About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the Foreign Relations series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

**Sources for the Foreign Relations Series**

The *Foreign Relations* statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government
agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Record Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s indexed central files for 1969–1972 are available at Archives II. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office (or lot) files covering the 1969–1976, period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents maintained and preserved formerly at the Nixon Presidential Material Project at Archives II and currently at the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and at other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of the Nixon Library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the Nixon Library include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Editorial Methodology

The documents are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance
from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words repeated in telegrams to avoid garbling or provide emphasis are silently corrected. Words and phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarized pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provided references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations
About the Series

The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act Review

Under the terms of the Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act (PRMPA) of 1974 (44 U.S.C. 2111 note), the Nixon Presidential Library in Yorba Linda, California, has custody of the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The requirements of the PRMPA and implementing regulations govern access to the Nixon Presidential historical materials. The PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require the Nixon Library to review for additional restrictions in order to ensure the protection of privacy rights of former Nixon White House officials, since these officials were not given the opportunity to separate their personal materials from public papers. Thus, the PRMPA and implementing public access regulations require the Nixon Library formally to notify the Nixon Estate and former Nixon White House staff members that the agency is scheduling for public release Nixon White House historical materials. The Nixon Estate and former White House Staff members have 30 days to contest the release of Nixon historical materials in which they were a participant or are mentioned. Further, the PRMPA and implementing regulations require the Nixon Library to segregate and return to the creator of files private and personal materials. All Foreign Relations volumes that include materials from the Nixon Library are processed and released in accordance with the PRMPA.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this vol-
ume, which began in 2016 and was completed in 2017, resulted in the
decision to withhold 0 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in
0 documents, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in 0
documents.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research
conducted in preparing this volume and as a result of the declassifica-
tion review process described above, that the documentation and editor-
ial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable
record of the public diplomacy of the Nixon administration.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
Acting Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
September 2018
Preface


In 2007, historians at the Office of the Historian proposed a retrospective series of the Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volume designed to augment the series’ coverage of U.S. public diplomacy. While the FRUS series began to document the subject in a sustained and concerted way starting with the second administration of President Richard M. Nixon, previous FRUS coverage of U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been far less consistent. These retrospective volumes will fill that gap, which stretches from the First World War to the early 1970s. Resource constraints and the statutory requirement to publish Foreign Relations volumes 30 years after the events that they cover mean that compilations in this volume have been researched and compiled piecemeal over a longer period of time than the typical FRUS volume. Fortunately, progress is being made. During the fall of 2014, the Office released the compilation covering the U.S. Government’s public diplomacy efforts from 1917 to 1919. Subsequent compilations, which will document up to the end of the first Nixon administration, will be published as they are completed.

This compilation, covering the years 1969 to 1972, focuses on the Nixon administration’s efforts to manage public diplomacy during Nixon’s first term in office. It describes how the United States Information Agency (USIA) worked to present U.S. foreign policy objectives to the world during a time of social change within the United States and how USIA attempted to reach new audiences, specifically young adults. The volume chronicles the development of new structures within USIA, including the Executive Committee (ExComm) and the Young Officers’ Policy Panel (YOPP). It depicts how the Agency commemorated the Apollo 11 moon landing, took part in the Women’s Strike for Equality, and planned for the U.S. Bicentennial celebration. The compilation also illustrates how USIA and the Department of State pursued public diplomacy against the backdrop of the Vietnam war, the President’s 1972 trip to China, and the 1972 Moscow summit. Additional documentation chronicles the Department of State’s cultural exchange activities, including administration of the Art in Embassies program and the Cultural Presentations program. The volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplo-
macy, 1973–1976, which contains a chapter on international information policy, public diplomacy, and cultural affairs.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
General Editor

Acknowledgments

The editor wishes to acknowledge the assistance of John Laster and Peter Halligas of the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.; Elizabeth Gray, David Langbart, Tab Lewis, Don McIlwain, and Richard Peuser of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland; John Powers of the National Security Council, formerly of the Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland; Meghan Parker Lee of the Richard M. Nixon Library in Yorba Linda, California; and Vera Ekechukwu of the University of Arkansas Libraries, Fayetteville, Arkansas.

David H. Herschler, the former Deputy Historian, conducted the initial research for this volume. M. Todd Bennett, the former Chief of the Europe and General Division, and Adam M. Howard, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series, also conducted research. Kristin L. Ahlberg completed the research and edited the volume, under the supervision of Adam M. Howard, who reviewed the compilation. Stephanie Eckroth performed the copy and technical editing, under the supervision of Mandy Chalou, Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. Kerry E. Hite coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, Chief of the Declassification Division.

Kristin L. Ahlberg, Ph.D.
Historian
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Sources


The Presidential papers of Richard M. Nixon, housed at the Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and formally housed at the National Archives and Records Administration, are a key source of high-level decision making documentation on public diplomacy. A number of collections are relevant to research in this area. Within the National Security Council Files, the most useful collections are the Agency Files, Subject Files, Name Files, Haig Chronological File, and the Kissinger Telephone Conversation transcripts.

The National Archives and Records Administration also houses essential high-level documentation on the implementation and management of public diplomacy during the Nixon administration. Within the Department of State Record Group 59, the records of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs are especially significant, as they contain the files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs as well as the records of the Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. In addition, the Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files for 1967–1969 and 1970–1973 include a variety of documentation on cultural programming and educational and cultural exchanges. Of great importance is Record Group 306, the records of the United States Information Agency. These collections yield a substantial amount of documentation on USIA’s organizational structure, as well as on program development, implementation, and evaluation. The USIA Historical Collection includes Subject Files (containing records relating to USIA function, mission, organization, and programs compiled by former USIA archivist Martin Manning), Office of the Director Files (containing biographical material on USIA senior personnel and major speeches), and Reports and Studies Files. The Records of the Office of Policy and Plans contain both subject files and general subject files. The Office of the Director Files (separate from those contained within the USIA Historical Collection) also include detailed subject files. The Office of Research files contain a variety of USIA printed products, including the Research Reports and the Special Reports. The Office of Research and Evaluation files contain program files, while the Office of Research and Assessment files include documentation relating to the Advisory Commission on Information and the Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.
Unpublished Sources

Department of State

Central Files. See National Archives and Records Administration, below.

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, Records of the Department of State

Subject-Numeric Indexed Central Files, 1967–69 and 1970–73
- CUL 8: Culture; Fairs, Exhibits, and Displays
- CUL 14: Culture; Music
- CUL 16: Culture; Cultural Presentations
- CUL 16 US: Culture; Cultural Presentations, United States
- EDX 1 US: Education and Cultural Exchange; General Policy, Plans, Coordination, United States
- EDX 1–1: Education and Cultural Exchange; Country Program Plans, Allocations
- EDX 4 US–USSR: Education and Cultural Exchange; Agreements, United States and Soviet Union
- EDX AFR-US: Education and Cultural Exchange; United States and Africa
- EDX US–USSR: Education and Cultural Exchange; United States and Soviet Union
- INF 2 VIET S: Information; Reports and Statistics, South Vietnam

Lot Files

Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files of Assistant Secretary John Richardson: Entry P–242, Lots 76D186 and 78D184

Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency

Associate Directorate for Programs

Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents: Entry P–100
Executive Committee, E/CLS Files, ExComm: Entry UD–112
Executive Committee General Files: Entry UD UP–005

Historical Collection

Subject Files, 1953–2000: Entry A1–1066
Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000: Entry A1–1069

Office of Administration and Management

Assistant Director’s Correspondence File, SUBJ 1968–1972: Entry UD–164

Office of the Director

Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972: Entry A1–42
Director’s Subject Files, 1961: Entry UD WW–142

Office of Policy and Plans

IOP/C Cultural and Youth Subject Files, 1955–1971: Entry UD–90
Policy Coordination Staff, Cultural Affairs and Youth Adviser, Subject Files, 1955–1971: Entry UD–102
Sources XV

Program Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1966–1971: Entry P–12
Plans and Operational Policy Staff, Office of Planning Officer, Subject Files: Entry P–207
Program Coordination Staff, Advisor for Science, Space, and Environment, Subject Files, 1958–1972: Entry P–243
Office of Research
Special Reports, 1953–1997: Entry P–160
Office of Research and Assessment
Office of Research and Evaluation
Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1969–1978: Entry P–119

Nixon Presidential Materials Project, National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland (now at the Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California)

National Security Council (NSC) Files
Agency Files: United States Information Agency; Voice of America
Haig Chronological File
Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts
Chronological File
Name Files
Subject Files:
   East/West Center
   Space Programs Foreign Cooperation
   United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs
   Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

National Security Council Institutional Files (H–Files)
National Security Decision Memoranda

White House Central Files
Staff Member and Office Files, Office of Presidential Papers and Archives, Daily Diary
Subject Files
FG 230

White House Special Files
Staff Member and Office Files: Scali Files
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Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library and Museum, Yorba Linda, California

White House Central Files
Subject Files
FG 230

White House Staff Files
Staff Member and Office Files: HR Haldeman

Published Sources


The Chicago Tribune

Congressional Record


The New York Times

Sports Illustrated


Sources XVII


XVIII  Sources


The Wall Street Journal

The Washington Post
Abbreviations and Terms

A/ART, Art in Embassies Staff, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Operations, Bureau of Administration, Department of State
A/IT, Office of International Training, Agency for International Development
ABA, American Basketball Association; also American Bar Association
ABC, American Broadcasting Company
ACDA, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
ACE, American Council on Education
ACTION, federal agency created by the merger of VISTA and the Peace Corps
AD–70, *Alliance Defense Problems for the 1970s*
AEC, Atomic Energy Commission
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFSA, American Foreign Service Association
AH, Alexander Haig
AID, Agency for International Development
AID/V, Bureau for Viet-Nam, Agency for International Development
AIESEC, *Association internationale des étudiants en sciences économiques et commerciales* (International Association of Students in Economic and Commercial Sciences)
AIG, address indicator group
Am, American
AP, Associated Press
ARA–LA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State; Agency for International Development
ARA–LA/APU, Argentina-Paraguay-Uruguay, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State
ARBC, American Revolution Bicentennial Commission
ARVN, Army of the Republic of Vietnam
Ass’t, assistant
B–52, all-weather, intercontinental, strategic heavy bomber
BALPA, Balance of Payments Reduction Program; exercise undertaken during the Johnson administration in 1968
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BFS, Board of Foreign Scholarships
BIAAS, proposed Bicentennial Institute of Advanced American Studies
BIE, Bureau of International Expositions
BNC, bi-national center
BPAO, Branch Public Affairs Officer
BST, Blood, Sweat and Tears (rock band)
BW, Barbara White
C–47, military transport aircraft
C, Counselor of the Department of State
C/Y, Special Assistant for Youth, Office of the Counselor, Department of State
CA, circular airgram
CAO, cultural affairs officer
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization

XIX
XX Abbreviations and Terms

Chieu Hoi, “Open Arms” Government of South Vietnam amnesty program
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINCPAC, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
CINCPACFLT, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet
CINCUSARPAC, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Army Pacific
Comm., committee; also commission
COMSAT, communications satellite
Conf., conference
Cong., Congress
ConGen, Consulate General
CORDS, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support
COSVN, Central Office for South Vietnam
CPDC, GVN Central Pacification and Development Council
CPM, Country Program Memorandum (USIA)
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/CP, Office of Cultural Presentations, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/EX, Office of the Executive Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/IR, Public Information and Reports Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/OPP, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CU/PRS, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CTZ, corps tactical zone
D, Democrat
DFL, Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party
Dir., director
Doc., document
DOCSA, Deputy Director for Operations (Counterinsurgency and Special Activities), Joint Chiefs of Staff
DOD, Department of Defense
DPO, Daniel P. Oleksiw
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
E, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
E/CA/REP, Foreign Reporting Division, Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State
EA, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EA/ACA, Asian Communist Affairs (People’s Republic of China, Mongolia, Hong Kong, and Macau Affairs), Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State
EC–121, unarmed, four-engine propeller-driven reconnaissance aircraft
EDIP, European Defense Improvement Program
EEC, European Economic Community
ERA, Equal Rights Amendment
ETV, educational television
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/BRY, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/CHIP, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Baltic States, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/FBX, France, Benelux, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Abbreviations and Terms  XXI

EUR/SES, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State

Eurovision, television contribution network part of the European Broadcasting Union

Exec., executive

4–A, American Association of Advertising Agencies

F–4 Phantom, an all-weather jet fighter-bomber used by the Air Force and Navy

FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

FAS, Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps (USIA)

FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt

FEW, Federally Employed Women

FI, Frederick Irving

FJS or FS or F or S, Frank J. Shakespeare

FRANTIC GOAT, leaflet mission flown during the Vietnam war

FS, Foreign Service

FSIO, Foreign Service Information Officer

FSO, Foreign Service Officer

FY, fiscal year

FYI, for your information

Gen., General

GMD, Guomindang (Nationalist Party; Republic of China), also called the Kuomintang

GMT, Greenwich Mean Time

GOC, Government of Cambodia

GRC, Government of the Republic of China

GS, General Schedule

GVN, Government of Vietnam

HAD or HD, Henry A. Dunlap

HAK or HK, Henry A. Kissinger

HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

HL, Henry Loomis

H.R., House Resolution

I or USIA/I, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

IAA or USIA/IAA, Office of Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency

IAESTE, International Association for the Exchange of Students for Technical Experience

IAF or USIA/IAF, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency

IAF/VN or USIA/IAF/VN, Vietnam Staff, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency

IAI/S or USIA/IAI/S, United States Advisory Commission on Information

IAN or USIA/IAN, Office of Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency

IAP, International Arts Program, Smithsonian Institution

IAS or USIA/IAS, Office of Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency

IAYC, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

IBS or USIA/IBS, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting, United States Information Agency

IBS/PS or USIA/IBS/PS, USSR Division, Policy Application Staff, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting, United States Information Agency
XXII Abbreviations and Terms

IBS/PW or USIA/IBS/PW, VOA English Division, Policy Application Staff, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting, United States Information Agency
I/C or USIA/I/C, Special Assistant for Welfare and Grievances, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
ICPG, International Cultural Planning Group
ICS or USIA/ICS, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency
ICS/C or USIA/ICS/C, Cultural Operations Division, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency
ICS/E or USIA/ICS/E, Exhibits Division, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency
ICSG, International Cultural Strategy Group
IEA or USIA/IEA, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (beginning in 1971)
IEE or USIA/IEE, Office of Assistant Director, Soviet Union and East Europe, United States Information Agency (beginning in 1971)
I/EX or USIA/I/EX, Executive Officer, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
IG, interdepartmental exchange group; also interagency group
IGC or USIA/IGC, Office of the General Counsel, United States Information Agency
IIE, Institute of International Education
ILA or USIA/ILA, Office of Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency (beginning in 1971)
IMV or USIA/IMV, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later Screen Service), United States Information Agency
IMV/M or USIA/IMV/M, Program Manager, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later Screen Service), United States Information Agency
IMV/MW or USIA/IMV/MW, Worldwide Programs, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later Screen Service), United States Information Agency
IMV/O or USIA/IMV/O, Operations Manager, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later Screen Service), United States Information Agency
IMV/OSC or USIA/IMV/OSC, Service Control Branch, Quality Control Branch, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later Screen Service), United States Information Agency
IMV/P or USIA/IMV/P, Production Manager, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later Screen Service), United States Information Agency
IMV/PS or USIA/IMV/PS, Staff Production Division, International Communications Media Staff, Office of Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later Screen Service), United States Information Agency
INE or USIA/INE, Office of Assistant Director, Near East and North Africa, United States Information Agency (beginning in 1971)
Info Guide, USIA policy statement on U.S. attitudes toward a given situation, normally classified and transmitted by telegram or pouch
INRA, International Research Associates
Intelsat, International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium
Intl., international
IO, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IO/OIA, Office of International Administration, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State
IOA or USIA/IOA, Office of Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency

IOA/M or USIA/IOA/M, Management Division, Office of Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency

IOP or USIA/IOP, Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency (changed to Office of Policy and Plans in mid 1969)

IOP/C or USIA/IOP/C, Chief, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency

IOP/G or USIA/IOP/G, Policy Guidance and Media Reaction Staff, Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency (changed to Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans in mid 1969)

IOP/P or USIA/IOP/P, Assistant Director, Policy and Plans, Office of Policy and Research, United States Information Agency; also Chief, Plans and Resource Analysis Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency

IOR or USIA/IOR, Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency

IOR/E or USIA/IOR/E, Chief, Evaluation and Analysis Staff, Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency

IOR/I or USIA/IOR/I, Chief, Inspection and Audit Staff, Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency

IOR/L or USIA/IOR/L, Agency Library, Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency

IOR/M or USIA/IOR/M, Coordinator for Management Information Systems—Resource Allocation System Development, Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency

IOR/R or USIA/IOR/R, Assistant Director for Research (later changed to Chief, Research Service), Office of Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency

IOS or USIA/IOS, Office of Assistant Director, Security, United States Information Agency

IPS or USIA/IPS, Office of Assistant Director, Press and Publications, United States Information Agency

IPS/MI or USIA/IPS/MI, America Illustrated Branch, Publications Division, Office of Assistant Director, Press and Publications, United States Information Agency

IPT or USIA/IPT, Office of Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, United States Information Agency

I/R or USIA/I/R, Office of Assistant Director, Public Information, United States Information Agency

I/RA or USIA/I/RA, Resource Analysis Staff, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

I/S or USIA/I/S, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

I/S–O or USIA/I/S–O, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency

ISA or USIA/ISA, Office of Assistant Director, South Asia, United States Information Agency (beginning in 1971)

ISDI, Inter-American Social Development Institute

ISS or USIA/ISS, Office of Assistant Director, Screen Service, United States Information Agency

ITU, International Telecommunications Union

IWE or USIA/IWE, Office of Assistant Director, West Europe, United States Information Agency (beginning in 1971)

JAS, John A. Scali

JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
XXIV Abbreviations and Terms

JDL, Jewish Defense League
JER, John E. Reinhardt
JOB, John O’Brien
JOT, junior officer in training
JR, John Richardson
JUSPAO, Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office, Vietnam

K, Henry Kissinger
KB, Kenneth Bunce
KW, kilowatt

L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LCRP, Assistant Legal Adviser for Cultural Relations and Public Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LA, Latin America
LAM SON (also LAMSON) 719, a 1971 operation in Laos by South Vietnamese forces to interdict the Ho Chi Minh Trail
LBJ, Lyndon Baines Johnson
LDC, lesser developed country
LEM, Lunar Excursion Module (lander portion of Apollo spacecraft)
Lt., lieutenant
Lt. Col., lieutenant colonel

MACV, Military Assistance Command Vietnam
MIN, Minister; Ministry
MIS, management information system
MOI, Ministry of Information
MPAA, Motion Picture Association of America
Mtg., meeting

NAB–JOBS, National Alliance of Businessmen-Job Opportunities in the Business Sector
NAC, North Atlantic Council
NAFSA, National Association for Foreign Student Affairs
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NCA, National Council for the Arts
NCFA, National Council of Fine Arts; also National Collection of Fine Arts
NCFA/IAP, National Council of Fine Arts, International Arts Program
NCNA, New China News Agency
NCUSCR, National Committee for U.S.-China Relations
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; also National Endowment for the Arts

New Mobe, New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam
NLF, National Liberation Front

Nodis, no distribution
Noforn, no foreign dissemination
NPN, News Policy Note (USIA)
NPT, (Nuclear) Non-Proliferation Treaty
NSA, National Student Association
NSC, National Security Council
NSC–U/SM, National Security Council, Under Secretaries Committee memorandum
NSDM, National Security Decision Memorandum
NSF, National Science Foundation
Abbreviations and Terms

NSSM, National Security Study Memorandum
NVA, North Vietnamese Army
NVN, North Vietnam

O, Administrative Offices and Staffs, Department of State
O-2B, observation aircraft used in Vietnam
OAS, Organization of American States
OASD/ISA, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
OAU, Organization of African Unity
OBE, overtaken by events
OMB, Office of Management and Budget
Orig., original
OSD/ISA, Office of the Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs
OSS, Office of Strategic Services
OST, White House Office of Science and Technology (Science Advisor's Office)

P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; also President
P/MS, Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PanAm, Pan-American Airlines
PAO, public affairs officer
PC, Peace Corps
PER/CMA, Career Management and Assignments Division, Personnel, Department of State
PEN, poets, essayists, and novelists
P.L. 480, Public Law 480: Food for Peace
P.M., Prime Minister
POA, Pacific Ocean Areas
Potomac Cable, unclassified Info Guide transmitted over Wireless File (USIA)
POW, prisoner of war
PPBS, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System initiated by the Johnson administration in 1965 for identifying agency goals
PPBS/MIS, Planning-Programming-Budgeting System, Management Information System
PPC or AA/PPC, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development
PPC/TIXD or AA/PPC/TIXD, Title IX Division, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development
PR, public relations
PRC, People's Republic of China
Pres., President
Prof., professor
PSDF, People's Self Defense Force
Psy Ops or PSYOPS, psychological operations

R, Republican; also William Rogers
REACH, proposed Re-Establish America's Cultural Heritage initiative
RCA, Radio Corporation of America
Rcpt, receipt
Rec., receive
Ref., reference
Rep., report
Ret., retired
RFE, Radio Free Europe
RFK, Robert F. Krill
RG, Record Group
Abbreviations and Terms

RL, Radio Liberty
RN, Richard Nixon
ROC, Republic of China
ROK, Republic of Korea
rpt., repeat
RSC, regional service center (USIA)
RVN, Republic of Vietnam

S, Senate; also Secretary of State
S/PC, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–I, Secretariat Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
SA–2, surface to air missile
SALT, Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty
SC, UN Security Council
SCAO, Senior Academic Cultural Affairs Officer
SDS, Students for a Democratic Society
SEA, Southeast Asia
SEAMES, Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Secretariat
SEATO, South East Asian Treaty Organization
Sec. or Secy., Secretary
SIE, Special International Exhibition
SITES, Smithsonian Institution Traveling Exhibition Service
SRG, Senior Review Group
STAGs, Short Term American Grantees
Stat., statute
STP, Special Thematic Programming
SVN, South Vietnam

TASS, Telegraphnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soyuza (Telegram Agency of the Soviet Union)
TCC, troop contributing country
Telstar, communications satellite
Tet, Vietnamese lunar new year
THVN, SVN national television agency
TV, television

U, Under Secretary of State
U/SM, NSC Under Secretaries Committee memorandum
UAR, United Arab Republic
UCLA, University of California Los Angeles
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USA, United States Army; also United States of America
USAF, United States Air Force
USC, NSC Under Secretaries Committee; also United States Code
USES, U.S. Expositions Staff, Department of Commerce
USG, United States Government
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UST, United States Treaty series
Abbreviations and Terms

USUN, United States Mission to the United Nations

VC, Viet Cong
VIP, very important person
VIS, Vietnamese Information Service
VISTA, Volunteers in Service to America
VMC, Vietnam Moratorium Committee
VN, Vietnam
VOA, Voice of America
VOF, Voice of Freedom
VTVN, SVN national radio system

WES, William E. Strasburg
WSAG, Washington Special Actions Group
WH, White House
WHO, World Health Organization
WHW, William H. Weathersby
WYA, World Youth Assembly

YOPP, Young Officers’ Policy Panel

Z, Zulu Time (Greenwich Mean Time)
Persons

Ablard, Charles D., General Counsel and Congressional Liaison, U.S. Information Agency, from May 1969

Abrams, Creighton W., Jr., General, USA; Commander, U.S. Military Assistance Command Vietnam, until June 28, 1972; Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, from October 12, 1972

Adair, Edwin R., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Indiana) until January 3, 1971; U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia from July 8, 1971

Adams, Walter, President, Michigan State University, from April 1, 1969, until January 1, 1970; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Adler, Kenneth P., Deputy Assistant Director, Research, Office of Research and Assessment, U.S. Information Agency, from July 1969; Program Research Officer, U.S. Consulate at Munich, from August 1971

Agnew, Spiro T., Vice President of the United States

Akers, Robert W., Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency until early 1969; also acting Director in late 1968 and early 1969


Aldridge, John W., Professor of English, University of Michigan; Special Adviser for American Studies, U.S. Embassy in Bonn; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Aldrin, Buzz, U.S. astronaut


Allen, George V., Director of the U.S. Information Agency from November 15, 1957, until December 1, 1960

Allen, Richard V., planning staff, National Security Council; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

Allende Gossens, Salvador, leader of the Unidad Popular in Chile; President of Chile from 1970

Allot, Gordon, L., Senator (R-Colorado) until January 3, 1973

Amerson, Robert C., Assistant Director, Latin America, U.S. Information Agency, until early 1971; counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in Madrid, from July 1971

Anderson, James P., reporter and diplomatic and national security correspondent, Westinghouse Broadcasting Company

Annenberg, Walter H., U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom from April 29, 1969

Arends, Leslie C., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Illinois); Minority Whip

Armstrong, Neil, U.S. astronaut

XXX Persons

Ashe, Arthur, U.S. tennis player
Atwater, James D., Special Assistant to the President
Austin, Gilbert F., public affairs officer and counselor for public affairs, U.S. Consulate at Rawalpindi; thereafter Assistant Director, South Asia, U.S. Information Agency

Babbidge, Homer D., Jr., President, University of Connecticut until 1972; Vice Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; Chairman from early 1969
Baker, Howard, Senator (R-Tennessee); Chairman, Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment
Baker, John A., Jr., Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Prague, until August 1970; thereafter Country Director, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Baltic States (title changed to Director, Office of Eastern European Affairs in 1972), Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Balaguer Ricardo, Joaquin, President of the Dominican Republic
Barnett, Robert W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until 1970; thereafter Director, Washington Center of the Asia Society
Batson, Douglas N., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs until mid-1969; thereafter Executive Director of the Secretariat, Thai-U.S. Educational Foundation; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee
Beam, Jacob D., U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union from April 18, 1969
Beaudry, Robert M., Special Assistant and Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until mid-1969; Country Director, Italy, Austria, Switzerland, from July 1969 until January 1972; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee
Bennett, William F., Chief, Operations Center, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency, until 1970
Benson, Raymond E., Assistant Director, Research and Analysis, Office of Policy and Research, U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1969; Assistant Director, Research Service, Office of Research and Assessment, from mid-1969 until late 1969; Assistant Director, Research, Office of Research and Assessment, from late 1969 until early 1971; counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in Ankara, from July 1971
Bernhart, Richard V., Deputy Director, Office of Social and Civic Development (designation later changed to Office of Population and Civic Development), Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, until 1971; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee
Bernstein, Leonard, U.S. composer and conductor
Billington, James, Professor of History, Princeton University; Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships
Blitchik, David E., Office of the Under Secretary of State, until mid-1969; thereafter member, Policy Planning Staff, Department of State
Blackburn, Paul P., III, Special Assistant to the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency; Director, USIS Tokyo American Center, from June 1972; member, USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel
Blair, William D., Jr., Director, Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, until late 1969; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from May 1970; also acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from April until September 1971

Blatchford, Joseph H. (Joe), Director of the Peace Corps (ACTION from 1971) from May 1, 1969, until June 1971; Director of ACTION from July 1, 1971

Bode, Carl, Professor of American Studies, University of Maryland; former senior cultural affairs adviser, U.S. Embassy in London, in the late 1950s; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Bohlen, Charles E. (Chip), Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until January 22, 1969; Secretary of State ad interim from January 20 until January 22, 1969

Boswell, William O., Director, Office of International Conferences, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State, until early 1970


Bradshaw, James E., public affairs officer, U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong, until 1970; policy officer, Office of Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, U.S. Information Agency

Brandt, Willy, former Governing Mayor of Berlin; West German Vice Chancellor and Foreign Minister until October 21, 1969; Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany from October 22, 1969


Brooks, Cleanth, Professor of Rhetoric, Yale University; former senior cultural affairs adviser, U.S. Embassy in London, during the mid-1960s; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Brooks, Robert R.R., Dean and Professor of Economics, Williams College, until 1971; former senior cultural affairs adviser, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Brown, John R. III, White House Staff Assistant (to H.R. Haldeman) from January 21, 1969, until March 1, 1971


Brown, Winthrop G. (Win), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs until April 1972; also Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Liaison with the Governors

Brzezinski, Zbigniew K., former member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, during the Johnson administration; Professor, Columbia University

Buchanan, Patrick J., Special Assistant to the President

Buckley, James L., Senator (R-New York) from January 3, 1971

Buckley, William F., Jr., editor-in-chief, National Review, and host of the public affairs program Firing Line; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Bundy, McGeorge, President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from 1961 until 1966; thereafter President of the Ford Foundation

Bunker, Ellsworth, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam
Butterfield, Alexander P., Deputy Assistant to the President

Calderan, Rafael, President of Venezuela from March 11, 1969
Calkins, Howard W., public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Yaounde; Assistant Policy Officer (Cultural), Office of Assistant Director, Africa, U.S. Information Agency, from 1971; Assistant Coordinator, Office of Assistant Director, Africa, from 1972
Canning, Michael P., foreign information specialist, Bolivia, Chile, Peru Affairs, Office of Assistant Director, Latin America, U.S. Information Agency, from early 1970 until late 1971; information officer, U.S. Embassy in Kampala, from September 1972; Chairman, USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel; Co-Chairman, USIA Goals Committee, Young Officers’ Policy Panel
Carter, Darrell D., public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Lima; Assistant Director, Latin America, U.S. Information Agency, from July 1971
Carter, W. Beverly, Jr., public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Lagos, until 1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from November 1969 until June 1972; U.S. Ambassador to Tanzania from July 1972
Cash, Johnny, U.S. musician
Castro Ruz, Fidel, Premier of Cuba
Ceausescu, Nicolae, General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party and Chairman of the State Council of the Socialist Republic of Romania (President of Romania)
Cecere, Peter P., Cultural Operations Division, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency; member, USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel
Chapin, Dwight L., Special Assistant to the President from 1969 until 1971; thereafter Deputy Special Assistant to the President (President’s Appointments Secretary)
Chapman, Richard Dabney, Chief, Europe Division, Policy Application Staff, Programs, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, U.S. Information Agency; branch public affairs officer, U.S. Consulate in Zagreb, from June 1970
Chernoff, Howard L., executive officer, U.S. Consulate in Osaka; Commissioner General, Osaka World Exhibition Office, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency
Cho En-lai (Zhou Enlai), Premier and Foreign Minister of the People’s Republic of China
Church, Frank, Senator (D-Idaho)
Clapp, Margaret, Historian and former President, Wellesley College; former senior cultural affairs adviser, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee
Clift, A. Denis, member, National Security Council Staff
Coffey, Kenneth J., Chief, Foreign Service Personnel Division, Office of Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, U.S. Information Agency, until 1970
Cohen, Alvin H., policy officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Latin America, U.S. Information Agency, until 1971; Deputy Assistant Director, from May 1971 until August 1972; deputy public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Bonn, from December 1972; member, USIA Apollo-11 Task Force

Cohen, Sigmund M., Jr., assistant cultural affairs officer, U.S. Consulate in Calcutta, until 1969; program officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, U.S. Information Agency, from 1969 until 1971; field program officer, U.S. Embassy in Bonn, from June 1972; member, USIA Goals Committee, Young Officers’ Policy Panel

Cole, Kenneth R., (Ken) Jr., Special Assistant to the President from January until November 1969; Deputy Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs from November 1969 until December 1972; also Executive Director of the Domestic Council

Colligan, Francis J., Director, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until early 1970; thereafter Senior Policy Adviser, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, until mid-1971; also Executive Director, Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Collins, Michael, U.S. astronaut; Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from January 6, 1970, until April 11, 1971

Congelton, John D., cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, until 1969; policy officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, U.S. Information Agency, from late 1969 until 1971; Chief, China Division, Media Research, Office of Research and Assessment, from December 1971

Conley, James D., foreign information specialist, United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Yugoslavia, Office of the Assistant Director, Europe, U.S. Information Agency, until early 1970; Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans from January 1970 until mid-1971; public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Lisbon, from August 1971

Conley, Philip J., Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency; involved in USIA Bicentennial planning efforts

Conover, Willis, Voice of America broadcaster and host of “Music USA” program

Cook, Paul A., senior policy officer, Program and Legislative Analysis, Policy Review and Coordination Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until 1970; acting Facilitative Services Division Chief, Office of Program Development and Evaluation, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, from mid-1970 until 1971; thereafter Director, Facilitative Services Staff

Copland, Aaron, U.S. composer

Copmann, Lyle D., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Latin America, U.S. Information Agency, from January 1969 until 1971; Deputy Assistant Director, Press and Publications Service, from 1971; thereafter Assistant Director

Cottman, James Stewart, Jr., Executive Secretary, Board of the Foreign Service; Special Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management, from September 1970 until July 1971; thereafter Counselor for International Organization Affairs, U.S. Embassy in Geneva

Crockett, Thomas J. (Jack), assistant cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Manila, until 1969; cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Tunis, from late 1969

Cromwell, W. Kennedy, III, regional affairs officer, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; also acting UN and Population Affairs Officer in 1969 (position changed to UN and Regional Affairs Adviser in 1970); Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Gaborone, from June 1970 until November 1971; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, from November 1971; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee
Cross, Robert D., Special Assistant for Youth, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (position moved into the Office of the Counselor in mid-1969) until 1970; information officer, U.S. Embassy in Montevideo, from June 1970; cultural affairs officer, from October 1970; Executive Secretary, Inter-Agency Youth Committee, until 1970

Culbertson, Robert E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Social and Civic Development) until 1970; thereafter Director, AID, U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City

Curran, Robert T. (Ted), information officer, U.S. Embassy in Mexico City, from January 1969 until August 1970; Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1970 until September 1972; thereafter Deputy Director of Personnel for Management

Cushing, Richard G., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, U.S. Information Agency, also acting Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, until mid-1971; counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, from July 1971

David, Edward E., Jr., Science Advisor to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology from September 14, 1970; Chairman, President’s Science Advisory Committee

Davies, Richard T., Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, U.S. Information Agency, until 1968; Consul General, U.S. Consulate in Calcutta, until August 1969; member, Planning and Coordination Staff, Department of State, from late 1969 until mid-1970; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from August 1970 until December 1972; U.S. Ambassador to Poland from December 2, 1972

Davis, Jeanne W., Secretariat Staff Director, Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Director, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, from 1970 until 1971; Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff, from 1971

Davis, Richard H., U.S. Ambassador to Romania until August 6, 1969

Dawson, Horace G., Jr., public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, until 1970; cultural affairs advisor, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency, from September 1971; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee and member of its steering committee

Dayan, Moshe, Defense Minister of Israel

Dayton, Daryl D., Music Advisor, Cultural Operations Division (position moved under Program Development Division in 1971), Operations, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency

De Gaulle, Charles, President of France until April 1969

Derge, David R., Executive Vice President and Dean for Administration, Indiana University; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs from 1969

Dickson, William S., Chief, USSR Division, Policy Application Staff, Programs, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, U.S. Information Agency

Dillon, Dorothy R., foreign information specialist, Panama and Central American Affairs, Office of Assistant Director, Latin America, U.S. Information Agency, from 1970; policy officer from mid-1971; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Dobrynin, Anatoly F., Soviet Ambassador to the United States; also Full Member of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

Douglas, Kirk, U.S. actor

Dreschsler, Gerhard, Chief, Exhibits Division, Cultural Operations Division, Operations, Office of the Assistant Director, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency

DuBridge, Lee A., Science Adviser to the President and Director of the Office of Science and Technology from 1969 until mid-1970

Dubs, Adolph (Spitc), acting Country Director, Soviet Union, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, until April 1969; Country Director, until August 1971; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, from September 1972

Dunlap, Henry A., Assistant Director, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency, from 1969 until mid-1971; Special Assistant to the Director and Deputy Director, Office of the Director, from May 1971

Dwinnell, Lane, former Governor of New Hampshire

Eagleburger, Lawrence S., Executive Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs in early 1969; Political Adviser, Counselor for Political Affairs, U.S. Mission to NATO, from 1969 until 1971; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and National Security Council Affairs, Office of International Security Affairs, from August 1971

Ehrlichman, John D., Counsel to the President from January until November 1969; thereafter Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States from January 20, 1953, until January 20, 1961

Eliot, Theodore L., Jr., Iran Country Director, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until August 1969; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department from August 10, 1969

Ellington, Ben L., Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Policy and Research, U.S. Information Agency, until early 1969; Chief, Management Division, Office of Assistant Director, Administration, from early 1969 until mid-1969; Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Administration, from August 1969 until June 1971; executive officer, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, from July 1971

Ellington, Duke, U.S. composer, pianist, and bandleader

Espinosa, J. Manuel, Deputy Director, Office of Inter-American Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

Falkiewicz, Andrew T., public affairs officer and later press and cultural officer, U.S. Embassy in Prague; counselor for cultural affairs, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, from July 1971

Farrar, Curtis, Deputy Assistant Administrator and acting Assistant Administrator, Office of Program and Policy Coordination (changed to Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination in 1970) and Special Assistant to the Administrator, Agency for International Development, until late 1969; thereafter Deputy Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Near East and South Asia; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

Fasceell, Dante B., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida)

Fessenden, Russell H., Deputy Chief of Mission (Chargé d’Affaires from January 14 until July 22, 1969), U.S. Embassy in Bonn, until July 1971; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from July 1971 until December 1972

Flanigan, Peter M., Consultant to the President on Administration and Staffing from January until April 1969; thereafter Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs; Executive Director of the Council for International Economic Policy

Frei Montalva, Eduardo, President of Chile until 1970

Finch, Robert H., Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from January 21, 1969, until June 23, 1970; Counselor to the President from June 6, 1970, until December 15, 1972
XXXVI Persons

Fox, Richard K., Jr., counselor for administration, U.S. Embassy in Madrid, until 1969; Executive Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, from July 1970

Fulbright, J. William, Senator (D-Arkansas); Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Gabor, Andrew G., Europe, Policy Guidance and Media Reaction Staff (Policy Guidance Staff from mid-1969), Office of Policy and Research (Office of Policy and Plans from mid-1969), U.S Information Agency (title changed to Policy Guidance Coordinator in 1970)

Gallup, George Jr., President of the Gallup Poll

Gannon, Samuel R., III (Sam), Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Europe, U.S. Information Agency, from February 1970 until July 1971; Executive Assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management from July 1971

Gandhi, Indira, Prime Minister of India

Garcia-Godoy, Hector, President of the Dominican Republic under the provisional government established by the OAS, from September 1965 until June 1, 1966

Garment, Leonard (Len), Special Consultant to the President from May 28, 1969; Presidential liaison to the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission

Gergen, David R., Staff Assistant to the President from 1971

Giddens, Kenneth R., Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, U.S. Information Agency, from August 1969

Gildner, Jay W., counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in Tehran; Assistant Director, West Europe, U.S. Information Agency, from 1971

Glazer, Joseph (Joe), Labor and Equal Opportunity Advisor, Office of Policy and Research (Office of Policy and Plans from mid-1969), U.S. Information Agency; Labor and Urban Affairs Advisor (position moved under the Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans in mid-1970); thereafter Labor, Minorities, and Urban Affairs Advisor

Goldwater, Barry, Senator (R-Arizona)

Goddell, Charles E., Senator (R-New York) until January 3, 1971

Goodpaster, Andrew J., General, USA; Deputy Commander, Military Assistance Command Vietnam, until April 1969; thereafter Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command, Supreme Allied Commander, Europe

Gowon, Yakubu (Jack), General; Chairman of the Supreme Military Council of Nigeria

Green, Fitzhugh, Jr., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency, until early 1971; thereafter Associate Administrator for International Activities, Environmental Protection Agency

Green, Marshall, U.S. Ambassador to Indonesia until March 26, 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from May 5, 1969; Chairman, Special Group on Southeast Asia, from May 1970


Groff-Smith, Geoffrey, Assistant Cultural Affairs Adviser, Office of Policy and Research (Office of Policy and Plans from mid-1969), U.S. Information Agency; cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Ankara, from June 1972; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee
Grooms, Sally M., administrative officer, Office of Policy and Research (Office of Policy and Plans from mid-1969), U.S. Information Agency; also Special Assistant to the Assistant Director for Policy and Plans in 1969 and 1970; career management specialist, Career Management and Training Division, Office of Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, from June 1970 until April 1971; employee development specialist, from April until June 1971; special assistant, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, from August 1971; Chair, USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel in 1971

Guarco, Anthony, Deputy Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (later changed to Screen Service), U.S. Information Agency

Guhin, Michael A., member, National Security Council Staff

Gullion, Edmund A. (Ed), Dean, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University; member, ACE Commission on International Education

Gvishiani, Dzerman, Deputy Chairman, Soviet State Committee on Science and Technology

Haig, Alexander Meigs, Jr., Colonel, Brigadier General from November 1969, Major General from March 1972, USA; Senior Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 28, 1969, until June 1970; thereafter Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Haise, Fred, Jr., U.S. astronaut

Haldeman, H.R. (Bob), Assistant to the President and White House Chief of Staff from January 1969


Hall, William O. (Bill), U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia until May 15, 1971; Director General of the Foreign Service from July 5, 1971

Halsema, James J. (Jim), Chief, Training Division, Office of Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1970; also Coordinator, Management Information Systems, Office of Research and Assessment, from early 1970 until mid-1970; Special Assistant to the Director and Deputy Director from June 1970 until 1971; public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Santiago, from August 1971; counselor for public affairs, from December 1971


Handler, Philip, President, National Academy of Sciences; Chairman, National Science Board; member, President’s Science Advisory Committee


Hanks, Nancy, President, Associated Councils on the Arts; thereafter Chair, National Endowment for the Arts

Hannah, John A., Administrator of the Agency for International Development from April 2, 1969

Hanson, Arnold C., branch public affairs officer, U.S. Consulate in Bombay, from September 1969 until 1971; policy officer, Office of Assistant Director, South Asia, U.S. Information Agency

Hanson, Joseph O., Jr. (Joe), National Security Affairs Liaison, Office of Policy and Research (Office of Policy and Plans from mid-1969), U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1969; thereafter National Security Affairs Liaison, National Security Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans
XXXVIII  Persons

Haratunian, M. William, Chief, News and Current Affairs, Programs, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting Service, U.S. Information Agency; Deputy Assistant Director (Planning), Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, from June 1971

Harford, Carol V., staff assistant to Leonard Garment, Office of the Assistant for Cultural Affairs, Executive Office of the President; member, International Cultural Strategy Group; member, International Cultural Planning Group Task Force on U.S. Representation in the Arts Abroad

Harlow, Bryce N., Assistant to the President from January 1969 until November 1969; Counselor to the President from November 1969 until December 9, 1970

Harris, Reed, Assistant Director, Policy and Plans, Office of Policy and Research, U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1969; Assistant Director, Plans and Programs, Office of Policy and Plans, from mid-1969; Special Assistant to the Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Research and Assessment, from September 1969; later Special Assistant to the Assistant Director, Office of Research

Hartman, Arthur A., Special Assistant and Staff Director, NSC Under Secretaries Committee, Office of the Under Secretary of State, from February 1969; Deputy Director for Coordination, Planning and Coordination Staff, from August 1969 until July 1972; thereafter Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Mission to the European Community

Hartry, Theodore G., detailed to the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State; Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency, from 1970; thereafter Deputy Director, Office of Cultural Presentations, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State

Hatfield, Mark, Senator (R-Oregon)

Hays, Otis E., Jr., acting Deputy Assistant Director (Vietnam), Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and the Pacific, U.S. Information Agency, from mid-1969; Deputy Assistant Director (Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos), from mid-1971 until late 1971; Deputy Assistant Director (Indochina), from late 1971

Hays, Wayne L., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Ohio)

Hazlett, McCrea, Professor of English and Vice President, University of Rochester; senior cultural affairs adviser, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, from September 1971; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Heath, Edward, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom from June 19, 1970

Heindel, Richard H., Professor of History and Dean of the Faculty, Pennsylvania State University Capitol Campus; member, American Council on Education Commission on International Education

Helms, Richard M., Director of Central Intelligence

Hemming, Albert E. (Al), Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Europe, U.S. Information Agency; Assistant Director, Europe (West Europe from 1971), from October 1969 until mid-1971; Chief, Inspection and Audit Staff, Office of Research and Assessment, from 1971

Henkin, Daniel Z., acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs until May 1969; thereafter Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs and Department of Defense Spokesman

Herschensohn, S. Bruce, Assistant Director, Motion Picture and Television Service (later changed to Screen Service), U.S. Information Agency, until April 1972; Deputy Special Assistant to the President from September 1972; consultant, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Hickok, Robert C., Deputy Chief, Policy & Programs (position moved under Exhibits Division in 1971), Operations, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency

Higby, Lawrence M. (Larry), Deputy Assistant to the President, Office of the White House Chief of Staff, from 1969
Hillenbrand, Martin J., U.S. Ambassador to Hungary until February 15, 1969; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from February 20, 1969, until April 30, 1972; U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany from June 27, 1972

Hitchcock, David I., Jr., policy officer, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency, until early 1969; deputy public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, from June 1970

Ho Chi Minh, leader of the Lao Dong Party and President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam until his death on September 3, 1969


Holdridge, John H., Director, Office of Research and Analysis for East Asia and Pacific, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, until mid-1969; thereafter, member, Operations Staff (East Asia), National Security Council Staff


Houdek, Robert G., member, Office of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 until July 1971

Hoyt, Palmer, Editor and Publisher of The Denver Post; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Hubbard, Charlotte M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, until early 1970

Humphrey, Hubert H., Vice President of the United States until January 20, 1969; Chairman, Board of Trustees, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; Senator (DFL-Minnesota) from January 3, 1971

Humphrey, Richard A., Director, American Council on Education Commission on International Education

Hurd, James D., Magazine and Special Services Division Chief, Office of Media Services, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; information planning officer, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Public Affairs, from May 1970 until late 1971; interagency liaison, Office of Policy and Plans, from 1971; also international expositions officer within the Department of State

Hutchinson, William E., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Administration, U.S. Information Agency, from January until September 1969; Assistant Director, Africa, from June 1970 until early 1971; public affairs officer, U.S. Consulate in Hong Kong, from July 1971

Inman, Jerry L., assistant cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo; Japan, Korea, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency; Special Assistant for Youth, Office of the Counselor, Department of State, from 1970

Irving, Frederick (Fred), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Operations until mid-1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from July 1969 until October 1972; U.S. Ambassador to Iceland from October 11, 1972

Irwin, John N., II, Under Secretary of State from September 21, 1970, until July 12, 1972; (thereafter re-designated as Deputy Secretary of State); Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

Izenberg, Ivan, deputy policy officer, Regional Cultural Affairs, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency; member, USIA Apollo-11 Task Force
Janka, Leslie A. (Les), Staff Assistant, National Security Council Staff, from 1971
Jellison, Robert A., III, Chief, Field Development Division, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, until 1971; policy officer, United Kingdom, Canada, Ireland, Office of Assistant Director, West Europe, U.S. Information Agency
Jenkins, Kempton B., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, U.S. Information Agency, until late 1969; thereafter Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
Johnson, Lyndon B., President of the United States, from November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969
Johnson, U. Alexis, U.S. Ambassador to Japan until January 1969; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from February 7, 1969
Jones, William B., Director, Office of Program Development and Evaluation, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, until 1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from September 1969
Kaunda, Kenneth D., President of Zambia; President of the Organization of African Unity from September 1970
Keating, Kenneth B., U.S. Ambassador to India from July 2, 1969, until July 26, 1972
Keogh, James, Special Assistant to the President (head speechwriter) from 1969 until 1971; Director of the U.S. Information Agency from February 8, 1973, until November 30, 1976
Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 20, 1961, until his death on November 22, 1963
Kennedy, Richard T., (Dick), Colonel (ret.) USA; member, Planning Group, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 until 1970; thereafter Director, Planning Group
Kenyatta, Jomo, President of Kenya
Khrushchev, Nikita S., former First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Soviet Communist Part and Chairman of the Soviet Council of Ministers, from 1953 until 1964
Kiesinger, Kurt Georg, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 21, 1969
Kissinger, Henry A., President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs until November 3, 1975
Klein, Herbert G., Director of Communications for the Executive Branch from January 1969
Kopp, Eugene P., Deputy General Counsel, U.S. Information Agency, from July 1969 until 1971; Assistant Director, Administration, from 1972; also acting General Counsel and Congressional Liaison in 1972
Korry, Edward M., U.S. Ambassador to Chile until October 12, 1971
Kosygin, Alexei N., Chairman (Premier) of the Soviet Council of Ministers; also Member of the Politiburo of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
Krill, Robert F., foreign information specialist, Italy, Malta, Spain, Portugal, Office of Assistant Director, Europe, U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1969; Special Assistant to the Associate Director and Deputy Associate Director, Research and Assessment, from July 1969
LaFontant, Jewel, lawyer; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs from 1969
Laird, Melvin R., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Wisconsin), until January 21, 1969; Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1969

Larmon, Sigurd S., President, Young & Rubicam; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Lawson, Murray G., Agency Historian, Office of Assistant Director, Administration, U.S. Information Agency (position moved into the Office of Research and Assessment in mid-1969)


Leeper, Robert H., acting Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Public Information, U.S. Information Agency; Deputy Assistant Director, from February 1971 until 1972; information officer, U.S. Consulate at Hong Kong, from July 1972

Leonhart, William, U.S. Ambassador to Yugoslavia from June 30, 1969, until October 18, 1971; thereafter detailed to the National War College

Lewis, Mark B., Director, Office of Cultural Presentations, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State; also Director, Office of Multilateral Policy and Programs during 1970 and Director, Office of Private Cooperation during 1971; member, International Cultural Planning Group Task Force on U.S. Representation in the Arts Abroad

Levitsky, Melvyn, Operations Center, Executive Secretariat, Department of State, until 1971

Lindsay, John, Mayor of New York

Lisagor, Peter, syndicated columnist and Washington Bureau Chief, Chicago Daily News


Lodge, John Davis, U.S. Ambassador to Argentina from July 23, 1969

Lofton, Harry M., principal officer, U.S. Consulate in Curacao, from June 1970

Lon Nol, General, Royal Khmer Armed Forces; First Vice President of the Council of Ministers and Minister of Defense of Cambodia; Acting Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense, June 1969; Prime Minister and Minister of National Defense after March 18, 1970

Loomis, Henry, former Director of the Voice of America; Executive Director, Nixon Task Forces, during 1968; Deputy Director of the U.S. Information Agency from April 3, 1969, until September 1972 and Chairman, USIA Executive Committee (ExComm); thereafter President, Corporation for Public Broadcasting

Lowell, James A., Jr., U.S. astronaut

Lowenstein, Allard K., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)

Lowenstein, Linda, Office of Inter-African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

Lyman, Princeton N., Chief, Title IX Division, Program Policy, Office of Program and Policy Coordination, Agency for International Development, until early 1970; Chief, Civic Participation Division, Office of Policy Development and Analysis, Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, from mid-1970 until late 1971; Director, Office of Technical Assistance Coordination, Bureau for Africa, from late 1971; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee
Lynn, Laurence E., Jr., Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 until September 1970; Director, Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council Staff, from 1970 until 1971

Mace, Howard P., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Personnel and Deputy Director General and Director of Personnel; acting Director General of the Foreign Service in 1971

MacGregor, Clark, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Minnesota) until 1971; Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations from January 1, 1972

Macmillan, Harold, former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom

Macomber, William B., Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations (later Legislative Affairs) until October 2, 1969; Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration from October 3, 1969, until July 1971; thereafter Deputy Under Secretary of State for Management

Mahoney, David J., Chairman, Norton Simon Inc.; Chairman, American Revolution Bicentennial Commission

Malek, Frederick V. (Fred), Deputy Under Secretary for Health, Education and Welfare until late 1970; thereafter Special Assistant to the President with responsibility for personnel

Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung), Chairman, Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and Politburo of the People’s Republic of China

Marasciulo, Edward, Deputy Director, Office of Argentina-Paraguay-Uruguay, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, from May 1970; also acting Director in 1971; Director, AID mission at the U.S. Embassy in Tegucigalpa

Marcy, Mildred K., Women’s Activities Adviser, Office of Policy and Research (Office of Policy and Plans from mid-1969), U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1969; National Development Adviser, from early 1970 (position moved under the Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans in mid-1970) until mid-1970; Bicentennial, Population, and Women’s Activities Adviser, from mid-1970 until late 1971; Bicentennial, American Institutions, Women’s Activities Adviser, from late 1971; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee and member of its steering committee

Marks, Leonard H., Director of the U.S. Information Agency until December 6, 1968; thereafter head of the U.S. Delegation for Intelsat permanent arrangements in 1969


Matteson, Robert E., Director, Office of International Training, Agency for International Development, until late 1971; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

Matuszeski, William (Bill), Assistant to the Director and Deputy Director, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency, until early 1970

Mayo, Robert P., Director of the Bureau of the Budget from January 22, 1969, until June 30, 1970; Counselor to the President until July 28, 1970

McClellan, John L., Senator (D-Arkansas); Chairman, Senate Committee on Appropriations

McCloskey, Paul N., Jr., (Pete), member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-California)

McCloskey, Robert J., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and Director, Office of News, Bureau of Public Affairs; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Press Relations and Special Assistant to the Secretary (Department of State Spokesman) from July 1969

McCulloch, Samuel C., cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City; Cultural Coordinator (Exchanges, Books, Youth Arts), Office of Assistant Director, Latin America, U.S. Information Agency, from 1969 (title changed to Cultural Affairs Officer in 1971); also Argentina, Panama, Uruguay and Central America Affairs in 1971
McDonnell, Mary E., Adviser, Commercial Affairs and Business Activities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State, until 1971
McElroy, William D., Director, National Science Foundation, from July 1969 until January 1972
McGee, Gale W., Senator (D-Wyoming)
McGowan, William, Special Security and Special Projects Office, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Command
McGovern, George S., Senator (D-South Dakota); Democratic candidate and nominee for President in 1972
McHenry, Donald F., officer in charge, Dependent Area Affairs, Office of United Nations Political Affairs, Bureau of International Organization Affairs, Department of State; Special Assistant to the Counselor of the Department of State from May 1969 until mid-1971
McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense from January 21, 1961, until February 29, 1968; thereafter President, World Bank/International Monetary Fund
McNichol, Paul J., Assistant Director, Security, U.S. Information Agency, until late 1971
McWhorter, Charles K. (Charlie), lawyer, AT&T; member, International Cultural Strategy Group
Meeker, Leonard C., Legal Advisor of the Department of State until July 13, 1969; U.S. Ambassador to Romania from September 16, 1969
Meyer, Charles A., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, from April 2, 1969
Middleton, Adrian T., Director, Career Management and Assignments Division, Personnel, Administrative Offices and Staffs, Department of State
Miller, William D., public affairs officer and counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, until 1970; thereafter Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Broadcasting, U.S. Information Agency
Mobutu, Sésé Seko (Joseph-Désiré), Lieutenant General; President of the Republic of the Congo (Zaire) and Minister of Defense
Moody, Wayland P., President, San Antonio College; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs
Moorer, Thomas H., Jr., Admiral, USN; Chief of Naval Operations until July 1970; Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from July 2, 1970
Morris, Paul K., branch public affairs officer, U.S. Consulate in Madras; Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency; chair, USIA Working Group on Agency Book Policy
Morris, Roger, member, Operations Staff (Africa), National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 until April 1970; thereafter member, Planning Group, National Security Council Staff
Mosely, Lionel S., Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, U.S. Information Agency
XLIV Persons

Moss, John E., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California); Chairman, House Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information

Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, Assistant to the President for Urban Affairs and Executive Secretary of the Council on Urban Affairs from January 1969 until December 1969, Counselor to the President from January 1970 until January 20, 1971; also Vice Chairman, Board of Trustees, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Muller, Steven, Professor of Political Science and Vice President for Public Affairs, Cornell University, until 1971; Provost, Johns Hopkins University, from 1971 until 1972; thereafter President; member, ACE Commission on International Education

Mundt, Karl E., Senator (R-South Dakota) until January 3, 1973

Murrow, Edward R., Director of the U.S. Information Agency from March 15, 1961, until January 20, 1964

Muskie, Edmund S., Senator (D-Maine); Democratic candidate for President in 1972

Nalle, David, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1970; Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, from mid-1970 until mid-1971; cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Moscow, from June 1972

Nasser, Gamal Abdel, President of Egypt from 1956 until 1970

Nelson, J. William, U.S. Expositions Staff, Department of Commerce

Nelson, Lyle, Chair, Stanford University Department of Communications; Vice-Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships

Neureiter, Norman P., Assistant for International Affairs to the President’s Science Adviser, White House Office of Science and Technology

Newsom, David D., U.S. Ambassador to Libya until June 21, 1969; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Nguyen Van Thieu, President of the Republic of (South) Vietnam


Nixon, Pat, First Lady of the United States

Nixon, Richard M., President of the United States from January 20, 1969, until August 9, 1974

Noah, Lynn H., program analysis officer, U.S. Information Agency; Deputy Chief, Plans and Operational Policy Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, from 1971; acting Chief, Plans and Operational Policy Staff, in mid-1971; thereafter Chief

Novik, M.S., radio and television consultant; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information


O’Brien, John R. (Jack), Assistant to the Director and the Deputy Director, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency, until 1970; Executive Secretary, USIA Executive Committee (ExComm), until 1970

O’Donnell, Kevin, Director, ACTION, from July 1, 1971, until September 30, 1972


Olom, Louis T., Staff Director, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, United States Information Agency

Osborne, Monta L., foreign information specialist (Vietnam), Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1971; detailed to the Department of Defense as a liaison officer in August 1971
Osgood, Robert E. (Bob), Assistant for Programs, National Security Council Staff, from January 1969 until 1970; Director, Planning Group, National Security Council Staff, from 1970 until 1971; member, International Culture Strategy Group

Owen, Robert I., principal officer, U.S. Consulate in Zagreb; Country Director, Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, Albania, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from July 1970 until mid-1971

Packard, David, Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 24, 1969, until December 13, 1971

Paine, Thomas O., Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration from March 21, 1969, until September 15, 1970

Palmer, Joseph II, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until July 7, 1969; U.S. Ambassador to Libya from October 9, 1969, until November 7, 1972

Pauker, John, Chief, Policy Guidance and Media Reaction Staff (later Policy Guidance Staff), Office of Policy and Research (later Office of Policy and Plans), U.S. Information Agency, until early 1970; Deputy Chief, National Security Advisory Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, from mid-1970


Pedersen, Richard F., Counselor of the Department of State from January 24, 1969; Chairman, Inter-Agency Youth Committee


Peterson, Rudolph A., President and Chief Executive Officer, Bank of America; Chairman, Presidential Task Force on International Development, from September 2, 1969

Phillips, Richard I., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs until early 1970; also acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from January until late 1969; principal officer, U.S. Consulate at Monterrey

Picker, Arnold M., Chairman, Executive Committee, United Artists Corporation; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs


Plaza Lasso, Galo, Secretary-General, Organization of American States

Posner, Ben, Assistant Director, Administration, U.S. Information Agency until 1972; member, USIA Executive Committee (ExComm); Agency Transition Officer in 1968 and early 1969

Price, Raymond K., Jr., (Ray), Special Assistant to the President

Quimby, Thomas H.E., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs until mid-1969; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur (Mujib), President of the Awami League; Prime Minister and Minister of Defense of Bangladesh from January 1972
XLVI Persons

Read, Benjamin H., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Executive Secretary of the Department until February 14, 1969; thereafter Director, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars

Reed, Leonard, Chief, America Illustrated Branch, Publications Division, Office of Assistant Director, Press and Publications Service, U.S. Information Agency, from July 1970

Reid, Ogden R., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New York)

Reinhardt, John E., Deputy Director, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency, until 1969; Assistant Director, Africa, from mid-1969 until mid-1970; Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, from June 1970 until late 1971; U.S. Ambassador to Nigeria from December 3, 1971

Resor, Stanley R., Secretary of the Army until June 30, 1971

Reston, James B. (Scotty), syndicated columnist and Vice President of The New York Times

Richardson, Elliot L., Under Secretary of State from January 23, 1969, until June 23, 1970; Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare from June 24, 1970

Richardson, John, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from July 15, 1969; also acting Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from September 1971

Roach, James R., Professor of Government, University of Texas; Chairman, Board of Foreign Scholarships

Roberts, Walter R., counselor for public affairs, U.S. Mission to the United Nations; Deputy Associate Director, Office of Research and Assessment, U.S. Information Agency, from late 1969 until early 1971; acting Associate Director, Research and Assessment, from early 1971 until late 1971; Associate Director, Research and Assessment, from late 1971

Robinson, Thomas E., Chairman, Department of Secondary Education, Rider College; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Rockefeller, Nelson A., Governor of New York

Rockwell, Stuart W., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs until March 1970; U.S. Ambassador to Morocco from April 22, 1970

Rodman, Peter W., member, Planning Group, National Security Council Staff, from 1969 until 1970; thereafter staff member of the Office of the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs, National Security Council Staff

Rogers, William P., Secretary of State from January 22, 1969

Romulo, Carlos, Philippines Foreign Secretary

Rooney, John, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York)

Rosenfeld, Eugene, Assistant Director, Public Information, U.S. Information Agency, until 1970; assistant cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in London from December 1970

Ross, Roger P., planning coordinator, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service, U.S. Information Agency, from 1971

Roth, Richard L., Director, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, from July 1970; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Committee

Rountree, William M. (Bill), U.S. Ambassador to South Africa until June 5, 1970; U.S. Ambassador to Brazil from November 16, 1970

Rowan, Carl T., Director of the U.S. Information Agency from February 28, 1964, until July 10, 1965

Runyon, Charles III, Assistant Legal Adviser for African Affairs, Department of State until 1972; thereafter Assistant Legal Adviser for Cultural Relations and Public Affairs


Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 21, 1961, until January 20, 1969

Ryan, Hewson A. (Hew), Acting Director, U.S. Information Agency, from late 1968 until early 1969; Deputy Director for Policy and Research (changed to Deputy Director, Policy and Plans in mid-1969); member, USIA Executive Committee (ExComm); member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee; U.S. Ambassador to Honduras from November 5, 1969


Sachar, Abram L., Chancellor, Brandeis University; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; Vice Chairman from 1969

Samuels, Nathaniel, Deputy Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from April 1, 1969, until May 31, 1972

Sandman, Leonard, Labor and Social Affairs Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, from March 1969 until 1971; labor and political officer, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, from September 1971; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

Saragat, Giuseppe, President of Italy

Saunders, Harold (Hal), member, Operations Staff (Near East and South Asia), National Security Council Staff, from January 1969

Scalapino, Robert A., Professor of Political Science, University of California-Berkeley; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs until 1969

Scali, John A., Chief Diplomatic Correspondent for ABC News until 1971; thereafter Special Assistant to the President

Scheer, Julian, Assistant Administrator for Public Affairs, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

Schneider, Michael D., foreign information specialist (Vietnam), Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency; member, USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel

Schneidman, Harold F., Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, U.S. Information Agency, from June 1970 until mid-1971; Assistant Director, Information Center Service, from 1971; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Scott, Frank A., foreign information officer, U.S. Information Agency; detailed as Deputy Director, Public Information and Reports Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, in 1970; acting Director in 1971; information officer, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, from January 1972

Scott, Hugh D., Jr., Senator (R-Pennsylvania); Senate Minority Leader


Scranton, William W., former Governor of Pennsylvania
Semler, Peter, political officer, U.S. Embassy in Paris, until 1970; international relations officer, Bilateral Political Relations Section, Soviet Foreign Affairs Division, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from 1970; detailed to the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in 1972

Shakespeare, Frank J., Jr., television adviser to Republican candidate Richard Nixon during the 1968 presidential campaign and President, CBS TV Services Division until January 1969; Director of the U.S. Information Agency from February 7, 1969


Sheehan, Mark T., Director, Office of Policy Guidance, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, until late 1969; Chairman, Department of State Committee on Astronaut Travel

Shirley, John W. (Jock), policy officer, Office of Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, U.S. Information Agency; press and cultural officer, U.S. Embassy in Warsaw, from June 1970 until 1972; Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Soviet Union and East Europe, from August 1972

Shriver, R. Sargent, U.S. Ambassador to France until March 25, 1970

Shultz, George P., Secretary of Labor from January 22, 1969, until July 1, 1970; Director of the Office of Management and Budget from July 1, 1970, until June 11, 1972; thereafter Secretary of the Treasury and head of the Council on Economic Policy from December 1972

Siciliano, Rocco C., Under Secretary of Commerce until 1971

Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, head of state of Cambodia until March 18, 1970; leader of Cambodian government-in-exile in Beijing from 1970

Simpson, Vojislav, conductor, Belgrade’s Television Jazz Orchestra

Sisco, Joseph J., Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs until February 1969; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs and Chairman, NSC Interdepartmental Group for the Near East and South Asia

Sivard, Robert P., Agency Art Director, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency

Smiley, Joseph R., President, University of Colorado; Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, until early 1969

Smith, H. Alexander, Senator (R-New Jersey) from 1943 until 1958

Smith, Gerard C., Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency from February 7, 1969; Representative (Ambassador) and Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks

Smith, Stanley, U.S. tennis player

Sneider, Richard L., member, Operations Staff (East Asia), National Security Council Staff, from January until September 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, from September 1969 until July 1972; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from August 1972

Sober, Sidney, Director, Regional Affairs and Staff Director, NSC Interdepartmental Group, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State, until November 1969; Deputy Chief of Mission (Chargé d’Affaires ad interim from May 1972), U.S. Embassy in Rawalpindi; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

Solomon, Richard H., member, National Security Council Staff

Sonnenfeldt, Helmut (Hal), member, Operations staff (Europe), National Security Council Staff, from January 1969

Southard, Clifford E., public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Rangoon; Chief, Foreign Service Personnel Division, Office of Assistant Director, Personnel and Training, U.S. Information Agency, from December 1969 until mid-1971; Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, from 1971
Spector, Melbourne L., Executive Director, American Revolutionary Bicentennial Commission


Squires, Leslie Albion (Les), principal officer, U.S. Consulate in Dacca; foreign information officer, U.S. Information Agency; Assistant Director, South Asia, from 1971 until early 1972; public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Manila, from September 1972

Stans, Maurice H., Secretary of Commerce from January 21, 1969, until February 15, 1972; thereafter Chairman of the Finance Committee of the Committee to Re-Elect the President

Stanton, Frank N., President, Columbia Broadcasting System until 1971, thereafter Vice Chairman of CBS; Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Stefan, Charles G., Director, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from March 1970

Steenhoven, Graham, President, U.S. Table Tennis Association

Sterling, John Ewart Wallace, Chancellor, Stanford University; Chairman, American Revolutionary Bicentennial Commission

Stern, Ernest, Assistant Administrator, Office of Program and Policy Coordination (Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination from 1970), Agency for International Development, from mid-1969

Stieglitz, Perry J., branch public affairs officer, U.S. Consulate in Marseille, from late 1968; cultural affairs officer and assistant policy officer, Office of Assistant Director, Europe, U.S. Information Agency, from 1971; deputy policy officer, Office of Assistant Director, West Europe, from mid-1971 until late 1971; thereafter Area Cultural Coordinator; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Stoddard, John C., Media Content Officer, Office of Policy and Research (Office of Policy and Plans from mid-1969), U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1970; thereafter Business Advisor, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans; member, USIA Apollo-11 Task Force and staff member, USIA Apollo-11 Operations Office

Straight, Michael, Chairman, National Endowment for the Arts; member, International Cultural Planning Group Task Force on U.S. Representation in the Arts Abroad

Strasburg, William E. (Bill), Associate Director, Research and Assessment, U.S. Information Agency, from mid-1969 until early 1971

Sullivan, William H., U.S. Ambassador to Laos until March 18, 1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs from April 1969; Chairman, Interdepartmental Group on Vietnam

Sweigert, John L. (Jack), U.S. astronaut

Szulc, Tad, reporter, The New York Times

Teal, Fred T., Assistant Legal Adviser for Cultural Relations and Public Affairs, Department of State, until mid-1972

Telich, Maire Louise, Planning Officer, Plans and Resource Analysis Staff (later changed to Plans and Operational Policy Staff), Office of Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency, from 1970 until late 1971; thereafter Europe Program Officer, Program Development Division, Office of Assistant Director, Information Center Service

Thieu, see Nguyen Van Thieu

Thompson, Jane Monroe Goelot, Director, Department of State Art in Embassies Program, from 1972

Tibbetts, Margaret J., U.S. Ambassador to Norway until May 23, 1969; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from June 1969 until 1971

Tito, Josip, President of Yugoslavia

Tobey, John E., Staff Assistant, Political Military Affairs, Office of Policy Guidance, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, until 1970
L  Persons

**Tompkins, Pauline**, President, Cedar Crest College; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, until 1969

**Tower, John**, Senator (R-Texas)


**Unger, Leonard**, U.S. Ambassador to Thailand

**Vance, Sheldon B.**, U.S. Ambassador to Chad until May 9, 1969; U.S. Ambassador to the Congo from June 28, 1969

**Vail, Thomas Van Husen**, Editor and Publisher, Cleveland Plain Dealer; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

**Vaky, Viron P. (Pete)**, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Coordinator, Alliance for Progress, and acting Assistant Secretary from January until May 1969; member, Operations Staff (Latin America), National Security Council Staff, from May 1969 until October 1972; U.S. Ambassador to Costa Rica from September 11, 1972

**Veliotes, Nicholas A.**, political counselor, U.S. Embassy at Vientiane; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State from September 1970 until July 1972; thereafter Special Assistant to the Deputy Secretary of State

**Veneman, John G.**, Under Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare


**Walkinshaw, Robert L.**, Labor Adviser, Office of Regional Affairs, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State, until mid-1970; area development adviser, Civil Operations and Rural Development Support, U.S. Embassy in Saigon; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

**Ware, Richard A.**, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from January 1969

**Warren, Gerald L. (Jerry)**, Deputy Press Secretary to the President

**Watts, William**, Staff Secretary, National Security Council Staff Secretariat, from 1970 until 1971

**Weathersby, William H. (Bill)**, Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, until 1969; Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, U.S. Information Agency, from late 1969 until early 1970; thereafter Vice President for Public Affairs, Princeton University

**Weinberger, Caspar W.**, Head, Federal Trade Commission, from 1969 until 1970; Deputy Director, Office of Management and Budget, from June 1970 until May 1972; Director, from June 12, 1972

**Weiss, Seymour (Sey)**, Director, Office of Strategic and Functional Research and Special Assistant to the Director for Intelligence Resources, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State; acting Staff Director, NSC Under Secretaries Committee; member, Planning and Coordination Staff, from June 1970

**Welch, Wilford H.**, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Department of State; member, Inter-Agency Youth Committee

White, Barbara M., Associate Director, Policy and Research, U.S. Information Agency, until mid-1969; Associate Director, Policy and Plans, from mid-1969 until early 1970; Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, from early 1970 until late 1971; thereafter Special Assistant to the Director; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Whiting, John D., Argentine Desk Officer, Argentina-Paraguay-Uruguay, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Wilcox, Wayne A., retired Professor of Political Science, Columbia University; senior cultural affairs adviser, U.S. Embassy in London from August 1971; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Wile, Frank S., Chief, Personnel Requirements Branch, Career Management and Assignments Division, Personnel, Department of State, until mid-1969; thereafter Personnel Director, Executive Office, Bureau of European Affairs

Williams, James A., Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State; Staff Assistant, Office of the Under Secretary of State; thereafter Office of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Yemen, South Yemen, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Williams, Maurice J., Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Near East and South Asia, Agency for International Development, until 1971; Deputy Administrator from 1971; acting Administrator in 1971

Wilson, Harold, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until June 1970; thereafter leader of the British Labour Party

Winkler, Gordon, Deputy Assistant Director, Office of Assistant Director, Africa, U.S. Information Agency, from mid-1969 until early 1971; Assistant Director, Africa, from 1971

Winks, Robin W., Professor of History, Yale University; senior cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in London; chairman, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Wright, James (Jim), member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Texas)

Wortzel, Arthur I., Director, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State, from June 1969 until early 1970; Deputy Chief of Mission, U.S. Embassy in Prague, from August 1970

Wylie, Laurence, Professor of the Civilization of France, Harvard University; former senior cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Paris; member, USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad, General; Chief Martial Law Administrator, President, Minister of Defense, and Minister of Foreign Affairs of Pakistan, from March 1969 until December 1971

Zhou Enlai, see Chou En-lai

Ziegler, Ronald L., White House Press Secretary
Public Diplomacy, 1969–1972

1. Briefing Book Prepared in the United States Information Agency

Washington, undated

[Omitted here are the Introduction; Table of Contents; Section I: Agency Missions and Statutory Authorities; Section II: Basic Organization and Function; Section III: Budgetary and Financial Information; Section IV: Key Personnel; Section V: Significant Relationships within the U.S. Government; Section VI: Significant Intergovernmental Relationships; and Section VII: Legislative Processes and Problems.]

VIII. POLICY AND PROGRAM ISSUES; PRIORITIES

Psychological Problems in Conduct of Foreign Policy

NOTE: USIA is charged with “advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated U.S. policies, programs and official statements.”

Important issues that concern USIA in its advisory role are listed in this section. On these issues, USIA also has an operational role in interpreting U.S. policies and actions to overseas audiences. (Only issues with world-wide ramifications are included here. Those of strictly area significance are left to the area papers.) Specific program recommendations will be made at a later date.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Administration and Management, Assistant Director’s Correspondence File, SUBJ 1968–1972, Entry UD–164, Box 1, INF 14–1 Briefing Papers, Transition Books—Vol. I and II 1968. Confidential. The portion of the briefing book printed here is Volume I. In a November 19, 1968, memorandum to agency officials, Posner indicated that the briefing book consisted of information provided by “all Agency Elements” regarding “policy and program issues.” He continued: “As anticipated, changes in the world situation and the passage of time may make it necessary to up-date some of the materials. We are prepared to make such changes as elements, in their judgment, consider necessary to present a current picture of Agency problems and conditions.” (Ibid.; INF 14–1 Briefing Papers (Orderly Transition of Presidency) 1968)
A. Matters of Immediate Concern

1. The Transfer of Power

A deliberate effort will be necessary to demonstrate to the world the process of orderly transition. Such an effort could help offset any sense of hiatus which might generate anxiety in countries relying on U.S. support, or encourage adversaries to act on a presumed wavering in the U.S. resolve to honor commitments of the past. The newly elected leadership should give public assurance that, while it prepares to review U.S. foreign policy, it will not unilaterally abandon or curtail any commitment affecting the rest of the world. An early statement of cardinal principles would have an excellent effect.

2. The New Leadership

A comparable effort will be required to project the new leadership—President, Vice President and cabinet officers as they are announced. After the divisiveness of the campaign much of which was reflected in editorials abroad, steps must be taken to develop sympathetic understanding and support for the new personalities on the part of opinion leaders abroad.

3. Viet-Nam

This will probably continue to be the number one priority problem. Any of the alternatives—escalation, withdrawal, or even a break-off of the Paris Peace Talks—will present problems with respect to our allies in Southeast Asia and to those countries that have opposed our policies up to now.

4. Czech-NATO Crisis

Fear of possible Soviet moves against Romania, Yugoslavia, West Germany or Berlin—in addition to what many foreign observers see as a slow U.S. and NATO reaction to the invasion of Czechoslovakia—have to a degree shaken public confidence in the safety of Europe. Two types of action should be urgently considered: (a) public statements or action specifically designed to deter the USSR from further moves; (b) more vigorous U.S. initiatives to energize NATO.

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5. U.S. Determination for Peace

While making clear the U.S. stand against aggression, we must also bring home to world opinion our continuing commitment to peace. In this context, the new leadership could well reiterate U.S. determination to avoid nuclear war and limit the arms race; and point out its willingness to resume the temporarily abandoned dialogue with the USSR as soon as the Soviets give evidence that they will respect the rights of other nations. Strong U.S. leadership to ratify the non-proliferation treaty,4 at an early appropriate moment, could have a salutary effect in helping win adherence of such undecided nations as Germany, Israel and India.

6. World Opinion and the Current Domestic Scene

Many foreign observers see the U.S. as torn by internal conflicts, between whites and blacks, rich and poor, old and young. They see these conflicts producing violence in a country already prone to violence. Commentators speak frequently of the U.S. tradition of frontier violence and the use of guns to settle disputes; in describing present conditions, they fall back on the terms “malaise” and “sick society.” The general response is one of anxiety, the prognosis varying widely between friendly and hostile critics. Strong statements by the new U.S. leadership putting the situation in perspective would be helpful with foreign audiences.

B. Matters Requiring Special Attention Within the Next Twelve Months

1. Free World Opinion and the U.S. Role in World Affairs

There is growing fear that the U.S., troubled by domestic problems and weary of the costly Viet-Nam war, is ready to turn away from its far-reaching international commitments. Talk of a possible neo-isolationism is widespread. Hence the need for reassurance by the new leadership that—while the U.S. will modify its policies as changing circumstances require—there is a basic constancy in the U.S. participation in the world community of nations.

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2. U.S. Role in the U.N.

As a corollary to point #1 above, an early reaffirmation of U.S. support to the United Nations would have a salutary effect on world opinion. It should include tangible evidence of U.S. commitment to the U.N., possibly in the form of concrete suggestions on U.N. peacekeeping machinery or initiatives in the disarmament field. And it should include reiteration of the traditional U.S. support for the development of international law.

3. The U.S. and the Developing World

Another area for high priority attention is the relationship of the U.S. to the developing world. Cuts in the foreign aid program and indications of a trend toward protectionism provide a backdrop for deep questioning about U.S. intentions. A major statement of the policy of the new administration, early in 1969, could do much to clear the air.

4. U.S. Arms sales to Other Countries

This already sensitive issue—tied in the public mind to the broader question of the arms race—will become even more so with the sale of F–4s to Israel, the probable sale of tanks to Pakistan, and the probable resumption of a cash sale policy for both India and Pakistan. A long-overdue review of our substantive policy should be accompanied by an effort to sort out and construct some sort of reasonable public affairs policy, which has thus far been lacking.

5. Space

Advance planning is needed for the possibility that the USSR may land a man on the moon before the U.S. does. If so, the effect on world opinion will be considerable. Simply to repeat that we are “not racing” will do little to counter the impression that the U.S. is in second place both in space exploration and in scientific development in general. USIA should participate in contingency planning.

6. Military bases

The question of U.S. military bases overseas is a continuing one, bearing closely on the sensitivity of other nations to over-dependence on the United States. The factor of foreign opinion, in its many ramifications, should be carefully considered as plans are reviewed. Here USIA can make an important contribution to current State-Defense studies.

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5 Reference is to Johnson’s 1968 decision to sell F–4 Phantom fighter-bombers to Israel in order to enhance Israeli security. For additional information about the decision, see ibid., vol. XX, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1967–68, Documents 306, 308, 309, 311, 317, 330, 332, and 360.
7. Chemical-biological Weapons

The development of chemical-biological weapons and their potential use are getting increasing public attention both at home and abroad. The question may pose a psychological problem comparable to—though not so great as—the problem of nuclear weapons. Again, psychological factors are a vital element to be considered.

C. Long-Term or Continuing Issues

1. The Peace/Strength Image of the U.S.

A serious and continuing problem is to assure world opinion of U.S. strength to deter aggression and simultaneously of our dedication to peace. A delicate balance must be maintained. Suggestions were made above for reiterating the U.S. military commitment in NATO. At the same time, we must recognize that much of the world, reacting emotionally to the situation in Viet-Nam, sees U.S. action there as war-like and needlessly destructive. Hence the need also to dramatize our deep national commitment to peace. This might be done through new U.S. initiatives in the U.N.; through greater emphasis on disarmament and arms control (exploiting the Disarmament Agency as an important symbol of our practical aspirations for peace); through identifying the U.S. tangibly with the search for solutions to the great common problems such as health, education, and increased food production.

Communist China

U.S. relations with mainland China loom as a major problem in the years ahead, with implications for U.S. policy world-wide.

[Omitted here are the remainder of Section VIII; Section IX: U.S. Advisory Commission on Information; Section X: Personal Arrangements: The Director and Deputy Director; Section XI: Internal Communications; the bibliography; and the index.]
No. 2 Washington, January 9, 1969

Former Director Suggests New Guidelines for USIA

In a valedictory report to Congress as Director of the U.S. Information Agency, a position he held for more than three years, Leonard H. Marks today recommended a new legislative study of USIA to mark its directions for the future.

Marks left USIA last month to head the U.S. delegation to negotiate permanent arrangements for the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium (Intelsat).

He said that changing times dictate a new delineation of USIA’s future role in the U.S. Government’s foreign affairs community.

The study of the Agency’s information and cultural programs abroad should resolve such questions as its goals in the 1970s, audience priorities, the extent of the Agency’s role in shaping foreign policy and whether program emphasis should be on short or long range objectives, Marks suggested.

In a series of guidelines for USIA operations, Marks cited truth as a “practical, powerful resource in enhancing our image abroad.”

“Truth has put America far ahead in the contest of ideas; let us keep her there,” he said, adding:

“For those who, in troubled times, might doubt the wisdom of reporting the bad in America along with the good, I offer two arguments

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3 Johnson selected Marks as his nominee for United States Information Agency (USIA) Director in 1965, following the departure of Carl T. Rowan. Marks resigned as Director on December 6, 1968. In the interim, USIA Deputy Director Robert W. Akers served as Acting Director.

4 In the section of the Report to Congress (see footnote 2, above) entitled “Reflections and Recommendations,” Marks noted the helpfulness of various constituencies, including the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, in providing advice regarding USIA responsibilities and generating “interest and discussion on the problems and challenges of international communications.” He continued: “Beyond this, the changing times call for a new and expanded study to be undertaken of USIA and its directions for the future. Accordingly, I recommend that a legislative study be undertaken by the 91st Congress to delineate the future role of USIA in the Government’s foreign affairs community.” (United States Information Agency 30th Report to Congress, January–June 1968, pp. 33–34)
against diluting the truth: first, from an open society today, news radiates immediately to all parts of the world, and we can be certain our enemies will emphasize and exaggerate the unfavorable. Obviously, then, it behooves us to tell the whole story, but to give it balance and perspective and depth, something which our detractors and the commercial news media cannot be expected to do.

“Second, it is my conviction that the full news—the whole truth—from America adds up to a positive, creditable and appealing picture. What we, in the myopia of our daily pursuits, may regard as disturbing national problems can be interpreted in proper perspective as challenges which a dynamic and self-confident people expect to take in their stride. . .

“Today it does matter that Americans be regarded abroad as citizens of a mature, responsible and right-minded society. This is a proper concern of the USIA information and cultural programs—not to compete with the established media, but expertly to supplement their output abroad. Headlines highlight the news of the moment. It is USIA’s task to add balance and perspective.”

(Editors: Copies of USIA’s 30th Report to Congress are available from the Office of Public Information, Room 730, 1750 Pennsylvania Avenue N.W. Washington, D.C. 20547)

Washington, January 21, 1969

Introduction

Foreign and domestic policies are inextricably interwoven; indeed, it is difficult to tell in many cases which is the warp and which the woof in the fabric of our society. Of one thing, however, we can be certain. Each influences the other. In short, we have problems at home and overseas. This nation must engage in its problem solving—in part because we still have a “decent respect to the opinions of mankind.” Our information and educational exchange programs are a manifestation of this continuing respect.

In this, our Sixth Annual Report to Congress, we cannot dwell on the domestic problems of riots and racism, ghettos and transit systems, education and urbanization. But we must recognize at the outset that the solutions to these problems will make ever-increasing demands on the public purse and hence may have a profound effect on international programs.

There are no quiet places in the world today. The nation must not deceive itself into thinking that even when a peaceful and honorable settlement is achieved in Viet-Nam, we shall be free of foreign entanglements, and our frustrations with foreign affairs at an end. Still we must not let these frustrations turn our attention from our real and permanent responsibilities as we respond with our manifold international programs. In particular, this Commission’s main concern is that there must be no further eroding of programs of international educational and

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2 Reference is to the Declaration of Independence.
cultural exchange as a result of the general feelings of frustration with things international. We assume that after 30 years of Government-supported educational and cultural relations, this nation is committed to such programs. If it is not, it should be.

In any case, the faith of this Commission remains steadfast in the Government’s educational and cultural exchange programs as one way of letting other nations witness our problem-solving and one significant opportunity for cooperation with other peoples. And so it should. There has recently been called to our attention a series of letters from 105 ambassadors and chargés d’affaires around the world. An analysis of these letters shows that it is the overwhelming consensus of these U.S. mission heads that the educational and cultural programs—

(1) Are an effective and significant element in our long-term foreign relations with virtually every country replying. (The force and conviction of the statements, many of them from veteran ambassadors, are striking.)

(2) Are an effective and essential tool to reach and inform national intellectual and political leaders, and the press and other information media on American character and policies.

(3) Have effectively contributed to removing misconceptions about, and hostility to, the United States and its social, economic, and cultural achievements; and, as a corollary, to offsetting pro-Communist propaganda and predilections.

(4) Have significantly helped to develop education and to introduce new educational approaches in many countries, with particular reference to the developing nations.

(5) Provide an invaluable means for keeping channels of communication open in both directions at times when and places where political tensions or hostility block official diplomatic relationships.

(6) Are a significant method of reaching young people—especially potential leaders in the emerging countries and the “new generation” which has come up in Europe and elsewhere with little recollection of World War II and few post-war associations with the United States.

Specific examples of effectiveness cited in the letters are many and persuasive, namely:

(1) In most countries with long-standing exchange programs, an impressive number of key people today at very high levels—in political and public life, in press and information circles, and in education—are former grantees.

(2) In emerging countries the programs have been markedly successful in selecting leaders and potential leaders.

(3) Strong, fruitful, and continuing relationships have been established, through the exchange programs, with educational institutions, educational policymakers, professors, and teachers.
The exchange programs have been a successful means of introducing American studies abroad, especially in Europe, and of acquainting teachers with the United States and its educational system.

This is not to say that these programs are perfect or that the ambassadors had no criticism of them. On the other hand, it is difficult indeed to state precisely what an ideal educational exchange program would be, just as it is impossible for an educator to state what the ideal curriculum in any subject is.

Since the law which created this Commission requires us to report to Congress annually, we have assumed that Congress wishes our views and our recommendations in regard to the program. Further, it should be remembered that in Executive Order 11034 (June 26, 1962) implementing the Fulbright-Hays Act and delegating authority under it to various Government departments and agencies, the President reserved unto himself the right to receive recommendations from the Commission. We intend, therefore, to transmit to the President a copy of this annual report to the Congress.

We recommend:

1. That the President personally and vigorously identify to the American people and to Congress the crucial importance of international educational and cultural programs and that he give continuous support to such programs as a vital part of U.S. foreign relations and an indispensable sector of the infrastructure of U.S. foreign policy.

2. That the President establish an organizational structure within the executive branch which will assure consistent and purposeful national action in international educational and cultural affairs.

Some questions which would be answered in the implementation of these recommendations are listed below:

What administrative pattern, both in Washington and in the field, can best facilitate the Government’s performance of its role? Should all educational and cultural activities supported by Government be directed by one agency, or should they be dispersed among various agencies; and if the latter, how can they be effectively coordinated? And how should the administration of educational and cultural activities

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be related to that of similar activities such as economic development assistance or trade?

To what extent should the international cultural programs of the United States be deliberately related to those of other countries, and should this be done primarily through multilateral means or through bilateral, reciprocal means? For that matter, to what extent can cultural relations be made genuinely reciprocal?

What should be the magnitude of an adequate educational and cultural relations program, and what should be the relative magnitude of each of its component parts?

These questions, and many others like them, have been the subjects of discussions in innumerable studies, reports, conference sessions, and congressional hearings, as a conscious search for overall policy has developed and become increasingly insistent.

Underlying all these questions, and in a sense conditioning the answers to all of them, is the fundamental question: How can educational and cultural programs contribute to the advancement of the basic objectives of U.S. foreign policy?

If the recommendations and the questions listed above seem familiar, so they should. The recommendations are taken almost verbatim from a report of 1961 to the new Kennedy administration and to the Congress by our predecessor commission, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange. It was written by Walter H.C. Laves. These questions, which persist as fundamental and valid, are taken from the book Cultural Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy, by Charles A. Thomson and Walter H.C. Laves (Indiana University Press, 1963).

It seems to us that, as a nation, through our representatives in Congress and through innumerable educational institutions, volunteer groups, cultural societies, world affairs councils, and the like, we must reaffirm our commitment to international educational and cultural exchange. If we choose not to, let us say so. If we are committed, let us begin to move forward.

[Omitted here are the sections: Continuity of Personnel and the Role of the Cultural Affairs Officer; A New Agency for International Education; The CIA and the “Rusk Committee”; Funding; and Evaluation Studies.]

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CONCLUSIONS

In short:

1. We reaffirm our belief that the educational and cultural exchange programs of the Government have been and continue to be a success by any measurement.

2. We assert that these programs and their place in the Government deserve Presidential attention as one of the most important aspects of our foreign relations.

3. It follows, then, that we feel the programs should be properly funded in terms of the foreign policy-oriented purposes which underlie them. By this we mean that the Congress should provide each year sufficient money to maintain and improve such ongoing programs as the teaching of English as a second language and American studies overseas as an integral part of a comprehensive cultural and educational relations program. We would leave to the judgment of the operators the exact amount to be requested each year, but surely the amounts must not fluctuate over the decades as they have in the past. These fluctuations, it seems to us, show the lack of a firm belief in Government-sponsored international educational and cultural programs which is simply unbecoming a great nation.

4. We repeat our recommendation that the International Education Act be funded as soon as possible and to the extent feasible. Congress has authorized appropriations. It is time they were made. The funding of this act will provide an educated and informed generation which the country cannot afford to be without.

5. We intend to continue the dialog with our sister commission, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, so that we may discuss in greater detail the subjects that have already been broached in the meetings that we have had.

6. We call upon the President and Secretary of State to seek the Advisory Commission’s advice to a greater extent than previously. We feel that we are knowledgeable about many of the problems in this field.

7. We feel that there must be a permanent evaluation staff for these programs so that the Department will know of successes achieved or problems encountered year in and year out and can thus constantly improve the programs.

8. We feel especially strongly that after 30 years of Government-sponsored educational and cultural programs overseas it is time that

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the Government and the nation, too, decide in what agency these programs are to be located, how and to what extent they are to be supported, and how their relationship to domestic international educational and cultural programs, to information and propaganda, and to intelligence gathering are to be ordered in the whole complex of Government agencies.

[Omitted here is the appendix: Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs.]

4. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President’s Counsel (Ehrlichman)

Washington, February 4, 1969

Will you give me a report on what will specifically be done on my suggestion to have Klein at the domestic level and Shakespeare at the international level collect the best, brief affirmative comments with regard to the Inauguration and also the press conference and seeing that they are properly distributed.

Such phrases, for example, from the Houston Chronicle, “Mr. Nixon is off to an excellent start,” from the Denver Post, “In two decades of public life Richard Nixon has never spoken more wisely, more appropriately and more effectively. It was an excellent speech, dignified in tone, perceptive in insight, sound in emphasis. It constitutes an auspicious beginning for a new Administration.”

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1 Source: Nixon Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 230, Box 1, EX FG 230. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy.


The purpose of following up on this suggestion is that this will indicate a pattern I would like to see followed in the future.

5. **Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency**

Washington, February 6, 1969

[Omitted here are the title page and the Table of Contents.]

**INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY**

How are President Nixon and his new Administration viewed overseas? How is he characterized as a political personality? What do foreign opinion leaders see as his main problems and his prospects for dealing with them? Have their views changed since the election and especially since the inauguration? What do they expect him to do with respect to their countries and other areas of the world?

The purpose of this study is to supply at least tentative answers to these questions. It is based on an examination of foreign media content, reports from U.S. diplomatic posts abroad and available survey research. It is focused mainly on the period from the November 5 election to the week following the Inaugural Address. Views expressed in communist countries are treated separately at the end of the study.

There are a few generalizations that can be drawn from the study (none very surprising).

*First*, President Nixon is very widely seen as a pragmatic, professional, highly experienced political leader. Words like “firm,” “serious,” “hard lining,” “anti-communist” are frequently used to describe him, as are “cautious,” “middle of the roader,” and sometimes “courageous.” In contrast to descriptions of past Presidents and Presidential candidates, such words as “idealist,” “innovative,” “charismatic,” are virtually absent, nor is the description “Eisenhower Republican” often used. There are indications, however, that the tone and substance of the Inaugural Address have led to a blurring of the earlier image. Some commentators seem less certain that former characterizations such as

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Special Reports, 1953–1997, Entry P–160, Box 28, S–58–69. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. The paper is entitled “President Nixon in Foreign Eyes: Images and Expectations.”

“hard liner” hold true. For example, a conservative Japanese newspaper predicted after the election that the Nixon Administration would favor the use of force. After the Inaugural, it asserted that the Address’s calm and moderate tone indicated the emergence of a new Nixon.

Second, across the spectrum of comment from friendly to hostile, there are no widely accepted predictions of profound changes in U.S. domestic or foreign policies. Possible shifts in attention from foreign to domestic concerns or from Asia to Europe are often foreseen. But these shifts are not expected to be drastic. Some West European left-intellectual commentators predict the new Administration will not pay sufficient attention to problems of youth and the poor. In Africa, some expect Black America will be paid less heed.

The perceived catalog of U.S. problems remains unchanged: Vietnam, the Middle East, superpower relations, arms limitation, the alliance system, aid to the underdeveloped nations, the world monetary system, domestic inflation, civil unrest, racial strife. As before, awareness and interpretations of these problems, the importance attached to them, and prescriptions offered for their solution vary enormously.

Third, expressions of confidence in the new Administration’s capacity to deal with foreign and domestic problems tend to vary both according to geographic area and political orientation. West Europeans tend to see the choices open to the new Administration as limited by prior commitments, domestic preoccupations and the world situation. Right and center European opinion appear to have more confidence in the Administration’s abilities. It is notable that some “independent” opinion leaders such as the London Times are cautiously optimistic. By contrast, liberal to left opinion is more skeptical.

In other areas of the world—Asia, Africa, Latin America, the Middle East—there appears to be far less awareness that the range of choice is limited. Emphasis is not on the capacity of the Administration to resolve problems but on its will to bestow or withhold attention and favor.

In East Asia most concern is focused on continued American resistance to communist expansion, although Japanese opinion is somewhat preoccupied with future trade relations. Opinion in the Arab world is totally preoccupied with the new Administration’s intentions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Similarly, some Israeli commentators dwell on prospects for diminished U.S. support while others hopefully predict no change. Indian comment often indicates that the measure of the new Administration will be its aid program while Pakistani opinion sees settlement of the Viet-Nam War and reduction of East-West tension as criteria of success. In Latin America, commentators concentrate on the hope for increased U.S. interest, attention and aid and the fear of U.S. neglect. In Africa, too, aid and interest are often seen as the yardsticks against which the new Administration will be measured.
Fourth, there is a pronounced tendency among commentators in most countries to seek indications that relations with the U.S. will improve or at least not deteriorate. Arab commentators looked hopefully to the Scranton visit\textsuperscript{3} for a change in U.S. Middle East policy. NATO advocates found the Kissinger appointment encouraging evidence of greater attention to Europe. Some Latin American comment viewed the Galo Plaza interview\textsuperscript{4} as highly significant. Both India and Pakistan look to the new Administration for more sympathetic treatment. Relatively little comment predicts worsening relations.

[Omitted here are the sections: Europe, East Asia, Near East and South Asia, Latin America, Africa, and The Nixon Image in Communist Propaganda.]

\textsuperscript{3} Presumable reference to Scranton’s December 1968 fact-finding tour of the Middle East made on behalf of President-elect Nixon. Scranton traveled to Iran (December 2–5), Lebanon (December 5), UAR (December 6–7), Saudi Arabia (December 7–8), Jordan (December 8), and Israel (December 9–11). For memoranda of conversation of his meetings with Middle Eastern leaders, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XX, Arab–Israeli Dispute, 1967–1968, Documents 342–344 and 346–347, and ibid., vol. XXI, Near East Region; Arabian Peninsula, Document 318.

\textsuperscript{4} Possible reference to the President’s meeting with Plaza on January 21 at 4:45 p.m. Rogers and Vaky also attended the meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) For additional information, see Benjamin Welles, “President Talks With O.A.S. Chief: Galo Plaza Is Nixon’s First Official Foreign Visitor,” New York Times, January 22, 1969, p. 28.

6. **Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rogers and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\textsuperscript{1}**

Washington, February 7, 1969, 3:45 p.m.

R just heard that Frank Shakesphere was taking a trip to Beirut or someplace like that and has his doubts about whether this is a good move. They might think we have some sort of plan by sending Shakesphere.

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, Box 1, February 1–11, 1969. No classification marking.
HAK said he hadn’t thought about that. What happened was someone asked at the Cabinet meeting\(^2\) (K thought Haldeman) whether Shakesphere could go somewhere to meet the public affairs officials.

R felt that Shakesphere was fairly inexperienced and maybe it might be a better idea to send him to Europe or Latin America.

K thought Europe would be a good idea and would give him a chance to meet the people there.

K said he would be seeing the P on a minor matter at 4:30 and would bring it up. It would give the P a positive reason rather than negative for not sending S to the Middle East.

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\(^2\) Presumable reference to the February 7 Cabinet meeting, which took place in the White House Cabinet Room from 10:07 until 11:55 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

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7. Memorandum From President Nixon to the Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on Information (Stanton)\(^1\)

Washington, February 20, 1969

Dear Frank:

Thank you for your letter of February 3\(^2\) regarding the procedures of the National Security Council.

I have carefully considered the question of attendance at the National Security Council meetings and have concluded that if I am to be able to use this forum effectively, I must limit the regular attendance to the statutory members of the Council. Frank Shakespeare will be invited to all meetings in which matters of particular concern to USIA are under discussion.

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\(^1\) Source: Nixon Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 230, Box 1, EX FG 230. No classification marking.

\(^2\) See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 14. At the January 21 NSC meeting, the President indicated that the Secretary of the Treasury “is the only non-statutory Cabinet Member who will participate on a regular basis.” (Ibid.) For the meeting minutes, see ibid., Document 15.
I appreciate your interest in the role of USIA and can assure you that I am fully aware of the importance of having USIA contribute to forming, as well as implementing, our policy.

Sincerely,

RN

8. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, February 20, 1969

SUBJECT

East/West Center on the Common Problems of Advanced Societies

In December 1966, President Johnson asked McGeorge Bundy to explore the possibilities of a Center in which representatives of advanced nations on both sides of the curtain might work together on some common problems of industrialized societies. Bundy held extensive discussions with business and academic leaders here and abroad, and came up with a proposal for an East/West Center, manned by academicians, scientists, etc., from both East and West. The general purposes of the Center would be to:

—study common problems of organization and management in fields such as communications, urban organization, economic and industrial development, higher education, and resource use;

—apply analytic techniques to these problems.


2 According to a transcript of a February 7 telephone conversation between Bundy and Kissinger, which occurred at 10:45 a.m., Bundy “brought up the matter of the East-West Center (for the study of common problems of an advanced society). If the project is to stay alive, there needs to be some indication that the new Administration takes at least some interest in it. If the President doesn’t mention it in Europe [reference is to the President’s upcoming trip; see footnote 3, below], it will probably die—if he does, it will become part of his Administration.” (Ibid., Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, Box 1, February 1–11, 1969)
The U.S. share of annual expenses for the Center should not exceed $2.5 million. The over-all cost of the Center, including a core staff and provision for special subjects, might be as high as $5 million, but U.S. participation would not exceed 50% at a maximum, and ought to be kept at 40% if possible. (Consultation with Congressional leaders has indicated that they would be willing to go along with this level of expense.)

If the project is to stay alive, there needs to be some indication that you are favorably disposed to studying it further, and all you would need to do is mention to Wilson that you are still considering it.

My own feeling is that this is a project worth continuing. The cost is small and the possible benefits fairly large.

Recommendation:

That you authorize me to indicate to the British your interest in the project, and your willingness to discuss it very briefly, and informally, while in London.3 If you agree to this course, I will see that your briefing book gives you the necessary background.4

If you decide to go ahead, we will need to find a U.S. coordinator for the project.

Approve
Disapprove
Give me a list of candidates5

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3 The President, as part of a larger trip to Europe, visited the United Kingdom, February 24–26, and met with Wilson on February 24. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XLI, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, Documents 310 and 311. Additional documentation, including background papers, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Boxes 442–448, President’s Trip Files. In his memoirs, the President wrote: “I wanted this trip, my first abroad as President, to establish the principle that we would consult with our allies before negotiating with our potential adversaries. I also wanted to show the world that the new American President was not completely obsessed with Vietnam, and to dramatize for Americans at home that, despite opposition to the war, their President could still be received abroad with respect and even enthusiasm.” (RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, p. 370)

4 The President initialed his approval and wrote below it: “But—just indicate agreement—It is not worth discussion—since we agree.”

5 The President did not approve or disapprove this recommendation.
9. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to all USIA Element Heads

Washington, February 24, 1969

SUBJECT
Young Officers’ Policy Panel

Effective March 10, I am establishing a Young Officers’ Policy Panel in USIA. Its purpose is to bring the insights of the Agency’s young generation to bear more actively on our problems. I also hope that it will serve to give our young officers a greater sense of participation in our common tasks.

The Panel will be composed of about a dozen young officers of the foreign and domestic services. Members will be appointed for a year and serve on a rotating basis. Their regular assignments will allow for a degree of flexibility in working hours in order to enable them to participate in Panel activities.

The Panel will report to the Deputy Director (Policy and Research). I expect to meet with the group myself at an early date, and thereafter as time permits.

The responsibilities of the Panel will be of three principal types:

1. To receive and screen the ideas of all young officers so that the best of these ideas may be transmitted to Agency elements for action.

2. To arrange for other young Agency officers to participate in activities through which they can broaden their outlook and contribute to Agency thinking and decision-making. These activities will include:
   a. Attendance at debriefings of USIA and State Department officers and of CU grantees;
   b. Participation in IOP communication seminars;
   c. Attendance at staff meetings of Agency elements other than the one to which assigned;

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2 In 1969, the USIA leadership decided to remove the research function from the Office of Policy and Research and establish an Office of Research and Assessment, containing divisions and units from the Office of Policy and Research, the Office of the Director, and Office of the Assistant Director for Administration. At the time of this memorandum, Ryan served as the Deputy Director for Policy and Research. Strasburg assumed the position of Associate Director for Research and Assessment, of the newly-created Office of Research and Assessment, in mid 1969. For additional information, see Document 16.
d. Participation in screening of IMV productions and acquisitions;
e. Participation in Agency working groups (e.g., PPBS Working Group);
f. Campus recruiting.

3. To keep open the Agency’s lines of communication with college students and their organizations, and bring the insights gained to bear on Agency policies, products, and programs. Panel members will meet and correspond with student groups, and as a result of these contacts will, for instance:
   a. Make recommendations on Agency policies and plans;
   b. Make suggestions for new Agency media products and field activities;
   c. Select magazine reprints and other items for a quarterly youth packet, like the quarterly IPS cultural packet;
   d. Comment on radio and television programs, films, pamphlets, and other media output.

   The Panel, once formed, will establish its own procedures.

**ACTION REQUESTED**

You are requested to nominate up to three young officers from your elements to serve on the Young Officers’ Policy Panel. Your nominees should be in their twenties or early thirties and at the FSIO 5–7, GS 9–13 level. Please send their names and a brief statement about each to the Deputy Director (Policy and Research) no later than February 28.

