrictions. Where will the world find itself?

We have suggested the convening of a World Disarmament Conference with the participation of all states in the world—France, China, the UK and others. Perhaps this won’t achieve immediate agreement, but at least the problem would be discussed. But we are told that this is not a good idea and the US raises up in arms against it.

We are discussing a SALT agreement bilaterally but other countries are continuing their arms programs. How long can this go on? This is not just a philosophical question divorced from life, but it is a
question of practical politics which is related to the situation several years in the future.

The President: Mr. Foreign Minister, the world would be safer if the arms race could be discontinued on a world-wide basis. Perhaps the best way to lead in this direction would be for us to conclude a SALT agreement and MBFR. This would show the good faith of both of us and would show the way toward ending the arms race. It would be an example and would lend credibility to what we want to see in the world as a whole.

Gromyko: I understand your words. It is not easy to give a full answer to this question, but I wanted to call your attention to it. These are matters which exist in real life and this influences life everywhere.

Now, if I could ask you one last question. You made a casual remark earlier that you valued the talks in Moscow by Mr. Robinson about grain. Could you give me your views on this?

The President: As I understand it, the Soviet side and Mr. Robinson have been negotiating on a grain deal which would be made on a five-year basis. Five million tons could be sold annually with an option to purchase three million more tons. Alternatively, six million tons could be specified as a firm figure. In addition, further sales could be made this year. There is some question if the five-year period should begin this year or next.

Mr. Robinson has my full authority to go back to Moscow in a week or so and achieve agreement. I did not mean to pass over this question casually. As we see it, it would be better to have stability in purchases rather than the peaks and valleys of the past. This would be in the spirit of our talk in Helsinki. It should also contain the concept of the sale of oil.

If we can do a grain deal, the oil deal might take a bit longer. But both would be in our mutual interest.

Gromyko: It is clear we are talking about the purchase of grain this year on a one-time basis and a separate agreement on a long term basis.

Dr. Kissinger: This is correct. It is a US bureaucratic problem as to when the five-year period should start. It is clear it should start next year. If you want, you can purchase additional grain this year. As I see the situation, most of the remaining issues are technical.

We will work out an agreement and present it to you. Mr. Robinson will go to Moscow on Wednesday or Thursday.³

On the oil question, it would be helpful if 10 million tons could be sold in connection with the grain purchases. Then we can discuss in a

³ September 24 or 25.
more leisurely way with you the idea of an exchange of technology on oil. Robinson can discuss this with you.

You will have the proposed agreement no later than the first two days of next week.

The President: There should be no serious problems about this. I have given instructions that there should be no nit-picking. The agreement would show that détente benefits both sides.

Gromyko: Well, I don’t want to go into the details since the talks are continuing. I have had information on them since I have been in the US.

Mr. President, I want to thank you for your reception, your courtesy and the time you have given me. We have expressed our thoughts frankly—perhaps too frankly—but this has always been helpful in the past in discussing problems.

The President: I want to reassure you that frankness is very helpful in solving problems. I believe in frankness and candor. I thank you for coming and for helping to lay the groundwork for progress in SALT and in other areas.

I should mention that in my speech in Oklahoma I will say that “encouraging progress” has been made.4

Gromyko: I have no objection.

The President: Please give my very best regards to the General Secretary.

The meeting terminated at 7:05 p.m.5

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4 See footnote 2, Document 191.

5 After his meeting with Ford in the Oval Office, Gromyko went to the North Lawn of the White House to issue a statement to the press and answer several questions. The text of his remarks are attached but not printed.
193. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 19, 1975, 4–6:04 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the United States
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (interpreter)
Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Jan M. Lodal, National Security Council Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT

SALT

[From 4:00 to 4:30, Secretary Kissinger, Foreign Minister Gromyko and Ambassador Dobrynin conferred alone in Secretary Kissinger’s office, then the meeting began in the Conference Room. Photographers were admitted briefly and then dismissed.]

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, I don’t have to welcome you here. You are always welcome. I thought your meeting yesterday with the President was very fruitful. And I want to reaffirm what the President said, in a larger circle: Our policy of détente is a fixed policy. Our aim, as the General Secretary said, is to make it irreversible. We want to find ways of working together in practical ways and to continue the practice of meetings and consultations, particularly at the highest level. Occasionally there are disappointments and irritations, but we both share a

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, September 18–21, 1975—Talks with Gromyko. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Conference Room at the Department of State.

2 No record of the private meeting has been found. See, however, Document 195 for a brief account of what Kissinger told Gromyko privately about the “Palestine question.”

3 See Document 192.
responsibility to ease international tensions. And if we look over the long-term future, we can see fewer issues where our interests will conflict and more issues where our interests will be coming increasingly together.

So it is in this spirit I welcome you here and look forward to our meeting here and on Sunday.4

Gromyko: Thank you for those words of welcome, Mr. Secretary. I certainly share your opinion that yesterday’s meeting was a useful one. We touched upon several important matters and I set out the policy of the Soviet Union on several questions. The main thing was that on both sides it was reaffirmed that our two countries will continue the line that has been developing over the past two years, mainly as a result of the Soviet-American summit meetings. In this spirit we will take part in our meetings today and on Sunday.

Kissinger: I proposed that we would start with the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks and reserve for this evening discussion of the Middle East.

Gromyko: I think that would be the right thing to do. The question then is how specifically should we organize our discussion on SALT. I proceed from the view that our position was set out in detail and is known to you, just as your position was set out in detail and is known to us. I suggest we set forth those items that are not agreed.

Kissinger: That would be useful. Let us do an inventory of the issues and why we disagree. Then on Sunday we will have another opportunity to discuss.

Gromyko: That would probably be the best way.

If we agreed on that, who starts? Do you want to, or let me speak?

Kissinger: Perhaps you would like to make a few remarks.

Gromyko: All right. You will remember the reply we gave to the repeated statements made by the American side that the question of verification [kontrol’] is very important for the United States and that it is a question that seriously impedes an agreement, and the fact that there was no understanding on verification was a serious impediment to an agreement. At that time you formulated your position, and the American side—the President—stated that you were proceeding from the assumption that if a missile of a certain type was tested with MIRVs, all missiles of that type would be treated as MIRVed. That meant all three types of ours you are familiar with would be counted as MIRVed, that is, counted in the 1320 as agreed in Vladivostok.

4 September 21.
No, we thoroughly discussed that problem—it was not an easy one. But we took a decision to meet the United States half way and we gave a positive response, as you recall. At that time we thought this was a major concession of principle—and I repeat, there are concessions and concessions and this is a major concession of principle—but the U.S. took no steps that are comparable to the concession we made. And this was surprising. The figures you later gave us regarding missiles on heavy bombers and surface ships showed no change of any significance, and there is no possibility to underestimate the seriousness of the present situation.

Kissinger: What do you mean by “underestimate the seriousness of the present situation”?

Gromyko: How do we assess your position? We assess it this way: We believe that after Vladivostok you reoriented yourselves and decided to open up a new channel of the arms race. You felt that in some respect you had traveled a greater distance than we had and you decided to exploit that in your unilateral interests. If that is so, it would be hard to count on an agreement being reached on that basis.

The problem of cruise missiles in that respect has become a very serious brake on the path of reaching an agreement. We formulated our specific proposals on this matter and those are the ones we abide by to this day. And we believe there is a possibility to find a mutually acceptable solution, provided you leave aside your aim of achieving a unilateral advantage. But to achieve it, you must withdraw from your one-sided position. As for cruise missiles on heavy bombers, our position is that all cruise missiles of over 600-kilometer range should be counted in the number of vehicles, and there is no possibility of even considering 2500. Or any intermediate figure between 600 and 2500 could not be accepted. Regarding sea-based cruise missiles, we also believe a solution can be found on the basis that all of a range of over 600 kilometers be banned.

Kissinger: Banned or counted?

Gromyko: Banned.

Let me remind you of another matter. You recall at Helsinki, at the discussion there, on five points on which our positions coincided or were almost coincidental we decided we would instruct our delegations at Geneva to formulate the final words on those points. Unfortunately, your delegation did not receive instructions on all those five points. To my knowledge. Perhaps there was not enough time, I don’t know.

Kissinger: What are the points?

Gromyko: Let me list the five points.

Point 1: intercontinental range cruise missiles we agreed would be banned. There is no problem here. Your delegation did receive instructions and they are working on this now, on the form of words.
Point 2: ballistic missiles of ranges exceeding 600 kilometers on vessels—except submarines, because as you know that’s a different matter. There too, it was agreed they would be banned and the delegations would be instructed. There is no problem here; the delegations are at work.

Point 3: cruise missiles with ranges in excess of 600 kilometers on any flying machines except heavy bombers. We agreed here too they would be banned. Except heavy bombers, because they are a different matter altogether. Here, on this point, your delegation has said it has no instruction to engage in any discussion. We are rather surprised by this. Perhaps it is just a matter of time, or you changed your position on it.

Then there was Point 4, that related to both ballistic and cruise missiles. We agreed it would be forbidden to deploy them on the seabed and ocean floor, including internal and territorial waters. We agreed at Helsinki, but your delegation says it has no instructions on this point regarding cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Do we want to put cruise missiles on the ocean floor? Crawling cruise missiles? We didn’t understand cruise missiles could be put on the ocean floor.

Gromyko: Not to put.

Kissinger: That is a misunderstanding. There is no problem on that.

Gromyko: Your delegation doesn’t work on it. It says it has no instructions.

Then there is the last point, point 5, which concerns the nonplacement in orbit of nuclear weapons or any other weapons of mass destruction. On this we thought alike at Helsinki, and we are pleased to see that your delegation has instructions on this and is working on it.

So work continues on three, and on two there is no movement.

Kissinger: The two points are cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers and cruise missiles on the ocean floor.

Gromyko: Right. That is all I wanted to say regarding cruise missiles.

Now, about the heavy bomber. We want to say quite frankly you must be guided by some sort of consideration of diplomatic bargaining because we cannot believe you really regard that plane—the Backfire—as a heavy bomber. So if someone from some agency is whispering in your ear that it is, you should—in a loud voice—make clear that it isn’t. We wish we did have a plane with the characteristics you ascribe to the Backfire! So when you give us a bonus of 100 extra aircraft, that is of no consequence because the question is one of principle. So that is the case for the Backfire bomber.
Now, on the question of modernization of missiles and our agreement that we would leave in the new agreement the clause of the Interim Agreement, that is, that in modernizing missiles the two sides would be allowed to increase the size of the silos by 10–15%. In effect, we accepted your idea, which did not in fact run counter to our own wishes, to provide a limit in terms of volume to the possible increase in the dimensions of a silo, that in the final analysis the volume of the silo should not be increased more than 32%.

As we see it, you want to introduce, guided I guess by certain one-sided considerations that maybe your military people have prompted you, a limit on vertical changes in the dimensions of a silo by not more than 15%. Regarding horizontal, there is no problem of a limit of 10–15%. We believe such a view is not justified and will serve only a one-sided interest. It is quite right that both sides would undertake not to increase the total volume by more than 32% but it would be up to the side concerned to decide how that figure of 32% would be reached—either by only a vertical change or only horizontal or a combination of both—being limited by 32%.

Kissinger: If you go 32% only vertical you will reach China and we’re trying to prevent that.

Gromyko: We are not saying that there can be no increase in the horizontal by 10–15% or that the vertical would be unlimited. That is not what we are asking. The joint position should be fair and equal, that is, that both sides should be free to do it either vertical or horizontal or in combination but without exceeding 32%. That we feel is a fair and neutral position. And we hope you will take a more objective position in this matter.

Now on the question of conversion of non-heavy to heavy missiles and on the conditions which would prevent such conversions.

The starting points for this already have been discussed and there is no need to repeat ourselves. You know the basic unit is taken to be our SS–19 missile. Our view is, and we have already set it out to you: here the basic figure establishing a certain limit should be launching weight, starting weight, not throwweight. That we feel is the simplest. But simplicity isn’t everything in this matter; it is the simplest and most reliable way of guaranteeing this limit. If that method is applied, fewer parameters will have to be verified, and that itself yields a certain advantage.

You know that insofar as throwweight is concerned, that figure can change depending on the range or distance the missile is expected to fly. You can throw a bigger weight smaller distances or a smaller weight bigger distances. So that would complicate matters and make it harder to get accuracy.
Kissinger: Maybe we can let you throw any weight you want a short distance.

Gromyko: Also, the earth unfortunately has the drawback that it revolves. Very long ago it took it into its head to revolve, so you can throw a missile in the direction of the rotation or against. And that too does affect the measurement if you are measuring by throwweight. So regardless of how you treat the whole matter, one cannot fail to agree that this would be a less reliable means of control than the starting weight.

There are certain other matters on which there was some exchange of views, maybe insufficiently complete. On some you have not finalized your position. But I would like to close on that. But the main thing is that in giving you our reply on the question of verification, we stated—and you will recall this—that our position and our readiness were being extended in the context of agreement being reached on certain other questions, foremost being cruise missiles.

I would like to make one other point: I am sure this applies to you and it certainly does to us, but we want to reach an agreement that is most effective, that holds back and slows down the arms race in this important field and makes the peoples of both our countries and the entire world feel this. We want it to exert a positive influence on the state of affairs in the world. But if in stopping one channel of the arms race you open up another one—cruise missiles—then all the positive elements that would have been reached in other areas will be reduced to zero. And in fact, we will be worse off materially and even strategically, because we don’t know, we might be worse off.

But I emphasize that our interest in reaching an accord has not diminished. I said that to the President and I repeat it now emphatically. We are ready to do it now and to work as long as necessary to do it. But we want an accord to be as effective as possible, and we want it—as both agreed—to serve the purpose of holding back the arms race.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, this was a very clear exposition and very helpful to our analysis of the problem. Let me make a few observations and go into detail on some. I will say a few things to let you know our thinking, for your colleagues in Moscow.

On the instructions to our delegation. On the issue of cruise missiles on the ocean floor, this is not a problem. We had never considered the possibility of putting cruise missiles on the ocean floor so we had no formal government position on the issue. It is not something that will hold up an agreement. It is just a conceptual problem here.

On cruise missiles on aircraft other than heavy bombers, this is related to the question of how we settle cruise missiles on heavy bombers. So this is easily soluble. And I will come back to this Sunday. If we solve the cruise missile issue in general, we will easily solve this. This
will be a 15-minute discussion. But it is difficult to issue instructions on one without solving it all.

So on the issues that were agreed in Helsinki, we can consider them substantially solved.

Now, on the relatively less crucial issues. Silo dimensions. Our difficulty is that under the present agreement, it can’t be modified more than 10–15% in any one direction. There is no dispute. The question was whether you can do it 10–15% in both directions. If you can, it means something like a 52% increase in volume. And this seems to us excessive.

Gromyko: This is not the case.

Kissinger: In the existing agreement, that was agreed to in Geneva, the rule was that it can’t be more than 15% in one direction.

Korniyenko: It doesn’t say anything about directions.

Kissinger: You are quite right. There are three possible interpretations: You can either increase it 15% in volume, which is absurd; 15% in one direction; or 15% in both. But under no possibility can it mean 32% in one direction. Under your interpretation, you could reach a 52% increase in volume by a 15% increase in both directions.

Gromyko: Yes. 52%.

Kissinger: I had the unworthy thought that when you offered 32%, making it much deeper, you weren’t doing something to hurt yourself. What you are now proposing is a volume change of 32% and you would prefer to feel free to take it in any one direction. If you take it only horizontally, you could do it 15% horizontally. But if you go deeper, you could theoretically take it 32%. Theoretically you could go deeper than 15% and increase the volume to 32%.

Gromyko: Either, or in combination.

Kissinger: Yes. You could do any number of things to get 32%. And that is something we have great difficulty with. Because we believe, quite candidly, it would give you . . . it is less favorable for limiting the size of missiles than the Interim Agreement.

Gromyko: So you would agree to the continuation of the present situation, the volume can be increased by 52%?

Kissinger: No. We can agree to a volume limit of 32% as long as you don’t take more than 15% in one direction.

Gromyko: Your idea is an advantage to yourself.

Kissinger: We don’t want any increase.

Gromyko: It is for your advantage.

Kissinger: Anatol, the Foreign Minister sprung a double negative in the car that took me 15 minutes to figure out.
We cannot accept 52%. We in Moscow in ’72 didn’t want any change. We frankly thought it would be 15% in any one direction. We never defined it, but it was our thought. If we change it, we are adding quite a new dimension. We are prepared to continue the Interim Agreement limit but add to it a 32% volume limitation. That we are prepared to do. But we can’t accept that the whole volume can be taken in one direction.

Regarding throwweight, we are of course talking about missiles of intercontinental range. The SS–17 has a considerable increase in its throwweight by increased propulsion. So if you increase the SS–19 by propulsion you will get a considerable increase in throwweight; it would approach the throwweight of the SS–9.

[Kissinger and Lodal confer.]

Mr. Lodal feels you are not cleared for figures on Soviet throwweight. Be that as it may, that is our estimate. So any further increase in throwweight in the SS–19 will make it practically identical to the SS–9, which by common agreement was heavy in ’72. And it hasn’t become light in the interim.

We are prepared to combine the launching weight and throwweight, so we don’t insist on one. But we would have obliterated the distinction between light and heavy if we permit any increase in the throwweight of the SS–19.

These are two matters which aren’t as much issues of principle as the other you raised.

As for discussion of what each side has done since Vladivostok . . .

Gromyko: You deliberately omitted Backfire.

Kissinger: No, I’m coming to it. I am doing it in a different order, Mr. Foreign Minister, to throw you off stride. [laughter] I am taking the easy ones first, then the issues of principle. Actually I was coming to Backfire next.

On the Backfire there is a difference in the assessment of the two sides, but we will take seriously what you have said, that it is not a heavy bomber. We had another intelligence assessment made, and had another study. We agree with you that it is obviously not intended for an intercontinental role, but it has the capability of an intercontinental role. We will take your view seriously, and we will return to it.

Let me turn to cruise missiles. Did I deliberately leave something else out?

Gromyko: There are other minor issues. Like when the figure of 2400 will be reached. I didn’t mention that.

Kissinger: That one will be settled.

Gromyko: Other countries being used to outflank the agreement . . .
Kissinger: But you didn’t raise it. I believe they will be settled, not without difficulty, but they will be settled.

Now, Vladivostok, and its aftermath. You correctly stated that you made an important concession of principle in accepting our verification proposal. But I cannot accept that the U.S. has made no effort to solve problems.

First, at Vladivostok there was no discussion of sea-based cruise missiles. So in theory they were free. In fact, there was no serious discussion of cruise missiles in general, so in this sense there was ambiguity. And there was no discussion of cruise missiles on planes other than heavy bombers. So to put severe limits on both is a significant concession by the U.S. We deliberately put a limit which would put the Soviet Union out of range of any sea-based cruise missiles. So in effect we have said the Soviet Union will be out of range of sea-based strategic cruise missiles. We have said 1000; you have said 600. This is the range. This is not a great difference. But to put a limit on it not only goes beyond Vladivostok but is a significant concession. We have said we will not deploy strategic cruise missiles.

On cruise missiles on aircraft, we have accepted a range limit.

Thirdly, the reason we are reluctant to accept your position on cruise missiles is that bombers have been counted as a unit. Bombers can carry 10 bombs, or a substantial number of bombs. So all bombers can carry more than one weapon. This is inherent in bombers. So whether we deliver it by a missile or drop it, the strategic significance is not very different.

The reason we do it obviously is because of your very heavy air defenses. But we have agreed on no ABM defense. We can agree on no air defense. We can change our position on air-launched cruise missiles. I am giving you our position. I am not making a specific proposal.

So we have accepted a range limit on air-launched missiles, on sea-based missiles, and a ban on ballistic missiles on surface ships. And I would like to point out that we have progressively reduced the ranges, and we have made a major effort to meet some of your concerns.

We will study what you have said and we will see whether we can take more of your concerns into account and will make a serious proposal Sunday night.

But I wanted to explain our reasoning for you and your colleagues. We have accepted severe range limits on air-launched and sea-based missiles, and we will come to agreement on missiles on heavy bombers. We are concerned about your air defense; we are not trying to open up a new area for strategic competition.

On entry into force, we will find a compromise solution.
There are a lot of other issues I don’t want to raise. So I will look at the Backfire and the others and I will give you some ideas, perhaps with concrete numbers, when I see you Sunday.

Gromyko: Good. Good.

Kissinger: The press will be downstairs.

Gromyko: How many times should I speak to the press in the United States? Maybe I will do it at the end of the evening. So now I can go to the roof and parachute down. [laughter]

Kissinger: We can take you out through the basement. But it will ... I can say something.

Gromyko: If you met with them alone, they might think Gromyko was angry.

Kissinger: I would prefer you say something. Say we continued a detailed review of SALT positions.

Gromyko: Let’s perhaps be very brief. List the headings we discussed. There was only one question. If we are to mention it, I will probably say we discussed the problem. Naturally, both sides considered that the Vladivostok understanding is a very good basis for an agreement. Each meeting, including a meeting of the Ministers, is useful and is a step forward in the direction of working out an agreement.

Kissinger: That is absolutely enough, and would be very good.

Gromyko: Then I would close my eyes. Or maybe one eye.

Kissinger: I will move my lips while you are speaking. [laughter] I will say the same thing. There was a detailed review; it was a useful discussion.

Gromyko: If there is a question regarding the visit, I will make reference to yesterday’s statement⁵ and say I have nothing to add.

Kissinger: All right.

Gromyko: That there is no concrete basis for a precise date.

Kissinger: I will say the same thing and add two points—that we had a detailed discussion and I agree it was a useful meeting.

[The meeting concluded at 6:04 p.m. The Secretary accompanied the Foreign Minister downstairs. Their brief remarks to the press are attached.]⁶

⁵ See footnote 5, Document 192.
⁶ Not attached and not found.
194. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, September 19, 1975, 6:17–6:50 p.m.

**SUBJECT**

SALT

**PARTICIPANTS**

The Secretary  
The Counselor  
Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson  
William G. Hyland, Director, INR  
Jan Lodal, NSC  
John H. Kelly—C (Notetaker)

Kissinger: That was not the most exalted meeting I have ever been in. [A reference to the just concluded meeting with Gromyko.]\(^2\) Both sides are just digging in. Our position is impossible. Over the last 15 months, we have made no concessions. They made a massive concession on FBS at Vladivostok. Now they have conceded on verification. We just keep on inventing things to put in the agreement. Two years ago, I couldn’t even get Defense to agree to put a cruise missiles on a 747 or a bomber.

Sonnenfeldt: Gromyko wanted to know if we agree to ban cruise missiles from the ocean floor.

Kissinger: Of course, we agree. We hadn’t even conceived that anyone would want to put cruise missiles on the ocean floor. We’ve got a massive problem with these escalating cruise missile programs.

Johnson: Did you make any progress on Backfire?

Kissinger: The Backfire issue is a fraud. If the Backfire is strategic, then our Forward Based Systems (FBS) are strategic. Both can hit the other on one-way missions. Since Backfire cannot reach us, they can use our argument with which we exclude FBS. To try to include Backfire is an outrage.

Johnson: Yes, Backfire is one issue that seems non-negotiable. If it were included, the Soviets would have to cut even more to reach 2400. My thought has always been to deal with Backfire through non-circumvention and assurances.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, July–Oct. 1975. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Kelly. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s office. According to an unidentified note in the margin: “JK[elly] says HS[onnenfeldt] does not need to see.”

\(^2\) See Document 193.
Kissinger: There are two ways of dealing with this. One is the Schlesinger approach, which is impossible. The Soviets will never give us written assurance not to raise FBS in SALT III. If Schlesinger goes to Jackson on this, he will raise hell.

Johnson: Cruise missiles are going to stir up a storm with the Doves on the Hill. I don’t see why we need it.

Kissinger: Schlesinger thinks he needs the SLCM so he can hit Murmansk in case the Soviets invade Northern Norway.

Sonnenfeldt: He can use Poseidon.

Kissinger: He doesn’t know what to use the other warheads on Poseidon for. He says he does not want to use nuclear weapons. He wants to use a conventional cruise missile. That won’t do any good. He can’t destroy anything with that.

Sonnenfeldt: Their studies indicate that the conventional cruise missile will have a zero CEP.

Lodal: But there is no chance in putting one 2000-pound HE warhead on Murmansk.

Kissinger: It would be criminal to drop an HE warhead with a five million dollar platform on Russia, but he says the cruise missile will only cost 800 thousand dollars.

Lodal: That’s ridiculous. It will cost more than that.

Kissinger: How much will it cost?

Lodal: I would guess a couple of million dollars.

Kissinger: Can you do a cost effectiveness study for me?

Lodal: Yes.

Kissinger: I want you to do a cost effectiveness study on how much it would cost to take out the docks in Murmansk. Take a look at his other case, too, which is Iran.

Hyland: If he wants a single warhead, why not keep the Polaris A–1 on station?

Kissinger: It’s ludicrous to think that if the Soviets invaded Norway, all we would do would be to destroy the docks in Murmansk.

Sonnenfeldt: Schlesinger’s theory is that this is a godsend to keep nuclear wars limited to small exchanges.

Kissinger: This is a road to strategic disaster. If Schlesinger goes on down this road of blurring the distinction between conventional and nuclear armed cruise missiles, we will not build a breakout capability. The Soviets will build interchangeable warheads so they can break out anytime they want. If they put a 2000-kilometer ALCM on a Badger aircraft, that old klunker will have a significant strategic capability. These cruise missiles will enable the Soviets to saturate the US with their medium bomber force. This will enable the Soviets to solve the fratricide
problem. They would follow the ballistic missiles with cruise missiles. It would be a nightmare, and Schlesinger admitted it would be. This is really a Kabuki play, it will make no difference in the end. Then there is the Ikle idea of trading Backfire against SLCM platforms. He has to be nuts if he thinks the Soviets would trade 300 planes against 300 ships.

Johnson: Does he want to trade the Backfire against the platform or the individual SLCM?

Sonnenfeldt: The platform.

Kissinger: That’s nuts. Trading 400 Backfire against 400 SLCM platforms means a virtually unlimited threat against the Soviets. I thought maybe we could accept the 600 kilometers on SLCMs. [To Johnson] Are you going to share all of this with your delegation? One of our problems is that you read private instructions to everybody on your delegation.

Johnson: No, no. I tried that once to try to take care of a problem. It won’t happen again.

Kissinger: Schlesinger wants us to trade Backfire against our 75 FB–111s and 200 SLCMs. Will the Soviets buy?

Johnson: I don’t know.

Hyland: The Soviets feel they can sweat it out to the end. Gromyko is under no pressure now to make any concessions.

Johnson: What do we get for the 375 Backfire?

Kissinger: We get eyewash for Congress.

Johnson: Congress will say that makes a new ceiling on the aggregate.

Sonnenfeldt: I can conceive of Congress ratifying the treaty but voting against cruise missiles.

Lodal: Congress will say the agreement is an engine of proliferation.

Kissinger: If we have no new SALT agreement by winter, Congress may solve the cruise missile problem for us.

Hyland: Can we really trade 300 Backfire against 200 SLCMs?

Kissinger: If you take Schlesinger’s position, which is wrong, because he makes no distinction between conventional and nuclear armed cruise missiles, and then ban cruise missiles on all aircraft but heavy bombers . . .

Lodal: Schlesinger may not want . . .

Hyland: Schlesinger doesn’t want nuclear warheads on any ALCMs except those on heavy bombers.

Lodal: But the FB–111s are already equipped with a nuclear SRAM, so that’s nutty.
Kissinger: Is Schlesinger willing to have no nuclear armed cruise missiles on any aircraft except heavy bombers?
Lodal: He’s willing to seek some sort of mutual assurances.
Hyland: Under this approach, would Backfire and SLCMs be outside the agreement?
Kissinger: Yes, these are hybrid systems. I thought up the 200 SLCMs.
Hyland: What do we do on ALCMs?
Kissinger: We could tell the Russians that we will accept a 600-kilometer ALCM limit on all aircraft but heavy bombers. But when should we surface the nuclear versus conventional arming? If I can sign Schlesinger on for a deal without a cruise missile definition, he will then have a vested interest in the deal. How can we tell the Soviets that conventional cruise missiles would run free? How could they be sure we would play it straight?
Sonnenfeldt: Especially after the cobra toxin publicity.
Hyland: There is no way to verify which is nuclear armed and which is conventional.
Kissinger: We should get the proposal on the table with no reference to the conventional armed angle. If they don’t accept it, there is no harm done. If they do accept it, then we can send it to Geneva and table the definition. Then the President can overrule Defense so we can compromise with the Soviets.
Sonnenfeldt: It will be very tough to overrule Defense after we have tabled a proposal.
Kissinger: It is very tough to overrule Defense now. When we go to Geneva with this, they will say it is the first time we have mentioned the conventional angle.
Lodal: We can reduce the range.
Kissinger: We’ll be driven back to low ranges for conventional warheads. Alex can table this, the Soviets will scream, and we can go back to range issues.
Lodal: One of the problems is that Schlesinger does not know his own programs. The only sensible program is the RPV.
Sonnenfeldt: Someone better get some studies on this terminal guidance system.
Kissinger: If we give the Soviets 600 kilometers on SLCMs and on cruise missiles other than heavy bombers, and limit the number of heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs, the Soviets get quite a bit. We

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3 During a Congressional investigation of CIA abuses in September, it was revealed that the CIA had maintained a small stock of biological weapons, including cobra venom.
will have tough sledding on the nuclear versus conventional arming, but if the HE warhead reduces the range so much it may drive ALCMs back. We need a cost effectiveness study. I’ll give Gromyko these ideas. We are meeting them on lots of points. If they plan to build 375 Backfire, then offering them 300 outside the agreement is not bad. We can trade those off against SLCMs and the FB–111. We will hold all SLCMs at 600 kilometers except the 200 which will be matched against Backfire.

Lodal: Are we going to permit the 200 SLCMs outside the 2400?
Kissinger: We might agree to count them in the aggregate. We will have room since we won’t build to 2400 anyway.

Hyland: Would the Soviets have freedom to choose between Backfire and SLCMs?
Kissinger: No, they can’t have SLCMs between 600 and 2000 kilometers. We can.

Hyland: We can ban ALCMs above the range limit and above 600 on aircraft other than heavy bombers.
Sonnenfeldt: We could even improve on that. We’ll have quite a few unfilled positions in the 2400 with which we could count ALCMs.

Johnson: What about ICCMs?
Kissinger: They will stay as it is, but I might tell Gromyko that we would be willing to drop down to 3000 kilometers. I can’t imagine why the Soviets accepted 5500 kilometers on ICCMs.

Johnson: The Germans want to build surface-to-surface conventional cruise missiles.
Kissinger: Surface-to-surface conventional cruise missiles are a fraud. They are only good for one thing—nuclear warheads.

Sonnenfeldt: By leaving the ICCM range unchanged, DOD can get all the development they want for cruise missiles.
Kissinger: Why don’t they use the cruise missiles for Murmansk from land instead of putting them on F-4s? They could put the land-based cruise missile in Norway.
Lodal: They could build recoverable cruise missiles.
Kissinger: Do we have a chance of selling this package?
Sonnenfeldt: I don’t think so, not after the discussion of silo modification.
Johnson: Did you get into that today?
Kissinger: Gromyko just doesn’t understand silo dimensions. He says they will accept 32 percent, that they will not widen the dimensions, but he claims they are permitted to go straight down forever. Either Gromyko is a pain in the neck or they’re developing a new long, skinny missile.
Johnson: Why the hassle?
Kissinger: If the Soviets give in on throw-weight, we can give them the silo dimension.
Sonnenfeldt: But if we don’t get throw-weight, then we need them.
Hyland: We know from an intercept that Brezhnev checked on the size of their new missiles in 1972. They knew the dimension meant 15 percent in either direction. They have not exceeded that.
Kissinger: I’ll tell Gromyko we’ll take throw-weight in return for the silo dimensions.

195. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, September 19, 1975, 8:15–10:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief, USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., American Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, September 18–21, 1975—Talks with Gromyko. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. All brackets are in the original. The dinner meeting was held in the Monroe–Madison Room at the Department of State.
SUBJECTS
Cyprus; CTB and Ban on New Systems; Korea; MBFR; Middle East

Sisco: Did you hear the story of Malik and Moynihan? Moynihan said to him after the Special Session speech: “You see, we've learned to give Presidium-length speeches.” Malik said, “Yes, but have you learned to get Presidium-length applause?” [Laughter] I think it was Moynihan.

The Foreign Minister has given more General Assembly speeches than anyone.
Kissinger: Every single one?
Gromyko: [thinks] I think so. But not every Special Session. Not this last one.
Sonnenfeldt: When you were in the Oval Office, you had been there before anyone else.
Kissinger: By far.
Gromyko: When Roosevelt was there I first was there. When I presented my credentials. What did we talk about? About the forthcoming Yalta Conference.
I had my papers and a set speech. And he had a speech. He said: “They'll be published an hour from now, so let's forget it.” So neither of us delivered any speech. [Laughter]
Kissinger: Was he in good health?
Gromyko: Not in very good health.
Kissinger: Particularly after Yalta, he was in poor health.
Gromyko: At Yalta he spent one day in bed. Stalin, Molotov and I visited him in his room.
Gromyko: You still doubt the existence of Leningrad?
Kissinger: Absolutely.
Gromyko: Then in what city did our Revolution begin?
Kissinger: St. Petersburg. [Laughter]
Gromyko: Recognized! Recognized!
Kissinger: It would have been interesting if Lenin, for some reason, hadn't made it. Because in the top leadership, there were very few who wanted to make a Revolution. It was his will power, really.
Gromyko: It raises an interesting question about the role of personality.
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: But the trend of the times was towards that. Timing maybe. Most were in favor of Lenin’s view.
Kissinger: Because of his personality. He drove them to it.
Sonnenfeldt: In the State Department we deny the role of personality. [Laughter]
Kissinger: True.
Hyland: Objective factors!
Gromyko: There was an interesting book by a Marxist, Plekhanov, on the role of personality.\(^2\) The monistic view of history.
Kissinger: It is an interesting question, for Marxists, because there have been so many developments in the history of Marxism that were produced by strong personalities.
Gromyko: But Marxism doesn’t deny the role of personality. Maybe this will help the State Department. [Laughter]
Stoessel: Time will tell!
Sisco: It was also true in the birth of our Nation, our Revolution.

Cyprus

Gromyko: Is there anything new on the Cyprus problem now?
Kissinger: I don’t think much can happen until our Congress has acted on Turkish aid and Turkey has its election.
Sisco: And Cyprus wants to go through a General Assembly exercise.
Kissinger: What will be your position on Denktash?
Gromyko: On what?
Kissinger: If he comes.
Gromyko: It is impossible for two speakers to come and speak for the same state.
Hartman: It’s in the Political Committee.
Gromyko: But it’s one state. Cyprus is a member of the General Assembly, not Cypruses. It will be the most unusual thing.
Kissinger: [smiles] You’ll have a tough decision to make if Congress doesn’t lift the ban.
Gromyko: In what way?
Kissinger: Whether to move towards Turkey or the other way.
Dobrynin: What is the other way?
Kissinger: Towards Greece.
There are no negotiations going on now.
Gromyko: I read they were stopped in New York.
Hartman: Effectively suspended.
Kissinger: Is there a date for resumption?

Hartman: After the Turkish elections.
Gromyko: It’s not very encouraging, not very encouraging.
Hartman: It’s very bad.
Gromyko: I’ve met Makarios but not Denktash.
Kissinger: I’ve never met him. When we were there,3 Makarios asked me to help with the communal problem. I said “That’s one problem I’ll never touch.” Two months later it blew up.
Gromyko: In that palace . . .
Sisco: He escaped through the back door.
Dobrynin: Sometimes it’s helpful to have a back door!
Kissinger: I don’t know what the Greeks expected to accomplish by that coup. Because enosis would never be accepted.

Comprehensive Test Ban and Ban on New Systems

Gromyko: In your speech, will you propose anything for the agenda?
Kissinger: No. If we did, we would tell you. Will you?
Gromyko: One we already proposed.
Kissinger: The complete test ban.
Gromyko: Yes. We may add another, which I wanted to tell you: the banning of new types of weapons. We discussed this before.
Kissinger: I remember. I don’t understand what you have in mind.
Gromyko: New systems of mass destruction, new kinds of weapons.
Kissinger: What would be your definition of new systems?
Gromyko: In a sense broader, in a sense narrower than new types of weapons. Generally, when we are asked, our answer is: If and when concrete negotiations take place, we’ll be ready with the details.
Kissinger: When you build that new missile that’s 32% deeper than other missiles, is that a new system? [Laughter]
Kissinger: Does “new” mean new for a country or new in the world?
Gromyko: That did not exist in the world. It will be negotiated.
Kissinger: So India can build missiles up to the SS–19, or planes up to B–1.

3 Kissinger and Gromyko met in Nicosia, Cyprus, on May 7, 1974, to discuss Soviet-American relations and the Middle East. See footnote 2, Document 34.
Gromyko: That can be discussed too. We won’t say that from the first discussion in the Assembly we worked out a complete proposal. It’s subject to negotiation.

_Korea_

Kissinger: The only thing we’re thinking of proposing is a four-power arrangement to replace the [Korean] Armistice Agreement if the UN Command is abolished. I don’t think it will be accepted.

Gromyko: We would put it in general, our proposal.

Kissinger: I’ll have to think about it.

Gromyko: You rightly mention about the spreading.

Kissinger: That’s more interesting to me than that others prevent us. If it’s about our armaments, we should discuss it in SALT. If it’s about the whole world, it’s a matter of defining what is new.

Sisco: Will you be submitting a resolution?

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: [rises with his glass] Your visits here are regular now, Mr. Foreign Minister. And that shows the role that our two countries have in keeping the peace and in building a constructive environment for the world. We have in the past two years made our meetings regular features of the international landscape, and we attach great importance to this relationship. Even if events do not often go as smoothly as one of us may want, the trend is clear. We will work so that history will look back on this as the period when this became permanent. As one who was one of its architects, you are always welcome here. So, I propose a toast to the Foreign Minister, to our relationship and to the friendship of the Soviet and American peoples. [All toast]

Gromyko: Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your very kind words. They are very close to our own thinking. There are indeed no few questions that require our consideration and discussion. And even now when we have traversed an important road in the last years, a great effort is required to resolve important issues. The first is the need to prepare and elaborate a new agreement on SALT. And I would like to emphasize that our interest in this has not diminished, absolutely. We believe—and this is the view of General Secretary Brezhnev personally—that a new agreement would have a tremendous importance for our relationship and for the entire world. And we are prepared to have solutions on every question that is before the Soviet Union and the United States; the inventory of issues doesn’t boil down to the one I mentioned. And as before, we would like to go on discussing these issues at all levels, including the Foreign Minister level.

I want to thank you for the hospitality here in Washington. I had a very useful meeting yesterday with the President. And whenever you are willing to meet with us, we are always ready.
So, I propose a toast to the Secretary of State, to further successes in this field, to the further development of our relations, and to all your colleagues and co-workers and assistants in this room.

Kissinger: Those are my sentiments exactly. This is a task to which we must devote ourselves.

MBFR

Before we turn to our main subject, do you have any ideas on the direction we might take in Vienna? Or is the present framework . . .?

Gromyko: First, some time ago you will recall you intimated to me, in Vienna or in Geneva, that you were considering discussing in the framework of the Vienna talks new types of arms. Notice I don’t say “new systems”! But since then we have seen nothing new in the Western positions. So we come to the conclusion there is no new Western view.

That is my first point. My second point is: we feel now that what is being demanded of us by the Western side is completely unjust. All these bargaining points—and that’s what they are—are impossible. We are told we have too many tanks. And we should just take them out—just for a thank you. And all this is called a mutually advantageous agreement. Maybe I’m exaggerating a little bit, but all this really conveys the spirit of what is happening in Vienna.

Now my third point is: It may well be that soon we may have the urge to discuss this again, maybe on a bilateral basis with the United States, before we decide on what further steps we may take in Vienna. I don’t want to be ahead of myself, but this may happen.

Kissinger: It is not excluded.

Gromyko: Not excluded.

Kissinger: Its rejection is not guaranteed. I’m practicing double negatives. But I’m a minor leaguer!

Can I interpret your beginning remarks about nuclear weapons to mean that if this were included, our proposals might look less unequal?

Gromyko: We said in Vienna that it would certainly facilitate matters if there could be a broader approach, both with the number of states involved and the types of arms. But it seems not to have been developed further.

Kissinger: We are studying it, and the possibility of including it is not excluded.

Regarding your third point, we would be interested in bilateral exchanges on that before major steps are taken in Vienna, because it might facilitate matters.

Gromyko: Good. Well, then, when and where do we take up the main question?
Kissinger: We can take it up now.
Gromyko: Let’s do it.

Middle East

Kissinger: I thought if I raised another subject, you might forget about the Middle East.
Gromyko: You’re the last one to visit the Middle East, so perhaps you’d like to tell us something. [Laughter]
Kissinger: I have said my views on this, including publicly. Our objectives in the Egyptian-Israeli negotiation were several: First, to prevent a situation in the Middle East where a stalemate would lead to such frustration that it could lead to another war. Second, to make some progress in order to unlock the possibility for further progress.

We seriously considered an overall approach, for some months. For a variety of reasons, including domestic, we decided that it wouldn’t work. As I explained in my speech the other day [at Cincinnati], we have always considered that the step-by-step approach would merge eventually into a comprehensive approach.

Could we turn the air conditioning on?
The presence of the Soviet Foreign Minister activates so many other electronic devices—to photograph you, tape you, and give you a medical examination, that it overloads the circuit. [Laughter]
Gromyko: [to Dobrynin] What we suspected was true! [Laughter]
Kissinger: There are two ways we can proceed. One is by encouraging a negotiation between Syria and Israel. And/or reactivating the Geneva Conference. Or something in between, like intensive consultations with the parties outside the framework of the Conference, leading eventually to reconvening the Conference.

We are prepared to consult seriously with you to consider the feasibility of these approaches, or any other you might think useful. We have no intention of pursuing the conclusion of these negotiations as a solo American effort. So the only question is how to proceed now, what might be discussed, what could succeed and what possibility exists for contacts between us or between the parties. A Syrian step or an overall step, or an overall that might include as a first step Syria—all these are possibilities, and we have reached no conclusion. As I’ve communicated with you and said publicly, we are prepared to discuss all of this with you.

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4 Kissinger delivered an address, “Global Peace, the Middle East, and the United States,” on September 16 before a dinner meeting of the Greater Cincinnati Chamber of Commerce and other area organizations. For the text of the speech, see Department of State Bulletin, October 6, 1975, pp. 493–500.
[At 9:22 p.m. the party moves out of the dining room to the larger room, where the doors are opened to let in some ventilation.]

Gromyko: I have a question, Mr. Secretary. Do you have any specific plan in the Middle East from now on? Of late you have been making frequent references to the Geneva Conference. You just now expressed the possibility of conducting affairs there with the broad participation of relevant other countries. So, do you have a plan? Or maybe you don’t have a thought-out plan? I have a second question.

Kissinger: You’re counting on my vanity never to admit I haven’t a plan.

Gromyko: While you’re always adding to my difficulties, I want to make your situation easier. [Laughter]

My second question is: insofar as the Geneva Conference is concerned, how do you think it can be reconvened and conduct its deliberations? How could it be, so to speak, constitutionalized? How should it be reconvened, or reactivated?

Kissinger: With respect to your first question, we do not have a fixed unchangeable plan. We have some ideas. As soon as our sanity is restored, for example, we could encourage some sort of negotiation with Syria and Israel, some sort of arrangement on the Golan Heights to continue the steps in the Sinai. If they are interested. We told President Asad we might encourage it if they are interested. It would be difficult, like the last one, but not impossible. The Israeli statements are not encouraging, but they are never encouraging at the beginning. That’s one approach. With all the participants in the last war having gotten something, there is a possibility for Geneva.

The other approach is more comprehensive. I have no detailed idea. If, for example, one did not want to reconvene Geneva immediately, because of its formality and complexity, it wouldn’t be excluded to have informal meetings of the co-chairmen, and then meetings with the parties. I have no precise proposal.

You ask how it could be organized. If it is reconstituted, the easiest way would be to reconstitute it first with the participants who were there the last time, without prejudice to other possible participants later. This would enable it to begin, leaving the possibility of other participants to come later.

These are some ideas.

Gromyko: With respect to the Geneva Conference, right now we have a very poor understanding as to how the Geneva Conference could be reconvened, in view of the situation that has taken shape after the separate agreement between Egypt and Israel, with you as intermediary and with your active participation. What is the situation now?
The Syrians now are not prepared to take part in the Geneva Conference.

Kissinger: Have you asked them?

Gromyko: Yes. We have been in contact with them and it is our impression the Syrians are not prepared to take part, given the present situation.

The second point is the Palestinians have their own position, and their own proposals regarding the situation in the Middle East. They claim—and we feel they have every right—the right to take part in a reconstituted Geneva Conference. We feel that unless this is resolved there is no possibility for fruitful work of the Conference.

So, on the one hand, there is the question of the Palestinians. We know less about the position of Jordan, but, as far as we know, Jordan is not enthusiastic about the work of the Conference. But I can’t vouch for them.

So what kind of Conference is it if the Syrians and the Palestinians don’t participate? Who will participate? The partners in the deal that took place without us, for the reasons you know? Egypt, Israel, and the United States? Such is the situation. If you have opinions on this, tell us. According to our information, that is the situation now in the Middle East.

Kissinger: But . . .

Gromyko: That’s my first point. My second point is . . .

Kissinger: Excuse me.

Gromyko: My second point is: If I understand you correctly, you do allow the possibility of undertaking something outside the scope of the Conference but with the participation of a broad circle of participants, and probably you’re thinking of the Soviet Union and the United States as well.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: But what kind of action outside the Geneva Conference and in a broad circle are you visualizing? And how would such a mechanism actually operate? You say the United States is ready to consult with the Soviet Union. We are ready to consult with you and always have been. The hitch hasn’t been on our side. We are always ready to consult and we have always said the two powers have not used their full powers in this matter. But we do rule out the possibility of having a reconstituted Geneva Conference in which the participants would be the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt and Israel and probably Jordan, but not Syria and the Palestinians. It would be one thing if the Syrians and Palestinians said they wouldn’t mind to have the question discussed by those, without them, but I’m sure you’ll agree that’s highly unlikely.
In terms of a profound consideration of this problem, we believe the United States and the Soviet Union could utilize their contacts with other parties and jointly or separately use their contacts to encourage a settlement. And we are prepared to do that. But in the past, whenever you say you are ready to engage in joint efforts, several weeks after this understanding it just broke up in the air. We don’t take a dogmatic approach. We want to see what can be done.

The third point: We do not approve of what has been done in the Middle East recently. As I told the President, there will be no campaign. But we do not approve of what has been done on a separatist basis. Because Arab territory is still occupied by Israel—even if a small part has been given up. We have said on various levels, including the level of the General Secretary and the President, that the Middle East doesn’t only have an Arab-Israeli aspect but an international aspect. So even if one Arab state said that it would sacrifice one part of its territory for peace, we would not accept that. We would not accept the situation where an aggressor could be given a prize for his aggression. So even if some Arab state were to say: “Due to circumstances that it’s impossible to regain all our territories, we are compelled to sacrifice part of our territory,” we would regard this as unfair and we could not accept a situation where an aggressor could get a prize for aggression. Because involved here is a broader international aspect, and involved here are many other countries’ interests, not only in the Middle East.

You have been aware all along of our readiness for joint measures and to act jointly in all questions regarding the Middle East problem. But evidently other considerations, narrower considerations, got the upper hand in your thinking.

So we should do some more thinking, and after this meeting we should visualize further consultations on what should be done. If you are prepared to make a change in your position, as evidenced by what was done, then perhaps there is a possibility for something still to be done and on a joint basis.

It’s up to you to let us know how it can be done.

Kissinger: With respect to Geneva, we are prepared to reconvene but we do not insist on it. If there is no basis for reconvening, then it shouldn’t be done. We have not asked the parties about it, and this would have to be the first step. So what you say about Syria is unfamiliar to us. My experience with Syria—which is not as extensive as yours—is that you shouldn’t always take their first word as the last. It is not implausible, knowing them, that for a few weeks they’ll take this position.

I agree with you, Mr. Foreign Minister, there is no sense convening the Geneva Conference with only the United States, Soviet Union, Egypt, Israel and Jordan.
Gromyko: How can it take place without Syria and the Palestinians? The Soviet Union will be out too.

Kissinger: We will not attend the Geneva Conference without the Soviet Union; that is a firm decision. This strengthens my case. I agree, it is unlikely that Syria and the Palestinians will ask us to hold it without them.

As I told you privately this afternoon, the Palestinian question is an extremely difficult one for us, and if that is the precondition of starting it, it can’t start. We believe it is a discussable subject if it reconvenes with the present participants and considers other participants. Maybe we can ask the Syrians, if you don’t object.

Maybe we can discuss having an informal conference, broader than Geneva but outside it.

After all, the consumer-producer conference now is beginning with a preparatory conference. It’s not an unheard-of diplomatic phenomenon.

Your third point. I must say I was a little surprised to hear the Soviet Union wouldn’t accept it if one Arab state decided to modify its frontiers. We haven’t heard any Arab state that said it would do so, and we have not proposed it to any Arab state. But I always thought that you supported the ’67 frontiers but if one Arab state modified its position you would support it. It may be a purely theoretical question, because there is no Arab state that would.

Gromyko: We support the 1967 frontiers.

Kissinger: I know, but it’s a new position to state that if one Arab state made a change you would not accept it. That is new, and if carried out, will be an interesting statement.

You say you think we act on narrow considerations. I have explained to you and to your Ambassador: We don’t want to be involved in a purely theoretical exercise. We have always thought that to move in attainable stages would move us more easily towards solutions. Rather than have a theoretical exercise that proved impossible.

This gives us no special advantage, because the history of the Middle East shows how relationships are transitory. Especially because friendships in the Middle East are expensive, and usually express themselves in money. In order to avoid pressures, political and economic, there had to be some progress. And there could be progress only by the methods we used. We did it to promote progress. I said it publicly, and I will reiterate it. It is not inconsistent with your position. Your approach has been to state general principles, and our approach has been to make concrete progress.

\(^5\) See footnote 2, Document 193.
Are we serious? It was us, not you, that initiated the present discussions.

Gromyko: But before.

Kissinger: You’ve done it often. But this latest exchange was initiated by us. But I agree, in light of our discussion, we should perhaps begin a more intensive discussion between us. I’ve told you we are encouraging a negotiation between Syria and Israel, but not with overwhelming rapidity. So there is time for an exchange of ideas. We can meet again. Your Ambassador and I could meet. Or Sisco and your Ambassador could resume their discussions. Or whomever you designate.

Gromyko: Of course we are prepared to discuss the substance of these matters, first and foremost the substance. We have been talking up to now about methods, forms—even this evening—not territories, a Palestinian state. So if we really want to promote a Palestine settlement, isn’t it high time we discussed the matters at hand? You proposed discussions outside of the Geneva Conference, with a broader circle, but how do you contemplate this? If it’s a conference outside a Conference, surely the Syrians and Palestinians won’t participate. So how will it take place? How do you solve a question that interests the Syrians and Palestinians?

This isn’t the first time we’ve had the United States say the Palestinians should be in the Conference at some later stage after it’s reconvened. But how do you do it in practice? But how do you find a solution to the Palestinian problem? Perhaps there will be some correction in your position. What is your substantive position? They have a problem, and practically the whole world supports them. Where is the question of their statehood? A solution to the substantive part of the Palestinian question?

Kissinger: In all frankness, as we conduct our discussions, both of us have the possibility of putting before the other positions that one can’t fulfill and to use them to embarrass the other. Our problems with the Palestinian question are obvious, and I say this to every Arab leader. I never promise what I can’t deliver. We can’t change our position on the Palestinian problem. It’s a proposition with which the Palestinians will have to get used. They’ll have to accept the framework in which progress can be made.

Borders, guarantees—we all know the agenda. But where do we go? We have in the past been unable to cooperate because the goal of the discussion wasn’t clear. A discussion must take into account—I’ll be frank—our possibilities. We say this to the Arabs. Any discussion that doesn’t take this into account will lead to concern on our part that it’s only being done to embarrass us.
The question of the Palestinians to us is a very complicated one, which requires some evolution. It’s simple as far as you’re concerned.

Whether the Syrians would cooperate in Geneva or outside the Geneva framework, I’m not so sure. The worst mistake one can make in the Middle East is to accept anyone’s statement as conclusive the first time, or even the tenth time.

I have the impression the Syrians are interested in a negotiation. They haven’t said it explicitly. I have the impression they’ll do it without the direct participation of the Palestinians. They’ll find some way to do it—a Joint Command, or some way. I’m just reading between the lines. Then, if they’re interested in a negotiation, in what framework will it be? We are prepared to exchange ideas with them, and with you, and we’ll keep you informed.

We are at the point where a decision can be made. In the spring, the options were narrowed. Today, we have more maneuvering room. There are many possibilities, including intensive discussions with you.

How should it be constituted? We two could invite the parties. There are many ways it could be done.

Gromyko: Let us agree, then, to continue our consultations on various levels, on the Ambassadorial level, or if needed, the Foreign Minister level. Bilateral consultations. But with the understanding that these should relate not only to methods, forms and approaches, but to the substance of the matter at hand.

On the substance, let us agree the discussion will not circumvent the Syrians or Palestinians, so that if they object to an exchange of view without them it won’t be done. But if they agree, consultations will proceed. I’m not saying that without Egypt and Jordan it can be done.

Kissinger: And Israel. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Of course. It goes without saying. Unless the United States objects.

Kissinger: To Israel participating?

It adds excitement to the exercise. [Laughter]

Gromyko: To ignore the views of Syria and the Palestinians would mean marking time without any progress whatsoever. It’s a cliche, but we should continue our consultations. You seem more optimistic regarding participation of the Palestinians and the Syrians.

Kissinger: Syria. I know nothing about the Palestinians.

Gromyko: But there should be complete clarity about one thing: circumvention of the Syrians and Palestinians would mean no productive consultations without their consent, and no productive reconvening of Geneva could be contemplated.

Can we agree the United States and the Soviet Union will from now on return to the formula that was agreed on previously but sus-
tained a failure, namely that we will act in concert for a solution to the Middle East issue? Or do you feel it’s too early and it can’t be considered at this point? If you agree, we should agree on who should meet and when to resume consultations—I don’t mean the exact date. To resume where we leave off.

Kissinger: With respect to your first point: We, of course, have no contact with the Palestinians, and therefore we are generically conducting our policy without consultation with the Palestinians. So that part of your presentation we can’t accept. Inherently.

We have the highest regard for President Asad and we will do nothing to the detriment or isolation of Syria. So we agree to the proposition that we will do nothing without consultation with Syria. All the more so as we’ve said the next negotiation, if there is no overall approach, would be a Syrian-Israeli negotiation which would, of course, require Syrian participation.

We are, of course, prepared for serious discussion of what steps could be taken. Perhaps Sunday, after we’ve had time to think a bit, we could discuss where and what meetings could take place.

Gromyko: Let’s return to the matter on Sunday, then. To specify the point under discussion.

How many more problems do we have to discuss tonight? Five?

Kissinger: I’m willing to surrender. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Conditionally? Unconditionally? [Laughter]

Kissinger: You wouldn’t accept an unconditional surrender! Have you any topics?

Gromyko: No, we could adjourn now.

Kissinger: So, 8:00 Sunday.

Dobrynin: 7:30. Is it convenient?

Kissinger: Let me think. Let’s say 8:00. Because we may not get to New York on time.

Gromyko: 8 o’clock.

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6 September 21.
196. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 21, 1975, 9:30–11:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee, CPSU, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Member of the Collegium and Chief of USA Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Minister
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Yuliy M. Vorontsov, Minister-Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh, Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Yuriy E. Fokin, Special Assistant to the Minister
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Joseph J. Sisco, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
William G. Hyland, Director, INR
Jan M. Lodal, Director of Program Analysis, National Security Council Staff
Peter W. Rodman, National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT

SALT

Gromyko: Mr. Secretary, perhaps we might then, as we agreed, continue our discussion on the question before us. As I recall I was the last to speak at the last meeting, so perhaps you might want to develop your views. The question is how can we overcome the very serious difficulties we have encountered, and they are indeed substantial.

Kissinger: I assume we’re talking about strategic arms limitation, or is it true on every subject?

Gromyko: We agreed [to discuss SALT this time].

Kissinger: Yes. I gave you a detailed explanation of our thinking; I didn’t give you any concrete proposals. But basically what we’re trying...
to do is take into account the various ranges of cruise missiles, so those launched from ships couldn’t be considered strategic.

The best thing would be to give you some of our new considerations, and go on from there.

But before I do, let me make some general comments, one procedural and one substantive.

The procedural one is, if we want to keep open the option of a visit by the General Secretary around December 15, some progress should be made in October, so that we’re not running up against a deadline. If we stick to our plan of a visit by me in November, we should shift most of the issues to Geneva. I think this is very important.

The second issue is: You mentioned to the President that the visit can be delayed until the spring. I recognize we’ve come up against some issues that make it difficult to see how it will be concluded. We, of course, welcome a visit by the General Secretary anytime.

From the point of view of our election, a visit next year is better for us. But from the point of view of making an agreement, if we have an agreement next April or May, we will be accused of making every concession under the pressure of electoral considerations. Ratification would be in a very unpleasant atmosphere. If it runs into ’77, we run into the end of the Interim Agreement. So if it isn’t finished in December, we can finish it anytime.

But we consider these summits important to our relations.

And I think after this agreement, we should consider not gearing them to particular negotiations. The Soviet General Secretary and the President of the United States have much to talk about without an agreement.

In SALT, we have the problem of air-launched cruise missiles; we have the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles. On air-launched cruise missiles we have the problem of those on heavy bombers and those on non-strategic bombers. We have the Backfire, but that’s our problem. Silo dimensions, and definition of heavy missiles.

On the date the 2400 goes into effect, that’s not a major problem. You propose 12 months; we propose the date the agreement goes into effect. I am sure it will be solved.

What other issues are there?

Sonnenfeldt: The reductions negotiations.

Hyland: Noncircumvention.

Gromyko: Start of the other negotiations.

Kissinger: That should be in Geneva. On air-launched cruise missiles, your position is that above 600 kilometers they should be banned on planes except heavy bombers, and counted on heavy bombers.
Gromyko: Yes, on that issue, they should be banned on all aircraft except heavy bombers, but on those they should be counted.

Kissinger: Cruise missiles above 600 kilometers in range on aircraft other than heavy bombers should be banned, but those on heavy bombers should be counted.

Dobrynin: That’s right.

Kissinger: On ships, they should be banned above 600 kilometers.

Gromyko: Banned.

Kissinger: Backfire you don’t want to include.

Silo dimensions, you want to dig towards China.

Gromyko: Salvos?

Kissinger: Silos. You want to dig down. [Laughter] And you want to have the launching weight of missiles.

Let me go through our position. We will accept no cruise missiles above 600 kilometers on any plane except heavy bombers. So we accept your position. On heavy bombers, we have to maintain our position of 2500 kilometers but we are willing to limit the number of planes that will be equipped with cruise missiles above 2500 kilometers. We propose 300. We have about 600 bombers, so that’s about half.

We are prepared to ban those above 2500 kilometers. You wanted to count them. We propose to ban them. So it’s an attempt to come closer to your position.

On ships we accept 600 kilometers, with one proviso which I will explain.

With respect to Backfire, we have tried to think very hard, and we have tried to estimate what you’re likely to do, which may not be right, and we have tried to come up with a position that meets your concerns and some of ours, some of which are domestic.

We accept the General Secretary’s position that it is not a heavy bomber, but it is sort of a hybrid. We would like to propose—the number can be negotiated, but say 300 for purposes of discussion—that we could have 300 of such hybrid systems, in which we would propose to include 100 FB–111s. This would not be part of the 2400, by the way. It could be a separate protocol. One hundred FB–111s, and about 200 ship-launched cruise missiles of a range between 600 and 2000 kilometers. And any beyond 2000 kilometers would be banned.

So our proposal is that we create a separate category, of so-called hybrid systems, which we define as not being intended for strategic purposes. Two hundred of them between 600 and 2000 kilometers.

The numbers are negotiable. If the concept is acceptable . . . If the number is 300, if you wanted to have 200 Backfire, you could have 100
sea-launched cruise missiles. Each side could compose its 300 as it wanted.

This would be our basic proposal. I repeat, we have attempted to account for many of the considerations you’ve advanced. We have taken the Backfire out of the 2400. We have tried to estimate what you may do, which may not be right. If the concept is acceptable, we can work out the proportions.

So on sea-launched cruise missiles, the number of bombers carrying them, and taking Backfire out, and banning cruise missiles above 2500 kilometers on airplanes, we have also tried to take into account your considerations.

The way our forces are developing, there are four or five spaces where we could use cruise missiles above the 2500-kilometer range.

On silo dimensions and definition of heavy missiles. If we come to an agreement that we count both launching weight and throwweight together, then we could talk about silo dimension . . . that would not be such an issue of principle.

Here is a copy. [Tab A]3

I know you can’t give me an answer right away.

Gromyko [to Sukhodrev in Russian]: Translate it, and the figures.

[Sukhodrev translates aloud the paper at Tab A. They confer in Russian.]

Gromyko: First, I just wish to remind you of one fact: Our position on the question of verification—I say this because it is important and relevant to the whole issue and all elements of the agreement—will remain valid provided a solution is found on all the other questions on which we have come up against difficulties. So if there are other questions on which we have come up against difficulties, so our position on verification will become invalid.

Kissinger: I understand.

Gromyko: I just wanted to remind you. My second point is: As regards those new observations you have made, my first impression is that in your exposé there are some elements of clarification and some modification on some matters relating to cruise missiles. But you seem to be still clinging to those cruise missiles and you have not accepted our basic position of principle on these cruise missiles.

So, in short, this channel [of the arms race] is not cut off and it will continue to operate even if a new agreement is reached.

Kissinger: Which channel?

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Gromyko: Cruise missiles. In any case, those observations will require study and further discussion.

Three, on Backfire. At first glance your position is rather contradictory. On one hand you say you accept our statement that it’s not a heavy bomber, that it doesn’t have the characteristics inherent in a heavy bomber. That’s a positive aspect. On the other hand, you introduced quantitative limitations on their number; and at the same time, so that he doesn’t have too bad a deal [the Backfire] you throw in one of your comparable things to keep him company, so he won’t have too bad a time. You’re extending the Vladivostok agreement to other categories, one you call the hybrid system. To be consistent, since you accept that the Backfire isn’t a heavy bomber, it would be logical to conclude that the whole question simply drops off. As to your analogous systems, we are not raising this question, and we wouldn’t cry if our non-heavy bomber spent its life in a state of loneliness, without American companionship. And to add in cruise missiles would complicate things rather than facilitate them.

But on this, too, we will require further study and will give you a reply as soon as we have done so.

Kissinger: And make a counterproposal.

Gromyko: That will depend on the conclusion we draw.

Another matter that will require additional study on our part is your suggestion that a connection be made between the allowable increase in the volume of a silo and the criteria for the definition of heavy missile, that is to define it by both starting weight and throwweight.

Those will require study, and there are various aspects, including the purely technical.

Kissinger: On your various points, may I make a few observations.

We recognize that your acceptance of our verification criteria is linked to solutions of cruise missiles and other issues. If I don’t reiterate it, it’s because it’s understood.

Second, you say our proposal is to keep open the channel of cruise missiles. But it is also attempting to take account of some of your concerns.

First, however one interprets the Vladivostok agreement, there is no question that sea-launched cruise missiles are not included in it. So our willingness to include sea-launched cruise missiles is an attempt to meet your concern. Air-launched cruise missiles we have agreed to ban them over 2500, to limit those under 2500, and to ban them on other than heavy bombers. And fourth, by limiting the number of heavy bombers that can carry them.

Dobrynin: Are they included in the 2400?

Kissinger: They are included.
The only channel we keep open ... What we've given up is that under Vladivostok we could develop cruise missiles of any range and put them on heavy bombers as long as we count them. And that we've given up, and that is worth considering.

We have not kept the channel completely open. We have tried to meet your concerns, except one point.

On the Backfire, we didn’t say it is not a heavy bomber. We say we accept your assurance that it’s not intended as a heavy bomber.

Gromyko: It’s the same.

Kissinger: I’ll tell you our frank assessment. We believe it’s designed for peripheral missions, and that it has those characteristics. Unfortunately for the purposes of this agreement, your designers gave it a capacity for a greater range if you really want to. That’s why we call it a hybrid.

Gromyko: What is the range of the Phantom?
Kissinger: 500 to 600 miles.
Gromyko: 700.
Kissinger: The Phantom is much smaller.
Lodal [to Kissinger]: Depending on what it carries.
Sonnenfeldt [to Kissinger]: But it can’t reach there from the U.S.
Kissinger: We will trade you F–4s for Backfires.

Gromyko: If you want to be guided by that logic, even the Phantom can appropriately be listed in the category of a bomber that has a strategic purpose, while it is not strategic. Because from the Atlantic it can reach Soviet territory. One way, without coming back. So it’s a contradictory kind of logic.

Kissinger: On the Backfire, our thinking was to find a formulation, or concept, in which it is brought into relationship with other systems that are not basically strategic, such as short-range sea-launched cruise missiles, and to consider them with other planes which you didn’t mention. That plane we have already. It eases the situation here and it reflects the reality that there are some weapons that in an extremity can be used in a certain way even though not basically designed for it.

In your fourth point, you simply stated—correctly—the issue of definition of heavy missile and the issue of silo dimension and that we establish a sort of linkage.

In our proposal, if the concept is accepted, the numbers could be negotiated. Even the rate of deployment could be discussed, of certain categories of weapons.

Gromyko: Yes. The rate of deployment?
Kissinger: For example, suppose you accepted this concept of 300 against 300, we might agree not to deploy our 300 more rapidly than you deploy yours.
Dobrynin: Within the time of the agreement?  
Kissinger: Within the time of the agreement.  
Dobrynin: There is no other time period.  
Kissinger: But suppose you deployed only 100 Backfire by 1980. We wouldn’t deploy 300 by 1980.  
[The Russian side confers.]  
Gromyko: That was clarification.  
Kissinger: One other thing. When you compare the Phantom to the Backfire. The Backfire in its dimensions is almost indistinguishable from the Bison, which you have agreed to consider a heavy bomber.  
Gromyko: In its dimensions?  
Kissinger: Range.  
Gromyko: A stork has the same dimension as an eagle but it is not the same. Even the American eagle!  
Sonnenfeldt: The payload is different!  
Kissinger: No, in size, payload, range.  
Gromyko: Range? That is one of the weak points of your argument. Because it’s not the same range.  
Kissinger: Maybe we should sell you some engines. A plane that large . . .  
Dobrynin: The F–111 isn’t the same as the Bison.  
Gromyko: For some reason when the conversation gets around to display of the Phantom’s qualities in the Sinai, everyone praises it to the skies, but in negotiations everyone belittles them.  
Kissinger: No, they are excellent tactical aircraft.  
Dobrynin: And the Bison?  
Kissinger: The Bison isn’t a tactical aircraft. The Bison is like our B–47.  
Sonnenfeldt: Between Egypt and Israel the Phantom is strategic.  
Kissinger: Not the range. Not the payload.  
Gromyko: Let me say again that was my first reaction to your considerations. If we had more time at our disposal in our visit, we might meet again. But we need two or three days. So we’ll continue our exchanges in our channel.  
Kissinger: I don’t exclude it if we could meet for a day in Europe, if necessary. But we can discuss that.  
Gromyko: We shall talk.  
What you said at the outset about the visit and its link with a new agreement, what I said earlier frees me from the need to add to it.  
Kissinger: Good.
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[Kissinger and Gromyko conferred alone between 10:45 and 11:30 p.m. They spoke to the press in the lobby of the Soviet Mission. See Tab B. The Secretary then walked back to the Waldorf Towers.]

4 Not attached and not found.

197. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford


SUBJECT

Discussion with Foreign Minister Gromyko

The bulk of my discussions with Foreign Minister Gromyko were on SALT and the Middle East. There were two fairly long sessions on SALT, one in Washington and the other at the Soviet UN Mission in New York on Sunday.

No particular progress was anticipated on SALT, since Gromyko has to check with the Politburo on such a major issue. And Gromyko is reluctant to be drawn into a dialogue on weapons systems and so forth.

Nevertheless, he made no real attempt to find an opening for moving ahead. At first he repeated the exact same position that the Soviets held at the time of the Helsinki meeting. He belittled the movement we had made at that meeting and since.

In this light, I deferred discussing a resolution of the issue and I warned him that failure to make some progress in October and November would throw the entire question into an election year, which was the least advantageous time for a rational debate in the Congress.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, July–Oct. 1975. Secret; Sensitive. The original is an uninitialed copy. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland forwarded it with a brief attached note to Kissinger on September 25. On September 27, Paul Barbian, Kissinger’s special assistant, wrote in the margin of the note: “This was put in HAK’s book 9/26 as requested. I don’t know if he used it. Please advise if further action is needed.” Sonnenfeldt replied in the margin: “He gave it to the President 9/27/75.”

2 See Document 193.

3 September 21. See Document 196.
over ratification, or defer a new agreement until 1977 when the current agreement expires.

In the second session, I outlined a general approach that we could take on the issues of cruise missiles and Backfire bombers. I said, in effect, that we could meet most of their concerns about cruise missiles by agreeing on the range of air-launched missiles that would be permitted (2500 km) and putting sea-based cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber into a separate category of hybrid systems.

I suggested that if we could agree on this general framework, we could discuss such issues as the number of bombers armed with cruise missiles and could limit the number of Backfire and sea-based cruise missiles on the Soviet side and the number of FB–111 bombers, sea-based cruise missiles on our side; this agreed level would be outside the 2400 ceiling. He asked a few questions about the meaning of this approach, but, of course, only offered to report our position. Later he told me that it would take two weeks of analysis, and two Politburo meetings to frame a reply.

In general, Gromyko’s reactions suggest that Moscow has two very strongly held positions:

1. The Soviets adamantly refuse to agree to open what they call a new “channel” of competition in cruise missiles; they probably, in fact, do see this as a new frontier of strategic weaponry in which our technology gives a commanding advantage, at least in the short run; they probably believe that to allow a virtually unchecked deployment of cruise missiles, even of intermediate ranges, undermines the 2400 ceiling which they so reluctantly conceded in Vladivostok.

2. The second very tough point is their claim, now tied to Brezhnev’s personal word, that the Backfire is not a heavy bomber; Gromyko and other members of his staff said bluntly that our position on this convinced them we were not really serious about SALT at all.

—This controversy has a very disturbing aspect: we can find no way that their claim for Backfire’s range and payload could be accurate; but if so, it is puzzling why they are so intransigent in maintaining our calculations are dead wrong.

In any case, the upshot of this meeting is that we still have a stalemate, and the hopes of breaking the impasse, if we adhere to our present position, are not favorable.

