Public Diplomacy,
1961–1963

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About the Series

The *Foreign Relations of the United States* series presents the official documentary historical record of major foreign policy decisions and significant diplomatic activity of the United States Government. The Historian of the Department of State is charged with the responsibility for the preparation of the *Foreign Relations* series. The staff of the Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, under the direction of the General Editor of the *Foreign Relations* series, plans, researches, compiles, and edits the volumes in the series. Secretary of State Frank B. Kellogg first promulgated official regulations codifying specific standards for the selection and editing of documents for the series on March 26, 1925. These regulations, with minor modifications, guided the series through 1991.


The statute requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of major United States foreign policy decisions and significant United States diplomatic activity. The volumes of the series should include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major foreign policy decisions and actions of the United States Government. The statute also confirms the editing principles established by Secretary Kellogg: the *Foreign Relations* series is guided by the principles of historical objectivity and accuracy; records should not be altered or deletions made without indicating in the published text that a deletion has been made; the published record should omit no facts that were of major importance in reaching a decision; and nothing should be omitted for the purposes of concealing a defect in policy. The statute also requires that the *Foreign Relations* series be published not more than 30 years after the events recorded. The editors are convinced that this volume meets all regulatory, statutory, and scholarly standards of selection and editing.

Sources for the *Foreign Relations* Series

The Foreign Relations statute requires that the published record in the *Foreign Relations* series include all records needed to provide comprehensive documentation of major U.S. foreign policy decisions and significant U.S. diplomatic activity. It further requires that government
about the series

agencies, departments, and other entities of the U.S. Government engaged in foreign policy formulation, execution, or support cooperate with the Department of State historians by providing full and complete access to records pertinent to foreign policy decisions and actions and by providing copies of selected records. Most of the sources consulted in the preparation of this volume have been declassified and are available for review at the National Archives and Records Administration (Archives II), in College Park, Maryland.

The editors of the Foreign Relations series have complete access to all the retired records and papers of the Department of State: the central files of the Department; the special decentralized files (“lot files”) of the Department at the bureau, office, and division levels; the files of the Department’s Executive Secretariat, which contain the records of international conferences and high-level official visits, correspondence with foreign leaders by the President and Secretary of State, and the memoranda of conversations between the President and the Secretary of State and foreign officials; and the files of overseas diplomatic posts. All of the Department’s central files are available in electronic or microfilm formats at Archives II, and may be accessed using the Access to Archival Databases (AAD) tool. Almost all of the Department’s decentralized office files covering this period, which the National Archives deems worthy of permanent retention, have been transferred to or are in the process of being transferred from the Department’s custody to Archives II.

Research for Foreign Relations volumes is undertaken through special access to restricted documents at the presidential libraries and other agencies. While all the material printed in this volume has been declassified, some of it is extracted from still-classified documents. The staff of each presidential library is processing and declassifying many of the documents used in this volume, but they may not be available in their entirety at the time of publication. Presidential papers maintained and preserved at the presidential libraries include some of the most significant foreign-affairs related documentation from White House offices, the Department of State, and other federal agencies including the National Security Council, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Editorial Methodology

The documents in this volume are presented chronologically according to Washington time. Memoranda of conversation are placed according to the time and date of the conversation, rather than the date the memorandum was drafted.

Editorial treatment of the documents published in the Foreign Relations series follows Office style guidelines, supplemented by guidance
from the General Editor and the Chief of the Editing and Publishing Division. The documents are reproduced as exactly as possible, including marginalia or other notations, which are described in the footnotes. Texts are transcribed and printed according to accepted conventions for the publication of historical documents within the limitations of modern typography. A heading has been supplied by the editors for each document included in this volume. Spelling, capitalization, and punctuation are retained as found in the original text, except that obvious typographical errors are silently corrected. Other mistakes and omissions in documents are corrected by bracketed insertions: a correction is set in italic type; an addition in roman type. Words and phrases underlined in the source text are printed in italics. Abbreviations and contractions are preserved as found in the original text, and a list of abbreviations is included in the front matter of each volume.

Bracketed insertions are also used to indicate omitted text that deals with an unrelated subject (in roman type) or that remains classified after declassification review (in italic type). The amount and, where possible, the nature of the material not declassified has been noted by indicating the number of lines or pages of text that were omitted. Entire documents withheld for declassification purposes have been accounted for and are listed with headings, source notes, and number of pages not declassified in their chronological place. All brackets that appear in the original text are so identified in footnotes. All ellipses are in the original documents.

The first footnote to each document indicates the source of the document, original classification, distribution, and drafting information. This note also provides the background of important documents and policies and indicates whether the President or his major policy advisers read the document.

Editorial notes and additional annotation summarize pertinent material not printed in the volume, indicate the location of additional documentary sources, provide references to important related documents printed in other volumes, describe key events, and provide summaries of and citations to public statements that supplement and elucidate the printed documents. Information derived from memoirs and other first-hand accounts has been used when appropriate to supplement or explicate the official record.

The numbers in the index refer to document numbers rather than to page numbers.

Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation

The Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, established under the Foreign Relations statute, reviews records, advises, and makes recommendations concerning the Foreign Relations
VI About the Series

The Advisory Committee monitors the overall compilation and editorial process of the series and advises on all aspects of the preparation and declassification of the series. The Advisory Committee does not necessarily review the contents of individual volumes in the series, but it makes recommendations on issues that come to its attention and reviews volumes as it deems necessary to fulfill its advisory and statutory obligations.

Declassification Review

The Office of Information Programs and Services, Bureau of Administration, conducted the declassification review for the Department of State of the documents published in this volume. The review was conducted in accordance with the standards set forth in Executive Order 13526 on Classified National Security Information and applicable laws.

The principle guiding declassification review is to release all information, subject only to the current requirements of national security as embodied in law and regulation. Declassification decisions entailed concurrence of the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the Department of State, other concerned agencies of the U.S. Government, and the appropriate foreign governments regarding specific documents of those governments. The declassification review of this compilation, which began in 2015 and was completed in 2017, resulted in the decision to withhold 0 documents in full, excise a paragraph or more in one document, and make minor excisions of less than a paragraph in one document.

The Office of the Historian is confident, on the basis of the research conducted in preparing this compilation and as a result of the declassification review process described above, that the documentation and editorial notes presented here provide a thorough, accurate, and reliable record of public diplomacy initiatives during the John F. Kennedy administration.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.          Stephen P. Randolph, Ph.D.
General Editor          The Historian

Bureau of Public Affairs
December 2017
Preface


In 2007, historians at the Office of the Historian proposed a set of retrospective Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) volumes designed to augment the series’ coverage of U.S. public diplomacy. While the series began to document the subject in a sustained and concerted way starting with the second administration of President Richard M. Nixon, previous FRUS coverage of U.S. public diplomacy efforts have been far less consistent. These retrospective volumes will fill that gap, which stretches from the First World War to the early 1970s. Resource constraints and the statutory requirement to publish Foreign Relations volumes 30 years after the events that they cover mean that compilations in these volumes have been researched and compiled piecemeal over a longer period of time than the typical FRUS volume. Fortunately, progress is being made. During the fall of 2014, the Office released the volume covering the U.S. Government’s public diplomacy efforts from 1917 to 1919. Subsequent compilations, which will document up to the end of the first Nixon administration, will be published as they are completed.

This volume, covering the years 1961 to 1963 focuses on the John F. Kennedy administration’s efforts to manage public diplomacy during the middle portion of the Cold war. It describes how the United States Information Agency (USIA) worked to present U.S. foreign policy objectives to the world during a time of social change within the United States. The compilation also illustrates how USIA and the Department of State pursued public diplomacy against the backdrop of crises, including the Bay of Pigs invasion, the construction of the Berlin Wall, Laos, Vietnam, and the Cuban Missile Crisis. Additional documentation chronicles the Kennedy administration’s attempts to develop a national cultural policy, the importance of overseas polling, and the Department of State’s educational exchange activities. The volume should be read in conjunction with Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, volume XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy: United Nations; and Scientific Matters, which contains a chapter on information policy.

Adam M. Howard, Ph.D.
General Editor
Acknowledgments

The editors wish to acknowledge the assistance of John Laster and Peter Halligas of the National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C.; Elizabeth Gray, David Langbart, Tab Lewis, Don McIlwain, and Richard Peuser of the National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland; and Karen Abramson, Stacey Chandler, Michelle DeMartino, Michael Desmond, Abigale Malangone, and Maura Porter of the John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts.

Kristin L. Ahlberg, Charles V. Hawley, and Keri E. Lewis researched this volume. Kristin Ahlberg selected and edited the documentation for 1960, 1961, and 1962, and Charles Hawley selected and edited the documentation for 1963, under the supervision of Adam M. Howard, General Editor of the Foreign Relations series. Adam Howard and Kristin Ahlberg reviewed the compilation. Mandy A. Chalou, chief of the Editing and Publishing Division, performed the copy and technical editing, and Dean Weatherhead coordinated the declassification review under the supervision of Carl Ashley, chief of the Declassification Division. Joseph Wicentowski provided technical assistance in creating the multimedia component of this volume.

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Sources


The Presidential papers of John F. Kennedy, housed at the John F. Kennedy Presidential Library, are a key source of high-level decision making documentation on public diplomacy. A number of collections within the National Security File (NSF) are relevant to research in this area, specifically the Departments and Agencies series, Meetings and Memoranda series, and Subjects series. In addition, the President’s Office Files, specifically the Departments and Agencies series, contains a substantial amount of documentation regarding the United States Information Agency, including memoranda from USIA Director Edward R. Murrow to President Kennedy. Also significant are the Personal Papers of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr. Schlesinger’s White House Files, specifically the subject file and classified subject file yield documentation concerning the cultural affairs of the Kennedy administration.

The National Archives and Records Administration also houses essential high-level documentation on the implementation and management of public diplomacy during the Kennedy administration. Within the Department of State Record Group 59, the records of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs are especially significant, as they contain the files of the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs as well as the records of the Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs. Of great importance is Record Group 306, the records of the United States Information Agency. These collections yield a substantial amount of documentation on USIA’s organizational structure, as well as on program development, implementation, and evaluation. The USIA Historical Collection includes Subject Files (containing records relating to USIA function, mission, organization, and programs compiled by former USIA archivist Martin Manning), Office of the Director Files (containing biographical material on USIA senior personnel and major speeches), and Reports and Studies Files. The Records of the Office of Plans contain both subject files and general subject files. The Office of the Director Files (separate from those contained within the USIA Historical Collection) also include detailed subject files. The Office of Research files contain a variety of USIA printed products, including the Special Reports.
Sources

Unpublished Sources

National Archives and Records Administration, College Park, Maryland

Record Group 59, General Records of the Department of State

Central Files.

032: Tours (Visits of unofficial persons to or from other countries, including the United States)

511.00: Psychological Warfare (General)

In February 1963 the Department of State switched from a decimal file number to a subject numeric system for its Central Files

Lot Files.

CU Files: Lot 63D135 (Entry A1–5072)
  - Records of the Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961–1962

CU Files: Lot 68D277 (Entry A1–5461)

CU Files: Lot 72D363 (Entry A1–5458)

Record Group 306, Records of the United States Information Agency

Alphabetical Subject Files Containing Policy Guidance, 1953–1961 (Entry UD WW 199)

Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969 (Entry UD WW 266)

USIA Historical Collection
  - Office of the Director, Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials, 1953–2000 (Entry A–I 1069)

Office of the Director
  - Director’s Subject Files, 1961 (Entry UD WW 142)
  - Director’s Subject Files, 1962–1963 (Entry UD WW 173)
  - DIRECTR Subj File, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69, Acc. #72A5121 (Entry UD WW 257)

Office of Plans
  - Office of Plans, Subject Files, 1955–1971 (Entry UD WW 148)
  - Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970 (Entry UD WW 151)
  - Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Acc. #65A175 (Entry UD WW 288)
  - Office of Plans, Subject Files, 1955–1971, Acc. #65Z1075 [B] (General IOP) (Entry UD WW 334)
  - Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970 (Entry UD WW 372)
Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Acc. #67A222 (Entry UD WW 379)
Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970 (Entry UD WW 382)

Office of Research
Library, Archives, Office of the Archivist/Historian, Records Relating to the U.S.
Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs,
1962–1978 (Entry P–138)
Special Reports, 1953–1997 (Entry P–160)

Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Kansas
Presidential Appointment Books

John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, Massachusetts
National Security Files
  Countries Series
  Charles E. Johnson Files
  Departments and Agencies Series
  Meetings and Memoranda Series
  Subjects Series

Personal Papers of Arthur M. Schlesinger Jr.
  White House Files
    Subject File, 1961–1964
    Classified Subject Files

Personal Papers of Robert F. Kennedy
  Attorney General’s General Correspondence

Pre-Presidential Papers
  Transition Files–Task Force Reports
  Transition Files–Transition Reports

President’s Office Files
  Departments and Agencies Series
  Staff Memoranda

United States Information Agency Records (RG 306)
  Series 1, Records, 1961–1964

White House Central Files
  Subject Files
    FG 296: Includes information on the United States Information Agency
    FG 750: Includes information on the U.S. Advisory Commission on Interna-
    tional, Educational, and Cultural Affairs

President’s Daily Diary

Published Sources

*The Christian Science Monitor*
XIV Sources

Congressional Record


The New York Times

The Washington Post


Abbreviations and Terms

A, airgram
ABC, American Broadcasting Company
ACEC/S or ACE/S, Secretariat of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange and the Advisory Committee on the Arts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
ACLU, American Civil Liberties Union
ADP, automatic data processing
AF, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AF/P, Public Affairs Adviser, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFE, Office of Eastern and Southern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AFL–CIO, American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
AFN, Office of Northern African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State; also, American Forces Network
AFP, Agence France Presse (French Press Agency); also Alliance for Progress
AFW, Office of West African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State
AGVA, American Guild of Variety Artists
AID or USAID, Agency for International Development
Amb., ambassador
ANTA, American National Theatre and Academy
AP, Associated Press
ARA or ARA/LA, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State/Bureau for Latin America, Agency for International Development
ASPAU, African Scholarship Program of American Universities
BBC, British Broadcasting Corporation
BIE, Bureau of International Exhibitions
BPAO, Branch Public Affairs Officer
CA, circular airgram; also Bureau of Consular Affairs, Department of State
CAO, cultural affairs officer
CARE, Cooperative for American Relief Everywhere
CAT, Civil Air Transport
CBS, Columbia Broadcasting System
CEJ, Charles E. Johnson
CENTO, Central Treaty Organization
Ch., chair
ChiCom, Chinese Communist
Chieu Hoi, Government of Vietnam Viet Cong repatriation program
CIA, Central Intelligence Agency
CINC PAC or USCINC PAC, Commander-in-Chief, Pacific
CINE, Committee on International Nontheatrical Events
COB, close of business
Col., colonel
COM, chief of mission
Cong., Congress
CORE, Congress of Racial Equality
COSEC, coordinating secretariat of International Student Conference
COSERV, National Council for Community Services to International Visitors
CPAO, chief public affairs officer
CPP, Country Plan Program
CRP, China Reporting Program, United States Information Service
CU, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
CO, copy
D, Democrat; also Office of the Deputy Secretary of State
DAC, Development Assistance Committee
DAG, Development Assistance Group
DAR, Daughters of the American Revolution
DCM, deputy chief of mission
Dept., Department
DFL, Minnesota Democratic-Farmer-Labor party
Distrib., distribution
DLF, Development Loan Fund
DM, D Mark; Deutschemark
DOD, Department of Defense
DPAO, deputy public affairs officer
DRE, Directorio Revolucionario Estudiantil (Student Revolutionary Directorate), Cuba
DRV, Democratic Republic of Vietnam
DW or DMW, Donald M. Wilson
ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East
ECHO, passive communications satellite experiment
EDT, Eastern Daylight Time
EE, East European; Office of Eastern European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EEC, European Economic Community
Emb., Embassy
Embtel, Embassy telegram
E.O., Executive Order
ERM, Edward R. Murrow
EUR, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/CE, Office of Central European Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SES, Soviet and East European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
EUR/SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Ex–Im, also Eximbank, Export-Import Bank
FAO, United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization
FAR, Forces Armées du Royaume (Royal Armed Forces), Laos
FBI, Federal Bureau of Investigation
FBIS, Foreign Broadcast Information Service
FBO, Office of Foreign Buildings, Department of State
FCC, Federal Communications Commission
FDR, Franklin Delano Roosevelt
FE, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FE/P, Office of Public Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
FE/SEA, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
Abbreviations and Terms  XVII

Fed., federal
FFP, Food for Peace (Public Law 480)
FM, frequency modulation
FMM, French Military Mission
ForMin, foreign minister
FRG, Federal Republic of Germany
FSIO, Foreign Service Information Officer
FSO, Foreign Service Officer
FSR, Foreign Service Reserve
FY, fiscal year
FYI, for your information

G, Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
GAO, General Accounting Office
GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GDR, German Democratic Republic
Gen., general
GOI, Government of India
GOM, Government of Malaysia
GS, Glenn Smith; also General Schedule
GVN, Government of Vietnam

H, Bureau of Congressional Relations, Department of State
HAR, Hewson A. Ryan
HEW, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

I or USIA/I, Office of the Director, United States Information Agency
I/R or USIA/I/R, Office of the Director, Public Information, United States Information Agency
IAA or USIA/IAA, Office of the Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency
IAE or USIA/IAE, Office of the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency
IAF or USIA/IAF, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency
IAL or USIA/IAL, Office of the Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency
IAN or USIA/IAN, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency
IAS or USIA/IAS, Office of the Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency
IBS or USIA/IBS, Office of the Director, Broadcasting, United States Information Agency
ICA, International Cooperation Administration
ICC, International Control Commission
ICS or USIA/ICS, Office of the Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency
IGC or USIA/IGC, Office of the General Counsel, United States Information Agency
IGY, International Geophysical Year
IMF, International Monetary Fund
IMG, Informational Media Guaranty
IMS or USIA/IMS, Office of the Director, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency

Info-Guide, policy statement on U.S. attitudes toward a given situation, usually classified and transmitted by telegram or pouch
XVIII Abbreviations and Terms

INR, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State
IOA or USIA/IOA, Office of the Assistant Director, Administration and Management, United States Information Agency
IOA/B or USIA/IOA/B, Office of the Assistant Director, Administration and Management, Budget, United States Information Agency
IOC or USIA/IOC, Office of Private Cooperation, United States Information Agency
IOP or USIA/IOP, Office of Plans (later Office of Policy), United States Information Agency
IPS or USIA/IPS, Office of the Director, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency
IRR or USIA/IRR, Research and Reference Service, United States Information Agency
IRS, Office of the Director of Information Research Service, United States Information Agency
ISC, International Student Conference
ISMUN, International Student Movement for the United Nations
ITV or USIA/ITV, Office of the Director, Television Service, United States Information Agency
IUS, International Union of Students
IUSY, International Union of Socialist Youth
JCS, Joint Chiefs of Staff
KL, Kong Le
kw, kilowatt
L, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State
LDB, Lucius D. Battle
LSB, Leslie S. Brady
M, Office of the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
MAAG, Military Assistance Advisory Group
MACV, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MAP, Military Assistance Program
McG, George McGovern
McGB, Mc George Bundy
MBS, Mutual Broadcasting System
Meo (Hmong), mountain tribes in Laos
mm, millimeter
MSP, Mutual Security Program
mtg., meeting
NAACP, National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
NAFSA, National Association of Foreign Student Advisers
NARBA, North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement
NASA, National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC, National Broadcasting Company
NCFE, National Committee for a Free Europe
NEA, Bureau of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Department of State; also National Endowment for the Arts
NFL, National Liberation Front
NODIS, no distribution
NSAM, National Security Action Memorandum
NSC, National Security Council
Abbreviations and Terms  XIX