**Frank Shakespeare**

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10. **Memorandum From the President’s Assistant (Harlow) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)**

Washington, February 26, 1969

In conversation with leaders in Congress, the suggestion has been made that the USIA undertake an international program of publicizing the contrast between the way in which the United States treats its...
allies and the forceful manner in which the Soviet Union threatens its satellites. We discuss and negotiate; they send in tanks; etc. The President’s current trip is one example, and the use of USSR military in Czechoslovakia is another.

Bryce N. Harlow

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3 Harlow signed “Bryce” above this typed signature.

11. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Research, United States Information Agency (Ryan) to all USIA Element Heads

Washington, March 18, 1969

SUBJECT

Establishment of Executive Committee

As outlined at our meeting this morning, an Executive Committee has been established to advise the Director and the Deputy Director on major questions regarding the use of Agency resources. The Committee will thus replace the Program Review Committee and the system previously in effect for media content decisions.

The Committee will initially be composed of:

Deputy Director, Chairman
Deputy Director (Policy and Research)
Assistant Director (Administration)
An Executive Secretary

Pending the appointment of the permanent Executive Secretary, papers should be submitted to the Committee through ICP.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Executive Committee, E/CLS Files, ExComm, Entry UD–112, Box 1, Executive Comm—Miscellaneous. No classification marking.
2 No record of the meeting has been found.
The Committee will meet as often as necessary and at least twice a week for the immediate future. The initial schedule will provide for meetings on Monday at 11:30 AM and on Thursday at 9:30 AM.

Any Agency element may submit any matter for the Committee’s consideration that it deems appropriate. The Committee will also review subjects on its own initiative. All parts of the Agency that have an interest in a subject will be invited to submit their views.

The Committee, as it begins to function, will develop procedures to ensure adequate staff work and expeditious handling of its business. Attached are interim instructions for the submission of proposals.³

Hewson A. Ryan⁴

³ Attached but not printed are the interim instructions “Submission of Proposals to the Executive Committee,” dated March 18, and a proposal form, intended to be attached as a cover sheet to a proposal. The interim instructions read, in part: “The Committee will consider a proposal only after full staff work has been completed, permitting a thorough analysis of all pertinent data, including possible alternatives. At the same time, it is important that items requiring priority attention be identified and expedited, so that the Committee may make decisions as promptly as required.” In an April 23 memorandum for all element heads, O’Brien indicated that some proposals for submission to the ExComm had been delayed “because they lacked clear definition of timing, had not been fully coordinated with other elements involved, or omitted pertinent information.” O’Brien attached guidelines and a summary sheet, indicating that they replaced the March 18 interim instructions. (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Evaluation, Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1969–1978, Entry P–119, INF 1–14 Executive Committee folder 1)

⁴ Ryan signed “Hew Ryan” above this typed signature.
HAK said he had Frankel’s letter and is thinking about it. Frankel said that was all he wanted him to do and also wanted to thank him for all the help he gave Bob. HAK said it was a very responsible and fair statement.

HAK said he had a complaint in that the Ben Wells story was outrageous. There was no element of truth in it. First of all, one letter from Stanton had arrived at the Pierre and had gotten lost during the transition period. The President had personally answered another. HAK said Stanton had been on his conscience (quote) but only because of the letter. HAK said he does not have final say on NSC participation—the President does. The President’s only reason for omitting USIA was the simple fact that he wanted to keep the numbers of participants down. If USIA attended, that would mean several additional agencies would have to be added. Shakespeare is on the Review Group as a permanent invitee but not as a statutory member. HAK said he does have final say on participation and has absolutely no objection to Shakespeare being on it.

Another point—Stanton has resigned as has every other member when a new President comes in. The only issue here is whether Stanton will stay on because of Shakespeare. The President doesn’t know whether it is wise to have two CBS men head the USIA program.

HAK said he thought newsies weren’t allowed to quote people at the Gridiron and this is what happened. His quote was correct but
Stanton’s was totally untrue. HAK asked Walsh to call Shakespeare at 6. He finally called at 9:00 and the story had been filed.

Frankel wanted to know if there was anything about this weekend he should know that wasn’t obvious. HAK said that the President felt they could get some serious uninterrupted talking done on the trip out on general matters. No heavy decisions will be made. Also, that Bunker and Goodpaster would be coming in and they will meet out there.

Frankel apologized for the mess re the story and said he would take care of any action necessary to rectify it.

7 The President and First Lady Pat Nixon were scheduled to visit former President Harry Truman and former First Lady Bess Truman in Independence, Missouri, on March 21 before flying to California for the weekend. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President met with Rogers, Kissinger, Bunker, and Goodpaster at the Western White House in San Clemente, California, during the morning of March 23. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) No record of this meeting has been found.

8 On March 21, Wells reported: “Mr. Kissinger’s alleged cold-shouldering of the commission [U.S. Advisory Commission on Information], which is headed by Dr. Frank Stanton, president of the Columbia Broadcasting System, has led to private criticism among commission members and to a report in The New York Times of unanswered communications and other grievances.” He explained that White House officials had “sharply challenged” the information contained within Wells’s March 20 article and that Kissinger planned to name a USIA official to his staff. (“Kissinger to Add U.S.I.A. Staff Aide: But Agency Won’t Get Seat on Full Security Council,” New York Times, March 21, 1969, p. 23)
13. Minutes of a USIA Executive Committee Meeting

Minutes No. 4 Washington, March 31, 1969

GENERAL SUBJECT
Apollo 11; IMV Feature Films; Services for Foreign Press

MEMBERS PRESENT
Henry Loomis
Ben Posner
Hewson Ryan
John O’Brien
Ben Ellington

A. Mr. Loomis said the Agency should plan to go all-out on exploitation of Apollo 11 with no unreasonable restraints because of budgetary or bureaucratic considerations. He emphasized the need for speed in getting products to the field. He pointed out the need for keeping under review contingency planning in connection with Apollo 11. While not taking final action on IOP’s proposal for a worldwide telecast, Mr. Loomis said we should not be competitive with the U.S. commercials but should extend help to selected foreign telecasters.

B. Other items:
1. Mr. Loomis reported that he discussed with the Assistant Director for IMV the Director’s decision to hold up action temporarily on the future production of Agency feature-length films. Mr. Loomis said the Director had raised three basic questions about Agency feature

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Executive Committee, E/CLS Files, ExComm, Entry UD–112, Box 1, Chron Files—Meetings 1 thru 4. No classification marking.
2 Attached but not printed at Tab A is “Apollo 11—Agency Guidelines, Planning Paper No. 1,” submitted by IOP/P to the Executive Committee on March 28. The proposal outlined the coverage and handling of the Apollo 11 mission, scheduled to launch in July, listing approved projects, those in preparation, and others under examination.
3 According to the proposal (see footnote 2, above), IOP/P proposed that, with regards to the broadcast: “a. Investigation of the feasibility of the first truly worldwide telecast, in which the astronauts in Houston (either during their quarantine period or immediately after) would discuss their experiences via satellite hookup with young people on all continents. One or two young people speaking in the presence of a young studio audience would participate from each location. The Agency would have to work this out with U.S. and foreign networks and could probably recuperate some of the costs. The dramatic use of space satellites in marking the first major milestone in the exploration of space would be highly symbolic. So would be also the concept of the first ‘envoys of mankind to the moon’ reporting to representatives of the ‘space generation’ of all mankind. Total costs of such a telecast are estimated at $85,000 for a one-hour show (including preparatory travel by the producer), but it will require much preliminary work to find out what the actual cost that the Agency itself would have to bear would be. For this preliminary work, the Executive Committee’s approval of the project in principle is required.” (Ibid.)
films: our capability to produce them, distribution, and whether we could be competitive with Hollywood. Mr. Loomis asked Mr. O’Brien to prepare a paper on *The Seventh Generation*\(^4\) taking into consideration the views of IMV, IOP, and the areas and the possibilities for effective distribution.

2. Mr. Loomis said he thought we should take a look at the services we offer to the foreign press in New York and Washington and asked Mr. Ryan to examine all aspects, including a possible “country plan” for New York.\(^5\)

3. Mr. Loomis said he wanted Mr. Ellington to be present at all meetings at which reorganization of the Agency was discussed.

*John O’Brien*\(^6\)

*Executive Secretary*

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\(^4\) Reference is to *USA: The Seventh Generation*, the 1960s USIA feature-length film that traced a cohort of Americans from birth to death.

\(^5\) An unknown hand placed a bracket in the right-hand margin next to this point.

\(^6\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Washington, April 4, 1969

SUBJECT
AFRICA DAY

I should like to propose that the President proclaim an annual AFRICA DAY, in recognition of the special ties of heritage and culture which the U.S. shares with the nations of Africa. The suggested date would be May 25, the day on which the Organization of African Unity was instituted in 1963. This is the only date which has virtual universal common significance for all independent African-governed states, selection of that date would indicate U.S. recognition and respect for the concepts of practical initiative toward progress and spirit of common identity—both of which are embodied in the OAU.

I believe that the proclamation of a U.S. national AFRICA DAY would have important beneficial effects, both immediate and long-range, on the psychological climate which conditions U.S.-African relations. Such a step would constitute formal, prideful acknowledgement of the unique relationship existing between Americans and Africans...which the latter share with the people of no other major power. Such a gesture would be particularly useful at this time, where there is a deep-seated suspicion that the U.S. is losing interest in Africa.

Although domestic considerations are not our concern, it is suggested that the act of establishing AFRICA DAY would have considerable symbolic importance as a measurement of the concern and respect felt by the Administration for the heritage and special identity of Black Americans.

It is also to be pointed out that this gesture, with high potential advantages, would cost nothing in terms of tangible resources. Also a precedent exists for such a commemorative day: Pan American Day.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 7, INF–1 General Policy Plans Coordination. Limited Official Use. Shakespeare sent a copy of the memorandum to Garment under an April 10 covering memorandum, noting that Reinhardt planned to meet with Palmer on April 11 to discuss the proposal. He added, “The attitude of the State Department officers below Palmer is reportedly very enthusiastic.” Shakespeare concluded: “I appreciate your offer to check this out with Finch and hope that it is possible to do so promptly.” (Ibid.)

2 April 14.
If this recommendation is adopted and AFRICA DAY is proclaimed, it would be most fitting to celebrate the first one at a Presidential reception for African ambassadors and U.S. Negro leaders on May 25th. That reception could be combined with the reception which African ambassadors propose to give to celebrate the sixth OAU anniversary. (The State Department has informed the White House of this proposal and recommended that the President attend.)

The AFRICA DAY idea is being discussed with the African Bureau of State, which has registered initial enthusiasm for it.³

³ In an April 15 memorandum to Shakespeare, sent through Loomis, DuBois commented that the Department of State favored the proposal and “has ready a memorandum to the President together with a draft proclamation,” adding that these documents would not be sent forward until Finch commented on the proposal. O’Brien wrote at the top of the memorandum: “HL [Henry Loomis] discussed w/FS several times.” (Ibid.) In an April 17 memorandum to Shakespeare, DuBois indicated that the Department’s Bureau of African Affairs had informed DuBois that “Secretary Finch is opposed to an Africa Day observance. He believes that this might lead to criticism of the Administration on campuses by black militants and cause agitation and unrest.” (Ibid.)
15. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, April 11, 1969

SUBJECT

East-West Center

During your London visit\(^2\) you indicated to the British general agreement with McGeorge Bundy’s project for an East-West Center on the Common Problems of Advanced Societies. (My earlier memo describing the project is at Tab A.)\(^3\)

Bundy has now talked further with the British, who are prepared—if we do not object—to come up with a first-stage plan for a Center, with a British home and lead in the sponsorship.

He has also talked with the chief Russian negotiator, Dzerman Gvishiani (who is Deputy Chairman of the State Committee on Science and Technology, and Kosygin’s son-in-law).\(^4\) Gvishiani was encouraging about possible Soviet participation, and indicated his personal hope that Bundy would continue to work on the project. Bundy says he now believes the Soviets have made a decision in favor of joining the Center.

As a result of these talks, Bundy proposes that:

—The U.S. Government give a quiet indication to the Soviets of support for the project;

—We select an individual to be responsible for negotiations both in Washington and abroad (including a check with appropriate members of Congress to see that earlier indications of support still stand);

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 321, Subject Files, East/West Center [Feb 1969–Sept 1972]. Confidential. Sent for action. Eagleburger wrote “HAK called Bundy on Apr. 15, 1969” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. In the top left-hand corner of the memorandum, Eagleburger added: “Osgood to follow for NSC.” Eagleburger sent a copy of the memorandum to Osgood under an April 16 memorandum, noting that Nixon had approved “our going ahead” with the East-West Center project and that Kissinger “would like you to be the staff member to follow this project.” Eagleburger concluded: “In a previous incarnation I was somewhat involved in the Bundy proposal and would be happy to get together with you sometime this week to fill you in on what background I have.” (Ibid.)


3 Printed as Document 8.

4 Attached but not printed at Tab B is an undated memorandum prepared by Bundy concerning his April 3 meeting with Dzerman Gvishiani, which took place at the Ford Foundation in New York.
We support, at a later time, an appropriation of up to $2 million for the National Science Foundation (as the U.S. contribution to the project).

The Issues

We now need to make several decisions.

First, should we agree to continue the project through the next stage? My own view is that we should go ahead. The Center has real substantive merit; further, a U.S. withdrawal now might be misinterpreted by the Soviets.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to tell Bundy that the U.S. is prepared to go ahead with the project, subject to review as plans progress.

Approve______  Disapprove______  See me______

Second, do we ask Bundy to continue to represent the U.S. (either permanently or for the next stage)? I suggest that we keep Bundy, at least for the next round of talks—leaving open the possibility of setting up a new group (with a new chief) at a later date. Bundy knows the background to the project and is well known and trusted by his foreign counterparts.

Recommendation: That you authorize me to tell Bundy you would like him to continue on as U.S. representative for the next stage of the talks.

Approve______  Prefer that he be dropped and a new representative named______

Prefer that Bundy be told he is to continue as U.S. representative throughout all stages of the negotiations______

Finally, should we tell Bundy that we see no objection to telling the British that they should come up with a first-stage plan for the Center? I believe we should let them go ahead.

Recommendation: That Bundy be authorized to tell the British that we have no objection.

Approve______  Disapprove______  See me______

5 The President initialed his approval.
6 The President initialed his approval.
7 The President initialed his approval.
16. Minutes of a USIA Executive Committee Meeting

Minutes No. 10  
Washington, April 21, 1969

PRESENT

Henry Loomis
Ben Posner
Hewson A. Ryan
John R. O’Brien
Ben Ellington, IOA/M
Walter Jones, IOA/M

A. Reorganization of IOP

A Task Force was directed to develop detailed plans for the establishment of a new Office of Research and Assessment. This Office, to be headed by an Associate Director, will be made up of certain units transferred from the Office of the Director, the Office of Administration, and the Office of Policy and Research. The principal components of the new Office will be the Inspection and Audit staffs, the Research Service, the Agency Library, and a new Program Analysis staff.

This new Office of Research and Assessment (tentatively to be referred to as IOR) will be responsible for assessing how efficiently the Agency has been conducting its operations and how effective they have been in reaching our foreign audiences. IOP will continue to be responsible for planning for the future and for providing overall policy guidance for current Agency operations.

The Task Force will be chaired by the Management Division and contain representatives from Research, IOP, one of the geographic areas and one of the media. The Task Force is responsible for developing recommendations on functional statements, staffing patterns, and office space allocation.

B. Construction of USIS New Delhi Offices and Information Center

Nothing new.

John R. O’Brien
Executive Secretary

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 17, Director’s Office—Executive Comm. No classification marking. No drafting date appears on the minutes. An unknown hand wrote “IAS—Mr. Littell” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum; another unknown hand crossed it out and wrote “I/S file” beneath it.

2 O’Brien initialed “JOB” above this typed signature.
17. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Research, United States Information Agency (Ryan) to the Director (Shakespeare)

Washington, April 21, 1969

SUBJECT

Opinion Study on Viet-Nam: Conclusions and Recommendations

Attached is the report you requested on current foreign opinion about Viet-Nam.  

This memorandum presents conclusions we have drawn from the study. It also sets forth our recommendations—first, in terms of the Agency’s psychological advisory role; second, in terms of USIA action as a consequence of the study.

Foreign Opinion Considerations for U.S. Viet-Nam Policy

1. Our evidence indicates that current foreign interest in Viet-Nam is not very high and does not seem likely to become so as long as the Paris talks offer some hope of progress, and as long as there is no major escalation of the war. At least at present, the U.S. is not under heavy pressure to alter its course.

   We recommend that, from the viewpoint of the international audience, the U.S. maintain its present relatively low level of public treatment of Viet-Nam.

2. Our study indicates that U.S. actions which can be seen as escalating the conflict in Viet-Nam are very likely to have considerable psychological repercussions in many areas of the world.

   If there should be a decision to resume bombing of North Viet-Nam, or to take some other action interpretable as escalation, we recommend careful advance psychological preparation of foreign opinion, to seek acceptance of the U.S. action as justifiable and necessary.

3. An important exception to the general picture of current foreign interest in Viet-Nam is that part of Asia which sees its own security tied to U.S. firmness. Our study discloses fears of a softening U.S. commitment to Asia, with the U.S. stand on Viet-Nam as a barometer of American intentions. Reduction of U.S. strength in South Viet-Nam would almost surely intensify Asian doubts about U.S. reliability. Pic-

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2 Attached but not printed is the report, entitled “Current Climate of Foreign Opinion on Viet-Nam.”

3 See footnote 2, Document 1.
tures, on television and in the press, of the first U.S. units leaving Viet-
Nam could have dramatic effects in these nations.

There is a real need for the U.S. to provide, by actions and statements,
solid indications of its continuing commitment to Asia. Secretary Rogers’
coming Asian trips (to Viet-Nam, to the SEATO and TCC meetings)\(^4\) should
be used as occasions—among others—for such reassurances. Specially targeted
reassurances to Asian friends of the U.S. should precede any reduction of
American forces in SVN. If a reduction involves recall of nonessential support
troops rather than combat troops, the U.S. should make the distinction explic-
itly clear.

4. The present general state of world opinion—with the exceptions
noted above—does not now pose serious problems for the United
States. But there is a need to look ahead and begin preparing for the
future—for the time when the terms of a peace settlement may be a
matter of keen public dispute.

From our analysis, it appears that—while media attention to Viet-
Nam is generally at a low level—there is no evidence that basic attitudes
toward the war have changed. Most of the public abroad simply wants
it to end, and would be inclined to applaud any settlement bringing
the war to an end. Furthermore, there is insufficient appreciation abroad
of the role of the GVN as a viable, representative government.
Therefore:

*It is important for the U.S. to identify those minimum conditions which it*
*considers essential to a peace settlement, and to begin laying the groundwork now for public understanding of their importance. At an appropriate moment, it would be well for the Nixon Administration to define these conditions in new terminology eschewing the much-belabored 14 points,\(^5\) and the oft-quoted “one-man, one-vote” formula. (We are not referring here to the details of negotiations, but rather to the broad principles which the Administration decides must be the basis for any settlement.) In this context, the U.S. should state its case without detracting from the key role of the GVN in defining the*

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\(^4\) References are to Rogers’s upcoming trips to Saigon May 14–19 to meet with
Thieu and U.S. and Vietnamese officials and to Bangkok May 19–23 to attend the SEATO
Council and seven-nation meetings. For Rogers’s May 9 statement, in which he outlined
the purpose for and itinerary of the trip, see Department of State Bulletin, May 26, 1969,
pp. 433–434. For Rogers’s May 12 departure statement, his remarks at a May 14 news
conference upon arrival in Saigon, and his remarks at a May 19 news conference upon
his departure, see ibid., June 2, 1969, pp. 461–464. For his May 20 statement at the SEATO
Council opening session, the text of final communiqué released on May 21, the text of
the final communiqué issued at the close of the seven-nation meeting on May 22, and
Rogers’s statement upon his departure from Bangkok, see ibid., June 9, 1969, pp. 477–484.

\(^5\) Presumable reference to President Wilson’s plan for a comprehensive peace settle-
ment following World War I. Wilson enumerated the Fourteen Points in an address
before a joint session of Congress on January 8, 1918.
basic principles for a settlement. In fact, that role should be prominently featured.

USIA Operations

The following recommendations apply to USIA Operations:

1. Except in Asia, and in a few places like Sweden where Viet-Nam is a continuing public opinion problem for the United States, the current level of Agency treatment of Viet-Nam is adequate.

2. The Agency should make special efforts, in Asian countries where reassurance is needed, to heighten confidence in the reliability of U.S. commitments. Embodied clearly in these efforts, however, should be continuing emphasis on efforts of the Asian nations themselves to provide for their own defense.

3. The Agency should take additional steps to promote foreign awareness of the GVN as a viable, broadly based, constitutional government. To promote awareness of the successes of the GVN in shouldering its military and civil burdens is equally important. In the latter effort, the most convincing voice would be the GVN’s. Accordingly, the Agency should also press the GVN to improve and expand its own overseas information activities. As the GVN does so, the level of the United States’ public treatment of its role in Viet-Nam could be reduced.

Hewson A. Ryan

18. Memorandum of Conversation

Washington, May 1, 1969

SUBJECT
State/USIA Interchange of Personnel

PARTICIPANTS
Department of State
Howard P. Mace, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Personnel
Adrian T. Middleton, Director, Career Management and Assignment Division
Frank S. Wile, Chief, Personnel Requirements Branch

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 1, INF–11 Department of State. No classification marking. Drafted by Wile on May 12. Copies were sent to Mace and Middleton. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum twice. Notations in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum read: “5–21–69” and “I—Mr. O’Brien.”
As a follow-up to a meeting \(^2\) between Under Secretary Richardson and USIA Deputy Director Henry Loomis, a meeting was arranged for Thursday afternoon May 1 to discuss State/USIA relationships in terms of what was described as an “enlightened” interchange of personnel. After noting the existence of such a program in the CU and P areas, USIA participants expressed the belief that there were other areas which could be exploited to mutual advantage—both at State and in USIA. The program in CU (up to 40 persons from USIA to man positions in CU) was one which gave some worry since through the years it had been reduced to much smaller proportions than was thought desirable. Rather than retrenching, it seemed that State and USIA ought to be expanding their relationships. USIA pointed out that the CU program was a natural focal point on the domestic scene for returning cultural affairs officers.

It was agreed that there were indeed areas other than in CU and in P which could be examined to see whether an expanded USIA representation in State could be accommodated. Likewise, in USIA, there were doubtless areas which could very profitably absorb details of FSO’s from State. Overseas the prospect seemed equally bright for both agencies, with the suggestion underscored that where possible this interchange take place at the same post. In the spirit of a positive approach by both sides it was agreed that USIA and State would designate officers to explore the ramifications of an expanded interchange program. Both agencies would examine their position resources for the purpose of identifying those most appropriate for an interchange. It was also agreed that should an expanded program result, it would begin on a reasonable scale—no mass movement of personnel.

\(^2\) No record of this meeting has been found.
19. Memorandum From Richard Sneider of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, May 7, 1969

SUBJECT

VOA Political Commentary Beamed to China

You asked to see what VOA puts out as political commentary to Communist China.

I attach a representative sample (Tab B).\(^2\) I attach, also, at Tab A,\(^3\) a copy of the “Country Paper” for China used as basic guidance by VOA. It makes the following points:

A. **Audience**—The target is an elite group, including officials who do not themselves listen, but receive reports of VOA programs.

B. **Special Factors**—The Chinese have been exposed to massive propaganda; they will be skeptical of anything with a propagandistic flavor. The target audience is not thinking of destroying the system, but turns to outside broadcasts for independent information and for release from the sterility of Chinese Communist media.

C. **Objectives**—VOA tries to act as a “window on the world.” The underlying purposes are:

1. to inform listeners of the real direction of US policy.
2. to increase dissatisfaction with and distrust of Peking’s policies.
3. to stimulate a desire for a more realistic and reasonable stance by the Peking leadership.

D. **Themes**—The US does not threaten China; we seek a reduction of tensions. We retain our friendship and respect for the Chinese people and look forward to an eventual restoration of ties. The US can and will repel Communist aggression, but our purpose is defensive, and we seek cooperation rather than hostility. We believe in the free flow of ideas and people. Chinese Communist policies have interfered with China’s development and have isolated China internationally. The great world problems transcend national boundaries, and must be

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed is the IBS Country Paper on mainland China, dated December 13, 1967.
solved cooperatively. We wish to cooperate with all nations in programs of mutual assistance. There are built-in fallacies in Communist ideology; changes will inevitably come to China, as they are coming to Eastern Europe, requiring Communism to be more responsive to the people’s needs.

E. Program Content—There are six categories: news; political commentary; cross-reporting on Asia and Communist countries; cautious coverage of Communist Chinese internal affairs; features on the United States; and music.

Comment: Frank Shakespeare is anxious to review VOA’s output to Communist China in connection with the new China Study and the opening of a new, much more powerful VOA broadcasting station beamed at China.

4 Not further identified.

20. Minutes of an Inter-Agency Youth Committee Meeting

Washington, May 8, 1969

Counselor Richard F. Pedersen, Chairman

White House
Richard V. Allen

State Department
Thomas H. Quimby, AF
Robert M. Beaudry, EUR
Sidney Sober, NEA
Richard Bernhard, ARA
Robert L. Walkinshaw, EA
Douglas N. Batson, CU

DOD
James D. Dunlap, ISA

USIA
Hewson A. Ryan, Deputy Director
Geoffrey Groff-Smith, IOP

AID
Curtis Farrar, PPC
Robert E. Matteson, IT

Princeton N. Lyman, PPC/TIXD

The first Inter-Agency Youth Committee meeting since the change of Administration was devoted to a review of questions under consideration by the new Chairman.

The Counselor, Mr. Pedersen, who has been assigned the responsibility in the State Department for youth affairs and the chairmanship of the inter-agency group, asked for a preliminary discussion of objectives and operations in the youth effort. He urged that these questions subsequently be reviewed in the bureaus and agencies. He plans to convene another session shortly after his return from the SEATO\(^2\) and CENTO\(^3\) meetings with a view to deciding on specific actions to increase emphasis on youth as a political factor.

A number of points threaded through the discussion, getting emphasis from several speakers:

—The political necessity of our understanding the attitudes and values of youth abroad;
—The need for more analytical reporting on the concerns felt by youth;
—The need to assign young officers to posts in countries where youth play a critical political role, so as to establish contacts, develop relationships and rapport, and produce the necessary reporting;
—The key role of the Ambassador in spurring an Embassy to the necessary contact and reporting work, and the need for a periodic reminder to Ambassadors of the importance Washington accords this work;
—“Influence” as a misleading and futile objective unless it is viewed as a long-run by-product of individual relationships. US policy—as others see it—was cited as surely the prime influencer.
—The desirability of “reverse influence”—the need to take into account in the formulation of policy the concerns of youth as these become known through political analysis and reporting.

Committee members generally reported that their bureaus and agencies are well aware of the political importance of youth. However,
most characterized performance in the field as spotty, and dependent largely on the extent to which the Ambassador takes an interest.

Mr. Cross opened the discussion by tracing the evolution of USG objectives vis-à-vis youth, beginning with the original impetus of the cold war competition for the respect of the young elites of the Third World. What has remained constant throughout, he said, has been the attempt to keep an awareness in the foreign affairs agencies of youth as a political force in their societies. Student uprisings last year in Paris, Mexico City and elsewhere reinforced this effort, and led to a call by two bureaus for a re-evaluation of the IAYC and its program. Mr. Cross suggested that this, together with the advent of the new Administration, offered an opportunity to rethink the philosophy and the mechanism of the youth effort in order to make them adequate to the needs of modern diplomacy in the Seventies.

Mr. Pedersen raised questions about the nature of the phenomenon and its variations according to area; about U.S. objectives—whether influence or understanding, and to what end, or relationship with future leaders; about the degree of emphasis to be given contact work, and whether more reporting is needed in order to develop a better concept of what is going on in the world; whether it is sufficient for the Embassies to develop these insights or whether it is necessary for Washington to have them as well. (See attachment).

Among ideas he has under consideration are a letter to new Ambassadors to call their attention to youth as a political factor; a task force to update the U.S. interest in students and youth abroad and to make recommendations to the new Administration; a training seminar for USG personnel; and the possibility of earmarking certain funds for U.S. purposes.

Mr. Sober said he considered the various objectives suggested as all necessary and consistent with each other. We need information that will tip us off to important changes in a country. As to influence, it hangs largely on how youth abroad read U.S. policies; despite our efforts to have our aims understood, there is a fundamental difference of view about the validity of American activities. This means there is a basic problem we cannot do much about. Nevertheless, it is important to give periodic re-emphasis to the importance of contact with youth, to analysis and reporting of their concerns, and to jacking up the Ambassadors who tend to overlook its importance.

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4 May–June 1968.
5 Summer and fall of 1968, culminating right before the Summer Olympics held in Mexico City.
6 Attached but not printed is the 2-page meeting agenda.
Mr. Walkinshaw suggested that it is necessary for us, relying largely on young officers in our Missions, to try to understand the young people who are against the establishment, to observe what is going on, express concern and establish rapport with them. Out of this may come a continuing dialogue. He said the State Department needs more analytical reporting on the changing attitudes and values of youth abroad.

Mr. Lyman underscored the importance of understanding youth as distinct from any attempt to influence them. We must come to know what youth is concerned about; then, what may result is an influence on our own policy. The kind of analysis and reporting that comes from the field—on attitudes and emotions, frustrations and pressures, all in the context of the particular economic changes underway in a given country—is of extreme importance. To get such reporting, it is necessary to have contacts with the youth in question. From there, Mr. Lyman suggested, we can make decisions on policy—changing ours or trying to change theirs.

The Chairman commended the existing instructions in the political affairs volume of the Foreign Affairs Manual, covering what is expected of the field in regard to youth and young leaders. However, he pointed out that they place less emphasis on gaining an insight into current attitudes than on working with future leaders with a view to the long run. Good instructions notwithstanding, it was suggested, there remains the bureaucratic problem of how to get the Ambassador and the Mission to do what they are supposed to do.

Mr. Beaudry drew a distinction between cultivating future leaders in areas such as political parties or labor movements, where so-called youth may be as old as 45 and where comers generally are known to our Embassies, and in the more amorphous student groups. The USG must consider whether youth are likely to affect the attitudes and policies of their own governments. We can have little influence on student unrest in Europe, but political reporting on students is important nonetheless. For the necessary contact work, he said, Embassies are virtually limited to their officers under 30.

Mr. Ryan said USIA has no illusions as to what is possible in the way of influencing people. That Agency’s major goal is to provide information. Reporting that shows why youth are unhappy with policies of the U.S. or of their own country is particularly helpful to USIA. We need to consider such attitudes when we make foreign policy, but to get this reporting, it is necessary to keep pressure on the Ambassador.

Mr. Pedersen asked committee members how much attention their bureaus and agencies and the Embassies give to youth and students as a political force.

AF: Mr. Quimby reported his bureau has a high degree of awareness of the problem. He suggested that we assign young officers to
those countries where youth are evidently a major factor, instead of relying on youth committees.

ARA: Mr. Bernhart said that ARA officers have reason to be well aware of student problems. Nevertheless, Embassy performance has been spotty, and this is largely a reflection of the interest or lack of interest of the Ambassador. The ARA Bureau has been reorganized and a State-AID office of social and civic development has been set up to include youth. Some new and interesting programs are underway.

EA: Mr. Walkinshaw said his Bureau is definitely aware of the importance of youth, but the Embassies have an uneven record. When he reviewed EA policy assessment papers for the past two years, he found not one had mentioned youth.

EUR: Mr. Beaudry said it is necessary to remember that radical youth are a minority; he thinks the more accessible elements should be provided with USIA’s factual information to counter distortions resulting partly from hostile propaganda. The generation gap that divides those who went through World War II and those who didn’t is becoming apparent now in terms of concern about NATO and security. He feels we should support our friends among the local leaders who are under attack by youth.

NEA: Mr. Sober said the limited access that prevails in a number of countries puts the utility of a youth committee in question there. In others, it may be a good time to encourage a renewed effort, now that the bureau is changing a number of Ambassadors.

CU: Mr. Batson suggested that the best possible youth program would be an increased CU student exchange, particularly where it is operated as a bi-national program. Mr. Cross pointed out that while CU exchanges are an important resource, some of the youth who really count—in Ecuador, for example—would not come to the US on a CU grant.

PC: Mr. Curtis said the Peace Corps sees communication and influence as a two-way process rather than a means to direct behavior. What is important is the mechanism that permits communication to go on.

The Chairman asked whether the unequaled insights into attitudes acquired by Volunteers abroad were funneled back to USG policy makers so that they might have an impact on this government. Mr. Curtis explained that the departing Volunteer is debriefed abroad by two PC staffers whose report is sent to the Peace Corps in Washington. The Chairman, upon learning that these reports are not shared with the State Department, suggested this was an area that might be examined. Mr. Curtis and Mr. Quimby warned that this might be mistaken for intelligence work and imperil Peace Corps operations and recruit-
ment. Mr. Pedersen said the question is one of getting better guidelines for U.S. policies; he thought the Volunteers might well want to have such an influence on government policy.

USIA: Mr. Ryan said USIA has always looked on youth as a major target. In Latin America, where there are nineteen student affairs grantees, programs are extensive. Elsewhere, the Voice of America has just developed a Saturday night “rock” music program for Poland; exchanges in Eastern Europe and the American Cultural Center in Paris focus on youth. A good deal of the agency’s research is directed at youth. But the world-wide operation has been affected by the BALPA cutbacks in young officers.7

AID: Mr. Farrar said AID programs bring that agency into contact with a wide variety of youth. However, AID has no money or programs for youth as such, and country assistance plans normally do not specify youth as a category for attention. He said AID people often have been irritated by repeated appeals in the name of the youth program for AID money to do something for which CU lacks funds.

A/IT: Mr. Matteson called AID’s international training program one of the big missed bets in U.S. foreign policy. Half of the several thousand participants brought here annually under the program are under 30 or 35. In attempting to influence their attitudes toward change and modernization, we indirectly affect their attitude toward the U.S.

DOD: Mr. Dunlap said that DOD has a generally good awareness of the political importance of youth, if “youth” can be said to encompass something more than those under 30. Awareness is good also throughout the military system. The Defense Department has come a long way since 1964: The $42 million-a-year program to train foreign military is now augmented by a $3-to-4 million “information program” that grew out of an effort by the IAYC five years ago. The information program carries a wide range of objectives and brings foreign trainees into touch with American labor leaders, press, the racial situation, etc. Mr. Dunlap said he intends to shift more money to these efforts in coming months and years. He finds the key to success lies with the Ambassador: If he is enthusiastic, then the whole process is focused on bringing potential future leaders rather than just on training in firing a gun or giving a trip to a friend.

7 In an attempt to deal with the overseas balance of payments problem, in 1968 President Johnson directed the reduction of the number of U.S. personnel overseas under the jurisdiction of U.S. diplomatic mission (with the exception of Vietnam) by 10 percent.
NEW INITIATIVES FOR VIET-NAM

Flexibility marks President Nixon’s May 14 statement of important new initiatives for peace in Viet-Nam. So does firmness in support of South Vietnamese self-determination.

The President’s statement is the most comprehensive definition so far of American peace aims. It is also the most flexible program of ways to achieve Vietnamese peace that has yet been proposed.

Only one of the principles underlying that program is immutable: That the U.S. will not compromise on the right of self-determination for the South Vietnamese people, and will stay the course until that right is realized.

In the wake of Mr. Nixon’s major policy statement, U.S. officials emphasize these new initiatives:

—Provision for a peace achieved either by a formal negotiated settlement or by an informal understanding. This is a new flexibility.

—Provision for a simultaneous start of mutual foreign troop withdrawals from South Viet-Nam, for agreement on a mutually acceptable timetable, and for rapid accomplishment. This would extend to withdrawal of North Vietnamese forces from Cambodia and Laos too. It would effectively end hostilities.

—Provision for North Viet-Nam to remove its forces from the south without having to admit that they are there now.

—Provision for U.S. participation in multilateral talks on political matters, if South Viet-Nam invites this.

—Provision for a mutually acceptable supervisory body to verify withdrawals and cease-fire arrangements.

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2 In a May 14 address to the nation, broadcast on radio and television networks at 10 p.m., the President discussed the eight points of the settlement U.S. negotiators would seek in Paris, one emphasizing mutual withdrawal of non-South Vietnamese forces to designated locations over a period of 12 months. For the text of the address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 369–375. For additional information about the speech, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Document 68. For additional information about Nixon’s discussion of the settlement before a joint meeting of the National Security Council and the Cabinet on May 15, see ibid., vol. I. Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 25.
U.S. officials point out that these proposals, like the entire statement itself, were made after continuing and full consultation with South Vietnamese President Thieu.

The American officials also underscore:
—The extreme flexibility of the President’s realistic and reasonable proposals of a framework for serious negotiations.
—The willingness of the Nixon Administration to hear and discuss counterproposals from any of the parties at the Paris talks.

The tone of Mr. Nixon’s policy statement, and the flexibility of his peace proposals, are evidence of sincere U.S. determination to bring about a mutually acceptable settlement of the Viet-Nam war. It is emphatically not to be interpreted as a sign of weakness—any lessening of U.S. firmness in support of South Vietnamese self-determination.

It would be tragic for the North Vietnamese government to believe that time is on its side—that prolongation of hostilities, or disagreement over Viet-Nam within the United States, will force the U.S. to retreat. That error of judgment could only bring more suffering and bloodshed to the people of Viet-Nam in place of the peace that they desire. In President Nixon’s words: “If the needless suffering continues, this would affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay.”

Mr. Nixon’s studied proposals allow all sides considerable room for accommodation. What the U.S. and its allies seek is not a paper peace but a peace that is a fact. That real peace is within range of the many possibilities encompassed in President Nixon’s comprehensive and flexible proposals. It is now up to the other side to decide what kind of negotiations they prefer to conduct.

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3 The complete sentence reads: “I must also make clear, in all candor, that if the needless suffering continues, this will affect other decisions. Nobody has anything to gain by delay.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 374)
22. Editorial Note

On May 19, 1969, the United States Advisory Commission on Information released its 24th report, covering the calendar year of 1968, and later submitted the report to both the House of Representatives and the Senate under a transmittal letter dated July 1, 1969. The members of the Commission at the time of the report’s release were Chairman Frank Stanton, Sigurd S. Larmon, M.S. Novik, Palmer Hoyt, and Thomas Vail. In the foreword of the report, the members stressed that the Commission, established in 1948 to “watch over a communications dialogue with the rest of the world,” had “arrived simultaneously at its majority and an inescapable conclusion: Our national commitment is incomplete.” Noting the disparity in funding between U.S. information activities and defense and international affairs programs, the Commission asserted:

“Our concern is a matter of record. There are four channels through which a nation may conduct its foreign affairs. The first is diplomacy. The second is trade. The third is communication. The fourth is force. Three are complementary, the last is alternative. Indeed, the last alternative. It is indicative of the disordered priorities of our time that 95 percent of our foreign affairs moneys are devoted to the channel that the other 5 percent is dedicated to avoid.’

“But the essential problem is not in dollars. It is in direction.

“Which way best leads from where we are to where we want the world to be?

“How are the two hundred million of us to convince the thirty-three hundred million of them that we are on the right path, and that it is wide enough for all to travel.

“Eventually, if not now, it must be through knowing each other, then trusting each other.

“And if eventually, why not now?

“That is the petition of the 24th Report.”


In the first paragraph of the body of the report, the Commission assessed the United States’ global standing. It concluded: “The world’s curiosity about the United States—about its policies and intentions, its actions and capabilities—has increased in proportion to the growth of America’s power and influence. The world’s opinion about the United States has fluctuated measurably. In recent years, the trend has been...
The Commission noted that a number of opportunities “remain unexploited” and that “some past gains must be consolidated,” linking these statements to nine areas for improvement regarding the United States Information Agency (USIA): research, Voice of America (VOA) broadcasting, United States Information Service (USIS) libraries and information centers, cultural and educational exchanges, communications techniques, the connection of private resources to the U.S. communications program, foreign journalists and news organizations, representation allowances, and the career corps for Foreign Service Information Officers (FSIOs). (Ibid., pages 5–6) The Commission ended the report, stating:

“One basic theme is common to this and the 23 earlier reports prepared by this Commission for the Congress and the President: that America’s foreign policy must be strengthened by the infusion of psychological or communications factors. This can occur only if USIA is permitted to play a role where the action is—in the National Security Council, with the Secretary of State, with Ambassadors abroad, and wherever feasible in the Cabinet. The past 20 years have seen tortured, though discernible, progress toward that end. It is our hope that the reluctance of the past will be overcome by the enthusiastic endorsement of the future.” (Ibid., page 9)

The Commission members included an afterword in the 24th Report, referencing a recommendation made in the previous year’s report regarding a “major review,” predicated on 11 questions, of USIA and “the governmental context in which it operates.” Such questions, the Committee conceded, “are still worth asking:

“Is the United States Information Agency to be but an agent of American ‘propaganda’?

“Should it be more than an arm of foreign policy?

“Are information, educational and cultural objectives compatible within one agency?

“Were they consolidated outside of the Department of State, should that body have Cabinet rank?

“Or should the reins be drawn together within a restructured Department of State?

“Does the responsibility of those who create the foreign policy of the United States go beyond its declaration?

“Should they have charge of its promulgation as well?

“Should USIA have a hand in information dispersal for Government agencies beyond the Department of State?

“Should it play a role in the influence of policy as well as in its execution?

“Should it help support those private organizations whose overseas activities had been subsidized covertly in the past by the federal government and whose future funding is under study by a committee chaired by the Secretary of State?”
“Do we really intend that USIA work toward ‘mutual understanding’; is it to help us understand them as well as to help them understand us?

“As we repeat the questions, so also do we repeat the hope that they will be answered.” (Ibid., pages 10–11)


23. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis) to the President’s Counsel (Ehrlichman), the President’s Assistant (Haldeman), the President’s Assistant (Harlow), and the President’s Special Assistant (Keogh)

Washington, May 20, 1969

I am enclosing copies of an update of a report on the President’s overseas image.\(^2\) You may recall we did an earlier one in December which focused mainly on the reaction to the election.\(^3\)

The new study traces the changes in foreign concepts of the President since the inauguration,\(^4\) but prior to the Vietnamese speech.\(^5\) It is based on press, television and radio comment.

The following trends are discernible:

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 1, INF 13 Foreign Media Reactions. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Shakespeare and Ryan.

\(^2\) Attached but not printed is a May 16 report entitled “Foreign Media Comment on President Nixon, His Policies and Actions.”

\(^3\) Not found.


\(^5\) See footnote 2, Document 21.
The European tour—widely hailed as a success—produced a significant increase in confidence in the President’s leadership and authority.\(^6\)

Many see a new flexibility in U.S. foreign policy and believe the President is actively seeking peace abroad and fostering a more serene political atmosphere domestically.

The President’s moderation—especially his restraint in handling the EC–121 incident\(^7\)—has won him the growing respect and admiration of many elements in the free world and led to a fading of his earlier image as a “hard-liner.”

Widespread approval of the President’s style is, however, tempered by growing concern over the pace of policy pronouncements and by a feeling that many critical tests over possible future actions lie ahead.

**Henry Loomis**\(^8\)

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\(^8\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
24. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Oleksiw) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)\(^1\)

Washington, June 3, 1969

SUBJECT

Changes in Midway Meeting\(^2\) Psychological Objectives

Following is a slightly revised version of the guidelines I listed in my June 2 memo (attached).\(^3\) These changes were suggested by Ambassador Sullivan, Marshall Green’s Deputy for Viet-Nam Affairs.

Thus modified, Agency objectives for the Midway Meeting are to strengthen the public image of:

1. Mutual confidence between Washington and Saigon.
2. Rapport achieved between Presidents Nixon and Thieu as Chiefs of State.
3. Basic agreement on essential proposals for Paris negotiations.
4. Competence, confidence and ability of South Viet-Nam to assume increasing responsibilities:
   a. GVN military capabilities are improved and still improving;
   b. Political cohesion in the GVN now strong enough to permit GVN flexible political approach to the NLF.
5. US–GVN agreement that Hanoi must respond positively to allied call for mutual military withdrawals.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 3, PSY—Psychological Operations. Confidential. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

\(^2\) Reference is to the President’s talks with Thieu, scheduled to take place on Midway Island June 8. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Documents 79–81.

\(^3\) Attached but not printed.
25. Memorandum From the Office of Policy and Plans, Apollo 11 Operations Center, United States Information Agency to the Director (Shakespeare)\(^1\)

Washington, June 6, 1969

SUBJECT

Weekly Report—June 6, 1969

*Status of Agency Projects.* The Science Advisor has briefed the NASA and USIA officers who will operate the European Apollo News Center, which will open in Paris on June 13. He also informed interested Department of State officials of Agency plans in support of Apollo 11, who seemed impressed by the magnitude of the effort.

Field posts were given additional guidelines urging that the posts respect the serious, scientific nature of the Apollo 11 program; to recognize that the mission could be postponed, aborted or fail, and not to assume its success until the astronauts were safely back and the mission completed; encouraging them to concentrate during these pre-launch weeks on explaining what the moon landing is about and on enabling the largest number of people possible to watch the event by community TV viewing arrangements. They were informed of the dates on which various media products will be shipped from Washington and given a detailed time schedule sequence of events of the Apollo 11 mission itself, plus the schedule of television newscasts from the moon.

The media have assigned top priority to Apollo 11 projects.

IPS has completed editorial work on a two-page photo insert of Apollo 10 pictures for the *Man on the Moon* pamphlet and is preparing a leaflet with excerpts from articles by Archibald McLeish, Pearl Buck and John Dos Passos on the human significance of lunar exploration for insertion in various Agency and other publications. The Dos Passos article will also be distributed for press placement. IPS is arranging to

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Evaluation, Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1969–1978, Entry P–119, INF Apollo Project 1969. No classification marking. Bardos initialed the “from” line of the memorandum. Ryan sent a copy of the memorandum to all USIA agency heads and USIS posts under a June 6 covering memorandum, indicating that the memorandum was the “first in a series of special weekly reports” concerning USIA’s Apollo 11 coverage. Ryan also noted that USIA had established an Apollo 11 Operations Center to coordinate the USIA effort. Earlier, in a June 2 memorandum to all elements, Loomis stated that Shakespeare had “assigned the highest priority to the Agency’s coverage and support of the Apollo-11 moon landing project” and accordingly, both the Operations Center and an intra-agency Apollo 11 task force had been established effective June 2. (Ibid.)
reprint or adapt three NASA pamphlets now in preparation for use after splashdown.

VOA reports that its give-away offer, made in English language broadcasts only, has already brought a flood of 14,000 letters. Coverage plans for the Apollo 11 mission are the most extensive ever attempted by VOA. They include the use of Astronaut Walter Schirra as a commentator at Houston—a role Schirra has tentatively accepted.

IMV is on schedule with the production of the Frank Borman film videotaped in Houston last month which is for pre-launch television distribution. The English version has been approved, the Spanish, Arabic, Portuguese, and French versions are at Technicolor Laboratories in California, and all prints will be shipped late this month. NASA has promised to deliver to IMV today the 16mm film on Apollo 10, which covers both that mission and the impending Apollo 11. Revisions for Agency use will be made immediately, and several of the language versions should be in the hands of posts prior to the Apollo 11 launch. Work has begun on a feature-length 65mm film on Apollo 11, scheduled for completion in December.

ICS is shipping the large number of exhibit items ordered for posts and developing a new design for an Apollo 11 button. It expects to design a walk-through exhibit based on NASA material (recently excerpted in Look) juxtaposing passages and illustrations from Jules Verne’s Journey Around the Moon with actual Apollo 8 photographs.

Post Activities. SOVEXPORTFILM has asked our Moscow Embassy to screen the Apollo 9 film with a view to distributing it in the Soviet Union.

USIS Seoul and Manila are working on ambitious plans to enable masses of people to view the Apollo 11 mission on screens set up in public squares.

USIS Caracas has proposed an imaginative scheme for the use of military aircraft to speed videotapes and kinescopes of the mission from ground stations to nearby countries which do not have them. We are looking into whether this would be compatible with our policy of not competing with American commercial networks.

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2 Apollo 10, commanded by Thomas P. Stafford, launched on May 18 and returned to Earth on May 26.
3 Presumably reference to Verne’s Around the Moon, published in 1870, the sequel to From Earth to the Moon (1865).
4 Apollo 8, commanded by Frank Borman, launched on December 21, 1968. It was the first manned spacecraft to leave the Earth’s orbit and orbit around the moon.
5 Apollo 9, commanded by James McDivitt, launched on March 3, 1969, and returned to Earth on March 12.
USIS Paris has issued a special “space” issue of its *Informations et Documents* for the Air Show. One of its captions describes the LEM on the moon as seen “by earthlight” (“au clair de la Terre”).

*The Foreign Impact of Apollo Still Growing.* A typical message from USIS Santiago, Chile, reports that Apollo 10 generated more TV coverage than any other single event in the history of Chilean television; and radio made heavy use of USIS and VOA material.

Several of the enthusiastic comments on Apollo 10 in the foreign press stressed the absence of American gloating over their space victory. The London *Sunday Telegraph*, for example, commented that the mission was “not only a triumph of the American scientists, but also a strong dose of the American way of life”. Still, the paper continued, “we have been spared any trace of propaganda”.

More media correspondents from abroad have asked for NASA accreditation to cover the Apollo 11 launch than ever before, and they will be joined at the Cape by a very large number of VIPs. The latter includes 150 very prominent Belgians from all walks of life. We are trying to respond to USIS posts’ requests for facilitative assistance but have had to warn the field that hotel reservations are already impossible to obtain within convenient distance of the Cape.

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26. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, June 30, 1969

SUBJECT
Soviet Jamming of the Voice of America and our Response

This is in response to your request through Alex Butterfield of June 23 which asked for a brief report of U.S. reactions to increased Soviet jamming of Voice of America broadcasts.²

Soviet jamming of Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts, which had been a fixture of the Cold War scene, ceased abruptly on June 19, 1963. For just over five years the VOA reached Soviet audiences with minimal interference. Then on August 21, 1968, at the time of the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia,³ the Soviets resumed systematic jamming which has continued up to the present.

It is difficult to prove categorically that Soviet electronic interference “recently intensified,” in part because of the practical impossibility of accurately measuring reception of VOA programs in all parts of the USSR, and in part because of the use of differing types of jamming.

At least for the area of Moscow, where—because of the presence of the American Embassy—we are able to get regular reports on VOA reception, the Soviet jamming effort appears to have become less selective and more continuous in recent months. A rough estimate would be that 80–85% of the 13 hours per day of VOA programs beamed to

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¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 306, Agency Files, Voice of America. Confidential. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. An unknown hand wrote “ret 7/2” below the stamped notation. Another unknown hand wrote “AH—NOTE PAGE 3” at the top of the memorandum. Haig sent a copy of the memorandum to Sonnenfeldt under a July 3 memorandum, which read: “Attached is a copy of the memorandum you prepared for the President dealing with Soviet jamming activities. Please destroy this as I am sure Henry would be upset if he thought it had been sent out of the office. Unfortunately we have a monkey which we must be prepared to deal with. Please analyze the President’s instruction and see if we can develop an appropriate plan which would be responsive to it, if only in part, and prepare a memorandum for the President for approval. As you know, this is a Pandora’s box which could work to our disadvantage. On the other hand, if we were to convey the President’s decision directly to State it would probably leak with serious damage to the President. Please scratch your noggin on this one and give me your ideas.” (Ibid.)

² In a June 23 memorandum to Kissinger, Butterfield wrote: “In the June 18 ‘Staff and Department Brief’ the President read of the Soviet Union’s recently intensified jamming efforts directed at Voice of America broadcasts. He would like a short report from you concerning the reaction on our part.” (Ibid.)

the Moscow area (central European Russia) are now subject to a significant level of purposeful interference.

It is harder to give an estimate for outlying areas, where U.S. travel is relatively less frequent, and travel by technical personnel capable of making accurate measurements is quite rare. But certainly there is less jamming in peripheral areas than in and around Moscow. For some reason, for example, we know of no attempt to block VOA programs in the Baltic languages (Lithuanian, Latvian, and Estonian). However, all other non-Russian broadcasts to the USSR have been targets for jamming along with our Russian programming.

The jamming has taken various forms. Our programming in the 25 meter band and above is generally blocked by superimposition of a strong local Soviet station (Radio “Mayak,” which means “beacon”), broadcasting light popular music, commentary, and news. Below the 25 meter band, VOA broadcasts are generally subject to the traditional, harshly unpleasant electronic buzz of the jammer.

We made an early diplomatic protest, but have taken no action since, in large part because we have expected that the jamming would be stopped after the reconsolidation of the Soviet position in Czechoslovakia. On September 19, 1968, roughly one month after jamming was resumed, then Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Charles Bohlen gave Ambassador Dobrynin an aide-memoire protesting the Soviet interference as a violation of the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) Convention of 1965.4 On October 9, 1968 the Soviet Embassy delivered a note to the State Department categorically rejecting our protest.

Since then various American officials have made informal protests to their Soviet counterparts on the jamming question both here and in Moscow, but no further formal action has been taken. As recently as June 18 the Assistant Director of USIA for Soviet Union and Eastern Europe raised the matter in a conversation with the Soviet Press Counselor, Soviet Cultural Counselor, and the Managing Editor of the magazine Soviet Life.5 The Soviets gave evidence of being embarrassed by

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5 Reference is to the bi-monthly magazine of Soviet culture and history, which began publication in the 1950s.
the jamming and reacted defensively; one muttered that “this sort of thing reflects special circumstances.” The USIA officer got the impression that the time might be ripe for a new diplomatic démarche on the subject.

We have other options as well. We might raise the Soviet jamming formally through ITU channels, but the practical effect would probably be only to increase publicity. Much the same could be said of the suggestion of bringing the matter to the UN.

Our ultimate—and I think undesirable—option would be to retaliate in kind by reactivating a powerful long wave VOA transmitter near Munich, Germany, which when used, effectively blocks out Moscow Radio broadcasts to Eastern Europe. Our use of this transmitter caused the Soviets to protest through the ITU several years ago and we ceased operations, but the equipment is still in place.

My personal opinion is that the jamming has probably outlasted its usefulness even in Soviet eyes, but once this sort of thing is set in motion, it is difficult bureaucratically to stop it, unless the order comes from the very top. The jamming is of course indefensible and contradicts the Soviet assertion that they favor increased exchanges of information. I think that if we make real progress on preparations for SALT, we should point out the incompatibility of their continued jamming with U.S.-Soviet cooperation on disarmament.6

6 In the margin below this paragraph, the President wrote: “K Our response has been typically much too soft—I want a protest filed—strong, soon, & hard. RN.”
Washington, July 12, 1969

SUBJECT

Protest on Soviet Jamming of Voice of America

You recently asked for a stiffer US response to the persistent—and, in the past two months, increasing—Soviet jamming of the Voice of America (VOA) broadcasts beamed to the USSR.\(^2\)

Since my previous report to you on this subject, I have noted that Ambassador Beam—on State Department instruction—also made the point that Soviet jamming of VOA was inconsistent with the expressed desire of both countries for a freer flow of information in his initial conversation in Moscow with Premier Kosygin on April 22 this year.\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 306, Agency Files, Voice of America. Confidential; Nodis. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it. An unknown hand wrote “ret 7/16” below the stamped notation. Sonnenfeldt sent a copy of the memorandum to Kissinger under a July 10 memorandum requesting that Kissinger sign the memorandum to the President. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) See Document 26 and footnote 6 thereto.

SUBJECT
Your Meeting with Frank Shakespeare—July 17, 4:00 p.m.\(^2\)

At 4:00 p.m. on Thursday, July 17, you have agreed to receive USIA Director Frank Shakespeare for a report on his recent trip to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Mr. Shakespeare visited both Leningrad and Moscow while in the USSR. In Leningrad on July 1 he officially opened the new American exhibit "Education USA,"\(^3\) and in Moscow he consulted with Ambassador Beam and other American Embassy officers on the state of our exchanges program with the Soviet Union. Although he neither requested nor was granted any appointments with Soviet officials, Mr. Shakespeare was very hospitably received on arrival at Moscow Airport by representatives of Soviet organizations dealing with cultural affairs, and was seen off on departure as well.

Mr. Shakespeare’s further travels took him to Warsaw and Bucharest. In both cities he was most cordially received and had a number of lengthy discussions with local officials. Mr. Shakespeare’s final stop was in Vienna, where he headed a conference of USIS officers dealing with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

As Mr. Shakespeare presents his report, you may wish to:
—seek his estimate of the climate for the negotiations this fall with the Soviets on the next two-year renewal (1970–71) of the US–USSR cultural exchange program;

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. Confidential. Sent for information. All brackets are in the original. A stamped notation indicates that the President saw it. An unknown hand wrote "ret 7/17" below the stamped notation. Sonnenfeldt sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a July 16 covering memorandum, recommending that Kissinger sign the attached memorandum. Sonnenfeldt added: "(I would be interested in sitting in on this one, if it were feasible.)"

\(^2\) According to the President’s Daily Diary, the President met with Shakespeare in the White House Oval Office from 4:25 until 4:50 p.m. Kissinger attended the meeting from 4:25 until 4:30 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files) No record of the meeting has been found.

\(^3\) On April 8, Shakespeare announced that the arrangements for the "Education U.S.A." exhibit were being finalized. The Washington Post reported that the exhibit "will employ Russian-speaking American guides, interesting visual teaching aides, educational games, closed circuit television and a sampling of library materials, films and records." ("Soviet Tour Arranged for U.S. Exhibit," April 9, 1969, p. A15)
—note the great success enjoyed by Embassy Warsaw recently in attracting huge crowds of interested Poles with Apollo program films and exhibits, and ask whether this surge of USIS activity has caused any misgivings among Polish officialdom;

—inquire whether, as a result of his talks in Bucharest, Mr. Shakespeare feels the Romanians are sincerely interested in trying to conclude an agreement for the opening of cultural centers separate from embassies in our respective countries in time for your visit on August 2–3; 4

[For your background, our plans envisage a center including a reading room/library, English teaching laboratory, and a lecture facility which could possibly also serve as a concert and film auditorium. Ours would be in Bucharest and the Romanians’ would be in New York. These negotiations have gone on for some time, but there is evidence that we are close to agreement, and that the Romanians would not be averse to announcing final plans during your visit to Bucharest.]

—suggest that you would be pleased to see such progress in improving our day-to-day relations with the Romanians, but do not want any pressure exerted on the Romanians in connection with your visit; you are quite willing to wait for results through the normal course of negotiations;

—ask Mr. Shakespeare whether he discussed any subjects of political interest apart from the cultural and exchanges field;

[For your background, I understand that—particularly in Warsaw—Mr. Shakespeare found local officials eager for political discussions, and especially interested in our current negotiations on Vietnam and attempts to cool the Arab-Israeli confrontation in the Middle East.]

—inquire whether Mr. Shakespeare heard any comments and/or criticisms in Eastern Europe concerning your plans to visit Bucharest; and ask how USIA plans to exploit your trip in its Eastern European programs.

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The full impact of the Apollo 11 mission around the world will not be apparent until well after the splashdown. But it is already safe to say that no past event has been seen on television or followed by radio by so large a proportion of humanity. Partly, as a result of this, partly because of the magnitude of the event itself, no comparable number of human beings has ever had as deep a sense of participation in a news story or as deep a feeling of identification with two men as they did with Neil Armstrong and “Buzz” Aldrin.

Of the currently estimated total television audience of 650 million which watched the moon walk as it happened, 500 million were abroad, 320 million in Western and Eastern Europe, 75 million in Latin America, and most of the rest in Japan and elsewhere in Asia. The Japanese audience at the time of the moon walk was estimated at 70 to 80 million. In Italy, some 40 million watched the telecast. According to our present information, of the countries of Western or Eastern Europe, only the Soviet Union, East Germany, and Iceland failed to relay the Eurovision coverage of this event. Tape coverage was, however, included in regular Soviet TV newscasts. Elsewhere in the world, all countries which had the technical capability of telecasting Apollo 11 live did so. Thanks to last-minute arrangements by NASA and COMSAT, this included all Latin American countries, with the exception of Paraguay, Ecuador, and Cuba. (Venezuela and Colombia sought USIA help and went to great expense themselves to lease a portable ground station for live TV coverage of Apollo 11.) In Africa, Moroccan, Tunisian, and Libyan television were part of the worldwide circuit. Finally, television stations in Asia—Japan, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Korea—covered the event simultaneously and as fully as it was covered anywhere. All other television stations around the world (outside Communist China, Russia, and East Germany) may be assumed to be carrying taped or filmed reports as fast as they can get them.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 1, INF–13 Foreign Media Reaction. No classification marking. An unknown hand wrote “7/22/69” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Loomis also initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 The Apollo 11 astronauts—Aldrin, Armstrong, and Collins—departed Earth aboard the Apollo spacecraft on July 16 at 9:32 a.m. Eastern Daylight Time. Armstrong became the first human to walk on the Moon on July 20 and was later joined by Aldrin; Collins remained in the command module. The crew splashed down in the Pacific Ocean on July 24.
The Voice of America, relayed by both the domestic and external services of the BBC, as well as by All-India Radio and at least 22 other national networks around the world and by well over 1400 individual radio stations in Latin America, calculates its audience during the moon landing and walk to have been over 500 million. Jamming of Russian language broadcasts in the Soviet Union continued uninterrupted but English transmissions to the USSR and two channels in Mandarin beamed to Red China were clear.

Well over 800 foreign correspondents and media men covered the mission from Cape Kennedy and the Houston Manned Space Center in a total of 33 languages. The Japanese, 120 strong, represented the largest single national contingent. There were 200 media representatives from Latin America, and some 300 from Europe.

Perhaps more important than all these figures has been the depth and seriousness of coverage in many countries. Most radio and TV stations abroad prepared their audiences for the Apollo 11 mission for weeks, by broadcasting documentaries on past space exploits, interviews with experts, and detailed explanations of the mission plan. Newspapers in many countries have devoted a page a day to the preparations for the moon landing mission, and there have been impressive special space issues of mass publication periodicals in Italy and elsewhere. They have generally drawn the bulk of their source material from our own USIA output.

As for comment on the mission, the reactions flowing in indicate that the impact was great. Apart from the Communist Chinese press in Hong Kong (and presumably in Mainland China itself)—which speaks of this exploit as the last gasp of American imperialism—reporting has been positive and enthusiastic, with of course an occasional negative comment. The Arab world, the UAR included, joined in the general mood of euphoria. Communist papers in the West, like L’Humanité in France and Unità in Italy, echoed the chorus of approval resounding around them, only gently expressing their preference for the Soviet approach of unmanned space probes. Some papers in both the industrialised and underdeveloped world (e.g., the Times of London and Addis Reporter in Ethiopia) mentioned the contrast between the billions spent for space exploration and lack of success in dealing with urgent problems facing humanity here on Earth—but many (e.g., Rheinische Post in Germany and Ittefan in Pakistan) answered such criticism by noting that this great undertaking of man does not hinder human progress, but in the long run helps humanity marshal its talents and resources in solving age-old problems. Most papers were simply lost in awe on this “day in our history, the like of which none of us has ever seen or will live to see again” (Daily Mail). They saw “the feat of all time . . . accomplished” (Figaro). They commented that “the
consequences of this first step are beyond imagining” (*Die Welt*). They noted that “Man knew he would conquer (space) not for the sake of conquest, not for self, but for freedom of spirit and humanity.” (*Working People’s Daily, Burma*)

Evidence of the profound impact of the moon landing from all corners of the world is copious and often moving. It ranges from the Pope’s hailing the astronauts as “conquerors of the moon” and Prime Minister Wilson’s stating his profound admiration for them, to the Pakistani newspaperman’s expressing gratitude that he belongs to the generation which has witnessed an event of this magnitude. Babies were named after Apollo in Lebanon and Scotland, a public bus in downtown Dar es Salaam. An estimated 150,000 watched the moon walk on a giant television screen in a public square in Seoul, and crowds trying to press into Apollo exhibits at the American Embassy in Warsaw, USIS Lome (Togo) and USIS Addis Ababa got temporarily out of control. People danced in the streets of Santiago (Chile), and the President of Venezuela,* after watching the moon walk in the company of his cabinet through a good part of the night, made an impromptu address to his nation when the astronauts safely boarded the “Eagle” again. In spite of the modest coverage of the flight by Soviet media, Americans living there were congratulated by Russian friends and even by chance acquaintances. The Moscow Embassy received congratulatory telegrams, as well as a number of telephone calls inquiring about the progress of the mission. The President of Chile* called on Ambassador Korry to say how pleased he was. He, as well as a number of other chiefs of state, declared July 21 a national holiday. School children in Bavaria and students in Mexico were excused from classes that day. Many world capitals were deserted at the time of the launch or during other daytime events, as people stayed near their television sets. Church bells rang out and fire sirens screamed to announce the moon landing in various Latin American cities. Laplanders followed the flight on their transistor radios while pasturing their reindeer.

This is, of course, a preliminary report. We are engaged in an attempt to judge the effect of the Apollo 11 story on foreign audiences in a more systematic way by a comparative opinion survey in selected countries before and after the mission. The results of this survey will be available in about four weeks.

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3 Caldera.
4 Reference is to the lunar module.
5 Frei.
Attached is a summary of foreign media reaction, dated July 21, relating to the moon landing. Our Media Reaction Unit will continue to follow and report on this subject.

Frank Shakespeare

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6 Not attached.
7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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30. Circular Message From the United States Information Agency to the Embassy in Thailand

USIA–12811 Washington, August 2, 1969

Following guidance received from Presidential party and given to USIA media:

1. The Nixon Administration intends this to be an era of negotiations in which American Foreign Policy will not be based on the assumption of intrinsic hostility, unless such hostility is demonstrated by specific action.

2. Peace in Asia—which is a precondition to peace in the world—cannot result primarily from American conceptions but has to involve Asian initiatives and regional and sub-regional arrangements that have an Asian origin.

3. The United States would be prepared to support such regional Arrangements—especially in the economic field—if American assistance were requested and, in the U.S. view required.

Shakespeare

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31. **Letter From the Assistant Director, East Asia and the Pacific, United States Information Agency (Oleksiw) to all USIA Public Affairs Officers**

Washington, August 5, 1969

Dear PAO:

USIS/Manila’s Jack Crockett has given us an excellent, almost verbatim report of the PAO Conference which will be very helpful to us in future planning. Since it is over sixty pages long, we are sending you a summary of the main points discussed.

If this summary stimulates further discussion at your post of some of the main issues we faced at Manila, it will have served its main purpose. We have not attempted here to underline points of particular favor here in the Agency. Rather, we have tried to reflect as accurately as possible the gist of our remarks and the trends in the participants’ thinking.

Some of these opinions—and our own policy decisions—will be incorporated in the 1969 Area Plan and possibly in other communications from IAF.

I regret that various splashdowns have prevented us from getting this to you sooner.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Dan Oleksiw

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, Plans and Operational Policy Staff, Office of Planning Officer, Subject Files, Entry P–207, Box 2, INF 3 PAO Conference. Unclassified; Official-Informal. The letter is PAO Letter #15.

2 Oleksiw signed “Dan” above this typed signature.
USIA EAST AND PACIFIC PAO CONFERENCE
Manila, May 9–11, 1969

SUMMARY OF CONFERENCE REPORT

PAOs and Acting PAOs from 14 IAF posts met in Manila for three days of discussion. Deputy Director Loomis and representatives of IAF, IPS, IPT and RSC/Manila participated in the meeting. USIA officers assigned to CINCPAC and on loan to the Army on Okinawa were accompanied by military representatives from CINCPAC and 7th Psy Ops Group, Okinawa. (Since Deputy Director Henry Loomis’s remarks were taped and sent to each PAO, they are not included in this summary.)

I. PPBS: We agreed that despite some usefulness, the total exercise as presently constituted has not been worth the effort. But some regular analysis of our programs is needed, possibly not annually. Exposures as a main pillar of PPBS should be dropped.

II. Attitudes Towards America: Asians are, to varying degrees, America watchers. America’s domestic problems are, however, first viewed in terms of their possible influence on US policies and actions towards Asia. Many PAOs saw little evidence of intellectual interest in US racial, urban and student disorders and their causes. But there was general agreement that US prestige is diminished when we are not able to solve our own problems at home.

PAOs emphasized that the image of the US usually depended more on the state of bi-lateral relations (security treaty, Okinawa, Korean military modernization, trade restrictions) than on developments within the US.

PAOs agreed that evidence of progress in solving our domestic problems was needed. It was suggested that the Agency summarize more frequently progress in integration, the elimination of poverty, etc.

III. US Policy in Asia: It was also suggested that posts should plan Americana programming after first analyzing local interests and objec-

3 Confidential. No drafting information appears on the conference report summary.
tives of the host country, then selecting information about the American experience which can be made relevant to those local interests.

To meet field needs dealing with the United States, the Agency must take into account divergent levels of understanding, even within one geographic area. This has been a problem with world-wide films. PAOs were full of praise for films on the Apollo project, but wished for faster delivery. More acquired films should be offered the posts (copies of IMV acquisitions were distributed.)

It was also suggested that the Agency prepare a regular feature on “what Americans are thinking,” based on numerous domestic polls, and that the Agency cover more fully favorable comment about the US from well-known foreign specialists.

Oleksiw described Assistant Secretary Green’s emphasis on “modesty, mutuality and multi-lateralism” and suggested that these themes should be applied to USIS work as well as to US foreign policy in Asia. He also suggested that, as US policies are reassessed and newly articulated, USIS posts must find ways of demonstrating continued US interest in Asia. Assistant Secretary Green’s emphasis on Asian initiatives and cooperation was noted, and it was suggested that there needs to be more stress on Asian commitment to Asian progress. Many PAOs reported uncertainty as to the direction of US foreign policy and especially the strength of US commitments in Asia.

There was general agreement that while regional cooperation is desirable, its development would be difficult in the absence of a US defensive umbrella. Furthermore, the chances for an Asian regional security system appeared to the conferees to be slim.

IV. USIA and National Development: While there was general agreement that USIS posts in developing countries should be involved in national development (where national development was a goal of the USG), there may be a lack of precision in understanding the overall US objective and in defining the best areas for USIS concentration. To a large extent, the role of USIS in national development must be shaped by the differing situation in each country. Thus there must be flexibility in the USIA approach to nation-building. An overall, governing policy from Washington would probably be impractical.

Posts should avoid national development programs which get ahead of US national interests; posts should not imply that we have all the answers to another country’s developmental problems. But we should be thoroughly involved in AID programs, especially dealing with communications, and develop appropriate USIS efforts which are coordinated with AID and clearly serve US national goals in the host country.

Discussion of USIS development activity in various IAF countries brought out these particularly important points:
1. Through the communications media, the educational system, and community organizations, USIS can stimulate discussion and foster actions supporting national development.

2. In most cases, USIS is a catalyst, bringing people and ideas together, sharing both US and other relevant experience and scholarship. Our purpose is to foster a climate conducive to the growth of free institutions, social/economic progress and national unity.

3. In some instances, especially in insurgency-threatened situations and especially where host governments are ill-prepared, USIS can contribute effectively to training in information skills of host country officials.

4. USIS can also sometimes provide useful information advice, where host governments welcome this assistance, and information equipment as well, working with AID. But an objective should be to strengthen host government ability to operate its own information programs, not to reinforce dependence on USIS.

5. In support of national development goals, USIS posts need to identify the “agents of change,” those in and out of government, often not among the top leadership, who are advocating and carrying out significant changes likely to promote national development. These “agents” may be at the bureau level within ministries, among student leaders, within the political opposition, among religious leaders or young, upcoming journalists. They are often not among the elite, who often tend to be more satisfied with the status quo.

6. Key obstacles to national development are: a) unfamiliarity of urban leaders with conditions and attitudes in rural areas; b) insufficient local media understanding of national development; c) traditionalism; d) inadequate exchange of information and experience with other developing countries.

V. New Approaches to Programming

1. Seminars

Seminars, both single-country and regional, can be useful if: they are well-planned; there is sufficient local interest and indigenous sponsorship; there is careful selection of participants; and there is imaginative follow-up. Seminars provide an excellent means of targeting ideas to the right people; they can provide a focus for multi-media support from Washington and locally; they facilitate exchange of views among Asian leaders and hence encourage regional ties and cooperation. One caveat: US visibility should be low.

2. Books and Libraries

It is important for USIS posts to help strengthen indigenous libraries and to provide them with essential books about the United States and supporting US foreign policies. We should not be satisfied with
the reading room syndrome, but should get the right books to the
right people, through their own institutions where possible. Our own
libraries can be very useful in some countries. In others, we should
work to turn the books over to local libraries, as we have done in
Australia, concentrating our own effort on stronger reference collec-
tions. As USIS posts improve their reference service and focus more
sharply on targetting books to selected audiences, they will need better
trained library personnel.

3. Translations

Bangkok has developed very extensive commercial distribution of
Agency books in Thai through promotion of sales of *Seripharb (Hor-
zons)*. A new title a month is published, and 6–9,000 copies are sold
commercially. Each title is offered to *Seripharb*’s 43,000 subscribers at
a special rate (about $.20). Each issue of *Seripharb* sent to subscribers
included a promotional flyer. The books are also sold over the counter.
Post funds were involved originally in establishing a revolving fund
for the distributor who now makes a steady, small profit. There are
no distribution costs to USIS now.

4. P.L. 480 India Text Book Program

Over 400 have been published in India. USIS Burma is using coun-
terpart Kyats to pay for the books published with surplus rupees.4 The
books represent an excellent collection of texts in the natural and social
sciences as well as literature. (IAF will be communicating separately5
with posts concerning possible interest in purchasing sample collec-
tions for display purposes.)

5. American History in Asian Textbooks

Singapore and several other posts have managed to stimulate gov-
ernment interest in either acquiring or producing locally textbooks on
the United States history for secondary school use. While much has
been done by some posts, there is room for additional initiative at
some posts with local education ministries, school boards, textbook
writers and publishers to improve the coverage of the US.

6. Bi-National Centers

They can be an excellent means of accomplishing our cultural and
some informational objectives, as well as being influential centers of

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4 The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480), signed into
law by President Eisenhower on July 10, 1954, established the Food for Peace program.
Under the provisions of the law, the United States could make concessional sales of
surplus grains to friendly nations, earmark commodities for domestic and foreign disaster
relief, and barter surplus for strategic materials. The United States used surplus currencies
accruing from Title I agreements to fund a variety of programs and projects within a
recipient nation, including textbook publishing.

5 Not found and not further identified.
English teaching. The bi-national character of these centers is in keeping with the Marshall Green philosophy of lowering the purely American presence. BNCs should do more than teach English; and special attention in English discussion groups should be given to USIS target groups, especially English teachers.

7. Regional Programming

Regional programs can strengthen regional cooperation and encourage expert attention to mutual problems. Regional programming can mean a forthcoming brochure on regional development projects in East Asia; an upcoming exhibit on the road to development; a regional seminar on ETV, urbanization or community action; articles in Horizons\(^6\) describing development problems and solutions; post-produced films—in or out of country—showing relevant development efforts; regional, Asian TV cooperation in production of a series on regional affairs; closer relations between USIS posts and the headquarters of regional organizations in the various countries; or a regional seminar of American studies scholars.

It was pointed out that regional cooperation was an objective in itself (to be discreetly supported) and a means of reaching significant audiences with multi-media supported, in-depth programs involving American specialists who cannot visit each post.

PAOs’ views on other regional or sub-regional projects requiring Agency support and coordination were sought: what could the Agency do to help posts strengthen contacts with labor leaders? Should there be an IAF-based regional national development officer to advise posts on their programs, to provide liaison between specialists in Asia and between them and counterparts in the US? Are there regional ties in American studies in Asia that should be strengthened by a regional seminar every year or so and by eventual establishment of an East Asian American Studies Association? Should we plan a regional meeting (and the needed follow-up) on the role of the university in national development?

8. Youth

Developing a meaningful dialogue with university students and young professionals should be the focus of special post efforts by most IAF countries.

9. Films

It is easier to make a good film than it is to use it properly. There is much room for improvement in the use of Agency films. There are

\(^6\) Published monthly in English and several Asian languages for Southeast Asia.
still posts where the main effort is through over-the-counter, first-come, first-serve loans.

VI. USIA and Japan, Viet-Nam and China

1. Japan

While Japanese favor a more active role in Asian affairs, there is little public interest in specific Asian countries except China, with which Japanese want to improve relations.

While Southeast Asians are willing to receive assistance from Japan, many fewer see a mutuality of interests with Japan.

It is both USIA and Department policy to encourage a larger Japanese role in Asian regional development. This requires careful programming by USIS Japan and the cooperation in some instances of Embassies and USIS posts in Southeast Asia. PAOs noted that the Japanese image in Southeast Asia is not good. Memories are long; Japanese businessmen are aggressive; and Japanese economic power causes some anxiety.

While Japanese cooperation in Asian development is desired by the US (and by other Asian governments), there is little support in SEA or Japan proper for a Japanese role in the region’s security.

2. Viet-Nam

JUSPAO’s third-country information services were reviewed for the PAOs. They consist of:

—Fast Film Clip Service for TV: in IAF, Bangkok, Seoul, Djakarta and Manila receive regularly. When speed is important, films are processed in Viet-Nam. JUSPAO can respond to special TV film requests.

—Media Client Mailers: primarily for journalists, mostly those who have worked in Viet-Nam. Sent once or twice a month. Includes captured documents, research notes, development stories.

—Photo Service: 77 posts receive.

—Feature Service: especially good. Used as backgrounder and for research. Stories in depth, fairly long.

—IPS Coverage: filed over 550 stories in FY ’69. Mostly stories from outside Saigon. JUSPAO needs to know how these stories are used.

—VOA: coverage in Mandarin, Cambodian and Vietnamese, two correspondents for English broadcasts.

—Captured Documents and Research Notes Service: this service seems to be especially well received by newspapers.

—PAO Orientation Program: ten-day briefings and inspection, groups of 4–5 PAOs. Field trips included. A valuable program, well received around the world by Agency PAOs.

—Third-Country Journalists Program: posts should discourage journalists planning to visit Viet-Nam from thinking they will receive VIP treatment. They will receive solid briefings, but not from Ambassa-
 dor Bunker or General Abrams. JUSPAO will assign a USIS officer to each visitor, but programs cannot be individually tailored for all visitors.

There seems to be little optimism that the GVN will rapidly improve its own third-country information programs.

3. China

China will probably step up its diplomatic activity around the world and continue its support of insurgent groups in Thailand, Burma, India and elsewhere. At home, China is still in the throes of the cultural revolution’s repercussions.

USIS Hong Kong’s China Reporting Program calls attention to China’s problems in every sphere about which we have reliable information. USIS Hong Kong will attempt to develop special materials on China to meet posts’ special requests.

Hong Kong would like posts’ usage reports of China material, especially radio tapes and press packets. Posts’ suggestions for articles in World Today and for books to be translated into Chinese would be appreciated.

The question was raised whether USIS is necessarily helping to develop a sense of loyalty among overseas Chinese to the Southeast Asian countries where they live by placing Chinese-oriented material in World Today. IAF plans to pursue this question.

VII. Other Items of Special Importance

1. Personnel

By the end of the summer, there will be another FSIO list which will include lateral entries. Some officers, upon entry as FSIOs, may have to pay into the Foreign Service Retirement Fund for any time they were uncovered, or where their contribution under different systems was not equivalent to the FS one. There is no requirement to pay for service credited while in the military. Whether it will be to an officer’s advantage to pay for uncovered years will depend on each individual case.

Regarding the new Evaluation Reports, it was emphasized that no rating form could replace an officer’s frequent discussions with his subordinates on the work they were doing.

The Phase II Program was explained. The program is designed to bring junior officers back to the US at an earlier, critical stage in their career for three years, to update personnel in their own culture, prepare them for later assignments in the Agency and provide additional area

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7 Published in Chinese.
and language training. A course in communications is being developed and will be included in Phase II.

Some PAOs expressed concern that the Agency had become so dependent on JOTs for its new talent and that, because of BALPA, lateral entries from outside the Agency had been suspended. It was explained that this suspension was only temporary. Some PAOs also did not think that the resignation rate of 200 out of a total of 600 JOTs (since the program’s inception) spoke very well for the JOT program.

2. Foreign National Employee Training

The function of the new Regional Local Employee Training Officer was explained. He is available to posts to: 1) help explain the role of USIA in each country; 2) update employees’ knowledge of current developments on the US scene; 3) organize (or arrange for others to provide) training programs in the area for key local personnel. The Regional Training Officer, Charles Vetter, would spend up to three weeks in a country and would be prepared to visit branch posts as well.

3. Research

There was strong opinion favoring restoration of the recently BALPA’d Regional Research Officer. The general outlook for research in the Agency appears promising, but it would take time to recruit good people. Emphasis on research should shift from “interesting” surveys to partly qualitative studies with program implications. PAOs agreed that they needed more research on programs and related products. The most effective research for USIA should not only tell us where we have been but also indicate future directions for USIS programming decisions.

4. Horizons and Dialogue

PAOs were generally satisfied with both publications as is. More sophisticated articles on national and regional development might be printed in separate pamphlets for limited, more targeted distribution. Horizons was praised highly by many PAOs. However, the magazine has less appeal in the more sophisticated countries, such as Japan. It was suggested that Dialogue should be directed at sophisticated audiences in a country, Horizons at more middle-brow readers. While Dialogue will occasionally contain articles relating to national development, it will continue to concentrate on American culture.

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8 See footnote 7, Document 20.
9 Cultural quarterly published in English, French, and Spanish containing articles appearing in major U.S. publications.
32. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Richardson) to the President’s Special Counsel (Garment)\(^1\)

Washington, August 7, 1969

SUBJECT

Reduction in FY '70 Educational Cultural Exchange Budget: Proposed Letters from President to Senator McClellan and Congressman Rooney

1. I understand that John Richardson has discussed with you our hope that the President would be willing to write a letter to Senator McClellan urging restoration of the 10% ($3.9 million) cut imposed by the House on the Department’s FY 1970 Educational and Cultural Affairs appropriation request.\(^2\)

We think that it would also be extremely helpful if the President would be willing to send a note to Chairman Rooney indicating the President’s desire to discuss the matter with him in person after the recess.

Drafts are enclosed at Tab A.\(^3\) The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee is holding its hearing today, August 7.\(^4\) The letters should be delivered before the recess.

2. Secretary Rogers and I, Frank Shakespeare, and our Ambassadors believe these exchange activities contribute directly and importantly both to the achievement of US policy objectives and to the enhancement of our image and influence all around the world. The programs have suffered badly in recent years from both neglect and meat axe budget cuts. We, in the Department of State, are determined to see them

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, EDX 1 US. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Kissinger and Harlow. Blind copied to Shakespeare and Mayo. A typed note at the end of the memorandum reads: “Original bypassed S/S and sent direct to Garment from U 8/7/69. See Garment/Richardson memo 8/18/69 (S/S–12621) for final disposition.” The August 18 Garment/Richardson memorandum was not found.


\(^3\) Attached but not printed.

\(^4\) On August 7, Richardson testified before the subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee in support of restoring $3,862,000 of the $3,975,000 that the House of Representatives had reduced for the funding of educational and cultural exchange activities. See Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for Fiscal Year 1970 Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations United States Senate Ninety-First Congress First Session on H.R. 12964. (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1969)
reinvigorated and in some instances, redirected. We are confident that John Richardson will provide the necessary strong and imaginative leadership.

Such early and tangible evidence of Presidential interest and support would be of enormous help to him and to us in rebuilding morale and restoring momentum in the responsible bureau. Further, if the Senate does restore the funds (as appears unlikely without this intervention), we will have the elbow-room so urgently needed to revive the programs and to restore confidence in these important aspects of our relations with other countries all around the world.

3. The timing for such an initiative in support of the “Fulbright Exchange Program” seems especially auspicious just now following the moon landing and the President’s trip. These letters will emphatically but quietly signal to anxious academic, cultural and intellectual constituencies here and abroad this Administration’s serious interest in developing these constructive means of international communication. The action will be especially welcomed now because it is widely believed that lack of Presidential support in 1967 and 1968 was the prime factor in the 42% nose dive in appropriations for these programs which occurred in that period. The response should be equally favorable whether or not the Senate restores the funds.

The last such Presidential intervention was through a similar letter from Mr. Johnson to Senator McClellan requesting restoration of a House cut in the summer of 1964. The Senate did, in that case, respond.

A relevant article from the current issue of “Ripon Forum” is enclosed at Tab B for your information.

We very much appreciate your interest in pursuing the matter.

Elliot L. Richardson

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5 In addition to his state visit to Romania (see footnote 4, Document 28), the President traveled to the Philippines (July 26–27), Indonesia (July 27–28), Thailand (July 28–30), South Vietnam (July 30), India (July 31–August 1), Pakistan (August 1–2), and the United Kingdom (August 3). For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 18, 192, and 269; ibid., vol. VI, Vietnam, January 1969–July 1970, Documents 102 and 103; and ibid., vol. E–7, Documents on South Asia, 1969–1972, Documents 29 and 31.


7 In an August 18 memorandum to Richardson (see footnote 1, above), Garment indicated that while the Fulbright program was “highly desirable,” it was “not one of the President’s highest priority items.” Garment commented that the President did not intend to pursue the matter further at the time. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, EDX 1 US)

8 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Memorandum From Acting Secretary of State Johnson to the President’s Assistant (Flanigan)\(^1\)

Washington, August 16, 1969

SUBJECT
Apollo 11 World Tour

I have reviewed the recommendations Julian Sheer sent to you and find them excellent.\(^2\)

The Department of State will of course be happy to fund all receptions and other such entertaining in honor of the astronauts. It is not clear what other “activities” will require funding. If there are such and the amount is substantial I am advised we would have a serious problem finding resources and would want to consult concerned agencies on the matter.

USIA agrees in principle to the recommendations subject to working out the details.

The State Department Committee on Astronaut Travel, which includes USIA and NASA representatives, has reviewed the recommendations and come up with a number of suggestions which I pass along for your consideration.

The Committee will meet at 3:00 p.m., Tuesday, August 19th in room 6804 of the State Department. If you would care to send a representative please feel free to do so. In any case you will be promptly advised of any further recommendations they have. If there is anything specific you would like the Committee to take up, please let me know.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 392, Subject Files, Space Programs Foreign Cooperation (1970) [Feb. 69–Nov 70]. No classification marking.

\(^2\) Under an August 15 memorandum to Flanigan, Scheer transmitted information concerning the program for an Apollo 11 astronaut tour. Scheer noted: “It is important that we have approval for this mission as soon as possible so that advance groups can begin travel within ten days.” (Ibid.)
or call the Committee Chairman (Mark Sheehan on extension 20596 in the Department).  

U Alexis Johnson

Enclosure

Paper Prepared by the Department of State Committee on Astronaut Travel

Washington, undated

Suggestions

Itinerary

1. We suggest the New York appearance be limited if possible to the United Nations. The time is ideal for U.N. appearance. We feel any other appearances would dilute the desired impact of expressing the universality of the moon mission at the outset of the world tour.

2. We suggest that in view of existing political problems it would be appropriate to hold the first rest day somewhere other than Lima. If possible we would suggest rest days both at Quito and Rio de Janeiro. We realise that makes three rest days in the first nine days of the trip, but to avoid fatigue at the outset that might be useful. If only one rest day is desired we would recommend Rio de Janeiro, since Quito has a relatively high altitude, which could fatigue the Astronauts otherwise.

3. Similarly, Canberra is not as interesting a place for a rest day as Tokyo and we would suggest moving that rest day to Tokyo.

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3 In an August 26 memorandum to Paine, Flanigan indicated that the President “has decided that the Apollo 11 Astronauts will tour the world as his representatives.” (Ibid.) According to the New York Times, the White House announced on September 19 that the astronauts and their wives would travel to 22 nations. The astronauts would begin their tour in Mexico City on September 29. (“3 Moon Astronauts Will Make a 22-Nation Tour,” September 20, 1969, p. 5) On November 5, the astronaut party flew from Tokyo to Washington to meet with the President and First Lady Pat Nixon and spend the night at the White House before flying to Houston to brief the Apollo 12 astronauts before their space mission. (Nan Robertson, “Apollo 11 Crew Feted by Nixons On Returning From World Tour,” New York Times, November 6, 1969, p. 42) For the President’s remarks at a White House ceremony honoring the astronauts, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 917–918.

4 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper.

5 An unknown hand wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “Given the UN ceremony on Aug 13, why bother with the UN again.”

6 An unknown hand wrote in the left-hand margin next to this point: “For active men, who might want to rest on the beach, I’d prefer Australia to Japan.”
4. There is some question as to whether the airport at Rawalpindi is adequate to receive the Presidential jet aircraft and that it might prove necessary to land at Lahore or Karachi. In that connection we would suggest moving that rest day to either New Delhi or Tehran. There will be an Asian fair at Tehran when the Astronauts arrive and that might make an enjoyable rest day.

Staffing

We will be happy to provide a State Department staff assistant for the trip. We would also suggest that a Protocol officer from State would be useful. (We have a Protocol officer who has been on Astronaut trips before). In addition the staff assistant for the Department’s Astronaut Travel Committee is already familiar with the preliminary planning for the trip. Furthermore, he is a former USIA staffer and has had public affairs experience at State.

5. USIA would probably want to put a Voice of America regional staffer on the plane, changing him as the trip moves from one area to another. We would recommend a spare seat be kept for this and suggest another spare seat be kept in case it was necessary to pick up additional secretarial or other help from the posts for brief periods as the trip progresses.

6. You may wish to consider adding State, USIA or White House personnel to the advance trip. State has no preference in this matter. I believe USIA would like to have one person on the advance party.
SUMMARY

U.S. standing in science and the exploration of space advanced considerably after the successful completion of the Apollo 11 mission, according to surveys conducted immediately before and after the flight in Great Britain, France, India, Japan, the Philippines and Venezuela. Opinion of U.S. military strength rose slightly in three of these countries—Britain, France and Japan—and increased moderately in Manila. The moon landing improved considerably general opinion of the United States in France, but had a barely significant effect in Britain, Japan, or the Philippines.

More people abroad knew which country had conducted the Apollo 11 mission, and could give the name of the mission or spaceship than recalled such information about the mid-May Apollo 10 flight. Practically all those interviewed after the landing knew that the United States had landed men on the moon. At least eight out of ten could name the mission or its craft.

The Apollo 11 moon landing seemed to leave a strong immediate impact upon an overseas audience already generally impressed by the earlier Apollo 10 flight. At least 80 per cent in all surveyed countries were impressed to some degree with the moon landing as a scientific development; 60 per cent or more expressed themselves as being “very” or “extremely” impressed. People everywhere were more likely to judge a manned landing on the moon important after the accomplish-
ment than before. In France, the percentage who thought it important increased by 24 percentage points (from 47 to 71 per cent). After the mission, the belief that a moon landing would benefit other countries increased by at least ten percentage points in each country, and by as much as 16 points in France and Venezuela. Except in Japan, respondents exhibited a slightly greater interest than before the moon landing in having the U.S. continue its space efforts. At the same time roughly one-half of the sampled populations (somewhat more in France, fewer in India) felt the U.S. should devote more time and money to problems here on earth.

[Omitted here is the remainder of the report.]

35. Memorandum From the Director of the Program Analysis Staff, National Security Council (Lynn) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, September 18, 1969

SUBJECT

USIS Functions in Thailand and Elsewhere

In response to the President’s desire to terminate USIS activities such as the Mobile Information Teams in Thailand, which place the U.S. in the role of pleaders for the local government, you forwarded a memorandum to the President (at Tab A) asking him to approve a study of the alternatives.

You also noted, on Holdridge’s covering memorandum (at Tab A),\(^2\) that you wanted to implement the President’s directive with a

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed is an August 6 covering memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger. In it, Holdridge indicated that, in accordance with Kissinger’s instructions, he had prepared a draft NSSM “directing that a Study be prepared which would recommend adjustments in the USIS program in Thailand intended to eliminate its emphasis upon publicizing programs and objectives which are intrinsically the province of the Royal Thai Government rather than of the U.S. Government.” Kissinger noted on the memorandum: “Let the memo to Pres. go. But if he approves it—simply issue directive to Shakespeare.” A notation on the covering memorandum in an unknown hand indicates that it was hand-carried to the President on August 11.
directive to Shakespeare rather than a NSSM (which Holdridge had attached).

The President’s response indicated that he wants all USIS programs of this nature (i.e. in Thailand and elsewhere) cut back.

I was given the action on the comeback and John Holdridge and I have drafted a memorandum to implement the President’s directive for Shakespeare for your signature (at Tab B).³

This memorandum asks Shakespeare to examine USIS programs of the type in question and forward his recommendations on how to terminate them. It also notes that in the case of Thailand, such a study is underway as part of the NSSM 51 program analysis study⁴ and that this will be forwarded as soon as it is available.

In this connection, I should note that USIA is acutely conscious of its inadequately defined role. I understand they would welcome a full review of their policy and program assumptions. This concern explains in part their enthusiastic cooperation with the Thailand (NSSM 51) study. They have given us an excellent analyst to serve as a member of the ad hoc group and have said they expect the study to result in program guidelines and program analysis standards which they consider to be badly needed.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memorandum for Shakespeare at Tab B.

³ Attached but not printed is the October 9 memorandum from Kissinger to Shakespeare, which Kissinger signed. In it, Kissinger indicated that the President had directed that the activities of USIS on behalf of various governments “be terminated as soon as possible” and directed the preparation of a study of the scope of USIS programs in this nature, “of the implications of terminating these activities, and of the most expeditious way to accomplish this objective.” In telegram 14847 from Bangkok, November 1, Unger provided a summary of U.S.-Thai relations, noting various factors that the Thai Government “will take as an indication of acceleration disengagement” on the part of the United States. With regard to the Kissinger instructions, Unger stated: “We have been working steadily for some time now to get the Thai Government to assume more and more informational activities but I have been intent on continuing our support of necessary functions until the Thai were ready and able to take over. The order [the October 9 memorandum] cited appears to foreclose any such orderly handover.” The telegram is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XX, Southeast Asia, 1969–1972, Document 33.

⁴ NSSM 51, issued on April 26, indicated that the President had “directed that a program analysis of Thailand” be pursued, including the programs of USIA, the Peace Corps, and the CIA. The NSSM is printed ibid., Document 10. For the summary paper prepared in response to NSSM 51, dated August 5, 1970, see ibid., Document 82.
Tab A

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, August 11, 1969

SUBJECT

USIS Functions in Thailand

During your visit to Thailand one of the features of the U.S. presence there which was most strongly criticized by the Thai was the extent to which the U.S. information program is carrying on activities which more properly belong to the Thai and which in effect put the United States in the position of acting as a special pleader on behalf of the Royal Thai Government to the Thai people. In particular, the operations of USIS Mobile Information Teams were cited as a case in point.

I believe it would be a comparatively simple process to withdraw the USIS program in Thailand from operations and activities of the sort which have brought criticism from the Thai. We could anticipate quick dividends in improving U.S.-Thai relations and in making the United States presence in Thailand more tolerable. In addition, we would be responding to your guidelines on giving the Thai the primary responsibility for coping with subversion in Thailand. I have accordingly drafted a NSSM to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence and the Director, U.S. Information Agency, directing that a Study be prepared on the scope of the USIS program in Thailand which would recommend areas in which U.S. activities in publicizing programs and objectives which are intrinsically the province of the Royal Thai Government would be eliminated.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize the issuance of the NSSM at Tab A.

5 Secret. Sent for action.
6 See footnote 5, Document 32.
7 The President initialed the approval line. Next to his initials he wrote: I believe this is a serious problem in several other countries—I want U.S.I.A. to examine its activities & cut down drastically.” An unknown hand wrote “9–2–69” next to the President’s notation. Kissinger wrote in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum: “Let’s draft instructions for Shakespeare.”
Meeting on Educational and Cultural Affairs at State Department

Barbara White and I represented the Agency at a joint meeting September 12 of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, the Board of Foreign Scholarships, and the American Council on Education. At the opening session the group discussed the question of organization of the U.S. Government’s educational and cultural programs overseas. Focal point was the proposal, made in recent years by the Advisory Commission and several other academic groups, to create a new quasi-public body akin to the British Council for administering these programs (including USIA’s cultural activities). Proponents of this approach decided not to push it at the present time, but to concentrate instead on strengthening CU’s programs within the Department of State. The reasons were: (1) greater confidence in the leadership of CU under the new administration, and (2) realization of the difficulties of getting legislation to set up a new body.

There was also considerable discussion of the purposes of international educational and cultural exchange; several participants felt that a new rationale was necessary. While some feeble pleas were made in favor of individual grants to promote pure scholarship for the sake of scholarship, there was a clear consensus that the thrust of the program should be directed to institution building. Most of those present seemed to feel that university-to-university arrangements should constitute the major part of the exchange program. Though the issue of “relevance” was recognized, there was a clear consensus that the fields of study included in these institution-building programs should be allowed to


2 Founded during the 1930s and granted a Royal Charter in 1940 in order to promote knowledge of the United Kingdom and the English language and develop closer cultural relations with other nations.
cover a far broader range than in the project-oriented programs of the AID.

There was an astonishing atmosphere of realism in the discussions regarding the fundamental rationale of the government’s international educational and cultural programs. One of the working papers by Richard A. Humphrey, of the American Council on Education, had stressed that the government could not be expected to finance such programs other than to serve the “public interest in the setting of our relations with other countries.” It is reported that Assistant Secretary John Richardson had made the same point before the Board of Foreign Scholarships on the previous day. In any case, the conferees of September 12th clearly accepted this as a basis of their discussion.

In the final session there was quite some discussion on whether the government’s “propaganda agency” ought to be involved in cultural affairs. Beyond some objections to the fact that the exchange program is administered by USIA officers in the field there were also suggestions that libraries should be detached from the Agency and attached to CU. The chairman emphasized that the purpose was not to dismantle USIA but entertained with interest the remark that films were no less cultural than libraries. Some of the scholars present clearly had difficulty in understanding the finer points of the organizational status quo and saw the need to have exchanges and libraries both under the CAO an added argument in favor of removing libraries from USIA and attaching them to CU. Ed Gullion, Dean of the Fletcher School, asked me to comment on behalf of USIA, and I tried to clarify some of the misunderstandings and expressed the view that informational and cultural activities are not incompatible. Some of those present nodded sympathetically. Richard H. Heindel, of Pennsylvania State University, formally withdrew some of his reservations about USIA’s role, but Steven Muller, of Cornell, predicted that universities would not cooperate in the more intensive manner now contemplated with a cultural program administered overseas by USIA officers. Still, at the end of the session it appeared that none of the recommendations resulting from the conference would be directed against the role of USIA.

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3 Not found and not further identified.
4 Babbidge.
37. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, October 1, 1969

Romulo suggested that it would be very helpful if a propaganda offensive could be launched, constantly repeating what the United States has done in offering peace in Vietnam in preparation for what we may have to do later. He says that all of the sophisticates know what we have done but that this requires constant repetition. Perhaps you could put this in the mill with the research group, and tell Harlow to follow up on the Congressional side. You will, of course, have to provide some simple statements for people to make. Frank Shakespeare should be running this very, very strongly in USIA and, of course, we should continue to try to get it across in the columns to the extent that we have any influence in that direction.

\(^1\) Source: Nixon Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG–230, Box 1, EX FG 230 10/1/69–12/31/69. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

38. Minutes of an International Cultural Strategy Group Meeting\(^1\)

Washington, October 6, 1969

**INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL STRATEGY GROUP**

Met 1 PM October 6, 1969. Department of State. Members: Host, John Richardson, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs; Henry Loomis, Deputy Director, U.S. Information Agency; Bob Osgood, National Security Council; Charlie McWhorter, private citizen. Unable to attend: Leonard Garment, Special Consultant to the President, Frank Shakespeare, Director, USIA and Michael Straight. Executive Secretary: Carol Harford.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 1, CUL–1 Policy Plans. No classification marking. No drafting date appears on the minutes. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the minutes and wrote: "IOR note conclusion 1 IOP, ICS fyi HL."
DISCUSSION

General

Recognition of existent diversity in international cultural affairs programs, the timeliness of new perspectives, need for new ideas and approaches, the existence of probable bureaucratic slippage, the difficulty of measuring effectiveness, the volatile nature of some artists and their disagreement with Federal policy, need for support from the Secretary of State and the Executive Branch of Government—and consequent hoped-for Congressional support which might follow—were fundamental discussion points. The need to articulate for ourselves and Congress the significance of the vague area of cultural affairs important to world peace and security was also considered. These factors were directed toward the major question of how this group can help to shape contemporary cultural policy which will be instrumental in building a positive future. Integral to these deliberations is the objective of cultural interchange.

This group will address itself as agreed to in the terms of reference “To secure improved planning and coordination of USG actions and programs with direct or indirect cross cultural impacts substantially affecting our capacity to achieve foreign policy objectives.”

In line with this thought, as an example of how the group might participate in shaping policy, the question was raised as to whether the US has made sufficient effort to maintain communication with Arab countries during this period of interrupted diplomatic relations. Has the approach been primarily negative? Could we break existent barriers? What could be the role of Government cultural programs in this and similar situations?

The value of the military exchange program was illustrated through reference to present military personnel who are serving as heads of state in Latin America.

Discussion of priority determinations centered around the recent Voice of America language study, and the upcoming survey on motion pictures, and general research plans of USIA. The development of the
management information section over the next 3–4 years for $2–3 million will address itself to determining what information is required by whom to make what decision. The need for research and priority determination is motivated by the realization that what is fundamentally important are methods of communication for a variety of purposes.

Conclusions:

1. CU needs and interests should be a part of USIA’s development of the management information research project. Possibly State Department funds could be invested.

2. Increased attention should be directed toward continuous mechanisms in the grantee process, i.e. continuous stream from selection, through Stateside activities, through return and replacement to home life.

3. This group should recommend appointment to the House Appropriations Committee of a senior Republican who would have genuine interest in State and USIA programs. Charlie McWhorter offered to follow-up after next meeting of this group when candidates can be suggested and discussed.

4. Terms of Reference as discussed are acceptable. If needs change, terms can be adjusted.

5. Luncheon meetings should be held every two weeks, on Mondays. The next meeting, therefore, is scheduled for October 20; place to be determined.

6. Agenda items should be suggested only if they are important. If there are no agenda items, the meeting should still be held, recurring contact considered important for general as well as specific discussion. (Suggested agenda items or other relevant information can be directed to Carol Hartford, Room 128, Executive Office Building, The White House, Telephone: 456-2775; 2776)

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5 Loomis placed three parallel, vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this point.

6 Loomis placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this point.
Specific:

1. President Nixon’s reception the morning of October 14 for People-to-People people:7

   John Richardson suggested that this might be an appropriate occasion for the President to make brief but cogent remarks regarding the constructive role of cultural affairs in world peace. This could be especially timely in view of the planned October 15 moratorium march.8

   People-to-People offers an opportunity to broaden the base of operations through private voluntary groups. The organization is asking Mr. Richardson for suggestions and advice, as to programs and personnel. They are in need of a new chairman, and a treasurer. The point was made that there may be need for review of some aspects of the program.

   Recommended candidate for the position of chairman is Lane Dwinnell, former Governor of New Hampshire.