Moreover, the increasingly severe deadlock in SALT seems to be coming on top of uncertainties and frustrations in Moscow: uncertainties over the grain negotiations, frustration over Portugal and the Middle East, and over their inability to convene a conference of Communist parties in Europe; there are some signs of internal debate on the strategy of other communist parties.
Above all, the impasse on SALT seems to be coinciding with the succession to Brezhnev:

—Gromyko set out a timetable for possible meetings, which makes it fairly obvious that Brezhnev will not come in December, though he held open a possible meeting between you and Brezhnev in Europe as a kind of safety valve.

—Gromyko’s conversation suggests (though this is not certain) that they may even have in mind a visit in the spring by someone other than Brezhnev—even though they know that is inconvenient and raises political problems.

—Rumors and reports of Brezhnev’s retirement keep reappearing, and we must seriously consider whether the Soviet leadership is not caught up in a debate about his retirement and succession.

—If this is so, then the delays on SALT and the possible collapse of the Vladivostok agreement may add greatly to the uncertainty in Moscow, and SALT may even become an issue in a succession debate.

We have tentatively agreed that we might meet in Europe in early November.

Once we have in hand their response to the SALT position I outlined, we will have to reassess the individual issues, and re-examine the chances for reaching a successful SALT agreement this year.4

4 During his meeting with the President in the Oval Office at 10 a.m. on September 25, Kissinger remarked: “We need to talk about SALT. I don't think we will get a SALT agreement. There will be no Brezhnev visit. So we need an alternative strategy. I think the reaction here to Vladivostok really shook them. If we sign and have a brawl here during their Party Congress, that would be very bad for them. I think they want to wait until their Party Congress is over.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15)
198. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 3, 1975, 8:36–9:20 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: On the wheat deal, it is being nitpicked again. We have an escape clause, so they want one. Another issue is reserves. Enders is hipped on them, but I am overruling him. We can get an agreement over the weekend. We will get a simultaneous oil deal. About 250,000 barrels per day.

The President: At what kind of price?
Kissinger: We will get a discount. It won’t be listed as such, but it will amount to about 15%.

The President: How much this year?
Kissinger: About the same as in the agreement.

The President: Can it be announced?
Kissinger: Yes.

Scowcroft: Before the October crop report?

The President: Let’s get the estimates for October and find out from Robinson how much they want and when.

[Omitted here is discussion of Congress, the Middle East, and Spain.]

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 In an October 2 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt, Lord, and Enders briefed Kissinger on the grain negotiations and sought his approval on a series of recommendations regarding the details of the proposed agreement. Kissinger approved the recommendations but expressed some concern about allowing such details of the agreement to delay its conclusion. He agreed, for instance, to seek approval from the Department of Commerce for a proposed letter on maritime issues with the handwritten caveat: “But let’s not get so super cute that the whole agreement falls through.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Grain Negotiations)

3 In an October 3 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger on the oil talks and sought his authorization for Robinson to initial a letter of intent committing the two sides to an agreement. (Ibid.)
199. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Joseph Kraft

Washington, October 6, 1975, 7:15 p.m.

K: How are you Joe?
JK: I am in good shape. It was nice to see you. How did the Dobrynin thing go?2
HK: Inconclusive.
JK: Did he make a counter offer?
HK: Not yet. I didn’t expect it that early. Gromyko didn’t get back until a week ago.
JK: He wasn’t outraged?
HK: What do you mean?
JK: I have a chance to write something about Schlesinger. He went over there and surfaced the whole Pentagon position.3 The Economist supports it.4 I was surprised and called them up. The last lines of piece say it is better to get the cruise missile thing straight than to have a bad SALT Agreement. What I planned to do tomorrow . . .
HK: I knew he was talking all over Europe about this. It happened after we made the deal on the cruise with him.
JK: I have a theory about him. I would like to write something about him that will turn him around. I would like to show how he will go down in history with a bad reputation.
HK: I doubt you can do that.
JK: You really do? I am trying to show what is happening. Latin and Kalveman5 thought it would work.
HK: Kalveman is good—Latin I don’t know. The cruise is so ill assorted. There are so many confused things in there. Why do it with

1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking.
2 In an October 4 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt briefed Kissinger for a meeting with Dobrynin on October 6. Sonnenfeldt doubted that the Soviets would be ready to reply to the note on SALT that Kissinger gave Gromyko in New York on September 21: “However, we suggest that you raise this with Dobrynin and tell him that any alternative formulations on Backfire or cruise missiles would be helpful to us.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Oct.–Dec. 1975) No substantive record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on October 6 has been found.
3 During an 8-day European tour in September, Schlesinger visited the United Kingdom, Denmark, Germany, and France.
5 Not further identified.
cruise when you have 1,000 airplanes. It could easily lead to our removal of our tactical airforces.

JK: Yes. But is there a new position to be taken?
HK: What I told you yesterday, that we are waiting.

JK: What I would be saying is that we are waiting but it would be probably helpful if the Russians could come back with a counter-proposal rather than a flat turn down.
HK: That would be helpful.
JK: Is there anything in the way of counter . . .

HK: The two big areas are Backfire and cruise. They wouldn’t propose anything on the Backfire because it is their offset to our overseas systems, but maybe on the cruise.

JK: Their present proposal is one that limits the range to 300 miles?
HK: No to 600 kilometers. There is a compromise possible there.
JK: You mean add 1,000—is that the kind of compromise?
HK: Or a distinction between air-launched and ship-launched cruises.

JK: That takes you way out. Do they need to say something about conventions.
HK: That is the next issue, but they don’t need to say anything about it now.
JK: Let me see what I can do.
HK: It is a useful subject to do something thoughtful with. I am going to get myself . . .
JK: It is the first couple of pages of the Economist.
HK: O.K. Thank you.6

6 In his next column, Kraft singled out Ford, not Schlesinger, for criticism on SALT: “Mr. Ford gets no credit with his right-wing constituency for détente or arms control. So he has now accepted a tough set of Pentagon demands that would put limits on bombers the Russians claim are not capable of reaching the United States, while giving great latitude to the cruise missile, a new weapon being developed by the Pentagon which could put all arms control efforts out of business. The Russians are still considering the latest American offer, and it is possible they want to deal so badly they will accept it. But State Department officials are deeply pessimistic. They fear that for the sake of his right-wing constituency at home President Ford has let go the chance to complete the arms agreement known as SALT II.” (Joseph Kraft, “Mr. Ford Runs to the Right,” The Washington Post, October 9, 1975, p. A10)
200. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 7, 1975, 9:40–10:18 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Kissinger:] On the grain deal, we can get it any time we want. The key is whether we keep it linked with oil. I think if we hold tough, we will get an oil deal. The Soviets must have the grain. If we don’t we will be lambasted by Jackson for giving up our agricultural power.

The President: I think we should keep them linked. How long do you think it would take?

Kissinger: I think within a week.

The President: Let’s do it. Send Chuck [Robinson] instructions.2

Kissinger: There is another chicken-shit issue on which the Pentagon is dug in—cruise missiles on the seabeds.

The President: Didn’t we agree on this earlier?

Kissinger: You agreed with them at Helsinki.

The President: How would they [the Pentagon] even use it? Do they have a program to do it?

Scowcroft: No, it is not that they have it in mind. They just don’t want to limit them in any way until we resolve the cruise missile issue overall.

The President: It’s nuts. Give Alex [Johnson] instructions.3

Kissinger: That gets me to Schlesinger: NATO has asked that we don’t agree to anything on cruise missiles without consultation. There is an article in The Economist on the virtues of cruise missiles.4 This is Schlesinger’s campaign.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 Kissinger sent instructions to Robinson in telegram 239604 to Moscow, October 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Grain Negotiations)

3 Not found.

4 See Document 199.
The President: I’ll be damned. How does Haig stand?
Kissinger: I doubt if he’s heard of it.
The President: Let’s get Haig on board on it.
Kissinger: I am getting him back here to talk about Yugoslavia contingency plans with the British and French.
I talked to Dobrynin. He said maybe we could arrange something on cruise missiles, but on Backfire, they are adamant. He also thinks Schlesinger is so dominant now that any agreement would come under very heavy fire here.

[Omitted here is discussion of negotiations on the Middle East.]

5 See footnote 2, Document 199.

201. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)1

Washington, October 8, 1975, 4:15 p.m.

D: Hello, Henry how are you?
K: Okay.
D: Now, I think you won all the battles on the Hill, so you are free.
K: There was no question; did you doubt it?
D: No, I’m simply saying now, well you won. I quote and unquote. I did not tell if and when, no. Well, you did call me, Henry.
K: Yes, that’s right. Put me in my place. [laughter] Listen, you’re supposed to get along with me; I don’t have to get along with you.
D: I know, that’s why I’m trying to respectfully ask you, you called me.
K: I would much rather have an incompetent Soviet ambassador here. [laughter] That’s actually not true. If friendship’s possible between Communists and Capitalists we come pretty close to it.
D: Well, I think this is not the right description, I think it’s the social order between human beings. This is the most important.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 31, Dobrynin/Kissinger Telcons (4). No classification marking. All brackets are in the original. The blank underscores indicate omissions in the original.
K: That’s right.
Anatoliy, first, I can’t do it on the 5th.2
D: You can’t. So what is your proposal?
K: I think I can do it probably—I would like to let you know at the end of the week—either the 12th or the 13th.
D: Of November.
K: Yeah. Or maybe the 14th. 12th, 13th or 14th. I will know by Monday3 at the latest.
D: OK. In the meanwhile I will check with Gromyko. OK?
K: Right. Another possibility is that I come to your Party Conference on the 8th, or whatever it is.
D: But this is in February.
K: Oh, no, I mean whatever celebration you have for the 8th. For the Revolution—I think that this would be good for my domestic position to come to this celebration of the . . .
D: I’m afraid you’d be elected to one of our offices. [laughter] What are they going to do then back home?
K: Ask Fulbright. I was fighting like a maniac for you at lunch today.
D: What was wrong today?
K: Oh, somebody argued that we should be much tougher with the Soviets. The trouble is, Anatoliy, they are all in favor of being tough with you on the theory that you won’t retaliate. [laughter]
D: This is something that is happening, really.
K: I have a higher estimate of your moral fiber.
D: Well, we are a quiet gentle people, you know. Only unless we became angry we could be dangerous. Otherwise, we really . . .
K: You could be dangerous, but I’ll wait til you do something before I react.

Anatol, there is one problem I wanted to discuss with you, which has to do with that oil deal. You remember I always said to you that we wanted a 20 percent discount although it didn’t have to be exactly in the agreement.
D: No, you mentioned you wanted to discuss with Brezhnev.
K: That’s right. And I mentioned it to you.
D: Well you mentioned that that was a question, but I didn’t say anything because . . .

2 Reference is to Kissinger’s proposed trip to Moscow.
3 October 13.
K: No, no, I’m not asking you to give me an answer. But we’ve now told Robinson to go down to 15 percent. The problem we have is we can’t justify buying oil from you in such laughable quantities. There is no benefit to us from it. I mean we can get this, at market prices we can get it from Iran. We have no shortage of oil.

D: No, I understand. May I have a few minutes on this particular subject because I just received telegram from Moscow. The substance of this very lengthy telegram is that everything was agreed, and that, looking through the telegram and telling you, but that summarizes it—everything was all right until yesterday the text of agreement on grain was already completely agreed upon.

K: Well, this shows that I wasn’t conducting the negotiations.

D: Yes, this is clear.

K: But never would I complete the text of something you are interested in until I have what I’m interested in.

D: And there was another agreement involved oil which said there should be letter of intent and we have agreed on number 6 which said the price of this would be …

K: “Mutually interesting.”

D: Yes, well, this was so.

K: Which I would be willing to go ahead with.

D: No, no, but today, the American delegation, October 8, in the morning, they referred to the high level they received from Washington—very different text which now a letter of intent which dealt really with, that it should be 15 percent less.

K: Now, let me explain.

D: And may I finish because this is really what they are telling.

K: No, because if you finish, I may have to take account of it.

D: [laughs] Oh, Henry, let’s be serious; this is really what they are telling. You don’t know anything about what is the text today, which is completely different from what has been discussed until now. So, and they said that unless it will be not accepted—this ultimatum—this particular 15 percent, then there will be no agreement on grain and no letter of intent and no oil. And this is what they ask specifically—they ask me to come to you and the President. This argument: first, they are saying that really it is putting us in a very undignified position. You know that we are always buying all the goods including on your market on the world market. We never ask to be less than. You put us in a very awkward political position. You put us on a basis with the Third World. It is very clear. You will have meeting soon in Paris or whatever it will be. Our oil export is very more. We do not really play an effective role in ______ of world oil. But you could never let us in the situation where we agreed politically on the 15 percent less. You understand.
That will show all the other countries that we are playing to—against them.

K: Yes, but the amounts are so negligible.
D: But that is the point.
K: But we need it more for our domestic purposes.
D: But let me put it this way. The corn business and then continue the negotiation on this one. It wasn’t our idea about oil. It was your idea from the very beginning.
K: But you know the President is personally involved. It was his idea to start with.
D: Not when you put us on 15% less.
K: Let me make this suggestion to you. First, we don’t insist that the 15 percent is reflected in the letter. We can go back to the formula that was in the letter of intent. If we can have a side agreement—as we have had in the past—that the 15 percent is reflected somewhere either in the shipping rates or something. Do you see what I mean?
D: In any case it will be known immediately.
K: Well, I can’t promise you that it won’t be known, given the way our government operates.
D: I know, it will be really known.
K: But at least it wouldn’t be in the original letter. The second thing is I will instruct Robinson to stay there at least another 48 hours so that we don’t have—we removed the ultimatum quality ... to give us a chance to consider it here.
D: May I put it this way: You will consider or what? I didn’t quite get that.
K: We will have another consideration of this. You better figure out something that we can present as being advantageous to us in that oil deal.
D: Figure out—what else? We—why prefer to _____ what was in the letter of intent.
K: But when we discuss the price you will tell us it isn’t possible.
D: We discuss on the level which is really a world market.
K: Yeah, but why should we buy 200,000 barrels a day from you at world prices.
D: But you may not buy at all. You have such a unique position. First you ask us to sell to you, we say all right, but then you say—you didn’t tell us the oil was—if you don’t like it, you don’t buy from us. But you ask us to sell—and at the same time ask us for a different price.
K: We can ask, you don’t have to agree to it.
D: This is the situation. That is why I really have now—
K: To unlink the two I would have to have a talk with the President.

D: Henry, I have right here telegram asking on the highest level to approach you—and ask you

K: Let me do this: I will talk to the President tomorrow morning. I will keep Robinson there. You will tell them that we do ask for that discount, though it doesn’t have to be in the letter of intent. But at least tell them this.

D: I will, I will.

K: Then we will see if we have any other ideas tomorrow.

D: Okay. Really asking this kind of thing is putting us politically, in a . . .

K: All right, I have another suggestion. You can accept our last SALT proposal.

D: Oh, this we have another chance. [Laughs] . . . we can’t deal all the points to you, Henry.

K: Just count Backfire.

D: You already have too many points.

K: No, I figured that Brezhnev is looking for an excuse to count the Backfire.

D: In some areas you have already quite a plus—points we take rather quietly. You shouldn’t go too far.

K: Where do we have a plus—?

D: You have enough—don’t ask me to tell you.

K: Tell me—no—really? I’m always accused of losing every negotiation to you.

D: The next time I have a quiet day, I will go over it point-by-point, all right?

K: Okay.

D: To discuss it—but this is the argument—they don’t accept it simply—it is what we are trying to impress to you, but—simply we feel it is politically and economically you put us on a direct confrontation with the . . . ______ countries, with the Third World and economically we have no grounds for any other negotiations . . . on any basis and do this for a very negligible amount of oil.

K: Okay, well let me discuss it.

D: Please look into this. I will say you are giving another two days. You will tell me tomorrow what you are doing, okay?

K: Exactly.

D: Because this really is high level to you and the President.
202. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 9, 1975, 9:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Soviet-American relations. During this exchange, however, Kissinger commented: “I met with the Los Angeles Times group. They think our foreign policy is in good shape. Even détente—only the word is bad. If the Democrats attack your foreign policy, they are hitting your strong point.”]

Kissinger: On the grain deal, the Soviets told us they couldn’t buy a 15% discount. It would destroy them with the East Europeans, the Third World and OPEC. The negotiations on this have been a disaster. Butz has talked every day with his guy on an open line. Then . . .

[The Vice President calls.]2

Yesterday he pulled Bell3 out on the grounds that the grain part was completed.

President: He mentioned that yesterday. I said I didn’t think the delegation was coming home.

Kissinger: It puts us in a tough position all around. We can’t reopen the grain deal, and there’s lots of farmer pressure on us to move on the grain.

We have some options for disguising a discount which we can try on them. But if they reject it, you will have to decide whether to break the linkage. There are problems either way. In principle, I favor being tough. So does Simon. But if it fails, then it will hurt détente and get the farmers on your neck.

President: How is the grain deal?

Kissinger: It is a great grain deal. We could wait until Saturday4 and see if they will buy our oil offer.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 15. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 Brackets in the original.
3 Richard Bell.
4 October 11.
President: How about initialling on Saturday? That would be good politically.

Kissinger: Then we could wait 30 days. If after that we don’t have it, I think you have to go ahead on the grain.

President: I agree. Will you take care of it?5

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East and Angola.]

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5 Kissinger sent instructions to Robinson in telegram 241606 to Moscow, October 9. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) Kissinger also asked Sonnenfeldt to “call Dobrynin on my behalf and tell him what we are doing.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts) In an October 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that he had called Dobrynin that afternoon and then sent to the Soviet Embassy an informal note based on the “first two paragraphs of the instructions sent to Robinson today.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Grain Negotiations)

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203. Memorandum of Conversation1


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of the President’s upcoming trip to China.]

[Kissinger:] On the grain deal—it has not been brilliantly handled. We could have him [Robinson]2 initial and sign the letter of intent, in which case we’d probably never get a price deal. Or we could have Robinson go to the prepcon, and then return to Moscow Thursday3 and initial and sign the letter of intent. If you don’t have to have it, it might be marginally better to go back Thursday.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 16. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 Brackets in the original.
President: We are under a lot of pressure.

Kissinger: Butz thinks he can manage with announcing the Polish deal.

Scowcroft: The longer it drags out the more it will look like a fight in which we caved.

President: Let's have Robinson initial and sign the letter of intent by Sunday.

Kissinger: Okay. I will check once more before the final decision.

[Omitted here is discussion of Portugal and Norway.]

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204. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt)

Washington, October 13, 1975, 10:15 p.m.

K: On that paper I have which we are probably going to be bouncing around until Robinson is back in this country—what is the recommendation?2

S: On the oil or the grain thing?

K: The grain thing—my view is he should sign it.

S: The main consideration is whether that is alright in the Congress. We should make phone calls before he does it.

K: You know that better than the President, who wants to sign it?

S: I can only give you the issues—if you want to sign it, sign it.

K: I don’t think the Congressional argument is the important one.

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking.

2 On October 13, Sonnenfeldt and Hinton sent Kissinger a detailed “urgent” memorandum on “next steps” in the grain-oil negotiations, including various scenarios and options. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Grain Negotiations) Kissinger, however, called Sonnenfeldt at 6:50 p.m. to ask: “K: Where is that memo that was supposed to be here at 2:30? S: It is there. K: It is somewhere within five blocks of my office? S: I have talked to your staff assistant who had a question on some of the sentences, so I know it is in your office. K: On my desk? S: I am sure it must be on your desk, Henry. K: O.K.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)
S: Both Case and Long say they want to be consulted before it is signed. On balance, however, I think it is better to sign it.

K: The oil is of a complexity that I can’t comprehend.

S: There is a letter of intent which would be signed by Robinson and Patolichev. In that letter it contains a letter on pricing.

K: What about the side letter?

S: That states the follow on negotiations in which the letter of intent would concur. The one letter says we assume the Soviets would continue the negotiations with a price break. One goes through the various gimmicks, the other one comes out and tells the difference between the world price and the price we are asking.

K: That is 15% again?

S: Roughly.

K: What would we give to Dobrynin?

S: Any one of those three and they would have to say that is the basis on which the negotiations would continue. The soft letter would give us some additional statements from the Soviets that they would be helpful in the follow-on negotiations. We won’t get what we want anyway now.

K: Not now. I thought I would call Dobrynin and tell them what we have in mind.

S: You said you wanted to have something from the Soviets that you could cite when people raise the question about that clause.

K: I am worried about instructing Robinson. Can we instruct him to get some sort of assurance with respect to the four points and giving us a price break?

S: Are we going to tell Dobrynin first?

K: I wouldn’t think we should do that.

S: Either you give it to him ahead of time or tell him in Moscow.

K: I would like it somewhere between option three and two. What the best approach would be is to let the Russians know what we want and let Robinson try to work it out.

S: It comes down to the same thing because you have to tell Dobrynin ahead of time.

K: I plan to tell Dobrynin, in fact I will try to reach him now.

S: He had the four areas where we wanted some breaks before. They are not likely to produce anything in writing from the Soviets, hence the third letter you have there.

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3 Senators Clifford P. Case (Republican, New Jersey) and Russell Long (Democrat, Louisiana).
K: I hate to give them something else that they will reject and then cave again.
S: There is likely in the first to . . .
K: I want to leave it up to Robinson what to do.
S: Then we will have to instruct Robinson.
K: Could you do that.
S: Yes. 4
K: O.K.

4 See footnote 3, Document 207.

205. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin) 1

Washington, October 13, 1975, 10:23 p.m.

K: Mr. Ambassador.
D: They hoped to see you too and to speak with the President—the cosmonauts. I said he is probably in Canada—nobody knows.
K: Where could I have seen them when they saw the President. When are they coming back?
D: On the 22nd.
K: I will be in China. When will they leave here?
D: Tomorrow morning.
K: What time?
D: Around nine. Could you arrange something before?
K: I don’t have to see them for more than 10 minutes, do I?
D: I am sure they would prefer to see you.
K: Would they see me at 8:45 in the State Department?
D: That is 8:45?
K: Yes, is that too late?
D: I am sure they would like it very much.

K: Bring them at 8:45.
D: I think they would prefer to see you there. Your people will know?
K: Yes. Are they flying on a commercial plane?
D: No, a special one.
K: Then they can leave any time. Do you want me to have our astronauts here too?
D: It is up to you. In Moscow they will appreciate it.
K: How much of a discount do I get on oil if I do this?
D: It is so political—you press us too hard.
K: When you have amateurs doing this it is very hard for us.
D: I got a telegram from the very top—it was clear before but they are pressing very hard.
K: Did I press you on television?2
D: No, you made it very clear. All the press makes it clear that all the business is political not commercial. First you want to press the Arab world. Commercial it is nothing because it is very few barrels we are going to sell you. You want to say you are very smart Yankee.
K: You don’t understand. We are trying to help you restore relations with the Israelis!
D: I didn’t want to bother you.
K: I want to give you something to write to Moscow about, can I? We have these morons—everyone is to get in the newspapers. We are not going to exert much pressure on the Arabs with this oil—how do you think it will affect the OPEC situation.
D: Our impression is that you are trying to be very stubborn. We see telegrams from the heads of Socialist countries saying are you going to yield. You put us in an embarrassing position.
K: Don’t be surprised if we buy from the Chinese, you have had your chance. What I would like to do is this—send Robinson back on Wednesday3 and get the thing finished up.
D: The grain deal separate from the oil?
K: By having you accept our position.
D: On oil?
K: If you make a call to Gromyko why won’t he accept it. Listen, what I think should be done is this—our problem is partly political but

2 During an interview on the NBC News program “Meet the Press” on October 12, Kissinger addressed the “realities” underlying Soviet-American relations, including strategic arms limitation talks and the grain–oil negotiations. For the full text of the interview, see Department of State Bulletin, November 10, 1975, pp. 657–662.
3 October 15.
not political in the sense that you have in mind. Not in the sense of scoring a victory over the Arabs with 200,000 barrels of oil. What we are concerned with is to be able to show that we could make an arrangement that is of great interest to the U.S. in an area of concern to us in order to defuse people like Jackson. My suggestion is that I would be prepared to let them sign the grain deal this week and sign a letter of intent on the oil.

D: What kind of letter?

K: Roughly along the lines of what we have been negotiating. I think we can find an understanding on some of these corollary things like shipping. You will try to work out something in the negotiations not now, on the real agreement that will benefit us somewhat.

D: What do you mean some benefit?

K: I am sure we could work out through a combination of the four points we gave you last week, some combination of things which if they don't amount to 15% would show some benefit we could justify on this.

D: Friend to friend?

K: Yes.

D: The situation is we are now forced because of a very bad crop to buy quite an amount of grain from the U.S. This is on top level. We were forced to accept your terms. The high rates are unjustified. Your Administration—the President and you personally are taking our throats and impressing high rates on shipping which is not justified. We swallowed it. We felt it is necessary although we could use ships of our own. But now you are trying to force us to swallow another thing on the oil business. We don't care about 15 or 20%, we are prepared to pay you more. But before the Party Congress it looks like they are trying to take.

K: You have to admit my public statements have stayed far away from anything like that.

D: I am stating how we feel.

K: How do you propose we conclude it now?

D: We have a grain deal which is favorable to you—to your farmers and to your President. He will get many votes because of it. It is a good deal commercially for you and it is necessary for us period! There is another deal with oil but don't force us to take too many concessions. We are prepared to make some concessions. In Moscow the Secretary General says you are trying to make a political gain. We have some difficulties and a different situation in the oil world but one after the other. What was the situation in Moscow the Administration wants to have an agreement on oil but you put us in a situation where it is awkward for us to accept it. On grain you propose and we accept free
commercial market. But on oil we have to make reductions for you so now. Is it true you don’t want to give us reductions but you give the U.S. reductions, the socialist countries are saying.

K: But I want you to advise me.

D: But in Moscow it is growing to the extent where it is very difficult. O.K. we say we will have to pay them.

K: What is your personal advice?

D: My personal advice for the oil you can buy (static in the lines).

K: I have trouble hearing there is something wrong with the lines.

Can you hang up for a minute.

D: Yes.

K: O.K.

D: When are you going to Canada?

K: Tomorrow at 3:00.

D: I can come to see you for ½ an hour to let me explain in detail because it is very sensitive?

K: Yes, between 12 and 1:00. Bring your cosmonauts by at 8:45.

D: Tell your people you are calling me between 12 and 1:00. I think it is important.

K: But we should settle it this week.

D: If you would see me alone we could settle things.

206. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 14, 1975, 9:27–10:27 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Edward H. Levi, Attorney General
John O. Marsh, Jr., Counsellor to the President
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Kissinger: I talked to Dobrynin about the grain deal. He said we have no idea how outraged they are on the grain deal. First we hold up sales; then we ram a long-term deal down their throats; then we hold them up on freight rates; then when they are trying to cooperate on the oil deal, we leak about a discount in a way which sets OPEC against them. I think we have gone to the limit. Hal [Sonnenfeldt] thinks so and so does Brent.

President: Grain prices went down the limit. The farmers are going to be screaming. Can we have them start buying?

Kissinger: I had agreed they could buy six—we can go to 8.

President: Let’s stick with 6 for now. When would this happen—Thursday?

Kissinger: Let’s make it Friday. They would have to determine when to buy. We would sign the oil letter, but I think we won’t get anything.

President: That’s O. K.

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Lebanon.]

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 16. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 See Document 205.

3 Brackets in the original.

4 October 16.
SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Dobrynin: Grain/Oil

Before you discuss how to get both of us out of the Moscow negotiations with faces saved all around, you should make some general points. The Soviets have talked themselves into a self-righteous rage about this whole negotiation and it is time to bring them back to reality.

1. Before they feel too sorry for themselves, or too generous, about the grain agreement and the maritime agreement, they should recall that this whole matter need not have arisen in this fashion were it not for the 1972 grain deal and subsequent Soviet moves into our grain markets in total disregard of the effect on world prices (and domestic US prices) and of the needs of others. The 1972 deal is perhaps the heaviest single mortgage in détente. Admittedly, our own performance at that time was not brilliant, but all our errors were in favor of the USSR. (The 3 year credit; the subsidized price at which the Soviets were able to buy.) The result was economic chaos and a political fouling of the détente nest which still endures. Both of us must recognize that this year’s deal must overcome these disastrous residues of 1972 (and 1974).

2. The Soviets do us no unilateral favor in signing the grain deal and agreeing to the freight rate arrangement. The political realities are that without them, there will be no shipment of grain to the USSR, beginning right now. The Soviets may think the President is on the hook politically to the farmers and Patolichev with his customary delicacy has repeatedly referred to this in his talks with Robinson. But the President could easily turn this situation to his political advantage in the present mood in this country and the Soviets should be aware of that.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Grain Negotiations. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In a typewritten note forwarding the memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported: “Here is the grain/oil package for Dobrynin. I hope you have a chance to read it. Please note at Tab A, an instruction for Robinson. This requires your approval so we can send it to him promptly. He needs a day to sort out his tactics.” Sonnenfeldt also forwarded an extract from the memorandum in a personal message to Robinson on October 16. “I thought you might be interested in a portion of the memo I sent the Secretary prior to his last talk with Dobrynin,” Sonnenfeldt explained. “I don’t think he used much of it but it gives you my views. Please hold this just to yourself.” (Ibid.)

2 No substantive record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on October 14 has been found. See, however, footnote 3 below.
3. We have heard all kinds of outrage on the oil deal. But for years the Soviets have been eager to become energy suppliers both to earn hard currency and to build a pillar of a more normal long-term political relationship. The proposed gas deals have massive political and economic problems for us, yet the Administration has continued to support them. What better way to help smooth the way than to begin in an area where no immediate massive US investments are required as a precondition to deliveries: oil.

4. As a matter of economic reality, however, no American firm is going to start buying oil from a new and untested source at a time when the price is such that all the oil we want is available. So, our idea of a discount is a way for the US to start becoming a regular and serious customer of the USSR, providing hard currency and, somewhat down the road, the possibility of technology which will permit the Soviets to increase oil production and increase hard currency sales to us.

5. This concept was put to Brezhnev by the President in Helsinki. Brezhnev, after he had asked about the magnitude of the proposed discount (Ford said 20–25%), never rejected the idea. On the contrary, there was agreement at Helsinki that there would be a parallel oil deal and that is the basis on which we proceeded.

6. Patolichev deliberately stalled on the oil part of the deal when Robinson first got there. Precious days were wasted while we progressed on grain—another favor to the Soviets from us. Patolichev’s tactic was clear (and in violation of the understanding at Helsinki): he wanted to get grain wrapped up in hopes that the farm pressures on the President would be so great that we would give up on oil or at least separate the two issues indefinitely. He has won his point but he may well have outsmarted himself. If there is no oil agreement, the grain may never move. And an understanding at the highest level has been nullified.

7. We recognize that Patolichev has had a great time beating up on Robinson with sarcasm and vehemence. But what Robinson has tried to do is very simply to make it possible for the Soviets to satisfy their own economic and political interest in starting up a long term oil relationship with us without embarrassment. Hence the various ideas regarding freight rates, clearing charges, deferred payments. These are no favor to us even though to the simple minded they look like it in the short run; they are the way into a profitable relationship for the Soviets. (It could have been much simpler for the Soviets to allow a modest discount.)

8. Let us therefore cut out the breastbeating and get these talks finished so that the results will work in both our favor over the coming year.

9. We are prepared to let Robinson (1) sign the grain agreement and (2) sign the letter of intent, minus the 10 day clause as Patolichev
suggested. We would also lift the embargo on the understanding that any purchases above 5 million tons must first be discussed with us, even before they start approaching the brokers.

10. Concerning para 6 of the oil letter on prices (“assure the interests of both governments”), we think it important that there be clear understanding now that the follow-on negotiations will lead to satisfactory results. We will instruct Robinson to be as flexible as possible in working out these assurances—to encompass some or all of the ideas previously presented but not stated in precise detail—and expect the Soviets to be conciliatory. (HAK: You may want to read to D. from our proposed instruction to Robinson at Tab A).³

11. Robinson will also want a clear assurance that the oil negotiations will resume here on October 22, coterminous with the maritime negotiations, with the expectation that all matters will be concluded in time for the lapse of the present maritime agreement on December 31. (Without it no ships will move!)

³ Attached but not printed. Kissinger approved the instructions, which were sent in telegram 244346 to Moscow, October 15. The telegram also included the following report: “Secretary has talked to Dobrynin about situation, in light latest Presidential decisions, assuring him you will be flexible on text side agreement and asking for Soviet flexibility. Dobrynin indicated more Soviet flexibility not to be expected, but he did not totally exclude it. Sonnenfeldt followed up reiterating to Dobrynin need for something beyond present letter of intent on price.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
208. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State and Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

President: I thought I would fill Henry in on the talk with Schlesinger.2

Kissinger: I haven’t had a chance to talk to Brent about it.

President: He asked for the meeting, but I don’t know if we got to his subjects. We started on personnel. It looks like we will lose Ellsworth. I offered a couple of jobs to him but he wanted to stay where he was, but with a higher title. I said I couldn’t see making two deputies in Defense. He asked about an undersecretary rank. I said send me the papers.

Kissinger: I have no problem with that, but DOD should get out of foreign policy.

President: Then I hit him on the Détente article by Dr. Wynfred Joshua3 a classified analytical paper, criticizing détente, which was, I said, was amateurish and shouldn’t have been released. He agreed. Then I said he hadn’t done his work on the Hill on the Defense budget. He said no organic harm had been done, but I said it was not perceived that way. Then Brent came in and we discussed the budget cut I wanted him to take. Then Brent says he went back and talked to him for some time.

Scowcroft: [Described Schlesinger conversation with me]

Kissinger: There is something every day. Today it is Les Gelb.4 Vladivostok was a real achievement. They are after me but it is going to get to you.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 16. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.


3 Document 184.

President: That is correct.

Kissinger: When we were at Vladivostok they didn’t have us push on Backfire. On missiles, they just asked us to protect the SRAM, not cruise missiles [See exchange of messages from Vladivostok, Tab A].

Schlesinger is making it tough for you with the Reagan bunch, but if you move to the right, the liberals will kill you in the election for sabotaging détente.

President: Are we working up anything new on our SALT position?

Kissinger: I don’t think we should until the Soviets respond to us.

President: What does Haig think about cruise missiles?

Kissinger: He is not all that enamored with them. He thinks Schlesinger’s objective is to get all the tactical nuclear weapons out of Europe. Except on SALT, Schlesinger is on the very liberal side.

If we don’t cap the cruise missiles, the Democrats will kill you with the claim there is a gap you can drive a truck through.

In Canada, he is saying we are falling behind in Defense with the Soviets. That is okay with a Congressional committee but not with foreigners. He also told them about using cruise missiles in response to an attack in Northern Norway. That is dangerous—indicating we would not respond to an attack with the full force of NATO.

The Democrats will have a field day if you support his SALT position and there will be no agreement.

President: I want a SALT agreement. I want to let my conversation with Jim sink in and then talk to him next week.

Kissinger: I think you must tell him that what should be coming from the Pentagon is simply support for your position. I earlier did some talking points to that end, but you don’t really need them.

President: Give them to me. I want to pursue my talk with him in a more general sense.

Kissinger: Haig says he [Schlesinger] wants to be President.

[There is discussion of whether or not Schlesinger will resign.]

President: Give me the talking points.

[Omitted here is extensive discussion of issues unrelated to Soviet-American relations.]

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5 Not attached. See Document 97.
6 Not found.
209. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Secretary of Agriculture Butz

Washington, October 16, 1975, 12:03 p.m.

K: Earl.
B: Yeah, Henry.
K: Earl, I am a little upset about—first of all, about the Washington Post story yesterday.2
B: There was some truth to it.
K: Well, there may be some truth to it, but you know, if every Goddamn Cabinet member thinks he is the President.
B: I understand that.
K: We have an impossible situation. There is such a thing . . .
B: As I told you earlier, Henry, I am playing on your team but you never . . . I said I was tired of being treated like a cross-eyed step-child and this morning we had that economic board over there and Deane Hinton was there and at that point Dunlop made an impassioned plea that food policy has got to be a general policy here and I said I quite agree with that. Part of that general policy should be the Department of Agriculture, too.
K: Oh, I couldn’t agree more, but the thing that really upsets me isn’t so much the news story. But I was talking to Dobrynin the other day4 and Dobrynin says he was told by both you and Bell that the President and I are the ones that are embargoing food.
B: Listen, I haven’t even talked to Dobrynin in three or four months. And I am sure that Bell hasn’t talked to Dobrynin either. As a matter of fact . . .

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Brackets are in the original. Blank underscores indicate omissions in the original.
3 Although no substantive record of the meeting of the Economic Policy Board has been found, Hinton provided an account in a memorandum to Kissinger on October 16: “EPB made a good decision October 16—they decided to cancel the proposed meeting with the President on the attached agenda. However, the discussion of grain negotiations with the Soviets was acrimonious to the point that Dunlop and Butz were literally yelling at each other. Butz is in high dudgeon over the Washington Post story of this morning had how the negotiations have been handled in general, particularly Dunlop’s role. Butz also said it was a matter of principle with him, that the EPB having decided the release number should be seven million tons the Secretary of State, who had not heard the discussion, should still be insisting on six million. Apparently, you and he will have to sort this out between you.” Hinton recommended that Kissinger call Butz. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 5, Grain Negotiations)
4 See footnote 3, Document 207.
K: If it wasn’t Dobrynin then it was told to the Russians in Moscow. The point is, if that is the game they are going to play that means the President has to pay for _____ for one week. Which is all we were talking about.

B: Listen, Henry, there is a hell of a lot of loose talk taking place around this place. Now you know—you called me about not breaking the discussions taking place in Moscow and not relating oil to grain and we have been scrupulously careful.5

K: No, you—no, that came out of . . .

B: That came out in the *Times*6 and I don’t know who the hell the *Times*...

K: That came out of . . . I am really in despair. How—we are hanging on by our fingernails as a country, Earl.

B: Yeah.

K: We have lost a President, we’ve had Vietnam. We are in deep trouble and if—the few assets we have we squander. Now, you ask the President, I have been one of your big boosters here.

B: I know you have and frankly I have been one of yours, too, Henry.

K: That’s right. I’ve always . . .

B: News leaks on this thing and frankly we have been extremely careful.

K: But what concerns me is this.

B: On Sunday,7 I don’t know where the hell they got that.

K: They got it out of Zarb’s shop and it is an outrage.

B: Some of it may have come from National Security—I don’t know but I . . .

K: I don’t think so—I don’t think anyone here knew enough about it.

B: Anyway, wherever they got it, I don’t know but I just want to tell you that I think that our people have been remarkably careful in this situation.

K: But what we need is—you know, when we ask you to do something, you are to carry the can on technical grounds. Once it is in the paper that Kissinger wanted to—and Ford wanted to have an embargo

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5 Kissinger and Butz spoke on the telephone on October 9 at 10:46 a.m. A transcript of the conversation is in Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations.


7 October 12.
on Poland in order to keep the heat on Russia, that creates unbelievable resentments in Moscow. It is a lot easier to have them sore at you than at us.

B: Well, I agree with you but then—listen, this is putting two and two together—they didn’t get that from us, Henry.

K: No, it is a direct quote.

B: In where, this morning’s paper?

K: In the Washington Post, either this morning or yesterday.

B: Direct quote? Who are they quoting?

K: Agriculture official.

B: Oh, hell, that is just like when they quote State Department officials—they make it up and they quote somebody, Henry. Now, you talk about Dobrynin saying that—I haven’t talked to Dobrynin in three months. Nor has Bell. I suppose contacts have been made at lower levels—I don’t know. Was invited to this Russian reception Monday night for the astronauts and I purposely didn’t go because it is best not to . . .

K: Look, you can—I have always felt that you and I—you have constituency and within the limits that are set you have go to please them and basically I want you—I want to please them—but you know for our policy it helps—it is easier to say Butz is a son-of-a-bitch than to say we are the sons-of-bitches. You are not responsible for foreign policy but if we say we have tried to squeeze Russia and that goes to Brezhnev, then we pay all across the board.

B: Yeah.

K: That’s our problem on this.

B: Oh, I hope none of our people said that.

K: They have got the Polish thing very right in the newspaper—that I wanted it and in fact that Ford and I wanted it in order to keep the heat on Russia.

B: But that quote on that was not new—that’s been in stories around hither and yonder for two or three weeks, Henry.

K: Okay. Well, let me raise another question with you. You are fighting very hard for that 7 million tons. I prefer six million and let them come back for more.

B: Well, Henry, we discussed this Tuesday morning very fully in the Economic Policy Board over there and the decision at that point was unanimous on this deal.

K: Yeah, but none of these guys has any foreign policy sense.

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8 No record of the meeting of the Economic Policy Board on October 14 has been found.
B: Well, I think there is very considerable question if they will even buy six. Our best intelligence is they have now bought about 22 to 23 million tons around the world some place and our own estimate was that they were going to need 25. Now they may need more than that but in the meantime there is evidence that they are cutting back in feeding rates and that they are going to take less than originally contemplated and I think what we have done, Henry, is make ourselves once again the residual supplier in the world market—all of our competition has cleaned out their warehouses and bins.

K: Yeah, but there isn’t . . .

B: And we said here now that we take what we can get. And I suspect that we are going to end this year with a substantial increase in ______. So my sticking with seven was that we had a full discussion of this Tuesday and the facts were on the table. I don’t know if 1 million tons makes that much difference.

K: But if they cleaned out all the bins then it means for sure if they want more than ______ they have got to come to us.

B: If they want more than six—it is a very considerable question. I guess your instructions to Chuck\(^9\) are that we would like to have the Russians say our intentions are to buy so much. I don’t think you are going to get the Russians to say that because if they openly say—for publication—our intentions are, that weakens their position at the bargaining table vis-à-vis our grain export.

K: No, no, our instructions were that—unless they were changed—we would tell them privately they couldn’t go above the figure.

B: We would monitor that very carefully.

K: But they didn’t have to announce what they were going to do.

B: They will ask us what we think they will buy, and at that point I think that Dick Bell or somebody could say, well, our best analysis is their needs may be this much.

K: I would prefer to say you can buy 6 million now and come back to us if you want more and not say you can’t buy more than six.

B: Why do you pick the six?

K: Because that’s what is the other agreement . . . frankly to have a figure where they have to come back to us.

B: These are two separate things. [Missed a sentence or two] I discussed this with Bill Seidman. His initial instructions were going to be that they could buy 6 million tons starting next October 1, but the wheat crop is going to be available in June, you see, and therefore I suggested that we make the language that they could buy X million tons,

\(^9\) Robinson.
whatever it was, out of the 1975 crop. Which means they can begin buying over—they can buy for delivery out of the ’76 crop, too. Just as a year ago in October they purchased some for delivery out of the 1975 crop.

K: You know, in fact, Earl, for a variety of reasons including total indiscipline in the government, we have not gotten out of this grain situation what we should have.

B: I kind of agree with that. We are coming out of it with nothing except a long term agreement. I guess that’s right. And, frankly, from my point of view it would be awfully nice to have some kind of petroleum agreement. A part of my problem, Henry, is to diffuse this knee-jerk emotional reaction against selling anything to the Russians.

K: That’s right.
B: And if we had a petroleum agreement it would make it a hell of a lot easier from my point of view and yours too.

K: Exactly.
B: And if it was just a cosmetic agreement.
K: Well, that’s why I want it.
B: Well, I am for you, as you know, if we can get it.

K: But it isn’t only the petroleum. We’ve just gotten ourselves over a barrel and really, you know, as far as I personally am concerned, in the seventh year of being in Washington, I don’t give a damn anymore what people say.

B: I am getting that way myself.
K: Because my record is, for better or worse, now fixed.
B: It is a good record, Henry. Listen, why don’t we go now on these instructions to Chuck. I understand that he is going to be in Moscow tonight. He is probably there right now. That he can talk in terms of seven, and we will watch this very, very carefully as we did before.

K: But the problem is then we have no leverage if . . .
B: They may want to go beyond that. I doubt if they will go to 7.
K: Yeah.
B: But we will watch this very carefully. As you know, on that prior sale of 9.8 million tons there wasn’t a ton sold without our prior approval over here. When it approached 10 we put our brakes on it.

K: Yeah.
B: Why don’t we go at this and we’ll watch it very carefully.
K: That doesn’t help me if they buy more than 6. What I would like is something we could hold them up to.
B: Why don’t you pick 5 then? If you arbitrarily picked 6 . . .
K: Well, I picked 6 only because it was consistent with the other—I will be happy to pick 5.
B: Of course, this isn’t consistent—because the other is a minimum of 6 and maximum of 7. We have already sold them 9.8 and we are talking about some on top of this.

K: But you will scream even more if I say 5.

B: Well, obviously.

K: I had it five and, in fact, I increased it by one.

B: Well, the group yesterday, based on the . . .

K: Yeah, but that group, Earl, with all due respect—there isn’t one man in that group who has the slightest foreign policy sense.

B: Uh-huh. You have your man there.

K: Yeah, I don’t know—who is the guy?

B: Well, you had Deane Hinton there this morning. I don’t know—there was nobody there Tuesday, I guess. Well, we discussed it again this morning. Have you talked to Hinton since our meeting this morning?

K: Hinton is working for me and, by God, he does what I tell him to.

B: Well . . .

K: We haven’t reached that point yet.

B: Well, he was there this morning. He can report back to you. Again the discussion this morning was let’s stick at seven. And that was the consensus of the group there this morning as it was Tuesday.

K: Okay. Well, let me talk to Hinton.

B: Okay, thanks, Henry.

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210. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The Soviets and the Middle East

My staff, with informal cooperation from several bureaus, recently undertook a study of the Soviet role in the Middle East (and Persian Gulf), focussing primarily on the kinds of problems that will arise ei-

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ther after or aside from the settlement process. The following are the main conclusions and observations; I am attaching a copy of the paper but do not believe you need read through it, since you are more than familiar with most of the issues that are raised.

*The Soviet Role and the Settlement*

Although we focus on issues transcending the settlement process, these issues are inextricably intertwined with the question of the Soviets and the settlement.

— The Soviets see their vital interests engaged in the Middle East and will almost inevitably play a significant continuing role there. While the Arab-Israel dispute has been their main vehicle thus far, they have several other attractive alternative entrees to the region.

— The scope of the Soviet role will in the first instance be determined by the regional states. We, however, have a strong interest in circumscribing Soviet involvement and our policies will have a major impact on the desire and ability of the regional states to limit the Soviets.

— Our leverage in the short term is particularly great because of our dominant role in the settlement process. We need to determine, therefore, which short-term tactic is more promising: excluding the Soviets as much as possible or seeking to institutionalize their role in the region.

— Seeking to exclude the Soviets from the settlement process and the Middle East in general would increase the likelihood that they will look for opportunities to foment and exploit other tensions. However, including them in the process cannot ensure their good behavior, especially as regards issues not directly related to the settlement.

— Should we appear to be giving the Soviets a free ride by assigning them an unearned role in the settlement process, our Middle East and détente policies would both come in for domestic criticism.

— In such a fairly well balanced situation, consideration of détente and global US-Soviet competition play a significant role.

— Given that the Soviets (a) are finding the Arab-Israel dispute increasingly unprofitable for their policy, and (b) do have other attractive options in the Middle East, their propensity to oppose a settlement is fairly low, especially if they could associate themselves with it in a prestigious manner.

— One post-settlement area in which the Soviets will have to be involved is limitation on arms transfers. This gives them strong leverage on the situation, especially since we will face serious problems in

\[2\text{ Attached but not printed.}\]
squaring restraints in the Arab-Israel context with our arms supply programs in the Gulf.

Other Areas of Opportunity

Aside from the Arab-Israel conflict, there are several ways that the Soviets could profitably engage themselves in the Middle East (page references are to the attached study):

—The Palestinians will offer a prime opportunity, both because their hopes will remain unfulfilled and because they offer fertile ground for radicalism. (pp. 6–7)

—Intra-Arab rivalries will almost inevitably flourish either on traditional grounds (Baghdad vs. Damascus vs. Cairo) or along radical/conservative lines. These will be a standing invitation to meddling by outside forces including the Soviets. (pp. 10–12)

—The Soviets will undoubtedly seek to develop their role in the Persian Gulf. For some time at least, this will probably involve expanding ties with Iran and seeking diplomatic openings on the Arab side of the Gulf. Promotion or exploitation of radicalism in the Gulf region would cause problems for the Soviets but they probably hope to profit from a long-term trend in this direction. (pp. 13–14)

—Soviet ability to manipulate the oil situation is small. The best opportunity (although it has pitfalls) would be to appear as the backer of the producers against Western threats. (pp. 15–16)

—Soviet attempts to profit from ties to Israel and to local Communists show little prospect for near-term advantage.

Principal Implications

—Our long-term interests are probably best served by a policy that seeks to circumscribe Soviet involvement by: building them into the settlement, accepting the permanency of some Soviet role, and defining our policy as one of working primarily with the regional states rather than conceptualizing the area as an area of US-Soviet competition. This broad approach, backed by a continuing active US policy in the region, should not only give us the best chance of “domesticating” the Soviets in Middle East affairs but also maximizes the chances for achieving our regional interests and can be used as an incentive in the overall context of US-Soviet relations.

—Our present policy of keeping lines of communication open to a broad range of Arab nations as well as Israel is a vital policy element, second only to the pursuit of peace.

—The relatively novel danger that emerges concerns the Soviets becoming the protectors of the oil producers. Although this is no imminent prospect, we need to guard against it by (a) avoiding statements or actions that would scare the producers into the Soviet embrace, and (b)
ensuring that the Soviets realize that we see our vital interests at stake in the region and do not miscalculate our tolerance.

211. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, October 17, 1975, 2:14 p.m.

K: Hello Anatol.
D: How are you Henry. Thank you very much. How was your trip?
K: I am just leaving.
D: I mean your trip to Canada.²
K: Didn’t you read about it in the newspapers? It is getting to be like the Kremlin.
D: It is no problem. You are covered—it is an open door policy.
K: Two things, three things really. Patolichev is acting too nasty. We are trying to get this thing settled and a little more conciliation on his part would be helpful.³
D: I don’t understand.
K: His behavior is getting to be too tough. I understand your problem but your analysis is not exactly correct—the one you gave me the other day.⁴
D: It is our analysis.
K: I think you are wrong. If I want compensation I want it in the political field, I don’t give a damn about the economic thing.
D: Sure, like . . .

¹ Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking.
² Kissinger was in Ottawa October 14–15 for meetings with Canadian Secretary for External Affairs Allan MacEachen. He left Washington on October 17 for a 6-day trip to Japan and China.
³ In telegram 14888 from Moscow, October 17, Robinson reported that he had held a 3-hour meeting with Patolichev that morning “aimed at bringing our grain/oil negotiations to a conclusion.” “The Soviets’ attitude,” Robinson noted, “was extremely cold, unhappy and very hard.” (Telegram 14888 from Moscow, October 17; National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)
⁴ See Document 207.
K: That is ridiculous. That is not the issue. I think we can settle it in turn. I think we can settle it in terms agreeable to you if you can—well, first of all, I think the behavior is too rough.

D: I don’t have any information on this.

K: I want to tell you this privately and if we make this agreement I think we should do it in a way that we are pleased with each other. Those are the instructions Robinson has.\(^5\)

D: The real . . .

K: Those are exactly his instructions and you will have to help us a little bit in not pressing things to the absolute limit. I am meeting your basic point.

D: I will pass on the points you mentioned since I don’t have any information yet.\(^6\)

K: Ok. The second thing is the date that looks best to meet Gromyko is the 14th.

D: The 14th of November. Late November you couldn’t do it.

K: No because I have to visit your allies.

D: Yes, you have a political problem. Ok. I will check with him while you are there and when you come back, tell you.

K: Yes, and I wanted to tell you I am taking Sonnenfeldt to China. This has nothing to do with you. It is to give him some experience and satisfy his ego. He is not along for any substantive purpose. I have him along for his education and his ego. I wanted you to know this from me—it has nothing to do with you.

D: I understand.

K: I know we have an occasional reason to be irritated with each other, but I think this thing will come out alright. We should have a serious talk sometime soon when we can on where we should go in our relationship.

D: What about SALT?

K: I am waiting for your response. I can’t do any more til I have a reply from you.

D: I understand. Will there be anything new when Sadat will be here?\(^7\) You promised to tell me.

\(^5\) See footnote 3, Document 207.

\(^6\) In telegram 14954 from Moscow, October 17, Robinson reported a meeting that afternoon after which Patolichev approved several revisions to the overall package on American grain and Soviet oil, possibly opening the door to a final settlement. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files) After several days of further talks in Moscow, Robinson finally notified Washington (and Kissinger in China) on October 20 that at 1 p.m. Moscow time, “Patolichev and I executed the grain agreement and oil letter of intent.” (Telegram 15000 from Moscow, October 20; ibid.)

\(^7\) Sadat was in the United States October 27–November 5 for a State visit.
K: We are giving them B–52s but that wouldn’t affect you—they are aimed at Israel.
D: Otherwise, there is nothing interest.
K: There won’t be anything spectacular that I foresee.
D: Do you take him to Disney World?
K: I won’t, no.
D: What about the beginning of this building of our apartment house in the complex of our embassy?
K: Let me get you an answer when I get back. I have to catch a plane.
D: Ok.
K: And you’ll let me know about the 14th?
D: Yes.
K: We’ll meet the 13th.
D: What do you mean?
K: I will arrive the evening of the 13th and we’ll meet on the 14th.
D: Ok. You will be in Paris.
K: I will be in Paris afterwards.
D: Ok. Have a nice trip.
K: Thank you.

212. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford¹

Moscow, October 27, 1975.

Dear Mr. President,

After this recent visit to Washington Mr. A. A. Gromyko informed me and my colleagues in detail about the talks he had had with you and with Secretary of State H. Kissinger in Washington and New York.

We note with satisfaction the determination that you expressed, to firmly adhere to the course which has shaped up in the Soviet-American relations for the last years. This fully corresponds to our own intention as our Minister has already told you. He also set forth our po-

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Counselor of the Department, Box 6, SALT, Nov.–Dec. 1975. No classification marking.
positions on the issues which are the subject of the exchange of views between our countries.

Now I would like to dwell only on one of them—on the question to which, as I understand, both sides attach paramount importance. The matter in question is how to convert into a concrete Agreement the understanding on limitation of strategic offensive weapons which was reached at our meeting with you in Vladivostok last November.

You recall, Mr. President, that it was meant from the very beginning—and it was mutually confirmed in Helsinki—that the signing of such an Agreement should be the main outcome of the forthcoming visit to the United States. We are still of the same opinion.

However, I would like to tell you frankly, that we are concerned with the state of affairs regarding the preparation of the Agreement in view of the position taken by the US side.

I have in mind above all the attempt by the US side actually to leave outside the limits of the Agreement, i.e. not to place limitation on a whole kind of weapons—cruise missiles which are capable to perform the same missions as are the weapons included by the US into the Agreement.

There is a strange situation here: we are negotiating a limitation by certain ceiling of the number of delivery vehicles for strategic weapons, but at the same time the development of a new category of delivery vehicles for such weapons is started. In other words, a new channel of arms race is being opened. But did we have that in mind in Vladivostok?

The subsequent modifications in the American position—the setting of a 3000 km range limit for such missiles then 2500 kms, or certain limitation on the number of aircraft equipped with such missiles—hardly change anything in substance. The new channel of arms race would any way remain opened. To agree with the latest American proposal to the effect that up to 300 heavy bombers could be armed with such missiles would mean that above 2400 strategic delivery vehicles, agreed upon in Vladivostok between us, the sides could have thousands, literally thousands of units of weapons intended for striking the territories of each other. What kind of strategic arms limitation is it?

Or let us take another question. Refusing to take into account the cruise missiles on heavy bombers, i.e. the type of weapons which is most directly related to the task to be solved by the Agreement, the US side is at the same time trying to include Soviet Backfire bombers into the category of heavy bombers, although those aircraft are not of such type and have no relationship whatsoever to the Agreement.

As I have already told you personally in Helsinki, those Soviet planes are of twice as less maximum range as the bomber you refer to
(Bison) and, consequently, are not capable of carrying out missions at intercontinental distances which are assigned to heavy bombers.

However the latest American proposals contain limitations on those aircraft under the guise of so called “hybrid systems”, and at the same time the deployment of sea-based cruise missiles with a range up to 2000 kilometers is legitimized. So what we have got here: the Soviet Union is offered to limit the number of weapons which have nothing to do with the task to be settled by the Agreement and we are also expected at the same time to give our sanction so that the US side is allowed to have additional quantity of weapons which are very directly related to the Agreement.

Such proposals can only lead us aside but in no way can they move ahead the working-out of the Agreement.

And all this is going on even after we have expressed, on our part, readiness to meet the US position on the matter to which you attached so great an importance—to count against the ceiling for missiles with MIRVs (1320) all missiles of the kinds which have been tested with MIRVs. It was not a simple matter for us, Mr. President, to take that decision. But we took that step, and we took it in the hope that the US side will duly appreciate it and would take such a position on other remaining issues—first of all on cruise missiles—which would make it possible to find quickly mutually acceptable solutions.

But unfortunately, it has not happened. A reciprocal step from the US side—not only equal to ours but even comparable with it—has not followed so far.

At the next meeting of the representatives of our countries the Soviet side will be prepared to continue the exchange of views on concrete issues of strategic arms limitation. But we consider it important that you have clear understanding already now of our attitude to the approach on which the American position rests as well as to the latest American proposals on the main unresolved questions.

I would like to hope that it will help you, Mr. President, to see better the substance of the differences between the USSR and the USA in this field, and that you will make decisions which will allow to work out such an Agreement that would fully correspond to the goal set—to put in a real way a limit to the build-up of strategic weapons.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

SUBJECT
Reply to Brezhnev on SALT

I have prepared a reply to Brezhnev’s letter of October 27 on SALT. As I noted to you in my earlier memorandum, it is my judgment that the current deadlock cannot be broken in Geneva or in other meetings between myself and Gromyko.

With the approach of the February, 1976, Communist Party Congress in the Soviet Union and our own primary elections, time is of the essence if we are to find any breakthrough which will enable us to conclude a SALT agreement and arrange a summit. The alternative is to recess the negotiations until after the 1976 election. We would then have less than a year to negotiate an agreement covering the period to 1985.

It is likely that Brezhnev will have departed office by that period. Following Brezhnev’s departure, there will no doubt be a period of instability in the Soviet hierarchy no matter who emerges in the position of authority. The new leadership will be cautious and unwilling to make concessions which would permit opponents to criticize what has been done. Therefore, I judge that it is essential to make one more effort with Brezhnev to try to get SALT moving again.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to forward the attached letter (Tab A) to Brezhnev.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, “Outside the System” Chronological Files, 1974–1977, Box 3, 11/3/75–11/11/75. Secret; Sensitive. The original is an uninitialed copy. Scowcroft revised the initialed copy on November 3, the day he formally replaced Kissinger as Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt and Hyland forwarded two drafts, a “shorter, procedural letter” and a “longer, more substantive letter,” in an October 29 memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Counselor of the Department, Box 6, SALT, July–Oct. 1975)

2 Document 212.

3 There is no indication of Ford’s approval or disapproval, but the letter was subsequently sent. See Document 214.
214. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, undated.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have taken careful note of your letter of October 27 regarding the SALT negotiations. I regret very much that you have been unable to find any areas of compromise between the positions of the two sides. I continue to believe that it is a matter of great importance to both your side and ours to continue to search for a solution which will enable us to resolve satisfactorily the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks.

In your letter you referred to cruise missiles as weapons systems capable of performing the same missions as weapons included in the agreement. But, as you recall, there was no specific discussion of cruise missiles at Vladivostok and indeed these weapons systems closely resemble those known as forward-based systems, which have been explicitly excluded from the Vladivostok agreement. The only understanding at Vladivostok that can possibly be connected to cruise missiles related to “air-to-surface missiles” with which bombers may be equipped. Thus, in putting forward proposals to limit cruise missiles on aircraft and on seagoing vessels which clearly are not intercontinental systems, the United States is making a significant concession to your side.

You pointed out in your letter that the US side has proposed that the Soviet aircraft known as Backfire should be limited by the new agreement. The Backfire aircraft was not discussed at Vladivostok, but aircraft with intercontinental capabilities (heavy bombers) are obviously of the type which have been considered in SALT and are an appropriate subject for discussion in these negotiations. We acknowledge that the Backfire may have been designed for peripheral attack missions. However, at the extremes of its capabilities, the Backfire aircraft appears capable of intercontinental missions particularly if equipped with a tanker fleet and based in northern areas. Thus, it is in a sense a hybrid category and we have made a substantial concession in permitting up to 300 above the 2400 ceiling.

It is apparent that we have reached a deadlock. Despite the current differences between the two sides, I still believe that it is of paramount importance to both sides to resolve these matters by a reasonable com-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov. - Dec. 1975. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the letter was delivered to the Soviet Embassy at 2:30 p.m. on November 4.
2 Document 212.
promise. In your message you referred to another meeting between our representatives. If you have any suggestions in this respect, I will appreciate receiving them.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

215. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Half-Lies and Half-Truths

The Press currently is riddled with them and it seems almost hopeless to try to correct them.

—SALT “evasions”; see the Middleton article last Saturday.2 It is almost wholly false in recounting the alleged differences between Schlesinger and you and above all in stating that you have “turned a blind eye” to Soviet “violations.” The “most serious infraction—the 200 new command and control silos—is in fact not the most serious problem at all, either in terms of SALT compliance or in terms of strategic significance. Above all, however, you turned no “blind eye” toward it since it has been raised repeatedly in the SCC and we have acquired information that indicates that at the very least it would take enormous effort and many months work for the Russians to turn these silos into ICBM launchers. The story also ignores our own “violation”—the environmental shelters—which despite repeated requests by the White House has not been corrected.

—Conceding unequal ceilings to the Soviets at Vladivostok; see the Middleton piece. It is of course false since the unequal aggregates would have been balanced by unequal MIRV limits in our favor. The


decision was in fact made by the President at Vladivostok and the difference in terms of strategic impact is nil. Nor did the President reject your alleged position “out of hand.” As I recall it took a walk in the snow plus additional discussions lasting several hours at Vladivostok to decide that there was a marginal political advantage in going one way rather than the other.

—Cruise Missiles; see the Wall Street Journal editorial of November 7. Almost totally false. It is not true that the Soviets are trying to “limit” our cruise missiles. They are trying to get us to count them against the 2400 aggregate above a certain range. It is we who are trying to limit Soviet cruise missiles since the Soviets will be faced with the fact that they are already above the 2400 limit and counting cruise missiles forces them either not to have them or to remove some other systems important to them. Moreover, it is we who are proposing to ban certain of them above range limits (with Pentagon agreement).

—Cruise missile verification; see the Wall Street Journal editorial of November 7. You and the President want to rely on Soviet “good faith.” At least half false. The only difference relates to range limits and whatever the limit the verification problems are exactly identical. The one Pentagon proposal extant—to limit cruise missile restrictions to nuclear armed ones—would indeed depend solely on Soviet “good faith” for implementation.

—Cruise missiles: You want to limit them, Schlesinger wants to have them. Wall Street Journal. False on its face.

—“Your Office” wrote a memo to Scowcroft recommending against the President’s meeting Solzhenitsyn because it would “offend the Soviets.” George Will, “Meet the Press.” Half truth. A State Department office did indeed write such a memo and it went in the routine Springsteen to Scowcroft channel. You may be responsible as you are for everything the Department does, but you never saw, much less endorsed this memo.

—The Soviets refuse to count their “intercontinental” Backfire against the 2400 limit and you agree with it. George Will, “Meet the Press” and others. Half false. The Backfire is intercontinental in certain flight profiles, but by common agreement its basic mission is peripheral. You have not agreed not to count it altogether. Missing from the allegation, however, is the point that hundreds of US aircraft that can attack the USSR in certain modes are excluded and thousands of cruise

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3 Attached but not printed.
4 Ford was interviewed on the NBC News program “Meet the Press” on November 9; George Will, then an editor of the magazine National Review, was a member of the panel of questioners. For the text of the interview, see Public Papers: Ford, 1975, No. 666.
5 See footnote 5, Document 155.
missiles that could attack the USSR, are under our proposals, excluded from the 2400 aggregate.

—Yours is a policy of “preemptive concession”; you want to be hard on everyone but the Soviets. (Middleton, Whalen)\(^6\) These are precisely the kind of smears that have been whispered around town for months, and are now out in the open, which create the kind of “tension” the President referred to yesterday.

—You oppose raising the nuclear threshold in Europe. At best a half truth. The issue is whether we should do this piecemeal or as the result of considered strategic decision; whether it is politically and psychologically wise to do so to such an extent that the nuclear deterrent loses all meaning and whether we and our allies have the resources and priorities to compensate the raising of the threshold with the kinds of conventional forces required as a result. Moreover, who, after ten years time, will be ahead in an out-of-theater cruise missile race.

—The Defense Budget. All kinds of articles imply that there was an issue here. False. If anything, the requirements you have envisaged for strategic and theater forces require higher defense budgets than those coming out of Defense.


216. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford\(^1\)


SUBJECT

National Intelligence Estimate “The Soviet Assessment of the US”

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the United States Intelligence Board, has issued a National Intelligence Es-

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 18, USSR (25). Secret. Sent for information. In a memorandum forwarding a draft and the attached NIE to Kissinger on October 31, Clift explained: “This Estimate is the Intelligence Community’s first attempt in recent years to deal comprehensively with this topic. It was initiated in response to your request at the August 1974 NSCIC meeting.” A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has
timate on the Soviet assessment of the United States (at Tab A). The Estimate treats factors affecting the Soviet view of the US, principal Soviet conclusions about the US, and the implications of those conclusions for Soviet policy. (The Estimate does not address the issues of internal USSR developments and the possibility of Soviet leadership changes.) A summary follows.

Soviet leaders are, in fact, preoccupied with developments and problems in the United States. In February of next year, they must present to their Party Congress an assessment of the state of US-Soviet relations and their future policy recommendations based on that assessment. Additionally, the projected US-Soviet summit meeting and SALT agreement will give new momentum to the détente process or, if they do not take place, will add to doubts now surrounding détente. It is also well understood in Moscow that the terms, conditions and future of US-Soviet détente will be under debate in the 1976 US election campaign.

The Soviet leaders' assessment of the US is shaped by their own strong consensus in favor of détente and by growing Soviet power—especially military—which increases their long-term confidence. It is also influenced by their perception that international relations are undergoing a fundamental restructuring to the disadvantage of non-Communist industrial states and that capitalism as a whole is in crisis, perhaps a crisis deeper and more long-lasting than those it has survived in the past. At the same time, in judging US strengths and weaknesses, the Soviet leaders appear to have a realistic view of US power and of their own shortcomings and long term problems.

Within the context of the above considerations affecting Soviet perceptions of the US, the Estimate states that the Soviets likely have reached the following conclusions about this country:

**Overall U.S. Posture:** They believe that as a result of international and domestic US developments, the USSR is dealing with a chastened United States, a nation which has been obliged to recognize the limits of its power and one whose confidence in its old international role has been undermined.

**U.S. Politics and Society:** The social and political unrest which has marked the US scene in recent years is taken seriously as further evidence of the United States' present weakened condition.

—The Soviets believe that domestic dissent has had a corrosive, though not crippling, effect on US ability to act abroad and has been a

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seen.” Ford also initialed the memorandum. According to an attached correspondence profile, the President noted it on November 11.

2 NIE 11–5–75, October 9; attached but not printed. A copy is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Electronic Reading Room.
factor in turning the US Government toward improving relations with the USSR.

—Surprised and shocked by the outcome of the Watergate episode, the Soviets believe one of its consequences has been to weaken the Presidency vis-à-vis the Congress which has limited the Administration’s ability to carry forward a détente policy.

—With respect to the Congress elected in 1974, the Soviets welcome what they see as its increasing readiness to challenge Administration military spending and deployment proposals, but also believe that its generally more negative attitude toward US-Soviet détente may mean trouble for them in arms control and trade negotiations.

Military Capabilities and Intentions: The Soviets have a high regard for the technical, industrial and economic prowess of the United States and assume that the US will continue to improve its strategic posture.

—With respect to conventional forces, the Soviets have a healthy respect for US capabilities and do not doubt that the United States has the physical and technical means to sustain and develop them further. The key question is whether the United States has the will to do so.

—In their private councils, the Soviets note only that public and Congressional opposition to arms spending has grown, not that it has won the day. The so-called military industrial complex in the United States is said to be still highly influential and it is regularly claimed that US defense spending is moving steadily upward.

Economic Position: The Soviets see themselves currently running ahead in terms of overall rate of growth but by other measures concede the lead to the US. Additionally the Soviets concede a substantial edge to the US in productivity. They also acknowledge that the recovery in US industrial production has already begun.

—In science and technology, Soviet respect for US capabilities is undimmed. The fact that the USSR has a long way to go to close the technology gap appears to be uncontested in Moscow.

—On trade, in the wake of US legislative restrictions, there is more realism in Moscow about the future prospects for these relations. Skepticism about the economic benefits of détente is spreading, particularly among Soviet economists.

U.S. Foreign Policy: The Soviets see US foreign policy as being aimed at preserving a powerful world role for the United States through the orchestration of an effective east-west balance of power. They see a trend toward greater limitations on direct foreign involvement as a result of diminished resources and public support.

—They expect that the United States will not be satisfied to accommodate itself to international changes inimical to its interests but will
try to reverse them or find ways to turn them to advantage; not just to maintain its power but to regain clear superiority over the USSR.

—US setbacks also worry Soviet leaders; they are fearful that the United States, from an urge to recover its losses and restore its prestige, will take a harder stance in adversary situations; they believe that increased US preoccupation with domestic affairs and with shoring up the Atlantic Alliance has adversely affected the development of US-Soviet détente; and, by and large, they are less confident they can read the intentions of your Administration than they were those of the Nixon Administration.

Implications for Soviet Policy

The above conclusions are predicted to have the following implications for Soviet policy in the near term:

—Soviet leaders, comparing their own domestic and international positions with those of the United States, believe that the balance sheet is changing in the USSR’s favor. Nevertheless, they recognize that the United States has great strength in certain areas—economic, technology, military and diplomatic—and thus do not accept as a basis for policy making that the United States is in permanent decline.

—The Soviet leaders perceive the present US-Soviet relationship in strategic nuclear weapons to be one of rough balance. Although they may entertain hopes that US resolve as a strategic competitor is weakening, they know realistically that the United States need not concede the USSR a superior position in the next decade.

—There is constant conflict in the minds of the Soviet leaders between the temptation to seize tactical opportunities as they arise, in Europe and elsewhere, and their desire to preserve profitable relations with the United States and the West generally. At present, the Soviets remain concerned to preserve the benefits of the détente relationship, and to avoid arousing negative US reactions. However, should they perceive a decline in US readiness to react against developments such as those in Portugal, if the benefits of détente should appear to be diminishing drastically, or if more militant attitudes should become dominant among the new leaders soon to emerge, the result could be a more assertive policy.