NSF, National Science Foundation
OAS, Organization of American States
OBE, overtaken by events
OCB, Operations Coordination Board
OECD, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OEE, Office of Educational Exchange, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State
OEEC, Organization for European Economic Cooperation
OEP, Office of Emergency Planning, White House
OITF, Office of International Trade Fairs, Department of Commerce
OSD, Office of the Secretary of Defense
P, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
P/PG, Policy Plans and Guidance Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PSI, Special Information Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State
PAO, public affairs officer
Pax Romana, international federation of Catholic university students and graduates
PCG, Planning Coordination Group
PDJ, Plaine des Jarres (Plain of Jars), Laos
P.L., public Law; also Pathet Lao
P.L.–480; Public Law 480, Food for Peace
POLAD, political advisor
Polaris, submarine
Potomac Cable, unclassified Info-Guide transmitted over Wireless File
Pres., President
PSB, Psychological Strategy Board
Q & A, question and answer
R, Republican
R & D, research and development; also research and design
ref., reference
reftel, reference telegram
Res., resolution
Rev., reverend
RFA, Radio Free Asia
RFE/RL, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
RG, Record Group
RH, Reed Harris
RIAS, Rundfunk in Amerikanischen Sektor (U.S. Radio in the U.S. Sector of Berlin)
RLG, Royal Laotian Government
RLN, Radio Liberty Network
RMR or RM/R, Records and Reference Branch, Department of State
rpt., repeat
rptd, repeated
ROK or ROKG, Republic of Korea/Republic of Korea Government
RSC, Regional Service Center, USIA
S, Office of the Secretary of State; also Senate
S/AL, Office of the Ambassador at Large, Department of State
S/P, Policy Planning Council, Department of State
S/S, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
S/S–RO, Reports and Operations Staff, Executive Secretariat, Department of State
Abbreviations and Terms

S–5, U.S. military civil affairs or civil affairs officers
SE, southeast
SEATO, South East Asian Treaty Organization
Sec., secretary
SECAF, Secretary of the Air Force
SECNAV, Secretary of the Navy
sess., session
SFRC, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
SIE, Special International Exhibits
SNIE, Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOP, standard operating procedure
SORAFOM, Société de radiodiffusion de la France d’outre-mer (radio and television stations operating in French overseas departments and territories)
SOV, Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
SovBloc, Soviet Bloc
SP or SPA, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State
SR, President’s Special Representative, Department of State
Stat., statute
STRAC, Strategic Army Corps

TASS, Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union
TCS, Thomas C. Sorensen
TRP, Taiwan Reporting Program, United States Information Service
TV, television
TVA, Tennessee Valley Authority

U, Office of the Under Secretary of State
U–2, high altitude reconnaissance aircraft
UAR, United Arab Republic
UK, United Kingdom
UN, United Nations
UNESCO, United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
UNGA, United Nations General Assembly
UNICEF, United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund
UPI, United Press International
US, United States
USA, United States of America; also United States Army
USAF, United States Air Force
USARYIS, United States Army Ryukyus Islands
USCAR, United States Civil Administration of the Ryukyus
USINFO, series indicator for messages from the United States Information Service
USN, United States Navy
USUN, U.S. Mission to the United Nations
USIA, United States Information Agency
USIS, United States Information Service
USITO, outgoing telegram from the United States Information Agency to the field
USMC, United States Marine Corps
USOM, United States Operations Mission
USSR, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
U.S.T., United States Treaties and Other International Agreements

VC, Viet Cong
VIP, very important person
Abbreviations and Terms

VIS, Vietnamese Information Service
VOA, Voice of America

WAH, W. Averell Harriman
WAY, World Assembly of Youth
WE, Western European
WFCYWG, World Federation of Catholic Young Women and Girls
WFDY, World Federation of Democratic Youth
WH, White House
WR, weekly report
WUS, World University Service

Z, Zulu (Greenwich Mean Time)
Zone D, Viet Cong jungle base area near Saigon
Persons

Abernethy, John T., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Bureau of African Affairs, Department of State

Acheson, Dean G., Secretary of State from January 21, 1949, until January 20, 1953; adviser to Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; Chairman, President’s Advisory Committee on NATO

Achilles, Theodore C., Counselor of the Department of State until February 15, 1961; thereafter Special Assistant to the Secretary of State and Director, Operations Center; member, Department of State Task Force on Latin America

Adams, Walter, Professor of Economics, Michigan State University; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Adenauer, Konrad, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany until October 17, 1963

Adzhubei, Aleksei I., Editor in Chief, Izvestia and Khrushchev’s son-in-law

Alessandri Rodriguez, Jorge, President of Chile

Alexander, Archibald, President, Radio Free Europe; Vice Chairman, Board of Governors, Rutgers University; member, Task Force on USIA

Allen, George V., member, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee); Director, United States Information Agency, from November 15, 1957, until December 1, 1960

Almond, Gabriel, Professor of Political Science, Yale University; member, Task Force on USIA

Alsop, Joseph, U.S. journalist and syndicated newspaper columnist

Amory, Robert, Jr., Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget

Anderson, Burnett, Director of Planning, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency from July 9, 1961

Anderson, Marian, U.S. classical singer

Armstrong, Louis, U.S. jazz musician and actor

Ball, George W., Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, from January 30 until December 3, 1961; thereafter Under Secretary of State

Barnett, Ross, Governor of Mississippi

Barrett, Edward W., Dean, Columbia University School of Journalism; member, Task Force on USIA

Battey, Brian M., foreign affairs officer, Office of Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency; thereafter Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962)

Battle, Lucius D., Special Assistant to the Secretary and Executive Secretary of the Department of State, from March 16, 1961, until May 2, 1962; Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, from June 5, 1962

Bauer, Robert A., foreign affairs officer, United States Information Agency; detailed to the Presentations Division, Office of Cultural Exchange, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, 1961; thereafter cultural affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Cairo

Beers, Robert M., Deputy Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency, from April 1960 until 1963; thereafter deputy public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Karachi

XXIII
Begg, John M., Deputy Director, Office of Private Cooperation, United States Information Agency
Belk, Samuel E., member, National Security Council Staff
Bell, David E., Director, Bureau of the Budget, until December 20, 1962; thereafter Administrator, Agency for International Development
Bell, James Dunbar, Director, Office of Southwest Pacific Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State, from June 1960
Beltran Espantoso, Pedro, Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Commerce of Peru until July 18, 1962
Bennett, Lowell, Director, Office of Public Information, United States Information Agency, from May 1, 1961
Benton, William B., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from 1945 until 1947
Berle, Adolf A., Jr., Chairman, Task Force on Immediate Latin Problems, from November until December 1960; Chairman, Department of State Task Force on Latin America, from January 2 until July 7, 1961
Betancourt, Romulo, President of Venezuela
Bingham, Barry, Editor in Chief, Louisville Courier Journal; member, Task Force on USIA
Black, Hugo, Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court
Blum, Robert, President, Asia Foundation; member, Task Force on USIA
Boerner, Alfred V., Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency, from November 12, 1961; detailed to the Department of State as Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, from December 1, 1961; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from June 10, 1962
Bogart, Lee, Bureau of Advertising, American Newspaper Publishers Association; member, Task Force on USIA
Bohlen, Charles E., Special Assistant to the Secretary of State until September 1962; U.S. Ambassador to France from September 4, 1962
Bolton, Frances Payne, member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Ohio)
Bosch, Juan, President of the Dominican Republic from February 27, 1962, until September 25, 1963
Bow, Frank T., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Ohio)
Bowles, Chester B., Under Secretary of State from January 25 until December 3, 1961; U.S. Ambassador at Large and President’s Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs, from December 4, 1961, until June 9, 1963; U.S. Ambassador to India, from July 19, 1963
Bradford, Saxton, Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency; detailed to the Department of State as Director, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs from 1959 until December 9, 1961; counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in Mexico City from December 10, 1961
Brady, Leslie S., counselor for cultural affairs, U.S. Embassy in Moscow; thereafter Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (Soviet Bloc from 1962), United States Information Agency
Brandt, Willy, Governing Mayor of Berlin
Brando, Marlon, U.S. actor and star of the film The Ugly American
Broecker, Theodor William, visual information officer, Office of the Director, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency, from June 6, 1961; thereafter visual information specialist
Brooke, Edgar D., Director of Media Content, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency, from 1961
Brubeck, William H., Deputy Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 1961 until May 1962; Executive Secretary of the Department of State and Special Assistant to the Secretary of State from May 14, 1962, until July 20, 1963; thereafter member, National Security Council Staff
Brynner, Yul, Russian-born, U.S.-based actor
Bunce, W. Kenneth, Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency, from 1963

Bundy, Frederic O., coordinator of National Security Council and Operations Coordination Board Affairs, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency

Bundy, McGeorge, President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs from January 20, 1961

Burdeet, William C., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, Department of State

Burris, Philip H., Director, Policy Plans and Guidance Staff, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy Plans and Guidance, Bureau of Public Affairs

Butler, George N., Deputy Director, Television Service, United States Information Agency, until July 1961; thereafter public affairs officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in Guatemala City

Byrnes, James F., Secretary of State from July 3, 1945, until January 21, 1947

Canham, Erwin D., Editor, The Christian Science Monitor; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information until 1961

Cantrill, Hadley, Chairman of the Board and Senior Counselor, Institute for International Social Research; member, Task Force on USIA

Carlson, Robert, Vice President, Standard Oil; member, Task Force on USIA


Carson, Rachel, U.S. scientist and author of Silent Spring

Carter, Alan, press officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi from April 1960; Special Assistant to the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, from 1962 until 1963; thereafter Director, Television Service

Casals, Pablo (Pau Casals i Defilò), Spanish cellist and conductor

Castro Ruz, Fidel, Prime Minister of Cuba

Cater, S. Douglass, Jr., Washington editor, Reporter magazine; visiting Professor of Public Affairs, Wesleyan University

Church, Frank, Senator (D-Idaho)

Clarke, Robert J., Assistant Manager for Policy Application, Office of the Director, Broadcast Service, United States Information Agency

Clay, Lucius D., President’s Special Representative in Berlin with the Rank of Ambassador from August 1961

Cleveland, J. Harlan, Dean, Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Administration, Syracuse University; member, Task Force on USIA; Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs from February 23, 1961

Clifton, Chester V., Brigadier General, USA; President’s Military Aide

Cody, Morrill, Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency, from November 26, 1961, until mid-1963

Collins, LeRoy, former Governor of Florida; President, National Association of Broadcasters

Conde, Corinne, Chief, Indonesia Service, United States Information Agency

Conlon, Edward J. (Ned), information officer and attaché at the U.S. Embassy in Jakarta; news guidance officer, Office of Policy, United States Information Agency, from November 1962

Cook, Donald B., Director, Office of Educational Exchange, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, in 1961; Director, Educational and Cultural Programs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, in 1962

Coombs, Philip H., Program Director for Education, Ford Foundation; Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from March 23, 1961, until June 4, 1962
XXVI  Persons

Cottam, Howard R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Crosby, John, U.S. radio and television critic, New York Herald Tribune; syndicated columnist

Cross, Charles T., officer in charge of Laos Affairs, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Curtis, John R., Jr., Staff Assistant to the Counselor and the Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from August 6, 1961, until March 4, 1962; Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, from March 4, 1962, until July 1963; thereafter economic officer, U.S. Mission at Berlin

Curtis, Tony, U.S. film and television actor

Dacko, David, President of the Central African Republic from 1960 until 1966

Dalcher, Laurence F., foreign affairs officer, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency; information officer, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, from July 7, 1963

Daniels, Jonathan, Editor, Raleigh The News and Observer; member, U.S Advisory Commission on Information, until 1962

Davison, W. Phillips, The Rand Corporation; Secretary, Task Force on USIA
de Gaulle, Charles, President of France

Diem, see Ngo Dinh Diem

Dillon, C. Douglas, Under Secretary of State until January 4, 1961; Secretary of the Treasury, from January 21, 1961

Dobrynin, Anatoliy F., Chief of the American Countries Division, Soviet Foreign Ministry, until March 1962; thereafter Soviet Ambassador to the United States

Donovan, James A., Jr., Secretariat of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange and the Advisory Committee on the Arts, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, from August 21, 1960; later Staff Director, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs and Advisory Committee on the Arts

Dos Passos, John R., U.S. novelist and artist

Douglas, Lewis W., former U.S. Ambassador to the United Kingdom during the Truman administration; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information until early 1962

Douglas, Paul, Senator (R-Illinois)

Douglas, William O., Associate Justice, U.S. Supreme Court

Draper, William H., Jr., chair, President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee)

Drummond, Roscoe, U.S. journalist and syndicated newspaper columnist (“State of the Nation”)

Dulles, Alan W., Director of Central Intelligence until November 29, 1961; member, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee)

Dungan, Ralph A., Special Assistant to the President

Dutton, Frederick G., Special Adviser to the President until late 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Congressional Relations from November 29, 1961

Eastland, James, Senator (D-Mississippi)

Edmondson, J. Howard, Governor of Oklahoma

Ehrman, Robert William, foreign affairs officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency, until 1963; thereafter political officer

Eisenhower, Dwight D., President of the United States from January 20, 1953, until January 20, 1961

Englund, George, U.S. film director; director of The Ugly American

Erhard, Ludwig, Vice Chancellor and Minister of Economic Affairs, Federal Republic of Germany, until October 17, 1963; thereafter Chancellor
Ericson, Richard A., special assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration, from September 17, 1961

Ewing, Gordon A., Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency

Fascell, Dante B., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Florida); Chairman, Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movement, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Fischer, John, Editor in Chief, Harper’s Magazine; member, Task Force on USIA


Forrestal, Michael V., member, National Security Council staff, from January 1962

Foster, Luther H., President, Tuskegee Institute; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Free, Lloyd, Director, Institute for Social Research; Secretary, Task Force on USIA

Fredericks, J. Wayne, Special Assistant for Program Planning to the Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, Department of State, from February until May 1961; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs from May 28, 1961

Freeman, Orville L., Secretary of Agriculture from January 21, 1961

Frondizi, Arturo, President of Argentina until March 29, 1962

Frost, Robert, U.S. poet

Fullbright, J. William, Senator (D-Arkansas); Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Fulton, James G., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-Pennsylvania)

Gagarin, Yuri, Soviet cosmonaut, first human to orbit the Earth

Galbraith, J. Kenneth, U.S. Ambassador to India, from March 29, 1961, until July 12, 1963

Gallup, George, President, American Institute of Public Opinion; member, Task Force on USIA

Gardner, John W., President, Carnegie Corporation; Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs


Gilpatric, Roswell L., Deputy Secretary of Defense from January 24, 1961; also member of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency

Glazer, Morton, foreign affairs officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency

Glenn, John H., Colonel, USMC; first U.S. astronaut to orbit the Earth on February 20, 1962

Goldenson, Leonard H., Chairman of the Board, American Broadcasting Company

Goodman, Benny, U.S. jazz musician

Goodpaster, Andrew J., General, USA; Staff Secretary to President Eisenhower; Special Assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Kennedy administration

Goodwin, Richard N., President’s Assistant Special Counsel until November 1961; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs, from November 1961 until January 1963; Secretary General, International Peace Corps Secretariat from January 1963

Gordon, Lincoln, member, Department of State Task Force on Latin America; U.S. Ambassador to Brazil from October 1961

Gore, Albert, Senator (D-Tennessee); Chairman, Near East Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
XXVIII Persons

Gorrell, Juan L., supervisor information specialist, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, Department of State

Goulart, Joao, President of Brazil from September 7, 1961

Gray, Gordon, President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs until January 20, 1961; member, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee)

Greenfield, James L., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs

Guarco, Anthony, Deputy Director, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency

Hadraba, Theodore J., Director, Office of International Trade, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State until August 1961; thereafter Coordinator for Commercial Activities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, Department of State

Halsema, James J., Director of Planning, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency; public affairs officer and attache, U.S. Embassy in Cairo, from July 9, 1961, until September 22, 1961; thereafter counselor for public affairs


Hammarskjold, Dag, United Nations Secretary General until his death on September 18, 1961

Handley, William J., Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency until 1961; U.S. Ambassador to Mali from late 1961

Hanson, Joseph O., Jr., Adviser for National Security, Planning, and Program Advisory Staff, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency

Harkins, Paul, D., General, USA; Commander of the Military Advisory Command, Vietnam, from February 8, 1962

Harr, Karl G., Jr., member, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee)

Harris, Reed, Special Assistant to the Director, United States Information Agency, from July 17, 1961, until March 14, 1962; thereafter Executive Assistant to the Director

Harris, Yancey A., Chief, Motion Picture—TV Contract Branch, Office of the Director, Television Service, United States Information Agency

Harriman, W. Averell, U.S. Ambassador at Large, from February 13 until December 3, 1961; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, from December 4, 1961, until April 3, 1963; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from April 4, 1963, and Chairman of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency

Hatcher, Andrew T., Assistant Press Secretary to the President

Hays, Wayne, member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Ohio)

Hesburgh, Theodore M., Rev., President, Notre Dame University; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; member, U.S. Commission on Civil Rights

Hickok, Robert C., International Exhibits Administrative Coordinator, Office of Information Center, United States Information Agency

Hilsman, Roger, Jr., Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State from February 19, 1961, until April 25, 1963; Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, from May 9, 1963

Ho Chi Minh, President of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam; also Chairman and General Secretary of Dang Lao Dong, Workers’ Party of Vietnam

Hodges, Luther H., Secretary of Commerce from January 21, 1961

Hoover, Herbert Jr., Under Secretary of State and Chairman of the Operations Coordinating Board, from October 4, 1954, until February 5, 1957

Humphrey, Hubert H., Jr., Senator (DFL-Minnesota) and Senate Majority Whip

Irwin, John N. II, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs until 1961; member, President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee).

Isenbergh, Maxwell (Max), Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs from May 22, 1961; thereafter Special Adviser on Cultural Affairs, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State.

Jackson, C.D., Special Assistant to the President, from January 26, 1953, until March 1954; member, President's Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee).

Jackson, William H., Chairman, President's Committee on International Information Activities, 1953; Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, from September 1955 until January 1956; Special Assistant to the President, from January until September 1956; Acting Special Assistant to the President, from September 1956 until January 1957.

Johnson, Charles E., member, National Security Council staff.

Johnson, Lyndon Baines, Vice President of the United States until November 22, 1963; President from November 22, 1963, until January 20, 1969.


Johnson, Walter, Professor of History, University of Chicago; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.

Johnston, Eric, President, Motion Picture Association of America.


Jones, Ralph A., Deputy Director, Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State.

Jorden, William J., Member, Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from August 1, 1961, until April 1962; thereafter Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs.

Kaysen, Carl, Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

Keita, Modibo, President of Mali.

Keating, Kenneth B., Senator (R-New York).


Kennedy, Jacqueline B., First Lady of the United States.

Kennedy, John F., President of the United States from January 20, 1961, until his death on November 22, 1963.

Kennedy, Robert F., Attorney General of the United States.

Khrushchev, Nikita Sergeyevich, First Secretary, Communist Party of the Soviet Union; also Chairman, Soviet Council of Ministers.

King, Martin Luther Jr., Rev., U.S. civil rights activist.


Kohler, Foy D., Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs until August 19, 1962; thereafter U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union.