Conclusion:

   It was agreed that it would be pertinent to recommend that the President include constructive reference to the role of cultural affairs in international relations in his remarks to the People-to-People assemblage. John Richardson agreed to draft a suggested statement and send it to group members. The final suggested statement will be sent to Len Garment for on forwarding.

II Cultural Presentations

   John Richardson learned that the House Appropriations Committee intended to eliminate the Cultural Presentations program for this year. In view of this, after clearance from White House, State Department and USIA officials concerned, it was agreed that transferring the program from State to USIA would be wise. Congressman John Rooney from New York must agree to the transfer.

Conclusion

   1. The Department of State will first talk with Congressman Rooney.
   2. USIA will talk with the Congressman following State’s discussion.

   Carol Hartford9

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7 For the text of the President’s October 14 remarks at a ceremony commemorating the establishment of the People-to-People program, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 801–803.

8 The Vietnam Moratorium Committee had called for a nationwide protest, to take place on October 15, regarding U.S. involvement in Vietnam.

9 Hanford signed “Carol” above this typed signature.
Shakespeare said he felt he should cover several points with K before his dinner with William Buckley, which had come out of a long (3–4 hour) dinner he had with Buckley in New York about 10 days ago. (1) Buckley said he thought the conservative group in this country was becoming increasingly concerned about Vietnam. Buckley feels that in about 2 months, that group will be opening up and being very critical of the Administration. He felt the reason for this was the group’s feeling that the Administration wasn’t being strong enough. In response to a query by Shakespeare, Buckley had said the two-month timetable was pretty definite.

(2) Buckley had told Shakespeare he wanted to register again with K his feeling about the concept of a volunteer army in Vietnam. K said he had received Buckley’s ideas on this.

(3) Shakespeare said Buckley’s third item was related to a personal matter. The conservative party has put him under enormous pressure in New York because of their outrage at Goodell. They are anxious to knock Goodell out much as they did Lindsey in the primary. They want Bill to run against Goodell. In order to do this, he must change his registration by January 1970 from Stamford to New York, even though the primary (?) would not be until April. As soon as he changes his registration, there is bound to be a lot of speculation as to why he is doing it. Buckley wondered how his role on the Advisory Commission would relate to this.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, Box 2, October 1–13, 1969. No classification marking.
2 There is no indication as to when Shakespeare’s subsequent dinner with Buckley took place.
3 Founded in 1962. In 1965, Buckley ran as the Conservative Party candidate for mayor of New York. He lost to Lindsay, the Republican Party candidate, who was also the nominee of the Liberal Party.
4 New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller appointed Goodell to the Senate in September 1968 to fill the seat formerly held by Robert F. Kennedy.
5 Lindsay lost the 1969 Republican mayoral primary to State Senator John Marchi. Lindsay then campaigned as the candidate of the New York Liberal Party and won reelection.
6 Buckley’s brother James L. Buckley ran as the Conservative Party candidate in the 1970 Senate race in New York and defeated Goodell.
(4) Buckley, at the time of their dinner, was anxious to have a chat with K because he said he was puzzled—he had, in response to K’s suggestion, come up with a certain plan of action on the matter discussed by K with him. K had said it wasn’t a good plan of action. K said he planned to take this up with Buckley at dinner.

Shakespeare then said he wanted to mention one final piece of intelligence. When he was in Vietnam, he was immensely disturbed at the caliber of the reporters, and the reporting, going on. He felt at that time that the Laos and Thailand situations were going to blow as a result of conversations he had. When he got back, he told Stanton and Buckley as members of the Advisory Commission to take a look at Laos, Thailand and Vietnam. They both agreed to do it. Now Shakespeare has Buckley locked in—he is going to visit the three countries November 28 through December 5; and Stanton will probably be put on the same trip. In this connection, Shakespeare asked K’s advice as to who they should talk with. K said he would put something together on that, and that he would give Buckley total support. Shakespeare said he knew K would; and he had felt safe in posturing it.

Shakespeare said he was making a speech tomorrow, and one of the things he is going to talk about is the Voice of America, touching on what they are doing in Eastern Europe—the Munich transmitter and its value since they are jamming us, and since it will also come in on the Moscow wavelength in Eastern Europe. He asked K if he thought it would be safe to say that. K suggested he take it fairly easy—not make a big issue of it; especially with the new government in Germany he might get into severe trouble with them. Shakespeare thanked K for mentioning this. He hadn’t thought of the new Government. This had all been cleared with Kissinger.

7 Federal elections took place in the Federal Republic of Germany on September 28. In a September 29 memorandum to the President, Kissinger stated: “Yesterday’s West German election does not appear to have significantly altered the make-up of the Bundestag. Neither of the prominent political parties—Kiesinger’s Christian Democratic Party and Brandt’s Social Democratic Party—gained a clear-cut majority in the Bundestag. The Christian Democrats will hold 242 of the 496 seats. The Social Democratic Party announced that it will attempt to form a governing coalition with the liberal Free Democratic Party.” For the complete memorandum, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, Document 27.
40. Editorial Note

On October 13, 1969, the United States Information Agency (USIA) released News Policy Note 27–69, entitled “October 15 Moratorium on the Viet-Nam War.” The Note, drafted in the Office of Policy and Plans (IOP) by Assistant Cultural Affairs Adviser Geoffrey Groff-Smith and Chief of the Policy Guidance Staff John Pauker, outlined the nature of the nationwide protest called for by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC) and specified the guidelines for USIA treatment of the moratorium:

“It is no secret abroad that within the United States there is opposition to U.S. policy in Viet-Nam. We have reported manifestations of that opposition before, matter-of-factly and in perspective in order to balance sensational commercial coverage. The coming moratorium will be another manifestation of that opposition, and should be treated in the same way.

“Specifically, we want foreign audiences to view the activities relating to the moratorium in light of the many positive efforts of the U.S. Government, and of the President himself, to reduce the violence in Viet-Nam and end the war.

“You should gear the volume of output about the moratorium to the requirements of credibility and the newsworthiness of the developments, bearing in mind President Nixon’s recent call for national unity in support of the Administration’s Viet-Nam policy. In original comment, to set the stage for the moratorium and also while it proceeds, make the following points:

“With the President, all Americans want to end the war:

‘I want to end this war. The American people want to end this war.’ (Address to the nation, May 14, 1969.)

“The question is how this can best be done. Organizers of the VMC propose speedier unilateral withdrawal of U.S. forces. Others—most recently Senators Goldwater and Tower—advocate intensified conventional military pressures on the enemy. Many other Americans have varying views between these positions.

“The President has stated that ‘we have ruled out attempting to impose a purely military solution on the battlefield.’ In his efforts to arrive at a disengagement, the President has put forth only one condition which is not negotiable: the right of the people of South Viet-Nam freely to determine their own future. In seeing that this basic right of the South Vietnamese people is met, the President has publicly set forth these three criteria for the disengagement of U.S. troops from Viet-Nam:

“(1) Progress at the Paris talks.

“(2) Reduction in the intensity of combat.
“(3) Ability of the South Vietnamese to undertake a larger responsibility for combat operations.

“The rights of free speech, assembly and petition are guaranteed and protected by the U.S. Constitution and by American democratic traditions. It is clear that the Federal Government will not interfere with the protests as long as they are peaceful and do not interfere with the right of other citizens to pursue their own activities.

“If violence should occur it will be detrimental not only to the aims of the Administration but to those of the dissenters as well.

“Caution: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, do not suggest that the moratorium is at the instigation of, or controlled by, any single political group of individuals or of another political party.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural and Youth Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 6, EDX 12 October 15 Moratorium 1969)
Memorandum From the Associate Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (White) to the Deputy Assistant Director for Plans and Programs, Office of Policy and Plans (Bardos), the Cultural Affairs Adviser, Office of Policy and Plans (Bunce), and the Deputy Planning Officer, Office of Policy and Plans (Sablosky)\(^1\)

Washington, October 17, 1969

SUBJECT
Meeting with John Richardson

Bill Weathersby and I had lunch Monday\(^2\) with John Richardson, who raised the question of what more we can do to draw USIA and CU closer together.

We agreed that a most important step was better joint planning of our programs. For example, the CU budget presentation made to the Bureau of the Budget last week should have been discussed with USIA. We should also reciprocate and keep CU informed of our new priorities and major program decisions. Coordination should be both at an area level and between IOP and the Assistant Secretary’s office.

(On this point, I understand that the Bureau of the Budget asked CU whether its proposals had been cleared with us, and asked our Area Directors the same question at their presentations this week. The answer was no; the Areas will pursue this with their counterparts in CU, and Ken should pursue it with Fred Irving.)\(^3\)

We mentioned USIA’s plans for PPBS–MIS, and the likelihood of having one or more pilot posts as the systems develop. John said he would like to include CU in these pilot projects.

We also discussed the possibility of having a single country plan for USIS posts, broad enough to encompass both USIA and CU objectives. I suggested that it might be useful for a small group from USIA and CU to spend a day talking about the formulation of objectives for our programs—how we can advance U.S. objectives both short and long

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, Policy Coordination Staff, Cultural Affairs and Youth Adviser, Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–102, Box 2, EDX 1 General Policy, Plans, Coordination. No classification marking. Drafted by White. Copies were sent to Weathersby, Strasburg, and Halsema. Bunce placed a checkmark next to his name in the addressee line. He also wrote “KB/file” and “Nancy—fyi” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

\(^2\) October 13.

\(^3\) An unknown hand, presumably Bunce, underlined the portion of the sentence beginning with the word “Areas.”
term. I have asked Irving Sablosky to draw up a proposed agenda for such a meeting.\(^4\)

We also discussed briefly the need to reduce USIA and CU reporting requirements, and agreed on the importance of pursuing this effort.

**Barbara M. White**\(^5\)

\(^4\) The proposed agenda has not been found. There is no indication that such a meeting took place.

\(^5\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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**42. Notes of an International Cultural Strategy Group Meeting**\(^1\)

Washington, undated

**INTERNATIONAL CULTURAL STRATEGY GROUP**

Met 12:30 p.m. October 20, 1969, Department of State. Participating: Len Garment, John Richardson, Bob Osgood, Ray Price, Charlie McWhorter, Bill Weathersby.

It was agreed that these notes would include only substantive conclusions, and who is to do what, as a result. Therefore:

I. CU/USIA research programs will be coordinated. John Richardson will ask his deputy, Fred Irving, to contact USIA’s Bill Strasburg re: the joint program.

II. The group agreed that the Asia Foundation is worthy of continued Government support. John Richardson will send Len Garment information on the Foundation. Following receipt of this information, on behalf of the International Cultural Strategy Group Len will write to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget recommending Administration support for the Foundation.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1066, Box 7, Relations With White House, 1968–1969. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Shakespeare, Loomis, and Weathersby. Shakespeare’s name is typewritten in the top right-hand corner; an unknown hand wrote Loomis’s and Weathersby’s names below this. An unknown hand wrote “TRIP FOLDER” in the top left-hand corner of the memorandum.
III. The group supported the concept that there should be dramatic evidence of the President’s concern with the quality of living as expressed through his support for cultural affairs. John Ehrlichman said such a presentation must be made before December 1. Charlie McWhorter is to formulate what is to be said.2 Len Garment is to talk with John Ehrlichman. Then Len is to present the concept to the Republican Leadership. John Richardson will talk with Nancy Hanks about their respective programs with regard to this new approach.

IV. The group gave its “blessings minus money” to the Willis Conover proposal for an Irish-American Festival. It was suggested that possibly there could be a Swedish-American Festival also, held in Sweden, which might have more value from the standpoint of political objective.

V. It was agreed that youth, including high school students, should not be ruled out of the Cultural Presentations Program.

Carol Harford3

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2 The agenda for the November 3 International Cultural Strategy Group meeting indicated that the Group would address several items discussed during the October 20 meeting, including the development of an administration policy on cultural affairs. Attached to the agenda is an October 22 memorandum from McWhorter to Garment, in which McWhorter summarized the current budgets for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA), National Council for the Arts (NCA), and CU, adding that the “public support” for these programs “has come from citizens in all walks of life who give a high priority to efforts to improve the quality of life in America and for efforts to improve the image of American life among peoples in other parts of the world.” He proposed a “dramatic increase” in funds for these programs, an expansion of the Department of State’s cultural activities, and development of “some sort of formula” in order to direct a fixed amount or percentage of money for these activities. Concerning the latter, McWhorter stated, “It may well be that the Administration would want to come up with some descriptive phrase or slogan for this new emphasis such as “REACH” (Re-Establish America’s Cultural Heritage).” (Ibid.)

3 Harford signed “Carol” above this typed signature. An unknown hand wrote “White House” below the typed signature.
Washington, October 30, 1969, 6:12 p.m.

S had three items he wanted to discuss with K. In addition to the TV coverage in Latin America on the speech, S was contemplating having about 6 or 7 of top publishers from South America come into the studio on Saturday to tape ½ hour of discussion. K said if it would be favorable, by all means do it. S said they could carefully select the people who would appear. K asked if S had read the speech. S read the first draft and thought that it would be a good speech.

#2 S was leaving tomorrow (Friday) for India and West Germany. Keating has asked S to talk to full mission in New Delhi—about 80–90 people also talk to Mrs. Gandhi. Was there anything S should know in speaking to Mrs. Gandhi. I indicated that S should tell her not to be mislead by the press on Vietnam. The President has come as far as he is going, he is very determined, it is now necessary for Hanoi to make a move. Told S to be tough with no apologies. S agreed completely with that. K added that the President will be in office for three more years no matter what happens. S asked if he could refer to this conversation with K in his discussion with Mrs. Gandhi. K asked if there would be an Embassy man there and S said only Keating and he would follow any rules S set up. K indicated that in that case S could mention the conversation but Keating should leave his name out of his reports.

#3 He is going to Germany to look over their facilities. He will go to Berlin to discuss Radio Free Europe with his counter parts (Alles). K said he was a friend of his and S should pass on his regards. S asked

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2 Reference is to the President’s October 31 remarks before the annual meeting of the Inter American Press Association, which he delivered at 9:35 p.m. at the Washington Hilton Hotel. His remarks were scheduled to be carried live by Telstar throughout the Western hemisphere. For the text of his remarks, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 893–901. According to a transcript of a November 1 telephone conversation between Kissinger and the President, which took place at 10:45 a.m., Nixon indicated that he had spoken with Haldeman, stating: “I want you [Kissinger], and Haldeman, within the next two days, to get any good statements by Latin American Presidents and want to get them to Ziegler for release as ‘White House was delighted to learn that, etc. etc.’ That is the way to do it. I want the foreign reaction reflected here. Don’t send them to me. Get them to Klein and Ziegler and to State and say get it to the press.” Kissinger responded that he would “have USIA start collecting them immediately.” (Ibid., Box 3, November 1–10, 1969)

3 November 1.
if K recalled S’s talk with the P.M. of Poland\(^4\) and how unhappy he
was with Radio Free Europe and will probably bring it up with the
West Germans. There is also increasing unhappiness with DOA. Since
there are no trade discussions between East Germany and Poland, S
thinks it is almost certain that the continued existence of transistors
on German soil will come up.\(^5\) S’s view would be not to mention it at
all. K indicated that S should let them raise it. S said they have already
inquired about legal treaties. K said he didn’t think they have the guts
to make S leave. S said he would sit tight and listen. K said S should
tell them these things as if they were every day issues and very natural
and that we have no thought of discontinuing them.

[Omission is in the original.] L.A. indicated that they won’t take
it since they are being exempted heavily on L.A. speech. There is no
point in our men sending it over in the middle of the night. Except
from the Saturday taping, there won’t be much contact and wanted K
to be aware.

Wanted K to make sure the President knows that Buckley and
Scranton(?)\(^6\) will make the trip. K said he knew already.

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\(^4\) Jozef Cyrankiewicz.

\(^5\) A January 27 memorandum prepared for the 303 Committee indicates that RFE’s
programming headquarters were located in Munich with transmitters in Biblis and
Holzkirchen, with an additional translator in Gloria, Portugal. The memorandum is
printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean,

\(^6\) Presumable reference to Stanton.
CA–6011 Washington, November 5, 1969, 1601Z

SUBJECT
Bureau of International Expositions (BIE): Reservation of United States Bicentennial Date—1976

As the Embassy knows, the subject of an international exposition to be organized in the United States in 1976 as part of the Bicentennial celebrations has been under active consideration by The American Revolution Bicentennial Commission (ARBC). The Commission, authorized by Act of Congress, is now developing plans for all aspects of the Bicentenary. Three formal sessions have been held since July, most recently on October 8–9. Additional sessions are planned at an early date.

As part of its work, the Commission has heard detailed presentations from three major cities—Boston, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.—which seek the privilege of holding the type of international exposition in 1976 that would qualify for sanction by the Bureau of International Expositions (BIE). At least one other city has requested the opportunity for a similar presentation. Meanwhile, the Commission is in communication with the Governors of the 50 states in order to coordinate all phases of the program and to insure that it will be thoroughly national in character.

Due to unavoidable circumstances, the Commission has not been able to complete its study and recommendations on the important issue of an international exposition. However, as a result of the October meetings, the Commission has asked the Secretary of Commerce to have his United States Expositions Staff proceed with the necessary technical studies of the various exposition projects.


At the October meetings, the Commission was advised of previous diplomatic action taken by the Embassy in 1964, under guidance from the Department, to protect the Bicentennial dates with the BIE. As the enclosure indicates, the Commission also requested the Department to take whatever action is advisable to continue (or “renew”) the United States reservation of 1976 for an international exposition of a nature appropriate to the Bicentennial.

The Embassy is, therefore, authorized to communicate with the BIE and to ask that this request be taken under official advisement by the BIE Classification Committee at its meeting of November 10 and by the BIE Administrative Council at its meeting of November 14, probably under Agenda item 12. The United States would hope by this action to set in motion the BIE’s formal processes for clearance of the year 1976 for an international exposition of a universal category in this country.

The American Revolution Bicentennial Commission has indicated, in connection with the above actions, that it hopes to make its recommendation to the President on the exposition element of the Bicentennial as early in 1970 as possible. The Department will promptly forward to the Embassy for transmittal to the BIE the result of this executive decision and the supporting details as to the site, theme, timing and method of organization of the exposition project.

On such a schedule the United States would hopefully anticipate that formal considerations by the BIE might be concluded in time for affirmative action by its membership at the semi-annual Administrative Council meeting in May, 1970.

Rogers

3 Confirmed by letters received from BIE President Barety and BIE Director Chalon in January, 1966 forwarded under Embassy airgrams #1647 and #1338. [Footnote is in the original.]

4 Enclosed but not printed is an October 15 memorandum from Sterling to Stans.

5 In Circular Airgram 6381 to multiple posts, November 28, the Department indicated that that U.S. representatives to the BIE meeting had renewed the official reservation of 1976. Recognizing that international participation in the Bicentennial was a key component of the Department of Commerce study, the Department also requested that posts respond to an enclosed paper entitled “Plans for U.S. Bicentennial Exposition—1976 ‘Century III,’” regarding the feasibility of international participation in the Bicentennial, specifically at a U.S.-hosted international exposition in 1976. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, CUL 8)
45. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)

Washington, November 14, 1969

SUBJECT
Support in the United States for the Policies Set Forth in the Vietnam Speech

The President has again raised with me the importance of conveying to our missions abroad the support which he has received for his policies on Vietnam and his November 3d speech. The President has cited such particulars as the Gallup poll, the Chilton poll and the unprecedented letter and wire response, as well as the number of

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1066, Box 7, Relations With White House, 1968–1969. No classification marking. An attached USIA action slip indicates that the memorandum was sent to Weathersby for immediate action. In a November 13 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger indicated that he had instructed Shakespeare “to undertake an immediate program with all of our missions abroad to exploit the manifestations of support of your policies for Vietnam which have developed in the wake of your November 3d speech.” Kissinger added that he had also asked Laird to prepare “a similar Game Plan designed to insure that our Armed Forces not only in Vietnam but elsewhere are apprised of the response we have received to your November 3d speech.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, Subject Files, FG 230, Box 1, EX FG 230 10/1/69–12/31/69)

2 On November 3, the President addressed the nation at 9:32 p.m. from his office in the White House. Broadcast live on radio and television, the address became known as the “silent majority” speech, as the President appealed to the “great silent majority” of Americans to support U.S. policy in Vietnam. The address is printed in Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 901–909. In his diary entry for November 4, Haldeman recounted: “Reaction day, and a spectacular one! Wires pouring in all day as fast as machines could process them. Piled them all on P desk. He greatly enjoyed going through them all through the day as the pile steadily grew. Showed his favorites to all comers. Almost all favorable, and about 43 referred to ‘quiet major.’” He continued: “P especially pleased at the reaction from the speech because he succeeded in moving people to action without demagoguing. His view is that you fire people up with a tough loud speech, but you win them over and change their minds only by calm reasoning.” (The Haldeman Diaries: Inside the Nixon White House, p. 105)

3 On November 5, Washington Post reporter Chalmers M. Roberts wrote: “George Gallup made a quickie poll of 501 adults living in 286 localities just after the speech. He concluded that the President had won a vote of confidence from 77 per cent of those who listened (7 out of 10 contacted) with only 6 per cent expressing outright opposition. Another 17 per cent were undecided.” (“Nixon Says Speech Has Wide Support,” p. A1)
Congressmen and Senators who will eventually sign the letter to Lodge\(^4\) or the Joint Resolution supporting his policy.\(^5\) The President is also desirous of having our Armed Forces, especially those in Vietnam, advised of the support which his speech generated. I will discuss this with Mel Laird today.

Would you please provide the President with a report on what actions you have taken to insure maximum foreign coverage by USIA.\(^6\)

Henry A. Kissinger

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\(^4\) On November 13, the President spoke in the House chamber at 12:53 p.m. and the Senate chamber at 2:37 p.m. For the text of these remarks, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, pp. 930–935. In his remarks before the Senate, he stated: “I am very grateful for the fact that a number of Members of the Senate—more than 60—have indicated by a letter to Ambassador Lodge their support of a just peace in Vietnam and their support of some of the proposals I made in my speech of November 3 on that subject.” (Ibid., p. 935) The text of the Senators’ letter is printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1969*, vol. 5, p. 1590. See also Robert B. Semple, Jr., “Nixon, in a Visit, Thanks Congress for War Support,” *New York Times*, November 14, 1969, p. 1.

\(^5\) Reference is to H. Res. 613 (H–Rep 91–643), introduced by Wright and Hays on November 4 and reported by the House Foreign Affairs Committee on November 13. On November 12, a bipartisan congressional delegation met with the President at the White House and endorsed, in a telephone conversation with Lodge in Paris, their support, in the form of a resolution, for the administration’s positions at the Paris talks. (“Lawmakers Call Lodge to Voice Support of His Position in Paris,” *New York Times*, November 13, 1969, p. 32) Senator Allott and Representatives Wright, Hays, Adair, and Arends participated in a press conference following the meeting at 5:32 p.m. in the Roosevelt Room. The text of the press conference is printed in *Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, 1969*, vol. 5, no. 46, pp. 1589–1592. During the press conference, Wright stated: “The resolution has effected such spontaneous support from both sides of the aisle that today we have 300 cosponsors representing a broad ideological spectrum of the membership. I think perhaps every State is represented. The 300 Members consist of 181 Republican Members and 119 Democratic Members, who are official cosponsors.” (Ibid., p. 1589) See also *Congress and the Nation*, vol. III, 1969–1972, p. 903.

\(^6\) For the USIA response; see Document 49.
USIA–19244 Washington, November 14, 1969

Agency producing for distribution next week 15-minute TV program “Silent Majority” using Washington Correspondent format. Program includes stock and specially filmed footage supporting administration position majority Americans behind government’s Vietnam policy. Also, interview George Gallup Jr. discusses results poll taken same night President’s nationwide telecast November 3. IMV distributing usual language versions to Posts using Correspondent and English masters (with narrator on camera) all others. Program timed assist Posts counteract expected negative impact moratorium coverage. Arrange placement on channels regularly using weekly Correspondent show. Do not offer program competitive stations. Non-Correspondent Posts free attempt best possible placement. Request usage reports and Post evaluations.

Decontrol following November 13, 1970.

Loomis

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Evaluation, Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1969–1978, Entry P–119, MV General The Silent Majority 1969. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Peter Synodis (IMV/MW) on November 13; cleared by O. Rudolph Aggrey (IMV/M); John DeViney (IMV/PS); Anthony Jowit (IMV/P); Stoddard; Frank Tribbe (IGC); Ralph Price (IMV/O); and William Lowdermilk (IMV/OSC); approved by Herschensohn. Cleared for transmission in USIA at 5:34 p.m. Sent via pouch to Bucharest, Budapest, and Warsaw from Rogers. Sent via telegraph.

2 Reference is to USIA’s weekly topical program, initiated in 1968, shipped to multiple countries. Each country received a special report voiced by a reporter from that country.

3 See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 45.

4 Reference is to the moratorium demonstration organized by the VMC and the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (New Mobe) scheduled to take place in Washington on November 15.

5 In USIA–19550 to all principal USIS posts, November 20, USIA indicated that the “Silent Majority” program had shipped to all principal posts: “Request you personally screen print immediately upon receipt and, if in your judgment best, arrange country team screening. Agency desires maximum effort for placement and use deemed most appropriate by PAO. Leave matter of direct projections to target group audiences to post discretion.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Evaluation, Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1969–1978, Entry P–119, MV General The Silent Majority 1969) For additional information about the domestic response to the film, see Document 49.
47. Report Prepared by the Media Review Committee of the USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel

Washington, undated

PURPOSE

The Media Review Committee as part of its continuing effort to review, analyze and evaluate media output of the Agency, has completed a survey of the Agency treatment of the Vietnam Moratorium of October 15. The Committee concerned itself with two main issues: (1) The adequacy of the Agency Policy directives as they affected media coverage of the event, and (2) the adequacy of the Media Elements in covering the event within the framework of Agency Policy.

PROCEDURE

The Committee studied the IOP News Policy Note issued October 13 and an extensive (almost all-inclusive) sampling of Agency media output on the Moratorium.

CONCLUSIONS

Though some members of the Committee felt that more specific and explicit directive in the News Policy Note may have improved media compliance with Policy, the majority opinion was that the Policy Note gave adequate guidance on the one hand, and sufficient leeway for creative interpretation by media professionals on the other.

The Committee was of the unanimous opinion that, while the extent of Agency media coverage of the Moratorium was somewhat lacking, the major problem was the almost total lack of depth in the existing coverage.

The Committee was of the unanimous opinion that any failure to provide the foreign audience and the Post with adequate coverage, background and information was not due to restraints imposed by Policy, but rather to a lack of initiative within the Media Elements.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural and Youth Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 6, EDX 12 October 15 Moratorium 1969. Limited Official Use. Martin Ronan, a TV production specialist in IMV and the Chairman of the Media Review Committee, sent the report to Schneider under a November 13 note. (Ibid.) Under a November 14 covering memorandum, Schneider sent Shakespeare both a copy of the report and Ronan’s memorandum to Shakespeare, writing: “While the report cannot affect coverage of the November 15 Mobilization, we hope its recommendations will be useful in the future. We would also like to suggest that policy guidance for such events be issued earlier. The NPN on the October 15 Moratorium is dated October 13.” (Ibid.)

2 See Document 40.
RECOMMENDATIONS

1) Those Agency Media Elements geared toward instantaneous release and distribution of information (IBS and parts of IPS):
(A) Provide more in-depth coverage for their general audience by utilizing on-the-spot reporters, news documentary-style wrap-ups, extensive articles (Agency authored or commissioned), interviews with non-government public figures, and more use of Editorial Roundups from various U.S. Newspapers. (B) Provide more extensive and in-depth information and background for staff use at Posts.

2) Those Agency Media Elements not concerned primarily with instantaneous distribution: (A) Plan for future use of materials, at least in a general way, by recording some of the events of the day (B) Outline future use so that specific events, interviews, etc. relevant to a final product or viewpoint may be obtained.

[Omitted here is the Analysis section of the report.]

SUMMARY

The Committee has attempted to study the Agency coverage of the October 15th Moratorium primarily from the standpoint of the News Policy Note which states in part: “You should gear the volume of output about the Moratorium to the requirements of credibility and the newsworthiness of the developments . . .” As stated above, our criticism is only slightly directed toward the “volume” of Agency coverage, but definitely toward its fulfillment of the “requirements of credibility.” It is the judgement of the Committee that more in-depth coverage of the Moratorium would have reversed the negative reports received from some Posts.

In a cable from Moscow, for example, it was related that VOA was rated third by Russian newspapers comparing coverage of the Moratorium by West German Broadcasting, BBC and VOA. A similar report was received from Warsaw.3

These Post responses are mentioned at the end of this study because they open the door to other problems. Every Media Element does not always take advantage of the potential for extensive coverage and creative interpretation provided by an objective, open Policy Note. Nor does every Post receive all of the materials which are initiated by the Media Elements in Washington.

In the case of Agency media coverage of the October 15 Moratorium, the distance between Policy and Post was not bridged as well as it should have been by the Media Elements.

3 The cables were not found.
48. Letter From the Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars (Humphrey) to President Nixon

Washington, November 18, 1969

Dear Mr. President:

You will recall that the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was established by Act of Congress last year to be “a living institution expressing the ideals and concerns of Woodrow Wilson . . . symbolizing and strengthening the fruitful relation between the world of learning and the world of public affairs.”

Congress placed the Center in the Smithsonian Institution under the administration of its own Board of Trustees who were appointed subsequently by President Johnson and yourself as listed below. I was designated Chairman of the Board.

Your own message to Congress on District of Columbia affairs last April gave us a strong start by declaring that “an international center for scholars to be established as a living memorial to Woodrow Wilson . . . could hardly be a more appropriate memorial to a President who combined a devotion to scholarship with a passion for peace. The

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 409, Subject Files, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Vol. II [Nov 69–Jan 70]. No classification marking. Read sent a copy of the letter and a subsequent letter from Humphrey to the President, dated December 17, to Kissinger under a December 19 note, stating that the letters would inform Kissinger of Read’s and Humphrey’s “efforts to bring Woodrow Wilson to life in the attic of the Smithsonian!” (Ibid.) Kissinger sent the copies of the letters to Cole under an undated memorandum indicating that he had received the copies from Read, who informed Kissinger that the Bureau of the Budget had not assigned an appropriation to the Center for FY 1971. Kissinger added, “I continue to believe that the FY 1971 budget should include some provision for assistance to the Center.” (Ibid.) On a December 29 typewritten note, Kissinger wrote: “Already approved by Pres. I believe. Please check if not let me call or write Ben Read.” (Ibid.) On a January 12, 1970, typewritten note, Kissinger indicated that the Center would receive “$100,000” from the “Humanities Foundation.” (Ibid.) For the Department of State’s comments on Humphrey’s November 18 letter, see Document 51.

2 Reference is to P.L. 90–637 (82 Stat. 1356), the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Act of 1968, signed into law by President Johnson on October 25, 1968. At the signing ceremony, Johnson commented that the legislation would “establish this monument to a great American President—as a living memorial to one who combined great scholarship, a progressive spirit, and a practical understanding of political life.” (Public Papers: Johnson, 1968–1969, Book II, p. 1070)
District has long sought, and long needed, a center for both men of letters and men of affairs.3

Because of the generalized nature of the statute creating the Center and its legislative history, the Board and its staff spent seven months in extensive correspondence and discussions to determine the needs of scholars visiting the District and how best to fulfill a unique and useful public purpose within the broad goals of the presidential memorial institution framework. I personally devoted considerable time to this effort in correspondence and in discussions here and abroad. I think we have obtained substantial Congressional support.

At our Board meeting last month, at which Secretaries Rogers and Finch were ably represented, the Trustees approved the opening in October of 1970 of new international fellowship and guest scholar programs in prime space which has been offered to the Center in the newly renovated original Smithsonian Institution building. Those programs and plans are described in the attached brochure, which includes the above quote from your April message to Congress.4 The brochure has been mailed to a large number of institutions and individuals in this country and elsewhere.

I think the fellowship program we have designed [is] unique and desirable in scope and purpose. When the program is fully operational, up to forty distinguished scholars—approximately half from the United States and half from other countries—will be selected to work and study here for periods ranging from a few weeks to several years. They will be chosen—again in approximately equal measure—from many traditional academic disciplines and from a variety of non-academic occupations and professions such as government, law, business, journalism, etc.

The theme of the program is designed to accentuate those aspects of Wilson’s ideals and concerns for which he is perhaps best remembered a half century after his presidency—his search for international peace and the imaginative new governmental approaches he used to meet pressing issues of his day. We are determined to concentrate our efforts here on studies of some of the big issues of our times which are simply

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3 In his April 28 special message to the Congress on the District of Columbia, Nixon stated: “One of the most significant additions to Pennsylvania Avenue will be an international center for scholars, to be established as a living memorial to Woodrow Wilson in the area just north of the National Archives. There could hardly be a more appropriate memorial to a President who combined a devotion to scholarship with a passion for peace. The District has long sought, and long needed, a center for both men of letters and men of affairs. This should be, as it was first proposed, ‘an institution of learning that the 22nd Century will regard as having influenced the 21st.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, p. 332)

4 Not found attached.
not getting the attention they deserve in governments or in the institutions of higher education.

For these purposes we have submitted a modest and carefully reviewed budget estimate for fiscal year 1971 totalling $900,000, including $400,000 for equipping the Center and administrative support and $500,000 to finance twenty fellowships. We have set our sights on raising from private sources at least another $500,000 to finance the other twenty fellows, and if we do better than that we will be able to reduce the federal sums requested for this purpose accordingly. We are setting up a bipartisan outside advisory committee to assist us in this development effort.

We were advised today of the tentative decision of the Bureau of the Budget to provide no funds for the Center in the coming fiscal year and informed that this issue would be presented to you in a few days. I do not know the Bureau’s reasoning, and obviously there is no point in my addressing this issue in terms of dollars and cents.

Mr. President, I am convinced that we have laid the groundwork here to create something of significant national and international import which will have value in terms of cultural exchanges and education, and, most importantly, in new approaches to some of the staggering problems confronting all advanced societies today. I ask your support in reinstating the original budget request submitted by the Board of Trustees of the Woodrow Wilson International Center.

Sincerely,

Hubert H. Humphrey

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5 Printed from a copy that indicates Humphrey signed the original.
49. Editorial Note

In a November 20, 1969, memorandum to President Richard M. Nixon, Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) Henry Loomis outlined the support the United States Information Agency had provided for the President’s November 3 speech on Vietnam. The memorandum, a copy of which was sent to Secretary of State William Rogers, responded to the November 14 request that Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs Henry Kissinger had made to USIA Director Frank J. Shakespeare. (See Document 45.) Loomis stated that USIA “used the full resources of the Information Agency in disseminating the November 3 speech on Viet-Nam.” He indicated that the speech had been broadcast live on the Voice of America (VOA) English service, with simultaneous translations in Chinese, Spanish, and French. The address was later broadcast in Vietnamese. In addition, kinescopes were sent to posts for local television placement. Loomis stated that USIA had provided a “steady output of information materials” following the speech. Loomis concluded the memorandum by noting: “We have just sent to 103 countries a 15-minute television program entitled ‘The Silent Majority,’ which effectively supports one of the principal points made in your November 3 speech. This film has aroused considerable press and television interest in the U.S. in the past few days.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1066, Box 7, Relations With White House, 1968–1969)

The previous day, the Washington Post printed an article by Chicago Daily News Reporter Robert Gruenberg, referencing the television film, entitled The Silent Majority. Gruenberg wrote that the film had “originated in the United States Information Agency on Nov. 4, the day after President Nixon’s nationally televised speech on Vietnam policy. USIA officials said the White House was not involved in the planning or its direction.” Gruenberg also wrote that the film “cost $20,000. It was completed early Sunday, and its 12 days of production involved extensive use of film clips of ordinary Americans at work, as well as scenes of former Vice President Hubert Humphrey voicing statements of support for Mr. Nixon during a recent visit to the White House.” (“USIA Film Shows Views Of Majority,” November 19, 1969, page A14)

On November 20, the New York Times printed excerpts from The Silent Majority script. The excerpts included details about the November 15 moratorium demonstration organized by the Vietnam Moratorium Committee (VMC) and the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (New Mobe) and remarks by Humphrey and George Gallup Jr., the President of the Gallup Poll. (“Excerpts From the Script for ‘The Silent Majority,’ page 27) Also that day, USIA officials screened
a special showing of *The Silent Majority* at the office of Representative John E. Moss (Democrat-California), the chair of the House Government Operations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations and Government Information, at the request of Moss and Representative Ogden R. Reid (Republican-New York), the ranking minority member of the committee. *New York Times* reporter Tad Szulc, in a November 21 article, wrote that after “demanding” a special showing, Moss and Reid “were shown the $20,000 film by Eugene Kopp, the general counsel of U.S.I.A., and Anthony Guarco, deputy assistant director of the agency for motion pictures and television. Mr. Kopp and Mr. Guarco brought the film to the Capitol.” (“U.S.I.A. Film on Dissent Stirs Concern in Capitol,” page 24)

Both Moss and Reid criticized the film, asserting that the editorializing might impair the U.S. image abroad. According to the *Washington Post*, Moss “said the film indicates a subtle change by an agency committed to informing to one of a ‘propaganda effort.’

“That was not the role assigned to the agency,’ said Moss. ‘I think it most appropriate to show demonstrations for or against (U.S. Vietnam policy) or both,’ he added.

“But here we are, faced with a slogan, “The Silent Majority,” and the film attempts to establish that as a fact. That’s a very difficult thing to do.”” (Robert-Gruenberg, “Two House Members Criticize USIA Film,” November 22, 1969, page A2)

By 1970, the USIA leadership conceded that *The Silent Majority* had not been well received abroad. *New York Times* reporter Richard Halloran wrote in a January 30, 1970, article that a USIA spokesperson stated that “only 26 of the 106 posts overseas to which the film had been sent had reported showing it. Of these, many showings consisted only of selected segments of the film.” The unidentified spokesperson claimed that “17 U.S.I.A. posts reported that the film had not been shown in their host countries because there was no interest, the post officials thought it politically inappropriate, or the local television station or theater managers thought it not timely.” The best reception of the film took place in Mexico “where it was shown 42 times to about seven million people. It also went well in several Central American countries, in Brazil and in Ecuador.” (“‘Silent Majority,’ U.S.I.A. Film, Fails To Stir Foreigners,” page 8)
50. Telegram From the Embassy in Romania to the Department of State

Bucharest, November 21, 1969, 0830Z

3042. USIA for IPS and ICS.

Bucharest, November 21—American composer-conductor Aaron Copland left this capital Friday, after having enriched Romania’s musical life in several ways.

In his concert with the symphonic orchestra of Romania radio-television Thursday night, the Romanian public for the first time heard three contemporary American compositions. These were Leonard Bernstein’s overture to Candide and Copland’s concert for clarinet and string orchestra and El Salon Mexican. The clarinet concert, with Aurelian-Octav Popa as a soloist, clearly was the public’s favorite.

But from the audience’s reaction to the lively Candide and Salon Mexican and from comment and conversation immediately following the concert it was evident that these two compositions also were enjoyed. The large radio-television concert hall, considered Bucharest’s finest, was filled to the last seat, including a who’s who in Romanian music as well as large numbers of enthusiastic youngsters.

Before the concert, Mr. Copland presented a prize of 5,000 lei (about $270) to the Romanian Union of Composers, to be awarded to a Romanian composer under 30 who is considered one of the outstanding talents of the present generation.

The proposal was accepted on behalf of the union by Zeno Vancea, UCTS Vice President, who thanked Mr. Copland for his artistic and material contributions to Romanian music.

Meeker

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, CUL 16 US. Unclassified. Repeated for information to USIA.
2 November 21.
3 Reference is to the operetta composed by Bernstein based on Voltaire’s Candide. It opened on Broadway on December 1, 1956, at the Martin Beck Theater. (Louis Calta, “Candide to Open at Beck Tonight,” New York Times, December 1, 1956, p. 18)
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 25, 1969

SUBJECT
Comments on Letter of November 18 to the President from Hubert H. Humphrey, as Chairman of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Regarding Funding for FY 1971

In response to Mr. Cole’s request of November 20, the Department’s comments follow. In October of 1961 President Kennedy, in response to a joint resolution of the Congress, appointed the Woodrow Wilson Memorial Commission to consider and to make plans for a national memorial to the 28th President. In 1966, following hearings, the commission filed its report recommending establishment of a Center for Scholars in downtown Washington. The Secretary of State, appearing in a personal capacity, had testified before the Commission in 1966 in support of such a center to be a place for scholars from all parts of the world. The Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars was established by Act of Congress approved October 24, 1968.

The Act specified that the Secretary of State would be a statutory member of the Center’s Board of Trustees. Pursuant to that appoint-
ment the Secretary has been represented at the Assistant Secretary level at Board meetings and kept informed of Board actions.

Through the Board and Executive Committee meetings so far held, and extensive staff work, progress has been made in delineating functions of the Center and planning an opening in the Fall of 1970 in temporary space offered to the Center in the original Smithsonian Institution building. This progress can continue only as funds can be made available.

The Department believes the consideration of funding for FY 1971 needs to take careful account of the opportunity this project, already well begun, provides to contribute to our foreign relations, to wit:

1. A national memorial to Woodrow Wilson can appropriately serve the interests of international scholars. Wilson’s memory is most closely identified with international peace and scholarship.

2. International scholarly efforts, encouraged through such a center, can contribute to new cooperative approaches to human problems common to more than one continent—among them, the basic issues raised by illiteracy, hunger, overpopulation, urban problems, et al.—as well as in fields of lesser urgency but nonetheless affording the basis for significant scholarly cooperation and communication.

In view of the plans so far made and already given wide circulation, and the Executive endorsement given last April to this memorial, it is strongly recommended that funding to continue the progress now under way be provided.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

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8 Reference is to the Smithsonian Institution building known as the “Castle,” designed by architect James Renwick Jr. and completed in 1855.


10 Curran signed for Eliot above Eliot’s typed signature.
52. Memorandum From the Military Assistant to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis)¹

Washington, November 25, 1969

SUBJECT

Public Opinion Surveys

The President has expressed an interest in learning who actually conducts the public opinion surveys USIA sponsors periodically in foreign countries. Specifically, he would like to know:

—whether the organizations contracted are subsidiaries of U.S. groups?
—whether it is feasible to use organizations like Gallup and Sidlinger for this sort of survey?

Would you please send us a memorandum for the President on the above subject.

Alexander M. Haig
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Military Assistant

53. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis) to President Nixon

Washington, November 26, 1969

Most of the organizations with which USIA contracts for opinion surveys are affiliates of either the Gallup Organization (Princeton, New Jersey) or of International Research Associates (INRA, New York). Gallup and INRA have few subsidiaries abroad, working primarily through affiliated survey research organizations. Sidlinger does not have foreign subsidiaries or affiliates.

We are occasionally able to contract directly with Gallup or INRA, who then act in our behalf in contacting their subsidiaries or affiliates.

All USIA opinion research is conducted in their native language by nationals of the country in which the survey is taken. We are assured that U.S. Government sponsorship is kept in confidence.

There are 36 currently outstanding or recently completed contracts or obligations, totalling $452,409, between the Information Agency’s Research Service and public opinion research organizations. Fourteen of these ($149,915) are with Gallup affiliates or subsidiaries. Thirteen ($174,036) are with affiliates or subsidiaries of INRA. The remaining nine ($128,458) are with independent local survey research firms, including two small contracts with the Roper Institute of Williamstown, Massachusetts.

We contract with independent, foreign-owned research organizations only if there are no American affiliates or subsidiaries in the country, if the bid received from the American affiliate or subsidiary is not competitive, or if the competence of the independent firm, and the services it renders, are superior.

Henry Loomis

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. No classification marking. According to another copy of the memorandum, it was drafted by Benson and cleared by Strasburg. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 1, INF–12 Public Opinion and Attitudes) Loomis sent the copy of the memorandum printed here to Haig under a November 26 covering memorandum. Haig sent both the memorandum and the covering letter to Higby under a December 5 covering memorandum, indicating that the memorandum “points out, inter alia, that the bulk of their public opinion surveys are contracted with associates of either Gallup or International Research Associates.” (Ibid.)

2 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
54. Note From the Special Assistant to the Associate Director and Deputy Associate Director, Research and Assessment, United States Information Agency (Krill) to the Associate Director, Research and Assessment (Strasburg)

Washington, December 4, 1969

SUBJECT
IPS Output on Massacre Story

IPS is concentrating on official statements of the U.S. Government. The White House statement, along with those of Secretaries Rogers, Laird and Resor have been stressed. They also carried the initial DOD announcement of DOD’s plans to investigate the case and to court marshal Lt. Calley.

IPS emphasis has been on official statements, following IOP policy guidance which pushes the line that this is an abhorrent act, the U.S. doesn’t condone it and is seeking the people responsible who will be punished. They are also picking up “selected” editorial comment which supports the U.S. Government line.

They haven’t treated the developing viewpoint that this should be considered as a normal “act of war.”

They have picked up some foreign editorials pointing out that only in America, which is an open society, could such a story become a public issue.

RFK


SUBJECT
Agency Book Selection Policy

Recent internal and external criticism of Agency book selection procedures points out a serious shortcoming in USIA policy which has disturbed younger officers for some time: The Agency is not helping USIS Posts obtain as varied a selection of its books as they should have. The Agency has unnecessarily shied away from controversial books, conservative as well as liberal. While we can not carry all books, the Posts should be able to demonstrate to their audiences the great range of thought in America, and the confidence we have that free expression of ideas—even if these ideas are offensively stated or radical departures from current norms—is central to the democratic process.

We believe that adoption of the following suggestions would substantially improve the Agency’s book selection procedures:

1) Criteria for selecting “program books” should include: The book’s utility to USIA objectives in different countries; the importance of a book as representative of the views of a significant group in America; the book’s relevance to concerns of people in other countries; the book’s prize and literary significance (Pulitzer Prize, National Book Award, the review of major journals can be useful in this respect.)

2) ICS should inform PAOs of all books reviewed by the Agency.

3) ICS should continue to send out “program books,” but PAOs should be allowed to select books from all these reviewed by ICS—or from other sources—without ICS veto, and without justification. The Agency should rely on the judgments of its PAOs in those matters (if necessary Post-ICS differences of opinion should be reviewed at the Area Director level.)

4) The Agency should seek advice from scholars and professional people in various fields to assist in selection of titles and improving selection in special areas. Liaison with the Agency “Campus Representatives” might be improved for this purpose.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 1, BKs 1 Task Force on Books Policy. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to Loomis, Weathersby, and Dunlap.
SUBJECT
Planning of the American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration

The National Bicentennial Plan

The Commission organized a meeting for the preparation of the American Revolution Bicentennial Plan at Williamsburg November 17–18. Besides the staff of the ARBC and a few private consultants, the participants included representatives of the White House, the several Federal agencies whose heads are ex-officio members of the Commission, and other Federal agencies that have an especial interest in the program. Phil Conley represented the Agency.

It was clear from the meeting that the Chairman of the Commission, John E. Wallace Sterling and the Executive Director, Melbourne L. Spector are worried over the great amount of work yet to be done by the ARBC in the remaining few months. They are prepared to step up pressure on all responsible parties to get the job done properly and on time.

The main topics discussed at the meeting were:

1. The Outline of the Commission’s Plan. The Commission’s staff presented a draft outline of the National Bicentennial Plan. In general terms the outline was approved by the meeting’s participants. In the outline the staff took its lead from several points that President Nixon has emphasized on various occasions. The Bicentennial is an occasion for celebration of the past, but more important it is an opportunity for the American people to rededicate themselves to the ideals of the past and to gird themselves for greater achievement in the future. The report, therefore, will try to give a new interpretation of the Declaration of Independence in terms that are meaningful today and will set national goals for the years between now and 1976 and for the century

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, 1963–1969, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD–264, Box 311, CUL Culture (GEN). No classification marking. White sent the memorandum to Weathersby under a December 8 typewritten note, in which she wrote: “This is Phil Conley’s report on the Bicentennial. He recommends (p. 3) an Agency task force to submit a plan to the Commission by February 28, 1970.” She continued: “We did create a committee about a year ago but it seems to have been inactive. Hence I think we should probably accept Phil’s suggestion.” Weathersby initialed the typewritten note.
following. The President has mentioned particularly several areas in which the country can make great progress by 1976: management of our growing abundance, making real our ideals of full opportunity, cleaning up our air and water, balancing our system of transportation, improving our systems of education and health care. Above all, following the President’s injunction, the Bicentennial plan is to concern itself not only with material development but especially with the spiritual quality of American life. The celebration and the search and striving for new goals will involve not just the Federal Government but all the states and local communities, all parts of the society, indeed every person in the country.

2. Organization for the future work of the Commission. The Commission now has five Committees: Media; Arts, Humanities, and Science; Commerce and Labor; Events and Exhibitions; and Voluntary, Military and Service Organizations. The primary function of these Committees is to stimulate early planning and programming by state, local, and private organizations and institutions in their respective fields. In the nine weeks the Committees were in existence before the Williamsburg meeting only one had been active. The Williamsburg meeting agreed that each of these Committees needs a full-time assistant, if it is to accomplish its task and the Commission’s Executive Director will examine this question. As a result of his assessment, it is possible that the Commission or the White House will request certain agencies to detail an officer full time to the Commission until July 1970.

3. The Young People and the Bicentennial. Remarks of Jim Atwater of the White House staff led to much discussion of how the Commission can assure that the young people of the country will fully participate in both the celebration and the rededication. There was general fear that unless they have a significant role in planning the program, many important elements in our youth may consider the celebration not “their thing” and stay aloof from or even hostile to the whole program. A Committee of three, including Phil Conley, was set up to advise the Executive Director on this point.

4. Planning within Departments and Agencies. Each Agency represented at the Williamsburg meeting was asked to present to the Commission its program for the period from now to 1976. From the discussions at the meeting, it is clear that a great deal of planning and budgeting is going on in various agencies, e.g., Commerce, Interior (National Park Service), Smithsonian, and the Library of Congress. The Smithsonian and the Library of Congress, at least, have set up special staffs solely to plan their institution’s role in the Bicentennial.

5. International Aspects of the Bicentennial. The Department of State was asked by Mr. Spector to take the lead in developing the international program. Francis Colligan and Paul A. Cook of CU and Phil
Conley (IOP) will meet soon as a first step toward accelerating the international planning.

**USIA’s Role in the Bicentennial Period**

As indicated in the attached outline, USIA will have a major role in publicizing and interpreting Bicentennial programs and projects in the U.S., helping in negotiations involving foreign governments or institutions, and carrying out special USIA projects.

**Recommendations**

1. The Agency should set immediately adequate machinery for internal planning, coordinating and executing its role in respect to the Bicentennial. The machinery could consist of the following:
   a. A planning task force should prepare the Agency’s preliminary Bicentennial Plan. The membership of the Bicentennial task force could be similar to the Apollo XI Task Force\(^2\) and include representation from IOP, IOA, and each medium and area office. In order that the Agency’s plan be considered in the National Bicentennial Plan, it should be submitted to the ARBC by February 29, 1970.
   b. Upon completion of its report, the Bicentennial task force as a formed body can be disbanded, but each Agency element represented on the task force should designate one person to continue to be responsible for stimulating and coordinating all its programs relating to the Bicentennial.
   c. At some time in the future when the volume of Agency programming and production will have reached a certain height, it will probably be necessary for the Director to appoint an Agency Coordinator for the Bicentennial Celebration.

2. If the Agency is called upon to detail an officer to the ARBC staff, it [should] do so.

3. The Director in a meeting with his senior staff make clear the following points: a. The importance of the Bicentennial Celebration, b. The tremendous opportunity the Bicentennial offers the Agency to present America’s past, present and future society in favorable light, c. The need for all elements of the Agency to buckle down and develop their recommendations for the Agency’s participation in and exploitation of the Bicentennial during the budget years from now until 1976.

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\(^2\) See Document 25.
USIA’s Role in Respect to American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration

The total number of projects or programs that will be carried on throughout the United States during the period of the Bicentennial Celebration will be beyond counting. Some programs will be frivolous and of only local and ephemeral significance. But a good number will be of international and lasting importance. Only some that are under consideration, study or even negotiation are: Olympics in Denver, Los Angeles, or both; major expositions at Boston, Philadelphia, and/or Washington; international symposia; major music, dance and film festivals; artistic and historical exhibits; competitions in literature and all other arts; commemorative stamp, medals, and coins; 76 or 200 new cities; establishment of a national theater; special research and publications programs; international scholarships; a chair of youth hostels.

Many of these programs will be occasions of festivity and pride. The Agency will have much to do in publicizing them. But surely USIA’s great opportunity lies in seizing upon these occasions and this era to emphasize the ideas and ideals that lay behind this country’s foundation and growth, in presenting to the world the new dedication the President urged upon the nation, the search for new short-term (till 1976) and long-term (1976–2076) goals, and above all programs that will be set in motion to achieve the short-range goals.

The Agency’s tasks relating to the Bicentennial can be grouped under five headings:

I. Advising ARBC and other agencies on actual or potential foreign opinion in relation to the Bicentennial or specific projects.

II. Publicizing and interpreting events of the Bicentennial. This will involve not only publicizing the events to overseas audiences but bringing out their significance.

III. Assisting other Federal Agencies, states, municipalities or private institutions in carrying out the international side of their programs. Any CU program will, of course, be administered in the field by USIS. Furthermore, other Federal agencies, certain state and local government-
tional or private institutions or organizations will seek the help of the State Department, the Agency, or Embassies in various matters such as borrowing materials from foreign institutions in events to be held in the U.S., negotiation for gifts or other tokens from foreign countries, suggesting that foreign institutions hold exhibits, music festivals, or other programs in their own countries to celebrate our Bicentennial. Regardless of whether the original approach is made to the Department, the Agency, or an Embassy the burden of handling the request in the field will fall on USIS.

IV. Adaptation or expansion of continuing USIA programs. Some of these programs may also fit under V below. The following suggestions have already been made by various parts of the Agency:

- Special Forum programs
- Special issues of Dialogue
- Bibliographies or appropriate subjects

A special book translation program for at least all the major languages (French, Spanish, Arabic). The program should cover all periods and all major problems or themes of American history.

Series of educational films for high school or college level on American history.

V. Special USIS Programs. Several suggestions have already been made:

- A cluster of multi-media programs on such subjects as advancement (and retreat) of individual liberties in the U.S.
- U.S. concern in the past for liberty and for improvement of the quality of human life outside its own borders.
- Contributions U.S. has received from abroad—institution, ideas, mores, culture, and financing (railroads, canals, ranches,) etc.
- U.S. contribution to mankind’s culture.
- Development of the ideal of free education for all children.
- Development of the arts in the U.S.
- Awards for the best foreign books or university theses in American history, government, political system, etc.
- Establishment and strengthening of research or documentation in centers overseas, drawing upon the new library techniques.
- International, regional or national conferences on various themes relating to the American Revolution.

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4 Program of broadcast lectures on a variety of subjects.
Publications of collections of essays by distinguished foreign leaders and intellectuals on the American contribution to the world, especially in the spiritual and cultural realms.

The Agency should also back appropriate projects that CU may propose, such as, at least one major bicentennial festival of the performing arts in each area and establishment of commemorative chairs in American studies at foreign universities.

57. Report Prepared by the USIA Goals Committee of the USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel

Washington, December 5, 1969

OBJECTIVE 1: Builds an understanding of contemporary America presenting balanced, multi-faceted views of American culture—encompassing its history, institutions, achievements, aspirations, and problems.

Agency field personnel should have an intuitive, almost instinctive grasp of this objective. And it is particularly imperative that stateside Agency employees, especially those directly involved with media output have a fine sensitivity for this objective and implement it daily.

The dramatic events and happenings of modern America are highlighted all over the world in a multitude of ways by non-USIA sources. USIA is responsible for interpreting the modern American scene so that foreign audiences can place events in proper historical and contemporary perspective. Because the United States is a major world power in the political, economic, and military spheres, American culture—its dynamism as well as its weaknesses—is felt in most areas of the world. USIA’s presentation of American society must reflect that very diversity from which the United States derives its strength. And in selecting those elements of American life to portray to foreign audiences, USIA

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1970. No classification marking. Sent to YOPP members under a December 5 covering memorandum, which listed the members of the USIA Goals Committee. Both the report and the covering memorandum are attached to a February 6, 1970, briefing paper prepared by Matuszeski in advance of a meeting with YOPP members.
should seek out and present the views of responsible prominent persons outside the Agency, and indeed outside the USG.

Presenting a balanced and multi-faceted view of the United States means that USIA recognizes the pride Americans take in their society’s open nature which stimulates dissent and diversity and encourages or even invites self-criticism. The essence of America’s strength is that there is no single government approved version of the United States. Striving to portray balanced views of contemporary America does not mean to suggest that everything the Agency does must reflect perfect harmony and balance on every side of an issue or that output must be weighted to the ideological ounce. On the contrary, USIA should avoid this dull bland fudge which tries to offend no one and succeeds admirably in boring everyone.

If discussion, sharp clear dialogue, and dissent are recognized as among America’s more prominent assets, then they should be presented as such in a lucid, coherent manner to foreign audiences. It must be emphasized that the above refers to a presentation of domestic American life and not to foreign posture or policy which USIA has to portray in a unified manner speaking as the official voice of the American government. Where a conflict exists between the proper portrayal of domestic American events and the expediencies of U.S. foreign policy, where there is a conflict between this goal and the goal calling for the defense of U.S. foreign policy, the approach must be left to the PAO given his understanding of the special forces coming into play in the host country. Material fulfilling both objectives should be supplied by the Agency.

**OBJECTIVE 2: Encourages understanding and support by other nations of United States foreign policy objectives as enunciated by the President and the Secretary of State.**

The wording of the above mission statement is designed to correspond to the realistic possibilities of USIA operations affecting foreign attitudes or actions relative to U.S. foreign policy objectives. The tone “encourages” signals modesty, modesty in that USIA probably can do little more in its present form than simply make known the U.S. Government’s position on a specific foreign policy issue. The goal implies a whole range of possibilities, from the simple presentation of information to the hope that “understanding and support”, as revealed in attitudes and actions, will result.

“Foreign policy” as stated above is taken to mean official foreign policy as specifically produced by documents and statements by the White House or the State Department and does not mean broader areas of government actions that can be interpreted as foreign policy. This makes the USIA task fairly specific and tightly defined.
“As enunciated by the President and the Secretary of State” here obviously implies that official foreign policy can be physically delivered by representatives or spokesmen at various levels, from standard news conference sessions to declarations at the mission level by Embassy officers, who themselves should be prepared to explain the considerations underlying these policies, as appropriate. Once admitted that this part of the USIA mission has very clear limits, aspects of it that involve USIA/USIS can be fairly clearly outlined at the Washington and post levels.

At the Washington level; USIA\(^2\) publishes and distributes to USIS posts official U.S. Government statements and texts on foreign policy issues, offers foreign audiences the views of the President and his administration on U.S. foreign policy issues by creating media products treating administration pronouncements or actions in that field, covers foreign travel undertaken by the President or his official representatives as well as official visits of foreign dignitaries to the United States, and informs foreign audiences on proceedings of international organizations of which the United States is a member or an interested party.

At the Post level USIS acts as official American spokesman on foreign policy issues at overseas missions, makes available directly to foreign audiences, in particular news media, foreign policy statements and texts made by the President or other U.S. Government spokesmen, as well as the local missions’ declarations involving the host country and arranges for and advises on meetings of the Ambassador, members of the country team, and visiting U.S. officials with the local press and news media.

**OBJECTIVE 3: Contributes to the exchange with other societies of information, skills and experience to promote development and the solution of common problems.**

The foreign policy interests of nations cannot always be expected to coincide, but there are basic human concerns that do. Humanity faces common problems—violence, poverty, overpopulation, depletion of natural resources, the destruction of the environment, to name the major ones—that must be solved in common. Communication has a limited role to play in the solution of these problems and USIA a contribution to make to that communication. That contribution is the function of this agency goal.

In the past we have always regarded development as a need of the underdeveloped world, and thus have directed our “National Development” activities to those countries only. If the Agency is to

\(^2\) An unknown hand inserted “USIA” into this sentence between the words “level” and “publishes.”
continue to play a role in development, it must recognize that development is a world-wide problem, not only because the problems of the poorer nations affect the rest of the international community, but because the industrialized nations themselves have reached a new level of technology which has created a whole new set of developmental problems.

In contributing to the exchange “of information, skills and experience to promote development and the solution of common problems” USIA should serve as the intermediary between American experts and organizations and those of other countries in appropriate fields, such as health, demography, urbanology; in general, all areas of activity from the cultural to the social and physical sciences which relate to development and the improvement of the quality of life.

This is not to say that the Agency officer, in order to function properly within this goal, must be a developmental expert. It is, however, important and reasonable to assume that officials whose commodity is their country’s culture should be aware of the problems their country faces, and efforts made toward their solutions.

Besides being a point of contact between the U.S. and the other countries in these various fields—an area where our cultural exchange program must play a very important role—USIA should be a conduit for information from governmental and non-governmental sources which the PAO determines will aid the development in a realistic and workable fashion.

This demands an understanding on the part of every USIA officer of the problems of the host country, the preoccupations and aspirations of its people, and its relation to the international community and the United States in political, economic and cultural affairs; in other words, an extremely perceptive officer, and an intelligent listener able to act on what he has heard, able to pull together many resources in the country in which he works as well as his own country.

Mutuality of interest can only be achieved through genuine dialogue. Often in the past USIA has been insensitive to other countries’ needs and wishes and has patronizingly given out what it thought they should have, frequently with a shallow interest in picturesque local customs. This superficiality has especially repelled the intellectual leaders USIA has tried to reach. A genuine sensitivity to, and appreciation of the social, scientific and cultural achievements of the host country will help foster the mutual respect so vital to any form of cross-cultural communication.

OBJECTIVE 4: Participation in foreign policy formulation by advising the President, his representatives overseas and the executive branch of public opinion and other psychological factors abroad and their implications for U.S. foreign policies.

USIA can contribute to the formulation of foreign policy by providing information and counsel on foreign public opinion and the psycho-
logical factors from which it is derived. In the past the Agency’s participation in policymaking has occasionally been noteworthy and creative, but more frequently deficient in both quality and quantity and never consistent or systematic. Nearly a decade after President Kennedy’s creation of a policy mandate for the Agency, this objective continues to express more closely a desired state of affairs than a current reality.

That this is the case is due to factors beyond and within the Agency’s control. Of the former, the attitudes of the President and the Department of State are the most crucial. That is, both must want the kind of counsel that USIA is capable of providing. This implies more than just a close relationship between the Agency Director and the President. Personal friendship and political ties are no guarantee of systematic policy involvement. On the inter-agency level, the Department of State has frequently either ignored or remained hostile to the consideration of psychological and public opinion factors in foreign policy decision-making. Too often, the Department’s concern with foreign public opinion has occurred only in crisis situations—when foreign emotions are high and when communications with foreign audiences are often least effective. In the last analysis each President structures the policy process to suit his own preferences, and without a clear indication that the Agency’s counsel is both a desirable and necessary part of that process, maximum realization of this objective at all levels is impossible.

But to a significant extent the existing situation is also a result of factors which are within the Agency’s control. USIA has developed a high degree of professionalism and expertise in its communications to foreign audiences; it has not done so in the area of policy formulation. Emphasis on overseas activities and on providing administrative and program support for them has resulted in a failure to develop the requisite amount of skilled personnel necessary to enable the Agency’s leadership to fulfill its counseling function. In addition, the Agency has all too often had little of relevance to contribute. In large part this has been a consequence of inadequate research. Opinion surveys which were not always analyzed in depth, a tendency to conduct surveys oriented to worldwide comparisons rather than issues pertinent to particular regions or countries, and the subordination of country and area expertise to survey research techniques have lead in the past to

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research findings which were frequently superficial and lacking in guidance on long-range trends in foreign public opinion.

USIA also has not consistently sought to place experienced officers in positions to offer counsel at key points and at the highest levels in other departments and agencies dealing with foreign affairs. Too frequently Agency personnel are assigned to Office of Public Information where their knowledge and sensitivity to foreign opinion have little or no impact on policy as it is being formulated. If maximum effectiveness is to be achieved, Agency officers must be strategically placed to deal with problems and issues before, rather than after, they reach communications channels.

Broadening of the Agency’s counseling role is as desirable in the field as it is in Washington. This means, in addition to a close working relationship between the Ambassador and the PAO, that a continuing dialogue be maintained between Agency officers at all levels and other members of the Embassy staff. Not only will this lead to the more effective carrying out of USIA’s own programs, but officers representing other agencies and functions can benefit if they are kept constantly aware of information opportunities, the communication channels open to them and the potential consequences of their actions on foreign public opinion.

It is a truism to state that cross cultural communication and public opinion are important components of modern diplomacy. USIA possesses a legitimate competence in these areas and this competence should be as much a part of the policy process as the more traditional military, economic and political influences. The Agency’s participation in policy formulation should be more than to act simply as a conduit for a specialized kind of intelligence. Its information and counsel on the psychological dimension of foreign policy should be an integral part of the policy formulation process at all levels both in Washington and in the field.
58. Summary Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Director, 
East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency

Washington, December 8, 1969

VIETNAMIZATION OF JUSPAO’S INFORMATION AND 
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS PROGRAMS

(Summary of a presentation made by M. L. Osborne, Viet-Nam 
Working Group, East Asia and Pacific, USIA at meeting of DOD’s 

USIA has, from the beginning, considered its psychological operations (PSYOP) support program in Viet-Nam as short-term in nature. Our concept since 1965 has been and now is that functions in this field properly belong to and must ultimately be performed by the Government of Viet-Nam (GVN).

During 1969 the effort to train and equip GVN agencies to perform information/PSYOP functions intensified. Significant developments in Vietnamization of these functions include the following:

—The Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the GVN have signed an agreement whereby the Vietnamese will, by July 1, 1971, assume all responsibility for technical operation and programming of the television network being constructed by the USG. Personnel of the national television agency (THVN) are being trained in programming by a team from National Broadcasting Corporation, International under contract with JUSPAO. Six THVN engineers are presently attending a two-year course at the RCA Institute in New York.

—A new four-station radio network being constructed by the USG will be completed in mid-February 1971. Personnel of the national radio system (VTVN) are being trained to operate the existing radio system and will be expected to assume complete responsibility for the new system. JUSPAO will retain an advisory and training assistance function for perhaps a year after turnover of the new network to GVN.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1– 
42, Box 3, PSY—Psychological Operations. Confidential. Fitzhugh Green sent a copy of 
the summary to Shakespeare, copying Loomis and Weathersby, under a December 11 
memorandum, indicating that Osborn prepared the “excellent brief.” Continuing, Green 
noted that it “offers you a clear, short picture of how JUSPAO is Vietnamizing some of 
its key functions.” (Ibid.) The Joint United States Public Affairs Office in Saigon was 
established in 1965 and headed by a senior USIA Foreign Service Officer and staffed 
and funded by USIA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and the Agency for International 
Development (AID).
—JUSPAO’s assistance to the Ministry of Information’s (MOI) printing plant (the National Information House) and to the National Motion Picture Center will be substantially terminated by June 30, 1970.

—JUSPAO and the MOI began, during 1969, to publish joint PSYOP policy guidances and information plans. In planning the PSYOP program in support of the annual TET campaign, the Ministry of Information (MOI) took the lead for the first time. The American role in PSYOP policy and planning will continue to decrease as GVN agencies can be motivated to assume greater responsibility and be equipped to do so.

—The MOI is progressively assuming a greater share of the load of producing information and PSYOP materials, including leaflets, posters, newspapers, magazines, tapes, booklets and cartoon books. For example, the GVN has agreed to produce half or more of all materials being prepared for the 1970 TET campaign. Vietnamese personnel are being trained in writing, editorial work, typesetting, page layout, cliche production, preparation of an offset news service for the provinces, and operation of printing equipment.

—During November of 1969, JUSPAO was engaged in shifting to MOI responsibility for delivery of PSYOP materials from Saigon to the provinces. The first phase involves transfer of responsibility for overland deliveries to provinces in III and IV CTZs. The next step will be to arrange greater MOI involvement in air-delivery of materials to I and II CTZs.

—The U.S. Mission plans, ultimately, to eliminate all Assistant Province Advisor/Psychological Operations positions in the 44 provinces, leaving the senior JUSPAO Vietnamese local employee in each province to perform residual functions. Ten such positions were scheduled for elimination by December 1, 1969.

—A key part of JUSPAO’s Vietnamization program is to develop in the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) the capability of operating the entire field PSYOP program in support of pacification. In pursuance of this objective, information cadre at province, district and village/hamlet levels have been trained at the National Training Center at Vung Tau and at the MOI’s An Dong Training Center in Saigon.
59. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to all USIA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, December 10, 1969

Dear

You will shortly receive a circular outlining certain changes in the procedures for book selection and placement in USIS libraries throughout the world.

It is evident that careful criteria governing the selection of books for our libraries are needed. Some 2,500 books are published monthly in the United States and our facilities are limited by both capacity and budget. USIS libraries are not meant to be replicas of U.S. public libraries, nor are they meant to replace local book stores, but rather to make available representative balanced presentations of responsible and relevant currents of American thought.

On the whole this function has been well fulfilled. Books reflecting the diverse opinions of our citizenry are readily available at our facilities.

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2 In Circular Airgram 2 to all principal USIS posts, Budapest, Bucharest, Moscow, Prague, Sofia, and Warsaw, January 2, 1970, USIA transmitted the revised guidelines for PAOs to follow in administering the book program, stating: “As respected cultural institutions providing accurate, objective information in an atmosphere of integrity and credibility, USIS libraries must offer representative balanced presentations of responsible and relevant currents of American thought. The Country Public Affairs Officer is responsible for determining the size and scope of the collection and for selecting titles which are significant and relevant in terms of country objectives and audiences.” (Ibid.)

3 On December 8, the New York Times reported that USIA was in the process of carrying out recommendations made by James Burnham, an editor of National Review, that USIS libraries provide more titles written by conservative authors: “Mr. Burnham’s recommendations appear to reflect Mr. Shakespeare’s and Mr. Buckley’s belief that libraries of the United States Information Agency abroad have been heavily weighed in favor of books by ‘liberal’ writers and that, in the interests of objectivity, the lists must now be balanced with conservative works,” (Tad Szulc, “Author Asks Change in U.S.I.A.: Consultant Bids It List More Books by Conservatives, p. 2) In a December 9 memorandum to Strasburg, Harris took issue with Burnham’s other assessment that American non-fiction and fiction writers were underrepresented in USIS libraries, writing that “Mr. Burnham apparently made the error because he mistakenly assumed that he was reviewing some ‘master list’ of all the books in USIA libraries; what he examined was a consolidated list of books recommended since 1960.” He continued: “Our libraries carry far more representative works of the classic American writers than Mr. Burnham states. They were on the shelves before 1960 (with replacements ordered since then when wear made that necessary).” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Evaluation, Office of the Associate Director, Program Files, 1969–1978, Entry P–119, PR—Public Relations)
However some of the procedures followed heretofore require modification. For instance, it has come to my attention that in the case of some books, Country Public Affairs Officers cannot obtain them unless they justify their requests in each case. I find that certain books by eminent Americans, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, Edwin Reischauer and Stewart Alsop are in that category. This seems unwise and I have therefore ordered the requirement for justification discontinued.\(^4\)

I regard the Country PAO as the most knowledgeable authority and the best judge on library requirements within his country. He should be able to order his books without the need for justifying his choice in each case.

The need for maintaining a balance among books and publications in ideological areas will continue as the direct responsibility of the PAO. And I know that under the new ruling the PAO’s will continue to exercise their discretion, good taste and best judgment in ordering all books.

Sincerely,

Frank Shakespeare\(^5\)

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\(^4\) Presumable reference to Shakespeare’s decision to strike a USIA policy regarding the screening of certain book titles requested by PAOs. Szulc wrote that “Mr. Shakespeare was reported to have ordered the elimination of a long-standing screening process under which a number of books, usually by ‘liberal’ authors, were not sent when requested by local U.S.I.A. offices. Mr. Shakespeare was said to feel that this represented unwarranted censorship.” (“New Chief Seeks to Reshape U.S.I.A.,” \textit{New York Times}, December 7, 1969, p. 1) See also Robert Keatley, “Playing it Straight: New USIA Head Talks Conservatively, but He Vows to Seek ‘Balance,’” \textit{Wall Street Journal}, December 23, 1969, p. 1.

\(^5\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
MEMORANDUM FROM THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, RESEARCH, OFFICE OF RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENT, UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY (ADLER) TO THE ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR, RESEARCH AND ASSESSMENT (STRASBURG)¹

Washington, December 11, 1969

SUBJECT

Agreement Concerning Release of Public Opinion Poll Data

In handling the results of USIA-sponsored opinion polls conducted abroad, we are committed publicly and on the record to three policies:

1) Poll results while still classified as “Confidential”, will be made available upon request to the chairmen of the appropriate Congressional committees and subcommittees and to the ranking minority members of these committees, with the understanding that the results will not be made public.

2) Polls classified as “Confidential” will be automatically declassified two years after their completion, and those classified “Limited Official Use” one year after completion, unless at that time the interests of national security requires them to remain classified.

3) The Agency will not engage in selective release of poll findings.

The first two of these policies were worked out between Edward R. Murrow, then, Director of USIA, and Congressmen Moss and Meader in February 1963. Mr. Murrow’s letter to Congressman Moss and the full text of the statement on “USIA Policy Concerning Availability of its Foreign Public Opinion Polls” were inserted by Mr. Moss in the Congressional Record of February 26, 1963. The policies were summarized by Mr. Murrow at the hearings before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives on March 28, 1963. Copies of these two documents are attached for your information.²

The pledge that “this Agency will never engage in selective release of its polling material” was made by Mr. Murrow in a letter to Senator Scott in March 1963.³ The Senator had requested that the Agency cancel the agreement between USIA and the House Government Information Subcommittee on the delayed release of U.S. Government polls. He


² Attached but not printed.

³ Attached but not printed is the March 16, 1963, letter from Murrow to Scott.
based his demand on the charge that the Agency had leaked results of a Confidential poll to AP because the poll showed U.S. prestige to be high in Europe. Senator Scott urged “immediate publication of all prestige polls”, but Mr. Murrow politely stuck by the new policy.

The reasons for delaying public release of our poll results were well stated by Mr. Murrow in his testimony before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements. Said Mr. Murrow: “These polls are only valuable if they represent an honest count. For this reason we use indigenous organizations to conduct the polls. The polls are not identified as being done for the U.S. Government. Such identification by release too soon after their being taken would inhibit an open and candid response for those interviewed next time around. Also, there could well be embarrassment to the government of the country in which the poll was taken. Indeed, the release of certain information could seriously compromise our diplomatic position.”

To the question on why we do these polls, Mr. Murrow said: “the purpose of the research is to try to determine to a large measure the areas of suspicion, confusion, uncertainty, in order that we can better tailor the output of our various mediums to meet these criticisms or misunderstanding.”

To sum up, the Moss Agreement does not prevent us from releasing polls before the two years are up. But the pledge given to Senator Scott—not to mention the possible reactions of other Congressmen—argues against using poll data to show how well we are doing unless we are prepared to release all poll results from these countries relevant to U.S. standing. This might be advantageous in view of the generally favorable tenor of the results obtained in our recent surveys. But it would set a precedent which could force the Agency to publish results the next time we do such surveys even if such results might reflect unfavorably upon the Administration. In the long run, the present arrangement would seem to serve better the interests of the Agency and of the Administration in power.
61. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of Defense Laird and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)¹

Washington, December 15, 1969

SUBJECT
Psywar Operations Against the Vietnamese Communists

The President has requested² that you prepare an assessment of your programs designed to lower the morale of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese populace.³ The assessment should include suggestions for improving the programs, particularly against North Vietnam, and should also deal with any problems you foresee in the disruption of the psywar programs as Vietnamization proceeds.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1970. Secret. An unknown hand wrote “DPO [Daniel P. Oleksiw]” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. The USIA assessment is printed as Document 66.


³ An unknown hand underlined most of this sentence and placed a “1.” in the right-hand margin.

⁴ An unknown hand underlined most of this paragraph and placed a “2.” in the left-hand margin next to the fragment “suggestions for improving the programs, particularly against North Vietnam” and a “3.” in the right-hand margin next to the fragment “you foresee in the disruption of the psywar programs as Vietnamization proceeds.”
Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Motion Picture and Television Service, United States Information Agency (Herschensohn) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)

Washington, December 17, 1969

In my absence I asked Mr. Guarco to contact Kirk Douglas. They spoke with each other on December 2.

Mr. Douglas’ plan is basically to establish a firm well organized tour that would have permanence over a period of a year or two covering a broad spectrum of artists (not only film people) in all fields.

Mr. Douglas spoke to Mr. Guarco for over a half hour on his past trips and successes particularly with overseas students. He feels rather frustrated with the “ad hoc” arrangements of the past whereby his trips materialized only because he personally made the effort and not because of U.S. Government awareness of the potential of such programs.

He is opposed to Film Festival participation because “they are considered commercial ventures and therefore not effective vehicles for the purpose he has in mind.”

He suggested the proposal that Mr. Guarco discuss “his plan” with me and anyone else who is interested and if indeed there is interest then we can meet with him or he meet with us at a place and time mutually convenient.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 3, EDX 22 Visit of Kirk Douglas. No classification marking. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote: “JOB [John O’Brien] do we know how effective he was? Pls see me. HL, 12/19.” Under a December 22 typewritten covering note, O’Brien sent the memorandum to Weathersby, stating: “Bill—Perhaps someone in IOP can answer Henry’s question. All I know is that Douglas handled himself well in Bangkok. Pleasant enough but marginal value. I’ll suggest that Henry talk with Bruce after he hears from you. JOB.” Under an undated handwritten note to Bunche, Weathersby sent Herschensohn’s memorandum and O’Brien’s note. In it, he wrote: “Ken: my memory holds that Douglas did extremely well in India in 1964. Can you put together a report on his performances and the value of them? WHW.”

2 According to a transcript of a November 5 telephone conversation between Kissinger and Douglas, Kissinger indicated that he was “interested in D’s idea and Frank Shakespeare would be back from his trip [to Asia and Europe] and would also be interested in it. D said we had the perfect example of his idea when the Russian Cosmonauts were in New York for the reception. They had such a good time and they wouldn’t let Douglas go. This is an example of dialogue at a different level.” (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronological File, Box 3, November 1–10, 1969)
I will discuss this with you whenever you want. Attached is a report on his previous tours.³

Bruce Herschensohn⁴
IMV

³ Attached but not printed is an undated listing of Douglas’s tours in 1963 (São Paulo and Cartagena), 1964 (New Delhi, Bangkok, Manila, and Hong Kong), 1965 (Oslo, Tunis, Rabat, and Madrid; scheduled to visit Algiers), and 1966 (Warsaw, Prague, Bucharest, and Budapest).

⁴ Herschensohn signed “Bruce” above this typed signature.

63. Circular Message From the United States Information Agency to all Principal USIS Posts and the Embassy in the Soviet Union¹

USIA–21074
Washington, December 31, 1969

Circular Infoguide No. 69-22. Subject: The Path to Peace

1. The path to peace in Viet-Nam has been charted in a series of recent statements by President Nixon. In discussions and output, USIA should reflect realistically the progress achieved toward peace, and confidence in the course that has been chosen. Our tone should be one of cautious optimism.

2. The President, in concert with the Republic of Viet-Nam, has outlined alternate plans to achieve a just peace: through a negotiated settlement if possible, or through continued Vietnamization if necessary. He ruled out a precipitate withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Viet-Nam.²


² Reference is to the President’s November 3 address; see footnote 2, Document 45. The President addressed the nation on December 15 regarding progress on Vietnamization and the troop withdrawal program; for the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 1025–1028.
3. Even though debate over the best means to achieve peace will continue, as is inherent in a democratic society, the unity of the nation and its leaders in their desire to end the conflict is not open to question.

4. To promote a better understanding abroad of the key issues of peace and war in Viet-Nam, Agency media should give increased attention to these major points:

   a. The Republic of Viet-Nam is continuing to show substantial progress in its economic, social and political development. These accomplishments—in addition to growing South Vietnamese military strength—enhance South Viet-Nam’s status as a sovereign, independent and viable state.

   b. Hanoi has miscalculated the desire of the South Vietnamese people for self-determination. Evidence of that desire is readily apparent in the persistence of South Viet-Nam’s nation-building efforts while engaged in a stubborn defense of its freedom.

   c. Hanoi and its supporters have misread minority agitation in the U.S. They appear to think that a vocal minority can bypass the processes of American democracy, including an open society’s primary means of political expression—the ballot box. The strength of our society is built on freedom of expression. This means that any American has the right to express, without fear, opinions that differ from those held by others, including his elected leaders. President Nixon sympathizes with the idealism of critics at home and fully shares their desire for peace. Under his oath of office the President must act in accordance with his best judgment of the interest of the nation as a whole. He cannot permit a vocal segment of the population to sway this judgment, particularly when it has been endorsed as sound by a majority of the people.

   d. While Communist prisoners of war have access to the resources of the Red Cross and other rights to which they are entitled, American POWs held in North Viet-Nam are denied the humane treatment required by international conventions to which Hanoi has subscribed.

   e. For years Hanoi has followed a deliberate policy of using assassination and other forms of terrorism against civilians in its attempt to deprive the South Vietnamese people of their independence. This policy is abhorrent to the United States. Accusations of isolated instances of atrocities by Americans have created grave concern in our nation, beginning at the highest levels, and the individuals involved are brought to trial. Americans withhold judgment of the accused, however, until a verdict is returned indicating guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This is in accord with the Code of Military Justice and the U.S. legal system, under which the individual is presumed innocent until found guilty.

   f. The United States stands for freedom of choice for the people of South Viet-Nam. In most parts of the nation—in those not controlled
by the National Liberation Front—local government officials have been elected to office in free elections. National leaders, including the President, Vice President and members of both houses of the National Assembly, were chosen by the people. The NLF, on the other hand, has never put its claim of legitimacy to the test of the ballot box.

g. The path to peace is a two-way street. The President has set forth the record of U.S. good faith in the quest for a negotiated settlement. Hanoi has offered nothing in return. Despite the discouraging lack of progress in efforts to negotiate, the U.S. will continue to do everything possible and consider any proposal that might advance this means of bringing the conflict to an end.

h. In continuing the reduction of our troop commitment (by 115,000 this year) the President has clearly shown the U.S. determination to end the conflict and to take risks for peace.

5. Agency media will continue to give a balanced presentation of support for U.S. policy and of dissent in United States, as well as divergent viewpoints and interpretations.

6. In sum, the United States will continue along complementary tracks of its clearly-defined path, rejecting a precipitate, immediate withdrawal from Viet-Nam. The U.S. Government has made clear its confidence that these tracks—negotiation preferably, Vietnamization as necessary—will lead to a peace that will preserve the fundamental right of the people of South Viet-Nam to determine their own future.
64. Letter From the Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency (Reinhardt) to all USIA Public Affairs Officers

WASHINGTON, JANUARY 6, 1970

Dear,

You are scheduled shortly to receive a 16mm color print of the excellent 55-minute “CBS Report” by Charles Collingwood, telecast in the U.S. on December 2, entitled A Timetable for Viet-Nam. As the circular announcing this to you makes clear, the Agency attaches particular importance to this film. May I ask you please to give it your personal attention.

A number of you have noted in the past that Viet-Nam was not a lively issue in your country, and that for USIS to do much programming on the subject was only to risk focusing attention on it where now there was little or none, possibly with unfavorable results as far as attitudes toward the U.S. were concerned. If this is still your judgment of the situation, you may choose not to program this film, or at any rate to program it only to a very limited degree.

But I would like to be very sure that you are sure of this—you, your Ambassador and other members of the Country Team. My own impression, I must say, is that Viet-Nam is on people’s minds almost everywhere these days, with the U.S. role not widely understood or respected, to put it mildly, and that effective programming by USIS...
to correct misimpressions is therefore very much needed almost everywhere.\(^5\)

If effective programming on the topic is indeed called for in your country of assignment, then *A Timetable for Viet-Nam* should be useful to you. It strikes us, at any rate, as being an unusually effective TV-style report on how South Viet-Nam really is becoming a viable entity politically, socially, economically and militarily, and on how the President's plans for U.S. military disengagement therefore stands a reasonable chance of success—and not just as a disguised defeat.

The report is not in any sense an official briefing. CBS made it, and aired it to the American people, quite independently of any element of the U.S. Government. It is frankly critical of some aspects of the U.S. and South Vietnamese performances. It is not dogmatic; it acknowledges uncertainties, problems, dangers. Its predictions of success are heavily qualified. Its handling of the Viet Cong and North Vietnamese is measured, not shrill. All of this makes its basic points the more persuasive, we find.

Would you in due course please give me your evaluation of the usefulness of this film. If there were differences of opinion about it, within the Country Team, what were they? How did you try to program the film, if at all? (Note in the circular that television rights have been obtained for several African TV posts; CBS withheld these rights only for those countries where it felt it could market the program commercially.) What were the results?—how many showings, where, to what kinds of audiences, with what reactions from them?

Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt\(^6\)

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\(^5\) An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

\(^6\) Reinhardt signed “John” above this typed signature.
65. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant (Ehrlichman)

Washington, January 7, 1970

SUBJECT

Proposals for the State of the Union Message

The President, in his memorandum of November 5 calling for proposals for the State of the Union message, stated that “it is highly important that we outline our approach to the course we believe our country should take in the years ahead. We must make an imaginative and compelling statement of our objectives and purposes.” To that end, I should like to submit the following suggestion for the foreign policy portion of his message.

Proposal:

That the President make a statement explaining and expanding what has become known as the Nixon Doctrine for Asia to the less developed countries of the world.

Explanation and Justification:

The President, in his press conference on February 6, 1969, said, “I think you could describe me best as not being a half-worlder with my eyes looking only to Europe or only to Asia, but one who sees the

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. Confidential. Haig sent a copy of the memorandum to Kissinger under a January 9 note, commenting: “The attached memorandum from Frank Shakespeare reflects our failure to get our policy across even to our own bureaucracy. I must say I consider it a little bit presumptuous of Frank to delve into your woodpile to the extent that he has in this memorandum. I think the President has quite clearly, and certainly you have, broadened the Nixon Doctrine beyond the confines of Asia as it pertains to the LDC’s. I suppose there is no value in doing anything with this, however.” Haig appended the following handwritten notation: “I have talked to Shakespeare about Kirk Douglas[,] he will be back on this. Al.” Kissinger wrote in the top right-hand corner of Haig’s note: “Shakespeare is a blowhard. HK.” (Ibid.) Herschensohn met with Douglas on February 9; for his account of this meeting, see Document 72.

2 Not found.

whole world. We live in one world and we must go forward together in the whole world.”

The impression is rather widely held, however, that Viet-Nam and related Asian issues have preoccupied the Administration and have overshadowed the problems of our relations with other areas. The news media, both American and foreign, by their own concentration on the war, the peace efforts and the demonstrations, have contributed to this view and to obscuring the fact that our new Asian policy is closely related to the policies developed for other areas.

Contrary to the misunderstanding of some of the press and public, a close examination reveals that there is an impressive, compelling consistency and logical imperative between the Nixon Doctrine for Asia and the President’s statements of U.S. policy toward Europe, Latin America and Africa. While it has gone largely unnoticed by the press, the underlying principles are the same, the style and approach to be followed are identical, and the long-range objectives for those areas are consistent and mutually supporting.

The fact that the President does see the world “whole,” and that he has fashioned a foreign policy to take the U.S. with our friends and allies “forward together in the whole world,” could be dramatically and clearly demonstrated by a Presidential declaration extending the Nixon Doctrine into a major thrust in foreign affairs.

A statement by the President to this effect might appropriately include the following principles:

1. We recognize that national pride is the dominant factor in nation building, and we affirm our respect for the identity and national dignity of all nations.

2. We are dedicated to improving the quality of life, but we recognize that each nation must achieve its own development in terms of its own traditions and values. We stand ready to help where we are asked and where developing nations themselves are moving ahead.

3. While “lecturing less and listening more” we will count upon the constructive cooperation of our friends and allies.

4. We are prepared to lend support, along with other economically developed nations, to regional organizations or through multilateral arrangements where our support is sought for constructive proposals.

5. We recognize the primary responsibilities of other states for their affairs—for development, security and military defense. We shall furnish military and economic assistance when requested and when we find it essential and in accordance with our treaty commitments.

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4 For the text, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 66–76.
But we shall look to any nation directly concerned or threatened to assume the primary responsibility. “The defense of freedom is everybody’s business—not just Americans’ business. And it is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened.”

6. Our policies will seek to lessen the dependence of other nations upon us and reduce the need for American support.

7. While aid is temporarily necessary, trade is essential in development, and we shall press for a liberal system of tariff preferences to be extended to developing countries. We shall take the lead in international forums in seeking to reduce some of the non-tariff barriers maintained by industrialized countries that affect the opportunities of the developing countries to export their products and also seek Congressional approval of unilateral reductions in our import tariffs on a variety of products of special interest to developing countries.

**Advantages:**

A Presidential statement extending the Nixon Doctrine beyond the confines of Asia would, in our opinion, have the following positive results:

1. It would show that the U.S. is pursuing a logically integrated, coherent and consistent foreign policy toward the non-Communist countries of the world.

2. It would increase the understanding and respect of both Americans and foreigners for our foreign policy.

3. It would make clear that we are concerned for the people of all less developed countries, and that we do not favor one at the expense of others.

4. It would reassure American citizens and our friends abroad that we seek to avoid future wars like Viet-Nam, but that we are not withdrawing from our role as a major world power into a shell of isolationism.

*Frank Shakespeare*  

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5 Nixon made this statement in his November 3, 1969, speech; see footnote 2, Document 45.

6 Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.
66. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, January 13, 1970

SUBJECT

PsyWar Operations Against Vietnamese Communists

As requested in your memorandum of December 15, 1969,\(^2\) to the Secretary of Defense and the Director of the U.S. Information Agency, the attached assessment of programs designed to affect morale of the Communists and Communist sympathizers in Viet-Nam is submitted.

The assessment was prepared in collaboration with the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC); the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), Saigon; and the Military Assistance Command, Viet-Nam (MACV). It was coordinated with the Department of Defense, which is submitting a separate but similar document.\(^3\)

Because he is out of the country, Mr. Shakespeare has not read the assessment.

Henry Loomis\(^4\)

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\(^2\) See Document 61.

\(^3\) Not found and not further identified.

\(^4\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment

Assessment Prepared in the United States Information Agency

Washington, January 1970

[Omitted here are the title page and the table of contents.]

SUMMARY

The Chieu Hoi (Open Arms) inducement campaign has been a solid success in 1969, producing over 47,000 defectors. The ralliers have provided crucial intelligence and other aid to Free World Forces, and these defections are a major concern to the Communist leadership. Yet the inducement campaign to defect, surrender, or desert, while singularly effective against Viet Cong (Southerners), has had little effect against the North Vietnamese Army (NVA).

The leaflet campaigns along the Lao trail and border areas of Cambodia appear to be very useful. But the Cambodia effort lacks continuity because of recurrent unfavorable wind conditions and Sihanouk’s prohibition against overflight. Reward programs for delivering enemy weapons have been partially successful. Efforts to play on North-South regional prejudices in enemy ranks have been cautious, subtle and almost exclusively covert.

Now that enemy forces are predominantly North Vietnamese, two appeals are becoming stale: (1) the appeal to rally seldom affects North Vietnamese soldiers because their relatives are in the North, not the South; and (2) the appeal to surrender under slackening battle situations is not compelling, as the NVA often retreats to sanctuaries. Therefore, it would appear necessary to expand and sharpen communication with Communist forces, particularly NVA, in sanctuaries or on the trail, where war-weariness and opportunity for reflection can be exploited.

For the past fifteen months, there has been no overt program directed specifically at North Vietnam. This is the largest gap in GVN–US PSYOP in Vietnam. The only means of addressing North Vietnamese targets is via radio. The Voice of America (VOA) can be heard in NVN by very limited but important audiences 10 hours daily, but its message is directed to all Vietnamese, and often in the Southern dialect. We have some indications that information received from VOA and the BBC is circulated orally in North Vietnam.

5 Top Secret. No drafting information appears on the assessment, which is entitled “Assessment of Psychological Operations Programs in Viet-Nam.”
An intensive and extensive all-media campaign, based on political, military, economic, and social progress in South Vietnam, continues with growing success to foster mutual support between the GVN and the SVN populace.

With the above developing situation, 1970 programs should serve three major purposes: (1) weaken the resolve of enemy forces, especially the NVA; (2) mobilize politically the population in South Vietnam; and (3) open additional communication with the North Vietnamese people.

Specific suggestions for improving our PSYOP include: (1) in inducement programs, increase the proportion of desert/fade-away appeals, (2) in output to NVA and NVN, stress the availability of peace on honorable terms, (3) expand air-drops over Cambodia, (4) increase air-drops over Laos, and (5) start overt broadcasts specifically to NVN.

With regard to Vietnamization, both the joint US Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO) and the US Military Assistance Command (MACV) are beginning to devolve most of the total PSYOP effort on the GVN’s Ministry of Information (MOI) and RVNAF’s General Political Warfare Department (GPWD). JUSPAO has established some tentative dates for MOI’s assumption of responsibility for segments of media operations, and MACV is staffing a plan for the turnover of military PSYOP assets to RVNAF.

Major problems of Vietnamization are: (1) deficient GVN interest in PSYOP, (2) lack of continuity of MOI leadership, (3) a plethora of GVN PSYOP agencies, and lack of coordination, (4) the GVN’s difficulty in training and retaining qualified personnel, (5) possible misuse of information personnel for President Thieu’s personal benefit, (6) the scarcity of official printing establishments, (7) poor distribution of MOI funds to provincial offices, and (8) potential neglect of PSYOP against the enemy, owing to Vietnamese military PSYOP priorities.

[Omitted here are sections I. Appraisal; II. Improvement of Psyop Programs Against the Enemy; and III. Impact of Vietnamization on Psyop Programs.]
67. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to all Diplomatic Posts


SUBJECT
Impact of Youth and the US National Interest.

One of the first statements I made upon assuming my duties in the Department was that we must encourage the active participation of young people and listen to the ideas of dissenters if we are to formulate a foreign policy responsive to the needs of the future.

That statement was addressed to our own people in the Department, but I believe we must take a comparable interest in youth abroad, who today represent a force in society of substantial proportions that may well affect US foreign relations of the future.

We must take them into account—just as we do more traditional political, economic and social forces—in particular because they are increasingly the force of change that will alter the political and social climate in which we work in the future.

Accordingly, I would like your Country Team to re-examine the attention they are giving to this aspect of their work in order to assure that your Embassy’s efforts are commensurate with the current and potential impact of youth on the society of the country and with the resources available to you.

There are two principal objectives on which we should concentrate:

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2 In his January 22 message to employees of the Department of State, AID, USIA, ACDA, and the Peace Corps, Rogers referenced remarks made by then-presidential candidate Nixon in September 1968 regarding youth and asserted: “In this spirit I hope to lead a receptive and open establishment where men speak their minds and are listened to on merit, and where divergent views are fully and promptly passed on for decision. We must tap all the creative ideas and energies of this Department in the formulation of a foreign policy responsive to the needs of the future. Only if we do so can we systematically delineate meaningful alternatives from which the President can determine a considered policy course. “To those in the levels of highest responsibility—the Under and Assistant Secretaries, and our Ambassadors—I look not only for your judgment but for stimulation of such a process and in particular your encouragement of the participation of our young people.” (Department of State Bulletin, February 10, 1969, p. 125)
(1) To assure that we assess as accurately as possible the political and social attitudes of students and other young people and come to a sound appreciation of their likely effect on political and social structures. Such analysis should be of immediate value to the Embassies in their own work and will be useful to the Department in both current and long-range planning.

(2) To seek to identify and establish relationships with the rising young leaders who are most likely in future years to reach positions of national influence, particularly in economic and political fields. Within carefully but boldly determined limits suitable to your country situation this should include contact not only with potential future leaders within the established system but also with those among the disaffected and the “outs”.

I am conscious that recent personnel cuts are making Mission workloads difficult and that you face hard decisions in determining where to place your priorities. It is the intention of this instruction that Embassies should reassess youth matters to assure that they are being given their proper attention proportional to the increased world-wide impact of youth. While reducing wherever possible the total flow of communications, it is necessary to bear in mind that the phenomenon of politically conscious and restless youth should be routinely built in as part of your mission’s normal political reporting.

The following specific suggestions have worked in some countries to assure adequate attention to youth matters. Obviously the situation varies from country to country, and the organization of the work must be adapted to the size and resources of your Mission.

1. While all officers should be responsible for contacts with and reporting views of youth in their functional areas of responsibility, you may wish to consider the designation of a special youth officer from among the present complement. Such an officer, regardless of his agency affiliation, should work with and through the political section in his capacity as coordinator and stimulator of Mission youth awareness and contact. He should be of an age and personality that suit

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3 Presumable reference to the Nixon administration’s ongoing effort to reduce overseas personnel. A July 9, 1969, White House press release indicated that Nixon had ordered a 10 percent reduction in direct-hire personnel and certain military personnel and that the reductions would begin as soon as possible. For the text of the press release, see ibid., August 4, 1969, pp. 92–95. In a July 21 memorandum to Richardson, Kissinger referenced the reduction, noting: “Each agency with personnel overseas will be required to meet the ten per cent quota, and reductions will be made on a country-by-country basis, insofar as practicable.” The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. III, Foreign Economic Policy; International Monetary Policy, 1969–1972, Document 25. See also ibid., vol. II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Documents 303, 304, and 306.
him to deal with young people and to develop the intense personal relationships that characterize this work. The goal should be to find, assign and support the best qualified person in a manner that will be appropriate and comfortable for your Mission.

The responsibilities of such an officer would include:

(a) Establishing contacts, and coordinating the effort of others to do the same, with influential young leaders (political, labor, business, student, educational, media, military, governmental, etc.).

(b) Encouraging, initiating and coordinating analysis and reporting on current and potential political, social and economic impact of youth forces on society. One early focus of such reporting could usefully be the plans of youth groups and the local government for participation in the U.N. sponsored World Youth Assembly to be held in New York in July, 1970.

(c) Coordinating other Embassy efforts on a day-to-day basis.

A reasonable percentage of representation and travel funds will be needed for his use.

2. The established Youth Committees, chaired by you or a senior Embassy officer, should continue to have responsibility for overall direction of youth matters among all elements of the Mission. Alternatively, such supervision and coordination might appropriately be subject to direct responsibility of your Country Team.

3. You are requested to review with your Country Team whether some resources could be specifically earmarked for youth matters. In addition to representation and travel funds, these may include USIS GOE funds, and grants to binational centers; CU exchange grants; military training opportunities; and, where AID operates, participant training slots and the use of the Special Development (self-help) Fund in support of development projects with youth involvement.

Support and overall supervision of the youth program will continue to be extended from Washington by the Inter-Agency Youth Committee (State, Defense, USIA, AID), chaired by the Counselor of the Department and supported full time by the Department’s Youth Advisor.

I would appreciate your consideration of the guidance in this CA and would welcome your comments. Your personal interest and conclusions will, I am sure, be the key to the effectiveness of your Mission’s program.

Rogers
68. Memorandum From President Nixon to the President’s Assistant (Haldeman)¹

Washington, January 26, 1970

In talking to several people in Philadelphia² I heard concern expressed with regard to the Nancy Hanks-Garment operation³ on the ground that their thrust was to support those activities in the cultural field which were “novel” and broke new ground rather than to put any significant emphasis on the more traditional activities.

This is completely contrary to my views. I do not want to take it up directly with Garment and Hanks but I want you to. As you, of course, know those who are on the modern art and music kick are 95 percent against us anyway. I refer to the recent addicts of Leonard Bernstein and the whole New York crowd.

When I compare the horrible monstrosity of Lincoln Center with the Academy of Music in Philadelphia I realize how decadent the modern art and architecture have become.

This is what the Kennedy-Shriver crowd believed in and they had every right to encourage this kind of stuff when they were in. But I have no intention whatever of continuing to encourage it now. If this forces a show-down and even some resignations it’s all right with me. I am not going to have 40 million dollars scattered all over the country in projects of this type.

P.S. I also want a check made with regard to the incredibly atrocious modern art that has been scattered around the embassies around the world. I asked for this several months ago from Shakespeare and have heard nothing but silence since I made the request. I know that Keating has done some cleaning out of the Embassy in New Delhi, but I want to know what they are doing in some of the other places. One of the worst, incidentally, was Davis in Rumania.

¹ Source: Nixon Library, White House Staff Files, Staff Member and Office Files: HR Haldeman, Box 229, P Memos 1970. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy.

² The evening of January 24, the President and the First Lady traveled to Philadelphia by train in order to attend a concert of the Philadelphia Orchestra at the Philadelphia Academy of Music. That evening, Nixon also presented the Presidential Medal of Freedom to violinist Eugene Ormandy, the Music Director of the Philadelphia Orchestra. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) For the text of the President’s remarks upon presenting the award, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 16–17.

³ Presumable reference to the efforts undertaken by the International Cultural Strategy Group regarding the promulgation of a national cultural policy. See Documents 38 and 42.
We, of course, cannot tell the Ambassadors what kind of art they personally can have, but I found in travelling around the world that many of our Ambassadors were displaying the modern art due to the fact that they were compelled to because of some committee which once was headed up by Mrs. Kefauver and where they were loaned some of these little uglies from the Museum of Modern Art in New York. At least, I want a quiet check made—not one that is going to hit the newspapers and stir up all the troops—but I simply want it understood that this Administration is going to turn away from the policy of forcing our embassies abroad or those who receive assistance from the United States at home to move in the direction of off-beat art, music and literature.

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4 Reference is to Nancy Kefauver, the wife of Senator Estes Kefauver (D-Tennessee), the 1956 Democratic nominee for Vice President. President Kennedy had appointed Mrs. Kefauver Director of the Art in Embassies Program.

69. Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Secretary of Commerce Stans

Washington, January 30, 1970

Dear Maury:

My staff continues to enjoy working with your representatives on the President’s Bicentennial Commission. Although recommendations are not due until July 4, we recognize that a decision on the international exposition aspect of the Bicentennial should be made before the spring meeting of the Bureau of International Expositions (BIE) in Paris.

At the request of your Department, a questionnaire on likely foreign interest in participating in a 1976 Bicentennial exposition was circulated

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 8. No classification marking. Notations in an unknown hand in the bottom margin of the first page of the letter indicate that Hurd drafted the letter, which was retyped in S/S–S by Levitsky. Collins sent a copy of the letter to Rogers under a January 23 action memorandum, in which Collins indicated that the survey of desk officers and selected posts regarding foreign participation in a possible 1976 exposition had been completed and was “ready for transmission” to Stans. Collins requested that Rogers sign the attached letter enclosing the evaluation. (Ibid.)
to all country desk officers here and to selected foreign posts. The response with respect to about 90 countries is tabulated in the enclosure.

I hope this summary will prove useful in connection with the evaluation your United States Expositions Staff is preparing on the exposition plans already advanced by various U.S. cities. As you know, we have continued to reserve 1976 with the BIE and now need to let them know of site, theme and dates, if there is to be an exposition.

Let me know if I can be of any further assistance.