—The Soviet leaders do not welcome American political divisions that threaten the bilateral relationship. They will be hoping for the election in 1976 of the presidential candidate, whatever his party affiliation, who is in their view most committed to US-Soviet détente and best able to secure a firm consensus behind this policy. They will probably weigh the possible impact of their own policy actions on the election’s outcome.
The US intelligence community judges that Brezhnev approaches important decisions on SALT and thus the Summit with his political freedom more circumscribed than before. All intelligence agencies except CIA believe that, while desiring a SALT agreement, the Soviets will offer only minor concessions, will refuse to accept any inhibitions on the improvement or modernization of their own strategic forces, and will continue to press for limitations on US cruise missile development. CIA believes that, in the end, the Soviets are likely to prove willing to make more than minor concessions on the key issues of cruise missiles and Backfire.

Should a SALT agreement prove unattainable and the Summit not occur this winter, the Estimate states that the Soviets would face serious problems. While it is possible that this could spark a challenge to Brezhnev’s leadership and policies, all agencies think it more likely the Politburo would prefer to minimize the internal political repercussions in order to keep détente intact as the USSR’s general line and to preserve as much of its content as possible in the short run.

217. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have been giving careful thought to the state of our relations generally and to the situation that has arisen in the negotiations on strategic arms limitation. I am concerned that a sense of uncertainty and even drift has appeared in our relations. This is reinforced by the deadlock which emerged from the most recent exchange of messages on strategic arms limitations. I believe there is a risk that if this situation persists it would serve neither the interests of our two countries nor those of the world at large. In these circumstances, I believe steps should be taken by both of us to reverse the present trend. Assuming that you share this view, I would be prepared to send Secretary of State Kissinger to Moscow to review with you the entire range of

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov.–Dec. 1975. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the letter was delivered to Ambassador Dobrynin by messenger at 9:15 a.m. on November 17.

2 Documents 212 and 214.
American-Soviet relations especially to explore ways of resolving the present deadlock in the strategic arms limitation negotiation. In doing so, I would proceed from the assumption that you agree with me that such a visit should yield positive results, including significant progress in resolving the disagreements on strategic arms. Quite clearly, failure to achieve positive results would represent a setback of considerable magnitude to the line of policy you and I have in the past agreed upon.

If this proposal and the reasoning underlying it meet with your approval, the proposed visit by Secretary Kissinger could take place either during the weekend of December 13–14 or on December 18–19.

As you may know, I am participating in meetings on economic policy with several of my colleagues in France this weekend, but I would of course be pleased to receive your reaction to the above suggestions at any time.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

3 President Ford attended the Economic Summit in Rambouillet November 15–17.
4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

218. Memorandum From Thomas P. Thornton of the Policy Planning Staff to the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord)


SUBJECT
Staff Views on Détente

You asked me to pull together the views of Staff members on the issue of détente. The response was not exactly overwhelming and I am not sure how much can be made out of the responses that we got. I am still mulling this over, but thought you might want to have an interim

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 77D112, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Box 359, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Nov. 16–30, 1975. Confidential; Exdis; No Distribution Outside S/P. The memorandum is stamped: “Urgent.” Drafted by Thornton on November 10.
reading prior to the staff meeting with Ambassador Stoessel.\(^2\) I am sending copies of this to all S/P members for their background for the meeting; also in the hope that it will stimulate further responses or reassessments (Delphic or otherwise) of previous responses.

I expected that the responses might run along one or more of three lines:

—That the US was taking too hard a line in dealing with the Soviets;
—That the policy of détente was doing pretty much what it is supposed to and hence is in our interest;
—That the Soviets are getting the better end of the deal.

The results tended to cluster towards the third of these, suggesting that the line of most détente critics in the public and Congress is not far off target. Nobody on the staff was condemning the policy outright or even complaining that we were being grossly outdone. Nonetheless, I think that this general direction is noteworthy coming from this staff.

In general terms, I guess almost all of the responses could best be characterized as uneasy and/or unenthusiastic, but showing no deep concern. Indeed, the clearest message that comes through is that for most of the areas considered, détente has been pretty much irrelevant. The costs are seen as small but the payoffs as even smaller.

However, it must be remembered that the question, as phrased, was directed at specifics, rather than the overall context of US relations. (Nobody much felt impelled to gratuitously note the fact that we have, after all, moved away from war.) Had we asked directly for an overall assessment, the tone would have no doubt been more favorable.

But this is an important point to note. When people (including people with the breadth of view of this staff) look at détente, they tend to talk about the part of the elephant that they see; with at least part of their mind they judge détente in these terms, and often unfavorably. Another part of their mind no doubt appreciates the benefits of the larger picture but does not necessarily get articulated.

And, of course, if the component parts of the elephant are for the most part unattractive, then there are legitimate questions to be raised about the attractiveness of the beast in toto.

\(^2\) In a note to members of the S/P staff on November 20, Peter B. Swiers, Lord’s special assistant, reported that the meeting was scheduled for 4:15 p.m. on November 21. Swiers added in a marginal note to Lord: “Substantive material attached: 1. Thornton memo on S/P views of détente; 2. Kennan [October 23] speech [on the Enduring Anatomy of Russian/American Relations]; 3. Moscow 16100 [November 8] on Soviet views of US-Soviet Relations; 4. Moscow 16313 [November 12] on Soviet Leadership succession. All S/P members received individual copies.” Copies of all the attachments are ibid. No substantive record of the meeting between Stoessel and the S/P staff on November 21 has been found.
Looking at specifics, détente benefits were seen in such things as: weakening the Soviet position somewhat in Eastern Europe and among the world Communist parties; potential Soviet involvement in the international economy; taking some elements of stress out of US-West European relations; slightly improved Soviet behavior in the Middle East and the UN; some commercial advantages; and payoffs in Sino-US relations.

The disadvantages are often mirror images of the advantages; weakening the rationale of NATO; reducing general US-European cohesion; making European Communists respectable; making the Congress less cooperative; not restraining the Soviets effectively in Africa (Somalia, Guinea, Angola) or in South Asia (anti-US propaganda); not moving the Soviets far enough in the Middle East peace process; raising doubts about the US among friends and allies (e.g., fear of condominium; complaints that we treat the Soviets better than our friends; concern that the US is too complacent; we are no longer reliable in a crisis); and leaving the Third World with the feeling that we and the Soviets may well be improving our relations but that is of no benefit to anybody else.

I had hoped we would come up with something more exciting and new. Perhaps the Stoessel meeting will turn up something we can all get our teeth into.

219. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford

Moscow, November 20, 1975.

Dear Mr. President,

I have just received your letter of November 16.2 I would like to say from the outset that we also are concerned by the state of affairs developing recently in the relations between our countries, particularly in connection with a problem which we both consider as a first and foremost problem. I have in mind the working out on the basis of the Vladivostok agreement of a new Agreement on strategic arms limitations

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov.–Dec. 1975. No classification marking. Marginalia indicate the letter was received from the Soviet Embassy at 6:45 p.m.

2 Document 217.
which, as it was agreed, should be signed during my visit to the United States.

We share your opinion that it is necessary to make energetic efforts to resolve remaining questions which delay the completion of the preparation of this Agreement. On our part we are ready to continue discussing these questions in constructive way. At the same time we are entitled—in the light of major steps made by us—to expect that the American side also will display a necessary constructive approach to finding out of mutually acceptable solutions.

These are the very considerations which urged me to send to you my letter of October 27.3 We, of course, are ready to receive Secretary H. Kissinger in Moscow to discuss the questions of strategic arms limitations, as well as to exchange opinions on the whole complex of the Soviet-American relations. The most convenient time for this would be December 18–19.

Beside the problem of strategic arms limitations there are, of course, other major problems of international character for the solution of which both of our countries can do a great deal. There are questions of bilateral nature which await their solution. We are in favour of moving ahead along the whole range of the Soviet-American relations, moving ahead in the interests of further development of these relations, in the interests of strengthening the process of relaxation as a whole.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev4

3 Document 212.
4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
220. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, November 21, 1975, 9:30 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**

President Ford  
Secretary of State Kissinger  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is discussion of Cyprus and the President’s upcoming trip to China.]

Kissinger: We had an effusive reply from Brezhnev—only three days after we sent our letter.\(^2\)

The President: That is very forthcoming—damned good.

Kissinger: I think we should get another Vladivostok agreement on cruise missiles and Backfire. Then we would work out an agreement and Brezhnev could come by April. That would keep the Middle East quiet. We need to have an NSC meeting, or maybe a principals-only Verification Panel meeting.

The President: I would have Clements attend also, not just Rumsfeld.

Kissinger: If we get the total reduced to 2300, it would take the Soviets out of cruise missiles. We would be permitted 200 on SLCMs as an offset to Backfire. We would count ALCMs over 600 as MIRV and ban them on other than heavy bombers.

They have about 1450 ICBMs and about 900 SLBMs. They will be squeezed out of cruise missiles. We would need a side letter from Brezhnev putting a ceiling on Backfire. You don’t have to commit yourself now. Brezhnev wouldn’t invite me without a willingness to negotiate.

Without Congress, we would have the Soviet-Chinese triangle working again. I think we should tell the Chinese I am going to Moscow. The Soviet angle is what keeps the Chinese under control.

The President: When we hung tough on the Peking visit, it obviously worked.

[Omitted here are a brief exchange on the President’s upcoming trip to China and discussion of Congressional investigations on intelligence and foreign policy.]

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 16. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

\(^2\) Documents 219 and 217, respectively.
Angola and Kissinger’s Last Trip to Moscow, November 1975–January 1976

221. Note From the Department of State to the Soviet Leadership

Washington, undated.

We have viewed with astonishment the precipitate action of the U.S.S.R. in extending on November 11 immediate diplomatic recognition to only one of the three political factions and to one purporting to be the legal government of the Republic of Angola, when in fact that group represented a minority of the population and controlled less than one-third of Angolan territory on that date. Moreover, the Soviet Union must be conscious of the fact that it has extended its recognition in the face of an appeal from the Organization of African Unity for all countries to refrain from extending diplomatic recognition to any of the three liberation movements while the Organization undertakes efforts to obtain a negotiated solution to the Angolan problem.

Together with the rest of the world the United States is fully aware of the large quantity of sophisticated arms, military equipment and personnel which the Soviet Union has caused to be sent by air and by sea to enable the aforementioned minority faction to perpetuate a tragic and bloody civil war in a country that has already suffered much. In our opinion the conduct of the Soviet Union in this matter has now surpassed all bounds of restraint, and has additionally placed it in serious conflict with the great majority of the members of the Organization of African Unity. It is not in the spirit of our mutual efforts to reduce tensions in the world; it is not consistent with the Declaration of Principles we both signed and if continued can set back the progress of détente.

We urge the Soviet Union to give serious consideration to a re-examination of its present policy in Angola. We propose that the So-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 4, Angola. No classification marking. Drafted by Mulcahy and Sonnenfeldt. Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft in a November 19 memorandum to Kissinger, who approved it with minor revisions. Kissinger also approved the following option: “That this not be sent as a formal note, but as an informal message in your channel (in which case I will have it retyped accordingly and returned to you for dispatch.” Sonnenfeldt returned the revised text to the Secretary on November 20. According to marginalia, the note was hand-delivered to the Soviet Embassy at 8 a.m. on November 22.

2 On November 11, Agostinho Neto and the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) declared the independence of the People’s Republic of Angola from Portugal (and from other factions in the Angolan civil war); the Soviet Union, Cuba, Brazil, Mozambique, Congo, and Guinea quickly recognized the new government. Documentation is in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXVIII, Southern Africa.
The Soviet Union discontinue the efforts it is now making to escalate the fighting in Angola, to give public support to the efforts of the O.A.U. to promote a ceasefire and the subsequent initiation of peaceful negotiations among the three Angolan movements and to issue an appeal to all nations to cease their intervention in Angola’s internal affairs.

The United States for its part pursues no unilateral interests in Angola and is exclusively concerned with seeing the people of that country live in peace, independence and well-being. We oppose any action that would make Angola an arena for competition between external powers. Our policies and actions are designed to assure achievement of these objectives and we are prepared to cooperate in any effort that insulates Angola from major power conflict.

We are willing to play any helpful diplomatic role that promises to lead to a cease-fire and to peaceful negotiations toward a solution in Angola which will be acceptable to the three political movements.

222. Note From the Soviet Leadership to the Department of State

Moscow, undated.

Assertions made in the approach by the State Department of November 22 concerning the Soviet position with regard to Angola could not be viewed other than as an attempt to divert attention from the real causes underlining the events which are taking place in that country.

As has already been stated earlier to the US Government the information disseminated in the USA alleging mass shipments of arms by the Soviet Union to Angola and the presence there of “hundreds” of Soviet military personnel is without foundation. Not a single Soviet man is taking part in the hostilities in Angola. Likewise the Soviet side rejects assertions that it is the support by the Soviet Union of the legitimate Government of the People’s Republic of Angola which is recog-
nized already by many states in the world is the cause of what is going on in Angola.

The real causes of that are an open secret. It is well known that the foreign monopolies which for scores of years were masters in the land of Angola were in no way happy by the beginning of the process of decolonization in this country which was bound inevitably to lead and had led to the victory of the national patriotic forces. That was why even prior to the granting of independence certain foreign circles banked on splitting the national liberation movement in the country and encouraged and supported militarily those separatist movements which bound themselves with foreign interests.

Now the events have reached the point when a direct intervention of neocolonialist forces has begun in Angola, in the first place, on the part of the Republic of South Africa. Regular units of the SAR, detachments of South African and Rhodesian mercenaries are participating in the military actions. It is also known that these groupings receive an extensive aid, including military aid, from the United States. In other words, the original cause of the continuing bloodshed in Angola lies in the interference into the internal affairs of that country by the forces, which do not wish to reconcile themselves to the loss of their position there. And the US Government knows all this.

As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, being a consistent supporter of the liquidation of remnants of colonialism, it recognized the People’s Republic of Angola and its Government, formed by the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA), which enjoys a wide support of the Angolan people as a leading national patriotic organization. It is not by chance that by the present moment the People’s Republic of Angola has been already recognized by nearly 30 states of the world, half of which are the African countries—members of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). It shows in itself the groundlessness of statements that the Soviet position on this question supposedly contradicts the position of the African states.

It is also known that after concluding in January 1975 an agreement among the three Angolan movements on the order of granting independence to Angola and on establishing a transitional Government with the participation in it of representatives of those movements the USSR welcomed the creation of such a Government.

Yet, shortly after, the FNLA and the UNITA embarked on the path of undermining the transitional Government thus frustrating its normal functioning and eventually starting military actions which were encouraged and supported from the outside.

The Soviet Union never was and could not be in favour of unleashing a civil war in Angola. It has always supported and is acting in support of the aspirations of the Angolan patriotic forces, as well as of
the efforts of the African states designed to ensure national independence and peaceful development of Angola. The Soviet Union would only welcome such mode of action which would be pursuing the goal of consolidating in Angola all the forces that are striving for a genuine independence and free development of this country.

The Soviet Union firmly adheres to the position that armed aggression in Angola be ceased and the right of its people be safeguarded to decide by itself how to build the new life under the conditions of independence and territorial integrity without any outside interference.

The Soviet Union is prepared to state publicly about it. If the USA is also prepared to make a similar statement and act accordingly, we would welcome this.

In the light of the above-stated attempts to lay some sort of blame on the Soviet Union for the present developments in Angola are devoid of any foundation. Equally groundless are the endeavours to present this matter in such a way as if the policy of the Soviet Union toward Angola is not consistent with the Soviet-American documents.

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223. Memorandum From Secretary of State Kissinger to President Ford


SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin, Tuesday, November [December] 9, 1975, 4 p.m.

This will be a somewhat delicate meeting because of the need to postpone my previously set visit to Moscow, the difficult situation in Angola and the Soviet effort to participate in Middle East diplomacy. These are the subjects for discussion.

Our current relations with the Soviets are clouded in part because of escalating public rhetoric in both countries. The Soviets are reacting with increasing bitterness to attacks on "détente" in this country;

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Brezhnev in Warsaw this morning was quite sharp in commenting on alleged Western failure to live up to the CSCE agreement (though he refrained from singling out the US). The Soviets have stalled the previously promising negotiations for renewal of the maritime agreement, possibly because Brezhnev is under attack at home for paying too much to make up the disastrous Soviet harvest. On Angola, the Soviets have made an apparent overture to Zaire to cool down the situation but their active support, and Cuba’s, of the MPLA continues space.

The present time is probably quite fluid in Moscow because of the preparations for the Party Congress at which time Brezhnev will have to make a rather basic, programmatic statement on domestic and foreign affairs. This is bound to be affected by Soviet perceptions of where the US is headed and these perceptions, in turn, may well be subject to controversy, as they always have been in the past. There continues to be evidence that Brezhnev himself wants to keep relations with us on an even keel so that he can pursue his economic programs and safeguard his place in history. He probably wants a SALT agreement, but his military—always more influential when the leadership picture is uncertain—have programs that they will not be prepared to sacrifice. (In practice, for example, counting Backfire would mean that the Soviets would have to dismantle deployed ICBMs or SLBMs to stay within the 2400 limit.) Brezhnev undoubtedly sees himself as having made substantial concessions at and since Vladivostok and his concern with a potentially massive US cruise missile program seems genuine, if only because he is not anxious to make the huge investments required to match it rapidly. He probably is also stung by the debate about SALT “violations” here.

Talking Points

1. SALT
   —we have been intensively examining ways to deal with the current deadlock on Backfire and cruise missiles;
   —it had been our hope to have fully thought out considerations by next week so that Secretary Kissinger could conduct the fruitful conversations in Moscow which we agreed we should have in our recent exchange of correspondence;
   —however, we now find that more work remains to be done and that the commitments of the senior cabinet officers are such that we cannot schedule the required high-level meetings during the next 10 days;
   —since we would like to be in a position to forward some views and considerations to the Soviet side a week or more before the Secretary’s visit, so that your leaders can review them. I would like to sug-
gest that Secretary Kissinger make his visit during the week of January 19;

—I would of course welcome any substantive Soviet views in the meantime so that our own work might have the benefit of them;

—I want to stress that my sole concern is to assure that a visit will be constructive; I believe an unsuccessful visit would be against the interest of both our countries at this time. I proceed from the assumption that this is Mr. Brezhnev’s view also.

—I regret any inconvenience the proposed postponement might produce for Mr. Brezhnev but I hope he and his colleagues will understand my reasons and that the sole purpose is to produce progress.

2. Angola
—this is a very disturbing situation;
—we have no direct interests in Angola and want to see the country at peace and independent;
—but it is clear that if one external power becomes active and pursues unilateral interests, others are bound to take notice;
—it is clear that Angola’s neighbors and other African states are deeply disturbed by Soviet and Cuban intervention;
—we for our part, as we have stated in diplomatic communications, are deeply concerned by Soviet/Cuban actions. Whatever the original motivations, these actions are now clearly aimed at creating a bridgehead for external powers in a strategic area of Africa;
—this is not in conformity with our many formal and informal understandings not to exacerbate tensions, not to intervene in the affairs of other countries and not to seek unilateral gains at the expense of the other side;
—we want to see the factions in Angola compose their differences and we want to see all external interventions ended. To this end it is essential that Soviet and Cuban involvement—beyond normal interstate relations—be ended;
—when this happens we would be ready to join in UN or other moves to bar external interference and to help bring about domestic tranquillity in Angola;
—I must stress that if the present situation persists it cannot help but affect other relationships.

3. Middle East
—Secretary Kissinger has informed me of your proposal to conduct bilateral consultations over the coming year;
—I am prepared to do this in a constructive spirit and on a regular basis and would assign Under Secretary Sisco to this task;
exchanges could be conducted here, in New York and in Moscow as convenient to both sides;

—we would look to the resumption of the Geneva talks in a manner acceptable to all concerned. At the moment that condition does not pertain but we would hope that our consultations might contribute to bringing it about.

Note: A letter from you to Brezhnev proposing postponement of my Moscow trip until January is attached so that you can hand it to Dobrynin.

2 Printed as Document 225.

224. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, December 9, 1975, 4:15–4:49 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Amb. Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the United States
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECTS
Delay of Kissinger trip; SALT; Middle East; Angola

[There was small talk at the beginning.]

The President: Let me reiterate what I have publicly stated—that it is in both our interests to get a SALT agreement. We are getting closer, I think. There are still some areas of disagreement, but we are working them out.

I know we agreed on Henry’s going the 17th to the 19th of this month. But Secretary Rumsfeld is at NATO; Henry is going over there

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. For their memoir accounts of the meeting, see Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 821–822, and Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 352.
too, and we just won’t have an opportunity to work out a modified position, and I know we shouldn’t go there without some new ideas to present. I want to make sure our position is firmly backed by all the agencies. So I hope the General Secretary will agree to delay Henry’s visit until mid-January. I know you can’t answer now, but I wanted to tell you directly and give you a letter to deliver to General Secretary Brezhnev. I know it complicates your situation. When is your Party Conference?

Amb. Dobrynin: The 25th of February. It will cover both domestic and foreign policy and it will last about ten days. There are about 6,000 delegates.

The President: Will this present too many problems for you?

Dobrynin: [reads letter] [To Kissinger:] When would you come?

Kissinger: The week of the 19th, or the 16th, or earlier, if you delay the UN debate.

Dobrynin: Your UN representative is not very helpful. He is pushing us to confrontation. But to get back to essentials. General Secretary Brezhnev will consider it seriously. He will be a little surprised because I know he was preparing for the visit. He will wonder why the delay. But now you have told me.

Kissinger: I told him it had nothing to do with China.

The President: Absolutely not. It was for the reasons I said.

Dobrynin: But these delays, aren’t they harmful? Especially in an election year?

The President: They are potentially harmful. But if we don’t do it systematically and one Department doesn’t go along, we will be in a difficult position.

Kissinger: Even if—or especially if—the President has to overrule someone, we have to show that everyone had a hearing.

[More discussion reassuring him about the delay.]

Dobrynin: The problem is the cruise missile and Backfire.

Kissinger: I told Anatoliy we were thinking of counting some of the ALCM’s as MIRVs.

Dobrynin: It makes sense. They look like a MIRV.

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2 Document 225.
3 Daniel Patrick Moynihan.
4 Ford and Kissinger returned to Washington on December 8 after an 8-day Asia trip, which included official visits to China (December 1–5), Indonesia (December 5–6), and the Philippines (December 6–7), as well as more informal meetings in Japan (December 8).
Kissinger: We have to find some modification in your position also.

Dobrynin: How!

Kissinger: On the Backfire, for example. But another reason for the delay is for us to be able to get some ideas to Brezhnev ahead of time.

Dobrynin: How about a discussion between us on the Middle East, as Co-Chairmen of the Geneva Conference?

Kissinger: We have talked about having some substantive discussions between me and Dobrynin or between Dobrynin and Sisco.

Dobrynin: I have the impression that we are not communicating enough on this. This could be just to exchange ideas and let each other know what the thinking is.

The President: I think it is a good idea, especially on the Middle East.

There is another problem—Angola. We don’t think the turmoil there is good. I know in general what you are doing and some of the others. It is not a healthy situation to have that sort of tearing-up situation going on. If we could find some sort of settlement where no one would lose face . . .

Dobrynin: We have no troops there.

The President: But you have our neighbors to the south there—Cuba.

Kissinger: If you could get the Cuban troops withdrawn . . .

Dobrynin: Why don’t you talk to the Cubans?

Kissinger: We have almost no contact. But if you could withdraw them we would get other outside forces withdrawn. If you stop the airlift we will do likewise, and we could turn to a coalition.

Dobrynin: Already almost 50% of the nations have recognized one side. They have always refused a coalition.

Kissinger: If you keep putting equipment in and we do, then we create a strain on our relations because then someone must win and someone lose. Then perhaps the UN could help.

Dobrynin: It is difficult to check equipment. We have to do it directly, but through Zaire it can be done indirectly—not that we accuse you of that. I think a political solution should come first. We are not interested in Angola. It was the process of decolonization. But you know how Africa goes. One day it goes this way; another day that way.

Kissinger: We can’t defend to our people your massive airlift and the Cuban troops. It can’t go on without raising serious questions here. We will have to find ways either to insulate it or match it.
Dobrynin: It is not up to me to argue. Angola is a long way away. I will convey to my government. If you had some proposal other than “you just shouldn’t do this.”

The President: I am for détente, but this is difficult for me to explain.

225. Letter From President Ford to General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

In your letter of November 20 you were kind enough to indicate your readiness to receive Secretary of State Kissinger in Moscow on December 18–19 to discuss questions of strategic arms limitations as well as the broader aspects of relations between our two countries. I greatly welcomed the spirit of that letter.

Since our exchange of letters, I have continued intensively to review the complex issues involved in the negotiations on strategic arms limitations. I have now come to the conclusion that the interest I know we both share in a productive visit by Secretary Kissinger would be better served if we could defer it for a few weeks. If convenient for you and your colleagues, I would like to propose any three days in the week of January 19.

I want you to know that in suggesting a postponement my sole purpose is to advance the prospects for achieving a mutually acceptable SALT agreement. I continue to believe, as I know you do, that we face no greater responsibility than that of reducing the threat of nuclear war by continuing the progress that our two countries have jointly made in limiting strategic arms. The additional time can be used for further intensive efforts to find solutions to the difficult and complex issues that remain to be settled. I assure you that my Government is actively searching for solutions, as I know yours is also. If we are to

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov.–Dec. 1975. No classification marking. Although no drafting information appears on the letter, Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft under a December 9 memorandum to Kissinger; Sonnenfeldt and Kissinger revised the text by hand. (Ibid.) According to marginalia, the letter was handed to Ambassador Dobrynin by President Ford at their meeting; see Document 224.

2 Document 219.

3 Documents 212 and 214.
achieve positive results, a spirit of compromise will be required on both sides in the negotiations. I assume that you share my views, and I would welcome any additional thoughts on possible solutions which you may have. 

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

4 In a December 11 letter to Ford, Brezhnev replied: “I have received your letter of December 9. I note with satisfaction the coincidence of our thoughts that we have no greater responsibility than that of reducing the threat of nuclear war. Of special significance in this case is, no doubt, further progress towards strategic arms limitations. I have already expressed to you my considerations as to what is causing the delay in completion to that effect; I will not repeat myself. Now, about the time of Secretary Kissinger’s visit to Moscow. If the US side needs some time to take decisions which, as you write, would make the Secretary’s visit more productive, then we are ready to regard this with understanding. The most convenient for us new time of Secretary Kissinger’s visit would be January 19–21, 1976.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 6, SALT, Nov.–Dec. 1975)

226. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger¹


SUBJECT

SALT: Colby Analysis

Bill Colby has forwarded to you an analysis of how SALT II will fit into Soviet policy in 1976 and thereafter.² We have underlined relevant passages and summarized a few below.

—The absence of a SALT Agreement would cause uncertainty about the future strategic balance, encouraging darker interpretation of US intentions.

—The absence of limitations would relieve the Soviets from the healthy necessity to dismantle older weapon systems.


² Not attached. A December 5 memorandum from Colby to Kissinger, analyzing Soviet policy and SALT II, is attached to a memorandum from Scowcroft to Ford, December 15, summarizing it. (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Subject File, 1974–1977, Box 20, SALT)
—The results would not necessarily be unmanageable for the US but would be greatly damaging to the prospects for positive long term change in the Soviet system.

—Moscow’s most serious cause for concern is what it views as the Administration’s lack of capacity to maintain détente.

—Brezhnev will likely stay on after the Party Congress.

—Brezhnev evidently has decided that another Arms Control Agreement, while desirable, is not essential.

—If Brezhnev leaves office, the uncertainty in Soviet leadership will encourage the Politburo to avoid risky decisions.

—If SALT II is suspended until 1977, the Soviets will probably have entered into a succession struggle. This process is likely to increase the weight of professional military opinion on strategic matters.

227. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Lord) to Secretary of State Kissinger\(^1\)


Beyond Détente

Five months after the Helsinki summit, the state of détente remains the focal point of domestic criticism of US foreign policy and the election year just ahead is likely to intensify partisan debate. In our relations with the major international players, détente is a key measuring rod. It was of course the well publicized centerpiece of our two recent visits to China, will be the principal topic at this week’s NATO ministerial and may be affected significantly by your upcoming talks in Moscow with Brezhnev.

_\textit{I have felt for some time that we needed a fresh overall look at where we have been and where we should be headed in East-West relations.} This judgment has been reinforced by our recent visits to China, by S/P discussions of détente\(^2\) and by the grumblings of Congressmen and newsmen

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 77D112, Policy Planning Staff (S/P), Box 359, Director’s Files (Winston Lord), 1969–77, Dec. 1–15, 1975. Secret. Drafted by Philip S. Kaplan (S/P) on December 9. No evidence has been found to indicate that Kissinger read the memorandum; he attended a NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels December 11–12.

\(^2\) See Document 218.
that we should be more specific and less rhetorical about past achievements and future aims of US détente policy.

The attached paper, which was written by a member of my staff, addresses both of these questions in some detail. It is candid, contains a number of frankly controversial judgments and several specific suggestions. While it has not been circulated around the bureaus, the author has discussed the topic with a wide range of officials in State and other concerned agencies. Focusing on Europe, it provides a highly useful perspective for the restricted meetings at NATO, the London Chiefs of Mission conference and the Moscow talks. I hope you can read it on the plane to Brussels.

Like Gaul, the paper is divided into three parts. A brief opening summary is followed by detailed analysis of how détente policy has and has not affected the basic realities of the post-war European security system—the German question, Soviet control of Eastern Europe, the strategic armaments race, the military confrontation in Central Europe, and the strength of West European communists—as well as the issue of Soviet restraint. It then goes on, starting on page 14, to look beyond détente to the next phase of East-West relations.

The paper strikes the following general balance sheet on past negotiations:

—both sides have accomplished their vital aims in the specific negotiations and neither side has significantly prejudiced either crucial interests of the other or the longer-term scenario for East-West relations in Europe;

—the product of these negotiations has taken the form of a limited albeit important modus vivendi rather than a qualitative change in the nature of East-West relations;

—a certain political balance has been reached which has both enhanced stability and security in Europe and accorded a heightened measure of legitimacy to the international system;

—this balance could serve East and West fairly well for a number of years and provides a plateau on which to build;

—on the other hand, progress to date has been tentative and still lacks the roots necessary to assure enduring stability in East-West relations.

In formulating policy for the next phase of East-West relations, we will be operating within both foreign and domestic political constraints. The paper sets forth the following conclusions concerning likely parameters of future policy:

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3 Drafted by Kaplan on December 8; attached but not printed.
—the subject matter of “détente” now is moving closer to the real marrow of East-West relations—i.e. basic foreign policy interests rather than practical understandings will be increasingly involved in negotiations such as MBFR and SALT Three;
— the period of great breakthroughs is behind us and our policy has begun to collide with its initial parameters;
— this is because it has substantially fulfilled its objectives;
— we need to build a broad domestic political consensus in order to consolidate and continue the policy of improving East-West relations; and
— in building that consensus, we should drop the abstract term “détente” from our public lexicon, make a major effort to clarify what has and has not so far been achieved, carefully explain our future policy objectives and, in doing this, restrain our rhetoric to match our aims.

As to the future, the paper recommends a short- to medium-term policy of consolidation, implementation and concentration:

— The first task is to hold our ground and to consolidate past gains in the face of domestic political skepticism, the elections next year at home, in Germany and Japan and the upcoming succession in Russia, China and perhaps Yugoslavia.
— We need next to ensure that Soviet treaty obligations are adhered to and that agreements are filled with life. This applies to SALT One but also to CSCE undertakings and US/Soviet bilateral framework agreements. Such a policy is essential in assuring domestic support for improved East-West relations. The question of implementation also holds the key to how we handle CSCE follow-up at Belgrade and beyond. The paper suggests a policy on this matter.
— Thirdly, we should concentrate our efforts on a few key security negotiations—especially SALT and MBFR. We also should make a major effort to resolve the emigration/MFN-credits deadlock and should continue the careful step-by-step development of more normal political and economic relations with Eastern Europe.
— Finally, we need to make better use of our China card in dealing with Russia. The more restrained line recommended in the paper would be welcomed in Peking. It could be presented most profitably in the proposed Presidential Foreign Policy Report and in a major speech by you or the President.
228. Memorandum of Conversation\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, December 12, 1975, 11:35 a.m.–12:25 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Gerald R. Ford
Hugh Sidey, \textit{Time} Magazine
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
William L. Greener, Jr., Deputy Press Secretary

Sidey: Has the world improved over the past year?

The President: I inherited a fine foundation. We had to build from there. We had to convince our NATO allies I stood for American strength. Now the Alliance is stronger and our relations bilaterally are better than ever.

Also it was time to solidify our relations with Japan. U.S.-Japanese relations are now the best ever. My trip and the Emperor’s trip here.

The Middle East—the aftermath of the October war. We need to keep moving. We were disappointed in March but we have it now and the situation is better. There were some problems in the UN. The Sinai agreement lowered the danger threshold, but we can’t rest.

In Southeast Asia, we have lost Indochina, but my trip in December was very helpful in convincing them that the U.S. continues to be an Asian power and we will resist expansion.

In Portugal, the situation is moving toward a solution. It is much better than several months ago.

In Spain, there appears, with Juan Carlos and the new Cabinet, to be a movement toward moderation. This will be a help in reentering Europe.

With the USSR we have a chance for a SALT II agreement. We made headway in other areas. The five-year grain deal was good. There are many exchanges. But we do have serious differences: Portugal, An-
gola. Kissinger has spoken strongly on the Soviets in Angola and I support him.

Sidey: Are the Soviets cheating on SALT?
The President: I don’t believe they are cheating. There are ambiguities and we have sent them to the SCC. There is an inevitable gray area.

Sidey: Is your relationship with Brezhnev good?
The President: I think it is a good candid working relationship.

Sidey: Does he have the people’s interest at heart rather than just his personal power?
The President: He appreciates the danger of confrontations with the U.S. I think there is realization on both sides that we must try to find a way to avoid confrontation.

Sidey: Are you encouraged by the attitude of the Western Alliance leaders?
The President: Yes. They have their differences, but they are honest ones.

Sidey: How do you see the outcome of U.S.-Soviet competition other than military?
The President: Aside from the military, I think our country can more than hold its own in economic or other competition with our free system.

Sidey: What are your foreign policy nightmares?
The President: The danger of some miscalculation by some nuclear power which could start a nuclear conflict.

Sidey: What if Israel should become a nuclear power to stabilize the Middle East?
The President: It wouldn’t be helpful.

Sidey: Won’t nuclear weapons inevitably be used? Kennedy thought so.
The President: I am not pessimistic from the leaders I know; it doesn’t have to happen.

Sidey: Do you have enough power in foreign policy?
The President: There are frustrations. [Off the record] Angola is very frustrating—it is so useless.

Sidey: Your religion. What has all this power done to that?
The President: I still pray. I think there is a higher order of things.

Sidey: Where does the U.S. stand in terms of power?
The President: In economics, the U.S. has proven our system works.

Sidey: Do you use the Hot Line?
The President: We have good means without that. I haven’t used it.
Sidey: Does our agriculture power give us a blue chip advantage?
The President: It is helpful for others to know we have these reserves to help—our friends and our opponents. I don’t think we should use it in a crass powerseeking way.

Sidey: Can you trust these foreign leaders?
The President: No one has violated my trust thus far.

Sidey: How about the third century?
The President: The first hundred years stabilized the government structure. The second gave us the industrial corporation. Now we have new problems. Everything is big—it tends to smother the individual.

Sidey: Have the attacks on Kissinger been unfair?
The President: In many instances, unfair, inaccurate and harmful.

Sidey: You are hard to parse. You are conservative in budgetary terms, yet pursue détente. How do you define yourself?

The President: I grew up in an isolationist, Fortress American environment. World War II showed us that the world was different. I became convinced of the role of the U.S. in the world.

Sidey: Why this foreign policy revolt?
The President: I think it is an outgrowth of Vietnam.

Sidey: Why do you have to see these leaders personally?
The President: I think it very important to have a personal relationship so you know what the words mean, what the matters mean, etc.

Sidey: What is the most encouraging thing?
The President: The incidents: Vladivostok, Sinai, Mayaguez. Otherwise the growth of personal relationships.

[The above are informal notes.]
229. Memorandum of Conversation\footnote{Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.}


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State  
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: At NATO I presented détente as a combination of conciliation and firmness.

Giscard invited me to a private dinner. He is concerned about Angola. They will recruit mercenaries, provide gunships, and put mirages into Zaire.

At the very moment when the Soviets begin to blink, the Congress is going to cut our legs off.\footnote{On December 19, the Senate passed an amendment to the Defense Appropriations bill, sponsored by John V. Tunney (Democrat, California), that effectively blocked any further covert support for anti-Communist forces in the Angolan civil war.}

Zaire and Zambia were very upset at Moynihan—who is a laughing stock and a disaster in Europe.

I am purging the African bureau, after the \textit{NY Times} article\footnote{Reference is presumably to Seymour Hersh, “Angola-Aid Issue Opening Rifts in State Department,” \textit{The New York Times}, December 14, 1975, pp. 1, 2.} [There was further discussion of State and Defense leaks].

The President: How about a veto if they pass the bill? I could say it was hasty action, and make the point they are toying with the national interest.

Kissinger: We are living in a nihilistic nightmare. It proves that Vietnam is not an aberration but our normal attitude. When our critics can complain about the volume of SS–19s and cave in Angola, when they can try to change the Soviet internal structure . . .

The Soviets have become a superpower. Before World War I, the emergence of Germany as a major power brought about a war. We have to manage the emergence of the Soviets to a superpower status without a war. We are being deprived of both the carrot and the stick. We will lose Angola and then they will want us to cut off grain to the Soviet Union. We are losing all flexibility and we will soon be in a position of nuclear war or nothing.
President: I couldn’t agree more.

Kissinger: No one will ever believe us again if we can’t do this. How can they believe we will back them?

[Discussion of Woodward article in the Post about the circumstances of the Nixon pardon.]

Kissinger: I would recommend to take on the Congress on the national interest. We have little to lose. It was inevitable there would be a Soviet overture—now they are laughing at us. We would have had Angola settled by January if these bastards had not been in town.

President: The more I think of it, the more I think I should veto.

Scowcroft: A veto threat is keeping the bill from being passed.

President: But if we veto and get it sustained, we can at least show that one-third of the government is with us.

Kissinger: We have several problems: even if you veto, we are out of funds.

[Discussion of tactics on veto, delay, and getting $28 million.]

Kissinger: If this works, I would send Schaufele to Africa, go to the UN Security Council in January with a program. We have to be careful about withdrawal of foreign forces.

[The President calls Mahon on Angola reprogramming action.]

President: He was wafflie at first, but I got him back on the track. We will get the Subcommittee down here. I think we can make it.

Kissinger: It is not just Angola. I think when you make a decision it is the responsibility of each agency head to pull his department in line. They will do the same thing in SALT.

On SALT, I think we cannot count Backfire, we must have a position on cruise missiles, and I must have negotiating flexibility in Moscow. The Pentagon position is to leave out Backfire, and cruise missiles. They lose both ways that way; it counts Backfire as within SALT and lets the cruise missiles run free. They might as a last ditch effort.

President: I talked to Don and the JCS.

Kissinger: Brent said you were terrific.

President: I talked to Don. He promised to work with the JCS and he says they are committed to coming up with some new silos.

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5 Congressman George H. Mahon (Democrat, Texas), Chairman of the House Appropriations Committee. No substantive record has been found of the telephone conversation between Ford and Mahon.

6 Donald Rumsfeld.
Kissinger: They must stop treating me as the soft guy. If they take it seriously . . .
President: Give them a chance.
Kissinger: I think we can get an agreement and sell it.
[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

230. Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Ford

Moscow, undated.

The considerations of the President on Angola in his talk with the Soviet Ambassador were attentively studied in Moscow.

We, as the President, cannot of course be but concerned by the attempts of certain circles within and outside the United States to use the events in this African country for bringing complications into the Soviet-American relations.

Since there is no real foundation, as we are convinced, for such a turn of events, the task consequently is not to give the upper hand to these attempts. And here a considered, sound approach is needed including in the public statements which have been made in connection with the Angolan affairs.

As to the considerations of the President concerning the ways of ending the war and establishing peace in Angola, the Soviet Union, as we already told the American side, never has been and could not be a champion of unleashing a civil war in that country. We would only welcome such type of actions which would aim at consolidating in Angola all the forces striving for real independence and free development of their country.

The case, however, is, that what is happening in Angola is not simply an “internal strife”, but a direct military intervention, in particular, on the part of the Republic of South Africa, with the use of both the foreign mercenaries and splinter groupings inside Angola who tied themselves to foreign interests alien to the people of Angola.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, 1955–1977, Box 4, Angola. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the note was delivered by Dobrynin on December 18 at 7 p.m. For their memoir accounts of the note, see Kissinger, Years of Renewal, pp. 824–825, and Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 361.

2 See Document 224.
It would be unjustified to equate foreign interventionists, who use as their tool separatist groups in Angola, with the lawful Government of that country, who are fighting back the intervention, and consequently to equate those who are helping the interventionists with those who are supporting the lawful Government.

That is why it seems to us unjustified, and unjust to make an appeal for cessation of hostilities in Angola to all belligerent parties there, thus putting on the same level the interventionists and the patriotic forces headed by the lawful Government of the Peoples Republic of Angola. What should be pursued now is the end of foreign military intervention in that country so that its people could in reality be ensured the right to decide by themselves the questions of building new life in conditions of independence and freedom without any interference from outside.

The Soviet Union continues to be ready to make an appropriate official statement. We would welcome such a statement also on the part of the United States, as well as its practical actions leading towards the above goal.

In conclusion we would like to underline once again that the President can rest assured that the Soviet side is in no way interested in having the events in Angola viewed from the angle of “confrontation between Moscow and Washington” and as “a test of the policy of relaxation of tension”.

231. Briefing Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Schaufele) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Soviet Note on Angola of 18 December

The Soviet informal note of December 18 is a reply to the talk that Ambassador Dobrynin had with the President and you December 9.2

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 4, Angola. Secret. Forwarded through Sonnenfeldt and Sisco. The two Soviet notes of November 28 and December 18 are attached. See Documents 222 and 230.

2 See Document 224.
I have compared this note with the previous similar note of November 28 and find very little difference. The Soviets, although they profess that they would welcome “actions aimed at consolidating in Angola all the forces striving for real independence”, then proceed by implication to identify the FNLA and UNITA as separatist groups which cannot be equated with “the lawful government”.

As an extension of the Soviet concept of just wars of liberation the note states that a cessation of hostilities in Angola would be unjustified and unjust since it equates the “interventionists” and the MPLA forces. Although the Soviets state that there should be an end to foreign military intervention they obviously do not include themselves in that category. The note repeats their readiness to make an appropriate official statement if the U.S. would also do so and, in addition, take practical actions leading to the end of foreign military intervention. The Soviet Union does not mention that it would take similar actions.

The only relatively new element is the Soviet contention that it has no interest in placing the Angolan situation in the context of détente.

My reaction is that the Soviets are not yet prepared to enter into serious negotiations on the Angolan situation but would be concerned if the U.S. determination to resist the Soviet encroachment would have an unfavorable effect on détente.

232. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

US-Soviet Cooperative Projects and Negotiations: Candidates for Cancellation or Postponement in Angola Context

Attached (Tab A) is a complete inventory of all projected activities for the next several weeks.2

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 4, Angola. Secret; Nodis; Sensitive.

2 Attached but not printed. The list included such disparate items as the proposed Ford–Brezhnev summit in Washington, the SALT II talks in Geneva, the TTB/PNE talks in Moscow; the visit of the Roy Clark Country Music Show to the Soviet Union (January–February), and the visit of the Don Cossacks Dance Troup to the United States (February–April).
The most obvious candidates are those that are most visible: e.g., deposits of ratifications of already agreed and ratified agreements, trips (i.e. yours), cultural manifestations.

Of course, the implications of cancelling or postponing this or that activity have to be examined in the total context of our interests and the underlying strategy and concept for dealing with the USSR—as well as the optics and political appearances of various kinds of activities.

Thus, was President Johnson right in terms of real interests in cancelling SALT after the invasion of Czechoslovakia? He clearly had second thoughts since he sought to reinstate SALT during the transition.

Any actions we take in these areas must also be put in the context of our problem with regard to the microwave signal being beamed at our Embassy, the withdrawal of our Ambassador and the prospect of public disclosure.

Perhaps the most efficient way to proceed is for you to digest the attached list and indicate by checkmark where you think we (1) can get leverage from postponement or cancellation and (2) need to act because appearances will be incongruous and damaging if Angola continues to be critical.

As you know, my own position is that the most effective courses of action (apart from what remains available in the way of options on the ground in Angola) relate to (1) pressure against weak third parties on overflight and refueling, (2) quiet undemonstrative—but noticeable by the Soviets—naval movements responsive to Soviet naval movements, (3) blunt talk to Dobrynin about the impact on our total relationship, (4) pressure on OAU members to keep clear the distinction between support for the MPLA and endorsement (i.e. opposition to) of Soviet intervention.3

3 In a December 22 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported that EUR suggested adding the following items to the list: signature of the U.S.–USSR maritime agreement, grain sales, credits, American commercial involvement in Soviet projects, civil air negotiations, and computer sales. (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 4, Angola)
233. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs (Mulcahy) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Dobrynin: Talking Points on Angola

For the Secretary’s meeting with Ambassador Dobrynin later today, AF has the following talking points to suggest:

—We were not at all impressed with your last note. It seems to make clear your determination to persist in Angola until there has been an MPLA military victory.

—You must understand that we are equally determined that you will not succeed in foisting this minority group on the Angolan majority who bore the brunt of the struggle for independence as much, if not more so, than did the MPLA.

—We want to make it clear that we are not anti-MPLA. We have been quite sincere in our public statements that we favor some form of coalition or government of national unity which will represent all elements of the population.

—You have been here long enough to know our system. You also know me well enough to realize that I do not give up easily. I can assure you that we intend to stay in the Angolan picture. We have the means to do so and we will continue to use the resources at our command. Nor are we alone.

—There is still an impressive amount of support for our efforts in the Congress, in the press and at the grass roots of America. Between now and the time Congress reconvenes, I think you will see a surprising shift in attitudes, especially if you persist in so obvious an effort to seek unilateral advantage.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 4, Angola. Secret; Nodis. Sonnenfeldt initialed the memorandum; Mulcahy did not.

2 No record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on December 23 has been found. Dobrynin, however, recalled the meeting in his memoirs: “On December 23 Kissinger again questioned the Soviet role [in Angola] and linked it to détente. He proposed a face-saving exit by referring the whole thing to the Organization of African Unity, which was already involved in mediation without success. What really mattered to Kissinger was not who won, but that none of the combatants themselves should achieve victory with the outside help of a superpower.” (Dobrynin, In Confidence, p. 361)

3 Document 230.
—If you persist, you must realize that there are other fields on which we meet and you can expect to get your come-uppance in several of them.

—You will not in the long run manage to hold Angola. Africans are Africans first and foremost. They will never really accept domination by a clique who is so potently your puppet. Moreover, you will have succeeded in incurring the enmity of virtually all other self-respecting African governments.

—Right now you face the certain prospect of attack by the majority of the African states in next month’s OAU meetings. So do your Cuban friends. As your stalking horse in Latin America the Cubans have received a severe setback. All the old suspicions of them have again been raised against them there. You are serving neither your own nor Cuba’s best interests.

—Let me be very clear once again. Angola is the last place we want to be. We mean that. We are engaged there now only because you are. Whatever your original motives, they can have no validity now. Before this situation devolves into a perpetual civil war, you should join us in working with the OAU for a fair and equitable settlement and then join in helping to rebuild the ravages of the war.

—As soon as you and the Cubans are prepared to announce your intention to end military intervention and to assume a presence normal for an external and extra-regional power, we will be happy to use all our influence to ensure the non-intervention of all external powers. We have no particular interest in any one outcome in Angola: our sole interest is that the country is not the playground for great power competition.

—You and we have many interests on which we can collaborate—above all those relating to a peaceful and cooperative world order within which we have a rewarding and mutually advantageous bilateral relationship. It is absurd that this should be placed in jeopardy by what you are doing in Angola. But that it is in jeopardy, there should be no doubt, whatever a single Senate vote or Washington Post editorial may say.

—We prefer that the signature ceremony next Monday for the maritime agreement4 not take place at Cabinet level and in public. We will be in touch with you about alternative arrangements, though for now we are prepared to proceed with the signature.

4 The maritime agreement was signed in Washington and Moscow on Monday, December 29, and entered into force on January 1, 1976.
234. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Intelligence Report on Current USSR Thinking

The Central Intelligence Agency has reported two recent contacts with one of the higher-visibility career Soviet KGB officers, Viktor Lesiovskiy, in which Lesiovskiy commented at length on Angola, Soviet politics, possible changes in the Soviet leadership, US-Soviet relations and SALT. Lesiovskiy had just returned from a two month visit to the United States. He told the CIA contact that his remarks reflected the conversations he had had with Ambassador Dobrynin and he stressed that he was speaking authoritatively. While his remarks cannot be accepted at face value, Lesiovskiy has a long record of candid talk about important policy matters, and his remarks—summarized in the following paragraphs—provide an interesting window on current developments in Moscow.

Soviet Internal Politics

Illustrating his inside information on Soviet domestic developments, Lesiovskiy cited his confidant, “the then Deputy Minister of ‘Reserve’” who had informed him of Nikita Khrushchev’s fall three months before it occurred. As a wheeler-dealer in his own right, Lesiovskiy insists that everything in Moscow is achieved by pull and personal connections; he attributes to such well-placed connections not only his own flamboyant career but also his inner knowledge of Soviet policy. In commenting on Khrushchev’s fall, Lesiovskiy said that skill in domestic and economic affairs is essential to achieving and maintaining power in the USSR; foreign policy successes or skills are largely irrelevant. Lesiovskiy insisted, however, that the current Soviet leadership nonetheless is seeking concrete results from its present foreign policy in the time frame of just before and just after the Party Congress.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 18, USSR (28). Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for information. The memorandum, which was not initialed by Scowcroft, is based on Intelligence Information Cable TDFIR DB–315/13398–75, December 20. (Ibid.) Clift forwarded a draft, along with the cable, in a memorandum to Scowcroft on December 24. Scowcroft wrote in the margin: “I have read the report and the President has as well.” (Ibid.) During a meeting in the Oval Office on December 22, Ford, Scowcroft, Kissinger, and Rumsfeld briefly discussed “Angola and the Soviet [Lesiovskiy] report.” (Ibid., Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17) According to an attached correspondence profile, the memorandum was noted by Ford and Scowcroft on December 31.
Lesiovskiy’s overall perception of the Soviet internal scene at present is that the current complexion of domestic policies will continue for about two years, after which he anticipated radical changes. He personally believes that much needs to be changed and that this will require new people not identified with current policies, but rather resolved to carry out extensive innovation. He thinks that the initial turnover from the present leadership may well be via an interim leadership which will not differ radically from the present hierarchy. Internal pressures would then force changes, and these might escalate rapidly into a more or less “muted explosion.”

Lesiovskiy said that Brezhnev will be free to visit the U.S. in March or April 1976, assuming that that would work out well with the Ford Government. Lesiovskiy explained that Moscow assumes that you are watching your domestic situation carefully, including the early primary elections, and would be in a position to have meaningful meeting with Brezhnev only if you had in the meanwhile been able to overcome those domestic political problems. In this connection, Lesiovskiy commented that he did not understand the origin of rumors concerning Brezhnev’s early departure from the public scene; he claimed that he, Lesiovskiy, would be informed if this were true, which it is not.

Soviet Leadership Changes

Lesiovskiy made the point more than once that the Party Congress will lead to no “dramatic” changes in the leadership. Certainly, Brezhnev would not step down, and he might go on for a couple of years after the Congress. Some likely would leave the scene at the Congress, however. Lesiovskiy offered as examples of those who would be departing:

1. Premier Kosygin, who is physically unable to continue;
2. Politburo Member Arvid Pel’she, who is too old to go on;
3. Central Committee Secretary and Politburo Member Mikhail Suslov, who is 70 years old and will also perhaps step down.

The man of the future is Politburo Member Fedor Kulakov. According to Lesiovskiy, this was signalled to the world a couple of weeks ago in a photograph of a vote in the Supreme Soviet, in which Kulakov was shown in a central position in the second row. This contrasted with Foreign Minister Andrey Gromyko and KGB Chief Yuriy Andropov who were only in the third row.

In addition to Kulakov, First Secretary of the Leningrad Oblast Party Committee Grigoriy Romanov is also destined for a higher role, perhaps even higher than Kulakov. Romanov is more dynamic and better prepared than Kulakov, and a candidate to succeed Kosygin as Chairman of the Council of Ministers. Candidate Politburo Member Petr Masherov is “a nice man”, but does not have as much standing as Romanov. In addition, Masherov’s position as First Secretary of the Be-
lorussian Party gives him a smaller platform for advancement than the Ukraine gives Ukrainian Party First Secretary Vladimir Shcherbitskiy. Shcherbitskiy is a leading candidate for the Chairmanship of the Council of Ministers. He is widely liked and respected. He will certainly be promoted, since running the Ukraine is a responsible position very similar to central Soviet leadership.

Andropov wants very much to leave his post as Head of the KGB in order to return to party work, but this is unlikely. It would be difficult to replace him; there is no one to take over. Much has been said about Gromyko leaving the Foreign Ministry in order to step up to a higher level, but Lesiovskiy, who claims to know him well, does not believe it. For one thing Gromyko relies heavily on his own apparatus. This is formed essentially of Foreign Ministry officials who, like Lesiovskiy, are loyal. According to Lesiovskiy, Gromyko would not be able to operate as confidently without them and he would not be able to establish another apparatus.

The United States Scene

Lesiovskiy said that he was extremely concerned about what he saw as the danger that Secretary Kissinger might not be able to continue in office. Lesiovskiy said that such an eventuality would be against the desires of the Soviet government. If Secretary Kissinger should be forced out, it would be because of United States domestic opposition to him; Moscow, for its part, would be willing to help him out.

In this regard, Lesiovskiy said that Moscow had favored a Kissinger trip to Moscow during December, but that it had been cancelled by your telephone call to Ambassador Dobrynin. According to Lesiovskiy, the Kremlin meeting with Dr. Kissinger was reset for 16–19 January 1976, thus allowing sufficient time for both sides to prepare for a final SALT accord.

In response to a question as to what specific parts of conversations with source were particularly authoritative and should be brought to high-level U.S. Government attention, Lesiovskiy specified that the Soviet leadership’s interest in Secretary Kissinger’s mid-January trip to Moscow for SALT negotiations, a visit by CPSU Secretary General Leonid Brezhnev to the United States around April, and the willingness of the Soviet leadership to make compromises in support of Secretary Kissinger and President Ford all constitute priority topics and “authoritative messages.”

On SALT Lesiovskiy said that there are no substantial military differences which could prevent a SALT accord; the only remaining prob-

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2 No record of a telephone conversation between Ford and Dobrynin has been found. Reference may be to the meeting between the two men on December 9; see Document 224.
lem is how to make an agreement acceptable to the general public on both sides.

Lesiovskiy said that cruise missiles must be limited in number but added that they do not represent a strategic military threat as such because of Soviet ability to track missile-carrying submarines. He noted, however, that cruise missiles would be useful in a limited war. Similarly, Lesiovskiy insisted that the Soviet “Backfire” bomber posed no strategic threat to the U.S. since it travels at subsonic speeds and even large numbers of them could be tracked by the U.S. Government. Lesiovskiy concluded that these new weapons could be limited in a SALT Agreement but they could not be prohibited entirely. Since the desires of military leaders in both the U.S. and the USSR for the latest sophisticated hardware must be met.

Angola

Lesiovskiy said that a deal with the U.S. could also include a settlement in Angola. Moscow has no crucial interest in Angola and could therefore reach a compromise with the United States. This would be based on persuading the current warring Angolan parties to work out a political settlement while the Big Powers shut down their aid. Lesiovskiy had said earlier that Angola is a Kremlin adventure, similar to that of the U.S. in Vietnam, and that it will similarly fail. He said that the USSR had become enmeshed in its involvement in Angola essentially because of its support for the MPLA over a period of 15 years. The USSR found that it could not change that policy now that the MPLA had taken power in Luanda. He added that such a policy change would be difficult just before a Party Congress, but emphasized that the USSR was simply continuing its limited support, limited in that Soviets will not be sent to Angola as an invasion force.

Lesiovskiy said that on the basis of what he had learned in New York he was convinced that such a political solution could be found and that it would be equally satisfactory to the United States, given that country’s large-scale involvement. In this connection, he said that it was significant that the Soviet government had learned three or four weeks ago of the United States’ large-scale involvement but had avoided making propaganda thereof. Lesiovskiy’s assessment of the American public temper—which he has been conveying to his government from the United States and which he will emphasize upon his return to Moscow—is that a U.S./Soviet settlement in Angola would be particularly helpful to Secretary Kissinger at this time. Lesiovskiy said that he will also recommend that Moscow not consider the United Nations as a locus for achieving a settlement on Angola with the United States, at least as long as the U.S. retains its present Ambassador at the U.N. Lesiovskiy claimed that the idea of a Soviet/U.S. deal on Angola forming part of an arrangement to accommodate you and Secretary Kissinger was his own perception, but he said that it
was based on the overall attitude confirmed to him by Soviet Embassy officials in Washington “during the past few days.”

235. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Hyland) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Jamaica

Washington, December 31, 1975, 2245Z.

Tohak 29/WH52625. Subject: Moscow Trip.

We are not at all sure that postponing the Moscow trip is a real option, even if SALT process in Washington does not yield maximum results. Any change of more than a few days would be immediately interpreted as linking SALT with Angola. This would be an effective linkage only if we could guarantee that the threat of abandoning SALT, or slowing it down, would yield results in Angola. This would be major calculated risk. The Soviets are committed to the MPLA; they have resumed their airlift, and given us no encouragement. From their viewpoint they are playing strong hand in immediate future (leaving aside the longer term problem of supporting anti-guerrilla war or wearing out their welcome). Linkage of SALT and Angola might shore up position of Kremlin hardliners who pressed Angolan operation. They would argue that US policy is hardening across the board, and that there is no reason for Soviets to try conciliatory tactics. They must have argued that Angola was worth some risk in any case. Even if they had argued they could score a quick cheap victory and are now faced with the consequences of a miscalculation, we are not sure that moderates in Kremlin, including Brezhnev, would have political punch to repudiate Angolan adventure just before a Party Congress.

In short, we are inclined to believe there is better than even chance that deferring your visit will not yield a change of Soviet policy in Angola, but may well put an end to SALT negotiations until after the elections.

Nevertheless, we have to recognize that SALT negotiations in Moscow on January 19 will occur under most inauspicious circum-

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stances. This is precise time when Congress will return, and Angolan debate will flare up. By then OAU will have taken place, and probably yielded inconclusive call for peace negotiations and foreign withdrawals. In wake of this meeting MPLA will probably pick up some fence sitters. By that time South Africans will have begun complete disengagement, and situation in rest of Angola will be about the same, with UNITA forced to give some ground. Soviet build up will begin to have more telling effect, though rainy season in East Angola prevents major offensive operations.

On the other hand, our programs will begin to have some effect mainly in the north, with appearance of 300-man force now being recruited, and use of helicopter missile ships. Nevertheless, Soviets will almost certainly calculate that over long haul their forces will prevail, and that they need not make any concession beyond cosmetics to placate African opinion. If Congress were to cut off further funding during your visit, this would be bad psychological blow in any case.

In sum, we have a dilemma. Proceeding with visit and negotiations will confirm in Kremlin that Angola is in fact a low risk operation, and that they simply have to stick it out for a while longer.

Threat of cancellation might have some sobering effect in Kremlin, but will not alter situation in Angola or cause Soviets to terminate this adventure. Consequences for SALT will be ominous, particularly since it will be hard to argue that we can easily resume negotiations at later stage. Moreover, we have invested some capital in argument that SALT is in our overall interests and is not directly linked to other aspects of Soviet-American relations.

Our only recommendation is that you might want to engage in some private brinkmanship with Dobrynin after your return. You could hint that visit is not definite in light of Soviet response on Angola and defer any announcement of date until few days before departure. We also could leak out that visit is being reconsidered. And you could try some reverse linkage by saying to Dobrynin that only a guarantee of a forthcoming Soviet SALT proposal could justify visit in light of circumstances. In other words, you would argue that only a very favorable SALT agreement resulting from your visit would contain critics of détente. Moreover, you might argue for a gesture of Soviet restraint in Angola, such as terminating airlift, and announcing willingness to support ceasefire.

One final point is how would we proceed if Moscow negotiations are stalemated and Angola deteriorates. We would have to give

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thought to broad change of policy in an election year. You might want to underscore this consequence for Dobrynin.

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236. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 6, 1976, 9:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for NSC

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Soviet-American relations.]

Kissinger: Dobrynin said the Pravda article on Angola meant nothing. If they have something to say to us they will say it. He was very cocky; now intervention means everything except their support of the MPLA.

It is pathetic the African answers to your letter. They want help but they don’t see how they can trust us after the Senate vote. It was an outrageous thing for the Senate to do.

The key is the OAU meeting. I will meet with the African Ambassadors. If we don’t wrap it up before Congress comes back, I think all hell will break loose. After the meeting we should meet next week, perhaps have an NSC, to coolly decide what to do. If we get a good resolution we can decide—but the press is playing it as another Vietnam.

President: I think there is a little better feeling now about it then two weeks ago, but it is still murky.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 For the English text of the editorial, published in Pravda on January 3, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVIII, No. 1 (February 4, 1976), pp. 4–5. Kissinger and Dobrynin evidently met on January 5; see footnote 1, Document 239. No substantive record of the conversation has been found.

3 Reference is to a letter from Ford to the heads of state of Zaire, Zambia, Gabon, Senegal, and Ivory Coast, which was transmitted in telegram 1374, January 3, just prior to the OAU summit. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXVIII, Southern Africa, Document 168.

4 See footnote 2, Document 229.
Kissinger: Most of the responses to your letter—Sadat, Kenyatta, have been very good.

We will have a SALT NSC Thursday.\(^5\) Whatever the positions, there is an entirely different attitude. Don has basically changed the whole atmosphere. The discussions have been serious and workmanlike.

There are three basic options: (1) Deferral. I am worried that moratoriums are hard to end and I think we should legitimize cruise missiles. After the election the Democrats will go to the left of you. (2) Include Backfire. That’s a good position but nonnegotiable. (3) A mixed package like you and I discussed weeks ago. [He described some of the elements.]

Dobrynin was afraid when I called him in that we would cancel the trip. If we were stronger, we probably should, but you have rightly said we shouldn’t link grain and Angola, and we can’t then link SALT with it.

President: I agree.

[Discussion of SALT options and President’s support of mixed package.]

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Soviet-American relations.]


\(^6\) In his memoirs, Kissinger explained the principal options as follows: “The Pentagon put forth as Option IV its familiar position of counting the Backfire as a strategic bomber. To demonstrate flexibility, it also proposed a modified Option IV, which allowed the Soviets (for some inscrutable reason lost in the mists of time) to avoid counting whatever Backfires had been produced by the time the SALT interim agreement ended in 1977, perhaps 110 to 120 bombers. Finally, there emerged an Option III which, in a five-year agreement ending in 1982, balanced 300 Backfires against the right to have 15 cruise missiles of a range up to 2,500 kilometers on each of 25 surface shops, or a total of 375.” (Kissinger, *Years of Renewal*, p. 852)
237. **Memorandum of Conversation**

Washington, January 8, 1976, 9:23–10:30 a.m.

**PARTICIPANTS**
- President Ford
- Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
- Lt. General Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Omitted here is a brief exchange on Iranian oil.]

[The President:] Henry, where do we stand?

Kissinger: I asked Dobrynin for a delay in my trip by a few days. He thought it would be impossible, but he is checking. But there is another question—could I go with this uproar on Angola? The conservatives will scream that we are protesting Angola and still toady up to them. If I don’t go, the liberals will scream that we are jeopardizing everything for Angola when we shouldn’t be there in the first place.

The OAU meeting probably won’t be decisive, unless it is negative.

Rumsfeld: Henry has a good point. It is not just the seeming contradiction between our concern on Angola and going to the Soviet Union. There are so many people who will say what the hell is going on.

Kissinger: If I didn’t go, I would have to say that under these conditions it would create the wrong impressions, that we want SALT and will submit our proposals at Geneva and continue working with the Soviet Union. My people think that if we postpone again now we won’t get SALT this year.

Rumsfeld: I don’t think we should assume we couldn’t get a deal later.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 During a telephone conversation at 3 p.m. on January 6, Kissinger asked Dobrynin whether it would be “absolutely impossible” to change the dates for his upcoming visit to Moscow. According to Kissinger, “it [had] been suggested to me” that it might be inappropriate to visit Moscow, especially during the President’s State of the Union address on January 19, while news reports charged the Ford administration with “coddling the Soviet Union.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations)

3 See Document 235.
The President: My feeling is SALT II is in the best interests of the United States and the world. Second, I have the feeling that if we don’t continue to move constructively, we won’t get one in 1976. Won’t your cancellation preclude us moving in a constructive way? What else could we do?

Kissinger: A cancellation wouldn’t really calm the conservatives until Reagan was disposed of. The liberals will scream that we are paying for Angola twice, but they may pressure you to negotiate SALT.

Rumsfeld: That is not bad.

[Discussion of timing, Congressional ratification, etc. Kissinger argued against Option IV, unless put in Geneva. Rumsfeld said the JCS aren’t in concrete and we should discuss the essence of the difference between III and IV.]4

Rumsfeld: Both for your decision making process you should see the essence of the difference between III and IV. George Brown’s judgment is to present IV, then go with G or pieces of III, then let you decide on a fallback.

The President: [Discussed procedure at the NSC meeting.] I would like a military assessment of the difference between these options and no agreement.

Kissinger: Jim [Schlesinger] was really willing at the last NSC meeting to let Backfire run free.

I think on the negotiation we should look at the best reasonable outcome. If you start with Backfire, since they have said a million times they wouldn’t do it, they know there must be a fallback.

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4 See footnote 6, Document 236.
238. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Angola and Our Soviet Policy

Assuming we end up essentially leaving the field to the Soviets and Cubans and that the MPLA becomes more or less universally recognized (though with some guerrilla action and possibly minor South African presence continuing), we will be seen as having been substantially bested by the Soviets in a power contest. We will need to take remedial action to minimize the longer term effects on African and other states of such an outcome and we will need to find ways to make clear to the Soviets that they have by their actions incurred costs that may make their gain transitory or at least expensive. If possible, we would of course wish to get the Soviets and the Cubans out of Angola and to reduce their roles there to those normal between sovereign states, i.e., prevent Angola from becoming, even for a period, a Soviet military strong point and source of spreading influence in the region.

The first order of business will be to talk clearly to the Soviets, and at a high level. The points to make are simple:

—they have violated not only the understandings we signed at past summit meetings (no unilateral advantage at the expense of the other side, no exacerbation of tensions in third areas), but they have violated a cardinal law of the balance of power: that if one power seeks and obtains a margin of advantage over the other, the latter is bound to seek to redress the balance. It is immaterial in this context, whether Soviet intervention was asked for. Its effect is to place us at a disadvantage and this is unacceptable.

The next point to make is that the United States will use all means at its disposal to make the Soviet (and Cuban) intervention as costly and injurious to Soviet interests as we can. We will do so by the use of diplomatic means in Africa and in other ways available to us.

Thirdly, the Soviets should recognize that we will not feel bound by agreements to exercise restraint where we may perceive opportunities to seek unilateral advantages at Soviet expense. This will be our policy at least until Soviet military intervention and Cuban military in-

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Intervention has ceased and Soviet (Cuban) relations with Angola have been placed on the basis of normal interstate relations.

Fourth, there will have to be implications in our bilateral relations. For the moment, we will be prepared to continue those efforts, in the mutual interest, whereby we have been seeking to place our relations on a normal and constructive basis. This includes SALT, MBFR and our grain relationships. It must, however, be understood in Moscow that in all these and other areas, US negotiating flexibility has been reduced by Soviet conduct.

At the same time, those aspects of our relationship that in recent years have taken it beyond a purely pragmatic and interest-oriented one, and have involved certain gestures of friendship, good will and warmth must in present circumstances be curtailed.

—A visit by Brezhnev to the United States will be inappropriate, although we are prepared to arrange for a summit meeting for the purpose of signing a SALT agreement or conducting other necessary business between us;

—exchanges involving demonstrations of good will and other manifestations of warmth and friendship will be curtailed;

—exchanges enabling the USSR to earn hard currency, such as the hockey teams, gymnasts, etc., will be curtailed;

—a decision, already reached, to end discrimination against Soviet shipping in the Cuban trade will not be implemented;

—we can provide no assurance that if American unions should take action against shipping destined for the USSR, the Administration will use its influence to prevent such actions;

—all actions designed to normalize relations with Cuba will be suspended;

—we will not refrain from employing diplomatic and other means, especially among third world states, to embarrass the USSR with respect to its actions in Angola;

—we will take naval and aerial countermeasures commensurate with Soviet naval movements in the South Atlantic but will hold the Soviets scrupulously to the terms of the incidents at sea agreement, subject to reciprocity;

—Secretary Kissinger’s proposed visit to Moscow will proceed as a working visit in the common interest but without ceremony;

—the USG may decide that it is obliged to make public the interference with our Moscow Embassy’s normal functions and the hazards to

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2 The Agreement on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas was signed on May 25, 1972, at the end of the Moscow summit. (23 UST 1168; TIAS 7379)
health posed by transmission of dangerous forms of radiation against its premises from Soviet sources.

In sum, our relations will for the indefinite future be placed on an exclusively pragmatic basis and all appropriate steps will be taken to redress the unilateral advantage acquired by the USSR in Angola. This posture will continue until such time as the Soviet Union terminates its own and Cuban intervention in Angola and ends its special position in that country.

239. Note From the Soviet Leadership to President Ford

Moscow, undated.

Moscow, naturally, continues to follow closely the developments in Angola and in this regard is ready to maintain an appropriate contact with the American side.

We have in respect of Angola one clear and consistent policy. If we say that the Soviet Union is against foreign interference in the affairs of Angola, we say it to everyone and publicly too.

It is important, certainly, to discern a clear dividing line between a real interference in the affairs of Angola, meaning the military intervention of the Republic of South Africa and the actions of her accomplices, and the support rendered by many states to the lawful government of that country precisely for putting an end to such interference, for securing freedom, independence and territorial integrity of Angola.

When the foreign interference—not the fictitious but the real one—in the affairs of the sovereign state of Angola is stopped and the people of Angola get an opportunity to manage by themselves their affairs, then, it goes without saying, there will be no need to render them assistance in the form required by and granted to the People’s Republic of Angola now. Then the question about anybody’s “military presence” in Angola will solve itself in a natural way.

That is the principled position of the Soviet Union. It is our deep belief that it contains nothing which would hurt anybody’s interests in—

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Jan.–April 1976. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the note was received on January 9 and was a “reply to HAK–AD talk of Jan. 5.” No record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on January 5 has been found, but see Document 236.
including those of the United States. Therefore it cannot and should not lead to any complications in the Soviet-American relations.