Kong Le, captain, Lao National Army, Commander of the Second Paratroop Battalion and leader of the neutralist military forces.
XXX    Persons

Kruilak, Victor H., Major General, USMC; Special Assistant for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities, Joint Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Labouisse, Henry R., Director of the International Cooperation Administration from February 22 until October 6, 1961; U.S. Ambassador to Greece from 1962

Lansdale, Edward G., Brigadier General, USAF; Deputy Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense until May 1961; thereafter Assistant for Special Operations to the Secretary of Defense; also Chief of Operations for Operation Mongoose after November 1961

Larmon, Sigurd S., Chairman of the Board, Young & Rubicam, Inc.; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information

Larsen, Roy E., Chairman, Executive Committee of Time, Inc.; Vice Chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs; member, Board of Directors, Radio Free Europe Fund

Larson, Arthur, Director, United States Information Agency, from December 18, 1956, until October 27, 1957

Laufer, Leopold, Office of Plans (Office of Policy after August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency, until August 25, 1962; thereafter international relations officer, Agency for International Development

Lay, James S., Jr., Executive Secretary, National Security Council, from 1950 until 1961

Leddy, John M., Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for International Affairs; member, Department of State Task Force on Latin America

Lewis, Irving J., acting Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget, 1963

Lewis, Samuel W., Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State from May 28, 1961, until February 18, 1962; thereafter Special Assistant to the President’s Special Representative and Adviser on African, Asian, and Latin American Affairs until September 1, 1963

Lincoln, Evelyn, Personal Secretary to the President

Lincoln, Robert A., Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia, United States Information Agency, from 1963

Lippman, Walter, U.S. journalist and syndicated newspaper columnist

Lleras Camargo, Alberto, President of Colombia until 1962

Lodge, Henry Cabot, Jr., U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam from August 26, 1963

Loomis, Henry, Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency

Mackland, Ray, Director, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency, from October 3, 1961

Macmillan, Harold, Prime Minister of the United Kingdom until October 1963

Magnuson, Warren G., Senator (D-Washington)

Malinovsky, Rodion Ya, Marshal of the Soviet Union and Minister of Defense

Manell, Abram E., public affairs adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs, Department of State

Mann, Donald R., information specialist, Office of the Director, Press and Publication Service, United States Information Agency

Mann, George A., foreign affairs officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Near East, United States Information Agency, until June 1962; public affairs officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in Tel Aviv, from June 10, 1962

Mann, Thomas C., Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs until April 20, 1961; U.S. Ambassador to Mexico from May 8, 1961, until December 22, 1963; thereafter Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs; member, Task Force on Latin America

Manning, Robert J., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from April 1962

Mansfield, Mike, Senator (D-Montana) and Senate Majority Leader from January 3, 1961; member, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Marcy, Carl, Chief of Staff, Senate Foreign Relations Committee; member, Task Force on USIA

Marcy, Mildred K., Women’s Activities Advisor, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency, from May 1, 1961

Marlowe, Sanford, Director, Office of Private Cooperation, United States Information Agency

Marshall, George C., Secretary of State from January 21, 1947, until January 20, 1949

Martin, Edwin M., Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs from September 4, 1960, until May 17, 1962; Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from May 18, 1962, until late 1963

May, Mark A., Director, Institute of Human Relations and Professor Emeritus of Psychology, Yale University; chairman, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information until early 1962; member, Task Force on USIA

Mc Cone, John A., Director of Central Intelligence from November 29, 1961

McConeghey, Harold G., foreign affairs officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency

McCormack, John W., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Massachusetts) and Speaker of the House of Representatives

McClellan, John L., Senator (D-Arkansas)

McCloy, John, former U.S. High Commissioner in Germany; member, President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee); Adviser to the President on Disarmament

Mc Dowell, Harris B., Jr., member, U.S. House of Representatives, (D-Delaware)

McGhee, George C., member, President’s Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program (Draper Committee); Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, from February 13 until December 3, 1961; Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs from December 4, 1961, until March 27, 1963; U.S. Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, from May 18, 1963

McGovern, George S., President’s Special Assistant and Director, Office of Food for Peace, from January 20, 1961, until July 18, 1962; Senator (D-South Dakota) from January 3, 1963

McKnight, John P., Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency; later Agency Planning Officer, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962)


McNamara, Robert S., Secretary of Defense, from January 21, 1961

Mecklin, John, public affairs office, U.S. Embassy in Saigon, from July 8 until September 28, 1962; thereafter counselor for public affairs

Meiklejohn, Norman J., information specialist, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency; United States Information Agency liaison officer with the Peace Corps

Merchant, Livingston T. (Livy), Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs until January 31, 1961; Secretary of State ad interim, January 20, 1961, until January 21, 1961; member, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee); Special Assistant for NATO Multilateral Force Negotiations, Office of the Secretary, Department of State; U.S. Ambassador to Canada, from February 20, 1961, until May 26, 1962; President’s Personal Envoy to South Asia during October and November 1961

Merrow, Chester E., member, U.S. House of Representatives (R-New Hampshire)

Miller, Francis P., Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs

Minnow, Newton N., Chairman, Federal Communications Commission
Mitgang, Herbert, reporter and editor of the Sunday Drama section, The New York Times; author of books on Abraham Lincoln and Carl Sandburg

Moceri, James, foreign affairs officer, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency, until 1962; thereafter public affairs officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in Khartoum

Mollenhoff, Clark R., Cowles Publications; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information from May 1, 1962

Moore, Daniel E., acting Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency, 1963

Morales-Carrion, Arturo, member, Department of State Task Force on Latin America; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs from February 14, 1961

Morgan, George Allen, Director, Foreign Service Institute, Department of State

Morgan, Thomas E., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Pennsylvania); chair, House Foreign Affairs Committee

Moss, John E., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-California)

Muhl, Edward, Vice President in Charge of Production, Universal Pictures

Mundt, Karl E., Senator (R-South Dakota)

Murphy, Franklin D., Chancellor, University of California Los Angeles; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

Murrow, Edward R., Vice President, Columbia Broadcasting System; member, Task Force on USIA; Director, United States Information Agency, from March 15, 1961

Nehru, Jawaharlal, Prime Minister of India and Minister for External Affairs

Neilson, N. Paul, Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency, until 1962; public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Jakarta, from August 13, 1962; thereafter counselor for public affairs

Neilson, Waldimar, Ford Foundation; Executive Director of the President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee); member, Task Force on USIA

Neustadt, Richard E., Professor of Government, Columbia University; also Kennedy transition adviser from 1960 until 1961; consultant to the President from 1961

Ngo Dinh Diem, President of the Republic of Vietnam until November 1, 1963

Ngo Dinh Nhu, brother of President Ngo Dinh Diem; Presidential Counselor and Head of the Interministerial Committee for Strategic Hamlets, Republic of Vietnam, until November 1, 1963

Ngo Dinh Nhu, Madame (Tran Le Xuan), wife of Ngo Dinh Nhu and member of the Vietnamese National Assembly; official hostess for President Ngo Dinh Diem

Nhu, see Ngo Dinh Nhu

Nickel, Edward J., Deputy Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency, until 1962; thereafter deputy public affairs officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in Tokyo

Nitze, Paul H., Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs from January 1961

Nixon, Richard M., Vice President of the United States until January 20, 1961

Nolting, Frederick E., Jr., U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Vietnam, from March 15, 1961, until August 15, 1963

Novik, Morris S., radio and television consultant; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, from May 1, 1962

O’Brien, John R., Deputy Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency until June 1961; public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in Rangoon, from June 22 1961, until July 7 1963; public affairs officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in Bangkok from July 1963; also counselor for public affairs
O’Brien, Lawrence F., Special Assistant to the President
Oshins, Robert, Director of Research, Democratic National Committee; member, Task Force on USIA

Paley, William S., Chairman of the Board, Columbia Broadcasting System
Pauker, John, Chief, Policy Guidance Staff, Office of Plans (Office of Policy from August 8, 1962), United States Information Agency, from July 22, 1962
Payne, C. Robert, Special Assistant to the Director, United States Information Agency, until late 1961; thereafter counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in Taipei
Phillips, Joseph B., Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency, until late 1961; counselor for public affairs, U.S. Embassy in Rome, from November 26, 1961
Phoumi Nosavan, General, Lao National Army, Minister of Defense, Royal Lao Government (as recognized by the United States) and de facto leader of the government until June 23, 1962; thereafter Vice Premier and Minister of Finance in the Lao coalition government
Phoumi Vongvichit, Pathet Lao delegate to the Geneva Conference; Minister of Information and Tourism, after June 23, 1962
Plesent, Stanley, General Counsel, United States Information Agency, from December 1, 1961
deSola Pool, Ithiel, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; member, Task Force on USIA

Quadros, Janio, President of Brazil from January 31 until August 25, 1961
Quinim Pholsena, Lao Minister of Foreign Affairs, from June 23, 1962, until April 1, 1963

Read, Benjamin H., Executive Secretary of the Department of State from August 3, 1963
Reed, Philip D., Chairman, Federal Reserve Bank of New York; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information until 1961; member, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad (Sprague Committee)
Reinsch, J. Leonard, Executive Director, WSB-TV, Atlanta; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on Information from 1961; chair from April 2, 1962
Reischauer, Edwin O., U.S. Ambassador to Japan
Rice, Edward E., member of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State, until January 1, 1962; thereafter Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs
Richardson, John Jr., lawyer; Director, Radio Free Europe, from 1961
Roberts, Chalmers, U.S. journalist
Roberts, Edward V. (Ned), Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency
Rockefeller, Nelson A., Special Assistant to the President, from 1954 until 1955 and Chairman of the Planning Coordination Group, 1955
Rooney, John J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-New York); Chairman, Subcommittee on the Department of State, Justice, and Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, House Committee on Appropriations
Rostow, Walt W., Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs until December 4, 1961; thereafter Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council, Department of State
Rowan, Carl T., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from February 27, 1961; U.S. Ambassador to Finland from March 9, 1963
Rusk, Dean, Secretary of State from January 21, 1961
Ryan, Hewson A. (Hew), Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency, from January 2, 1962
XXXIV Persons

Salinger, Pierre E.G., White House Press Secretary
Sanford, Terry, Governor of North Carolina
Sargeant, Howland, President, Radio Liberation; member, Task Force on USIA
Sarnoff, Robert W., Chairman of the Board, National Broadcasting Corporation
Sayles, V. George, international press officer, Office of the Director, Press and Publications Service, United States Information Agency
Schlesinger, Arthur M., Jr., Special Assistant to the President
Schmitt, G. Lewis, Assistant Director, Administration, United States Information Agency
Seltzer, Leo, documentary filmmaker
Severeid, Eric, journalist, Columbia Broadcasting System
Sharon, John, U.S. lawyer
Shelton, Turner B., Director, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency, until August 1961
Shepard, Alan B., Jr., First U.S. astronaut to travel into space
Shriver, R. Sargent, Director, Peace Corps, from March 22, 1961
Shooshan, Harry, Assistant Deputy Administrator, Office of the Deputy Administrator for Operations, Agency for International Development, from November 4, 1961
Siemer, Heinrich B., information specialist, Office of the Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency
Sihanouk, Prince Norodom, Head of State of Cambodia; also President of the Council of Ministers from January 26, 1961
Siscoe, Frank G., Director, Soviet and East European Exchanges Staff, Bureau of European Affairs, Department of State
Smith, Bromley K., Acting Executive Secretary, National Security Council until August 1961; thereafter Executive Secretary
Smith, Glenn L., Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, United States Information Agency, from April 10, 1961, until July 15, 1962; thereafter public affairs officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in Addis Ababa
Smith, H. Alexander, Senator (R-New Jersey)
Smith, Howard K., journalist, CBS News, until 1961; thereafter journalist, ABC News; moderator of the 1960 presidential debates
Smith, Shirley, Director, Women’s Africa Committee
Smythe, Mabel M., Principal, New Lincoln High School, New York; member, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs
Sorensen, Theodore C., Special Counsel to the President
Sorensen, Thomas C., program policy officer, United States Information Agency, until February 1961; thereafter Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency
Souvanna Phouma, Prince, leader of the neutralist political forces in Laos; Lao Prime Minister and Minister of Defense, Veteran Affairs, and Social Action, after June 23, 1962
Sparkman, John J., Senator (D-Alabama)
Speier, Hans, Rand Corporation; member, Task Force on USIA
Sprague, Mansfield D., Chairman, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad
Squires, Leslie Albion, Office of the Assistant Director, Africa, United States Information Agency, until July 1961; public affairs officer and attaché, U.S. Embassy in Ankara, from July 9, 1961; also acting Assistant Director, Africa, in 1961

Staats, Elmer B., Deputy Director, Bureau of the Budget; also acting Director, Bureau of the Budget

Steeves, John M., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs until January 7, 1962; U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan from March 20, 1962

Steinbeck, John, U.S. author

Stennis, John, Senator (D-Mississippi)

Stephens, Elizabeth L., information specialist, Office of the Director, Television Service, United States Information Agency

Stephens, Oren, Director, Office of Research and Analysis (Research and Reference Service from October 4, 1961), United States Information Agency

Stevens, George C., Jr., Director, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency, from January 31, 1962

Stevenson, Adlai E., III, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations from January 21, 1961

Strouss-Hupe, Robert, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania; member, Task Force on USIA

Streibert, Theodore C., Director of the United States Information Agency, from August 4, 1953, until November 15, 1956

Sylvester, Arthur, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs

Talbot, Phillips, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs from April 18, 1961

Taylor, Maxwell D., General, USA; President’s Military Representative from July 1961 until October 1, 1962; thereafter Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Teal, Fred T., Assistant Legal Adviser for Cultural Relations and Public Affairs, Office of the Legal Adviser, Department of State

Thompson, Charles A.H., Rand Corporation; member, Task Force on USIA

Thompson, Llewellyn E., Jr. (Tommy), U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union until July 27, 1962; U.S. Ambassador at Large and Special Assistant to the Secretary from October 3, 1962

Touré, Sekou, President of Guinea

Truman, Harry S, President of the United States from April 12, 1945, until January 20, 1953

Tubby, Roger W., Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs from March 10, 1961, until April 1, 1962; thereafter U.S. Representative to the European Office of the United Nations and Other International Organizations

Tuch, Hans N., foreign affairs officer, United States Information Agency, from October 1961; Deputy Assistant Director, Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, United States Information Agency, from March 24, 1963

Tull, James N., foreign affairs officer, Office of the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency from 1963

Tyler, William R., Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from May 1961 until August 1962; Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, from August 20, 1962

Udall, Stuart L., Secretary of Interior

Ullbricht, Walter, Chairman of the Council of State and of the Socialist Unity Party of the German Democratic Republic

Usher, Richard E., Deputy Director, Office of Southeast Asian Affairs, Department of State, until December 26, 1961; thereafter Regional Planning Adviser, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs

Vogel, Arthur C., information specialist, Office of the Director, Information Center Service, United States Information Agency

Wakefield, Rowan A., staff assistant, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, from May 15, 1961

Washburn, Abbot, Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency until 1961; Acting Director in early 1961

Wheeler, Earle G., General, USA; Chief of Staff, from October 1, 1962

Wheeler, E. Romney, Director, Television Service, United States Information Agency, until 1962

White, Lee C., Assistant Special Counsel to the President from January 1961

White, Paul Lincoln, Director, Office of News, Bureau of Public Affairs, Department of State, until July 1963; thereafter Consul General, U.S. Consulate at Melbourne

White, Theodore, U.S. journalist and author

White, William Lindsay, journalist and foreign correspondent; later editor and publisher of the Emporia Gazette

White, William Allen, editor and publisher of the Emporia Gazette until 1944

Wilkins, Roy, U.S. civil rights leader and activist; head of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People

Williams, G. Mennen, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs

Williams, Haydn, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs; member, Department of State Task Force on Latin America

Wilson, Donald M., Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency, from January 28, 1961

Wilson, Woodrow, President of the United States, from 1913 until 1921

Wright, W. Marshall, Special Assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Department of State

Yarmolinsky, Adam, Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense

Youlou, Abbe Fulbert, President of the Republic of Congo

Zablocki, Clement J., member, U.S. House of Representatives (D-Wisconsin)

Zain, Zairin, Indonesian Ambassador to the United States

Zorthian, Barry, foreign affairs officer, Office of the Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency until May 1961; deputy public affairs officer, U.S. Embassy in New Delhi, from May 1, 1961
WASHINGTON, DECEMBER 1960.

SUBJECT
Educational Exchange

The long-range purpose of the Educational Exchange Program of the State Department is to contribute to the raising of intellectual and educational levels everywhere so that our way of life can be assured survival. Short range, it resists Communist appeals by building into other countries a broadly knowledgeable leadership class. Another short range effect is to raise the technical competence in underdeveloped countries. It also makes Americans more sophisticated about the world and our problems in it.

This program differs in interest and in kind from the technical assistance and educational assistance programs of ICA which are specifically designed to contribute to economic development. But as illiterate countries come into being, as in Africa, massive ICA assistance is put into general education and educational institutions. This movement of ICA into the purely educational field has blurred the original clear difference between the two programs.

The comparatively modest size of the State Department’s program is misleading. It is highly selective. It is apportioned by countries according to political judgments. It is carefully programmed. Its balance between immediate and ultimate objectives is calculated. It combines U.S. dollars, foreign currencies and private contributions, thus making

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, Pre-Presidential Papers, Transition Files—Task Force Reports, Task Force Reports 1960, Box 1073, Exchange of Persons. No classification marking. A piece of paper is taped over the date on the copy of the memorandum printed here.
up a pattern of complicated cooperative grants. It also stimulates and services a variety of non-government exchanges.

The Department does as little as possible itself but contracts student placement, programming of foreign visits, examinations, etc., to private institutions. Its relationships with contractors are generally good, but Government accounting practices are an irritation and some of the contractors have become high-powered pressure groups with a vested interest in the status quo.

The principal advisory and cooperative groups assisting the program are the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange (responding to the Smith-Mundt Act),\textsuperscript{2} the Board of Foreign Scholarships (Fulbright Act),\textsuperscript{3} the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, and the Advisory Committee on the Arts. Their guidance is supplemented by called meetings of professional people.

The principal handicaps are:

1. Rigidity in law (and interpretation of law).
2. Chronic shortage of funds.
3. Weak leadership, reflecting lack of real State Department interest in this arm of foreign policy. The geographical (political) bureaus of State know little and care less about the program.
4. Impending shortage of U.S. educational resources for overseas activity, a reflection of lack of national attention to our educational establishment.

Senator Fulbright has conferred with Government and educational officials and has asked for suggestions for drafting new comprehensive legislation for the exchange program, addressed principally at point one above. There are now unnecessary built-in restrictions, due partly to legislative and appropriations language, that make it difficult to assure the foreigner an adequate experience in the U.S. The Bureau of the Budget recently added to these restrictions by putting foreign currencies for this program into the dollar appropriations process.

The program needs strong, convinced leadership.

The ideal position in the Government for the exchange program would be close to the State Department for policy guidance, but outside its administrative control, as in the Information Agency (USIA). The

\textsuperscript{2} The U.S. Information and Educational Exchange Act of 1948 (P.L. 80–402), which President Harry S. Truman signed into law on January 27, 1948, commonly known as the Smith-Mundt Act after Senator H. Alexander Smith (R–New Jersey) and Representative Karl Mundt (R–South Dakota), established guidelines by which the United States conducted public diplomacy overseas.

\textsuperscript{3} The Fulbright Act, P.L. 79–584, which Truman signed into law on August 1, 1946, mandated the establishment of an international exchange program.
State Department’s administration is not equipped to handle contracts and complicated fiscal relationships with private institutions.

The educational exchange work of the State Department is closely akin to the cultural work of USIA. These programs could be brought together. If related to the State Department and operated together, they need administrative autonomy for efficiency.