With best personal regards,

Sincerely,

William P. Rogers

Enclosure

Summary Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, January 1970

SUMMARY

U.S. 1976 BICENTENNIAL EXPOSITION

HIGHLIGHTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE

(Based on 90 Replies)

I. Participation: Almost 60 countries already seem interested in participating.

II. If approved by the Bureau of International Expositions (BIE), the options of participation received the following comment:

A. National pavilion: Only about 15 countries, mostly BIE member nations, now seem to have the resources to mount an independent national pavilion.

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2 See footnote 5, Document 44.
3 Rogers signed “Bill” above this typed signature.
4 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the summary.
5 See footnote, page 3. [Footnote is in the original. The footnote on page 3 reads: “*Foreign Policy Footnote* There is undoubtedly some correlation between the interest of many foreign governments in participating in a 1976 Bicentennial exposition (I) and the reason most frequently given for such participation—the promotion of trade, tourism and investment abroad (IV). This suggests that the role of foreign governments (and international organizations) at even the non-commercial type of exposition sponsored by the BIE will have many long-term implications for at least the economic sector of U.S. foreign policy.”]
B. National exhibit: The use of covered space to mount an exhibit is favored by about 30 smaller nations.

C. Joint exhibit: This alternative is almost equally favored by a group of Scandinavian, Central American, various African regional and S.E. Asian countries.

D. Performing arts: There is a wide indication of interest. However, U.S. funding would be required in a number of cases.

E. Special Demonstration project: Only a half-dozen countries now show a capacity to contribute in this manner (Canada, Iceland, Scandinavia, Israel, Libya, India). Funds are definitely a factor.

F. People-to-people: Same as II(d).

III. Foreign response if the event is organized outside of BIE jurisdiction? BIE approval is not a critical factor to many of the smaller countries since only 34 (mainly European) nations belong to BIE. The response of immediate neighbors is often more compelling; but this is bound to be influenced by actions of the major powers, most of which belong to BIE. Also, lack of BIE sanction might bring participation by non-member nations at minimum levels. On the other hand, if the celebration were negotiated as a project beyond BIE jurisdiction, there should probably be no restraint to participation even by BIE member nations.

A. Special demonstration project: The response is generally similar to that given under II (d, e, & f.)

B. Cultural/artistic program:

C. People-to-people:

IV. Determining factors in participation: The most-frequently noted incentive to participation is promotion of trade, tourism and investment. Also cited are prestige, displays of amity and friendship, and a concern for the state of political relations with the U.S. during the next 5 years.6

V. Importance of site: In almost all, except special interest cases, the particular metropolitan site is not considered a factor that would seriously affect participation. Apparently this reflects some confidence in the site-selection process being undertaken by the U.S. Government.

A. Competition between cities: The reaction to a competition between cities was generally negative.

[Omitted here is the undated, 9-page table entitled “U.S. 1976 Bicentennial Exposition.”]

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6 Ibid.
B. Multi-site possibilities: Most foreign countries regard the multi-city concept with misgiving. They believe multi-city proposals will result in an increase in administrative/financial burdens, rivalry between sites and a diffusion in total impact. They will probably respond favorably to a multi-site-in-one-city location if they are provided the necessary, organizational assurances by the expo management.

70. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, February 5, 1970

SUBJECT
US–USSR Exchanges Negotiations

As the Secretary informed the President on January 22, negotiations for renewal of the US–USSR Exchanges Agreement began January 29.

By now, most provisions have been agreed satisfactorily. This includes restoration of normal levels in educational and performing arts exchanges; introduction of the category “Man and His Environment” and of a new provision for exchanges of lecturers; and continuation of all other programs.

The Soviets have, however, informed us today that they are prepared to reach agreement on the important exhibit exchange only if we meet two points which they have raised. Specifically, they will

2 Reference is to the “Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical, Educational, Cultural and Other Fields in 1970–1971.” In a January 22 memorandum to the President, Rogers indicated that the negotiations on the agreement would take place in Washington beginning January 29 and that the United States and Soviet Union had exchanged draft texts. After noting several significant differences in the drafts, concerning exhibits, educational exchanges, and scientific and technical exchanges, Rogers stated: “Indications are that the negotiations will be carried on in an atmosphere notably better than on some occasions in the past. Specifically, earlier Soviet references to Viet-Nam or other political issues as a hindrance to fruitful exchanges are not likely to be repeated. Given a suitable atmosphere, we intend to encourage the Soviets to look toward new activities, such as cooperative research, which will deepen the exposure of their people to American society.” (Ibid.) Additional documentation on the negotiations is ibid.
accept an exchange of one exhibit in six cities (as before) for up to four weeks in each city (changed from three to four weeks). Based upon our experience under the last agreement, this represents a potential 15% increase in exposure. However, they insist upon our accepting some language in the new agreement dealing with (1) jubilee celebrations and (2) diploma equivalency. The latter can most likely be dealt with by language which is harmless. The former, which is undoubtedly related to Soviet commemoration this year of the Lenin centenary, is probably important to the Soviets for two reasons. First, they fear that we might take actions critical of the Lenin celebration. Second, they may hope that an agreement provision would prove useful in their efforts to drum up support for commemorations outside the communist world.

We have already told the Soviets that we, as a government, have no means or intention to inhibit activities related to the Lenin centenary, whether or not the Soviets would regard them as hostile. On the other hand, we have pointed out, we will take no official action which we would regard as hostile or inappropriate. They have, nevertheless, flatly stated that they want some language in the agreement if they are to concede on the exhibit program.

We are prepared to offer the following, noncommittal language: “The Parties note that commemorative activities may take place in their countries in connection with jubilee celebrations recognized by international bodies.”

Alternatively, we might tell the Soviets that we cannot agree to any language on the subject. Unless they are bluffing, this will suspend the negotiations and we will either face a break or will have to concede the point at a later meeting.

We believe that the language which we plan to offer would not likely cause us serious embarrassment under foreseeable circumstances.

We will be meeting with the chairman of the Soviet delegation at 11 A.M. Friday, February 6.3

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

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3 On February 10 in Washington, D.C., U.S. and Soviet representatives signed the agreement. For the text of the agreement, in addition to the Department’s announcement concerning the signing and the contents of the agreement, see Department of State Bulletin, March 2, 1970, pp. 260–266. See also United States Treaties and Other International Agreements, vol. 21, part 2, 1970, pp. 1205–1225.
71. **Airgram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State**

A–309

London, February 17, 1970

**SUBJECT**

Plans for U.S. Bicentennial Exposition, 1976. Ref: Department’s CA–6381.\(^2\) FOR STATE (P/MS—Hurd); COMMERCE (Expositions Staff—Nelson).

Without checking directly with the British, it is, of course, not possible to give a precise prediction of possible British participation in the 1976 Exposition. This participation would also naturally depend very much on the form, content and approach which is finally determined by our own national commission. Within these limitations, the following comments can be made:

1. In view of the “special relationship,” at least in the cultural field, as well as of Britain’s somewhat special role in the origins of American independence, we believe Britain would have no choice but to be present in a major way in any form of celebration of our bicentennial.

2. As Britain has consistently played a major role in the BIE, they will certainly wish to have any participation of an exposition nature be in a BIE-sanctioned event. At the same time, for the reasons above, they would have a difficult time not participating on strictly BIE grounds, and in the event of a non-BIE sanctioned event would probably try hard to find a way out of the dilemma. In order to avoid the dilemma, however, the chances are that they will give their support in the BIE to any proposals the US may make provided that we on our side are willing to abide by the essential rules.

3. In order to improve the British image in this connection, we assume that (financial considerations allowing) the British would prefer to have a national-type pavilion in any exposition if national pavilions were allowed. If pavilions of a “subject” nature were the rule, we assume that the British would want to have a clearly identified and significant role in them.

4. The site or sites selected are unlikely to have any effect on British participation, though they might perhaps prefer a site not too closely associated with a major British defeat (e.g. Yorktown).\(^3\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 8. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Cleveland (E/MIN) and W. Hall (E/C); cleared by Weld; approved by Cleveland. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the Department on February 28 at 11:33 a.m.

\(^2\) See footnote 5, Document 44.

\(^3\) Lord Cornwallis surrendered at Yorktown, October 19, 1781.
5. It is quite possible that the scale of British participation might be enhanced if there were a chance of maintaining some sort of permanent exposition which would contribute in a lasting way to US–UK relations. On the other hand, cost factors might militate against this.

6. Recognizing that BIE rules forbid commercial exhibits, it is nevertheless important to realize that the scale of British participation would be enhanced if they could associate it in some way with the promotion of British exports, which is a major national objective.

7. The United Kingdom already has a good system of performing arts in the U.S. It is anticipated that this would be expanded to take advantage of the facilities offered at an exhibition for the display of British skills, arts, and culture.

Annenberg

72. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, February 17, 1970

SUBJECT
Record of Conversation between Mr. Herschensohn of USIA and Kirk Douglas

Attached is a memorandum for the record of a conversation between Mr. Herschensohn of USIA and Kirk Douglas which is a followup resulting from our prod to Frank Shakespeare.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 293, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. I [Apr 69–25 Feb 70]. Limited Official Use. Kissinger initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Haig wrote “File” next to Kissinger’s initials and drew an arrow from it to his name and initials in the “from” line.

\(^2\) See footnote 1, Document 65.
Apparently you impressed Kirk Douglas very much and also whetted his appetite for a more active role in our information efforts. Mr. Herschensohn proposes the establishment of a committee consisting of Hollywood talent, Motion Picture Association of America and USIA, with a view to exploiting entertaining personalities already travelling abroad, with USIA acting as the catalyst. I believe the plan has some merits and that if Kirk Douglas were to participate in the formulation or membership of the committee, we may reap some real benefits, both internationally and politically, recognizing that the temperament of our players would require some careful and deft handling.

Recommendation:

That I call Henry Loomis in Frank Shakespeare’s absence and tell him that you are impressed with the initial outline of the plan and suggest that they proceed immediately to finalize the proposal to include perhaps additional coordination with Douglas, with the view toward seeing if he would be willing to play a role. The plan would then be run by us once more, through Klein, Ziegler and ultimately the President for final approval.³

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the Senior Military Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig)⁴

Washington, February 16, 1970

The attached memorandum from Bruce Herschensohn, who is head of the Motion Picture and Television Service of USIA, summarizes his recent meeting with Kirk Douglas in Los Angeles. The memorandum is obviously confidential in nature and after I get back from Africa, I intend to give further consideration to the suggestions made and will be in touch with you at that time. In the meanwhile, if you or Henry have any suggestions, I would appreciate having them.

Frank Shakespeare⁵

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³ Haig added the “Approve” and “Disapprove” lines at the bottom of the memorandum by hand. Kissinger placed a checkmark on the “Approve” line.
⁴ Limited Official Use.
⁵ Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.
Attachment

Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency (Herschensohn) to the Director (Shakespeare)

Washington, February 10, 1970

REFERENCE

My Memo of February 9, 1970

As you suggested, I had a meeting with Kirk Douglas. He feels the government is not taking advantage of some of the nation’s best talent which could be used as world-wide ambassadors of good will.

In the past he has done such work with USIA coordination. He said though he has thank you letters from Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, there was never any follow-up. No one asked him to do more. He doesn’t want to be a nuisance but he wants to do something for the country and feels he can do this kind of work well. He also believes many others would be more than willing if only asked.

He feels there ought to be an organized effort, particularly to take advantage of those celebrities who are overseas making films, therefore, transportation being of no cost to the government. Further, he feels payment of any kind would be unnecessary. He feels we are missing the boat.

With all the pitfalls and dangers, I agree with him. We are not taking advantage of a national asset. The obvious danger is, what happens when these celebrities speak against present policy? Practically

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6 Limited Official Use. A copy was sent to Loomis. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 3, EDX 22 Visit of Kirk Douglas.

7 Not found.

8 In a March 6 memorandum to Weathersby, Bunce indicated that IAN and IAL were interested in programming Douglas, with IAL providing a number of programming options. Bunce continued: “Based on past experience, it is clear that Douglas wants to be treated as something more than a film star and is not much interested in drama groups per se. He likes to project ‘a picture of himself as a poor boy who had made good and had kept a sense of proportion and faith in American society and institutions.’ It is also clear, however, that it is as a Hollywood film star that he has interest for overseas audiences and any programming would have to start from that premise. He has been effective in meeting with university students. He appears able to talk on such subjects as ‘The role of the arts in a democracy,’ ‘The performing artist in a modern society,’ ‘Is the cinema dead?’ He also is not adverse, apparently, to discussing civil rights, war and peace and other subjects in a political vein.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 3, EDX 22 Visit of Kirk Douglas)
all the actors and actresses he mentioned and can summon are people
who not only represent the liberal persuasion and are politically part-
san but they are highly outspoken. (Paul Newman, Burt Lancaster,
Marlon Brando were some of the names.)

In the course of our conversation he said if anyone in an audience
asked him he would say, “I didn’t vote for Nixon, but frankly I think
he’s doing a damned good job”. He, obviously, is one who gets involved
at election time as a partisan but is non-partisan after the election and
I feel he could be a real asset. I’m not so sure of some of the other
names mentioned (not so much in regard to the President, but in regard
to present policies).

At any rate, I feel a sensible plan could and should be worked out
and may have many benefits.

First, he’s right. So many of these people want to do something for
their country, and almost feel a frustration at not being asked. Most
are too proud to ask if they can be useful. Secondly, they do draw
crowds and we could be in the act just enough to enlarge or limit future
engagements, depending on how they conduct their engagements and
how they respond to questions. We could also be out of the act enough
to make it a non-government representation. If they were good (and
certainly some would be good), it could be some of the best people-
to-people contact.

There is another benefit: It is often said (because it’s true), that the
Hollywood artistic community is largely liberally oriented and from
the Democratic party. Kirk Douglas met Henry Kissinger and now he
raves about him. In short, he found out Republicans are also humans
and perhaps Washington should discover Hollywood personalities are
also humans. To my knowledge, no President since FDR has recognized
Hollywood’s contributions to the point of requesting their contributions.
That’s the highest honor. Perhaps President Nixon could set up a
committee for the purpose of doing exactly that. He would be recogniz-
ing the unique position of the American film industry—an industry of
artists who have created a major twentieth century art form. He would
also show he realizes they can tell the world about the creative spirit
in America perhaps better than a government official. The Hollywood
community would be flattered beyond comparison with any other
Presidential directive.

The following is a preliminary plan only for the purpose of
discussion:

The President appoints a committee to take national advantage of
the resource of already travelling Hollywood artists. The committee
consists of Hollywood talent, MPAA, and USIA (or State/CU). The
committee meets quarterly and acts as a clearing house to assimilate
what personalities will be where in the next three months, and who
would be interested in talking to specific groups. The USIA representa-
tive would then advise the appropriate PAO’s in those countries where
the celebrities will be visiting.

The PAO arranges for whatever we request. (Perhaps a meeting
with university students on a particular topic or a creative group on
another topic or whatever.) USIA Washington would serve as the cata-
lyst, the PAO’s as planners. If we find out that celebrity #7 is counter-
productive to the foreign policy aims of the country, we take his name
off the list for future engagements.

Would we act as censor? Not really. Certainly not regarding what
they say. We would set-up where they speak and to whom they speak.
We would also advise the committee of our recommendations based
on past performances.

Though the cinema is now a world-wide art, America is its inventor
and retains a monopoly of real talent.

I think this plan, or something like it, is something the government
should initiate during this Administration.

We all know there is a real two party system emerging in the
South. Beyond this plan’s more obvious immediate merits, maybe we
can help create a two party system in Hollywood.

Bruce Herschensohn

9 Herschensohn signed “Bruce” above this typed signature.
SUBJECT
USIA Activities

The December 22 issue of the Chicago Tribune reported that Arthur Meyerhoff, a Chicago advertising executive, had criticized USIA for speaking primarily to the intellectual elite. As you requested, we have analyzed these comments.

The idea that USIA programs address themselves principally to intellectual elites is mistaken. USIA does attempt to focus, however, on bringing its message to present and potential leaders in a given country. This policy has been reinforced by USIA’s attempt to rationalize its operations through a planning-programming-budgeting system which requires that program effectiveness be judged principally by the exposure of well defined target groups to USIS program output. The target group approach to USIA programs is implemented world-wide. In a few countries, however, mass audiences are considered important target groups. Examples are Vietnam and Thailand where the threat of actual and potential insurgencies makes mass opinion critical.

It is doubtful that world-wide USIA activities could be reoriented toward mass audiences without an appreciable increase in USIA’s budget. Neither is it clear that such a reorientation would further U.S. foreign policy goals. On the whole, USIA’s effectiveness depends more
on the quality of its personnel and its message than on whether it pursues a mass or an elitist approach to propaganda. I can request a study clarifying the costs and benefits of a mass audience as opposed to a target group approach.

RECOMMENDATION:

Approve study of mass audience approach

Do not desire such a study

4 The President wrote “no” on the line next to the recommendation and wrote below it: “I prefer the emphasis on the elite groups—people who will lead the country—intellectuals, business etc. —The mass approach is too costly—and generally not productive. It is better to sell our idea to a local leader & count on him to sell it to the masses.” An unknown hand wrote below this “3–13–70.”

74. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency (Carter) to the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service (Herschensohn)1

Washington, February 25, 1970

On my last extensive trip to the area, I ran into repeated requests from our posts for a greater input of films to be used both as a representative American art-form and an art-form that has particular appeal to young intellectuals.

It seems to me that the success of our Experimental Film Program last year speaks for itself. However, at least three of the posts, which had it would like to see it repeated on an annual basis (with different films of course). Still other posts, which didn’t get the Experimental Film Package, want something similar.

I wonder if IMV could explore at least two possibilities for IAN in the very near future. First, could we ask Willard Van Dyke of the Museum of Modern Art to undertake putting together a selection of

experimental films annually? We might be able to provide a consultant’s fee for this and, of course, we would pay for the prints. If other areas are interested, we could involve ourselves to a bigger project at less cost per area.

A second source is suggested by the attached clipping.\(^2\) Is it possible for us to latch onto the 25 films involved in the National Student Film Festival?\(^3\) Or is the level of film making involved here less than we would want? If so, is there some way that the American Film Institute could pull together (for a fee) a higher level of experimental films?

Obviously, all of our posts would also welcome contemporary Hollywood film classics on a continuing basis, even more than they get now, but I quite understand the problems involved. That’s one of the reasons we’d like you to explore for us relatively inexpensive sources of the film productions of the better young film makers in the United States. I cannot emphasize for you sufficiently the appeal such films have for our target audiences. It’s something of a phenomenon which we must put to our use.

\(^2\) Not found attached.
\(^3\) Co-sponsored by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA), Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, and the National Student Association (NSA).
A MULTITUDE OF COUNSELORS

Seventh Annual Report
of the U.S. Advisory Commission
on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

One who surveys international educational and cultural exchange programs cannot but be struck by their enormous variety; and as he comes upon the widely differing activities with their diverse goals, he feels as if he were peering into a kaleidoscope—so ever-changing are the patterns he sees. During the past year the Advisory Commission has itself looked at many of these programs from many points of view and with many counselors both inside and outside the Government. In this our Seventh Annual Report we wish to state some of our findings and conclusions.

In May of 1969 the Commission met with representatives of various outside organizations and other Government advisory groups to discuss the whole range of the Government’s educational and cultural exchange programs, how these are related to programs of information and propaganda, and a number of other pertinent questions with which we have concerned ourselves. There were present at this meeting representatives from the National Association for Foreign Student Affairs (NAFSA), the National Council for Community Services to International Visitors (COSERV), the Commission on International Education of the American Council on Education, the National Review Board of the East-West Center in Honolulu, the Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, the Board of Foreign Scholarships, the

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Committee on Youth in the office of the Under Secretary of State, and this Advisory Commission itself. Also present at this meeting was John Richardson, Jr., the newly designated Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, whose appointment at that time had not yet been confirmed by the Senate.

Then on September 12, 1969, the Advisory Commission held another meeting, this one with the full Board of Foreign Scholarships and the Commission on International Education of the American Council on Education. 2 Again, our objective in holding these joint meetings was perfectly simple: to get the best possible advice and guidance from the three groups concerning the whole range of international educational and cultural affairs, both public and private. We had written a strong and critical Sixth Annual Report, 3 making a number of significant recommendations, one of which was that all possible effort be made to remove international educational and cultural programs from the Department of State and to combine these with certain educational and cultural portions of the U.S. Information Agency programs and with the programs of the Institute of International Studies in the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Obviously, we had offered such recommendations for the most serious consideration of the new Administration, which was one day old when we submitted the report to the Congress and to the President and the Secretary of State.

We are pleased to note that in our joint meetings there was thoughtful deliberation of the variety of ways in which these programs might be arranged. There were discussions, for example, of moving all of the USIA back to the Department of State; of creating a quasi-public corporation, perhaps along the lines of the Smithsonian Institution or the National Academy of Sciences; and of simply removing the cultural affairs officers from the direct control of the U.S. Information Service overseas and creating a career service for these persons within the Department of State and/or the Foreign Service.

During the course of the summer and early fall, after Mr. Richardson’s confirmation and at subsequent meetings with him, we were pleased to note that both the Assistant Secretary and Secretary of State Rogers obviously intended to give more personal attention to the Department’s international education and cultural programs and to seek for them as much financial support as they thought Congress would permit. Further, it was the view of the Secretary that these programs could best be administered within the Department of State.

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2 A list of participants is included in appendix A. [Footnote is in the original.]
3 See Document 3.
One manifestation of the increased support within the Department, the lack of which we had deplored in previous reports, is seen in the fiscal year 1971 budget request which is now before the Congress, asking that funds for educational and cultural exchanges be lifted from the $31.425 million, where they now have stood for 2 years, to $40 million. This may not be as much as we would wish, but it amounts to about a one-third increase in the request and, if granted by the Congress, will certainly put the international educational and cultural programs of this Government on the upswing.

In the light of the deliberations in the joint meetings mentioned above and the subsequent discussions with Assistant Secretary Richardson and with the Secretary himself, the Commission has decided that it will not now press for its earlier recommendation that the programs be removed from the State Department. In all fairness to the new Administration, and with much evidence of increasing support, we have informed the Department of State through the Assistant Secretary that we will watch to see what happens during the next year. If the programs do not receive the support we think they merit, we may then suggest again that they be reordered somehow in the complex of Government organizations concerned with them, or that they be removed from Government and placed in a quasi-public agency.

Secretary Rogers, in testimony before the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on September 25, 1969, requesting a restoration in funds cut by the House from the Department’s fiscal year 1970 request for $35.4 million for educational and cultural programs, said:

“We not only think that this restoration is fully justified, but we would expect in any subsequent years to increase our budget request. I am convinced from observations I have made that in the educational field the money is very well spent. This story repeats itself many times when you talk to young people particularly around the world; how many of them were educated here; how much it has meant to them; and how helpful they will be to the United States in their own countries.”

Moreover, we were impressed by the justification used in the Department’s budget presentation for fiscal 1971 requesting $40 million for mutual educational and cultural exchange activities. It seems to us that this is one of the best and most succinct statements we have read

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4 Reference is to H.R. 17575, the Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill for fiscal year 1971.

concerning the purposes of the Department’s educational and cultural exchange programs.

“Any sound strategy for effective response to the realities we face in world politics requires an improved U.S. capacity to communicate with other societies in the U.S. interest through mutually rewarding interactions among key leadership groups and individuals here and abroad. People-to-people programs of all kinds are therefore a realistic and effective means of enhancing constructive U.S. influence in the world. They can, if well managed, develop a sufficiently common perspective among key elements of other societies and our own to provide a solid base for strengthened economic, military and political, as well as cultural, relations.

“The management of such programs, along with the performance of the other policy and coordinating functions of the Secretary of State described above, are the business of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs.

“In discharging these responsibilities, the Bureau operates on the premise that increasing mass media control over the attention and short-term reactions of public opinion does not reduce the influence of individual opinion and decision-makers in the international arena any more than is the case in domestic affairs. And the face-to-face personal experiences those leaders have had with Americans and in America can be crucial for our relations with their countries.

“Similarly, mass tourism and the increasing volume of general academic, professional, performing arts and business travel does not at all reduce the significance of the specific positive or negative experiences of the individuals whose attitudes are or will become decisive in each country. Their personal experiences can result in trends and patterns of educational, creative, scientific and political thought leading directly either toward cooperation or conflict. Close and persisting personal, group and institutional relationships can be especially potent factors affecting these trends and patterns when they develop in fields of central social and (ultimately) political importance. Among these fields in most countries are education, science, journalism, public service, the professions and the arts.”

Agenda for the Coming Year

As the Advisory Commission watches the development of international programs in the coming year, it will also be cooperating with the Bureau and the Department on a number of tasks.

The final report of the joint meeting of September 12, which was transmitted to Assistant Secretary Richardson in a letter of October 23 from the Chairman of this Commission and the Chairman of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, lists 13 “topics requiring further study and recommendations.”⁶ Wishing to work more closely with the Bureau of

⁶ See appendix A. [Footnote is in the original. The letter to Richardson is from both Babbidge and Roach. Bardos and White also attended the September 12, 1969, joint meeting. For their assessment, see Document 36.]
Educational and Cultural Affairs than has been the case in the past, we asked Mr. Richardson for his suggestions as to which of these topics he thought should have priority. He listed a number of these in his answer of November 21, and it is these matters to which we intend to address ourselves in the next year.

It was the Commission’s feeling that the new program initiatives suggested at the joint meeting in September should be formulated by the Assistant Secretary’s office, and he has agreed to undertake this task.

The expansion of the use of binational commissions abroad for a number of purposes is a matter for the Board of Foreign Scholarships to undertake, and they have indeed agreed to give this subject thorough consideration.

As for the application to other cultures of the learning technology developed in the United States, further investigation of this topic will include study and discussion of a report, *To Improve Learning*, prepared by the Commission on Instructional Technology for the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. This report was just published this month (March) by the House Committee on Education and Labor.

The Policy and Research Staff of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is looking into the question of maintaining current central inventories of information on public and private activities relating to international educational and cultural programs.

The question of wider distribution of scholarly books and publications overseas and greater availability to the American scholar of similar publications from abroad we have referred to the Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs, which has already given a good deal of thought to this subject.

One topic for further study which we chose to inquire into, even though it was not on the Assistant Secretary’s list, was the proposed use of binational selection procedures for short-term visitors. We have been promised a study of this question by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Finally, both the Advisory Commission and the Board of Foreign Scholarships hope to meet with the President or a representative in the White House within the next year.

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7 See appendix B. [Footnote is in the original.]


9 See appendix D for a paper prepared for this committee on “The American Library Presence Abroad.” [Footnote is in the original. The paper is entitled “The American Library Presence Abroad: A Report to the Government Advisory Committee on International Book and Library Programs.”]
These, then, are some of the questions that we intend to give further attention and thought to in the coming year, and we look forward to ever-increasing cooperation with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Department of State in these matters.

Reaction to the Commission’s Sixth Annual Report

Readers of our Sixth Annual Report, entitled “Is Anyone Listening?”, will remember that we covered a broad number of subjects, directing attention to the need for a clear commitment on the part of the entire executive branch to international educational and cultural programs. We were pleased to note that this report was distributed more widely and was listened to by more people than any other report since A Beacon of Hope. That was the Commission’s first annual report, in which we fulfilled a mandate from the Congress to make a survey of the effectiveness of the programs in international educational and cultural affairs of the Department of State from 1949 to 1962.

In addition to the congressional print, the usual form of publication of our annual reports, we reprinted it in full in the Spring 1969 issue of our quarterly Exchange. It received distribution in that way to over 8,000 persons. It went also, of course, in several copies each to 106 cultural affairs officers around the world. Moreover, during the course of the past year we have received more than a hundred letters requesting extra copies, sometimes as many as 40 copies. We reprint, as appendix C, a sample of reactions to that report received by the Commission over the past year.

We regret to say, however, that another report, issued at about the same time, on the use of U.S.-owned excess foreign currencies, although well received in certain quarters, did not get the attention we had hoped it would. We remain of the opinion that this is a useful report for anyone dealing in excess foreign currencies who wishes to utilize them for international educational and cultural programs. Copies are available from the staff of the Commission.

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10 Printed as Document 3.
12 At appendix C are 10 pages of comments regarding the 1969 report.
Research and Evaluation

In last year’s report we made some fairly strong recommendations with respect to the research and evaluation function in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. We were therefore pleased to learn that one of the very first official acts of the new Assistant Secretary was to insert in the then virtually complete fiscal 1971 budget a request to the Congress for the sum of $100,000 for program research and evaluation. It is the Commission’s and the Bureau’s good fortune that he understands the methods and criteria of this function, and that he is being supported in his request for funds by the Department and the Bureau of the Budget.

We regret to note, however, that restrictive personnel policies in the Department have delayed the establishment of a permanent evaluation staff which, incidentally, we recommended last year. Along with the Assistant Secretary, we believe that the development of a social science research capability in the Bureau is a fundamental and urgent management requirement; and we hope the Assistant Secretary will be able to find ways within the personnel ceilings to establish such a staff.

Institutionalizing the evaluation and research function, needless to say, would give it the staying power which “contracting out” lacks. It would also provide the technical competence required for monitoring research contracts with independent research firms and centers. Finally, this institutionalizing would provide the daily evaluation and research continuity which operators of the program cannot themselves provide, and it would constantly remind all of us of those inevitable gaps between the goals that we envisage and the results we attain.

Conclusions

To sum up:

(1) After much discussion with “a multitude of counselors,” we have decided that it is reasonable to await the outcome of the 1971 budget presentations and final appropriations for international educational and cultural exchange programs before making any recommendations; and to observe the operation of the program by the Department of State. We are pleased to strike an optimistic note about both of these subjects.

(2) We have set an agenda for ourselves for the coming year, as noted, and will of course give our attention to other related matters as they come up.

(3) We urge the Department as soon as possible, pending availability of funds, to develop social science competence within the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs for the purpose of research, evaluation, and appraisal of effectiveness of the Bureau’s programs. We offer all possible cooperation in this endeavor since one of the statutory
functions of this Commission is to “appraise the effectiveness of programs carried out pursuant to [the Fulbright-Hays Act].”\textsuperscript{14}

[Omitted here are appendices A–D.]

\textsuperscript{14} An unknown hand added the brackets.

76. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency (Herschensohn) to the Deputy Director (Loomis), Deputy Director for Policy and Plans (Weathersby), and Associate Director for Research and Assessment (Strasburg)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, March 2, 1970

Let me tell you about last Thursday\textsuperscript{2} morning.

I saw one of our films in its interlock stage that told the story of a polluted river in another country and about an observatory in still another country. Cinematically, it should have no trouble at all in competing for theatrical placement in the area of the world for which it was produced. After it was over I asked:

“What did this cost?”

“$22,000.”

“What does it do for us?”

“The United States financed the observatory.”

“But we didn’t say that in the narrative.”

“The Area Officer told us not to say that. You see, the U.S. paid the whole bill. 100%. If many countries gave financial contributions it might have been O.K. to mention, but it was only us.”

“You mean we don’t want them to know we financed it?”

“Right.”

“Well, why do we want to show them the damned observatory?”

“It builds pride in themselves and their whole area.”

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 13, Motion Pictures and Television (IMV) General 1970. No classification marking. Drafted by Herschensohn.

\textsuperscript{2} February 26.
“Not pride in us?”
“Pride in them.”
“Gee.”
“You see, there is no pride if they think we did it for them.”
“How about the first part of the film on the river?”
“The whole business of ecology and pollution that can harm fishing is a world-wide problem.”
“$22,000?”
“$22,000.”
“Are there other films planned in the series using the same kind of logic?”
“Of course. They are all on nation building and pride. The next one is on housing. It won’t show any U.S. involvement.”
“How many of these are scheduled?”
“Nine.”
“Then that’s $22,000 x 9?”
“$198,000.”
“Since it is such low key propaganda, would the area at least agree to a screen credit for USIS?”
“No. It would look like big brother.”
“$198,000?”
“$198,000.”

I had to leave because I was keeping a PAO waiting in my office. He just returned from the country in which he served and he wanted to talk about our films in that country.
He said, “They really love films on art and paintings. We should do more of them.”
“What else do you feel we need?”
“Can we get some underground films to show them?”
“Pardon?”
“Some underground films. They would go over well.”
“Most of them deal with sex or anti-religion or take an anti-U.S. posture on Vietnam or speak against us regarding race relations. Most of it is pretty bad.”
“But some of it would be good. They are interested in underground films.”
“But we aren’t a public service. What else do you think we should do?”
“They have a lot of problems our films could help solve.”
“Is that the criteria you use to show our films?”
“Well, it has to be something of real value to them. We should make more films that could help them in development. The whole under-developed world needs more films on national development. We ought to do more of it.”

“I think we have higher priorities.” (I said that knowing I was not completely honest since no one really knows.)

“We do?”

“Yes.”

He didn’t ask but I’m sure he wonders what they could possibly be. Maybe he is right. Maybe they are all right. I don’t think so. The debate continues and I feel it should be resolved.

Of course national development and regional cooperation is a U.S. foreign policy objective. But won’t any and all U.S. objectives continue to be suspect if we are not held in respect? I would assume the USIA’s job is to insure that other nations of the world have respect for this country (a job so far unaccomplished) so our broad national and international goals can be more easily achieved.

As someone involved in propaganda for the United States, I find it difficult to get enthused about telling citizens of a foreign land that they have a great observatory and their country is responsible for it and at the same time have it be my job to make sure they don’t find out we financed it.

I know this may sound absurd but what would happen if we took all the money we spend trying to build respect for other countries and put it into projects that would have as their goal, building respect for this country?

Am I not thinking deeply enough?

Have we all thought so deeply that we have lost our purpose?

I mention all this about Thursday morning because there is one Thursday morning every week and sometimes more.

Bruce Herschensohn

IMV

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Weathersby) to the Director (Shakespeare)

Washington, March 19, 1970

SUBJECT
Implementation of Your Book Policy

Following our conversation I set up a small Working Group—chaired by Paul Morris, a senior foreign service officer—to examine how the Agency is implementing your new book policy. I also had several meetings with Henry Dunlap and his staff.

The vast majority of books ordered by PAO’s are being sent automatically. In the case of a small number of titles about which ICS has questions, it sends an appraisal instead. If the PAO then resubmits the order he receives the book. No justification is required.

I suggest the following two alternatives for your consideration:

(1) **Send all books ordered.** This procedure has the advantage of speed and simplicity. It also has, however, certain marked disadvantages. Even following your letter of December 10, ICS continues to receive orders for books which PAO’s might not request if they had full information. In the case of these “discretionary use” books, I believe the PAO would welcome additional information before deciding to place the order. “Discretionary use” books include titles:

— that emphasize negative aspects of American life or policies (in which case the appraisal points out other titles the post should order to balance them). . . .

— that are out of date (where a more recent work would better serve the post’s purpose). . . .

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 1, BKS 1 Task Force on Book Policy. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates it was received on April 2. Loomis and O’Brien initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum; Loomis also wrote: “JOB Let’s be sure this [is] looked at again in June. HL 4/2.” O’Brien sent a copy of the memorandum to White under an April 2 handwritten note, stating: Barbara—Pls note Henry’s comment. Leave it to you whether this should come to the ExCom. JOB.” (Ibid.)

2 Reference is to Circular Airgram 2, January 2, which contained the revised guidelines for PAOs to follow in administering the book program; see footnote 2, Document 59. Morris sent Weathersby the report of the Working Group on Agency Book Policy under a February 26 covering memorandum. The report consisted of two parts: recommendations for strengthening the book selection policy and the present procedures for book selection. (Ibid.)

3 See Document 59.
—of inferior quality (including those that might be considered pornographic or in poor taste). . . .

—of questionable program value (mystery stories, light fiction of poor literary quality). . . .

—by foreign authors, of little if any relevance to the USIA program. . . .

—By III–C authors (those who have taken the Fifth Amendment, called for overthrow of U.S. government, etc.); since 1954 it has been Agency policy to use works by such authors only when they serve a clear program purpose.

These facts are often not known to the PAO when he orders the book. If the book is automatically supplied, USIA funds are wasted for purchase and shipping, and in some cases embarrassment to the Agency might result.

(2) Send ICS appraisals of “discretionary use” titles, followed by the book if the PAO resubmits the order. This alternative still leaves the ultimate judgment to the PAO, but gives him the benefit of the Agency’s knowledge which he cannot be expected to have.

Books by eminent Americans, persons of recognized stature in their fields, would not be considered in the “discretionary use” category; orders for them would be filled upon receipt. They would include American works that have won major literary awards (e.g. Pulitzer, Nobel, National Book Award). If the content of these titles suggests certain cautions as to their use, ICS would simultaneously send the appraisals for the personal attention of the PAO.

I recommend Alternative 2. I believe this carries out the intent of the policy, while still protecting both the Agency and the PAO himself. In our discussions Henry Dunlap and I have agreed on certain steps (such as updating of appraisals) to ensure that ICS procedures are responsive to your policy.

If you agree, I will also carry out a further review with ICS in July. Six months’ experience should give us a good indication of how the new procedures are working.

For your information I am enclosing a summary which was prepared by ICS as of March 13.4

4 Attached but not printed is an undated summary enclosure entitled “Analysis of Book Orders.”
Henry Dunlap concurs in this recommendation. We would welcome the opportunity to discuss it further with you.\footnote{In a July 1 memorandum to Bunce, White, in reference to Weathersby’s memorandum, noted that IOP “is committed to taking another look this month at how the new book policy is working. The Director accepted our recommendation for Alternative 2, but with the understanding that we would have another look at the question in six months.” She continued: “Could you please take this on?” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 1, BKS 1 Task Force on Book Policy)}

\textbf{William H. Weathersby}\footnote{Weathersby initialed “WHW” above this typed signature.}

\section*{78. \textit{Info Guide Prepared in the Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency}}\footnote{Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1970. No classification marking. Weathersby sent the Info Guide to all heads of elements under a March 20 covering memorandum, stating: “I know that you share my feeling that the Agency has a continuing responsibility to convey to our audiences overseas the significance of the Foreign Policy Report. The attached paper is intended to focus attention of media and posts on the importance of this task.”}

No. 70–8 \hspace{2cm} Washington, March 20, 1970

“A New Strategy for Peace”

1. The President’s report to the Congress on U.S. foreign policy for the 1970’s\footnote{Reference is to the President’s February 18 report to Congress, entitled “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970s: A New Strategy for Peace.” For the text of the report, see \textit{Public Papers: Nixon, 1970}, pp. 116–190. It is also printed in \textit{Foreign Relations}, 1969–1976, vol. I, Foundations of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 60. In a March 26 memorandum to Shakespeare, Weathersby updated him on the actions that USIA had taken, and plans proposed, “to make maximum use of the President’s report as our fundamental guidance on foreign policy. We want to make sure that the Agency not only keeps alive for overseas audiences the significance of the report, but also considers its implications for Agency operations.” (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1970)} provides us with nearly limitless opportunities to explain abroad the direction in which the United States has embarked.
2. Agency media and posts alike should take sustained and creative steps to ensure that the substance of the report is kept before the public in the months to come. For this comprehensive statement on foreign and defense policy sets out a long term strategy for peace—not tactics to meet immediate crises.

3. The President’s report reflects the change that has taken place in the pattern of international relationships. It signifies a shift from the policies of the postwar era, an era characterized by American leadership in nearly all fields of endeavor, to the era of the 1970’s, in which other nations have the ability and the responsibility to do for themselves what once we might have been required to do for them. This concept of shared responsibilities is the essence of the Nixon Doctrine.3

4. The central thrust of our message should be that this Administration has charted a new course in American foreign policy predicated on a balanced and realistic American role. America’s interests must shape its commitments, rather than the reverse. Our tone should be one of modesty and restraint, in keeping with the tone of the report. Eschewing ideology, dealing with the world as it is today rather than as it was, or as we might wish it to be, this policy aims at a purposeful partnership with other nations in the pursuit of common ends. We should try to communicate this tone, to get across a sense of new departures.

5. At the same time, Agency media and posts alike should take care to show that the U.S. has no intention of withdrawing from the world: we will maintain our commitments, meet our responsibilities, protect our interests, and thereby help to build peace.

6. In stressing these goals and their implications for the international community, Agency media and posts should draw upon the following principal themes for emphasis:
   a. A new era in international relations has begun. The Nixon Administration has taken steps to adjust the interlocking web of its foreign political, economic, trade, and defense policies to the era of the 1970’s. This era contrasts sharply with the last two decades. Over that period the energies of a generation of dedicated and creative Americans were absorbed in fashioning policies to deal with a cycle of recurring international crises that had their origins in the destruction caused by World War II and the turmoil and uncertainty that often attended the birth of new nations. Then we confronted a monolithic Communist world and our initiatives and resources were largely responsible for political stability and economic progress. That period is over. Today, we deal with a world of stronger allies, a community of independent developing

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3 See footnote 3, Document 65.
nations, and a Communist world still hostile but now divided. These changed circumstances provide opportunity to get at the causes of crises, to take a longer view.

b. American foreign policy, designed to help build a durable peace, is guided by three basic principles: partnership, strength, and willingness to negotiate.

(1) Partnership. The obligations of peace, like its benefits, must be shared. Our contribution and success will depend not on the frequency or depth of involvement in the affairs of others, but on the stamina of our policies.

More active participation by our friends and allies in their own defense and progress will result in a more effective common effort toward goals we all seek.

The fact that the U.S. does not seek to dominate world affairs does not mean that it is moving toward disengagement or returning to isolation. On the contrary, at the core of the Nixon Doctrine is the assumption that we will maintain our commitments; that we will participate in the defense and development of allies and friends; but that we will help only where that help will make a real difference and where it is considered in our interest. This is not a blueprint for a retreat from responsibility. It is a recognition that interests shape commitments, rather than the other way around.

(2) Strength. Any suggestion that the defenses of America are weak could lead others to make dangerous miscalculations. We will therefore maintain sufficient strength to deny other countries the ability to impose their will on the United States and its allies. At the same time, we realize that our security as well as the security of other nations depends upon effective arms control. There is no area in which we and the Soviet Union—as well as others—have greater common interest, than in reaching agreement with regard to arms control.

(3) Willingness to negotiate. All nations have important national interests to protect. But the most fundamental interest of each lies in building a structure of peace: when peace is threatened the security of all is diminished. America’s commitment to peace is most convincingly demonstrated by its willingness to negotiate points of difference with adversaries as well as with friends in a fair, flexible and businesslike manner. No nation need be our permanent enemy.

Negotiation must proceed from knowledge. Hence a Verification Panel was set up under the National Security Council to establish as

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firmly as possible the data on which to base policy discussions. This “building block” approach involved the most intensive study of strategic arms problems ever made by this or any other government, and played a central part in making our preparation for the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks with the Soviet Union, the most thorough in which the U.S. Government has ever engaged.

b. Peace also has an economic dimension. Here we seek shared responsibilities in partnership with others to advance our common purposes.

We will continue to support measures that strengthen the world monetary system and freer trade on which the prosperity and development of most countries, including our own, depend. Economic barriers block more than the free flow of goods and capital across national borders; they obstruct a more open world in which ideas and people, as well as goods and machinery, move among nations with maximum freedom.

We look forward to the time when our relations with the Communist countries will have improved to the point where trade relations can increase between us.

We will watch with great interest the developing relations between the European Community and other nations, some of which have applied for membership. The Community’s trade policies will be of increasing importance to our own trade policy in the years ahead.

Economic development is also an international responsibility: the struggle of developing countries to achieve a satisfactory rate of economic and social progress is one of the great challenges of our times, and as such must be of concern to all. A liberal system of tariff preferences for exports of developing countries, as proposed in the President’s report, is designed to assist the developing countries in their development.

c. Foreign aid is not a panacea. It is a means of supplementing the essential ingredient for progress in the developing world—efforts of the nations themselves to mobilize the resources and energies of their own peoples. New U.S. foreign assistance policies, designed to be more responsive to conditions of 1970’s, are based on these premises:

—Multilateral institutions must play an increasing role in the provision of aid.
—The developing countries themselves must play a larger part in formulating their own development strategies.
—U.S. bilateral aid must carry fewer restrictions.
—Private investment must play a central role in the development process, to whatever extent desired by developing nations themselves.
—Trade policy must recognize the special needs of the developing countries.
7. A durable peace requires a structure of stability within which the rights of each nation are respected. President Nixon’s new strategy for peace provides a realistic and specific blueprint for the U.S. contribution to that structure.

8. Area Treatment. This guidance is limited to global themes. Output to each area will, of course, put special emphasis on the regional sections of the report.

79. **Paper Prepared in the United States Information Agency**

Washington, March 30, 1970

**PLAN FOR USIA’S ROLE IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION BICENTENNIAL CELEBRATION**

**SUMMARY**

USIA offers to provide the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission advice on overseas public opinion relating to the Bicentennial celebration. Within the limits of its resources it also offers assistance to the Commission and other Federal, state, municipal and private institutions on the international aspects of their Bicentennial programs. It will use its press, radio, television and motion picture services and an expansion of its exhibits programs to interpret to foreign audiences the Bicentennial and its most important themes and component events. For the same purpose the Agency hopes to expand its participation in international fairs during the Bicentennial period.

During the Bicentennial period, USIA will foster the study of the American Revolution and subsequent development of our society in foreign universities and special research centers through supplying them appropriate books and research materials and through arranging

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1970. No classification marking. Under an April 2 covering memorandum, Shakespeare sent Sterling a copy of the paper and an additional statement of recommendations regarding international projects associated with the Bicentennial that might be undertaken by other agencies, noting that Sterling had requested this information in a January 30 letter. He concluded: “I assure you that this Agency is ready to assist your Commission in any way it can to make international aspects of the Bicentennial Celebration successful.” (Ibid.) Sterling’s January 30 letter, in which he noted that the ARBC required agency responses by April 1 in order to prepare a report to the President for submission by July 4, is ibid.
many lectures and seminars. In cooperation with the Department of State or a private foundation it will organize musical workshops, competitions for the best performances of American music and for outstanding research on American music. The Agency will also promote the expansion and improvement of English language teaching overseas and provide special study materials that will help the students to increase their knowledge of American society and its history.

The Voice of America will broadcast throughout the world four series of lectures for American government, literature, music, and on the ethnic origin of the American people, plus recordings of the talks of U.S. presidents and other historical American personages of the past half century.

The Agency and its overseas posts will help foreign media representatives cover the Bicentennial successfully. In its programs the USIA will make an especial effort to reach the young people in foreign countries.

These plans are, of course, subject to the availability of appropriated funds.

**USIA Plans and Recommendations for the American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration**

Items in this list represent ideas which have been submitted by various elements or individuals of the Agency for consideration by USIA and the Bicentennial Commission. The final selection of projects for adoption will be made from this list and other ideas which will be received prior to the completion of the final draft of USIA’s Plan which will be submitted to the Commission by mid-March, 1970.

I. Recommendation for domestic projects.
   A. Complete a Model City by 1976 (William G. Hamilton)
   B. Clean the Potomac by 1976 so that people can swim in it at Washington. (Kenneth Sparks)
   C. Eliminate the drug problem in Washington (Kenneth Sparks)
   D. The Bicentennial Bookshelf (Henry A. Dunlap)
   E. Bicentennial Awards for American Achievement in areas of life (medicine), liberty (just laws), and pursuit of happiness (arts and environment).
   F. Declaration of Inter-dependence by the President and the Congress.
   G. Produce a series of three or four-hour long films showing the evolution of American concepts, modeled on BBC’s series “Civilization.” (James K. Welsh, Jr.)
H. Revive the Broadway Hit “1776”\(^2\) with road companies to travel not only to major cities but also to smaller towns.

I. Begin or end an important U.S. space exploit on July 4, 1976. (IPS)

J. Revive the Freedom Train of Historic Documents,\(^3\) with trips abroad as well as in the U.S. (IPS)

K. The Liberty Bell should tour the world’s great cities. (IPS)

L. International, regional or national Conferences on various themes relating to the American Revolution.

M. Private foundations which have given grants to promote the design of outstanding posters in conjunction with the Smithsonian Institution should produce a series of outstanding posters every year between now and 1976 on the United States, its history and ideals. These would be distributed widely in the U.S. and abroad.

II. Recommendations for programs in international field to be administered by some organization other than USIA.

A. Various projects suggested in CU’s field.

1. At least one major bicentennial festival of the performing arts for each world area.

2. Establishment of commemorative chairs of American studies at foreign universities.

3. Tours by small teams of American experts in appropriate fields to conduct seminars in each world area.

4. A greatly stepped-up CU program of grants to bring selected individuals to participate in such Bicentennial programs as seminars and workshops.

B. Series of major studies on various aspects of American Civilization each study to be prepared under the direction of an outstanding foreign scholar in the fashion of Gunnar Myrdal’s *The American Dilemma*.\(^4\) (Philip J. Conley)

C. The U.S. should make some significant gesture to the world. For example, it could offer a substantial grant to an international body for some purpose like improvement of the environment which is of great interest to all mankind.

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\(^2\) Reference is to the 1969 musical, later film, depicting the events surrounding the signing of the Declaration of Independence.

\(^3\) Reference is to the travelling collection, overseen by the American Heritage Foundation, of 126 key U.S. documents, including the Bill of Rights, Treaty of Paris, and Emancipation Proclamation, that departed Philadelphia by train on September 17, 1947. The train visited cities in 48 states before the tour ended on January 22, 1949.

\(^4\) Reference is to *An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy*, published in 1944 and written by the Swedish economist Gunnar Myrdal, which focused on race relations in the United States.
D. Special and substantial discounts should be offered to foreigners, especially students for travel, hotels, and if possible, food.

E. An all-out program is necessary to develop the facilities and services needed to cope with the vast influx of visitors: guides, police and information assistants capable of dealing with visitors at least in the major languages; hotel and other lodging facilities and clearing houses for up-to-the-minute information on available space; etc.

F. A program to codify and, as desirable, translate documents in foreign countries relating to the U.S. for example, papers relating to Polish-American relations in the Revolutionary Period. (Wilson P. Dizard)

G. Grants to finance joint foreign-American scholarly research studies on subjects like the history of U.S. relationships with a given country, or the role played by the people from a certain country in the development of the U.S.

H. Beginning in 1976, Annual Bicentennial Awards by the National Foundation of the Arts and the Humanities and the National Science Foundation to be given to foreigners for outstanding achievements in major fields such as medicine, environment, sciences, the arts and the humanities.

I. Beginning in 1976 Annual Bicentennial Awards by the American Council of Learned Socialities to the author of the best foreign books and university theses on American history, governmental system, and society and on the arts and the humanities in America.

J. A comparative inter-American research project conducted by American and Latin American scholars on the relationship between the American Revolution and those of Latin America. (IAL)

K. Objects USA Exhibition of the Smithsonian Institution should be put on extended overseas tour accompanied by lecturers and visual aids. A counterpart Objects Latin America exhibit could be organized for showing in the U.S. by 1976.

L. Annual meetings of the various foreign Associations of American Studies should be held in the U.S. during 1976. Various international learned societies should also be invited to hold their meetings in this country during 1976.

M. Publication of collections of essays by distinguished foreign leaders and intellectuals on the American contributions to the world, especially in the spiritual and cultural realms.

5 The exhibit, consisting of craft objects rendered in various media, appeared at the Smithsonian Institution in 1969.
N. Refit a major American passenger liner as a traveling exhibit and seminar platform for a worldwide, year-long tour. NASA, the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, USIA, and many private firms could use the facilities of the vessel.

III. USIA Programs

A. Multi-Media Projects. Multi-media programs on the Early History, the Formative Years, the Western Saga, Problems of American History (such as growth, race, world responsibility, urbanization), Current Progress, and Long-Term National Goals. Two annually 1971–76. (ICS)

B. ICS’s Area of Interest

1. Traveling seminars (of several American scholars) on the meaning of the Revolution today.

2. Tours of volunteer individual American speakers to conduct seminars on the meaning of the Revolution today.


4. The Agency should request funds to provide a substantial increase in the documentation resources of a few major research centers in Europe, Japan, and India specialized in research on the U.S. (Philip J. Conley)

5. Improvement of the collection of books and other study materials at foreign universities and teacher training colleges which hold courses on the U.S. (Philip J. Conley)


7. Two series of leaflets on Distinguished Americans in graded English (1,000 to 2,000 words limit) as a supplement to existing materials. The series would cover (a) the “Founding Fathers” and (b) illustrious Americans in literature, art, science, education, politics, social movements, etc.

8. English teaching study guides based on the history of the American Revolution and the period leading up to it.


6 Asterisked items originated outside the medium office that would be the most concerned with it. When available the origin of the proposal is shown in parenthesis. [Footnote is in the original.]

7 Ibid.
10. Publication of a variety of simplified books (The Ladder Series) as study guides for schools and libraries on the American Revolution, the Constitution, the American history.

11. Augmented translation program of books dealing with the American Revolution and subsequent developments of the American people. Annually from 1971 to 1975 the Agency proposes to acquire rights for publication of ten titles in twenty-four languages.

12. Book exhibits to promote wider commercial distribution and reading of books issued by American publishers on the American Revolution and the achievements of the U.S. over the past 200 years.

13. Prize essay contests in which students would express their own views of the significance of the American Revolution. (Perhaps in cooperation with another Federal agency.)

14. Exhibits programs on the Early History, the Formative Years, Western Saga, Problems in American History (such as growth, race, world responsibility), Current Progress, and Long-term National Goals. Annually from 1971 to 1976 this program will include six photogel exhibits (one for each area) and six panel exhibits.

15. The packet exhibits which are sent monthly to Africa will be increased by four extra ones each year 1971 to 1976.

16. As in the case of Apollo 11, the Agency will furnish to the field myriad small exhibit items, such as flags, buttons, posters, especially during the years 1975 and 1976.

17. To the extent possible the Agency will meet the numerous requests for exhibits and exhibit materials from foreign institutions and organizations desiring to mark our Bicentennial with complementary exhibits, festivals, or other forms of celebration.

18. The Agency should recommend that during the Bicentennial period the U.S. participate at least once in each of the international trade fairs held in foreign countries. At present, we are authorized to participate in the fairs at Berlin and in Eastern Europe. During this period the fairs in other parts of the world also offer exceptional opportunities to bring out the significance of the American Revolution and the entire American experience.

19. The Agency will give as wide overseas distribution as appropriate to the many valuable bibliographies of primary and secondary material relating to the Bicentennial that will be prepared by the Library of Congress, the National Archives and other Federal agencies, state and local governments and private organizations. In addition, the Agency will produce and issue supplementary bibliographies of secondary sources, whenever they seem desirable to meet a need of the overseas audiences.
20. Make especial effort to meet requests of foreign scholars for research materials relating to projects on the American Revolution and the development of the U.S. (Philip J. Conley)\(^8\)

21. Produce or purchase available recordings of most significant American documents read by prominent Americans. (IPS)

C. IBS’s Area of Interest. The Voice of America plans several programs in its Forum series which are broadcast in English worldwide to an intellectual audience. With the exception of the anthology of recorded talks of outstanding Americans (Item 1), each Forum lecture will be by an outstanding scholar and each series will be coordinated by a distinguished scholar. Each series will also result in a hard and softback book for distribution overseas. The planned series will include:

1. “Voice of America’s Past—Fifty Years of Recorded History.” Talks will include those of U.S. presidents and great historical American personages of the past half century.

2. “Americans All: People from Everywhere.” A series of 26 talks on great Americans of various national and ethnic derivations. In addition to the normal Forum broadcast in English each talk would be translated and broadcast in the language of the country of origin of the American portrayed or of his ancestors.

3. “How the USA Governs Itself.” Twenty-six talks on American government at all levels with proper attention to the role of private groups.

4. “Two Centuries of American Literature” a radio anthology accompanied by literary comments.


D. IMV’s Area of Interest.

1. Up-date Agency’s film series “Scenes for American History.”

E. IPS’s Area of Interest.

1. Special issues of Dialogue, America Illustrated and other Agency magazines on Bicentennial themes.

\(^8\) Ibid.
80. Memorandum From the Senior Military Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, April 8, 1970

SUBJECT

USIA Polls

At Tab A is the memorandum you sent to the President in response to his directive that USIA polls abroad be eliminated. You informed the President that you would discuss the consequences of phasing out USIA polling in Vietnam and elsewhere abroad in a manner that would avoid drawing attention to their cessation. The President’s notation indicated that he wanted you to proceed with the phase-out since the polls “serve no useful purpose.”

At Tab B is a memorandum from you to Shakespeare which would implement the President’s directive.

I believe that USIA should have a full hearing before the President’s directive is implemented since I am sure that a good case could be made for the value of these polls. As you know, the President is not particularly happy with the pollsters at the present moment. Rather than send a directive on this subject it would be preferable to meet with Shakespeare and discuss means by which the implementation can best be handled. As an initial step, I suggest that you ask Shakespeare to prepare a carefully reasoned rebuttal and to develop procedures which would better preserve the secrecy of the results of the polls. In the interim, Shakespeare should reduce the frequency of polls being taken, particularly in Vietnam.

RECOMMENDATION

That you not send a written directive to Shakespeare, but rather discuss with him the means by which the President’s order can be temporized.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [2 of 2]. Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Attached as Tab A to a May 22 memorandum from Kennedy to Kissinger, in which Kennedy highlighted issues for Kissinger to discuss at a May 22 breakfast with Shakespeare. (Ibid.) Tab B of the May 22 memorandum, a March 23 memorandum from Shakespeare to Kissinger, is attached as Tab C to a May 21 memorandum from Kennedy and Rodman to Kissinger, printed as Document 86.

\(^2\) Kissinger initialed the “Disapprove” line. Below it, he wrote: “I think they should go. I’ll see Shakespeare but Pres is right.”
Tab A

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, March 27, 1970

SUBJECT
USIA Polls in Vietnam

1. In the News Summary of 20th March, you took note of a report that Shakespeare had denied Fulbright the USIA Vietnam polls. The incident cited was a refusal of a USIA witness to give over the polls. The witness said he must refer the request to his Director. Shakespeare has consulted with us, and we have advised him to respond to Fulbright in the following way:
   —The survey data should be given to Fulbright because refusal would only magnify their impact—they would be leaked anyway.
   —The data must remain classified.
   —An unclassified letter of transmittal from USIA to Fulbright should be drafted to emphasize that to declassify or leak the polls would constitute an attempt seriously to distort, since they would be interpreted as being similar in accuracy to American polls. They, of course, are not—being designed instead to serve a particular operational need . . . etc., etc. It should be drafted in a manner to settle blame squarely on Fulbright if the polls are leaked.
   —When the polls are leaked, the USIA-Fulbright letter should be released to the Press with a special news conference.

2. I shall consult with Frank Shakespeare to examine the consequences of phasing out USIA polling in Vietnam and elsewhere abroad in a manner that would avoid drawing attention to their cessation.

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3 Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. The President wrote “ok” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

4 Not found.

5 During a March 19 hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Nickel indicated that he was acting under instructions from Shakespeare not to provide the committee with the polling information. Fulbright asserted that by refusing to answer, Nickels was taking the Fifth Amendment. (“USIA Withholds Poll Data,” Washington Post, March 20, 1970, p. A16)

6 On April 23, during the daily proceedings of the Senate, Fulbright asked to enter into the Congressional Record his correspondence with Shakespeare regarding the polling data, including an April 6 letter from Shakespeare to Fulbright, under which Shakespeare transmitted “classified copies of the surveys conducted in Viet-Nam from 1965 to 1970.” (Congressional Record, vol. 116, Part 10 (April 23–May 4, 1970), pp. 12752–12753)

7 The President wrote “ok” below this sentence and drew an upward facing arrow to the word “avoid.” He added, “But phase them out. They serve no useful purpose.”
Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
USIA Polls Abroad

The President has requested that a report be prepared on the value of USIA polling abroad to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy. The report should examine the risks of misinterpretation and public disclosure of the results, as well as the consequences of not having the type of information which the polls provide. The report should also consider procedures which could be adopted to maintain greater security for the findings of the polls.

In the interim, the President has directed that the frequency of USIA polling be decreased, particularly in Vietnam, and that a plan be developed for a possible eventual phase-out of all USIA polling activity. The plan should include a description of the best manner for effecting a phase-out without drawing attention to cessation of polling.

Henry A. Kissinger

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8 Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only
9 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Dear Maury:

Thank you for your letter of March 18 on the question of organizing an international exposition in the U.S. as part of the Bicentennial. I hope the enclosed paper is helpful.

On the basis of a study forwarded to you earlier this year, we believe there is wide foreign interest in participating in a Bicentennial event. We also believe that foreign participation should be related to the inter-action between this country and the world community. How this can be accomplished will depend on specific provisions of the exposition plan.

In the past, expositions have tended to attract foreign participation by pretending that differences between nations did not exist. It might be more useful to focus instead on cooperative means of reducing those differences. For this purpose, projects having the dimension of a Bicentennial should be organized so that their international element contributes to the prospect of a more peaceful world.

In our view, some of the exposition projects now being considered offer interesting opportunities in the foreign policy field. We know that other countries have much to contribute to what we are planning in 1976. We also believe that the manner in which we organize an

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 8. No classification marking. Drafted by Blair and Hurd; cleared by Davies, Conley, Colligan, and McDonnell. Copies were sent to J. Stewart Cottman (O) and McHenry. Collins sent a copy of the letter to Rogers under an April 24 action memorandum, indicating that Stans, in a March 18 letter, had asked the Department for “further assistance” concerning the possibility of an international exposition in 1976. Collins noted that the “expositions question” remained under review by the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission and that Commerce planned to submit, on or around May 1, an analysis of exposition projects already provided to the ARBC. In absence of the analysis, Collins continued, it was “difficult for the Department to comment with any precision on the long range, foreign affairs potential of these exposition projects.” However, he wrote, the Department had prepared a paper, as an enclosure to the letter to Stans, explaining how an exposition “might be organized so as to help clarify U.S. foreign policy objectives between 1976 and 2000.” Collins requested that Rogers sign the letter to Stans. (Ibid.)

2 See footnote 1, above.
exposition can give us a better sense of the goals we hope to achieve, at home and abroad, between 1976 and the year 2000.

With best personal regards,
Sincerely,

William P. Rogers\(^3\)

Enclosure

Paper Prepared in the Department of State\(^4\)

Washington, April 1970

1976 Bicentennial Exposition
(Foreign Policy Aspects)

The Secretary of Commerce has posed several inter-related questions on the holding of an international exposition in 1976 as part of the Bicentennial. These are:

Whether a decision not to host an exposition for the world to attend would have unfavorable foreign policy implications;

Whether the organization of such an event would be likely to have an impact on our foreign relations; and

Whether international participation in a Bicentennial exposition might be organized in such a way as to clarify U.S. foreign policy aims for the years 1976–2000.

In answer to the first question; assuming there will be some form of foreign participation in the Bicentennial, we do not consider it likely that failure to organize a 1976 exposition will impair our relations with foreign countries.

It is, of course, more difficult to make prediction about the impact of exposition projects for 1976 that are still only in the planning stage. None of these projects have yet received the official sanction of the Federal Government or the Bureau of International Expositions (BIE) in Paris.

Certainly, if such an event is to be held, the role which the U.S. government plays as host will have to be clearly defined. This will

\(^3\) Rogers signed “Bill” above this typed signature.
\(^4\) Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the paper.
have a direct, although short-term, bearing on our relations with participating foreign governments and international organizations.

As to the long view, it is generally recognized that, in the past, world expositions have usually celebrated nonpolitical aspirations and achievements. Their impact on foreign affairs has not been of great consequence.

It is believed, however, that some of the exposition projects for 1976 now being examined might serve as a useful way of charting our nation’s path in the world community during the last quarter of the twentieth century.

This thought is reinforced by the study, recently forwarded to you, on the likely interest of some 70 foreign governments in participating in a Bicentennial exposition. The reasons for this interest are varied. They include a wish to demonstrate bonds of friendship and historical ties with the U.S. Closely related, even in the non-commercial type of exposition sanctioned by the BIE, are economic incentives—to promote foreign trade, travel and investment. Probably most fundamental, however, is the compelling need to express a special sense of nationhood.

When all factors are considered, it is believed that a Bicentennial exposition might serve a useful role if it could help nations project the cooperative endeavors in the foreign affairs field with which they hope to be associated in the relatively short period of time between 1976 and 2000.

An effort might be made in the international sector to clarify and substantially further foreign policy aims of participating countries in a much more realistic way than has previously been attempted. Perhaps this could be accomplished through an imaginative project on themes which are basic to our—and to most nations’—international objectives in the coming decades.

An exposition might be used to identify common areas of interest. There are many fields of exploration. Among them are a closer partnership of nations in practical efforts for peace; for law; for development; for human rights; for the application of science and technology; for environmental rescue; for arms control and disarmament, etc. Perhaps means of actually carrying forward the efforts toward realization of these goals could be built into the exposition plan through coordinated elements of national pavilions, joint exhibits, working conferences, demonstrations and seminars.

Thus, an effort could be made to connect the international component of the exposition in a more visceral way with operating programs

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5 See the enclosure to Document 69.
of participating governments. Ideally, the relevance of the exposition, in its foreign affairs aspect, would be confirmed by definitive solutions to problems between nations arrived at in years after the project’s conclusion.

Viewed in this light, a 1976 Bicentennial exposition might well serve as a mirror in which to observe not so much reflections but emerging relationships between peoples, governments and the lands they inhabit. Hopefully, a greater sense of common problems to be met by combined effort will diminish the preoccupation of countries with their “image” abroad.

These are only a few ingredients of the foreign affairs aspects of the Bicentennial. There are many more, with interesting ramifications in the policy field. They suggest, however, that the vehicle of an exposition—as an inventory of civilization—is still a valid means of making men focus on where they stand in history. But as the pressures of history change, so must the vehicle be susceptible to change. It must adapt itself to the needs of the men who design it.

The above paragraph takes into account several innovative exposition projects now under consideration by the President’s American Revolution Bicentennial Commission and the Department of Commerce. It will not be possible to comment on the foreign policy aspects of these proposals, vis-à-vis the more conventional but “socially relevant” exposition projects of other cities, until presentation of the Commerce Department’s analysis scheduled for May 1, 1970.
82. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson) to the Assistant for International Affairs to the President’s Science Advisor, White House Office of Science and Technology (Neureiter)\(^1\)

Washington, May 1, 1970

SUBJECT
Your Phone Call of April 23

Your inquiry goes to the heart of an issue I have for many years considered central to the successful conduct of our foreign relations.

No organized effort has ever been made to collect and analyze the data with respect to the whole gamut of exchanges (government, private, planned, unplanned, etc.), although there is far more knowledge about these relationships with some countries than with others.

Therefore, the entire CU research budget request for FY 1971 ($100,000) was designed to begin to fill this vacuum by developing systems to make possible intelligent estimates of the extent and impact of existing leadership exchanges between the U.S. and the rest of the world.

My impression is that there is considerable though insufficient, largely unfocused and uncoordinated effort now going into leadership development in the Third World. Some AID, CU, DOD and other government programs make important contributions. So do some foundation supported, business, educational and professional activities.

Present managements of both AID and CU are working to make their own programs more productive in this regard. CU is now strengthening its organizational capacity both to coordinate governmental efforts and to stimulate and guide private programs. Of course the U.S. International Development Institute, if and when established, should provide major new capabilities.

In my opinion, based on prior personal study as well as what I have learned from the experience of CU, democratic leadership development through properly focused exchanges and other organizational techniques is a highly economical method both of influencing the political process in other countries and of improving the context comprised of relationships and attitudes within which our political, military and

economic relations with those countries are conducted. By strengthening moderate social and political trends, these methods can (at minor cost) be expected over time to reduce significantly the probability of extreme and dangerous behavior by other states, developed as well as undeveloped. In addition, they can significantly affect the predispositions of opinion-makers and decision-makers in positions of direct importance to our national security and other interests.

Your inquiry suggests to me the possibility of a new world-wide priority in the focusing of official, as well as other, exchanges. The results of one previous effort may be indicative: the success of the post-war emphasis on bringing leaders and professionals from Germany, to acquaint them with our democratic institutions and to develop new leadership for Germany’s democratic growth. The “foreign leader” program of CU was the mechanism utilized to carry out this purpose. In 1952, 61 percent of all our leader grantees came from Germany alone. Between 1949 and 1962, a total of 5,351 German leaders and specialists were brought to the U.S. under the CU program. Testimony to the success of this effort has been received within the week from Embassy Bonn (Minister Fressenden), following a visit by Daniel P. Moynihan (Annex A).²

Each year this Bureau is asked by the House Appropriations Subcommittee to provide a table listing “exchange programs” conducted by nine governmental agencies. Their annual grant programs aggregate more than $400 million. The stated purposes include the following:

—“Improve and strengthen the international relations of the U.S.”
—Assist “peoples of the world in their efforts toward economic development.”²
—Strengthen U.S. capabilities in the health sciences through cooperation with other countries.
—“Provide for research into problems of flight within and outside the earth’s atmosphere . . .”
—“Help the peoples of interested countries and areas in meeting their needs for skilled manpower.”
—Improve U.S. capabilities in foreign language and area studies through activities with other countries.
—“Promote progress and scholarship in the humanities and arts in the United States” through activities with other countries.

² Attached but not printed as Annex A is an April 21 letter from Fessenden to Moynihan, under which Fessenden transmitted an undated paper outlining the “great value” of exchange programs to the U.S.–FRG relationship.
Without doubt, many present efforts could be enormously energized and made more effective by focusing concurrently on the priority goal: strengthening democratic leadership potentials.

**HIGHLIGHTS OF CERTAIN U.S. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITIES**

Although some 26 agencies have international programs in educational, scientific, and cultural affairs, only a few are listed below for their apparent relevance to your inquiry. AID holds a special place in leadership development, both by the extent and nature of its programs.

**Agency for International Development**

—6860 U.S. technicians to developing countries (on assignment as of 6/30/69)

—11,000+ foreign participant trainees programmed to U.S. (during fiscal year ended 6/30/69)

—International Executive Service Corps, founded in 1964, receives partial funding from AID to enable U.S. business executives to transfer know-how directly to enterprises in developing countries

—the proposed U.S. International Development Institute (Peterson Report)\(^3\) contemplates an increasing proportion of the work of AID being “carried out largely through private channels—universities, scientific organizations, business firms, voluntary agencies, and special-purpose organizations in people-to-people and institution-to-institution programs. The program should rely heavily on scientific and professional experts from private institutions from specific assignments, rather than on permanent employees. This would permit the United States to draw on a broad range of talent around the country.”

The above projected Institute follows Congressional authorization for the Inter-American Social Development Institute (ISDI), proposed by Congressman Fascell.

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Commerce
—Office of International Business Travel, Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce, operates virtually “a businessman’s leader program,” and is highly experienced in international business contacts.

Labor
—Various exchange activities, e.g. assistance to CU in administering International Visitor grants.

Peace Corps
—10,000 American citizens “in service” (as of 6/30/69).

State (Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs)
—exchanges: 4,937 to the U.S., 1,613 from the U.S. (in year ending 6/30/69).
—academic exchanges: graduate students, research scholars, university lecturers, teachers.
—non-academic exchanges include: leaders and specialists (a recent survey of ambassadors puts the values of the “leader” program above all other exchanges in achieving foreign policy objectives—they were universally regarded as prime instruments for reaching influential persons in all fields); also, multiarea journalism projects (at Indiana University and Syracuse University), to share our communications developments with communicators, present and prospective, in other countries, including the Third World; other multi-area exchanges (e.g., Youth Leaders and Social Workers), including representatives of Third World Countries.
—Conferences, e.g. biennial U.S.-Japan Conferences on Cultural and Educational Interchange, with Third World implications.
—East-West Center (Center for Cultural and Technical Interchange Between East and West in Honolulu)—orienting its programs to projects or problems including the basic human needs (food, health, etc.) of populations in the Third World of East Asia and the South Pacific. (CU presents the budget for the Center and has asked $5.47 million for FY ’71, as against $5.26 million appropriated for this year.)

United States Information Agency
—Binational Centers with seminar, library, joint study and other relevant programs included.
—English Language Teaching
—Libraries
—Book programs, periodicals, exhibits, etc.
—Educational Support Branch (ICS) program to use voluntary visitors overseas as speakers and lecturers.
U.S. PRIVATE SECTOR ACTIVITIES

This sector is so large and diverse that only a representative sample, to illustrate various types of approach and organization, will be attempted.

American Council of Learned Societies—fellowships for Americans to go abroad. A point of emphasis: American Studies (history, literature, institutions, etc.)

Asia Foundation—support to numerous cross-cultural efforts, many in Third World countries; emphasis on institution building, with special efforts directed to educational and other high leverage leadership development. For Fiscal Year 1971, CU and AID have requested $4,750,000 in direct support.

Council for Latin America—an effort supported by many American corporations to (among other purposes) “work with local groups to form a solid base for democratic institutions” and to promote “community development projects and student exchanges.”

Eisenhower Exchange Fellowships, Inc.—a business-assisted program in which some 40 mid-career government and private professional persons have six-month visits, largely profession-related, in the U.S. (CU has been serving as the point-of-contact for these visits, including half-day Departmental briefings in which representatives of the geographical areas discuss problems of those areas (including Third World) with Eisenhower Fellows4 from them.)

Ford Foundation—extensive activities, including training fellowships.

IAESTE–AIESEC—acronyms for groups of students in economic and commercial fields (IAESTE) and in technical fields (AIESEC), these organizations provide exchange and traineeship experiences. They reach a large number of countries, e.g. IAESTE currently has some 40 member countries.

Institute of International Education (IIE)—This is the largest private organization engaged in managing student exchanges. Its 50th anniversary commemoration program (1969) put a special emphasis on the opportunity for exchange programs—including private programs administered by IIE—to help meet basic human problems, e.g. hunger, over-population, environmental control, etc. The total budget, largely supported by U.S. Government and foundations, is around $22.3 million.

4 Fellowship program for international mid-career professionals established in 1953 to honor President Eisenhower.
International Development Foundation, Inc.—Pioneering private effort, supported by AID contracts and by foundations, in leadership development programs in Latin America.

P.E.N.—a world association of writers, with 80 centers in Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia and the Americas.

Rockefeller Foundation—extensive activities, including the International Rice Institute in the Philippines.

World Peace Through Law Center—a worldwide effort to associate judges and lawyers in worthwhile projects (developed) by Charles Rhyne5).

CORPORATIONS

In the increasingly international or multinational form of so many American corporations, they are undertaking more and more participation in communities where they have business operations. Their growing “sense of community” leads both to financial assistance to education, welfare, youth and other activities; it also leads to making executives and staff experts stationed in those countries available to groups of interested nationals. Large numbers of potential leaders become acquainted with management know-how, marketing techniques, etc., and also with the modern business spirit of cooperation and community-relatedness. Unused capabilities are probably vast.

UNIVERSITIES

In numerous programs and projects, including overseas campuses, many American universities are in fact functioning as a vital international force. Examples are literally too numerous to mention. One that is rarely cited, but relevant: a number have sent their presidents or other principal administrators and professors overseas to meet with alumni and, in some instances, their invited guests. Columbia University has been a bellwether in this; others include the University of Michigan, the University of California (Berkeley), Louisiana State University, etc. The follow-up activities of some institutions have included the sending of the alumni magazine to overseas alumni.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

Again, this sector is too large and diverse to do more than suggest illustrative examples. It is an important sector, however, because important national purposes can be achieved through multinational means.

UNESCO, WHO, FAO and, on a regional basis, OAS and Southeast Asia Ministers of Education Secretariat (SEAMES), all engage in

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5 Rhyne, a Washington, D.C. lawyer and a past President of the American Bar Association (ABA), founded the Center and served as its President.
“exchange” and “institution building” programs with important primary or secondary leadership development effects.

INTERNATIONAL NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS

There are international professional and common interest associations in almost all fields; a directory of international organizations runs to 1200 pages.

Their existence presents a challenge to assure the highest possible level of U.S. representation and an opportunity to devise means for stimulation and guidance toward relevance to the leadership development-communication concept.

The following place-names of conference centers suggest the utility of another useful communication technique: Bilderberg, Ditchley, Villa Serbelloni (Rockefeller Foundation), etc. in Europe; Airlie, Arden House, Aspen Dartmouth, Gould House, Wingspread, in the United States. More leadership people from the Third World could obviously be brought into such meetings and more such meetings could be organized.

SOME CATEGORIES OF INDIVIDUALS TO BE INCLUDED

In thinking of directions of effort your inquiry suggests, I would recommend special attention to professionals and other problem-solving categories, among them those in:

—urban planning
—environment (pollution control)
—population planning
—food technology
—communication systems development
—educational modernization and reform
—utilization of marine resources
—social work
—business management
—public administration
—education
—engineering
—journalism

Regional meetings of the American Assembly are often held in other countries as continuations of the original meetings at Arden House, Harriman, New York. [Footnote is in the original. While President of Columbia University (1948–1953), Eisenhower established the American Assembly, a public policy institute. Arden House is the estate owned by E.H. Harriman. Harriman’s sons later deeded the property to Columbia University.]
—law
—public health
—scientists

The success of efforts, involving such categories as those above will depend in part on volunteerism. I would hope for a growing reliance on selected volunteers able and willing to undertake public or private visits overseas, in the context of cooperation and partnership, along lines of common interest.

Also, the capacity to communicate. This is not intended to suggest a premium on fluency, or glibness; but, rather, on the inherent ability of some individuals to communicate their sense of the importance of a professional field, of the environment it needs in which to flourish, and of the interrelatedness and interdependence of people in such a field—regardless of the stages of economic growth of their countries. This capacity to communicate is of course a priceless ingredient in international relations, and essential, I believe, to the success of the concept suggested in your inquiry.

I would be happy to pursue further any aspect of this question which you might consider useful.
Airgram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State

A–144

Saigon, May 4, 1970

SUBJECT

AID/V, CIA, JCS for SAGSA, USIA for IAF/VN

1. SUMMARY: President Nixon’s announcement of combined U.S.-South Vietnamese operations against VC/NVA sanctuaries in Cambodia was given major play by local media as JUSPAO rushed English and Vietnamese texts to all media and top officials and issued policy guidance for Mission elements on psyop exploitation of the action.

MOI began transmission on medium-wave radio of dictation-speed daily policy guidance to rural and urban cadre.

First Signal Brigade gave go ahead to JUSPAO for renovation of Qui Nhon transmitter site on Vung Chua mountain.

The mass abduction of 200 civilians from a resettlement community in Pleiku headed the list of terrorist actions reported by cable to IPS.

2. U.S./FREE WORLD SUPPORT: Within one hour after transmission of President Nixon’s May 1 speech on the Cambodian situation, JUSPAO distributed full English texts to the GVN Presidential Palace, Ministries, legislators, and media. Vietnamese texts followed a few hours later, as did English and Vietnamese versions of Wireless File backgrounders on the speech. Tapes of the Vietnamese translation of the speech, as broadcast by VOA, were rushed to VTVN, THVN and Voice of Freedom, all of which used them in their news programs the same day. Favorable Vietnamese reactions to the speech were cabled to IPS and voiced in English, Vietnamese, Cambodian and Spanish for IBS use. JUSPAO issued policy guidance on May 1 which will govern production of psyop leaflets, air tapes and a special 500,000-copy issue of Free South. Copies of the July 1969 backgrounder on COSVN were made available by JUSPAO to the international press through the Mission Press Center.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, INF 2 VIET S. Confidential. Drafted by T. Mason (JUSPAO) and Hoffman; approved by Lee. Repeated for information to Bangkok, Vientiane, CINCPAC, CINCPACFLT, and CINCUSARPAC. None of the cables referenced in the airgram were found.


3 Nixon delivered the speech on April 30; see footnote 2, above.
Korean plans to construct a large medical facility in Viet Nam were the subject of a report cabled to IPS, as was a wrapup on the extent of GVN–ROK economic and technical cooperation. A similar piece was voiced for VOA in Vietnamese, Mandarin, Cambodian and Spanish.

The installation of a modern playground in Cholon by Korean forces was reported by the Vietnamese edition of *Free World* No. 4 (monthly magazine for educated adults; circulation 155,000), utilizing Viet Nam Feature Service photos.

VOF broadcast details of Japanese financial aid to the GVN, in the form of a 100 million piaster grant for the construction of homes for war victims.

3. **MOI/VIS/COMMEDIA:** On May 1, MOI shifted from short-to-medium-wave radio its daily transmission of dictation-speed news, information and guidance on Pacification and Development progress for use by rural and urban cadre. Few cadre have access to short-wave receivers, but medium-wave sets are ubiquitous. The program is originated in Saigon and rebroadcast by provincial stations.

The 1st Signal Brigade approved JUSPAO occupancy on May 1 of its building on Vung Chua Mountain, where the Qui Nhon THVN transmitter will be installed. Renovation of the building will begin in the next few days. Installation of electronic equipment is scheduled to begin June 8.

The program to substitute surface distribution of JUSPAO and MOI materials for delivery by Otter aircraft was reported progressing well in III CTZ. VIS offices in the provinces were showing initiative and enterprise in picking up their own material at truck drop-off points and in cooperating with other VIS offices to forward material for outlying provinces.

4. **GVN IMAGE:** A Japanese trade mission survey showing improving stability in Viet-Nam, citing Vietnamese resources which can open the way to increased production and trade, and recommending serious consideration of Japanese investment here was the subject of two in-depth pieces cabled to IPS. A story on the development of community schools as part of South Viet-Nam’s expanding educational system was also cabled to IPS.

The weekly tape “Vietnamese Images and Current Events” emphasized the accomplishments of the GVN village self-development program for 1970 as viewed by a favorably impressed recent returnee from North Viet-Nam.

*Viet-Nam Today* (CPDC Pacification weekly, 600,000 circulation) reported the granting of apartments to 1,700 disabled war veterans as a result of cooperation between the VN Invalids’ Association and the Ministry of Veterans’ Affairs.
Two backgrounders were cabled to IPS: one on the record 1969 fish catch resulting from improved security, improved methods, and the motorization of boats, and the other on the bumper 1969–70 rice crop, up 17% from the previous year, because of improved security and the wider use of miracle rice.\(^4\)

Eight hundred copies of the Viet-Nam Feature Service article “Pacification Program at Work” were distributed worldwide.

5. ENEMY AND ENEMY IMAGE: A report on the mass abduction of 200 civilians from a resettlement community in Pleiku and a wrapup of communist terrorist acts during the week were cabled to IPS. Protests to the International Control Commission by the GVN against NVN terrorism were voiced in Spanish, Mandarin and Cambodian for VOA; and a feature on how the Viet Cong force children into committing terrorist acts was taped in Spanish. Both Viet-Nam Press and the new Saigon English-language newspaper Daily Mirror began serializing the Viet-Nam Feature Service article “Children of the Viet Cong”.

The plight of Vietnamese living in Cambodia, who have received the brunt of Cambodian retaliation against communists living among them, was broadcast to the enemy by VOF, along with a report on the establishment by the GVN of a committee to accept Vietnamese who leave Cambodia.

The critical shortage of food supplies for troops in the South, as reported by a North Vietnamese major who rallied, was emphasized in a broadcast to the enemy by Voice of Freedom.

6. ELECTIONS: The coming Provincial and City Council elections in June were again given heavy publicity in-country and abroad. A feature voiced in Vietnamese for IBS reported that some 2,000 candidates are likely to run for over 550 seats.

The JUSPAO Van Tac Vu team\(^5\) worked with a popular Vietnamese comic singing trip to produce a song for a THVN performance, informing citizens how to vote in these elections and urging election of candidates who will provide good local leadership rather than those who are running for personal motives.

Special Pacification Tape No. 24 described provincial/municipal council voting procedures and the significance of these elections, using interviews with the Deputy Minister of Interior and the Director of the Local Administration Service.

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\(^4\) Reference is to the development of hardier rice strains, notably IR8 or “miracle rice,” during the “Green Revolution” of the 1960s and 1970s. The International Rice Research Institute, located in Los Banos, Philippines, contributed to the development of these varieties.

\(^5\) Traveling theater troupe.
The continuing election of village and hamlet chiefs was the subject of a report voiced in Vietnamese for IBS, a picture story given worldwide distribution, and an article in Viet Nam Today, which also ran a three-photo spread showing elected village councils in action.

7. CHIEU HOI: Long Me (Mother’s Heart), the unattributed Ministry of Chieu Hoi magazine, which appears bi-monthly in 200,000 copies for educated adults and the population of enemy areas, covered the mass conversion ceremony at Bien Hoa of 91 POWs to Hoi Chanh status and their preparation for vocational training at the Bien Hoa Center.

Free South reviewed the results of the Spring Solidarity Campaign in which over 8,000 communist cadres and soldiers rallied and brought with them hundreds of weapons. In the same issue the Minister of Chieu Hoi announced that almost 5,000 returnees have been released to civilian life so far in 1970. Viet Nam Today and VOF told of the vocational training of nearly 400 returnees in Saigon since the first of the year, and Offset News Service (fortnightly rural-oriented; circulation 150,000) ran three photos and a story quoting the reasons given by four high-ranking returnees for rejecting the communist side.

8. ARVN IMAGE: The ARVN 12th Infantry Regiment’s civic action activities in Go Cong province, particularly in educating servicemen’s children, were the subject of a feature taped in Vietnamese in support of the ARVN image. Two photos in Viet Nam Today showed ARVN units distributing rice to civilians and reconstructing a house.

A TV clip was released on the graduation of over 1,000 officers at the Thu Duc Military School as a significant contribution to improved leadership in ARVN. A Spanish voice tape for this clip was also produced. A report on the turnover of U.S. Coast Guard vessels and of the Camp Davis port facilities to Vietnamese forces was cabled to IPS and voiced in Vietnamese.

The role of Vietnamese police women in security work was the subject of a two-page spread in Free World magazine, which is distributed monthly in 155,000 copies to educated adults throughout South East Asia. JUSPAO’s picture story was the source of the material used. Pictures of ARVN in action were provided to MACV for display at its headquarters.

Free South told of increasing security enjoyed by the border province of Hau Nghia, where the principal military force is the ARVN 25th Division, aided by paramilitary and local militia units.

9. MISCELLANEOUS: MACV-obligated funds are to be used to purchase special weather-resistant paper for the printing of three million PSDF badges.

Negotiations continued between JUSPAO and the landlord of the Rex building toward modification of JUSPAO’s current lease to provide additional space essential to JUSPAO’s proper security.
Two local employees of JUSPAO, Pham Ngoc Quang and Ung Van Luong, were scheduled to participate in the Local Employees’ Administrative Conference in Singapore from May 20 through 22.

10. **LEAFLETS**: During the period April 8–14, 311 C–47 or 0–2B sorties were flown over 2,865 loudspeaker targets and 3,645 leaflet targets. This resulted in 332.1 hours of loudspeaker use and the dissemination of 78.55 million leaflets.

During the same period, 12 C–47 sorties were conducted in target areas 15, 16 and 17, dropping 45,954,000 leaflets.

One sortie was flown in III CTZ in support of FRANTIC GOAT, dropping 12 million leaflets on April 22 using the Nguyen Trai III series theme. In support of the TRAIL campaign, one sortie on April 22 dropped 12 million leaflets in target area 16 using the anti-NVA series theme, and another on April 23 dropped 12 million leaflets in target area 17 using the Laos-Safe Conduct series theme.

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6 Bunker initialed below this typed signature.

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84. **Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (White) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)**

Washington, May 14, 1970

**SUBJECT**

Sources of U.S. Policy Pronouncements

The Agency is well serviced by the Department of State in the matter of ready information on U.S. foreign policy positions and pronouncements. We are severely handicapped on the other hand, when a White House official or spokesman is the source of a policy position.

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Not having access, via a prompt transcript or Strowger relay, to their exact words, we frequently are unable to provide Agency media and overseas posts with quick information policy guidance on fast-breaking events. While the stories of IBS and IPS correspondents who cover the briefings are helpful, they obviously cannot substitute for a transcript.

If you agree, perhaps you may wish to explore with your White House contacts the possibility of making the following arrangements to remedy this situation:

1. **On Kissinger backgrounds:** It would be most helpful if the White House would provide us, by messenger service if possible, the transcript of a Kissinger briefing at the same time it delivers copies to State. At present, we get copies only of the State outgoing telegrams containing the transcript, usually 24 or more hours after the event.

2. **On daily Ziegler press briefings:** Live Strowger transmission of these twice-a-day sessions—similar to that now provided us on the McCloskey briefings—would enable IOP to monitor them, thus providing a strong assist in our policy guidance operation for the fast media. We also are asking Joe Hanson to check with Defense to see if Strowger transmissions can be arranged for briefings given by the DOD spokesman. (NOTE: The Director and staff of State’s Office of Press Relations say they will strongly support our effort to arrange Strowger broadcasts of Ziegler and Henkin briefings. They, like we, are too often dangerously in the dark on White House and DOD policy positions and say they would find Strowger broadcasts “tremendously helpful.”)

   **Barbara M. White**

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2 Reference is to an internal USIA/VOA monitoring system that allowed broadcasters to listen to various audio feeds by using an automatic switching device. In a broader context, the Strowger switch allowed for the development of automatic telephone exchanges, beginning in the 1890s. For additional information about the Strowger relay and its use within VOA, see Alan L. Heil, Jr., *Voice of America, A History,* p. 472.

3 An unknown hand, presumably White, initialed above this typed signature.
85. Memorandum From the Chairman of the USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel (Canning) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)¹

Washington, May 15, 1970

Dear Mr. Shakespeare:

In establishing the Young Officers’ Policy Panel in your memorandum of February 24, 1969, you charged the Panel to “receive and screen the ideas of all young officers” and to “keep open the Agency’s lines of communications with college students and their organizations.”² Recognizing this dual responsibility, the Panel feels it must try to portray to you the mood of urgency and crisis among many young Americans that has stemmed from the events of the past two weeks.³ We frankly acknowledge that elements of that mood are shared by many young USIA officers.

The Cambodian action, the Kent State deaths, the university strikes and demonstrations—all these have led to a notable change in attitude among many American college students. The change is towards a widening bitterness, with more students becoming outspokenly anti-government than heretofore. More politically sensitive young people now see their attempts to alter existing policies as futile, see their choices being cut away from them. The frustration is such that fewer sincere dissenters are capable of recognizing Administration efforts to appreciate their concerns.

Trying to capture some of that sense of urgency, YOPP offers the enclosed paper, “The Mood of Dissent”, an impressionistic account that reflects the minds of many who demonstrated in Washington last May 9th.⁴

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 16, IOP—Youth Activities 1970. No classification marking. A typed notation in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum reads: “Wednesday, 5/20 11:15 a.m.” O’Brien and Shakespeare initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. According to an attached distribution list, copies were also sent to White, Strasburg, Loomis, Halsema, Rosenfeld, Ablard, McNichol, Hutchinson, Hemsing, Oleksiw, Amerson, Nalle, Jenkins, Posner, Mosley, Giddens, Dunlap, Herschensohn, Towery, and Olom.

² Attached and printed as Document 9.

³ Reference is to the U.S. and South Vietnamese military incursion into Cambodia to destroy sanctuaries on the border, which the President announced during his televised address on April 30 (see footnote 2, Document 83), and the May 4 shooting of 13 people, 4 of them fatally, on the campus of Kent State University in Kent, Ohio. Later that week, protests and student strikes took place at many U.S. colleges and universities, prompting these institutions to end the spring academic semester early.

It is essential that Agency leadership also know of younger officers’ lack of confidence in our ability to advocate public affairs positions at the highest levels of government. The Cambodian action and its aftermath have heightened that feeling. From what we have learned, the Agency was not even called upon officially to present a position before the act.5

Clearly, the opportunities are limited for USIA participation in any before-the-decision consultation effort. Nevertheless, we want to know that the Agency leadership is aggressively and courageously advocating public affairs positions on key foreign policy issues, whether requested or not.

Finally, the events of the past two weeks have kindled YOPP’s interest in how USIA as a communications agency has treated such events. Our preliminary investigation of IBS and IPS output shows a wide-ranging and consistent coverage of these events as news, yet a general lack of a deeper treatment of the background to the complex issues involved. A full report on our media review findings will be presented upon their completion.6

The Panel earnestly hopes we can discuss the concerns raised in this letter with you and other Agency officers at your earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Michael P. Canning

Enclosure

Paper Prepared By the USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel7

Washington, undated

THE MOOD OF DISSENT

“We are the voice of America”—a Black Panther news vendor hawked his paper on the Ellipse last Saturday8 and was cheered with “right on” from the predominantly white young people everywhere he went. Who are the kids who came to tell the President they’re mad

5 An unknown hand, presumably O’Brien’s, placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph.
6 An unknown hand, presumably O’Brien’s, placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. The report on media review findings was not found.
7 No classification marking.
8 May 9.
about Cambodia and the deaths of their fellow students at Kent State? They were the Future Farmers of America, the BusAd\(^9\) and Engineering majors, the varsity athletes from mid-western colleges. There were government officials, and some older people who had brought their kids risking the tear gas that many said was inevitable. Many were out protesting for the first time. These were the people the SDS has never been able to move, the ones who usually watched and went home mumbling about the damn anarchists. They’re the ones who always believed in the system. Now they’re active and convinced that they are the voice of America. Has the middle dropped out? Why?

The “Movement” had been telling them for over a year that President Nixon had no intention of winding down the war. He’s going to expand it, they were told, because he wants to win. The Pentagon will never let us “lose”. But he brought over a hundred thousand troops home. We haven’t started bombing the North again, and Secretary Rogers said there would never be any American ground forces in Laos or Cambodia. The New Left told them to wait and see. What can they believe? The “Movement” also told them that oppression was coming and that dissent would be crushed. They didn’t believe it. This is the United States, after all. Then the Vice-President seemed to be appealing to hate; and then “college bums;” and then Kent State. Some construction workers in New York reacted in the finest brown shirt tradition while the police looked on.\(^10\) New Left propaganda? What can they believe? Who’s telling it like it is, a glib young aide who comes out of the White House with his bullhorn to “listen” or a buddy who’s had his head busted by some crypto-fascist yelling “love it or leave it.”

“The streets of our country are in turmoil. The universities are filled with students rebelling and rioting. Communists are seeking to destroy our country. Russia is threatening us with her might and the Republic is in danger. Yes, danger. Yes, danger from within and without. We need law and order. Without law and order our nation can not survive.”

Sound familiar? Most students today know that Adolph Hitler said it in 1932.

Alienation is that sense of not being able to control one’s life, of the inability to affect anything by one’s action. It’s frustrating, maddening, depressing, destructive—especially when you’re 20. All of the young

\(^9\) Business Administration.

\(^10\) Reference is to the “hard hat riot.” Following the Kent State shootings on May 4 (see footnote 3, above), a student anti-war protest in New York’s financial district turned violent when construction workers began attacking protestors. For additional information, see Homer Bigart, “War Foes Here Attacked by Construction Workers,” \textit{New York Times}, May 9, 1970, p. 1.
people who have been protesting about Cambodia have done so out of frustration, many of them because they are angry, but not yet entirely alienated. No, they probably haven’t dropped out yet. They are, after all, appealing to the system, and in the only way they think will work. You don’t stand outside the White House shouting at your President unless you expect him to hear. You don’t go into the streets and beg for change unless you think change is possible. Those that have been through it before are alienated, and they’re more than frustrated or angry. They were in the streets too. How long will it take the newcomers to become that alienated? They still believe in the system enough to go to Congress, to pledge to work in the next elections to change things. And change is what they want, not just sympathetic ears. How long will it take them to become alienated?

Things like Earth Day[^1] won’t buy them off. The wasted environment for them is like Vietnam, another example of a bankrupt system. Sure, they are not a majority. They are a good part of the country’s young people and for a youth-oriented culture that’s a pretty important hunk. And, if they don’t buy the system, who will? They are the future middle class leaders. Where they go the society will eventually go, willingly or not.

Options slip away and more ask whose side they are on, someone who screams that the killing must stop in Asia because we made a massive mistake and must correct it, or someone who says, when four students are killed in Ohio, that they got what they deserved.

[^1]: Senator Gaylord Nelson (D-Wisconsin) proposed an Earth Day celebration designed to bring attention to various environmental issues. The first Earth Day occurred on April 22, 1970. Activities, including “teach-ins” and community cleanups, took place in many U.S. cities.
Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy and Peter W. Rodman of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, May 21, 1970

SUBJECT

Frank Shakespeare’s Observations about State Department Africanists

Frank Shakespeare has sent you a memorandum (Tab C) recording his observations at a recent Chiefs of Mission meeting in Africa and the results of his own research into the ages and educational backgrounds of State Department officials dealing with Africa.

You might find his conclusions worth reading. He notes that:

— a preponderant majority of State Department Africanists come from Harvard, Yale, and Princeton. (He assures you in a cover note that he has nothing against Harvard!)\(^2\)

— the Chiefs of Mission meeting was dominated by the uniformity of outlook of the career people, and the Administration viewpoint was under-represented.

— we send Ambassadors whose average age is 53 to a continent ruled by young leaders, many of whom are in their 30’s.

He recommends that we try to:

— recruit people of more diverse backgrounds into the career service, disassemble the “African Club” that seems to have come into being, and get younger men into higher career positions.

— insure that top-level officials attend Chiefs of Mission meetings, to listen to the Ambassadors and to impress the Administration view on the gathering.

A reply to Mr. Shakespeare is at Tab A for your signature.\(^3\)


\(^2\) Attached but not printed is the undated covering note in Shakespeare’s handwriting which reads: “Henry I’ve got nothing against HARVARD. Honest! Frank.”

\(^3\) Attached but not printed. Kissinger did not sign the memorandum, dated May 22.
At Tab B is a memorandum to you from Roger Morris, commenting on the points Shakespeare raises. He blames the Foreign Service, rather than the eastern universities.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Mr. Shakespeare at Tab A.

Tab B

Memorandum From Roger Morris of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, May 21, 1970

SUBJECT

Shakespeare Memo

Peter Rodman has asked me for my comments on Frank Shakespeare's memo.

1. Shakespeare is right, of course, about the "sameness of view" in our African corps, but for the wrong reasons. Harvard and Princeton are not to blame for bias, lack of imagination, and differences of view from the Administration's policy. Rather:

—The Foreign Service, as a bureaucratic career system, is a stodgy guild, punishing innovation and dissent and rewarding conformity. With almost no exception, those who rise to the top (and the African Embassies scarcely get the cream) are suitably stagnant products of this system.

—Intellectually, the policy views that worry Shakespeare are not the offspring of Eastern universities (which, in fact, give almost no attention to Africa). This set of mind was born in the fit of conversion which the Foreign Service experienced when it discovered decolonization during the late 1950s. Like all late converts who are deeply ridden with the guilt of past sins (in this case, having been hoodwinked by colonial foreign offices), our new African "specialists" swallowed whole the then fashionable "realities." To wit, that the tide of African nationalism was rolling inexorably south; development proceeded by certain truths; if we don't "win" Africa, the Soviets will; the Africans unlike most governments mean what they say, nation-states created

¹ Confidential. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
in Paris and London are immutable, etc. I am not so worried that these views are contrary to a particular Administration’s policy. The point is that they are demonstrably wrong. And our obsession with them seriously detracts from our ability to cope with Africa in the 70s, especially if the Continent should by some chance become important to us.

—As for geographical spread in recruiting for the Foreign Service, the Establishment has been trying to accomplish just that over the past few years. For reasons outlined above this has had no appreciable effect on either bureaucratic mentality or creativity.

2. I quite agree that bureaucracy will run with the ball whenever an Administration fails to make itself felt with the presence of senior officers. But what Shakespeare witnessed was, after all, the result of several African appointments during the Nixon Administration. We have only ourselves to blame for giving State its head in assembling the predictable collection of super-annuated mediocrities on the eve of retirement, for whom Africa is a natural pasture. Ultimately, of course, there is only one answer to reestablishing the authority of the Administration in the bureaucracy, and that is to appoint an Assistant Secretary whose views and loyalty leave no doubt. That is not the case at present. Of the group Shakespeare saw, only Bill Roundtree matches those qualities with the requisite ability and experience.

3. The problem of youth, to be sure, is most critical. Even if we select from the career service, younger men between 35 and 45 should be getting their experience in running Missions. This would not only benefit the Africans, but just might save a few Foreign Service officers for the psychological and mental paralysis which overtakes them otherwise.

The ideal goal is to make Africa a major area of recruitment for young shirt-sleeve Ambassadors from the private sector. After one has satisfied the pretentions of the handful of Oxford or UCLA graduates who govern the host countries, the real job is contact with and assistance to a frontier society. What better place for young lawyers, engineers, journalists and teachers to combine public service with personal diplomacy in the best tradition. The Africans themselves are most susceptible to this informality, and most repelled by the present starchiness, which conveys nothing so much as a confirmation of the racism they suspect of Americans in any case.

In sum, I quite agree that the African club should be disbanded. Not that the Continent is important. But there is always the chance that it might be some day. And in the interim, Africa can be used as an effective training ground for a revitalization of our own diplomatic service. Not to mention the real benefits to African development which would come with new injection of youth and imagination in the U.S. presence.
Tab C

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^5\)

Washington, March 23, 1970

While attending the Chiefs of Mission meeting in Africa, I became aware of a depressing *sameness* of view . . . a lack of ideas clashing, of concepts challenged and argued. It was the same type of thing I used to notice in the CBS newsrooms . . . the sanctification of certain ideas, the importance of peer group acceptance. In searching for the reasons, I came upon two factors:

I. **Excessive Commonality of Background.**

There are 27 U.S. Missions to African countries headed by Ambassadors who are careerists. Fifteen of these men went to Harvard, Yale or Princeton . . . eleven went to Harvard.

Of the Washington based officers supervising African operations, here is their educational background . . .

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Position</th>
<th>Institution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Assistant Secretary</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, African Affairs</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal Advisor, Africa</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intelligence, Africa</td>
<td>State</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Africa</td>
<td>Peace Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Director, Africa</td>
<td>CIA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Ass’t. Sec., Africa</td>
<td>Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dir., Intl. Commerce, Africa</td>
<td>Commerce</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition, the U.S. Mission Chief (less than Ambassadorial rank) in Algeria, Angola, Gambia, Rhodesia and Swaziland went to Harvard (3), Yale or Princeton.

II. **Absence of Nixon Administration Officials.**

Of the approximately 160 people attending this four-day conference, planned to coordinate foreign policy toward an entire continent, I was the only Nixon Administration official present. The Secretary

\(^5\) Confidential.
of State attended for one day as part of his African tour. The entire conference was run, directed and consisted of career officers. There was no Nixon Administration voice.

The two Ambassadors who are political appointees . . . Tom Melady of Burundi and Tony Marshall of Malagasy . . . each tried once to inject new ideas. Tom Melady suggested that as the Spanish Government, in recent years, has moved more toward a centrist position, it has moderated its African policy. He suggested Portugal may act similarly if it moves to the center in the post-Salazar period. This comment was greeted with polite silence. Tony Marshall proposed that a very quiet and low key encouragement of trade between black African countries and the Union of South Africa might develop relationships and contacts that could have a beneficial effect on both sides. This proposal met with sharp and negative response, except for Bill Rountree, our Ambassador to South Africa, who pointed out that this is exactly what the French Ambassadors to the former French black-African countries are doing.

Charles Runyon, State’s Legal Advisor for Africa, gave an emotional talk on Civil Rights in South Africa, during which he said that Bar Associations and lawyers’ groups in that country are “mounting the barricades” against the government. He left the clear impression that the wish was the father to the thought. Mr. Runyon was the Assistant Dean of the Yale Law School, 1957–1963.