We would like to hope that the United States will not permit rash actions in connection with Angola, including actions against countries rendering assistance to her lawful government, which could really complicate both the Soviet-American relations and the cause of relaxation in general.

240. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: We have had a message from the Soviets which is mildly encouraging. [Hands message to the President.]

The President: What does it really mean?

Kissinger: Our position is basically hopeless in Angola. We have done miraculously at the OAU at Addis Ababa, considering we have nothing to offer compared to the Soviet Union.

The President: I would say we are doing pretty well.

Kissinger: It is unbelievable that Diggs would go there and attack us that way—when his specific proposal is in fact ours.

The President: He is a lightweight and listens to the wrong people.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office. The memorandum is incorrectly dated January 8; the references in the text to the Soviet note of January 9 and to the NSC meeting of January 13 ("tomorrow") indicate that the meeting probably took place on January 12. According to the President's Daily Diary, Ford met with Kissinger and Scowcroft on January 8 only once (with Rumsfeld), at 9:23 a.m.; see Document 237. The President did not meet with the two men again until January 12, and then only once, from 9:25 to 10:25 a.m., the likely time of this meeting. (Ford Library, White House Office Files)

2 Document 239.

3 Congressman Charles C. Diggs, Jr. (Democrat, Michigan).
Kissinger: What could this mean . . . We will ask them: Are we correct that if we remove the South Africans, they will move with us to eliminate all foreign presence?

The President: How long would that take?

Kissinger: It also raises the question of my trip.

The President: You have negotiated under adverse criticism before. I think you should go. If you don’t, SALT II is probably down the drain and we may lose attempts at solving Angola.

Kissinger: Reagan may come after you. I am being accused of being too tough on the Soviet Union and too soft at the same time.

Moynihan is a disaster. His opening comments at the Security Council debate would have been disastrous. [He described the comments.]

The President: The arguments against your going are political and those for your going are substantive, and I think we should go with substance.

Kissinger: I think you should decide on SALT and make a decision at the NSC meeting tomorrow.4

The President: I think Option III is what we should really work from. But I want to get as much support from Defense as possible. I have been thinking if you could get something between III and IV to give Dobrynin . . . Obviously they won’t buy it, but then you could go there and put Option III on the table.

Kissinger: They will accept everything except surface ships and counting Backfire. We have given them some options on Backfire—like counting all the ones they build after the date of a treaty—and they have rejected them.

The President: I would like to get Defense off our back.

Kissinger: We won’t get Option III easily. I can’t go to Moscow without the full support of Defense. They must be told that. [There is discussion of how to deal with Backfire, etc.]

The President: How would you deal with it?

Kissinger: I could tell Dobrynin this is as far as we can go now, but I would have flexibility in Moscow. [There is more discussion about counting surface ships, Backfire, etc.]

Scowcroft: If you start with Option III, I am convinced you will have leaks that the JCS was overruled.

Kissinger: But if we go with Option IV, I will be accused of not negotiating hard enough for Option IV. But we can go with counting

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Backfire after 1977, and count cruise missiles on surface ships as MIRV’s. If that fails, go to Option III, with a separate protocol on Backfire and surface ships, with a reduction to 2,300 for five years or an eight-year agreement with higher numbers.

The President: This at least gives you the argument that we tried a preferred position.

Kissinger: It is a two-edged sword—they could also claim we shouldn’t have fallen off.

The President: Let’s go that way. Give me a paper for the NSC tomorrow.

[Omitted here is discussion of personnel matters, including Kissinger’s proposal to appoint Joseph Sisco as Ambassador to the Soviet Union.]

241. Note From the Department of State to the Soviet Leadership

Washington, undated.

We have studied with great care the communication from Moscow concerning Angola which was delivered to us on January 9.

We do not propose to engage with the Soviet side in further disputations about “fictitious” or “real” foreign interference in Angolan affairs, we will evidently not agree on this matter. Our purpose is to have foreign interference ended, whatever characterization is applied to it. In that regard, we have noted with interest the statements in the Soviet communication concerning the military intervention of South Africa. It appears from these statements that the Soviet side now envisages the termination of all foreign military presence in Angola when the above military intervention has ended. We consider this Soviet position to be significant. For its part the US is willing to use its influence to bring about the cessation of foreign intervention. At the same time, we would appreciate having explicit confirmation from Moscow that the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Jan.–April 1976. No classification marking. Although no drafting information appears on the note, Sonnenfeldt forwarded a draft in a memorandum to Kissinger on January 12. Kissinger approved the text with the following handwritten instructions: “with change plus Hyland sentence. Get it retyped & put before me early afternoon.” Substantive revisions are noted below.

2 Document 239.

3 Hyland inserted this sentence in the text.
Soviet side will end its own military role as well as seeing to it that the military role of Cuba, with which the Soviet role is inextricably linked, will also end. The Soviet communication states that this problem will “solve itself in a natural way.” It will be important to know Moscow’s view as to the time frame in which such a solution, that is, the termination of Soviet and Cuban military presence and activity in Angola, would take place after South African withdrawal has been accomplished.4

We would like to be certain that there is complete understanding in Moscow of our fundamental view of the Angolan issue, as it has evolved in recent months.

Angola would never have become a critical issue in American-Soviet relations if there had not been massive infusions of Soviet and Cuban military equipment and forces into the country. We have proceeded from the assumption that the essence of our relationship, if it is to proceed along the lines mapped out in the discussions and understandings of 1972–74, is that neither side will seek to obtain positions of unilateral advantage vis-à-vis the other, that restraint will govern our respective policies, and that nothing will be done that could escalate situations, where there may be turbulence or instability for other reasons, into confrontations between our two countries.

It has been our view that these principles of mutual relations were not simply a matter of abstract “good will” but that they are at the very heart of how two responsible great powers must conduct their relations in the nuclear era. For it must be clear that where great powers are concerned, when either one succeeds somehow to obtain a special position of influence based on military intervention, in some locale because of certain temporary political opportunities and irrespective of original motives, the other power will sooner or later act to offset this advantage. But this will inevitably lead to a chain of action and reaction that was typical of other historic eras in which great powers maneuvered for advantage only to find themselves sooner or later embroiled in major crises and, indeed, open conflict.

But it is precisely this pattern that we sought to break.

Whatever justification, be it as a matter of “principle” or in real or alleged requests for assistance, the Soviet side may consider itself to have had in intervening itself and actively supporting the Cuban intervention in Angola, the fact remains that there has never been any historic Soviet, or Russian, interest in that part of the world. It is precisely because the United States respects the position of the Soviet Union as a

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4 Kissinger added the phrase: “after South African withdrawal has been accomplished.”
great power that it was bound to see the Soviet move into Angola, whatever the motivation, as running counter to the crucial principles of restraint, eschewal of unilateral advantage and scrupulous concern for the interests of others which we jointly enunciated in the early seventies.

It is not for us to lecture the Soviet side about its own interests. But we cannot help observing that whatever the attitudes of the African states with respect to South African intervention and in regard to the three contending factions in Angola, all the major African states view with utmost dismay the establishment of a Soviet/Cuban military position in the region of southwest Africa. Moreover, the Soviet side must be aware also that the steady trend toward a normalization of American relations with Cuba, which we had initiated not least in order to further the process of normalizing US-Soviet relations, has been most seriously damaged by what has happened in Angola. We believe that this is a wholly unnecessary setback to the constructive trends in our relations to which we jointly committed ourselves and we cannot believe that this is ultimately in the Soviet interest.

It is against the background of these very fundamental considerations, going to the very heart of our relations and indeed of a peaceful world order, that Moscow should evaluate our position on Angola. And that is why the speedy clarifications of Soviet policies and intentions for which we are asking in the first part of this message are of such vital importance. We believe there remains time and opportunity for the kind of statesmanship, on both sides, that will avoid our two countries once again becoming the victims of the iron laws of great power competition which had such disastrous consequences in the past and which it is our historic task to overcome.
242. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Soviet Military Aid to Angola

You asked how Soviet military aid to Angola compares with Soviet aid to all of sub-Saharan Africa. Recognizing that any figures of this kind are soft, the conclusions are:

—We estimate Soviet military deliveries to the MPLA in Angola in 1975 at about $160 million, including Soviet reimbursement to the Cubans.
—This is the equivalent of 85 percent of Soviet military aid to all the rest of sub-Saharan Africa in that year.
—It is more than the total amount of Soviet economic aid extended to sub-Saharan Africa in the past five years.
—It is six times as much as the amount of Soviet economic assistance actually used by all of sub-Saharan Africa in 1975.

Soviet Military Assistance to Angola

—Soviet military arms deliveries to Angola in 1975 are estimated to have an equivalent US value of $93 million; the estimated cost of Soviet advisers believed to be present in Angola accounts for $2 million more; and the transportation costs of the Soviet arms lift during the last seven months are valued at $2 million. Thus, total Soviet assistance to Angola in 1975 may be said to have totaled approximately $97 million.
—Assuming that the Soviets are reimbursing the Cubans for the military personnel and equipment that the latter have sent to Angola, another estimated $63 million should perhaps be added to the Soviet outlays above. We estimate that this $63 million comprises $39 million for equipment, $20 million for military personnel, and $4 million for transportation.
—Thus, the total Soviet expenditure for Angola in 1975, assuming that the Soviets are reimbursing the Cubans for both manpower and equipment, is $160 million.

Military Deliveries to Sub-Saharan Africa

—Soviet military deliveries to all of sub-Saharan Africa except Angola in 1975 totaled roughly $188 million. This was a three-fold increase over 1974, when Soviet aid was $68 million, and an even larger increase.

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over 1972 and 1973, when Soviet aid was $35 million each year. The bulk of the 1975 deliveries went to Somalia, Nigeria, and Uganda.

—Military deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa from other Communist sources in 1975 totaled $31 million. (It may be noted that this total fluctuates—i.e., in 1972 and 1974, it ran only about $8 million a year.)

—Military deliveries to sub-Saharan Africa from non-Communist countries other than the United States in 1974, latest year for which such data are available, amounted to $115.4 million.

Soviet Economic Aid to Sub-Saharan Africa (No Foreign Dissem)

Details of Soviet economic aid to sub-Saharan Africa for the past five years are as follows:

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Extensions</th>
<th>Drawdowns</th>
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<tbody>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>$73.8 m (preliminary)</td>
<td>$27.0 m (preliminary)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>35.0</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>27.6</td>
<td>40.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$148.7 $191.0

Note: Virtually all the above figures are extremely soft. They are preliminary and subject to considerable change. Prices are estimated in terms of what equipment and manpower would cost in the US.

243. Note From President Ford to the Soviet Leadership\(^1\)

Washington, undated.

The United States has re-examined the outstanding issues in the negotiations for a new strategic arms limitations agreement based on the Vladivostok accords. In order to facilitate the discussion between Secretary Kissinger and General Secretary Brezhnev in Moscow, the United States believes the following represents an equitable resolution

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 15, Misc. Docs, Tels, Etc. 1975 (Folder 6). Secret. According to marginalia, Kissinger gave the note to Dobrynin on January 14 at 6:30 p.m. at the Department of State. No substantive record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin has been found.
of the current differences over limits on cruise missiles and the Soviet bomber known as “Backfire.”

With respect to cruise missile limitations, the following provisions would apply:

1. Any heavy bomber equipped with cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 km and up to 2500 km would be considered as the equivalent of a MIRVed missile and therefore each such bomber would be counted in the ceiling of 1320 MIRVed missiles.

2. Similarly, any surface ship equipped with cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km and up to a range of 2500 km would also be considered the equivalent of a MIRVed missile and therefore each ship would also count against the ceiling of 1320 MIRVed missiles.

3. Air-launched cruise missiles on heavy bombers or cruise missiles on surface ships with a range greater than 2500 km would be banned.

4. No air-launched cruise missile with a range greater than 600 km could be deployed on any aircraft other than a heavy bomber.

5. Cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km would be banned from deployment on any submarine, as proposed by the Soviet side.

6. The US suggests that the previous understanding permitting land-based cruise missiles up to intercontinental range be reconsidered; consistent with the new US proposals concerning limitations on other cruise missiles, the US believes that the development and deployment of land-based cruise missiles be limited to a range no greater than 2500 km.

The foregoing limitations on cruise missiles represent a significant movement toward the Soviet position and a compromise which should meet Soviet concerns.

As for the question of the “Backfire” bomber, the US believes that a compromise on this issue is also called for, along the following lines:

a. The US would agree that no Backfire aircraft produced prior to the entry into force of the new Agreement (October 3, 1977) would be counted in the ceiling of 2400 strategic delivery vehicles.

b. Subsequent to the entry into force of the new Agreement, all Backfire aircraft produced would be counted in the ceiling of 2400, under the same procedures agreed for counting other bombers included in the 2400.

The US has put forward these new proposals on the assumption that there will be an agreement on the question of verification of MIRV ICBMs and SLBMs along the lines already conditionally accepted by the Soviet side in discussions with Secretary Kissinger. Moreover, the US also proceeds from the assumption that there will be a satisfactory
agreement on defining a heavy missile as any ICBM having a launching weight or a throw weight greater than the Soviet ICBM known as the SS–19.

244. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 15, 1976, 10:05–10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: I presented Modified Option IV to Dobrynin. He read through it until he got to Backfire. Then he went up in smoke. He said they want an agreement but there is no way they can count Backfire. He said he had no instructions and maybe he would be surprised but he thought it was impossible.

He asked if there were any other possibilities. I mentioned Option I because everyone seemed to like that. He said that was impossible. I used Don’s argument that it deferred the politically sensitive part until after our election. He said maybe it was acceptable if we included ALCM’s for the MIRV counting rules. That would be a concession in two ways on their part: It included the principle of Backfire, lets SLCM’s match off against Backfire, and gives us the counting rules without including all cruise missiles. You and Brezhnev would sign, with a codicil saying there would be an agreement on saying cruise missiles and Backfire by January 1977. They want it done in your term.

I think it would lead to Option III. As I understand Clements, his objection to III is political in this election year. This idea would solve that.

I can’t judge the political impact of the primaries on an agreement, but this would avoid this. I think you should let the Chiefs know about this and get them on board.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 See Document 243 and footnote 1 thereto.
3 Donald Rumsfeld.
I must tell you that Brent thinks the JCS have already pocketed the MIRV verification rules and will scream “unilateral concession” if we include ALCM’s in a deferral package.

The President: I think Option III is the place to end up and I am willing to defend it politically. This might be a good way to get there. Why isn’t matching Backfire off against SLCM’s a good trade militarily?

[Discussion of the Option IV and III SLCM packages]

Scowcroft: Do you want the NSC meeting on Monday or Saturday? Monday might be a bad day.

The President: Let’s wait to see how the State of the Union is coming along.

Kissinger: My press conference went well. They were very respectful.

The President: I think we are in good shape on the issues. We certainly made the right decision on your going to Moscow, that’s obvious from the press reports of your press conference. If we had cancelled, they would have screamed that we were jeopardizing SALT and the whole relationship for lousy Angola.

Kissinger: Mahon called me wailing about what to do on the Defense appropriation bill. Maybe you should get the leaders in.

The President: I am having them in on Tuesday on the Budget.

Kissinger: I wouldn’t mix the two.

The President: When are you getting back? We should be able to get the leaders to hold off on the bill until then.

Kissinger: Sunday.  

Scowcroft: But we need a strategy. Perhaps we should figure a way to go in openly for the money.

Kissinger: The problem is how do you administer it? Make Zaire acknowledge openly that they are intervening with our money? That is why we did it covertly.

The President: Let’s meet with the leaders when you get back from Moscow.

Kissinger: Okay, but we shouldn’t be under any illusions that I will bring something back with me. That will take time, if it ever happens.

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5 During his press conference at the Department of State on January 14, the Secretary announced that the President had approved his upcoming trip to Moscow. Kissinger also criticized the Soviet role in Angola, declaring that the “United States considers such actions incompatible with a genuine relaxation of tensions.” For the full text of the press conference, see Department of State Bulletin, February 2, 1976, pp. 125–132.
6 January 25.
The President: I understand, but I think you could at least tell them of your discussion.

Kissinger: Okay, And I am having some books prepared of foreign press comments on Angola and how we are abdicating our great power responsibility.

245. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, January 16, 1976, 3:50 p.m.

K: When are you going out?
D: I am just behind. Anything new for me to say to Brezhnev or Gromyko, your old friends.
K: I do consider them old friends.
D: The same to you.
K: I am committing political suicide going to Moscow at this time.
D: I would not go that far but I understand political danger.
K: I am doing it because we owe it to history to try to make another effort. If we fail they will say he should not have gone and if we succeed all hell will break loose. On some of the ideas I gave you as my own you know, don’t phrase them into these exact numbers I gave you. Where I said to train [trade] off some Backfire against ship launched missiles. How we work out the numbers we have to have a little flexibility in Moscow. The difference between the first and second—outside the counting. In the second one you don’t count the ______ as MIRVs and there may be one other wrinkle. In the second one we would probably ask that the overall totals be reduced to 2300 by ’80.
D: You mentioned this before.
K: The advantage of the second one is that it is a separate protocol.
D: On the real issue there will be no counting. Both of them. Ships with missiles against Backfire. Without any numbers.
K: Exactly. It is a number ______ in that whatever number is established for Backfire will establish the number for ships.

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Blank underscores indicate omissions in the original.
D: Cruise missiles we will have it within the agreement itself.
K: In the heavy bombers, and the other stuff is the same.
D: You exchange Backfire for . . .

K: Right. The third possibility was to leave something for later discussion. Yet another variation, but I am talking as a statement, can have the cruise missiles/Backfire issue for a lesser time than the whole agreement, say five year period for an interim agreement. On the second variation then we could have more numbers in each category.

D: Okay.

K: You, Gromyko and I or whoever ought to get together Tuesday night\(^2\) briefly so that we can discuss the tactics. As a friend I have to prevent to be charged with ending too quickly to a different approach so we have to decide as we did in ______ negotiations. Who puts forward what.

D: You will decide how to handle it.

K: One final thing. We must have a serious talk about Angola. I don’t care what the Congress does. The very people who fought against it will then take it out on something else.

D: Yes, I understand this.

K: You explain this to your leaders. I look forward to seeing you in Moscow.

D: [less than 1 line not declassified]

K: [less than 1 line not declassified]

D: . . . Whatever is best. See you on Tuesday. You don’t know if there are any surprises for us in the State of the Union\(^3\)—will there be any surprises?

K: No. It looks to me, the draft that now exists is mostly domestic.

D: I am sure.

K: There will be something on foreign policy. At present no particular country is mentioned. As it stands it is not a major problem for you.

D: Okay, Henry. Thank you. See you on Tuesday.\(^4\)

\(^2\) January 20.

\(^3\) Ford delivered his State of the Union address on January 19. For the text, see Public Papers: Ford, 1976, No. 19.

\(^4\) In a January 17 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported: “As you asked, I spoke to Vorontsov at about 4 p.m. I told him I was calling at your request to reiterate and reemphasize what was said to Dobrynin before his departure, i.e., that there must be no military offensive in Angola while you are in Moscow. I asked Vorontsov to convey this promptly to his authorities in Moscow. He said he understood the point and would do so at once.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 4, Angola)
246. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Kissinger


The Soviet Position on Angola

Since Soviet activities toward Angola will come up during your Moscow visit, we have reviewed Soviet commentary and clandestine reports since last November to see what insight they might add on the evolution of Moscow’s Angolan policy in that period and on what you might meet there on this issue. It is, of course, too soon for this analysis to take account of Soviet reaction to your press conference statement of January 14.2

In sum, Moscow’s treatment of the Angolan question has undergone some change since Angolan independence, but this seems more a shift in tactics in response to the developing situation than any moderation of the basic Soviet objective of assuring an MPLA “victory.” The Soviets seem unlikely to do anything that would undermine the MPLA’s position.

The tactical adjustment in Moscow’s posture seems to reflect several elements in the situation:

— the MPLA’s improved military position and its growing international prestige;
— the desire to develop as wide support as possible from the OAU and its components for the Soviet-backed cause in Angola; and
— the reluctance to damage Soviet-US relations any more than necessary, particularly in view of your coming visit.

Indeed, as the situation on the ground becomes more favorable to the MPLA, the Soviets will be increasingly able to sound “flexible” or to grant some of our demands—on “coalition” government or even some kinds of outside military assistance, for example—without jeopardizing their clients’ pre-eminent position.

In regard to what you may wish to try to accomplish in Moscow, therefore, the current Soviet view as seen from the material we have would appear to allow for a possible US-Soviet compromise statement including a generalized ambiguous call for an end to foreign intervention and a future government composed of the MPLA and other Ango-


2 See footnote 5, Document 244.
lan factions. We doubt, however, that any specific reference to either FNLA or UNITA would be possible. We see no evidence of give in the Soviets’ opposition to a cease-fire proposal or to any formula that would bind the USSR and its clients to observe a general arms embargo.

The Evidence

A reading of the Soviet Notes of November 28 and December 18, the authoritative Pravda “Observer” article of January 3 and other major press commentary, as well as clandestine reporting, indicates that the Soviet position has evolved somewhat, although Moscow’s goal of an MPLA “victory” and its opposition to a cease-fire remain unchanged.

Initially, Moscow denied any involvement in the Angolan war. It continues to deny its naval deployments in the area. Slowly, however, the Soviets begrudgingly acknowledged the existence of a Soviet role and then began to hint that the scope of the Soviet involvement was linked to the level of intervention by others. In commentary open to various interpretations, Moscow has now raised the possibility that it might be willing to reduce the scope of its involvement if others did so also.

On the composition of a future Angolan government, Moscow first insisted flatly that the MPLA-formed regime was the “legitimate government” and excluded any kind of a coalition. More recently, while Moscow still abjures formal participation by the FNLA and UNITA per se, it has implied that it could endorse a more broadly based regime, expanded to include “other patriotic forces” under an “MPLA umbrella.” Private statements in the last few days have carefully nurtured this possibility.

The Rationale

In Angola itself, MPLA success in achieving breakthroughs in the North and in stalling opposition advances on other fronts has improved Luanda’s military position. The Soviets probably now calculate that the MPLA’s position is fairly secure. Barring unforeseen reverses, its drive for primacy within Angola seems likely to become steadily more convincing.

Like ourselves, however, the Soviets probably foresee no early end to the fighting in Angola. Moscow thus probably believes that its objectives can be attained, or best promoted, by assuring a posture of public “reasonableness.” It probably calculates that a rigid posture leading to

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3 Documents 222 and 230.
4 See footnote 2, Document 236.
prolongation or further escalation of the war holds uncertainties of a widened conflict, with potential risks to broader Soviet foreign policy interests, including its relations with African states and the US.

In the African context, a policy of seeming accommodation also promises potential advantages. Moscow’s current posture may lead to an easing of tensions between Moscow and several important African states over Angola, e.g., Zaire and Zambia.

In the long term, the Soviets may also see advantages if they can engage the US in negotiations over South Africa’s involvement. A practical demonstration that South Africa is an American client, subject to US dictates in the Angolan situation, may well be seen in Moscow as offering considerable potential for further complicating US relations with black Africa. In this Moscow may count on using Cuban withdrawal as a bargaining chip.

The potential effect of Angolan events on US-Soviet relations undoubtedly troubles the Kremlin. We believe that when the Politburo decided to go into Angola in a big way, it saw an opportunity to fatten its African portfolio at minimal risk, given the Portuguese imbroglio and a post-Vietnam US preoccupied with internal dissension. The leadership was surely taken aback by US reaction, and various policy courses must have been discussed. However, aside from one rather curious clandestine report from a Soviet source alleging serious division in November over Angolan policy and ending with what could be construed as a plea for a vigorous international challenge to it, we have no good evidence of a leadership split over Angola. On the other hand, there is no reason to doubt that US reaction has caused and is causing second thoughts.

The Politburo does not want any further deterioration in its détente relationship with the US. Brezhnev especially does not want a confrontation if, as we believe is true, he plans to make détente the centerpiece in his accountability report to the 25th CPSU Congress five weeks hence.

**In Brief**

Soviet statements on Angola read within these parameters suggest that Brezhnev and his colleagues hope to be able to have, if not the best, then certainly not the worst of both worlds by adopting a policy of seeming reasonableness. Vis-à-vis the US, Brezhnev probably calculates that the Soviets’ declared “flexibility” will at least minimize the damage to our relationship and at the same time limit the nature of any US actions. By engaging us in discussions, as has been hinted, they would buy time for the MPLA to consolidate and further its gains. The trend in Soviet commentaries on the modalities of settlement raises the possibility that they may now even seriously consider agreement on a suitably
nuanced US-Soviet statement which Moscow would calculate as allowing the US to save face. The only real limits to Soviet accommodation in such a statement, given their optimistic assessment of the local scene despite the outcome of OAU deliberations, are the necessity not to undermine MPLA morale and the need not to open themselves to the charge of failing to support a “national liberation movement” on the eve of its apparent success.

247. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and James B. Reston of The New York Times

Washington, January 19, 1976, 5:47 p.m.

K: Scotty how are you?
R: You are off are you?
K: That’s right.²
R: To what purpose—is there something useful that can be said about this.
K: I am in despair. I am going knowing full well everyone will shout at me. The thing to do would have been to say I am not going under these conditions. The strategic arms limitation is more important than the ups and downs of our domestic debate and I think we should give it one more try. If we fail at least we will have known we have done everything we could.
R: You must have some reason for believing . . .
K: I believe since the Soviets were the ones that asked for this trip—since we told them they have to modify their position—we have changed the date three times and they have accepted that—they must have a strong reason for wanting an agreement and they must realize that with Angola and the mood in this country another failure would be a significant setback. If we mortgage everything to secure debating points we will be in bad shape.
R: It is worth a try and you do the best you can against the historical problem. It is a hell of a problem. I don’t think they would want you to come and fail.

¹ Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. No classification marking.
² Kissinger left Washington that evening for his last official trip to Moscow.
K: If I go and fail because of their intransigence they will have one hell of responsibility.

R: Is that the kind of thing you can talk to Dobrynin about in advance and have some indication of where you are going?

K: You can be sure I have talked to him in advance.

R: They must be more worried about this decline of trust in this country; it is not in their long-term interests.

K: That is true, but you and I know that a year into a confrontation with the Russians many of the most vocal attackers of détente today would be screaming for more peace moves. We would be where we are today but with less favorable positions for us. It is hard to conduct negotiations over a period of time.

R: Angola can’t be that important to them.

K: They may not know how to get out of it. It is a serious matter now there are 8,000 Cuban troops. We can’t even send money to friendly governments who want to help Angola and the Cubans can send in 8,000 troops.

R: Have you had any talks on the Hill about this before you went away or is it so political.

K: I have talked to Hubert and to Javits and a few members of the Foreign Relations Committee. My impression is we can get support for a SALT Agreement.

R: What is the alternative?

K: There is no alternative. Without SALT the gaps will be larger against us. It is too bad that the intellectual community is turned off, because they could explode these charges if they wanted to with some analysis.

R: I had a funny point I wanted to put to you. When you first came here I said I thought there was a role the press could play if there was an understanding.

K: Yes.

R: What has been going through my mind was that if in the spring we had had enough trust so that you could have told us what the Soviets were doing in Angola there were many views that would have been printed. Congress would then have implored you to go into Angola.

K: We couldn’t have done it before this summer. We didn’t know it before July.

R: There was a lot of time between July and the end of the year.

3 Senator Humphrey.
K: We started briefing the Congress in August. We briefed eight Committees 25 times.

R: You are going from Moscow to NATO and coming back when?

K: Sunday afternoon.4

R: Well, my best wishes go with you, my dear friend.

K: Thank you Scotty and let’s get together when I come back?

R: Look forward to it.

K: O.K. Good.5

4 January 25. Kissinger stopped in Brussels January 23 to brief NATO officials on SALT. He also made a stop in Madrid on January 24 before returning to Washington.

5 While Kissinger went to Moscow, Reston wrote a column based on their telephone conversation in which he assessed the implications of Kissinger’s trip in terms of both domestic politics and foreign policy. “[E]ven a limited compromise in the Kissinger–Soviet talks this week in Moscow,” Reston concluded, “would be a political event in the [1976 Presidential election] campaign if nothing else. It would help the President ease the pressure on détente and the Russians, and this may have been what Moscow had in mind by inviting Mr. Kissinger to the Soviet Union in the first place.” (Reston, “Kissinger’s Mission,” The New York Times, January 21, 1976, p. 35)

248. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Moscow

Washington, January 21, 1976, 0335Z.

Tohak 11/WH60078. 1. I spoke to the President briefly this evening just before he went to the Residence. He asked whether you had been satisfied with the SOTU.2 I told him you thought it came out on the soft side but was satisfactory and that his delivery was superb. (I had already told him I thought the speech had been softened too much.)

2. The President seemed in a relaxed and good mood. He asked when you arrived in Moscow and when I thought we would be hearing from you. I asked what he thought now about all the SALT positions and he said he had been so wrapped up in the SOTU and the budget ac-


2 See footnote 3, Document 245.
tivities that he had not mentally reviewed the positions since the NSC meeting. He suggested we talk about it first thing in the morning.

3. He then said that if there were some way you could get across to the Russians that we would be pleased to have them buy more grain, it would be a big help back here. Prices are now low and the President thinks that news of additional sales to the Soviets would give détente a boost.

4. The President raised the idea of Mansfield as Ambassador to the PRC, just to ask that I think about it overnight. I did not tell him I had raised it with you because I thought it best to hold that in reserve in case of need. I will tell him in the morning I do not think it is a particularly good idea. If you have any additional specific arguments I should use, please let me know.

5. I spoke to Nancy this evening. We had a good chat and she seems to be in good spirits.

6. Warm regards.

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3 The NSC met on January 19 to discuss the SALT II negotiations. The record of the meeting is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXIII, SALT II, 1972–1979.*

4 Nancy Kissinger.
249. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, January 21, 1976, 11 a.m.–1:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Vasily G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
V. G. Komplektov, Acting Chief of USA Dept., MFA
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Dept., MFA (Interpreter)
Maj. General Mikhail Kozlov, Deputy Chief of General Staff
Nikolai N. Detinov, CPSU Secretariat

U.S.
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
James P. Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs; Director of DOD SALT Task Force
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT
SALT; Angola

[Brezhnev entered first, wearing a blue suit, blue shirt, red patterned tie, and four medals: Hero of Soviet Union; Hero of Socialist Labor; the Lenin Peace Prize; and the Joliet-Curie Prize. The speakers stood on one side of the long table on which stood, among other drinks, bottled Pepsi. Black and white portraits of Marx and Lenin were on the wall.]

Brezhnev: [to the press] This is a link-up of Soviet and American journalists, like Soyuz and Apollo.

[To Secretary Kissinger, as he entered] You look much younger.

Kissinger: You look very well.
Brezhnev: Thanks for the compliment.
Kissinger: I’m fat.
Gromyko: No. You lost weight.
[The members of the Secretary’s party were introduced. The press took photos.]
Brezhnev: [to Sonnenfeldt] Here’s an old acquaintance, a traveling companion.

Nicholas Daniloff (UPI): [In Russian] When will your visit to us take place?
Brezhnev: That all depends on what Secretary Kissinger says.
Daniloff: Can you evaluate the current status of US/Soviet relations?
Brezhnev: It’s hard for me to evaluate. It’s up to what nice things Kissinger has to say.
Kissinger: I hope he [Daniloff] is friendlier in Russian than he is in English.

Daniloff: What are the chief subjects of your talks?
Brezhnev: The primary subject is the achievement of a new SALT Agreement. There are also questions of the reduction of forces in Europe and a general review of the international situation. The world is big, and the subjects are inexhaustible.

Reporter: Will Angola be among the subjects?
Brezhnev: I have no questions about Angola. Angola is not my country.
Kissinger: It will certainly be discussed.
Gromyko: The agenda is always adopted by mutual agreement.
Kissinger: Then I will discuss it.
Brezhnev: You’ll discuss it with Sonnenfeldt. That will insure complete agreement. I’ve never seen him have a disagreement with Sonnenfeldt.

Murrey Marder (Washington Post): The two countries each have a large event coming up on February 24, the New Hampshire primary and the Party Congress. Do you expect—(interrupted)
Brezhnev: The Congress is a great event for me, for our Party, and for the entire country. It is a great event for me as the one who gives the major report. It’s a momentous occasion.
Marder: Will you report about a SALT agreement?
Brezhnev: If such an agreement is reached, I will talk about it. If an agreement is not reached by then, and there is something to report about it, I will do so. Our people are used to being told what is happening.
Reporter: Do you hope to visit Washington for a Summit in the near future?

Brezhnev: I expect to. I can’t say when. If I can return to the first part of the question, let me say the basic importance of that visit is that agreement must be reached. And then Comrade Brezhnev can go to Washington and sign the agreement.

Reporter: Do you expect these talks to produce an agreement?

Brezhnev: I can’t give a definite reply before the talks, but I certainly appreciate your curiosity. Your question contains your answer.

Gromyko: This is a diplomatic answer.

Brezhnev: I appreciate your interest. Thank you for your respect, and you have to realize that I can’t give precise answers to questions before this conference.

[The press were ushered out and the parties sat at the table and the talks began.]

Brezhnev: I’m happy once again to welcome you here in Moscow, Mr. Secretary. A little over a year now has passed since we last met, but in the world many events have taken place of a different sort.

But the major fact is, in our view, that in spite of all the complexities that exist, our two countries have succeeded in consolidating the line of détente and the line of improvement of US-Soviet relations. That line is, I may say, now passing through a test of its durability. And it is proving, in our view, its durability and its wisdom. We appreciate that both President Ford and you as Secretary of State of the United States are upholding that line in the face of unceasing assault on it by various ill-wishers.

I wish here to place emphasis on one very important point of principle. Since today and tomorrow we are due to engage in very serious discussions, I should like to emphasize that we, for our part, remain dedicated to those fundamental agreements and understandings that have been agreed between our two countries and we are ready to continue efforts to bring about their consistent implementation. At the same time, I must say outright, that in recent months not everything is shaping up in US-Soviet relations as we would like. And I would like to stress, through no fault of the Soviet Union, there has appeared a certain hitch in the development of our relations, and that includes the preparations for a new agreement on strategic arms limitation. We regard it as not only wrong but also harmful to allow of any pause or, all the more, of any stagnation in the implementation of the joint line we have both undertaken.

I, Dr. Kissinger, would not be mistaken to say that you know full well that the Soviet Union—the Soviet Government and the entire Party, and I myself—are in favor of truly businesslike relations with the
United States on a broad range of questions. And I don’t know what the reasons are why objections are raised and proposals are put forth that are overly complicated. We must make an effort to improve relations on a broad front, and we have untapped resources in this respect, and we must move forward along that line. I must speak frankly. I trust you’ll agree with me; that our countries have no right to slacken our efforts at ending the threat of war and ending the arms race. And there are other problems, too, requiring our joint efforts.

Dr. Kissinger, this is by no means our first meeting. We have had others. There is a good tradition that has been established in the past, and it is one of a frank exchange of views on whatever questions arise. And I’d like to suggest we discuss today whatever questions we have in the same spirit.

The newsmen a little while ago asked us what questions we would be discussing and I said one of the most important was the negotiation of a new SALT agreement. And I trust you’ll agree. So I would like Dr. Kissinger to start out on the question of SALT and set out.

I want to say I have the full text here of President Ford’s State of the Union speech, but I have not yet had a chance to make a detailed study.

The floor is yours, Dr. Kissinger. Have a cookie. Just one. I really don’t see they are any danger to you. [Laughter]

Gromyko: You see all these plates here are fully MIRV’d. [Laughter]

Kissinger: The General Secretary is personally responsible for at least 15 pounds of my overweight.

Brezhnev: My God! Add that to all my other responsibilities? If that were all, it would be a lot easier.

Another thing I can tell you: I have given up smoking. It took one day to do that.

Kissinger: Where is that cigarette case that had the clock on it?

Brezhnev: I had two. I gave one away. I don’t know where it is. My doctor suggested: Why don’t you give up smoking? I am surprised how easy it was.

Kissinger: When the General Secretary comes to the United States, I hope he can teach my wife how to do it.

Brezhnev: I don’t know whether I can do it. The urge to smoke is just vanishing. I used to do it before going to bed, but now I have the urge a little bit but still don’t.

Kissinger: My wife is in the hospital and has to give it up. So she’s a little irritable.

A year ago, the doctor sent her to a hypnotist as a way to get her to stop. He sent a nurse along with her. Afterwards, she came back to my
office and told me about it. She lit up a cigarette while telling me about it. [Laughter] But the nurse has given up smoking. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: That’s like a story by Zoshchenko. I remember it almost literally. He wrote short humorous stories. One dealt with the harm of smoking. A man said: I’ll just give it up. It’s hard, though, so someone suggested I go to a hypnotist. So I went to a hypnotist. The room was in almost total darkness. I seated myself in a chair and the hypnotist says: Take everything out of your pocket and put it on the table. I took out a pack of homegrown tobacco. He made passes with his hands and he said, don’t think about anything. And I said to myself I shouldn’t forget about one thing—to be sure to leave the tobacco when I left. [Laughter]

That is in a collection of stories published here, by Zoshchenko.

I feel when people can joke with each other, they are in a good mood and can do business with each other. A man who can’t joke isn’t a good man.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I’d like first to bring you the greetings and warm regards of President Ford, who hopes my mission will succeed and looks forward to your visit to the United States soon, hopefully in the Spring.

Brezhnev: Thank you for the greetings and good wishes. And I say this in great sincerity and great respect for the President.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, I first came to Moscow in April of 1972 at a very critical period in our relations. At that time, there was a sharp increase in tensions in the world. The talks on strategic arms were stalemated. Conflicts in other parts of the world, especially Southeast Asia, threatened our relationship. Nevertheless both our countries, conscious of our responsibility, worked with dedication to overcome all obstacles. What we were able to achieve in that atmosphere was a testimony to the special responsibilities we share to bring the nuclear arms race under control and to bring peace to the world at last.

In some respects this present meeting occurs in similar circumstances. For what we accomplish in the next few days, or fail to accomplish, will have a very important impact on the future course of Soviet-American relations and therefore the peace of the world.

Our countries are the strongest nuclear powers in the world. Others can talk about petty problems, but we bear a special responsibility to lessen the dangers of nuclear war, to lessen tensions that could lead to confrontation and to work together to achieve a world of greater peace.

I have had the privilege of many conversations with the General Secretary and I know he is dedicated to bringing about an improvement in our relationship and he is as conscious as we are of the special responsibility of our two countries. On our side, the President is firmly
committed to improving our relations. And despite our election campaign and despite attacks by some of the leading contenders for the Presidency in both parties, he will persevere on this course.

And my presence here in the face of much criticism is testimony to the sincerity of our purpose. Nevertheless it is clear that what we accomplish here is going to be subjected to the most minute scrutiny in America.

I am also aware, Mr. General Secretary, that you will be reporting to the Party next month. Thus we both have reason to regard the outcome of this meeting as a very crucial element in both our countries’ foreign policies.

We both have spoken many times of our responsibilities and of the need to make an improvement of our relations irreversible. This remains our objective. But events in the past 12 months have demonstrated this has not been achieved. The majority of Americans still believe that it is essential for world peace that the two strongest powers continue to improve relations and that they take a further step to limit strategic arms.

[Brezhnev speaks loudly to Gromyko while Dr. Kissinger continues.]

We will continue on this course. But we cannot ignore the fact that this possibility will be greatly influenced by events. Thus the first task of our meeting is to make progress on strategic arms limitation and then to make progress on other matters that divide us.

It has been over a year since the meeting at Vladivostok. New issues have arisen on both sides that were not foreseen at that time. We must not permit these issues to become obstacles to the truly historic gains achieved at Vladivostok. I’ve given your Ambassador a new proposal [Tab A] which deals with the issues of cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber. We believe these proposals represent a serious effort, and believe it is time that both of us approached these issues in a spirit of compromise, if we are to have any chance of concluding a new agreement.

The day of my departure from Washington, President Ford met with his National Security Council for the third time on this subject. At the end of the meeting, he emphasized to his advisers, and to me, the importance he attaches to bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion, even though it is fair to say not all the advice he received was unanimous. It is an indication of the seriousness in which he approaches my mission and his determination to make every effort that

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2 Not attached. Reference is presumably to Document 243.
3 See footnote 3, Document 248.
he has approved this proposal and sent me here with instructions to exert every effort to work out a possible agreement that both sides can sign.

I hope to hear your reaction to this new approach.

Angola

But before I conclude, I would like to raise one new issue that has arisen between us.

It is intolerable to us that a country in the Western Hemisphere should launch virtual invasion of Africa. Moreover, the support of the Soviet Union to this Cuban force creates a precedent that the United States must resist. We have made it a cardinal principle of our relations that one great power must exercise restraint and not strive for unilateral advantage. If that principle is now abandoned, the prospect is for a chain of action and reaction with the potential for disastrous results.

In addition to Angola, we are also prepared to discuss the Middle East.

Brezhnev: You say that in the sense of a threat of some kind of war breaking out.

Kissinger: It is not a threat of war, Mr. General Secretary. But if every country behaves this way, it could grow into a very dangerous situation.

Brezhnev: But I think we should conduct discussions first and foremost on the SALT issue. If we raise all sorts of extraneous matters, we will accomplish nothing.

I am just sleeping in my bed and all of a sudden I hear about events in Portugal, about which I know nothing. Then I hear Costa Gomes⁴ wants to visit the Soviet Union. So I receive him. You can read the communiqué. We promised him trade. So what? We trade with many countries. As for the leader of the Communist Party—Alvaro Cunhal—I’ve never set eyes on him in my life.

Then the Angola situation comes up. Portugal grants it independence. Neto approached Cuba after aggression was committed and Cuba agreed to support them. There is no Soviet military presence in Angola.

It is true that before independence we agreed to sell them some tanks, but that is no secret. If you talk of catastrophic consequences for the Soviet Union, that is the wrong way to talk. I could talk of disastrous consequences for the United States in the Middle East, but that’s the wrong way.

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⁴ Francisco da Costa Gomes, President of the National Salvation Junta in Portugal.
There is no way to underestimate the importance we attach to reaching agreement on strategic arms limitation. We reached an important agreement at Vladivostok. Now someone says that was nothing but a piece of paper. We should deal with it in a businesslike way.

I don’t know what Andrei Andreyevich [Gromyko] thinks on this. He’s the diplomat. But if President Ford were sitting here, I’d say the same thing.

I don’t want to discuss the President’s State of the Union Address because I have not read it. But we had a chance to discuss it yesterday. He talks about the 1976 military budget being greater than 1975, the need to have superior military power, the need to discuss questions including SALT with the Soviet Union from a position of strength. I could never have admitted the thought that such a lackadaisical attitude could be given to such important agreements.

Kissinger: I agree, Mr. General Secretary, first priority should be to a new agreement on strategic arms.

Brezhnev: I agree.

Kissinger: But it is also a fact that our two countries, because of our power and because of our strategic interests around the world, have a special responsibility to show restraint. Because success by one country in one area can always be compensated by success for the other in other areas. I have never forgotten the conversation I had with the General Secretary, when he told me his father said the monument to peacemakers should be placed on the highest mountain. We should remember that the issues that seem important now may look like nothing a few years from now. Tens of millions were killed in Europe over Alsace-Lorraine, and what difference does it make today? The casualties in a future war would end civilized life as we know it.

I must tell you frankly, the introduction into Angola of a Cuban expeditionary force backed by Soviet arms is a matter that we must take extremely seriously. I agree also that we should be prepared to work on strategic arms. We have worked almost five years on this. If we do not complete it, our successors will have to. We will work with all seriousness to conclude the agreement we achieved at Vladivostok, which we do not consider a scrap of paper.

Brezhnev: That I like. If you have instructions to take a serious attitude on that. It is one thing to joke; it is another thing to take it in a serious way.

We will see how matters stand in actual fact.

You mentioned your first visit in 1972 and the situation and atmosphere at that time. You are quite right, it was complicated then. And we showed at that time that the Soviet Union wants good relations with the United States, that we don’t want war, but we want peace with
all nations. There could be no better proof of our dedication to peace at that time. The bombs were falling on Vietnam; Communist parties all over the world were berating the United States. We had to face the dilemma of whether to receive Dr. Kissinger and President Nixon in Moscow or not. We gave proof to that. We knew the war in Vietnam would ultimately end and it would not produce a world war. And the decision we made then is proof of our dedication. In this spirit I will be addressing the 25th Party Congress—not from positions of strength but from positions of seeking peace.

Are we here to discuss SALT? Or Angola? What do we need a success in Angola? We need nothing in Angola. But the whole world can read in the press that the West, and America, are sending arms and mercenaries in Angola. And you turn everything on its head. I've never been to Portugal; we are not responsible for anything there.

In Spain, there are lots of strikes going on—and you can hold the Soviet Union responsible. If you have proof to the contrary, lay it out on the table.

Aleksandrov: Tell him about what you read.

Brezhnev: Recently, I read Kissinger will be going to Spain. An American delegation was there and made preparations for a new agreement on military bases. Here am I making every effort for peace, and Kissinger is going around making agreements on military bases. I won't say this publicly, but this was in my head. If I were discussing strategic arms, I wouldn't go around organizing military bases, but I would go home and report to President Ford and work on a new agreement on strategic arms. So you can visit Moscow only in passing and your primary aim is to visit Madrid, you can do that if you want, but it certainly won't earn you respect in the world.

Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Let me now, Dr. Kissinger, say a few words on substance of SALT, our principal goal. We have recently, Dr. Kissinger, already set out to the President our assessment of the state of affairs regarding the new agreement. We did this in all frankness and without beating around the bush.

Kissinger: What is the General Secretary referring to?

Dobrynin: The last letter [Tab B].

Brezhnev: After all, work on preparing a new agreement has not yet been completed and therefore the Vladivostok understanding so far

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5 During his visit to Madrid on January 24, Kissinger signed a bilateral Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation.

6 Not attached. Reference is presumably to Document 212.
remains unrealized. I believe all this should be of equal concern to both sides since we do not believe the United States is interested in an agreement to any less extent than is the Soviet Union. During the negotiations already after Vladivostok, we for our part have made significant important steps to meet the United States in questions that are of particular importance to the American side, to display a readiness to seek constructive solutions to highly important problems. The United States to date has made no equal responsive steps or even steps comparable with ours.

The American side, as is evident from its latest proposals of January 14, attempts on the one hand to introduce limitations on Soviet arms that are not strategic arms at all, and on the other hand to legalize for yourself new systems that are genuinely strategic. Needless to say, such an approach complicates the process of reaching agreement.

Could we have a little five minute break?

Kissinger: I was going to propose the same.

Brezhnev: So we have achieved our first agreement!

[There was a break from 12:25 to 12:41 p.m., and the meeting resumed.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, let me just in passing express my gratification that you have, as you say, instructions—as I have, too—to work out a mutually acceptable agreement on strategic arms. And I would like both of us to carry out our instructions in good faith, without worrying about second-rate matters. We can have different views about bombers, about 100 questions, and you could put questions to me and I to you. But let us secure an agreement and the kind of peace we want, and we can crown our efforts.

Kissinger: I agree. And that is the spirit we should conduct our discussions.

Brezhnev: Good.

[Brezhnev and Gromyko confer about the schedule.]

We are threatened with complete starvation. They have taken all our teacups and everything.

Kissinger: I’m sure you have lost many state guests to starvation in the Kremlin!

I met yesterday the Queen of Denmark who was very impressed with her visit to the Soviet Union.

Brezhnev: I didn’t meet her.

Kissinger: If you start undermining royalty ... She saw some family jewels in the Kremlin. [Laughter]

Gromyko: She was very impressive as a personality.

Brezhnev: There are some very impressive people there.
Kissinger: But when you start impressing European royalty, the sense of insecurity is great. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Women start out by looking at jewels. That is why there are so few women in politics.

Kissinger: The ones that are bloodthirsty.

Brezhnev: So, who dictates the terms of the new agreement? We've got to get down to writing a draft.

Kissinger: We made a proposal to you, to which we have not yet received a reply, in which we really attempted to meet several of your points. So we would appreciate your reflections or any counterproposals you may have. Of course, we could also sign this proposal, and then I could go to Leningrad tomorrow. If it exists.

Gromyko: Maybe Leningrad is just a legend—spread since the time of Peter the Great.

Kissinger: Since my wife saw it, I'm a little bit more convinced.

Gromyko: Couldn't that have been hypnosis? [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Like the man sitting and thinking about one thing in the world—not to forget his tobacco. [Laughter]

First of all, I would deem it necessary to remind you that the readiness to count in the number of MIRV'd missiles, in the 1320, all missiles of such types as had been tested with MIRV's was and is contingent on mutually acceptable solutions on the other as yet outstanding questions.

Kissinger: I understand that.

Brezhnev: So I trust there is no misunderstanding on that.

Kissinger: The Foreign Minister has made it clear. I do not exclude there are one or two others in our government who believe you have conceded that. But the Foreign Minister has made it clear in every meeting we have had.

Brezhnev: Now as regards air-to-ground cruise missiles. We feel as hitherto that air-to-ground cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers carried by heavy bombers must be on an equal footing with ballistic missiles of that class and must be counted in the total of 2400 strategic armed vehicles, each one counted as one vehicle.

Kissinger: But this was always your position.

Brezhnev: That solution most effectively meets the goals of limiting strategic arms and accords with the substance of the Vladivostok understanding.

Comrade Kissinger—I mean Dr. Kissinger. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Maybe at the Party Congress they will do it. [Laughter] I believe if the General Secretary called me Comrade Kissinger, it would
not be without influence on subsequent primaries. Jackson and Reagan would be very grateful.

Brezhnev: I’m not all that familiar with all the ramifications of your election campaign. So I’d better be objective.

At the same time, Dr. Kissinger, we are prepared to look for a possible other way of solving the question of equipping heavy bombers with air-to-ground cruise missiles. But on the essential condition that the limitations on such missiles be organically tied in with the basic parameters of the quantitative limits agreed in Vladivostok.

Kissinger: I’m sure the General Secretary will explain that.

Brezhnev: We will be prepared to make this additional step forward to meet the United States, or speaking more directly, this concession to the United States, on condition that a mutually acceptable solution is achieved to the entire complex of issues on cruise missiles.

Specifically, as such a variant of a solution to this question, we are proposing that heavy bombers with cruise missiles with ranges exceeding 600 kilometers be regarded as vehicles equipped with MIRV’s and that accordingly they be counted within the agreed figure for those vehicles, that is, 1320.

At the same time, a B–52 heavy bomber should be termed to be equal to one MIRV’d missile, and the B–1 heavy bomber equal to three such missiles.

As regards the US proposal that the cruise missiles with a range over 2500 kilometers on heavy bombers be banned, we agree with it.

That is our view on what we feel to be a very important element of the whole complex of strategic arms limitations.

Kissinger: Could I listen to the rest of . . . ? If the General Secretary has reactions to the rest of our proposal. And then I will give a comprehensive answer.

Brezhnev: All right.

[Kissinger confers briefly with Wade.]

I’ll go on, Dr. Kissinger, and go on now to sea-based cruise missiles.

Our position on sea-based cruise missiles of long range remains as before. We propose that all such cruise missiles of over 600 kilometers in range be completely banned. We consider that only such a solution can ensure the effective closing off of a new channel for the strategic arms race. We believe the fact that the United States now agrees to the banning of such missiles on submarines is a good thing. But it is not enough. This ban should apply also to surface ships. This also is a very realistic and concrete proposal.

Now on land-based cruise missiles. We proceed from the assumption that between us it is already agreed that land-based cruise missiles
of intercontinental range should be banned. And we understood that agreement to mean that insofar as the United States and Soviet Union are concerned, there should be no question at all of shorter-range cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Could you explain this?
Dobrynin: They would be banned.
Kissinger: All land-based cruise missiles?
Dobrynin: He will go on.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: All land.

Brezhnev: Since, however, as will be seen from the latest American proposals, the United States admits of such a possibility, by proposing there be permission to build missiles of very long range, that is, up to 2500 kilometers, we regard it as a necessity to introduce complete clarity on this score by banning land-based cruise missiles of a range over 600 kilometers.

Now, on the Soviet TU–22 bomber—the one that you call Backfire. As we have officially stated on more than one occasion, the Soviet bomber called the Backfire by the American side is not a heavy bomber. This in fact was admitted by the American side. Therefore they have nothing to do with the agreement now being negotiated. American proposals having to do with this, including the very latest ones, limiting this within the total number of 2400, are totally unacceptable.

To put an end to all sorts of speculation on the characteristics of this airplane, I am prepared to give you officially its range. The maximum range is 2200 kilometers. And I wish to inform you we would be prepared to reflect that figure in the materials of the negotiations.

Kissinger: About 1400 miles. If an airplane flies over the United States and drops bombs, we know it’s not a Backfire.
Sukhodrev: It’s radius of action is 2000 kilometers.
Kissinger: Is the General Secretary finished?
Brezhnev: Maybe I should stop there. I feel there is ample material from what I’ve said to fulfill the instructions we both have and reach agreement.

Kissinger: May I ask a technical question, Mr. General Secretary? And then I’d like a five minute break.
Brezhnev: Please.
Kissinger: How did you calculate this range? What speed and at what altitude?
Brezhnev: I’ll be absolutely honest. I don’t know. But I can ask for an official brief on that.
Kissinger: Because that makes a difference. If you calculate it at supersonic flight at a low altitude, you get one answer. If you calculate it subsonic speed and a high altitude, it is another answer. With a heavy load there is a different answer; with a different load, another answer.

Kozlov: [Standing up at the end of the table] The plane was flying at a high altitude of 18,000 meters, at speeds intermittently both subsonic and supersonic. And the loads were minimal. If it was carrying a maximum load, the range would have gone way down to 1000 kilometers.

Brezhnev: That is absolutely official.

Kissinger: Let me understand. What is the range if it flies subsonically, at a high altitude, with a medium load?

Kozlov: As I just reported to the General Secretary, if the load is increased, and at that height, the radius would only be 1000 kilometers.

Kissinger: The General Secretary said alternating . . .

Brezhnev: Would you excuse me.

[He goes out.]

Kissinger: The General said 1000 kilometers at a medium height. If it flew at say 15–20,000 meters altitude, all subsonically, what would be the radius?

Kozlov: In that case, given a tailwind, the radius could perhaps go up to 2400 kilometers.

Kissinger: He is very conservative. We think it could do 6,000 kilometers, or more.

Wade: 4,000 kilometers.

Hyland: 4,000–5,000 radius.

[Brezhnev returns]

Brezhnev: What is the time in Washington now?

Kissinger: 5:30 in the morning.

Brezhnev: How do you get yourself accommodated so easily?

Kissinger: I had a good night’s sleep. I was here.

Brezhnev: I saw your arrival on television last night. I saw your fur hat.

Kissinger: I got it in Vladivostok. If you say about 2400 kilometers [radius], then the range one way would be 4500 to 5000 kilometers. Is that right?

Kozlov: Yes, you are absolutely right.

Kissinger: 5000 plus.

Kozlov: That is the range.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, not you yourself, but let’s as an experiment, put Sonnenfeldt on that plane, and fill it with gas and fly it to New York. Or both, and call it MIRVed.
That is a very substantive answer. Because my honest word is behind it. Because if this isn’t true, I would stand exposed before the whole world. Because if I say this officially and agree to have it reflected in the document, if it were not true, it would be a serious thing.

Kissinger: Let me take five minutes to discuss this.

Brezhnev: All right. I think, Dr. Kissinger, you and I have a good basis for understanding. We should not try to pull things out of each other.

Kissinger: I tell you. Our generals double the range of your Backfire; your generals cut it in half.

Brezhnev: Your generals should not control your government, any more than ours do ours. If generals were allowed to govern, there would be a world war and they wouldn’t be among the living and would have no one to govern.

[The meeting broke from 1:30 to 1:40 and then resumed.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, please. Could I just say something? I want to make one suggestion. This is a very important question we are discussing. This is really the very core of our future relationship. So I would like to make this suggestion. This is a matter that I am sure requires a certain thinking and consideration and therefore a certain period of time. So perhaps we should declare a recess. All the more so since Comrade Gromyko has a luncheon party for you which will require some time. After all, it takes time to talk.

And we could perhaps resume our discussions at five o’clock this afternoon.

Kissinger: That’s a better idea.

Brezhnev: I’m seeking no advantages for myself.

Kissinger: I was going to make the same proposal.

Brezhnev: [Pointing to the album which the Secretary has taken out in front of him] What are those and I hope reasonable proposals?

Kissinger: [handing over the album of photographs] These are photos we took of the General Secretary at Vladivostok and Helsinki. There are some very good pictures in it.

Brezhnev: [Looks through the album] I weighed less when I was in Helsinki than now. Now I’m 85–88 kilos.

Kissinger: The General Secretary looks very well.

Brezhnev: I try. All young people try and look that way, so I try.

Kissinger: I understand the General Secretary’s speech [to the Party Congress] has to be two-to-three hours. That takes great stamina.

Brezhnev: Even more.

Aleksandrov: Castro once talked 10 hours!
Brezhnev: But ours will get big attention—the international part. There will be an economic section, and a part on the Party itself. As at the 24th Congress, we are setting out the program for the coming five years. And we have a very big step forward in these last five years—in the economy, in various social fields, in the spiritual field. Our own political unity of the people and the Party has gained in strength. It is a big Party, so there are quite a few things to say. About 15–15½ million members, quite a big organized force.

Kissinger: We will meet again this afternoon.

Brezhnev: Good.

Kissinger: Can I meet with the General Secretary one minute alone?

[He confers privately with the General Secretary at the end of the table.]  
I’d like to say a word about that electronic problem. We have not briefed our people on it. Your measurements were taken at ground level. But on the higher floors, which we will let you measure, it becomes very high. If it becomes public . . .

Brezhnev: The President answered me on that.

Kissinger: I’m not saying it for negotiating purposes. We appreciated your reply. If you could pay some attention to it.

And in general terms we wanted to tell the General Secretary we genuinely want an agreement. We have a difficult situation.

Brezhnev: We hope we can achieve an agreement and it will help Ford’s situation.

Kissinger: Not so much Ford’s situation but we have a concrete subject to defeat the opponents [of détente]. I agree you have nothing to gain in Angola. We have nothing to gain in Angola. But 8000 Cubans running around . . . You wouldn’t want Hungarians running around conducting anti-Soviet activities.

[The meeting ended.]

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7 Brezhnev and Kissinger apparently discussed Angola at this time; see Document 256 and footnote 4 thereto. No other record of the discussion has been found.
250. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger has just sent you the following report of his first meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.

The meeting with Brezhnev has just ended. Brezhnev led off with a fairly conciliatory statement emphasizing his interest in concluding a SALT agreement. I then made an opening statement in a similar spirit but I hit hard on the consequences of Cuban and Soviet intervention in Angola, which drew a sharp, prolonged response from Brezhnev, disclaiming any responsibility for Angola. At one point, he referred to the State of the Union and the increase in our Defense budgets as a sign of the obstacles arising in Soviet-American relations. However, he calmed down somewhat and expressed his appreciation that you and I were still committed to an improvement in relations despite increasingly sharp attacks from critics.

At this point, we returned to SALT and I asked Brezhnev to respond to our latest proposal. He then proceeded to present an item-by-item proposal of his own based upon our position. He began by calling attention to their concession on MIRV verification and he emphasized very strongly that this was organically linked to a solution of all outstanding problems and stressed there should be no misunderstanding about this linkage.

He then addressed the ALCM problem and said they still preferred to count each individual cruise missile on heavy bombers. However, they were prepared to accept our proposal that heavy bombers equipped with ALCMs over 600 km in range would count as a MIRV against the ceiling of 1320. But he introduced a new wrinkle by claiming that each B–52 would count as one, but the B–1 would count as three. Second, he accepted our proposal that all ALCMs over 2500 km in range would be banned. Third, he addressed sea-based cruise missiles and took note of the fact that we now both agree that SLCMs over 600 km in range would be banned from deployment on submarines. Nevertheless, he said the Soviets still proposed that all sea-based missiles over 600 km in range should be banned altogether. On land-based

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cruise missiles, Brezhnev took a new position. He claimed that the previous agreement to ban land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range was meant to ban all cruise missiles of shorter ranges as well. In order to clear up any misunderstanding, he now proposed a ban on all land-based cruise missiles over 600 km in range. Finally, he turned to the question of backfire and began by emphatically denying that the Backfire bomber could be considered a strategic weapon. He referred to his previous statement to you on this matter and said that he could now officially give us the official range estimate for this bomber and that this could be made a matter of record in the negotiations. He stated that the radius of the Backfire was 2200 km.

At this point, I interrupted to ask some questions about the Backfire estimate; namely, what conditions of flight altitude, subsonic or sonic, etc., were assumed in this estimate of 2200. Brezhnev turned the question over to General Kozlov who said this range reflected an altitude of 10,000 meters with a maximum load. I asked what the radius would be for a subsonic mission at a higher altitude, say 15,000 meters, and General Kozlov said it might be 2400 km. Brezhnev then suggested that we recess to reflect upon what he had said and proposed reconvening at 5:00 p.m. this evening Moscow time.

In addition to the foregoing, Gromyko told me privately last night and again before lunch today that a deferral option was completely out of the question. He characterized it as a present to the United States since they believe Backfire should not be counted in any case.

In light of Brezhnev’s presentations and Gromyko’s remarks, my strong recommendation is that we not proceed with a straightforward presentation of Option 3 which would merely challenge Brezhnev on the Backfire and without benefit of some preliminary discussion of the concept behind Option 3. What I propose to do is to explore with Brezhnev the modified version of Option 3 which we discussed briefly in the NSC meeting in which Backfire and surface ship cruise missiles would be put in a separate category for limitations during a five-year period beginning in 1977 through 1982. This has the advantage that the Soviets would not be able to develop or deploy sophisticated cruise missiles in this period, while our surface ship cruise missile program would be approaching an optimal level for breakout or for putting pressure on the negotiations. Moreover, this approach would ease the verification problem since the Soviets would not be able to deploy the cruise missile at long range. In addition, since the Soviets claim that the Backfire has a 2400 km radius this provides an opening to group both the Backfire and cruise missiles of a similar range. I would start out by suggesting a separate limit on Backfire during this period at about 250 and in this way, allow Brezhnev to save face and to keep open all our significant cruise missile options. As discussed at the NSC, I would out-
line a limit on surface ship cruise missiles at about 25 ships with 10–15 launchers, but my main aim this evening will be to persuade Brezhnev this is an equitable compromise without yet committing ourselves to specific numbers. On land-based cruise missiles I will say that we have two choices, either to return to the original agreement banning intercontinental missiles and therefore permitting shorter ranges, or to accept our new position of banning above the range of 2500 km.

I anticipate a lengthy evening session but it is also likely that Brezhnev will have to consider what we say and take it to the Politburo probably tomorrow, which means we may have a decisive session on Thursday afternoon. I will report this evening my impressions of what the prospects for an agreement are. As of now, I am impressed with Brezhnev’s determination to get into the substance of SALT, signified by the presence of some of his SALT experts and his willingness to respond in detail to our proposal. Nevertheless, it is clear that on Backfire, at least, he has a tough political problem, and his claim that it is not strategic is being backed up by official military estimates. Thus, this evening’s session is almost certain to be very tough going.3

2 January 22.

3 In message Tohak 15 to Kissinger, January 21, Scowcroft reported: “The President has read the report of your first meeting with Brezhnev (Hako 3). He observed that Brezhnev appeared to be taking the negotiations very seriously and noted that he was even making specific counterproposals, extreme though some of them might be. He has called an NSC meeting for 5:30 this afternoon, at which time he proposes to state his concurrence with your plan of action.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Trip Briefing Books and Cables of Henry Kissinger, 1974–1977, Box 19, TOHAK (1)) The NSC met at 5:30 p.m. that evening. See Document 253.
251. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, January 21, 1976, 5:02–6:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
V. G. Komplektov, Acting Chief of USA Dept, MFA
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Dept, MFA (Interpreter)
Mag. Gen. Mikhail Kozlov, Deputy Chief of General Staff
Nikolai N. Detinov, CPSU Secretariat

US
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
James P. Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs; Director of DOD SALT Task Force
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECT

SALT

Brezhnev: I took a rest. I was reading some summaries, including about China, your friend.

Kissinger: They just gave you a helicopter.

Gromyko: Our own!

Brezhnev: They formed a committee for the funeral of Chou En-lai.\(^2\) It had 107 members, including Mao. But he didn’t attend anything or speak any word on behalf of Chou. He’s probably considering his next poem.

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976—Kissinger Moscow Trip (1). Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office at the Kremlin.

\(^2\) Zhou died on January 8.
Kissinger: The most dangerous position in the world is to be number two in China.

Brezhnev: I didn’t want to discuss China.

Kissinger: If you want a smaller discussion while I’m here, we can do it.

Brezhnev: We would just get into a state of confusion. We had better stay away from it.

Well, Dr. Kissinger, we’ll hear from you. These are weighty matters. If the time elapsed since our morning meeting is sufficient, maybe you could reply.

Kissinger: Could I ask one technical question on the Backfire?

Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: Because I’m trying to reconcile your estimates with ours. And we are trying to figure out how you arrived at 2200 kilometers. We thought the profile was for low-altitude flight, of which all except 20% would be high-altitude and supersonic and rest low-altitude and subsonic. Either an all low-altitude flight at 0.85 Mach or a high-altitude flight of which 250 nautical miles are supersonic would get you to 2200.

The thing that concerns us is high-altitude flight with subsonic speed—say about 10 kilometers [in altitude].

That’s our question.

Kozlov: What radius would you have expected if it flew at 0.85 and a height of over 10 kilometers?

Kissinger: Over 4,000 kilometers.

Kozlov: Those figures aren’t confirmed either by theoretical consideration or by practical testing. The figure of 2200 was taken at optimal altitude and speed. It is a figure that has been officially given to you and there really can be no other. And as you yourself said three hours ago, Mr. Secretary, you can go on to say the maximum range would be 5000 kilometers.

Kissinger: From those figures.

Well, let me go on to the General Secretary’s observations.

First of all, I would like to say I have been very impressed by the seriousness of the General Secretary’s remarks and the Foreign Minister’s remarks on the subject. And I also appreciate that the General Secretary has given us concrete positions which in some respects take into account considerations we had expressed.

Now let me deal first with the cruise missile. And we all understand that just as your agreement on MIRV counting is dependent on...
agreement on other issues, so is any summary I might make now on what we believe we have agreed dependent on an agreement. That goes without saying.

My understanding after listening to the General Secretary is that we agree that air-to-surface cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers can be deployed only on heavy bombers, that is to say, on those bombers that are counted against the total of 2400. This is what we seem to have agreed upon.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: I’m just summing up, to see where we agree and where we disagree.

Brezhnev: I listen.

Kissinger: We also agree that no air-to-surface cruise missiles can be deployed of a range greater than 2500, even on planes that are not heavy bombers. They are banned completely.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: This morning we agreed that air-to-surface missiles on heavy bombers will be counted as MIRVed missiles—that is, each bomber counts as one MIRV—with cruise missiles of a range up to 2500 kilometers.

Gromyko: Between 600 and 2500 kilometers.

Kissinger: Any heavy bomber with cruise missiles of a range between 600 and 2500 will be counted as MIRVed. According to the Soviet proposal, each B–52 is counted as one MIRV and each B–1 is counted as three MIRV, if they are armed with cruise missiles. Now we cannot accept that—to disturb that harmony. That part we cannot accept. But I will make a proposal with respect to that in a minute. In fact, I’ll do it now. I will propose that we agree to deploy no more cruise missiles on a B–1 than we would deploy on a B–52. So they both (each) would be counted as one.

Senator Church will control it for you.

[Gromyko explains it to Brezhnev.]

In other words, we agree that on each B–1 we’ll put no more cruise missiles than we would put on the B–52. The same principle.

Gromyko: It’s clear.

Dobrynin: The speed is different.

Kissinger: The speed has nothing to do with the cruise missile. The cruise missile is subsonic; the B–1 is supersonic. You don’t want a bomber to outrun its cruise missile.

Gromyko: It makes no difference. The bomber delivers its missile in this length of time.
Kissinger: If you study it, I think you’ll find the B–1 flies supersonically only part of the time. So you’ll find that the time it takes to approach the release point is of marginal difference.

Brezhnev: Terrible things we’re talking about—“approaching release points.”

Kissinger: It should be our highest goal to prevent such an event from ever arising.

Let me now go to sea-based cruise missiles. We agree now that no cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 kilometers should be deployed on submarines.

Gromyko: That agreement was reached quite long since.

Kissinger: This morning.

Gromyko: This was confirmation.

Kissinger: I’m just summing up. We do not agree on cruise missiles on surface ships.

On land-based cruise missiles of 5500 kilometers, of intercontinental range, should be banned. That usually means that they are permitted below that. And we accepted that. We accepted your proposal.

Gromyko: But there was no understanding reached on what would be permitted. It would be wrong to believe that missiles with other parameters would be allowed.

Kissinger: I admit I’ve not been in office as long as the Foreign Minister and don’t know all the subtleties of international diplomacy, but I’ve usually assumed that what is not prohibited is permitted.

Gromyko: Yes, but on both sides new elements are introduced.

Kissinger: I’m not complaining. You have every right to introduce new elements. But if you ban them of range above 5500 kilometers, you permit them below 5500 kilometers.

Gromyko: That’s wrong.

Kissinger: That’s wrong? Well, when I’m Foreign Minister for 20 years I’ll understand this. But I’m not going to pursue this now. It’s a lack of experience on my part.

Gromyko: [Laughs]: For you to judge.

Kissinger: We propose to ban everything of range above 2500 kilometers, to establish symmetry in the counting.

Brezhnev: The ban?

Kissinger: Above 2500.

Wade: It was our last proposal.

Kissinger: By “We,” I mean the United States. For symmetry.

Gromyko: That was your proposal of January 14, to which we objected.
Kissinger: That’s right. So the only two proposals we’ve ever studied were your proposal of 5500 which you made in May [July] and our proposal of 2500 which we made on January 14.3

But can I assume in the rest of the proposal, except for land-based, that everything not banned is permitted? Or counted.

Gromyko: Yes, but you suggest that in exchange for something on our side.

Kissinger: Just to get the record straight. You proposed 5500; we accepted it. So we accept either 5500 or 2500, whichever you prefer.

[They confer]

Gromyko: Then missiles with ranges between 600 and 2500 kilometers remain outside the scope of the proposal, and second, you link it with proposals unacceptable to us.

Kissinger: That may be true. But the Foreign Minister in Geneva proposed 5500 and we accepted and sent it to Geneva. It was negotiated between Semenov and Johnson. It was never disputed by the Soviet side until this morning.

Brezhnev: Are you suggesting we be allowed land-based cruise missiles with ranges up to 2500?

Kissinger: All I’m saying is, we assume . . . Mr. General Secretary, I’m simply trying to get the record straight. You proposed 5500; we accepted it. President Ford confirmed it to the General Secretary in Helsinki. We then agreed to shift the implementation of this to Geneva. And they’re discussing it in Geneva. We never heard the figure of 600 until this morning.

In fact, they already agreed to it in Article IX in Geneva.

[They confer among themselves.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, could I ask, what would be the purpose of having land-based cruise missiles with a range of 2500 kilometers?