The question of the relationship of the Department’s exchange program to ICA educational programs should be made clear. The appointment of a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for inter-agency educational and cultural coordination did not achieve this purpose, since his role has not been accepted outside the State Department itself. This relationship with ICA is increasingly important because many of the new and expanding programs can be authorized either through economic aid or educational exchange depending upon the emphasis, funding source and operating responsibility intended.

The present level of the educational exchange program is $23.2 million in dollars and $19 million in foreign currencies. This is far short of requirements to meet needs and opportunities country by country. There should be a regular annual increase of hard dollar appropriations and a considerable immediate increase in foreign currency availability. Coupled with greater flexibility of use, this could begin to meet program needs and produce a better program, which is even more desirable than greater numbers. A freer use of excess foreign currencies is required to stabilize and improve present programs and for overseas expansion, particularly into new fields such as educational centers, regional universities and institutes.

Educational institutions abroad, created and supported by the United States and largely financed by foreign currencies owed the U.S., would vastly expand our influence and our objectives. They would help fill the educational vacuum the U.S.S.R. is trying to fill while it draws off potential free leadership into Soviet educational institutions. They need not be standard universities in all cases, but carefully designed to meet national and regional needs. This offers the best chance for expansion of our programs at low cost, and without over-burdening our own schools.
MEMORANDUM ON THE U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY: PURPOSE AND ORGANIZATION

SUMMARY

This is the first of two memoranda on USIA. This one contains recommendations on USIA’s purpose, general organization, relationship to the State Department and criteria for selecting its leadership. The second \footnote{The second memorandum, dated December 16, is ibid.} will make recommendations regarding immediate program needs, Fiscal Year 1961 and ’62 budget levels and improvements in internal organization.

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS

1. All overseas psychological (information, cultural, educational) operations of the U.S. Government should be grouped together in one organization.

2. This organization should take its policy guidance from the State Department but should be independently administered and not a part of State or any other agency.

3. This organization should be the overseas psychological instrument of the U.S. Government. It should have close relations with the White House (which decides and speaks on foreign policy) as well as the State Department (which implements that policy).

PURPOSE

It should be the purpose of USIA to further the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives by:

1. Using communications techniques (personal contact and exchanges, libraries, press, radio, motion pictures, television, fairs and

\footnote{Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda, Box 64, Neustadt, Richard E., 1961–1962. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Neustadt, who was coordinating the transition team, sent the paper to the President-elect under a January 2 memorandum, in which he stated: “On December 21 you asked me for a memorandum on the United States Information Agency. In response, I am enclosing two memoranda prepared by Thomas C. Sorensen. You requested a report from him some time ago, through Sorensen’s brother Ted. By the time his memoranda were written the Sharon task force on this subject had come into being and Sorensen, who was consulted by Sharon’s associates, assumed that their work superseded his own. Accordingly, he did not send these memoranda to you. But it seems to me that you should see them; having fished them out of limbo I forward them herewith.” (Ibid.)}
exhibits, lectures, book publishing and others) to promote climates of 
public opinion abroad which will enhance the prospects of achieving 
these objectives through diplomatic means.

2. Projecting to the world an image of a strong, democratic, dynamic 
America which is serving the interests of free peoples and is worthy 
of their cooperation.

3. Advising the President and the State Department on the reactions 
of foreign peoples to, and the consequences of, proposed U.S. policies, 
programs and official statements. Repeated propaganda defeats in 
recent years, notably our handling of the U–2 affair
and some develop-
ments in Africa and Asia, attest to the importance of this function.

USIA should be the psychological instrument of the U.S. Govern-
ment overseas, just as State is its diplomatic instrument and CIA its 
intelligence instrument.

GENERAL ORGANIZATION

The consensus of best-informed opinion, with which I fully agree, 
is that all overseas psychological activities of the U.S. Government 
should be grouped together in one organization.

The Fifteenth Report (1960) of the U.S. Advisory Commission on 
Information states: “To meet the competitive ideological and propa-
ganda challenge of the future, the time has come for the United States 
to consolidate all the foreign cultural, educational and information 
programs in one agency of cabinet status. The purpose is to ensure 
maximum coordination and unified direction of the total U.S. commu-
nications effort.” I agree, except for the recommendation that this 
agency be of cabinet status. USIA, like CIA, does not participate in the 
policy-making function and should not be of cabinet rank. The Director 
of USIA should, however, be a member of the National Security Council 
(NSC) and the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB).

Theodore C. Streibert, first Director of USIA, wrote in response to 
a query from me regarding his views: “The cultural and exchange 
functions of State should be centralized in USIA . . . An effort should

3 On May 1, 1960, a U.S. unarmed U–2 reconnaissance plane was shot down 1,200 
miles inside the Soviet Union. Premier Nikita Khrushchev exploited the incident at the 
May 1960 four-power summit meeting in Moscow, causing the summit to collapse. See 
Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. X, Part I, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus, 
Germany; Austria, Documents 164–192.

4 The Commission was created by the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948. For the report, 
see Fifteenth Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, Letter From Chairman, 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Information Transmitting a Copy of the Fifteenth Report of the 
U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, Dated April 1960, Pursuant to Public Law 402, 
Printing Office, 1960)
be made to pull together the overseas educational projects of ICA and
a large number of other Government agencies into USIA. This could
be gradually accomplished if the cultural and exchange responsibilities
of State were put into USIA. If not, I am afraid it would be difficult to
achieve much centralization of overseas educational activities, although
it is obviously needed.”

Unification of overseas information, educational and cultural
activities would bring together: USIA as presently constituted; the
Fulbright (P.L. 584) and Smith-Mundt (P.L. 402) exchange-of-persons
programs\(^5\)—now administered by the State Department’s Bureau of
Educational and Cultural Relations (CU);\(^6\) the cultural presentations
(musicians, artists and athletes) aspects of the President’s Special Inter-
national Program (P.L. 860)\(^7\)—now administered by State (CU) but
“coordinated” by the Director of USIA; the international fair and exhibit
portion of the President’s Special International Program—also now
“coordinated” by the USIA Director but administered by the Commerce
Department’s Office of International Trade Fairs (OITF), and those
purely educational functions now carried on by the International Coop-
eration Administration (ICA).

The exchange-of-persons and cultural programs of State, and the
exhibits program of Commerce are closely akin to the cultural and
informational work of USIA. Each is an integral part of the total psycho-
logical effort. Each is a necessary instrument for effective orchestration.
The effectiveness of the total effort, and each individual part, would
be increased by unification. Unification would permit a reduction in
the number of employees and elimination of overlapping functions.

**RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATE DEPARTMENT**

The overseas psychological program should be conducted by an
independent agency, such as USIA is now, or by an agency related to
the State Department but independently administered, such as ICA.
In any event policy must be supplied by State but without the overlay
of State’s administrative machinery.

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\(^5\) See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1.

\(^6\) The Department of State established the Bureau of International Cultural Relations
on June 1, 1959, and renamed it the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs on April
17, 1960.

\(^7\) Reference is to the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation
Act of 1956 (P.L. 84–860), which went into effect on August 1, 1956. The Act authorized
the President to provide for U.S. artist and athlete tours abroad; U.S. representation in
artistic, dramatic, musical, sports, and other cultural festivals, competitions, or events;
U.S. participation in international fairs and expositions, including trade and industrial
fairs; and publicity and promotion abroad of these activities.
This year’s Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information states: “Foreign information operations have been conducted more effectively outside the Department of State but within the limits of its foreign policy guidance.” The Commission notes that “USIA has obtained more coordinated foreign policy guidance as an independent agency than when it was in the (State) Department.” The Draper Committee (1959), concurring in this view, concluded that a separate agency is more likely to generate “high vitality” and a “sense of urgency,” and also is more likely to achieve a vigorous, imaginative program and effective administration of the distinctive tasks involved.” Both groups oppose putting operations into a department which by tradition and training has been responsible for formulating policy.

Former USIA Director Streibert wrote me: “It is completely clear to me from my experience in 1953 to 1956 that information activities should not be incorporated within the State Department, but should continue as an independent agency . . . These operations are foreign to its (State’s) field of diplomacy . . . A separate agency can develop greater competence in both personnel and methods if it has a single objective and is not diverted by being part of another organization. The proponents of moving USIA back into State are never explicit, at least to my knowledge, as to what currently is so wrong . . . as to require a fundamental change. It has been especially established overseas that the USIA country staffs do work well under the Chief of Mission and as part of the country diplomatic establishment.”

It is important to note that USIA staffs abroad are thoroughly integrated in the Embassy establishment and, as Mr. Streibert points out, work under the direction of the Chief of Mission. Integration overseas is essential for a coordinated approach; independence of operations (though not of policy) is equally essential at home for a vigorous, effective program.

The top career man in State’s Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, who might be thought to favor the status quo, supports this view. In a memorandum discussing his particular field of interest he stated: “The ideal position in the Government for the exchange program would be close to the State Department for policy guidance but outside

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its administrative control, as in the Information Agency. The (State) Department’s administration is not equipped to handle contracts and complicated fiscal relationships with private institutions . . . If (information and exchange programs are) related to the (State) Department and operated together, they need administrative autonomy for efficiency.”9

CRITERIA FOR LEADERSHIP

To be effective, the Director and Deputy Director of USIA should:

1. Have experience in world affairs and knowledge of foreign peoples. In particular they should comprehend the “revolution of rising expectations” throughout the world, and its impact on U.S. foreign policy.

2. Be pragmatic, open-minded and sensitive to international political currents, without being naive.

3. Understand the potentialities of propaganda while being aware of its limitations.

4. Be able to apply the psychological factor in the determination of policies affecting our relations with other nations. That is, they should be able to advise on the reactions of foreign peoples to, and the consequences of, proposed U.S. policies and programs.

5. Have a clear understanding of, and loyalty to, the President’s program.

6. Have qualities of leadership, be able and decisive executives, men who are impatient with inefficiency.

In addition, the Director should have the personality and the public stature which would enable him to deal amicably and effectively with Congress and the American people. The Deputy Director should be a professional propagandist, preferably with overseas experience, and should have the confidence of—and the ability to work with—the President’s policy advisers and press secretary. (The Deputy Director is USIA’s liaison with the White House staff.)

9 The memorandum was not found.
3. Report Prepared by Deputy Director-Designate Donald M. Wilson


This report is highly selective. It covers five areas of USIA activity that I think require the promptest action. They are: Organization, Programs, Personnel, Budget Levels, and Recruiting.

ORGANIZATION

The new administration should determine, as soon as possible, the position it intends to give USIA within the governmental framework. This decision will put to rest an uncertainty that now exists throughout the Agency. This uncertainty results from the fact that during the Truman administration the information program was the responsibility of the State Department, and during the Eisenhower administration it was the responsibility of the independent USIA. Senator Kennedy’s decision will have far-reaching effects on the prestige of USIA, both in Washington and abroad.

There are three principal proposals for USIA:

1) Keep it as it is.

2) Return it to the State Department under an Under Secretary or Assistant Secretary for Cultural and Information Affairs. This view has considerable report [support?] from Congress, from the career element in the State Department, and from Douglas Dillon.²

3) Elevate it to Cabinet rank, as proposed by the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information (Mark May, Erwin Canham, Sigurd Larmon, Philip Reed, Lewis Douglas).³

The consensus of opinion, with which I agree, favors retaining USIA as an independent agency but not elevating it to Cabinet rank. An independent agency is more likely to produce imagination, urgency and pride in its work. The Draper Committee⁴ came to this conclusion in 1959. The Sprague Committee, although it has not completed its

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¹ Source: Kennedy Library, Personal Papers of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General’s General Correspondence, Box 78, United States Information Agency (USIA), 12/1960–5/1962. No classification marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Wilson sent the report to Robert Kennedy under a December 13 covering memorandum, indicating that it was the “preliminary report” on USIA. (Ibid.)

² In the left-hand margin next to this point, an unknown hand placed an “X” and wrote “Bill Walton” next to it. Walton, a friend of the Kennedy family, was an adviser to Kennedy during his election campaign.

³ See footnote 4, Document 2.

⁴ See footnote 8, Document 2.
report to the President yet, has also come to the same conclusion. There is also a morale factor. There has been an encouraging growth in the pride and professionalism of USIA’s personnel. The number and quality of applicants seeking to join the Agency has greatly increased. To re-integrate the Agency into State would destroy the esprit which has slowly been growing.

The principal argument favoring re-integration into the State Department appears to be that USIA may, as time goes on and its influence increases, attempt to enter the policy-making area and thus embarrass the U.S. government. This could happen. But it has not happened in the past seven years and there is no reason why it should happen if the President makes it plain to the Director of USIA that policy decisions come only from the White House and the State Department.

The chief argument against granting Cabinet rank to USIA is that it would inevitably lead to conflict with the State Department. The State Department is the foreign policy arm of the government. USIA is the organizational arm whose duty it is to explain and promote that policy. USIA, not being a policy maker, should remain in a subordinate role to State. However, it should always be able to offer its views on the international psychological effects of policies before they are put into effect.

Another decision requiring prompt action concerns the scope of USIA’s responsibilities. There are many, including myself, who feel that all overseas psychological operations (information, educational, and cultural) should be grouped under USIA. Currently there are two important programs that are outside of USIA’s sphere. One is administered by the State Department, the other by the Commerce Department.

1) The State Department administers all educational exchange (Fulbright) and cultural programs under its Bureau of Educational and Cultural Relations. Although this Bureau is responsible for selecting the people who go abroad under these programs, USIA gets the job making their arrangements and shepherding them once they get overseas. This is an awkward and cumbersome arrangement. These exchange and cultural programs, which fall under the heading of over-

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5 The President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad, chaired by former Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Mansfield Sprague, was established by President Eisenhower in 1959. For the announcement of the appointment of the Committee, see Department of State Bulletin, March 7, 1960, p. 365. The Committee submitted its conclusions and recommendations to Eisenhower on December 23, 1960. A copy of the report is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Charles E. Johnson Files, Box 466, President’s Committee on Information Activities Abroad, 1960. On January 11, 1961, the White House released an exchange of letters between Sprague and Eisenhower and highlights of the Committee’s recommendations and extracts from the report; for the text, see Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1961, pp. 182–195.
seas psychological operations, should be taken out of State and put under USIA. This might prove difficult to get through the Senate, however, since the original divorce of the exchange programs from the information programs was initiated by Senator Fulbright. He presumably feels the same today.

2) The Commerce Department administers the international fair and exhibit programs with the “coordination” of USIA. Some international fairs and exhibits are truly “commercial” and devoted to the promotion of products. But many, i.e., the 1959 Agricultural Fair in New Delhi, are more truly cold war competitions, using “commercial” products as trappings behind which each nation tries to promote its own image. The psychological importance of these fairs and exhibits far outweigh the commercial importance and USIA should be given primary responsibility for the entire program with Commerce put in the subsidiary role.

PROGRAMS

This section picks out the two most crucial regional areas of Africa and Latin America for brief examination and makes some program recommendations. It also picks out two tremendously useful tools—science and television—and offers some ideas on how they might be used to better advantage.

A) AFRICA—At the present we have 31 USIA posts in 20 African countries. By June 30, 1961 there will be 12 new posts opened in 11 more African countries. These figures illustrate the kind of African operation that currently dominates USIA: secure a foothold in every new country. We will only have 98 Americans manning those 43 posts by June 30, 1961, which indicates what a slim foothold it is.

This foothold operation is obviously necessary and the new administration should support it wholeheartedly by giving it sufficient funds to staff it with the proper personnel and physical equipment. But we must also look ahead and anticipate the type of programs that will prove the most effective in Africa. Here are three programs that appear particularly promising.

1) English Language Teaching—The new leadership and the intellectual elite of all French Africa is hungry to learn English. In that hunger lies an enormous opportunity for USIA that we must exploit. The possibilities are tremendous. For example, in answer to an urgent State Department call, USIA opened an Information Center in Bamako, Mali this Fall. The Public Affairs Officer had no sooner arrived than he was asked to set up an English class in the Presidential palace. His students today: The President6 and his wife, three cabinet ministers and their

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6 Modibo Keita.
wives, the Mayor, and three high officials of the Foreign Ministry. In the Congo, where the teaching program is only two months old, 150 are enrolled, including several Chiefs. In Guinea, where most USIA operations are being curtailed by the pro-Communist government, the English teaching program is specifically exempted and the students include several cabinet and sub-cabinet officials. We should begin extensive recruiting of qualified American teachers who speak French to move into this vacuum. Equally as important, we should plan to supply all French Africa with American textbooks on the basic subjects. To backstop that, excellent libraries should be set up to maintain and nourish the interest in the English language. This program should be viewed as a long-term project of 20 or 30 years through which we can exert great influence on the present and future leaders of Africa.

2) Radio Broadcasting—The Communist and pro-Communist radios of Moscow, Peking, and Cairo broadcast 100 hours a week of African programs to African audiences. Voice of America broadcasts 7 hours of African programs a week, most of it with a weak signal from Munich and Tangier. It now appears practically certain that we will be forced out of Tangier by the Moroccan government at the end of 1963. USIA signed an agreement with Liberia in October, 1959 to build a powerful short-wave relay station there but appropriations were not forthcoming until July of 1960. When completed in the summer or fall of 1963, at the cost of $13 million, the Liberian station will blanket all of Africa with a clear signal. Under present plans VOA will have no effective radio signal into Africa until that time.

Because of this, VOA has made what it describes as a “comprehensive study” of the possibilities of putting two 35kw transmitters that they now own into the Liberian site as an interim measure. Their study indicated that this would take one year, cost $1 million, provide a signal too weak to be of much use south of Guinea and would substantially slow down the construction of the permanent relay station in Liberia. They rejected the idea.

VOA has long hoped to buy a portable relay station consisting of one 50kw medium wave transmitter and three 50kw shortwave transmitters. This can be built in eleven months and can be moved to any point in the world in two or three weeks. The cost is $1.8 million. It would cover a fairly wide portion of Africa. I recommend that USIA asks Congress for a special appropriation this year to build such a portable transmitter. I further recommend it be set up in Liberia in early 1962 to cover at least a year and a half of the gap before completion of the permanent station. Because it is portable, it will not interfere with the construction of the permanent station. Once the permanent station is in use, the portable one can be used in another important
area or put in reserve for emergency use (i.e., the Lebanon crisis,\(^7\) where a portable station would have been invaluable.)

3) African Students in Europe—There are now over 20,000 African students in England and France and nearly that number in Germany. These are the future leaders of Africa, forming the opinions and ideas that they will take back home and put into practice. The Communists are hard at work organizing clubs, discussion groups, holding special lectures and seminars for them. We should surpass the Communists in this activity.

B) Latin America: The Nixon trip to Latin America in 1958\(^8\) triggered USIA into stepping up its program there although it still is inadequate. Unlike Africa, there are long established posts in most of the major cities. Current USIA activity is directed toward strengthening personnel, library, press, motion picture, television and radio operations. Here are three programs which need particular attention:

1) Student and Labor Groups—There are two leadership groups in Latin America upon which USIA should concentrate. One group is the students who represent a powerful political entity today in most Latin American countries. The other group is the labor leaders whose power has been growing rapidly in spite of efforts by ruling oligarchies to hold them down.

USIA has made a start at the establishment of nine new Community centers for labor and students. They have also made a start in asking for special USIA student and labor “Information Officers” who will be specially trained in their fields as well as in Communist strategies normally employed to subvert such groups. Both of these programs should be expanded so USIA will be better able to deal with these two new power elites.