My suggestions are these:

1. A determined effort should be made by the State Department to recruit young officers of diversified geographical and educational backgrounds so the diverse viewpoints of the entire American people are more thoroughly reflected in the Department.

2. I do not know if the African situation regarding the commonality of educational background among Ambassadors is atypical. If so, an “African Club” may have come into being, whether inadvertently or otherwise, and should be gradually disassembled.

3. The heads of the foreign policy related agencies should personally attend Chief of Mission meetings whenever possible. These are:

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7 Antonio de Oliveira Salazar served as Prime Minister of Portugal until September 1968.
John Hanna\textsuperscript{8} \ldots \ldots AID
Joe Blatchford \ldots \ldots Peace Corps
Gerard Smith \ldots \ldots Disarmament
Frank Shakespeare \ldots \ldots USIA

These men, being political appointees, tend to be more directly in touch with Administration thinking on foreign policy and by virtue of their positions able to have some influence on the Ambassadors.

Furthermore, one top Nixon official directly responsible for foreign policy \ldots the Secretary of State, the Under Secretary or you \ldots should always attend, both to listen to the views of the Ambassadors and to make clear the views of the Government.

The Chiefs of Mission meeting for Latin America, by the way, went better. Elliot Richardson attended and the Assistant Secretary (Meyer) of course is a political appointee, as are several of the Ambassadors. John Lodge of Argentina and Fife Symington of Trinidad and Tobago spoke up strongly from time to time.

4. There are some outstanding men among our Ambassadors to Africa. Without going into detail, the following impressed me:

\begin{itemize}
\item Dean Brown \ldots \ldots Senegal
\item Bill Rountree \ldots \ldots South Africa
\item Bill Hall \ldots \ldots Ethiopia
\item Sheldon Vance \ldots \ldots Congo
\end{itemize}

5. The average age of our African Ambassadors is 53. Only four are under 50. African national leaders are young. Mobutu of the Congo, who has more or less ruled for ten years, is forty. The Prime Minister of Morocco is 38.\textsuperscript{9} The former Foreign Minister of Dahomey is 35. And so on. It seems to me that, on merit alone, we should have some young careerist ambassadors. Africa, where responsibilities are not always major, would be a good place to assign some. Almost every major American business corporation today has some vice presidents in their late thirties or early forties. Many of the key aides surrounding President Nixon are young. Is the State Department that much tougher?

Frank Shakespeare\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{8} Shakespeare corrected the spelling of Hannah’s last name by handwriting an “h” after the second “a.”
\textsuperscript{9} Ahmed Laraki.
\textsuperscript{10} Shakespeare initialed “FS” above this typed signature.
Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency (Nalle) to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans (White)

Washington, June 1, 1970

SUBJECT

Educational & Cultural Exchange—FY ’71 Appropriations

State’s FY ’71 Appropriations legislation just out of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Governmental Operations, includes a section (enclosed) which I feel may have serious implications for the entire educational and cultural exchange program.

The section states that the Department may not give or loan any money to anyone who has participated (or assisted) in any campus disturbance since August 1, 1969. A number of possible problems arise depending on how State decides to implement the measure. Suppose the Department decided to require recipients (both American and foreign) to sign a statement or affidavit attesting they have not been party to any demonstration. This is a course they are considering. On the face of it this may eliminate some who were actually involved in campus disturbances last year.

A much deeper question arises when we consider how such a statement might appear to someone who has not been in any disturbances, but who (1) might sympathize with the objectives of some of these campus activities or, (2) objects to signing a statement which makes (indirectly) his political viewpoint a criterion for a State Department grant or loan.

From a public affairs standpoint such a statement or affidavit may appear to a foreign intellectual or student wishing to undertake studies in the U.S. with State support as an intrusion into his behavior or political point of view and conclude it is none of State’s business, with the obvious negative side effects.

I understand that State does not plan to appeal the measure. This may be in part a result of the $5.5 million increase CU received this year. While it is altogether likely State is aware of the public affairs implications of the issue, I wonder whether USIA might re-emphasize

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 1, CUL 1 General. No classification marking. Drafted by Sigmund Cohen. A copy was sent to Bunce.

2 Attached but not printed is a page containing Section 705 of the Department of State, Justice and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Bill of 1971. (See footnote 4, Document 75)
to State the potential damage such a statement or stipulation might have on its educational and cultural exchange program, as well as the harm it would do to this government’s credibility as a respecter of dissent.³

More parochially the measure directly affects a major packaged program (Youth and Social Commitment) IAN wishes to undertake in FY ’71. Plans call for two young Americans who have made a meaningful contribution to this country’s special advancement to participate as STAG’s in the program. Last week CU and IAN officials and consultants⁴ jointly hired to advise on the program and to suggest speakers, met to discuss among other things this measure and its possible affect on speakers (STAG’s) for the program. Our consultants bluntly stated that no one they recommended for the program and whom they know personally would agree to sign such a statement whether they had taken part in campus disturbances or not. They added that many young people today would consider such a statement repugnant to their political convictions. (I might add that these are precisely the young people we need for educational and cultural exchange programs who can perhaps broaden the rather narrow picture many of our audiences have of American society these days).

³ An unknown hand, presumably White’s, underlined most of this paragraph.
⁴ University Research Corporation
4801 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20008 [Footnote is in the original.]
88. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Oleksiw) to the Director (Shakespeare)\(^1\)

Washington, June 1, 1970

SUBJECT

May Opinion Trend Survey Results (Viet-Nam)

Herewith are selected results from a probability sample of 637 adult Vietnamese interviews taken in Saigon May 3–10, 1970.

—Twenty-seven percent of the general public rated achievement of peace and termination of the war as the most important problem facing Viet-Nam today; 21 percent listed economic problems and 8 percent political stability as most important.

—Uncertainty regarding the future performance of GVN was expressed in the rise of “Don’t Know” answers to a question of confidence in the ability of the government to meet the needs of the people in the years ahead. Among the general public, “Don’t Know” responses were up from 38 percent in March to 57 percent in May. The college-educated voicing increased confidence in the GVN’s ability fell from 19 percent in March to 3 percent in May; they listed as reasons the inability of the GVN to settle the issues involving students and veterans, profiteering and corruption.

—in May 1970 those who thought the war would end in a year or less declined to 4 percent from a high of 45 percent of the general public in October 1968.

—Rating of the U.S. as a dependable ally of SVN reached the lowest point in thirteen Saigon surveys, with only 26 percent of the general public and 23 percent of the college-educated thinking of U.S. as “very dependable” or “rather dependable.”

—Forty-four percent of the general public and 68 percent of the college-educated thought the attacks on the sanctuaries would be beneficial.

89. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)¹

Washington, June 2, 1970, 11:35 a.m.

S: I just spoke with Bill Buckley and he feels very strongly about an idea he has. He has come to the conclusion that the Administration is losing and there are fissures (or fishers?) on the conservative side which have been with us.

K: Why?

S: They are deep and maybe you should talk to him. He feels this would be a domestic (?) time to say that people who fight in VN will be volunteers. I don’t know if the numbers will work.

K: No, we have looked into that.

S: He has a flood of mail and the numbers are bothering him about slippage. It would show understanding. He felt cooperate revulsion about Southeast Asia is greater than he thought. I have had a philosophic talk with him.

K: If society is so weak?

S: Volunteers plus regulars are not enough?

K: No. We have looked at it carefully. It’s physically impossible. It’s not a policy choice. We just cannot do it. Not before next year.

S: He said in the future it won’t have a feeling of relating.

K: Not for the rest of the year.

S: I am startled. I don’t share his feeling but—

K: Moreover, I expect Buckley to fight that sort of thing. Our business elite is just maddening. They have no political sense.

S: All during the ’30’s they armed Japan.

K: If we let the students drive us out the business people will be their next victims.

S: That’s where they will turn?

K: We are gaining but the students want to destroy the society.

S: I just wanted you to know.

K: Bill is gallant and he supports the Administration, I know.

S: He says it’s unbearable that parents have wounded and dead sons in S.E.A. because they don’t have the feeling that sons are sacrificed for a ______2 cause.

K: I agree with that.

S: He has done a lot of thinking about it. He is in a more contemplative mood than I have ever seen him.

K: To lose your forum for the privilege of a slow withdrawal will be any better?

S: What will the President say?

K: Reaffirming what he has said and the success of the military. The success of withdrawal and so forth.

S: Bill’s antenna are so much better than my own. I don’t pick up the crossroads.

K: Our elite has collapsed. All over the country it’s disturbing.

S: His number in Conn. is 203/DA5–1231.

K: I will call him. I have word for you from the President. He wants the fellow that attended the Harriman meeting transferred to a lowly job. He thinks someone has to walk the plank.

S: For your private information I took a substantive step. We have one officer who signed the petition over there.3 That’s the one who showed poor judgment. He has been at State as special advisor for youth affairs for three years. He was scheduled to go to a university to do some extra study. He is being transferred to Bolivia or somewhere in L.A. and I brought him over and gave him a lecture as well. I felt that was substantive. It violated the ethic. But this young man Snyder4 is different. Haldeman called about that. It would be absurd to move him. He was invited by the Deputy Assistant Secy. of State. He is a member of the Open Forum.5  ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? How do I discipline an officer for going to Dean Rusk’s home?

2 Omission is in the original.

3 On May 8, more than 250 Department of State and other foreign affairs employees signed a letter, addressed to Rogers, which criticized U.S. involvement in Cambodia. For additional information, see Peter Grose, “250 in State Dept. Sign a War Protest,” New York Times, May 9, 1970, p. 1. Presumably, Shakespeare is referring to Cross, a USIA employee detailed to the Department of State to serve in Pedersen’s office as the Special Assistant for Youth and as the Executive Secretary of the Inter-agency Youth Committee.

4 Not further identified.

5 Rusk established the Open Forum in 1967 in order to facilitate the free exchange of ideas within the Department of State. On May 9, 1970, the Washington Post reported that 25 Department of State and AID personnel from the American Foreign Service Association (AFSA) and the Open Forum had “called on Rogers to seek an explanation about the present course of U.S. policy. Rogers met with them around a conference table for about an hour and 20 minutes.” (State Department Aides Sign Letters Of Protest Over Escalation of War,” p. A2)
K: The President misunderstood.
S: The group who signed the letter are different.
K: I didn’t realize it was the Open Forum.
S: I talked to the officers and said I didn’t think they understood
what career service was about. I thought this was disloyal. Of 250 there
were 2 USIA officers. One is transferred. But this one young man who
went to Rusk’s home, I find unacceptable. One young man shouldn’t
be disciplined. The older ones should be but not this one. It should be
at the top. This agency was one of the 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 At
the base of that you have had no newspaper stories since I have been
with it about the USIA policy toward the Administration. He hasn’t a
problem with us. I don’t want him to misread—
K: He doesn’t. He thought you should set an example.
S: The Special Assistant to the Secy. of State and who has been
assigned to a prestigious college has been pulled out of all that and
sent to an obscure post.6 But to punish this kid would be wrong.
K: Let me raise that with him.

6 Presumably, Shakespeare is again referring to Cross, who was later reassigned to
Montevideo as an information officer.

90. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Motion Pictures and Television Service, United States Information Agency (Herschensohn) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)1

Washington, June 9, 1970

This coming July 4 in Washington should be permanentized into the largest, biggest production of USIA film history.

Last July there was Woodstock and from it came one of the best documentaries of all time.² Creatively, it was a marvelous film. Unfortunately, its cast was dope, sex, and anti-war songs—but what made the film great was its creativity and its sheer size and entertainment value.

For once, this July the 4th, we have an enormous event that speaks positively about our society with all the elements of entertainment and size.³ By its projected magnitude, a great film could brush aside international borders, (except the Bloc countries) and be a vehicle for

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, Program Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1966–1971, Entry P–12, Box 1, INF 7–6 Honor America Day. No classification marking. Drafted by Herschensohn. Copies were sent to IOP and the area directors. A typewritten notation on the first page of the memorandum reads: “IOP—Miss White.” Handwritten notations in an unknown hand indicate that the copies were sent to IOP/C and IOP/P. An unknown hand also wrote White’s, Bunce’s, and Conley’s initials in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 Presumably Herschensohn meant August 1969, which is when the Woodstock festival took place in upstate New York. Woodstock, the documentary directed by Michael Wadleigh, won an Academy Award in 1970 for best documentary.

3 Reference is to Honor America Day, a day-long event planned to take place on the grounds of the Washington Monument on Independence Day. The event was scheduled to include an ecumenical prayer service, flag procession, and an evening rally, organized by Walt Disney and MPAA head Jack Valenti, accompanied by performances by various entertainers, prior to the traditional fireworks display. Entertainer Bob Hope and the Reverend Billy Graham served as the co-chairs of the citizens committee, and hotel owner J. Willard Marriott chaired the executive committee. (“‘Honor America Day’ Set for Capital July 4,” June 5, 1970, p. 39 and “Big July 4 Rally Slated in Capital: ‘Honor America Day’ Group Planning Demonstration,” June 14, 1970, p. 44, both New York Times) In late June, activist Rennie Davis met with the Honor America Day organizers on two successive days and presented a list of demands for the organizers to consider. According to the New York Times: “The demands included painting the Washington Monument ‘all the colors of the rainbow to symbolize more unity than only shades of red, white, and blue.’ Other suggestions were carrying the flags of the Vietcong and other ‘liberated peoples’ in a parade, and allowing Allen Ginsburg, the poet, to direct a religious service with the Rev. Billy Graham, the evangelist.” (“Radicals Give Demands for July 4 Fete,” ibid., June 26, 1970, p. 16) The Honor America Committee rejected Davis’s demands, while suggesting that Davis, and those accompanying him to the meetings, could propose entertainers to add to the evening rally. (“July 4 Group Bars Radicals’ Demands,” ibid., June 27, 1970, p. 25) At a June 29 news conference in Washington, Hope explained that the day’s events were “designed to ‘show Americans can have a good time together despite their differences.’” (“Peak Capital Crowd Foreseen On July 4 Honor America Day,” ibid., June 30, 1970, p. 32)
audiences of all ages. Its cast would include Bob Hope, Reverend Billy Graham, Johnny Cash, Glen Campbell and others.

We are making a check to see if someone else is going to make a large production of this day. But time is short, the fiscal year is running out and with it our funds that would need to be contracted if no one else is planning its production. We would need your approval as we simultaneously check to see if anyone else has production plans, so as little time as possible is wasted. If no one else is making those plans, we could then move ahead right away. Even with simultaneous approval, time would be terribly short.

I think it would be obvious to anyone who would suspect us of “June spending”, this event could be done in no other way since its announcement was only made days ago and contracts must be made prior to the event.

We request $180,000 to make this production.

We are coordinating with networks and we will shortly send you a proposed television plan as well. It will not be as costly, however, as the above.

To save time we are sending copies of this memo to IOP and all Area Directors.4

Bruce Herschensohn5

IMV

4 Under an August 13 covering memorandum, Stoddard sent Leeper a copy of an undated paper entitled “United States Information Agency Activities Supporting the Honor America Day Program.” The paper stated that USIA media outlets “gave extensive coverage to the day’s events, showing the representation of all faiths, participation of various racial groups, members of the principal political parties, social and economic groups, and the large crowds of people demonstrating their pride and pleasure in having an opportunity to honor America.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, Program Coordination Staff, Subject Files, 1966–1971, Entry P–12, Box 1, INF 7–6 Honor America Day)

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
INSTRUCTION TO THE VOICE OF AMERICA, IOP, AREA DIRECTORS

In order to carry out most effectively the principles established in the “Directive to the Voice of America” issued in 1959, VOA is henceforth to be operated in accordance with the following lines of authority over program content:

POLICY GUIDANCE The Office of Policy and Plans is responsible for providing policy guidance and is the sole source of such guidance. VOA is responsible for applying the guidance to its output.

NEWS Content is to be determined by VOA.

BACKGROUNDING, ANALYSIS, AND COMMENTARY Content is to be determined by VOA. It is the intent of this instruction that VOA exercise maximum flexibility to create timely, imaginative, and effective programs.

CONSULTATION There will be frequent consultation among VOA, IOP, the offices of the Area Directors, and field posts to ensure an exchange of information and views leading to most effective implementation of Public Law 402 and the “Directive.”

Frank Shakespeare

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research and Assessment, Program Files, 1970–1971, Entry P–226, Box 5, INF–1–14 Executive Committee [2/4]. No classification marking. A notation in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that copies were sent to all IOR divisions on June 10.

2 In 1959, Loomis, then VOA Director, worked to develop a statement of principles to govern VOA programming and explain the VOA’s mission. The principles were elucidated in a directive issued by then USIA Director Allen in 1960. For additional information, see Alan Heil, Voice of America, A History, pp. 64–65. Under a June 16 memorandum, O’Brien sent Giddens a copy of Murrow’s December 4, 1962, directive on VOA and Shakespeare’s June 9 memorandum, noting that it was “interesting” to compare the two sets of instructions. O’Brien concluded: “For the record, the original directive to VOA—the one Frank Shakespeare has recently reaffirmed—was approved in 1960, not 1959, according to Lawson.” (National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1970) Murrow’s December 1962 directive is in Foreign Relations, 1917–1972, vol. VI, Public Diplomacy, 1961–1963.

3 Reference is to the U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P.L. 80–402), which Truman signed into law on January 27, 1948. The Act, commonly known as the Smith–Mundt Act after Senator H. Alexander Smith (R-New Jersey) and Representative Karl Mundt (R-South Dakota), established guidelines by which the United States conducted public diplomacy overseas.
Washington, June 23, 1970

SUBJECT

General Haig’s Request for Comments on Information Vacuum in Cambodia

General Haig asked that Jim Carrigan write some general notes on the communications vacuum in Cambodia. Jim’s comments follow:

GENERAL:

The ability of the GOC to communicate with Cambodia’s rural population is severely limited. Radio, television and motion pictures media resources have been neglected; equipment is old and in disrepair, and trained personnel are few in number. Military communications between army units in the field are sorely lacking, and communications between the field and headquarters are practically non-existent.

The NVN and the VC are reportedly carrying out effective psywar programs designed to reinforce their claim that Sihanouk is the legitimate leader of the people and that the Lon Nol Government is corrupt, illegal and is using the people of Cambodia to further the interests of their masters, the Americans and America’s allies.

The NVN and the VC soldiers have assumed a new identity. They are now members of Sihanouk’s Liberation Army of Cambodia. They have been seen wearing Sihanouk arm-bands. Others wear pictures of Sihanouk attached to their caps. It is reported that these troops are well-disciplined and seasoned. It is reported that they have “liberated” villages, given medical aid and food to the people. And this is followed with evening entertainment during which Sihanouk’s praises are sung and the traitorous activities of the Lon Nol Government are exposed ad infinitum. To cement this psychological advantage and to maintain a constant propaganda barrage, Peking and Hanoi beam powerful radio signals that are reportedly heard “loud and clear” throughout the country. The Lon Nol Government has very little at hand to counter this serious propaganda threat. The GOC radio is weak and there are insufficient trained programming personnel. However, if steps are not taken immediately to improve Cambodia’s ability to tell its own story, to keep its people informed, to point out Sihanouk’s true character and
to exploit his “marriage” to the North Vietnamese and the Chinese Communists, the Lon Nol Government might well lose what support it now has in the provinces.

**POSSIBLE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT:**

1. Assess the condition and capabilities of present transmitter facilities. Determine whether it is feasible to repair this equipment. Reportedly, some of it is of Chinese origin.

2. Lend a portable transmitter to the GOC. It should be kept in mind that the American technical staff should be kept to a minimum. The Cambodians want to do as much as possible on their own and we should respect that desire.

3. Urge the Australians to give and install a permanent 50 KW medium and short wave transmitter in Cambodia.

4. Urge the Australians to assign at least one, preferably two, program advisors to the staff of the radio station. This will be essential if a regular flow of material is to be prepared.

5. Study the capabilities and potential effectiveness of the GOC TV station. There are over 15,000 receiving sets in and around Phnom Penh. As well, with a good antenna, Saigon is received easily.

6. Strengthen the GOC’s motion picture capability. Reportedly they have cameramen, film and equipment. Their processing ability however, is nil. Through Major Am Rong, we have been asked to process footage for the Government. This request has been given to USIA/IAF for consideration.
Washington, June 26, 1970

SUBJECT

Neil Armstrong’s Visit to the USSR

Neil Armstrong phoned me this morning to express his disappointment that he was unable to “deliver” on getting to the US exhibit in Novosibirsk. He explained he made a continuing effort with his Soviet hosts to include a visit in his itinerary but they consistently scheduled him around this possibility. He said that it became increasingly apparent that he could only have visited the exhibit by rudely breaking his schedule and making a major issue which he felt would have jeopardized the rest of his visit, and perhaps the value of his trip all together. He said the most important parts of his trip included the long meeting with Kosygin and a series of relatively substantive talks with important Soviet scientists. Another worthwhile aspect of his visit, Neil said, was the genuine camaraderie which developed between himself and his Soviet cosmanaut hosts. Their reaction to his repeated suggestion to stop at the US exhibit would have made a direct confrontation necessary to overcome their objections. He regretted the outcome and hoped that I would understand that he had not forgotten my phone request to him prior to his departure.

Kosygin invited him to return to the Soviet Union and the two Soviet cosmanauts told him categorically that he would receive a formal invitation in the not too distant future. Neil said that he hoped that the invitation would be forthcoming and that he would be able to accept it to permit followup meetings with the Soviet scientists with hopefully less time spent viewing Soviet cultural sites.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 10, Field—Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (IAS) 1970. Limited Official Use. Copies were sent to Loomis, Bourgin, Drechsler, Verner, Dubs, and to Squires and McKinley in Moscow.


HIGHLIGHTS

In eight countries surveyed around the second week in June, 1970 awareness both of fighting in Cambodia and U.S. participation ranged from 42 per cent in Delhi/Bombay to 78 per cent in Sweden.

Among those respondents with opinions about U.S. involvement in Cambodia, disapproval predominated by substantial margins in five countries—France, West Germany, Sweden, Japan and India (Delhi and Bombay). In Great Britain opinions were fairly evenly divided, and only in Australia and Manila did approval prevail.

The main reason voiced for approval of the U.S. entry into Cambodia was that the action was required to save the Cambodian government from Communists. This was closely followed by generalized anti-Communist sentiment and the view that the U.S. entry furthered termination of the war.

The most frequent reason cited for disapproval of the U.S. entry into Cambodia was that the U.S. allegedly had no business in Indochina. Others saw the action as spreading or lengthening the war, or increasing the danger of Chinese involvement.

More generally, reactions to U.S. policies and actions in Viet-Nam were predominantly negative in six of the eight countries surveyed. Only in Australia and Manila did favorable sentiments prevail.

With regard to respect for the U.S., substantial declines from the late 1969 level were registered in four of the six countries for which trend data are available—Great Britain, France, West Germany, and to a lesser extent, Japan. In Sweden and Manila there were no appreciable changes from prior surveys. No trend measurements are available for Australia and India.

Notable shifts in degree of respect for the USSR also occurred from late 1969 to mid-1970. There were substantial trend increases in respect

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for the USSR in Sweden and Britain, declines of comparable magnitude in France and Manila, and no appreciable change in West Germany and Japan.

Comparison of these trends for the USSR with those of the U.S. indicates that the U.S. has lost much of its earlier lead over the USSR in four countries, has completely lost its lead in Sweden, and only in Manila is there a greater U.S. lead than before.

The change in confidence in U.S. ability to deal wisely with world problems, from before to after U.S. entry into Cambodia, is the most dramatic trend in the present study. The losses in confidence range from large to very large in five of the six countries for which trend data are available. In the sixth, Manila, the trend is also downward, but not large enough to be wholly conclusive.

During this same time span, namely from late 1969 to mid-1970, the USSR suffered only limited losses in confidence in France, West Germany, and Manila, gained somewhat in Sweden, and showed no appreciable change in Great Britain and Japan.

The consequences of these trend changes is to leave the U.S. with a greatly reduced margin of leadership over the USSR in extent of foreign confidence in its ability to deal wisely with world problems.

An additional measurement of confidence in the U.S. was available from Great Britain in a May 7–10 survey, only about a week after the U.S. entry into Cambodia. This study showed British confidence to be somewhat lower in May than in June. The possibility therefore arises that the current comparatively low levels of confidence in the U.S. represent increases from even lower levels more immediately after the U.S. entry into Cambodia.

To shed some light on the possible reasons for the current low levels of confidence in the U.S., respondents in each of the eight countries were first asked whether their confidence had recently gone up or down. “Gone down” responses prevailed in seven countries and were a standoff in the eighth (Manila). Next, the respondents reporting changes in attitudes were asked for reasons. Most often cited as a cause for decline in confidence was U.S. entry into Cambodia, or more generally, U.S. actions in Viet-Nam. The reasons given for increases in confidence were for the most part too few for a meaningful picture.

Further indication of the influence of the U.S. entry into Cambodia on levels of confidence in the United States is provided by comparisons in confidence by respondents who approved of U.S. entry into Cambodia versus those who disapproved. The results show quite clearly
that large losses in confidence are associated with disapproval of U.S. actions in Cambodia.  

[Omitted here are the table of contents, the introduction, the body of the report, tables, and the appendix: Description of Sample, 1969 and 1970 Opinion Surveys.]

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2 In August, the New York Times reported that USIA had provided Lowenstein certain sections of the research report. Lowenstein "made available the answers to two questions, which asked foreign citizens several weeks after the Cambodian operation began whether their confidence in the United States had increased or decreased and if they approved or disapproved of United States policy in Vietnam." ("Cambodian Drive Hurt U.S. Prestige: Polls Taken by U.S.I.A. Find Drop in 7 of 8 Countries," August 10, 1970, p. 5) On December 20, during his appearance on the ABC News public affairs program "Issues and Answers," Shakespeare asserted that U.S. prestige abroad had "suffered" as a result of the Cambodian incursion. (Terence Smith, "U.S.I.A. Chief Says Cambodia Drive Hurt U.S. Abroad," ibid., December 21, 1970, p. 4)

95. Memorandum From the Cultural Affairs Adviser, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Bunce) to Multiple Addressees

Washington, July 9, 1970

A More Positive Projection of the United States

At the last Director's staff meeting Mr. Loomis noted that a recent visitor to this country had stated that the impression he had received from his tour is that American society is in much better shape than he had been led to believe from information available to him in Europe. Mr. Loomis requested that we take another look at Agency activities and approaches to be sure that we are doing everything that is appropriate and useful to provide the world with a more balanced and accurate impression of the American scene than it is getting at the present time. Are we taking adequate advantage of all our opportunities?

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1970. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by Bunce. Sent to White, Strasburg, Halsema, Weintal, Mosley, area assistant directors, and media assistant directors. Halsema initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. A slip attached to the first page of the memorandum indicates that it was sent to Loomis on July 9 for his information. Loomis initialed the slip, indicating that he had seen the memorandum.
Do we dwell more on the negative than credibility requires?
Are we positive enough in our tone?
Do we devote too much attention to an explanation of problems?
Are we spreading our resources too thin by trying to cover too many subjects?
Could we achieve better quality and better results by concentrating on a few of the most important issues and treating them in greater depth?
Could we achieve better media products by greater use of outside talents?

These questions listed for illustrative purposes may not be the most significant ones. The important question is, are there new or different approaches that might make our efforts more successful?

I would appreciate your ideas, in writing, by July 15.2 We would then pull these together as a jumping-off point for a discussion session.


96. Airgram From the Consulate in Curacao to the Department of State1

A–38 Curacao, July 10, 1970

SUBJECT

Request for Country Western Music

A local radio station has requested that the Consulate General furnish it with tapes of country western music, specifically Johnny Cash and similar performers.

A thorough search of the tape library at this post does not reveal a single country western tape. There are numerous jazz, Latin rhythms,
“soul music”, “hippie music”, chamber music, semi-classical and other tapes available. Such music no doubt has its place but not at the complete exclusion of the very popular country western.

The phenomenon of Johnny Cash as a top-flight performer both on television and radio has swept America and has been recognized throughout our country. Johnny Cash has been given very special recognition by President Nixon as a guest at the White House.\(^2\)

Country western music represents the very foundations of America and its music and it should have earned a place in our endeavors to feature American culture abroad. Perhaps far too little emphasis has been placed over the years on the exportation of programs which represent the taste of the majority of Americans.

The Consulate General would appreciate a supply of Johnny Cash tapes and similar American country western stars as soon as possible.

Lofton\(^3\)


\(^3\) Lofton initialed “HML” next to this typed signature.
Washington, July 20, 1970

SUBJECT
Library in Bucharest; Blood, Sweat and Tears in Eastern Europe

REF
Mr. Halsema’s Telephone Request

Library in Bucharest

We are on the verge of finalizing arrangements for our Library in Bucharest. The site will be a centrally-located building, containing government offices soon to be vacated, for which we are presently negotiating the terms of a lease. Meanwhile, the Romanians are doing the same for offices in the Hammarskjold Plaza Building in New York. Both libraries will rent for approximately $32,000 a year. We expect both contracts to be signed late in August, at which time we begin renovating the Bucharest site and hope to have our Library ready for opening by the new year.

Blood, Sweat and Tears in Eastern Europe

The Blood, Sweat and Tears group played to over 50,000 predominantly young people in Yugoslavia, Romania and Poland during its recent East European tour. The group gave ten performances (four in Yugoslavia, three in Romania and three in Poland) to audiences which displayed extraordinary enthusiasm. Comments from the audiences and in the press were unanimously positive with phrases such as “fantastic,” “of high excellence,” “unbelievable and incredible” and “a

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3 On June 11, the Department of State announced that Blood, Sweat, and Tears planned to perform in Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland as part of an 11 concert, 26-day tour. (“American Rock Group To Tour 3 Countries In Eastern Europe,” New York Times, June 12, 1970, p. 4) Richardson sent a copy of the New York Times article to Rogers under a June 12 information memorandum, writing: “We hope the Blood, Sweat and Tears tour will be a plus for the Department as well as useful in Eastern Europe.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files of Assistant Secretary John Richardson, 1968–1976, Lots 76D186 and 78D184, Entry P–242, Box 2, Cultural Presentations Program CU/CP 1971)
revelation” peppering the reviews. All of our Embassies reported that
the group left overwhelmingly favorable impressions in each country.

The one sour note of the tour developed in Romania where Roman-
ian officials objected to the “sensuous” body movements of the ensam-}
ble and the high-decibel volume of their amplifier. Although the group
was prepared to modify certain aspects of its performing technique in
order to meet these objections, they felt they could not radically change
their performing style in order to accommodate the Romanian’s
demands. At that juncture the Romanians unilaterally cancelled the
BST’s final performance which was to have been a benefit concert in
Ploesti with proceeds going to Romanian flood victims. (The reason
for this cancellation was never publicized.) This cancellation followed
two performances in Bucharest to wildly enthusiastic audiences which
screamed for numerous encores. At the second of these performances
the Romanians used Militiamen with police dogs to sweep the stadium
in order to get all the spectators to leave. Notwithstanding this sour
note, our Embassy noted that in terms of cultural propaganda the BST
appearances “made it possible for us to reach a part of our target
audiences never touched before.” The Embassy added that the cancella-
tion was clearly a Romanian political reaction to “an unbelievably
successful reception for BST by young Romanians.”

The large film crew which acompañied the BST group on its tour
filmed certain scenes (e.g., Polish militiamen seeking BST autographs,
Romanian militiamen on guard duty during the BST performances)
which may cause problems if used in the final film version since filming
of uniformed officials is not allowed without prior permission. We
have alerted the Cultural Presentations office at the State Department
about our views on this subject and I understand from Mark Lewis
that his office will review the film at the rough cut state. A copy of
my memorandum on this subject is attached. 4

4 Attached but not printed is Alexander’s July 14 memorandum to Lewis. In it,
Alexander commented that he was “happy” to have Lewis’s confirmation that CU would
do “everything possible” to ensure that film sequences featuring militiamen in Poland
and Romania would not be utilized in the film of the Blood, Sweat, and Tears tour.
98. Airgram From the Embassy in Yugoslavia to the Department of State

A–307 Belgrade, July 24, 1970

SUBJECT

EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL EXCHANGE: Visit and Performances of Duke Ellington Orchestra in Yugoslavia

SUMMARY:

ELLINGTON ORCHESTRA GIVES TWO PERFORMANCES IN BELGRADE, ONE IN DUBROVNIK. DUBROVNIK CONCERT FIRST JAZZ PRESENTATION IN TRADITIONALLY CLASSIC SUMMER FESTIVAL. DUKE, AS USUAL, OUTSTANDING AMBASSADOR OF GOOD WILL. AUDIENCES ENTHUSIASTIC. PRESS, RADIO, TV COVERAGE EXCELLENT.

Seventeen musicians and an entourage of twelve (managers, composers, personal attendants and wives) accompanied Duke Ellington when he arrived at Belgrade’s airport at 1505 hours on July 14. In addition to representatives of the sponsoring Yugoslav organization—the “Dom Omladine” (House of Youth)—press, radio and TV correspondents, a delegation of Embassy officers as well as local fans, the jazz orchestra of Belgrade Radio/TV was on hand to welcome the Duke of American jazz.

The impressive welcome, with the Belgrade orchestra playing classic Ellington compositions in the airport terminal, was slightly delayed because of the fact that the group had arrived without Yugoslav visas. The “Duke” himself was passed through customs without delay and smilingly took over from leader Vojislav SIMIC the direction of the pleased Belgrade musicians who performed with such vigor that all activity in the airport terminal including announcements of plane arrivals and departures was forced to a halt.

The Ellington orchestra played its first concert in the large “Dom Sindikata” hall in central Belgrade less than three hours later. Despite the fact that it was already off season and the temperatures soared, well over 1,000 Belgrade jazz buffs were on hand enthusiastically

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Records Relating to Select USIA Programs, 1953–1999, Entry A1–1061, Box 6, Duke Ellington, Tours, 1959–1976. Unclassified. Drafted by Sharek on July 23 and approved by Littell. Sharek initialed for Littell. Repeated for information to Zagreb. Copies were sent to USIA–IAS and to Chapman at the Consulate in Zagreb. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the Department on July 27 at 7:04 a.m. A notation in an unknown hand in the right-hand corner of the Airgram reads: “(Report read to Conover's office.”)
applauding the orchestra for which they had been waiting for so many years. The Duke was scheduled to perform in Yugoslavia in 1963 under CU/CP sponsorship but the tragic death of President Kennedy resulted in a cancellation and seven more years of effort before the Youth Hall was able to arrange the present appearance.

The first concert ended at 7:30 p.m. with the Duke enthusiastically telling his equally enthusiastic audience “Volim Vas Ludo” (Serbo-Croatian for “I Love You Madly”) his usual closing lines. The audience responded with a crescendo of applause.

Despite his obvious fatigue the Duke was prevailed upon to give two interviews during the short one hour pause between performances. The first was for UPI correspondent Richard Sudhalter and an Embassy employee taping for VOA. The second was for a group of Yugoslav journalists representing the Belgrade press, a jazz publication, a popular radio disc jockey, “MiniMax”, and the Macedonian press. Both interviews were directed toward the Duke’s musical career, his views on music, art and philosophy of life. The press, radio and TV coverage flowing from the interviews, both in Belgrade and Dubrovnik, has been outstanding. It will be submitted separately.\(^2\)

The second performance of the evening (and the final one in Belgrade) was attended by more than 1,500 enthusiastic jazz fans and was broadcast live by both Radio and TV Belgrade. A feature of the program proudly announced by the sponsors was the first European performance of the “New Orleans Jazz Suite”.\(^3\)

The Embassy co-hosted with the Yugoslav sponsors a reception for the orchestra following the second performance. The performance and reception were attended by the Ambassador and Mrs. Leonhart and daughters. The Duke dedicated a final number to Mrs. Leonhart.

The schedule of the Ellington orchestra in Yugoslavia initially included a performance in Zagreb, which was regrettably scratched when the sponsoring Croatian organization withdrew its projected sponsorship. The gap in the program was quickly filled a week before their arrival by the Concert Agency and the organizers of the Dubrovnik Summer Festival who broke tradition by including JAZZ for the first time in this traditionally classical program. The Embassy was at least partially instrumental in making this possible by underwriting $1,500 (in GOE dinars) of the $4,000 orchestra fee for this performance. It might be added parenthetically that the Belgrade Bank of Commerce was also a contributing sponsor in making the necessary exchange of dinars into dollars to pay the orchestra and by otherwise helping in

\(^2\) Not found.

\(^3\) Presumable reference to Ellington’s 1970 studio album *New Orleans Suite.*
defraying costs through paid advertisements. The bulk of the $6,000 fee for the two Belgrade performances was covered however by Belgrade Radio/TV.

The CAO and the Yugoslav Cultural Advisor accompanied the orchestra to Dubrovnik on July 15. The day in Dubrovnik began with a two hour press interview by correspondents from “Politika”, “Vjesnik”, “Oslabodjenje”, “Dubrovacki Vjesnik”, Zagreb Radio/TV, “Slobodna Dalmacija”, the Hungarian language press from the Vojvodina and representatives of the Dubrovnik Festival. The publicity manager of the Festival took it upon himself to translate in full a letter sent to Duke Ellington by President Nixon applauding his current trip abroad as an important means of bringing part of American culture to people abroad.

Most interesting was a question asked by Mr. Nikita PETRAK, the music editor of Zagreb Radio/TV, who inquired whether Ellington knew Willis Conover of VOA. When the Duke responded that he knew Conover personally, Petrak commented that Willis Conover is fondly considered to be the principal tutor and friend of a whole generation of Yugoslav jazz buffs. Petrak went on to say that not only have he and thousands of Yugoslav youth learned and kept abreast of the best in popular music through Mr. Conover’s program but for over 15 years he has also been their inspiration and teacher of English. Petrak’s spoken (American) English is letter perfect and one can, in fact, easily detect the tonal qualities of Conover’s voice.

An excellent review by music critic TOMASEK in the July 17 issue of Vjesnik sums up the general reaction of the Yugoslav press and the Dubrovnik Festival audience: “This was a display presented in the most serious vein—according to Stravinsky4—of the best in the musical entertainment in the USA. This was the ideal answer to the dilemma as to whether such music belongs in the Dubrovnik Festival. In my opinion the level of this performance should be the standard according to which future performances of this kind are to be included.”

The 9 p.m. concert of the Duke Ellington orchestra on an outdoor terrace of one of the towers ringing the walled city of Dubrovnik was heard not only by the overflow crowd of 1,300 plus but, seemingly, by everyone within the city. The Duke and his orchestra departed Dubrovnik by early flight on July 16 bound for Palermo.

The visit of the Duke Ellington orchestra to Yugoslavia can be considered an outstanding success. Professionally, the orchestra performed without flaw and met every expectation. “The Duke” was, as

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4 Presumable reference to Soviet composer, pianist, and conductor Igor Stravinsky.
usual, a charming Ambassador of Good Will and the orchestra members were likewise, both onstage and off.

Leonhart

5 Littell signed for Leonhart over Leonhart’s typed signature.


Washington, July 30, 1970

[Omitted here is the table of contents.]

INTRODUCTION

NOTE: The purpose of the Agency Program Memorandum is to furnish guidance for the preparation of the Agency’s budget presentation to the Office of Management and Budget and for the preparation of Area Program Memoranda and Media Planning Papers for fiscal 1971 and 1972. It will be sent to posts to inform the staff in the field of guidelines and priorities the Agency has set for the program as a whole. This is the first year in which an Agency Program Memorandum has been prepared, hence the format is still experimental.

The mission of the Information Agency, briefly stated, is to advance United States foreign policy in two ways: by communicating directly with the people of other nations, and by advising the President and his foreign affairs representatives with regard to the implications of foreign public opinion for U.S. policies.

Of all the agencies of the government, USIA alone is responsible for conducting overseas information and cultural programs. It is the

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1970. Limited Official Use. Drafted on July 29 by members of the IOP/P staff. White sent a copy of the Agency Program Memorandum to all heads of elements under a July 30 covering memorandum, indicating that the memorandum, “on which you commented in a previous draft,” had been “approved in substance by the Executive Committee.” Bunce initialed the covering memorandum for White. On July 6, White had circulated to the Executive Committee a draft version of the Program Memorandum, noting that she had shared an earlier draft (presumably the one referenced in the July 30 covering memorandum) with the heads of all elements and had incorporated their “comments and suggestions.” (Ibid.)
government’s principal instrument of public diplomacy. In this role, it has a continuing responsibility to build respect abroad for the United States, to deepen understanding, on the part of its audiences overseas, of the basic principles that shape America’s approach to foreign affairs, and to seek support for specific policies and actions. From this responsibility, and from the Agency’s role as advisor on foreign public opinion—both in the Executive Branch in Washington and in U.S. Missions abroad—flow the unique contribution USIA is called upon to make in the government’s conduct of foreign relations.

The President’s comprehensive foreign policy message, “A New Strategy for Peace,”2 provides USIA with direction for setting goals and operational priorities. The Administration’s emphasis on systematic planning and improved management also imposes upon the Agency the obligation to plan ahead and to review its operations even more carefully than in the past in order to insure the best use of its human and material resources.

The Agency will have to be innovative in the years ahead, and not for budgetary reasons alone. As it reviews its operations in the light of the President’s message, the Agency will bear in mind that the new foreign policy predicates a more discriminating U.S. role in world affairs. The President’s concept of partnership suggests that the U.S. will have to lower its voice. As the U.S. intends to carry “less of the load,” the Agency, too, may do fewer things in some places. This will mean, in many cases, limiting quantities of direct output and developing two-way communications techniques which will convey our information and our views without suggesting that we see ourselves sitting “at the head of the table.” In some countries, an additional factor of increasing government restrictions on foreign information activities will limit the scope and affect the style of USIS operations.

At the same time, even with these constraints, a number of factors indicate a need for increased or intensified USIA action in certain sectors. The foreign policy enunciated by the President implies expansion of efforts to communicate with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the Agency will wish to concentrate greater financial and personnel resources in that area as new opportunities open. The sophistication of audiences and media in Western Europe and Japan—assigned highest foreign policy priority by the President—demands intense effort and more sophisticated communication techniques on the part of USIA, if it is to reach them. In fact audiences and media everywhere are becoming more discriminating, especially as more and more media products from a variety of sources compete for their atten-

2 See footnote 2, Document 78.
tion. With television growing in importance in most countries, the Agency will have to make significantly greater use of this medium. The Agency will have to give increased attention, too, to the professionalism of its staff, both in Washington and overseas, which means broadened and intensified training for both American and foreign national personnel. These tasks will have to be accomplished without additional funding and with reduced personnel. For example, there are nearly 20% fewer American USIS employees overseas now than there were three years ago.

All this indicates the need for change in the Agency’s way of managing its affairs and going about its business. In the next few years, it will be essential that the Agency continuously review priorities to insure the best use of resources, progressively adjusting its structure and operations to the needs of public diplomacy in the decade just begun.

GUIDELINES

I. THE AGENCY AS ADVISOR.

Though by its nature less visible and less dependent on major resources, and perhaps inherently less capable of systematic structuring, the Agency’s advisory role is as important as its communication function. In the long run, USIA’s goals will often best be served by its helping to improve the psychological impact of all U.S. Government actions overseas. This it can do in its advisory role, through active participation in decision making in the Executive Branch of the government in Washington and in country teams abroad.

The President’s “new strategy” entails a new level of sensitivity to the perceived interests of other nations; the Agency’s policy and research mechanisms must be further refined to enable the Director to provide the President with accurate information and analysis of foreign opinion for his policy decisions. Public Affairs Officers abroad must regard themselves as part of these policy and research mechanisms as well as users of the information and analysis in advising their Ambassadors.

ACTION:

1. The Agency will continue to give high priority to attitude research, to provide background for performing the advisory function, as an aid to policy judgments, and as a tool for use in planning or evaluating USIA programs. (IOR)

2. The Agency will seek to develop a systematic and continuing method for tapping the knowledge and judgment of USIS field officers, as a valuable source of information regarding attitudes and psychological factors. This method will include thorough debriefings of returning
officers in the Agency and reports from the field on selective, critical issues when required for specific purposes. (IOR)

3. The Agency will initiate a series of advisory papers on the policy implications of foreign attitudes, as an experiment in systematizing its advisory function in Washington. (IOP / IOR / Areas)

II. THE AGENCY AS COMMUNICATOR.

A. A Priority for Content: the New Strategy for Peace.

In his comprehensive message, “U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970’s: A New Strategy For Peace,”3 the President sets forth a foreign policy based on three elements: Partnership with friends, strength, and the willingness to negotiate differences with adversaries. It is the Agency’s task to relate American positions and actions over the coming years to this concept in order to help key audiences abroad see specific decisions as parts of a whole.

Much of this will find its expression in themes devised country by country and area by area. Some themes, however—especially those designed to show the United States as a strong, creative, and forward looking nation and thus a worthy and desirable partner—have broader relevance and will receive the priority attention of Agency media.

1. Foreign Policy.

The Agency’s principal message is that the U.S. wishes to contribute to the achievement of a stable peace which will permit the nations of the world, acting in a climate of mutual respect, to develop their own potential, to choose their own form of government, and to work together to solve shared problems.

a. The United States, acting in a spirit of partnership, will, where this is consistent with its own national interest, participate in the defense and development of allies and friends on the basis of mutual consultation and responsibility.

b. Where its interests conflict with the interests of other nations, the United States will actively seek areas of accommodation and will maintain a willingness to negotiate.

c. “Where it makes a real difference and is considered in our interest,” the United States is ready to cooperate with other nations and with international organizations to assist those countries which undertake programs of modernization based on the principle of self-help.

d. The United States recognizes that unchecked pollution of the air, land and sea constitutes a world-wide threat to human life, and is

3 Ibid.
willing to take a leading role, in cooperation with other countries and with international organizations, in developing means to reverse the trend toward degradation of the environment. Since all efforts may be meaningless if the population of the planet continues to increase at present rates, the U.S. will participate in international programs aimed at halting the population explosion.

2. The U.S. as a Society.

The approaching bicentennial celebration offers the Agency a unique opportunity to project the United States of the present against the backdrop of its history—to discuss the experience and the democratic values that have emerged from the nation’s first two hundred years, and to convey the dynamism and diversity of the American society which must meet the tests of the 1970s.

a. Rapid economic and technological development has brought the nation unprecedented prosperity but has also created new environmental and social problems. Americans are going through a period fraught with tensions but rich in promise as they seek solutions that will assure equal opportunity and improve the quality of life for all citizens.

b. The diversified structure of American mass education, always a subject of controversy and experiment, has been a vital factor in the country’s growth. Americans are now engaged in fresh debate and testing to make education responsive to the needs of today and tomorrow.

c. The variety of expression in the arts, the innovation and experimentation, reflect the diversity and vigor of contemporary America.

d. Americans have put scientific research and technology to work to satisfy human needs, and much knowledge and experience gained, as in the space program, is available to all nations.

B. A Preferred Stance: Influence with Low Visibility

The Agency and USIS posts will maintain an operational stance sensitive and appropriate to the situation in each country, responsive to the concept of partnership and to the tone of the President’s foreign policy statement. “Partnership” can be projected, and a “low profile” maintained, by

1. keeping post activity, output and visibility to a level appropriate to the goals of U.S. foreign policy in the country;

2. selectively extending the concept of binationalism beyond BNCs to other kinds of post operations which lend themselves to co-sponsorship arrangements and host country participation;

3. developing and expanding communications techniques in which target audiences or their representatives play an active role (e.g. seminars, letters to the editor in Dialogue, etc.);
4. developing multinational activities within or outside of regional organizations on issues and problems of shared concern;
   5. encouraging private U.S. business and American organizations to engage in activities which support Agency objectives.

ACTION:

a. The Agency and USIS Posts will identify those regional organizations, both official and private, which have the actual or potential capability for taking the initiative in information and cultural programs promoting common goals. Where possible, the Agency will assist these organizations to realize their potential and phase out USIA activities which would duplicate theirs. (IOP/Areas)

b. The Agency will be alert to third country information activities with two goals in mind: (1) to identify opportunities for cooperation with friendly efforts, and (2) where U.S. interests dictate, to point out the distortions of hostile propaganda, keeping in mind the aim of lowering cold war tensions. (Areas/IOR/IOP)

C. Operational Priorities

1. Allocation of funds, personnel and facilities will be adjusted to reflect new U.S. foreign policy priorities and Agency capabilities.

ACTION:

a. Management processes and techniques will be improved.
   (i) The Agency will appoint a high level task force to develop—with outside consultants, as necessary—a Resource Allocation System, building on the positive aspects of the present PPBS, and taking account of knowledge gained through the contract effort of A.D. Little, Inc. On approval of the Executive Committee, the task force will proceed to test the new system at a pilot post or posts. (I/IOP/IOR/IOA)
   (ii) The Agency will continue its effort to develop a Management Information System, geared to the requirements of the Resource Allocation System, including the PAO Resource Management System. (IOR/IOA/IOP)
   (iii) In order to increase the PAO’s involvement in decisions affecting his country program, the PAO Resource Management System will be expanded to additional media resources, and at the same time simplified to the extent possible. This will be done with careful attention to control of the necessary paper flow and bookkeeping requirements for small posts. (IOA/IOP)

4 See footnote 4, Document 38.
(iv) USIA and CU planning processes will be integrated, so that all cultural and information programs carried out by USIA in a given country will be described and analyzed in a single document. (IOP)

b. The level of Media operations will reflect both the special capabilities of each medium for projecting particular kinds of messages to particular audiences, and PAO and Area judgments as to the proper mix and balance of products and programs required for communicating with their targets. (Media/Areas)

c. Agency-wide standards for resource allocation by country will be developed. (IOP/IOA/Areas)

   (i) Criteria will be set for maintaining or establishing small posts.
   (ii) Criteria will be set for and applied to information and binational centers, with the purpose of assuring the representative quality of those installations the Agency continues to operate or support.
   (iii) Techniques will be developed for keeping a USIS presence in some places where a USIS post may not be justified. The possibilities of joint USIS/State staffing in certain circumstances will be explored.
   (iv) Criteria applicable across Area lines for the staffing and funding of country programs will be developed, articulated and progressively applied.

d. Career development and training programs will be expanded to increase the professionalism of the Agency’s staff, including its foreign service, domestic service, and overseas local employees. (IPT)

   (i) A new career development division will concentrate on career counseling and planning for all categories of Agency staff.
   (ii) The course in international communications, which is now being evaluated as a pilot project, will be regularized.
   (iii) All available avenues to keep the staff abreast of significant trends and developments of contemporary America will be pursued.
   (iv) The Agency will inaugurate a series of media workshops in Washington and overseas.

   (v) The Agency will provide a variety of media and other functional training (in English teaching, BNC operation, library science, radio, etc.) tailored to the needs of individual field officers to prepare them in specialized fields new to them with which they will have to deal in their next assignment.

e. The Voice of America will adjust its programming and facilities to increase regional effectiveness. (IBS/Areas)

   (i) English broadcasts to South Asia and the Far East will be treated as vernacular broadcasts addressed to specific audiences.
   (ii) As additional transmitters can be made available, priority will be given to increasing vernacular language broadcasts to Eastern Europe.
(iii) The Voice of America will actively seek opportunities to expand medium wave coverage in areas where it is important.

2. The Agency will adjust the allocation of its resources to reflect priorities among Areas. (IOP/IOA)

ACTION:

a. The Agency will provide all the resources it can to establish and expand communication with significant audiences in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. (IAS/IAE/_MEDIA)

(i) Special International Exhibits funds will, as a rule, be reserved for exhibits in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, and used in ways that will increase the impact of each exhibit—e.g., by enabling the employment of a greater number of American guides and by the publication of souvenir pamphlets. (IAS/ICS)

(ii) The Agency will seek opportunities for greater cooperation in television with countries of the area and, if possible, for arranging program exchanges. (IAS/IMV)

(iii) The Agency will maintain its interest and participation in RIAS as the most effective means of communicating with audiences in East Germany. (IAE)

b. Far from taking for granted a favorable psychological climate in Japan and key countries of Western Europe, the Agency will respond to the high priority the President has assigned to U.S. relations with these countries. (IAF/IAE/IOP/IOA)

c. While the Agency still has a major commitment to programs in Southeast Asia flowing from the overall U.S. engagement there, it will disengage as rapidly as feasible from information support to governments there. (IAF)

d. The Agency will attempt to restore the level of useful communication with Arab target audiences, primarily through radio. (IAN/Media)

3. The Agency will seek, both in Washington and in the field, opportunities and techniques for exploiting television in communicating with target audiences.

ACTION:

a. The Agency will continue to work, on the highest level, to develop closer operational relationships with American networks both in order to avoid duplicating their activities and to obtain freer access to the use of their documentary programs where these would otherwise not be seen. (I/IMV)

b. In countries where there is a satellite television capability, posts will maintain close contact with local television broadcasters to assure,
within the limits of the policy set forth in CA–1493, July 29, 1970, that television programs important for the accomplishment of Agency objectives are given maximum exposure on foreign television. (Areas/IMV)

c. The Agency will acquire the technical capability to produce television programs in color and will go into color production as effective placement in the field necessitates this move. (IMV)

d. The Agency will continue to cultivate its working relationship with Eurovision and the Asian Broadcasting Union and will explore the possibility that similar networks may develop in other Areas, especially Latin America. (IMV/IAE/IAL)

4. Agency media will seek fresh approaches and techniques in order to convey to priority audiences around the world—many of which are increasingly sophisticated—an impression of U.S. creativity, innovative spirit, and technical skill.

ACTION:

a. Where posts and media must choose between high quality targeted products and programs on the one hand and quantity output on the other, the decision will go in favor of quality. (Areas/Media)

b. The Program Coordination Staff of IOP will function as the central “theme” office for the development of coordinated programs focusing the efforts of various media at a given time on themes of priority interest in more than one Area. The programs will be offered to field posts for their adaptation to the needs of their country programs. (IOP/Areas/Media)

c. To assure both the representative quality of USIA overseas installations and their appropriateness to program needs in the local context, a central Overseas Space Planning and Services Staff will be established in IOA to supervise their interior and exterior design, maintenance, furnishing and refurbishing. (IOA/Areas)

d. To assure that the most modern techniques and devices are explored for their possible utility to the Agency, the Media will on a continuing basis acquire and test new products in Washington and, where appropriate, in field situations. (Media)

e. To reach key audiences such as media leaders and university and intellectual circles, particularly in more advanced countries, the Agency will continue to develop and employ techniques more sophisticated and less direct than the traditional information handouts. (Areas/Media/IOP)

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5 Not found.
(i) Seminars and conferences, already a vital part of posts’ programs, will be a preferred means of engaging members of these audiences in an exchange of views with American peers on issues of common concern.

(ii) For selected media representatives, travel to the United States (programmed by the Foreign Correspondents Centers)—or, when useful, to third countries—will enable these key people to see for themselves and report their findings to their audiences at home.

f. Agency media will design programs and material attuned to important youth audiences overseas. Whether or not a direct appeal to youth is made in a given program, the increasing proportion and role of youth suggests the young should constitute a sizable proportion of the USIS primary target group in many countries. The formats of publications, the voices of radio announcers, and the content, viewpoints and personalities selected for USIS programs and materials should take this into account and seek to attract these student and youth audiences. (Media/IOP)

g. Agency Media will seek to increase opportunities for staff travel as a means of enhancing the professionalism of personnel, providing needed familiarity with the U.S. scene or other countries, and enlivening and deepening output. (Media)

5. The Agency will pursue, both in Washington and overseas, opportunities and means for cooperating with private American business and organizations in carrying out USIA’s mission, and will seek to exploit available products of commercial media suitable for program use.

ACTION:

a. The acquisition function of the Motion Picture and Television Service will be strengthened in order to provide posts a wider choice of films produced commercially but of clear value and appropriateness to country programs. (IMV)

b. Posts will, with the help of their Ambassadors, establish close contact with representatives of major American businesses both in order to counsel them on public relations matters of concern to the U.S. national interest and (except in cases where this may be counter-productive) to involve them in the moral and financial support of Binational Centers and of other USIS programs. They will call on the Agency where home office authorization or encouragement is needed, and the Agency will take action on a high level, as appropriate. (Areas/IOP)

c. The Agency will study the legal and practical feasibility of having corporate sponsors cover part or all of the costs of specific regional or world-wide satellite telecasts. (IGC/IOA/IMV)
6. The Agency will systematically undertake to refine its techniques of identifying and selecting target audiences within countries.

ACTION:

a. The Agency will give priority to the analysis of influence structures and the definition of target groups in 20 to 25 countries of highest priority. Where feasible, experiments like the Philippines “agents of change” study\(^6\) and other pilot projects will be undertaken, with the aim of developing a research base for the refinement of the target concept in Agency planning and practice. (IOR)

b. With regard to those countries of high priority where projects similar to the Philippines study cannot be undertaken, the Agency will give priority to analysis of existing relevant information about influence structures in their societies, including the role of public opinion in the formation of public policies of their governments. (IOR)

c. The Agency will develop means to enable posts of lower priority to benefit from the methods of social science research in identifying target groups and individuals. (IOR)

d. The Agency will analyze those direct activities (exclusive of VOA and the servicing of foreign mass media) which are conceived for very large or mass audiences to ascertain whether their departure from the Agency’s philosophy of selective targeting is justified. (Areas/IOR/IOP)

7. The Agency will mount a coordinated effort in support of the American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration.

ACTION:

a. Within the limits of available resources, the Agency will develop special products, programs and activities that will help project in other countries the meaning of the Bicentennial celebration. (Media/Areas/IOP)

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\(^6\) Not found.
100. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 3, 1970

I request that, effective immediately, the USIA Director attend all meetings of WSAG dealing with SE Asia, particularly Cambodia.

The USIA chairs the SE Asia PSYOPS Committee of the USG.² This afternoon the committee had an extensive discussion on the steps necessary to promptly provide the GOC with an effective national radio communications system. Several matters arose in which a deep and direct knowledge of USG policy was necessary to proper evaluation. I found myself uncertain, as has occurred on previous occasions, because my understanding of all the policy considerations involved is too sketchy. This is unsuitable from the point of view of direction of the committee for this Agency and unacceptable to me.

If it is not convenient for you to have the USIA Director participate in WSAG meetings, I respectfully request that our responsibilities relating to the PSYOPS program for SE Asia be transferred to a USG agency which does participate.


I understand the next WSAG meeting is Tuesday afternoon (August 4.) The subject is Cambodia. May I attend?

Frank Shakespeare

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3 For the summary of conclusions of the August 4 WSAG meeting, which took place in the White House Situation Room from 5:10 to 6:45 p.m., see ibid., vol. VII, Vietnam, July 1970-January 1972, Document 7. According to the Summary of Conclusions, Shakespeare did not attend the meeting. In a September 11 memorandum to Kissinger, Shakespeare inquired: “Has a decision been reached concerning participation by USIA on WSAG?” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–December 14, 1970] [1 of 2] Under an October 5 memorandum to Kissinger, Richard Kennedy forwarded a copy of Shakespeare’s memorandum and a draft memorandum from Kissinger to Shakespeare. In his memorandum, Kennedy explained that Shakespeare “will be consulted in matters affecting his agency or when his agency is in a position to make a contribution to the on-going effort.” (Ibid.) Haig sent copies of these three memoranda to Kissinger under an October 5 note, stating that it “would be of benefit” to include Shakespeare or Loomis at WSAG meetings focused on crisis management, adding: “Also, recognizing that most of the WSAG deliberations are none of USIA’s business, I nonetheless believe that Shakespeare’s attendance only in an observer status during crisis management periods would be of some value since he can be generally expected to follow your lead.” (Ibid.) Kissinger wrote on Haig’s note: “Let me talk to him. HK.”

4 Shakespeare initialed “PS” above this typed signature.

101. Memorandum From the Science and Space Adviser, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Bourgin) to the Assistant Director, Europe (Hemsing)

Washington, August 10, 1970

Apollo 13 Crew to Europe

Another Presidential astronaut mission is under way. Commander James A. Lovell, Jr. of the Apollo 13 crew (which got in trouble and

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, Program Coordination Staff, Advisor for Science, Space, and Environment, Subject Files, 1958–1972, Entry P–243, Box 16, INF 7–6, Apollo 13 Astronaut Tour. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Bourgin; cleared by Stoddard. Copies were sent to White, Jenkins, Posner, and Nalle. Printed from an uninitialed copy.
never made the moon landing, but returned safely) had some European invitations outstanding. When these got to the White House they were balanced against countries which had not yet had formal astronaut visits, and another tour was projected. It was approved today, and could take place in late September and early October, or earlier.

It will include Lovell, John L. Sweigert, and Fred Haise Jr., and the two wives (Sweigert is a bachelor), and will be financed and staged by State, NASA, and USIA, as before.

They will visit Iceland, Ireland, Switzerland, Greece, Malta, and possibly Poland, which Mr. Kissinger’s office wants, but must still be explored.

This tour will have less quick crowd exposure, and more exposure to the scientific and student community than recent trips. We will be shooting for something like three days per stop, instead of the one-day stops of the Apollo 11 and Apollo 12 tours.

I will keep you informed of developments.

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2 The Apollo 13 mission launched from Cape Canaveral on April 11. Two oxygen tanks exploded in the service module, and the craft also experienced a loss of power. In order to conserve power to reenter the Earth’s atmosphere, the astronauts powered down the equipment in the command module and used limited power in the lunar module. The moon landing was also cancelled. The astronauts returned to Earth on April 17.

3 Attached but not printed is an August 10 memorandum from Haig to U. Alexis Johnson, Scheer, and Loomis, in which Haig indicated that the President wanted the Apollo 13 crew to undertake a goodwill tour in September. Loomis wrote: IOP Action. Keep me informed.” and “FS fyi” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
102. Memorandum for the File

Washington, August 11, 1970

Meeting called by Mr. Richardson on August 11, 1970 to discuss the general framework of guidelines which should be highlighted to the field in connection with the forwarding of our FY 1971 country allocations.

FY 1971 GUIDELINES:

1. Close collaboration with ARA and USIA.

2. Be sure CAOs are directing priorities toward making a real contribution to changing needs. May need re-shuffling of priorities, with changes and increases where possible and new initiatives not necessarily wedded to traditional arrangements and levels.

3. Encourage new initiatives—cooperative arrangements, new directions, pursue new resources and sources of funds to accomplish new initiatives in promising non-academic program areas. Cooperation of private industry as a source of funds, etc. not really tapped; new types of approaches need to be explored and developed.

4. Binational commission business should be directed toward enabling it to becoming a growing force in bringing in other sources of support. Commissions should be encouraged to engage in more service activities that can have a multiplier effect. Commission programs should focus sharply on CU program objectives and priorities. Be sure we have efficient and effective interaction of post, commission, and CU in planning and carrying out programs, in pursuing priorities, and in developing real U.S. post institution inter-action on the conduct of specific projects.

5. Keep reminding host countries and institutions that our responses in the future will depend heavily on what they contribute financially.

6. Keep the posts alerted to keeping a sharp focus on innovative programs, new targets, new program resources, new sources of funds.

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2 An unknown hand underlined “FY 1971.”
103. Memorandum From the National Development Adviser, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Marcy) to the Director (Shakespeare)¹

Washington, August 21, 1970

SUBJECT

Wednesday, August 26, Women’s Liberation Day Observances on the 50th anniversary of the ratification of the 19th Amendment to the Constitution granting American women the right to vote.

On short notice and with very little advance planning, several members of IPT and I have cooperated in setting up the following program in Room 1100 from 9:30 to 11:30 a.m. on next Wednesday.

We have engaged two very knowledgeable speakers to make brief presentations and then engage in a discussion with all Agency personnel who are interested in—or puzzled by—this social development in the U.S.

Vera Glaser, Correspondent and syndicated columnist for Knight Newspapers

Member of President Nixon’s Task Force on Women’s Rights and Responsibilities

and

Susan Ross, recent graduate of New York University Law School: co-founder and first President of Women’s Rights Commission in New York: currently teaching a course at George Washington University Law School on “Women and the Law”: also a full-time staff member of the Equal Opportunity Commission

We realize that the scheduling competes with your Staff Meeting. But we hope at its conclusion that you and the others present might find it worthwhile to stop in at the symposium in Room 1100—before you go to the noontime rally in Lafayette Square:²

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—Women’s Activities 1970. No classification marking. Sent through White. Shakespeare initialed the memorandum. A typed notation in the top right-hand corner of the first page of the memorandum reads: “Wednesday, 8/26 after STAFF meeting.” Attached but not printed is an August 24 USIA announcement entitled “WOMEN’S LIBERATION Is it ‘a matter of simple justice’?” inviting USIA employees to attend the August 26 discussion.

² Shakespeare placed a vertical line in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. On August 26, the Washington Post reported that members of the Federally Employed Women (FEW) organization would disseminate, at the Lafayette Square rally, the results of a mail survey of senators regarding the proposed Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). (“2 Rallies Planned By Women in D.C.,” p. A10)
104. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, August 24, 1970

SUBJECT

American Rock Band in Eastern Europe

A recent tour in Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania of a State Department sponsored musical group, “Blood, Sweat and Tears,” proved to be highly successful. Between 10–20,000 young East Europeans turned out for the performances in each country and were wildly enthusiastic. Indeed, the Romanian authorities cancelled the final concert in Romania (a benefit performance for flood victims), undoubtedly fearing they could not contain exuberant crowds.

The tour through the communist countries apparently had a constructive impact on the members of the band, who on return reflected more balanced perspectives about the United States. Their new outlook was picked up in the press—and, as a result, the radical left (led by Mr. Abbie Hoffman) picketed the band’s concert in New York charging that the band had become “pig-collaborators.”

Secretary Rogers has sent you a memorandum on the Blood, Sweat and Tears tour, including press commentary and quotations from the band members (Tab A).³

² For a USIA assessment of the tour, see Document 97.
³ In the margin below this sentence, the President wrote: “K It might be worthwhile to get the quotes on page 3 broadly circulated—if a way can be found—in addition to the Digest coverage. Buchanan or [unclear] might have an idea as to how youth [unclear] might [unclear] the message.”
Tab A

Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, August 14, 1970

SUBJECT
Results of Department-Sponsored Tour of Eastern Europe by Blood, Sweat and Tears

The contemporary American musical group, Blood, Sweat and Tears, recently returned from a visit to Yugoslavia, Poland and Romania under our auspices. They waived their normal performance fee of $25,000 per night for this tour. Audience reception to the ten concerts was outstandingly favorable, and our Embassies reported that they were able for the first time to reach and communicate with youthful audiences. Over 15,000 persons attended the concerts in Yugoslavia; more than 20,000 in Romania; and 18,000 in Poland.

The Reader’s Digest assigned Mr. Ira Wolfert to accompany the tour. In a letter dated July 28 to Assistant Secretary Richardson, Mr. Wolfert summarized his conclusions as follows:

“I scored the tour A plus.

“Here were the American Establishment and its youthful opposition getting together to present a very bright aspect of the quality of present-day American life to peoples whose own media have been enjoying a field-day coloring it all horrible.

“The audiences got the message. The ovations they thundered forth were described to me by knowledgeable people I consulted in all three countries visited as ‘historic, unprecedented,’ and they were for America as much as for the band as the Bucharest audiences made clear by greeting the conclusion of the last encore with a chant of ‘USA, USA’ that went on until the police stopped it.

“Although the police stopped it, it’s hard to believe it will not linger on in the hearts of those who raised the cry.

“The taxpayers got a bargain this time and I look forward to more like them.”

Earlier, on July 13 in a telephone conversation with our Office of Cultural Presentations, Mr. Wolfert described the tour as “A very large plus for the United States and the State Department.” He added that

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4 No classification marking.
“As a result of this tour, Communist propaganda will have a harder
time convincing those people.” The final concert in Romania, scheduled
to be held in Ploesti as a benefit for flood relief, was cancelled by the
Romanian authorities. Mr. Wolfert, commenting on the cancellation,
said:

“It was cancelled because the Government of Romania was afraid
that they would be blown out of power by saxophones. They were
afraid there would be people coming down the streets like Hungary
or Czechoslovakia. They didn’t want any more people being too joyful.
The cancellation was a tribute to Blood, Sweat and Tears.”

The tour apparently had a constructive effect on the youthful mem-
bers of the Band who, on their return, reflected new perspectives about
the United States. Before they left, two of them in particular indicated
views held by other youthful American college-age students regarding
Cambodia, Viet-Nam and race relations. On their return to the United
States, the Band’s drummer, in an interview published in the New
York Post on July 10, declared:

“Communism is a stone drag. Before the trip I thought all that
stuff about Communism was American propaganda. But now I know
I could never live that way.”

The drummer also said he expected to be criticized by the radical
left in the United States because of his conclusions: “But they ought
to go over and see for themselves,” he added.

On July 19 the New York Times published a long article on the
return of the Band under the headline, “Lessons for a Rock Group.”
The guitarist, the most outspoken critic before the trip, stated:

“I wish that everybody in America who has strong political feel-
ings—one way or the other—could go over there and see what it’s
like. It turned out that I really missed this country while we were there.
The positive things that we do have really are worth it—compared to
what’s happening in the rest of the world.”

In the same article, the saxophone player said:

“The first night in Bucharest we got two encores and everybody
went crazy. I don’t think we really saw the audience reaction—scream-
ing ‘USA, USA’—we just heard it. And that kind of turned our heads
around because it was great to see everyone that enthusiastic . . . It

5 The President bracketed this paragraph.
7 Steve Katz.
8 The President bracketed this paragraph.
9 Fred Lipsius.
meant something else to us there because they could see the freedom
we had on the stand—the excitement and happiness of playing.”

On July 22, testifying before the House Sub-Committee on State
Department Organization and Foreign Operations, columnist William
Buckley, a member of the USIA Advisory Commission on Informa-
tion, stated:

“We did have a smashing success with the Blood, Sweat and Tears
group; whether they converted more Romanians or whether Roman-
ians affected them, it is hard to say. It is rumored that some of the
members of Blood, Sweat and Tears having come back from East Europe
are actually more appreciative of America than they were when they
left. So it may be that that particular activity will have primarily a
beneficial effect domestically.”

On the night of July 25, Blood, Sweat and Tears conducted its first
New York concert since its return at Madison Square Garden. The
radical left, the Yippies, led personally by Mr. Abbie Hoffman, picketed
the concert outside. They handed out a leaflet charging that the purpose
of the Blood, Sweat and Tears tour was “to create false propaganda
about how happy everyone in the good ol’ U.S. of A. really is.” The
leaflet declared:

“Stop buying albums and attending concerts of these pig-
collaborators.”

“Disrupt any concerts by any means necessary, especially when
they lay down the pig lies about how free everyone is in the U.S.”

The leaflet is signed “Youth International Party.”

Media comment on the Eastern European concerts continues to be
highly favorable from Yugoslavia and Poland.

William P. Rogers

10 The President bracketed this paragraph.
11 For Buckley’s complete testimony, see U.S. Information Agency Operations, Part
II, Hearings on the U.S. Information Agency Before the Subcommittee on State Department
Organization and Foreign Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representa-
tives Ninety-First Congress Second Session and Ninety-Second Congress First Session, July
105. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant (Haldeman)

Washington, September 2, 1970

SUBJECT

Memorandum on Middle East from Director, USIA to the President

The attached memorandum was dictated to Marge Acker by Frank Shakespeare this morning with an urgent request that it be given directly to the President. Marge brought it to me, I showed it to Henry, with the comment that it did not contain an appropriate course of action at this time. Shakespeare, however, is very concerned that the President see the memorandum, recognizing that it may not be well received. He told me that world-wide reaction is mounting on this issue and that consequently he wants the memorandum to go to the President. I told Henry that I would bring it to your attention first.

Yesterday’s meeting set in train a series of diplomatic actions which must be undertaken promptly before any public posture is taken on recent evidence of Soviet/Egyptian cheating in the Middle East. Only after this diplomatic route has been properly assessed can we determine what kind of public posture the President should take. In either event, I doubt that he would wish to resort to such a drastic solution but rather that we will proceed much along the lines of the earlier violation case by using a fairly controlled public release stance. On the other hand, Shakespeare’s memorandum does suggest that a head of steam may be building which is somewhat more severe than yesterday’s meeting would have reflected.

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Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to President Nixon

Washington, September 2, 1970

I address you directly because I believe we are faced with an immediate psychological problem of enormous world-wide dimension.

It is my firm belief that unless the Soviets are sternly called to account for their violations of the Mid-East cease-fire agreement, credibility of the United States and of your own will be put in serious doubt throughout the world.

At your July 30 Los Angeles press conference you said, “I believe that Israel can agree to the cease-fire and can agree to negotiations without fear that by her negotiations her position may be compromised or jeopardized in that period.”

I recommend the following action:

A. That you appear promptly on nation-wide television to nail down the Soviet challenge. This program should be satellited worldwide and foreign networks tipped off that it will be “very important” so that many will carry it live and all will tape it for fast play back.

B. Your statement should consist of (1) evidence and (2) conclusions. All relevant photos and technical data proving the violations of the cease-fire should be released and as much of Soviet private assurances on the cease-fire as you may choose.

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3 No classification marking. Copies were sent to Haldeman and Kissinger.

4 On August 7, Rogers announced that the Governments of the United Arab Republic (UAR) and Israel had informed the United States of their acceptance of the U.S. proposal for a standstill cease fire. The 90-day cease-fire would take effect at 2200 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) that day. (Department of State Bulletin, August 31, 1970, p. 244) The text of the Israeli-UAR cease-fire agreement is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972, Document 145. In a separate memorandum to the President, September 2, Shakespeare characterized the violations as “Soviet perfidy in the Middle East.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [1 of 2]) On September 3, McCloskey read a statement to reporters indicating violations of the cease-fire agreement had taken place: “We are not going into details. We are taking up this matter with both the U.A.R. and the U.S.S.R. through diplomatic channels. We are continuing to watch the balance closely and, as we have said previously, have no intention of permitting Israel’s security to be adversely affected.” (Department of State Bulletin, September 21, 1970, p. 326)

5 For the text of the President’s news conference, which took place in the Santa Monica Room of the Century Plaza Hotel in Los Angeles, at 8 p.m. and was broadcast live on television and radio, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 626–635.
C. That you emphasize violations by the Soviet Union rather than Egypt. The Soviets would surely like any confrontation on violations to be between Egypt and the United States and will make every effort to play it that way. This should be precluded by the nature of your remarks. In doing so, you will also put considerable psychological pressure on Nasser by implicitly reducing him to a Soviet puppet.

D. Having proved the violations beyond doubt, declare that unless the missiles are removed to their pre-August 7 positions within a reasonable time, you will take steps to provide the Israelis the means to redress the military balance.

E. Make clear that the Soviet perfidy places in serious doubt the validity of the SALT talks which, in the final analysis, are based on the faith and confidence the contracting powers have in each other.6

I am convinced that unless we react strongly and promptly against these violations, the credibility of the United States and your credibility will suffer almost irretrievable damage.

By linking Middle-East missilery violations to the SALT talks which themselves relate to missilery, you will help Jewish and liberal bodies throughout the world to view the SALT talks in a more realistic light.

Another effect will be to raise a major caution light to the West German government as to the wisdom and possible dangers of Ost Politik.

Frank Shakespeare7

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6 The formal talks began in Helsinki on November 17, 1969, and concluded on December 22. The second round of talks took place in Vienna beginning on April 16, 1970.

7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
106. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency (Pistor) to the Director (Shakespeare)

Washington, September 2, 1970

In response to your request for media and public reaction to the latest developments on the cease-fire standstill in the Middle East, we have had telephone conversations with Athens and Tel Aviv, have placed calls to Ankara and Beirut, and have sent an immediate telegram to New Delhi.

Results of our efforts so far indicate that it is too early to have any reaction to the reports which appeared in this morning’s Washington Post and the late editions of the New York Times to the effect that the US now has evidence of recent violations of the standstill.

In Athens, the afternoon editions come out at noon local time (or 6:00 a.m. Washington time), and our people were able to report nothing on the latest developments. However, they are checking to see whether comment might have been carried on the radio, although they are doubtful that there was any.

In Israel, there have been no new developments in the last 24 hours. However, there has been a cumulative buildup of disappointment since the cease-fire went into effect over the US failure to take action on the reported violations of the standstill. There is increasing feeling that the US is caving-in to the Russians and not living up to its previous assurances to Israel. This, coupled with the so-called “Dayan crisis,” resulting from a widespread belief that the Israeli Minister of Defense may resign if the US is not more forthcoming, has created an atmosphere unlike any which our PAO in Tel Aviv has seen during his two years service there.

We have been informed there will be two to four hour delays in our calls to Beirut and Ankara, and we do not expect a reply from

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2 See footnote 4, Document 105.

3 Not found.


New Delhi until late this afternoon. We will bring to your attention whatever information comes in.

IOR has informed us that media reaction reports from posts in the area so far have carried nothing on the developments described above.

107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France

Washington, September 12, 1970, 2213Z


1. President Nixon in message to Congress on September 11, 1970 instructs Secretary of State to proceed officially with appropriate registration procedures with Bureau of International Expositions (BIE) for an International exposition in Philadelphia in 1976 as part of Bicentennial.

2. This information should be promptly conveyed to BIE in confirmation site and timing of U.S. international exposition for which BIE has formally reserved 1976.

3. Pertinent documents referred to in reference will be forwarded under airgram next week. They will consist of (a) Latest draft Philadelphia 1976 Exposition Corporation General Regulations, which have been given provisional U.S. Government review, in English with French and Russian translations; and (b) Presidential statement.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 8. Unclassified. Drafted by Hurd; cleared by telephone by Teal, Nelson, and E. Skora (ABRC); approved by Blair. Hurd initialed for the clearing officials and for Blair.

2 In telegram 11771 from Paris, September 1, the Embassy reported that Chalon “emphasized importance being officially informed soonest re site and type of exposition for 1976 if BIE approval to be sought at November 17 General Assembly.” (Ibid.)

3 Alexander Davit, counselor for commercial affairs, and Richard Kirby, economic and commercial officer.


5 In airgrams A–264 and A–266 to Paris, September 25 and 30, respectively. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 8)
4. Embassy, after coordination with William Phillips, Philadelphia Paris representative, should forward documents to BIE Classifications Committee and attempt arrange joint Philadelphia Corporation/U.S. Government presentation to Committee first week November in support Philadelphia application for formal BIE registration action at semiannual November 17 meeting.

5. As general regulations make clear, US wishes avoid costly national pavilion type exposition. Plans for more socially-dynamic exposition at Philadelphia in 1976 focus on category two exposition under 1928 Convention, as amended. In terms language of new draft Protocol to replace 1928 convention, Philadelphia plan would fit universal rather than specialized category. This should be made clear to BIE in order compress registration process to meet November 17 deadline.

6. FYI: Secretary of Commerce and Director of Office of Management and Budget have yet to complete study requiring report to President that Philadelphia 1976 Exposition meets all provisions of PL–91–269. END OF MESSAGE

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6 Reference is to the Convention Relating to International Exhibitions, signed in Paris, on November 22, 1928. The Convention regulated the frequency of international exhibitions, outlined the responsibilities of organizers and participants, and established the BIE.

7 Approved on May 27, 1970, P.L. 91–269 provided for federal government recognition and participation in international exhibitions proposed to take place in the United States. On January 11, 1971, the BIE sanctioned Philadelphia as the location for the exposition. Ultimately, on May 16, 1972, the ARBC rejected a proposal put forth by the Philadelphia 1976 Bicentennial Corporation. It then informed Nixon of this decision. As a result, the United States did not host an international exposition as part of the 1976 Bicentennial commemoration. For additional information regarding this decision, see The Bicentennial of the United States of America: A Final Report to the People, American Revolution Bicentennial Administration, vol. I, Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977, p. 225.
108. **Circular Message From the United States Information Agency to all Principal USIS Posts and the Embassy in the Soviet Union**

Washington, September 17, 1970

**SUBJECT**

Middle East Standstill Violations

1. United States continues to feel that, despite violations, it would be best for all to get negotiations underway since only hope for peace in Middle East rests in common understandings between Arab nations and Israel.

2. Nevertheless, VOA, Wireless File and our field officers are to continue to emphasize Soviet duplicity in standstill violations.

3. Although both sides have committed violations of standstill, violations are substantively different. Soviet Union-UAR have constructed new missile sites and moved missilery nearer Canal while Israel has conducted reconnaissance flights over a prohibited area. On Egyptian side new sites have been constructed for SA2 missiles, sites formerly under construction have been completed and missilery has been moved closer to Canal. These violations started immediately upon advent of Cease-Fire-Standstill and have steadily continued. It is known that Soviet personnel participate directly in missile movements and in management of Egyptian defense system.

4. As regards comparison with Cuban crisis, missilery in that episode was offensive, exclusively Soviet controlled and constituted direct threat to United States . . . factors not present today in Middle East. Linkage between these two situations relates to duplicity of Soviet regime, which showed in each case that it cannot be trusted. It is worth noting that Gromyko was Soviet Foreign Minister who lied to President Kennedy and is Foreign Minister today . . . and that Soviet Ambassador to United States then and now is Anatoliy Dobrynin.

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2 See footnote 4, Document 105.

3 Reference is to the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis.
5. Hijackings, however tragic, are to be treated as essentially side show. They are serious irritant, of course, but have little potential to affect historic course of events as compared to military aspects of Arab-Israeli conflict. Inform Branch posts.

Shakespeare

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109. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)

Washington, September 17, 1970, 6:55 p.m.

K: At least you know how to get my attention.

S: Do you want me to read it to you—they have alerted all the wire services that at 6:00 Chicago time they will be coming out with a big story. This is what the President said to the editors and broadcasters—“If the Syrians or Iraquis intervene in Jordan there are only

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2 “They” is in reference to the editorial staff of the Chicago Sun-Times. On September 17, while in Chicago, the President met with the paper’s editorial staff. According to Kissinger, who described the incident in his memoirs: “Nixon had just learned of the outbreak of civil war in Jordan. Though usually his self-discipline was monumental, it could be breached by emotion at moments of high tension. Charged up by the news and the military movements he had just approved, Nixon proceeded to tell the amazed editors that if Iraq or Syria intervened in Jordan only the Israelis or the United States could stop them; he preferred that the United States do it.” Kissinger continued, “It was too much to expect that such sensational news could be kept off the record. The Sun-Times ran the exact quote in an early edition. Though it was then withdrawn when Ziegler insisted on the off-the-record rule, this only heightened its foreign policy impact.” (White House Years, pp. 614–615) See also “U.S. Held Ready to Intervene,” Washington Post, September 18, 1970, p. A1.
two of us to stop them, the Israelis or us. It will be preferable for us
to do it. The Russians are going to pay dearly for moving the missiles
in. The Israelis are going to get five times as much as they would have
if the missiles would not have moved. We are embarking on a tougher
policy in the Middle East. The Sixth Fleet is going to be beefed up. I
was having an argument with Kissinger who thinks we blew it in
Jordan. We will intervene if the situation is such that our intervention
will make a difference.” Chicago Sun Times is saying as a lead that it
was learned today from high sources that the U.S. will intervene in
Jordan if the Syrians or Iraquis move. I know what the editors were
told, but I don’t know how they will write it.

K: What does he mean that I thought we blew it in Jordan. I have
been raising hell with him along the lines that we have been behaving
and that Jordan was about to blow.

S: This is a senior man’s notes of what the President told them.

K: Was Lisagor there?

S: I don’t know. We will get this around the world in just a few
minutes.

K: I think the Secretary of State is going to have a bloody heart
attack.

S: We passed this along to State—Rogers and Sisco.\(^3\)

K: God help us. Those fools at State think I am putting him up to
it. It doesn’t give me any pain.

\(^3\) Kissinger called Rogers at 7:29 that evening. According to the transcript of their
conversation, Rogers noted that Loomis “says the wire services have put out the word
to keep the wires open so they are probably going to give it a good play.” (National
Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Telephone Conversations, Chronologi-
cal File, Box 6, September 12–17, 1970)
110. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 18, 1970

SUBJECT
Chicago Sun Times—Middle East Incident

Sequence of events in this situation was as follows:

1. Yesterday afternoon USIA was reliably informed of the President’s remarks to the Sun Times² and that the paper would play them on a headline-basis, starting with the edition at 6:00 p.m. Chicago time.

2. I immediately informed Al Haig and had our officers inform State. We instructed our Chicago VOA man to get the first edition of the Sun Times as it came off the press. We instructed VOA operations to stand alert for a significant news break.

3. Upon publication, VOA used the Sun Times story (U.S. might intervene if Iraq or Syria act), with attribution only to the Sun Times . . . “A Chicago paper, the Sun Times, says tonight that it has learned, etc.” No mention was made of the President or the USG. It was treated as a news item only.

4. I left the Agency to attend a reception by the American Women in Radio and Television for the new president, who is a VOA employee. Upon leaving this reception, an Evening Star reporter asked why I, as featured speaker, had arrived so late. I said a major news story had tied me up . . . a Chicago Sun Times story relating to possible intervention in the Middle East. I was asked if Nixon had been in Chicago all day, if he had met with the Sun Times and if VOA was playing the story worldwide. I said “yes” to all three. This accounts for the coverage in today’s Star.

5. Upon returning home, I was shocked to learn that the wire services were not playing the story. I called Ron Ziegler and discovered for the first time that the President’s remarks (while accurately

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 394, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [1 of 2]. No classification marking. In the top left-hand corner of the memorandum, Shakespeare wrote: “Bob—Please note last 2 paragraphs. F.S.” Haldeman sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a September 22 covering memorandum, writing: “I think Frank makes some points that are at least worth considering in his attached memorandum. Is there any way we can fold his operation more effectively into our overall communications apparatus?” (Ibid.) Both the memorandum and the covering memorandum are attached as Tab D to a November 18 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger printed as Document 119.

reported) were completely off-the-record and that the Sun Times would play down the story in subsequent editions. VOA was immediately instructed to do the same. Fortunately, our worldwide Wireless File to the Embassies and our instruction to press officers throughout the world had not yet gone out.

This incident, while not really serious, focuses attention on a point we have discussed before. The international communications arm of this Government is just not sufficiently informed to give anything but a fraction of the support to our foreign policy of which it is capable. Worse, we are courting mistakes which may some day be serious indeed. To let our international media arms atrophy . . . as they may because insecurity of judgment leads to a play-it-safe and do-nothing approach . . . would be tragic. To have a situation in which we have not been present at any senior executive discussion on the Mid East since the cease-fire began is unfathomable to me in an age when communications is revolutionizing diplomacy.4

It is not enough to have occasional memos of instruction. Effective communication is an orchestrated performance. Nuances . . . long term strategy . . . and occasional very fast and deft actions . . . all play a role. Continuing knowledge is an absolute prerequisite. We do not have it. It is a mistake.

Frank Shakespeare5

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4 An unknown hand underlined this sentence.

5 Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature. In an undated memorandum to Shakespeare, Kissinger thanked Shakespeare for his memorandum and asserted that he had done nothing “improper” regarding the Chicago Sun Times incident. Kissinger continued: “The problem in that episode was that it was not the product of a coordinated plan. You knew as much about it as I did. I was back in Washington at the time. The dilemma that emerged was between acquiescing in an advantageous story and protecting the integrity of the off-the-record ground rules.” (Ibid.) In his memoirs, Kissinger wrote: “Though Nixon was contrite after the event, I considered his statement on the whole helpful. When I was informed of it by the head of the US Information Agency, Frank Shakespeare, I told him that it gave me no pain. For one thing, it would prove to our bureaucracy that my pressures for a buildup in the Mediterranean reflected the President’s approach, not my idiosyncrasy; indeed, it brought home to them that their real choice was between systematic interagency planning and ad hoc decisions in which they would not participate. Once I had convinced Rogers that I had not put Nixon up to it, the incident led to a brief period of improved relations between us.” (White House Years, p. 615)
111. Memorandum From the Director, Office of Cultural Presentation, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (Lewis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson)¹

Washington, October 5, 1970

SUBJECT
The Office of the President and the Arts

REF
Mr. Garment’s Request for Ideas²

The following suggestions for encouraging and giving more prestige to the arts are submitted for the Office of the President, present and future, recognizing that other national priorities may require the expenditures listed below. However, the psychological steps cited below will cost nothing or very little and may contribute toward a more peaceful climate in America.³

A. Encouraging the Arts in America:

1. Incorporation of a Status of Arts section in annual State of the Union messages.⁴

2. Establishment of an annual televised interview with the President, the Chairman of the National Council on the Arts and the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs being interviewed by leading media specialists on the arts.⁵

3. A budget of $100 million for the National Council on the Arts and Endowment for the Arts, announced by the President.

4. Honor America’s poets, artists, writers, sculptors, conductors, dancers, etc., by Presidential Proclamation or “A Day.” Example: Presidential dedication of Walt Whitman Park, 19th and “E” Streets, Washington, with a statue of Whitman.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 1, CUL 3 International Cultural Strategy Group. No classification marking. Lewis wrote “Mr. Loomis” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Lewis sent the memorandum to Loomis under an October 12 handwritten note, in which he stated: “In view of your membership in the International Cultural Strategy Group, the attached is FYI for it suggests psychological steps & mentions USIA.” (Ibid.)

² There is no indication as to when and in what form Garment made this request.

³ Lewis underlined “psychological steps.”

⁴ Lewis placed two vertical parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this point.

⁵ Lewis placed two vertical parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this point.
5. Presidential attendance (or a representative of the President) at selected dedication ceremonies marking the opening of cultural centers, theatres, auditoriums, e.g., Catholic University auditorium.

6. White House awards to the winners of national contests in the arts now conducted by the nation’s high schools and universities, e.g., national collegiate jazz contest.

7. Bicentennial Anniversary: Assure that a large portion of the celebrations emphasize America’s cultural-artistic heritage by having American performing artists perform.  

B. International Communication through the Arts:

1. Using Points A1 and A2 above, place Presidential emphasis on the need for an expanded program for sending American performing arts abroad.

2. A Presidential invitation to the heads of America’s major companies with international investments to attend a White House meeting for the purpose of planning public-private partnership to implement Point B1 and to implement the programming of foreign grantees in the United States under the Educational Exchange Program.

3. On a selective basis, White House announcement of American performing arts tours going abroad under Government sponsorship. (Such as to USSR, Eastern Europe, Middle East.)

4. Inclusion of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs at White House dinners for foreign visitors.

5. More White House functions like the one for Duke Ellington, with USIA film coverage and network TV permitted.

6. Reports of effective, successful U.S. performing arts tours abroad should be available to the President so that he may, as appropriate, refer to them in conversations with members of Congress, with media, with visiting foreign leaders.

7. Under White House sponsorship, bring to Washington on return from tours abroad highly-successful American performing arts groups or artists for an invitational performance here, with the President in

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6 Lewis placed two vertical parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this point.

7 Lewis placed two vertical parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this point.

8 Lewis underlined “with USIA film coverage.” Presumable reference to the April 29, 1969, White House dinner honoring Ellington, who also received the Presidential Medal of Freedom. For the text of the President’s toast at the dinner and the President’s and Ellington’s remarks during the medal presentation, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1969, pp. 338–339.
attendance to provide brief welcoming remarks, with appropriate media coverage.  

8. On Presidential trips abroad, include in local programs a visit by the President to that country’s outstanding cultural-artistic accomplishment.

9. An annual U.S. television program, sponsored by the private sector (See B2), featuring all the American cultural attractions that have toured abroad for the United States that year.  

Mark B. Lewis

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9 Possible venues: Kennedy Center, Smithsonian, Department of State, Catholic University auditorium, a recommended new building for the National Council on the Arts, including auditorium. [Footnote is in the original.]

10 Lewis placed two vertical parallel lines in the right-hand margin next to this point.

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112. Memorandum From the Chief of the Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Joyce) to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans (White)

Washington, October 7, 1970

Meeting of the International Cultural Planning Task Force

Representatives of the Task Force, USIA, Smithsonian, National Endowment, Museum of Modern Art, CU, and George Washington University met at Carol Harford’s request on October 6, to discuss the role of the U.S. in international art festivals.

1. It was agreed that there should be a U.S. presence at such exhibitions, even though this implies no commitment to U.S. participation in every international show.

2. It was agreed that by participation in such shows the U.S. attempts to reach and influence elites in the artistic and intellectual realms and sometimes to satisfy needs that are not esthetic but political.

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3. It was agreed that greater efforts ought to be made to seek private sources of support for U.S. cultural presentations overseas. It was further agreed that the effort to secure private financing should be coordinated so that CU, USIA and IAP are not all simultaneously trying to pluck the same goose.

4. It was agreed also that traveling art shows overseas frequently have more impact and value for the U.S. than does participation in the great well-known international shows.

I explained to this group, as I last week explained to the Smithsonian people, that USIA believes that the U.S. government should maintain an international presence in the world of art and that USIA also believes that traveling shows are exceedingly useful. I promised to discuss further with the geographical areas possibilities for USIS offered by the Smithsonian Institution Traveling Exhibition Service (which I described to you on Monday). I observed that, although the Traveling Service presents an attractive opportunity, the fact that it will cost money is an obstacle to USIA, since USIA does not wish to present to the Appropriations Committee a budget item related to international art shows. USIA would have no objection to the concept of the Traveling Service if the Smithsonian or some other institution would foot the bill.

Carol Harford will write a report of the meeting. The participants will have an opportunity to make comments on it as well as further suggestions before the report goes to the International Cultural Committee.

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2 October 5. The Smithsonian Institution Traveling Exhibition Service (SITES) was established in 1951 with Annemarie Pope named as the first SITES Director.

3 Not found.

Excerpts of Radio interview of USIA
Director Frank Shakespeare by James Anderson,
Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., October 20, 1970

Anderson: You no doubt have seen, as others have, a lot of stories—some of them speculative and some of them don’t seem to have the grains of truth that they ought to—that there is developing a USIA line or a USIA policy separate and distinct from the State Department. Is there such?

Shakespeare: Well that’s a complicated question. Firstly, and to make it very clear the policy of the United States is set by the President of the United States and is articulated by the State Department. That is the formal structure of the foreign policy of the United States. Now the USIA carries on a major information program throughout the world which is structured to be in general support of foreign policy interests of the people of this country. We very understandably may have different points of emphasis than the formal diplomat would have, but that’s only to say the obvious. That is to say that an information and communications program is something different and newer than formal and traditional diplomacy.

Anderson: Well how do you understand then your relationship with the State Department? Is it as one executive branch of the State Department or what?

Shakespeare: No. The United States Information Agency was established by the Congress as an independent Agency. We receive the money to run this Agency directly from the Congress of the United States, that is from the House and the Senate. I as the Director of the Agency report directly to the President of the United States not to the Secretary of State. However, we are instructed to take formal foreign policy guidance from the State Department because we in this Agency do not set policy; we implement it and try to support that policy, so that the officers of our Agency and I myself meet frequently with the senior officers of the State Department to receive the specific guidance.

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as to what the foreign policy is. But there is a very considerable leeway and certainly autonomy for us then to carry on a continuing, broadscale information program throughout the world.

JA: Did, as has been reported, the Secretary of State send a memo to you with—as I understand the thrust of it—the idea that the USIA is subordinate to the State Department as a policy instrument?²

FS: No I think the Secretary simply wanted to make sure there was no misunderstanding between the USIA and the State Department as to the formal expression of the foreign policy of the United States, and indeed there is no misunderstanding. The formal expression of the foreign policy of the United States, as I said, is by the President of the United States or by the Secretary of State.

JA: During the Middle East there was also some leak, chiefly in London, of a memo which took a harder line than the apparent line the State Department was taking.³ Is that so, did the USIA take from time to time, using that as an example, does the USIA take a different tactical view of events that are happening in the rest of the world?

FS: During the height, if you could call it that, of the situation in the Middle East when it became very evident that there had been a substantial violation by the Soviets and Egyptians of the standstill agreement,⁴ the United States Information Agency sent to its officers throughout the world a general guidance paper—and I think that’s what you refer to—which described the situation and the implication that we thought that it had. All of our officers take those as a normal matter and use those as a basis for contact with the press, television, radio, government people throughout the world and that was true in this case.

² On October 19, the Washington Post reported that “on or about Sept. 21” Rogers had sent Shakespeare a memorandum “reminding him that the law provides that USIA is under the authority of the State Department in policy matters” following the USIA release of Info Guide No. 70–46 on September 17 (see Document 108). (“Rogers Warns USIA Chief Not to Set Foreign Policy,” p. A1) See also Tad Szulc, “Tough U.S.I.A. Line Drew A Complaint from Rogers,” New York Times, October 25, 1970, p. 3. Shakespeare met with Nixon on November 25. According to Haldeman’s record of the meeting: “Following Shakespeare’s presentation, the President assured him that the USIA position was very much along the correct lines, and that Shakespeare had the President’s full support—that he should not seek or engage in a direct confrontation with State, but should continue to work as skillfully as he has in the past.” (Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971, footnote 22, Document 74)

³ According to the Washington Post, following the dissemination of Info Guide No. 70–46, “a local USIA man passed it on to the London press, apparently in sharpened form. The result was a spate of British press stories to the effect that Washington was equating Suez with Cuba.” (“Rogers Warns USIA Chief Not to Set Foreign Policy,” October 19, 1970, p. A1)

⁴ See footnote 4, Document 105.
JA: But it did not as I understand you then, it did not differ substantially from what the State Department was saying at that time?

FS: Well it certainly didn’t differ in fact. As I said, in many cases we differ in points of emphasis. Now let me give you an illustration because this point, this matter of points of emphasis in communication, is something I think that needs to be carefully understood. Communications is a whole new force in diplomacy. It’s, in my opinion, having a revolutionary effect on diplomacy. Now let me try to give you an illustration. If in 1938 or in 1939 there had been a USIA (it did not exist at that time) the State Department of the United States Government would have been having formal diplomatic representations to Adolph Hitler and his government and those would have been the official formal statements and papers with which we are all familiar. They would have been couched in diplomatic language and although they could have been and doubtless were fairly stern they were basically formal representations between governments. A USIA at that point might very well have been saying throughout the world “why are you putting Jews in the ovens?” Now both of those were consistent with the facts. They both would have served the objectives in making the world aware of what the Government of Nazi Germany represented, but they would be different styles: the diplomatic style, the formal diplomatic relationships between governments, and the general communication of information throughout the world. Those are different things.

JA: Then to take your thesis a step further, the actual presentation of it, the medium, as it were, can sometimes be as important as the message then by the emphasis, the technical emphasis, that the USIA can give, it can then give substantial flavoring or substantial emphasis to a foreign policy can it not?

FS: Yes very much so, and I think you’re hitting right on it. Today, the attitude of people about an action of their government or about an action of a foreign government can, in fact, be an inhibiting factor in what the governments can make work or can do. To use the most obvious illustrations, in the case of Southeast Asia, the case of Viet-Nam, the attitude of the world people, indeed the attitude of many citizens of the United States about the situation in Southeast Asia has had an inhibiting force on, has reduced the options open to, the United States Government. To take another case, the world’s passions are in many ways intimately involved in what’s going on in the Middle East. Certainly world Jewry is very concerned with Israel. The Arabs, 100,000,000 Arabs, highly involved emotionally as well as rationally with what’s occurring in the Middle East. Now those are psychological factors; those are human factors; they’re not power factors, but they translate . . . with today’s rapid communications, with today’s ability
to reach people and to galvanize people, the attitude of people becomes the factor. How do you, how do attitudes of people form? They form through knowledge; and communications is the transmittal of knowledge.

114. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, Public Information, United States Information Agency (Leeper) to all USIA Element Heads

Washington, October 29, 1970

The following statement was released this morning:

“The news story in the Washington Post of October 29 stating that, in connection with alleged construction of a Soviet submarine base in Cuba, Mr. Shakespeare recommended to the White House that diplomatic relations between the United States and the USSR be broken and SALT negotiations between the two countries be suspended, is totally untrue.

“During the period when the submarine base reports were prevalent, he was in Europe and made no recommendations whatsoever to anyone on the subject at any time.”

Robert H. Leeper

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2 Chalmers M. Roberts, “USIA Chief Said to Urge End to SALT,” Washington Post, October 29, 1970, p. A1. Roberts wrote: “According to the account, the Shakespeare proposal was made in early October before the Washington-Moscow arrangement under which Moscow announced it was not building a Soviet submarine base. That deal has never been officially confirmed, however.” On October 30, the Washington Post reported that Ziegler had denied that Shakespeare “had urged” Nixon to suspend the SALT negotiations: “Campaigning with Mr. Nixon yesterday, Ziegler said: ‘The White House did not receive any such recommendation from Mr. Shakespeare.’” (USIA Chief’s Role Denied,” p. A13)

Memorandum Prepared by the International Cultural Planning Group Task Force on U.S. Representation in the Arts Abroad

Washington, undated

RECOMMENDATIONS OF ICPG TASK FORCE ON U.S. REPRESENTATION IN THE ARTS ABROAD

The conclusions reached by members (names noted on attachment) of the International Cultural Planning Group Task Force on U.S. representation in the arts abroad are reflected in the following recommendations of the 12 persons who represented private and Government interests in the visual and performing arts.

The Members agreed that it is important for the U.S. to be among the participating nations at international cultural events abroad, and that form and scope of representation must be responsive to the individual event or the country in which representation will occur. It also became evident that existing programs should be reviewed.

Interwoven among the broader precepts and more specific problems, was an attempt to determine the appropriate role of Government—coordinator, catalyst or source? The consensus seemed to be the former.

While the combined resources of Government agencies most directly involved with this facet of representation abroad (State, USIA, NCFA/IAP) are probably considerably less than $2 million, the value is significant. Though relatively miniscule, the funding is significant also. Particularly now, as related to the International Art Program.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 1, CUL 3 International Cultural Strategy Group. No classification marking. Hanford sent a copy of the recommendations to Joyce under an October 29 covering memorandum, indicating that the ICPG had discussed the recommendations at its October 27 meeting and that the consensus "was that Recommendation 1—a need for coordination of U.S. involvement in the international arts arena—should be resolved first.” Hanford wrote that Michael Straight (National Endowment for the Arts), upon the request of the ICPG, had agreed to chair a working group “to look into specifics of current practices.” Bunce, in an October 27 memorandum to Loomis, referencing the discussion of the recommendations that would take place that day, stated: “We have some reservations about the recommendation that a central government office coordinate U.S. arts representation abroad as to policy, responsibility for representation and procedure, funding, and role of a possible advisory council. Carol apparently does not have fixed views as to where such a central office should be located—whether in the White House, CU or in USIA. If decisions of such an office would involve funding and the office were outside of USIA, it might involve some complications with regard to Agency funding priorities. On the whole, the memorandum appears to provide a good basis for discussion by the International Cultural Planning Group.” (Ibid.)

2 Attached but not printed is the undated list of Task Force members.
of the Smithsonian, which comes under the direct jurisdiction of the National Collection of Fine Arts. Budgetary demands upon the NCFA for its domestic programs seems to call for a review now of IAP policies and procedures. What seems to be needed is re-assessment of IAP’s current status within NCFA and possible consideration of another base for its operations. While the program must continue its commitment to international representation (i.e., the exchange of fine arts exhibits as well as U.S. participation in Venice and Sao Paulo Biennials and similar international events—as specified in the Memorandum of Understanding between USIA and the Smithsonian Institution) of American activity in the visual arts, budgetary adjustments may call for shifting the major fiscal burden for specific exhibitions.

I. There is a need for coordination of U.S. involvement in the international arts arena. This is necessary from the standpoint of policy determination and because representatives of Government agencies find there is overlap in approaching private sources for funds, which are becoming more difficult to get.

Coordination could help to make budgets, impacts and effect go further thereby, hopefully, creating fuller, richer programs for foreign audiences.