Kissinger: What is the purpose of having them with a range of 5500 kilometers?

Dobrynin: They could reach each other. Intercontinental range.

Gromyko: Classic intercontinental range.

Dobrynin: This is why the General Secretary asked what you need them for, at 2500 kilometers.

Kissinger: We’ve never considered your proposal of 600 kilometers, because the Foreign Minister on behalf of your government made a proposal of under 5500. We accepted it. President Ford agreed

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3 See Documents 159 and 160 and 243.
at Geneva. Our delegation, on behalf of our government, negotiated it at Geneva.

Gromyko: That’s why we are now making this proposal. In fact, the first time we heard of cruise missiles was after we agreed at Vladivostok.

Kissinger: But the Foreign Minister made this proposal after Vladivostok, and our delegations agreed on it after Vladivostok.

[Brezhnev and Korniyenko go off and confer.]

Gromyko: But you raised the whole matter of cruise missiles at Vladivostok.

Kissinger: Let me read what was discussed at Helsinki. [He reads from the discussion of August 2, 1975:] Our President said: “We have agreed to ban land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range.” We accepted. The General Secretary then said: “When you say cruise missiles of intercontinental range, do you mean land-based?” Then I said: “You wanted to ban them and the President has agreed.”

Then we listed a few other things and we agreed we’d send them to Geneva. And Brezhnev said “Very good.”

Gromyko: That was part of the question.

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: And that part did not exhaust the question in its entirety. Haven’t both sides raised new points?

Kissinger: You have every right to raise a new point, but I’m only saying it was never considered in our government.

Gromyko: The whole question of the cruise missile was raised after Vladivostok. You can’t reproach us.

Kissinger: I’m not. Our delegations at Geneva have agreed on language. But that’s not a reproach.

Gromyko: And they’ll do that without any difficulty because this is a question they haven’t considered. What they agreed about 5500-kilometer-range missiles stands.

Kissinger: If you’ve agreed on banning them over 5500 kilometers range, what’s the point of banning them over 600 kilometers?

Gromyko: What you can ask us rightfully is: Why didn’t we raise this in the first place? But we can boomerang that to you, and ask why have you raised new points? We’ve raised new points too.

Kissinger: I’m just making a summary. This is a point we’ve not agreed.

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4 See Document 173.
As to Backfire. It is clear that we have a disagreement but we appreciate the General Secretary’s official presentation on the range of the aircraft.

Brezhnev: And I confirm that is indeed official and a fact.
Kissinger: And we appreciate his willingness to include it in the official record.

[They confer]
Kissinger: Do you want to take a break?
Gromyko: Just for two minutes.
Kissinger: Do you want to translate that [last sentence]? [Sukhodrev translates the sentence about including it in the official record.]
Brezhnev: I confirm that too.

[There was a break from 5:57 to 6:07. Brezhnev and Gromyko go in the back room to confer, and return.]
Brezhnev: Why doesn’t Sonnenfeldt say anything?
Kissinger: The truth is, he speaks and I just move my lips.
Brezhnev: I didn’t know that. I keep attacking you, and actually the target should be Sonnenfeldt. I’m misaddressing all my comments.
Kissinger: Don’t think Sonnenfeldt doesn’t feel it. If you look closely at the photos in that album, you’ll see Sonnenfeldt is always leaning forward to block me out.
Brezhnev: There are some very great experts in that field.
Kissinger: Should I continue. Maybe we can agree on limiting the range of Sonnenfeldt. [Laughter] Or counting him. [Laughter]
Hyland: Three to one. Just don’t MIRV him.
Kissinger: The Soviet Union says the Backfire bomber with a range of around 2400 kilometers should not be considered a strategic bomber, but the US side considers surface ships with cruise missiles of a range of 600 kilometers should be included. We’re willing to consider a compromise.
Brezhnev: I said 2200.
I will make the following proposal. On the whole business. We could agree on those aspects of the cruise missile that we’ve agreed to up to now, as part of the Vladivostok agreement, that is, on air-launched cruise missiles and on submarine-launched cruise missiles. Then we could make a separate interim agreement for five years which deals with the Backfire and ship-launched cruise missiles—and I suppose, now that you’ve raised the issue, land-based cruise missiles. And we would then propose that the total number of Backfires in that interim agreement, over five years, to 1982, should be limited to 275, and
the total number of ships on which we could have cruise missiles of 600 kilometers should be limited to 25. And I haven’t figured out what to say about land-based cruise missiles. And as part of this proposal, I would propose that the total number of delivery vehicles be reduced to 2300 after three years.

Brezhnev: That is, to revise the Vladivostok figure?

Kissinger: After three years.

Brezhnev: I don’t think that could be an appropriate proposal. Why should we go back on our agreement?

Kissinger: In 1977 it would be 2400.

Dobrynin: Right.

[Sukhodrev explains to Brezhnev.]

Brezhnev: But in any event it does amount to revision of the classical Vladivostok agreement.

On such a basis it would be difficult to agree. We wouldn’t agree what had been revised at Vladivostok. I don’t see why we should have all these combinations. And then again, the Backfire in one way or another would be included in the agreement, while it’s not a strategic bomber.

Kissinger: No, outside the total.

Gromyko: But in the agreement. Makes no difference if it’s in a separate agreement or in the same basic agreement.

Brezhnev: Maybe we wouldn’t like to get into an impasse on this. Maybe we’re a little tired after a full day’s work.

Kissinger: Our theory is we would put the weapons in a gray area of similar range into a separate category.

Gromyko: You mean Backfire and surface-ship cruise missiles?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: In short, you want, in return for Backfire, to include another strategic weapon, while in principle we do not consider the Backfire a strategic weapon?

Kissinger: But we don’t consider a sea-launched cruise missile of 600 kilometer range a strategic weapon.

Gromyko: It will operate just as any other rocket of that category. And you realize full well what distance into Soviet territory those weapons could reach.

Brezhnev: So I think we should give some thought to that proposal. I don’t want to reject that out of hand.

Kissinger: Maybe that’s a good idea. Or make a counterproposal.

Sukhodrev: On 2300.

Stoessel: On the whole complex.
[They confer. Korniyenko hands Brezhnev a paper, probably the communiqué on the second meeting. Both sides confer. The Soviets discuss the next day’s schedule.]

Brezhnev: Shall we perhaps take a recess, and take a rest? Do you have any objection to that?

Kissinger: No. I could get to see the ballet, which I also don’t know if it exists.

Gromyko: What will you do there? Compare ballerinas with Backfire?

Kissinger: I’m going to determine the range of the ballerina.

Brezhnev: But that is a methodology we don’t use. And we don’t even have it. [He draws a diagram]. It’s a triangle. If you sit in the box, it’s one distance. If you sit in the orchestra, it’s another. That is land-based. [Laughter]

Kissinger: I’ll make myself a forward-based system, and I want to be counted.

Brezhnev: I think we should meet tomorrow at 12:00.

Kissinger: Good.

[The meeting ended. The Secretary and his party, accompanied by Ambassador Dobrynin, went directly to the Bolshoi Theatre for a performance of “Giselle” in honor of the Secretary.]
cial” Brezhnev guarantee that the aircraft had a “maximum operational” radius of 2200–2400 KM.

3. I then proceeded to sum up the points of agreement and differences in our two positions. I noted that on ALCMs we both had the same approach: to count as MIRVed, and to ban above 2500 KM, and ban on other aircraft above 600 KM. I said we could not accept their counting of the B–1 as equal to 3 MIRVed vehicles. This brought a lame rejoinder from Gromyko that the reason was that the B–1 was supersonic and could reach the target earlier than the B–52, but this was not pressed seriously.

4. On sea based cruise missiles I noted we agreed on submarines but not on surface ship cruise missiles between 600 KM and 2500 KM. I then said that we were surprised by their interpretation of the ban on intercontinental land based cruise missiles, which lead to a long confused debate. Gromyko first claimed that they assumed all along that all land based cruise missiles over 600 KM would be banned, and that was implicit in their proposal. I knocked this down, but it was finally left that they would consider the question again: either to return to the original interpretation, leaving all land based missiles up to intercontinental range free, or banning only those above 2500 KM.

5. I noted the similarity in range between their claim of 2200–2400 KM for the Backfire and our proposal for SLCMs on surface ships up to 2500 KM, and I as well contrasted our willingness to include SLCMs as strategic weapons in SALT and their resistance on Backfire. I suggested a separate five year agreement in which they would not deploy more than 275 Backfire in the period up to the end of 1982, and we would not deploy more than 25 surface ships with cruise missiles for the five year period. I said this was a conditional proposal subject to agreement as all outstanding issues.

6. In this context I proposed that we also reduce from 2400 to 2300 by 1980. This last point caused some consternation. Brezhnev said that he could not revise Vladivostok, and both Gromyko and Brezhnev repeated that Backfire was not strategic. After considerable discussion on the Soviet side Brezhnev said he did not reject our ideas out of hand, but proposed a recess until 12 noon tomorrow, which I assume means he will hold a Politburo meeting in the morning.

7. My strategy tomorrow will be to listen to whatever they produce. Assuming they continue to reject any numerical limit on Backfire I will concentrate mainly on the cruise missiles and try to draw Brezhnev out further on any assurances about Backfire. Incidentally, Dobrynin “guaranteed” that the Politburo would never agree to count Backfire, because it has been sold as a peripheral attack system.

8. Unless there is an unexpected break in the Soviet position, which is not entirely ruled out, all I can do is narrow the differences to the
point that they can be considered again in Washington. Basically, we may leave here with a reasonable cruise missiles package plus some assurances on Backfire’s range and other indicators. If so, we can evaluate what such an overall agreement would look like in Washington.

9. In this light I really see no reason to go to a pure version of Option III, nor do I see deferral as a real option unless the Soviets get desperate.

253. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to Secretary of State Kissinger in Moscow

Washington, January 22, 1976, 0501Z.

Tohak 20/WH60092. I have just come from a two-hour NSC meeting which I can only describe as surreal. The President opened with a good summary of where we stand, stressing the Soviet concessions and the advantages of your approach for dealing with Backfire and cruise missiles in a separate agreement with a five year limitation. He then asked Admiral Holloway what the Navy program was for the number of SLCM launchers per ship.

Holloway thereupon launched into an incredible commentary on the unacceptability of the proposed Backfire–surface ship SLCM trade off. He stated that there is no U.S. surface ship SLCM program; that the Navy has always envisioned using submarines as the platform for cruise missiles; that the first money for developing a surface ship cruise missile capability isn’t programmed until ’78 and that the maximum deployment by ’82 would be limited to six ships (nuclear strike cruisers). Under heavy prodding from Clements, he later acknowledged that it might be possible to reach as many as fifteen ships, if the Spruance class frigates were reconfigured, but bad-mouthed that approach as seriously degrading the Spruance class for other missions. He said almost in as many words that he was not sure the surface ship cruise missile concept had any merit at all.


The President was visibly shocked and expressed his amazement at this Defense reversal, in view of their acceptance of modified Option IV. Neither Holloway nor Clements could provide any kind of a logical explanation for this turnabout. In the course of this mess Holloway also stated that they planned no more than eight launchers on each ship and that there would be no repeat no reload capability.

The President pressed the point that, particularly in light of our uncertainty on cruise missile deployments, the concept of considering them together with Backfire as a gray area made sense. Clements dismissed this argument and asserted that Defense had never repeat never seriously considered surface ship SLCMs as a reasonable trade-off for Backfire. He stated that such a separate agreement would be indefensible because of the inequity of the ten to one aircraft to ship ratio. He also dwelled on the point that Brezhnev’s assertion of the Backfire range as 2400 kilometers, almost 100 percent less than the capability we give it, so seriously called into question Soviet good faith as to require resolution of this issue before proceeding further to discuss anything at all. Clements insisted it was clear that the radius of Backfire is at least 2700 nautical miles—almost twice the Russian figure. Several times I pointed out the irrelevancy of these arguments, e.g., counting B–52 as the same as an SSN–6 also makes little sense but we do that, and tried to refocus the argument back on what is achievable against what happens without an agreement.

Ikle delivered a convoluted pitch that the number of Backfires should equal the number of U.S. platforms in any separate agreement, on a freedom to mix basis—the mix apparently being bombers of the Backfire variety, surface ship SLCMs and submarine SLCMs. He also raised the heavy missile definition as a vital point for you to resolve. The Vice President then weighed in with his Teller arguments again, maintaining we really shouldn’t limit ourselves on cruise missiles. The only effect he had was on the land based cruise missile range. On that point, Clements said that the difference between 5500 and 2500 was, for Defense, no big issue, I pointed out that the real issue was verification, which argued for 2500; Colby and Ikle agreed. After the meeting, however, the President said he would go with the Vice President and he came down on 5500.

Toward the end Clements and Holloway came out firmly against the 250–25 equation. By this time the President was thoroughly disgusted. He told Clements and Holloway in clear terms what he thought of the inconsistency of their positions today against Monday^3 (but he was not visibly mad enough). He ended the meeting by directing Hol-

loway to send over a paper on acceptable tradeoffs by tomorrow morning. It is apparent to me that the tradeoff Holloway will propose is submarine cruise missiles, notwithstanding the fact that everyone agreed months ago to ban them over 600 kilometers.

After the meeting the President was angrier than I have ever seen him. He ranted about the total inconsistency with previous Defense positions, said that Rumsfeld and Brown could god damn well try themselves to get the extra money necessary when we failed to get a SALT agreement, and stormed out to go to the Kennedy Center.

It was a complete debacle, and I really don’t know where we stand now. Holloway virtually removed the surface ship SLCM as a system we had any real interest in, much less one we should pay something to protect. He will probably come in with a proposal that each side can have 250 platforms of gray area systems—Backfire, surface ships and submarines. That is almost indistinguishable from the deferral option.

The President was so mad I cannot predict what he will do in the cold light of morning. I suggest you not for the moment lock up the submarine SLCM ban. I really see no Defense support for any variety of Option III at the moment, although we have not heard from Rumsfeld and Brown. In fact, I am driven to the hypothesis that the JCS don’t want an agreement and will pursue any convenient argument to prevent it.

I will keep you abreast of developments in the morning as they occur. Right now I am depressed.

Warm regards.

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254. Message From Secretary of State Kissinger to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft)¹

Moscow, January 22, 1976, 0905Z.

Hakto 5. Ref: Tohak 20.² Have just now read your report on the NSC meeting. There are several points I want to emphasize strongly to the President. First, we have had two Verification Panels and four NSC meetings at which agreed options were developed.

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¹ Source: Ford Library, Cheney Files, Box 11, General Subject File, 1974–77, Strategic Arms Limitation Talks—General, 1/76–2/76. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
² Document 253.
Second, the President approved, at DOD urging, Option 4 which includes a ban on submarine launched SLCMs beyond 600 KMs and this was submitted to the Soviets in writing. Thus, we cannot simply repudiate it.

Third, the President approved as a fallback Option 3 including the numbers for a Backfire/surface ship trade-off. I submitted a modified Option 3 which is much more advantageous to the US. We cannot blithely sweep away these numbers after discussing them with the Soviets. The JCS first complained the SLCM numbers were too low, that they might want hundreds of surface SLCM platforms. Now they say the numbers are too high, they’ll have only eight. The whole concept of the grey area is being challenged after being proposed by Rumsfeld and approved at the NSC meetings.

Fourth, it makes no sense at all to keep asking for new papers from the JCS. The only result will be piling up a record that will be used against us later. Finally, as I reported in my last message, I intend to listen to Brezhnev’s presentation this morning and to concentrate on cruise missiles.

I strongly request that the President reconvene the NSC and lay down the law. He should recount the record of the past two months, the fact that unanimous agreement was reached on Option 4, that he personally approved Option 3, that what I have offered is better, that I was authorized to deal with SLCMs and Backfire as a grey area, and that now the whole concept is being undone by irresponsible and totally new ideas. You should inform the President that under these conditions I will not reach any agreement here and will simply bring all of the issues back to Washington. No matter what the Soviet reply, I have been driven to a deferral option which is less favorable to us than what we have tabled and which has already been rejected.

Please make sure the President knows my thinking including this message.
Hakto 6. The Secretary is sending his reply to the account of the NSC meeting, but we wanted you to know that he is being too restrained given the outrageous performance at the NSC. It is incredible that in the middle of these negotiations, after some progress has been made, and with Brezhnev now considering our approach that the entire agreed framework should be collapsed by new positions or 180 degree turns that were never heard before. How can Clements say that there was never any grey area, after Rumsfeld sponsored it repeatedly, or Holloway say they only want a program of a few ships with eight launchers when we have been hearing the most glowing advocacy of it, and the most scurrilous attacks on the Secretary for allegedly giving it away. Where were they all this time? We do not see how we can proceed in these weird circumstances. It is all the more devastating when you consider that the Soviets are showing a serious interest and obviously trying to find some middle ground without capitulating. If we were in the Secretary’s place we would simply abandon the effort or quit, but we will certainly advise him to persevere. We could make progress here today, but not without absolute, unqualified support from Washington. What all this is doing is to drive us to a position where even if the Soviets today show some give we will have to propose deferral of the Backfire/SLCM issues which you and we know is worse for our interest than any of the options we have been negotiating. We are not, obviously, blaming you but for the first time in our careers are giving vent to a real outrage at what is being perpetrated to the utmost potential damage to our country.


2 See Documents 253 and 254.
256. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Moscow, January 22, 1976, 6:04–9:42 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

**USSR**
Leonid I. Brezhnev, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Andrei M. Aleksandrov-Agentov, Assistant to the General Secretary
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
V.G. Komplektov, Acting Chief of USA Dept, MFA
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Department, MFA
(interpreter)
Maj. Gen. Mikhail Kozlov, Deputy Chief of General Staff
Nikolai N. Detinov, CPSU Secretariat

**U.S.**
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
James P. Wade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs; Director of DOD SALT Task Force
Roger Molander, Program Analysis Staff, NSC Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

SALT; Angola; MBFR

Brezhnev: I don’t think we need to ask each other questions. There is enough to think about.

Did you convey my greetings to President Ford?

Kissinger: I did last night. I also told him we had a very serious meeting. And he asked me to convey his greetings to you.

Brezhnev: Thank you.

Maybe we could proceed a little faster today.

Kissinger: All right.

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\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976—Kissinger Moscow Trip (2). Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. Drafted by Rodman. The meeting was held in Brezhnev’s office at the Kremlin.
Brezhnev: Here is a match. [He lights a match and makes a motion to ignite all his talking papers.]
Kissinger: I thought you were going to bring out your cannon.
Brezhnev: There is a cannon in my office?
Kissinger: You threatened me with it last time.
Brezhnev: As long as America threatens us, we have to threaten America. We now have MIRVed warheads on that cannon. And one is aimed at your house.
Kissinger: I’d better get my dog out of there. [Laughter]
Brezhnev: [Looks through his papers] You have an enormous number of forces. Horrors! I can’t imagine where you get them all. And so many in Europe.
Kissinger: If your generals count like our generals count, Mr. General Secretary, there will be an amazing computation.
Brezhnev: Apart from his greetings, did the President convey anything interesting? I think I know what he said. He said, “Dr. Kissinger, go ahead and decide all questions yourself.”
Kissinger: [Laughs] I fear not!
Brezhnev: The President has changed!
We discussed quite a few issues yesterday\(^2\) but did not discuss all of them. Perhaps we should go through some of the other matters we didn’t discuss, and later get to the decisive ones. But considering your own desires, maybe we could go through them.
Earlier Dr. Kissinger said he was afraid of me. I want to say I’m afraid of him. So I guess I’d better give him more of these cookies, to make him kinder. [He passes over a plate of snacks.] And there is one other request: Could we have Sonnenfeldt seated further in the back? [Laughter]
Kissinger: Under the table!
Brezhnev: That would be too polite. He’d be at the same level.
Kissinger: I’ve been trying to do that for seven years.
Brezhnev: During the war, soldiers had the habit of taking out their wrist watches and holding them out and saying: “Let’s trade without looking.”
Kissinger: Do you want to trade Korniyenko for Sonnenfeldt?
Brezhnev: No, it would be unfair to Korniyenko.
Sonnenfeldt: I went to one of your dentists this morning. You missed your chance.

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\(^2\) See Documents 249 and 251.
Kissinger: They put a transmitter in. If you had to listen to everything Sonnenfeldt had to say, you’d need a whole staff.

Brezhnev: A whole Pentagon! Why did they call it that?

Kissinger: It has five sides, the building.

Brezhnev: Could I see your watch?

[Secretary Kissinger gives it to him.]

Gromyko: Very cheap, very cheap.

Stoessel: Mine is a Soviet one.

Kissinger: When we made the ceasefire in the Middle East [in October 1973], you gave me a Soviet watch.

Brezhnev: I’ve had this electronic watch several months now.

Kissinger: A Soviet one?

Brezhnev: Soviet made. [He hands it to the Secretary.]

Kissinger: Very nice. [He hands it back.]

Strategic Arms Limitation

Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, let me say again: Although we did have very thorough discussions yesterday, we were not able to touch on some matters relating to strategic arms limitation. Therefore, if you agree, I’d like to dwell on some of them.

Kissinger: Please.

Brezhnev: First, there is the question of the definition of a heavy ICBM and the question of the limits of increase in the dimensions of silos for ICBM launching. We, as hitherto, proceed from the assumption that what is considered to be a heavy ICBM would be any ICBM with a launching weight in excess of the biggest of the light ICBMs deployed by either side as of the date of the signing. Launching weight is a criterion which allows of quite definitely distinguishing between light and heavy missiles. The delimitation of missiles according to both launching weight and throw weight, as suggested by the American side, in our view excessively complicates the question due to the need to count the additional number of parameters and number of factors affecting throw weight beyond launching weight.

We also wish to confirm our readiness to specify the agreement that was achieved in connection with the Interim Agreement on the increase in dimensions of ICBM launching silos in the process of their modernization by not more than 10 to 15 percent in such a way that initial volume should not increase by over 32 percent. Within the limits of that volume, the dimensions of a silo could increase in diameter, in depth, or in both directions, at the discretion of each side.

You see, Dr. Kissinger, we’re giving you complete freedom again.

Kissinger: The only reason we don’t agree earlier is we enjoy each other’s company so much we don’t want to leave earlier.
Brezhnev: Which is true. But on the one condition, Dr. Kissinger, that you accept what I say. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Yes.

Brezhnev: I will say more, Dr. Kissinger, with a view to achieving a mutually acceptable understanding simultaneously on two questions—that is, on the dimensions of ICBM launching silos and on the definition of a heavy ICBM. We would be prepared to agree that light and heavy ICBMs be distinguished both by launching weight and throw weight, having in view that the American side would agree to our proposed formula specifying the understanding under the Interim Agreement concerning an increase in the dimensions of ICBM launching silos in the process of their modernization by no more than 10 to 15 percent.

Kissinger: As I understand your silo proposal, it is that the dimensions of the silo can be increased by 10 to 15 percent in any direction, as long as the increase in volume is not greater than 32 percent. In other words, if you go down 15 percent . . .

Brezhnev: I will repeat. On silo dimensions we also confirm our readiness to specify the understanding achieved in connection with the Interim Agreement on the increase in dimension of ICBM launching silos by no more than 10 to 15 percent, in such a way that the initial volume of ICBM launching silos should not be increased by more than 32 percent. Within the limits of that volume, the dimensions of a silo could be increased in diameter, in depth, or in both directions, at the discretion of both sides.

Kissinger: But not 10 to 15 percent.

Gromyko: The initial calculation starts out with 10 to 15 percent.

Kissinger: I think we can settle it. The Foreign Minister wants to dig towards China. This is where we have our disagreement.

Gromyko: How did you read my thoughts?

Kissinger: I know you.

If you increase the diameter by 15 percent, that’s 32 percent in volume. That’s no problem. On the other hand, if you dig down, then you could dig down 32 percent under this.

Gromyko: No.

Kissinger: You can only go down 15 percent? If you go down 15 percent, then you can go out 5 to 7 percent.

Gromyko: You can dig down so far as you have to to get your 32 percent increase in volume, which is more than 10 to 15 percent.

Kissinger: That’s what I want to understand.

Gromyko: This is strict mathematics.
Kissinger: If we have limits of 10 to 15 percent, you can say the following. If you have a diameter of 15 percent, that’s 32 percent. If you go down 15 percent, you can also go in diameter another 5 to 7 percent.

Gromyko: You can, that is right, to make up a totality of 32 percent. But you can make up that totality by digging down 32 percent without changing the diameter at all.

Kissinger: Have you consulted the Chinese?

Gromyko: It’s a little hard for us to do that. Your relations are better!

Kissinger: Let me understand your total proposal. You want to increase the volume by a total of 32 percent, however you do it. This is not the Interim Agreement; this is a new agreement.

Gromyko: The starting point is the Interim Agreement. Because 32 percent makes an increase in volume.

Kissinger: Let me get your proposal.

[Both sides confer.]

Then if we agree to your definition of volume, you agree that both starting weight and throw weight would be frozen.

Gromyko: Exactly right. The only difference being we turn it around. We agree to defining it by both throw weight and launching weight.

Kissinger: The division would be between starting weight and throw weight.

Let me make clear: These changes in silos can be made only once. Once and not again.

Dobrynin: “Of the original.”

Kissinger: All right.

Sukhodrev: “. . . in such a way that initial increase in volume . . .”

Kissinger: All right. Then we accept this.

Brezhnev: Good. It’s agreed?

Kissinger: Yes.

Sukhodrev: On the whole . . .?

Kissinger: On the package. You’ll give me a translation. But to sum it up, the volume of original silos can be increased by 32 percent.

[Both sides confer.]

All right. So we understand each other. I mean, they’ll have to work out precise language in Geneva.

Gromyko: Textually it should be worked out in Geneva.

Kissinger: I think we understand what we mean. You accept both throw weight and launching weight; and you get 32 percent in volume. What do you get when you strike oil down there?
Brezhnev: Yesterday, Dr. Kissinger listed the questions on which the positions of the two sides coincide. Let me just name them again:
—First, permission to deploy cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers only on heavy bombers, that is, only on those that will be included in the total number of 2400 vehicles. Agreed?
Kissinger: Yes.
Brezhnev: And second, prohibition of all air-to-ground cruise missiles with a range of over 2500 kilometers. Also agreed?
Kissinger: Agreed.
Brezhnev: Third, the banning of deployment of cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on submarines.
Kissinger: Right.
Brezhnev: We want once again to confirm that we, for our part, regard these questions as being settled.
Kissinger: Right.
Brezhnev: Voroshilov would have said, “Good [in English].”
Let me now turn to the questions in which Dr. Kissinger yesterday set out new proposals. We have had to give them very intensive study and great attention. We have thoroughly weighed those proposals and to frankly and directly set out our attitude to them.
Dr. Kissinger suggested that each B–1 aircraft with cruise missiles be considered equal not to three MIRVed missiles as the Soviet side suggested, but to only one missile, coupled with the obligation of the American side not to deploy on the B–1 more than it would deploy on the B–52.
Kissinger: Correct. “Good.” [Laughter]
Brezhnev: I must say it is hard for us to regard that proposal as acceptable. I have to say why. Left completely unclear is so important a factor as the number of missiles aboard each bomber. And surely a great deal depends on that. And furthermore, quite undoubtedly there is a vast difference in technical characteristics and combat capabilities of the old B–52 aircraft and the new B–1 aircraft.
I have given deep thought to this proposal of ours regarding the equalization of one B–1 carrying cruise missiles to three MIRVed missiles. We maintain that proposal. And if that approach is taken, we believe, of course, that the undertaking of the Americans not to deploy more missiles on a B–1 than on a B–52 should likewise be maintained.
Kissinger: He maintains the 3:1?
Sukhodrev: Yes.
Kissinger: And on top of that we have to limit deployment?
Brezhnev: Yes.
Kissinger: That’s impossible. How they get to the launch point is irrelevant. We will agree not to deploy no more on the B–1 than on the B–52. Frankly, we haven’t decided to deploy any on the B–1.

Gromyko: Well, if you haven’t decided on that, it’s easier to settle.

Kissinger: From the point of view of the problem you face, whether a cruise missile is dropped from a B–1 or a B–52 makes no difference at all. Because what will determine your strategic problem is the number of cruise missiles, not how they’re brought to the launch point.

And therefore, we agree that no plane should have more cruise missiles than the B–52. That we agree to.

Brezhnev: But, Dr. Kissinger, you’re ignoring one important element.

Kissinger: Which is what?

Brezhnev: Speed.

Kissinger: First, supersonic airplanes fly at supersonic speed for only very short distances. And like your supersonic planes, our supersonic planes would fly at subsonic speeds most of the time. But even if it’s one hour faster to the launch point than the B–52, or two hours, what difference does it make? The cruise missile itself flies at subsonic speed. It will take longer to get to the release point than it will take your missiles to reach the United States.

Gromyko: But what you say applies to the speed of cruise missiles, and that is right—whether they are launched from a B–1 or a B–52. But take the difference in time it takes to get to the launch point. That is important. Even 15 minutes matter.

Kissinger: Why? If it takes four hours then to reach the destination, what difference do 15 minutes make?

Gromyko: That’s true. Once launched, it will take equal time, but the time from delivery to the launch point is different.

Kissinger: Maybe an hour.

Gromyko: It relates to nuclear collision.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, Mr. Foreign Minister, but neither bombers nor cruise missiles can be used for a surprise attack.

Gromyko: If not for a surprise attack, then simply attack—even if they’re used in the process of tragic events unfolding.

Kissinger: Then 15 minutes make no difference.

Gromyko: No military man would agree with that. I would think that in a nuclear war, even minutes count.

Kissinger: We’re not counting the SS–19 for more than the SS–18. We can’t make a distinction between the B–1 and the B–52 and count the B–1 for three MIRVs. But we can agree not to deploy on the B–1 more cruise missiles than on the B–52.
Brezhnev: Mr. Kissinger, let’s leave you to think that over officially.

Kissinger: Okay.

Brezhnev: Let me return to the question of the Backfire bomber. Dr. Kissinger yesterday proposed, apart from the agreement on limitation of strategic arms on which we have long since been working, to conclude an additional so-called interim agreement. In that interim agreement, he would like to limit the number of our medium-range Backfire bombers and give the United States the right to equip 25 surface ships with cruise missiles with a range of up to 2500 kilometers.

Kissinger: Correct.

Brezhnev: I must say outright that that proposal is absolutely unacceptable. It would limit a type of our armament which can in no way relate to strategic arms, and at the same time it would open up for the United States the opportunity to create a new type of weapon which in substance would be nothing short of strategic.

Kissinger: You should hear our generals, Mr. General Secretary.

Brezhnev: Oh, they say lots of things. Our viewpoint is that all cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers on surface ships should be banned.

Dr. Kissinger, I have given this some thought for a long time. We understand that having artificially created the so-called question of the Soviet Backfire, which bears no relation whatsoever to the question of strategic arms, and having allowed a propaganda storm to arise over this, the American administration finds it difficult to extricate itself. To enable you to do so and to create a more favorable atmosphere for reaching rapid agreement, we are prepared to do the following. We could reflect in the materials of the negotiations an understanding that the Backfire aircraft would not be given a capability to operate at intercontinental ranges.

Aleksandrov: In addition to what was said on that score yesterday.

Brezhnev: It goes without saying that such assurances could not be given without the understanding that the total question of the Backfire would be finally removed from the negotiation.

Now, on land-based cruise missiles. Here I would like to confirm the position we set out yesterday in our first day of discussion, that is, in addition to the already-achieved banning of land-based cruise missiles of intercontinental range, all land-based cruise missiles with a range of over 600 kilometers should likewise be banned.

Furthermore, yesterday, Dr. Kissinger, you proposed we reach agreement to the effect that the total number of strategic arms vehicles as agreed at Vladivostok, that is, 2400, be reduced by 100 vehicles, that is, reduced to 2300 for each side.

Brezhnev: Now, we have given some thought to this too, and we believe that to speak about reducing the number by 100 in conditions where the right would be preserved to build thousands upon thousands of new strategic missiles, that is, cruise missiles, would simply be a self-delusion, and a delusion of public opinion.

This is how we would think it possible to go about this. We would agree to discuss the question of reducing the total number of vehicles on the scale that Dr. Kissinger has suggested, or—and I emphasize this—even on a larger scale, if the United States accepts our proposal to ban land-based and surface-ship-based cruise missiles with the range of over 600 kilometers. As to the question of how an agreement on reduction of the number of strategic arms vehicles, given this stipulated condition, would be formalized, this is something I am sure we could agree upon ourselves without difficulty. Either a separate agreement, or a side letter, or a letter exchanged afterwards, or some kind of appendage to the operative agreement. That is, we would immediately initiate a discussion of this matter. An exchange of letters in which the sides express their intent is a normal matter. We have done it before.

Kissinger: Why not do it in the agreement? I want to understand.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, I would right now believe that could be done—enter it into the agreement—if you accept our proposal.

Kissinger: Of course. I mean, I understand.

Brezhnev: That, Dr. Kissinger, is in summary what I wanted to tell you. And I feel if we take into account yesterday’s discussion and today’s, we have room for agreement. So it’s not been just a routine visit.

Kissinger: I think, Mr. General Secretary, given the complexity of the subject, you have made some very major proposals. I agree with you that we are moving towards each other on many issues.

Could I ask for a few minutes interval?

Brezhnev: Certainly. And I trust that all these Comrades here are writing this very faithfully to convey it to President Ford.

Kissinger: The question is to whom else they’re conveying it.

[Laughter]

Brezhnev: So Senator Jackson doesn’t get any food for his thing. If one gives up one’s conscience altogether, one can agree to anything.

I read some of the reports that TASS gave me about the coverage of the question and answer session we had with the correspondents yesterday. I think it’s quite good.

Kissinger: We have told our press that the Soviet Union has made a very serious effort.
Brezhnev: I think that’s right. We do keep beating at this common goal, and the general direction of our effort is toward achievement.

[There was a break from 7:34 to 7:46 p.m. and the meeting resumed.]

Brezhnev: Let’s compare watches. [He gets up and shows his again. He and Sonnenfeldt compare. Kissinger takes Dobrynin aside. Brezhnev goes over and shows Dr. Kissinger his watch.]

It’s still early. Do you want 10 minutes more?

Gromyko: Let’s have a little intermission after the intermission.

[They all get up. Brezhnev goes to the curtain at the far end of the room.]

Angola

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you know what’s here? A map of our attack on the United States. [He shows the map on the wall behind the curtain.]

Kissinger: Of course. From Angola! [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Don’t mention that word to me. We have nothing to do with that country. I cannot talk about that country.

[Brezhnev then moved away and Gromyko and Amb. Stoessel came up to talk with the Secretary.]

Kissinger: The Cubans were in Angola before the South Africans entered. We asked you a question: if the South Africans withdrew, would the Cubans withdraw?

Gromyko: We have nothing to do with that. We have given some equipment to the legitimate government—that’s all.

Kissinger: You transport the Cubans in your planes. They are chartered Soviet planes.

Gromyko: What planes are you talking about? The ones which transported equipment? We have sent no troops.

Amb. Stoessel: No, the Soviet planes used to transport Cuban troops to Angola.

Gromyko [avoiding a direct answer]: The South Africans are still there. They make no move to leave.

Kissinger: The South Africans are in the process of withdrawing. Gromyko: If this is announced, we will react to it.

Kissinger: I wish to tell you in all seriousness that we can never accept 8,000 Cuban troops in Angola.

Why don’t you come to Brussels with me tomorrow and brief NATO?

Gromyko: But you refuse to let us join NATO!
Kissinger: But we’d begin by having the General Secretary come with me tomorrow, as a surprise.

Brezhnev: On another matter, I’m sorry to hear your wife is in the hospital today. I will send something appropriate to Dobrynin. But give her my best wishes. Tell her that story from Zoshchenko about giving up smoking.

Kissinger: She’ll be out for the weekend, but they’ll have to operate.

Brezhnev: I’ve had three operations. I had one under a local anesthetic, for curiosity’s sake.

During the war when I was on the front line I had a car to drive me around. I also had horses. I don’t mean when attacking. But when there was free time, I liked to saddle up and ride around. A relative of Troyanovsky—our Ambassador to Japan—who was a newsreel cameraman was with me. On our holiday on November 7, I said to him, “I want to take a ride.” And I had a very beautiful horse. And I was riding full tilt, and suddenly there was a trench, and the horse’s legs fell into the trench. I fell, and the saddle got me. Two weeks later I was all right. You know, 25 or 30 years passed, and I felt nothing. Then the doctor was looking me over on a different matter and said I needed an operation. And when they were cutting me open, they found some clotted blood that had turned to stone. It was quite unexpected.

Strategic Arms Limitation

How many times have you been here?
Kissinger: This is the seventh or eighth time.

Brezhnev: But this time you go back with the biggest package ever.

[They were all seated again at 8:05.]

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, you would, I suppose, like to say a couple of words on Vienna.

Kissinger: Right.

First, on the question of throw weight and volume, we need to say no more.

Now let me sum up your proposal. On the discussions we had yesterday, the General Secretary confirmed the points I said we had agreed. Of course we all understand that all the agreements are in the context of a total agreement. That goes without saying.

Brezhnev: Yes.

Kissinger: . . . regarding air-to-surface missiles and regarding cruise missiles on submarines.

Gromyko: And surface-ship missiles.

Kissinger: No. This is what we agreed upon.
Then, as I understand the General Secretary, he was rejecting the proposal I made yesterday about a separate category with Backfire aircraft and surface-ship cruise missiles.

Brezhnev: I developed that by saying we would undertake not to give the Backfire in the future any strategic capability; that is, its range would be limited to 2200.

Kissinger: I understand it. I’m coming back to that. And the General Secretary said you would undertake not to give the Backfire intercontinental range. About that I’d like to ask some questions at the end.

Brezhnev: Of course.

Kissinger: With respect to sea-launched cruise missiles and land-launched cruise missiles, the General Secretary wanted them reduced to 600 kilometers—banned above 600 kilometers. Surface-ship-launched and land-based cruise missiles. And in return for this, the General Secretary indicated that the Soviet Union would be prepared to discuss a reduction of the number from 2400 to 2300, or even below 2300.

Brezhnev: Yes, on certain conditions.

Kissinger: On condition that we agree on the limit to 600 kilometers for surface ships and land-based cruise missiles.

Gromyko: And there is also the time factor, that is, after the agreement comes into force.

Kissinger: Yes. At a date to be agreed upon.

Brezhnev: Otherwise no one would understand what we were trying to do.

Kissinger: May I ask the General Secretary what that lower number is that he has in mind below 2300, or has he not thought about it?

Brezhnev: I haven’t given any thought to that yet. You named a figure of 2300 instead of 2400, and I just responded to that. Politically, that would be a good thing for both the United States and the Soviet Union because it would mean we are both gradually reducing our forces.

We are discussing the whole thing in complex, and perhaps this isn’t the appropriate time, but where would you discuss forward-based systems? Because, for example, you said you’d be willing to withdraw 2000 warheads from Europe, leaving 7000 behind. You’d probably take out your most obsolete.

Kissinger: That’s in a different negotiation. No, we wouldn’t leave 7000 behind.

Brezhnev: 5000. [Kissinger laughs.] Is that a small number?

Kissinger: Can I ask the General Secretary? On ship-launched cruise missiles, surface-ship-launched cruise missiles, we propose that
ships be counted as MIRVs, in our original proposal [if they carry cruise missiles], of range between 600 and 2500 kilometers. We are prepared to include the ships in the total. The question is what your reaction is to this particular proposal.

Gromyko: Negative.

Kissinger: That means in practice we have to dismantle other MIRVed missiles to do it.

Gromyko: Negative.

Kissinger: All right. I’m through asking these questions, because all of these will have to be reviewed in Washington. Because the General Secretary has introduced so many new elements that we couldn’t conclude it here.

Dobrynin: To clarify.

Kissinger: Now may I turn to Backfire. As I understand the General Secretary’s remarks, we will get a formal statement signed by the General Secretary that its operational radius is 2200 kilometers maximum. Did I understand this correctly? I’m really asking for my understanding and for the understanding of my colleagues. Will that include a statement of on what assumptions this statement is derived?

[Gromyko explains to Brezhnev.]

Brezhnev: I don’t know what else you want.

Kissinger: Let me ask a few more questions.

Brezhnev: I’ve given you the figures of its actual operational radius and assured you we will not turn it into an intercontinental bomber.

Kissinger: May I ask, with respect to the second [point], does that mean there will be no changes in the airframe?

Stoessel: Contours.


Brezhnev: We will lengthen the fuselage so that it stretches from Archangel to Washington! If we make a fuselage that long, we’d probably be sunk. It would take about 50 years to build one.

Dr. Kissinger, look, what I’ve said on this is really waterproof.

Kissinger: I have two other questions, if the General Secretary’s patience holds out. One is easy, because he’s already answered. The first is: The Backfire cannot have air-to-surface missiles of more than 600 kilometers because it’s not counted in the total. That’s your own definition. [They confer.]

Does Gromyko object to it?

Gromyko: That question is completely outside the discussion. It will not be given any intercontinental range.
Kissinger: The General Secretary said that only heavy bombers included in the total of 2400 can have them.

Gromyko: This is completely irrelevant.

Kissinger: Is it yes or no?

Dobrynin: He says it is irrelevant.

Kissinger: But “irrelevant” is not an answer.

Gromyko: Why should that question arise? That relates to all heavy bombers, yours or ours.

Kissinger: All right. Then the answer is yes.

Sukhodrev [re-reads]: “Air to surface missiles can be placed only on heavy bombers, that is, only on those included in the total of 2400.”

Kissinger: I understand your proposal now, Mr. General Secretary. We will study it. We will no doubt give you our considerations within a few weeks. I believe we have made significant progress on a number of important issues.

Brezhnev: But one earnest request! Don’t think up anymore problems. Or else you leave and suddenly I get a telegram from Washington with some entirely new problems invented. Let’s be decent children of our epoch.

Kissinger: We will discuss it in the framework of our discussions here. We will review our position in light of your position.

Brezhnev: Even if you look at those through a magnifying glass, you’ll see they are very good proposals. If you see it through Jackson’s or Reagan’s magnifying glass, it will be a very bad mirror.

Kissinger: Jackson and I meet very infrequently. I think Jackson will make peace with you before he makes peace with me.

Brezhnev: He just keeps talking as much as he can. He raises all the money he can so he speaks on radio and television. He’s trying to fight Ford and trying to fight you.

Kissinger: He was on television yesterday saying I made too many concessions.

Brezhnev: We can’t adapt ourselves to his views because we deal with America and the American Government—with those in whom the American people invested their trust. We want to deal with the American people, and devil take the rest. Tomorrow there will be another 10 fellows saying things.

Kissinger: There are already 12 candidates. We count them in the 1320 total. And we promise you not to give them intercontinental characteristics.

Brezhnev: I think some of them should be put into one of these missiles.
Kissinger: So I believe, as I have said, we have made some progress. We will study it. We will look at our proposals in light of what you have said. We will study it very seriously.

Brezhnev: I appreciate that and I know that, whatever the situation is, I feel sure, and I know I’m right, the President does value your abilities in the international field very highly and I’m sure he will be influenced by what you are able to do. And you know, as many times as I’ve met you, I’ve never allowed myself to interfere in American domestic matters.

Kissinger: Except on our side.

Brezhnev: If I only could.

Kissinger: Mr. General Secretary, we’ve had many meetings and we’ve settled many important questions between us.

Brezhnev: I said at the outset, we have gone a long way. And whatever ramifications there have been, it’s to the credit of the leaders of both countries that we have managed to preserve our relationship, despite the adversities of fate.

Kissinger: So we’ll be in touch with you in two or three weeks. Two—no more than three weeks.

Brezhnev: The sooner that happens, the sooner my visit to the United States, sometime after the Party Congress. After the Party Congress, when things get down to normal and we have this agreement, I can visit the United States. And I shall certainly try to act in as favorable a way as possible, so it will be no less successful than the last visit.

Kissinger: If we reach an agreement, it will be of historic significance.

Brezhnev: So long as we have as few official ceremonies as possible. I’m a simple man and don’t like these ceremonies.

Kissinger: We’ll have a schedule.

Brezhnev: Camp David I like. It’s quiet; you can take walks.

Kissinger: We should spend some time at Camp David.

Brezhnev: It would be a good thing to come a day or day and a half before.

Kissinger: To get used to the time change. Camp David, or is there any other place you prefer, like Williamsburg? It is more quiet in Camp David.

Brezhnev: I’m a man of few requirements.

Kissinger: I see the General Secretary is very sure he’ll be reelected at the Party Congress.

Brezhnev: That is hard to say.

Kissinger: You’ll have to teach us.
Brezhnev: Let me say in the presence of my colleagues that I feel confident of the support of the local party people.

Gromyko: And we don’t have 12 candidates!

Brezhnev: But when it comes to voting, you can reach into a hat and they’re not there.

Kissinger: You need some technical assistance.

Brezhnev: Once, when the secret ballot was first introduced in this country, I was working at a factory. And there was a party conference at the factory. And when they were nominating candidates, they nominated more than were needed to fill the posts. Like in your election. When they started the counting, they found that one less had been elected than was needed. So everyone shouted: “Tsibulski! Tsibulski!” So he was written into the list. But again they counted and there were not enough votes. So then he gets up and says, “I’m an old man. I’ve worked my fill. Strike me off.” But everyone says: “You’ve got to run.” Then again they voted and again they counted, and again there were not enough votes. They voted again for three days!

Kissinger: Did he make it?

Brezhnev: No. [Laughter] They nominated someone else. But this was a time when everyone was suspicious of everyone else. Like in your country. [Laughter]

They nominate, say, Brezhnev, Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt.

Kissinger: He’d certainly get elected. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: So someone gets up and asks the question, “Did Comrade B have a mother?” The answer is yes. Then they ask: “Where does she live?” “Odessa.” They want to know: Why do you ask? The answer is: “I was just asking.” So then they’d send someone to Odessa to check on his mother.

That is just joking.

Kissinger: In our country when they ask if a man has a mother, they have other things in mind, and they won’t be satisfied with checking in Odessa. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: Why don’t we send Kissinger tomorrow morning to Leningrad?

Kissinger: In a Backfire. It doesn’t have the range.

Gromyko: It could be refueled.

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, let’s devote at least some minutes to Vienna.

Kissinger: It would confuse our press if we reached agreement on the Vienna negotiation.

Aleksandrov: A great-power diktat!
Kissinger: May I ask one procedural question about SALT? Should we task this one thing we agreed on—on volume and throw weight—to Geneva? On the 32 percent?

Brezhnev: We can.

Kissinger: All right. We’ll pass it next week.

MBFR

Brezhnev: Dr. Kissinger, the talks on force and arms reduction in Europe have been going on for two years now. And I have spoken on this subject whenever I possibly could—in meetings and abroad, on many occasions. We have been consistently emphasizing that both sides should achieve these reductions without harming the security of either.

We have carefully studied the proposal of the West.3 The positive element in them is the fact that it recognizes the need for reduction of nuclear weapons, as well. This is something the USSR has favored from the very outset. However, the implementation of that is made contingent on acceptance by us of the entire Western scheme of reduction, which we have repeatedly made clear cannot be the basis for agreement. We have given much thought to a way we could move these negotiations off dead center.

Meeting the wishes of the Western side, we would agree that in the first stage, that is, in 1976, this year, there be a reduction in Central Europe of the armed forces of only the USSR and the United States by an equal percent, let’s say 2 or 3 percent of the total strength of the armed forces of countries of the Warsaw Pact and NATO in that area. We would be showing an example to all the others. Their forces would be frozen—not increased. We would be setting an example. It goes without saying that an agreement on such a reduction of Soviet and American forces should include the clearcut obligation of all other countries having forces in Central Europe on freezing their forces at the present level, and subsequent reduction in a later phase.

To implement this proposal, as well as to achieve agreement on subsequent reductions, it would be necessary to reach agreement on what forces would be subject to this agreement and an understanding on the strength of forces in Central Europe.

I should like to hope our new proposals aimed at achieving progress at Vienna will meet a positive response on the part of the United States and other states. We believe they are a step toward reaching a mutually acceptable agreement. So I think we do have im-

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important things to consider, and a possibility here of moving the thing off dead center.

Kissinger: May I ask the General Secretary a few questions?
Brezhnev: Please.

Kissinger: By 2–3 percent, you mean of U.S. and Soviet forces or of all forces?
Brezhnev: No, of all forces. The forces reduced would be Soviet and American, but the percent would be a percent of all forces, NATO and Warsaw Pact.

Kissinger: By a fixed percent of the total forces. Of all forces or of ground forces?
Dobrynin/Gromyko: Of all.
Gromyko: Further specification will be done at the talks. Our delegation will receive appropriate instructions.

Kissinger: So will our delegation. That doesn’t mean they’ll agree!
Brezhnev: The next time we meet we’ll speak English. Because Gromyko and Sukhodrev keep confusing me.

Kissinger: I’m convinced the General Secretary understands perfect English.
Brezhnev: Maybe 90 percent.
Kissinger: So he has an advantage. And I speak in German.

Kissinger: They all speak English when they don’t want you to understand.

Brezhnev: That’s right! What can I do about it?
Kissinger: Well, I don’t think this proposal will be rapidly accepted.
Gromyko: Well, accept it slowly. [Laughter]
Brezhnev: Take two to three weeks and accept it!
Gromyko: For friendship’s sake, take a month!

Kissinger: We’ll do it in the spirit of our special relationship.
Brezhnev: As I said at the outset, we do value the fact that in spite of differences and nuances, and while it is easier in our country than in yours, both are pursuing the line of détente, and we appreciate that.

Kissinger: Does this mean we’ll get a formal response to our proposal in Vienna?
Gromyko: There is now a recess. When it resumes, our delegation will give the formal reply to the Western proposal—which will be neg-
ative. Our delegation will then be instructed to set out in greater detail the proposal that was set out in general terms by the General Secretary.

Hyland: They’re meeting next week.

Brezhnev: What time will you be leaving town?

Kissinger: I think at 12:30.

**Strategic Arms Limitation**

Brezhnev: In a friendly spirit, can I ask are you pleased with our discussions?

Kissinger: I think we made progress in our SALT discussion. You introduced interesting ideas today. It remains to be studied and to think of how to reconcile the two sides’ approaches.

Brezhnev: Are we finished?

Dobrynin: Yes.

Brezhnev: I guess we can finish on that. I’d like to ask you once again to give my good wishes to the President, and my best wishes in his arduous duties. And I trust when you report back, he will appreciate the great efforts we have made and the constructive character of our discussions.

Kissinger: You can be sure I will do this. There has been definite progress made. Your side has made a great effort. If we continue this effort on both sides, we can achieve an historic agreement.

**Angola**

I must say one thing. I don’t want to mislead you. You said you didn’t want to discuss the subject [Angola] beyond what you said at the end of the table. But we will not be able to accept the increasing number of Cuban troops and we will have to take measures in that respect.

Brezhnev: That’s a diplomatic question. Discuss it with Gromyko.

We have in fact set out to the American side and to the President personally our approach to events in Angola. And yet the American side, as will be seen from your recent statement to our Ambassador, is continuing to depict our position in a distorted light, seeking to equalize the intervention of South African racists and assistance by the Soviet Union and other states to the legitimate government of Angola to resist aggressors and their abettors.

There are no Soviet troops. We have sold a limited number of tanks. That is the role we are playing there, and no more.

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4 See footnote 7, Document 249.
5 Presumably a reference to Document 230.
6 See Document 233 and footnote 2 thereto.
Kissinger: We asked you a question two weeks ago, to which we have not received an answer.

Gromyko: Let’s meet at 9:30 tomorrow morning. You won’t be asleep?

Kissinger: No. The Italian Prime Minister has never been awake in any meeting I’ve had with him. Unless we discuss women. [Laughter]

Brezhnev: I trust the President will also discern interesting points that have come up in my visit.

Kissinger: I am certain. And we’ll give the press a generally positive account.

Brezhnev: I guess you will be saying something to the press tomorrow.

Kissinger: Yes, along the lines I have said to you—that we have had positive discussions on SALT, that in certain important areas progress was made, that the General Secretary presented some new and interesting ideas that we will now study in Washington, and that some of the issues that we have agreed in principle here will be transferred to Geneva. In this sense.

[At this point the Secretary handed to the General Secretary a set of copies of a photograph of himself taken by David Kennerly at Helsinki, which Mr. Kennerly hoped he would autograph. Brezhnev looked over and got up abruptly and went in the back room. Amb. Dobrynin explained that Brezhnev did not like the candid photo and went out to find a better one.]

Sukhodrev: Could I read out what we suggest as a final communique?

[He reads out the draft at Tab A:] 8


“On 20–23 January in Moscow discussions took place between General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee L.I. Brezhnev, Politburo member and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR A. A. Gromyko and the U. S. Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger.

“The talks touched upon a broad range of questions of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and the United States of America. Taking place in the discussions were, on the Soviet side . . . and on the American side . . .

“Both sides expressed their firm intention to continue the further strengthening and development of relations between the USSR and the

7 See Document 241.
8 Attached but not printed.
USA in keeping with the course which has been defined in joint Soviet-American agreements and understandings. It was noted that this course serves the interests of the peoples of both countries and is an essential factor in the cause of relaxation of international tension and the strengthening of peace.

“In the course of the negotiations special attention was devoted to examination of concrete questions relating to the working out of a new long-term agreement between the USSR and the USA on limitation of strategic offensive weapons, on the basis of the agreement reached during the negotiations between the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee and the President of the USA in Vladivostok in November 1974. Progress was attained on a number of these questions, and it was agreed that negotiations will be continued with the aim of finding mutually acceptable solutions to the remaining problems.

“During examination of the status of negotiations on reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe, both sides had in mind the task of facilitating progress in these negotiations.

“There was also an exchange of views on a number of other urgent international problems.

“The negotiations took place in a business-like and constructive atmosphere. Both sides consider the exchange of views to have been useful.”

Kissinger: Could we keep this for a couple of hours and give you some ideas? Then tomorrow Sonnenfeldt and Korniyenko could meet. In essence, there are just some one or two sentences we would like to add.

[Brezhnev returns with his official photo and two watches for Sonnenfeldt.]

Kissinger [looks at the watch given to Sonnenfeldt]: This picks up whatever his tooth doesn’t.

Brezhnev: This is a good photograph.

Kissinger: I’m very grateful.

Brezhnev: I think nothing should be done to cast any shadow over the work we have done together. This would be both wrong and not in the interests of either the Soviet Union or United States.

[He shows Sonnenfeldt how the watch band can be adjusted.] And I guarantee its accuracy.


Brezhnev: It’s just a watch!

Well then, we thank you. These two days were not easy.
Kissinger: I want to thank you for taking two days from your schedule. After many changes in your schedule to set the dates of the meeting.

Brezhnev: This often happens. The most important thing is to act in good faith.

Kissinger: This you can be sure.

[The meeting ended.]

257. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


Secretary Kissinger asked me to provide you with the following report of his latest meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev.

1. Have concluded four-hour evening session which yielded important progress, specifically Soviet concession on throw weight and a willingness to consider reductions even beyond 2300. Moreover, we have narrowed differences on SLCMs and obtained concrete assurances on Backfire performance. It is clear that significant agreement is within our grasp, but decision will have to be made by you after my return.

2. Following are the details of the session. Brezhnev began by picking up the previous discussion with Gromyko on the definition of a heavy missile and the interpretation of the increase in silo dimensions by no more than 10–15 percent. He accepted my proposal of September that they would agree to define a heavy missile as any ICBM having a launching weight and throw weight greater than the largest light missile existing on either side at the time the agreement goes into effect. This means of course the SS–19 now becomes the threshold. In return, we agreed to their interpretation that the original silo could be increased by no more than 32 percent of its volume. This has no meaning as long as the throw weight definition has been agreed. So that represented a significant concession we have been insisting on for years in both SALT negotiations.

3. Then Brezhnev turned to a point-by-point discussion of the
five-year interim agreement. First, he noted that we now agreed on
banning ALCMs on any aircraft other than heavy bombers, banning
any ALCM over 2500 KM, and banning cruise missiles over 600 KM on
submarines. I confirmed this description of the status of the discus-
sions. Brezhnev then went into the counting of B–1 as three MIRVed ve-
vehicles and B–52 as only one. I had said at the second meeting that we
would agree to limit the number of ALCMs on the B–1 to no more than
the number of any individual B–52. (Of course, both aircraft are de-
dsigned to carry 20.) Brezhnev argued against this but I feel this was
mostly bargaining material. He then turned to the five-year interim
agreement and rejected it both on grounds that it included Backfire and
that they still wanted a ban on SLCMs over 600 KM on surface ships.
He repeated their proposal that all land-based cruise missiles over 600
KM should be banned.

4. At this point he went over his assurances on the Backfire per-
formance, and emphasized that he would make the limit of perform-
ance at 2200 KM a matter of record that would be binding for the dura-
tion of the agreement, if we would agree that this issue was completely
settled and would not be raised in subsequent talks. He also agreed that
there would be no upgrading of Backfire and that he would discuss
specific criteria.

5. Then he made a new proposal, namely that they would agree to
reduction to 2300 and “even larger” if we accepted their proposal on
land-based and sea-based cruise missiles, that is to ban them over 600
KM.

6. He would not be drawn out further on the scale of reductions
but certainly 2200 is possible in light of his statements. I probed to see
whether they might come back to the counting of sea-based SLCMs as
MIRV and this probably is not a firm position. I asked some questions
about the criteria on Backfire performance, but it was clear that we will
have to give them the specifics if we want to go in this direction.

7. I consider that we have now achieved significant concessions on
the issues we have pressed: First, the MIRV counting rules can be con-
firmed in return for the ALCM counting as MIRV; second, we have set
a limit on throw weight; third, we have the opportunity to dictate a set
of limitations on Backfire performance; fourth, we have a chance at a
significant reduction in Soviet forces, that would constitute almost 20
percent of their present force, and we can probably work out a cruise
missile solution that counts land-based intercontinental cruise missiles
and counts SLCMs on surface ships as MIRV. I could probably have
wrapped up the agreement under normal conditions. In light of the dis-
cussions in Washington that Brent has reported I could not go further
than to say this was a constructive initiative on Brezhnev’s part, but
that I would have to report it and we would reply within two or three weeks. Given the massive confusions reflected in the NSC meeting,\(^2\) I had no choice but to let the opportunity to exploit this breakthrough go by.

8. I raised Angola very privately with Brezhnev and warned him we would not be passive in the face of the Cuban expeditionary force. I then said it for the record in the large meeting,\(^3\) and Gromyko and I will meet on it tomorrow morning.

9. I believe that what has been achieved here in two days offers us the chance for an agreement that is clearly in our interest. I intend to brief the press that progress has been made, and that some issues have been settled while the differences on others have been narrowed.

10. Finally, it is imperative that everyone now be quiet until we can return and review where we stand.

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\(^2\) See Document 253.

\(^3\) See footnote 7, Document 249 and Document 256 and footnote 4 thereto.
258. Memorandum of Conversation

Moscow, January 23, 1976, 9:34–11:45 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

USSR:  
Andrei A. Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU; Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Vasiliy V. Kuznetsov, First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador to the U.S.
Vasiliy G. Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
V. G. Komplektov, Acting Chief of USA Dept., MFA
Valerian V. Mikhailov, Deputy Chief of USA Dept., MFA
Oleg Grinevskiy, Deputy Chief of Middle East Dept., MFA
Oleg M. Sokolov, Chief of International Affairs, USA Dept., MFA
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counselor, Second European Dept., MFA (Interpreter)

US:  
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Amb. Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., Ambassador to the USSR
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary for European Affairs
Arthur R. Day, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Edward F. Fugit, Country Officer, Angola
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

Middle East; Angola; Japan; China; Limitation of New Weapons of Mass Destruction; PNE Negotiation; MBFR

Gromyko: I think we can begin, Mr. Secretary. Do you have any ideas on what we should take up? I thought the Middle East.

Kissinger: Well, we must state our opinion on Angola. And then we are prepared to discuss the Middle East, and any other subject you would like to discuss.

Gromyko: Let’s rather discuss the Middle East, because we have had no discussions yet on that and we have discussed Angola. Unless you have nothing to discuss on the Middle East.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger Reports on USSR, China, and Middle East Discussions, 1974–1976, Box 1, USSR Memcons and Reports, January 21–23, 1976—Kissinger Moscow Trip (3). Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Foreign Ministry’s Tolstoi House.
Kissinger: I have something. But I must point out that messages on Angola at the highest level have a tendency to go unanswered, which is a new factor in our relationship.

Gromyko: What do you suggest?

Kissinger: You suggested the Middle East; we suggested Angola—we can compromise on discussing peaceful nuclear explosions. [Laughter]

Gromyko: Let’s do that. That means we will merely continue the discussion, not start it.

Kissinger: I’m prepared to discuss the Middle East first. I just wanted to make clear we will state our view on Angola. And we still need answers to some of the questions.

Gromyko: That you have said already.

[The waiters bring in coffee and snacks].

It is very hard to discuss questions like the Middle East, Angola and peaceful nuclear explosions, without coffee.

Middle East

I’d certainly like to know your views, Mr. Secretary, regarding the present situation in the Middle East and regarding possible steps leading towards a settlement.

Kissinger: At this moment there is a United Nations debate, in which our two representatives are exhausting their repertory of adjectives. I do not believe this debate will lead to a conclusion which will . . .

Gromyko: In the Security Council?

Kissinger: In the Security Council . . . which I don’t believe will lead to a clearcut conclusion. And the question then is where we go from there.

Gromyko: Even assuming it doesn’t lead to any positive results, what is your conclusion?

Kissinger: I think we should let the discussion run its course in the Security Council. After that, the question is how the peace process can be resumed.

Gromyko: Abstracting ourselves from the Security Council discussions for a moment, what is your opinion on the substance of the matter? What possible steps do you foresee? Or do you believe it is impossible to take any further steps, for one reason or another?

Kissinger: We believe a way should be found by which the Geneva Conference could be reassembled. Either through a preparatory conference or directly.

Gromyko: With respect to the first part of your remarks, regarding the need to find some way of reassembling the Geneva Conference, that
suits us because we too believe the Geneva Conference would be useful. With regard to the second part, some multilateral consultations, that is something we have discussed before. You know our view, because we discussed it in the fall of last year and I believe I have nothing to add on the subject of some sort of preparatory consultations.

I think it would be best if you simply dropped the whole idea of a preparatory conference because I don’t think it is a viable one, and you would simply be wasting your effort. Because all the difficulties facing us right now and standing in the way of finding a settlement would be transferred to that forum as well. However you call the forum—a preliminary conference or whatever. And that relates to the question of the Palestinians and their role in such a forum. So you can’t hide from that question.

Kissinger: It is true, there is no way of avoiding discussion of the question, but the issue is whether in discussion of the question, the Palestinians have to be present from the beginning.

Gromyko: Our view is they must be present in the multilateral discussions from the beginning. As regards bilateral discussions, that is what we are doing right here. And you have certainly discussed it on a bilateral basis with many, and so have we.

Kissinger: You know this is not possible for us at this moment, and we will just have to just work as we have until we find a common denominator. We suggested the idea of a preparatory conference.

Gromyko: If at the present it is impossible for you to take part in any multilateral discussions with the Palestinians, for us and others it is impossible to take part in multilateral discussions without the Palestinians.

Of course, it is conceivable that when all the parties concerned reach prior agreement, prior to the actual opening of Geneva, that it can open without the Palestinians but that as soon as it opens the Palestinians can take part in the discussion of the substance. But I emphasize, prior agreement with the parties concerned would be necessary, and of course it would have to be concerted with the Palestinians themselves.

Kissinger: We do not believe conditions are right yet. We have said we can’t ask Israel to negotiate with a party that doesn’t accept the existence of Israel and that doesn’t accept Resolutions 242 and 338.

Gromyko: We know what Israel’s position is in that regard and we know that the position enjoys US support. But after all, Israel never displayed a positive attitude on the question of assuring the legitimate rights of the Palestinians, and notably the legitimate demand of the Palestinians to be allowed to set up their own national state of the Arab people of Palestine. So how can Israel take the position of requiring
them to recognize Israel as a state in those circumstances? If Israel wants to see the Palestinians taking that sort of position, surely Israel has to make some sort of movement in the regard I have stated.

There should be no question of the difficulty in deciding who should have to take the first move—who is to say “A.” It should be easy to settle that one has to say “A” and the other has to say “B.” That is what diplomacy is for. It should be a second-rate matter as long as the substance is settled.

And we have sufficient ground as far as this train of thought. You remember I said this to you when I was in the United States, and in fact I said this to Israeli Foreign Minister Allon.

Kissinger: I’m not here to speak for Israel. On some points we agree with them and on some we do not. True, any progress will depend on US influence on Israel. We have proved we are prepared to do this. The United States has repeatedly declared it will not deal with the Palestinians until they recognize the State of Israel and Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338. It follows from that that if the Palestinians do this, certain policy conclusions will follow in the United States. That would not go unanswered in the United States. And that is not without significance.

Gromyko: But the Palestinians say they cannot do any such thing until Israel recognizes their legitimate rights, notably their legitimate right to set up an independent state of the Palestinian people. And this is something we know only too well. I don’t know whether you know, but we certainly do. Surely the problem I mentioned—of who says “A”—is one that is going to be an impediment to progress. I therefore ask what is diplomacy for? Please tell me. What is diplomacy for, if it can’t resolve the question of who says “A?”

Kissinger: That’s what I am suggesting. The Palestinians should say “A.”

Gromyko: This should be resolved in such a way that the prestige of no one is prejudiced. If that is the only stumbling block, surely the US and Soviet Union could organize it in such a way that “A” is said simultaneously by both sides. Surely it can’t be a completely insurmountable obstacle. [Korniyenko shows Gromyko a talking paper.]

Kissinger: Is Korniyenko making trouble again?

Korniyenko: Double “A” instead of “A” and “B.”

Kissinger: I was saying, if you understand American football, we will trade Sonnenfeldt for Korniyenko and a draft choice.

Gromyko: Double “A.”

Kissinger: There are two separate problems. One is the attitude of Israel to the Palestinians; the other is the attitude of the United States to the Palestinians. The attitude of Israel to the Palestinians will lag be-
hind the attitude of the United States inevitably, given the complexity of their domestic situation. Of course, there is no complexity in our domestic situation. If Palestinian recognition of Israel went unreciprocated for a considerable length of time, that would itself be a fact of significance. But I have said consistently that the United States would not ignore such a statement by the Palestinians.

Gromyko: We believe the basis I've suggested is the only possible one for a search for a solution to this matter. The basis that Israel is trying to impose—and by and large you seem to be in sympathy with it—that first the Palestinians should undertake and state their readiness to recognize and only then can Israel do it—is unrealistic. Even if we took that kind of attitude, it would not have any positive result. This is an artificial difficulty created by Israel itself, though you seem prepared to share it.

Kissinger: What I've said is an American proposal, not an Israeli proposal. I believe Israel would probably not respond immediately to a Palestinian statement of recognition. I'm speaking for the United States, and not for Israel.

Gromyko: Allon spoke of it in New York, and they say it every day. I certainly see no possibility of unilateral movement as you want to see, particularly if as you say even after a statement or decision taken by the Palestinians Israel would temporize for a while before responding. That makes it unrealistic. We see it as an artificial construction. Perhaps related to certain domestic conditions, but I don’t want to delve into that; you know best.

So I see it as difficult. I have felt anyway that because of certain remarks you have made, we probably won’t make headway.

Kissinger: Then we should each do what we can to keep the situation restrained and keep in contact.

Gromyko: Our position has been all along and is one of restraint. We have never been in sympathy with a military solution to the problem; we have never been in sympathy with continuing clashes in the Middle East. At the same time, the very logic of the facts has all too frequently prevailed in these matters. So we would emphasize that if anyone thinks the danger has been removed from the area, that certainly is far too early.

Kissinger: We don’t believe the danger is removed. We have repeatedly stated we are prepared to make a major effort when the time is ready. Not an unmeasurable period of time. We don’t believe conditions can be maintained as they are. On the contrary. We don’t believe it. And we have no intention of maintaining them as they are.

Gromyko: Let’s take another subject. On the understanding that any side can display initiative in terms of exchanging views in one place or another, or on one subject or another.
Kissinger: Correct. Do you want to go to another subject?
Gromyko: All right.

Angola

Kissinger: In that case, I’d like to state our view on Angola.
We recognize that the Soviet Union has supported the MPLA for a long time. And we recognize that some of the activities in Angola have historic reason and understandable causes.

But we also believe that over a period of months, and recently, they have reached dimensions that are inconsistent with the principles we have jointly signed. We have called the attention of the Soviet Government for many months to our concerns. We have made repeated offers to stop foreign intervention. We have even said we would use our influence to bring about the initial withdrawal of South African forces, to be followed by the withdrawal of other forces.

But we are confronted by the fact that answers are evasive and many months go by.

We cannot accept that 10,000 troops be sent as an expeditionary force carried in Soviet aircraft, with Soviet equipment. We must take public notice. The tragedy is that those of us who have supported the policy of détente with the Soviet Union will increasingly be put into the position of attacking this policy.

So we believe something should be done about this before irreparable damage is caused.

We have made a specific proposal over the weeks. This is our attitude, which we cannot give up.

Gromyko: First of all, I would like to say that fundamentally and in principle our attitude on the Angola question was set out on your visit to this country and personally to you by General Secretary Brezhnev.

With respect to your remarks concerning Cuba, I have no intention of discussing whatever actions Cuba is taking. We have not been authorized by the Cuban Government to speak on its behalf, but we do know that what Cuba is doing to render assistance to the legitimate Angolan Government, at the specific request of that Angolan Government—which I must say has been inflated out of all proportion in the United States—is a matter between Cuba and the legitimate government of Angola.

That concerns Cuba. With respect to the Soviet Union, let me say this:

First, we have taken note—and this relates not just to the Soviet Union but to the majority of the states—that following the proclamation of Angolan independence, Angola became the victim of outside intervention, and in effect that intervention began earlier. Is it not a fact
that the South African Government has introduced its military forces in Angola? If someone wants to close their eyes, nonetheless it is a fact that we see and others do. It is a fact that it is taking place.

Some say they are in the process of being withdrawn. What kind of fact is that if every day we read reports that the South African forces are increasing?

So, the first fact is, there is a clear-cut case of intervention, and in fact, aggression, that is taking place against Angola by South Africa.

That is the first point. The second point is this:

The Soviet Union did assist the MPLA in its fight for the independence of Angola against the colonialists. And that is something we made absolutely no secret of. That part is a completely open book. After independence, we established relations with the new legitimate government and on that we based accordingly our policy and practical actions, regarding Angola as an independent and sovereign state. General Secretary Brezhnev told you previously that we had sold quantities—and let me say, insignificant quantities—of arms. And, incidentally, the United States—and there is ample information to that effect—has given funds and never ended giving supplies to the separatist elements in Angola that are backed by external elements which are well known. The United States has given them substantial assistance, and that fact is well known.

Thirdly, if there is any impression that the Soviet Union has virtually nothing else to do and does nothing else except talk somebody in Angola out of any contacts or to discourage any formation of any coalition government, that is a big mistake. We have spoken not a word either for or against such contacts and talks. We consider that a matter for the sovereign government of Angola themselves.