2) Radio Broadcasting—VOA began its first short wave broadcast to Latin America in March 1959. Today VOA is broadcasting only seven hours a week directly to Latin America and seven hours of re-broadcast. The Budget for Fiscal Year 1962 calls for an extra seven hours a week. Meanwhile the Communists are broadcasting 163 hours a week into Latin America. VOA argues that short wave is not popular and it is more effective to place packaged programs on medium wave commercial stations. However, this medium wave placement is always subject to restriction by an unfriendly government. Short wave is not. My recommendation would be to increase short wave to 42 hours a week.

\(^7\) Reference is to the 1958 crisis that led to the introduction of U.S. forces into Lebanon and British forces into Jordan.

\(^8\) For documentation on Vice President Nixon’s April 27–May 15, 1958, trip to South America, see Foreign Relations, 1958–1960, vol. V, American Republics, Documents 42–57.
Cuba receives the same single hour of short wave that the rest of Latin America receives. Medium wave broadcasts into Cuba have been considered but rejected because they would violate the North American Broadcasting Agreement of which we and other North American nations are signatories. Furthermore, if we attempted to direct a propaganda broadcast at Cuba they could easily turn some 50 of their 148 transmitters on us and badly foul up the American airwaves along the East Coast. From the "Voice" point of view, we are currently stymied in our relations with Cuba.

3) Television—Latin America has 3.3 million television sets today with an estimated audience of 15 million (4 million each in Mexico and Brazil). USIA has only one weekly 15-minute news show which is sent to all TV countries and viewed by 10 million people. If this estimate of viewers is even partially correct, it points up the great potential of the TV medium in Latin America. New programs should be directed at the student and labor groups.

C) SCIENCE: A November survey taken for USIA in England showed that a majority of people thought Russia had more vehicles in space than we did (actual count is 26–5 in our favor). A recent survey in India was more disturbing. Not only did most Indians think we had fewer vehicles in space, but they also thought that we were behind the Russians in all aspects of scientific achievement. Most disturbing of all, they thought that Russia had done more for mankind through scientific achievements than we had. These are just a few indicators of how badly we have failed in translating the great achievements of U.S. science to the world.

At present, USIA has only one officer assigned to scientific planning in Washington.

We need to launch a full-scale science program, aimed particularly at such uncommitted nations as Egypt and India. This should include:

1) The increased exchange of science students and delegations.
2) Increased visits of leading American scientists to foreign countries.
3) A much wider dissemination of U.S. scientific and technical journals.
4) The establishment of scientific and technical libraries.
5) The establishment of scientific and technical bi-national centers.
6) A program to send science teachers abroad.
7) More science film festivals to utilize the superb scientific and technical films that are made each year by American firms.

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9 Not found.
D) TELEVISION: The proposed USIA budget for TV next year is $1.8 million. This compares with $10 million being spent for press services, $6 million for motion picture services, and $18 million for VOA. The television department, created two years ago, distributes the one 15-minute news show to Latin America, and puts together package series on such topics as I.G.Y., Newport Jazz Festival, and Americans at Work. This is not nearly enough.

In a world where there are already 33 million TV sets outside the Iron Curtain (excluding the U.S.) and 6 million behind the Iron Curtain, the potential is tremendous.

In three to five years it will be possible to broadcast television programs directly from the U.S. to other parts of the world on a regular basis. We must be the first to seize this opportunity, ready with the equipment and the programs for Africa and the other uncommitted areas (Actually it is possible now to send a signal via the Echo satellite across the ocean. It would be a one-shot operation but perhaps we should utilize it for some great event that highlights the democratic way of life.).

Presidential press conferences should be videotaped and dispatched immediately around the world for local television placement by USIA. There is hardly a television station in the world that wouldn’t accept them free. They represent the best possible means of explaining American policy.

[Omitted here are Wilson’s comments on personnel, budget levels, and recruiting.]
Memorandum From James J. Halsema, Office of Plans, United States Information Agency to the Acting Director (Washburn)


The Eisenhower-Kennedy Meeting

The meeting between President Eisenhower and President-elect Kennedy of December 6, their first since the election, gave USIA an excellent opportunity to convey to world-wide audiences something of the importance and the cordiality of the occasion, some back-grounding of US process in the transfer of responsibility between one administration and another, and an idea of the serious concern shown by both principals for their responsibilities in today’s world.

In the field of radio, the Voice of America (IBS) gave the meeting extensive coverage in all news roundups to all areas. For more than 24 hours December 6 and 7 on virtually all shows it was the lead story. Significant editorial comment was picked up. On-the-spot reportage was broadcast to all areas in English. The Latin American Division and the German and Yugoslav desks prepared special reports which have been broadcast. The Japanese and Burmese desks used taped inserts. The event was the subject of special direct feeds to Athens and Bangkok in Greek and Thai respectively. The Indian desk airmailed a tape of the reportage to New Delhi. Several desks used the full text of the communiqué, the Russian twice.

The Press Service (IPS) sent out the full text of the joint statement (380 words) and a lead (670 words) highlighting the joint statement, human interest and color angles. This was carried on all Files.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 372, Box 603, Director’s Correspondence—1960. No classification marking. Drafted by Halsema and Dalcher. A copy was sent to Dalcher.


3 November 8.

4 The Wireless File transmitted from Washington to posts included official statements of U.S. policy, in addition to news articles and press summaries prepared by the Department of State. The Wireless File also sent five regional transmissions of policy statements and news background materials to post five days a week.
pictures, one of President Eisenhower greeting President-elect Kennedy on the White House portico, another in the President’s office, were processed and serviced quickly to all posts. (Other photographic possibilities were quite limited.) A roundup of US and foreign editorial comment and IPS column treatment followed. The Chalmers Roberts’ article on transition in the Washington Post⁵ was sent in full on Wireless Files (radio teletype) to all parts of the world.

The Television Service (ITV) acquired from Telenews 3 minutes of newsreel coverage of the meeting for distribution to 23 posts with TV outlets in Latin America, the Near East, and Africa which are not regularly serviced by commercial newsreels. One minute of this coverage was included in the regular TV weekly program for Latin America, PANORAMA PANAMERICANO.

Though conditions were not ideal for newsreel coverage, the Agency’s motion picture service (IMS) obtained 253 feet of useful coverage which was sent to USIS newsreel operations in 27 countries, and in addition, the coverage was supplied to commercial newsreel operations in 16 other countries.

⁵ Presumable reference to “Scene II of Transition: U.S. Process Clicks at White House,” The Washington Post, December 7, 1960, p. A11. Roberts, describing the meeting, wrote: “But above all, it was the second scene in one of the greatest processes of the American system of government: the orderly transfer of power from the leader of one political party to that of the other. The first scene was in the voting booths across the land on Election Day; the third and concluding scene will come on Inauguration Day.”
5. **Report Prepared by the Task Force on the United States Information Agency**


   [Omitted here are the cover page, a listing of members, and the table of contents.]

   **PART ONE**

   **RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ACTION**

   **A. Recommendations for Executive Action**

   1. **The Role of USIA and its Director**

      (a) Retain the present status of USIA as an independent agency reporting directly to the President.

      (b) Designate the Director of USIA as Chief Adviser to the President and members of the Cabinet on the psychological aspects of international problems.

      (c) Invite the Director of USIA to attend Cabinet meetings on a regular basis.

      (d) Designate the Director of USIA an *ex officio* member of the National Security Council pending statutory membership.

      (e) Establish under the National Security Council a Committee on Information and Exchange Policy, consisting of:

         (i) The Director of USIA.

         (ii) The Under Secretary of State.


         (iv) The Director of CIA.

         (v) The Director of ICA.

         (vi) One or two public members.

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, Pre-Presidential Papers, Transition Files—Transition Reports, Transition Reports 1960, Box 1072, United States Information Agency—Task Force Report. Confidential. Free and Davison chaired the Task Force on USIA; its members were Alexander, Almond, Barrett, Bingham, Blum, Bogart, Cantrill, Carlson, Carroll, Cleveland, Fischer, Gallup, Carl Marcy, May, Murrow, Neilon, Oshins, deSola Pool, Sargeant, Speier, Strauss-Hupe, and Thompson. The Task Force was an outgrowth of a study undertaken by Stevenson, aided by Ball and Sharon, regarding foreign policy issues. The resultant report outlined decisions Kennedy needed to make during the transition and the foreign policy challenges facing the administration following the inauguration. According to *The New York Times*, Sharon had suggested that Kennedy “go beyond the report and use the pre-Inauguration period to set up task forces on United States foreign policy—what it has been, what is wrong with it, the decisions and actions ahead.” (Dana Adams Schmidt, “Kennedy Gets Aid on Foreign Policy: Dozen Groups Assay Wide Area of Problems—Will Offer Ideas by Dec. 31,” December 20, 1960, p. 36)
2. Exchange of Persons
(a) Direct USIA to coordinate and act as a clearinghouse for information on all exchange of persons activities, both governmental and private.
(b) Direct that the Public Affairs Officer at United States overseas missions coordinate all United States government-sponsored exchange of persons activities within the country.
(c) Direct the Committee on Information and Exchange Policy to develop a program of improved selection, orientation, handling, briefing and follow-up for persons involved in exchange programs.
(d) Direct USIA to develop a program for coordination and guidance of privately-sponsored exchange of persons programs.

3. Information Programs
(a) Direct USIA to develop a program to make available United States wire services to the newspapers serving critical foreign areas.
(b) Direct USIA to develop programs for distribution of United States books and magazines at competitive prices in key foreign areas.
(c) Direct USIA to develop a program for increased assistance to English-teaching in foreign educational institutions.
(d) Direct USIA to assume responsibility for arranging and conducting suitable Independence Day celebrations abroad, this activity to be subsequently budgeted by USIA.
(e) Direct that Foreign Service Officers, early in their careers, be given training and experience in international information and cultural programs.

B. Recommendations for Legislative Action
1. Submit legislation revising the role of USIA by:
(a) Re-naming it the International Exchange Agency or the United States Cultural Exchange Agency.
(b) Transferring to the new agency the following related programs now administered by other agencies:

1) Exchange of Persons (from the Department of State)
2) Cultural Presentations (from the Department of State)
3) Educational programs other than technical assistance (from ICA)
4) International Trade Fairs (from the Department of Commerce)

(c) Organizing the new agency into three major operating divisions for Educational, Cultural and Information Activities.
(d) Making the Director of the new agency a member of the National Security Council.
2. Request additional appropriations to increase the USIA FY 1962 budget from the anticipated $130 million to $150 million. (This figure
is exclusive of programs proposed to be transferred to USIA which were previously budgeted by other agencies.)

3. Request legislation eliminating detailed restrictions on the use of foreign currencies derived from the sale of surplus agricultural commodities so as to make such funds subject to appropriation for all international education, cultural and information programs.

4. Request a supplemental appropriation to the President, to remain available as an emergency contingency fund until expended, in the amount of $100 million, for use in international education, cultural and information programs.

5. Request Congress to authorize and appropriate funds for:
   (a) a career service for USIA;
   (b) adjustment of salaries of USIA personnel so as to correspond to those applicable to similar positions in the Department of State;
   (c) a more adequate training program, both within the government and at private universities, for USIA personnel;
   (d) an increase in the funds available to the Office of Research and Analysis for contracting for surveys and research from $122,500 to $300,000;
   (e) an amount not to exceed $1 million for FY ’62 to cover the costs of needed experts for, and studies to be made by, the proposed Committee on Information and Exchange Policy.

C. Recommendations for International Negotiation

1. Direct USIA to develop educational and other exchange of persons programs in conjunction with other friendly countries on a bi-lateral or multi-lateral basis.

D. Recommendations for Further Study and Consideration

1. Direct USIA to re-evaluate the effectiveness of exchange programs with unfriendly countries and to make recommendations for increasing their effectiveness for achieving United States objectives.

PART TWO
INTRODUCTION

I. The Dependence on Sound Substantive Policies

A. Limits on Cultural and Information Activities

The Task Force is under no illusions that any modifications in the information and cultural machinery of government can reverse the unfavorable trends in the psychological position of the United States abroad. We cannot put a good face on unsound or inadequate policies or unwise actions by information or cultural operations, let alone by slogans or propaganda gimmicks.
B. Basic Policy Recommendations

Fundamentally, the decline in United States prestige can be arrested only by more dynamic Presidential leadership, a much clearer sense of our national purposes, sound substantive policies and better coordinated programs for accomplishing them. Among important specifics, reversal of the recent trend will require that the United States

1) adopt a posture toward the world and its problems, and pursue policies and programs motivated by considerations more positive than mere anti-communism;

2) identify itself in a more vital way with “the revolution of rising expectations” now sweeping the world, rather than continue to be identified as the defender of the status quo;

3) use all of its programs in the underdeveloped areas (including its information and cultural activities) to develop frameworks of free governments, within which the aspirations of the people can ultimately be met;

4) come to terms with the spirit of nationalism (and concomitant feelings about racism) which constitutes the most powerful emotional force now at work in the Afro-Asian countries;

5) do a more effective and imaginative job of waging the psychological war against Communism behind the Iron Curtain, rather than continuing to allow the Communists to choose psychological battle grounds on Free World territory, with relatively little disruption behind their lines.

C. Need to Consider Psychological Effects

The Task Force is fully aware that foreign reactions cannot be the controlling element in the formulation of substantive United States policies; that measures in the furtherance of America’s broader interests may be unpopular in certain parts of the world; that psychological considerations are not separable from political ones and are only one of the factors that must be considered in the evolution of sound policies. At the same time, if unfavorable trends of foreign opinion are to be reversed, psychological considerations must be taken into account on a more regular, systematic basis than has been true in the past, not only in the conduct of our information and cultural operations, but at the level of the President, the Secretary of State and all other major officials who make statements, develop policies and decide on action or non-action by the United States Government.

D. No Substitute for Foresight

In this connection, no machinery can substitute for a President and Cabinet members who anticipate foreign reactions before they talk or act. However, the Task Force believes that given proper support by the President and his Cabinet the recommendations proposed herein
can insure that psychological considerations are at least not overlooked when policies are being formulated, and that success can be achieved in coordinating the policies and actions of the manifold agencies whose operations, whether domestic or international, have psychological impact abroad.

II. Failures of the United States Information and Cultural Programs

A. Failures at the Top

Considering the severe limitations to which they have been subjected in recent years, the staffs of the international information, education and cultural arms of the Government have functioned remarkably well. With some exceptions, however, the programs which they have been asked to carry out have become pedestrian and routine. Furthermore, other weaknesses have limited the staff’s effectiveness—deficiencies which must also be rectified if the United States is to regain prestige abroad. By and large, for example, the President, his Cabinet and their staffs have failed to:

1) infuse psychological considerations, on a systematic basis, into the formulation and execution of substantive policies which have or could have psychological impact;

2) develop clear-cut, meaningful, long-range objectives (worldwide and country-by-country) toward which our international information, education and cultural programs and all the media should be working;

3) devise common informational themes to be stressed by all departments and agencies of the government, which would help define as well as achieve America’s psychological objectives;

4) determine on a priority basis and with sufficient precision the “target groups” to be emphasized in each country; more specifically to establish, on a sufficiently systematic and extensive basis, close, continuing working relationships with:

   (a) new or emerging elites (e.g., military or urban middle-class), or
   (b) urban labor and youth (particularly university students) in countries where they will play an increasingly important political role;

5) coordinate effectively the various informational and cultural tools available to the United States Government so as to attain long-range objectives in target areas as well as with target groups.

B. Need for Coordination

It is recommended below that certain exchange of persons, educational and cultural programs now being conducted by other agencies be transferred to USIA. In the case of certain other activities, however, such as those of CIA and the Department of Defense, such a step is not feasible. The problem is not one of amalgamation but of more effective coordination.
C. The Failures Can Be Remedied

In the balance of the report the Task Force is making detailed recommendations to remedy these failures and to help regain United States prestige abroad. Not all the members of the Task Force expressed their opinions on all of these recommendations; not all of the recommendations are unanimous; but where any substantial or significant difference of opinion emerged, this fact is noted.

PART THREE

THE ROLE OF USIA AND ITS DIRECTOR

I. USIA to Remain Independent

The Task Force is virtually unanimous in recommending that the USIA continue as an independent agency reporting directly to the President. The Agency should not be transferred back into the State Department as the psychological aspects of international problems would become totally submerged; the activities of USIA involve operations and widespread administrative responsibilities, requiring specialized personnel unsuited to the State Department personnel structure; a large-scale reorganization with disruption of current operations would be required which the United States can ill afford at this juncture.

II. The Director of USIA

A. Adviser to the President and the Cabinet

The Director of USIA should be designated as the chief adviser to the President, the Secretary of State, and other members of the Cabinet on the psychological aspects of international problems and the attitudes of foreign peoples. His primary responsibility should be to call attention to the psychological considerations which must be taken into account in the formulation and execution of American foreign policy. Obviously the new Director of USIA should be someone who enjoys or could gain the full confidence and support of the President and his Cabinet.

B. Member of the NSC

To facilitate his role as chief adviser to the President and the Cabinet, the Director of USIA should be:

1) invited to attend Cabinet meetings on a regular basis;
2) made an *ex officio* member of the National Security Council pending statutory membership;
3) added to the membership of the Council by statute.

The principal aim of United States policy is often to produce a particular reaction by foreign leaders and peoples. It is only common sense that the foremost expert in predicting and creating opinion should be a member of the policy-making body and participate actively in its deliberations.
III. Committee on Information and Exchange Policy

A. Function

A Committee on Information and Exchange Policy should be established within the framework of the National Security Council, with the responsibility to:

1) infuse psychological considerations, on a more effective, systematic basis, into the formulation and execution of United States policies and programs;

2) develop long-range psychological objectives toward which all appropriate arms of the Government should strive;

3) devise policies for exchange of persons, international education and other cultural activities to make them more useful in the attainment of United States objectives;

4) anticipate events, developments and Communist moves which will pose psychological problems and devise specific and coordinated programs for coping with them in advance;

5) assess on a periodic, independent basis, and devise ways of increasing United States prestige abroad;

6) propose measures for coordinating United States information and cultural policies and programs with those of other countries and organizations of the Free World;

7) devise specific programs for waging the psychological war more effectively behind the Iron Curtain.

B. Composition

The Committee would be composed of the following:

1) The Director of USIA (Chairman)

2) The Undersecretary of State (Chester Bowles)

3) The Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (Paul Nitze)

4) The Director of CIA (Allen Dulles)

5) The Director of ICA

6) One or two public members (to be appointed by the President)

C. Staff

The Committee should have a relatively small, high-level staff whose primary purpose would be to develop ideas and originate material for presentation to the Bowles-Nitze-Dulles, etc. group. The staff would keep in close and constant touch with all pertinent governmental agencies, draw upon outside, non-governmental experts and consultants, utilize policy studies, analyses and social science research undertaken within the government or commissioned to outside experts or organizations, and establish liaison with such non-governmental activi-
ties as those of the American Committee for Liberation, the Free Europe Committee and the Asia Foundation.

D. Other Views

Some members of the Task Force thought the functions suggested for the Committee should be the responsibility of the Director of USIA; another that they should be the responsibility of the Department of State. About two-thirds of the Task Force, however, favored the recommendation on the grounds that the functions proposed cannot be effectively performed at the level of any one of the several agencies of the government which are directly concerned; that the functions specified require a coordinated effort by a number of agencies which can only be assured structurally through the formation of a board or committee; and that this committee to be effective should be set up at no lower level than within the framework of the NSC.

IV. Transfer of Certain Programs to USIA

A. Task Force Recommendation

Programs now being administered by other agencies, but which are integrally related to programs conducted by USIA, should be transferred to USIA to insure a coordinated effort toward the accomplishment of the objectives to be developed by the Committee on Information and Exchange Policy:

a) The Exchange of Persons Program (now in the State Department);

b) The Cultural Presentations Program (under the President’s Special International Program, now in the State Department);

c) The educational, book and English-teaching programs now being conducted by ICA which are not confined to technical assistance training;

d) The International Trade Fair Program (now in Commerce).