 Recommendation: That a central Government office coordinate U.S. arts representation abroad as to policy (where, when and what form) responsibility for representation (which agency) and procedure (selection of work, funding, role of possible advisory council).

II. Government endorsement is essential and a little “seed” money is helpful to increasing coordination between private and public interests in support of a joint venture in the arts.

 Recommendation: That the President meet with selected representatives of industry to ask their support to increase U.S. cultural representation abroad.

III. There was discussion within the group, as there apparently has been in international arts groups meetings, of considering festivals of mixed cultural media. Whereas this type of festival takes place in other countries, to the knowledge of members of this group, none such has taken place in the United States.

 Recommendation: That consideration be given to the feasibility of the United States hosting an international festival of mixed cultural media.

That consideration be given to the feasibility of U.S. representatives encouraging more of this type of international festival abroad.

IV. The role of U.S. representation in the visual arts has been directed fairly consistently to entries in major international exhibitions, with smaller exhibitions being sent as well.

 Recommendation: That emphasis be placed on increasing the number of smaller exhibits circulated abroad, and the policy of entry into major international exhibitions be re-examined from the standpoints of support and cultural and diplomatic usefulness.
116. Address by the Counselor of the Department of State
(Pedersen)\(^1\)

Washington, November 12, 1970

Youth, Change, and Foreign Policy

I would like to talk to you today about a factor in the conduct of foreign affairs that we are taking into greater account in our operations both in the Department of State and in our missions around the world.

That factor is the present or potential power of students and youth, here and abroad, and their role as generators and reflectors of social and political change. Here, at a conference of voluntary agencies to which young people have been particularly invited, it is appropriate to consider that impact and how we are incorporating it into the planning of our foreign policy.

Around the globe a wave of activism on the part of young people has unsettled political developments in country after country. At its crest in 1968 youth sparked major outbreaks in more than 30 countries. That this broad movement surprised most governments and most foreign offices has been a spur to closer attention to the views and activities of younger people.

The significance for policymakers does not, however, rest only in the immediate effect of these eruptions on governments in being. Significance also resides in what lies behind them.

Today’s youth are the product of fundamental changes that have swept the world in the quarter century since World War II. An age of science and technology, of exploding population, of instant communication, of rising demands for higher standards of life, has produced a cultural revolution and with it a political ferment.

Everywhere—more than when we were young—youth are questioning, challenging, and doubting—everything.

Both here and abroad, many young people are approaching national and world issues, ideologies and priorities, institutions and authority, in a substantially different way from that of the generation that preceded them.

Many also are not, but clearly something new is going on, something significant, something that forces us to focus on the nature of our era.

We must seek first to understand what is happening. Then we must ask what are its implications.

That today’s youth represent a new kind of generation is hardly to be wondered at.

—Well over half of the world’s expanding population has been born since World War II; that is, they are under 25. They have no direct knowledge of that war, no direct knowledge of the Korean war, no direct knowledge of the more dangerous periods of the cold war.

—More and more of these young people are better and better educated. Across the world rapid gains have been made in primary and secondary education and in eliminating illiteracy. The 11 million who were in universities or other schools of higher education in 1960 had swelled just 5 years later by 60 percent, to 18 million. In the United States the number doubled between 1960 and 1969. Better informed, better educated, they are more conscious socially and politically as well.

—And those who enter university stay there much longer than formerly. They have to. The knowledge they need in order to cope in this technological age has exploded. So at a time when young people are apparently maturing physically earlier than before, their active participation in society is postponed. Added to this, in developed countries, is a new affluence, releasing many students from the economic cares that kept their parent’s generation preoccupied.

—Everywhere, also, modern communications are making young people vividly aware of their world, and ours, and of how others elsewhere are reacting to it. Tantalizing, broadening, stimulating, disillusioning word comes early and graphically, prepackaged and instantly transmitted. Instead of making society uniform, as most of us once expected, this vast flow of information has encouraged the formation of subcultures such as that of “youth” and has done so without regard to national or ideological lines.

—The rush to the cities characteristic of the age is creating its own influences. All over the world, people are discarding the old traditions and the old restraints of village or town to seek new opportunities in an urban setting. There they form a critical mass, swollen in numbers, newly free to question and to probe. There their children pass formative years amid vastly new and untraditional influences.

—And in much of the world the exhilaration of newly found independence has come face to face with the hard realities of underdevelopment, producing at one time progress, hope, frustration, and despair.

Who can wonder that youth formed under the pressure of these circumstances see the world in a different light?

Some believe that the youth phenomenon will pass, that youth will settle into “normalcy.” No doubt this will be so in societies, such as
our own, with healthy economies and established means of popular change; no doubt so if we mean that the outrages of violence must be ended and that the appeals of extremist ideology will abate; no doubt so if “normalcy” includes the process of peaceful change. But in other circumstances the phenomenon is likely to persist, and everywhere the factors that brought the phenomenon into being are far from disappearing.

Impact of Youth Upon Developments Abroad

Those of us who are responsible for the country’s foreign affairs must face the implications of this phenomenon both abroad and at home. Let us look at foreign matters first.

For a number of years the Department of State has recognized that foreign policy must take into account the substantial impact of young people—radical, liberal, moderate, conservative, or reactionary—upon developments abroad.

In many countries youth have commanded our attention as a political factor now.

Youth abroad also bear on U.S. long-term foreign relations. They may be said, for instance, to provide a “distant early warning” of the problems of a society and the directions it might take. They carry with them a core of attitudes and values that will influence, though with modification of perspective and greater nuance, the decades to come. From them, though not necessarily nor even probably from those who loom largest for the moment, inevitably must come the leadership of tomorrow.

Exactly what may be the long-range influence of current youth unrest is necessarily speculative, as all future estimates must be. But what is clear is this: No Embassy effort at political analysis is complete unless it takes into account the shifts in values, norms, and beliefs and the actual political impact of the various and often divergent forces of a politically aware generation.

Since 1962 the Government has sought to assure attention to such developments through an Inter-Agency Youth Committee and through the stimulus of a special Youth Adviser responsible to the Secretary of State. Programs of Government agencies with foreign young people—especially in the Defense Department, USIA, and AID—have been operated under general coordination through the Committee. And our Embassies have been encouraged by the Committee to observe and report on youth developments, just as they do on commercial, labor, political, economic, or other matters.

After assuming office in 1969, Secretary of State Rogers decided that a new impetus needed to be given to Department and Embassy
efforts to take account of continued youth activities around the world. He instructed all American Ambassadors abroad to reexamine the priority they were giving to this aspect of their work. They were requested to assure that their Embassies were according not special weight but realistic weight to the new political impact of youth on society, to the societal changes youth were reflecting, and to the changes they were generating. They were asked to take advantage of the interests and energies of younger Embassy officers by giving them opportunities to develop such work. And they were asked to examine their use of available funds for exchanges, assistance, and other purposes to insure that youth factors were being taken into account.

To reinforce the point the Youth Adviser was sent to regional meetings of American Ambassadors throughout the world. He found our Ambassadors receptive, prepared to cooperate, and in many cases more conscious than the Department of the youthfulness of particular societies (17 heads of states or government are 40 or under). Systematic incorporation of youth developments is now an established part of the political and economic analysis of most Embassies.

Conveying an undistorted understanding of American life and of American objectives to those who will be the carriers of new values and new attitudes is also of importance to our long-term foreign policy objectives. So also is the contribution we are uniquely able to make to young people in underdeveloped countries in acquiring the skills and knowledge necessary for economic and social progress in a modern world. Government-wide programs involving exchange activities, the principal means through which we seek these objectives, reach the surprisingly large figure of $400 million.

Two such programs are operated directly by the State Department—one by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and one by the Agency for International Development. Together they bring some 7,000 people to the United States annually, about half of whom are under 30. I am pleased to say that several years of budget cuts in the educational and cultural programs were reversed last year under the new Assistant Secretary, John Richardson, when we received a $5 million increase.

We must recognize, of course, that of 130,000 foreign university students in the United States, 90 percent are here without U.S. Government sponsorship, support, or scarcely encouragement. It may well be that there is more we could do to help contribute to the success of their sojourn in the United States.

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2 See footnote 2, Document 67.
Greater Exchange With American Young People

If our custody of America’s welfare abroad includes a responsibility to comprehend the impact of foreign youth on American interests, so also do we have a responsibility to consider the views of American young people in determining what those interests are.

I do not mean to suggest that American youth stand as a monolithic force presenting a single view. The spectrum is broad, the political persuasions varied. In large measure we do not even accurately know the balance of their views. And it is too early to tell what trends will be lasting. But running through all and affecting all are the currents of the times. New forces are stirring all youth, and the drive to make their views heard is compelling.

One need not concur in these views to conclude that they should be given a hearing. At a time when American foreign policy is shifting from preoccupation with the problems bestowed on the world by World War II toward preoccupation with the opportunities of the last quarter of the 20th century, a readjustment of our role and involvement abroad has indeed become both desirable and necessary. That adjustment has been set underway by the President. It embraces a continued involvement, a continued expression of leadership, and a continued concern for our security; but it does so in the context of greater responsibility by others and in the conviction that no nation should play too predominant a role.

In any case youth’s active participation in the conduct of public affairs is to be vigorously encouraged. The opening of our councils to the best that American youth today offer will give us the advantage of new conceptions of our problems and an opportunity to engage in a fruitful exchange of views where perspectives or conclusions differ.

In his first statement to the Department after assuming office Secretary Rogers stated that he hoped to lead a “receptive and open establishment where men speak their minds and are listened to on merit, and where divergent views are fully and promptly passed on for decision.” And he called upon senior officers to encourage the participation of our young people. That statement was directed to the stimulation of young people within the Department, but it applies as well to the greater exchange which the Department desires with American young people.

On both sides there is much to gain from an increased dialogue. We in Government will have to avoid a temptation to think we have “communicated” with youth simply when we have informed

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Footnote: 3 For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1969, p. 125. [Footnote is in the original. See ibid.]
them of the details of our policies. We will have to be ready to face and deal not only with specific discussions of specific policies but also with fundamental challenges to values and assumptions. We will have not just to listen but really to hear.

So on their side will youth have to show their own readiness to listen, to deal with facts, and to consider the complexities and specifications of decisionmaking as it actually happens.

Among us all there will have to be an effort to talk with, not at, each other.

New Measures and New Approaches

To find effective ways to open policymaking mechanisms to these prospects is an important task. We have already taken a number of steps.

An essential move was to release creative energies in the Department itself. To do this we have taken measures such as these:

—Expanded use has been encouraged by the Department’s senior officers of what is known as the Open Forum Panel, an opportunity for junior Foreign Service officers—almost all still in their twenties or early thirties—to convey to the very top of the Department considered views on policy they wish to transmit outside the constraints of bureaucratic channels. They have done so and have utilized the means not only to suggest changes in existing or proposed policies but even, happily, to reinforce policies already underway in which they saw special merit. Two of the Department-wide task forces created to review our entire management and policy structure were charged with mandates to develop greater “creativity” as well as greater “openness” within the Department.4

—Each of our Bureaus was asked to make efforts to include young people in the advisory panels they customarily use to bring into the Department informed views from the academic, business, and other communities.

—And participation of American youth has been emphasized in the many multilateral organizations of which we are members. Our delegation to the current U.N. General Assembly, for example, includes

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4 Following an address Macomber made on January 14, 1970, regarding management strategies during the new decade, the Department established 13 task forces to study management issues in the Department and make recommendations for reform. The final reports of the task forces (including recommendations) and a summary report were released in a volume entitled Diplomacy for the 70’s: A Program of Management Reform for the Department of State, which Macomber presented to Rogers on November 20. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, Document 312. It is unclear as to which task forces Pedersen is referring.
a member who, at 30, is the youngest American delegate ever appointed and, for the first time, three young people under 25 serving as youth advisers.

No amount of openness within the Department, however, can substitute for the intellectual stimulation that comes from give-and-take between the Department and the world of the academics, voluntary agencies, and foreign affairs. Here also we are trying new approaches.

When the new Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Michael Collins, was appointed in January he was given a mandate by the Secretary to place special emphasis upon improving our relations with the public, “particularly the young people.” Mr. Collins responded to that mandate with the appointment of a new youth adviser in his Bureau assigned full time to deal with American youth and by the initiation of a comprehensive youth participation program.

—One aspect, a program to permit young professors to work for a full week side by side and issue by issue with officers in the Department related to their own specialty, was begun early in the year. Thirteen young African experts from as many campuses started the program, followed by groups on the Near East, South Asia, Latin America, and Europe. Seven more such groups of professors will have a chance to exchange views with our officers between now and next spring, this time in functional as well as geographical areas.

—Another aspect, to intensify efforts to get State Department officers, especially young ones, into contact with young people in their own setting, began this fall. Visits to at least 600 campuses are planned during the year, most of which will avoid the customary lecture pattern in preference to small group discussions.

—A doubling within the year of the number of young people who routinely have access to the Department for substantive discussions has been made a third objective, exemplified for instance, by the 200 students we expect to receive in January for weeklong seminars with Foreign Service officers.

—To reach still others a new program of radio and TV discussions on the issues and major assumptions underlying foreign policy among youth and Foreign Service officers is also under preparation.

Meanwhile we are continuing the placement of Foreign Service officers in universities for full academic periods—not only to advance their skills and learning but to expose them to the currents of thought that find expression on campus and to help convey to the campuses some of our knowledge and considerations. Forty-eight FSO’s are currently pursuing college courses across America and six high-level officers are located in universities as “diplomats-in-residence,” visiting professors, in effect, from the world of practice.
These many steps we have already taken may not be well known. But we do want it to be well known that we are committed to maintaining open channels of communication with the forces of youth here and abroad.

We believe that from our Embassies’ efforts abroad will come a surer sense of the tendencies of other societies. And we believe that from our efforts at home should come sounder foundations for future policymaking and bridges to a future governed by new conditions.

Young people, it must be remembered, are more than just another interest group. They are the members of all the interest groups of the future. And the best of them are already concerned not just for their own well-being of today but for that of the whole society of tomorrow.

Often those of us in Government may not be able to do, and often we should not do, what many of the most articulate youth are asking. But we should and we will add their advice, their perceptions, and their interests to those of traditional claimants in the formulation of a foreign policy in the service of our country.


Washington, undated

Draft Infoguide on Portraying the United States to Foreign Audiences

Problem

Foreign audiences today receive a great volume of information from and about the United States, but they often do not receive a full and fair picture of the American scene. There are many reasons for this.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–A42, Box 15, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1970. Limited Official Use. White sent the paper to Shakespeare, copying Loomis, under a November 13 memorandum, noting that IOP had authored the paper “with stress on the positive and a tone of confidence,” and that she had given a copy of the paper to Hemsing in advance of the upcoming European PAO meeting. She also commented that she would show Shakespeare a copy “in revised form before issuance.” Shakespeare circled this sentence and White’s name. He also wrote “Barbara Thanks. F.S.” in the top left-hand corner of White’s memorandum. (Ibid.)
Information flow is fragmentary. Messages compete for time and attention. Media, particularly television, assault the senses as much as they appeal to the intellect. The result is, consciously or unconsciously, to put a premium on the transmission of the sensational and on visceral audience response.

All around the world the United States is in the news. More often than not the United States makes international news as a principal protagonist in Big Power conflicts. While playing this role confers certain benefits on the United States, it tends to militate against appreciation of the complexity of American society and in favor of a simplistic and superficial view of American actions and motivations.

The productivity of Americans has made a mixed contribution to the national image, evoking both admiration and envy, and occasioning both gratitude and resentment among those dependent on American wealth. Our free institutions which have made such a large contribution to our productivity are admired, but at the same time non-Americans who feel they cannot “afford” freedom in their nations wonder if there is enough discipline in American life. People in developing countries in the 1970’s may well feel increasing estrangement from American experience and may view American developments in a prejudiced way because they are alien to their own vital concerns.

The United States’ “image problem” is compounded by the fact that, since the century of European exploration, much of the world has had higher hopes for America than for the older lands. Poor conditions of life in countries which are our chief rivals in power and influence often are overlooked, while exposure of the faults in American society gets notice and causes disappointment.

During the past five years Americans, themselves, have probably been the chief witnesses against America. Some of the most articulate individuals and institutions in the United States have expressed opposition to American policies and have questioned the validity of the organization and quality of American life. With America so much in the world news and with the great reach and penetration of the international media, internal debate in the United States has a worldwide audience, which includes parties determined to exploit the debate for their own, anti-American purposes.

Solving the problem is beyond the capability of USIA. Indeed, there are good reasons for our deriving comfort from the existence of some aspects of the “problem.” The present paper suggests treatment and themes which may enable media and posts to focus attention on the positive aspects of American life and thereby to increase respect for the United States.

Guidelines for Treatment of American Domestic Developments

1. Let the world know what America stands for. The measure of American institutions is the degree of liberty they confer and their responsive-
ness to the wants and needs of the citizens, freely expressed. Our particular institutions are peculiar to us. We have no desire and no right to confer them on other peoples. But the principles of free choice and popular participation in peaceful change which underlie the institutions of American life have universal appeal. It is not difficult to make a strong and positive identification of the United States with these principles; it is impossible for communist nations to do the same.

2. Show confidence in the United States. The United States approaches its bicentennial, having prevailed over crises of epic proportions. “Government of the people, by the people, for the people” still flourishes. The American people have demonstrated the capacity to remain faithful to the ideals of the founding fathers and simultaneously to adapt to greatly changed circumstances of life.

3. Place our materialism in context. Men everywhere want a decent life. A lack of at least a minimum of material things detracts from human dignity. The American system has provided the minimum for almost all Americans and has given vast numbers the opportunity to achieve much more. We do not flaunt our material accomplishments; and it is not USIA’s role to export American goods and technical advice. Our responsibilities are to illuminate the working of the American institutions which account for productivity and the equitable distribution of the product of labor and to show that American civilization is more than merely materialistic.

4. Be selective in output. USIA is engaged in advocacy. Today’s world is so full of communication and noise that only if we focus our message can we hope our audiences will focus their attention on what we have to say. We must know what else is being said about America, so we can select purposefully and be effective advocates.

5. Repeat, reinforce, recapitulate. Facts presented in isolation have far less impact than facts ordered explicitly and consecutively to support a well-defined theme. As additional facts are presented, restate the theme they support.

6. Be relevant to our audiences. Talk in terms of, “Everyone has problems. We sympathize with yours. We’ve had similar problems, and this is what we’re trying to do about them—which might possibly be of interest to you.” Where our problem-solving has borrowed from foreign experience, express gratitude for the help. Where our experience has been irrelevant, don’t parade it. Where we can’t help, listen; that may be help enough.

7. Show the United States on the frontiers of modern man’s experience. Our size, our resources, our universal interests and our free institutions usually expose Americans sooner and more fully than others to the problems of modern life. Our present is likely to be their future. However, our aim is not to direct our audiences’ attention to their future
problems (they are too busy now to worry about tomorrow’s troubles); rather, our goal is to demonstrate that the United States is capable of dealing with the challenges to society in America, and in the process, that Americans are accumulating experience which may be of benefit and which is made available to all mankind.

8. Do not advertise our problems. When and if our problems come to the attention of foreign publics, in a manner and to a degree that is harmful to our national interests, we should supply additional facts and explanations to gain understanding of our difficulties and recognition that we are overcoming them. But there is no reason for USIA or USIS posts to initiate discussion of American problems where concern with them is insignificant.

118. Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon

S/S 15343

Washington, November 14, 1970

SUBJECT
United States Participation in Fairs and Exhibitions Abroad

I. Problem
To provide for increased U.S. “political-purpose” participation in certain international fairs and exhibitions.

II. Discussion
On the basis of an Interagency Exhibits Committee review of United States participation in fairs and exhibitions abroad (copy attached), the Under Secretaries Committee has concluded that the United States is suffering political disadvantages because of both a lack of participation and poor-quality representation in a number of foreign exhibi-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1971. Limited Official Use. Drafted in S/PC. Under a November 17 covering memorandum (NSC–U/DM 53), Hartman sent a copy of the memorandum to Packard, Kissinger, Helms, Moorer, Siciliano, and Shakespeare. (Ibid.) An attached IOP/P routing slip indicates that copies were also sent to Hoffman, Sablosky, Noah, Telich, and Beko. An October 23 version of the memorandum, drafted by Malcom Lawrence (E/CBA), is ibid.

2 Not attached.
tions which do not meet the present criteria for U.S. Government involvement.

The problem has arisen largely as a result of changes in the priorities of the two principal agencies in the exhibition field. Department of Commerce exhibitions have become wholly “hard-sell” commercial operations staged primarily in Western Europe and Japan. Budget cuts have seriously limited USIA participation in international fairs; that agency has in fact been forced to concentrate its efforts in Eastern Europe.

A survey of U.S. missions reveals that there are currently some twenty annual or biennial events outside Eastern Europe for which U.S. participation has been solicited primarily for political reasons. The city locations are:

- Accra
- Addis Ababa
- Berlin
- Bogota
- Dar-es-Salaam
- Djakarta
- Guatemala
- Izmir
- Kinshasa
- Lima
- Lusaka
- Nairobi
- New Delhi
- Rabat
- San Salvador
- Santiago
- Thessaloniki
- Tripoli
- Tunis
- Valletta
- Vientiane

In many instances, e.g., Izmir and Thessaloniki, the United States is expected to be a major participant. U.S. absence is viewed with indignation as a politically-motivated sign of lack of interest. Local government and U.S. Embassy pressures have on a number of occasions persuaded the U.S. to make last minute decisions to participate without adequate resources or time to stage a creditable exhibit.

An avowed policy of not participating in non-commercial exhibits outside of Eastern Europe is unduly restrictive and unrealistic. As in the past, the pressures for U.S. participation in a certain number of exhibitions will continue to be applied by officials of the sponsoring countries. A planned program would accommodate most situations where political considerations are paramount and eliminate the present unsatisfactory makeshift and crash-planning procedures which are not conducive to either proper selectivity or effective participation.

The Under Secretaries Committee therefore recommends an orderly participation in selected exhibitions, based on alternative No. 3 as described on p. 11 in the attached Interagency Exhibits Committee report. This would provide limited scale participation, making use wherever possible of reusable, transportable exhibits. The above-men-
tioned cities constitute only a suggested list from which exhibition sites could be selected. The plan, to be implemented by USIA under State Department policy guidance, would call for an increase in Special International Exhibition (SIE) funding in the order of one and one-half million dollars annually.

III. Recommendation

That you endorse the concept of increased United States “political-purpose” exhibits and forward to the Office of Management and Budget, for consideration in the budget review now in process, this Committee’s recommendation that USIA be given a special fund of approximately one and one-half million dollars annually. This fund would be used to mount modest exhibits in those areas where the U.S. presence is deemed by the Department of State to be in the best interests of U.S. foreign policy.3

John N. Irwin II

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3 The President did not approve or disapprove the recommendation. In a January 8, 1971, memorandum to Irwin, Kissinger indicated that the President “has decided that the request for a special fund of $1.5 million for USIA political purpose exhibits should be handled through the usual budget process.” Under a January 13 covering memorandum, White sent Dunlap a copy of Kissinger’s memorandum, adding: “Ted Curran sent us this advance copy of the Kissinger memorandum. We will doubtless get another copy through channels later.” (National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1971) In a March 19 memorandum to Halsema, White commented on Nixon’s decision, stating: “You remember that it [the special appropriation] was turned down by the White House, but to my knowledge we never pursued it very vigorously. Frank mentioned at one point that he intended to talk to Henry Kissinger, but I do not believe he did. Perhaps Henry knows, or else we should check with Frank.” (Ibid.)
119. Memorandum From Harold H. Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)\(^1\)

Washington, November 18, 1970

SUBJECT
Frank Shakespeare Requests to See the President about the Mid-East

I understand from Jeanne Davis and Dick Kennedy that you already have on your desk a memo on how to clue Frank Shakespeare and USIA on Presidential decisions.\(^2\) So I am sending this to you since it deals with the same basic problem—that Shakespeare feels cut out.

In the immediately attached memo to HAK, Dwight Chapin asks whether you would recommend an appointment for Frank Shakespeare with the President “to discuss the Middle East.”\(^3\)

We can probably pinpoint the two points on Shakespeare’s mind from a series of recent memos: (1) Soviet duplicity in the Mid-East and (2) the importance of keeping USIA informed on the foreign policy line we want projected. Both of these were dramatized by Shakespeare in memos here after the cease-fire violations and during the recent Jordan crisis.\(^4\)

(1) You will recall that during the height of our concern over the Soviet/UAR violations of the cease-fire/standstill arrangement—late August and early September—Shakespeare sent HAK summaries of what was being reported in foreign press and television to draw our attention to the fact that Soviet duplicity was not being given enough emphasis. He recommended that White House and State Department do everything possible to correct the imbalance in reporting. Subsequently both State and JCS made this point in their instructions to

\(^{1}\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. II—1970 [27 Feb–Dec 14, 1970] [1 of 2]. No classification marking. Sent for action. All brackets, except for those indicated in footnotes, are in the original. An unknown hand wrote “OBE” at the top of the memorandum next to the stamped date of November 25. Saunders signed “Hal” next to his name in the “from” line. The President met with Shakespeare on November 25 from 11:30 a.m. until 12:16 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) For additional information, see footnote 2, Document 113.

\(^{2}\) An unknown hand placed brackets around the word “have” and wrote “had” above it. The memorandum Haig discusses here has not been found.

\(^{3}\) Not found attached.

\(^{4}\) Presumable reference to Shakespeare’s September 2 memorandum to the President (see the attachment to Document 105) and his September 18 memorandum to Kissinger (see Document 110).
posts abroad. USIA itself urged stiff instructions to its posts. [Tab A]. Shakespeare also urged the President to take a strong public stand against the Soviets. [Tab B]. Further, he followed up by calling attention to American reporting such as that by Marvin Kalb [Tab C] which draws attention to “the absence of a firm decision” by the U.S. in the face of a Soviet build-up in the UAR. In short, Shakespeare feels that there is something more we could do vis-a-vis the Russians in a public way and he is ready to do it. As you know, the press has been covering him.

(2) Shakespeare also recalls a potentially embarrassing situation during the Jordan crisis wherein USIA was set to go ahead and report—attributing to the Sun Times in Chicago only as instructed—the essence of the President’s Chicago background remarks about what we would do if Syria or Iraq intervened only to find out later (but before USIA had sent out its report, to Shakespeare’s relief) that everyone else had been told to play it down and that the President’s remarks were “off-the-record.” [It did result in one account of the incident in the Star]. [Memo at Tab D].

Shakespeare again draws HAK’s attention to that incident as an example of the problem which USIA consistently faces—being left out of what is going on. He makes the point that USIA has not been present at any senior meeting on the Mid-East since the beginning of the ceasefire and that it is creating problems as far as his being informed and, therefore, projecting an informed foreign policy line.

In short, it appears that Shakespeare would like the chance to promote a tougher public line on the Russians and to be better informed on what we are thinking. I can partly imagine that this is at least part reaction to his losing his seat when the Review Group became the SRG.

Technically Shakespeare is under Secretary Rogers and should be taking his cues from McCloskey or from whatever he works out with Alex Johnson. I had thought of a USIA officer being included in Bob

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5 Attached but not printed is a September 17 covering memorandum from Shakespeare to Kissinger transmitting a copy of a September 16 memorandum from Shakespeare to Giddens, Towery, USIA area directors, and IOP, containing the instructions. For the instructions as sent in Info Guide No. 70–46, September 17, see Document 108.

6 Not found attached. Presumably reference to Shakespeare’s September 2 memorandum to the President. See the attachment to Document 105.

7 Not found attached and not further identified.

8 Not found attached. Presumably reference to Shakespeare’s September 18 memorandum to Kissinger. See Document 110.

9 In NSDM 85, issued on September 14, the President directed the establishment of a Senior Review Group (SRG) to assist him “in carrying out my responsibilities for the conduct of national security affairs.” The membership of the SRG consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs. National Security Decision Memorandum 85 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. II, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy, 1969–1972, Document 121.
Houdek’s daily conference call, but Bob is wary of this because USIA doesn’t get all the traffic that State and Defense receive. Bob also feels USIA could easily misinterpret the shorthand exchanges in that call. All I can suggest is that HAK might offer to see Shakespeare. I can’t see the need for the President to see him on the Middle East.

Recommendation: That you check “no” on the attached and, if you want, note that HAK will see him.

120. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson)

Washington, December 1, 1970

SUBJECT

United States Exchange Programs and Leadership Development

As described in the attached November 13 memorandum from Dr. Kissinger, the President has ordered an inter-agency review of current US exchange programs. I would like you to assume responsibility for conducting this review and to submit your report to the Under Secretaries Committee by March 5, 1971.

I ask that you also assume responsibility for implementing the President’s additional directive that we undertake an interim increase in existing exchange programs. You should submit an interim report on this matter to the Under Secretaries Committee by December 22, 1970.

I am attaching a copy of my memorandum to the members of the Under Secretaries Committee asking them to designate representatives to your task force.

In carrying out your responsibilities, please feel free to draw upon the services and resources of other bureaus in this Department.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, EDX 1–1. Secret. Sent through Eliot. A stamped notation in the bottom right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received in CU/EX on December 7.

2 An unknown hand placed a checkmark above “President.”
Attachment

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin)

Washington, November 13, 1970

SUBJECT
United States Exchange Programs and Leadership Development

The President has directed a review of current United States exchange programs, to be combined with an analysis of possible steps to maximize (1) the effectiveness of programs of interchange with points of leadership in other countries, (2) the building of a broad continuing relationship, both public and private, with these leadership structures, and (3) contributions toward leadership development in other countries. In this study, particular emphasis and attention should be given to developing nations.

The study should:
—Review the extent and nature of U.S. Government, private sector and educational exchange programs covering substantive or professional fields (such as government, education, medicine, science, business, law, journalism and social science) including the military and also foreign students in the U.S. The review should identify the rationale of programs, geographic areas of concentration and reasoning behind priorities, and significant problems in program implementation. The review should also identify current programs in terms of whether they are or could be directed towards target-country leaders, mid-career people, or young potential leaders in their fields.
—Consider steps which might be initiated with regard to U.S. programs affecting the developing nations (primarily in the Middle East, Latin America, Asia and Africa), but not excluding the Eastern European countries and countries such as Spain and Portugal, to assure access to key leadership points in these societies, to coordinate government efforts in exchanges, and to stimulate and guide the private sector programs. Proposed alternative steps designed to achieve these goals—whether involving new programs, modification or improvement of existing programs, or the discarding of programs—should be accompanied by a discussion of the relevant advantages and disadvantages.
—Consider the relationship between U.S. Government and private sector exchange Programs (a) to the proposed International Development Institute and the newly established Inter-American Social Development Institute, and (b) to development assistance programs.

3 Secret; Nofor. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
With regard to foreign students in the United States, the study should re-examine the current programs to keep in contact with both U.S.-sponsored and non-sponsored students. The study should present the range of objectives that should govern U.S. Government contact with the students and also options regarding the levels, types and loci within the Government of programs to achieve these objectives.

The study is to be performed by the NSC Under Secretaries Committee. For the purposes of this study, the NSC Under Secretaries Committee will include representatives of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Agency for International Development, the United States Information Agency, the Peace Corps, and the President’s Science Advisor.

The President has directed all government departments and agencies and U.S. embassies and posts to provide information and active cooperation as required by the study.

The study and recommendations of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee should be submitted to the President by March 15, 1971.4

The President has directed that, in the meantime, the Department of State and other departments as appropriate take all possible steps to increase, with special priority on developing nations, the exchange in professional fields of individuals with strong leadership potential. Specifically, the President has directed that the Department of State and other departments review their respective policies and programs with a view toward maintaining an effective U.S. presence in parts of the world where conventional AID-type or other assistance programs are either being phased out or no longer operate. Also, in order to benefit more from people coming to the U.S. under non-U.S. Government sponsorship, existing governmental channels should be utilized to the extent possible to facilitate arrangements and contacts for these visitors.

Henry A. Kissinger

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4 An unknown hand underlined “March 15, 1971.”
Attachment

Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to Multiple Addressees

NSC-U/SM 88 Washington, December 1, 1970

TO
The Deputy Secretary of Defense
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Under Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Administrator, Agency for International Development
The Director, United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
The Director, Peace Corps
The Science Advisor to the President
The Director, United States Information Agency

SUBJECT
United States Exchange Program and Leadership Development

As set forth in the attached memorandum, the President has directed (1) a review of current United States exchange programs, and (2) while the review is in progress, an interim increase in the exchange in professional fields of individuals with strong leadership potential.

I have asked Mr. John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, to be responsible for the preparation and submission to the Under Secretaries Committee of the required exchange program study and for the coordination of the interim expansion program.

I would appreciate your designation to Mr. Richardson’s office (extension 22464) of a representative to his interagency task force.

As stated in the attached memorandum, the Under Secretaries Committee report should be submitted to the President by March 15, 1971; therefore, I have requested that Mr. Richardson submit his study to the Committee by March 5, 1971. Noting the President’s direction for an interim program, I also have requested that Mr. Richardson submit an interim program report to the Under Secretaries Committee by December 22, 1970.


6 Reference is to the November 13 memorandum from Kissinger to Irwin printed above.
Due to the extensive scope of this project and its short preparation period, I hope that you will be able to assist Mr. Richardson with such personnel and services as he may require.

John N. Irwin II  
Chairman

121. Letter From the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Reinhart) to all USIA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, December 11, 1970

Dear

There can be little doubt that you have heard a great deal about what the Director thinks, or does not think, concerning nation building, modernization, and development (and all synonyms for these terms) as objectives for USIS posts. In Africa and Latin America there traditionally has been no other objective. In our Area modernization-nation building has been a central objective for several posts. So where do we stand now? Why hasn’t the Agency given the posts official guidance? Isn’t there a legitimate connection between this objective and so much of the work which we have done recently in Laos, Viet-Nam, and Thailand? Furthermore, when we assist in nation building, aren’t we combating the potential enemies of the USG?

These are real questions, for I have heard many of you state them. I really have no better answers than I did in PAO Letter No. 16, in which I touched on this subject. What I do have is the attached memorandum which Barbara White wrote after sitting in on a discussion between the Director and Bob Amerson, Assistant Director for Latin America. Bob argued, in effect, that he was out of business in Latin America if nation building was judged to be out of bounds. The answer to this argument is set forth in Barbara’s memo.

I believe and have argued that we would all be much better off if we could get an official IOP guidance paper to the field on this subject.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1970. Limited Official Use; Official-Informal. The letter is PAO Letter # 32.
2 An unknown hand underlined this phrase.
3 Not found.
The Director has answered that he is not ready at this time to commit his views to paper. He has agreed, however, that this attachment be sent pending further elucidation.

Sincerely,

John E. Reinhardt
Assistant Director, USIA
(East Asia and Pacific)

Attachment

Notes Prepared by the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (White)

Washington, October 10, 1970

SUBJECT
USIA’s Role in National Development in Latin America

PARTICIPANTS
Mr. Shakespeare
IOP—Barbara M. White
IAL—Robert C. Amerson

In connection with questions by Bob Amerson about USIA’s role in national development in Latin America, the Director made the following points:

1) We do not question U.S. policy to support national development in Latin America, but as a specialized agency USIA has a special role and special priorities.

2) The primary objectives to which USIA should contribute are keeping the countries of Latin America (a) free and (b) on the side of the United States.

3) We should make a special point of informing the elites of how freedom can slip away—salami tactics of how communists take over a free government.

4) USIA has a special capability to explain the necessary ingredients of a free, modern society, among them (a) freedom of information, (b) private enterprise.

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4 Reinhardt signed “John” above this typed signature.
5 Limited Official Use. No drafting date appears on the notes.
5) Population control is a U.S. objective and USIA may contribute toward it in certain circumstances. The decisions, to be made country by country, depends on the judgment of the PAO, whether it is feasible and desirable for us, as the information service of a foreign government, to do so in this highly sensitive field. It also becomes a question of relative priorities with the other demands on USIA resources.

6) He expressed some doubt regarding how much USIA should try to promote democracy, U.S. style. He liked the wording of the IAL objective in its Area Program Memorandum: “Stimulating awareness among Latin governments of the need to be reasonably responsive to the needs and desires of their citizenry, whether or not the government is representative in a formal sense.” In other words, we should try to promote the principles of a free society, but recognize that different solutions will be applicable to different countries. He asked Bob to look into whether more should be done in Latin America in publicizing the Mexican experience.

7) He does not give a very high priority to gaining support for U.S. policies in other areas (e.g., Middle East, Viet-Nam). In general this is of lesser importance.

8) The four priority countries in Latin America (both for resources and for calibre of personnel) should be Argentina, Brazil, Mexico, and Venezuela.

The discussion centered on the specific objectives listed in IAL’s Area Program Memorandum. The fifth should be rewritten to state the political goal, e.g. development of a viable free society. Modernization is not an end in itself; our activities should support it only when there is a clearly defined political or ideological objective.
122. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson) to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, undated

SUBJECT
African Tour of U.S. Tennis Stars Arthur Ashe and Stanley Smith, October 20–November 6, 1970—INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

A few days after you received Arthur Ashe in your office in October—a fact widely reported in African media—Ashe and Smith began a six-country, Department-sponsored African tour. The press in each country attributed the tour to your initiation and desire for strengthening relations.

In 18 days of daily tennis exhibitions and coaching clinics with young African high school and university students, the tour of Kenya, Tanzania, Zambia, Uganda, Nigeria and Ghana produced the following results:

Africans of all age groups were delighted with the personalities and professional skills of Ashe and Smith. One Nigerian summed it up like this: “Their presence enhanced American prestige in a human way quite different from your Moonrock space escapades and other technical achievements.”

Ashe and Smith were special guests of President Kenyatta at a garden reception at State House and their tennis exhibition in Nairobi was an official event in the nation-wide celebration of Kenyatta Day;

They met for 45 minutes with the Head of State of Nigeria, General Gowon, at his residence;

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Policy and Plans, IOP/C Cultural Subject Files, 1955–1971, Entry UD–90, Box 1, CUL 1 GENERAL. No classification marking. Sent through S/S. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Drafted by Lewis on December 18. Copies were sent to Irwin, U. Alexis Johnson, Samuels, and Pedersen. Bunce sent a copy of the memorandum to White under a December 23 memorandum, indicating that Richardson’s memorandum “will be of interest.” (Ibid.)

2 October 20.
They played tennis with the son of Prime Minister Kaunda of Zambia, a few days after the emotional African media play of Prime Minister Kaunda’s last visit to the United States.

In all, some 12,000 persons, including Cabinet ministers, university teachers and students, watched the tennis exhibitions. Another 3,000 students were given personal coaching. Television interviews with Ashe and Smith reached mass audiences. There was daily, favorable press coverage in each country.

While the natural, harmonious partnership of the white and black American teammates received favorable attention everywhere, African pride in the successful young American Negro Ashe was the predominant reaction. The Kenya press called him “The first male Negro to make the big time in a stronghold of white players,” a recurrent theme. Similarly, there was highly favorable reaction everywhere to Ashe’s statements on apartheid in South Africa. As a result, our Embassies report meaningful local effects and increased rapport between Embassies and local groups.

In Ghana, trophy cups named for Ashe and Smith have been placed in permanent competition, to be awarded annually to local champions.

All Embassies connected with the tour have reflected the following evaluation from Embassy Nigeria: “Few cultural exchange programs here in recent years can match the success of the Ashe-Smith visit in meaningful impact. If, as it appears, good sportsmanship is an effective means of communication, we would like to go on record in support of visits of more athletes of this caliber in the cultural exchange program to Africa.”


4 Kaunda, representing the members of the OAU and the governments represented at the Lusaka conference, was scheduled to meet with Nixon on October 20 to discuss views concerning the situation in South Africa. While in Rome, prior to departing for New York, Kaunda received a telephone call asking him to change the appointment to 9:30 a.m. the morning of October 19, an hour before he was scheduled to address the UN General Assembly. At an October 19 gathering of African and Asian delegates to the United Nations, Kaunda stated that he “had been snubbed by the White House.” (“Zambian Chief Accuses White House of Snub,” *New York Times*, October 20, 1970, p. 20) Rogers proposed that he could meet with Kaunda, who indicated that “his schedule was fixed.” (Murrey Marder, “Rogers Fails to Soothe Zambia Chief,” *Washington Post*, October 21, 1970, p. 6) See also Robert H. Estabrook, “Zambian President Complains at U.N.: Nixon Snubbed Him,” *Washington Post*, October 20, 1970, p. A10 and “Priority for Politics,” *New York Times*, October 21, 1970, p. 46.
Two U.S. journalists accompanied the tour, Bud Collins of The Boston Globe and Frank Deford of Sports Illustrated magazine. Collins, writing in the Globe of October 31, said Tanzanians were “not impressed” by an earlier goodwill visit by U.S. astronauts or by a recent U.S. musical production travelling privately. With Ashe and Smith, Collins reported, “nothing came from the audiences but friendliness. As athletes they seemed to be less suspect and more acceptable even though USA is clearly lettered on their jerseys. Perhaps it is because they have something desirable to offer,” said Collins.

Deford’s article in Sports Illustrated is scheduled for publication in February. In a recent telephone call to the Department, Deford volunteered that “The American taxpayer certainly got his money’s worth and my article will reflect that.” The entire project cost $12,000, including travel.

JET magazine of December 17 published an article entitled “Tennis Star Arthur Ashe Hailed in Africa,” based on material from us.

USIA is producing a color film of the tour for follow-up use by African posts.

Major credit for the tour’s success goes to our Embassies and USIA posts who were responsible for effectively programming the players.

One of the best photographs of the tour was published in the Sunday Post of Nairobi, showing Ashe instructing a young African student. It is attached with two other photographs. We are enlarging the glossy print of this one picture for autographing by you as a momento for Ashe. The other two pictures attached illustrate Smith at a clinic and Ashe with General Gowon of Nigeria.

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6 Not found attached.
123. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, January 26, 1971

SUBJECT

Presidential Statement on European Integration

In recent months doubts have been expressed in European and American media concerning the firmness of American support for European integration. I think it would be useful for the President, in his forthcoming Foreign Policy Report² or in another appropriate statement early in the year, to repledge our support for the Europeans’ own efforts toward unity.

In 1970 there were several positive examples of European concerted action—the European (NATO) Program for Defense Improvement,³ UK progress toward membership in the European Community,⁴ and the beginning of regular meetings of the Community’s Foreign Ministers. The U.S. publicly welcomed the NATO defense improvement

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [2 of 2]. Confidential. Attached as Tab B to a January 29 memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, in which Sonnenfeldt summarized Shakespeare’s memorandum and recommended that Kissinger sign an attached response to Shakespeare. Kissinger’s signed response, attached as Tab A and dated February 1, reads: “Your memorandum of January 26, 1971, on European integration was very timely since I have been working on the European Chapter of the President’s forthcoming report. It was good to get your thoughts. The points you make are central and will be covered in very much the terms you suggest.” (Ibid.)


³ The NATO Defense Planning Committee commissioned a study in May 1970 entitled Alliance Defense Problems for the 1970’s, colloquially known as AD–70. In December 1970, the NATO Ministerial meeting in Brussels issued a final communiqué, which included an annex entitled “Alliance Defence for the Seventies.” The annex noted that 10 members of NATO had agreed to adopt a European Defense Improvement Program (EDIP). For the text of the communiqué and the annex, see Department of State Bulletin, January 4, 1971, pp. 2–6. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXIX, European Security, footnote 2, Document 34 and footnote 15, Document 63. See also ibid., vol. XLII, Western Europe; NATO, 1969–1972, Document 56.

⁴ In October 1971, the British Parliament voted to support the Heath government’s proposal to join the European Economic Community (EEC). For the text of a White House statement and Rogers’s October 28 statement regarding the decision, see Department of State Bulletin, November 22, 1971, p. 589. The United Kingdom formally entered the EEC in 1973.
program but generally refrained from favorable statements on the other actions. Meanwhile, well-advertized economic friction between the U.S. and the Community has raised questions about American policy on European integration.

Any statement the President makes should of course avoid the appearance of meddling; we would be commending the Europeans for actions they themselves have taken. At the same time, we should make it clear that we expect to defend our economic interests. The statement should, I think, include these points:

1) We welcome the recent positive actions by Western European nations as moves toward a greater European unity or “identity”;
2) We recognize the important contribution of this European process to the strength, stability and welfare of the world;
3) We wish to continue to cooperate with the Europeans as they progress toward greater unity. We may, of course, have differing views on particular questions.

Frank Shakespeare

5 Shakespeare initialed “FS” above this typed signature.

124. Memorandum Prepared by the Youth Adviser, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Meyer)

Washington, February 1971

SUBJECT

Worldwide Youth Revolution and What It Means for USIA

There’s a revolution going on in the attitudes and values of the world’s young people. Among other things, the world’s youth are becoming increasingly leftist and anti-American. This has the most serious implications for American foreign policy and for USIA, but,
unfortunately, the youth phenomenon is widely misunderstood within the foreign affairs establishment.

What are the causes of this revolution? Where is it going? What, if anything, can we do about it? In seeking answers to these questions, we can start with last summer’s World Youth Assembly—a microcosm of the world youth scene.

BACKGROUND

The first World Youth Assembly met under United Nations auspices in New York, July 9–17, 1970. The general tenor of the meeting was expressed in the WYA’s “Message to the General Assembly of the United Nations.” Among other things, it called for:

—“ending under-development, hunger, misery, racism and illiteracy to assure the free development of each country;”
—“the immediate cessation of American aggression against the Indo-Chinese peoples;”
—“the Soviet Union to immediately withdraw its occupying forces from Czechoslovakia, and to restore full democracy to that country;”
—“an end to any system of neo-colonialist exploitation;”
—“a repudiation of “the bloc politics of the Great Powers;”
—“non-interference in the affairs of other countries;”

Many generalizations may be drawn from the WYA. Among them:

—youth is increasingly impatient for rapid social, political and economic change;
—more and more educated young people are becoming radical leftists;
—U.S. policies are widely opposed; many are hostile to the U.S.;
—America is seen as a status quo, imperialistic nation;
—suspicion of the USSR is common;
—a Third World orientation is gaining ground;
—capitalism has few friends;
—a more responsive, humane form of democratic socialism is being sought by youth of industrialized nations;
—Third World youth is more and more disenchanted with political democracy, tending to favor some form of left-wing dictatorship;
—Marxism is youth’s prevalent language;
—youth from under-developed areas are intensely nationalistic;
—internationalism is becoming popular among youth in developed nations.

WAS IT REPRESENTATIVE?

The WYA is indicative of a clear and growing trend among the politically-aware members of the world’s youth.
It may be argued that students were over-represented at the WYA. But students are the most important sector of world youth. Ex-students are “over-represented” in almost all the institutions that matter—Government, business, universities, etc. As knowledge becomes more crucial to national development, students will be even more over-represented in the future.

It may be argued that the activists are not typical of youth in general. They are atypical only in that they are more committed and more sophisticated. Their attitudes, while often more extreme, are broadly reflective of the thinking of politically-aware young people. The militants’ opinions are not developed in isolation. They stem from the psychological orientation of their generation.

It may be argued that most young persons are interested mainly in personal, day-to-day problems and have few political feelings. This is less true than it was 20 years ago. In the developed nations, the politically-conscious may already be in the majority among the young. The important point is that the young people that count are the concerned ones. They set the tone and provide the impetus for the entire generation. The uninterested person is politically inert. Only those motivated enough to express themselves—whether by voting or by rioting—can influence society. History is made by the activists. The WYA delegates expressed opinions representative of the young activists of the world.

On the other hand, the negative aspect of youth thinking are too often overemphasized, both in the information media and the Government. Most of what went on at the WYA was quite positive. The resolutions expressed the real idealism of youth and their genuine and deep-felt concern for improving world conditions. Most of the sentiments voiced by youth, e.g., for economic development, for self-determination, are completely consistent with American goals and policies. We should not let our differences obscure our real areas of agreement with the world’s young people.

SURVEYS AND POLLS

A variety of opinion studies in various countries suggest that the views expressed at the WYA reflect the present trends in youth—and especially in student—thinking. Among those that can be mentioned:

A poll of Dutch, Swedish, Danish and Finnish university students, sponsored by the Office of Naval Research and concluded in 1969, found that a low of 26.4% in Finland and a high of 45% in the Netherlands answered “yes” to the question, “Is revolution by force better than evolution?” A poll conducted by Der Spiegel in 1968 found that 74% of German university students and 67% of all Germans between 15 and 25 supported the leftist-led student demonstrations in Germany that year.
Professor Robert Arnove, in *The Impact of University Social Structure on Student Alienation: A Venezuelan Study* (Stanford, 1970), finds that the more talented and self-confident university students “more frequently mention Marxism, Communism or a leftist ideology in general as alternatives to the present political regime.” Attitude studies conducted by Arnove in Venezuela indicate that some 60% of the university students surveyed believe that violence is needed to change the political situation in that country.

**THE SCHOLARLY VIEW**

A plethora of research by scholars and journalists also finds a leftist, Third World trend to be increasingly significant among youth. Dr. Seymour Martin Lipset, author of several articles and books on student activism, asserts in a Rand Corporation study that the decline of the cold war is a major reason why “youth on both sides of the curtain are seeking to reform or revolutionize their own societies.” (Rand document D–17567–PR August 7, 1968) Dr. Lipset says that the new political consciousness of youth leads them to oppose any power which they see “as a source of support for the status quo at home and abroad.”

A study conducted in Chile by Professor Myron Glazer in 1964 turned up attitudes typical of university students in developing nations. Dr. Glazer’s poll of Chilean students found that 88% favored either “substantial” reforms or “structural changes” in Chilean society. Only 12% thought that “moderate reforms” were adequate. (Reported in *Student Politics in Developing Nations*, Praeger, 1968).

In the light of this and similar studies, no observer of the youth scene can be surprised by the results of the recent Chilean elections.

More straws-in-the-wind: about 80% of the graduate students at the relatively-conservative Cebu branch of the University of the Philippines are “significantly discontented” with the country’s ruling establishment (*Asian Survey*, October, 1970). Professor Frank Penner in *Students in Revolt*, states that the political beliefs of German students “diverge radically from those of the average citizen.” He cites polls in the *Suddeutche Zeitung*, February, 1968, as examples of this attitude gap.

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RADICAL TODAY, CONSERVATIVE TOMORROW?

Of course, unorthodox behavior among youth has been common for ages. This disquieting phenomenon is widely discounted on the grounds that “boys will be boys,” and that once young people mature and settle down, they will become “just like everybody else.” Up until ten or twenty years ago this may have been true. But today’s young person is a different breed of cat. The experience of the 1950’s or the 1930’s is no longer a reliable guide to the 1970’s.

Undoubtedly most of today’s youth will become more moderate in the future, as they assume career and family responsibilities. Many, especially the more articulate and dedicated ones, will not. However, the crucial point is this: even if all young people were to become conservative to the same degree as did past generations, most of them will still end up in much more leftist positions than did their fathers. This is so because today’s youth starts from a position so much further to the left, and so much further from adults, than used to be the case. What used to be a generation gap, tolerable and expected, has become for many a generation chasm, intolerable and mystifying. But one has to understand this chasm to understand why youth will not opt for “business as usual” tomorrow. One has to understand it to appreciate the tidal wave of change that is already upon us. Surveying the situation from his position as Director-General of UNESCO, Rene Maheu declares, “The gulf separating young people from adults seems to be growing bigger everyday. This revolt is sweeping across virtually every part of the world; it has taken the form of an open dispute, not only with the university, but with society as a whole.”

Perhaps the leading expert on the youth mentality is Dr. Kenneth Keniston, Yale University psychologist and author of two books and several articles on the younger generation. Dr. Keniston was one of the participants in the State Department-sponsored symposium, “Worldwide Youth Unrest—Implications for Foreign Policy,” held in the Washington International Center, February 14, 1970. During the discussions, Dr. Keniston and other participants emphasized that the outlook of tomorrow’s adults is likely to be considerably different from that of the present over-35 generation. He said, “The rate of change is accelerating, not just in this country but all over the world . . . in every country . . . the gap between fathers and sons is not merely the usual

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fighting that goes on even in a static society, but is a real difference in
the life situations in which the sons are growing up . . . There is
something really new going on, and it is going to be going on more
and more as the rate of socio-economic change accelerates.”

Dr. Lipset, in his Rand study, comments, “It is likely that the current
generation of radical university students will continue to affect the
larger body politic in many countries ten, twenty and even thirty years
from now. Their elites will contain a much larger proportion of liberals
or leftists than they now do. This will include many whose image of
the United States and its role in the world will be quite different from
that of earlier generations.” Dr. Lipset cites as an example studies in
Japan which showed that a majority of businessmen under 40 voted
for the “pro-Marxist, relatively radical” Japanese Socialist Party. “This
more radical elite may not do anything to change the system,” Dr.
Lipset comments, “but their beliefs may affect the way they react
toward radical pressure on them from other groups, as well as their
view of new issues as they occur.”

YOUTH’S NEW WORLDVIEW

The sum of serious research on the situation reveals that today’s
youth has a frame of reference, a way of perceiving reality and a
psychological make-up that is such that their differences with adults
are becoming more and more qualitative rather than quantitative. It
used to be that, however great the differences of opinion may have
seemed between adults and youth, the disagreements were essentially
differences of degree within the same, overall cultural consensus. All
shared basic assumptions about the nature of things. The Argentine,
the Iranian or the French youth of yesterday may have been in left
field and his father in right, but at least they were in the same ball
park. Today more and more adults and youth are finding themselves
in different ball parks. Differences are increasingly not those of degree
within a tacitly-accepted set of social norms, but of kind between
mutually-exclusive value systems. These are differences difficult, if
not impossible, to resolve with the passage of time, because they are
differences in the conception of morality, something that most people
regard as non-negotiable.

The causes of these wide qualitative differences in psychological
orientation are basic and omnipresent. Psychologists and social scient-
ists long ago determined that a person’s worldview is determined
primarily by his early experiences. Dr. Lipset sums it up with “people
tend to form a defined frame of reference in late adolescence or early
youth within which they fit subsequent experiences. That is, the first
formative political experiences are most important.” (Rand document)
The world that formed today’s 20-year old, wherever he may be, is a
qualitatively different world from the one that formed his father. It is not unusual that the result is a different kind of person. The fathers of today grew up in a world that, for all its superficial changes, was not much different from the world of their fathers. Today’s sons have grown up in a world (the 1960’s) that, in terms of social change, is light-years away from the formative years of their fathers (the 1930’s and 1920’s).

Today’s older generation, as generations have always done, continues to abide by the values it learned in its youth. Dr. Margaret Mead, in her perceptive book, Culture and Commitment, believes that the present social-psychological dislocation is so great that the older generation must be considered “immigrants” into a modern world that only youth can really understand. “Our thinking still binds us to the past—to the world as it existed in our childhood and youth,” she writes. “Born and bred before the electronic revolution, most of us do not realize what it means.”

THE CHANGING SCENE

Since 1945, several revolutionary developments have helped create this radically-new environment. Briefly noted, they include:

1. **Rapid Technological Progress.** Ninety percent of the scientists that ever lived are alive today. Much of the world is entering the industrial age. Some of it is entering the post-industrial or, as Zbigniew Brzezinski terms it, the “technotronic age.” Salient in the process is the impact of electronic communications media. The transistor radio in the underdeveloped world and television in the developed nations have done more than provide new sources of information—they have changed man’s perception of reality. Unlike the over-35 generation, today’s youth are growing up acutely aware of alternative life-styles. As Margaret Mead points out, innovations in technology “inevitably bring about alternations in cultural character.”

2. **The Education Explosion.** In just six years, 1960–66, the total world school enrollment burgeoned 32%. Between 1960 and 1965, the world total of university students rose 61%. (UNESCO figures) This rapid expansion is continuing at all levels. Education, even of the most elementary kind, is a basic cause of attitude change.

3. **The Urban Explosion.** Urbanization and value change are closely related. Urban areas in the underdeveloped areas alone have quadrupled in size in 40 years, UNESCO says. Much of this growth has

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occurred in the large capital cities which are focal points of political and social discontent.

4. **Increased Material Wellbeing.** Despite the continuing poverty and disease in much of the world, real gains in health and economic prosperity have been registered in many areas. Meanwhile, the industrialized nations have moved into an era of unprecedented affluence.

5. **The Combined Effects of the Above Have Led to the Famous “Revolution of Rising Expectations.”** It is a basic tenet of social science that the most unstable societies are those undergoing profound changes in value systems. Also, as people get a taste of a better life, they are awakened from complacency and despair and demand more. In the underdeveloped countries this follows a familiar pattern: the cry for economic progress and a voice in Government by those groups that have traditionally been excluded from economic wellbeing and/or political influence. The industrialized countries are experiencing their own brand of rising expectations, and not just from racial and religious minorities. The affluent young now have expectations of realizing the professed ideals of their societies, ideals they feel are widely ignored in practice.

6. **Finally, The Bomb.** Youth, especially in the advanced nations, are resentful of the continuing threat of nuclear annihilation. With the decline of the cold war, this threat is no longer seen as a necessary evil.

**WHAT TO DO?**

The first thing we have to realize is that youth unrest will not go away. Rather, all indications are it will spread and intensify. It appears to be an inevitable result of the process of technological and social change, which nobody imagines can be reversed. We may not like youth unrest, but we are going to have to learn to live with it.

The second thing is by now a USIA truism. Whatever we may do, and however well we may do it, USIA by itself cannot hope to divert the main thrust of the world youth movement. Into the total world flood of information, our output is measured from an eye-dropper. This does not mean we can do nothing. It does mean we must avoid unrealistic expectations.

Socialism, anti-Americanism and Third Worldism will dominate world youth thinking for a long time to come. What the effects of this will be in five or ten years is a problem that our highest policymakers may wish to ponder.

In spite of a seemingly-bleak situation, there is much we can do with the middle-of-the-road and even the moderate leftist segment of world youth. Our influence on carefully-chosen target groups can make a difference. But the difference will be largely one of greater understanding and of cultivating a live-and-let-live attitude. We cannot expect that any but a handful of youth will like our system or support
our policies. “We cannot expect to make every one our friend, but we can try to make no one our enemy,” President Nixon said in his Inaugural Address.\textsuperscript{7} We cannot bring them into our camp. But we can help keep them out of the Russian or Chinese camps.

\textbf{GENERAL SUGGESTIONS}

With these caveats in mind, I offer some general recommendations on USIA youth programming.

1. \textit{Concentrate on Areas of Mutual Interest.} Everybody’s favorite topic is himself. Students and youth, especially those in underdeveloped areas are so intensely concerned with the problem of their own future and their countries that it is difficult to attract their interest with unrelated matters. A few are curious about the U.S., but this curiosity pales beside their overwhelming, parochial fascination with themselves. All our youth programming should therefore address itself to the first concern of human nature—“What’s in it for me?” Youth will be interested in American policies and American life only so far as they perceive a relevance to their own situation. The overriding interest of youth is the economic and/or political development of their own nations. We should concentrate on relating American policies and the American national experience to this central concern. There is a place for programming and media output that focuses entirely on the U.S., but it is a secondary place. With youth, an indirect approach is better than a frontal assault.

2. \textit{Be Honest and Open.} Credibility is extremely difficult, and often impossible, for USIA to obtain from young people. The news media show all of America’s warts. Youth, even more than others, react negatively to anything they perceive as a cover-up, distortion or a half-truth. The first hint of an attempt to whitewash America’s problems and whatever hard-won credibility we may have established is gone—often for good. We shouldn’t be ashamed of being less than perfect. Young people are perfectly willing to understand that Americans can commit errors like anybody else, and still be human.

3. \textit{Let Controversy Thrive.} It attracts interest. It aids credibility. It’s the stuff today’s young people are raised on. Our youth output should jump right into all the touchy issues of the day—campus unrest, drugs, black power, urban violence, U.S. investments overseas, etc. Let’s not suppose young people aren’t aware of these things and have not heard the negative side of the story many times over. The difficulty is that few of them will ever hear our side of the story unless we first gain their attention, respect and at least some credibility by boldly facing

\textsuperscript{7} The full text of Nixon’s address is printed in \textit{Public Papers: Nixon, 1969}, pp. 3–4.
up to these questions. It’s well worth giving exposure to problems everybody knows about already in order to give exposure to facts that everybody doesn’t know about.

4. Use the Soft-Sell. You can’t communicate with a suspicious and often hostile audience by flag-waving, tub-thumping and self-congratulation. America has no guaranteed solutions to world problems. Perhaps we should be more humble; certainly we should be more subtle.

5. Maintain High Quality and Intellectual Content. Our youth targets are primarily, if not exclusively, university student leaders, and young intellectuals, politicians and the like. These people are intelligent and often better informed than we realize. If they want anything at all from us, it’s serious and up-to-date information. Dialogue magazine is a good example of a top-quality product for this audience.

6. Use Third Country Examples. Students frequently complain that we talk about ourselves too much. Some may wonder how USIA can do its job without talking about America. With youth, at least, we often can’t do our job if we do talk about America. Many young people are so hostile to us they won’t listen to anything about us. Others are suspicious of USIA output, or bored by it. Many of our policy objectives—promotion of democracy, economic development, international cooperation—can be better advanced by talking about places such as Japan, Sweden, or Australia. The moral of the story may be the same. Only the setting would be different—and more acceptable to many. Likewise, books, films, lectures and articles by non-Americans are often better received than material by Americans. We can achieve our goals without blowing our own horn.

7. Don’t Fight the Third World Trend. Despite all the headaches it will give us, it’s the best thing—probably the only thing—we have going for us among youth. Young people may belabor the U.S., but they are not wild about the Russians either. We should respect this intense nationalism of youth, and recognize it as the biggest force preventing them from embracing the Russians or the Chinese. Respect for Third World sentiment fits in with the Nixon Doctrine of a lower profile overseas.

Official statements of American policy have frequently declared that we seek a world climate of mutual respect in which other nations may choose any form of government they wish and may develop their own potential as they see fit.

When today’s youth become tomorrow’s leaders, it would be unrealistic not to expect such things as increased criticism of the U.S., nationalization of many American firms abroad, and expanded trade

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8 See footnote 3, Document 65.
with the Communists from the underdeveloped world. This may make life more difficult for us, but by itself it won’t strike at our most vital interests. Real cause for alarm would be other nations aligning themselves militarily with our potential enemies. Fortunately, this is very unlikely if the Third World movement continues to grow at its present pace.

A SPECIFIC SUGGESTION FOR PROGRAMMING

With the above in mind, I recommend that the Agency establish a program of traveling seminars as the basis of its youth-directed activities. Seminars and similar multi-media workshops are perhaps the most effective tool we have for communicating with young audiences of all kinds. Programs of this type have been successfully used in Venezuela, Argentina, Brazil, Korea and the Philippines, as well as other posts. They have the advantage of prolonged personal contacts, frank and open dialogue, and in-depth study of problems of mutual concern. Also, a seminar is a vehicle around which other program elements can logically be organized, e.g., educational exchange, book presentations. Top-notch speakers and discussion leaders are the crucial ingredient of a successful seminar. The best books, films and/or exhibits are required. A convenient simultaneous translating arrangement may be needed. Few posts have the resources, time or talent to meet these demands, especially now, with the extensive cuts in personnel and budget. Nonetheless, many posts appear to be interested in offering youth seminars.

A series of circulating seminars might be the answer. We do not expect posts to organize their own ballets, string quartets or basketball teams. The Cultural Presentations program sends these groups out, and posts stage them. Why could not youth seminars be presented in the same way? A seminar could be put together on a topic of wide interest, such as economic development. This could be used by different posts with minor local adaptations. It would feature the best speakers and supporting material available. This approach would have several advantages. It would allow seminars to be presented at posts that are not able to mount their own. It would assure a high-quality product, avoid duplication of effort between posts and save money by spreading costs over a wider area.

A FOLLOW-UP ON TWO PERSISTENT QUESTIONS

The views offered above have been the subject of considerable debate within the Agency over past weeks. I would like to try to give more complete answers to the two questions that have been raised most frequently.

“Even if there is a leftist, anti-American trend among world youth, isn’t it just a fad? Won’t they see things differently when they grow older?”
This assumption is based on social and political conditions that existed prior to 1950. The world milieu has changed so radically since then that it is no longer a reliable prediction. I believe that most leftist students will retain most of their dissident attitudes as they grow older. To appreciate this, we must first identify the causes of the profound attitude changes among youth. Then we must ask if these causes will continue to operate in the future. If they do, it is reasonable to predict that the development of new attitude structures will continue and spread in years to come.

**IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY**

The basic, ultimate cause of worldwide youth unrest is rapid technological change. Technology affects man’s attitudes both directly and indirectly. It is the main force leading to such phenomena as increased urbanization, spreading mass education and prosperity. These developments are supported by technology, and, in an unending circle, also stimulate more and more advances in technology as time goes by.

All of this should be no surprise. Technology has been a root cause of social change throughout history. Inventions such as the steam engine and the spinning jenny contributed to the Industrial Revolution, which radically altered the environment, changed man’s conception of himself and society, sundered traditional political relationships and provoked an ongoing generation gap. These changes took place over a 150-year period. Nonetheless, they produced tremendous social upheavals and frequent violence.

The technological changes behind today’s attitudinal revolution occurred largely in the last 25 years. This speed-up of change is exemplified by the decreasing time lag between scientific discoveries and their practical applications—for photography it was 112 years; radio, 35 years; the A-bomb, six years; the solar battery, two years. Zbigniew Brzezinski says that “men living in the developed world will undergo during the next several decades a mutation potentially as basic as that experienced through the slow process of evolution from animal to human experience. The difference, however, is that the process will be telescoped in time—and hence the shock effect of the change may be quite profound.”

**GENERATION GAP**

Accelerated change greatly widens the generation gap because it affects young people, especially students, much more than older persons. Young people are the barometers of the times. As Prof. Robert Jay Lifton says in *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism*, \(^9\) “. . .

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youth groups represent a human vanguard in the sense that they are the first and most intense indicators of the kinds of psychological experience and identity shift which will occur subsequently in adult populations throughout a particular society.”

Those under 30 have experienced only one social and political age, the post-1945 era. Naturally enough, their attitudes are a response to their perceptions of this modern epoch. Student attitudes are even more responsive to the times than those of non-students because education widens one’s perceptions of and receptivity to contemporary developments.

Older persons, on the other hand, have experienced two ages, the present and the pre-1945 past. Their attitudes were shaped in an era that was, in many ways, radically different from today. Experiences of childhood and teenage years are the most important as far as value development is concerned. For most people, these early, formative experiences serve as perception filters, shielding their attitude structure from the disruptive effects of subsequent social change. Prof. Cyril Black, in The Dynamics of Modernization, says, “People tend to cling tightly to the traditional way of doing things, identifying their personal security with the culture with which they were indoctrinated in childhood.” Thus, most older persons have been psychologically unable to adjust their world view to respond to the new world environment, for to do so would threaten the whole moral and ideological foundation upon which they have built their lives. The result, as Raymond Aron notes, is that we now have “a generation whose perception of the world is in many respects radically different from that of the preceding generation.”

**FORCES OF CHANGE**

What are some of the broad social forces generated by technological change?

1. **Urbanization.** The cities of the developing nations are growing at a rate that will double their population in 11 years. The number of cities with more than a million persons has doubled (to 90) in the past 25 years. Within the next 20 years, 75% of the world’s people will live in urban areas. Most of this growth is due to internal migration. Studies by Samuel Huntington, Irving Horowitz and others show how the urban environment nurtures radicalism and dissent, especially among the young, by disrupting traditional attitude patterns developed in rural settings.

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2. **Communications.** Traditional belief systems have begun to crumble before the onslaught of electronic communications media. The number of radios increased 88%, and television sets, 257%, in Brazil from 1958 to 1966. In India comparable figures for the same period were 316% and 900%. Other countries show similar increases.

During the reign of print media, information dissemination was greatly limited by illiteracy and geography. Also, reading a newspaper is a less dramatic experience than watching television. Thus it was easier for people to be ignorant of, or emotionally detached from, current events. Today, TV and radio help young people break through the limits of parochial experience to discover the possibilities of new modes of existence. This causes intense dissatisfaction with the status quo and impels a search for radical solutions.

3. **Education.** India’s primary school enrollment jumped from 18.5 million in 1951 to 51.5 million in 1966. France’s university population, climbed 174% between 1958 and 1965. World university enrollment has risen 100% since 1960. Such figures suggest the dimensions of the recent educational explosion.

As Dr. Lipset and others point out (see *Youth and Leadership in the Developing Nations*, report of Foreign Area Research Coordination Group, Sept., 1967), increasing mass education is highly correlated with political instability, leftism and anti-Americanism. Dr. Arnove, in the study cited above, says, “Intense student involvement in the problems of a developing country also is likely to lead to more radical political sympathies.”

Professors David Abernathy and Trevor Coombe (“Education and Politics in Developing Countries,” *Harvard Educational Review*, Summer, 1965) say, “The expansion of education contributes directly towards instability because it generates demands upon the political system which that system is unable to meet.” Brzezinski notes the same problem in *Between Two Ages*. Dr. Huntington, in *Political Order in Changing Societies*, cites a recent study of 70 nations where the correlation between the rate of increase in primary enrollment and political instability was .61. He concludes, “The faster the enlightenment of the population, the more frequent the overthrow of the government.”

4. **Material progress or the possibility of it.** When your material needs are satisfied, you can afford to denounce materialism. Many young people in the industrialized countries have known nothing but prosper-

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ity. They are in the fortunate position of being able to concern themselves with questions that go beyond society’s material requirements into the realm of social ethnics and the quality of man’s existence. In a seeming paradox, their values have been made possible by technologically-induced prosperity, yet they challenge the way prosperity has been created and used in advanced societies.

Brzezinski says, “Now, for the first time in recorded history, man is beginning—though just beginning—to liberate himself from the oppressive struggle to survive as a physical being. This has prompted a renewed concern with the more elusive, spiritual aspects of existence; it has also created a state of agitation; in which systematic dialogue increasingly breaks down because of the lack of shared assumptions.”

In the underdeveloped countries, however, the possibilities of progress are widely perceived but little realized. However, enough progress has been made so that poverty is no longer stoically accepted as inevitable. The gap between rising expectations and brutal reality is a leading cause of radicalism. As Brzezinski says, modernization in traditional societies “both lays the ground work for well-being and stability and enhances the forces working for instability and revolution.”

5. Decline of Cold War. In addition to the impact of technology, lessening cold war tensions have been a factor in youth unrest, especially in Europe. Societies that feel threatened tend to draw together. They value conformity, overlook social ills and indulge in self-congratulation on the grounds that dissent weakens the society vis-à-vis the enemy. When outside challenges seem less dangerous, societies become less defensive of their shortcomings. Social and intellectual diversity set in. Domestic concerns regain priority. Young people respond to these changes more quickly than do older persons. As a result, they become dissatisfied with public policies and attitudes derived from the cold war milieu.

THE PERMANENCE OF THE NEW WORLD VIEW

The aforementioned social forces form a chain of directly related causes and effects. Technology leads to increased urbanization, mass communications, mass education and material progress. In turn these developments stimulate more and newer technology. They also bring about the formation of new attitude patterns which collide with traditional values and institutions.

The slowness of institutional change breeds political radicalism. Lagging development causes old-style leftism in the Third World, while widespread prosperity contributes to New Leftism in the industrialized nations. Both leftisms develop into cultural and political anti-Americanism because the United States is widely perceived by young people to be an energetic supporter of the world status quo.
Student and youth unrest will continue and spread in coming years because the social forces that cause it will continue and spread. More important for the future of American foreign policy, as the dissatisfied young grow older, they will maintain most of their dissenting attitudes. This is not only because the disgruntled young are more numerous and more radical than they used to be—though they certainly will derive sustenance from their numbers and the intensity of their beliefs. It is because the social conditions that caused youthful attitude changes will be continually available in the future to support and reinforce this new world view.

Today’s young rebels were nurtured in an environment created by technology. Despite the modifying effects of family and career responsibilities—not to mention hostile mainstream cultures—these new attitudes will be largely sustained by a world environment that will be even more technologically influenced in the future.

This contrasts sharply with the situation of 30 years ago, which is frequently and erroneously cited as an example of how today’s radicals will become conservative with age. In the industrialized countries, yesterday’s radicals were mostly products of the Depression. Their radicalism was mostly concerned with material conditions. By and large, their basic values were not too different from those of the mainstream culture. They wanted to restore prosperity and gain a more equitable distribution of wealth and political power, usually through a statist approach. It was generally assumed that any philosophical problems of alienation and identity would automatically be resolved if “economic man” was taken care of. Their radicalism was essentially one-dimensional and, in many cases, only skin deep. When the economic crisis ended, so did most radicalism. Today, however, the causes of youthful radicalism are not going to disappear. While the Depression was a shortlived exception to the main tide of events, the cause of today’s radicalism is the main tide of events.

In the Third World, yesterday’s radicals were scarce. Such as existed were products of isolated, modern enclaves such as universities, or of experience in alien, modern countries. Both situations were exceptions to the mainstream of their native societies, which were still traditional and as yet little affected by the broad impact of technology. It was difficult for attitudes born of advanced societies to flourish in such an environment. Youthful radicals easily reverted to traditional value patterns after leaving school or returning home from overseas. Today, the underdeveloped world is changing so rapidly that old values are in disarray. The old cultures are strong enough to conflict violently with the new attitudes, but not strong enough to stifle them. As the pace of change quickens in the Third World, traditional cultures will continue to weaken and the new environment will offer increasing support for radical viewpoints.
In short, yesterday’s radicalism, whether in the developed or underdeveloped world, was largely caused by situations that were exceptions to the rule. Today’s radicalism is caused by events that are, and will continue to be, the rule.

“Even if radical new attitudes persist, only a minority maintains such views. Aren’t we paying too much attention to it?”

History is strewn with the wreckage of social systems that were threatened by minorities. If conditions are right and their ideas are attractive enough, such minorities can become the predominant influence in society. The tide of events indicate that this will happen in many countries in the not-too-distant future.

In the Third World, radical and anti-American viewpoints are becoming common among all urban youth, regardless of their educational level. Such attitudes are more frequent, of course, among better educated young persons. In the industrialized nations these views are largely, but by no means, entirely, confined to the small university-educated elite. In all nations, the revolution in youth attitudes is taking place most rapidly among university students.

When one talks of minorities, it must be remembered that the college-educated is the single most important minority in many societies. The tide of events makes this educated elite even more important as time goes by. This is because, as nations modernize and develop, knowledge in all its forms becomes increasingly important as the fuel for still further social and economic progress. The university becomes more and more indispensable as a source of innovation. Consequently, those persons who develop and use knowledge become more influential. Knowledge increasingly becomes the basis for social and political power. Traditional sources of power—money, ascriptive status, religion, repression—decline in relative significance.

Brzezinski points out that, as societies become more advanced, political leadership is increasingly permeated “by individuals possessing special skills and intellectual talents. Knowledge becomes a tool of power and the effective mobilization of talent an important way to acquire power.”

In his introduction to the multi-national student survey sponsored by the Office of Naval Research in 1968, Prof. John Raser says there is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that the students he surveyed will play key social and political roles in their respective countries in the future. He also says the attitudes of these students are stable enough so that they will be “much the same” in the future. Partial results of this survey are noted earlier in this study.

In short, the tremendous importance of this educated minority resides in the fact that, to an even greater degree than in the past, it will supply the power wielders of tomorrow.
WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

The youth revolution raises important—even frightening—questions about the future of American foreign relations. Specifically, it raises fundamental questions about USIA’s raison d’etre in a rapidly-changing world. Brzezinski believes that our overseas representatives must be “capable of serving as creative interpreters of the new age, willing to engage in a meaningful dialogue with the host intellectual community, and concerned with promoting the widest possible dissemination of available knowledge.”

In The Great Ascent, Robert Heilbroner puts it more bluntly: “If America wishes to make its counsels heard among the revolutionary elites, its spokesmen must speak the words that answer their questions.”

Do we answer their questions, or do we talk to ourselves?

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125. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon

Washington, March 12, 1971

SUBJECT

Status of the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis

You will recall that during the latter half of 1969, McGeorge Bundy presented to key elements of your Administration, including Drs. Kissinger, DuBridge and McElroy, the concept of an International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, designed to study the problems common to industrialized societies. It would include countries of both eastern and western Europe. On October 7, 1969 you commended the proposal...
to Dr. McElroy directing that he provide for its financial and administrative support and consult with the Bureau of the Budget and proper committees of the Congress on the project.

Over the past two years Dr. Philip Handler, President of the National Academy of Sciences, which was designated the U.S. member institution of the Institute, has discussed arrangements for its establishment with representatives of other interested countries. The eight founding members will be the United States, Great Britain, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the USSR, Poland and East Germany. Preparatory work has been coordinated closely with this Department, the National Science Foundation, and the participating institutions of our Western allies. We have borne in mind particularly the sensitivity of the Federal Republic of Germany toward the nature of East German participation in the Institute, the autonomous, and non-governmental character of which we have sought to preserve.

The National Science Foundation has included a one million dollar item in its FY 1972 budget \(^2\) as our share of the initial funding of the Institute. The first of several conferences of founding members, which would begin a more formal process of establishment, is now expected to be held before the end of April. These two developments may well attract the attention of the press, which thus far has given the subject relatively little notice.

About a year ago, Drs. McElroy and Handler briefed key members of Congress on the Institute. It was their impression that those contacted, including those concerned with science and the National Science Foundation budget, reacted favorably, particularly when told that the Soviets had agreed to match the U.S. contribution.

William P. Rogers

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126. Editorial Note

On April 5, 1971, the United States Information Agency (USIA) published an announcement indicating that on April 1, USIA Director Frank J. Shakespeare had announced a restructuring of the geographic areas of the Agency in order to increase overseas effectiveness. The restructuring eliminated the Near East and South Asia Area in favor of establishing two new areas, resulting in seven areas:

“Near East and North Africa”—This new area encompasses the Arab-Islamic states in Africa and the Near East, plus Iran and Israel. North African countries transferred from the present Africa area include Morocco, Mauritania, Algeria, Libya, Tunisia, and the Sudan.

“South Asia”—This new area encompasses the South Asian countries formerly a part of the Near East and South Asia area, plus Burma. It includes India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Nepal, Ceylon, and Burma.

“Africa”—The present Africa area is unchanged except for the deletion of those countries transferred to the Near East and North Africa area.

“Europe”—The countries of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus will be transferred to the West Europe area, which otherwise is unchanged.

“East Asia and Pacific”—This area is unchanged except for the loss of Burma, which is transferred to the new South Asia area.

“Latin America”—No changes.

“Soviet Union and East Europe”—No changes.”

(National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 28, FJS, Directives, 1972)
127. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Director, Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency (Schneidman) to the Director (Shakespeare)\(^1\)

Washington, April 8, 1971

SUBJECT

The Media Aspects of ICS

ICS, like all other Agency elements, will have to face up to your mandate to zero in on the key political, psychological and philosophical problems that face us in the world. Doing this will undoubtedly require considerable change, both in organization and in overall tone.

Putting muscle into the operation is only part of the task. It seems to me that equally important is coming to grips with the media approach to ICS’ mission.

1. The Communists appear to be more alert than we to the use of the cultural approach. Worldwide, we are seeing increasing difficulty in making important placement of entire media products. This stems from the growing sophistication, affluence and overseas correspondents of foreign media organizations. There has been no comparable difficulty in reaching leaders through the use of books, exhibits, seminars, etc.\(^2\)

2. The Agency has in the field 223 information officers who are serviced continually by three Agency media elements. We have, for comparison purposes, 285 cultural officers in the field, and I submit that they are not properly serviced by any Agency or USG element.\(^3\) IOP certainly provides policy guidance, and both ICS and CU serve as passive supermarkets from which the PAO may order what he wants and what he knows about. I believe our cultural officers need as much service as our information officers and should have available to them a large variety of up-to-date and effective material carrying a full share of Washington policy thrust. This would allow the PAOs to pick, adapt and use from abundance.

3. The Agency is somewhere between a decade and a generation behind in the use of audio visual techniques which in themselves attest to American progress. ICS seems the logical place to take advantage of this opportunity, and to be given the responsibility for arming our

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 23, INC—General 1971. No classification marking. Copies were sent to White and Loomis. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum twice. There is no indication that Shakespeare saw the memorandum.

\(^2\) Loomis underlined this sentence.

\(^3\) Loomis underlined “cultural officers in the field,” and the portion of the sentence beginning with “are” and ending with “element.”
officers everywhere with the techniques and materials for effective one-on-one and other in-person efforts at persuasion.

128. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 13, 1971

During the March 4 press conference² the President said “. . . the purpose of our going into Cambodia was to cut American casualties . . .”³ and later on in reference to the use of American airpower in support of Lam Son 719,⁴ “. . . the purpose is to save American lives.”⁵

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [2 of 2]. Confidential. Attached as Tab B to an April 16 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, in which Holdridge noted that Shakespeare “expresses concern about the fact that we are continually talking about saving American lives but not stressing the fact that we are trying to save the lives of other peoples involved in the conflict in Vietnam. Mr. Shakespeare has a valid point which we probably need to keep in mind more frequently. The Communists in Paris are starting to make propaganda of it.” Another copy of Shakespeare’s memorandum is ibid., RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 20, OGA—White House January thru May 1971. Giddens sent a copy of the memorandum to Shakespeare under an April 6 memorandum, commenting that Holdridge recently had briefed the “top personnel” at the Voice of America and that, during the discussion period, the VOA personnel had pointed out that describing Lam Son 719 as saving American lives “creates a problem for VOA and USIA” since it prioritized saving American lives over Asian ones. Giddens added that Holdridge, in reference to presidential speeches, stated that the “White House staff would appreciate whatever advice the Agency may have in this regard.” (Ibid.)

² The President’s news conference on foreign policy took place at 9 p.m. in the White House East Room and was broadcast live on radio and television. For the transcript, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 386–395.

³ Noting that Cambodia “still troubles” many of the reporters assembled for the news conference, Nixon continued: “I recall at the time that we went into Cambodia—and all of you out there looking on television will remember what I said—I said the purpose of our going into Cambodia was to cut American casualties and to ensure the success of our withdrawal program.” (Ibid., p. 392)


⁵ The President remarked: “I said then, and I repeat now, the purpose is not to expand the war into Laos; the purpose is to save American lives, to guarantee the continued withdrawal of our own forces, and to increase the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves without our help, which means, of course, their ability to help our Vietnamization program and our own withdrawal program.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. 392)
This point surely registers with the American audience but overseas it tends to conjure a picture of Asians (South Vietnamese in this case) being used to buy American lives. It would be helpful if our top level statements reflected the view that our military operations are designed ultimately to reduce the scale of fighting and thus to save lives for all nations involved in the conflict.

I recognize this is a sticky point for a President who so very much needs to retain the support of the American public. I would appreciate your doing whatever you can.\(^6\)

Frank Shakespeare\(^7\)

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\(^6\) Kissinger’s April 20 response, attached as Tab A to the April 16 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger (see footnote 1, above), reads: “I want to thank you for the suggestion in your memorandum of April 13 that we should stress how our efforts in Vietnam are intended to save lives for all nations involved in the conflict, not just for ourselves.” He concluded: “We shall bear this in mind in future statements.” A typed notation at the end of the memorandum reads: “Dispatched 4/20/71 (rb) Outside Rcpt.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [2 of 2])

\(^7\) Shakespeare signed “FS” above this typed signature.
129. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (White) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)\(^1\)

Washington, April 15, 1971

**SUBJECT**

Senator Church's Bill to Amend the United States Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948\(^2\)

Henry Loomis, who is now out of the country, asked me to send you information on the Church Bill, S. 1397,\(^3\) and how it would affect USIA operations. As you will see, the bill would cause us considerable problems.

**Surrogate Information Activities**

The first part of the amendment introduced by Senator Church (text attached)\(^4\) would prohibit all U.S. Government agencies from preparing, assisting in preparing, or disseminating information on behalf of foreign governments. Should the bill become law today, it would affect USIA operations in South Viet-Nam and, until June 30, 1971, in Laos.

In South Viet-Nam, USIA is the executive agent for the Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO). Assistance to the GVN to improve its public information programs is one of JUSPAO's principal functions. Using USIA funds, and supported also by funds from DOD and AID, we have been assisting in the construction and operation of mass media communication facilities; providing general advisory assistance to the GVN's Ministry of Information to improve its personnel, training programs and organizations; and also assisting in the production of information materials such as films, radio programs and publications which do not carry USIA attribution.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, EDX 1 US. Confidential.

\(^2\) See footnote 3, Document 91.

\(^3\) Introduced in the Senate on March 29, 1971. That day, in session, Church stated that the United State Information Agency “is now engaged in a massive campaign, using every tool of the communication arts, to sell the Thieu Government to the people of Vietnam. Through television and radio, and newspapers, magazines, and leaflets by the tens of millions, the USIA is teamed up with military psychological warfare specialists to inflict on the people of Vietnam the kind of official propaganda system that we refuse to allow in our own country. It is the ultimate corruption in a war which has for years now eroded the moral sensibilities of our Nation.” (*Congressional Record*, vol. 117, Part 7 (March 29–April 1, 1971) p. 8325)

\(^4\) Attached but not printed.
We have carefully laid plans for phasing out of these programs of assistance to the GVN, and have established definite cut-off dates. Activities funded by USIA are scheduled for termination no later than December 31, 1972, with the large majority of activities, e.g. television, motion picture, magazine, pamphlet and poster production, being phased out before the end of 1971. All assistance in television, for example, terminates June 30. Three AID-funded and two residual USIA–AID–MACV projects, primarily for general advisory assistance to the GVN Ministry of Information’s field operations, will be gradually phased out between January 1, 1972 and July 1, 1973.

In Laos, since 1969, USIS has been engaged in a program of assistance to the Government’s Ministry of Information. Direct support activities for the Ministry have been progressively reduced and are scheduled for termination on June 30, 1971.

The foregoing paragraphs describe the total extent of USIA’s present activities that would be affected by the provisions of the Church Bill. It should be noted, however, that other Government agencies, such as DOD, would be affected by the bill as drafted.

It should also be noted that USIA facilitative assistance activities in southeast Asia have not been unique in our history. We have on several occasions provided information assistance to governments in emergency situations when it was considered necessary to do so for our national interest. In each case, the assistance was limited in time and terminated as rapidly as possible.

After World War II, USIA and its predecessor organizations provided advice and in some cases media materials to our European allies for use in their governments’ information programs. These activities were undertaken to attain American foreign policy objectives which were also supported by recipients of our military and economic aid.

Following the Marshall Plan period, USIA from time to time responded positively to developing nations’ requests for information program assistance. Activities in Thailand, South Korea, the Dominican Republic, and the Congo provide examples.

In the late 1960’s, USIS provided direct support to the Royal Thai Government in order to improve the Government’s capability to communicate with the Thai people in areas infiltrated by insurgents. In a June 5, 1947, commencement speech delivered at Harvard University, Secretary of State George Marshall called for a comprehensive program to rebuild the European economies. For the text of the speech, see Foreign Relations, 1947, vol. III, The British Commonwealth, Europe, pp. 237–239.

For a description of USIS programs in Thailand during the Johnson administration, see Foreign Relations, 1964–1968, vol. XXVII, Mainland Southeast Asia; Regional Affairs, Document 344.
port included production of film, publications and radio programs. This activity has recently ceased.

Beginning in the 1950’s and continuing until 1969 USIS assisted the ROK Government in the conduct of counterinsurgency operations and civic action programs. Our help was mainly in the form of USIS products, such as films, which were made available to Korean cultural centers.

During the tenure of Hector Garcia—Godoy’s Provisional Dominican Government (September 1965–July 1966) USIS gave material support and advisory assistance to that government’s get-out-the-vote campaign. Following the election of President Joaquin Belaguer,7 all material assistance was halted.

In the Congo, in the 1963–67 period, USIS provided support to the central government. The activities included publicizing of Congolese self-help projects and distribution of press features portraying responsible leadership. This support ceased in 1967.

**Attribution**

The second part of Senator Church’s amendment would require that any information prepared by a U.S. Government agency for distribution abroad be attributed. This restriction would affect adversely a great many activities conducted by USIS throughout the world, such as placement of press materials and radio tapes.

As a general rule, USIA materials are attributed to us. In a number of instances, however, depending on local circumstances, some of our products may be unattributed. This gives us a desirable flexibility, and makes our output more effective. Attribution is not always a matter of USIA’s choice. If we place a film with a commercial distributor abroad, he may prefer to cut off the last frames which state that it was produced by USIA. If we send press materials to an editor or VOA-produced tapes to a radio station manager, they may prefer to use the materials without attribution.

There is never any intent to deceive. If some of our materials are unattributed, they are all *attributable*—that is we are always ready to acknowledge and take responsibility in public for them.

**Suggestions for Your Statements**

If you receive questions on the first part of the Church Bill, we suggest you say that USIA at the present time has been supporting the information activities of other governments only in southeast Asia, that...
the Agency is rapidly terminating all such activities, and that if there are further questions, USIA will be glad to answer them.

If you receive questions concerning attribution of USIA materials, we suggest you reply that USIA generally issues its products with attribution, sometimes without, but that in every case USIA materials are attributable to the Agency. Again, USIA will be glad to answer any further questions on this subject.

Barbara M. White
Deputy Director
(Policy and Plans)

130. Memorandum of a Telephone Conversation Between the President’s Special Assistant (Scali) and President Nixon

Washington, April 21, 1971, 3 p.m.

Telephone Conversation with the President;

The President said he wants me to handle the Chinese Table Tennis Team visit. He suggested that it be “fairly soon” for maximum impact. This would be preferable, he said, to capitalize on current news interest and because of a possibility that delay in some way might ruin prospects for a trip.

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John A. Scali, Subject Files, Box 3, Chinese Table Tennis Team, April 21, 1971 [4 of 4]. No classification marking. According to the President’s Daily Diary, the telephone call took place from 2:54 until 3:01 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

2 On April 20, Steenhoven announced that the U.S. Table Tennis Association had extended an invitation to the Chinese Table Tennis Association to visit the United States. He explained that the invitation had been extended verbally during the U.S. team’s recent visit to the People’s Republic of China. (Chalmers M. Roberts, “Chinese Accept U.S. Trip; Agreed to Bid During Tour by Americans,” Washington Post, April 21, 1971, p. A1) Earlier in April, the PRC Government invited the U.S. team, then competing in a championship in Japan, to visit China; for additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 112. Ziegler also announced on April 20 that the United States Government “would welcome the visit” from the Chinese team and stated that Steenhoven would meet with the President on April 21. (“White House Welcomes News,” New York Times, April 21, 1971, p. 6) Following their meeting, Steenhoven told reporters that he planned to send a “formal letter of invitation” to the Chinese as a follow up to the verbal offer made during the trip. (“Nixon and Steenhoven Discuss a Chinese Visit,” ibid., April 22, 1971, p. 10) The President met with Steenhoven, Scali, and Ziegler in the Oval Office from 11:35 a.m. until 12:26 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)
The President suggested that all arrangements be handled very subtly by me. He said perhaps I would be “too visible” and would have to coordinate everything from backstage, while someone else was out front, perhaps someone close to the President but outside the government. However, he said maybe I should be out front, depending on what Kissinger and I decide is best. He emphasized keeping the State Department informed in order to keep their officials happy.

The President said it was important to do “exactly the same” in providing the Chinese with travel opportunities, visits, and hospitality as the American Table Tennis Team had while in China. The President said he, of course, would be most pleased to meet with them. The locale of the President’s visit was not necessarily an important factor but the President said he would be quite willing to meet with them in San Clemente. After all, it would have a tremendous impact, particularly on the West Coast.

The President said he would see to it that funds are available for the sponsors of the tour so that this will not be a problem. The President said he was particularly pleased that Bill Gossett, former president of the ABA, who is a friend, has been brought into the picture by Steenhoven. Gossett is first rate, and I should keep in close touch with him to make sure that we keep control throughout, either through backstage or out front operations. The President stressed that this Chinese visit was not just another exchange, but should be treated as something special and that he would rely on me to make sure this is done.

The President said Henry Kissinger would be phoning me sometime today to discuss first steps.³

³ No record of the telephone conversation between Scali and Kissinger has been found. Nixon spoke with Kissinger at 2:45 p.m., prior to his call with Scali, and instructed him to speak with Scali regarding the visit of the Chinese table tennis team. Nixon said: “The problem we have is that I don’t want [the visit] handled by USIA or State. If State handles it they will send out a weeping willow.” Kissinger replied: “You should be the only senior official they meet. Otherwise it looks like a big foreign policy ploy.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 9, Chronological File)
CA–724 Washington, April 21, 1971

SUBJECT

Portraying American Society to Foreign Audiences: Priority Themes

Purpose of this message is to identify themes about American society for use by Agency media and, as applicable, by individual posts. These themes are not definitive or exclusive: they do represent principal points that we want to communicate to our foreign audiences.

There is an excess of noise and information in communications today. Only if we focus our message can we hope our audiences will focus their attention on what we have to say. The foreign listener receives a myriad of facts, impressions and signals about our large and complex society. One of USIA’s chief tasks is to call attention to the fundamentals of our society and help our audiences put rapidly moving and frequently confusing day-by-day developments into perspective.

Familiar principles of communication, of course apply. We should repeat, reinforce, recapitulate; facts presented in isolation have far less impact than facts ordered explicitly and consecutively to support a well-defined theme. We must be relevant to our audiences, encouraging them to feel a sense of common endeavor with us, and speaking where possible in terms of their own experience.

Every nation has a style. The American style is movement, innovation, experiment. The vitality of American life presents an obvious magnet; we should seek to capitalize on it, particularly with younger audiences. The content and presentation of Agency media, and the atmosphere of our offices, centers and programs abroad should reinforce the image of a pioneering and dynamic nation.

Our tone, neither boastful nor defensive, should reflect our conviction and confidence.

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Understanding of the United States as a nation builds a base for understanding of United States policies. Specific foreign policy themes are the subject of a separate guidance.²

Shakespeare

Attachment

Paper³

Washington, April 21, 1971

Theme I

The Essence of American Institutions is Freedom

The institutions established for the American Republic two centuries ago, and modified since to meet contemporary conditions, embody the spirit of liberty. In contrast to societies which seek to repress “inimical” ideas, the American system seeks to enlist the efforts of all who would make a contribution. This ensures that new thinking confronts new problems, and that the institutions of government, based on the popular will, remain responsive.

The free circulation of dissenting opinion is basic to the American democratic process. The right of minorities to express their views by legal and non-violent means, is guaranteed. Illustrations of dissenting opinion ultimately being adopted by the majority, or becoming public policy, show democracy at work.

America’s political, economic, and social institutions seek to give maximum liberty to the individual, while providing for such governmental intervention as is necessary to insure the public interest. These institutions are subject to constant re-examination and modification, to correct weaknesses and meet changed conditions.

The continuing public debate over the nature and the functioning of our institutions is a source of strength. Through free competition of ideas comes progress.

Topics: The principles of 1776 and 1789; their changing application through our history; their expression in American institutions today
Government and public concern with the environment—case history of free discussion in the U.S.

² Not found.
³ Unclassified.
Dissent in the U.S., dissent in the USSR
American political processes: expression of diverse opinion, reconciling of diverse interests
Ferment of ideas in the American universities and media

Theme II

America is Committed to Equality of Opportunity

Equality of opportunity has been a national ideal since America’s founding as a nation. In large part, American history is the record of a continuing attempt to realize this ideal.

At the heart of the American commitment to equality of opportunity is education. Educational institutions are diversified in structure, free of centralized control, and by their nature are conducive to experiment. They have achieved both mass and quality education to a remarkable degree. Today American schools and universities are the focus of a national effort, public and private, to meet new demands brought about by rapid social change.

Each American generation has seen material advancement of the less-favored groups. While enjoying an unparalleled standard of living, the nation today is deeply aware of the minority who do not fully share in its material well-being; varied initiatives are being undertaken to help. Allocations for human resources make up the largest share of the federal budget today. Abetting these efforts of government, and the self-help endeavors of those lowest on the economic scale, business leaders are using corporate funds to train the formerly-unemployable, and give them a boost up the earning ladder.

Since World War II racial minorities have made accelerated strides, while a new principle of compensation for past disadvantage has been accepted. Through Republican and Democratic Administrations the process of mobility in American society has been furthered by court decisions, legislation and Presidential initiatives. Minorities have used peaceful demonstrations, labor union organization and the ballot to win a bigger stake in America.

Topics:  
Minority gains: the Black revolution, new steps for Chicanos and Indians, election of minority candidates 
American education gears to meet new challenges J.O.B.S.\(^4\) and other initiatives by private enterprise to hire and train the disadvantaged

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\(^4\) Presumable reference to the National Alliance of Businessmen—Job Opportunities in the Business Sector (NAB-JOBS), a training program established during the Johnson administration.
Vigor, experimentation and creativity mark the arts and sciences in contemporary America.

The arts in the United States are characterized by imagination, variety, innovation. Their quality has won world-wide interest and acclaim. Artists have shown a special facility for working with the materials of their modern civilization; their work expresses the contemporary American desire to probe the relationship between technology and human values. Private philanthropy, community efforts, business support and, recently, governmental assistance all help artists make their works available to a broader public.

Similar vigor and creativity are seen in the sciences. Americans have led the way in recognizing the value of research and in turning the fruits of science, through technology, into practical advances for human betterment. The American university is uniquely open-ended to Federal and State governments and the community, simultaneously serving them all while involving itself in common problems and needs. From its pioneering work in the social sciences, both theory and application, to the physical science investigations that have produced the preponderance of Nobel Prize winners, to the triumphs of the moon landings and the practical benefits of space exploration, America has charted new ground. Today she is one of the leaders in searching for a cancer cure, and in exploring the oceans for new ways of satisfying human needs for food and raw materials.

In both the arts and sciences, America has benefited from a rich variety of contributions from other cultures, and shares its own achievements with others.

*Topics:* New American directions in the arts
Cultural centers in regional capitals—Minneapolis, Seattle, Santa Fe, Dallas, Atlanta
The electronic revolution
The moon and beyond

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Earthly benefits from space exploration and cooperation
Sharing the fruits of research—space, seabeds, medicine

Theme IV

The United States is in the Forefront of a New Age

The United States is in the forefront of a new technological age, adapting to unprecedentedly rapid change. In science, industry, and social organization, America is pioneering. The forces of change, rather than the “status quo,” mark American society.

America’s very success in developing a highly productive, complex post-industrial society has resulted in new challenges to be met. Rapid technological change has inevitably brought with it tensions and dislocations in established patterns. If the past is any guide, America will seek to meet these challenges with a flexible, pragmatic approach.

Young Americans are particularly sensitive to the need to adapt the organization and forms of the social structure to accommodate the new challenges. Their idealism and energy contribute significantly to the efforts of more mature Americans in the search for constructive solutions.

There is growing realization of the need for new relationships between citizens and government. The President’s proposals to reorganize the Federal government, decentralize governmental responsibilities, and redistribute tax revenues are bold and far-reaching. It is too soon to predict in what form the proposals may be adopted; but there has been a strong response in Congress, among state and local officials,

6 In his State of the Union address, delivered before a joint session of Congress on January 22, 1971, the President described the “six great goals” designed to restructure the U.S. Government. For the text of the address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 50–58. With regards to government decentralization, Nixon asserted that the “time has now come in America to reverse the flow of power and resources from the States and communities to Washington, and start power and resources flowing back from Washington to the States and communities and, more important, to the people all across America.” (Ibid., p. 53) He indicated that he would send a series of revenue sharing proposals designed to provide states with “more money and less interference.” (Ibid., p. 54) Nixon’s government reorganization proposal centered on the reduction of the current 12 Cabinet departments to 8. The Departments of State, Treasury, Defense, and Justice would remain in their current forms, while the remaining departments would be “consolidated into four: Human Resources, Community Development, Natural Resources, and Economic Development.” (Ibid., p. 56) The President asserted that the time “has come to match our structure to our purposes—to look with a fresh eye, to organize the Government by conscious, comprehensive design to meet the new needs of a new era.” (Ibid.) Congress failed to take action on the reorganization proposal contained within the State of the Union address other than to hold a series of hearings. However, Congress, in 1971, did accept a Reorganization Plan that merged federal voluntary programs, such as the Peace Corps and VISTA, into a new agency known as ACTION. (Congress and the Nation, vol. III, 1969–1972, pp. 961–963)
and in the nation as a whole to the idea of a re-examination of national priorities and governmental structures.

America’s size, strength, resources and dynamism in entering its post-industrial phase may seem to separate the United States from other nations. And indeed there are indications that America’s technological lead is growing rather than diminishing. But many of the new challenges which America faces are presenting themselves with only slight modifications, or to a lesser degree, in other industrialized nations. The same challenges in large measure must be faced in the future by those countries just beginning to industrialize. The need to develop new patterns of life, improve public services, find adequate sources of taxation, and combat environmental pollution are not unique to America, or even to the Northern Hemisphere. Neither can these problems be solved in isolation from America’s neighbors in the world. America welcomes international cooperation in seeking solutions.

Topics: New governmental patterns: state-federal relationships; revenue sharing; federal government reorganization

The post-industrial society as seen in the U.S.; its benefits, its challenges: examples of urbanization, environment

Technology to serve, not dehumanize, man

Constructive efforts by youth to meet challenges of modern living

Productivity of the American economy

132. Memorandum From the Chair of the USIA Young Officers’ Policy Panel (Grooms) to the Members of the Young Officers’ Policy Panel

Washington, April 23, 1971

Friends,

The new YOPP met for the first time April 14. This letter describes some of the results of our day-long meeting. Briefly, we developed a rough agenda and agreed upon procedure. Panel members found that their concerns tended to fall into three intellectual pigeonholes: Prob-

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lems of Agency structure, professionalism, and communication with constituents. We discuss each in turn.—

1. The structure of the Agency encourages inefficiency and should be changed. Our present system of vertical compartmenting leads to a duplication of effort, difficulty in coordinating the work of the media and the field, and a waste of talent. Horizontal communication, so important to creative programming, is limited and ineffective. We work in isolation.

For example, radio, press, television and film, and other media offices in USIA are artificially separated. The workers in one medium are usually ignorant of what takes place in the others and are not normally encouraged to find out.

It is difficult for one media to use talent assigned to another even though such exchange may be in the best interests of the Agency. There is an overall need to coordinate the media and to break down bureaucratic barriers.

The division of USIS posts into information and cultural sections is another example of a structure of doubtful efficiency. And our vast and anonymous administrative bureaucracy presents what may be the most intractable problem of all.

Given these difficulties, it seems reasonable to ask if we might not find some better way of organizing ourselves. And it seems reasonable to suggest that we might redesign our bureaucratic apparatus to encourage initiative rather than continue to strangle it. YOPP hopes to develop concrete suggestions for reorganization of the Agency, and plans to make specific proposals on individual issues. We need your ideas.

(And then we have the distinction between young and old in USIA, as if there must be some qualitative philosophical difference determined by chronology. Why do we have a Young Officers Policy Panel? Are we better than older officers? Are we worse? Perhaps the YOPP could, in its fervor to reorganize, reorganize itself. We may pursue this speculation.)

2. Through improved training and greater job mobility, the Agency should make better use of its personnel. The Director has decided to establish a Foreign Affairs Specialist Corps (FAS). A long-range goal of the Agency is to staff all officer positions under Foreign Service personnel authority. All officer positions will be designated FSIO or FAS. (See the attached announcement on FAS.)
YOPP wants to know more about FAS. We are looking into it. The new system could help improve job mobility and reduce bureaucratic barriers to communication within USIA, if it is properly carried out.