So that is the answer to your so-called proposals. Has the Soviet Union ever objected on that score? Certainly not.

And my fourth and last point:

You have hinted that the possible development of events in Angola might adversely affect Soviet-American relations. Well, if the United States wants that, then those events can adversely affect our relationship. If that’s what the U.S. wants. We believe that all Soviet-American relations, and all that has been achieved, will override all momentary considerations or momentary events in Angola. So, objectively speaking, there is no reason for events in Angola to have an adverse effect on Soviet-American relations.

That is what I wanted to say to your remarks.

Kissinger: I have a few observations, Mr. Foreign Minister.

It is not true that the United States has supported what you call separatist forces. The United States gave no military assistance to those
forces until after the massive Soviet support to the MPLA. In fact, the United States rejected many opportunities in 1974 to give aid because we did not want to introduce the great power rivalry in Africa. Even after Soviet support started, we made proposals to you to halt it and to prevent it from getting out of hand.

We are not against the MPLA. We cannot recognize it as a legitimate government that is not recognized by half of the African states and established contrary to OAU resolutions.

Therefore, we believe there were many opportunities, in light of our specific responsibility to insulate the problem from great power rivalry. We have offered to use our influence to get South African forces out and we asked only for assurances that other foreign forces will leave.

When there are 20 flights a week from Cuba to Angola with Soviet planes, with 200 troops a day from Cuba to Angola, it isn’t something the Soviet Government can simply say doesn’t concern the Soviet Union. What would the Soviet Union say if American planes brought troops to another country?

So the reality is these are facts inconsistent with the principles we signed in June 1972.²

Moreover, what makes these events so tragic is that all the remarks the Foreign Minister has made overlook the situation in the United States, in which those who look for every opportunity to injure our policy will attack this—and we will not oppose it. Even those who oppose doing something in Angola propose doing things directly to the Soviet Union rather than in Angola.

It is a tragedy because the Soviet Union has nothing to gain in Angola. We have nothing to gain in Angola. Five years from now it will make no difference. I must say this is a tragedy, and I say this as one who has been the foremost defender of U.S.-Soviet rapprochement in the United States.

Gromyko: There is one point you made with which I certainly agree; the Soviet Union wants nothing whatever in Angola, and seeks no unilateral gain in Angola. We only want to see Angola as an independent and sovereign state. That’s all . . .

Kissinger: It is difficult to be sovereign and independent if there are 10,000 foreign troops. 80,000 Portuguese troops faced a guerrilla war, and I wouldn’t be surprised if 10,000 Cubans faced a protracted war.

² The reference is in error. Nixon and Brezhnev signed the “Basic Principles” on May 29, 1972.
Gromyko: To that I would reply that it is indeed most difficult to be an independent and sovereign state if there are in that state a mass of outside invading forces, with massive equipment, against the legitimate government. That does indeed create difficulties in the way of a sovereign and independent state.

You say we have not given a reply to your proposals. That I don’t understand. What other reply do you want? You have heard our pronouncements and the reply by General Secretary Brezhnev; you’ve heard the pronouncements and the reply I have just given you. What other do you want?

Kissinger: The last message we received from General Secretary Brezhnev said that if the South African forces were withdrawn, the question of the Cuban forces would solve itself in a “natural way.” We have asked in what you mean by a “natural way,” and how would it take place. No reply has been received in over two weeks.

Gromyko: I said at the very outset that we cannot speak on behalf of the Cubans. We are not authorized to speak for them. So what you speak about is a hypothetical question—what would happen if the Cubans were withdrawn. I cannot speak about it. It is first and foremost for the legitimate government of Angola to react, and it would be seen in the response they take to the withdrawal of South African forces. But that is hypothetical, because there is no withdrawal of South African forces.

Kissinger: We received a message from the General Secretary that if the South Africans leave, the problem of the others would be settled “in a natural way.” The question is: what does that mean?

Gromyko: It means exactly what it says. But you’re now discussing a purely hypothetical case. There is no South African withdrawal.

Kissinger: I asked what would happen if the South Africans withdrew. Clearly, it means the South African forces must first be withdrawn.

Gromyko: The government of the People’s Republic of Angola will set out its reaction after the withdrawal of South African forces. The Soviet Union is not the government of the People’s Republic of Angola. But our view is as set out in the General Secretary’s message, and I think the right thing to do would be to take a serious view of it.

On that note, I think I have exhausted all I have to say. Otherwise, I would just be repeating myself.

Kissinger: I want to say two things: We simply cannot accept that the government of Cuba, dependent entirely upon Soviet support in

3 Document 239.
Cuba and dependent entirely on the Soviet logistical support—nor
would you say if we decided to put an end to this by dealing with Cuba
directly that this is a matter of no concern to the Soviet Union. Second,
you cannot say it makes no difference when the intervention of the
Cubans ends—they were brought in by Soviet planes and ships and
you will not say when this will end.

It is a pity this has come to pass when many opportunities existed
for two great powers to settle this in a farsighted way.

Gromyko: I regret the conclusions you draw. I have nothing to add
to the statements on our side. It is those statements that express our
opinion, and not the interpretation you give.

Kissinger: It wouldn’t be the first time in history that events that no
one can explain afterwards give rise to consequences out of proportion
to their intrinsic significance.

Gromyko: We think no one else but ourselves can interpret our po-
sition and views. It is for us alone to set them out. Any attempt to inter-
pret them in a wrongful manner can only be seen as regrettable.

And if on your return to the United States you start to aggravate
this whole matter and make statements casting aspersions on our rela-
tions, it will not be we who will bear responsibility for the conse-
quences. It will be the responsibility solely of the United States. I cannot
believe that this meets the interests of the world situation.

Kissinger: Well, I’ve stated my view, and I see no need to repeat it.

Gromyko: Well, let’s turn to the next question.

Kissinger: I picked the last topic; why don’t you pick the next one?

Japan

Gromyko: Do we have anything at all in the Far East? Do you have
any comments on that? What are your assessments? Are you expecting
any surprises? You have many friends in that area—friends who were
looking out of the wrong side of their face at us.

Kissinger: You were in the Far East more recently; why don’t you
give your impression?

Gromyko: [Laughs] That’s no problem. I can say a few words.

I was in Japan.4 While I was there I set out our position on the ques-
tion of Soviet-Japanese relations. We spoke out in favor of more normal
relations, in the interest of détente and peace. In short, we applied the
principles that underlined U.S.-Soviet relations and that found expres-

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4 Gromyko was in Japan January 9–13 for an official visit. For the English text of the
joint communiqué, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVII, No. 2 (February 11,
sion in the relevant documents signed between the United States and the Soviet Union.

Of the political questions, there was one which was within our field of vision as well as of the Japanese—that was the possibility of a Sino-Japanese Treaty being signed. We gave our assessment of China’s attempts to include in that treaty a clause directly aimed at the Soviet Union—and you know what I’m referring to. On the Japanese side, they gave their assessment of the situation and they, in effect, said they assessed China’s claims in a somewhat different fashion. They underestimated somewhat the Chinese intentions in this respect. But the Japanese do understand our concerns.

As we understand it—and they said so themselves—the negotiations have not yet been completed, and we can only guess at the further development of those negotiations, and I would refrain from any kind of forecast. We would like to believe that the common sense of the Japanese will prevail, as well as their understanding of the proper role of Soviet-Japanese relations.

We made some references to bilateral economic relations between our two countries, but no specific agreements were signed. We also took up a few purely bilateral matters and a few others—such as fishing. But not too much, because there are special commissions set up for that, and that is within their jurisdiction.

You know the Japanese frequently make reference to the so-called northern territories. References were made during this visit as well, but it was not really discussed at these meetings, because the two sides speak totally different languages and the positions were totally at variance.

As elsewhere, in Japan I made no attempt whatsoever to reach any agreement or understanding that is at variance with the interests of any other country, including the United States. You can verify that with the Japanese. I said it publicly and privately.

Are you disappointed?

Kissinger: We recognize you gained no unilateral advantage in Japan, and it was in the spirit of our relationship.

No, I appreciate your explanation, and seriously I believe it reflects the principles of restraint that should govern our relations everywhere and are the basis of our relationship.

What we have heard from Japan coincides with the Foreign Minister’s statement. The Foreign Minister’s conduct was consistent with our relationship. We heard nothing contradictory.

5 Sakhalin.
Gromyko: Can I ask one question?

Kissinger: Yes.

Gromyko: There have been references in various publications to the proposed establishment of a US-Japanese consultative body or agency dealing with armament and armed forces. Can you give us some information about this? Any time we hear information that Japanese are taking steps to conserve wildlife and birds, it causes no concern. We are always prepared to cooperate with that. But when we hear something about armaments, we do display some concern, which is not unfounded.

Kissinger: All we are familiar with is that there is an agreement for the Japanese Foreign Minister and the American Secretary of State to meet twice a year. But we meet so often at international meetings that in fact there is no need to schedule special meetings. But I am familiar with no arrangement to consult on weapons. Certainly at a high level; maybe at a very low level. I’ll check when I get back and let Dobrynin know.

Gromyko: The military must have bypassed the Department of State.

Kissinger: What is your source? Japan and the United States are allies. I’m not familiar with any new institution. No new institution could be set up without our approval. But I want to check and make sure there is nothing that is being misunderstood. What is your source?

Korniyenko: Something at the end of December.

Gromyko: In the press. I read something about it just before I left for Japan.

Kissinger: Anyway, no new body has been set up to deal with military questions. But I will check and let Dobrynin know.

China

Gromyko: Let us now mentally transfer ourselves to China. It’s safe, of course, for you to go right into China, but for us it’s more complicated. You might quite logically ask me what my views are on this question, and it’s quite legitimate.

Our bilateral relations have undergone no change in recent months.

Kissinger: About China? Or are you approaching me carefully?

Gromyko: Going around! Our bilateral relations have undergone no changes in recent months.

With respect to China’s foreign policy, it is very sharply leveled against us, and in fact against the line of policy jointly formulated by the Soviet Union and the United States and expressed in our joint documents. Their view is the worse it is, the better. But you know better; you
were there most recently, and you patiently had to listen to a few lectures while you were there.

I was thinking when I read the reports of what you had to endure, I said to myself, I wish I could see Dr. Kissinger’s face right now. I wonder how he feels.

Kissinger: Of course, you have an advantage in Peking in that you have an Ambassador and we have only a Chief of Liaison Office. So we don’t get invited to so many diplomatic functions, at least of the intensity your Ambassador does.

It is true that the Chinese expressed their attitude to our relationship and found it too good, from their point of view. Of course, they will be delighted by the events of the previous subject. But it’s true: our bilateral relations [with China] are normal and developing. And during President Ford’s visit, this progress was confirmed.

Gromyko: I would like to ask one question, and it is of course your right to reply or not.

Kissinger: If it were not my right, you would of course force me to answer. [Laughter]

Gromyko: You are familiar with the general line of China’s policy as well as its policy toward various areas of the world—the Soviet Union, Europe, Asia. You know this policy is sharply at variance and totally counter to the line we have agreed on and reflected in our agreements, and the line we have confirmed in our discussions recently.

But leading figures in the United States, at a very high level, including the President and Secretary of State, studiously avoid giving an assessment of that line, which is sharply against détente and is a line which seeks deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and the United States. We in the Soviet leadership shrug our shoulders and wonder what reserves of patience it must take to simply endure this line and take no view. But the Soviet leadership pursues the line of peace and détente.

Kissinger: I think the Foreign Minister could not have read the toasts I gave on my visit to Peking in October, in which on two occasions I made it clear the United States would maintain its policy in accordance with our national interests. And I made it clear even more privately. So it is clear we do not give the Chinese a veto over our policy, and as I said to the General Secretary, we remain committed to the policy we are pursuing.

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6 For the text of Kissinger’s toasts on October 19 and 22 in Beijing, see Department of State Bulletin, November 17, 1975, pp. 682–683.
We were told there is a Soviet faction in the Chinese leadership, and they will no doubt tell you we have told them we will maintain our relations with the Soviet Union.

They can see what is happening in our relationship and will be delighted. But we have made clear we are prepared to improve our relationship with the Soviet Union.

Gromyko: When is your next trip to Peking?
Kissinger: We have not set a precise date.
Gromyko: You are about to go on an African holiday. If rumors are correct.

Kissinger: Not before the end of March.
Dobrynin: And to Latin America.
Kissinger: Latin America is first.
Gromyko: You are first going to invade Latin America and then you invade Africa.
Kissinger: No, you are forcing us into Africa in a much more active way.

Limitation of New Weapons of Mass Destruction

Gromyko: You know, Dr. Kissinger, the Disarmament Committee in Geneva seems to be working very sluggishly. Maybe we should give it an injection of some sort. The Committee has before it certain new questions to discuss, notably the question we first raised at the UN General Assembly. There was an appropriate resolution passed and now it goes to the Disarmament Committee, that is the limitation of new weapons systems. We know you take a cautious attitude. In fact you even start looking a bit bored when I discuss that subject. But we think it should be discussed.

Kissinger: No, I’m confused whether you mean that no state can develop weapons beyond what it has developed or that no state can develop weapons beyond what we have developed. So we have difficulty giving instructions to our delegation.

Gromyko: Then let us discuss that matter in the Committee and/or parallel with the work of the Committee—bilateral discussion of the matter to discuss various points. But we can’t say that because we take a dim view we can’t discuss it.

Kissinger: Perhaps our Ambassador here could discuss it here with someone you delegate, to get further clarification.

Gromyko: We wouldn’t want the exchange to take the form only of questions addressed to us. We would like perhaps not only to take questions but also to put them.

Kissinger: That is very appropriate. Why don’t we have discussions here in Moscow?
Gromyko: All right.
Kissinger: Stoessel will take care of it.
Gromyko: All right.

*Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Negotiation*

Kissinger: He’s engaged in discussions on peaceful nuclear explosions.
Gromyko: Let’s discuss.
Kissinger: You went three explosions a year beyond 150 kilotons. And we believe that would make verification impossible. Not to speak of ratification.
Gromyko: What is your proposal?
Kissinger: Our view is to take this up at the review conference in five years. Our understanding is you have no particular use for it now but just don’t want to foreclose the long-term future.
Gromyko: Representatives of the two sides are due to resume on January 27th.
Kissinger: Correct.
Gromyko: They could resume their discussion and perhaps take this up.
Kissinger: We should both keep an eye on these discussions and bring them to a successful conclusion.
Gromyko: There should be a successful conclusion.

*MBFR*

Kissinger: On the proposal last night with respect to Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, do you have the number from which the two-to-three percent is to be calculated?
Gromyko: The General Secretary set out our view of principles, and they give you the line along which we are thinking and which will be set out in detail. And when we submit the specific proposals after discussions resume in Vienna, we will have specific considerations to set forth, and we are now giving deliberation to that aspect.
Kissinger: Because we can’t give a reply until we know what your number is.
Gromyko: We are now giving thought to that aspect and we feel in the very near future we will be able to give a definite reply. It certainly would be a good thing to give a new lease on life to the work in Vienna.
Kissinger: We will study it carefully. I’m not too optimistic, as I told the General Secretary.
Gromyko: So you are not taking away optimism on this?
Kissinger: I’ll have to see your concrete proposal before I make a final judgment.
Gromyko: All right. As long as you don’t carry away pessimism from Moscow on this question.

Kissinger: I think we should make progress this year on mutual force reductions.

Gromyko: That would be good. China will certainly have a lot to blame us for. If there is success. Mostly us.

Kissinger: China will certainly be very angry. China will certainly be very angry if there is success in SALT.

But they haven’t given us any helicopters lately, so perhaps you should tell us what you are doing.

Gromyko: [Laughs] China gave us a helicopter because it is ours! Of course they recognized they made a mistake.

I was told Dr. Kissinger was staying for a week. Now these people tell me he’s departing.

Kissinger: Always something surprising!

[Both sides review drafts of the communique of the visit.]

I have a minor change. It says: “It was noted that a further strengthening and development of relations between the USSR and USA would serve the interests . . .” I would say “it was agreed” instead of “it was noted.”

Sukhodrev: To make it more readable in Russian, “Both sides are in agreement that,” or “agree that.”

Kissinger: “Both sides are in agreement.” If you say “both sides agreed,” it looks like a new agreement. “Would serve the interests.”

Gromyko: I believe this text is acceptable. Since General Secretary Brezhnev is directly concerned, I’ll just show it to him. I expect no difficulties or problems.

Kissinger: What time do you plan to release it?

Gromyko: At seven o’clock tonight Moscow time.

Kissinger: That’s at five o’clock Brussels time. All right. But when can you confirm it?

Gromyko: Another concession on our part.

Kissinger: It is amazing how you keep your country together, with all these concessions.

Gromyko: Concession after concession!

Kissinger: Everyone says you are so difficult to deal with.

Dobrynin: A total misunderstanding!

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7 For the final text of the joint communique, see ibid., February 16, 1976, p. 165.
Kissinger: A total misunderstanding. I was afraid before I came that two-or-three days here would not be enough time for us, because of all the concessions you would be making.

[The meeting then ended.]

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259. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT

Report on Secretary Kissinger’s Moscow Trip

President: We held an interesting meeting the other day.²
Kissinger: Brent told me. It is a disgrace.

[Discussed the merits of sea-launched cruise missiles.]

What these guys don’t do is compare their memos with what happens if there is no agreement.

What we have on the Backfire is a profile which includes a 300-kilometer supersonic dash. But Brezhnev will give us a commitment on the range and that there will be no upgrading.

We have agreement to reduce to 2300 or below, but right now Brezhnev wants a ban on cruise missiles above 600 kilometers.

President: [Discussion of the NSC meeting.]
Kissinger: I think we can take two-to-three weeks for a decision. I think we can get 2200, with Backfire not counted but with collateral restraints and a letter from us that if they go above certain number we will do something. They may accept surface ships as MIRVs if we show restraint. I would go along with 600 on land-based, but maybe go along with counting intercontinental cruise missiles to get the Vice President

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¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

² The President is referring to the January 21 NSC meeting. See Document 253.
off our back. But if we want a mobile missile, I would go with the Ballistic.

President: Don said Wade thought things had moved along well.
Kissinger: I think we are doing well. If we launched a real offensive in terms of the alternatives, we can kill them. I think we can get another set of concessions from them—not big ones.

We should forget about offsetting cruise missiles and Backfire.
President: How should we proceed? Tomorrow we will meet with Don.

Kissinger: Don has to get you what you need from Defense. Wade can tell him substantially what I am telling you. I had him in on everything.

On Angola, they were disdainful. It is the Senate action.\(^3\) They think they’ve got us.

President: How about NATO?\(^4\)
Kissinger: All the Foreign Ministers showed up except for the Greek and Icelander. Their feeling on Angola is really . . .

We had a meeting of the Big Four which was really a Directorate meeting. But Sauvagnargues said we are vanishing from the world scene—we are turning them back into Gaullists. France is very worried about Angola and turning all of Africa against the Francophone countries. Spain was great.

President: How about the European attitude toward Spain?
Kissinger: Much better. As long as Spain announces some movements toward liberalizing . . .

President: If you had not gone to Moscow, it would have been a serious mistake.
Did you get a chance to raise grain?
Kissinger: The mood was not right for it. They won’t do it as a favor. Besides, the ships are backed up in their ports.

[Discussion on the Middle East.]
Kissinger: I am deeply worried about our position in the world resulting from Angola. It is opening the Vietnam wounds again.
President: Do they know it’s not you and me?
Kissinger: Yes, but they must deal with the phenomenon. They like you both personally and for what you have done for the Alliance.
President: Anything on MBFR?

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\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 229.
\(^4\) On January 23, Kissinger met with NATO Foreign Ministers in Brussels to report on his negotiations in Moscow on SALT.
Kissinger: Yes. They rejected Option III. They proposed a 3% cut in overall forces, taken from U.S. and Soviet forces.
We have got to show you are a winner.
President: The economy is looking up and that was our weakest point.
Kissinger: That’s why they are coming after foreign policy. We got to go on the offensive—we have a damned good foreign policy.

260. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, January 26, 1976, 9:25–10:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
Secretary Kissinger’s SALT Discussions with Brezhnev

Kissinger: Wade did very well.
Rumsfeld: He was very pleased. It worked well.
The President: Henry, why don’t you bring us up to date?
Kissinger: They totally rejected Option IV. I then went to Modified Option III because I thought it was better for them. They rejected that on grounds that Backfire couldn’t be counted. They will give us in writing the range of the Backfire and a commitment that it wouldn’t be upgraded or used in an intercontinental role. It is not a lie based on design mission profile.
I think if we wrote down some specifications and some constraints, they would at least look at them.
They accepted the ALCM proposal. We can say we are giving something up, but since they wanted to count each missile, they gave up—especially their agreeing to 2500 kilometers.
They accepted SLCM from subs, but not surface ships.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
They want 600 kilometers for land-based. We made the mistake of going from 5500 to 2500. It called their attention to it.

Then they gave us the heavy missile definition.

Rumsfeld: This will defuse the violation argument on SALT I.

Kissinger: The soft areas are surface-ship SLCMs and land-based cruise missiles.

I get wildly different interpretations of the utility of surface-ship SLCMs. We could maybe count them as MIRV with an upper limit. Maybe if we counted land-based in the 2400.

Scowcroft/Rumsfeld: That won’t solve the European problem.

Kissinger: They will hang tough, I think, on 2500 kilometers on land-based. We can probably solve the surface-ship SLCMs.

Rumsfeld: But in Europe they are just like FBS.

Kissinger: But from Europe and Japan we can cover four-fifths of the USSR and they can just cover Europe.

We have insisted on 2500, but I think they won’t buy it.

Rumsfeld: There is also the nuclear versus the conventional warhead. Another issue is third country acquisition. If you bar conventional, you are barring the possibility of replacing some present systems.

I have never seen so much leaking as came out of your party.

Kissinger: It was done because it would have leaked after I briefed NATO.

Rumsfeld: Don’t blame it on NATO.

Kissinger: Cruise missile verification is really their problem through ’85. That can be our excuse for the nuclear versus conventional.

Rumsfeld: Cruise missile verification is a horror.

Scowcroft: You have the same problem with range if you allow 5500.

The President: I think we should look at all the issues and reach a judgment. What is the time schedule?

Kissinger: I think we should get something back to them before their Party Conference.

Rumsfeld: I was thinking we could get the VP Working Group going and try to get back to Dobrynin by 8 or 10 February.

Kissinger: One way would be to count all land-based over 600. That way we could have a few.

261. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Hartman) to Secretary of State Kissinger


US-Soviet Bilateral Relations and Angola

The Problem

In view of the uncompromising Soviet line on Angola, we need guidance on how to handle a number of bilateral issues which will be coming up in the months ahead.

Background/Analysis

Since your Moscow trip, there has been no decline in the level of Soviet and Cuban support to the MPLA. Soviet public statements maintain a calculated ambiguity, with an eye to diplomatic damage-limitation. If the collapse of the UNITA and FNLA position continues apace, the most visible stage of the Angola conflict may soon be over. But the Soviets seem to be preparing a rationale for continued Cuban/Soviet presence in an anti-guerrilla role.

Should the Soviet position continue to play out along these lines, we will want to consider carefully how we deal with Moscow on bilateral matters in the months ahead. There is little chance that any actions we can take in these areas will deflect the Soviets from their course. But highly visible moves with the Soviets would be perceived by third countries and our own public as an indication that we have accommodated to the Soviet role in Angola. By the same token, a perceptible cooling of the atmosphere would reinforce the point that the Kremlin must pay a price for efforts to exploit local situations. The US response must be fine-tuned, however, particularly if we should be able to present a SALT agreement to the Congress and the public this year.

In listing those items which are coming up for decision in the area of US–USSR relations, we leave aside negotiations or meetings which

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are either so minor as to be unnoticeable or so clearly in our interest as to make the importance of moving ahead self-evident. Aside from SALT, examples are:

- **TTB/PNE talks**, now resumed in Moscow
- **Oil negotiations**, now under way in Washington
- **Fisheries bilaterals**, scheduled for February in Washington
- **Marine cargo insurance talks**, set for London in March
- **Hotline negotiations** in Moscow in March
- **Civil Air negotiations**, which we hope will lead to a fairer shake for US companies through pooling. They are to take place in Moscow by June.
- **Incidents at Sea talks** pursuant to the 1973 agreement in Moscow in May.²
- **Consular review talks** in the context of CSCE which are tentatively set for sometime in the Spring.

There are a number of other items in this category, including regularly scheduled working-level meetings under bilateral cooperative agreements, performing arts groups and exhibits which are already touring in both countries.

The second category of events includes those which are visible and stoppable which we can see coming down the road in the January–July time frame. In some cases, we will need to ask again for decisions on these matters as they get closer, but in the meantime we need some signals as to how to proceed.

**Matters for Decision**

**Joint Commercial Commission Meeting.** Treasury and Commerce want to hold this year’s session on April 12–13 in Washington. It would involve Secretary Simon and Patolichev and would draw little attention here but fairly extensive publicity in the USSR. Simon is very anxious to get your approval to hold the meeting at that time and to proceed now with the planning. Barring a change in the Soviet posture in Angola, we recommend delaying it and the experts’ working group, which will precede it, to the second half of 1976.³

**Cabinet Level Meetings**

FEA Administrator Zarb and ERDA Chief Seamans are scheduled to attend a March 15 meeting in the USSR of the US–USSR Joint Energy Committee. HUD Secretary Carla Hills wishes to propose mid-May dates to the Soviets for the Joint Housing and Construction Committee

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² The reference is in error; the United States and Soviet Union signed the Incidents at Sea agreement in May 1972.

³ Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11. During a meeting with the President in the Oval Office on March 4, Kissinger raised this issue: “The U.S.-Soviet commissions—I think we should delay.” Ford replied: “I agree. I told Cheney.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 18)
meetings in Moscow. HEW Secretary Mathews has accepted an invitation from the Soviet Minister of Health to visit—tentatively in late Spring–early Summer.

On the Energy Committee meeting, which has already been postponed at our initiative a number of times, we recommend that we go ahead with the meetings, but that either Zarb or Seamans drop off the delegation.4

On HUD Secretary Hills’ preference for a mid-May meeting, we recommend we inform HUD that we would like to see the meeting delayed until after the middle of the year.5

On HEW Secretary Matthews, we recommend no action until the Soviets come back with firm dates.6

**Bicentennial Events**

We are pressing the Soviets for permission to hold a Bicentennial exhibit in Moscow this year in exchange for a Soviet national exhibit in the US in 1977. We have invited the Soviets to send a sailing ship to “Opsail,” a bicentennial review in New York followed by port calls. They have refused an invitation to send a warship to the bicentennial Naval review in New York and will probably not accept a similar invitation extended by the Mayor of San Francisco. We recommend letting the negotiations for the US exhibit proceed and the sailing ship invitation stand.7

**Space Cooperation**

NASA is pressing to meet with Soviet space officials to discuss cooperative efforts following the Apollo–Soyuz flight. The meeting has

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4 Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11.

5 Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11. An unidentified Department of State official wrote in the margin of another copy of this memorandum: “2/13/76—I called Mrs. Hills, passed to her the word that HAK would like to see meeting postponed until after mid-year. She said July was out, schedule filled up. Said she had made this clear a week ago (I don’t recall it was clear). She said she would accept decision. Could go in November, or send someone else.” (National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 10, POL 2 USSR–US) In a March 2 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt reported: “We are still being badgered by Zarb/Seamans and Carla Hills concerning their scheduled meeting and programs with the Soviets. Following our conversation last week, you were going to check with the President as to whether he concurs in having these and other Cabinet-level activities with the Soviets suspended for the time being. Were you able to do so, and can we proceed to tell those involved that there is a Presidential decision that they should not proceed with their programs?” Kissinger initialed the option: “OK, proceed.” (Ibid., Box 7, Soviet Union, Jan–April 1976)

6 Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11 and wrote in the margin: “but then drag our feet.”

7 Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11 and wrote in the margin: “but stop pressing them.”
been postponed several times and is now tentatively set for February. We do not anticipate that the meeting will lead to concrete results or publicity and recommend that planning go forward.\(^8\)

The items listed above need attention because of their visibility more than their substantive importance to us or the Soviet Union. There are other areas, however, which are both visible and intrinsically important.

**Computer Sales**

US agencies (including DOD) are considering a scaled down IBM proposal for a computer for Intourist. The risk of diverting computer capacity for KGB use is marginal in the case of this proposal as compared with the previous one, but approval will still draw fire from conservatives and especially from Senator Jackson. A Control Data request for approval of the sale of a very large $15 million computer for the Soviet Hydrometeorological Center is under active consideration, and CDC representatives are actively seeking approval for the sale. IBM and other manufacturers have submitted license applications for new computer sales totalling some $12 million for use in fields such as truck and machine tool manufacture. We recommend continued processing of license applications but with a hold on sensitive projects.\(^9\)

**Consultations on Outer Space Issues at UN**

We have scheduled bilateral consultations with the Soviets in London, in mid-February, on outer space issues under discussion at the UN (e.g. the draft moon treaty, direct satellite television broadcasting, remote sensing of earth). These bilaterals will take place concomitantly with the IMARSAT meeting, will attract no public attention, and are a continuing part of our effort to coordinate with Moscow on UN affairs to the extent possible and, especially, to prevent surprise Soviet grandstand plays at the UN. We thus recommend that these consultations proceed as scheduled.\(^10\)

**Long-Term Trade and Joint Ventures**

US firms are seeking working-level guidance from us before proceeding to negotiate with the Soviets on such long-term projects as construction of a spark-plug plant, and facilities for producing numerically

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\(^8\) Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11 and wrote in the margin: "but in lowest key possible."

\(^9\) Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11 and wrote in the margin: "process but not to approve license." An unidentified Department of State official wrote the following parenthetical comment in the margin: "that is, HK approves only processing applications, but does not approve issuing licenses at this point."

\(^10\) Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11.
controlled machine tools. US firms remain interested in the North Star LNG project and other major projects such as Sakhalin and Caspian Sea oil drilling, urea and potash deals, etc. And we expect the Soviets to come to us for more short and medium term commercial credits. The business community is looking for guidance on how to proceed. But public positive signals would be out of place in the Angola context and setting a negative tone would make it difficult to get things back on track at a later date. We recommend that we restrict ourselves to privately advising US firms on the working level that we see no reason for them not to proceed with any negotiation which they believe offers commercial benefits.\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{Consultations on Soviet Proposal on Weapons of Mass Destruction}

The Soviets suggested bilateral discussions in Moscow on the Soviet initiatives. We must complete our NSSM just getting underway on this subject before we can engage on substantive discussions. We recommend that Ambassador Stoessel be instructed not to approach the Soviets but, if they contact him, to reply that we will be in touch with regard for bilaterals upon completion of our internal studies.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{Middle East Bilaterals}

We do not believe that considerations unrelated to the Middle East should affect our position on the timing of bilaterals in Moscow or Washington.\textsuperscript{13}

\textit{Bilateral Discussions on CSCE Implementation}

It is time to renew our discussions in Moscow on CSCE implementation and we are staffing out an approach which reiterates our interest in Basket III while making some modest steps in areas of interest to the Soviets, such as travel controls. The approach includes the review of consular matters referred to above. We think we should proceed in view of our commitment to follow up on CSCE.\textsuperscript{14}

\textit{Kiev and New York Consulates}

The Soviets have their New York building; we are about to select ours in Kiev. We are tentatively planning to send an advance party to Kiev this summer to start preparations for renovating our new

\textsuperscript{11} Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11 and wrote in the margin: “our posture should be cool and aloof.”

\textsuperscript{12} Kissinger approved this recommendation on February 11 and wrote in the margin: “but again he is to delay bilaterals. He may give a holding answer.”

\textsuperscript{13} Kissinger indicated neither approval nor disapproval of this item.

\textsuperscript{14} Kissinger approved this and the next three recommendations on February 11 without comment.
building. The actual simultaneous opening of consulates is at least a year away, and we recommend proceeding with our preparations.

Moscow and Washington Chanceries

We continue to hold out permission to the Soviets to begin the apartment section of their complex here if they satisfy us on some points, including the cost of our Moscow project. We have already sold this horse several times; we recommend letting the current desultory negotiations proceed.

High-Visibility Performing Arts Exchanges

The next two performing arts groups scheduled under the Cultural Exchanges Agreement are the Don Cossack dance troupe, which will arrive here February 8, and the American Conservatory Theater, which goes to the USSR in May. A US university jazz band and the Moyseyev dancers are tentatively scheduled for mid-year. American impresarios are interested in bringing the Red Army Chorus to the US, but we have asked that this not be done in 1976. With this exception, we recommend business as usual in the performing arts fields, which we have long argued should proceed regardless of the ebb and flow of our bilateral political relationship.

262. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, February 16, 1976, 9:35–10:10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: My own view is that if this fails, we should suspend SALT until after the elections. This option is so much worse than Option II, but you can’t even get an honest discussion of the issues. Under IV, DOD was willing to give them 230 Backfire. They are not planning more than 450–500, they couldn’t be. And with reductions, the Backfire would be wholly offset. If the Soviets buy this, it will be in terms of

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
Backfire and cruise missile running free and no reductions. I am lukewarm in support of Option II, but I am not bleeding for it.

President: Rumsfeld, Brown and those people don’t understand. I agree with you.

Kissinger: The smart way would have been to pick up their points and build on them. If Reagan and Jackson get knocked out, the Soviets will be tougher.

President: I was so irritated last night that I was ready to junk the whole thing.2

Kissinger: The cynicism of these people is sickening.

President: How do you reconcile the DOD attitude with their screaming about the Soviets going all-out on Defense production? I think under the circumstances we have to go with this option. I am not optimistic but I think to go through the trauma it would take for Option II . . .

Kissinger: No, you can’t do it. It is just that we must recognize that it isn’t the best thing to do.

[Omitted here is discussion of Latin America, Law of the Sea, and China.]

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2 The President met with Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Cheney, and Scowcroft from 6:06 to 8:05 p.m. on February 15 to discuss SALT. A very brief memorandum of conversation is ibid. Rumsfeld’s record of the meeting is in the digital Donald Rumsfeld Papers.

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263. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev


Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have given considerable thought in recent weeks to the state of Soviet-American relations, and, in particular, to the situation with respect to the limitation of strategic arms.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 29, USSR, The “D” File. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the letter was “handed to Amb D by Sec. Kissinger at 11:15 a.m. on 2–16–76.” No substantive record of the meeting between Kissinger and Dobrynin on February 16 has been found.
Before your Party Congress I wanted to share with you my assessment of the situation and some thoughts on how we might proceed.

In a sense we are at a crossroads. We can permit tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union to reappear and the talks on strategic arms to remain deadlocked. Or we can reassert and implement previously enunciated policies of mutually restrained conduct, especially in regard to third areas, and also move ahead to consolidate what we have already achieved in strategic arms limitation. I am firmly for the latter course. But frankly, I am deeply concerned over the current state of Soviet-American relations. First of all, the policy pursued by the Soviet Union in Angola has led to a serious setback in Soviet-American relations; it threatens to discredit our attempt to build a relationship based on the principle that neither side will exacerbate tensions in third areas or seek a unilateral advantage. I must tell you in all candor that another similar event would have the most serious consequences. Second, we have thus far not succeeded in moving toward the translation of the Vladivostok agreements into binding form.

I believe that we must take measures to arrest this deterioration in our relations. It is my feeling that the first step should be to complete negotiations for a treaty based on Vladivostok and sign it as soon as possible. Therefore, I want to offer a compromise solution. It takes into account the requirements and positions of both sides and thus is the only one that offers a realistic hope of leading to an early and positive outcome in the strategic arms negotiations.

The compromise is that we would agree to proceed with the completion of a treaty based on our agreement at Vladivostok and sign such a treaty as soon as possible; and, in addition, we would conclude an interim agreement to deal with those issues for which we have not yet devised a satisfactory solution.

My view is that we should not let any differences at this point jeopardize what has already been achieved. Both sides would clearly gain from the consolidation of our agreement at Vladivostok. I am fully prepared to submit such a treaty to the Congress for early ratification. Moreover, I believe a joint decision to proceed in this manner would be widely acclaimed by both the Soviet and American people.

Mr. General Secretary, I am firmly committed to strategic arms control as a basic element of Soviet-American relations. I am dedicated to building a relationship based on mutual restraint. We now have the opportunity to take a major step forward and it is in this spirit that I offer what I believe is the most effective way of making progress. I will await your reply and should it indicate that we have a basis for pro-
ceeding, I suggest that Secretary Kissinger return to Moscow for discussion with you at a time of your convenience.

Sincerely,

Gerald R. Ford

264. Note From President Ford to the Soviet Leadership

Washington, undated.

The United States proposes that the two sides proceed in the following manner:

1. The U.S. and USSR agree to consolidate, and sign as soon as possible, the areas of agreement in a SALT II Treaty and defer the Backfire and certain “intermediate range” cruise missile issues for an agreed interim period, during which negotiations on these issues would continue.

2. In addition to those provisions already settled or still under discussion in Geneva, the treaty would also include provisions (a) to ban deployment of cruise missiles with a range over 600 km from all aircraft except those heavy bombers that are counted in the ceiling of 2,400; (b) to ban testing or production of air-launched cruise missiles with a range greater than 2,500 km; (c) to consider each heavy bomber equipped with a cruise missile with a range over 600 and up to 2,500 km as a MIRVed launcher and therefore to be counted against the ceiling of 1,320 MIRVed vehicles; and (d) at a time to be agreed upon, to review the range threshold limits on cruise missiles.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17. No classification marking. Numerous drafts of the note, dated February 12–16, are ibid., Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 29, USSR, The “D” File. Ford briefed Ikle on the final version during a meeting in the Oval Office on the morning of February 16: “I wanted to bring you up to date about a decision I made over the weekend. It will be delivered to Dobrynin this morning. It is deferral, under the concept of buying time for Backfire and cruise missiles. We picked January ’79 as the best time before our deployment of cruise missiles and which will still keep some restraint on Backfire. I thought it best to include ALCMs in the treaty. For other cruise missiles, their deployment is banned over 600 kilometers. On ‘nuclear-armed,’ I thought it best to defer that to Geneva in order not to overload the Soviets at the moment.” “I think it is the best we can do under the circumstances,” Ford added. “I don’t think it has much chance.” (Ibid., Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 17) When Rumsfeld asked that afternoon whether Dobrynin had received the note, Ford replied: “Yes, it was given to him at 11:15, with a personal two and a half page note from me to Brezhnev.” (Memorandum of conversation; ibid.)
3. On this basis the treaty would also include an agreement on the provisions for the verification of the deployment of MIRVed missiles, along the lines tentatively agreed in high level discussions, and, as well, agreement on the distinction between heavy and non-heavy ICBM's and the definition of a heavy missile.

4. As a part of resolving the issues of the Backfire bomber and sea- and land-based cruise missiles, the two sides would agree that their common intention is to reduce strategic armaments below the 2,400 ceiling agreed at Vladivostok.

5. The U.S. and USSR would also conclude an interim agreement for the period beginning with the signature of the new treaty until January 1, 1979, to include the following mutual constraints: (a) during the interim period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles would be tested to a range greater than 2,500 km; (b) during this period no sea-based or land-based cruise missiles with a range greater than 600 km would be operationally deployed on surface ships, on submarines, or on land; (c) the Soviet side would provide assurances that during this period the rate of production of the Soviet Backfire bomber would not be accelerated beyond the current and agreed rate, that the operational capabilities would not be improved, and, through other assurances to be agreed, that the Backfire bomber would not be deployed or operated in an intercontinental mode; (d) both sides would agree that their common objective would be to reach a mutually acceptable definitive solution to the problems of intermediate range sea- and land-based cruise missiles and the Backfire bomber as soon as possible. Negotiations to this end should begin immediately following the signing of the treaty based on Vladivostok; (e) negotiations on the resolution of the issues covered by the interim agreement would not replace the commitment, as currently reflected in the draft treaty being negotiated in Geneva, to conduct further negotiations beginning in 1977 for a more comprehensive agreement.
265. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
US-Soviet Oil Agreement

Frank Zarb, Alan Greenspan, Chuck Robinson, and I met on February 18, 1976 to discuss the status of the US-Soviet oil negotiations. The draft agreement would give the US an option to purchase 200,000 bpd of Soviet oil.

The Soviet team arrived a month ago to resume negotiations on the basis of the letter of intent signed by Chuck Robinson at the conclusion of our grain negotiations in Moscow last year. Although this letter was worded broadly enough to leave open the possibility of a marginal price discount to the United States, it is now apparent that we cannot in fact obtain an overt or significant price discount. The immediate economic benefits to the US must therefore come from advantageous shipping requirements, which would have the effect of reducing subsidies and increasing the use of US ships, or from import diversification and the new source of supply for US “independent” oil companies.

Zarb, Greenspan and I agreed with Robinson that to break off the negotiations now because we have been unable to obtain a price discount would be costly. It would risk charges of bad faith from the Soviets, who could point out that such a discount had not been a precondition of resumption of the talks. We believe it would be preferable to simply note at the end of this stage of the negotiations that we have “made progress,” and move on to the discussion of the shipping aspects of the agreement. We would reach interagency agreement now on “bottom line” shipping criteria (minimum terms which we would require on shipping in order to sign an overall oil agreement) and seek your approval of these criteria. If the Soviets did not agree to these minimum requirements, we could attempt again to negotiate a substantial price break; alternatively, we would have a more defensible basis for terminating the negotiations. If they did agree to adequate maritime

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 18, USSR (30). Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Butler forwarded a draft to Scowcroft on February 19; Scowcroft made a minor revision to the text. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Ford also initialed it. According to an attached correspondence profile, Ford noted it on February 24.

2 See footnote 6, Document 211.
provisions, we would have solid economic advantages to shipping which would outweigh the lack of an overt and significant oil price discount.

In any case, we concluded that we lose nothing by continuing negotiations, and that it would be difficult to terminate them gracefully at this point.³

³ In a February 27 memorandum to Scowcroft, Butler reported that 10 days of further talks had not “substantially altered the situation.” “Therefore,” Butler concluded, “the prospect at this time and under current guidelines is for continued stalemate—for perhaps ten days to two weeks—followed by termination of the negotiations.” Scowcroft wrote in the margin: “Keep me posted.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 18, USSR (31))

266. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford¹


SUBJECT

The 25th Soviet Party Congress

The 25th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party will convene on February 24. The Congress, the first in five years, is expected to reaffirm Leonid Brezhnev and the core of leaders around him in their positions and to reaffirm the basic outlines of their present policies. Shifts among second-echelon leaders, as well as some innovations in domestic programs, are possible, and could offer some clues as to how policy and the succession problem may develop in the post-Congress period. The following paragraphs, based on a CIA assessment, review the status of the leaders and possible changes at the Congress as well as

¹ Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 18, USSR (30). Confidential. Sent for information. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, the text was taken nearly verbatim from a February 13 assessment prepared by the CIA. In a February 18 memorandum to Scowcroft, Clift reported: “At our request, CIA has prepared an assessment of likely developments at the Congress—in both the leadership and in policy—based on the latest available intelligence information.” (Ibid.) A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Ford also initialed the memorandum. According to an attached correspondence profile, the President noted it on February 25.
the effects of events at home and abroad during the last year on present and future policies.

The Leaders

Brezhnev appears secure and determined to continue in office. The policy disappointments at home and abroad over the past year and a half have not seriously damaged his status. His health and stamina have stabilized in recent months, and he is able to function effectively, albeit at a reduced pace. Rumor and speculation—some from Soviet officials—that Brezhnev would soon retire have abated. At the republic congresses now under way, Brezhnev is being accorded a full portion of praise and honor.

Major changes in the rest of the leadership are also unlikely. A congress is not the usual occasion for a high-level shake-up. So long as the dominant senior members of the Politburo—Brezhnev, Kosygin, Podgorny, Suslov—hang together, underlings who desire a more vigorous leadership (and a bigger role for themselves in it) find no opening to promote change. The extremely small turnover of officials with Central Committee status who have been elected at the lower party meetings preceding the Congress suggests continued stability at the top.

The leadership is likely to make some adjustments in its membership at the secondary level. Premier Solomentsev of the Russian Republic and Leningrad party boss Romanov are among leaders who have some claim to promotion to full membership in the Politburo. At the same time, Arvid Pelshe, 77 and not influential, may retire honorably. The leadership has avoided recriminations over the harvest disaster, but it still may offer up someone—perhaps Agricultural Minister Polyansky—as a scapegoat.

If a top leader should go, Kosygin seems to be the most likely. Periodically, reports have circulated that he would like to retire and his health has been indifferent recently. Over the years his governmental apparatus has suffered attacks and incursions from the party, including Brezhnev, and reports of criticism cropped up again in December. Moreover, he is the only top leader who has an obvious successor, First Deputy Premier Mazurov. Even so, his departure is only a possibility, not a probability.

Although Brezhnev will remain at the helm, the Congress proceedings may give some indication that the leadership is beginning to address the problem of succession. Brezhnev has so far made no moves to establish a long-term successor, and most present candidates lack a good claim to his mantle. Shifts among junior leaders—for example, enhancing party secretary Kulakov’s status or bringing Ukrainian party
chief Shcherbitsky to Moscow—could signal that succession maneuvering has begun and suggest who might be a front-runner.

**Policies**

*Foreign Policy:* There seems little reason to doubt that the 25th Congress will reconfirm the CPSU’s dedication to the peace program outlined five years ago. The USSR’s foreign policy line is not seriously in question, and the tone as well as the specifics of Brezhnev’s report to the Congress will convey satisfaction and optimism. This will be attributed in the first instance to the growth of the USSR’s military capabilities, and the increased respect which must consequently be accorded to Soviet demands throughout the world.

On specific issues:

—Brezhnev will be able to point with pride to SALT I and the other agreements that were reached with the US in 1972. He will come out for a new SALT agreement and may put in a word in favor of future reductions, while repeating his call for the banning of new weapons of mass destruction. He will probably note that MBFR negotiations have begun since the 24th Congress in 1971 and call for more rapid progress in those talks.

—The treatment of the US relationship will probably be relatively sober. SALT II, MFN, credits, and Angola have helped create an atmosphere that would make it very difficult for Brezhnev, even if he were so inclined, to give a strongly positive cast to the US relationship. He will note the increasing activity of “anti-détente forces” in the US. At the same time, Brezhnev will want to signal—particularly in a US election year—that Soviet policy aims at getting détente with the US back on the tracks.

—Brezhnev will probably be positive on Moscow’s progress vis-à-vis West Europe. He can point to the Berlin quadripartite agreement, the treaty with the FRG, and expanding economic relations with Bonn, Paris, and London as concrete evidence of progress. Pride of place is likely to go to CSCE, which will be portrayed as a major achievement. Nevertheless, loss of momentum in bilateral relations with the FRG and France, serious difficulties in managing relations with Communist Parties in Europe, and disappointment with recent developments in Portugal, will all combine to give the West European part of the report a more subdued tone than would have been the case two years or even a year ago.

—Soviet treatment of China at the Congress is difficult to foresee. In the past week or so Moscow has been unusually harsh in its treatment of Peking; this could be a warm-up for a blast at the congress. But there is also a possibility that the Soviets are only reacting in a tactical way to what has been coming out of Peking since the unusually tough
People’s Daily editorial on New Year’s Day. At the 24th Congress, Brezhnev treated China with remarkable forebearance, given the fact that the border fighting was less than two years away. One argument in favor of such an approach this year is the recent leadership changes in Peking. The Soviets are not optimistic, but they might strike a moderate pose so as either to encourage “pro-Soviet” elements in China or, at least, to avoid giving additional ammunition to Moscow’s enemies there.

—Brezhnev will probably emphasize Moscow’s support for the “struggle against imperialism” and for national liberation movements. Communist successes in Vietnam and Angola will be prominent, not only because they are “successes,” but because Brezhnev will be seeking to underline the point that détente has not prevented the Soviet Union from carrying out its international socialist duty. He may also lean forward in this area in order to breathe life into the idea that the Soviet Union does have a leadership role in the world communist movement.

Domestic Policy: Most of Brezhnev’s ambitious plans to put his stamp on the country’s future at this Congress will come to naught. A long-term economic plan (1976–90) and a new constitution, which he promised for the Congress, are evidently far from ready. His rather vague calls for a comprehensive rationalization of agricultural and industrial management have generated little response. At the Congress next week:

—The leadership will try to gloss over present economic difficulties and to retain the verbal commitment to a consumer program that has for the time being lost much of its substance. Quality and efficiency will be stressed over quantitative growth. Brezhnev may be tempted to launch some modest management reorganization proposals for agriculture or industry to create a more convincing image of initiative in these areas.

—In the ideological sphere, Brezhnev will convey the message that détente and the CSCE agreements do not mean a slackening of the ideological struggle or of internal discipline.
SUBJECT

Special National Intelligence Estimate: "Implications of the 1975 Soviet Harvest"

The Director of Central Intelligence, with the concurrence of the United States Intelligence Board, has issued a Special National Intelligence Estimate on the implications of the disastrous 1975 Soviet harvest (at Tab A). The following paragraphs review the magnitude of the grain shortage in the USSR and measures being taken to cope with it, the domestic political consequences, the implications for U.S. grain sales this year and beyond to the USSR and possible related political leverage, and the impact on Soviet grain customers in Eastern Europe. A principal conclusion of the Estimate is that the "leverage" inherent in a temporary Soviet grain dependency on the U.S. is limited.

Developments in 1975

The 1975 crop failure in the Soviet Union was the worst since Leonid Brezhnev came to power in 1964. Production of all major crops suffered from severe drought during much of the 1975 growing season and grain production—140 million tons or 50 million tons below the average for 1971–74—was less than two-thirds of needs. The grain shortage, in particular, had far-reaching consequences:

—The livestock sector of the economy was hardest hit in 1975, despite government efforts to maintain the herds by such desperate measures as shipping animals from drought to non-drought areas, feeding livestock low-grade feedstuffs, cancelling longstanding export commitments to Eastern Europe and purchasing 27 million tons of foreign grain. State and collective farms began distress slaughtering of hogs...
and poultry late last summer and scattered sources report that private owners of livestock were also killing their animals during the fall. As a result, inventories of hogs and poultry dropped 20 percent and 15 percent respectively during 1975.

—The consumer was generally unaffected last year by the poor harvest, but by late in the year shortages of some food products—notably flour—were being reported in parts of the drought stricken area.

—Soviet GNP growth fell to about 2½ percent last year, a drop from 4½ percent in 1971–73, due in substantial measure to two successive years of decline in agricultural output.

—Imports of grain cost the Soviets over $1 billion in 1975, increasing the hard-currency deficit to an estimated record $4.7 billion.

The Outlook for 1976

The main impact of the 1975 crop failure will be felt this year and the consumer will be hardest hit. Probably the most serious problem in 1976 will be an expected one quarter drop in per capita meat consumption. In addition, an expected downturn in egg and milk production from 1975 levels will further erode the quality of the Soviet diet. Domestic and imported feed supplies will not be sufficient to support livestock inventories at the January 1, 1976 level and further distress slaughtering of livestock will occur at least in the first quarter of 1976. Prolonged shortages of meat will therefore be common through the summer and probably for the remainder of the year.

Consumer reaction to the expected meat shortages is difficult to predict. While the Soviet people have traditionally accepted programs to build the military and boost industrial production as justifying slow growth in living standards, food shortages and price increases caused by Khrushchev’s agrarian policies sparked considerable civil discontent and some rioting in the early 1960s. The 1976 contraction in meat supplies is expected to be unusually severe and comes in the wake of regime promises which have aroused expectations among consumers. Additionally, the government has done little to prepare consumers for the coming shortages. As a result, morale will undoubtedly sag and tensions will grow during the next few months, reaching a peak in late spring and early summer when shortages of livestock products will be most severe. There will be widespread grumbling in urban centers and occasional disorders are possible outside the major cities, especially if an equitable form of rationing is not enacted.

The government’s control mechanisms are adequate for their tasks but a pervasive malaise is likely. Criticism and debate within the regime on agricultural policy can be expected to mount.

In the area of foreign trade and payments, grain imports will be the main cause of a hard currency deficit of $3–5 billion in 1976. While
equipment purchases contracted in previous years will keep 1976 So-
viet imports high, Moscow is apparently reducing its planned cash ex-
penditures abroad. There is, however, no indication that the USSR’s
longer-term policy of increasing imports of high-technology Western
products is changing.

As in the past, no slackening of key military programs is expected
as a result of the crop failure. The poor harvests of the early 1960s did
not hinder the first major buildup of Soviet strategic weapons and the
poor harvest of 1972 came at a time when the Soviets were preparing a
number of new strategic missiles for production and deployment. The
new Five Year Plan suggests that the military establishment will re-
maintain insulated from the effects of last year’s harvest. In fact, it appears
that the plan allows for a rise in expenditures for military and space
programs.

Another harvest failure in 1976 would force further large reduc-
tions in livestock numbers and additional massive imports of grain
from hard currency areas. This, in turn, might force the USSR to make
substantial cutbacks in non-agricultural imports from the U.S. and else-
where to avoid a rapid build-up of foreign debt. The Soviet consumer
would face another reduction in meat supplies and, as the meat queues
lengthened, the leadership would have to decide whether formal rati-
oning should be initiated. Another poor harvest in 1976 or 1977 could
generate domestic difficulties on a scale that would affect regime cohe-
sion. The succession problem would then take on more urgency, and
the chances of factionalism would increase as the agricultural issue be-
came critical.

Soviet Need for U.S. Grain

Even if the grain harvests in the next several years are average or moder-
ately above average, the Soviets will have to import from the West more than
the 6–8 million tons per year stipulated in the US–USSR grain agreement.
The Soviet demand for U.S. grain depends on hard to predict Soviet re-
quirements and on production prospects in supplier countries. Addi-
tionally, over the longer term the U.S. share of the Soviet grain pur-
chases could be considerably reduced if the Soviets are willing to
develop the markets of smaller exporting countries.

While chronic agricultural problems may exert some moderating
effect on Soviet calculations about adventurist foreign activity, Moscow
probably believes that it need not take this factor into much account in
specific situations, reasoning that:

—it is already entitled to buy up to 8 million tons per year;
—U.S. ability to exert leverage is limited since U.S. farm and free
trade interests will oppose any attempt to limit sales in reaction to un-
wanted Soviet behavior, and any government controls are likely to be
short-lived;
—in the short run, other countries will provide additional amounts;
—over the longer run, the Soviets could expect to shift the pattern of their imports toward other suppliers; and
—in extreme circumstances, substantial belt-tightening is possible, and this is the likely reaction of the leadership to overt foreign pressures.

Soviet behavior to date, for example in Angola, suggests that the leadership sees no need to accommodate U.S. concerns because of its current reliance on U.S. grain.

Further successive crop failures, however, would create import needs that only the U.S. could satisfy. On occasions when the leadership wants to exceed the 8 million ton level of the five year agreement, it will probably judge that it should avoid threatening or highly offensive behavior in other arenas for a time. And if the bilateral détente relationship came under serious challenge, either in the U.S. or USSR, the advantages of the grain arrangement would be one of the significant arguments in Moscow in favor of keeping that relationship on an even keel and promoting mutual interests.

In sum, the DCI and the USIB judge that the “leverage” inherent in a temporary Soviet grain dependency is limited. The stringencies that would face the regime are unlikely to be so desperate, nor the extent of U.S. power to withhold goods so great, as to compel the USSR to substantially alter any important element of its domestic or foreign policy in response to outside pressure. Indeed, overt pressure from abroad would probably unify the leadership behind a negative reaction. If the result were reduced access to foreign grain, the regime would, we judge, be able to maintain control over increasingly disgruntled consumers.

Implications for Eastern Europe

The East European regimes stand to be tested as a result of the 1975 harvest. More than half of their normal grain imports come from the USSR, and these have been cut off for the current crop year, forcing them into Western markets. This phenomenon is likely to recur, probably compelling a reduction in East European imports of Western capital goods (of which the U.S. share is small). Any sharp reduction in living standards in East Europe carries with it a heightened risk of popular disorders, more so than would be the case in the USSR. While the USSR probably will provide some financial assistance to its clients in their time of troubles, it will resist any accelerated redirection of their trade patterns toward the West. This will be a persistent dilemma for both the Soviets and the East Europeans.

This memorandum is forwarded to provide you with the intelligence community’s initial assessment of the impact to be expected from the Soviet crop failure. We will continue to monitor developments in
the USSR and Eastern Europe closely and to examine the implications for U.S. policy.

268. Transcript of Interview With President Ford

Miami, March 1, 1976, 11:30 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Soviet Union.]

Mr. Whitcomb: Would it be that the Chinese are in disagreement with our policy of détente? Do you see this as an embarrassment to you, the fact that they did invite Mr. Nixon?2

The President: Not at all. When I was in China and met with Chairman Mao and with others, we had many, many discussions on world problems and world affairs.3 They want us to be strong. They agree with virtually every one of our foreign policy objectives.

We have many different philosophical views or political organization views, but I didn’t detect any lack of support for what we were trying to do throughout the world.

Mr. Whitcomb: Does there exist today, because of the Chinese opposition, a more serious problem with détente?

The President: I don’t use the word “détente” any more. I think what we ought to say is that the United States will meet with superpowers, the Soviet Union and with China and others, and seek to relax tensions so that we can continue a policy of peace through strength.

If we are strong militarily, which we are, and if we continue that strength, we can negotiate with the Soviet Union, with China and with others in order to maintain that peace. “Détente” is only a word that was coined—I don’t think it is applicable any more.

I think we have to talk about the realities—the negotiation for a lowering of a strategic nuclear ballistic type capability. We ought to talk about trade. We ought to talk about science and those things in an atmosphere where we are dealing from strength and we recognize that

1 Source: Ford Library, Nessen Files, Box 30, President Media Interviews, WCKT–TV (Richard Whitcomb)—Miami, March 1, 1976. No classification marking. Ford was in Florida to campaign before the March 9 Republican Presidential primary.

2 Nixon visited China in February 1976 as a private citizen.

3 President Ford made an official visit to China December 1–5, 1975, meeting with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.
others may have some but we have to have that strength to move ahead.

[Omitted here is discussion of the domestic economy.]

269. Briefing Memorandum From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Saunders) to Secretary of State Kissinger


Economic Leverage on the USSR

You are confronted with a great deal of simplistic talk about the “leverage” which our economic arrangements with the USSR give us in trying to change Soviet policy on whatever issue is being discussed at the moment.

As the principal architect of our policy, you do not need any help with the broad political response to those who take this line.

However, as a complement to the basic response, I thought you would be interested in the attached analysis of the economic limits of economic “leverage.”

What this boils down to is a series of simple statements that can be made about the economics of the relationship, bearing in mind that such statements about the economic limits in the relationship must always be read also in a larger political context:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Jan–April 1976. Secret. Drafted by Saunders and Lawrence J. Kennon in INR/REC on February 28. Forwarded through Sonnenfeldt. In a March 6 memorandum to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt commented: “The attached paper from Hal Saunders on economic leverage does not deal at all with the more fundamental issue of how we and other industrialized countries use economic assets to affect the longer term evolution of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. That is a much more complex subject than the simple issue of specific ‘leverage.’ Indeed the arguments over leverage, real and alleged, obscure the real issue in economic relations with the USSR: what impact can the outside world have on Soviet economic priorities, how can the outside world expand areas of interrelatedness between the Soviet and other economies, to what degree can Soviet reliance on the outside world be fostered, what policies, procedures and mechanisms are needed to permit non-market economies like ours to have a strategy toward market economies at all, specifically how can the U.S. do this vis-à-vis the USSR? Despite its lack of larger focus, the paper is a useful compendium of debating points that can be used in the ongoing discussion.” (Ibid.)

2 INR Report No. 325; not attached.
The Soviet economy is still almost completely economically independent of the United States.

Almost anything we supply them, such as grain, they could obtain sooner or later from other sources or, if need be, could do without altogether. The latter might be painful for them, but not so much so as to cause them to change any important policy or embarrass themselves with a reversal under obvious pressure.

Under current circumstances, economic leverage can be effective when tactfully used to gain lesser accommodations in a given negotiation or situation, as in the case of the grain freight-rate premium. Thus, we are now in a position where economic agreements must be negotiated on the basis of mutual economic advantage.

However, whenever the issue is of real importance, any attempt to apply economic leverage to the USSR directly is more likely to get their backs up than to force concessions.

A positive offer of something the Soviets want has a better chance of success than attempts to deprive them of something they have. There are somewhat differing views within this building of the extent to which this will be true over time. Some feel that US leverage will increase over time if the Soviets remain committed to the policy of modernizing their economy through importation of advanced Western technology and increasing Soviet meat consumption. Others agree that rising Soviet demand for US advanced technology and other products may over time contribute to a spirit of accommodation, but they believe this would be unlikely to increase our capacity to influence Soviet policies by withholding or threatening to withhold goods, services, or benefits the Soviets need and want.

Most of these points are more fully developed in the attached analysis. We will see what we can do to push the analysis on the last issue further.
February 1976–January 1977  1017

270.  Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and Ted Koppel of ABC News

Washington, March 17, 1976, 12:35 p.m.

Koppel: You have just been accused of being helpless and very emotional.

K: Who is that, Jackson?

Koppel: No, the Russians. The Russians are particularly talking about what happened yesterday as a display of helplessness and emotional.

K: What happened yesterday?

Koppel: Funseth’s statement at the briefing.2

K: Oh.

Koppel: What intrigues me though is the Russians seem to be exceedingly optimistic about SALT.

K: If they are I do not know why.

Koppel: You are not?

K: It depends on their answer.

Koppel: The kind of scenario that I could see building, if you had any indication that SALT was alive and well what is possible for political issues to get tough and once the primaries are over we revive the move toward détente.

K: We made this move 3 weeks ago. It is a serious move.

Koppel: It was never linked 3 weeks ago to Angola.

K: That is correct but we were positive they would figure it out for themselves what the reason was. I think we are living in that time now where everybody talks. This was not a high-level decision to figure this out.

Koppel: You were not intending this to be taken as a slap against SALT.

K: No. I wanted it to be taken as a sign the Angolans are not free.

Koppel: They are taking it as a sign this is an election year.

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking.

2 On March 16, Robert L. Funseth, the Department of State Spokesman, announced that, due to Soviet military involvement in Angola, the United States would temporarily suspend its participation in several Soviet-American joint commissions. “In light of the situation in Angola,” Funseth explained, “we felt we could not conduct our business with the Soviet Union as usual.” (Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S., Angry Over Angola, To Delay 3 Soviet Meetings,” The New York Times, March 17, 1976, pp. 1, 4) For background on this decision, see Document 261.
K: Believe me, we would have done this in any event and this was not intended to come out in the primaries or we could have put it out 3 weeks ago when it would have done him a hell of a lot more good. He did not need it in the primaries.

Koppel: Yes.

K: The time to put it out would have been before Florida. This decision was made in the middle of February.

Koppel: As far as SALT is concerned, nothing ... you know the Russians and how talkative they are in town. Today they are being extremely talkative. Unless you call up, you are lucky to get a good morning out of them. Today they are being very helpful.

K: Good. I consider that to be a good sign. It also means we are getting through to them. The fact they say we are helpless and emotional, that is not the worst thing they could say.

Koppel: That is right. What they find interesting is that they find Jackson particularly interesting as a candidate. He has never openly opposed détente, just you. They say he attacks you, not détente.

K: That is not true but lately he has been shifting on that. I don’t think it is true he has never attacked détente but he has lately shifted on that which indicates something on the public mood.

Koppel: Okay. Good. Thanks very much.

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3 Ford narrowly defeated Reagan in the Republican primary in Florida on March 9.
271. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Talk with Vorontsov: Soviet SALT Proposal on Its Way; Angola; Moscow Embassy Radiation

Dobrynin’s Health

When I had Vorontsov in to discuss our various efforts regarding the attacks on and harassment of Soviet personnel and facilities in New York, I asked him about Dobrynin’s health. He said Dobrynin was now recuperating from severe flu and pneumonia and it would be some time before he returns.

SALT

I then asked whether this means a delay in their response on SALT. He said it did not. I kept Vorontsov back alone after our other business was complete to ask him more specifically about SALT and the stories out of his Embassy that there will be an agreement in two months. Vorontsov said he was expecting, possibly still today, a letter from Brezhnev to the President which, he thought, would advance the SALT dialogue. Vorontsov said he would contact you as soon as he has precise instructions. He added that our last position offered some possibility for discussion but “did not save enough face.” I simply said I hoped the Brezhnev letter would advance matters. Vorontsov said they hoped an agreement could be wrapped up before the election campaign got too far along, i.e., in May some time. (This in fact fits with the Embassy dope stories which thus would seem to be authorized.)

Joint Commissions

Vorontsov then asked why we were “killing” the joint commissions by cancelling meetings. I said our purpose was to remove high visibility activities from the line of fire at a time when we and the country at large were profoundly disturbed by Soviet/Cuban actions in Angola and, perhaps, beyond. Vorontsov said we should have explained to him what we were doing rather than launch a boisterous press campaign to the effect we were punishing the Soviets. I told him that the original press story was unauthorized, that our plan had been

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, Jan–April 1976. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.
for each cabinet or agency head involved to inform his Soviet counterpart and that we would then confirm the postponements.

_Angola_

Vorontsov said he had been repeatedly asked by Moscow why we were reacting as violently to Angola as we were. Vorontsov said he thought we were overreacting. They could understand that we should have been “sore” about “losing” in Angola, but now we were saying and doing things that really go to the core of our relations and this was unwise. Vorontsov said the Soviets have no intention to go beyond Angola and neither do the Cubans. Moreover, we should remember that the Soviets are poor colonizers and have been notably unsuccessful in remaining influential in African states.

I told Vorontsov that he sounded like me since I too regarded the Soviets as “lousy imperialists.” On the other hand, we were bound to react to Angola with deep concern. Not only had the Soviets, with Cuban troops, imposed a minority regime, but they were now implanted in the midst of a highly explosive situation in Southern Africa where they could greatly add to the turbulence. Vorontsov said we should relax; the Soviets would not get themselves dragged into the conflicts of the region. As for the Cubans, we really should not feel that they will conquer Africa and Asia, like Alexander the Great.

I said the best thing they could do was to get the Cubans out of Angola and to reduce their own role to a more normal one. Vorontsov said we should be patient. As for the Cubans, there was no way to simply tell them to pull out. Castro was a very mature man now and we could rest assured that what happens in Southern Africa will be done by Africans. I told Vorontsov that I did not find this reassuring. The Soviets and Cubans were there on the ground with thousands of troops and hundreds of tanks and other military equipment. Even with all the maturity in the world, they would find it hard to refrain from intervening and this was bound to give us the gravest concern.

Vorontsov said again that we were exaggerating the problem, that the Soviets had no intention to involve themselves beyond Angola and that the Cubans would eventually leave, though they would no doubt want to help the MPLA establish itself. Vorontsov said that all our warnings and threats might have been understandable when we first lost out in Angola but now they sounded like we were trying to whip up public sentiment against the USSR. I said we were profoundly concerned both by what had happened and by what might happen and want to be sure this was clearly recognized by all, at home and abroad. Vorontsov said we should remember that the Soviets had shown great restraint in the Middle East, where we had driven them out of Egypt and reduced their influence. In that area, the Soviets could have been
far more vigorous in their actions. So, we should not assume that they will be adventurous thousands of miles further away.

Moreover, there were no Soviet troops in Angola, nor would there be. We should also remember that détente was born under the bombs of the US falling on Hanoi and Haiphong in 1972; so it could thrive with Angola, also. I said those bombs covered our withdrawal from Vietnam, while the Soviets have established a new position where they never had interests and from which they could move forward. Vorontsov said they still have no interests there. (And so it went.)

The Election Campaign

Vorontsov then said that they had assumed that after the President had won a couple of primaries our emotional talk would subside. But now, even though Reagan was obviously out of it, they really could not account for what we were saying. I said that what the President and you had said was not for political purposes but reflected real concern. Vorontsov said they have concluded that the President will be re-elected and they were pleased by the prospect. But we really should not exaggerate the danger of Soviet, or Cuban, involvement in the further course of events in Southern Africa.

Moscow Signal

At the end, I asked Vorontsov when, or indeed whether we could expect a reply, in word and deed, to our response to their initiative on the Moscow Embassy radiation problem.² He said he did not know but would inquire again; they had responded “in deed” by turning down the intensity. I said the problem remained both because of the health problem and because we are after all in an asymmetrical situation where they interfere with our Embassy and we do nothing to them. Vorontsov said there was nothing to jam in the Soviet Embassy, anyway. I said he should check with his intelligence types on that. Vorontsov then said that they were convinced there is no health hazard in Moscow. I said we cannot be so sure and are making careful medical checks. The situation on Stoessel was a painful illustration. Vorontsov agreed that health had to be taken seriously. I told him to use his influence in Moscow to get a response to our proposals since we continue to regard the problem as one of the utmost seriousness.

² On February 11, The New York Times reported concerns among Embassy employees in Moscow, as well as foreign diplomats, about the possible harmful effects of microwave radiation caused by Soviet listening devices. (“U.S. Radiation Report Worries Foreign Diplomats in Moscow,” p. 16) The Washington Post reported on February 27 that Ambassador Stoessel was suffering from anemia, possibly as a result of the radiation, and that the Department of State was sending a doctor to the Embassy to assess the risks. (“Health Test Set at U.S. Embassy,” p. A1)
272. Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford

Moscow, March 17, 1976.

Dear Mr. President,

I and my colleagues have thoroughly studied the consideration set forth in your letter of February 16, 1976 about current situation in the relations between our countries. It appears that we and you are evaluating in different way the causes of certain difficulties which cropped up into these relations lately. We have already expounded to you our point of view on that matter. It remains the same. It is important, however, that both you and we stand for overcoming the existing difficulties, for further improvement of the Soviet-American relations.

On our part we do not feel any hesitations in choosing the path. It was very recently stated at the highest forum of our country—the 25th Congress of the CPSU—that the Soviet Union intends firmly to continue the course for further improving Soviet-American relations in strict compliance with the spirit and letter of the concluded agreements and the undertaken commitments.

We definitely proceed from the assumption that there objectively exist necessary prerequisites that, granted mutual desire, the relations between our countries should continue to be developed and strengthened in the interests of our two peoples and the cause of world peace.

In this connection we as well as you, Mr. President, attach top priority to an early conclusion of working out and signing a long-term agreement on the whole complex of questions of limiting strategic weapons on the basis of the agreement reached between us in Vladivostok.

In the course of the talks already after Vladivostok—and you, certainly know it well—the Soviet side took a number of important steps to meet the American side in attempts to find mutually acceptable resolutions to the remaining issues.

Unfortunately, the same cannot be said about the position of the American side including the latest proposals which you call compromise ones in your letter.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 29, USSR, The “D” File. No classification marking. In an attached handwritten note, Eagleburger reported that the message was delivered on March 17 at 8:15 p.m.; according to marginalia, Scowcroft received a copy on March 18 at 7:05 a.m.

2 Document 263.
Let us, however, look whether they are really of such nature.

It is known that in meeting the wishes of the American side we expressed readiness to count as MIRVed missiles (1320 units) all missiles of the types which have been tested with MIRV, under condition that simultaneously agreement would be reached on the whole complex of cruise missiles. Up till now the American side as well agreed to that.