B. Other Views

The proposals to transfer the exchange of persons and cultural presentations programs from State to USIA are proposals on which the Task Force is not unanimous. Some members believe that such programs should be handled by private or semi-public organizations rather than by governmental agencies. Others feel that transferring these programs to USIA, which they consider a propaganda agency, would contaminate them and lead to their being used for propaganda purposes; that “education” and “culture”, in other words, should be kept separate from “information”. In addition, it should be noted that Senator Fulbright and many individuals and organizations in the educational community, would probably oppose such transfers, particularly of the exchange of persons program. Nevertheless, the majority of the Task Force feels that such a shift should be made, chiefly on the
ground that it would greatly facilitate the coordinated use of integrally related tools for accomplishing, not short-term propaganda effects, but long-range United States objectives. Opposition to the proposal to transfer the educational, book and English-teaching programs now being conducted by ICA to USIA is less intense. Current expenditures on the ICA educational programs alone probably equal or exceed the total operating budget for USIA!

V. Change in Name and Organization of USIA

Considering the proposed changes governing USIA’s cultural activities, the Task Force suggests that legislation be sought to:

A. Change the name of USIA to the International Exchange Agency or The United States Cultural Exchange Agency;

B. Reorganize the new agency into three major operating divisions:
   1) Educational Exchange;
   2) Cultural Affairs;
   3) Information Services.

The Task Force believes that these modifications would help to quiet apprehensions at home and abroad that USIA is nothing but a “propaganda” agency and, as such, one with which educational and cultural activities should not be identified.

[Omitted here is Part Four—Exchange of Persons.]

PART FIVE

SPECIFIC PROGRAM RECOMMENDATIONS

I. Scope of Task Force Recommendations

The Task Force has had neither the time nor the access to USIA records and personnel necessary for a meaningful critique of the specific media programs now conducted in the information field. There has been within USIA an almost continual review of the techniques and adequacy of the agency’s use of various media—radio and television, official press services, motion pictures, libraries, etc. The results of these studies will unquestionably be available to your Director of USIA when he is appointed. A useful reappraisal of these programs to determine whether proper emphasis is being placed on the given media and whether additional appropriations are required to expand a particular activity must of necessity proceed on a country by country basis. The Task Force has concluded that this is beyond its capability. However, it does wish to make certain recommendations in terms of new programs which it believes deserve the immediate attention of your Director of USIA.
II. Use of Press Services to Distribute Accurate News About the United States

In many areas of the world newspapers cannot afford the rates charged by the Associated Press and United Press International wire services. As a result, in key areas news media are almost completely dependent on cheaper foreign press services for news about events in the United States. This necessarily results in a more limited amount of coverage and also in foreign peoples consistently being exposed only to foreign interpretations of events in the United States and their significance.

We recommend that you instruct the Director of USIA to immediately explore possible governmental action to make United States wire services available to newspapers in key foreign countries, if necessary through direct government subsidy, to permit rates competitive with European services.

III. Availability of United States Books in Foreign Countries

Elsewhere in this Report the Task Force has urged greater recognition of the importance of directing information and cultural activities toward emerging power elites and particularly students and intellectuals who will wield increasing political power in emerging underdeveloped nations. One indispensable means of influencing such groups is by exposing them to the best political, economic, social and scientific thought of the United States. This can be accomplished only by placing in their hands the books and magazines through which such thought is conveyed. Books published in the United States, even the less expensive paperbound editions, are still prohibitively expensive in many critical areas of the world. This is particularly true because they are competing in a market flooded by cheap, subsidized Soviet publications. You should instruct your Director of USIA to immediately prepare programs for distribution of books and magazines, where necessary in translation, at prices which make them easily available. It appears probable that the most feasible solution again may be direct subsidy of foreign distribution by United States publishers.

IV. English Teaching Programs

The Committee on Information and Exchange Policy, through the appropriate United States agencies, should provide for greatly increased assistance to English teaching in educational institutions throughout the world. It should also provide coordination for supplementary English-teaching programs under United States auspices, where these are required.

V. Fourth of July Celebrations

Responsibility should be transferred to USIA for arranging and conducting Independence Day celebrations abroad, with an adequate
appropriation for this purpose. The USIA is in a unique position, through its field posts, to handle Fourth of July celebrations which will be properly symbolic of American ideals and traditions. Transferring this responsibility to USIA will also free the Department of State “representation” allowances from the substantial drain of Independence Day observances.

VI. Foreign Service Officers

Foreign Service Officers, early in their career, should be required to have training and experience in international information and cultural programs. Sensitivity to and competence in the psychological aspects of foreign policy must become “built into” our State Department and Foreign Service. Today, the Foreign Service has a definite “blind spot” and prejudice when it comes to the psychological aspects of international affairs—tendencies which, almost by heredity, are being handed down from one generation of Foreign Service Officers to the next. There must be a mutation in this process if the ideal is ever to be achieved: a State Department and Foreign Service capable of taking into account, automatically and instinctively, the psychological considerations necessary for American foreign policy to accomplish its objectives abroad.

[Omitted here is Part Six—Budget and Administration.]
Memorandum From Barry Zorthian, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency to the Director, Broadcasting Service (Loomis)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Servicing Radio in Africa

I would like to put on paper some of the thoughts I have expressed to you orally on the tremendous opportunities which I believe the United States is missing in regard to radio in Africa. These feelings, growing out of my own trip to the area late last spring, have been reinforced by reports from other travelers as well as the comments and evaluation of many expert observers of the African scene.

In my opening sentence, I use the term “United States” rather than Voice of America deliberately. Given our mission and facilities, I think that VOA is perhaps meeting its particular challenge in Africa as well as might be expected. Certainly, increased facilities and more manpower and funds will enable us to expand and refine our operation; as you are well aware, we are energetically pursuing these goals. However, I think the opportunities this country faces in the field of radio go well beyond the capacity or even the function of VOA. And it is this broader task which I would like to outline briefly.

Necessary to a full appreciation of this possibility are a few fundamental facts in regard to mass communication media in Africa (throughout this memorandum my use of Africa is meant to apply to sub-Saharan Africa rather than the entire continent):

1. Radio is today, and for the foreseeable future will remain, the closest instrument to a medium of “mass communication” on the continent. In the area involved, radio today reaches a potential audience of 17,000,000 which will probably double within the next five years.

2. Neither press, television nor motion picture can hope to reach anything close to this level in the near future. Illiteracy and the limitations on widespread distribution impede the development of press; television is simply too expensive for more than an experimental level

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Broadcasting Service—(IBS) General 1961. Secret. Loomis sent the memorandum to Wilson under an attached January 13 cover memorandum, copies of which were sent to Roberts and Zorthian, in which he stated: “I believe the enclosed memorandum on the subject—Servicing Radio in Africa—deserves serious consideration. I agree wholeheartedly that the U.S. has an opportunity to not only help African countries, but also to gain a continuing position of influence in the radio medium.”
for a long time—and once it gets out of this stage, the lack of power outside the major cities will make it largely an urban medium; motion pictures face limitations of projecting equipment, distribution means and exhibition facilities.

3. The emerging independent governments recognize the potential of radio. Almost every new government of any means—and even those without capital—is rapidly expanding both its domestic and external transmitting capability and is encouraging set distribution.

4. Expansion of radio on an even more accelerated pace is not only possible but the most economic means available to the new governments to communicate with their peoples. Radio transmitters are comparatively inexpensive; the availability of cheap transistor sets makes distribution feasible even in non-electrical areas; and staff requirements are reasonably modest in comparison with other media.

5. The overwhelming shortages faced by the new countries in this “explosion” of radio are trained staff and broadcast materials. The management of these new stations find it particularly hard to develop the type of educational broadcast materials which are in greatest demand by their listeners. In this situation, the United States can play an aggressive, imaginative role of servicing which can bring far-reaching dividends in coming years. What is needed is a major undertaking which will provide servicing to African radio—training of staff, consultative services, non-political broadcast materials, largely in the educational field of both an academic and adult extension nature. Expert consultation can provide the technical means for development of radio in the countries concerned; training of staff can insure orientation of the people who will direct the medium for many years to come; and provision of educational broadcast fare can create a vast reservoir of good will as well as orientation towards the source of such materials on the part of millions of Africans who above all are looking for education of any type.

BBC and Sorafom would seem to be the natural godparents of such an undertaking in their former colonial possessions. Both are trying to meet the challenge to some extent. But both have the onus of colonial heritage and neither has the capacity nor funds to fill the market. As countries begin to flex their nationalism, they are rejecting even the limited help that BBC and Sorafom can provide.

There is no doubt a need exists. Every contact we have had indicates that the directors of radio in these countries are going to get their needs met in one way or another. If the United States does not meet the challenge, other countries will. Certainly, both Moscow and Peiping are active in this area—but both fortunately face problems of language and some political resistance in the area. I think the conclusion is
inevitable that the way is pretty much open for the United States if it
uses discretion, tact and imagination.

I am not speaking of any limited effort. I think VOA could and
should play an important, though not a primary, role. But what I think
is needed is across-the-board massive undertaking that might well go
beyond radio, in fact to other means of mass communication. This offer
should perhaps be sponsored by a Foundation in order to eliminate
the suspicion of U.S. Government motivation or at least by a separate
government organization which would draw on the facilities and
resources of such agencies as USIA, State and ICA. Red tape, bureau-
cratic issues of jurisdiction, the normal built-in caution and resistance
of the established agencies would have to be overcome. What is needed
is boldness, persistence—and money in substantial amounts. But given
all this, I think the United States could make an investment which
would bring many rewards in terms of national interest in the future.

7. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States
Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy


The Secretary of State suggested this morning at his conference
that you might like a brief rundown of world press reaction to the
Inaugural Address.

1 Source: Kennedy Library, United States Information Agency Records (RG 306),
Series 1, Records, 1961–1964, Box 1, Memoranda 1961–1964 [1 of 3]. No classification
marking. Printed from an uninitialed copy. A notation in an unknown hand in the top
right-hand corner of the memorandum reads: "President read." Another copy of the
memorandum is in the National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1961, Entry

Kennedy delivered his inaugural address on January 20 at 12:52 p.m. from the
east front of the Capitol. For the text of the address, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961,
pp. 1–3. In a January 23 memorandum to Wilson, Halsema outlined USIA’s coverage
of the inauguration, noting: “USIA media gave saturation coverage to Inaugural Day
activities and are now following up with comprehensive reports of foreign and domestic
commend on the events of the day, and with reports of other actions as the new Adminis-
tration takes hold. A special effort is continuing, to familiarize overseas audiences with
the background and responsibilities of the Administration’s leading officials.” Halsema
added that USIA, having received an advance copy of the inaugural address, sent the
text via radio teletype to 87 posts on January 19. The VOA also broadcast the inaugural
ceremony live over 48 transmitters. (Kennedy Library, United States Information Agency
Records (RG 306), Series 1, Records, 1961–1964, Box 1, Memoranda 1961–1964 [1 of 3])
All major British papers lauded the address. The Daily Mail printed it in toto on the front page in place of the normal one-column editorial. The Manchester Guardian called it "an inspiring example of a courageous man dedicating himself to great responsibilities."

In France, Le Figaro said, "The speech was full of virile language . . . The new President is trying to re-animate the spirit of the pioneers."

In Germany, West Berlin’s Spandauer Volksblatt said, "Seldom in American history has an American President made such an impressive inaugural speech."

Cairo’s Akhbar Elyom observed, "We should look forward to the future with confidence. However, the U.S. relations with the Arabs has suffered in the past because of the Palestine question."

In India the Hindu of Madras wrote, "Though Mr. Kennedy is comparatively young, he is an experienced politician and is determined to be a strong Chief Executive on the model of former Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt."

Lima, Peru’s newspaper El Comercio echoed this: "President Kennedy is a fighter who belongs in the class of former Presidents Woodrow Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt."

In Tokyo, Yomiuri emphasized the President’s pledge of cooperation with Latin America saying, "There is little doubt that it was a warning to Castro’s Cuban regime. It is clear that the Cuban issue will be the first major test facing the new administration."

In Tunis the newspaper Al-Amal said, "President Kennedy spoke our language, the language of those countries . . . whose only goal is an era of worldwide cooperation."

COMMUNIST WORLD

Russia

The Soviets completely lifted jamming of the VOA Russian service for the first time since the Camp David period. Pravda carried five paragraphs of the speech in bold-faced double column on its back (foreign news) page. It omitted the following passages:

“We shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to insure the survival and the success of liberty.”

"We pledge our word that one form of colonial control shall not have passed away merely to be replaced by a far more iron tyranny."

"Arms we need."

**Satellites**

Prague expressed hope that U.S. policy will now be "more realistic."

Poland pointed to the absence of "threats."

Hungary felt that recent Soviet conciliatory moves have made the U.S.'s position "easier."

East Germany credited you with more realism and also said that the speech revealed an avowal of the "policy of strength."

China's chief ally in Europe, Albania, insisted that the "aggressive aims of American imperialism" have not changed.

**Communist China**

Peking responded with a crude and bitter personal attack. The Chinese Communist newspapers carried scurrilous cartoons and jingles depicting you and your cabinet as a reactionary clique of millionaires with a long record of aggressive behavior. They portrayed you as a McCarthyite and anti-labor politician. Peking even attacked your father, calling him, "The pre-war Ambassador who cheered Hitler on to the invasion of the Soviet Union." Finally, they referred to the new President as "Intimate with all rich men and covered with the stinking smell of copper."

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4 On January 17, 1938, President Roosevelt appointed Joseph P. Kennedy Ambassador to the United Kingdom. Kennedy served as Ambassador until October 22, 1940.
8. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy


Here is the requested memorandum of my views on the best organizational relationship between USIA and State in the information, cultural, and educational fields. This has been altered and refined from the original memorandum submitted to you on December 13th.2

Much of the disagreement over organization stems from the lack of understanding of the purpose of these programs. Some believe the programs so differ in purpose that they should not be conducted by the same governmental department. Others see the programs as ends in themselves. I disagree with both views. All these programs exist only to further the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives. All of them attempt to do this by creating climates of public opinion abroad that advance the aims of U.S. foreign policy.

Every serious study with which I am acquainted has first pointed this out and then gone on to recommend that the information, cultural, and educational activities be brought together in USIA, operating independently but subject to State Department policy control. This was advocated by the Sprague Committee Report (members: Mansfield Sprague, George Allen, Allen Dulles, Gordon Gray, Karl G. Harr, Jr., John N. Irwin, II, C.D. Jackson, Livingston T. Merchant, Philip D. Reed), the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information (members: Mark May, Erwin Canham, Sigurd Larmon, Philip Reed, Lewis Douglas), the Ball-Sharon task force report,3 Budget Bureau staff (in internal memoranda), and by Tom Sorensen (whose report4 you have previously seen).

Despite these recommendations, the political facts of life dictate that the educational exchange functions must remain under the State Department. Senator Fulbright is an architect of the program, his feelings are strong on the matter, and it is obviously no time to pick a losing fight over shifting the educational exchange program.

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1960-5/61. No classification marking. Attached but not printed are an undated cover sheet from Smathers to Kennedy marked “personal and confidential,” an undated paper entitled “Need for New Type of Leadership and Reorientation for the United States Information Agency,” and an undated paper entitled “Key Positions in the United States Information Agency and Suggested Candidates for Appointment.” Another copy of Wilson’s memorandum is ibid., National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 296, Cultural and Social Activities, General, 1/61-8/61.

2 See Document 3.

3 See footnote 1, Document 5.

4 See Document 2.
These political facts of life do not, however, apply to the cultural program. The argument is currently being made in the name of the educational exchange program that all USIA cultural activities be placed in the State Department too so they will not be “sullied” by the information program. This plan, presumably, would transfer the book translation, publication, and distribution programs, binational cultural centers, overseas libraries, and most of the exhibit programs into the State Department. The transfer would be made on the theoretical grounds that “information” and “culture” are totally different programs and that they work better when separated.

I do not believe that they do. The library, for example, is the heart of USIS activities abroad. Using it as a base, the PAO abroad is able to establish contacts with newspaper editors, radio commentators, and students and influence them because of this institutional backing and the reservoir of material it gives him to work with. When he tries to influence a student organization in Latin America, he uses neither all “informational” or “cultural” tools. He uses both. He combines exchange grants, books, carefully-placed newspaper material, motion pictures and presentation of materials that are often artistic in nature. If he is an imaginative and successful officer, he is always weaving together informational and cultural elements to get the maximum effectiveness.

Finally, such a dismemberment of USIA would deal it a serious morale defeat just at the wrong time. The appointment of Murrow should kindle an enthusiasm within the Agency (and without) that can prove more valuable than any other single element. This value will lie in Murrow’s ability to attract talent to the Agency and to make the most of the talent already in USIA. However, to follow Murrow’s appointment with the decision that a major arm of the Agency is being taken away will undercut him and weaken USIA at the wrong moment.

Donald M. Wilson

9. **Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy**


Dear Mr. President:

As you are well aware, informational, cultural and educational activities have become a major factor in United States foreign relations. In your State of the Union address you emphasized that these activities must be given even greater importance in the future.\(^2\) They can strengthen our ties with older nations, help advance underdeveloped nations, and enable the younger generation to build a positive long run basis for world peace.

Everyone who has looked into it, including several recent task forces and consultants, is strongly agreed that this whole area is in serious and urgent need of policy clarification, program coordination and strong direction.

A wide variety of related activities have proliferated in a number of Federal agencies. In the absence of any clear policy or direction, and under pressures from many sources, there have been conflicts both of philosophy and of day-to-day operations among these agencies, often to the detriment of our foreign relations.

When it comes to solutions, our advisers are generally agreed that responsibility for developing policy and coordinating programs must be focused in one place, even though operations may be shared among agencies.

There are very divergent opinions, however, as to whether and how these diverse activities should be reorganized. The primary agencies involved (though there are many other peripheral ones) are the United States Information Agency, the International Cooperation Agency, the Bureau of Cultural and Educational Affairs of the Department of State, and the Department of Defense.

The different advisers tend to propose solutions which emphasize their own primary concerns and experience. Some emphasize primarily the “psychological” or propaganda objective and impact, some the

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\(^1\) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 296, Cultural and Social Activities, General, 1/61–8/61. No classification marking.

\(^2\) For the text of the President’s State of the Union address, which he delivered before a joint session of Congress on January 30, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961*, pp. 19–28. The United States Information Agency summarized the address in Potomac Cable No. 136, sent via Wireless File on January 30. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Government Agencies—White House 1961 January–March)
“development” aspect, and others the long-range cultural and humanistic objectives. Actually, of course, all these are important and a way must be found to give them all a properly balanced emphasis.

Having considered the various diagnoses and cures that have been submitted, I have come to the following conclusions which I wish to share with you. (1) Although reorganization and redistribution of activities among various agencies will undoubtedly be necessary, this should not be our most immediate concern. Reorganization plans should be based on sound experience of the next few months.

The most pressing need right now is to provide all these agencies with clear, firm and imaginative policy and program direction. Even under present organizational arrangements, I am convinced, a much more forceful and imaginative job can be done, especially with an infusion of able people in key positions.

(2) Since all of these activities deeply affect our foreign relations, and since the Secretary of State has clearcut responsibility under existing legislation for providing policy guidance or direction to three of the four primary agencies concerned, I believe that the Department of State is the appropriate place to center policy development and coordination for the executive agencies with respect to these matters.