Under this topic of the improvement of the use of personnel, this panel asks itself if the present enforced distinction between “specialists” and “generalists” should be continued. Are these two forms of humanity mutually exclusive? The panel feels that, in the business of professional communication, excessive and enforced specialization is stultifying to the individual and consequently bad for the Agency.

Several panel members note that media personnel have little chance to learn about their audiences and in consequence produce in a vacuum. Because of this, persons in the field often find media products irrelevant to their audiences and hence ineffective. This is an old complaint and the problem persists despite the years of complaining.

To help improve matters, the panel proposes to encourage the exposure of working-level media personnel to information about their audiences. This can be done through open forums, visiting lectures (both U.S. and foreign nationals), and more frequent working-level conferences. Eventually FAS might have a salutary effect in helping promote contact between media personnel and audiences.

If specialization frustrates the specialist in Washington, the generalist doctrine equally keeps the generalist down. Officers in the field, our so-called generalists, are often inadequately trained in the tools of their trade. They are especially unfamiliar with modern techniques—multi-media, layout and printing, *Abstracta* and other modern exhibits tools, contemporary graphics, etc.

Is it unreasonable to suggest that we might profitably generalize the specialists, and teach the generalists something about the specialties of the trade? The panel thinks that this is reasonable and will seek ways to promote training and, for want of a better word, cross-fertilization. Let us hear from you.

We need to look closely at recruiting, JOT training, membership on the Board of Examiners and promotion panels. It is rumored that the Agency has difficulty in recruiting the best minds of our generation. Is this true? Can we do anything about it? Should we do anything about it?

3. **YOPP is faced with the problem of getting in touch with the people it claims to represent.** We want to direct more energy to communicating with you in Washington and in the field, and become less exclusively concerned with direct communication with the top levels of the Agency.

To this end we hope to increase the frequency of the YOPP letter, and turn it into an opinion forum open to any constituent, member of
the panel, or guest. We will continue to use the YOPP column in the USIA World, but will try to improve the column’s format.

We will sponsor more open discussions and bring more speakers, especially professionals in communication and the media, to the Agency.

We encourage constituents to attend weekly YOPP meetings, and will invite non-constituents to attend as appropriate. This is our meeting schedule—

First Thursday of each month—IMV (In the Old Post Office until it is destroyed)
Third Thursday of each month—VOA (In HEW North)
All other Thursdays—Room 600 in 1750 Pennsylvania

Call Larry Ott, IMV/PS, x51866 for the room location in IMV. Call Wendy Ross or Tom Eichler, IBS/PW, x54193 or x54585 for the room location in VOA.

In addition to our regular meetings, we plan organized debriefings of persons returning from the field. We hope to show new media products and send you interesting documents.

We hope to explore the use of more effective and cheaper media tools, and will encourage the elimination of costly and ineffective products and services.

So much for the preliminary shopping list. We’ll keep in touch.

[Omitted here is a listing of YOPP members and their contact information.]

Sally Grooms

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3 Reference is to an internal USIA periodical.
Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency (Schneidman) to the Director (Shakespeare)†

Washington, May 11, 1971

SUBJECT

Special Thematic Programming

Following our conversation on Friday and with the strong concurrence of Henry Loomis, we are proceeding to carry out your wishes for this new approach to field support.

We will put together a very small planning staff in my office. These will be almost entirely foreign service officers and will have no vested interest in any unit, its growth or continuation.

Our planning and production will be fully responsive to a combination of IOP worldwide themes and the specific themes put forward by the PAOs in the highest priority countries. We will produce only where there is very substantial commonality or in the event of an overriding political problem in a key country.

There will be no forced feeding or undue attempts to sell products to PAOs. We will do nothing which the field can do better or equally as well on its own. The size and expense of our products will be determined by the subject rather than the opposite.

STP will not alter in any way the existing relationship between the field and the various media elements. It will be the basis of continuing and productive interrelationships between the heads and creative personnel of all the media elements. We will work together on how to best focus Agency resources on a specific problem or idea rather than hold general discussions.

Harold F. Schneidman

† Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 22, FPD—General 1971. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Loomis.

‡ May 7. No record of this conversation has been found.

§ Schneidman wrote “Hal Schneidman” above this typed signature.
134. **Address by Secretary of State Rogers**¹

Washington, May 21, 1971

**Growing Ties Between Science and Foreign Policy**

I am pleased to have the honor to address you in the Smithsonian Institution in two capacities: as a Secretary of State with a keen interest in the relationship between science and foreign policy and as a member of the establishment. If any of you has ever, as I have, wondered what the precise definition of this term was, you need have no doubt about its meaning in these halls.

To the Smithsonian, the establishment consists of the President of the United States, the Vice President, the Chief Justice, and the Cabinet. For they are the legal entity which has since 1846 constituted the Smithsonian Institution under the official title of the Establishment.

May I begin by adding my most sincere congratulations to our guests of honor. They were honored this morning by the President of the United States for the distinguished contributions they have made to science in a most impressive ceremony at the White House.² Here at this luncheon I think it is entirely fitting that we underscore our great esteem for them again in this magnificent repository of our scientific and technological history.

We in the Nixon administration are highly conscious of the profound influence which science and technology have on our foreign policy. I had an opportunity to stress this point in January at the 12th meeting of the Panel on Science and Technology of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics by saying that our basic goal is to put science and technology at the service of human—and humane—ends.³

Science by its nature is universal and is insistent upon the interaction of scientists working at the frontiers of knowledge regardless of the divergencies and differences of policy which may separate the nations in which they hold citizenship. In my opinion, this has served well the cause of world peace. For the scientists have a very special

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¹ Source: Department of State Bulletin, June 14, 1971, pp. 766–768. No classification marking. Rogers made the remarks at a Smithsonian Institution luncheon honoring the 1970 Medal of Science recipients.


³ For Secretary Rogers’ address before the panel on Jan. 26, see Bulletin of Feb. 15, 1971, p. 198. [Footnote is in the original.]
capacity to establish communication and understanding which can contribute to subsequent political relationships of a constructive kind.

Thus, when the final history of U.S.-Soviet relations in the postwar era is written, the helpful role of the scientists will properly loom very large. I think it is accurate to say that the largest area of contact and relationships between Soviets and Americans is in the scientific field. I have followed with great satisfaction in the last half year or so the enlarging areas of relationships between the United States and the Soviet Union in the space field. These hold great promise of progress in the use of outer space for the benefit of all mankind. I also understand that arrangements are nearing completion under which U.S. and Soviet medical scientists will pursue cooperative research, going beyond exchanges, in the important fields of cancer, arteriosclerosis, and health effects of environmental pollutants.

One point I made in my remarks in January was that it is “the general policy of this administration to permit the exchange of unclassified scientific and technical information with the scientists and institutions of any country, regardless of the state of our diplomatic relations with that country.” This policy underlines our belief that restrictions on the free exchange of information are not compatible with the open world we seek. There was immediate speculation in the press on whether this statement included the People’s Republic of China. The answer is that it did. If the People’s Republic of China—or any other country—is interested in unclassified scientific exchanges, we are prepared to enter into appropriate arrangements with them.

The exchange of unclassified scientific and technical information on the widest possible basis would be a useful step toward the building of more cooperative relationships with mainland China. Another useful step would be the expansion of face-to-face contacts. In this there is a special role that the intellectual community, and especially scientists, can play.

We are pleased with the reports of the Chinese issuance of visas to American newsmen and to a few American scientists. We look forward to an opportunity to reciprocate. Thus far, however, we have not received any applications for visas from citizens of the People’s Republic of China.

I have been glad to learn that many American scientists and scientific organizations are issuing invitations to Chinese scientists to attend meetings and conferences in the United States. We in the Government

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do not offer advice on the specific invitation or the individual to be invited. However, I can assure you that, in the event these invitations are accepted and visa applications filed, I will take a personal and sympathetic interest in the speedy processing of those applications.

Another aspect of the relationship between science and foreign policy is the extent to which technology can help preserve the environment in which we live. This problem cuts across ideological and economic differences among nations. Many aspects of it can best be attacked on a global or regional basis; for example, desalting, weather modification, and pollution control. We are currently engaged in the search for ways to pool the world’s technical knowledge and to coordinate international efforts.

Preparations are now actively underway for the U.N. Conference in Stockholm next year. There the nations of the world will make a concerted attempt to identify the most pressing environmental problems and means for dealing with them. Just this week the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on the 1972 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment met for the first time in the State Department. I appointed this Committee, with Senator Howard Baker as its Chairman, to aid us in our preparations for Stockholm. With its help, we are determined to do all we can to make the Stockholm Conference a success.

Our scientific relations with other countries are in good condition. We need now to devote increasing attention to technological relations. A number of countries, particularly those in Eastern Europe and in the developing world, are placing greater emphasis on technological relationships than on academic and scientific relationships. We are sympathetic to their needs and are responding to them where we can.

However, as you know, in our society technology lies principally in the private sector. Government has traditionally played a very limited role. Moreover, there is no equivalent in the field of technology to the International Council of Scientific Unions. There are at the moment more questions than answers available in our approach to this matter. But we are anxious to find ways of helping others to gain the technological capabilities to solve their local problems. This indeed is a major new thrust in our policy of assistance to developing countries.

A considerable measure of accomplishment in the growing interaction between technology and foreign policy was demonstrated just 2 hours ago when delegates from 73 nations voted approval of an agree-

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ment containing definitive arrangements for the worldwide commercial communications satellite system. These delegates represent partners in the Intelsat Consortium. They have been negotiating these arrangements for 27 months. Thus, in the 10 years since the first experimental communications satellite flew, a large number of nations have worked out together the political and economic relationships whereby initial development of a new space technology has become a global operating system to serve their mutual needs.

There are, of course, many other aspects to the growing ties between science and foreign policy. President Nixon said earlier this year that the problems and opportunities created by science and technology "constitute the new dimension of our foreign policy and of international life. The greatest importance attaches to our performance in this new dimension, for upon it rests much of the hope for a better future."  

It is in this spirit that I address the distinguished scientists we are honoring today. The challenges within this new dimension of foreign policy call for new levels of international cooperation. We in government, and especially those of us in the foreign affairs field, need your support. For your work, and the work of your colleagues around the world, is of the utmost importance to the achievement of the better world for which we are all striving.

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7 The complete text of President Nixon’s foreign policy report to the Congress on Feb. 25 appears in the Bulletin of Mar. 22, 1971. [Footnote is in the original. See footnote 2, Document 123.]
135. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, West Europe, United States Information Agency (Hemsing) to the Director (Shakespeare)

Washington, May 24, 1971

SUBJECT
Worldwide “Placement” of Inspired Stories

As we heard again in the most recent Anglo-American talks, the British make a good thing out of their Information Research Department. While we can’t hope to duplicate their efforts, it does strike me that we could be doing more in the direction of inspiring articles by carefully calculated placement of certain “sanitized” classified documents with selected journalists around the world.

The dangers, of course, are obvious. Articles inspired by such operations would have to be completely unattributable. The choice of documents to be sanitized and “placed” is a matter requiring the most delicate and sensitive political judgment. The interests of other agencies would have to be protected carefully, but hopefully by something less than a full clearance procedure which leads to perfect safety—and perfect dullness!

Nevertheless, we do have a precedent for successful operations of this sort. For many years the Vienna Special Projects Office, with the concurrence of the Department and of Ambassadors concerned, carried on a similar operation with telegrams and airgrams received from missions in Eastern Europe and the USSR. Although it lasted for about ten years, I am told there was never any instance of embarrassment to the USG or our missions in Eastern Europe and the USSR.

I believe a centralized operation in our Agency carried on by 1–2 officers with a global purview could perform similar useful and profitable work for us.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1-42, Box 22, FPD—General 1971. Confidential. A copy was sent to Loomis. On the carbon copy of the memorandum sent to Loomis, Loomis wrote: “HD Pls discuss with other areas & IOP, IOR Then brief me. HL.” An unknown hand wrote “5/27” next to Loomis’s note. (Ibid.) In the bottom margin of the carbon copy, Loomis also wrote “Gammon prepare for Area Dirs Mtg Wed June 2, 1200 Rm 1750.” Dunlap’s response, to which Hemsing’s memorandum is attached, is printed as Document 138.
136. Editorial Note

In a May 26, 1971, memorandum to the heads of departments and agencies, President Richard Nixon referenced the increase in federal arts spending, specifically for the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities. Nixon acknowledged that the Endowment programs “are by no means the only Federal programs that affect, employ or contribute to the arts.” He continued: “It is my urgent desire that the growing partnership between Government and the arts continue to be developed to the benefit of both, and more particularly to the benefit of the people of America.” To that end, the President asked the agency and department heads to focus attention upon two questions: “First, how, as a part of its various programs, your agency can most vigorously assist the arts and artists; second, and perhaps more important, how the arts and artists can be of help to your agency and to its programs.” Nixon concluded by indicating that he had asked the Chair of the National Endowment for the Arts Nancy Hanks to coordinate the interagency response, due by September 20. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 21, PPL—Program Coordination Women, Youth, Science, etc. 1971)

Under a June 3 covering memorandum, W. Kenneth Bunce, the Cultural Affairs Advisor in the Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (USIA), sent copies of the President’s memorandum to all USIA area and media directors; Agency Art Director Robert Sivard; Assistant Director for Administration Ben Posner; and Chief of the Exhibits Division of the Cultural Operations Division in the Office of the Assistant Director, Information Center Service, Gerhard Dreschsler. Bunce indicated that each “area and medium” within USIA was requested to “present its views in writing,” concerning the President’s questions, before June 25, in advance of a meeting designed to discuss a coordinated agency response. (Ibid.) In a September 17 memorandum from Associate Director for Policy and Plans Arthur Hoffman to USIA Director Frank Shakespeare, transmitting a draft reply of the proposed USIA response, Hoffman specified that Horace Dawson, who had replaced Bunce as Cultural Affairs Advisor, had prepared “the bulk of our response” in “collaboration with Areas and Media.” (Ibid.)

Shakespeare sent Hanks the final version of the USIA report under a September 20 covering memorandum. In it, Shakespeare commented: “We in USIA are particularly sensitive to the increasingly important role of artists in conditioning the quality of life in the United States. We recognize that, to a significant degree, the reputation of American civilization in the world is a measure of the place accorded to the arts in the United States. USIA’s policy directives and programs accordingly give due weight to these considerations.” (Ibid.)
The USIA report, entitled “The United States Information Agency and the Arts,” restated USIA’s task of portraying to foreign audiences American culture, noting that the Agency had used arts and artists in pursuit of this objective. It summarized the various types of arts programs conducted either under USIA auspices or with USIA support, highlighting the various visual and aural mediums employed, noting that while the examples employed in the report “are by no means exhaustive, the types of programs described are representative of the kinds of activities the Agency utilizes in support of artists and the arts. The Agency hopes that benefits are mutual. In addition to USIA objectives that are served by performers, the Agency becomes a link between American artists and other cultural traditions and art forms. Moreover, it provides opportunities for American artists to be seen and appreciated by foreign audiences. Like other branches of government, USIA is limited in what it can do by resources; however, the Agency’s conviction that the arts are an indispensable reflection of cultural life in the United States is a long standing one.”

The conclusion of the report presented the following recommendations:

“In considering how the arts and artists can be of further help to USIA, the major point is that the Agency, given its objective of reflecting the cultural image of the United States, could do a great deal more of what it is now doing in this field if more opportunities and resources were available.

“American artists in fairly large numbers are already seen under commercial or private auspices in the principal cities of Western Europe and Latin America. It would be helpful if more of them could be made available for performances in the smaller centers of those areas and, even more importantly, in the Middle East, the Far East, and in Africa.

“As has been noted, financial considerations often make it necessary for USIS posts to program the young and less well known artists rather than the more established ones. And even in many of these instances, it is necessary for the artist to accept a smaller honorarium than would be the case under normal commercial arrangements. A greater willingness on the part of artists to do this would increase programming opportunities considerably for USIS posts.

“Present arrangements with the Smithsonian Institution call for six art exhibitions to be sent abroad for Agency purposes during the coming year. Twice that number would be more representative. And as with performing artists, it is certainly desirable that ways be found to accommodate the increasing demand for exposure to American art in developing areas, especially in Africa. Climatic conditions, storage, freight costs, and logistical programs have militated against this in the past.
“In connection with art exhibitions, it would greatly enhance their impact if artists were able to travel with them and to establish contact with audiences, especially with their own creative counterparts and with indigenous intellectuals. Although such an idea would be exactly suited to one man shows, it would be feasible also even when a variety of works is on display.

“A further and direct contribution to the graphic arts—and also assistance to USIS posts—would be the purchase of original paintings and sculpture for permanent display in USIS centers abroad. Works of this kind could also be placed in the homes of officers. These two outlets offer excellent possibilities for acquainting foreign audiences with the wealth of creative vision among American artists. This might be a program comparable to a similar one in aid of the arts during the Depression years.

“Along these same lines, it might be possible to have a number of young American artists (including those in the graphic arts) to remain for extended periods in foreign countries working with students while learning aspects of the arts of the host countries. The idea would be especially adaptable to less developed countries, where the artists would teach as well as work or study. This might be a kind of artistic Peace Corps.

“A matter of some importance to media branches in the Agency, especially to the Voice of America and to our Film and Television Service, is that of recording performances or parts of performances for use in programs abroad. The Agency was denied recording rights at the opening of the Kennedy Center. There was world-wide interest in this event. It had historic significance. USIA’s media should have been permitted to record it for contemporary overseas audiences and for posterity.

“In order to avoid this type of problem in the future, it would be helpful if the National Endowment for the Arts and similar government granting bodies would write into their grants the requirement that the Agency have recording, film, and video tape rights for non-commercial educational and/or informational use overseas.” (Ibid.)
137. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency and the Department of State to all USIS Posts

CA–1054

Washington, June 1, 1971

SUBJECT

Cultural Presentations

The following is for the attention and action of those posts that will be receiving Cultural Presentations from the Department. Since recipients have not been determined in all instances, this is sent as a circular.

The CU Information Office in State is now actively engaged in bringing to the attention of the U.S. public particularly successful Cultural Presentations which make a significant contribution to mutual understanding between the peoples of the U.S. and those of your country.

In addition to services now being provided, request that air mail and photo story coverage of such presentations be addressed to State CU/IR, based not only on performances but also on situations illustrating interaction between the performing group and the people of the country involved. Signals stories slugged for CU with glossies to follow are acceptable but would appreciate also negatives when possible.

All press clippings forwarded should have English translation included.

Request inclusion in all captions that the presentation was sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CUL 16. Unclassified. Drafted by Frank Scott and Bunce on May 27; cleared by Joyce, in draft by Irving and Lewis, in substance by Calkins, Hood, Arnold, and McCulloch, by telephone by Steiglitz and Hugh Burleson (IEA); approved by White. Sent via air pouch.

2 Reference is to the Public Information and Reports Staff, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU/IR).
Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Director and Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Dunlap) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)\(^1\)

Washington, June 2, 1971

Met with Area Dirs, IOP, IOR, IOA at the weekly Area Directors’ meeting to discuss Hemsings proposal “Worldwide Placement of Inspired Stories.”\(^2\)

The reaction was almost totally negative to the proposal.

Barbara White noted that in connection with the Church Bill,\(^3\) we are on record as saying “all Agency materials are attributable,” and the Hemsing proposal is directly contrary to this.

Lea Squires agreed, adding that such placement is the kind of thing an Ambassador might do occasionally, perhaps at the urging of his PAO, but it is not the kind of thing to formalize and put in the Manual.

Barbara White noted that this is precisely what CIA often does for us.

Bob Haney said such a procedure should not be formalized nor institutionalized.

Sam Gammon said that while all of the negative comments had validity, this device was a very useful tool of the trade. But he expressed doubt, as did others present, that we could find the one or two people to take on such a task here.\(^4\)

HAD\(^5\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 22, FPD—General 1971. Unclassified with Confidential attachment. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and also wrote “FS FYI 6/2.” An unknown hand crossed out this notation.

\(^2\) See Document 135.

\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 129.

\(^4\) Loomis placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to this paragraph and wrote “agree” to the right of it.

\(^5\) Dunlap wrote “(Henry Dunlap)” below his typed initials.
NEW YORK TIMES PUBLICATION OF VIETNAM STUDY

Foreign Media Reaction Reported as of 12 noon, June 15, 1971

Reaction in media of several West European countries and Canada to the publication in The New York Times of a Pentagon study on the Vietnam war has so far been largely confined to interpretations of its possible effects in the U.S.

French Radio: “Casts Doubt on Administration’s Efforts”

The French state-run radio reported from Washington this morning that the Administration was “awfully embarrassed.” The disclosure, it said, “is a shock for America, which suddenly must reconsider all its beliefs about the war in Indochina. This casts doubt on the genuineness of the Nixon Administration’s alleged efforts to end the war.”

“Demonstrates Mr. Nixon’s Good Faith”

On the other hand, the correspondent for the commercial Europe One radio remarked that “Mr. Melvin Laird appeared to be horrified, but he is virtually the only one in Washington so to be. This publication could not have been more timely for the Administration. It demon-

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strates the duplicity of the Democrats and, opposed to this, Mr. Nixon’s good faith.”

French papers today ran the story on inside pages. Some did not mention it.

Moderately conservative Figaro headlined on page four: “SPEC-TACULAR LEAKS IN WASHINGTON. . . President Johnson Reportedly Misled Public Opinion and Congress.”

The paper’s Washington correspondent said the publication “had the effect of a bombshell in the White House. The scandal is likely to entail important political consequences. . .”

Judging that “nothing in all this concerns Mr. Nixon directly,” the correspondent nevertheless remarked that “Mr. Nixon is very likely to suffer for the actions of his predecessor, Lyndon Johnson, insofar as the leaks in question show how far a President can go on his own authority when he acts without any Congressional control.”

**Correspondent Quotes Extensively From NY Times**

Independent-left Le Monde of Paris yesterday afternoon carried a report from its Washington correspondent which quoted extensively from the New York Times. He asserted that “this disclosure casts extreme doubt on the official version of the incidents which served as a pretext to widen the conflict.”

The Washington correspondent of mass-circulation pro-Government France-Soir wrote yesterday:

> “In order to attack North Vietnam, Johnson misled Congress. . . This probably could happen only in the U.S. . . .”

> “This report, published thanks to a mysterious leak, justifies the arguments of the liberal members of Congress who have been calling for several months for the re-establishment of the Senate’s right to decide on war, a right surrendered to the Executive since the Roosevelt era.

> “It also strengthens the position of the Republicans that the Democrats, especially Kennedy and Johnson, are responsible for the war, while Nixon on the contrary is the first President to try to reduce the role of the U.S. in the conflict.”

**London: “Not Entirely Unwelcome. . .”**

The independent Times of London said today:

> “While there’s no doubt that disclosure of the secret American warfare in Laos and North Vietnam through 1964 is both damaging to the national prestige and appalling to American advocates of openly justified policies, the revelations . . . are not entirely unwelcome among supporters of the Nixon Administration.

> “They may protest at the dastardly leak, but as James Reston writes, The ambiguity of the Nixon Administration’s zigzag withdrawal from Vietnam seems, in the light of these documents, almost innocent com-
pared to the deceptive and stealthy American involvement in the war under Presidents Johnson and Kennedy.”

“Unlikely Administration Leaked Report”

The independent London Financial Times wrote, “No one knows who leaked the report . . . It has been suggested that the Administration is itself responsible. This is considered unlikely . . . since the end result of the disclosures can lead only to greater disillusionment with the war and the Government in general, even though the present Administration is not implicated.”

“No Profound Impact Likely”

The Washington correspondent of the liberal Guardian of Manchester and London called publication of the papers “a further staggering blow at the honesty and credibility of government,” but said it was “too early to say what . . . impact the publication . . . will have on the American political scene.” He elaborated:

“My own guess is that it will not be profound. For one thing the perusal of such massive quantities of documents is now caviar to the general. And it’s the last President, not the present one, who will appear as the chief villain.”

Rome Radio: “Minimizing the Affair”

State-owned Italian radio said The New York Times articles had evoked “much emotion.” The broadcast noted that Secretary Laird had charged a breach of security in publication of the study. It maintained that a White House spokesman was “trying to minimize the affair.”


West German Treatment

West German television gave prominent placement last night to the “secret study of the war in Vietnam, which reveals U.S. involvement there as early as the Truman Administration.”

Several West German papers today reported "consternation" in U.S. Government quarters.

**Canada: "U.S. Kept in Dark"**

Canadian media gave prominence to news stories on Sunday's


**Moscow: "Awkward for the Administration"**

Moscow TASS international service in English carried today a dispatch datelined New York which said in part:

"TASS correspondent H. Freeman reports hitherto secret official documents, which have now come to light, confirm that the U.S. deliberately escalated and broadened the war in Indochina and misled the American public in giving its reasons for doing so. . . .

"The official documents published by *The New York Times* conclusively demonstrate that months before the alleged Tonkin Gulf incidents, Washington was already directing clandestine sabotage operations against the DRV and was making plans for a major attack against the DRV . . .

"This record of official duplicity comes at an awkward moment for the present Administration. The Senate is scheduled to vote this week on a proposal by Senators George McGovern and Mark Hatfield calling for the withdrawal of all U.S. forces from Indochina by the end of this year. Several Congressmen, including Paul McCloskey, Republican of California, have expressed the opinion that the revelations published in *The New York Times* will strengthen the position of the anti-war elements in Congress. The *New York Post* today editorially comments that the published documents dramatize the degree to which the American people and Congress have been kept uninformed or actively deceived about U.S. policy in Indochina."

Monitoring reports do not yet show any Hanoi comment.

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4 June 13.
6 On June 16, the Senate defeated the McGovern-Hatfield amendment on a roll call vote. (John W. Finney, "Senate, 55 to 42, Defeats McGovern-Hatfield Plan," *New York Times*, June 17, 1971, p. 1) However, the Senate later adopted a Mansfield-sponsored resolution, which called for the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Indochina within 9 months. A revised version substituted "at the earliest practicable date" for the 9 month timetable. (*Congress and the Nation*, vol. III, 1969–1972, p. 917)
1971 359

140. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 29, 1971

SUBJECT
USIA Comments on US–USSR Exhibits Negotiations

With the memorandum at Tab A, Frank Shakespeare forwards a copy of his comments to Secretary Rogers on State’s next steps in the US–USSR Exhibits negotiations.

Shakespeare believes that our exhibits in the Soviet Union are a very important instrument of propaganda, and he suggests that Rogers take a tougher line with the Soviets:

—forcefully remind Dobrynin of our request for high-level Soviet reconsideration of the exhibits issue; and

—tell Dobrynin for the record that “Soviet refusal to abide by the exhibit portion of the [exchange] agreement will force us to review the value of the agreement itself, and that we [will] consider publicizing the respective positions of the two governments.”

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [1 of 2]. Confidential. Sent for information. All brackets are in the original. There is no indication that Kissinger saw the memorandum.

2 The joint exhibits were considered a component of the broader U.S.–USSR Exchanges agreement signed in February 1970; see footnote 2, Document 70.

3 Attached but not printed are a June 23 covering note from Shakespeare to Kissinger attached to a June 21 memorandum from Shakespeare to Rogers concerning the exhibits negotiations. In the June 21 memorandum, Shakespeare noted Soviet views of exhibits: “Obviously, the Soviets are aware of the value of the exhibits to us and, conversely, of the limited effect of their own exhibits in the United States. Naturally, they are anxious to curtail the exhibits and limit the agreement to scientific and technical exchanges which are of primary benefit to them.” He continued: “Thus, it is axiomatic that to let the Soviets have scientific exchanges without allowing us to have face-to-face exhibits in the Soviet Union is not in the national interest.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [1 of 2])

4 In the memorandum to Rogers (see footnote 3, above), Shakespeare stated: “I regard exhibits in the Soviet Union along with Radios RFE–RL (and VOA) as our most potent propaganda weapons in Eastern Europe and especially in the Soviet Union. The curiosity of the Soviet peoples about the United States is insatiable and to be able to see and touch products or exhibits produced in the United States seems to add a sense of excitement to the drabness of Soviet life.” (Ibid.)

5 According to Shakespeare, during the course of the negotiations in 1970, Hillenbrand stated that the United States believed that the exhibits component was essential to the broader exchanges agreement. As such, Shakespeare asserted: “It seems to me that unless the Soviets are forcefully reminded of the Hillenbrand statement, we can expect nothing but further breaches of our agreements.” (Ibid.)
You have already approved State’s next steps and have asked Rogers to keep you posted. While no action is required on the Shakespeare memorandum, you should be aware of his line of argument, which, in my view, has a good deal of force.

141. Options Paper Prepared by the Inter-Agency Youth Committee Subcommittee on Foreign Students in the United States

Washington, July 12, 1971

SUBJECT
Options Regarding U.S. Government Concern with Foreign Students

INTRODUCTION
A memorandum to the NSC Under Secretaries Committee from Henry Kissinger dated November 13, 1970, directed a review of current U.S. exchange programs to be combined with an analysis of possible steps to maximize (1) the effectiveness of programs of interchange with points of leadership in other countries, (2) the building of a broad continuing relationship, both public and private, with these leadership structures, and (3) contributions toward leadership development in other countries. The memorandum called for particular emphasis to developing countries. One section of the memorandum particularly addressed itself to U.S. Government concern with foreign students in the U.S.

The overall review has been completed, but the report has left to the Inter-Agency Youth Committee a further analysis of the foreign

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files of Assistant Secretary John Richardson, 1968–1976, Lots 76D186 and 78D184, Entry P–242, Box 1, Reorganization 1971. Confidential. Sent to the members of the Inter-Agency Youth Committee.

2 See the first attachment to Document 120.

student situation, with a request for recommendations to the Under Secretaries’ Committee.

PROBLEM

What policy and objectives should govern U.S. Government involvement with foreign students in the United States? To what extent should there be—or appear to be—“manipulation”, or “exploitation”, or “use” of the visiting students? To what extent should the U.S. Government altruistically assist or arrange services for foreign students? Where do the “mutual interests” of students and government coincide? What options are open to Government action or restraint?

DISCUSSION

The number of foreign students studying in the U.S., now estimated at 144,000, has increased 75% in the last five years. Foreign students sponsored by the U.S. Government account for less than 10% of the total. There is no indication that these sharply rising numbers will decrease or even level off in the future.

This has taken place at a time of increased militancy on U.S. campuses and when pressures on already crowded facilities are making it increasingly difficult for universities to give special attention to foreign student problems and needs. In California, where the concentration of foreign students is great, financial pressures have resulted in the elimination of budget items for foreign student advisers in the state colleges.

Although there has been no comprehensive study of the impact that studying in the U.S. has on this generation of foreign students, preliminary research indicates that those from less developed parts of the world, i.e., Asia, Latin America and Africa, generally tend to be isolated or alienated from campus life and activities. There are fewer persons to turn to for assistance or advice on academic or personal problems, and only limited efforts being made by universities or surrounding communities to broaden their experiences and integrate them more fully into American life. It is questioned whether under these circumstances foreign students can return home with an adequate understanding of the dynamics of the American political and social system. Specifically, are they able to comprehend that the turmoil and dissent they have witnessed here can be accommodated within the U.S. system without fear of revolution or disintegration; or are they likely to return home to encourage such activity in their own less-accommodating nations; or are they likely to go home with primarily negative opinions about the course of events in the United States?

Although the U.S. Government has long realized the educational and personal benefits, for both Americans and foreigners, of having
foreign students on American campuses, both for them and their American counterparts, little has been done to come to grips with what policy and objectives should govern U.S. Government concern with the mass of non-sponsored as well as sponsored foreign students, or with the complexity of the problems confronting them.

It is a fair assumption that a significant number of future foreign leaders in many fields will have studied in the United States, particularly those from less developed areas of the world. This was pointed out at a recent meeting of members of U.S. Mission Youth Committee members from Mexico and Central America. In discussing problems in identifying and establishing relationships with potential leaders from those countries, the group consensus was that much of the future leadership either is now or will be studying in the United States and that the period of their stay here is the time to have maximum impact on them.

Government responsibility for foreign students now rests primarily with the Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU). The present administration of CU has placed a high priority on assistance to non-sponsored students, in addition to selecting and directly sponsoring a number of foreign students. Funds are used to promote better orientation programs for foreign students after arrival in the U.S., better university understanding of the problems and potential of foreign students, better advisory services, and improved overseas counseling on both academic and non-academic matters. Fiscal Year 1971 funding on these programs was $717,940, more than a 50 per cent increase over the prior year, and a further increase is expected in FY 1972. Although other government agencies are interested in foreign students, and a few (primarily the Agency for International Development) directly sponsor foreign students, CU makes the only known federal government financial contribution to programs for non-sponsored students.

[Omitted here are the Summary of Options; the Summary of Recommendations; and the Options portion of the paper, separated into three sections: A. Target Groups, B. Project Possibilities, and C. Organizational Changes.]

RECOMMENDATIONS

A. Target Group

The question of target group is a complex one. The subcommittee feels that the level of general services and concern for the large mass of foreign students is badly deficient, and further that there is really no way that the U.S. Government can or should avoid some degree of responsibility for all foreign students in the country, as set forth in Option 1.
On the other hand, it is clear that primary emphasis will have to be placed, as set forth in Option 2, on those foreign students the government itself sponsors, for whom it has already made a substantial financial investment. The Government uses elaborate selection techniques to obtain these students and usually has specific purposes in mind when the grants are made—whether related to possible future support of U.S. foreign policy or simply ensuring that coming leaders in key sectors of their societies have realistic views of the United States, good educational backgrounds, and the beginnings of strong international ties in their substantive fields. Since they have been chosen as the best people available, these students should be receiving prime attention. This proposition may also be stated in the converse. If an analysis of Government-sponsored students shows that they are not potential leaders in their sectors of society, that they are not the “cream of the crop”, then the U.S. Government is wasting a substantial sum of money.

 Granted the desirability of the improvement of services to all foreign students, the real question that is forced into the open is the extent to which active government involvement and concern should exist beyond the 10 per cent who are government-sponsored. Specifically, should the U.S. Government seek to identify—by group or individually—a set of non-sponsored foreign students whom it will seek to assist, promote, and/or influence? Or is the “government manipulation” that is implied in this sufficient reason in itself to leave them alone?

 The subcommittee realizes that overt U.S. Government interest in foreign students who are “tagged” as potential leaders is politically very sensitive, as outlined in the discussion of Project No. 5, and that methods for such determinations are neither very sophisticated nor reliable at this stage. Nevertheless, it believes that efforts must be made in this direction, using any resulting “list” in a manner that is determined to be appropriate under the cautionary procedures that are suggested under that project. Of the project possibilities set forth in the paper, such usage might include No. 4 on pre-departure English-language and tutoring assistance, No. 7 on post-arrival language-training and orientation and No. 11 on invitations to conferences.

 The subcommittee specifically rejects Target Group Option 4 on the limiting of the number of foreign students in the U.S. While the U.S. Government might concern itself, as in Project No. 2, with improving the ability of U.S. universities to select top-quality foreign students, the subcommittee believes that any other overt action relating to limit-

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4 According to the Summary of Options section on Project Possibilities, Project No. 5 is the “Systematic Identification of Potential Leaders.”
ing numbers would have negative repercussions. In fact, it believes that more thought should be given to attracting students from countries not now well represented in the U.S.

B. Project Possibilities

The project possibilities listed in this paper fall into three broad categories: (1) those that promote the support of U.S. foreign policy by foreign students, (2) those that seek to ensure a quality educational experience for visiting students, and (3) those that seek to broaden and make more realistic the foreign students’ view of the United States.

Only one of the possible projects relates directly to support of U.S. foreign policy—No. 13 on Government Liaison with Foreign Student Organizations. However, furtherance of support for foreign policy can be expected to come about indirectly through projects aimed basically at improved education and a realistic overall U.S. experience. For if the foreign student’s experience within the U.S. is constructive and useful, there may be expected in turn a favorable disposition towards the United States. The recent USIA-CU Country Program Memorandum for France makes this point well: “It is particularly necessary to emphasize the paradox that the political benefits of such exchanges are increased by a thoroughly non-political administration of the program. While generally true of cultural programming, this principle is especially important in the student area, and explains the extraordinary prestige and success of the Fulbright program.”

This raises the basic question of whether the direct quest for foreign policy support may not be too risky and whether equal results might not be obtained in a more subtle manner while other specific benefits are being achieved. In terms of this paper, the subcommittee believes that Project No. 13 can be undertaken without harm to overall purposes, but that it be begun with the utmost care and sensitivity to potential problems.

The subcommittee recommends that all of the other proposed projects be undertaken as resources permit, in the following priority order:

Project No.  1. Surveys Related to Foreign Students
            3. Pre-Departure Counseling
            11. Involvement of Students in University and Community
            7. Post-Arrival Assistance
            9. Foreign Student Advisors
            16. Follow-up With Returned Students
            2. Overseas Selection Procedures
            4. Pre-Departure English-Language Teaching
            8. Concentration of Grantees
10. Loan Fund for Needy Students
6. Information and Record-Keeping on Current Students
12. Promotion of Annual Conference of Foreign Student Organizations
13. Government Liaison with Foreign Student Organizations
5. Systematic Identification of Potential Leaders

The emphasis in all projects should be on (1) providing a full understanding of the United States, through maximum exposure to a variety of American institutions and ideals and through other techniques that will help remove stereotypes and misconceptions about the U.S., and (2) helping students minimize their personal difficulties while achieving their own educational goals. While the Government should concern itself as well with the quality of education that foreign students are receiving—for low-quality training of future leaders will only work to the detriment of the United States—the action on these matters must be left to individual universities and private agencies while the Government role remains one of encouragement and facilitation.

Above all, the subcommittee recommends that the Government capitalize on its experience thus far. Without being blatantly political and without intruding into the lives of students or the operations of universities and private agencies, the Government has had an effective program. Before departing from this low-key method of operation, it should give serious and measured thought.

Finally, on funding: It is clear that little can be done with any of these projects unless more funds are available. There is the feeling that Congress would probably not be receptive to requests for more funds to be used in this indirect manner. However, the statistics raise some interesting questions. CU now spends in the neighborhood of $6,000,000 annually for the support of about 3,500 directly-sponsored foreign students. It spends slightly over $700,000 for programs related to the estimated 144,000 non-sponsored foreign students. In terms of relations with potential leadership, what is the impact of direct sponsorship of this tiny fraction of the foreign students in this country? Might not the “cost/benefit” be improved by cutting off or greatly reducing direct sponsorship and putting the $6 million to work on the non-sponsored potential leadership that is already here? What would be the effect on our policy goals? What would be the reactions of Congress, the binational commissions, foreign governments? Would the dangers of government manipulation and exploitation of private students, discussed elsewhere in this paper, be enhanced? These are important questions, too complex for full analysis here. But we think they should be raised
and faced, and explored further. The number of foreign students is up, and the overall available funding is down. Perhaps it is time to change a traditional method of operation.

**C. Organizational Changes**

The subcommittee recommends adoption of all four organizational changes. Those regarding NAFSA, other private agencies, and a new association of foreign students, must of necessity be undertaken with due care and sensitivity to the relationship of Government to the private sector, and especially with regard to the need for a continuation of a long-standing and constructive partnership with NAFSA. However, the encouragement of substantially more private involvement in this field is essential to overcome and avoid the extensive fears of many foreign students of behind-the-scenes manipulation by the U.S. Government.

The subcommittee believes that the expanded office in State CU can be achieved with a minimum of disruption and a maximum of benefit. The structure should be designed so that, as expertise and experience improve, graduated increases in level and complexity of programs can be accommodated readily into the system. However, CU must be left to work out this shift within its own priorities and its own staff and financial capabilities.

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142. Memorandum From the Youth Adviser, Program Coordination Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Meyer) to the Director for Policy and Plans (White)

Washington, July 20, 1971

Increasing Emphasis on Young Professionals within Agency Youth Programs

I. At the youth meetings for Mexico-Central America and for East Asia, we discussed the desirability of changing the emphasis of State-USIA youth programs from students to young university graduates

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who have already taken the first step up their chosen career ladders. At the Singapore and Tokyo conferences there was general support for this idea, with USIS Seoul dissenting. The Mexico-Central America meeting produced no consensus on the question. The policy issues involved are of sufficient importance to merit top-level attention within USIA.

II. Why should we de-emphasize students?

A. Vast numbers of students. World university enrollments have doubled in the past decade and continue to grow at a high rate. It becomes increasingly difficult to single out the real leaders from this student mass.

B. Decline of student organizations. In some countries where student political organizations once existed, the rise of authoritarian regimes has led to their elimination or decay, e.g., Argentina, Brazil, Greece. Talented students thus have fewer structural frameworks within which to demonstrate their leadership potential.

C. Difficulty in predicting a student’s future influence. Students who look good today may fade tomorrow, while today’s obscure student may be tomorrow’s Prime Minister. Unfortunately, we don’t know enough about the probabilities of a student leader becoming a national leader—a substantial research effort on this question would be well worthwhile.

D. Scarcity of USIS resources. Recent reductions in personnel and budget leave us little choice but to narrow the scope of our youth activities. As our resources dwindle, the demands on students’ attention from competing information sources continue to increase.

E. Difficulty in changing student attitudes. Even if potential leaders among students could be accurately identified, it is extraordinarily difficult to achieve significant and lasting modifications in their political attitudes. You can achieve substantial attitude change that is short-lived, e.g., from a visit to the U.S., and you can achieve a modest attitude change that is permanent, e.g., from long-term, in-country exposure to seminars, personal contacts, and high-quality media products. Except for rare cases, you cannot—and we do not—achieve both. Indeed, I believe our dimension of time and resources in influencing students has frequently been way out of line with the return. Why?

1. Influence of environment and reference groups. The political and intellectual climate of universities frequently encourages leftist, anti-establishment and anti-American attitudes. Peer groups of student leaders are often even more radical in their viewpoints; group norms place individual students under considerable pressure to conform in both thought and action. Even if individual students are impressed by USIS efforts, it is almost impossible for them to maintain attitudes which diverge significantly from those of their reference group.
2. *Early formation of attitudes.* The student program is frequently defended on the grounds that we should reach potential leaders when they are young and thus, presumably, more easily influenced. However, there is considerable evidence, supported both by scholarly research and experience of USIS officers, that a person’s basic value structure is already well formed before he reaches university age. This is true of all persons, whether they go to college or not, but it appears to be especially true of university student leaders. The young activist is often politically-experienced and leftist-oriented at the high school level. One might argue that we should concentrate on secondary school students, but, for reasons noted above, this would be a near-impossible task.

III. In contrast, the potential leader in his late 20’s or 30’s is easier to identify, is usually functioning in a less radical environment, and is often easier to deal with. He may be a leftist, suspicious of the United States. His basic attitudes may be beyond influencing. But this does not mean we cannot program for such people. The key is to establish areas of mutual interest within which the potential leader and USIS have a logical reason to maintain personal and professional contact. If our programs are structured properly, the young professional will view them as directly useful in his career area. Students will often perceive the same program as mere imperialist propaganda. While desirable, it is not imperative for a person to like, or even to understand, the United States in order for us profitably to work with him. America deals every day with governments and political groups that waste little love on us. The practiced goal of our youth program should not be to convert people, but to try to show them where it is *in their own interest* to work with us—or, at least, to coexist with us.

IV. Overseas posts continually ask for more guidance from Washington on the youth program. I suggest we formulate a policy memo along the above lines and send it to the field with the suggestion that they implement it to the extent local conditions permit.
Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs (Brown) to the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (White)

Washington, July 27, 1971

SUBJECT
Tibetan Film “Man From A Missing Country”

This is a very poignant moving film, technically one of the finest I’ve seen in the USIA series. On policy grounds, however, I have serious misgivings as to whether it should be released at a time when we have entered a new stage in our relationship with the PRC.

a. The poignancy of the film arouses not only deep sympathy for the plight of the Tibetans but also revulsion against the Chinese for the brutality with which they tightened their grip on Tibet, oppressed its people, and suppressed its culture. While we do not want to appear as having gone “soft” on Chinese Communism neither do we want to appear anti-Chinese or anti-Peking.

b. The effect of the narration, indeed the total effect of the film is to portray Tibet as having been an independent country, a nation whose sovereignty was violated by the Chinese. This is the line taken by the Dalai Lama (clipping enclosed), but our Government, as noted by Cordell Hull in 1941, has never recognized the independence of Tibet. Rather, we have consistently held that Tibet is an autonomous area under Chinese sovereignty (a claim on which Taipei and Peking agree). This coincides with the position of the Government of India which affords the Dalai Lama safe haven in exile, but does not recognize his government.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [1 of 2]. Confidential. Eliot sent the memorandum to Kissinger under an August 19 memorandum, writing: “It is true that in view of the continued anti-American propaganda emerging from Peking, release of this film might be argued to be only a reasonable ‘tit for tat.’ However, the Department believes its release could not improve the prospects for success of the President’s visit and it might do real harm.” (Ibid.)

2 Presumably reference to various actions undertaken by the administration in 1971 vis a vis the U.S.–PRC relationship. On April 14, 1971, Nixon announced that the United States was prepared to expedite visas for PRC citizens to visit the United States and relax currency controls, in addition to several other measures. For his statement on the changes in trade and travel restrictions, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 530–531. Additionally, Kissinger made a secret trip to Beijing and met with Chinese leaders July 9–11, as part of larger worldwide trip. During the visit, plans were made for Nixon to visit China. For the records of these meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XVII, China, 1969–1972, Documents 139–144, and ibid., vol. E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972, Documents 7–9. For the announcement of the President’s acceptance of the invitation, which he made during his July 15 address to the nation, broadcast live on radio and television, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, pp. 819–820.

3 Not attached or further identified.
c. To the best of our knowledge the film represents a new departure. We are unaware that such a film has been done in the past several years. Its appearance at this juncture therefore might well be interpreted by Peking as a new signal of basic hostility, of American challenge to Peking’s claims regarding China’s territorial integrity, of long-term support for the Tibetans’ desire to “liberate” Tibet from Chinese control. These are not the signals which we wish to project. Rather we must work within the spirit of Dr. Kissinger’s July 16 backgrounder remark: “I am certain that neither of us will knowingly do something that would undermine the prospects of something that it took so long to prepare and that it took such painful decisions to reach.”

Winthrop G. Brown

4 Background briefing given by Kissinger and Ziegler on the morning of July 16 at San Clemente. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files—East Asia, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972)

5 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
1971 371

144. Letter From the Director of the Woodrow Wilson
International Center for Scholars (Read) to the President’s
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 2, 1971

Dear Henry:

Let me make a suggestion that you might think worth considering
as a follow-up of your own China trip² or a point for the conversations
during the President’s visit.

Two or three top Chinese scholars of the United States could be
invited to join the fellowship program of the Wilson Center. I think
we could probably take better care of them here and give them a better
understanding of the American system of government than would be
the case almost anywhere else. In almost any university setting they
are likely to be lionized or picketed, and if they had any genuine desire
to learn about the United States Government, the information they
would be apt to get and contacts and appointments they could make
would be secondary by comparison. The “men of letters and men of
affairs” they would be joining would be distinguished and international
in makeup—the latest list of appointments is attached. If they chose
scholars in the fields of international affairs or environment, they would
find themselves in particularly knowledgeable company, although I
would think a general invitation to scholars interested in studying our
system would be most acceptable. We would have maximum flexibility
in being able to receive them on short or no notice and for any length
of stay desired, since we are a year-round center, not operating on an
academic calendar, and there are no fixed lengths of appointment.

If this makes sense, Henry, let me know and we can pursue it
further. I am confident the other Board members would think it a
highly worthwhile action, and needless to say, I would give such an
effort top personal attention.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 409, Sub-
No classification marking. Holdridge sent the letter to Kissinger under an August 4
covering memorandum, commenting: “Mr. Read’s basic argument is that any such
scholars would find it almost impossible to work in a university environment because
they would either be lionized or picketed. However, in the relatively calm environment
of the Woodrow Wilson Center they could work with less pressure and yet be close to
the centers of American Government.” (Ibid.) Holdridge also attached, as Tab A, a draft
letter from Kissinger to Read and suggested that Kissinger sign it. In response to the
draft letter, Kissinger wrote on Holdridge’s covering memorandum: “Be a little more
encouraging ‘When it opens up will keep it very much in mind.’” (Ibid.) Kissinger’s
signed letter to Read, dated September 7, is ibid.

² See footnote 2, Document 143.
Nan and I were in a small pub on the Isle of Skye when your Peking trip and its results were announced with considerable style by the bartender. Believe it or not, even the Scots cheered!\(^3\) Congratulations on a superb move superbly performed.

All of the best,

Yours,

Benjamin H. Read\(^4\)

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\(^3\) Read added the exclamation point by hand.

\(^4\) Read signed “Ben” above this typed signature.
145. Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Under
Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to President Nixon

Washington, August 13, 1971

SUBJECT

Study of International Exchange

In response to your directive as conveyed in Dr. Kissinger’s memorandum of November 13, 1970, this report (a) reviews U.S. exchange programs and, (b) analyzes ways to maximize:

(1) the effectiveness of programs in building broad continuing relationships, both public and private, with leadership structures in other countries, and

(2) the contributions of these programs to leadership development.

The study was based on the review of about 300 programs and projects carried out by eighteen U.S. Government agencies; the activities of five categories of private exchange; and a survey of two multinational corporations. A data bank containing the characteristics of 55,000 persons exchanged in fiscal years 1968 and 1970 was established.
That portion of the study dealing with foreign student programs in the U.S. has been undertaken separately by the Interagency Youth Committee.\footnote{Printed as Document 141.}

There follows a summary of the report and recommendations:

I. REVIEW OF PRESENT PROGRAMS
   A. There is presently no overall consideration of our exchange programs. These 300 exchange programs and projects are conceived and managed separately by eighteen agencies.
   B. Total annual cost of Government exchange programs (including AID, State, Defense, Peace Corps, HEW, National Science Foundation, Department of Agriculture, AEC and others) is about $500 million.
   C. Country emphasis varies with little or no relationship to overall foreign relations criteria.
   D. Country exchange programs vary widely in the professional groups they engage, and give minimal attention to political consequences.
   E. Follow-up activities with exchanges are generally inadequate. Most agencies suffer from some lack of information about past program participants.
   F. There is some duplication among programs. There is also omission and underrepresentation of some significant groups in the total U.S. exchange effort.
   G. Private sector programs (e.g., voluntary organizations, educational institutions and corporations) constitute a large proportion of total U.S. exchange activity. Public and private sector programs would mutually benefit from even a modest degree of increased cooperation and even a rudimentary system for the exchange of information.

II. REVIEW OF LEADERSHIP DIMENSION
    A. Current exchange activity is programmed to achieve specific agency objectives. Concern for a leadership dimension is most evident in the programs of Defense and State.
    B. U.S. missions are capable of identifying and ranking the major groupings and institutions from which leaders come.
    C. It is possible to focus programs on the institutional structures that produce and influence leaders.
    D. Better coordination, planning, review and analysis in the overseas missions, supported by a Washington interdepartmental review.
mechanism, could significantly enhance the leadership dimension of many exchange programs.

III. CONCLUSIONS

A. Present U.S. Government exchange programs provide ample scope to achieve U.S. objectives, including an increase in emphasis on leadership.

B. Relatively modest additional resources may be warranted for exchanges with a high potential to influence leaders.

C. Within existing U.S. exchange objectives, and for an increased leadership dimension, the scope of present authorizing legislation appears to be basically adequate.

D. Present systems are inadequate to provide the needed degree of coordination, planning, review and analysis of U.S. exchange activity, with or without an increased leadership dimension.

E. There is a vital need for the centralized data gathering and analysis of information on U.S. programs in order to:
   (1) identify and review the government-wide distribution of program resources and evaluate program results;
   (2) eliminate overlap and inefficiencies in programs;
   (3) reexamine and periodically review country and professional group emphasis in the context of current U.S. foreign policy interests.

F. Dissents:
   (1) Department of Defense (Attached): The memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense raises a large number of points that basically advance two notions: (1) the lack of individual treatment and analysis of Defense programs leads to erroneous and unsubstantiated conclusions and, (2) the need for a new coordination mechanism has not been established, and a proper review of Defense programs would lead to different conclusions.

Comment:

The report provides a synthesis of a substantial volume of supporting materials and studies covering the programs of 18 agencies (see pp. 51-53); brevity precludes lengthy treatment of each agency’s individual programs. Also, it was not the purpose of this study to weigh the relative merits of the various programs.

To eliminate Government-wide overlaps and inefficiencies, the supporting studies evidence a need for improved coordination (i) between Washington and the field, and (ii) between the agencies themselves. Only a central entity can effectively respond to the need for

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5 Attached but not printed is a June 16 memorandum from Packard to Richardson.
organized and standardized periodic program planning, review and analysis.

The study recommends only increased and centralized coordination, planning, review, and analysis. What is suggested is intended to complement—not interfere with—individual agency responsibilities.

In particular, the relationship of military assistance training to the national security of the United States requires that decisions such as which countries receive training in what amounts, the types of training required and priorities for such training continue to be made by the Departments of State and Defense acting together for the total political/military interests of the United States. However, coordination of military assistance training with other Government-wide exchange programs is needed for general information, advice, evaluation and planning purposes.

(2) Agency for International Development (Attached): 6

The reply from the Deputy Administrator of AID expresses concern about (1) the scope of the leadership definition in relation to his Agency’s program, (2) the misleading inferences that arise from the use of statistical data and (3) his belief that the coordination function can best be achieved by placing it outside the National Security Council decision-making system. AID, however, favors the objectives of more complete data-gathering and information analysis capacity, better programs, improved policy guidance and a means to provide these elements.

Comment:

While we believe that the definition of leadership used in this study provides a reasonable analytical tool, the matter of the scope of the definition of leadership should be an early agenda item for any coordinating body. The point raised about the use of data would be valid if this were the only method of analysis used to develop study material. However, it would have required too extensive a volume to have dealt with the material developed in over 300 interviews. A statistical presentation was the most reasonable way to present the complex material in a succinct manner. A coordinating group with a supporting staff would have the capacity to develop the individual program issues and make decisions in a more finite manner. The concern about the relationship of sensitive exchange programs to the National Security System is also the concern of HEW, Peace Corps, and OST for the science community, and leads all of them to choose Option D which would place authority for coordination in the Secretary of State, rather than in an Interagency Group.

6 Attached but not printed is a June 28 memorandum from Williams to Hartman.
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS

Recommendation 1:
To achieve maximum benefit to the United States from its exchange programs, steps should be taken to assure more effective coordination, planning, review, and analysis of the total effort.\(^7\)

Recommendation 2:
The United States should place selective increased emphasis on influencing foreign leadership through the use of exchange programs.

Recommendation 3:
The study report also concludes that State’s academic exchange program and the educational training programs of AID need further analysis, sharper definition and perhaps joint management. The Department of State in conjunction with the Agency for International Development will undertake this review which will be completed by January 1, 1972.

Recommendation 4:
The responsibility for coordination, planning, review and analysis of U.S. exchange programs can be assigned to:

(A) each agency individually; or

(B) an existing coordinating organization; or

(C) a full or part-time Special Assistant to the President; or

(D) the Secretary of State; or

(E) a new coordinating organization, an NSC Inter-departmental Exchange Group reporting to the Under Secretaries Committee

(Analysis of options pp. 37–42)

The difficulty with option A is that no single agency has sufficient information or point of view to carry out its programs in reasonable relationship to those of the eighteen other agencies. There is no present interagency body with sufficient scope or relationship to a decision-making system to make option B a practical alternative. A Special Assistant to the President as suggested in option C adds an additional organizational layer which will tend to confuse regular lines of agency authority and is best reserved for those Governmental functions that do not fit within present agency structures. With respect to the recommended options D and E, the agencies differ on the degree to which their exchangees would be sensitive to any political overtones in a coordinating and planning mechanism. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare, the Agency for International Development, the

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\(^7\) The President did not approve or disapprove any of the recommendations. For his decision regarding the report, see Document 154.
Office of Science and Technology for the science agencies, and the Peace Corps (now ACTION) would favor placing the authorities in the Secretary of State where they believe such overtones would be less than in the NSC system: The Department of State favors option E because the coordinating mechanism would be related to a regular decision-making process. Further, not all agencies need be members of a coordinating body and the most directly concerned agencies—State, Defense, AID, and USIA—are members of the Under Secretaries Committee. All eighteen agencies should, of course, be required to furnish data and provide reports to the coordinating body.

To achieve better coordination, planning, review and analysis of U.S. Government exchange programs:

(a) Place the required authority in the Secretary of State,

OR

(b) establish a new Inter-departmental Exchange Group (IG) reporting to the Under Secretaries Committee

Recommendation 5:

To achieve a better relationship between U.S. Government programs and those of private organizations and to benefit from any established U.S. Government coordinating mechanism, a private International Exchange Council should be formed as a catalyst between the two sectors. The Council should be composed of seven members from private life and the Secretary of State and the Administrator of the Agency for International Development.

John N. Irwin II
Washington, August 16, 1971

SUBJECT
The President’s Trip to Peking: Psychological Initiatives

The current climate between the U.S. and the PRC is one that seems to benefit both the U.S. and China, although the President has candidly said that his forthcoming meeting with PRC leaders is not a discussion that is going to lead to “instant détente.”

Premier Chou En-lai in his recent interview with New York Times’ Reston also indicated a degree of realism by saying that “we do not expect a settlement of all questions at one stroke . . . but we may be able to find out from where we should start in solving these questions.”

The President’s projected visit to Peking presents us with opportunities to build what is now a temporary psychological asset into a long-range one. Hence, we propose the following initiatives which may enhance the overall impact of the President’s “journey for peace”:

—that the President take along with him a sample of moon rock specimens and a special autographed color photo album of U.S. moon exploration for presentation to the Chinese premier

—that the President consider taking an astronaut with him for the trip who, by virtue of immense Chinese interest and curiosity about space, could generate favorable opinion toward the U.S. and its scientific accomplishments.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 21, OGA—The President’s Trip to China and all documents relating to USIA/State coverage. Secret. Copies were sent to Loomis and White. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum twice.

2 During his August 4 news conference, the President remarked: “I will only say that as the joint announcement indicated, this will be a wide-ranging discussion of issues concerning both governments. It is not a discussion that is going to lead to instant détente.” (Public Papers: Nixon, 1971, p. 850)

3 See “Official Transcript of the Wide-Ranging Interview With Premier Chou in Peking,” New York Times, August 10, 1971, pp. 14–15. Reston interviewed Chou in the Fukien Room of the Great Hall of the People. Chou’s full statement reads: “We do not expect a settlement of all questions at one stroke. That is not possible. That would not be practicable. But by contacting each other, we may be able to find out from where we should start in solving these questions.” (Ibid., p. 15)

4 Loomis placed a checkmark in the right-hand margin next to this and the subsequent points.
—that the President offer technical assistance to the Chinese in building a ground station on the mainland capable of linking with Intelsat.
—that the President offer to establish a “hot-line” comparable to the Washington-Moscow hot line\(^5\)
—that the President present to the National Peking University through Premier Chou a prestige collection of books on American life, which would bring Chou up-to-date on contemporary America.

We feel that these initiatives as well as other phases of the President’s trip should be supported by a comprehensive program of fast and accurate reporting via VOA, the Wireless File, and other USIA media and techniques to key audiences throughout the world, and where possible through similar facilities owned and operated by allies.

Washington, August 17, 1971

SUBJECT
USIA Film on Chinese Subjugation of Tibet

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Frank Shakespeare reporting that USIA plans to release in about three weeks a film on Chinese subjugation of Tibet despite a recommendation from me and from Ambassador Brown of State\(^2\) that the film should not be released in view of the forthcoming Peking meeting.

Mr. Shakespeare takes the view that Peking’s radio and newspaper services have continued to attack the Nixon Administration and its policies with “unabated intensity” since the announcement of the proposed meeting, and therefore it makes “little sense for us to refrain from focusing the attention of the world’s peoples on the nature and historical acts of the men in power in Peking.”

Mr. Shakespeare does not mention that the one point which Ambassador Brown and I focused on as the primary reason for not issuing the USIA film at this time was that there have been virtually no references to Tibet in USIA output for some years. We had no objection to keeping up the regular USIA output on Communist China, but considered that something new such as the USIA film—which, incidentally, is a very effective presentation—would be raising the decibel count considerably in our propaganda exchanges with Peking. The use made of the film by USIA Public Affairs Officers could, in fact, amount to a very high profile action on our part.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 294, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. III—1971 [Jan–Dec 1971] [1 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, as did Janka, Saunders, and Sonnenfeldt. Kissinger wrote “Al—call USIA & follow up with directive. HK” at the top of the first page of the memorandum. Haig wrote “THRU HAIG (FOR ACTION—CALL)” and drew an arrow from it to Holdridge’s name in the “from” line. In an August 24 typewritten note to Kissinger, Haig indicated: “I have spoken to Frank Shakespeare about the Tibet film. He will not release it, of course, without our approval. On the other hand, I agree with him that we should not refuse the use of it without having the opportunity to at least review it.” He continued: “Rather than open you and the staff to charges of overkill, I have agreed with Frank to view the film when it is completed and to withhold final judgment until that time. In the interim Frank will make no plans or undertake any steps to release the film which is just about completed. It would be inappropriate to cancel what remains to be done on the film since the bulk of the costs have already been incurred.” Kissinger initialed his approval of Haig’s recommendation. (Ibid.)

\(^2\) For Brown’s recommendation to USIA, see Document 143.
With respect to the issue of Peking’s propaganda, at Tab B\(^3\) is a copy of a memorandum to the President from Frank Shakespeare which points out that there has been a distinct absence of Chinese Communist attacks on the President personally in recent weeks, even though the standard Peking line on “U.S. imperialism and aggression” has continued. It seems obvious that the Chinese are making some effort to improve the climate for the President’s visit, and I believe that any significant new step by us in our informational output regarding the PRC should be judged in this context.

Recommendation:

That you telephone Mr. Shakespeare to suggest that issuance of the USIA film on Tibet be deferred at least until after the President’s visit and we have a better idea of where next we want to go in our relations with Peking.\(^4\)

Tab A

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^5\)

Washington, August 12, 1971

John Holdridge of NSC and Win Brown of State have seen and commented on our film on Chinese subjugation of Tibet, entitled “Man from a Missing Country.” We are making a few small changes including a title change to “Man from a Missing Land,” the latter because the United States did not diplomatically recognize Tibet as an independent nation.

We plan to release this film on a world-wide basis as soon as the changes are completed, which should be in about three weeks. Our Public Affairs Officers in each country will follow the usual practice of making individual determinations as to the most suitable exposure of the program . . . including television, theatres, direct projection for small groups, use in seminars, private screenings for civic and media leaders, etc.

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\(^3\) Not found attached.

\(^4\) Kissinger initialed his approval of this recommendation.

\(^5\) No classification marking. Copies were sent to Holdridge and Brown. All brackets are in the original.
Holdridge and Brown felt the film should not be released in view of the forthcoming Peking meeting. Our judgment is different. Peking’s radio and newspaper services have continued to attack the Nixon Administration and policies of the United States with unabated intensity since the announcement of the proposed meeting.6

Item: James Reston in the New York Times reference Peking:

“You live [here] in an atmosphere of vicious and persistent anti-American propaganda . . . President Nixon’s visit is not discussed in the press or on the radio, both of which relentlessly characterize the American Government as the ‘arch-criminal’ of the world. The U.S., they insist, has been ‘beaten black and blue’ in Vietnam, but still goes on backing a ‘fascist clique’ in Vietnam, and is reviving ‘Japanese militarism’ and plotting new wars in Korea and the rest of Asia.”7

In view of this, it makes little sense for the United States to refrain from attempting to focus the attention of the world’s peoples on the nature and historical acts of the men in power in Peking. If the Peking Government continues to believe that it is to their advantage to have talks with our leaders, they will do so. If they should decide that it is not to their advantage, we may be sure they will not lack for a pretext to suspend the talks.

Frank Shakespeare8

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6 The President made this announcement in a July 15 television and radio address to the nation, broadcast live beginning at 7:31 p.m.; see footnote 2, Document 143.
8 Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.
Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to all USIA Public Affairs Officers

Washington, August 20, 1971

A one-hour film entitled VIETNAM! VIETNAM! dealing with aspects of the Vietnamese War during the decade of the 60’s has been completed and is available to the field posts. The film uses a cutoff point of December 31, 1969 on events relating to the war. Since many significant and well-known developments occurred after that date, this production must be considered basically archival. It is not really suited for dealing with the contemporary scene.

We recently sent a print of the film to several selected PAOs in diverse country situations . . . large, small, sophisticated, underdeveloped . . . and asked for their private assessment on its usefulness in their situation. Most felt that Viet-Nam was no longer a major attitudinal factor and that a production dealing with earlier events in the war was not presently useful. At least one, however, felt the film would be quite helpful.

You will each make your own judgment on the applicability of this film in your situation, as you do in all cases. Should your initial inclination be to use it, I suggest that you may wish to have the Ambassador and Political Officer screen the program and then counsel together with them before final decision.

Frank Shakespeare


2 In a June 10 article in the New York Times regarding the film, Szulc wrote: “Agency officials said today that no formal decision had been make to shelve the hour-long film—‘Vietnam, Vietnam!’—but authoritative sources in the agency indicated that it would ‘definitely’ not be offered for television or theater showings to foreign audiences.” He continued: “It was reliably reported that the head of the agency, Frank J. Shakespeare Jr., had concluded that the changing military and political situation in Vietnam, as well as domestic political considerations, now raised doubts on the film’s value as convincing and productive propaganda.” (Tad Szulc, “$250,000 U.S.I.A. Movie on Vietnam, 3 Years in the Making, Being Shelved,” p. 6)
1971 385

Washington, November 23, 1971

SUBJECT

Overseas Chinese Attitudes

Attachment “A” is an analysis of overseas Chinese attitudes in SE Asia, based on responses to PAO Letter #40, Attachment “B”. The predominant mood is apolitical, seeking to be neutral, and concerned with economic and trade problems rather than strong ideological convictions. But there are variables within this attitude, depending in varying degrees on host government’s foreign policy, on Peking’s attitudes, and on age groups.

Although the overseas Chinese appear proud of the achievements of Peking, they are reluctant to accept communist political and economic models. Because of their control of much of the trade and commerce in the region, their role in the life and stability of SE Asia is important—and they often influence political decisions. Thus, we are compelled to take a very close look at the overseas Chinese as a USIS audience.

To this end, on December 2, we will hold a working session on this subject. Dr. Lea Williams of Brown University, considered to be an authority on overseas Chinese, and several government experts will join us in discussing the impact on recent developments. From this session we hope to shed light on the role of USIA in this rapidly changing situation.

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2 Attached but not printed is PAO Letter #40, October 1. In it, Southard requested that PAOs report any “significant changes in attitudes of the overseas Chinese” in their respective countries “if any, which have resulted from recent developments.” He concluded: “It would be useful to point out whether Peking is making any deliberate effort to influence the overseas Chinese and what, if anything, the Agency (or USIS Hong Kong) should do.”
Attachment A

Report Prepared in the Office of the Assistant Director, East Asia and Pacific, United States Information Agency

Washington, undated

“OVERSEAS CHINESE ATTITUDES”

This report on overseas Chinese political and attitudinal issues is based primarily on responses of USIS posts to PAO Letter #40 (attached), in which the PAOs in countries where there is a sizable Chinese population were asked to assess overseas Chinese attitudes as a result of the evolving US-China relations and recent developments on the Chinese mainland. Following are the highlights:

In countries where Peking does not have diplomatic ties and where there is a significant Chinese population, such as Malaysia (4 million), Singapore (2 million) and Indonesia (3–4 million), the general overseas Chinese attitude toward the recent thaw in US-China relations is enthusiastic, and in some cases even euphoric. The Singapore PAO described the pro-Peking atmosphere as overwhelming and pervasive, with some pro-Taiwan elements rapidly moving toward the left.

It is apparent that the emotional pull of China (but not necessarily the ideological one) has had a direct effect on overseas Chinese communities, more so now than 5 or 10 years ago. Many now express a sense of pride in Peking’s accomplishments and view US-China contacts and President Nixon’s planned visit to Peking as a plus for the PRC. Inasmuch as there is a strong emotional attachment to what they consider their “homeland,” a disproportionately large number of overseas Chinese feel proud that China is finally emerging into the world as a great power. It should be noted that the younger Chinese do not have a strongly sentimental attachment, as do the old, for China, but there is still pride in being Chinese, and in what they see as the accomplishments of Peking.

This growing attitude has provoked increasing host government concern over the growth of Chinese chauvinism. While increasing PRC influence in the region is a growing possibility, host governments—e.g. Thailand—feel that such an influence would foster a potential subversive threat to their security.

Although some progress has been made toward developing a multi-racial society and nationhood in Thailand and Malaysia, Chinese allegiance to their adopted countries in some cases is still questionable. One indication is their continued preference for the Chinese language and culture.

3 Limited Official Use. No drafting information appears on the report.
4 See footnote 2, above.
5 See Document 146.
In Singapore and Malaysia, a vast system of Chinese schools still exists. The majority of Chinese in these countries, whether they are called Singaporeans or Malaysians, continue to receive their primary education predominantly in Chinese Mandarin. A large, if somewhat timid, Chinese-language press continues to flourish in all SEAsian countries, except Burma.

In contrast to the above, a segment of the overseas Chinese communities remains rabidly anti-communist and still maintains close ties with the Kuomintang\(^6\) and the government on Taiwan. This segment, as illustrated by the expressions of Chinese editors and publishers at the recent Chinese Language Press Institute meeting in San Francisco, showed bitterness and resentment toward U.S. policy, which in their minds had caused GRC's present predicament.

There is a certain ambivalence in attitude among the overseas Chinese, especially among the younger Chinese, toward mainland China. While they seem proud of what Mao has accomplished on the mainland and of what they view as the resurgence of China as a major world power, they would not want to live in China because of the difficult economic conditions and the regimented nature of life. The communist prescription for government and economic organization, which envisaged a high level of regimentation, does not seem to fit into the freer environment to which overseas Chinese are now accustomed.

Overseas Chinese attitudes toward the mainland, especially in countries with a neutral orientation, will depend to some extent on Peking's attitude toward them. In recent months, Peking appeared to be more interested in establishing bilateral government relations than in cultivation of the overseas Chinese.

For example, Chou En-lai, in his interview with the Malaysian trade delegation, reportedly denigrated the local Chinese and indicated that they should make more of an effort to fit in with the local culture.

In the near future, normalization of relations between the PRC and several neutral-type countries in SEAsia will depend on PRC agreement to and adherence of the principle of scrupulous non-interference in internal affairs. If state-to-state relations could be normalized, it is expected that increased contact between Peking and the overseas Chinese would ensue, and that expansion of Peking's influence in the Chinese communities might result. With lingering anxiety and suspicion, the host governments will not tolerate PRC exploitation of the overseas Chinese for political purposes.

Meanwhile, Peking conducts its diplomacy at several levels—(1) to reach accommodation with and (2) to influence various SEAsian governments, and (3) to continue hostile propaganda via PRC-supported clandestine radio broadcasts to Malaysia, Thailand, Burma, etc., which provide moral and ideological support for the CTO and/or indigenous insurgent elements. In recent months, while official Peking media have taken a more conciliatory attitude toward SEAsian governments, Peking continues to support rebel propaganda efforts through its “unofficial” mouthpieces.

In some countries, especially anti-communist countries, there is little outward, concrete evidence of substantial changes in overseas

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\(^6\) Nationalist Party, also called the Guomindang (GMD).
Chinese attitudes resulting from either recent U.S. initiatives toward the PRC or recent UN actions, genuine sentiment is difficult to show because of host government surveillance. In general, they approach China questions cautiously, watching which way the wind will blow. In Cambodia, Burma, Indonesia, etc., a large number of the overseas Chinese have a Peking rather than Taipei orientation. But the local governments have made it clear that they will not tolerate resurgence of banned pro-Chicom organizations.

In countries where the PRC maintains diplomatic relations, Peking appears to have taken a more active role vis-a-vis the overseas Chinese. In Vientiane, for example, the PAO reports that PRC Embassy officials have been noticeably more outgoing and genial in recent weeks, and that they have increased contact work among the local Chinese, who now accept such contacts and visit the PRC Embassy more freely than before. The Peking Embassy invites the Chinese to weekly film showings, audiences for which have increased from average of about 50 last year to over 300 currently. In Burma, the Embassy also has taken up a more active role in the Chinese community.

7 In August 1971, Rogers indicated that the United States would no longer oppose the seating of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations. In circular telegram T39511 to multiple posts, August 1, Rogers requested that the Chiefs of Mission transmit a message to the respective Foreign Ministers regarding UN representation. He stated that “at a press conference to be held in Washington probably on August 2 or 3, I plan to announce that the United States will support action at the General Assembly to seat the People’s Republic of China and at the same time will oppose any action to expel the Republic of China or to otherwise deprive it of representation at the UN. I will go on to say that our consultations have indicated that the question of China’s seat on the SC is a matter which many nations may wish to address and that we are prepared to have this question resolved on the basis of a decision of the members of the UN.” The telegram is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, vol. V, United Nations, 1969–1972, Document 387. On October 25, the United Nations expelled the Republic of China (ROC); see ibid., Document 429. See also *Congress and the Nation*, vol. III, 1969–1972, pp. 875–876.
Memorandum From the Director, Office of Cultural Presentation, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (Lewis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson)

Washington, December 1, 1971

SUBJECT
Performing Arts and the President’s Moscow Trip

You will recall from my memorandum of November 19 to you on performing arts groups for the U.S.S.R. that CP was committed to Embassy Moscow to nominate a fifth, and last, attraction under the current 1970–71 agreement. We indicated in this connection we were negotiating with the Composers’ Quartet/New York Woodwind Quintet for a four-week tour during the late April–early June, 1972 period. We have arrived at satisfactory terms with the Quartet/Quintet, have so informed Embassy Moscow, and all indications are that the contract can be signed in Moscow on December 3.

The background of negotiations for a fifth attraction has been long and complicated. It is related directly to Moscow’s footdragging in connection with their displeasure over JDL activities against Soviet performing arts attractions here. Embassy Moscow and the Department have held firmly to the principle that, regardless of what Moscow may decide about sending its performing arts groups here, the U.S. is entitled, under the exchanges agreement, to send a fifth attraction to the U.S.S.R. We sought to send the Chamber Music Society of Lincoln Center on a tour in December 1971–January 1972, but negotiations with Moscow broke down over terms of a possible contract. The Composers’ Quartet/Woodwind Quintet, highly recommended by our Music Panel, became available but only for late Spring, 1972. We had no other suitable nomination.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files of Assistant Secretary John Richardson, 1968–1976, Lots 76D186 and 78D184, Entry F–242, Box 2, Cultural Presentation Program CU/CP 1971. Confidential. Sent through Irving. Next to Richardson’s name in the addressee line, Irving wrote: “for info—no action now required. FL.” In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Irving wrote: “JR Jr. . . I took action. . . Ted Eliot phoned NSC. . . OK to sign contract but not have them appear in Moscow when President there. . . but Pres may possibly call them in from [unclear] to play if he so desires. FL 12/1.” Richardson wrote “OK JR 12/2” to the left of Irving’s notation.

2 Not found.
If our negotiations with Moscow on the Quartet/Quintet are successful, their tour will overlap with the President’s visit to the U.S.S.R.\(^3\) The Department had indicated in an October 20 Secretary Rogers to President memorandum (Tab A) that we were exploring the feasibility of sending an outstanding performing arts group to the U.S.S.R. to coincide with the President’s visit. We were subsequently informed by a November 9 Kissinger-Rogers memorandum (Tab B) that it would be “perhaps a bit early to take any decision . . . (on) sending a performing arts group . . . to coincide with the President’s planned visit.”

In view of the foregoing, we believe it would be desirable to inform the White House of current developments regarding the Quartet/Quintet tour. We think the following points should be made:

1. Past Soviet obstinacy has prevented the Department from mounting a fifth American performing arts attraction in the U.S.S.R. during the 1970–71 period of the current exchanges agreement;
2. As a result of our insistence on the right to present a fifth attraction under the terms of the current agreement, the difficulty in finding an appropriate attraction, scheduling on such short notice by outstanding performers, the only time available for a group suggested by our Music Panel will overlap with the President’s visit;
3. We think scheduling of the Quartet/Quintet within the U.S.S.R. can be accomplished to accommodate to whatever indications we may receive from the White House.

Recommendation:

We recommend that you approve the incorporation of the above points in a memorandum either

- a) from you to Mr. Garment
- or
- b) the Secretary to Dr. Kissinger

\(^3\) During an October 12 press conference, held in the White House Briefing Room, the President announced that a meeting between the leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union would take place in Moscow during May 1972. The text of the announcement and the press conference are printed in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 1030–1037. Kissinger also read the text of the announcement to the White House staff prior to the press conference; the memorandum of conversation is printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972, Document 1.
Washington, October 20, 1971

SUBJECT

The just-completed tour of the U.S.S.R. by Duke Ellington and his Orchestra, under the sponsorship of our Cultural Presentations Program, has been an unqualified communications success. His impact on the Soviet public and officials during a 35-day tour is reflected in the following results, including several “firsts”:

A. The day Ellington departed the U.S.S.R., Pravda published a remarkable, highly favorable article, citing the success of the tour and praising the American musicians as professionals and as individuals. This is the first time in recent years that Pravda has acknowledged the existence in the U.S.S.R. of a U.S. performing arts group.

B. Soviet authorities requested two additional concerts in Moscow to meet public demand for tickets. This is the first time in recent years such a request has been made. We agreed, on the condition that the additional concerts would be held in Moscow’s Palace of Sports, seating 10,000.

C. Thus for the first time, a U.S. performing arts group under our auspices was allowed to perform in the Palace of Sports, which had already been set up for ice hockey.

D. Approximately 114,000 persons attended Ellington’s 22 concerts in five cities.6 Audiences consisted of all age groups and included high Government officials in Moscow, at least one Soviet cosmonaut (Feoktistov) and poet Yevtushenko.6 Hundreds of travelers from distant places arrived in Moscow for concerts. One traveler said: “This

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4 No classification marking. Drafted by Lewis on October 18; concurred in substance by Stefan. Lewis initialed Stefan’s concurrence. According to another copy of the memorandum, Richardson sent the memorandum to Rogers under an October 18 action memorandum, in which he commented that Ellington’s tour “has been an unprecedented cultural and communications success.” He recommended that Rogers sign the memorandum to the President. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 20, OGA—CU State 1971 July thru December)

5 Leningrad, Minsk, Kiev, Rostov-on-the Don, and Moscow. The tour began in Leningrad on September 13 and ended in Moscow on October 12.

6 Presumable references to Konstantin Feoktistov and Yevgeny Yevtushenko.
only happens once in a lifetime. You cannot imagine the impression that Ellington makes on a Soviet audience.” Tickets in Moscow were being scalped for $50 each.

E. Off-stage, Ellington and his men met informally with many Soviet citizens, including leading Ukrainian composers, local musicians and students. Ellington and Soviet musicians conducted three jam sessions together.

F. U.S. press coverage of Soviet reaction was overwhelmingly favorable. *The New York Times* of September 14, in a review of the opening Leningrad concert said: “The applause began before the curtain went up and kept on after 45 minutes of encores.” At the end of the tour, the *Washington Post* said in part: “Tickets for the concerts have been the hen’s teeth of the Soviet Union for a month... ‘We’ve been waiting for you for centuries!’ a young Moscow fan yelled at Ellington when he arrived here last month, and so it seemed.”

John Chancellor of *NBC News* featured a Moscow concert on the October 14 network Nightly News, saying: “Duke Ellington has been on a State Department tour of Russia and it’s been a great success.”

*Life* covered the tour and plans to publish its article soon.

Comment:

While the Ellington communications, cultural and psychological success was anticipated, it exceeded our expectations.

We are exploring the feasibility of sending another outstanding performing arts group to the U.S.S.R. to coincide with your planned visit to Moscow.

William P. Rogers

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Tab B

Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to Secretary of State Rogers

Washington, November 9, 1971

SUBJECT
Performing Arts Tour of the Soviet Union (S/S–7116533)

The President appreciated your report on Duke Ellington’s recent, very successful tour of the Soviet Union.

It is perhaps a bit early to take any decision concerning the desirability of sending a performing arts group to the USSR to coincide with the President’s planned visit. The President has indicated that he will wish to weigh the pros and cons of such a proposal closer to the time of the Moscow visit.

Henry A. Kissinger

9 Confidential.

151. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to all Principal USIS Posts

CA–2260

Washington, December 2, 1971

SUBJECT
The Larger Picture

Most officers overseas and many in Washington tend to develop a limited focus. They concentrate on the local situation or on what is

news today. They are sensitive to the foreign audiences’ interests; and in their dialogues they tend to introduce only those subjects which are of immediate or foremost concern to their audiences.

These tendencies in many respects are praiseworthy. They can increase the effectiveness of the Agency’s communication effort. But too narrow focus and an over-concentration on what is locally relevant can diminish our effectiveness. Our audiences’ memories are short. Modern communication, dense and rapid, often presents news in isolated fragments. Agency officers in Washington and in posts abroad should try to show our audiences patterns of development and relate news items to these patterns.

To perform these tasks requires constant awareness by all officers of the needs and resources of all the principal Agency elements and the USIS posts. Each of us has his own job, but each should also contribute to the Agency’s task worldwide. Impact in one place or at one time is not enough. The most effective exploitation of news and presentation of our opinions can only be achieved by the use of all appropriate Agency resources, by thinking in global, strategic terms, and—especially to younger audiences—by cumulative reporting which gives historical perspective to developments in the 1970s.

Illustrative Cases

In recent months Agency treatment of some high priority subjects would have benefitted from greater coordination of effort. In some cases coordination was good in output to some parts of the world but not to others. We review a few of these cases and offer suggestions for continuing treatment of current priorities in the paragraphs below. Comments on the general problem of coordination of media resources and on these specific subjects are solicited.

1. Refugees from Communism. Wherever communist regimes are in control they have erected administrative and physical barriers against flight from their territories. This is a fact of twentieth century life. It is, perhaps, the single starkest admission of communist weakness and the most telling definition of the difference between us and them. It is a fact which most of the non-communist world has gotten used to, or is used to overlooking. From time to time, however, attempts to escape from communist nation-prisons increase or are particularly dramatic; and the cruel fact cannot be ignored. In the spring of 1971 escape attempts from mainland China to Hong Kong rose markedly, and in the summer of 1971 there was a significant increase in escape attempts from East Germany. In both instances the Agency was slow to report and to cross-report the developments. Inadequate exploitation of this subject is especially regrettable, since such territorial jails are observable in many parts of the world (Europe, Asia, Cuba).
2. _Viet-Nam._ Over the last two years, in consonance with the overall U.S. policy of Vietnamization, JUSPAO, Agency media and USIS posts have ceased acting on behalf of the GVN Ministry of Information in telling its story to foreign audiences. The United States, of course, continues to have a strong interest in seeing South Viet-Nam’s independence maintained. In most areas of the world today Viet-Nam is not a prime concern to our audiences. However, in the context of the Nixon Doctrine, our audiences in many countries may view South Viet-Nam as a test case for U.S. foreign policy commitments. Agency media and USIS posts should not talk about Viet-Nam for the general purpose of making conversation. But whenever the news permits, media and posts should be alert to opportunities to use the example of Viet-Nam (and those of Korea and Berlin) to remind our audiences that those who refuse subjugation can—with strength, determination, and the help of allies—successfully resist it.

3. _Communist Espionage._ A large number of official representatives of communist states abroad are intelligence agents. At times, in different countries, their activities become so blatant and harmful to the security of host nations that the agents are expelled. The expulsions and reasons for them are usually well publicized for a brief time, until a newer sensational development takes over the headlines. Usually, as in the recent Mexican and United Kingdom cases, foreign media or a foreign government take the lead in publicizing the communist subversive apparatus. Such events offer us important opportunities to heighten awareness of the communist record worldwide by aggregating case histories of communist espionage and deliberate violations of diplomatic practice.

4. _Castro and Allende._ The cases of Cuba under Castro and Chile under Allende are distinct in many respects; but both cases in varying degrees show repression of free expression, regimentation of economic life, and attacks by Marxists-in-power on the independence of the universities and the judiciary. Since the early 1960s Cuba under Castro has been an Agency priority subject. Since late 1970 the Agency has used factual, non-polemical cross-reporting and cross-play of comment throughout Latin America to increase knowledge of developments in Chile under Allende. A series of reports on Chile has gone to other parts of the world as well. Agency output on Cuba and Chile may be made more relevant if Washington media and USIS posts place developments in these countries in the context of the general pattern of events wherever Marxists achieve control. An important element in the Cuban story—which may also become manifest in the Chilean

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case—is the diminution of a nation’s political independence as a result of over-dependence on aid from communist states. Illustrations of this phenomenon can be drawn from many parts of the world. In Agency media output and USIS posts’ treatment of Cuba, Chile, and similar situations, we should recognize that certain aspects of the Castro and Allende programs are attractive to intellectuals and laborers in developing areas. Media output and posts’ presentations gain in credibility to developing countries’ audiences when they feature accounts by citizens of developing countries who have experienced the effects of communist rule or too close relations with communist states.

5. U.S. Strength and the Overall Balance. Military analysts and such authoritative publications as Jane's and the reports of the Institute of Strategic Studies in recent months have stated that the USSR is overtaking the U.S. in particular categories of armament and defense investment. It is important to keep our audiences aware that the U.S. maintains an edge in strategic weapons delivery systems and that, overall, the U.S. military posture is sufficient to our defense tasks. We must avoid poor-mouthing our military capacity and thereby undermining confidence in our strength and reliability. U.S. strength is an advantage to both our allies and the non-aligned. Wherever the forces of the U.S. directly confront those of the USSR, nations in the area of confrontation are significantly affected. It is not our desire to invite confrontation, nor do we wish big power differences to intrude on the peaceful development of nations in-between. It is, however, fitting for us quietly to emphasize the advantages to all non-communist nations which derive from U.S. strength, to bring to the attention of all non-communist audiences the proven benefits of collective security (including United Nations security forces actions), and to impress upon them the dangers of too intimate military involvement with communist powers. Here again, examples abound around the world.

6. Economic Interdependence. This subject has dominated international relations since mid-summer. Our foreign economic policy has come in for much criticism. While some of this results from expected hard bargaining positions of our trading partners and specific export interest groups abroad, part of the criticism stems from a lack of information. The Agency is publicizing facts of everyday economic life (e.g., comparative prices of consumer goods after payment of duties in different countries). International fair-sharing is not yet universally recognized as a useful principle, either by governments or by interest groups within nations. We must hope that more information will lead to greater appreciation of the U.S. position. In economic information the Agency works on the two levels of sophisticated arguments for
experts and popular appeals to foreign consumers. Far more coordination of Agency resources is needed; IOP is seeking to provide that. The Agency should also review basic policy regarding its activities on behalf of U.S. commercial interests abroad. Among governments’ foreign information programs, ours is unique in not devoting significant resources to export and tourism promotion.

Shakespeare

152. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency (Jenkins) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 7, 1971

SUBJECT

The President’s Trip to the Soviet Union

Just prior to his departure for Europe, Frank Shakespeare requested that I forward to you immediately this summary of our tentative planning for the President’s visit to the USSR in May, paralleling Secretary Rogers’ November 10 memorandum to the President.²

There are already some tentative indications that Soviet anti-American propaganda is toning down as the influence of the impending visit begins to be felt. There is every reason to assume that this process will accelerate and Soviet media will become increasingly less objectionable in their treatment of the United States—up to a point. While state-to-state relations can ebb and flow, Soviet propaganda dogma dictates

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1-42, Box 28, 1972 OGA—President’s Moscow Trip. Secret. Drafted by Jenkins on December 6; concurred in by Shakespeare and Loomis. Copies were sent to Reed, Dickson, and Drechsler. In a January 6, 1972, memorandum to Shakespeare, Kissinger responded: “I appreciate your suggestions concerning the President’s activities when he visits the USSR next May. We will keep your suggestions in mind as the planning progresses. It is still somewhat early to decide his schedule in any detail.” (Ibid.)

that the ideological struggle must go on. This same principle is reiterated even in today’s gradually improving atmosphere. While occasionally irritating, it is in our judgment a pragmatic approach to which we also subscribe in our own fashion.

1) **U.S. Government media treatment of the Soviet Union**—The Voice of America, as the official United States Government radio, pursues all reasonably attractive opportunities to expose Soviet perfidy, consistent with the requirements of dignity and the official responsibility of the Voice. Our broadcasts, of course, reflect the trend of substantive developments in our relations. As these improve and are improving, so the substance of our broadcasts will inevitably become less objectionable to Soviet authorities.

2) **Jamming**—A major bone of contention between ourselves and the Soviets in this field since the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia has been jamming of the Voice of America.\(^3\) This effort has now reached an all-out level in terms of volume. Soviet transmitters are engaged in jamming our Russian, Ukrainian, Georgian and Armenian broadcasts.

Jamming, in fact, is only partially effective. In major municipal centers where a heavy jamming effort is mounted, effectiveness is up to 80%. It is virtually completely ineffective in the countryside and even in suburbs of cities like Moscow and Leningrad.

The Soviets ceased jamming VOA in 1963 consistent with efforts to generate a détente. They resumed with the entrance of Soviet troops into Czechoslovakia. They might well terminate jamming as an act of goodwill prior to the President’s visit. There are many arguments against jamming. The Soviets are embarrassed by public discussion of the fact that they jam; jamming is only partially effective; it is expensive in terms of technical resources. However, if they have not terminated jamming prior to the visit, it certainly is an irritant we would hope would be raised during the visit. We will provide a detailed briefing paper on this topic as the visit draws near.

3) **Radio Free Europe**—**Radio Liberty**—While defensive about their own jamming, the Soviets can be expected to be quite offensive about Radio Liberty broadcasts to the Soviet Union. From our point of view, we would strongly oppose terminating broadcast activities of Radio Liberty (and RFE) as long as what the Soviets describe as the “ideological struggle” goes on.

\(^3\) See footnote 3, Document 1.
4) The President’s Impact within the USSR

a) We agree with Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that we should seek air and TV time for the President to address the Soviet people.4 We are not so sanguine that “the Soviet Government could not refuse your request,” but agree that there is a very good possibility that it might be granted. For this occasion we would suggest that we request the Soviets to invite the President to speak to the student body of Moscow University. Such an event would provide a dramatic platform and be guaranteed to attract worldwide media coverage. He, of course, was permitted to speak directly to the Soviet people on TV in July, 19595 and the Soviet press carried verbatim his airport arrival statement and his speech at the opening of the U.S. exhibit and the famous kitchen debate with Khrushchev which followed.6 Similar treatment was accorded to British Prime Minister Macmillan in 1961. These unusual TV appearances and texts, together with a later similar Kennedy interview in Izvestiya7 to this day are referred to by Soviet citizens as of great importance. We, of course, would offer to promote the publication of similar Soviet statements in the U.S. press. (In 1961 the New York Times printed an interview with Khrushchev8 as part of the Kennedy-Izvestiya bargain.)

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4 In the November 10 memorandum (see footnote 2, above), Rogers stated: “The most effective means for direct communication with the Soviet people would be nationwide radio and television appearances. Your 1959 Moscow speech had a great and lasting impact on Soviet popular attitudes toward the U.S., even though it was not carried nationwide. President Eisenhower was to have made a nationwide TV speech during his visit to the USSR in 1960, just as Khrushchev had done in the US. The Soviet Government could not refuse your request for air time, and you could quite properly set forth your concept of a generation of peace in the context of improving US-Soviet relations. The novelty of hearing the American viewpoint directly and fully would help reinforce the development of Soviet attitudes in this direction.”

5 Presumable reference to then-Vice President Nixon’s August 1, 1959, televised address to the Soviet public, made at the conclusion of his trip to the Soviet Union in order to open the American National Exhibition at Sokolniki Park in Moscow. For the text, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959, pp. 887–894.

6 The text of Nixon’s July 24 speech is ibid., pp. 881–886. During a tour of the exhibit that day, Nixon and Khrushchev came to a model American home and stopped in the kitchen. While there, they engaged in an argument about the relative merits of capitalism and Communism. The argument became known as the “kitchen debate.”


b) We endorse Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that the President consider opening our Consulate General in Leningrad.\(^9\) We intend to provide an outstanding art exhibit for the public floor in the Consulate building together with a Russian-language, illustrated color brochure on the collection for the occasion of the opening.

  c) A major U.S. exhibit, Research and Development-USA is scheduled to open in Volgograd (formerly Stalingrad) in May. The exhibit is unusually attractive and will feature twenty young fluent Russian-speaking American guides. You will recall President Nixon visited our Industrial Design–USA exhibit in 1967 in Moscow. This, together with his historic association with our National Exhibition in Moscow in 1959, would make a visit to the exhibit in Volgograd even more appropriate. This might also be particularly attractive to the Soviets in view of their national pride in the role of Stalingrad in the war against Nazi Germany.

  5) America Illustrated—Our quality monthly magazine, Amerika, 60,000 copies of which are distributed in the Soviet Union on the basis of reciprocity under the Exchanges Agreement, will feature a cover photograph of the President and Mrs. Nixon and an interview on US-Soviet relations. We are planning a special overrun of 100,000 copies to be distributed through the American exhibit while he is in the USSR.

  While the familiarity with the magazine which we find among Soviet citizens even in the provinces gives evidence that America Illustrated does, indeed, get around, we are not in a position to ascertain that the entire 60,000 copies are distributed. A Presidential reference to the magazine, perhaps in the context of a published statement or TV appearance, would enhance the possibility of honest distribution.

  6) We heartily endorse Secretary Rogers’ suggestion that a stop in Poland after the USSR be considered.\(^10\) We can imagine no visit which would be a more sure-fire public relations success.

Kempton B. Jenkins\(^11\)

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\(^9\) In the November 10 memorandum (see footnote 2, above), Rogers suggested: “Another possible opportunity for a public statement with good media appeal in the USSR and abroad would be the formal opening of our Consulate General in Leningrad. Your endorsement in 1959 of the idea of exchanging consulates makes it fitting that you should preside at a ceremony, which would symbolize a milestone in the implementation of the US-Soviet Consular Convention and a significant step in our political relations.”

\(^10\) According to Rogers (see footnote 2, above), “To help dispel any appearance of ‘superpower condominium’ and to counteract Soviet pretentions to hegemony in Eastern Europe, you may wish to consider two stopovers on your return from Moscow. One would be your appearance at a NATO session in Brussels, the other a visit to Poland.”

\(^11\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
153. Memorandum From the Staff Assistant to the President (Gergen) to the Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations (MacGregor) and the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)\(^1\)

Washington, December 13, 1971

**SUBJECT**

Presidential Involvement in Fulbright Scholarship Program

In honor of the 25th anniversary of the Fulbright Scholarship program, the leaders of the Board of Foreign Scholarships—a Presidentially-appointed group—have recently proposed that the President recognize the co-authors of the original legislation, Senator Fulbright and Representative Hays.\(^2\) They suggest that “honorary Fulbrights” be presented in the Oval Office, a recommendation prompted in part by the Senator’s own interest.

John Richardson, Jr., assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, is supporting the idea and in-house, Fred Malek, who was first running a check on it, has now swung from opposition to support. Before proceeding with a schedule request, however, it has been requested that I solicit your opinions.

Here are the pros and cons as seen by the proponents:

*Advantages*

1. Gesture of good will by the President, showing gracious and generous character to those who are known to oppose him.

2. Identification of President with the major U.S. program for cultural and educational exchange. The Fulbright budget was badly slashed under LBJ but has been increased each year under this Administration. This support is an important inroad to the university community, and would be well-highlighted by a ceremony.

3. Identification of President with members of the academic community who are Republicans, such as board chairman, Jim Billington,

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 815, Name Files, Senator Fulbright [1 of 3]. Administratively Confidential.

\(^2\) On September 23, the Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS), in recognition of the 25th anniversary of the Fulbright Program, hosted a luncheon meeting, at which Fulbright was honored. That day, the BFS released a statement entitled “Educational Exchanges in the Seventies,” which contained new guidelines for educational exchanges, developed by the BFS, Department of State, the American academic community, and the binational Fulbright Commissions. For the text of the Department announcement regarding the luncheon and the BFS statement, see Department of State Bulletin, October 11, 1971, pp. 386–390.
a young professor of history at Princeton, and vice-chairman, Lyle Nelson, head of the Stanford Communication Department. Other prominent scholars who are associated with the board could also be brought in if appropriate.

4. Possible points with Fulbright and Hays. The whole idea originated when the Senator told the board that he was prouder of this program than any other in which he had participated, and that he only regretted never being a recipient.

Disadvantages

1. The differences between the President and Fulbright are sufficiently deep and long-standing that the President might not wish to honor him in any way.

2. The timing is awkward: this is the 25th anniversary year so that a brief ceremony would be better now, but the White House schedule is very tight and Fulbright will soon be going home. It might be better in that sense to wait until January when the President could more easily do it in the spirit of “fresh starts” with the Congress.

Background materials are attached. Any advice you could give on this project would certainly be appreciated.4

Dave Gergen

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3 Attached but not printed are a December 1 memorandum from Richardson to Malek, a November 29 memorandum from Gergen to Malek, and a November 24 covering memorandum from Malek to Richardson. The covering memorandum transmitted a copy of a November 15 letter from Nelson to Haldeman, which was not found attached.

4 There is no indication that the President awarded “honorary Fulbrights” to either Fulbright or Hays during the last weeks of 1971.
154. National Security Decision Memorandum 143

Washington, December 17, 1971

SUBJECT

United States International Exchange Programs

The President has reviewed the report of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee on U.S. international exchange programs, as forwarded by the Under Secretary of State on August 13, 1971, and the dissenting memoranda of the Deputy Secretary of Defense and the Acting Administrator of AID.

The President considers that the report highlights the necessity for more effective information systems, coordination, longer-range planning and review of U.S. international exchange programs.

The President has made the following decisions:

—The Secretary of State shall have the responsibility and authority to develop and operate a central information system on exchanges and to levy requirements to collect Exchange program information from all agencies.

—The establishment of a private International Exchange Council to serve as a catalyst between the government and the private sector has been approved, and a more detailed program regarding this council should be forwarded for the President’s consideration.

—The Under Secretaries Committee shall have the responsibility for:

1. Instituting action programs on a priority basis to place selective increased emphasis on exchanges involving potential foreign leaders in the professional and technical fields, particularly in countries where other opportunities for contacts and possible influence are limited. (In U.S. exchange programs generally, leadership will be defined to include clear focus on technical and professional leadership such as scientists, lawyers, doctors and businessmen, in addition to present and prospective political leadership.)

2. Reviewing on a priority basis the substantive areas for possible action outlined in the study (such as creating or assisting public and private leadership development institutions, and expanding or focussing U.S. participation in third-country exchange activities).

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–241, NSDM Files, NSDM 143. Confidential. Copies were sent to Elliot Richardson, O’Donnell, Moorer, and Shultz. Another copy is attached as Tab B to a December 30 memorandum from Richardson to Irwin, printed as Document 156.

2 See Document 145 and footnote 3 thereto.

3 See ibid., footnotes 5 and 6.
3. Coordination, long-range planning and annually reviewing U.S. exchange programs and making recommendations to the agencies or, as appropriate, to the President on exchange policies, priorities and resource planning.

Under Secretaries Committee’s reports on the above action items shall be forwarded for the President’s consideration. In all these reviews, attention should be given to innovative experimentation with new mechanisms of intercountry exchange and cooperation directed toward the achievement of common goals and involving accomplished professionals. Any agency disagreements which may arise in the course of these reviews shall be forwarded for the President’s decision.

The Chairman of the Under Secretaries Committee may establish an interagency subcommittee on international exchanges, including representatives of the standing members of the Under Secretaries Committee and other agencies as appropriate, to assist in the discharge of its responsibility for interagency review and coordination.

The President considers it important that the operations of this interagency committee not compromise the substance or mutual benefit of our technical and scientific exchange programs. In addition, this interagency committee shall neither delimit or replace existing agency responsibilities nor impinge upon established coordinating mechanisms such as those between the Departments of Defense and State for military training programs.

Henry A. Kissinger
Memorandum From the Assistant Director, South Asia, United States Information Agency (Squires) to the Deputy Director (Loomis)

Washington, December 20, 1971

SUBJECT
The 14-Day Indo-Pakistan War

SUMMARY
The undeclared 1971 war between India and Pakistan began with full-scale hostilities on both East and West fronts on December 3. Two short weeks later following a desultory defense at best, the Pakistani army in the East surrendered, and Yahya Khan accepted an Indian ceasefire offer in the West.

The fighting which was mercifully short, ended in the birth of a new nation, Bangla Desh. By any measure the immediate prospects of the new nation of 75 million people are anything but bright. It is doubtful that the new nation can survive without substantial humanitarian and economic assistance for some time to come. With the fate of Sheikh Mujib unknown, the political viability and stability of Bangla Desh is equally questionable. The new Bengal Nation necessarily will be heavily dependent upon India involving some form of protectorate status, and that relationship, given the essential differences between the two, contains the seeds of further dissension and strife. An independent Bangla Desh, therefore, probably represents a short-term solution rather than a permanent arrangement. The intermediate prospects would appear to suggest continued instability on the subcontinent. In any case, a united Pakistan lasted less than 25 years, there are now three nations where there were two and India emerges as the dominant power in South Asia.

Traditionally, South Asia has been an area of major power rivalry and confrontation, and there is no reason to assume this will not con-
continue to be the case. Soviet backing of India’s cause unquestionably has provided the USSR with an immediate policy gain. In the process, however, the USSR may have become more enmeshed in South Asia than she might have preferred.\(^5\) China’s support for Pakistan represented little real commitment beyond diplomatic maneuver and propaganda. U.S. diplomatic efforts failed to halt the developing crisis and have succeeded in gaining India’s animosity and condemnation in the process.\(^6\)

India’s dramatic victory has confirmed Madame Gandhi’s political leadership and placed it beyond challenge.\(^7\) The nation is perhaps more united and euphoric in victory than at any time since independence. Pakistan, on the other hand, is a badly defeated and divided nation. Yahya Khan is being forced to resign in favor of a civilian coalition, and the public mood in Pakistan is one of angry humiliation.

The conflict underlined the international ramifications of local wars and the contradictions they produce. The United Nations demonstrated its inability to cope with local wars involving client states of the major powers.\(^8\) The USSR employed three vetos in the Security Council to block a ceasefire-withdrawal until India could achieve her primary military objective. The vote in the General Assembly, while overwhelmingly supporting a ceasefire resolution, could not be translated into effective action.\(^9\)

**PROGRAM IMPLICATIONS**

*Bangla Desh.* The extent to which USIS is permitted to continue operations, if at all, will depend in the long run on the U.S. attitude toward diplomatic recognition of an independent Bangla Desh.\(^{10}\) BPAO George Henry remains in Dacca and has been operating out of the ConGen since the bombing of our library. For the time being, preservation and utilization of our facilities will depend on informal arrangements and personal contacts with Indian and Bangla Desh authorities.

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\(^{5}\) Loomis underlined the portion of the paragraph beginning with “Soviet” and ending with “preferred.”

\(^{6}\) Loomis underlined this sentence.

\(^{7}\) Loomis underlined this sentence.