Yet now the American side proposes to consider as agreed only the first question—a bout the way of counting MIRVed missiles putting it in long-term agreement while leaving under the terms of these proposals actually unresolved the question of sea-based and land-based cruise missiles.

True, you propose that missiles of these two types should not be operationally deployed until January 1, 1979, but their production and testing would not be banned. But let us speak frankly—actually it would be a sanctioning of a new channel of strategic arms race because it is unrealistic to think that it would be easier to agree on banning long-range cruise missiles after they have been developed and, possibly, even put into mass production and not now when it hasn’t happened yet.

Trying to remove from limiting these really strategic types of weapons the American side at the same time attempts as before to put limitation of some kind on Soviet medium-range bomber which it calls “Backfire” and which is in no way related to the subject of the negotiations. The artificial character of including this issue into agenda and persistency shown by the American side in the matter cannot but bring inference that someone is deliberately trying to put roadblocks on the way to reaching an agreement.

Thus we do not see any forward movement in the US proposals of February 16 in comparison with what was discussed during Secretary Kissinger’s visit to Moscow last January. Moreover, there is a certain movement backward. It first of all applies to a linked solution of the questions of MIRVed missiles and cruise missiles, which I have mentioned above. Further, the US side agreed in January with the complete ban on submarine cruise missiles with the range over 600 km. and now it backed away from this agreement.

So, can one consider, Mr. President, such proposals as compromise ones?

I am saying this with all directness, because in such serious business one cannot leave any ambiguities.

We believe that the proposals which we set forth at the conclusion of the talks with Mr. Kissinger in Moscow constitute the realistic basis for solving the remaining issues of strategic arms limitations which are not yet agreed upon, and we hope that the US side would once again thoroughly weigh them from that very point of view.
There remain not so many unresolved issues, and if energetic efforts are taken for settling them the work on the Agreement can be completed within a very short period of time, which both sides are equally interested in.

In conclusion, I would like to reemphasize that in our deep conviction we can and must provide—proceeding from what has already been accomplished in Soviet-American relations and not succumbing to influences of various momentary considerations—for onward movement across the wide field of those relations.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

273. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, March 18, 1976, 9:35–10:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: There is nothing in the Soviet letter [the Brezhnev letter of March 17]. They misled us all day long. Voronstov briefed the press that we could have an agreement in two months. He called me and said it didn’t meet all our points but was positive. [He describes the letter.] They proposed going back to their January position as a basis.

President: Their idea for reductions has appealed to me.

Kissinger: We have two problems: How to handle the letter so it doesn’t do damage next week; and how to conduct our affairs in the government.

I think we are undermining détente. Except for Angola, I think the Soviets are getting a bum rap. I don’t believe they have massively in-

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 18. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 Document 272.
creased their forces. It is a gradual trend and will continue no matter what. They have been quiet in the Middle East. Only Angola was out of bounds.

The next thing which will happen is the Democrats will say SALT has collapsed and we have ruined détente. The Democrats may seize the peace issue.

President: Reagan hasn’t made headway with his charges as long as we are at peace and moving. SALT is in our national interest. The question is how to proceed.

Kissinger: We could have an NSC meeting late tomorrow. Hand out the letter, warn them against all leaks, and say we want a proposal for the next step within two weeks.

Scowcroft: It will leak. I would suggest instead that you call in just the principals, show them the note, and tell them you want to think about next steps.

President: I think it should be principals only. Maybe just here in the office—the three of us, Don, George,3 and George Bush.

Kissinger: I think Ikle also.

President: Let’s have a meeting late Friday4 with those people. Say it is not to distribute or it will leak. Say start a study the first of next week.

Kissinger: I agree with Brent. Say you just want to think about it over the weekend. Then have an NSC next Wednesday. I would even mention the option of suspending the talks. None of them will want to take the heat for it! [There is discussion of notifying Rumsfeld ahead of the others.]

You could then decide whether to go for one or not. If not, you could respond—which I don’t recommend—or string out the talks.5

[Omitted here is discussion of the Middle East, Vietnam, and Congress. At the end of the meeting, Kissinger interjected: “I think we should trim our sails a bit on the Soviet Union. We should keep clobbering them on Angola—partly to keep the [heat] on the Congress.”]

3 Donald Rumsfeld and General George Brown.
4 March 19.
5 During a meeting in the Oval Office that evening, the President assessed the Soviet note on SALT: “Most of you know I feel strongly that I think a good SALT treaty is in the national interest. But this note [Tab A] raises the possibility—if we pursue our present course—that we will be forced to suspend the talks for 1976.” “Another approach would be procedural,” Rumsfeld suggested, “ask them what they would propose to do now. Another approach would be to leave it in Geneva; another would be to defer until next year. Another approach would be Brezhnev visit without SALT. These are illustrative.” Ford concluded: “I think this note deserves careful thought.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 18)
274. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[Kissinger:] I am worried about the Soviet approach. If we piss on everything, we will lose the whole policy. If they think you are no better than anyone else they can do a lot to harass you. I think we should look for ways to reimpose our commitment to détente. We must show them Angola was unacceptable, but in retrospect I think the public postponement of the joint commissions was a mistake. Don’s approach yesterday was nonsense.2

The President: It didn’t make sense.
Kissinger: I am assuming that even if you don’t want an agreement you don’t want to break off the talks.

The President: I would prefer an agreement, because I think that is in the national interest.

Kissinger: One way to go would be to improve our last proposal, or pick out some of the more attractive aspects of the Soviet January proposal. Or to put together the best proposal we can, based on our old options, with reductions, but make it a final proposal not subject to negotiation.

The President: I like that approach. Especially I think reductions are very attractive. What is our timing?

Kissinger: I think we should do it in a leisurely way. After the meeting next Wednesday,3 you could say you want to think about it some more, until after the Wisconsin primary4 maybe. Then get them in and give them instructions to improve the last offer and also to look at Option II again. I don’t think you can let the process run free like the last time. I think you are in better shape now because in January the Chiefs were positioning themselves against a Jackson victory or against the Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee.

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 18. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 See footnote 5, Document 273.
3 March 24.
4 April 6.
The President: Is there an advantage in offering alternates—like extending the dates on the latest one and give them a modification on our earlier one?

Kissinger: I wouldn’t give them two. On the reduction proposal I would do it as a more or less final offer. If we use the latest one, I would just change the date to 1983.

The President: Brent, will you write down these options over the weekend so I can study them.

Kissinger: But I wouldn’t be that specific next Wednesday. I wouldn’t go further than to say you want to work for an agreement but you want to think more about how to go about it.

[There is some discussion of speeches and the political situation, and about Connally and the Secretary’s Dallas speech.]5

5 Brackets in the original. For the text of Kissinger’s speech on foreign policy and national security, delivered in Dallas on March 22, see Department of State Bulletin, April 12, 1976, pp. 457–465.

275. Memorandum of Conversation1

Washington, March 24, 1976, 5:50–7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
General George S. Brown, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Fred Ikle, Director, ACDA
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

SUBJECT
SALT

[Discussion of how to deal with press inquiries. It was decided to acknowledge that we have received an answer from the Soviet Union.]2

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 18. Secret; Nodis. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 Document 272.
We should say they have given us their considerations and this is another step in our continuing discussion.

The President: Don, why don’t you start?
Rumsfeld: I am inclined to a procedural approach.

The President: What do you mean?
Rumsfeld: Asking them what they would propose is no good because they think they have something on the table. We don’t have anything new. I would think put off until January; a summit without SALT, where the two of you can just talk. I would just shy away from dusting off a proposal we had made.

The President: George?
Brown: I heaved a sigh of relief. I thought our last proposal had some problems, so I tend to the procedural approach.

The President: Fred?
Ikle: I don’t think we should do anything in the meantime which would interfere with SALT—like Minuteman III. Then perhaps we could put some more issues into Geneva—not the central ones. We could then also undertake to educate them on these ambiguous systems.

The President: Henry?
Kissinger: There are three possibilities—deferral, stall, or make one final proposal.

[Discusses the three options]

The President: Putting it to Geneva is no good. I think we either suspend and ask for more money, or we look at the January proposals and see if there is anything to work with. Why not have the Verification Panel work at it for two weeks? If we can come up with a new wrinkle, fine. If not, we suspend and go to the Congress for more money.

Rumsfeld: I don’t think we necessarily need to ask for more money unless they start to break out.

I would urge you to expand your guidance to include the procedural option and not just review our two proposals and breaking off.

Scowcroft: We should set a deadline and ought to keep working on it.

The President: I don’t want to dilly dally around with Geneva or other procedures. I want either a new crack at it or to break it off.

[Much discussion]

I would like it if the Verification Panel would take these points of impasse and see if there is some place we can get some movement. I am

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3 See Document 264.
just not willing to do nothing for five or six months without sending up a request for more money.

Rumsfeld: I don’t think you should go up for more money just because we are delayed for five or six months. To do that, we should show that the Soviet Union has done something—the fact is they haven’t.

[Much discussion]

The President: Let’s have the Verification Panel look into the possibilities of modifying our last proposal or the one Henry and Brezhnev discussed.

Rumsfeld: It will certainly leak. We should think about getting out a statement about the Brezhnev response.

Scowcroft: That looks bad. We can have a question planted.

The President: And we could just say they gave us their considerations, and we will study them. This is just another step in the negotiating process.

276. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT
Conversation with Vorontsov

After I protested to Vorontsov concerning their latest harassment campaign against our Moscow Embassy, I spoke to him privately.

I told him we had instructed our spokesman to acknowledge that we had had a reply on SALT, that it contained Soviet considerations on the issues and that we were studying it. Vorontsov said this was a good thing to do since Senators and others were beginning to attack the Soviets for dragging their feet. I said we had not said that.

In response to my question, Vorontsov reiterated that the purport of the Soviet response was to indicate that they had felt we were on the way to a solution during the Moscow talks and that they had noted press stories that after North Carolina the President would be wholly

absorbed by domestic politics and that he would not be ready to focus on SALT again until after the Convention, or at any rate would not want to have any agreement until after that. Moscow, he said, was not inclined to “impose” on the President in these circumstances. I said this was all speculation and that if there were any additional considerations in Moscow it certainly will be quite possible to deal with them here, whatever the President’s campaign schedule. In any case, we were continuing to study the situation and hoped Moscow would not stand still.

I then said that the PNE talks were going nowhere fast and it looks like March 31 will come and go without agreement. Vorontsov said this will require some diplomatic action with respect to the TTBT. I said we were considering how to handle the passing of the originally envisaged effective date for the TTBT.

Vorontsov asked whether we were yet ready to consult on their broader proposal on mass destruction weapons. I said this remained under study but I personally found it hard to get my teeth into the concept. Vorontsov said they were interested in our ideas, as Korniyenko had told Stoessel and he, Vorontsov, had mentioned to you. I said the matter remained under study.

Vorontsov asked whether we would have any further response on their proposals for a comprehensive test ban. I said I thought Ikle had given him our views, which remained as they were.

I reminded Vorontsov that in our last conversation I had urged him to stress in Moscow that we still wanted a positive response from them on the radiation issue in Moscow. Vorontsov said he had reported that but nothing had yet been received. He said that in Moscow they were so mad about what had been happening to their facilities and people in New York that he thought they had not been able to bring themselves to respond on the radiation. I said we had not linked these matters though they quite probably would be in our press because of the additional harassment against our Embassy in recent days. I said the Soviets should not be making the connection since their radiation had been going on for many years and was a form of harassment that should cease under any circumstances. I said we were coming up to the

2 Reagan defeated Ford in the North Carolina Republican primary on March 23. During a telephone conversation late that evening, Kissinger and Eagleburger discussed the results: “E: Have you heard the news? K: We lost? E: Beyond that we relaxed a little soon. The news so far is ascribing it to détente so we will hear about it for a couple of weeks. K: That détente brought it about? E: The commentary is that there is some evidence of Reagan taking extra votes on his attacks against you and détente. These are the early commentaries.” “You know the tragedy is we had it licked,” Kissinger commented. “Any victories would have done it.” (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations) The Republican National Convention was scheduled for August.

3 See Document 271.
point where further publicity would become unavoidable. We were briefing, as we had to, personnel who have served in Moscow over the past years and sooner or later this will become public. We would then have to say that our efforts to get the signals turned off had failed. He at once said “Don’t do that, please. The matter is not dead. We will reply.” I said time was getting short and he should report to Moscow again that a response was essential so that this form of action against us will be stopped.

I said in conclusion that we had noted the Soviet role on the matter of the South Africans in Angola. Vorontsov pointed out that Gromyko had publicly stated in London that the Soviets were not going to get involved outside Angola. I said I hoped this was so and that now they should also get the Cubans out of there. Vorontsov said the Cubans would probably be staying awhile, but not for the purpose of other interventions. He said he did not like our escalating rhetoric about the Soviets and Cubans in Southern Africa and that he hoped Gromyko’s comments would have an effect. I said we had taken their involvement in Angola very seriously indeed and remained greatly concerned about further interventions. So, we have to make it known. Vorontsov said he was sure we were inspiring the press reports about contingency plans for blockades and invasions. We should remember that all these stories are copiously reported to Moscow by TASS. I said we were not inspiring this kind of speculation at all but our authoritative statements about Cuban intervention were a reflection of the very serious view we take of any such prospect.

Vorontsov said Dobrynin was out of the hospital and recuperating.
277. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 8, 1976, 4:54–5:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Don Kendall
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

[There was small talk at the beginning.]

Kendall: I know your schedule is tight, so I am organized. I want to talk about US-Soviet relations and politics.

I started going to the Soviet Union in 1939.

[Discusses his qualifications as a Soviet student.]

I believe in détente—there is no other answer.

[Discusses political qualifications—campaigning for Nixon in ’66, ’68, ’72.]

There were no “plusses” in the Cold War—either political or military. It is easy to give a speech and kick the Soviets around. It takes some guts and innovation to be constructive.

The new relationship was based on a series of bridges—not to change the system but to build an interlocking web which will build up trust and confidence. The Soviets have educated their people and the result has been pent-up consumer demand like nowhere else I have ever seen. Brezhnev spends two-thirds of his time with me on consumer problems. [Story about Brezhnev and Czech invasion.]

Over a period of time we can build up leverage with trade and grain, but that will take years. But the linkage theory never had a chance to work—we never gave them the trade or the credits.

And I know all about the Jewish issue. I have had garbage dumped in my yard, etc. But the Council for Soviet Jewry came to me and asked for help. [Described the deal for starting the MFN reversal.] This was all set when Angola burst. I think Angola got out of proportion. The only thing wrong was the Cubans. There was nothing wrong with the Soviets supporting their side—just like we do.

The cancellation of the Commercial Commission really got me upset.2 You can’t do this sort of thing on a stop-and-go basis. This is a

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 19. Confidential. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 See footnote 3, Document 261.
big error—just like when you dropped the word “détente.”³ I tried to talk Henry out of it but he went ahead anyway. I was mad as hell at Henry. We just shouldn’t blow everything when something goes wrong.

The other problem is the military. They have terrible blinders on. The only difference between Schlesinger and Rumsfeld is he is a better salesman.

The President: That is why I picked him.

Kendall: I don’t think you have to hit the Soviets over the head. It is a lousy way to go about it. Why the hell does Don have to say, “I don’t trust the Russians.” You can’t win in the long run by creating a crisis with the Soviets—you can’t do it year after year.

You made a terrible mistake when you dropped “détente.”

The President: It was only the word, not the process.

Kendall: I know, but when you drop the word it rattles not only here but around the world. You support the process but people don’t believe it because you drop the word.

The President: I guess we differ on that.

Kendall: We do and you are wrong.

Now, politics, Humphrey is going to be the winner. He will clean you up the way you are going on foreign policy.

The President: I agree on Humphrey.

Kendall: [Reads Harris⁴ judgments on support in the country on détente and Kissinger.]

The President: You haven’t heard me say anything but in support of Kissinger.

Kendall: Yes, but it doesn’t help when your people go around bad-mouthing him, Laird and Morton.⁵

The President: You know we got Morton turned right around. Laird is uncontrollable.⁶

Kendall: True, but Morton said in January, when I asked if he had checked with Henry about something, that Henry didn’t count for much anymore. [Reads from draft Democratic platform a statement strongly supporting a détente policy with the Soviet Union.]

Be positive on détente.

³ See Document 268.
⁴ Louis Harris, journalist and pollster, founder of Louis Harris and Associates, an American public opinion firm.
⁵ Rogers C.B. Morton, former Secretary of Commerce and chairman of Ford’s election campaign.
⁶ See Document 169.
Don’t sell the Defense budget by kicking the Soviets.
Don’t hold off on MFN.
Hold the Patolichev meeting.
Move as fast as possible on SALT.

The President: Let me talk to Brent on Patolichev. On SALT we are doing what we can, but we have trouble with the military.

Kendall: The military shouldn’t be in economic policy. They are in both. They won’t let us sell to the Soviets, so US technology goes to the Soviets through Japanese and European companies.

The President: We are moving as fast as possible on SALT.

278. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and James Reston of The New York Times

April 9, 1976, 5:10 p.m.

K: How are you?
R: I am fine. How are you?
K: It is going the way my friends predicted.
R: It is getting a little rough but you anticipated that.²
K: Nothing unexpected.
R: The thing that worries me about it is what the reaction will be in Peking and elsewhere—the Soviet Union. This is all perceived over there.

K: The biggest foreign policy problem we have is the foreign perception of where the United States is going because this debate on foreign policy isn’t discussing any real issues. The margin available for change isn’t that great and therefore to the extent that people believe there could be a major change here it is bound to be unsettling.

R: I can’t make out the Peking thing at all, Henry.³

¹ Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Kissinger was in Washington; Reston was in New York
² During the previous month in the Republican primary campaign, Reagan repeatedly attacked, and Ford defended, Kissinger’s conduct of foreign policy, especially his advocacy of détente with the Soviet Union.
³ On April 8, Hua Guofeng was formally selected over Deng Xiaoping to succeed Zhou Enlai as Premier of the People’s Republic of China. Three days earlier, the traditional day of mourning in China, thousands of ordinary citizens gathered in Beijing’s
K: I think it is 75% domestic in the sense that the radicals—that Teng went too dramatically towards—too far towards—he is a Chou En-lai disciple but he stressed economic progress too much. He could have survived that except for the fact that he moved the armed forces commanders out of their fiefdoms. When it came down to it—he had no friends left. He became more dispensable as the Chinese perception of their need for us declined. This is for your information only, but I had the distinct impression that he was going to be kept on as a symbol of their continuity with us, this is an impression I gathered when I was there last. The fact that they could dispense with him is indicative that they are prepared to give themselves the option of moving away from us. That hasn’t happened yet.

R: Do you see any reaction, besides the Jews in New York, out of Moscow.

K: Moscow has restrained themselves in this period—détente has essentially worked. The anti-communist movement is as strong now as it was at the height of the war. They might conclude that it is just hopeless.

R: Which would be silly.
K: Right.

R: That would be confusing policy and public opinion with campaign rhetoric.

K: There is a great unanimity among the candidates that détente has been a one-way street. I could make a strong case that it has been. It has been a one-way street in our direction rather than theirs.

R: That is an argument you can’t make.
K: It doesn’t help them to make that argument.
R: How do you proceed?

K: I believe the basic elements of our foreign policy are sound. I think if the Democrats come in to office they will pursue them. I think the most useful thing I can do is keep the basic structure of our foreign policy alive.

R: But basically you don’t really see any serious lurch from either Peking or Moscow.

K: No. I think they are both giving themselves the option of pulling away. We are beginning to use up our fat. The point will be reached where it won’t take much more to push them over the edge. We are not there yet. For example, there could be a Middle East crisis where détente will be less restraining than it would have been a year ago.

Tiananmen Square to honor Zhou and protest political developments in the wake of his death. Reston addressed the seemingly random process of selecting political leaders in the United States, United Kingdom, and China in his column that morning.
R: The Carter thing is picking up some considerable steam.⁴
K: It looks that way.
R: Up here at the Pulitzer Board today when people were asked who would be the candidates about three to one thought it would be Humphrey.
K: Not knowing much about domestic politics, I personally would say it depends on the Pennsylvania primary. If Jackson wins Hubert will probably get the nomination. If Carter wins the vote I don’t know how they could stop him.
R: If he took that and they were to broker it the nomination wouldn’t be worth much.
K: I have to go to a ceremony for Peter.⁵
R: On the Peter thing, the whole thing looks very bad, but Pete is taking the view that it is an incident.
K: I have made it a longer speech than I planned and I am making it about the press and the government rather than totally about Peter alone.
R: Is Nancy back?
K: She will be back Monday.⁶
R: Oh, sorry about tomorrow.
K: That’s O.K. Let’s get together soon.
R: Yes. All the best. Bye.
K: O.K.

⁴ In the most recent Democratic primary, Carter narrowly defeated Congressman Morris Udall (Arizona) in Wisconsin on April 6.
⁵ Reference is to a retirement ceremony for Peter Lisagor, Washington bureau chief of The Chicago Daily News.
⁶ April 12.
279. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, April 12, 1976.

SUBJECT

Soviet Coverage of the US Election Campaign

As the primaries have narrowed the field of Presidential candidates in the United States and foreign policy issues have come to the forefront of debate, Soviet comment on US political developments has increased in frequency and depth of analysis. The following paragraphs review the Soviet assessment of the Presidential candidates and the implications of the campaign for US–USSR relations.

Moscow has tended to assess the individual candidates according to their apparent positions on US-Soviet relations. The candidates believed to be opposed to détente have received the most attention in Soviet media. Thus, former Governor Reagan on the Republican side and Democratic candidates Wallace and Jackson have been roundly criticized in commentaries directed both abroad and to the domestic audience, including the central press and television. For the most part the remaining candidates have drawn little comment, either positive or negative. Representative Udall has virtually been written off already. One broadcast to North America was critical of Udall, along with Jackson, for attempting to ride an “anti-Soviet ticket” into the White House by identifying himself with a campaign supporting Soviet Jewry in New York.

Jimmy Carter, unknown in Soviet media a few weeks ago, has been acknowledged as the leading Democratic contender. The Soviet media have been slow to assess Carter’s policy positions. One early March Izvestia commentary saw his failure to “clearly define his program” as the secret of his success. Subsequently, a Pravda commentary offered a positive view of Carter in reporting that he had “publicly condemned those who would like the United States to return to the days of

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 19, USSR (33). Confidential. Sent for information. Clift forwarded a draft to Scowcroft on April 9, explaining that it had been prepared at Hyland’s request. “In response to our request,” Clift added, “CIA and FBIS have said that they will periodically prepare such analyses throughout the remainder of the campaign.” A copy of the draft with Scowcroft’s handwritten revisions is attached. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Ford also initialed it. According to an attached correspondence profile, the President noted the memorandum on April 13.

the cold war and confrontation with the Soviet Union.” Carter’s statement was one of the few positive references to US-Soviet relations from the campaign rhetoric that Soviet media have offered their readers. Soviet observers have noted that Senator Humphrey is reputed to be waiting in the wings for a propitious moment to launch his own candidacy.

Until recently, you have generally been given a positive image in the Soviet media. Soviet comment was particularly favorable toward you after the cabinet changes last November, an event which Soviet observers interpreted, in part, as a setback for the anti-détente forces in the US Government.

Soviet concern over your position began with your displeasure over Soviet policy in Angola. Soviet dissatisfaction became even more apparent after you terminated use of the term “détente” and after postponement of the meetings of the three joint US-Soviet commissions. Denying that Moscow has given the Administration any grounds for complaint, Soviet media have charged that to improve its position in the election campaign, the Administration has begun to backslide on détente and to side at times with “opponents of détente.”

In a recent analysis in Pravda, USA Institute Director Arbatov, while supportive of improved relations with the US, observed that:

—“The campaign against détente launched by the right has also left its mark on the vacillations in the US Administration itself . . .;”
—“Arguments concerning ‘peace through strength’, which have been reiterated for decades now and have produced nothing but an unrestrained arms race and the increased threat of war, do not become more convincing now;”
—“Much of what is being done in the United States creates additional difficulties on the path of the solution of urgent problems of Soviet-US relations, which are already complex enough . . .”

Soviet-US relations have not been a prominent or controversial issue in Presidential elections at least since 1960—and the Brezhnev leadership likely has been taken aback by the vigor of recent attacks in the US on the US-USSR relationship and the growing sentiment in favor of greater defense spending to counter the USSR. Arbatov’s article and recent other commentaries on the election suggest growing concern in Moscow that a longer range toughening of US attitudes and policy toward the USSR may be in the offing.

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280. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, April 15, 1976, 9:31–10:19 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Donald Rumsfeld, Secretary of Defense
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Richard Cheney, Assistant to the President

President: I have decided to make a major defense and foreign policy speech before the DAR next Wednesday. Hartman has done a redraft. It is tough—it takes on Reagan. Will you all look at it today so I can have it in final form by Saturday? It is a little tough on the Soviet Union but says we will negotiate . . .

Kissinger: The problem with the Soviet Union is that détente is really right. Second, you will have to deal with them after November. It really isn’t so that they are being irresponsible—except in Angola. And politically, if it is Humphrey and they [the Soviets] decide that Humphrey is preferable, they can be troublesome.

President: I don’t think it really does that. [He describes what is in the speech.]

Kissinger: Schlesinger is now saying the way we play détente is like the cold war.

President: Reagan, you notice, is not now saying that we are behind strategically. He is now emphasizing the conventional needs.

Rumsfeld: We need to avoid wild swings from euphoria to an all-out cold war with the Soviet Union.

[Omitted here is discussion of issues unrelated to Soviet-American relations.]

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 19. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.

2 April 21. For the text of the President’s remarks to the 85th Continental Congress of the Daughters of the American Revolution, see Public Papers: Ford, 1976, No. 349.
Dear Mr. President,

I would like to express to you some thoughts in connection with the situation which is evolving in Soviet-US relations.

I do not mean to address now specific questions which are the subject of negotiations between our countries. As is known, we have stated to you our views on questions related to the completion of working out the agreement on strategic arms limitation and now we await your answer to them.

At the present moment, as we see it, there is a necessity to discuss the state of affairs in the relations between our countries in a broader political context.

The Soviet-US relations have become recently a subject of acute polemics in the United States. We note that in the course of that debate your speeches, Mr. President—and we appreciate it—contain statements that are in principle in favour of the policy which has shaped up in relations between our countries due to our joint efforts. Life has already shown that this policy is correct and productive both from the viewpoint of interests of the peoples of our two countries and of promoting in general the reduction of tension in the world.

At the same time, let us be frank, much is said and done by the US leadership at present that cannot be regarded otherwise than something that runs contrary to that line. In many statements one can find one or two phrases in support of relaxation of tension. However they are somehow getting lost because the main message of those statements is essentially of a different direction. How else can one judge, for example, statements which are being repeated day after day, concerning “peace through strength”, “negotiations from the position of strength” etc. Statements of such kind—and they become ever more numerous in the course of time and obviously outweigh the statements in favour of the relaxation of tension—of course, cannot but damage the relations between the US and USSR. I do not mention the fact that our people also ask, which line in the US policy is the true and functioning one.

Moscow, April 16, 1976.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 29, USSR, The “D” File. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the letter was “hand carried by Vorontsov to Scowcroft—8:00 p.m. 4/16/76.”
And it is not only the words that matter. Suffice it to say of the steps by the US Government aimed at a sharp increase of the country’s military budget with the policy of the Soviet Union being simultaneously presented in a distorted light and non-existing expansionist designs are attributed to it. Various inventions are being spread from time to time about an alleged danger of an attack by the Soviet Union. And such things are said by politicians and not by authors of detective stories.

You, Mr. President, have, of course, noticed that so far we have reacted and continue to react with restraint to all that, being aware of the complexities of the internal situation in the United States particularly in connection with the ongoing election campaign in your country.

However, we are firmly convinced that some or other temporary features of the domestic political situation cannot serve as justification for jeopardizing everything of importance and value that has been achieved with great effort in Soviet-US relations.

It is important that what is being done with intention to get a certain momentary benefit should not have an adverse impact on Soviet-American relations, should not hamper solution of actually important and real problems before us. It is due to the objective reasons that both the Soviet Union and the United States are equally interested in the settlement of fundamental issues, and we have already agreed with you about that long time ago. And one cannot escape it anyway. There is no reasonable alternative to the policy of relaxation of tensions, which was recorded in the Soviet-US basic documents.

In our view, an approach of principle is required especially in present circumstances in order not to find oneself in an overpowering grip of inertia of political infighting which is in many respects determined by temporary, attendant circumstances.

In other words, we understand the situation this way: consistency as well as a weighed approach are needed in carrying out the mutually agreed policy so that no deterioration in the US-USSR relations is allowed, and those constructive things accumulated in these relations are not wasted, thus providing for the basis for onward development of these relations possibly even on a wider scale.

As for the Soviet side—quite recently I have already had an opportunity to reaffirm it—we are decidedly for the further improvement and deepening of our relations with the United States. This is why we are not indifferent to the polemics going on in the US around the Soviet-American relations.

We shall, as far as we can, contribute as before to the consolidation of the policy which corresponds to the interests of world stability, to positive development of relations between the USSR and the US. And
we would like to hope that on your part, Mr. President, and on the part of your Government a similar concern would be displayed for the fate of the relations between our countries.

Sincerely,

L. Brezhnev

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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282. Letter From President Ford to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev

Washington, undated.

Dear Mr. General Secretary:

I have read your letter of April 16 with great care and attention and I appreciate your sending such a message at this time. You have raised some fundamental questions about the state of our relations, and I want to set forth my position in the spirit of frankness that has always characterized our conversations and correspondence.

I fully appreciate that concerns may on occasion be aroused in other countries by what is said in an American election campaign. It is, of course, one of the great strengths of our system that free and full debate is encouraged and a broad range of issues are put before the American people. In the course of such a debate many things are said for domestic political purposes, without regard to their wider implications. Indeed, I have repeatedly spoken out against comments on American foreign policy in our campaign that are irresponsible and dangerous. But, of course, under our system I cannot control or preclude such statements by others.

I can understand how questions could arise over which is the true and functioning line of American policy. But the answer is simple and I would ask you always to have it in mind: only the President or Secretary of State speak authoritatively about our foreign policy. I believe my position is clear: I have repeatedly advocated and am committed to

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Kissinger–Scowcroft West Wing Office Files, 1974–1977, Box 29, USSR, The “D” File. No classification marking. According to marginalia, the letter was handed to Vorontsov by Scowcroft at 5:55 p.m. on April 27.

2 Document 281.
the further improvement of Soviet-American relations on the basis of the agreements we have reached and the line we have jointly set. And I have frequently criticized those who implicitly advocate a return to the alternative of the cold war period. I will continue to do so.

It is true that I found the word “détente” to have become distorted by our press and in our public debates. It is important to understand why I have stopped using this phrase. I wanted our people to understand that Soviet-American relations were too important to be summed up in a simple word or two and debated by slogans. There should be no doubt in your mind, Mr. General Secretary, that I will pursue the course we have jointly set of solidifying the very significant gains in our relations, and seeking opportunities for continuing progress.

Yet, I would be less than frank if I failed to point out that there are sources of genuine concern in this country about Soviet-American relations, concerns which cannot be ascribed to the expediency of the political campaign. You are aware of the profoundly negative effects of events in Angola. The Secretary of State at my instruction explained our concerns to you when you received him in Moscow last January. The introduction of Cuban combat troops marked a radical and dangerous change in the patterns of international conduct. We have made our position clear should Cuba take further interventionist action in the internal affairs of other countries regardless of the pretext used.

A second problem relates to our defense policies: Both of us have obligations to protect the national security of our countries. Inevitably, comparisons are drawn between the United States and the USSR. I would not try to hide the fact that I believe that the United States must have a strong defense posture, and it is clear from your statements that you feel exactly the same about the Soviet Union.

At the same time, we have a special responsibility to conduct our relations in the interest of relaxing tensions. This is my policy and I believe we are in fundamental agreement that we can continue to make progress on this basis. In particular, you and I agreed at Vladivostok that it would be in our mutual interest to moderate the strategic competition between us and thereby achieve a more stable, peaceful relationship. We have recently demonstrated once again, in the conclusion of the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions, that we can reach mutually satisfactory agreements even when the issues are very complex. Thus, I remain hopeful that we can reach a satisfactory conclusion in the current strategic arms limitation negotiations, and make some progress in the Vienna talks on force reduction in Europe.

3 See Document 268.
4 The Treaty on Underground Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes was formally signed at Washington and Moscow on May 28.
I am still in the process of considering a reply to your last letter,\(^5\) and we have been re-examining the issues with a view to finding a way to make progress in the SALT negotiations and achieve a mutually acceptable agreement. This remains, in my view, an essential goal.

I have noted that the Soviet side has been restrained in commenting on the many statements made in our election campaign. I can assure you that for my part I will do nothing to jeopardize progress in our future relations and will continue to attack those who put forward dangerous and irresponsible approaches to the serious issues of Soviet-American relations. I agree with you that we have no alternative but to continue on the course we set in our meetings at Vladivostok and Helsinki. Beyond arms control agreements, I think we should also aim at broadening our relations. I am firmly convinced that the American people support this course and that this will become clear in our elections.

Finally, Mr. General Secretary, I want to express again my appreciation for your initiative in raising some points of concern. We should maintain a more regular exchange, which frankly, has become too infrequent.

Sincerely,\(^6\)

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\(^5\) Document 272.

\(^6\) Printed from an unsigned copy.

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283. **Letter From Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev to President Ford**\(^1\)


Dear Mr. President,

I have attentively studied your last letter\(^2\) and would like to share with you some further thoughts concerning the state of affairs in the Soviet-US relations. In doing so I also have in mind the circumstance

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 10, POL 2 USSR–US. No classification marking. According to a handwritten note by Sonnenfeldt, “Dobrynin saw the Secy yesterday and dropped these off.” In addition to the letter, Dobrynin also delivered Soviet proposals on disarmament and on the environment. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) Document 282.
you have mentioned in your letter—the importance of maintaining a regular dialogue between us in the spirit of frankness and a business-like approach to the solution of arising problems.

Whatever the complexities of the present period and whatever the reasons causing them our mutual task is to work persistently in order to overcome them. The relations between our countries are too important and serious matter for both sides to approach them with a routine yardstick. Here a constant attention is needed at the highest level and now perhaps even more so than ever before. I think you agree with this.

I shall not conceal, Mr. President, that in studying your letter we had a double feeling. We regard as a positive moment your confirmation of the intention to follow the road of a further improvement and expansion of the relations between our countries in accordance with the policy mutually adopted by us. We also notice with satisfaction your assurance that the US leadership will not do anything that could jeopardize the progress in Soviet-US relations.

At the same time it is difficult to agree with the idea that we should not pay attention to public statements made by responsible US figures in which the line at the relaxation of tension with the Soviet Union is actually called in question. Of course, we cannot bypass, disregard such statements.

But it is not only the statements that matter. It is quite obvious that for the relations to develop and not to come to a standstill or still less to be thrown back, consistent efforts and practical work are needed with a view to solving specific questions constituting the subject matter of these relations. It is clear, for example, that one of these questions is the completion of working out a new strategic arms limitation agreement which, as your letter says, you also regard as an essential goal.

But it is exactly here that we see an obvious delay with the answer to our considerations of March 17,3 and meanwhile upbuilding of the military budget which has already reached an astronomical figure, is going on in the United States, new far-reaching armaments programs are initiated.

Of course, there can be no two opinions as to the right of each country to ensure its security, as is stated in your message. However the interests of ensuring security and a new spiral of arms race, uncoiled now in the United States—and this is exactly the fact—are far from being one and the same thing. I would be less than candid if I do not once again draw your attention to this fact having in view a long-term prospect of relations between our countries. Here, by the way, a cardinal question of mutual confidence is involved.

3 Document 272.
There is no need to cite other examples, including those of recent time which reflect as in focus the contradictoriness of a present-day US approach toward our relations. The examples of that kind are well known.

We, naturally, take note of your, Mr. President, explanations regarding the peculiarities of a current debate in the United States when “many things are said for domestic political purposes”. However, it cannot be all the same to us that many things among those that are not only talked about but also done now in the United States, and by the Administration itself for that matter, go objectively beyond the election campaign and can damage our relations. We cannot understand at all the reasons for such actions since, as it is acknowledged in your letter, there is no alternative to the course jointly set by our two countries and the American people support this course.

On the whole, as we see it, the relations between our countries are passing through a very responsible moment. Their future perspectives are to a considerable extent built today and it is very important that those perspectives should not fall a victim of momentary conjunctural gains. It seems that both you and we should be equally interested in it.

And this requires, I would like to stress it once again, a determination and persistency in upholding and pursuing consistently a course we agreed upon, active efforts for moving ahead wherever it is possible in resolving practical issues. On our part we are ready to do it.

The completion of the working out and signing by us of the treaty on peaceful nuclear explosions signifies that mutually beneficial agreement could and should be reached in spite of all complications. I am sure that granted an objective approach and necessary desire the working out of a mutually acceptable agreement on further limitation of strategic arms could be also completed without unreasonable delays and a real progress could be made in the talks on the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Central Europe. Incidentally, our delegation at the negotiations in Vienna will be ready in the near future to communicate in the interests of making progress data regarding the strength of the armed forces of the Warsaw Treaty countries in that region. Quite a lot could be done in other areas of our relations.

And the last thing we need is to put artificial obstacles in the Soviet-US relations. In particular we consider it wrong and harmful to represent the events in Angola as an example of some confrontation between the USSR and the United States in that country and in Africa in general. I would like to state it quite definitely that the Soviet Union is not interested in such confrontation. It did not pursue and does not pursue for itself, both in Angola and in other part of the world any advantages of political, economic or military nature.
The Soviet side is faithful to its line of principle aimed at solidifying and developing everything constructive and useful which exists and should exist in future in the Soviet-US relations. We would like to hope that the US leaders will also show a due concern for these relations.

Sincerely

L. Brezhnev

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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284. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, June 16, 1976, 11:45 a.m.

D: I was intending to call you. You are first.

K: We have a problem in which we were wondering whether you could be of some help. Our Ambassador in Lebanon and his deputy seem to be kidnapped by somebody.

D: You don’t know exactly?

K: We don’t know by whom. We suspect it is somebody from the rejectionist party from the PLO. We are not sure. Of course we are not blaming you for once.

D: Good.

K: But if you have him in the Russian Embassy will you send him out.

D: That is a promise.

K: Secondly, you will be in contact there with people that we are not in contact. Any influence you can use.

D: If you know anything.

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. No classification marking.

2 Ambassador Francis E. Meloy, Jr. and Robert O. Waring, the Embassy’s Economic Counselor, were kidnapped in Beirut that morning by the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The kidnapping came in the midst of escalation of the Lebanese civil war.
K: As soon as we know we will let you know. In the meantime if you pick up anything, if you could let us know you will have our profound gratitude.

D: I will do it right away. Gromyko told us for the decision to seek experts. He thinks they could be in contact there because it is not exactly sure when discussions will begin. They will have a chance when you are there for discussions.

K: That is the best conclusion.

D: I will send a cable right away.

K: This is not a foreign policy matter between us.

D: It is humanitarian. After all we are mutual about our ambassadors.

K: Thank you.

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285. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)

Washington, June 16, 1976, 5:42 p.m.

D: Hello.

K: Anatol, how are you. You know our Ambassador . . .

D: I heard, I am sorry.

K: I wanted to tell you that we are moving our fleet closer in as a precaution only if necessary to evacuate our people. We have 1400 Americans there and I wanted you to know that we have no intention of a military operation in Lebanon and that the only purpose is to move our people out. We will let you know the names of the ships. I think it would be helpful if we could avoid threatening notes back and forth.

D: Closer to the shore?

K: They are going to stay 12–14 hours out.

D: Of the time to go—our time?

K: 12–14 hours away from the coast.

D: You will take 12 hours to reach the shore—I understand.

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1 Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. No classification marking.

2 Meloy and Waring were killed in Beirut by the PFLP that afternoon. See Document 284.
K: And the reason I called you is so that we can avoid shooting at each other because we have to decide within the next 48 hours which way to evacuate Americans and which way . . .
D: What do you mean which way.
K: Whether by helicopter or by road into Syria.
D: I understand.
K: If we do it by road we will move the ships back.
D: You really . . .
K: It depends on military operations—what is going on in Lebanon. We cannot afford to have any more Americans killed there.
D: You have already decided?
K: No, we will make the decision within the next 48 hours.
D: I will inform my people.
K: It is intended as a friendly gesture to you.
D: I thank you for informing me and I will inform my people right away.

286. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)¹

Washington, June 17, 1976, 1:59 p.m.

K: I am late for a meeting with the President² so we have to make it quick.
D: One minute. Did Hyland mention to you I called you?
K: Yes.
D: I saw two telegrams. First for the President and Secretary of State to be informed confidentially and in advance of this in Lebanon in connection with the assassination of the Ambassador and to proceed under the assurance that the United States does not intend to take any military actions. This is the first message. The second is that they were

¹ Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. No classification marking.
² The President held a meeting in the Cabinet Room that afternoon to discuss the upcoming international economic summit in Puerto Rico. (Ford Library, White House Office Files, President’s Daily Diary)
in early contact with the PLO during the night. This may be belated but I think this may be of interest to you. Gromyko asked that we tell this personally for the President. The leadership of the PLO in Lebanon investigated the killing of the American Ambassador. The investigation proved the abduction was made in the neutral zone in the National Museum area. The leadership states the method is an apparent provocation of those forces which do not strive for peace but further aggravation. The PLO asked the Soviet Union to inform the United States Government of the above said. Secondly, in confidence they cannot ask for specifics to the American side but tell us in their own reply. It is important for you to know what they tell us. They have assured us that they are not going to have anything to do with what happened to the United States Ambassador but condemn those senseless acts. The Lebanese are taking most urgent measures to find and punish the criminals. One of these indications was it was not the intention of the Palestinians and that during the entire war no damage or harm has ever been done to your embassy or created in the western part of Beirut. PLO leaders reassure us the assassination of the United States Ambassador was by those who have nothing in common with the PLO. We would like to say we have no doubt as to the reliability of the information received from the PLO leaders.

K: Good. I appreciate this very much. And express my appreciation to your leadership.

D: Have you decided to do anything on the evacuation?

K: Nothing yet. I will let you know.

D: I will take it and report to you. I have some other things I will report to you later. Moscow would like to discuss with you about what we can do with Cyprus. But I will not bother you with this. I will see Hartman this afternoon and I assume Hartman will report to you.

K: Okay.
287. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\(^1\)

Washington, June 18, 1976, 10:45 a.m.

K: Anatol.
D: Hello, Henry.
K: One quick thing. As you know we are moving overland tomorrow.
D: To Syria?
K: Yes.
D: How many of you? It doesn’t matter.
K: We don’t know how many people are going to be wanting to move.
D: Just those who want to?
K: Yes. We are going to keep our embassy open. For your information we have, in order to keep the situation calm, we have decided against a military evacuation and therefore are taking the overland route.
D: I understand.
K: But what I wanted to say is we are moving our fleet much closer.
D: What do you mean closer?
K: About 30 miles off the coast.
D: Why are you doing that?
K: In case there is any interference of our movement by the Palestinians.
D: You are going to announce it.
K: We are not going to announce how far. We are not going to make any threatening announcement. Just telling you for your information.
D: How many ships—it doesn’t matter.
K: About 6 ships.
They will stay until the convoy is in Syria and then will move off.
D: One convoy or more.
K: We cannot be sure now.
D: Do you hope to finish within the day.

\(^1\) Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. No classification marking.
K: We have been given assurances by the Palestinians that they will not interfere. We are not expecting any trouble. If you could contact the Palestinians and urge them to cooperate. We are not looking for difficulties.

D: You have already informed them through your channels.

K: I think so.

D: They should know. We should apprise them of this information.

K: I think they already know it. It is up to you. I just want your people to know. It is not essential that you pass it to them.

D: You have passed the message for them to know. You can expect 2–3 days.

K: I think in one day—tomorrow.

D: It will then be over.

K: It could take two days. But a high probability is one day and then the fleet will move off to where it was.

D: You disappear on Sunday\(^2\) and I disappear on Saturday.

K: Yes. I am going to.

D: I am going to Bermuda with my granddaughter for one day. That is why I am interested to know everything is all right or I would postpone.

K: We don’t foresee a crisis and if everyone keeps his cool we will get it over with calmly.

D: I think so. O.K., Henry. Thank you.

\(^2\) June 20. Kissinger left for Paris to attend the OECD meeting.
288. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford


SUBJECT
Harriman–Brezhnev Meeting

Averell Harriman has provided our Embassy in Moscow with a report on his nearly three hour meeting with General Secretary Brezhnev in the Kremlin on September 20. During the course of the meeting, Mr. Harriman conveyed Governor Carter’s views—not spelled out in the reporting cable—in East-West relations to Brezhnev, sought to allay professed Soviet concerns aroused by the U.S. political campaign, conveyed to the General Secretary that Americans are quite serious about CSCE Basket III issues and Soviet Jewish emigration, and on several points defended Administration positions. The following paragraphs summarize Brezhnev’s responses to Harriman, his concerns as expressed in the meeting and points he raised on bilateral issues.

US–USSR Bilateral Relations

—Brezhnev said that the whole world knows that the USSR steadfastly seeks relations with the U.S. which will proceed on the basis of mutual advantage. As the result of enormous efforts we now have accords and understandings which have achieved improvements not only in US–USSR relations but for the world as a whole. “These are not illusions.”

—The General Secretary said that it was no fault of the Soviet Union that the process of improving relations had slowed down, that on several major issues there had been a fairly protracted pause.

—This results in the Soviets harboring a wariness of trends in American policy. Brezhnev noted that the trend manifested itself first and foremost in a renewed arms race and the American military budget. He complained that all of this was to the loud accompaniment of a mythical Soviet threat for which there were no grounds.

—Brezhnev continued that “obviously” forces were at work in the USSR [U.S.?] who do not like either relaxation of tensions or the devel-

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 19, USSR (43). Confidential; Sensitive. Sent for information. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Ford also initialed the memorandum. According to an attached correspondence profile, the President noted it on October 1.

2 The reporting cable, telegram 14951 from Moscow, September 22, is attached but not printed.
opment of US-Soviet relations. He understood the Administration’s meting it out to these forces for reasons of a momentary nature, but he felt this was a dangerous development.

—On the basic issue of relations, the Soviet Union is pursuing a consistent line. The Soviets were in favor of not abating efforts. They are prepared to interact and cooperate with all those who take a similar approach.

—On the subject of trade and commercial ties, Brezhnev said he wanted to tell Harriman on a personal basis “please place no pressure on the USSR; ‘all’ are in favor of development of trade without discrimination and mutual respect.” He continued that promises have been made but the cart is still right where it was and the Senate and Congress continue to try to exert pressure on the Soviet Union.

—Brezhnev said he had to mention that in the Soviet view the U.S. Administration had taken an “unseemly” attitude toward the MIG–25 which had made a “forced landing” in Japan.3

**Military and SALT Issues**

—Harriman told Brezhnev that because of an allegedly very active Soviet civil defense against a second strike there is considerable propaganda in the U.S. that the Soviets are preparing a first strike. Brezhnev “shook his head sadly” and commented that “they don’t know that there would be a second strike in a half hour.”

—In speaking of the slow-down in improving relations, Brezhnev said that on March 16 the Soviets had sent you their latest proposal on SALT,4 but had as yet received no answer. He asked, “what does that mean?” He said that “surely if that is the attitude now taken by the Administration, it is not a token of willingness or desire to achieve agreement.”

—On SALT, Brezhnev said that the Soviets were in favor of neither side having an advantage; rather that equilibrium be the result. It was not hard for the Soviets to detect that the American side in SALT was seeking to avoid any limitation on certain of its own types of arms such as the strategic cruise missile, while at the same time attempting to extend that definition to Soviet weapons which by no means had strategic capabilities. He said he was referring to the Backfire bomber. He emphasized that this was not a good approach, that the agreement must be on the basis of equality and equilibrium, that there is no other way to achieve a SALT agreement. Brezhnev added that he has made proposals to ban the Trident and B–1, and similar weapons in the USSR. He

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3 On September 6, a defecting Soviet pilot landed a MIG 25 aircraft at an airfield in Japan.

4 The latest Soviet proposal on SALT was dated March 17. See Document 272.
said that this was not accepted by the U.S. and construction was continuing. He added that the Soviet proposal for a ban on underground testing had not been accepted.

—Brezhnev avoided any response when Harriman pointed out that the Soviet Union was building up their conventional forces in Europe—more tanks, more troops, and quality of equipment.

—At the conclusion of the conversation, Brezhnev noted he had dedicated his life to prevent nuclear war. With “considerable emotion,” he said that “one bomb falls and we have a world war.”

U.S. Election Campaign

—Brezhnev said that the Soviets were by no means insensitive to the political line of the next President. He emphasized that the Soviets followed very closely the statements of both candidates.

—Laughing, Brezhnev said that in general on every issue the two candidates seem to try to vie in outspeaking the other, that perhaps this was an American custom. He recalled that in a recent “Jewish-Zionist” [B’nai B’rith] Congress, one of them announced support for the “poor Soviet Jews” and then the other did it as well.

—Brezhnev said he was not trying to attack Governor Carter because he had no intention of heaping praise on you either. He continued that he had read that you received in the White House the Ukrainian Cardinal Slejpy—who had been expelled from the USSR and whom even the Pope had forbidden to continue political activity. He asked whether you were trying to be more Catholic than the Pope.

—Brezhnev asked what was the true picture in the U.S.? What were people to think? How was he to know about Governor Carter and you?

Africa

—The General Secretary asked why Secretary Kissinger had taken it into his head to go travelling all over Africa. He said he even thought about it in bed; he couldn’t do it standing up. He said in an ironic manner that he understood Secretary Kissinger’s desire to strengthen reactionary regimes condemned by the UN.

—Brezhnev said that on Namibia, Secretary Kissinger was acting counter to the UN resolution when he talked about a two year period before independence.

—In response to Harriman’s statement that it would not do the Soviets any good to impugn American motives in Africa publicly,

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5 Brackets in the original.
6 During his trip to Africa in September, Kissinger visited Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Zaire, and Kenya.
Brezhnev turned to his foreign policy adviser Aleksandrov and asked “We have made it public?”

—At the very end of the conversation, Brezhnev’s foreign policy adviser Aleksandrov said that just as we asked the Soviets to understand campaign rhetoric, we should understand that the Soviets did not always control their press—as in the case of Secretary Kissinger’s trip to Africa.

Other

—Brezhnev said Kosygin was expected to be back at work in a few weeks.
—He said that the harvest was expected to be better this year than even in 1973, which was a record year.

289. Memorandum of Conversation

New York, September 29, 1976, 8 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Andrey Andreyevich Gromyko, Member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR
Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the USSR
Georgiy M. Korniyenko, Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs
Vasiliy Makarov, Chef de Cabinet to the Foreign Minister
Yuly M. Vorontsov, Minister Counselor, Soviet Embassy
Viktor M. Sukhodrev, Counsellor, Second European Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Interpreter)
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor of the Department of State
Arthur A. Hartman, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs
Winston Lord, Director, Policy Planning Staff
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

SUBJECTS

FRG; Africa; U.S. politics; agreément for Toon; SALT; Middle East; MBFR; Law of the Sea; U.S.-Soviet maritime and civil aviation agreements; Iran

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the Counselor, Box 7, Soviet Union, May–Sept. 1976. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Rodman. All brackets are in the original. The meeting was held in the Secretary’s Suite (35A) in the Waldorf Towers.
[Photos were taken. Then drinks and hors d’oeuvres were served in the living room.]

Kissinger: I can see any other Foreign Minister without White House supervision, but when I see you, I need White House supervision.

Hyland: Right.

Rodman: That’s right.

Dobrynin: The Tunisian Foreign Minister here had $50,000 stolen.

Kissinger: What was he doing with $50,000?

Dobrynin: All together, money and watch and jewelry.

Kissinger: I once gave this room to Bouteflika\(^2\) and then I needed it and he would not give it up. He said if I took it back he would go to Harlem. I should have let him do it. He said he’d stay at the Hotel Theresa. Where Castro stayed. [Laughter]

Gromyko: That mirror there.

Kissinger: Do you like this room? I’m in the imperial phase of my incumbency.

Gromyko: We are being dragged into an imperial room.

Kissinger: How is the General Secretary? How is his health?

Gromyko: Very good.

Kissinger: Did he have some vacation?

Gromyko: Yes, in the Crimea.

Kissinger: It’s beautiful there. I remember our visit there with pleasure.

Kissinger: Did you have a lot of rain?

Gromyko: Yes, in some places excessive.

Kissinger: Excessive? Will you sell us some grain? Or only in a five-year agreement?

Gromyko: It is subject to negotiation.

Your corn crop was lower this year.

Kissinger: Yes.

When are you going back?

Gromyko: The morning of the 3rd.

Kissinger: Directly?

Gromyko: No, to Brussels.

Kissinger: For a NATO consultation!

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\(^2\) Abdelaziz Bouteflika, Algerian Minister for Foreign Affairs and former President of the UN General Assembly.
Gromyko: I want to see it from the inside! And I will see it from another vantage point, too—Copenhagen.

Sukhodrev: Two nights in Brussels.

Gromyko: On the 6th, I’ll be in Moscow already.

Kissinger: Chiao Kuan-hua \(^3\) will be coming on the 3rd. You will just miss him.

They [the Chinese] are giving Schlesinger a tour.\(^4\) We are inviting Teng Hsiao-ping here for a tour. [Laughter] I don’t know if they are trying to annoy you or me.

Hyland: He gave a press conference in Japan.

Kissinger: What did he say?

Hyland: That Hua Kuo-feng was firmly established.

Kissinger: How does he know?

Hyland: He talked to him. [Laughter]

Kissinger: Do you have any clear-cut knowledge of what’s going on in China?

Gromyko: No, we don’t.

Kissinger: We’d never talked to this man before. [To Lord:] Did we ever meet him?

Lord: He was at one banquet.

Gromyko: He [Schlesinger] was received by Hua.

Kissinger: Yes.

Dobrynin: It was in *The Washington Post* today, second page.

Gromyko: You will get fresh news.

Kissinger: Undoubtedly. He was in Tibet.

Dobrynin: He said they were weak militarily.

Kissinger: That’ll go over big in Peking!

Dobrynin: He said their shells will just bounce off Soviet tanks.

Kissinger: You should pay him for the trip.

Joe Kraft told me that but I didn’t think he would say it publicly.

He allowed the journalists to sit in on the meetings.

Sonnenfeldt: Ben Wattenberg has been writing in the *Post*.

Rodman: He is a political scientist.

Sonnenfeldt: He ran Jackson’s campaign.

Kissinger: That isn’t bad for you, to have Schlesinger announce the Chinese have shells that bounce off Soviet tanks. They probably bounce

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\(^3\) Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs.

\(^4\) During his extended visit to China, Schlesinger met with Premier Hua Guofeng on September 28.
off American tanks, too. He had a big group. Richard Perle, Luttwak,®
Joe Kraft.

Hyland: Lloyd Shearer.®

Sonnenfeldt: Jerry Schecter. Bing West. He was a Schlesinger assistant.

Kissinger: It is a complicated political system.
Gromyko: Then why do you say it’s the best?

Kissinger: This tremendous creativity. There is this constant surprise of what our ministries will do. The reason why we are so good at foreign policy is our bureaucratic maneuvering is like between sovereign entities.

Gromyko: Did you watch the debate?®

Kissinger: I missed it.

Hyland: You will miss the second one. On foreign policy.
Gromyko: And the third one?
Kissinger: It’s on sex. [Laughter]
Gromyko: A crucial point!

Federal Republic of Germany

Kissinger: I’m assuming you want Schmidt to win.®
Gromyko: There are good chances.

Hartman: It is close.

Kissinger: Genscher thinks they will win by 3–4%.
Sonnenfeldt: It will be very close. They will be the smaller party. The CDU will have the chairmanship of the Bundestag and smaller committees.

Kissinger: What good does that do?
Sonnenfeldt: Prestige.

Gromyko: It is a very complicated political system in Germany.

Kissinger: Yes. If they lose, Brandt may come back. They will move to the left. Are you scared by that—their moving to the left?

Gromyko: Their confidence is growing.

Kissinger: I hope Schmidt will win.

5 Edward N. Luttwak, military strategist and defense consultant, was visiting Professor in Political Science at Johns Hopkins University.
6 Lloyd Shearer, columnist for Parade magazine.
7 Ford and Carter met in the first of three televised Presidential debates on September 23 in Philadelphia.
8 The West German Federal election was scheduled for October 3.
Genscher yesterday said they are 3% ahead—which means they don’t know. That’s within the margin of error.

Gromyko: The economic situation is improving.

Kissinger: There is no rationale. The population is moving to the right.

Sonnenfeldt: All northern Europeans are becoming more conservative.

*The Secretary’s Trip to Africa*

Gromyko: Did you sleep well after your trip to Africa?

Kissinger: I had read my press clippings, and by the time I got *Izvestia* translated . . . But the change isn’t so great in Africa as in the Middle East.

Gromyko: So the dancing was all right.

Kissinger: I gave a great speech [in Kenya] without translation; it had a great impact.

You’ve never been in Africa?

Gromyko: No. Of course, Egypt is in Africa.

Kissinger: They are a member of the OAU. There is no cultural connection between Algeria, say, and a black state. Nothing in common. Anything south of the Sahara. They have no historical connection either.

Gromyko: Language, culture.

Kissinger: East Africa has had more to do with Europe than with North Africa in the last 200 years.

Gromyko: That’s right. How many countries did you visit now?

Kissinger: Five: Kenya, Tanzania, Zaire, Zambia, South Africa. The last time seven. It is the only place I invariably get sick. There are 49 members of the OAU.

Gromyko: You need one more [to make 50].

Hyland: Namibia will be it.

Kissinger: I am getting nervous. There is no place I can go any more without getting criticized. I can’t go to the Middle East.

Gromyko: It was very mild, just sugar-coated. It was one-fifth of yours.

Kissinger: I read it every day. We have never criticized your trips or any specific figures.

Gromyko: Specific, specific. It was very mild.

Kissinger: When détente reaches a certain point, we should exchange countries every five years, to have the dominant influence in, and take care of their problems, and then switch.
Gromyko: Every day I open American newspapers and read your criticisms.

[The group moved to dinner.]

Kissinger: I agree this has not been a good year. Our domestic campaign got out of control. Really. If Reagan had lost in North Carolina in March, it would have taken an entirely different course.

Dobrynin: Couldn’t the Administration have had a different course?

Kissinger: Partly yes.

Dobrynin: That is the point.

Gromyko: When will you know the results in Germany?

Sonnenfeldt: We will know at 3:00 p.m. Sunday.

United States Politics

Kissinger: Anything that happened in foreign policy would actually help the President. Even a disaster.

Sonnenfeldt: We are looking for an incident!

Gromyko: The Secretary is right.

Kissinger: In foreign policy, if we do anything it helps. But seriously, at a minimum, nothing should be done to upset the situation.

You should know, Mr. Foreign Minister, I’m making my contribution to détente by taking no trips. Domestic trips are all right?


Kissinger: If I speak about steel production.

Tomorrow when I speak at the UN, can I speak about foreign policy?

In my speech tomorrow, I even say nice things about the Soviet Union.

Gromyko: No country makes such steaks as America. Not Britain, not France.

Kissinger: Japan makes good American steaks.

I raised the wrong subject. [Laughter]

Gromyko: But all speeches on domestic policy.

Kissinger: I’m criticized for always defending the Soviet Union.

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9 For the text of Kissinger’s speech before the UN General Assembly on September 30, see Department of State Bulletin, October 25, 1976, pp. 497–510.
Gromyko: This kind of criticism results from misunderstanding. [Laughter]
Kissinger: I think you have a point.
Kissinger: One of the interesting points is until Reagan was finally beaten at the Convention, he acted publicly as if he was really confident of winning.
He came very close.
Dobrynin: Who is Carter’s chief foreign policy adviser now?
Sonnenfeldt: Reston today said he’s not consulting any of his foreign policy advisers.
Gromyko: You know, I’ve seen many American movies, but I’ve never seen one with Reagan in it. It’s my fault, I know, but I’ve never seen him.
Kissinger: I had breakfast with the President of Universal Studios in the Spring. I said Reagan will withdraw. He said no. He was his agent, so he knows him. “To be a second-rate actor for 30 years, you have to have a monumental ego. He will never quit.” He was right.
Kissinger: What part of our relationship should we review, Mr. Foreign Minister?
Gromyko: I think we should not waste time so we take number one, then number two. [Laughter]
Kissinger: Let’s do something different—Let’s start with number 4. [Laughter] And we will save number three for the President.
Gromyko: We must be short and specific.
Kissinger: And to the point.
Dobrynin: So now the communiqué is ready. [Laughter]
Kissinger: We settled 1 and 2 and dropped #3. [Laughter]
Gromyko: The Secretary always asks what we say to the press. [Laughter] Now, we know. You see, as a rule we agree.
I think we should take up as the first question, the strategic.
Kissinger: Strategic? All right.
Gromyko: At one time—it coincided with my vacation—I learned Dr. Kissinger was making two or three speeches every day. I wondered whether he had become a candidate.
Kissinger: Did I say something in my speech that annoyed the Soviet leadership? Africa, I suppose.
Gromyko: You have touched many subjects.
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: You have discussed détente.
Kissinger: What is that? [Laughter]
Gromyko: I forgot, it’s not in the American language!
Kissinger: In August I gave one speech in Philadelphia.
Sonnenfeldt: And Boston.\textsuperscript{10}
Gromyko: Maybe we should speak a bit about the Middle East, the second.
Kissinger: All right.
Gromyko: And if there is time, maybe I will touch briefly on some others.

\textit{Agrément for Toon}

Kissinger: I want also to mention agrément for our Ambassador-designate.
Gromyko: Well, we are thinking about it. There are certain formalities. You should be pleased we are being so attentive on these things.
We will give an answer.
Is the Ambassador-designate in the US now, or elsewhere?
Kissinger: He is at his post, in Israel. There were many newspaper stories that he was anti-Soviet. That is ridiculous. We wouldn’t send an anti-Soviet Ambassador.
Gromyko: I’m not raising any questions.

\textit{Strategic Arms Limitation Talks}

Kissinger: Maybe we should say a few words about SALT.
Gromyko: Good.
Kissinger: I know we owe you an answer. There are many complicated reasons for it. One is the difficulty of coming to clearcut decisions. But let me ask you this question: What is your reason against deferring some of the items—like seabased cruise missiles and Backfire—for later negotiations? Because if we could defer those, we could come to agreement fairly rapidly.

[Dessert is served.]
Is Mrs. Gromyko with you?
Gromyko: Yes, she’s my chief of staff, I told you.
Kissinger: Nancy sends her regards.
Gromyko: Thank you, and my best regards to Nancy.
Kissinger: Thank you.
Gromyko: What is this wine?
Waiter: California.

\textsuperscript{10} Kissinger spoke before the Urban League in Boston on August 2, and on August 31, he addressed a meeting of the Opportunities Industrialization Center in Philadelphia; see Department of State \textit{Bulletin}, September 20, 1976, pp. 358–362.
Gromyko: It’s very good. Why don’t they make propaganda for it?
Dobrynin: They do!

Gromyko: We have always emphasized all the important ques-
tions should be resolved in a complex, without separating one or two of
these important problems from the rest. You will recall which ques-
tions were discussed, and there was an exchange of statements about
this, about treating them all as a complex. Especially in Geneva.

And we were in agreement. Which, in fact, is the one and only pos-
sible method of going about these solutions.

So we don’t think there is any good to come out of separating
them. Let us abide by what is agreed. These considerations should re-
fect in our discussions.

Kissinger: Bill, do you want to say something?

Hyland: The point you made is there is a chance to make major
progress on what was agreed at Vladivostok, between the President
and the General Secretary. And we should take advantage of this. The
remaining issues of cruise missiles and Backfire might be solved after
Vladivostok is finished.

The Agreement we proposed in February would not work to the
disadvantage of the Soviet Union, but would put substantial limits on
American programs.

Gromyko: Are we moving to the other room now?

Kissinger: [rises] I wanted to say a few words.

You and I have been meeting for many years now. As we look back
on the years, we can say that on the whole U.S.-Soviet relations have
progressed.

You will see in my speech tomorrow, except for some slight retalia-
tions, I’ll call attention to the importance of our relationship, which is
important to the peace of the world. We have differences of ideology,
and because we are great powers we have differences of national in-
terest. But we have special responsibilities for the peace of the world for
reasons that we two countries can appreciate.

It is idle to deny there have been setbacks—some because of our
domestic position, some because of what we see as unnecessary Soviet
action.

But it is clear that the course on which we embarked in 1971 and
1972 was the correct one. And the future of the world depends on
whether our two powers can find and continue a correct relationship.

On the personal level, I want to say I appreciate our working to-
gether, and I want to propose a toast to the friendship of our two coun-
tries. [Toast]
Gromyko: [rises in reply] It is extremely good to deliver two speeches in two days, yesterday in the General Assembly,11 and today at this table. But my consolation is this one will be shorter. [Laughter]

There are many problems that are to be discussed. I am ready to discuss those problems. On many of them, there are some aspects on which there is an understanding at least in principle. On others, there is not. But on those, an exchange of opinion must take place.

But on number 1—I had in mind the subject we just talked about—the impact of this problem is obvious. We believe it must be solved on the basis of the Vladivostok understanding. This is our position. From the beginning, we await your answer to our proposals. Several times it was postponed; I won’t count how many times it was postponed. It was not so simple; it was complicated in this country, for certain circumstances—but you know better than we how to cope with those circumstances.

The problems must be solved. The more important they are, the better the solutions will come from an exchange of views.

I mentioned the Middle East. It is very acute. At the very moment we sit at this table, blood is shed; they are cutting throats. We know what is taking place. We are ready to exchange views.

There are other problems, but I mention just these two.

I mentioned to the Secretary-General that we are ready to find a common base for a solution of the problems which divide us. We are ready, not less ready than before. We would like to see a solution to this. But we are not negotiating with ourselves, but with the United States. Possible results can be achieved only by rapprochement, by both.

So, to the success of this conversation—these conversations—and to the development of relations between our countries. [Toast] [The group moves back into the living room.]

Kissinger: If we could defer some items it would be easier to make progress.

Gromyko: It won’t work to try and separate some of the issues from the others.

That approach is unacceptable. Let’s be brief and to the point. We have many other questions. We cannot accept an agreement that leaves open the bomber and cruise missiles.

Kissinger: Do you think if we would send some technical experts to Geneva and explain the advantages, you would change your mind?

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Not all cruise missiles, only sea-based.

Gromyko: What will that do? I don’t think it would work. They couldn’t prove anything to us. I am treating that as a joke.

Kissinger: What is your answer to this argument? There are some weapons that are a grey area which can be used strategically but are not necessarily strategic—such as some of our cruise missiles and some of your bombers.

Gromyko: What exactly do you have in mind? If you mean our bomber, an appropriate explanation was given you [in January in Moscow] by the General Secretary. It is you that refer to that bomber and system that can be used strategically, but we rule that out.

Kissinger: I would suggest you discuss this question of deferral with the President. With more substantive arguments. Because I know the substantive arguments. Bill?

Hyland: It would be helpful.

Kissinger: You said you made certain concessions in Geneva as a package.

Gromyko: On an extremely important matter. The matter you said was the “most important.”

Kissinger: On the counting rules.

Gromyko: On the counting matter.

Kissinger: If you could point out the linkage you established then, because some of our people think it’s settled. Between us there is no misunderstanding. I’ve always understood some of the concessions made by the General Secretary were all linked to a satisfactory understanding on other issues.

Hyland: It might be helpful if you went over the January proposals, especially Brezhnev’s proposals.

Kissinger: If you could give a brief summary of where we stood in January, and the linkage, and your position on deferral.

Gromyko: All this consumes some time.

Hyland: We have 90 minutes scheduled, but really it’s two hours.

The Middle East

Kissinger: The Middle East.

Gromyko: The Middle East.

Kissinger: Do I get some credit for staying out of the Middle East for a year? A little item in the Soviet newspaper noting it?

Sonnenfeldt: Sovietskii Sport. [Laughter]

Gromyko: It took a great deal of willpower!

We have noticed the United States seems to be taking a sort of placid attitude in observing the situation in the Middle East, and the
United States is even expressing a certain satisfaction with the course of events there. You may not agree but we feel that it is a mistake, and the situation there is fraught with surprises and unpleasantness and consequences which neither the United States nor the Soviet Union nor the world needs. Notably the Lebanon issue. We had expected the United States to react acutely to that situation, and treat it as acute. How could anyone be placid in a reaction to what has happened there? Hostilities there are continuous.

You used to be mentioning the Geneva Conference and its work. I don’t hear you saying it any more. We believe it would be good to make use of that forum. I don’t know if it’s possible to resume it before the election, but maybe after the election. Maybe one will be ready to make a concession after the election.

We feel it should consider all important questions. Let me review what I see as the important questions.

First, the question of withdrawal of Israeli troops from all Arab territories that were occupied as a result of the 1967 war.

Second, a solution of the Palestinian problem with due regard for the legitimate rights of the Palestinians.

These are the two questions in which the Arab side is vitally interested. At the same time, there is regard for the questions Israel is interested in.

First, an end to the state of belligerency.

Second, recognition of the right of all states to independent existence and development, and including Israel.

These are the questions we believe should be considered by the Geneva Conference. They are questions knocking on the door and should be given consideration.

They can’t be resolved in just a few days, but it would take time. But these would be political negotiations, and there would be no hostilities [voyennye dейstviya]. Whatever hostilities are going on would end.

I don’t see anything here that is unacceptable to Israel. They have said they want recognition by the Arabs and the end of belligerency, and these are things they can get from the Geneva Conference. If there is understanding.

What you and we say would be very weighty at the Conference.

The last question is the composition of the Conference.

Kissinger: I was going to ask.

Gromyko: We proceed from the assumption it would be those at the original Conference as agreed. We believe Syria might take part.

Kissinger: Khaddam has a very beautiful speech prepared, that he wants to give.
Gromyko: But there is one new element. Without the Palestinians, it is impossible to discuss the Palestinian issue.

In confirmation of what I’ve just said, and this is an official proposal of the Soviet government, I will give you this proposal in writing, with a working translation in English.

[He hands Secretary Kissinger Tab A.]12

Brief and to the point.

Kissinger: Thank you. I will study this. We will have a chance to discuss it on Friday.13

Let me make an observation. First, Lebanon. I don’t find that the Soviet side is characterized by hyperactivity.

Gromyko: But we are indignant, and you applaud these events.

Kissinger: Where do we applaud?

Gromyko: There have been many statements on your part.

Kissinger: My?

Gromyko: Not you personally, but quite a few, both official and unofficial. The press has been unanimous that things are going quite well in Lebanon.

Kissinger: The press is not very perceptive, as proven by their constant criticism of me.

Gromyko: That really doesn’t sound too convincing—the attitude the press takes toward you.