(3) In order that the State Department may be properly staffed and organized to exercise this responsibility vigorously and imaginatively, I propose to appoint a well qualified person as Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs. Through consolidation, we have made available an Assistant Secretaryship for this purpose. I believe that a post at this level is requisite to giving the new position and the subject itself proper prestige and authority. This Assistant Secretary, working closely with the operating agencies concerned, would concentrate his energies on clarifying, developing and communicating policies in this area and insuring that such policies were faithfully expressed in operating programs. In this position he could maintain a balanced perspective of the several major objectives involved and devote himself fully to the central problem of policy development and program coordination which confronts us. This Assistant Secretary would also be concerned with providing guidance and stimulation to colleges, universities and private foundations and organizations that constitute the main “resource base” for the nation’s international activities in these fields.

I hope to secure for this position, as you know, Philip H. Coombs of the Ford Foundation who I believe is well qualified by experience, ability and personality to get this job done. If you agree with these proposals, I believe that it would help exceedingly to get things off to a fresh start if you personally would announce the new arrangements.
Enclosed is a draft press release\textsuperscript{3} which suggests what I have in mind by way of an announcement.

I will, of course, welcome the opportunity to answer any questions you have on any aspect of this matter.

Faithfully yours,

Dean Rusk\textsuperscript{4}

\textsuperscript{3} Attached but not printed is the 3-page draft press release, dated January 30, entitled “Suggested Press Release on International Educational and Cultural Affairs.”

\textsuperscript{4} Printed from a copy that indicates that Rusk signed the original.

\section{10. Memorandum From the Director-Designate of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)\textsuperscript{1}}


\textbf{SUBJECT}

Overseas Cultural Activities by the U.S. Government

Before our luncheon today\textsuperscript{2} I want to set forth for you my views on the role of cultural activities in the conduct of our foreign relations. I particularly wish to comment on the Secretary of State’s letter to the President of January 30\textsuperscript{3} on this subject, a copy of which was sent me by the State Department.

Since coming to Washington I have spent a large portion of my time studying this matter, with particular emphasis on organizational structure. I have read, or been briefed upon, various recent studies and have heard from officers with years of experience in this field. I am struck by the virtual unanimity of opinion which supports the general

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 296, Cultural and Social Activities, General, 1/61–8/61. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Thomas Sorensen. (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 382, Box 119, 1962 IOP/Rm 823)

\textsuperscript{2} No record of the luncheon meeting has been found.

\textsuperscript{3} See Document 9.
position of our Deputy Director, Donald M. Wilson, as set forth in his Memorandum to the President of January 26, 1961 (copy attached). 4

My views, and theirs, are:

1. “Culture” and “information” comprise a false dichotomy, in terms of both semantics and organization. Much if not most of USIA’s “information” effort deals with American culture—motion pictures, press releases, radio and television programs, pamphlets and exhibits on American history, literature and the arts.

2. Dissemination of information on American culture through the various media to selected audiences is perhaps our most important technique for influencing the political thinking of foreign opinion leaders.

3. It may not be politically possible to transfer the exchange-of-persons and cultural presentations programs from State to USIA as recommended by the President’s Task Force and two other studies prepared at his request. But we should not further fragment our overseas psychological operations by transferring the “cultural” portion of USIA to State (even if we could identify and separate this portion) without suffering the ill consequences cited by Mr. Wilson in his memorandum.

Part of the problem appears to be a misunderstanding of how the present machinery works. The exchange and cultural-presentation programs directed from Washington by the State Department are conducted in the field by USIS staffs under the direction of the Public Affairs Officer who is in charge of all cultural and informational activity in each country. Cultural Officers report to the Public Affairs Officer who is the principal U.S. cultural officer in the country. The USIS staff reports through State channels to the State Department on matters affecting State-directed programs; on matters affecting USIS programs the staffs report to me through our channels. Both Public Affairs and Cultural Officers are employees of this Agency. Many of our ablest Public Affairs Officers are former Cultural Officers.

Almost without exception, our Cultural Officers at recent regional meetings in Rio de Janeiro, Rome, Kampala, and Beirut emphatically endorsed the present arrangement in the field. Recommendation No. 3 of the Rome Conference of European Cultural and Educational Exchange Officers states: “(Resolved) that since, in a field cultural program, the so-called informational and cultural media and other cultural activities should not be separated, the operations now in USIS should continue to be in a single operational unit under the direction of a single person who reports to the Chief of Mission.” Similarly,

4 Printed as Document 8.
Kampala meeting “recognized that the Cultural Affairs Officer should be the focus of an integrated cultural program and vigorously urged that there be no organizational separation of cultural and information activities.”

While no formal poll of Ambassadors has been taken, we have every reason to believe they prefer the present integrated cultural-informational operation with one man, the Public Affairs Officer, responsible to the Chief of Mission at each post for these activities.

With respect to Secretary Rusk’s letter to the President of January 30, I do not understand precisely what he has in mind in the way of realigning functions, although I do agree with his thesis that “this whole area is in serious and urgent need of policy clarification, program coordination and strong direction.”

While I believe USIA must continue to receive policy guidance from State, I agree with the President’s Task Force, the U.S. Advisory Commission on Information, the Sprague Committee and the informal view of the Bureau of the Budget that the vitality and effectiveness of USIA depend in large measure on its independence of operations. I hope and assume that Mr. Rusk intends that the new Assistant Secretary will exercise program direction only over those activities now conducted by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. I welcome the new importance given those activities.

The State Department has—and will continue to have—the closest cooperation of USIA at both the operational and policy levels. Only with such cooperation will achievement of our common objectives be possible.

Edward R. Murrow
11. Memorandum From the Director, Motion Picture Service, United States Information Agency (Shelton) to the Director (Murrow)1


The Ugly American2 has a rather long history which I will be glad to fill you in on at your convenience.

About two years ago, the Department of State and this office were approached by a representative of Universal International Pictures relative to the possibility of achieving two objectives: (1) to obtain approval of a script which would make it possible for the Department and this office to request cooperation on the part of a Far Eastern country (preferably Thailand) in connection with the production of the film on location; and (2) to assist Universal International Pictures in obtaining aid from the Department of Defense in connection with a number of items available only from the Department of Defense which were necessary to the production.

The first script which was submitted was completely unacceptable to everyone concerned. A meeting was held by representatives of the film company with the Department of State and us regarding changes which might make the script suitable. It was our fear at the time that neither Mr. Englund3 nor certain other people associated with the production of the film were dealing with the Government in good faith in this matter.

In the meantime, since I was going to the Far East on other business, the Department of State requested that I include a full discussion of this problem with Ed Muhl, Vice President in Charge of Production of Universal Pictures in Los Angeles, and that I also discuss fully with Alexis Johnson, our Ambassador to Thailand.

I had such a discussion with Ed Muhl and received from him assurance that under no circumstances would his studio favor the production of this film unless the script could be written in a manner which would not be harmful to the overall interests of the United States. He assigned his assistant, Mel Tucker, to insure that this entire production was handled in a responsible manner rather than in the

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Miscellaneous #2—Various Subjects. Limited Official Use. Payne initialed the top right corner of the memorandum.
2 Reference is to the prospective film of the 1958 novel written by Eugene Burdick and William Lederer.
3 George Englund, a motion picture director.
what appeared to be considered sensational approach which was favored by George Englund.

I then discussed the entire situation with Ambassador Johnson upon my arrival in Bangkok. I also discussed the matter with John Steeves in Hong Kong since he had at almost that exact time been appointed Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs. The conclusion of our Ambassador in Thailand was in general that there would have to be a script which was satisfactory to us since inevitably the Thai Government would more or less want to be guided by our advice relative to whether or not they should assist in making the film in Thailand. It appeared clear that the Thai Government would not want the film made if it would be detrimental to US interests.

Various people connected with this production, including George Englund, have been to Thailand at least twice to discuss the entire project and to “scout locations.”

Several representatives of Universal International came back to Washington and met with Ed Kretzmann, several other people in the Department, and me about a year ago at which time they brought what they described as a “step outline” of a proposed new approach to the *Ugly American* script. This “step outline” had removed most of the objectionable parts of the original script from the viewpoint of ICA, the Foreign Service, the State Department in general, but had substituted a USIA “Information Officer” as the “heavy.” There appeared to be an obvious effort on their part to play off the varying special interests of the regular Foreign Service, political appointees, ICA, the State Department and USIA and they had apparently decided that if they could mobilize the support of the rest of the forces by removing portions which they considered negative they could get away with the use of USIA as the “heavy.” There was, however, a fairly good closing of ranks at this point and an insistence on the part of everyone concerned on the Government’s side that such an identification of USIA must not be used and an alternative proposal was made that the “heavy” be made a vague assistant in the Embassy unidentified as to his specific assignment.

After this meeting, the group from Universal International promised that they would submit a completed script consistent with all the suggested changes. Although we have heard from time to time that they were “working on the script,” they have not delivered it to either State or us as yet.

I want to emphasize that our relations with Universal International are extremely good as they are with every Hollywood film company. As a matter of fact, this has been the only case that I can recall of where there has been obvious efforts made to pressure various elements of the Government in an apparent desire to create friction within the Government so as to prevent a solid position regarding *The Ugly American*. 
It has been my observation, rightly or wrongly, that this effort has been made primarily by George Englund who has used John Horton (a public relations consultant here in Washington) in an effort to create some confusion on this entire matter. My feeling is that Ed Muhl is anxious to avoid anything that would be openly detrimental to the Government.

I have gone into this in some detail because of the very complicated history of this matter. There are many more points which I have not mentioned in this communication which I think are significant. I would welcome an opportunity to discuss this with you.

Turner B. Shelton

4 Shelton signed “Turner” above his typed signature.

12. Memorandum From the Director, Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency (Loomis) to the Director (Murrow)


Broadcasting to Cuba

In view of the questions raised in the press and in Congress about increasing broadcasts to Cuba, you may be interested in knowing what is being done and the problems involved in doing more.

1 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Box 35A, Cuba, General, 1/61–4/61. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Loomis. Printed from an uninitialed copy. Copies were sent to Wilson and Dave Phillips.

2 During the President’s February 8 news conference, held at the Department of State, a reporter asked: “Mr. President, Castro is reported to have built a new radio station, one of the largest in the hemisphere, which will begin operations within a few months to broadcast pro-Castro propaganda throughout Latin America. Is there anything we can do or plan to do to counter this?” The President responded: “We are giving the matter of Cuba and its export of its revolution throughout Latin America a matter of high priority. I could not state what actions will be taken yet until Mr. Berle, Mr. Mann, and Mr. Rusk have concluded their deliberations, which are now going ahead very intensely.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 73–74) Adolf Berle and Thomas Mann had been appointed to the inter-agency Task Force on Latin America, acting under Rusk’s direction. The Department announced the formation of the Task Force on January 31. In addition to Berle and Mann, Achilles, Leddy, Gordon, and Williams constituted the membership. (American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1961, p. 341) For additional information about the creation of the Task Force, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Document 4.
Consideration of the problem of broadcasting to Cuba is only meaningful when the assets of the entire U.S. Government are considered. There must be an important division of labor between USIA and CIA.

The U.S. Government has the following assets:

**ASSETS:**

**USIA**

Over a dozen powerful short wave transmitters in the U.S. Seven short wave transmitters with a total power of 530 KW are now being used for our hour long Spanish broadcast at 8:00 p.m. each evening. An hour later this program is repeated over two West Coast transmitters with a total power of 200 KW.

In addition to the short wave broadcasts, the Agency enjoys a tremendous placement on the local radios throughout Latin America. About 140 stations now relay portions of our short wave broadcast. In addition, we place roughly 400 hours a day on some 1,500 local stations in Latin America.

VOA also broadcasts 4½ hours a day in English to Latin America on short wave.

**CIA**

Radio Swan. A 50 KW medium wave transmitter located on Swan Island off the Honduran Coast. Swan broadcasts 6 days a week, 8 hours daily in Spanish, and ½ hour daily in English. It also has a 7½ KW short wave transmitter which carries the same programs.

CIA has also utilized mobile clandestine transmitters. I understand the attrition has been heavy.

**Private U.S.**

WRUL has five short wave transmitters in Boston with a total of 220 KW. These now broadcast several hours a day in Spanish and English to Latin America. While much of their program is music, CIA did place programs on them until Swan was operating.

Half a dozen commercial U.S. medium wave stations can be heard in some parts of Cuba, particularly late at night. WGBS in Miami has the best coverage. CIA is now placing two hours a day of Spanish on WGBS—one hour late in the evening, one hour early in the morning. WGBS broadcasts 50 KW in the daytime but is required to reduce power to 10 KW at night. CIA is attempting to get special FCC permission to raise the power of WGBS during its broadcast. To date CIA has not been successful.
Last year a VOA technical monitor toured the entire island of Cuba and obtained complete and accurate data on both medium wave and short wave reception, city-by-city. He found that in addition to WGBS, the Atlanta, Nashville, and New Orleans stations had fair reception in limited areas, especially late at night.

FACTS:

It is estimated that there are about 1,100,000 radio receivers in Cuba, of which at least 10% can tune short wave. There is considerable evidence that the number of short wave receivers may be significantly larger however—many of them having been smuggled into Cuba during the Batista regime in order to hear Castro’s short wave broadcasts.

There are 135 medium wave transmitters on the island. While most are quite low power, at least two are 50 KW. Most of these stations are concentrated in urban areas. Twenty-five FM transmitters are mainly used for relay purposes. Six low powered short wave transmitters are now in use but a 100 KW transmitter purchased from the Swiss last year should be on the air shortly.

The large number of medium wave transmitters, particularly in the Havana area, effectively block reception of medium wave stations from outside the area. Since Cuban radios no longer operate independently, Castro can assign many to a jamming function without interfering with his domestic coverage. For the last six weeks he has been jamming Swan medium wave with increasing effectiveness. He has attempted jamming on short wave but physics is against him and the short wave jamming has been largely ineffective. If Castro chose, he could change the frequency of his most powerful transmitters and interfere with U.S. commercial broadcasts as far north as New York and as far west as the Mississippi.

In February, 1960 the Senate ratified the North American Regional Broadcasting Agreement to which Canada, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Mexico, and the West Indies are signatories. The treaty, negotiated over ten years ago, assigns specific frequencies and powers to the different countries for the express purpose of minimizing interference between countries. If the U.S. Government overtly broadcasts on medium wave to Cuba, it would be a clear violation of this treaty.

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3 Fulgencio Batista served as President of Cuba from 1940 until 1944 and from 1952 until he fled Cuba on January 1, 1959.
4 The agreement was signed November 15, 1950, in Washington.
In view of the above, CIA and we have divided the job as follows:

VOA short wave broadcasts are aimed at an audience throughout Latin America. They discuss problems of interest to all of Latin America, including the Cuban problem. The US-Cuban position is explained not only to Cubans but to other Latin Americans. Its tone is objective and unexcited. Short wave broadcasts are massively supplemented by placement of material on local radios.

Radio Swan is for Cubans to talk to Cubans. Its purpose is to excite its listeners and to ridicule and undermine the regime. The CIA program on WGBS, while also Cuban to Cuban, is designed to be more objective, more certain of its accuracy, and quieter in tone.

All evidence points to both VOA and Swan having wide audiences. Many listen to both; to VOA for confirmation; to Swan for titillation. Some say that Swan has carried too many unfounded rumors and that its credibility is low. CIA is well aware of this and is watching it carefully, but we all agree the purpose of Swan is to be exciting. It should not have the same broadcast policy as the Voice. The WGBS program is just starting. All of this can perhaps best be summed up in the following direct quote from a Cuban defector who arrived in Mexico last week:

“VOA is the only thing we have, now that Radio Swan is being jammed. People spend the whole day waiting for the Voice of America broadcast. They consider it truthful and completely reliable. We know that when the Voice says it, it’s true. It is dangerous to be caught listening to the Voice of America, but everybody is doing it. There are many short wave sets in Cuba because they were popular when Fidel was broadcasting from the Sierra Maestra. Now they are being used to hear the Voice. We also try to hear Miami on the regular broadcast band, but it is not as clear or as strong as hearing the Voice from Washington.”

RECOMMENDATIONS:

The ‘62 Eisenhower budget calls for an increase of one hour in Spanish. The B budget you approved would call for an additional hour over that, which would make a total of three hours of daily originations in Spanish. I believe that this would be ample.

VOA has been urged by many to build a medium wave station in Florida. We have done the engineering studies of this. I do not recommend it however since it would be a clear violation of the NARBA Treaty; Castro could jam it in all the major cities; it would give him an excuse throughout Latin America when he started interfering with U.S. domestic broadcasts.

Many have also urged us to buy time on commercial stations. In fact, the Congress last year under the urging of Senator Mundt
appropriated $100,000 for this purpose. I did not and do not recommend that VOA do this since CIA is now doing it without attribution, making it more effective. Incidentally, we and CIA have worked very closely in this affair. We helped them contact WGBS and they used our engineering studies in picking the station.

CONCLUSIONS:

VOA is now doing all it can and should. Since you will be unable to mention the CIA program, there is no easy way to answer the many who press us to do more.

13. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy


SUBJECT

Expansion of Exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe

Your memorandum of February 8 asked for a report on exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and for recommendations for expanding these exchanges with the Soviet Union and Poland. An interim reply was sent to you on February 11. 

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2 In the February 8 memorandum to Rusk, the President wrote: “I would like to get a memorandum on our exchange of persons programs behind the Iron Curtain, particularly with Poland and with Russia. What we could do to step them up.” (Ibid.) A typewritten note at the conclusion of the President’s memorandum indicates that it was NSAM No. 13. Another copy of the memorandum, with a typewritten notation that the memorandum was from notes dictated by the President to Evelyn Lincoln, is in the Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 87, State: February 1961: 1–15.

3 Not printed. A copy is in National Archives, RG 59, S/S–NSC Files: Lot 72D316.
The report which you requested is attached and consists of four parts which are summarized below.

1. **Interim Report on Implementation of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges Under November 21, 1959 Agreement.** This paper reviews the implementation for 1960 of the current American-Soviet Exchange Agreement and reflects that only about 40 percent of the planned exchanges have been completed. The performance within the several categories varies for different reasons, the primary ones being Soviet interest in scientific and technical exchanges, reluctance to engage in long-term exchanges and a desire to avoid informational exchanges.

2. **Exchanges with Eastern Europe and Possibilities for Expansion.** This paper reviews exchanges with Eastern European countries and indicates that, except in the case of Poland, exchange activity has been strictly limited because of the unfavorable political climate in Hungary and Czechoslovakia, the cautious attitude of Rumania, and the only recent resumption of diplomatic relations with Bulgaria. Modest and gradual increases can be expected with Rumania and Bulgaria, but there is little hope for any significant change in the cases of Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The large-scale Polish program is unique because exchanges have been developed and financed primarily by private American groups, particularly the Ford and Rockefeller Foundations. The opportunities in Poland are still large but these are limited by the attitude of the Polish Government and the available official funds.

3. **Background Considerations: Expansion of Soviet Bloc Exchanges.** This paper considers the basic factors involved in joining in exchange programs with the Soviet Union, notes the inherent risks and the need to negotiate firmly for equivalent advantages, but concludes that exchanges arranged and carried out imaginatively, persistently, and with adequate resources of trained personnel and funds can be responsive to and advance our long-term interests.

4. **Possible Increases in Exchanges Program with the Soviet Union.** This paper reviews the possibilities for expansion of exchanges with the Soviet Union and suggests specific fields in which these exchanges may be increased. It also sets forth financial requirements for this...
expansion and recommends measures to increase the efficiency of administrative procedure.

Dean Rusk

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6 Printed from a copy that indicates Rusk signed the original.

14. Potomac Cable From the United States Information Agency

No. 139 Washington, February 27, 1961, 5:06 p.m.