\(^{8}\) Loomis underlined this sentence.

\(^{9}\) In a December 8 memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported that on December 7, the UN General Assembly had “approved a resolution on the Indo-Pak war essentially the same as that vetoed in the Security Council by the Soviets. The vote was 104 in favor (including the U.S.), 11 against (Soviet bloc minus Romania, plus Bhutan and India) and 10 abstentions, most notable of which were the UK, France and Denmark. The resolution specifically calls for a ceasefire, withdrawal of troops, creation of necessary conditions for a voluntary return of refugees and urges protection of civilians in the area.” (Ibid., vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 247)

\(^{10}\) Loomis underlined this sentence.
Pakistan. The U.S. complement is essentially intact, including both personnel and property. Rawalpindi is carrying on at one-third normal activity. Lahore and Karachi are operating with reduced staffs and schedules, but activity will pick up as personnel returns to duty. Lahore suffered moderate damage in an attack December 19 by demonstrators angered by lack of U.S. support in Pakistan’s hour of trial. On the other hand, there was a pro-U.S. demonstration at the Peshawar Center. The Hyderabad and Peshawar centers have not been damaged and should be back in operation this week.

India. The USIS program in India has been shaken by the war and accompanying Indian hostility against the U.S. There have been demonstrations at U.S. official and private facilities. The post has postponed Duke Ellington’s India tour, suspended the “in-houser” program temporarily, and cancelled “package programs” through January. The present wave of anti-Americanism should recede with the victorious end of the war, however, and we expect program activities to resume a more normal pattern over the coming months. Thereafter, we should seek opportunities to work toward restoration of Indo-American relations to a more cordial level.\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{11} Loomis underlined this sentence.
\textsuperscript{12} Loomis underlined the last two sentences of this paragraph.
156. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)\(^1\)

Washington, December 30, 1971

**Implementation of NSDM 143 on U.S. International Exchange Programs**

We now have the Presidential decisions in regard to the study of International Exchange which I prepared and you forwarded to the President on August 13, 1971.\(^2\) These decisions require the following actions:

1. Establishment by the Department of the criteria, methods, and procedures for a central information system on exchanges covering all agencies of the Federal Government,

2. Development of further recommendations to the President regarding the private international exchange council,

3. Determination of the methods and procedures by which the Under Secretaries Committee can carry out the responsibilities required by the memorandum for program review and development, coordination, and long-range planning regarding the totality of United States exchange programs with other countries.

Since exchange committee deliberations touched on a number of these specific points of implementation, I suggest that I seek the view of my task force members in other agencies as appropriate and then present recommendations to you regarding those aspects of the President’s decision that need further staff work.

**Recommendation:**

That you sign the attached memorandum (Tab A),\(^3\) making the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs responsible for the development of recommendations to implement NSDM 143.

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\(^2\) See Document 145.

\(^3\) Attached; printed as Document 157.
157. Memorandum From the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson)\(^1\)

S/S 7120905

Washington, January 10, 1972

SUBJECT

Implementation of NSDM 143\(^2\)

The President has responded to my memorandum of August 13,\(^3\) 1971 transmitting the study of international exchange prepared under your direction. The following tasks should now be undertaken to carry out the President’s decisions:

(1) Establishment of a structure and procedures for a central information system on exchanges,

(2) Recommendation to the President as to the scope and nature of the private International Exchange Council to be established to serve as a catalyst between the Government and the private sector, and

(3) Recommendations to the Under Secretaries Committee on the methods for carrying out the responsibilities for Government-wide exchange programs vested in that Committee.

I request that you undertake to make the necessary recommendations on these matters and report back to me at your earliest convenience.

John N. Irwin II

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 28, 1972 OGA—State/CU (Jan–June). Confidential. Sent through Curran. An attached USIA Action Request indicates that a copy of the memorandum was sent to Towery. Attached as Tab A to Document 156.

\(^2\) See Document 154.

\(^3\) See Document 145.
WASHINGTON, January 12, 1972

SUBJECT

USIA Film on Chinese Communist Subjugation of Tibet

You will recall that last August USIA Director Shakespeare wanted to release for worldwide distribution a documentary film on the Chinese Communist subjugation of Tibet, and that we asked for an indefinite postponement of this action. Our reasoning was that the film might affect adversely the President’s visit to the PRC.

At Tab A is a memorandum to you from Mr. Shakespeare saying that—“just to keep you informed”—the documentary on Tibet has been submitted to the Academy of Motion Pictures, Arts and Sciences for consideration as an Academy Award nominee. In checking up on the background of Mr. Shakespeare’s move, we discovered that he acted unilaterally and without reference to anyone else in USIA except the producer of the documentary. As we understand it, the procedure now will be as follows: there will be a screening in the first part of February by Academy representatives to determine the documentary’s acceptability for a nomination. If nominated, there will be a further screening by a jury in the first part of March to judge the merits of the film against the other contenders; and finally, if it makes the grade thus far, a final showing along with the other contestants sometime in May.

Theoretically, there should be little or no publicity concerning the documentary on Tibet in relation to the President’s visit, in view of the fact that the initial screening in February will not be public. However, there is a good chance that the news of the screening would

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan–Oct 1972] [2 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action. Haig initialed the right-hand corner of the memorandum. At the top of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote “Gen Haig” with an arrow pointing toward it. Haig sent the memorandum to Kissinger under a March 14 covering note, writing: “Henry: I told Shakespeare to hold up on release until after Moscow Summit. In this way, we will avoid interference of U.S. anti-PRC attitudes which could lessen Soviet concerns.” At the bottom of the covering note, Kissinger wrote: “Do memo for Pres. I see no point in this film.” Haig wrote Holdridge’s name above Kissinger’s handwritten note and drew an arrow from it to the note. (Ibid.) For the memorandum to the President, see Document 169.

2 See the attachment to Document 147.

3 See Document 147.

4 Not attached.
nevertheless leak out, since the deferral of the film’s release by USIA has already been mentioned in a New York Times article on USIA’s role in this Administration. I doubt that at this stage there would be any problems in connection with the President’s visit, but it would be embarrassing for the differences of opinion over the screening of this film to become a matter of widespread public knowledge.

On balance, U.S. interests would probably best be served if the film can be withheld at least until after the President’s visit to the PRC. On the other hand, even an attempt to defer the screening by Academy personnel could create problems if the New York Times or other papers became aware of this. Your guidance would be appreciated.

Have General Haig call Shakespeare
I will call Shakespeare
Holdridge to discuss matter with USIA personnel below the Director/Deputy Director level
Let screening proceed

5 Presumable reference to Benjamin Welles, “U.S. Said to Delay Film About Tibet: Reported Curb Tied to Fear of Friction With Peking,” New York Times, December 26, 1971, p. 21. Welles noted: “Both Mr. Loomis and Mr. Herschensohn insisted that the White House had made no decision to ban the picture. They conceded, however, that six months had passed since the documentary’s completion and that there was little, if any, likelihood that it would be released for distribution through theaters and television stations abroad in the foreseeable future.” (Ibid.)

6 Kissinger initialed his approval. Below the four recommendations, he wrote: “I guess we’ll have to proceed—but this is unacceptable. See whether there is a chance of turning it off.” Next to this notation, Haig wrote: “I’ve talked to Shakespeare—he’ll reluctantly hold until after Moscow Summit. Other [unclear—exercise?] damage already done. Al.”
Washington, January 15, 1972, 8:25 a.m.

K: I hope I didn’t wake you up.
S: No, I’m fine.
K: I think I did. Frank, Bob Haldeman told me yesterday you were thinking of leaving. I wanted to have an opportunity to talk with you before you did this.
S: I’m leaving this weekend for Romania and the Soviet Union.
K: Could you leave open your final decision until we have a chance to talk? I have certainly been one of the causes of your unhappiness unintentionally—partly because I have so many sons of bitches to take care of. People you can trust seem to slide to the bottom of the list. Your leaving at this stage when you have been one of the few loyalists here and one of the few who did what the President promised in 1968 would be symbolically and substantively a disaster. I can understand your dissatisfaction about being excluded from some of the meetings. This call is my idea—nobody asked me to do this.
S: It’s a complicated situation. I very much appreciate your talking to me. Why don’t we hold it until I return.
K: That is all I am asking. I want you to know—though I haven’t shown it in my actions—the presence of one decent, loyal person has meant a lot. Above all, we need you for the country. Whatever I can do to make you more effective will be done.
S: As I said, it is a complicated situation. But I appreciate your call.
K: Don’t do anything until you come back and you and I talk.
S: All right.
K: But that doesn’t commit you not to go through with your plans. I understand that you will not make a final decision until you talk to me but that you are not going to reverse it. Is that a fair statement?
S: Yes. Henry, at the tag-end of this trip, we will be having the annual German/American talks. Is there anything that occurred in the Brandt Meetings at Key Biscayne that is particularly relevant?

2 Reference is to the President’s meetings with Brandt at the President’s residence in Key Biscayne, Florida, December 28–29. For the memoranda of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XL, Germany and Berlin, 1969–1972, Documents 335 and 336.
K: I was flat on my back.
S: I knew you had the flu.
K: The reports I got—I never read the minutes—don’t indicate anything. The radios did not come up to the best of my knowledge.
S: Nothing on the radios or VOA?
K: Let me talk to Haig who was there, and I will get a message to you.
S: I don’t know what else would necessarily relate to those meetings. The agenda was drawn up by the Germans, and they have included the Conference on European Security, SALT, the Berlin talks, ratification of the two treaties\(^3\)—mostly as to attitudinal considerations.
K: Don’t give the European Security Conference\(^4\) any steam. The Germans want to but we don’t.
S: Keep it as far in the distance as possible?
K: Right.
S: On the question of SALT, Gerry\(^5\) gave me a good briefing. I saw him in Vienna 10 days ago, but there’s nothing on SALT at this particular point.
K: You might get across to the Soviets that their press campaign against the U.S. doesn’t make it any easier to proceed here along the lines of detente.
S: Press campaign in what sense?
K: Their consistent attack on Sino/U.S. cooperation and their behavior on Vietnam.
S: Okay, Henry, thanks very much.

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\(^3\) Presumable reference to the Berlin Agreement and the Soviet/Polish Treaty.


\(^5\) Smith.
160. Memorandum From Leslie Janka of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, January 17, 1972

SUBJECT
A USIA Problem

Frank Shakespeare has written you an “Eyes Only” memorandum (Tab B) complaining that he cannot respond to your December 17 request\(^2\) for an action plan to increase foreign understanding of U.S. security policy due to the fact that USIA’s management is not provided with a “full understanding of [our] real objectives. . . .”

He notes, however, that the basic work on your request has been done and can be made available to you. Since we cannot readily solve his lack of understanding of our security objectives and need for better guidance, the attached response requests Shakespeare to take his lead from the impending 1972 Foreign Policy Report\(^3\) and build upon the work USIA has already done to develop the action plan you requested, although this would prevent USIA’s using the 1972 Report as the launching point for the action program, as was requested.

Alternatively, you could meet more directly his problem of isolation from the centers of action by inviting him in for a brief discussion of our broad security objectives, but USIA is probably beyond help on

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan–Oct 1972] [2 of 2]. Confidential. All brackets are in the original. Kissinger wrote “OBE HK” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Haig wrote “Thru Haig” and drew an arrow from it to Janka’s name in the “from” line. An unknown hand crossed out “Thru Haig.”

\(^2\) Attached but not printed. In his December 17, 1971, memorandum to Shakespeare, Kissinger wrote that Laird had recommended to the President that the administration “increase its efforts to improve our Allies’ understanding of U.S. security policy.” Stating that the President had requested that USIA draft an action plan to increase understanding of the administration’s foreign policy, Kissinger commented: “The plan should be based primarily on USIA resources but should provide for close coordination with State and Defense. USIA resources should be diverted from lower priority programs for this purpose and the plan should indicate the programs to be curtailed as well as new and expanded programs.”

this matter, which is State’s responsibility anyway. Your response makes a courtesy offer of such a meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you sign the memo to Shakespeare at Tab A.4

Tab B

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)5

Washington, January 14, 1972

This memo is brief since the point to be made is simple, though critical. We can discuss it further if you wish . . . and I hope you do.

You inform me that Secretary Laird has expressed concern about “serious gaps in the knowledge and understanding of our friends with regard to our foreign policy and national security objectives.” Based on extensive travel and contact, I share the Secretary’s concern.

You request an “action plan . . . based primarily on USIA resources” to address the situation. I respectfully suggest that to submit an operations plan would really mislead both you and the President as to the central and very serious weakness of our foreign information program. It is not lack of plan; it is lack of knowledge.

Full understanding of real objectives . . . both day-to-day and long-term . . . is essential to the creation of effective communications support programs. USIA management is not provided with that understanding, thus the communications support provided to United States foreign

4 Not attached. In the margin below this recommendation, Haig wrote: “HAK—you should only discuss w/ Frank along w/other problem. Al.” Presumable reference is to an undated memorandum from Shakespeare to Kissinger regarding USIA coverage of the President’s trip to China. In it, Shakespeare noted the capacity of the Voice of America to broadcast in Chinese to China, in addition to the 700 hours broadcast in more than 30 other languages about China to other audiences. As such, he asserted: “It is imperative, therefore, both in terms of credibility for the official information arm of the U.S. Government abroad, and in furtherance of U.S. policy abroad, that a representative of the Voice of America be included in the official party that accompanies the President on this historic journey.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan–Oct 1972] [2 of 2])

5 Eyes Only. Shakespeare sent the memorandum to Kissinger under an undated handwritten memorandum that reads: “Basic planning work has been done on this matter. It is of course available to you and your staff. However, the attached memo focuses on what I believe to be the real problem. I have not sent copies to State or Defense. F.”
policy and national security objectives is much weaker and less imagin-ative than it should be. No operational action plan will correct that weakness.

The problem of poor management information is so overriding and so inhibits our ability to provide the kind of support which the nation deeply needs that it would be unfair to the President to respond in any other way.

Frank Shakespeare

6 Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.

161. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant (Scali) to President Nixon

Washington, January 17, 1972

SUBJECT
Chinese Table Tennis Visit

I am pleased to report that plans are now well advanced for the Springtime visit for the Chinese Table Tennis Team.

In answer to Premier Chou En Lai’s announcement, Graham Steenhoven, president of the American Table Tennis Association, is about to cable Peking suggesting that:

1. The Chinese Table Tennis Team, accompanied by appropriate Chinese officials, visit the United States sometime between April 15 and May 15 for a two-week visit. Chinese journalists would be invited to accompany the group.

2. A proposed itinerary includes visits to these seven cities: Los Angeles, Detroit, Washington, New York, Atlanta, San Francisco and Honolulu. Table Tennis matches would be scheduled in Los Angeles, Detroit and Atlanta.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John A. Scali, Subject Files, Box 3, Chinese Table Tennis Team April 21, 1971 [4 of 4]. No classification marking. Printed from an unsigned and uninitialed copy.
3. The Washington stop leaves open the possibility of a meeting with the President (although nothing is said to the Chinese about this), but makes no arrangements for visits with Congressional leaders, political figures and/or government leaders.

4. The visit is being consponsored by the National Committee on United States-China Relations, Inc., which is arranging receptions, dinners, transportation and other details. President Carl F. Stover, who is in frequent contact with me, is personally handling this, and is keeping close tabs on Steenhoven to make sure that all plans are carefully coordinated.

5. The National Committee on United States-China Relations, Inc. has already raised $60,000 to meet the cost of the tour. It anticipates that another $140,000 will be forthcoming from additional pledges. Pan Am has offered a jet charter for all travel. The list of patrons includes some of the most prominent corporations in the United States. Plans are afoot to add contributions from labor and religious organizations.

6. I am personally overseeing all arrangements, hoping to anticipate any problems, including those of security. In keeping with your instructions, the visit will be dignified, yet friendly, with time for some sightseeing and some contact with average Americans. I have suggested that a side trip to Williamsburg be added to the Washington stay, and that the San Francisco visit include a possible visit to the Stanford University campus.

Further, I have suggested that Steenhoven indicate in his cable that it would be desirable that the Chinese team visit the United States in advance of a proposed similar tour of Canada, which tentatively has been set for sometime in April. I will continue to keep you abreast of all developments.

Attached is a list of patrons who have signed up to help us sponsor the visit.²

² Not attached.
162. Circular Telegram From the United States Information Agency to all USIS Posts and Multiple Addressees

USIA–2793/Infor Guide No. 72–3

Washington, February 14, 1972, 1548Z.

2793. USIAC. CINCPAC for POA and AIG 7803, USCAR for OPA pass VOA correspondents. Subject. The President’s Journey—For a Generation of Peace

President’s unprecedented journey marks both beginning and an end. Hopefully, it will be beginning of process of communication between world’s most powerful nation and world’s most populous nation. It is end of over two decades US relations with PRC which were characterized by mutual hostility.

While journey will not rpt not result in instant solutions to US differences with China, opening of dialogue at highest level will serve cause of world peace. For this reason, President’s initiative has received enthusiastic support from American people and worldwide approval.

TREATMENT

Output should be full and factual, conveying serious purpose, historic significance and stated objectives of trip. In coverage of color and ceremony attendant upon this event, our commentaries should not focus on commercial media’s interest in unusual or the bizarre.

Since President himself has indicated probability that the only information on agenda and talks will be contained in joint communiqué upon conclusion of discussions, speculation would neither be productive nor in US interest. Thus every effort should be made to stay with and give full play to official pronouncements, statements and communiqués, as well as reports filed by VOA’s correspondent on the scene. Our media output and field posts should take full advantage of responsible and balanced domestic and foreign reaction.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 28, 1972 OGA—President’s China Trip. Limited Official Use; Priority. Drafted by Chase and Izenberg; cleared by Towery, Hoffman, Crane, Peterson, Bradshaw, Rugb, Arnold Hanson, Jellison, and Dillon and in substance by Holdridge and Alfred Le S. Jenkins (EA/ACA); approved by Monsen. With the exception of Towery, who initialed his clearance, Chase and Izenberg initialed for the clearing officials. Sent to all USIS posts and Berlin, Montreal, Moscow, Toronto, USUN, CINCPAC, and liaison offices USCAR. Sent via telegraph.

President’s most recent Foreign Policy Report provides the conceptual framework within which meetings will take place.

Following are points of emphasis to be used as appropriate:

—We should portray this event as part of President’s worldwide efforts for generation of peace. These include (1) beginning of new relationship with Soviet Union; (2) laying of foundation for improved relationship with European allies and Japan; and (3) creation of a new environment for world’s trade and monetary activities.

—Major purpose of President’s decision to visit PRC is to establish dialogue and develop process for continuing discussions of any differences.

—US well aware of problems as well as opportunities, but accepts challenge of reducing differences and building more constructive relationship.

—Exchange of views is essential to world peace, particularly in an age of turmoil and nuclear weapons.

—US and PRC will meet as equals in efforts to reduce tensions and differences. Neither country expects the other to barter away either country’s principles or abandon its friends.

—US will maintain its commitments and will not negotiate on behalf of third parties.

—US will preserve its close relationship with Japan, as it seeks to gain better understanding with China.

—Rather than attempting to exploit Sino-Soviet differences, US desires to better relations with both countries. US efforts to improve relations with PRC are intended to enhance prospects of world peace. Attempts to interpret US initiatives in any other light lack basis in reason or fact.

—US will maintain its friendship, diplomatic ties and its defense commitment with Republic of China on Taiwan. Ultimate relationship between Taiwan and mainland is not matter for US to decide.

—US does not expect instant solutions. President has emphasized existence of major differences. Thus output should not raise undue expectations.

—China’s cooperation in vast and complex arrangements that accompany the travel of America’s Chief Executive demonstrates a climate of mutual trust and respect. Hospitality of host government, events themselves and the concomitant media coverage are testimony to atmosphere within which detailed arrangements have been made by both governments for President and First Lady.

3 See footnote 3, Document 160.
—Meetings with Chou-En-lai and Mao Tse-tung will be primarily dialogue which US hopes will lead to period of negotiation rather than confrontation.

—Peace in Asia and in the world requires the participation of China whose population represents one quarter of the human race. President goes to Peking without illusions. He goes “committed to improvement of relations between our two peoples, for the sake of our two peoples and the people of the world.”

Shakespeare

4 The quotation is from the President’s Foreign Policy Report for 1972; see footnote 3, Document 160.

163. Letter From the Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Fulbright) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)

Washington, March 1, 1972

Dear Mr. Shakespeare:

I am enclosing a copy of Mr. Ablard’s letter of February 28 to Mr. Robert Dockery of the Committee staff concerning the status of the Country Program Memoranda prepared by the United States Information Agency. I understand from Mr. Ablard’s letter that the Memoranda are regarded as “internal planning or working documents” and...
as such, the Agency believes that “it would not be appropriate to provide these documents to the Committee.”

As you know, the “Agency in Brief 1972” publication\(^3\) describes this material in the following way:

“These CPM’s (Country Program Memoranda) are designed to integrate USIS planning and resource allocation with overall U.S. objectives in the country. The CPM’s encompass total Agency resources devoted to the country, including media products and materials supplied from Washington.” (p. 19)\(^4\)

I believe this information would be of interest to all Members of the Committee and of particular assistance to them in connection with the Agency’s authorization hearings, beginning March 20.\(^4\)

In view of this, I am requesting that the Agency reconsider its decision and agree to make this information available to the Committee. I should appreciate hearing from you on this matter at your earliest convenience and, hopefully, no later than March 10. If the original decision is maintained, I should like to know what the Agency’s legal authority is for withholding this type of information from the Congress.

Sincerely yours,

J.W. Fulbright

\(^3\) The “Agency in Brief” publications were produced annually by USIA’s Management Division and provided background information about USIA’s history, organization, and programming.

164. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^1\)

Washington, March 9, 1972

SUBJECT

PRC Jamming of VOA

Throughout the President’s visit\(^2\) Peking jammers continued to block transmissions of VOA Mandarin language broadcasts. Thus, while a dialogue was underway at the highest level, the official USG broadcasting arm was being frustrated in its effort to reach the Chinese people. By way of historic precedent, it is perhaps worth noting that the Soviets reduced jamming of VOA while Khrushchev was visiting the U.S.\(^3\)

Obviously, the practice of jamming in part negates the meaningful two-way flow of information which the President hopes to achieve. The United States does not jam the English or Chinese language broadcasts emanating from China. Moreover, the views of Chinese leaders are given a full hearing in the American press, particularly now that their representatives are permanently established in New York City.

In equity and fairness, therefore, we believe a case to eliminate jamming should be made to the People’s Republic of China at an appropriate time. At present the overseas broadcasts of Japan, Australia and Great Britain, among others, go unjammed by Peking.

Frank Shakespeare\(^4\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 306, Agency Files, Voice of America. No classification marking. Attached as Tab B to a March 31 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, in which Holdridge wrote: “Mr. Shakespeare asks that at an appropriate time we ask the PRC, as a matter of ‘equity and fairness,’ to eliminate the jamming.” Holdridge recommended that Kissinger sign the attached draft reply to Shakespeare, attached as Tab A to the March 31 memorandum. (Ibid.) In the memorandum to Shakespeare, dated April 4, Kissinger responded: “I can assure you that we will bear this problem [jamming] in mind as we proceed with our discussions with PRC representatives, and will, if an appropriate occasion develops, raise the matter with them.” (Ibid.)

\(^2\) See footnote 2, Document 162.


\(^4\) Shakespeare signed “Frank” above this typed signature.
MEMORANDUM FROM THE PRESIDENT’S SPECIAL ASSISTANT (SCALI) TO THE PRESIDENT’S ASSISTANT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS (KISSINGER)  

Washington, March 9, 1972

SUBJECT

Journalistic Exchange

Bob McCloskey of the State Department reports that he is already receiving numerous inquiries, such as the attached, asking for assistance and/or guidance for journalists’ visits to China under whatever cultural exchange can be worked out with the Chinese government.

He discussed this matter with me today for the purpose of working out a united government position on what, if anything, the government should do to help American newsmen.

I bring this up to you for your consideration in fitting it within the broad framework of cultural exchanges with the Chinese. I offer these points as possible guideposts:

1. The U.S. government must avoid encouraging, or appearing to encourage, the Chinese to select or favor any single American news organization or newsman. We should maintain a hands-off impartiality, leaving it to the Chinese to decide whom to admit, either for visits or for permanent accreditation, if and when the PRC chooses to do so.

2. As a government, however, we might encourage the PRC to allow American newsmen to visit China on reporting assignments and to allow American news organizations to establish permanent news bureaus in China. In return, we should welcome visits by Chinese newsmen and the establishment of permanent news bureaus in the United States.

3. As a government we should agree on a contact point for news organizations and newsmen interested in such reporting, in view of what has been said publicly about such journalistic exchanges, both by the President and in the Chinese-U.S. communique3 after the President’s visit. The State Department might be considered as the appropriate contact point, if it is to handle exchanges generally. State could

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John A. Scali, Subject Files, Box 5, Kissinger. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Ziegler.

2 Not attached.

receive and relay applications to the Chinese and assist in whatever way the government would decide on as appropriate under the policy.

Setting a policy and a procedure to be followed will become increasingly urgent as the applications begin to snowball. It would seem to me that some U.S. government involvement is inescapable in arranging such journalistic exchanges, unlike other visits such as those by physicians, educators, technicians, etc., which could be handled via a sponsoring organization such as the National Committee for the U.S.-China Relations.

As you recall, while in Hangchou, the Acting Director of Information for the PRC, P’eng Hua, at one point advised Ziegler and me that the Chinese had decided to allow 15 American newsmen to remain for a 7–10 day period after the President left China. Ziegler and I both advised him this was a decision for the Chinese to make but that, as a principle, we favored journalistic exchanges. As you know, the Chinese later changed their minds and allowed only two American newsmen to remain behind.4

4 In a March 28 memorandum to Scali, thanking him for his memorandum, Kissinger noted: “Your memorandum has been distributed to members of our staff concerned with the development of exchange programs with the PRC. The guidelines you suggest will be very helpful in the present period as we evolve procedures for handling such exchanges.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John A. Scali, Subject Files, Box 5, Kissinger)
Washington, March 13, 1972

SUBJECT
Modernization of Voice of America Transmitting Facilities

The transmitting facilities of the Voice of America are becoming increasingly obsolescent and unable to match the technical capability of broadcasts from the Communist word. We therefore request consideration of capital funds in the order of $75 million to be spent over the next few years to construct the necessary new transmitting facilities.

The Voice of America provides the only direct, uncensorable, overt channel of the U.S. Government to the peoples and leaders of those countries where the free flow of information is restricted or prohibited. At times of crisis the Voice provides a uniquely useful service.

To achieve maximum effectiveness the Voice must not only be audible but the audience must hear the signal as easily and reliably as the signals of our competitors. The Voice is falling seriously behind the rest of the world in its ability to deliver a competitive signal, especially to the most important targets of East Europe, Russia and China. The Voice has too few transmitters with which to combat the jamming. The rest of the world is building at a very rapid rate. For example, Russia is well along in construction of four massive new transmitting facilities. Their new antennas are significantly more powerful than our best.

Prior to World War II, 50-kilowatt transmitters were among the most powerful for shortwave broadcasting. When the Voice started a

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1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 306, Agency Files, Voice of America. Secret. Kissinger initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Shakespeare sent the memorandum to Kissinger under an undated handwritten note, commenting: "Henry—There is a closely held report on transmitter construction in the USSR that is very relevant to this memo. F." (Ibid.) Attached as Tab B to a March 16 covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, in which Sonnenfeldt stated that Shakespeare had asked for "authorization to discuss with foreign governments plans for replacement and modernization of VOA facilities that will be necessary over the next several years. The cost, he estimates, will be about $75 million. He is not asking for the money yet, but only wants to have conducted some negotiations with the host countries in advance." Sonnenfeldt continued: "I see no problems with this, except that your reply should not be construed as an approval of the funds. (I am trying to run down the 'intelligence' Shakespeare refers to in his covering note.)." He requested that Kissinger sign an attached memorandum, dated March 18. In the March 18 memorandum to Shakespeare, Kissinger noted: "Your plans for modernization create no problems that I am aware of." (Ibid.)
building program in the late fifties in order to catch up with the competition which had continued to build while the Voice sat still during the early fifties, it pioneered the development of 250-kilowatt transmitters. In 1962 there were nineteen such transmitters in the world, fourteen at the Voice of America, four Voice of America transmitters which had been purchased by Radio Liberty, and one Communist Chinese. By 1968 there were 52 transmitters, 32 of which were U.S. There are now 185 high powered transmitters—all operated by their respective governments. The Voice has 45, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe each have four, making a U.S. total of 53. The Communists have 71. Our information indicates that approximately 100 new high power transmitters are under construction or actively planned, many of them of 500-kilowatts or better, of which only nine 250-kilowatts are ours. The last VOA appropriation for new shortwave transmitters was in fiscal 1964 when the construction of the facility at Kavala, Greece was begun.

High power is necessary due to the chaos existing in the shortwave frequency bands. Shortwave broadcasting by all the countries of the world has increased 25% in the last decade. There are now about 1300 transmitters located throughout the world which result in an average of two transmitters on each frequency simultaneously. At peak hours and to highly important targets there may be as many as three or four transmitters on the same frequency. Only the strongest signal will get through. The others will be drowned out. I therefore consider it essential that the Voice of America power be significantly increased.

Our three oldest, most obsolete plants are in Okinawa, Tangier and Munich—the latter using transmitters captured from the Germans in World War II.

Okinawa is the most urgent since the Reversion Treaty requires us to relocate by May 1977. The tone of debate in the Diet indicates that there is little chance of obtaining a reversal or even a delay. The Japanese have agreed to pay us $16 million, the cost of duplicating the old station. However, we need modern high power transmitters if we are to put a competitive signal into Northern China and Asiatic Russia. We have, therefore, proposed to the OMB that we seek an agreement

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with South Korea and construct a modern plant. This would require an additional $20 million.

Due to the potential instability in Morocco, I believe that rather than modernize the plant in Tangier we should build a new one in either Portugal or Spain. The cost, $25 million, would be about the same as modernizing Tangier. The modernization of our plant in Germany would be approximately $20 million.

While these three transmitter facilities are of the highest priority, there are three or four others, including some in the United States, requiring improvement which we should have in order to make our signal competitive throughout the world.

The state of the art, particularly in high power transmitting tubes, has so advanced that it appears feasible to construct a superpower transmitter—10 times more powerful than current transmitters. We believe that the Russians are now experimenting in this field and that we at an early point should consider building and operating such a new generation transmitter. The cost would be about $10 million.

However, we should first concentrate on the highest priority—replacement of the obsolete.

Even with the most friendly countries, experience has shown that negotiating a relay station agreement is a long, arduous and sometimes expensive undertaking. It should not be commenced without assurance that if an agreement is obtained the necessary funds will be provided. Experience also indicates that it takes about five years from beginning negotiations until the transmitters are functioning.

These capital funds—in the order of $75 million—loom so large compared to our regular operating budget of $200 million that it is very difficult to get approval through the normal budgetary channels.

I therefore request that we be authorized to seek the necessary agreements with foreign governments so that when and if such agreements are obtained we will be able to request funds through the normal procedures.

I believe this project to be urgent and of unique importance to our national interest.

Frank Shakespeare
Dear Mr. Chairman:

In response to your letter of March 1, I am enclosing herewith the President’s directive dated March 15 from which you will note that I am unable to comply with your request for the USIA Country Program Memoranda and associated planning documents. I find that the material you request clearly falls within the scope of the President’s directive.

My staff and I have carefully examined the so-called Country Program Memoranda and find that, for the most part, these are planning or working documents subject to subsequent discussion and final approval. These documents are under constant review, and programs are changed in the light of changing developments in Washington and in the host countries.

You will note from the President’s directive that he wishes the Administration to be wholly responsive to Congressional requests subject only to restrictions necessary for the proper functioning of the Executive Department.

With this objective in view, I shall be happy to supply your Committee with summaries of the approved country objectives together with a description of the activities proposed to implement them. Also, our key officers, including myself and the Assistant Directors for each geographic area, are ready to provide your staff with country-by-country briefings as well as being available at all times for questioning by you and your colleagues.

Sincerely,

Frank Shakespeare

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1972. No classification marking. Kopp sent a copy of the letter to Towery under an attached routing slip. (Ibid.) Another attached IOP routing slip indicates that copies were sent to Towery, Hoffman, and Hartry.

2 See Document 163.

3 On March 20, the first day of the hearings, Fulbright indicated that he planned to block the USIA appropriation (H.R. 14734) unless Shakespeare reversed his decision concerning the release of documents to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Shakespeare asserted that the documents “were ‘unevaluated’ working papers from officers in various countries and they did not represent official agency policy.” (“Fulbright in Threat on U.S.I.A. Funding,” New York Times, March 21, 1972, p. 17) Ultimately, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee restored the 23 percent cut in the USIA FY 1973 budget request after McGee offered a floor amendment, which the Senate accepted on a 57–15 roll call vote. (Congress and the Nation, vol. III, 1969–1972, p. 891)
Enclosure

Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers and the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)\textsuperscript{4}

Washington, March 15, 1972

As you know, by a memorandum of August 30, 1971 to the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, I directed “not to make available to the Congress any internal working documents which would disclose tentative planning data on future years of the military assistance program which are not approved Executive Branch positions.”\textsuperscript{5} In that memorandum, I fully explained why I considered that the disclosure of such internal working papers to the Congress would not be in the public interest.

I have now been informed that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee have requested basic planning documents submitted by the country field teams to the United States Information Agency and the Agency for International Development, and other similar papers. These documents include all USIA Country Program Memoranda and the AID fiscal year 1973 Country Field Submission for Cambodia, which are prepared in the field for the benefit of the agencies and the Department of State and contain recommendations for the future.

Due to these new requests for documents of a similar nature to those covered by my August 30, 1971 directive, I hereby reiterate the position of this Administration so that there can be no misunderstanding on this point.

My memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, dated March 24, 1969,\textsuperscript{6} set forth our basic policy which is to comply to the fullest extent possible with Congressional requests for information. In pursuance of this policy, the Executive Departments and Agencies have provided to the Congress an unprecedented volume of information. In addition, Administration witnesses have appeared almost continuously before appropriate Committees of the Congress to present pertinent facts and information to satisfy Congressional needs in its oversight function and to present the views of the Administration on proposed legislation.

\textsuperscript{4} No classification marking.
\textsuperscript{5} Attached but not printed.
\textsuperscript{6} Attached but not printed.
The precedents on separation of powers established by my predecessors from first to last clearly demonstrate, however, that the President has the responsibility not to make available any information and material which would impair the orderly function of the Executive Branch of Government, since to do so would not be in the public interest. As indicated in my memorandum of March 24, 1969, this Administration will invoke Executive Privilege to withhold information only in the most compelling circumstances and only after a rigorous inquiry into the actual need for its exercise.

In accordance with the procedures established in my memorandum of March 24, 1969, I have conducted an inquiry with regard to the Congressional requests brought to my attention in this instance. The basic planning data and the various internal staff papers requested by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Operations and Government Information Subcommittee do not, insofar as they deal with future years, reflect any approved program of this Administration, but only proposals that are under consideration. Furthermore, the basic planning data requested reflect only tentative intermediate staff level thinking, which is but one step in the process of preparing recommendations to the Department Heads, and thereafter to me.⁷

I repeat my deep concern, shared by my predecessors, that unless privacy of preliminary exchange of views between personnel of the Executive Branch can be maintained, the full frank and healthy expression of opinion which is essential for the successful administration of Government would be muted.

Due to these facts and considerations, it is my determination that these documents fall within the conceptual scope of my directive of August 30, 1971 and that their disclosure to the Congress would also, as in that instance, not be in the public interest.

I, therefore, direct you not to make available to the Congress any internal working documents concerning the foreign assistance program or international information activities, which would disclose tentative planning data, such as is found in the Country Program Memoranda and the Country Field Submissions, and which are not approved positions.⁸

I have again noted that you and your respective Department and Agency have already provided much information and have offered to provide additional information including planning material and factors

⁷ An unknown hand underlined the portion of the paragraph beginning with “various” and ending with “me.”
⁸ An unknown hand wrote “clearance of State” after this sentence.
relating to our foreign assistance programs and international information activities. In implementing my general policy to provide the fullest possible information to the Congress, I will expect you and the other Heads of Departments and Agencies to continue to make available to the Congress all information relating to the foreign assistance program and international information activities not inconsistent with this directive.

Richard Nixon

168. Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 27, 1972

SUBJECT

Shakespeare on Correct Usage of the Term “Soviet”

Under cover of a memorandum (Tab A), Frank Shakespeare has sent you a copy of an internal USIA memo in which he recommends that his Agency’s media and men avoid using the term “Soviet” when referring to the people living within the borders of the Soviet Union. These people are not “Soviets,” Frank points out, but Russians, Ukrainians, Latvians, Uzbeks, etc. To call the USSR a “nation,” when it is a multi-national state, fosters an illusion that it is a happy family, rather than the imperialist state beset by nationality problems which it is.

Fulbright criticized this memorandum—particularly its last sentence—at the USIA authorization hearings March 23.² So did Senator Javits (although Frank does not mention this). Excerpts from it got into Friday’s press.³ The Soviet Embassy’s press counselor thereupon

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan–Oct 1972] [2 of 2]. Confidential. Sent for action. Haig initialed the memorandum. He also wrote “THRU HAIG” and drew a line from it to Sonnenfeldt’s name in the “from” line. An unknown hand crossed this out. Janka also initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

² See footnote 4, Document 163.

appeared at State, saying Dobrynin had sent him to request a copy of the memorandum and asking if the press stories had quoted it correctly. State didn’t have the memorandum at the time and doesn’t intend to give the Embassy a copy, but the Soviets (Russians, we mean) will be able to get it when it comes out in the published hearings.

USIA tells us that Frank dashed this memorandum off after a meeting with Dick Pipes, whose views you will recognize in it. He apparently did not consult with anybody on his staff or in State before sending it. Somebody then leaked it to Fulbright, who had it ready for the hearings.

We understand that Frank’s memorandum does not foreshadow any change in Voice transmission policies or other USIA output. The Voice has been broadcasting in several Soviet Union minority languages for a long time and tries to refer to the “peoples of the Soviet Union,” rather than the “Soviet people.”

A possibility, although State discounts it, is that the Soviet Embassy will enter a formal protest once it has the full text. The last sentence of the memorandum will bug the Soviet Union’s authorities, but they are on weak ground to protest for they themselves acknowledge that the USSR is a multi-national state.

Frank is covering his flanks by sending you his memorandum after it was leaked to Fulbright. There is no need to reply unless you wish to warn him to go easy on needling the Soviet Union on nationality issues right at the moment. If you wish to reply, we will draft an answer.

RECOMMENDATION
That you not reply to Shakespeare.
Approve _____ (No reply to be Sent) 4
Disapprove _____ (Sonnenfeldt prepare a reply to Shakespeare).

4 Kissinger initialed the “Approve” option.
Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)\(^5\)

Washington, March 23, 1972

The attached internal memorandum, from me to the head of our Policy and Plans office, was sharply criticized by Senator Fulbright during this morning’s USIA Authorization Hearings before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Fulbright took the position that its intent was to stir up trouble in a foreign country.

Frank Shakespeare\(^6\)

Attachment

Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare) to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans (Towery)\(^7\)

Washington, March 17, 1972

USSR propaganda increasingly refers to the people who live within its borders as “the Soviets.” There is no such thing. The correct meaning of soviet is a council of workers. Use of the word as a collective noun for the population of the USSR should be avoided by our media and officers.

The people of the major nations within the Soviet Union should be referred to by their nationality i.e. Ukrainians, Georgians, Latvians, Russians, Uzbeks, Armenians, etc.

To put it another way, the people of Georgia are Georgians; they are not Soviets, Russians, or anything else.

Correct use of words and terms is important, particularly when we are dealing with opponents who commonly distort meanings for purposes of deliberate confusion, deception, or political and psychological ends.

\(^5\) No classification marking.
\(^6\) Shakespeare initialed “FS” above this typed signature.
\(^7\) No classification marking.
Example: In the February issue of SOVIET LIFE, reference is made to “a new historical community of peoples—the Soviet nation.” This is semantical absurdity. There is no “Soviet nation” and never will be. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a state; it encompasses many nations, and is thus a multi-national state . . . but it is not a nation. To call it so, apart from being grammatically incorrect, is to foster the illusion of one happy family rather than an imperialist state increasingly beset with nationality problems, which is what it is.

Frank Shakespeare

8 Shakespeare initialed “FS” above this typed signature.

169. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, April 3, 1972

SUBJECT

USIA Film on Chinese Communist Subjugation of Tibet

Last year USIA produced a film on the Chinese Communist subjugation of Tibet entitled “Man from a Missing Land,” which Mr. Shakespeare planned to release last September. The film was to be distributed worldwide through USIA offices in each country. Although there had been virtually no reference to Tibet in USIA output for some years, Mr. Shakespeare held that, because Peking continues to attack the Administration (actually Peking had modified its polemics significantly after the advent of ping pong diplomacy), “it makes little sense for the U.S. to refrain from attempting to focus the attention of the world’s peoples on the nature and historical acts of the men in power in Peking. If the Peking Government continues to believe that it is to their advan-

tage to have talks with our leaders, they will do so. If they should decide that it is not to their advantage, we may be sure they will not lack for a pretext to suspend the talks” (Tab B).  

At my insistence, Mr. Shakespeare agreed to withhold distribution indefinitely.

In early January, Mr. Shakespeare informed us he had submitted the film to the Academy of Motion Pictures, Arts, and Sciences for the Academy Award competition (Tab C). The first and second stages of the competition were to have been held in February and March, with the final round set for May. Again at my request, Mr. Shakespeare agreed to withhold the film from the competitions until after the Moscow summit.

I believe we should now inform Mr. Shakespeare that the film should be permanently withheld from distribution or screening through USIA or any other channel. As you know, the PRC toned down its attacks on your Administration (they had very largely refrained from direct attacks on you personally since last spring) during your visit to China, and they have turned the volume and content up again only somewhat since your visit. Peking’s current propaganda attacks against the U.S. Government thus are considerably below what they were only a year ago. Distribution of this USIA attack on PRC rule in Tibet would therefore clearly not be to our advantage. There is the risk of press play for this in-house difference of opinion (the New York Times is aware of the film’s existence), but I think this problem is much smaller and more manageable than those that would certainly result in our relations with Peking if it were released.

At Tab A is a memorandum that I propose sending on your behalf to Mr. Shakespeare directing that this film not be distributed or screened in any way.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you approve my sending the memorandum to Mr. Shakespeare at Tab A.

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2 Not found attached. Tab B is an August 12, 1971, memorandum from Shakespeare to Kissinger, printed as an attachment to Document 147.

3 Not found attached. The memorandum is referenced in a January 12, 1972, memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger (see Document 158), a copy of which is attached at Tab C.

4 See footnote 5, Document 158.

5 Attached but not printed is the draft memorandum. In it, Kissinger noted that the film had come to the President’s attention and that it was “a superb work of film art technically.” However, due to the impact the film might have on U.S.–PRC relations, Kissinger requested that Shakespeare “withhold this film permanently from distribution or screening either abroad or in the United States.”

6 The President neither approved nor disapproved the recommendation.
Dear Mr. Steenhoven:

I wish to express my appreciation for the arrangements that you and your organization are making, with the assistance of the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations, to facilitate the visit to our country of the table tennis team from the People’s Republic of China. Having seen members of this team perform while in Peking, I know that the American people can anticipate a notable demonstration of Chinese athletic skill and good sportsmanship. You and your team conducted yourselves splendidly in April of 1971 as the first American participants in people-to-people contacts with the People’s Republic. I am sure that you will perform in an equally outstanding manner in hosting the return visit of the Chinese team.

As an expression of my personal interest in this important cultural exchange between the Chinese and American people, I have appointed Special Presidential Consultant John A. Scali as my personal representative to greet our guests from the People’s Republic, and to assist you and the National Committee in contributing to their comfort and convenience.

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, Staff Member and Office Files, John A. Scali, Subject Files, Box 3, Chinese Table Tennis Team April 21, 1971 [1 of 4]. No classification marking. Under an April 10 memorandum, Kissinger and Scali sent Nixon a copy of the proposed letter. They wrote: “The release of this letter would serve to underline your personal interest in this tour, without interfering in its private nature. It would thus be a useful signal both to the groups hosting the Chinese and to the Chinese themselves, and it should help improve the climate of the reception afforded the team by the American public.” Kissinger and Scali recommended that the President approve the public release of the letter to Steenhoven. Next to this recommendation, an unknown hand wrote: “Per Ron Ziegler—if anyone is to release letter—Steenhoven should—not WH.” (Ibid.) Earlier, in a March 23 memorandum to Haig, Scali and Solomon recommended that Nixon send a personal letter to Steenhoven, explaining that the letter “will give Steenhoven and his organization a bit of face; and by making explicit the White House backstopping of the tour, it will enable Steenhoven and the NCUSCR to handle any criticism from within their own ranks that the government is taking over their organizations in a clandestine manner. (We are now working out liaison arrangements with these two groups on a cooperative and confidential basis.).” (Ibid.)


3 See footnote 2, Document 130.
I know that you, and all Americans, will accord the visiting delegation the same friendly and hospitable reception that the American table tennis team and our official delegation received in China during the past year. Your organization and the American people will be our ambassadors in this effort to promote greater understanding between the peoples of China and the United States. I wish you every success.  

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

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The President met with the PRC table tennis team from 12:04 until 12:21 p.m. on April 18. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary) For his remarks, made during a Rose Garden ceremony, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 547–548.

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171. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon

Washington, May 18, 1972

SUBJECT

Psychological Warfare Operations Against North Vietnam and North Vietnamese Forces in South Vietnam

In accordance with your request, following is a report on the psychological warfare operations now under way or in the planning

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2 Presumable reference to a May 10 memorandum from the President to Kissinger, in which Nixon stated that he had “very little confidence in the CIA insofar as its developing programs that are imaginative on the propaganda side such as we used so successfully to discourage the enemy in World War II.” Nixon directed “on an urgent basis” that the CIA “implement programs whereby broadcasts, leaflets and every other device are used so that the North Vietnamese troops which are in South Vietnam, and the North Vietnamese populace, particularly in the Hanoi area, are told of the massive public support for the President’s decision [regarding the mining of Haiphong], of the damage that is being done to installations in North Vietnam, of the ships that are with the Marine Division on it that are menacing the coast of North Vietnam and any other story with regard to our military activities which might discourage the North Vietnamese leaders and general population.” The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972, Document 143.
stage against North Vietnam and North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam.

Leaflets

A. Under Way

—144 million leaflets have been or are being printed. Three separate texts are included, directed at North Vietnamese forces and the civilian population in the North. They inform the readers of your May 8 speech, and call on North Vietnamese soldiers and civilians to press for peace on the basis of your proposals and stress the theme of severe setbacks to North Vietnamese forces.

—Of these leaflets, 15.7 million have been dropped in three separate areas of South Vietnam (see map at Tab A) since May 11. These leaflet drops are continuing.

—600,000 leaflets were dropped over Hanoi by F–4 strike aircraft at 2400 Washington time on May 18.

B. Projected

—Dissemination in the next day or so of a minimum of 10 million leaflets has been directed by CINCPAC within the area of the Red River Delta and contiguous territory. 5 million more are to be disseminated by wind-drift in the North Vietnamese panhandle.

—Preparations are being made to use B–52’s for mass leaflet dissemination.

—Leaflet operations are being considered on-going, and materials will be updated as appropriate.

Radio Broadcasting

A. Under Way (Overt)

—VOA has doubled its programming to North Vietnam since May 8. It now broadcasts five hours daily during prime evening time (6–11 p.m.), using five transmitters with strong medium and short wave signals. The last two hours of a million watt, medium-wave transmitter are beamed directly at Hanoi. There has been no jamming.

—VOA’s signal has been upgraded further for beaming into North Vietnam by renting satellite transmission facilities.

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3 Reference is to the President’s address to the nation on the situation in Southeast Asia, which Nixon delivered at 9 p.m. from the White House Oval Office and broadcast live on radio and television. For the text of the address, see Public Papers: Nixon, 1972, pp. 583–587.

4 Attached as Tab C is a map entitled “Indochina,” which demarcates the leaflet drops made since May 11.
—Programming has consisted of your May 8 speech, official U.S. 
Government statements, coverage of the restrained Chinese and Soviet 
reaction to the mining, reportage of favorable U.S. opinion polls on 
your actions, and war correspondent reports emphasizing the positive 
side of the military situation in the South from our standpoint.

—The GVN General Political Warfare Department’s Voice of Free-
dom is broadcasting 20 hours daily to North Vietnam (1100 to 0700 
hours, Hanoi time). Content has emphasized South Vietnamese resist-
ance, the support of South Vietnam’s allies, and North Vietnamese 
casualties.

B. Projected (Overt)

—Widespread dissemination in North Vietnam by air-drop of sim-
ple, one-channel radios is being investigated. Some stocks are believed 
to be on hand, and more can be ordered.

—Refining of VOA programming to increase effectiveness will be 
undertaken. For example, favorable military information which up 
to now has not been broadcast due to its classified nature will be 
declassified.

—Friendly foreign radio broadcasters which are believed to have 
substantial North Vietnamese audiences (e.g., BBC and Radio Austra-
lia) will be requested to include favorable, but accurate, accounts of 
the military situation in South Vietnam and of foreign reactions to our 
military measures which are disadvantageous to North Vietnam.

C. Under Way (Covert)

—Existing black and grey CIA assets (Radio Saigon, Voice of Free-
dom, and other black and grey stations in both South Vietnam and 
Laos) are concentrating on carrying the message to North Vietnamese 
troops and the civil population in the North that dissension exists, 
popular morale is poor, and that criticism of the regime is widespread.

D. Projected (Covert)

—A plan has been drafted for setting up an intensive, Tokyo Rose” 
or “Axis Sally”-type 24-hour a day broadcasting effort against North 
Vietnam. The basic pitch will aim at the people over the heads of the 
top leadership, and will have a very simple theme: the war is madness 
and continues only because of the blind ambition and insane policies 
of this top leadership. The announcers will be persons who speak the 
North Vietnamese dialect.

—To gain audiences, the programming will be made against a 
background of carefully selected musical entertainment, spot news 
conveying an aggregate message of North Vietnamese defeat, and accu-
rate information about such matters as killed or captured North Viet-
namese soldiers and areas where the population will be affected by communications cuts.

—CIA communications specialists are already working with their counterparts in the military service and the Defense Department to arrange for transmitters, determine optimum broadcast frequencies, and resolve the many technical problems this project poses.

—Consideration is being given to the possibility of using a shipborne transmitter if necessary. The U.S. Navy communications ship “Blue Ridge” has been offered by the JCS for this purpose.

Disinformation

—CIA has a covert program underway to convince the top Hanoi leadership that the U.S. Government is in clandestine communication with a high-level dissident faction within the North Vietnamese Party apparatus.

—The first phase of this program involves “leaking” through a trusted agent in Vientiane the alleged word of an American official that “there are some people in Hanoi who also want to end this stupid war” and “thank God not everybody on the Central Committee is crazy.”

—“Evidence” will then be provided from a variety of sources and agents to develop the legend that the U.S. Government is in secret contact with a dissident faction in the North Vietnamese hierarchy. It might even be said that it was this faction which recommended the mining of Haiphong as the only tangible way to break the power of the hard-liners in Hanoi.

—The effects of this disinformation program could be significant—tensions and suspicions within the already-paranoiac Hanoi leadership might increase, and the unity of this leadership might be weakened.

Other

(All of the measures below are under study for early implementation.)

—Air-drop of empty parachutes, radios, and other equipment in various parts of North Vietnam to suggest airborne agent insertions.

—Placement of rubber life-rafts and associated equipment on North Vietnamese beaches to suggest seaborne agent insertions.

—Collection of sea-borne assets and deployment along the North Vietnamese coast to suggest that amphibious assaults are impending.

—Actual launching of small, commando-type operations along the North Vietnamese coast.

—Location of the Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio transmission facilities in North Vietnam, and inclusion of these facilities on regular USAF target listings.
All of the foregoing operations (with the exception of the disinformation program) are being coordinated by the Indo–China Ad Hoc Committee which is chaired by Ambassador Sullivan. Its members include senior representatives of State, CIA, OSD/ISA, the JCS, USIA, and the NSC Staff. The psychological warfare program is being handled at this level to assure rapid decisions and implementation of agreed actions. Under this committee, an intensive effort is now under way to develop more steps to increase the impact of our total psychological warfare program. Regular progress reports will be submitted to you.

Following your telephone conversation with General Haig on May 17, we have undertaken a major effort to rejuvenate and energize all facets of our psychological warfare. Themes will be broadened to encompass those facets of the program included in your May 18 memorandum to General Haig. General Haig has spoken personally to Director Helms, Ambassador Sullivan, Admiral Moorer and all other key officials associated with this program and General Haig is confident that dramatic improvements will follow.

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5 See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. VIII, Vietnam, January–October 1972, Document 155. During their conversation, Nixon commented: “Indicate to Helms that the President ordered doubling of the B–52’s. The President ordered another 100 to come in from Europe. Let them get a little frightened. We don’t do anything from the NSC group. But we have been terribly weak on the propaganda side. This is war! You remember George Creel in World War I and the silly OSS did well at times. I feel this is the time now if the tide of battle is turning to pour in the propaganda.”

6 See ibid., Document 160.
172. Memorandum From A. Denis Clift of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 19, 1972

SUBJECT
USIA Broadcasting after the Moscow Summit²

Acting Director Henry Loomis has sent you a report on USIA’s broadcasting policy to communist and non-communist countries in the post-Moscow-Summit period (Tab B).

In broadcasts to the USSR and other communist countries, USIA plans to:

—indicate US satisfaction with the important summit agreements reached;
—continue to acknowledge disagreements on ideology and Vietnam, clearly stating the US position;
—report internal developments in the USSR that have received significant news attention outside the USSR, with VOA’s emphasis on reporting, not seeking quarrels, eschewing polemics and not magnifying small incidents.

In the autumn, 1972, VOA’s northern Greece facility will begin broadcasts in the Uzbek language.

To non-communist countries, USIA will treat the new US–USSR relationship as an historic and hopeful event, at the same time drawing on statements by the President and other high US officials to emphasize the need for maintaining strength and proceeding cautiously as the US adds still more substance to the emerging world order.

All of these steps would appear to be in order. If you agree, the memorandum for General Haig’s signature to Loomis at Tab A would tell Loomis that USIA is moving in the right direction, particularly with regard to its handling of internal Soviet developments.

RECOMMENDATION

That you approve the memorandum for General Haig’s signature at Tab A.³


³ Kissinger initialed his approval. The signed version of the memorandum is printed as Document 173.
Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, June 16, 1972

SUBJECT
USIA Output After the Moscow Summit

Following the Moscow Summit we have reviewed USIA output worldwide to see which new emphases we should introduce. Our review has included an analysis of the content of the Soviet Union’s media addressed to international audiences. Their output has been cautious, with low-key attention to events in Viet-Nam and a general toning down of critical comment about the United States. At the same time, there has been an increase in the number of spontaneous items devoted to examples of US/USSR cooperation.

To the USSR and audiences in other communist nations we wish through USIA’s media to communicate our satisfaction with the important agreements which have been reached and our desire to supplement these with additional accords. We acknowledge that we disagree on ideology and Viet-Nam; and we state clearly the American position on these subjects. We also express the policy of the United States on the Middle East, hoping that the USSR will join us in supporting United Nations resolutions.

When internal developments in the USSR (intellectuals’ dissent, the treatment of religious and national minorities) receive significant news and editorial attention outside of the Soviet Union, the Voice of America will continue to report this back to its audiences in the USSR. VOA’s policy is to eschew polemics, not to seek quarrels with the Soviet Union, not to attempt to magnify small incidents.

In the autumn of this year construction of the VOA facility in northern Greece will be completed. This will enable us to inaugurate broadcasts in the Uzbek language. Depending on the scheduling of transmitter time, we will also increase VOA Russian from 11 hours

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Confidential. According to another copy of the memorandum, Hoffman drafted the memorandum on June 15 and Towery cleared it. Copies were sent to Jenkins, Roberts, Giddens, Miller, and Haney. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 295, Agency Files, USIA—Vol. IV—1972 [Jan-Oct 1972] [2 of 2])
daily to 13–14 hours a day; and we will increase VOA Ukrainian from two hours daily to three to four hours a day.

To audiences in non-communist countries our radio broadcasts, press, television and film services, and our lecture and book programs will treat the institution of the new US/USSR relationship as an historic and hopeful event which the United States long has strived for. At the same time we shall draw on statements by the President and other high American officials to emphasize the need for maintaining strength and proceeding cautiously as we add still more substance to the emerging world order.

We shall report the facts, which as always have more impact than words.

Henry Loomis

173. Memorandum From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis)\(^1\)

Washington, June 29, 1972

SUBJECT
USIA Broadcasting after the Moscow Summit

This is in reply to your memorandum of June 16. The policies you are proposing for USIA/VOA broadcasts to the Soviet Union definitely appear to be in the right direction. We would agree, with regard to internal Soviet developments, that you should continue to place the emphasis on reporting, at the same time continuing the VOA’s policy of eschewing polemics, not seeking quarrels and not attempting to magnify small incidents in your broadcasts to the Soviet Union.

Alexander M. Haig, Jr.
Major General, U.S. Army
Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

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174. Memorandum Prepared in the United States Information Agency

Washington, August 18, 1972

SUBJECT

USIA’s Report on Bicentennial Planning

REFERENCE

Second Paragraph of President Nixon’s Memorandum of July 28, 1972 for Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies

Much of USIA’s effort in the international communications field is devoted to explaining and interpreting the United States in terms of its historical development, its current policies, its future hopes, its people and its institutions. Therefore, the Bicentennial period adds additional reinforcement to activities in which we would be engaged anyway; and to the extent domestic Bicentennial activities provide new depth and understanding of our system and way of life at home, the more impact USIA can have abroad. For this reason it is virtually impossible to separate out cost data for Bicentennial-related activities. However, we estimate that by FY 1976 a significant portion of our media products and overseas cultural and information effort, as well as training programs for our personnel, will be related to Bicentennial purposes.

Within USIA’s regular program expenditures in FY 1976 approximately $15 million will be used for Bicentennial programs. Lesser amounts will be spent in the years leading up to FY 1976, beginning with the production or acquisition of media materials this year. Some of the most costly items will be two major documentary film productions (discussed below). It is planned that the principal funding for another major item, the “Age of Jefferson” exhibit, will come from the ARBC.


2 The second paragraph of Nixon’s July 28 memorandum reads: “2. Each Agency Head is requested to send Commission Chairman David J. Mahoney a detailed current report of the Bicentennial planning of his organization—in three designated theme areas—together with timing and cost data, by the close of business August 18. A copy of this presentation should also be sent to Leonard Garment, Special Consultant to the President, who is my liaison with the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission, and to Director Weinberger of the Office of Management and Budget.” (National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Subject Files, 1953–2000, Entry A1–1066, Box 142, Bicentennial Planning, 1970–1972)
The sum of $250,000.00 for this exhibit is included in the pending ARBC budget request to the Congress.

**Actions Taken or in Process**

1. **Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee**

   We have felt the need for consultation with the academic community on themes and presentation to foreign audiences of what the two hundred years of the American experience signify, not alone in the historical sense, but also in terms of contemporary and future implications. Consequently we have created an Ad Hoc Committee which will meet for two days in September at Airlie House. Eight distinguished academicians who are now serving or who have served with USIA abroad as Senior Cultural Affairs Officers are the nucleus of the committee; a few USIA and State Department officers will also participate. The committee’s recommendations are expected to guide us in increasing the quality of our Bicentennial-related media products and developing Bicentennial program training courses for our officers.

2. **Training experiences for USIA officers**

   We have placed three of our officers as full-time students in several universities for this academic year to develop their expertise in American Studies. We are conducting a census of Agency officers who could be programmed as lecturers in Bicentennial programs abroad; we are also identifying the most prominent gaps in the American Studies expertise possessed by officers now on Agency rolls. We have had a team from the American Studies Association evaluate the Agency’s Contemporary America seminar, which is one of the principal means we use to keep our officers up to date on the U.S. scene.

   Pending final recommendations from the Ad Hoc Committee mentioned above, we expect to develop several Bicentennial seminars for junior officers. We shall also institute longer-range Bicentennial seminars at mid-career and reorientation levels through which senior Agency officers may reinforce their knowledge.

3. **Media products or activities**

   The following is not an inclusive list of all media products related to Bicentennial purposes, but from each of our media we have selected illustrative examples:

   a) **Press and Publications Service**

   The first five articles in the July 1972 issue of *America Illustrated*, distributed under a reciprocal agreement in the U.S.S.R. and Poland, concern the Heritage and the Horizons themes of the Bicentennial. A copy of the magazine, with the English summary, is enclosed for your
information. Similar material has and will continue to appear in our various regional and centrally-produced magazines.

In addition to articles of analysis and review about U.S. development, we shall, of course, provide reportage overseas of significant activities related to the Bicentennial commemoration in this country.

b) Motion Picture and Television Service

Two major films are presently in production:

1) The American Purpose—designed to show how the constitutional purpose of the protection of “life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness” (enunciated when the U.S. was a rural, individualistic, underdeveloped, frontier society) has been maintained as the ultimate goal even though the country has been transformed into an urban, post-industrial nation.

2) The Continuing Revolution—to show that the United States is a place for change and has a tolerance for change—a place where the institutions and systems of government and society alike allow for and often encourage orderly and sometimes drastic changes. These changes when viewed over the relatively short span of decades are nothing less than revolutionary in their impact and precedent.

c) Radio—Voice of America

Five programs in its FORUM series are now being developed. They will be broadcast in English worldwide to an intellectual audience. Each lecture will be by an outstanding scholar and each series will be coordinated by a distinguished scholar. Each series will also result in a hard- and soft-back book for distribution overseas. The series will include:

1) “Voice of America’s Past—Fifty Years of Recorded History.” Talks will include those of U.S. Presidents and great historical American personages of the past half century.

2) “Americans all: People from Everywhere.” A series of 26 talks on great Americans of various national and ethnic derivations. In addition to the normal FORUM broadcast in English, each talk will be translated and broadcast in the language of the country of origin of the American portrayed or of his ancestors.

3) “How the U.S. Governs Itself.” Twenty-six talks on American government at all levels with proper attention to the role of private groups.

4) “Two Centuries of American Literature.” A radio anthology accompanied by literary comments.


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3 Not found enclosed.
4 See footnote 4, Document 56.
d) Information Center Service

This element of USIA gives professional guidance and supplies materials to USIS information centers and binational centers overseas. As one of its functions it operates a worldwide exhibits program.

1) Exhibit on "The Age of Jefferson"

A major exhibit is presently in the planning stage, in cooperation with the ARBC, which will portray the continuing significance of the ideals and concepts of America’s founding fathers.

Funded by the ARBC, the exhibit will be constructed under USIA direction. The presentation will have international relevance in its treatment of the exchange of ideas which were current on both sides of the Atlantic during the Age of Enlightenment and the resultant contribution to American thought in colonial times. It will show the contributions of Jefferson and other colonial leaders to the emergence of American political and social idealism, as well as to the development of similar political ideals in other countries.

This multi-media presentation will begin U.S. cultural efforts overseas and catalyze the activities of other countries. A joint “opening” in Paris and in Tokyo is projected. The Director of the Grand Palais in Paris has invited the United States to mount an exhibit in the main exhibition hall in 1974. The “Age of Jefferson” would be shown at this prestigious site in the spring of 1974. Discussions are underway with the Nippon Cultural Centre of Japan to sponsor satellite TV coverage of the Paris opening as well as an exhibit in conjunction with the Paris opening. It is hoped that parallel cultural events will take place elsewhere.

The “Age of Jefferson” should stimulate activities in other countries. The Government of France hopes to present a “Sound and Light” commemorating the American Revolution at one of our historic sites such as Mount Vernon or Monticello. The Government of France and other governments and private organizations overseas are exploring ideas for exhibits, seminars, exchanges, research and publications efforts.

“Spinoff” and follow-up cultural programming for the “Age” is expected. In addition to smaller multi-media presentations of the “Age” in other major world capitals, related meetings sponsored by USIS posts and local organizations in other countries can be expected.

“Sound and Light”, audio-visual and film techniques will help the visitor experience the times, the thought and better understand the personalities and contributions of Jefferson and his Age. Historic artifacts or copies, and information material will be part of the exhibit.

World famous architect, designer, film maker and furniture designer Charles Eames is designing the exhibit. Recipient of awards and recognition both in the U.S. and abroad, Eames has created exhibits and films for several major expositions.

After showings of the “Age of Jefferson” in Paris and other European capitals, the exhibit may be suitable for use in the U.S. in 1975 under the sponsorship of the ARBC.

Background

This sampling of the more important Bicentennial activities in which USIA is now engaged should be set into the context of the Agency’s basic mission, which is “to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements. The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communication—personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others” . . . including the administration overseas of the Department of State’s official exchange of persons program.

As a gauge for measurement, there is enclosed a March 30, 1970 Plan for USIA’s Role in the American Revolution Bicentennial Celebration. Now, two years later, we believe we have made significant progress along the general lines that were projected in that plan.

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6 See Document 79.
175. Memorandum From the Chairman of the USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee (Winks) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson) and the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Loomis)¹

New Haven, Connecticut, September 11, 1972

SUBJECT
Summary and Recommendations of initial meeting of the USIA/CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee, held at Airlie House September 5–7, 1972²

1. The Ad Hoc Committee, and especially the nine experienced academicians, agreed that the Bicentennial commemoration presents USIA and CU with a great opportunity to strengthen international communication; it makes certain recommendations as to emphasis and specific next steps; and it urgently asks for action. The committee believes that if the job is done well in the areas of our recommendations, a quality dialogue between the U.S. and other nations may very well be enhanced for some years in the future.

2. Since the Bicentennial celebration marks an anniversary of two hundred years of working together, programming targeted upon Bicentennial projects should emphasize, in particular, three vital elements in American life:

   a) the dynamic process that has historically relied on consensus and cooperation, through which the United States has become one of the oldest and most continuously stable constitutional nations in the world, while at the same time pacing the world in social change;³

   b) the United States as the Inquiring Society, engaged in persistent and healthy self-criticism and efforts at reform, as an indication of the confidence we have in our past and our hopes for evolving institutions;⁴

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 28, 1972 PPL.—Program Coordination. No classification marking. Loomis initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum twice. In a September 29 letter to Loomis, Winks expressed his thanks for USIA and CU leadership at the Airlie House Conference, adding: “I felt that the conference went well, and I have high expectations for at least some of the recommendations.” (Ibid.) Dunlap responded to Winks in an October 12 letter, thanking him for his “kind note” and explaining that Loomis had departed USIA on September 29 to take up his new position as President of the Corporation for Public Broadcasting. Dunlap indicated that he would send Loomis a copy of Winks’s letter and Dunlap’s reply. (Ibid.)

² Loomis initialed the portion of the subject line beginning with “Summary” and ending with “Committee.”

³ Loomis underlined “dynamic” and “consensus and cooperation.” He also placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.

⁴ Loomis underlined “Inquiring Society” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
c) the United States as still an open society, a land of opportunity in its regional and cultural diversity, in its fluidity and mobility, and it its mature ability to recognize rather than hide its problems.\(^5\)

3. The Ad Hoc Committee resoundingly endorsed a series of specific projects and urges USIA and CU to provide the necessary program support, in funding and in staff, to bring these proposals from idea to reality:

**RECOMMENDATIONS TO CU**

a) Proposal I—that a Bicentennial Institute of Advanced American Studies (BIAAS) be created, which would strengthen international exchange focused on American Studies and the study of contemporary America. The BIAAS should be a secretariat which would receive funds, and provide facilitative assistance for foreign scholars, artists and cultural leaders, publicists and Americanists. Some of these research visitors might want to be accredited to universities, major research libraries, the Library of Congress and local institutions or libraries, or presidential centers. The funding for the BIAAS should reflect external support (from foreign governments and foundations for their nationals) in partnership with funds from the U.S.

b) Proposal II—that there should be an International Congress of Foreign Associations of American Studies in the U.S. in 1976. The strengthening of international exchange can usefully be focused on groups with strong personal and professional commitments to America. In most major countries associations of American Studies, and professional organizations with American links, exist and would welcome the chance to come to the U.S. in the Bicentennial year. The Department of State, USIA, ARBC and perhaps Colonial Williamsburg should now plan space-available international conference facilities. The program should be coordinated with the American Council of Learned Societies, the Social Science Research Council, the Conference Board and foreign scholar associations. As for funding, again foreign governments and foundations should be invited to aid their national associations and CU should appropriate FY ’76 funds to insure American host government costs.

c) Proposal III—that exchange opportunities be vastly expanded as a special Bicentennial International Visitors Program. We believe that exchange is the single most valuable instrument of building empathy and understanding abroad for the United States. The international visitors program concept is sound, universally supported, and cost effective. We emphasize that this program should reach out to all

\(^5\) Loomis underlined “open society” and placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.
elements of society—e.g., publicists, parliamentarians, labor leaders, journalists, youth. We recommend, therefore, that the CU program should be expanded; that there should be coordinated use of the exchange of persons program of other governmental agencies for Bicentennial purposes; and that the Festival USA portion of the Bicentennial, in which both public and private agencies will be cooperating, should result in quality attention for our foreign visitors. We wish to give reality to the President’s invitation to the world to come and help us celebrate our two hundred years of achievement and our next hundred years of inquiry and experimentation. We stress that this must be a program of quality.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO USIA

d) Proposal IV (Training Programs)—that specific steps must be taken to provide USIA officers with a massive new training program to prepare them in fresh, new ways for the Bicentennial years, for we believe that few officers are now able either to take advantage of the unique opportunities offered by the Bicentennial concept or to implement the newer approaches to American Studies which must be the basis for future programming. To this end we overwhelmingly recommend that the Agency provide the necessary staff—beginning immediately with at least one officer assigned for this specific purpose—and funds to make possible the introduction of two proposals in this fiscal year:

(1) The development of a four-to-six-week course on the American Experience, which, over the next four years, would be offered at least twice a year and be required of all officers.6 The content of this course should be developed by a top-flight committee of academicians and Agency officers. Where it may prove useful, this course should introduce officers to the idea of similarity and contrast between national experiences as an organizing device for programming, in addition to giving emphasis to the uniqueness of America’s historical experiences.7

(2) The organization of one Experimental Workshop for June, 1973 on special subject areas of the American Experience (Art & Culture, Race & Society, Education & Life, and the like) which could be scheduled at the more attractive centers of local and State preparations for the Bicentennial. By assigning USIS officers to work-study experiences with

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6 In a March 2, 1973, memorandum to Keogh (then USIA Director) and Kopp (then USIA Deputy Director), Towery (then Deputy Director for Policy and Plans) indicated that IPT would, beginning in FY 1974, “offer twice a year a six or eight week course in the ‘American Experience’ which will be required of all Foreign Service Officers before assignment abroad.” The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, vol. XXXVIII, Part 2, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; Public Diplomacy, 1973–1976, Document 85.

7 Loomis placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent 5 points under “Proposal IV (Training Programs).”
such groups, much needed nationwide experience with the myriad of local and regional Bicentennial programs would be gained by our personnel.

We further agree that the Agency should move in fiscal year 1974 to promote four other approaches to training:

(3) Increase the number of full university study years in *American Studies* from the current level of approximately 2–3 per year to 6–8 per year.

(4) Establish a work-study program and training relationship with the Smithsonian Institution under which Agency officers would be detailed for three-to-six-month or even one-year periods to Divisions of the Smithsonian, particularly those which are charged with developing and preparing Bicentennial materials, exhibits and programs.

(5) Explore the possibility of organizing assignments of a number of senior Cultural Affairs Officers to the staffs of leading libraries and research institutes known for their outstanding collections of Americana. Such assignments would be for three to six months and be for the purpose of giving each CAO a professional experience with an outstanding cultural institution. (Possibilities: the Huntington Library in California; the New York State Historical Association Headquarters in Cooperstown, New York; the Winterthur Museum in Delaware are the type of institution we suggest.)

(6) Explore the desirability of assigning 4–5 officers each year to the staff of the American Revolution Bicentennial Commission itself as well as with other organizations making special efforts in the preparation of Bicentennial Programs, i.e., The American Heritage Publishing Company, the American Association for State and Local History, Society of American Historians, and the like.

e) Proposal V—We also feel that the Agency should give serious consideration to appointing, at least to our posts in London and Paris, a special Bicentennial Program Officer for the period 1973–1977. This person should not be below the level of 4, and might ideally be a senior officer (retired or retiring) on a consultant basis. If SCAOs are available at these posts, the BPO need not be an academic.8

4. Following considerable reflection and discussion, the Ad Hoc Committee identified six themes that may be said to run through the course of American history. It was decided that these themes in different forms might be considered by the Agency for programming through all its media products during the Bicentennial years. The themes are as follows:

I. Regionalism and variety in the United States9

II. Pragmatism and innovation: America as the Responsive Experimental Society

III. Conflict and Order: The Search for Social Responsibility

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8 Loomis placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this point.

9 Loomis placed a checkmark in the left-hand margin next to this and the subsequent 5 themes.
IV. Tradition and Continuity
V. Pluralism and Consensus
VI. Mobility and Change: The Evolving Society and the Permanent Revolution

5. Suggesting the importance attached to this aspect of the meeting at Airlie House, the conference organized itself into six sub-groups, each devoting the better parts of an evening and a morning to developing the tentative themes. Refinement and organization of these statements for further presentation must await the official transcript and notes, and media implementation recommendations could well be an item on the Agenda of the February meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee.

In the meantime, however, the committee singles out several aspects about the United States which deserve consideration in planning media products or other programming projects. We know, too, that several of the Agency’s elements have produced materials on some, if not all, of these subjects—but we are convinced the Bicentennial years heighten the need for additional concentration and more effective material. The following list of ideas relates quite directly to our elements a), b) and c) set forth in paragraph 2 of this memorandum:


2. The continuing American commitment to its Constitution; how that Constitution evolved from the period we are now commemorating; and how our Federal system works.

3. Our two-party system.

4. The role of consensus in America.

5. Our continuing commitment to the free electoral process, as evidenced by the fact that this nation has never suspended its elections in time of national emergency, e.g., 1864, 1944, thus assuring an orderly process of political change and continuity.

6. Voluntarism and the concept of community—voluntary organizations and movements are formed to effectuate the desires of their members, and to bring about reform, change and responsiveness on the part of government. Such groups are composed of people who share a common concern and are doing something about it (with and without the assistance of government); doing it of their own free will (citizen initiative); in response to a sense of civic responsibility—and within a political framework which permits and encourages such dynamism.

7. Consumer advocates and movements—as examples of how the individual and like-minded groups can bring change.

8. Community participation in education, a tradition dating from pre-independence to the present, as an expression of the nation’s commitment to free and ultimately universal education.
(9) Benefits to the society and to the individual of America’s commitment to a variety of forms and levels of university education.

(10) America as the “land of beginning again”, to draw upon the realities and strengths of our mobility.

(11) Adaptability and Openness—not the rootless American, but the American who carries his sense of identity with him, depending more upon his values than his environment.

(12) The continual fluid and wide economic choices open to Americans, as based on the free enterprise system celebrated by Adam Smith in 1776 in his publication in that year of Wealth of Nations.

(13) The role of the First American, who cannot be ignored in a year commemorating 1776: the Indian.

(14) The acceptance and tolerance, if not enjoyment, of change.

(15) The overseas view of America, with emphasis on the friendly and shrewd criticisms of writers such as Tocqueville, Beaumont, Siegfried, Bryce, Brogan, Revel, and other contemporary observers. (To illustrate that we are an open and self-critical society, we also recommend holding seminars during the Bicentennial to which distinguished foreign critics of America would be invited.)

(16) The relationship between private enterprise and good taste, showing the businessman and entrepreneur to be among those who are “creative” in the sense too often narrowly restricted to the arts.

(17) The Inventor: the American as tinkerer, improver, entrepreneur of ideas, and dreamer.

(18) The origins of new styles in the Arts evolving from our experimental society, especially in the dance, music and architecture.

(19) Philanthropy in America.

[Omitted here is a listing of members of the USIA–CU Ad Hoc Bicentennial Planning Committee.]

Robin W. Winks

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10 An unknown hand signed for Winks above this typed signature.
SUBJECT

Review on Foreign Students

As part of the study of “International Exchanges” sent to you on August 13, 1971, a separate review of foreign students was undertaken by the Inter-Agency Youth Committee (IAYC). This memorandum summarizes the IAYC report, previously forwarded, and describes action taken by the Under Secretaries Committee.

The IAYC study focused on (a) the significant increase in the number of foreign students in the U.S.—from 34,000 in 1955 to about 150,000 currently, (b) the fact that their U.S. education will assure many from less-developed countries of access to influential positions at home, and (c) the experience they receive here, especially as it affects their attitudes towards the U.S. and as it relates to the tasks they will undertake when they return home.

After reviewing this IAYC study and the basic study on “International Exchanges” which resulted in NSDM 143, the Under Secretaries Committee has taken the following steps:

1. Increased Attention and Resources

The Committee has decided that the presence here of large numbers of foreign students represents a foreign policy opportunity of sufficient magnitude to warrant increased attention and that such increased attention should focus particularly on the more than 90 percent who are not sponsored by the USG.

2. Policy Objectives

While there should be a continuing desire that foreign students meet their educational goals in the U.S., the Committee has agreed that the following objective should govern the design and administration of expanded USG programs for foreign students:

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2 See Document 141.
—That foreign students should obtain a balanced understanding of the U.S. with emphasis on how political, economic and social progress and the resolution of conflict are sought through popular participation and democratic means.

The Committee has also approved two other objectives, while recognizing that they would be somewhat more difficult to attain.

—That foreign students should develop in the U.S. lasting and useful contacts, both professional and social, that may over time strengthen the links between the U.S. and other nations in key social and political sectors.
—That foreign students should acquire an ability to identify and solve problems in their own societies.

3. Review of Resource Allocation

It has been decided that the new interagency subcommittee on international exchanges to be established in accordance with NSDM 143 will review the relative distribution of Government funds devoted to the seven percent of all foreign students who are USG-sponsored and to the remainder who are not so sponsored, and to consider possible changes in this distribution. The bulk of these funds is administered by the Department of State and the Agency for International Development.

4. Program Level

It has been decided that this new interagency subcommittee will make a recommendation on the specific level toward which the program undertaken by the Department of State for non-USG-sponsored foreign students should be expanded, taking into account the recommendations and options presented by the Inter-Agency Youth Committee.

5. Establishment of New Office

The Department of State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has been requested to establish an Office to plan and direct approaches toward foreign students, with emphasis on those here under other than USG auspices, and to seek to staff and fund the new Office at a level that assures it the means to carry out innovative initiatives.

6. New Program Approaches

The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs has been requested to direct the new Office, in carrying out its responsibilities for expanded USG attention to foreign students, to be guided by the following approaches:

—The stimulation of a national awareness of foreign student requirements and the guiding of private programs so as to fulfill approved objectives.
—Particular attention to the limited number of universities where almost half the foreign students are congregated.
—A focus on carefully selected groups of foreign students of high potential.
—Encouragement of continued assistance to foreign students by state governments and private universities so that study opportunities are not limited to the well-to-do.
—The continuing need for adequate U.S. counseling and the orientation of foreign students before they come to the U.S.

Steps Being Taken

By law and by Executive Order, the Department of State is the major focal point within the Federal Government for programs involving foreign students. The Department’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs is also the only Government agency expending funds on programs for the so-called “non-sponsored” students.

The Department of State fully recognizes the importance of these foreign students, and supports the IAYC recommendations for providing such students with increased Federal attention. The Department’s budget for non-USG-sponsored students has increased from $0.4 million in FY 1970 at the beginning of this Administration, to a current request to Congress for $1.5 million in FY 1973. In addition, the Department has requested in FY 1973 appropriations bills approval for new positions which could become available to support staffing increases.

As experience and opportunities warrant, and within an overall Departmental resource allocation system, the Department will be expanding this programming activity. At the same time, coordination efforts with other Governmental agencies will be enlarged, particularly under the international exchanges subcommittee of the Under Secretaries Committee, described in NSDM 143, as well as in the Inter-Agency Youth Committee.

John N. Irwin II
I–14502/72

Washington, October 16, 1972

SUBJECT
Department of Defense/United States Information Agency Cooperation Agreement

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, and the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans of USIA have reviewed the proposed agreement on peacetime cooperation between the Department of Defense and the United States Information Agency and recommend your approval of it.

The agreement provides for active cooperation between DOD and USIA for the purposes of enhancing overseas understanding of U.S. national security policy and building confidence in U.S. strength and determination to honor its commitments. Toward these ends, it provides mechanisms for expanded relations between ISA and USIA, establishes an officer exchange program, and recommends closer coordination between DOD and USIA in overseas posts. In addition, it provides for the assignment of USIA advisors to designated military commands. Those positions specifically mentioned in the agreement are already in existence; future assignments of USIA advisors to other commands will be considered on an individual basis, taking into consideration the needs and desires of those commands.

It is our understanding that the agreement will not change interagency relations in the public affairs field. In accordance with Department of Defense policies regulating DOD public affairs activities, USIA advisor duties will not extend to Department of Defense public affairs activities and the exchange program established by the agreement will not include the military public affairs community.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Associate Directorate for Programs, Subject Files of Basic Operating Documents, Entry P–100, Basic Documents 1972. No classification marking. The date on the memorandum is stamped.
Recommendation: That you sign the attached agreement.

G. Warren Nutter

R. Kenneth Towery

Enclosure

Agreement Prepared in the Department of Defense and the United States Information Agency

Washington, undated

DOD/USIA Cooperation Agreement

The United States Information Agency and the Department of Defense (hereinafter referred to as USIA and DOD) have agreed to establish close relations in the creation and execution of policies and programs. The two agencies thus hope (a) to achieve better understanding by overseas audiences of U.S. national security policies and (b) to build confidence both in U.S. strength and in its determination to honor its military commitments.

This agreement will apply during the times of peace.

In order to achieve their mutual objectives, the two agencies have agreed to the following cooperative arrangements:

1. Coordination:

The principal points of coordination representing the agencies under this agreement will be:

a. USIA’s Office of Policy and Plans (IOP).

b. DOD’s Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA).

Representatives of these offices will meet periodically to develop plans and policies to effect close cooperation between the two agencies in achieving the objectives described above.

The relationship between these offices also will entail sharing of defense and information policy matters of mutual interest, policy administration of the DOD/USIA Exchange Program, and cooperation in the creation of policies, plans, and programs to support U.S. defense policies abroad. In particular, on matters relating to national security

2 Hoffman signed for Towery.

3 No classification marking.
plans, military power, and military operations, ISA will advise and assist USIA as appropriate in developing USIA policies and programs aimed at increasing foreign understanding and acceptance of U.S. security policies. In turn, USIA will advise ISA on the public impact of U.S. defense programs and policies abroad. To strengthen this relationship, USIA will assign a senior FSIO to serve full-time in ISA on the staff of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Policy Plans and NSC Affairs. His functions are described in an annex to this Agreement.4

The Directorate of Plans and Programs in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs will remain the liaison point with USIA on public affairs matters.

USIA will continue to assign a senior FSIO from its National Security Advisory Staff in IOP as Defense Affairs Advisor. This officer will serve as the principal USIA liaison between offices in the two agencies.

2. Psychological Operations:

USIA will continue to maintain working relations between its Office of Policy and Plans and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for the purposes of exchanging information of relevance to psychological operations planning and of participating in psyop contingency planning. USIA has assigned a senior FSIO (on a reimbursable basis) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff (DOCSA) on a full-time basis. His principal function will be as an advisor on psychological operations and contingency plans for such operations.

3. USIA Advisors:

USIA will assign senior FSIOs, as available, and upon agreement with DOD and the Services, as USIA Advisors to designated military commands. Among those currently assigned are the Advisor to the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, and the Advisor to the John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance. The latter also serves as advisor to the Southern and Atlantic Commands for psychological operations contingency planning. Functions of USIA Advisors will vary with assignment, but their responsibility will be to provide the commands with appropriate guidance with respect to USIA policies and foreign audience attitudes. The rank of USIA Advisors will be determined by the requirements of the individual positions. Annexes to this Agreement describe the positions which have been established.5

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4 Attached but not printed.
5 Attached but not printed.
4. National War College:

USIA will continue to assign a senior FSIO to the National War College faculty. He will advise selected students, conduct discussion groups and seminars, moderate lecture sessions, and direct selected student research.

5. Exchange Program:

In addition to the above assignments, to enhance mutual understanding of agency operations and missions, DOD and USIA will establish a program of exchange between their personnel. Initially, not more than six officers from each agency may participate in the program at any one time. USIA participants may be assigned to OSD, JCS, and military Service staffs. DOD personnel may be assigned to research, regional, program development, or planning and policy offices of USIA. Exchange officers normally will be assigned in the Washington, D.C. area; in exceptional cases, they may be assigned elsewhere. Details of the exchanges will be mutually agreed on by the staff elements concerned through IOP and ISA. Participants normally should be no higher than Lt. Col./FSIO–4/GS–14 in rank.

6. Training:

The two agencies will endeavor to make spaces in appropriate training courses available to each other.

7. Overseas:

The offices of the two agencies will work together overseas to the maximum extent feasible, given differing basic missions and resource limitations, to support policies and programs which can enhance foreign understanding and acceptance of U.S. national security policies, military posture, alliances, and the U.S. military presence abroad. As appropriate, USIA and DOD military components overseas are encouraged to establish joint groups (on either a country or area basis) to facilitate interagency communications and cooperation.

8. Agreement Review:

These arrangements will be subject to review and revision one year after having been in force and as appropriate thereafter.

Melvin R. Laird
Frank Shakespeare
178. **Action Memorandum From the Director of the Art in Embassies Program, Department of State (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rogers**

Washington, October 20, 1972

**SUBJECT**

Art in Embassies Program

After three months as Director of the Department’s Art in Embassies Program, I have come to the conclusion that we do not have a thoughtful *Art* in Embassies Program but rather an “Art Decorating Embassies Program.”

We tend to gather unrelated objects. The ambassadors, for the most part, are politically reasoned and lean toward literary ideas rather than appreciation of the artistic merits of individual paintings and other artworks.

To cover U.S. interests and include the interests of the ambassadors; to cover artistic interests; and even to go as far as covering U.S. sociological interests, I recommend that art works be collected with a theme and meaning of how one work supports another.

We should have on hand X number of collections. They should be composed of 30 to 40 works of art. Each collection should be on a different theme with backup material intellectually thought-out. These collections would then be broken down into 4 or 5 works for various rooms in different embassies, resulting in X number of small groups of art works on X number of themes in each embassy.

For example: After determining the ambassador’s interests and the interests of X country for which a collection is being assembled I should be able to say: “You need four paintings for the dining room. X country is primarily an agrarian country. Here are four paintings representing our farm lands: one a rural scene, one a marketing scene, one a domestic scene in an agricultural area, as well as one contemporary work by an artist from a farming region. You need six paintings for the drawing room. For contrast, here are six paintings of New York City at various stages from 1700 to present, and, for the library, X number of old political cartoons of Washington, Lincoln, Jefferson, etc., which have

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 28, 1972 OGA—State (Sept.–Dec). No classification marking. An attached USIA Action Request slip indicates that copies were sent to Shakespeare, Schneidman, and Towery and additional copies were sent to Winkler, Crane, Jenkins, Carter, Pistor, Austin, Sivard, and Gildner. The Department’s Art in Embassies staff (A/ART) was located under the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Operations, Bureau of Administration.
artistic merit, but also show our historical greats had press problems. Perhaps in entrance hallways: paintings and sculptures of fern, fauna, and birds of the U.S. from a collection on a naturalists’ theme.”

There are a million themes to build upon:
1. Transportation—from prints of the pony express to Lester Cook’s space paintings.
2. National parks of America and ecology themes.
3. Art trends of various periods.
4. Theater, science, industrial, and architectural themes.
5. Paintings of historical events and persons. (Shouldn’t we prepare for embassies to participate artistically in the Bi-Centennial-1976?)
   And so forth and so on.
   This gives the ambassador something he can get his “teeth” into to use as an extension of both his and the U.S.A.’s interests, plus show a variety of artistic talents.

Artists and lenders are infinitely more prone to lend a work of art if they think the work is needed to contribute to a concrete idea with a specific need for his work to be included, rather than being asked to loan a work to cover a wall in some ambassador’s house.

No one person can be director, and curator of a museum, let alone a number of mini museums scattered over the world.

Curatorial help is essential if such a program is to be put into effect. The curatorial work of research, collecting, cataloging, and backup material for each “theme” collection can be contracted out through museums and/or universities’ Fine Arts Departments. Universities are eager for such compensatory programs for their students and teachers, and the museums for their younger curators in training.

I am sure both museums and universities would give guidance to the contracted curator and offer research facilities. The fees for each curator to put together 30 or 40 works in a collection would be between $2,000 and $2,500 for about a 3 months’ assignment.

There are endless sources, both private and public, to fund such a program. Funds raised would be donated directly to the universities or museums and tagged for this particular project, which would finally benefit the State Department’s Art in Embassies Program.

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2 Presumable reference to artist Hereward Lester Cooke, a curator at the National Gallery of Art who also served as an adviser to the NASA Art Program.
An important “by product” of such an operation would be the good will and better understanding that a “work together”-“help each other” situation generates. Art historians need jobs and the Department, as any “establishment” organization today, could use this added P.R.3

3 Rogers initialed his approval. A stamped notation reads “Oct 27 1972.” Attached but not printed is an undated set of procedures, upon which Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Operations John M. Thomas initialed his approval.

179. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)1

Washington, October 23, 1972

SUBJECT

VOA Outstanding Performance in the Psywar Campaign against North Vietnam

The President has asked me to convey to you his appreciation for the outstanding work done by the Voice of America over the past months in its support of the campaign to bring home to North Vietnam the determination of the United States in the wake of the North Vietnamese invasion of the South.2

1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 306, Agency Files, Voice of America. Confidential. Kennedy and Holdridge sent the memorandum to Kissinger under an October 23 memorandum, stating: “VOA has done a first-rate job broadcasting to North Vietnam in support of the psywar campaign directed by the President. Early in the campaign Frank Shakespeare diverted personnel and other resources toward the North Vietnam target, away from other areas, to make certain VOA broadcasts would have the impact on the North Vietnamese that the President’s directions called for. The contents of VOA programs have been imaginatively worked out to keep pressure on the DRV. We believe that the DRV reaction to these broadcasts is proof of their effectiveness.” (Ibid.)

He has been kept fully aware of your efforts to assure that the fullest coverage was provided and has noted with satisfaction the imagination and persistence with which the VOA and the Agency have pursued this task.

The President considers this an example of professionalism and dedication of which the United States Information Agency can be justly proud.

Henry A. Kissinger

180. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Chairman of the NSC Under Secretaries Committee (Irwin)

Washington, October 30, 1972

SUBJECT

Foreign Student Programs in the U.S.

The President has noted with interest the Inter-Agency Youth Committee study on Foreign Students in the U.S. and the Under Secretaries Committee memorandum of October 13, 1972, reviewing the IAYC report and describing actions undertaken by the USC.

The President noted with approval the statement of objectives and the organizational changes described in the USC memorandum of October 13.

It is recommended that two other objectives be added to those included in the USC memorandum of October 13:

—Resolution of the problem of non-return by foreign students to their home countries should be given increased attention.
—Foreign students should be provided language training and orientation on the American university system (not necessarily under U.S. Government auspices) sufficient to enhance the likelihood that they will benefit fully from study in the U.S.

2 See Document 176.
The new Interagency Subcommittee on International Exchanges, mandated by NSDM 143, should be formed as promptly as possible in order to undertake its review of the distribution of Government resources devoted to foreign students in the U.S.

Henry A. Kissinger

181. Memorandum From the Director, Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State (Roth) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Richardson)\(^1\)

Washington, November 9, 1972

SUBJECT
Activation of the Subcommittee on International Exchange

I suggest that we aim for the first organizational meeting of the Subcommittee on International Exchange on or about November 20. The following action must be taken before that time:

1. Approval of the attached draft invitation, agenda and functional statement for the committee.
2. Distribution of these papers by November 13. We should probably allow about a week before meeting date to assure that the agency principals can attend.

Organization of the work of the Subcommittee

The major projects of the Subcommittee on International Exchange should be carried out by working groups drawn from the participating agencies. Some of these groups should be permanent, others should be established to undertake a specific project and abolished at the completion of the project.

To assure the orderly handling of the work of the Subcommittee on Exchanges, I would recommend the establishment of a Working Group on Agenda and Project Coordination to allow all agencies a voice in the preparation of agenda; to assure that assignments are

\(^{1}\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Office of Public Information, Records Relating to a Study of International Exchange Programs, 1970–1975, Entry A1–37, Box 1, 143—Committee Meetings. Confidential. Drafted by Roth; cleared by Hitchcock and Fox.
carried out; and to clarify the issues and recommendations for review and approval by the Senior Group. It would be formed of a staff level person designated by each agency, to be chaired by the Director, CU/OPP.

Another permanent Working Group that should be established at the first meeting is a Science Agency Working Group to be chaired by a representative of the Science Advisor’s Office (OST). The sixteen science or science related agencies outlined in the study should be asked in a letter from you to relate to the Subcommittee’s work through the Working Group.

I believe that these are the only working groups that should be established at the first meeting. The Agenda and Project Coordination Working Group should meet before the second Subcommittee meeting to prepare study outlines and submit for review and approval a priority listing of work tasks to be undertaken.

Subcommittee Work Projects

The following projects are required by NSDM 143:

1. Developments of methods for obtaining data from government agencies on the outgoing American participants in exchange programs for inclusion in the data bank.

2. Establishment of methods and procedures for reviewing the total budget request of all U.S. Government agencies in the exchange field to permit recommendations regarding resource allocation for this area of government activity. This should also permit identification of leadership groups where new programs or selective increase in old programs may be required.

3. In addition, the October 30 memorandum from Dr. Kissinger directs that the Committee undertake the study recommended by the IAYC of the relative distribution of government funds devoted to support of governmentally sponsored versus privately-sponsored foreign students studying in the U.S.

Other projects that require early attention are:

1. Continuation of the field work of the study on Brazil and/or West Germany to determine methods for obtaining parallel coordination overseas to that of the Subcommittee.

2. A review of the spectrum of scientific disciplines included in the programs of the sixteen science agencies.

These projects should be started relatively soon after the establishment of the Committee so that working relations and a general sense

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2 See Document 180.
of purpose on the part of Committee members can develop. However, to establish the value of the Committee to all members care should be exercised in the choice of topic studied so that the benefits of coordination can be recognized by all agencies at the outset rather than joining some of the more difficult issues that can be better handled after the committee has developed a set of operating relationships.

**CU Staff Support to the Subcommittee**

The Committee offers the opportunity for CU to gain a broader knowledge of what is being done in all “exchange activities” throughout the Government. The Committee’s activities should provide opportunities for CU staff members to participate in studies with people from other Government agencies. Therefore, I believe that the work of the Committee should be integrated into the work of the Bureau insofar as practical, and should not be isolated from ongoing day-to-day activities. (The former Federal Interagency Council suffered from this isolation, and its activities had little effect on total Bureau work, which generally is thought of only as moving CU grantees).

I propose the establishment of a small unit in OPP, headed by the Deputy Director of OPP who will have the title, Secretary to the Subcommittee on International Exchange, assisted by four officers and one secretary to fill positions granted in the 1973 budget. This group should handle the staff support and paper work activities carried out by all parts of the Committee structure. Responsibility for the data bank required by NSDM 143 would be centered in CU/EX, where the Government-wide system can be developed in relation to information systems for the CU Bureau. Talent in this area is difficult to find, and the two activities can easily fit together.

If you approve, we will proceed to prepare for the Committee’s work along these lines.

Let’s Discuss$^3$

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$^3$ Richardson initialed his approval and placed a checkmark before his initials.
Opening remarks were made by Assistant Secretary Richardson. He noted that this Administration takes an active interest in international exchanges and that all indications are this interest will continue. The Subcommittee should be one oriented towards effective action.

**Timing of Meetings**

Mr. Richardson suggested that meetings of the Subcommittee be held as needed, rather than on a regularly scheduled basis. This proposal was accepted by the participants.

**Staff for the Subcommittee**

Mr. Richardson said a small staff for the Subcommittee will be supplied by CU. This staff will be charged with coordinating the work of Subcommittee Working Groups and with insuring that meaningful questions are brought to the attention of the Subcommittee. No objections to CU providing staff for the Subcommittee were expressed.

**Observer Attendance**

Mr. Richardson stated he believed attendance at Subcommittee meetings in general should be limited to representatives of the agencies making up the Subcommittee. Observers should be asked to attend only if their presence is required by their expertise or by their specific interest in a subject being considered. This suggestion was approved.

**Organizational Statement**

Mr. Richardson drew the attention of the participants to the Organizational Statement and invited comment. He noted it is the intention of the Department of State to request that the fact of the existence of the Subcommittee be declassified. Mr. McLaughlin of AID said declassification could pose a psychological problem if mention is made of the Subcommittee’s relation to the NSC. People would be concerned over the “hidden” meaning of the Committee on exchanges being tied to a

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Office of Public Information, Records Relating to a Study of International Exchange Programs, 1970–1975, Entry A1–37, Box 1, 143—Committee Meetings. Confidential. No drafting information appears on the minutes.
national security mechanism. Another suggestion was that in a declassified version of the Organizational Statement less stress should be given to U.S. Government focus on leadership in exchanges. It was also suggested that reference to the Exchange Study be eliminated. Such reference would lead people to ask questions about the exchange study which is classified Secret.

Mr. Richardson said a revised version of the Organizational Statement will be prepared, incorporating suggestions made at the meeting. The revised Organizational Statement will be sent to the participants for comment prior to any action being taken on declassifying it.

**Working Groups**

Mr. Richardson said a working group on agenda and project coordination should be established. This would be a working group of the whole, chaired by Mr. Richard L. Roth. This proposal was accepted by the participants.

Mr. Richardson also suggested that a Working Group on scientific exchanges be established. This suggestion was accepted.

Mr. Roth commented that participants should feel free to suggest topics for the consideration of the Agenda Working Group. They should not be limited to suggested areas of concern appearing in the Exchange Study.

**Briefing on Data Bank**

Mr. Roth spoke briefly on plans for the creation of a data bank, describing the system for collecting and analyzing information from exchange (J) visa applications. There was general agreement that data should be collected as of the present only because of the infeasibility of obtaining data covering the past. Miss Horn commented that recovery of data on past DOD activities was possible. However, such an effort would be so costly it could not be justified in terms of benefits derived. Mr. Hoffman stressed that we should not discard past records altogether and that some effort should be made to retain whatever we have in the way of historical material covering exchanges. The question was asked whether there was an intention to set up a data bank for non-government sponsored exchanges. Mr. Richardson said this was one of the anticipated objectives of the proposed Private Council referred to in NSDM 143 but that it would be a monumental undertaking which might have to be approached eventually through a variety of data banks operating on different elements of the private sector.

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2 See Document 154.
Briefing on Exchanges with the PRC

Mr. Richardson briefed the group on exchanges with the PRC, following which he drew their attention to the need for financial support for the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC.

Status Report on the Implementation of NSDM 143

Mr. Roth informed the group of the NSC’s request for a status report on the implementation of NSDM 143. He said the due date was December 8 and requested that all participants do their best to meet this deadline. In this connection, Mr. Austin noted the difficulty HEW was experiencing because of legislative and other constraints in responding to the NSDM 143 emphasis on leadership.

183. Airgram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State

A–749

Moscow, December 2, 1972

SUBJECT

Folk Singer Pete Seeger’s Tour of Soviet Union

American folk singer Pete Seeger concluded his latest tour of the Soviet Union with a recital November 20 before an audience of 1700 Soviet and foreign students in the ornate main auditorium of Moscow State University. He had already appeared under Goskontsert auspices in Novosibirsk, Irkutsk and Komerova.

Appearing without benefit of any special lighting or staging, and with only a fair sound system but a good interpreter, he got a warm reception for a mixed concert of recognized favorites (The Hammer Song, Freight Train, We Shall Overcome, Hush, Little Baby, and Let There Be Sunshine); straight and not so straight anti-war songs (Last Train to Nuremberg, and two of his own compositions: To Ho Chi Minh, and Land of 1000 Songs); and a miscellany including songs in favor of controlling pollution and population. The most unusual item was a song about a Jewish Collective Farmer in the Ukraine, one verse

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, EDX US–USSR. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Nalle; cleared by Dubs; approved by Falkiewicz. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the Department on December 11 at 4:39 p.m.
of which was in Yiddish, which was greeted by mixed laughter and confusion.

Despite several enthusiastic tries, Seeger was unable to raise the students into any kind of audience participation, and should perhaps have known Soviet audiences well enough not to try. He did get out-breaks of rhythmic applause for some of his more acid lyrics, such as the linking of the names of Calley, Medina, Custer and Nixon, as well as both houses of Congress, in Last Train to Nuremberg, but generally the audience was most favorable to the non-polemical songs it recognized. Aside from several comments about not being allowed to present protest songs on American television, Seeger limited his non-singing remarks to ecological problems and his own resolve to give up concerts for a year and return to his home near New York to work on community problems. (An American correspondent in the audience at Novosibirsk reported that his polemical remarks there were long enough to get in the way of the singing.)

The effect on the Moscow audience must have been as mixed as the program. The performer they had come to see (and tickets were hard to get) was obviously opposed to his own government and some other aspects of American life, but he was just as obviously free to travel and prosper, and he was planning to work within the system, even volunteering that his “dirty stream”, the Hudson River, was already getting cleaner. And, his third and last encore closed with the ambiguous line: “I know that you who hear my singing can make those freedom bells go ringing.”

 Beam²

² Dubs initialed below Beam’s typed signature.
184. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of State (Irwin) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Shakespeare)1

Washington, December 14, 1972

Dear Frank:

We have taken another look at a subject which, for some time, has been a matter of concern both to us in the Department and to you in USIA, “The US Image Problem in Western European Media”. I am pleased to send you a copy of a paper we have just prepared on this subject.2

As the paper makes clear, USIA as well as the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Department have given a good deal of attention to this problem and have been working at it with some success. The paper does, however, offer a number of suggestions for further action by the Department, USIA and our Embassies in Western Europe. The recommendations, I am informed, have been cleared informally with appropriate elements of USIA.

I appreciate the considerable effort which USIA along with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs have already made in dealing with the problem. As the paper points out, we would be well advised to put additional resources into this effort if we wish to make more headway in coping with the situation. The recommendations strike me as being reasonable and constructive.

I have already requested the CU and EUR Bureaus of the Department to carry out those recommendations that are within their jurisdictions. Since some of these proposals necessarily involve action by your Agency, I hope that the Department and USIA can cooperate in putting them into effect.

I believe that concerted action by the Department, USIA and the Embassies, even if it may not completely eliminate the problem, can go a long way toward reducing its dimensions.

Sincerely,

John N. Irwin II3

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1968–1972, Entry A1–42, Box 28, 1972 OGA—State (Sept.–Dec). No classification marking. Towery and Hoffman initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.

2 Enclosed but not printed is a paper entitled “The U.S. Image Problem in Western European Media.”

3 Irwin signed “Jack” above this typed signature.