Kissinger: Not the Soviet press, but the American press. [Laughter]

Gromyko: I mean the American press.

Kissinger: We can’t be responsible for our press, but we consider what is happening in Lebanon a tragedy—much of which is caused by your friends with your equipment. On both sides. There is no American equipment in Lebanon. We regret it; we are prepared to cooperate diplomatically. You wouldn’t want us to do anything physically.

I simply want to say there is no benefit for the United States in what is going on in Lebanon. And we would be prepared to cooperate as we have done to bring it to an end.

You know rivalry between Syria and Egypt, and Iraq and Libya. It is out of our control. We have concentrated on keeping the Israelis out.

You keep referring to an end of the state of war for Israel. I have always understood that for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from all Arab territory, what the Israelis would ask—in addition to the Amer-

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12 Attached but not printed.
13 October 1.
ican Treasury—is a state of peace, not an end of the state of war. Do you make the distinction?

Gromyko: No. We would be in agreement with both. I agree legally there is a difference between the two terms; a certain difference could be found. But we believe there should be a treaty ending the state of belligerency and establishing peace. Both. Because we understood Israel wanted both recognition by the Arabs and an end of the state of war. We would be prepared to formalize both the end of belligerency and the establishment of peace. That is our answer to your question.

We believe the Arabs too could accept that, although that is not an easy task at all. You know what position the Iraqis take, and the Palestinians too—it is not an easy subject. And Libya. So it is not a simple question.

But we believe that in the process of negotiations there is hope that all these could be considered in a complex and resolved in a fair and just manner.

But if all are left unresolved, the area will look like a ship with no steering gear, dragged by the waves toward a reef. Today someone’s blood is shed; tomorrow someone else’s. One doesn’t know. It is a voyage to nowhere.

And let me just add, these proposals we are going to transmit to all others in the Geneva Conference.

Kissinger: These here [in Tab A]?

Gromyko: Yes. We have given them to you first. We will probably give them to the Israelis here through their representative in New York. Do you have any objection?

Kissinger: No, it is one of the countries we wanted to give you for five years.

You can’t afford Cuba and Israel at the same time. [Laughter]

Another thing. You said the Palestinians have to be present to discuss Palestine.

Gromyko: Yes.

Kissinger: Can I conclude from this that they don’t have to be present for discussion of non-Palestinian issues?

Gromyko: We don’t know the Palestinian view on this. They might feel they have to take part in that or all, because all issues are a function of the Palestinian issue.

Our position is that they must be present to discuss all issues.

Kissinger: I thought there might be a potential . . .

Gromyko: We do not distinguish.

If there is any idea, you would have to contact the Palestinians.

Kissinger: Not this month.
Sonnenfeldt: Or next month. It’s still September!

Kissinger: We are prepared to reassemble the Geneva Conference. We have said so many times. We don’t say so every week because all the actors are preoccupied with Lebanon and can’t go to Geneva. Maybe that will be settled in the next weeks.

The problem with the composition is, as I have said: if it is confined to the original group, it can be done. If the Palestinians must be there, it is a massive problem. It would play into the hands of those who want a delay. But I don’t see why they have to be there to discuss borders, which don’t concern them.

Gromyko: But we believe that task could be fulfilled and the problem resolved by approaching it from the other end. Let us say the Conference convenes with all its original participants plus the Palestinians, and it dissolves into committees. One committee could concern itself with borders between Syria and Israel; another could take the Egyptian angle; another could take the Palestinian issue; another with Jordan; another if needed with Lebanon.

That is a way to cope with it. I don’t pretend to enumerate all possible variations.

Whatever the committees work out, the proposals could be submitted to the Conference as a whole. There is bound to be one dealing specifically with Palestinian issue. All these proposals will then have to be fused into one single document and the correlations established and fused into one document.

It is hard to contemplate that this—fusing into a document—could be carried out without the Palestinians, because the Palestinians are one of the elements. So we believe it can be solved from the other end.

Kissinger: Mr. Foreign Minister, we are not saying the Palestinians should be excluded. We are saying that to assemble a Conference including them on the first day will produce endless delay.

But there are a number of ideas here—the composition divided in groups.

Gromyko: It is a flexible formula.

Kissinger: That’s right. That is something I would like to think about.

Gromyko: And we and you would participate.

Kissinger: I assumed that.

We might let you be alone on the Lebanon committee. Since we are not familiar with the equipment there.

Gromyko: There is some Soviet equipment in Israel. What do you say about that?

Kissinger: I’d say there is collusion between the Soviet Union and Israel.
If we could do something to start the work of the Conference, perhaps in groups, so that we don’t have to make a decision to include them—or exclude them—this might be possible.

Gromyko: At what point and how long would they be absent?
Kissinger: Enough to get the Conference started. Because otherwise we get into issues like terrorism, etc.

Gromyko: I don’t know the Palestinian view. Suppose an establishing meeting is to decide the agenda, the agenda alone.
Kissinger: Yes.
Gromyko: There are these two points in favor of the Arabs and two points in favor of the Israelis. Suppose the original participants get together on this.
Kissinger: That would have merit.
Gromyko: I’m just thinking aloud. Then the work starts, with commissions, and the Palestinians are present. The Palestinians might not accept this.

This could break the dead end.

But there is a dead end if the organizational question should block the process of the substance.

Kissinger: We are quite determined to start the process after the elections.

Gromyko: I’m just thinking aloud.
Kissinger: We won’t contact the PLO.
Gromyko: You have no contact?
Kissinger: Security contact in Beirut, but no substantive contact.

This is something I want to explore. It has possibilities. I realize it is thinking out loud.

Gromyko: Just the last idea, on starting the Conference.
Kissinger: I realize it. But we can come back to it in exchanges.

**Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions**

Kissinger: What is topic 3?
Gromyko: Vienna.

We did not receive a reaction to our latest proposals.

Kissinger: Not to your proposals but to your giving the numbers.
Gromyko: You [We?] suspect probably the United States is holding it. Maybe your brotherly ministry.

Kissinger: Sometimes we have problems relating to brother ministries, sometimes problems regarding allies.

We have two problems. One is our figures with respect to your forces differ from your figures on your forces. We have to at some point discuss what is included.
The second problem is France refuses to be included in the numbers. We are looking for a way to exclude France but still give you a meaningful number.

The numbers we have aren’t significantly different from what we had in 1974, so you can use those. Your intelligence can tell you.

The basic problem is the French. We can give you a figure that leaves out France but allows you to compensate for French forces so we can’t use French forces to evade the overall obligation.

Gromyko: When can we get an answer?
Hyland: October. It would be helpful if we could discuss theirs.
Kissinger: Could we begin discussing the basis of your figures?
Korniyenko: Not before your figures.
Kissinger: That’s what I thought.
Hyland: Our figures haven’t changed much.
Sonnenfeldt: We are using different criteria to make the count.
Kissinger: The problem the Foreign Minister is making is they won’t discuss their criteria until they get our figures. Korniyenko’s pithy remark.
Sonnenfeldt: I understand.
Kissinger: We will give you the figures during October.
Gromyko: All right. All right.

Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and Non-Resort to Force

Gromyko: Non-proliferation.

We understand your concern with respect to certain things that have been happening. We know you had discussions with the French Government, regarding Pakistan. In general, there is some concern lest certain channels appear which could be harmful to that [Non-Proliferation] Treaty. We mentioned this in our speech yesterday. I’m not offering any specific proposals right now. But the question is important. We have to know whether all channels have been blocked to these weapons getting in the hands of states that could menace the world. We don’t know what is in your speech. We know your approach.

Kissinger: My speech will discuss it only in general terms because our President will make a statement . . . When?
Hyland: Soon. The next 48 hours. A written statement, not a speech.\textsuperscript{14}

\textsuperscript{14} For the text of the President’s statement on nuclear policy, released on October 28, see \textit{Public Papers: Ford, 1976}, No. 987.
Kissinger: He will make a series of concrete proposals of how to proceed. But in addition, we are prepared to discuss it with you on a bilateral basis.

Gromyko: Good.

Kissinger: The President’s statement will deal with a lot of technical matters, such as enrichment and reprocessing. We would be grateful for your ideas because we would like to block these channels.

Lord: We should have some warning [of the President’s statement].

Hyland: There will have to be some consultations.

Kissinger: It will be within a week. We can give you a summary before it is given. But it will be a complicated document and won’t lend itself to exchanges. But we can use it as a point of departure. Between Anatoly and me, or in Moscow.

Gromyko: We will be ready.

Hyland: It could be discussed Friday when the Foreign Minister comes to the White House.

Kissinger: Not usefully. We can discuss the importance of the subject. What is needed is practical steps.

Gromyko: We will be ready.

Kissinger: We will be ready when the statement is issued.

Gromyko: You are familiar with the proposals we made yesterday? On nonresort to military force.15

Kissinger: We will discuss it on Friday. I’ve glanced through it, but I haven’t had a chance . . .

Gromyko: When you’re ready, we can exchange views. Either before my departure, or between our delegations in New York. All right?

Kissinger: All right.

Law of the Sea

Gromyko: Next, what possible conclusion do you foresee in the Conference on Ocean problems?16

Kissinger: If it doesn’t conclude next year, we will have to proceed unilaterally on deep sea beds. We and you I don’t think are very far apart, except you want an anti-monopoly provision. This comes with bad grace from you. But this isn’t an insuperable obstacle if it’s not too restrictive. We can discuss it.

But we can’t accept a total internationalization of seabed mining. It means that countries that have the capability to mine will turn it all over to countries that have no capability to mine.

15 On September 28, the Soviet Union submitted to the UN Secretary General a draft treaty on the non-use of force in international relations.

16 The summer session of the Third UN Law of the Sea Conference (UNCLOS III) ended in mid-September. The next session was scheduled to begin in May 1977.
Gromyko: We regret that the Conference has not yet reached agreed decisions on these matters, and we have been somewhat surprised by the position taken by the United States. The United States has taken steps so the Conference has to work under the threat of unilateral action, and you mentioned it yourself, that unless there is a solution by next year, you would act unilaterally on certain aspects. We can’t consider that a positive attitude and consider it negative.

We agree it would be good if our two countries could find common language, because the others would undoubtedly take heed.

Kissinger: Especially the Chinese. But we’re not opposed to finding a common language.

Gromyko: You say our views aren’t too far apart on seabed mining. But there is one significant difference between us.

Do you think we two should have bilateral discussions before the Conference ends?

Kissinger: Absolutely.

Gromyko: But there have been cases where our two sides reached agreement on things and nothing happened. So there should be working discussions.

Kissinger: The Conference will not be concluded without contacts between key countries. The Conference never ends because the delegations, first, have no authority, and second, they become so enamored of the fine points they never can solve it. I instructed our delegation to consult with yours, but usually it’s too late.

Gromyko: You’re right.

Kissinger: I would welcome discussions on this.

Sonnenfeldt: We’ve had people going to Moscow.

Kissinger: But frankly I want to reorganize how we go about this. It is senseless to have our technicians go to Moscow and talk to your technicians and repeat what they do here. It has to be at some political level. With the help of technicians.

We’re prepared to have discussions in Moscow or Washington. Win, when will we be ready?

Lord: In a few weeks.

Kissinger: [to Gromyko] By November 1.

Gromyko: That’s acceptable.

Kissinger: We attach importance to it.

We have a legislative problem.

Gromyko: It didn’t come from the skies.

Kissinger: It didn’t come from the Administration.

Gromyko: For us, it’s the American side. Good.
Kissinger: There may be a two-week delay if our position isn’t ready.

Lord: The Conference begins in May.

Kissinger: But I really think we don’t have that many differences with the Soviet Union. We attach importance to it. Hal?

Gromyko: They used to say: “All roads lead to Rome.” Now all roads lead to . . .

Kissinger: . . . to Sonnenfeldt. I don’t know who will do it. We’ll aim for November 1 to start consultations.

US-Soviet Maritime and Civil Aviation Agreements

Gromyko: There have been certain difficulties with implementation of our maritime agreement, and we have the impression your side is putting unfair claims on us. But the two sides are about to begin talks on these matters. We hope your side will give the right kind of instructions. They haven’t been getting the right kind of instructions, it seems.

Kissinger: You don’t know our representatives!

Sonnenfeldt: We don’t know our representatives.

Kissinger: If I’m here after November 2, they will know me.

Gromyko: We would like you to look into this matter so we can find some solution to this.

Kissinger: All right. Bill [Hyland], can you give me something tomorrow night when I get back?

Gromyko: There is a rather analogous question in another field, for example, our agreement on civil aviation. Here too your side is putting forth desires for which we don’t think there are any grounds. In a word, here too, the agreement isn’t working too smoothly.

Dobrynin: It’s even working toward curtailment of our air traffic.

Gromyko: So, Mr. Secretary of State, I hope you can take a fresh look at this matter.

Hartman: It’s a question of whether they will sell a few tickets on Pan Am once in a while.

Dobrynin: We should share the capacity and share the profits.

Kissinger: What reason do our companies give?

Hartman: None.

Gromyko: It’s like highway robbery!

Dobrynin: The companies agreed upon it, Pan Am agreed, but your Federal Aviation Administration didn’t agree.

17 See Document 293.
Kissinger: Why?
Sonnenfeldt: Because they need the capacity to be profitable.
Dobrynin: But they agreed.
Sonnenfeldt: They’re regulated by a regulatory agency over which we have no control.
Kissinger: I don’t know enough about it. Art [Hartman], will you give me a paper on it?

Iran

Gromyko: Then Iran. There is one substantive problem.
Kissinger: I noticed the reference in your speech. I thought you meant India.
Gromyko: Your reference to my speech is correct.
I would like to say that however you assess your actions regarding Iran, it’s a matter of policy, and there is nothing commercial about these actions. What reason is there to supply arms to Iran in the amount of billions, billions of dollars? So far it’s $10 billion and the plan is twice that. Why do you want to cause tensions on the southern border of the Soviet Union? If you’re prompted by certain of your agencies, it’s not in the interests of peace or of a tranquil situation in that part of the world.
This isn’t in accordance with the words you use, or President Ford, or you at the table, on the need to find common language.
We have been observing your actions in Iran for some time. We thought your concern for US-Soviet relations would gain the upper hand. But it goes on. You know and we know and the leadership of Iran knows there is no security interest for Iran in this. But this line continues. I say this because it’s the line taken by our entire leadership, and the view personally of General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev.
Kissinger: First, at no conceivable level of armaments can Iran threaten the Soviet Union. The idea that Iran can want to cause tensions with the Soviet Union is inconceivable. And it has other neighbors than the Soviet Union who are armed by the Soviet Union. Iraq per capita is more heavily armed than Iran; India is armed by the Soviet Union. The idea that they (Iran) would take offensive action against the Soviet Union is beyond my imagination. Nor do they have weapons capable of taking offensive action. The Soviet Union is not its security problem but these others are. It lives in a world in which its neighbors are heavily armed; that’s its security problem.
Gromyko: We are raising this matter not because we are scared of Iran or of weapons placed in Iran’s hands, but because there are no reasonable grounds—and we have said this to the Shah many times—for such a huge arsenal. Who is threatening Iran? Not the Soviet Union; the
Shah knows. Iraq? But those two countries just signed an agreement.¹⁸ There is no threat from Pakistan; there are good relations. Is the threat coming from the seabed or outer space? No. If you take a cool-headed analysis, it is clear there are no grounds for it. Why this piling up of arms on the border of the Soviet Union?

If you were in the same position, you would react the same way. It’s not a matter of pure commerce—because they’re buying American arms. It’s a matter of policy. The major powers should not allow this, because in one part of the world we may stamp out the flames of war and tension would be generated in other parts.

So I wanted to call your attention to it, and President Ford’s attention, and the US Government.

Kissinger: We will note it. But I can’t accept that just signing an agreement means there can be no tension. And India is so heavily armed that it may even overcome the scruples which are so inseparable from Indian morality. Iran lives in a complicated environment.

But I’ll take note of it.

Gromyko: Shall we end on that?

Kissinger: What shall we say to the press?

Gromyko: First, we discussed international and bilateral questions. Second, among the problems under discussion are those raised in this session of the General Assembly, which is natural when the session is going on.

Third, it was agreed that on those problems which are not completed, negotiations will be continued. Among them, if you don’t mind, we might mention the possibility of concluding a new agreement on the limitation of strategic arms on the basis of the Vladivostok accord.

Kissinger: That’s fine. Should we mention that we discussed the Middle East? Africa?

Gromyko: Africa, maybe next time.

Sonnenfeldt: Can we confirm it if we’re asked?

Kissinger: I’d say we had a general review of the world situation, including the situation in the Middle East.

Gromyko: All right, you may mention it if you like. How can we separate that from strategic?

Sonnenfeldt: Mention it at the beginning under international issues.

Kissinger: Where did we mention consultations? Non-proliferation and Law of the Sea. We won’t say this to the press.

¹⁸ Reference is presumably to the June 1975 Algiers Accord, which was the basis for bilateral Iran–Iraq agreements on border issues.
Sonnenfeldt: A private agreement among ourselves.
Gromyko: Private, private.
Kissinger: They will ask what questions are being discussed by the General Assembly.
Hyland: The Soviet proposal on nonuse of military force.
Gromyko: The general formula, without particulars.
Kissinger: Yes.
[The conversation ended. The Secretary accompanied the Foreign Minister to the elevator.]

290. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, undated.

MEETING WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO
Friday, October 1, 1976
4:00 p.m. (90 minutes)
The Oval Office

I. Purpose

More than a year has elapsed since your Oval Office meeting with Gromyko last September and your earlier discussions with Brezhnev in Helsinki. While the general course of US–USSR relations has not changed, the pace of the relationship has slowed considerably. The events in Angola, the tone of the US election campaign, the situation in Lebanon, the lack of progress on SALT and MFN, charges and countercharges on CSCE implementation, the MIG–25 defection and the current Soviet campaign against our diplomatic initiatives in Africa all have been contributing factors. In his meeting with Averell Harriman

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 19, USSR (44). Top Secret; Sensitive. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Cliff forwarded it to Scowcroft on September 30. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” Ford also initialed it. According to an attached correspondence profile, the President noted the memorandum on October 1. A September 30 memorandum from Kissinger to Ford on the Gromyko meeting is also attached but not printed.

2 See Document 192.
on September 20, General Secretary gave the impression that the Soviet leadership is resigned to riding out events until November with the hope of resuming a more active relationship after the U.S. election.

On the basis of Gromyko’s talks with Secretary Kissinger on Wednesday evening, you should not expect anything radically new from the Foreign Minister. In addition to his general list of complaints about U.S. actions, he will want to discuss:

—SALT, expressing the hope for progress and reiterating Soviet opposition to the February proposal which would set aside Backfire and Cruise missiles;

—the Middle East, expressing the hope for resumption of the Geneva Conference; and

—the need for progress on MBFR, his hope for U.S. support for his proposed Non Use of Force Treaty, and his hope for US–USSR consultations on non-proliferation and law of the sea.

Your purpose in this meeting will be to:

—state that US–USSR relations remain on the same basic course which you and General Secretary Brezhnev set at Vladivostok;

—express your serious concern and dissatisfaction with Soviet actions and propaganda against the current diplomatic initiatives in Southern Africa;

—draw out Gromyko on the Soviet SALT position, stating that you will have the U.S. position again reviewed, with a view to resuming active discussions after the election; and

—state that you will study the Soviet proposal for resumption of the Middle East Geneva Conference, noting the problem posed by Palestinian participation.

II. Background, Participants and Press Arrangements

A. Background: Soviet Internal Developments. Since your last meeting with Gromyko the Soviets’ 25th Party Congress was held last February. At the Congress, Brezhnev and the other leaders expressed satisfaction that the main objectives of the “peace program” they announced in 1971 have been successfully implemented. At the same time, in keeping with the slower pace of our bilateral relations, speakers at the Congress generally ignored the US and East-West relations.

Just as the Soviet Party Congress pointed to no significant changes in foreign policy, neither did it make or even foreshadow changes in the leadership. Since the Congress, Brezhnev’s health seems to have

3 See Document 288.
4 September 29. See Document 289.
improved but Premier Kosygin recently was stricken, apparently with a heart attack, and has not yet returned to a full work schedule. The death of Defense Minister Grechko earlier this year presented the Politburo with an opportunity—quickly seized—to reaffirm civilian control of the military by naming as his successor Dimitry Ustinov, a civilian who has been a leading figure in the Soviet defense industry since 1941. Also to emphasize civilian preeminence, in recent months several civilian leaders have been promoted to high military rank—Brezhnev and Ustinov to Marshal of the Soviet Union and KGB Chief Andropov to General of the Army.

The Soviets have been preoccupied this year with internal matters including the Party Congress, economic problems, and the Conference of European Communist Parties.

**US–USSR Bilateral Relations**

*SALT.* Gromyko will probably express a sense of Soviet frustration over slow going in SALT. Following his presentation, you will wish to draw him out on any changes to be expected in the Soviet position. Brezhnev complained to Harriman that the Soviets had given the US a new SALT proposal in March and had not yet received a reply. Gromyko can be expected to repeat this and you will wish to remind him that the Soviet side did not make a new proposal; it turned down a U.S. proposal. Brezhnev indicated that if that is the attitude now taken by the Administration, “it is not a token of willingness or desire to achieve agreement.” More specifically, Brezhnev said that:

— the American side in SALT is seeking to avoid limitation on certain of its own arms such as the strategic cruise missile while attempting to extend that definition to Soviet weapons such as the Backfire bomber which do not have strategic capabilities;

— the Soviet side has proposed to ban the Trident and B–1 and similar weapons in the USSR, but the US has rejected this proposal. In fact, the Soviets probably do not expect a response from the US on their latest proposal before our elections.

Our current proposals on Backfire bombers and cruise missiles, put before the Soviets in February,⁵ are: (from signature through Jan. '79)

— **Backfire:** Prohibit acceleration of Backfire production beyond the current and agreed rate.

— Ban improvements in Backfire capability.

— **Cruise Missiles:** Ban ALCMs with range over 2500 km, restrict ALCMs over 600 km to deployment only on heavy bombers, count

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⁵ See Document 264.
heavy bombers equipped with 600–2500 km ALCMs in the 1320 MIRV sub-ceiling.

—Limit testing of all sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs), i.e., cruise missiles launched from submarines and surface ships, and land-launched cruise missiles (LLCMs) to a maximum range of 2500 km.

—Ban deployment of SLCMs and LLCMs over 600 km.

—Commitment to resolve the Backfire and cruise missile issues as soon as possible.

The Soviet response to this proposal was negative, claiming it represented a step backward, that resolution of the cruise missile issue would not become easier in the future as testing progressed and that Backfire was an artificial issue. The Soviet proposal of March did not include any new elements but reaffirmed the previous position they had put forward (a more detailed review of the SALT alternatives is at Tab A).^6

**Nuclear Test Ban Issues.** Gromyko may raise nuclear test ban issues. The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Treaty on Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) establish a yield limit of 150 kilotons for individual explosions. (The PNE Treaty permits group explosions up to an aggregate yield of 1.5 megatons under specified verification conditions.) Both treaties have been submitted to the Senate for ratification. There have been public allegations that certain recent Soviet explosions exceeded a 150 kiloton yield. Data on these explosions are now being studied. Gromyko may also advocate a comprehensive ban on nuclear weapons testing.

**US–USSR Trade.** With the Jackson–Vanik provisions of the Trade Act still blocking MFN for the Soviet Union, the pace of US–USSR trade expansion has slowed. At the same time, bilateral trade has grown from less than $200 million in 1970 to over $2 billion in 1975. In his meeting with Harriman on September 20, Brezhnev again stated that while all are in favor of developing trade without discrimination and with mutual respect, the United States should not attempt to place pressure on the USSR through linkage of trade to any other issue.

The current major irritants for the U.S. in our bilateral trade relations relate to the Maritime Agreement and the Civil Air Agreement. The USSR has shown unwillingness to fulfill its obligations under the Maritime Agreement of 1975 with respect to grain shipments on U.S. flag vessels. The net result of Soviet actions has been to deny U.S. shippers the opportunity to carry the one-third of the grain cargo to which they are entitled. U.S. shippers and maritime unions are

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^6 Dated July 15; attached but not printed.
showing increasing irritation. Additionally, the USSR is in violation of the Civil Air Agreement—ticketing practices by Aeroflot running counter to the agreement, and denial of U.S. charter flights running counter to the agreement. Through the State Department we have made strong representations on these issues.

Soviet Trade Minister Patolichev has been invited by Secretary Simon to come to Washington on October 17–23 for the Sixth Meeting of the Joint US–USSR Commercial Commission. We have not yet received a response from the Soviet side.

MIG–25/Belenko Defection. The USSR remains greatly disturbed by the September 6 defection of Viktor Belenko and by their inability thus far to recover the MIG–25 from the Japanese. On September 8 General Secretary Brezhnev sent you a message protesting the U.S. role in Belenko’s “forced landing,” stating that any U.S. actions with regard to the pilot and any efforts to get access to the aircraft could not but leave their mark on US–USSR relations. He said that Foreign Minister Gromyko would raise this with you together with a number of other Soviet complaints over what has been said and done in the United States in recent months. You have since replied to the General Secretary setting the record straight.

The Japanese Foreign Minister and Gromyko have just consulted in New York on the return of the aircraft (following its inspection by Japanese and U.S. experts). Belenko was granted political asylum by the United States on September 7. On September 28, at the request of the Soviet Embassy, Belenko met with Soviet officials at the State Department and, following their entreaties, told them that he had carefully planned his defection, and that asking for political asylum in the United States was his own decision. He said that he had not been harassed or threatened, that he was not taking pills or medication, that he did not wish to receive any communications from the USSR or his family, that his wife could get a divorce and that he wished no further meetings with Soviet representatives. You will wish to hear out Gromyko, note that the disposition of the MIG–25 is in the hands of the Government of Japan, and that the pilot’s decision to come to the United States was his own.

East-West Issues

CSCE. Gromyko is likely to be apprehensive about the follow-on to the Helsinki Conference and the prospect that Moscow will face a kangaroo court at the Belgrade meeting in June, particularly on Basket III

8 Not found.
(humanitarian) provisions of the Final Act. He may allude to Soviet counter-complaints, such as Radio Liberty broadcasts and US visa refusals.

The information we are receiving suggests a mixed picture on implementation. There has been progress in the area of military security, for example in confidence building measures, with participants in both East and West giving advance notification of major military maneuvers. Similarly, provisions concerning cooperation in the field of economics, science and technology and the environment are being implemented. There has been some progress in the implementation of provisions on human rights. Regulations governing foreign journalists have been eased somewhat; steps have been taken to simplify application for emigration and reduce its cost; and as a result of CSCE there has been a marked increase in emigration of ethnic Germans from Poland and the USSR to the FRG. There has also been some progress in the implementation of provisions on human rights. Regulations governing foreign journalists have been eased somewhat; steps have been taken to simplify application for emigration and reduce its cost; and as a result of CSCE there has been a marked increase in emigration of ethnic Germans from Poland and the USSR to the FRG. There has also been some progress in the implementation of provisions on human rights. Regulations governing foreign journalists have been eased somewhat; steps have been taken to simplify application for emigration and reduce its cost; and as a result of CSCE there has been a marked increase in emigration of ethnic Germans from Poland and the USSR to the FRG. There has also been some progress in the implementation of provisions on human rights. Regulations governing foreign journalists have been eased somewhat; steps have been taken to simplify application for emigration and reduce its cost; and as a result of CSCE there has been a marked increase in emigration of ethnic Germans from Poland and the USSR to the FRG.

Berlin. Despite public and private Soviet indications that they want peace and quiet in Berlin, Soviet acquiescence in GDR interference with the transit routes on August 13 may presage a somewhat harder line on Berlin. The Soviets continue to protest against what they claim to be Western “stretching” of the Quadripartite Agreement, citing plans for Berlin’s representation in a popularly elected European Parliament as an example. Gromyko can be expected to bring up Berlin as part of his list of complaints. FRG Foreign Minister Genscher requested during his meeting with you on September 289 that you stress to Gromyko the importance that the allies attach to strict observance and full implementation of the Quadripartite Agreement.

MBFR. In the Mutual and Balanced Force Reduction talks over the last three years we have sought to achieve a more stable military balance in Central Europe at lower levels of forces. The tenth round of the talks began this week in Vienna. The major development of the last session was the tabling of data by the Soviets on Eastern manpower in Central Europe. This was a significant move since it is one of the few times that the Soviets have tabled data in any arms control negotiations. However, the Soviet data puts Eastern force levels at some 160,000 below our own estimates of Eastern strength and suggests that NATO and Pact manpower in Central Europe is about equal. In fact the East has a significant manpower advantage which we and our allies

have sought to eliminate by our proposal that both sides reduce to a common manpower ceiling. As a first step in this process, the US has offered to withdraw 29,000 troops plus selected nuclear elements (the Option III package) in exchange for Soviet withdrawal of 68,000 men in the form of a tank army (with 1700 tanks).

Our efforts to question the Soviets on their data have been held up by our inability to table revised figures on Western force levels in Central Europe. This is due to the recent objection by the French (who do not participate in MBFR) to the continued inclusion of their forces stationed in Germany in the Western force total. We are working with our allies to solve this problem (which the Soviets may be aware of).

Africa. In his address to the U.N. General Assembly this week, Foreign Minister Gromyko was critical of Western diplomatic initiatives in Africa.10 Over the past several weeks the Soviet press has been highly critical of Secretary Kissinger’s mission (Tab B).11 Gromyko will take a strong line on US-African diplomacy. He will argue that the US aims to use minimal or non-existent progress to break down the anti-South African/Rhodesian polarization in Africa and that the US wishes to establish puppet regimes in Rhodesia and Namibia. It will be important to stress our dissatisfaction with Soviet propaganda, underscore the gravity of the situation and state the need for Soviet restraint.

Soviet/Cuban involvement in southern Africa could rise in coming months if, despite our recent diplomatic breakthrough, insurgent activity was to intensify and the white regimes undertook “active defense” intrusions into neighboring states. The success of our diplomatic initiative, therefore, is clearly crucial. In Brezhnev’s message to the Colombo non-aligned summit, southern Africa was the only location cited where “neo-colonialism” was now in the process of being turned out. Given the increased centrality of southern Africa in Moscow’s calculations, it may be overly optimistic to presume that we can convince Moscow to refrain from supporting violent change in the area. We may, however, be able to deter an active campaign to sabotage our efforts by pointing up the costs to the Soviets.

Middle East/Lebanon. Soviet influence in the Middle East continues in a downward spiral. Estranged from Egypt, Moscow had hoped to use an anti-Sinai pact “united front” of the Syrians and Palestinians to thrust the Arab-Israeli settlement process back into channels where Moscow could participate and curry Arab favor. The deterioration of the situation in Lebanon and the consequent split between the Palestinians and Syrians frustrated Moscow’s design.

10 See footnote 11, Document 289.
11 At Tab B is a compilation, dated September 24, of selected Soviet media comment on Kissinger’s trip to Africa.
Nevertheless, Gromyko will raise a renewed Soviet initiative to reconvene the Geneva Conference in two stages: a procedural stage possibly to work out PLO participation and a substantive stage. Moscow sees little chance for movement at present and Gromyko’s proposal is probably for the record. He will also probe whether we have any plans for additional contacts with Middle East parties preparatory to possible future settlement moves. The Soviets are nervous about Syrian intentions and have even shown signs of concern about the Palestinians. An indication that we see no possibilities for further settlement steps for the time being paradoxically may ease Moscow’s concerns and lessen any perceived need to make desperation moves in the Lebanese or Libyan contexts.

The fighting and quarreling between Soviet clients inside and outside Lebanon place the Soviets in a “no win” situation. While clearly leaning toward the Palestinians, whose continued autonomy best serves Soviet interest in regaining a Middle East diplomatic role, Moscow has taken pains to avoid completely alienating Syria. In this situation, Gromyko is likely to seek to score points by upbraiding us for tolerating Israeli support of the Christians in Lebanon.

UN. In his address to the UN General Assembly on Tuesday, Gromyko invited the US to begin discussing ways to reduce Soviet and US military activity in the Indian Ocean, the first such bid from a high-ranking Soviet leader. The Soviets are primarily seeking talks that would eliminate foreign military bases in the area. Otherwise, Gromyko’s address closely paralleled Brezhnev’s speech to the Party Congress in February. The Foreign Minister again called for a reduction in military budgets of the permanent states of the Security Council, repeated customary Soviet references to a non-use-of-force treaty, the elimination of nuclear weapons tests and the dismantling of foreign military bases.

China. The death of Mao raises questions of stability inside China and continuity in Sino-Soviet-US relations. Moscow has adopted a cautious, wait and see attitude and can be expected to make at least pro forma gestures to Peking for improved relations. Peking has so far shown no receptivity. Schlesinger’s visit, and the exceptional treatment accorded him in the PRC, has been highly irritating to the Soviets. Gromyko may raise it.

12 For the English text of Brezhnev’s speech to the 25th Party Congress, delivered in Moscow on February 24, see Current Digest of the Soviet Press, Vol. XXVIII, No. 8 (March 24, 1976), pp. 3–32.
13 Mao Zedong died on September 9.
B. Participants: Foreign Minister Gromyko, Ambassador Dobrynin, Viktor Sukhodrev (interpreter), Secretary Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft.

C. Press Arrangements: The meeting will be announced and there will be a press photo session at the beginning of your talks.

291. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 1, 1976, 9:53 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President: Your speech sounded great. How did the Gromyko meeting go?

Kissinger: He was on his best behavior. They basically just want to get back into the game. On SALT, on the Middle East, he wants Geneva. I said they would get nowhere. If they kept mentioning the PLO they will get nowhere. He indicated some flexibility, but I am not sure we want the Soviets involved.

[There is some discussion of the campaign.]

Kissinger: The Soviets will be a little mad about my speech.

The President: I haven’t looked at the brief.

Kissinger: He wants to consult on Law of the Sea, non-proliferation, and the Middle East. On SALT, they are ready to move. He wants me to come to Moscow. I am against it, but it is a crime what has happened.

The President: I agree completely. What some members of this Administration have done.

Kissinger: I would say this whole year has been bad. The campaign has not been fair to them, but their action in Angola and now their rhetoric in southern Africa are a serious block to better relations.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1976, Box 21. Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 See footnote 9, Document 289.
3 See Document 289.
4 Brackets in the original.
On SALT I made a pitch for the Rumsfeld position and he just brushed it aside. He’ll never agree to exempt Backfire and cruise missiles.

You could have a SALT agreement by February. But we have to repair the damage. You can see from Genscher\(^5\) the Soviets are approaching the Europeans rather than us. We can keep the Europeans in control as long as they think we have the inside track, but otherwise they will establish their own contacts. So I would tell him we will repair things after November.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to Soviet-American relations.]

\(^5\) A reference to Ford’s meeting with Genscher; see footnote 9, Document 290.

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292. Memorandum of Conversation\(^1\)

Washington, October 1, 1976, 4:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
- President Ford
- Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
- William G. Hyland, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
- Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Counselor, State Department
- Andrey Gromyko, Foreign Minister
- G. Kornienko, Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- A. Dobrynin, USSR Ambassador to the US

President: It’s been a year since I’ve seen you; there have been ups and downs. The long range objectives established in Vladivostok and at the Conference in Helsinki I want continued in the future, as long as I am in office. The road is not smooth, but basically it is where it was when I took office. SALT has slowed down because of the campaign. I assure you that after November 2 it can again become serious. We are trying to be constructive in South Africa, and events should proceed with a minimum of outside involvement. We have no interest in a permanent role there.

\(^1\) Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 21. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
Over the next four years, we should move ahead on MBFR, also on the Middle East. Let me repeat what I said to the General Secretary: our two countries must continue to put relations on a better basis; despite certain international problems, I believe we can carry it out.

Gromyko: Generally pleased to hear your introductory remarks, the meaning of which is that you confirm that you follow and intend to follow the course that has been taken in recent years, and that this is the basic line of the US and Soviet Union. This is also the basic problem I wanted to take up. Also SALT and the Middle East.

On both sides there are repeated statements, also by you, in favor of development of relations between Soviet Union and US on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Also notably in behalf of party and country by Leonid Brezhnev. Trust you are familiar with his remarks to the XXV Congress. Thus you and we have several times confirmed that we intend to continue on peaceful coexistence line, which is the most reasonable position. Recall this basic underlying concept embodied in US-Soviet documents: (1) Principles, (2) the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War, and (3) Vladivostok understanding; though not yet finalized, its importance is immense, provided both sides finalize it. All that is well and good but I would be wrong if I didn’t call attention to statements by the US not fully or at all in accord or even running counter to the line in these documents. I won’t list who said what, where and on what occasion. Every day people have hammered into their minds we are arming without let up and that the US should increase its arms, as if the US were prodded by the Soviet Union. We categorically reject this. An unbiased observer knows that the facts are opposite. Second, the Soviet Union allegedly is acting contrary to the line, bringing influence to bear on countries in remote areas to further unilateral interests and trying to give détente a one-sided interpretation. Not just officials but others. But the state of affairs is not discussed, and no rebuff is given to these statements. So we ask ourselves where is the essence of US policy? The President, when he speaks in public on various occasions, or to us at high-level meetings, or at a different place. We make no statements running counter to our agreed line. Just a few days ago I made a statement at the UN.

The other specific example relates to the MIG 25 which accidentally came down on Japanese territory. We were taken aback by the US line (so also by the Japanese line). As soon as that happened, a statement on Belenko by the White House: “If he wants asylum we’ll grant it.” A very hostile act. The plane is still not given back. US and Japan took the plane apart as if they owned it, like spoils of war. We can’t

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2 See footnote 12, Document 290.
3 See footnote 11, Document 289.
qualify this as anything but hostile. In 1970, during the Vietnam war, a US transport carrying large group came down on Soviet territory. We at once let them go. So there was another plane with two US generals in South Caucasus and we let them go. That is the practice of civilized countries. But that line didn’t suit the US and Japan. We are entitled to believe that the US would give Japanese friendly advice how to act, but no press stories, Belenko acted voluntarily. We don’t believe a word of it. Force was used. Confirmed by doctors. Don’t know what your military will do, but incident has injected great doubt into relations, especially as far as confidence is concerned. We now understand situation better than before: there is great difference in word and deed of US. General Secretary Brezhnev told us to tell you he is very bitter and indignant. How could you do it. How could you meet and look each other in the eye, and raise glasses and drink to friendship. Brezhnev says he just can’t conceive of the whole thing. Has caused great indignation in the whole country.

President: Some preliminary comments: 1) What I said at the outset is policy. What I have said publicly is that the relationship has ups and downs. Basic relationships must continue for peace.

But the President has a responsibility to maintain our security, as you do. Our efforts will fall within limits of Vladivostok agreement. We will maintain forces sufficient for security. Not incompatible with SALT agreement.

3) We have important differences over actions in far-off lands. We told you your actions in Angola were not helpful and hope it won’t happen again.

4) On Belenko: We have traditional asylum policy. All the information we have shows he did it voluntarily. You were granted an interview with your officials. Your remarks about the transport and the two generals are quite different cases. They wanted to come back; Belenko wanted asylum. So, they are not comparable. General Secretary has to recognize there is a difference. If Lt. Belenko wants to go back, we’ll accommodate his wishes. But he doesn’t. But that sort of incident is no reason to cut relations. We did not precipitate the incident. This incident should not interfere with our broad relationship.

Gromyko: Time will pass and you will realize you’ve been misled, and you’ll see the true circumstances concerning the plane and the desires of the pilot. Other occasions other people found themselves abroad and were asked to go back to tell the story of how they were treated. If we had used other means on American planes, some of them would have stayed in the Soviet Union.

Now on South Africa, there are no lack of statements that the Soviets are trying to interfere. Not a single soldier has ever been there. But US persons traveling there to advance US interests. We can’t approve.
Our attitude on racialism well-known since 1917. That’s one view of what justice is all about, should be in the hands of majority people. Racism is not in anyone’s interest. I took part in UN Charter drafting. Many clauses due to the collapse of the colonial system due to US-Soviet cooperation after war, and that went into the UN Charter. Now you assert we are taking bad position. We have no desire to interfere. No one should say we are white and you are black, therefore we know better what’s good for you. My own speech in UN consistent with this.

We are endeavoring to display tact and delicacy in your election campaign. We favor development of relations and line that has taken shape.

President: I appreciate that. US has never believed in colonialism. We gave freedom to the Philippines. And that is the best evidence we don’t believe in it. We have no racism in the US and don’t believe in it on a world-wide basis. So what we are doing in Africa is not in behalf of colonial ambitions. We want Africans to solve African problems and are glad to discuss it.

Gromyko: Can we take up SALT.

President: Sure.

Gromyko: We believe as before that this problem is of exceptional importance. We will finally abide by Vladivostok understanding. Both sides should make all effort to translate understanding into a new agreement. Should be in strict conformity with Vladivostok principles. Two basic differences stand in the way of a new agreement: (1) Cruise missiles. We set out our position in detail to Dr. Kissinger when he was last in Moscow. On that occasion the US side set one position. At that time we thought there was a basis for agreement. Dr. Kissinger said it would take more time to think it over; still no reply has been received. (2) Backfire: the position of the US side on this bomber is still being talked about, but we have on more than one occasion set forth that the Backfire is not a strategic bomber; doesn’t have attributes and we gave you arguments and reasons. Those were given to Dr. Kissinger by the General Secretary. We can’t take any other positions. It cannot be a strategic bomber and can’t be so regarded. General Secretary said not only is it not a strategic bomber, nor will we make it one. This has been said at a responsible level, so you can see how embarrassing it would be if it were discovered to do so. It can’t be hidden.

Our cruise missile position is the same as when Dr. Kissinger was in Moscow.

Don’t think we should prohibit only ballistic missiles above certain level but not prohibit cruise missiles. At one point US told us all to resolve the MIRV question for confidence: what missiles shall be counted as MIRV. We agreed if missile tested once with MIRV, all missiles of
that type would be counted. Not easy for us, a major concession. But stressed it was only valid if cruise missile and Backfire also settled as organic whole. In February we got your proposal to leave suspended cruise missile/Backfire while talks go on.

President: In February.

Gromyko: This was tantamount to saying what is acceptable to the US should be solved but what is not acceptable should be only talked about. This is not good. We don’t want an agreement to be unclear and things left unclear. We want a new SALT agreement and assume so does the US. We urge you to take another look; perhaps the advice some of your agencies give you is not in the broader interest of the US. Don’t know if it can be done before or after the election. But we are prepared to go ahead. If not, we will regret it deeply; if it is bogged down and fails it would damage the interests of both countries and peace.

President: I wanted it a year ago. Dr. Kissinger went in January and thought there was a narrowing of differences. In February I wrote General Secretary Brezhnev to suggest a settlement of cruise missile and Backfire by 1979. You rejected it in March. Hoped if you disagreed you’d make a new proposal, but you didn’t. After November it will be possible to sit down; if you have a proposal, we’ll listen. If the interim idea is no good, then we should talk. Henry?

Kissinger: Thought maybe we should reflect on what has been said. In a letter we could let them know about a reasonable timetable in a week or so. As I had understood, the General Secretary is prepared to reduce 2400 to 2300 or below.

Gromyko: This is not excluded.

Kissinger: As I understand it, the Soviets reject deferral. So you, Mr. President, have not yet considered with your advisers how to proceed.

Dobrynin: You gave us a reply.

President: But yours was a rejection.

Gromyko: Think it over. If there is any possibility along the lines spoken of by Kissinger, it would be attractive. Something in that area might get us out of dilemma. The Middle East?

Gromyko: Points of settlement are: 1) Return of occupied territory. 2) Solution of Palestine problem. But from the outset, to place matter on realistic basis, those two should be supplemented by two others (in terms of principles). First, recognition by Arabs and all states of rights of Israel and others to independent existence. Second, end to state of war in Middle East.

President: UN resolutions 338 and 242 offer a basis. Problem is to get over hump on PLO. If some mechanism can be found maybe all four points can be settled at same time.
Gromyko: We feel these four major items for Geneva agenda have been recognized by all parties. True not each party gives same importance to each item. But they all recognize items. So why not reconvene Geneva and place them on the agenda. We gave Dr. Kissinger our proposal and also to other parties.¹ Want them to think it over. We don’t think accept some other separate conference and start into a new jungle.

Re Palestinians—it is interwoven with all other questions in the Middle East. On adopting agenda without Palestinians, they’d have to be consulted. Then commissions. But can’t have full conference without Palestinians. Question of war and peace is more important than procedure. But the agenda can be adopted in one meeting. One single Geneva conference. No preliminary separate conference. No one can believe these four points solely in Soviet interest. Involve all the parties. So why not try. Find common language and cooperate or have contact. If Palestinians agree, there could be opening meeting to approve agenda, without Palestinians. Only one meeting. But there would be understanding that as soon as agenda is approved, the Palestinians come in. If that takes time, then it is OK, but no separate conference.

President: Suggestion merits careful consideration. I’ll sit down with Henry and we’ll be in touch.

President [Gromyko]: We’ll contact Palestinians and let you know.

¹ See Document 289 and footnote 12 thereto.
293. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Scowcroft) to President Ford

Washington, October 1, 1976.

SUBJECT

Soviet Violation of the Maritime Agreement

The US-Soviet Maritime Agreement of 1975 provides that one-third of all US grain shipped to the Soviet Union should be carried on US flag ships. However, the Soviets have taken a number of actions which have in effect denied US shippers the opportunity to carry the amount of cargo to which they are entitled under the agreement. As a result, since September 1975, US vessels have carried only 25.6% of the total amount of grain shipped to the Soviet Union, or approximately one million tons less than a one-third share. The Soviet actions include:

—A requirement that US shipowners and Soviet charterers agree upon freight rates, even though the Maritime Agreement provides that rates shall be established by designated (i.e. governmental) representatives.

—A prohibition on the use of tankers in the Far Eastern Soviet port of Nakhodka and a further restriction that the draft of all vessels destined for Nakhodka be no more than 32 feet.

—A requirement that only bulk-type vessels (as opposed to tankers) be used in shipments from our Atlantic Coast and Gulf ports to the Baltic and Black Seas.

US Maritime Administration officials have on a number of occasions pointed out to the Russians that these actions are contrary to specific provisions of the Maritime Agreement. Most recently, our Embassy in Moscow has delivered two notes strongly protesting Soviet violations of the agreement. We have complained that the Soviets are denying our shippers the opportunity to carry their fair share of the grain by offering to US owners cargoes (1) originating in areas in the US not served by American-flag vessels; (2) going to areas in the Soviet Union which do not accept US vessels; or (3) on routes for which conditions and freight rates were not agreed to by the designated representatives of the two governments.

1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Presidential Country Files for Europe and Canada, 1974–1977, Box 19, USSR (45). Confidential. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Hormats and Clift forwarded it on September 21 to Scowcroft, who revised it 5 days later. A note on the memorandum reads: “The President has seen.” According to an attached correspondence file, Ford noted the memorandum on October 4.
The Soviets have refused to acknowledge any obligation to increase future grain cargo allocations to levels required to provide US carriers a full one-third share of the shipments. Although the Soviets’ latest response to our protests was more conciliatory than earlier ones, they deny violating the agreement and assert that the US is attempting to obtain “unilateral advantages” by making “artificial” charges against Soviet merchant marine organizations. They claim that the reason US shippers are carrying less than their share is because of operational/technical problems, namely the inability of US shippers to meet the conditions spelled out by Soviet charterers. The Soviets are unhappy about having to pay US owners high shipping rates under the formula established in the agreement and accompanying understandings. Thus, they may be looking for ways to justify placement of grain cargoes with lower cost shippers.

US shippers and the maritime unions are deeply concerned about these reported Soviet violations of the agreement. In August a joint committee of American shipping companies and AFL–CIO maritime workers called for nation-wide demonstrations demanding Russian compliance with the Maritime Agreement. The committee further charged the State Department with being a “contributing factor” in the situation because of “its longstanding unwillingness to support an American-flag shipping capability and its failure to insist on the Russians’ strict observance of the terms of the agreement.”

We expect to discuss these issues in greater depth in maritime negotiations which begin in Washington on September 30. The Soviets have expressed confidence that the disputed issues can be successfully resolved at the experts’ level, but that remains to be seen.
294. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, October 3, 1976, 2:18–4:18 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS
President Ford
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Secretary of State
Brent Scowcroft, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Kissinger: First, a few foreign policy things. I spoke to the editorial writers. I needled Carter a bit. They asked me if I still believed there was no difference between the foreign policy views of the two candidates. I answered that. I said that when I said that, he had given one speech. Since then, he has displayed the full complexity of his thought! So now I wouldn’t say that. Now Carter is going in several directions at once.

On foreign policy there is a high probability that Egypt will jump Libya in the last part of October. This would be a donnybrook. We have said we would interpose the Sixth Fleet.

[Discussion]

The Soviets will think we put the Egyptians up to it. It will be tough for the Soviets—it would reduce them just to Iraq.

President: It would be great if they succeed, but what if they get beaten?

Scowcroft: They won’t get militarily beaten, but it is a thousand miles to Tripoli and they may not make it logistically.

President: We have to stand up to the Soviets if we need to.

Kissinger: That gets me to Gromyko. His behavior was really insolent. On Belenko [the defecting MiG–25 pilot] and Southern Africa.

I thought about calling him in and saying if they muck around in Africa, there will be no détente, no nothing.

In the Middle East they have interests. In Africa it is pure mischief. They don’t really stand to gain much from this gang and they have no permanent interests there. They can only be doing it to weaken and humiliate us. If they have any ideas about another Angola . . .

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1 Source: Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 21. Secret; Nodis. All brackets, except those inserted by the editor to indicate omitted passages, are in the original. The meeting was held in the Oval Office.
2 On October 2, Kissinger was interviewed by a panel at the Annual Meeting of the National Conference of Editorial Writers at Hilton Head, South Carolina. For the text of the interview, see Department of State Bulletin, November 1, 1976, pp. 541–554.
3 See Document 292.
President: I thought I had . . .

Kissinger: You made the points, but he slid off it.

[Omitted here is discussion of Africa, the Middle East, and Congress.]

Kissinger: On the debate, you should not go on the defensive.

President: I have no intention of doing so.

Kissinger: He will say you are destroying the moral basis of our foreign policy.

President: I will say: What is more moral than peace? What is more moral than bringing peace in the Middle East? What is more moral than what we’re doing in Southern Africa? There are about five things.

Kissinger: And what is more moral than bringing home 500,000 troops? The Democrats have gotten us into two wars.

President: I am well prepared on that.

Kissinger: He will hit also on secrecy. [Gives statistics on meetings.]

President: Good.

Kissinger: Another charge is that I am running foreign policy. The White House puts out that no, you overrule me frequently. That makes you look weak, as if we compete. You should look strong enough to have a strong Secretary of State. We are a partnership, with you making the decisions. We shape things in discussion—it is not a case of competing views.

Scowcroft: [Hands the President the 1974 Carter quote praising Kissinger.]

Kissinger: Carter said we were good friends and met frequently. I have met him twice in my life and once was a handshake at the Gridiron this year.

He will throw morality at you—using the State Department surveys I took.4 That is not true. We asked for criticisms and that is what we got. We asked what was wrong, not what was right. I told the editors that yesterday and got applause. It was a stupid way for us to go at it, but it shows our interest and a desire to get the views of the people.

Schlesinger is now with Carter.

Scowcroft: So says Dick Perle.
Kissinger: When Schlesinger went to China, I told the Chinese that we didn’t object to his going but not to use it for political purposes. The goddamned Chinese said we officially protested.

Carter might say, “Schlesinger says our relations with China are lousy.” You could say it is based on the Shanghai Communiqué and if they have any complaints they should convey them to the United States Government, not to a private citizen. If he says the Chinese say we are weak on the Soviets, I would say China can’t tell us how to conduct our policy just like the Soviets can’t. The Chinese would like us to be in confrontation with the Soviet Union to take their chestnuts out of the fire.

I said yesterday to the editorial writers we have to preserve peace both by strength and by conciliation.

If he hits generally on being weak on the Soviets, point out his positions. He wants to cut the defense budget, prevent our giving military aid to Kenya and Zaire, withdraw from Korea, and let Communists into European governments.

I would say there have been two Democratic administrations since World War II and we have gotten into two wars; we’ve had two Republican Administrations and got into no war.

I honestly believe that is no accident. They extend our commitments and reduce our strength. Do you have these statements on Communists in Italy? I would not defend the soft on Soviets charge. I would attack him for making it.

[Omitted here is further discussion in preparation for the upcoming debate, including possible questions on China.]

[Kissinger:] He says we have departed from the moral basis of foreign policy. I would say we have restored the moral basis of our foreign policy. I would blast him on that.

If he raises the Sonnenfeldt Doctrine, I would say there is none. What we also say is: we encourage the greatest independence and freedom of action but do not encourage a revolution. We have not intervened before during revolutions. Does he want to encourage a revolution? You have taken the responsible course—Presidential visits and trade.

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5 Reference is to “off-the-record” remarks Sonnenfeldt made during a conference of U.S. Ambassadors in London in December 1975, in particular, his suggestion that the United States should seek an “organic” evolution of the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. A subsequent account of Sonnenfeldt’s remarks is scheduled for publication in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976. Rowland Evans and Robert Novak published an account of his remarks in their syndicated column on March 22. Despite denials from the administration, including Sonnenfeldt himself, critics charged that this statement represented the recognition of a permanent Soviet sphere of influence in Eastern Europe, a position quickly dubbed the “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine.”
We won’t imply there is possibility of revolution when three times in the past the Soviet Army marched in. Who would be willing to use United States troops for an issue like this?

The greatest possibility for freedom in Eastern Europe is an easing of tensions so they can maneuver. The worst situation for them is when the Soviet Army is on their necks. You visited three countries in Eastern Europe to symbolize our commitment to freedom in Eastern Europe. No Democratic President has ever been in Eastern Europe.

President: Didn’t Kennedy go to Poland?

Kissinger: No, Nixon was the first, when he went to Romania. I wouldn’t just attack Carter. On foreign policy I would attack the Democrats also. Most Democrats agree our foreign policy is better.

Scowcroft: Isn’t that dangerous?

Kissinger: On domestic policy yes, foreign policy no. This is the man who wants to cut the budget, bring troops home and advocate revolution in Eastern Europe. This is the way to get us into war.

On Helsinki, the first point is there were 35 nations there, including the Vatican, not just the United States. Second, when he says it recognizes spheres of influence, it shows Carter doesn’t know what he is talking about. Helsinki says nothing about the Soviet Union in Europe. It says that borders can’t be changed by force, but only by peaceful means. To whose advantage is this? Ours or the Soviet Union’s, with 70 divisions on the border? For the first time the Soviets have committed themselves to implementing human rights. They’re not sticking to it right now but it gives us a standard to which we can hold them.

I am getting worked up. But this guy really burns me. He is a super liberal and now he is turning tough.

On grain, I don’t like this answer [in Eagleburger’s paper].

Scowcroft: He said we messed up the grain deal in 1972. The implications are that he would use grain as a weapon.

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6 Not found.

7 During the Presidential debate on October 6, the President answered a question on the Helsinki Accords, defending the agreement and declaring: “There is no Soviet domination in Eastern Europe, and there never will be under a Ford administration.” (Public Papers: Ford, 1976, No. 854) By the time he discussed the debate with Kissinger on October 11, the President had already suffered a setback in public opinion polls. Although the initial response to his performance had been positive, Ford acknowledged: “It was after two days of press play on Eastern Europe that it turned around.” When he asked if Kissinger was “going to resign because your President let you down,” the Secretary replied: “Don’t even think of what happened. One little glitch.” “You have confirmed in that debate,” Kissinger declared, “the country’s need for you and the disaster that Carter would be.” (Ford Library, National Security Adviser, Memoranda of Conversations, 1973–1977, Box 21)
295. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Kissinger and the Soviet Ambassador (Dobrynin)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, November 3, 1976, 4:30 p.m.

D: I just wanted to say to you that I am going to miss you—in the future I mean.\textsuperscript{2}

K: I will miss you too. If it is possible to have a Marxist friend . . .

D: No problem. It was so narrow.

K: If we had obtained a SALT agreement we would have won.

D: That is my impression. I think it would have changed the outcome.

K: I will stand outside the government for what I have stood for inside. You can be sure of that.

D: I know. Perhaps we can sit down quietly some time and talk.

K: I would like that. I owe you an apology. Believe me I did not know what they were doing. It was inexcusable.

D: It is O.K.

K: O.K., Anatol, thank you.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts. No classification marking.

\textsuperscript{2} On November 2, Jimmy Carter narrowly defeated Gerald Ford (50.1–48 percent of the popular vote; 297–240 electoral votes) in the Presidential election.

Sino-Soviet Relations: Keeping Our Cool

The Problem

The Soviets are seeking actively to cultivate the impression that there has been a softening in the PRC attitude toward Moscow and that significant changes in Sino-Soviet relations may be in store. They are doing so, in part at least, to worry the US and to gain leverage in their dealings with us. We need to minimize our vulnerability to such manipulation.

Background/Analysis

INR has sent you a special analysis (Tab 1) of recent developments in Sino-Soviet relations that indicates these relations are still frozen and that the PRC attitude on the question of relations with Moscow has not changed. That conclusion has been further justified by the walkout of the Soviet ambassador from a diplomatic dinner in Peking over criticism of the Soviet Union’s Africa policy by PRC Vice Premier Li Hsien-nien, who went on to criticize the Soviets for spreading false rumors of improving Sino-Soviet relations.

The reality, as we see it, is as follows:

—Mao’s death and the subsequent changes in the Chinese leadership have not produced any immediate change in the Chinese approach to dealing with the Soviet Union. Indeed, Chinese leaders at the highest level have gone out of their way to emphasize that there will be no change in Mao’s domestic and foreign policy line, specifically including relations with the Soviet Union. Although Peking remains prepared in principle to improve state relations with the USSR, China’s top leaders have clearly signaled that they do not consider such improvements likely.

—The Soviets, on the other hand, are seeking actively to cultivate the impression that significant changes in Sino-Soviet relations may be in store, partly in the hope, presumably, of gaining leverage in
Soviet-US relations. Moscow immediately toned down its anti-Chinese propaganda following Mao’s death, and the Soviets have made public gestures to demonstrate interest in a more normal relationship with Peking. Soviet diplomats are peddling the line that there has been a softening in the PRC attitude toward Moscow.

While Moscow is, for its own reasons, deliberately distorting the facts, this does not mean that we think matters remain as before. Mao’s role in shaping relations between Moscow and Peking cannot be lightly dismissed, and his death may eventually open possibilities for incremental improvements in state relations between Moscow and Peking. These will take time, however, and are not likely to affect the fundamental relationship, in which factors other than personality play the predominant role. Moreover, as our Embassy in Moscow has vigorously (and perceptively) argued (see the telegram at Tab 2), we should not underestimate the constraints that prevent Moscow from making the sort of substantive gestures to Peking that would stand the greatest chance of influencing Chinese attitudes.

We doubt that the sort of improvements in Sino-Soviet relations that might be achieved by the two sides alone—e.g., more correct behavior in bilateral contacts, toned down polemics, expanded trade, and even (at the extreme) progress in the border talks, troop reductions on the border, or a resumption of summit meetings—will alter the basic geo-political considerations that underpin our current relationship with Peking. For this to happen would require either a basic (and unlikely) change in Soviet global behavior or specific actions by us that would either cause Peking once again to treat the United States as the primary threat or that would gravely compromise our utility in Chinese eyes as a counterweight to the USSR. We do, therefore, have a degree of control over those circumstances that could lead to a fundamental qualitative change in the Sino-Soviet relationship.

We are not, on the other hand, in a position to prevent, or even impede, most of the bilateral actions by Moscow and Peking that could restore a modicum of normality to their state relations. But since these will not—if we conduct ourselves wisely—presage a change in the basic relationship, we should neither be unduly worried about this possibility nor set it as a goal of our policy to block such moves. To do so might not only prove unsuccessful but by telegraphing our sense of insecurity would make us more vulnerable to manipulation.

We do not yet see signs that Peking is seeking to play on US fears of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement, as Moscow is clearly trying to do. For Peking to follow suit at this stage would represent a contradictory

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3 Telegram 17617 from Moscow, November 10; attached but not printed.
strand in its present policy of seeking to warn all and sundry against Soviet machinations. We also believe that Peking would not move in this direction unless it made a sharply negative assessment of the new Administration’s attitude toward the US role in the world (i.e., not strong enough) or such issues as normalization and dealing with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, Peking’s awareness of its potential leverage is implied by Li Hsien-nien’s ironical remark to Senator Mansfield that there are those who “seem mortally afraid” that Mao’s death will lead to a change in Sino-Soviet relations.\(^4\)

It is important, therefore, that we position ourselves now to minimize any expectations in Peking or Moscow that they can exploit step by step improvements of their state relations in their bilateral relations with us. Above all, this means that in assessing new situations as they arise, we should avoid overreacting to minor adjustments in their relations or conveying the impression that we fear our own position in the global equilibrium would be threatened.

Specifically, this means:

—We should avoid in our public statements any implication that we are opposed in principle to positive developments in Sino-Soviet relations. If we do not need to go so far as to wish them well, we should at least strike a posture of quiet confidence (a posture which we feel is fully justified by the realities). We should also instruct our diplomatic officials in the field to reflect this posture in their contacts with other governments (Tab 3).\(^5\)

—In dealing with the press, we should continue (as you did at Williamsburg)\(^6\) to try to induce a greater degree of realism than has characterized many recent commentaries on Sino-Soviet relations. In essence, we should neither predict improvements, deny their possibility, nor appear preoccupied with the potential consequences for our own position.

—To the extent that the beginnings of a limited thaw in the other side of the triangle might affect our own interests, we can best safeguard them by sustaining movement and vitality in our relations with both Moscow and Peking. Under these circumstances, moreover, an overt public tilt toward one or the other, in the absence of specific—and

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\(^4\) Senators Mansfield and Glenn met with Chinese Vice Premier Li Xiannian in Beijing on October 9. A memorandum of conversation of the meeting was transmitted in telegram 2072 from Beijing, October 13. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

\(^5\) Draft telegram attached but not printed.

\(^6\) On November 16, Kissinger attended the annual meeting of the North Atlantic Assembly in Williamsburg, Virginia. For the text of both his formal remarks and the ensuing question-and-answer session, see Department of State Bulletin, December 13, 1976, pp. 701–713.
sufficient—provocation, would undercut our ability to use our own bi-
lateral leverage to deter both Moscow and Peking from moving toward
an overtly anti-US posture should their relationship show signs of new
life.

Recommendation

That you approve the telegram at Tab 3 to our diplomatic posts
abroad instructing them to maintain a posture of calm confidence in re-
sponse to rumors of a Sino-Soviet rapprochement and giving them
facts with which to rebut distortions of Sino-Soviet developments.7

7 Kissinger approved this recommendation; the instructions were sent in telegram
289646 to all posts, November 25. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy Files)

297. Briefing Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary
of State for Congressional Relations (Jenkins) to Secretary of
State Kissinger1


Dobrynin and Vanik Talk about Jackson/Vanik Amendment

Charlie Vanik called me this morning to report on the evening he
spent with Dobrynin last week. He had earlier told us that he had
gotten a green light from President-elect Carter to have a general re-
view of US-Soviet relations and the emigration problem with Do-
brynin. Vanik invited the Dobrynins for dinner at his own home and
they accepted. There were just the four of them.

Vanik emphasized, as the evening opened, that he was speaking
only as an individual Congressman but reflected a general view within
the Democratic Party, which was deeply committed to improving
US-Soviet relations. He stressed to Dobrynin that he should under-
stand this objective was a bipartisan objective and would not change
because of a shift in the Administration.

Dobrynin interrupted Vanik at this point to say that he appreciated
Vanik’s protestations that he was speaking as an individual, but that
Harriman had phoned him and informed him that President-elect

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 81D286, Records of the Office of the
Counselor, Box 10, POL 2 USSR—Emigration & Families. Confidential; Exdis. Forwarded
through Sonnenfeldt.
Carter had endorsed Vanik’s suggestion of getting together. Dobrynin gave Vanik the clear impression throughout the evening that he has a continuing dialogue with Governor Harriman.²

Vanik moved directly into the question of how to solve the trade/emigration bottleneck. He said that if the Soviets would take initiatives unilaterally to diminish police harassment, accelerate the emigration of 500 or 600 prominent families in the Moscow/Leningrad area, and generally permit emigration statistics to inch upward, this would set the atmosphere for Congressional initiatives to back out of the present impasse.

Dobrynin commented on each of these points. He insisted that harassment was a matter of individual police responses in many cases to Jewish dissident provocations. He said he knows there have been excesses, but on the other hand, those Jews who are interested in leaving the Soviet Union have adopted a very difficult posture. He said, “You know our police are not used to this kind of behavior and many people seem to enjoy making the police lose their tempers.” Notwithstanding that explanation, Dobrynin said, he would agree to try and see that a general tone was established which could not be misinterpreted as official harassment. On the subject of the overall numbers, Dobrynin felt that this is subject to a number of elements, but his bottom line was that the figures probably could rise without too much difficulty. On key families, Dobrynin said categorically he would recommend that an active review of family reunification cases be undertaken quickly which would accelerate the departure of a number of cases in which the United States is particularly interested.

At this point in the conversation Mrs. Dobrynin, whom Vanik characterized as an active, outspoken participant throughout the evening, interrupted to say, “I think it is ridiculous and costly to our image to attempt to keep people who clearly want to leave.” She actively supported Vanik, in fact, with her husband, saying, “You must recommend that they be permitted to go right away. It will be well received by the new Administration and will certainly reduce criticism of the Soviet Union in the United States.”

Vanik suggested that he had been playing with the idea privately of a resolution which would call upon the President to take whatever steps he deemed appropriate to achieve progress toward the goals legislated—i.e., free emigration and improving trade relations with the So-

²Two days after a meeting at Carter’s home in Plains, Georgia, Harriman visited Dobrynin in Washington on December 1 to convey the President-elect’s views on Soviet-American relations. A translation of Dobrynin’s report on the meeting with Harriman is in the U.S.-Soviet Relations Collection in the Virtual Archive of the Cold War International History Project.
viet Union. The President then could respond that, in the face of clear progress in Soviet emigration policy, he intended to issue a waiver. Congress in turn would indicate its support for such an act. Vanik opined that such a process would obviate the need for repeal or amendment of the legislation and would require nothing from the Soviets beyond the unilateral improvements he had discussed earlier. Vanik said he thought of a resolution which would refer to a two-year trial period.

Dobrynin rebelled at the thought of a two-year trial—or any time limit. He insisted that the Soviet Union is a proud and great country and could not be dictated to by a foreign country on such questions. However, he said, if you would remove the time limit, such a procedure would have much to commend it. He said, of course any such initiative by the President would have to include credits as well as MFN. Why not, said Dobrynin, just pass a resolution as you suggested, encouraging the President to take action which would be subject to repeal by the Congress at any time? “That is a fact of life in your legislature and you don’t have to state it. If you do and put a specific time limit, it then becomes a provocation to my Government.”

Dobrynin talked at some length of his desire for quick action on SALT. He told Vanik that they were very worried about our program to build a B–1 bomber. Dobrynin said, “If you go ahead with this program, then our people will have to work to develop a B–1 also. This kind of thing is terribly expensive for both sides. We are prepared to freeze our weapons systems at present levels. There is plenty of room for compromise and we consider this the most urgent international challenge we face.”

Vanik felt that Dobrynin intends to move rapidly on the emigration question, and he got the impression that we could look for some Soviet initiatives on reunification of families and emigration numbers within the next few months or even quicker.

Without endorsing any of Vanik’s own positions, I expressed our gratitude for his report and told him I would see it got to the appropriate people in the Department.
298. Memorandum From the Counselor of the Department of State (Sonnenfeldt) to Secretary of State Kissinger


SUBJECT

Your Luncheon with Dobrynin and Secretary-Designate Vance, January 4, 1977

Herewith a Checklist of the issues that may come up. I will provide you with a detailed discussion of some of these items tomorrow morning.

CHECKLIST

—SALT. Brezhnev has said that conclusion of a SALT Agreement is the primary item of business with the new Administration.

—Jackson–Vanik. Brezhnev has given revision of this legislation almost as much priority as he has conclusion of SALT Agreement.

—MBFR. During the closing days of the last round, the West finally tabled revised data on the forces of the direct Western participants. The Soviets have said they will be ready to start a data discussion next round.

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2 During a telephone conversation on December 20, Dobrynin agreed to Kissinger’s suggestion for a meeting with Vance on January 4. (Department of State, Electronic Reading Room, Kissinger Transcripts of Telephone Conversations) Kissinger called Vance 4 days later to confirm the appointment. (Ibid.) No substantive record of the meeting has been found.

3 A January 4 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger providing a more “detailed discussion” of these issues is in National Archives, RG 59, Lot File 91D414, Records of Henry Kissinger, 1973–77, Box 20, Nodis Briefing Memos, 1977, Folder 1. Excerpts are provided in footnotes below.

4 In his January 4 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt noted: “There appears to be high confidence in our government that a SALT agreement based on the negotiations to date could be wrapped up very expeditiously, were the cruise missile and Backfire issues to be resolved.” He added that, since the Soviets had a “vested interest” in SALT II, “[t]hey would be intensely concerned about the next Administration’s willingness (or lack thereof) to pick up the threads of negotiation. As a corollary, they will also be wondering how long it will take the next Administration to fix its policies in this area, with the expiration of the Interim Agreement much in mind.”

5 In his January 4 memorandum, Sonnenfeldt discussed the recent meeting between Dobrynin and Vanik; see Document 297. He also added the following parenthetical comment: “Neither Vanik nor Dobrynin seem to appreciate the domestic political burden such an approach would put on the President, who would have to defend his action against critics who would cite refused immigration cases as evidence that his waiver was ill advised.”
—**Soviet Force Buildup.** You may wish to tell Dobrynin that the pace and scope of the Soviet buildup has obviously become a matter of considerable public and official debate, both here and in NATO, about Soviet intentions.

—**TTBT/PNE.** The treaties are before the Senate for ratification. The Soviets may be concerned that they will be dead letters.

—**CTB.** The Soviets have given some indication of increased flexibility on verification and their position re participation of all nuclear powers.

—**Non First Use of Nuclear Weapons.** The Soviets have expressed disappointment over NATO’s swift rejection of their proposal.

—**Chancery Construction.** The ball is in the Soviet court. We have given them a list of things we want them to do for our people in Moscow before they can begin construction of their apartment complex here.

—**CIVAIR.** We have proposed January 24 for the opening formal talks. We expect a response tomorrow.

—**Maritime Agreement.** The Soviets have met our concerns and Assistant Secretary of Commerce Blackwell is now in Moscow to wrap up the formal agreement.

—**Thrust of Soviet Media Comment.** Soviet year-end output has begun to give negative slant to judgments on the outgoing Administration (arms race, artificial Soviet threat, Southern Africa) and to treat the incoming Administration with cautious respect. It is customary for Soviet publicity to put an incoming Administration under pressure to respond to forthcoming Soviet gestures (e.g., Stalin–Reston, 1952; Dartmouth Conference, 1960; SALT/Summit proposals, January, 1969).
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