REASSESSMENT

There is considerable interest abroad in the process of reassessment now under way in Washington. The significance of that process is worth clarifying, for the world has witnessed only two such thoroughgoing changes of U.S. Administration in nearly three decades.

The new Administration is conducting a general reassessment of its foreign policies in the light of the awareness that this is an era of great change. The world today is undergoing basic changes of a depth and scope and velocity which make this period a major turning-point in history. The Administration believes the central issue in foreign policy is to associate the United States constructively with an epoch of inevitable change. The U.S., with its friends, must decide on their mutual and realistic aspirations for the future.

In many cases the current reassessment will confirm the validity of previous decisions, enabling the Government to continue their application with confidence. In other cases, reassessment will disclose the need for a shift of emphases. In every case the constant of U.S. foreign policy is the aspirations of the American people. Under the democratic system, foreign policy could not long be at variance with those aspirations. Fundamental to all policy, domestic and foreign, are the national

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strength and growth adequate to that degree of American leadership in its change itself which circumstances may require.

The United States is determined to explore new solutions and, instead of belaboring old problems, to view these in fresh perspective. The U.S. hopes its determination is matched in Moscow.

A prime difficulty is the unwillingness of the Soviets to achieve settlements on any terms but their own. Both the U.S. and the USSR face major problems beyond their direct control. One such problem is the prospective proliferation of nuclear weapons to even more countries than now possess them. There is some feeling in Washington that the Soviets may incline toward some specific progress in the realm of arms control. But no progress is possible unless they change their views on inspection designed to assure compliance with agreed control measures.

Another major problem of interest both to the U.S. and the USSR is the rising power and belligerence of Communist China, a have-not country with a vast and growing population and a historical record of imperialist expansion. Peiping poses a major threat to Southeast Asia, coveting the land and resources of that area. The immediate threat is against Laos, and the United States would react vigorously if Peiping placed military pressure on Laos. In the long run, the problem for the non-Communist world will be to contain Chinese Communist aggressiveness and to seek a way to help reduce Communist China’s internal pressures.

There are other problems toward the solution of which new and more effective approaches are needed. These include the urgent and mounting requirements of newly emerging nations for developmental assistance, and the orientation of long-established friendly alliances to fresh and complex challenges. It is on such problems that the current reassessment in Washington is focusing.

Washburn
15. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

History of USIA Efforts to Employ ‘Themes’

In the various U.S. government information operations since the end of World War II, numerous efforts have been made to focus media output on priority themes.

The most ambitious effort was begun in 1954. Its purpose was to establish a number of “Global Themes” which presumably would dominate output both in Washington and the field. Over a two-year period the following were established as Global Themes:

1. Unite the Free World in order to reduce the Communist threat without war.

2. Expose the Communist Party or movement as a foreign force directed from Moscow or Peiping for expansionist purposes—Red colonialism.

3. The United States champions peace and progress through peaceful change.

4. The United States seeks with other nations and peoples to speed development and use of the Atom for Peace—as a promise of better life and a powerful force for world peace.

In December 1955 the terminology was changed to “Global Objectives.” This was tacit recognition of the lack of clarity in their formulation and their relative uselessness as guides to output. They remained on the books until July 1959 when they were officially cancelled but they had been virtually forgotten by that date.

The present consensus in the Agency is that they largely failed of their purpose for these reasons:

The first three themes were too general and platitudinous to be of much use. Theme No. 2 was merely an awkward restatement of one of the Agency’s primary missions. Numbers 1, 3 and 4 were heavily dependent on Government actions and statements for real effectiveness. The Atoms for Peace theme, which was specific, is cited by some

as the only effective theme because there were specific, easily-related deeds to match the words. Here too, however, when the action program petered out, so did the Agency theme, but only after a brief period during which the words ran so far ahead of the deeds as to raise unrealizable expectations. Finally, there was no follow-up or enforcement in the media to see that the themes were being used. (IOP had no power of enforcement.)

In 1956 and 1957, one theme was introduced which did have impact on the media and the field. The “Peoples’ Capitalism” campaign, although not officially promulgated as a theme and despite the widespread objection in many posts to the title, did achieve coordinated output by all the media on the nature of the American economy.

In 1959, two relatively modest efforts were initiated. With the advice of the Areas and the Media, IOP worked out two comprehensive lists of themes to be stressed in Washington media output, one for the general field of American life and culture, and the other for the material issued by the Agency on Communism. Both these lists are still technically in effect but evidence of their use by the media is spotty. There is no central evaluation of media output and neither IOP nor anyone else has enforcement authority for such guidances.

Two years ago, in the absence of any centrally established themes, VOA began to issue a series of quarterly themes to guide their language services and the writers of centrally produced scripts. More recently, IOP, in an effort to ensure a degree of homogeneity in the political content of Agency programs, began to specify sets of themes on a periodic basis. One of the purposes of such lists is to have media staffs relate upcoming developments in the foreign policy field to a set of priority concepts which the Government and the Agency wish to stress.

The Agency’s experience thus far with the central selection of themes would suggest the following conclusions:

(1) A distinction needs to be made between two types of themes: (a) those major themes which the Agency would like to see the Government project (or which the Government has already decided to project) around the world through a program of action and high-level statements over a period of time and which the Agency would help publicize alongside the commercial media which must do the bulk of the job; and (b) those themes which the Agency can usefully choose to emphasize in its own output with less regard to what the rest of the Government may or may not be doing at the moment.

(2) In this connection, distinctions have to be made among the three broad fields of subject matter with which our media generally deal: the field of current U.S. foreign policy and U.S. governmental action which has major impact abroad; the related field of communism and Sino-Soviet Bloc affairs, and the field of American life and culture.
(3) Generally speaking, in the field of current U.S. foreign policy themes can be effective for the Agency only if they have been adopted as themes for the Government as a whole. On such subjects as military strength, disarmament, negotiations with the USSR, foreign economic assistance, aid to education abroad, international cooperation in science, cultural interchange, support for the UN and rule of law, our attitude to free world alliances and our attitude toward national independence, a decision by the USIA to concentrate output on this or that related theme would be just as ineffective today as it was in 1954 unless it is accompanied by a sustained program of national action and of repeated top-level articulation of the relevant purposes and achievements. USIA can have an important role to play in suggesting such themes and, if they are adopted, advising on the most effective manner and timing of actions and statements useful in projecting the themes. (See Sprague Committee paper on Themes.) Selection by USIA of themes which it knows will be supported by Government actions and statements, and on which it wants its own media to place special emphasis, would then have real meaning and effect.

(4) On the other hand, in the other two major spheres with which USIA output deals, the general projection of American life and culture and various aspects of Communism, the Agency has much to gain by independently selecting the priority themes on which its media should concentrate. Hopefully an increasing percentage of our material on American life will report and reflect Government and private action to improve the quality of our society but much of our output will still be concerned with the existing reality of the American scene in which Government action is not necessarily the dominant factor. In the field of Communism, our material is naturally affected by events in the Sino-Soviet Bloc and the Communist movement, but considerable output can still be devoted to fairly permanent characteristics of Communist philosophy and behavior. In both these fields our present output is inclined to wander almost aimlessly over an infinite spectrum of subject matter, sometimes without any clear purpose. Periodic establishment of Agency priority themes in these two fields would result in greater impact abroad. (See Agency Guidances No. 9, June 3, 1959, and No. 10, July 14, 1959.)

(5) There are a number of central concepts which comprise the basic principles, or at least ideals, of American life and which may also be exemplified in our international behavior. These include such concepts as freedom, openness, progress and change, pluralism, service to humanity, respect for intellectual achievement, and respect for indivi-

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2 See footnote 5, Document 3.
individual dignity. In regard to such concepts, there is a choice to be made. USIA can select some of these concepts as themes for the projection of American life by the media regardless of any action we might take in the international sphere. Or the Agency could hold off selecting them as themes until there was a good prospect of Government action to project those themes on a world scale.

(6) Selection of themes for emphasis by the Agency should not imply that all other Agency output would be suspended. Providing the posts abroad with material to meet special country and area objectives should not be affected. Nor should all other output be exclusively concentrated on the chosen themes. The value of selecting themes lies in the establishment of priorities for the ideas on which the media can concentrate and coordinate their world-wide output and which they can treat in depth.

Thomas C. Sorensen

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

16. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to the Director (Murrow)


SUBJECT

Themes for USIA Programs

Following are 21 themes for your consideration. They are divided into four groups:

I. Those specifically dealing with foreign policy and which, to be truly effective, require concerted U.S. Government action including

statements and programs by the President and other top leaders as well as USIA emphasis.

II. Themes on general American concepts which would be more effective with Government-wide cooperation but are nonetheless susceptible to effective use by USIA alone.

III. Themes on American life and culture, adapted from a longer list promulgated by the Agency in 1959.

IV. Themes on Communist subjects, also adapted from a longer list adopted by USIA in 1959.

I. Themes in the Field of Foreign Policy—(Requiring Government wide cooperation)

1. The strength of the United States and the free world is being maintained so that it will effectively deter aggression, prevent the outbreak of war, increase the security of free nations and be able to frustrate limited aggressions without turning them into nuclear cataclysms. We consider this strength a sacred trust, to be handled with prudent restraint.

2. The United States is taking the initiative in making constructive, realistic proposals for various measures of disarmament. The United States will be tireless in its efforts to find agreement with the Soviet Union on cessation of nuclear tests, prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons, prevention of surprise attack and reduction of nuclear and conventional weapons and forces.

3. A strong, effective United Nations and steady progress toward the rule of law in the world community offer the greatest promise for escape from the precarious balance of terror and from the possibility of a world in the grip of an iron tyranny. The UN is particularly important today for the security of small nations. (One specific application of this theme now would be to stress: “The best way to keep the cold war out of Africa is to keep the UN in.”) The United States will do its utmost to strengthen international institutions which can help keep the peace and create world conditions favorable to the development of all societies in accordance with the desires of their people.

4. The United States stands ready seriously to negotiate outstanding issues with the Soviet Union. But we will not negotiate out of fear and are determined to defend the principles and positions of freedom.

5. We are committed to the encouragement of economic and social development, progress and growth for all people. Accordingly we favor cooperative international action to solve common economic problems, the freest possible flow of international trade and extensive efforts by all industrially advanced countries to help the newly developing nations help themselves.
6. Both the fate of civilization and the satisfaction of individual aspirations everywhere depend on education. The United States is committed to the expansion of educational opportunities and the improvement of the quality of education both at home and abroad. Taking seriously the Wellsian dictum that civilization is a race between education and catastrophe, the United States is eager to help the new countries lift dramatically the levels of their peoples’ literacy, technical skill, knowledge and understanding of the world.

7. Americans, with their rich and varied inheritance from other peoples, acknowledge and appreciate the achievements and values of other cultures. The United States seeks to encourage a maximum of cultural interchange among nations both for its own sake and for its contribution to international understanding. The United States is particularly interested in the greatest possible contact with the peoples of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

8. The community of free nations is being reinvigorated with strengthened defenses, greater attention to mutual consultation and more intensive collaboration on the basis of equality in the political, economic and social spheres.

(This theme is primarily of use in Western Europe. It is not popular in the former and present dependent territories in Asia and Africa.)

9. The United States supports the independence and self-determination of all peoples, including those in the newly developing parts of the world and those behind the Iron Curtain.

(This theme is primarily of use in Asia, Africa, and Eastern Europe. It is not popular among some of our allies in Western Europe.)

II. Themes on General American Concepts—(Preferably for Government-wide cooperation but susceptible to effective use by USIA alone)

1. Basic to American civilization is respect for the dignity and rights of the individual. We are striving as a nation to expand and perfect the protection of individual rights at home and we favor the advance of freedom for all men. We are convinced that nations can achieve industrial development and greater social welfare without resort to tyranny.

2. The United States of America today is the spiritual heir of the American Revolution of 1776. We are a people uniquely committed and sympathetic to change, which has been the keynote of our history. Although we have remained steadfast to the democratic principles on which the nation was founded and have preserved its basic political forms, our laws and institutions have evolved in response to changing needs. We do not cling to the status quo and are eager to help other nations on their road to political, economic and social advancement.
3. We are eager to let ideas be argued out freely so that the truth will prevail in all spheres. We are concerned pragmatically with the realities both of our own existence and of the world situation. We strive to solve the real problems which are common to all societies in the various stages of their development rather than view problems through a prism of outdated dogma and distort solutions to fit a strait-jacket of artificial doctrine. The future belongs to those who respect truth and deal with reality.

4. The United States, along with other nations, is actively engaged in pushing back the frontiers of science. It is particularly interested in enlisting the achievements of science and technology in the service of humanity. It is stepping up its own efforts, and is seeking the cooperation of all other nations, in utilizing scientific advances in combating disease, hunger, poverty and ignorance everywhere.

5. One of the main sources of strength of democratic society is its openness. It helps make possible the fulfillment of individual aspirations and gives free play to the creative energies of the people. Americans are also convinced that nations which insist on concealment of their weapons, forces and aggressive intentions are a menace to peace. The United States will join in challenging the leaders of the Sino-Soviet bloc on this issue and on the additional point that regimes which fear the free movement, thought and voice of their own people are basically weak and lacking in self-confidence. (This concept carries little weight in many parts of Africa and Asia.)

III. Themes on American Life and Culture—(Adapted from USIA Policy Guidance No. 10, July 14, 1959. For use by USIA media.)

1. The United States is a pluralistic society in which power is widely dispersed and which functions by achieving compromise among conflicting interests.

2. The United States has evolved a “mixed economy” in which government holds a balance among countervailing forces and interests, acts as a stimulator and regulator of private enterprise, and provides basic social security for its citizens.

3. American education is preparing unprecedented numbers of young people for lives that will be satisfying for themselves and fruitful for society. At the same time it is working to improve educational standards, expand resources and increase attention to gifted students.

4. The United States, despite great problems, has been making substantial progress through government and community effort toward the integration of its multi-racial population and toward the social and economic advancement of minority groups.
IV. Themes on Communist Subjects—(Chosen and adapted from USIA Policy Guidance No. 9, June 3, 1959. For use by USIA media.)

1. Communist policies and actions are essentially anti-nationalistic despite vociferous lip-service in support of freedom for colonial peoples. Nationalities have been suppressed by the USSR and Communist China. Independent nationalist movements abroad are covertly—and eventually overtly—undermined and opposed. Communist leaders support nationalism only as a “temporary stage on the way to Communism.”

2. Communism and freedom of thought and expression are incompatible. Communist societies tolerate only a single approach to the manifold problems of society and the varied creative expressions of the human mind.

3. The Communist state disregards the dignity and rights of the individual, interferes with family life and builds up new privileged classes.

17. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin)


This memorandum offers an outline for the fullest possible dissemination of information about the “Alianza para el Progreso.” It is our belief that an enormous amount of enthusiasm can be generated around this program. However, we feel that the timing and spacing of the propaganda push behind it are most important. Those who look back on the Marshall Plan warn quite rightly that we mustn’t let the

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2 The Spanish name of the Alliance for Progress. In both his inaugural address (see footnote 2, Document 7) and State of the Union address (see footnote 2, Document 9) the President expressed his commitment to an alliance between the United States and Latin America.
propaganda get out too far ahead of the actual social and economic aid. It will be some time before the effects of the program can be actually felt in Latin America: if we beat the drum too loudly and hold out promises that glitter too brightly, delays may generate great skepticism and give our enemies an opening. Also, we may create “great expectations” impossible of fulfillment, with inevitable Latin American disillusionment.

I. THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH

1. The speech should hit hardest at the social rather than the economic development aspects of the program. From the propaganda point of view, this will be most effective. It is the people of Latin America we want to reach and to involve in the success of the program; and this we do best by concentrating on the things of direct interest to the people—health, education, housing, land reform.

2. The speech, as well as subsequent official announcements, should emphasize strongly the mutual nature of the program, make forcefully the point that the program will not work unless everybody cooperates to make it work, that the U.S. can most effectively help those who are willing to help themselves.

   a. Reference might be made to self-help housing projects in Chile, to the Mexican “each one teach one” adult education program, and to Puerto Rico’s “Operation Bootstrap” (although the phrase itself should be avoided).

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4 On March 13, the President, at a White House reception, addressed Latin American diplomats and a bipartisan group of members of Congress to outline the Alliance for Progress initiative, a decade-long program to ensure social, political, and economic progress in the region. For the text of the address, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 170–175. For additional information about the speech, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Documents 5 and 6. The United States Information Agency summarized the address in Potomac Cable No. 142, sent in the Wireless File on March 13. (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 382, Box 117, MASTER COPIES—Jan.–Jun. 1961) Kennedy also sent a message to Congress, dated March 14, regarding social progress in Latin America; for the text, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 176–181. The Charter of Punta del Este, signed by all OAS members—except Cuba—in Montevideo on August 17, 1961, formally established the Alliance for Progress. For the text of the Charter, see Department of State Bulletin, September 11, 1961, pp. 463–469.
3. The “Alianza para el Progreso” should be clearly identified as the umbrella under which come the Peace Corps,\footnote{On March 1, the President signed Executive Order 10924, which provided for the establishment of a Peace Corps on a temporary basis; for the text, see Department of State Bulletin, March 20, 1961, pp. 400–401. In a March 1 message to Congress, the President described the goals of the program; see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 143–146. On September 22, the President signed the Peace Corps Act (P.L. 87–293; 75 Stat. 612) into law. For his remarks at the signing ceremony, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 614–615. For additional information concerning the establishment of the Peace Corps, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Documents 70, 71, and 73.} Food-for-Peace,\footnote{The Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act (P.L. 480), signed into law by Eisenhower on July 10, 1954, established the Food for Peace program. Under the provisions of the law, the United States could make concessional sales of surplus grains to friendly nations, earmark commodities for domestic and foreign disaster relief, and barter surplus for strategic materials. Following the inauguration, Kennedy issued Executive Order 10915, which amended earlier executive orders concerning the administration of Food for Peace, and appointed George McGovern his Special Assistant and Director of the Food for Peace program, a position located in the Executive Office of the President.} ICA Technical Assistance. This concept should be carried out after the speech with the “Alianza” label always being affixed to these other programs.

4. Simon Bolivar’s ideal of inter-American unity\footnote{In 1826, Bolivar, then President of Gran Colombia, had hoped to establish a confederation of Latin American nations to provide mutual security in support of their independence.} should be mentioned.

5. Mention might also be made of Latin American moves toward a common market.

6. The President’s use of the Spanish name of the program will have great appeal, although it may offend Portuguese-speaking Latin Americans. Perhaps he should introduce the name of the program, at the outset, in both Spanish and Portuguese, and thereafter refer to it in English.

II. FOLLOW-UP ACTION BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT

There will be a considerable period between the President’s speech and the actual effective start of the program. We must continue to keep the program in the popular mind during that time. We suggest:

1. A “progress report” in the address the President will make on Pan-American Day,\footnote{April 14. For the President’s remarks that day at the protocolary session of the OAS Council meeting, held at the Pan American Union Building, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 276–279.} and another on Columbus Day (“Dia de la Raza”).\footnote{October 12.}
2. Periodic appearances on VOA and USIA television programs of prominent people connected with the program and its various components (e.g., Berle, Mann, Shriver, Labouisse, Morales Carrion).

3. A speech by Ambassador Stevenson at the United Nations explaining the purposes of the program and, perhaps, inviting the Free World participation.

4. Speaking tours in the U.S. by ranking State Department people to explain the program and generate press coverage. Mr. Morales Carrion can be particularly effective.

5. It will be useful also to go outside the ranks of the Administration. Pronouncements from non-administration people who have good names in Latin America—e.g., Governor Rockefeller, Senator Mansfield, Sprague, Smith, Munoz Marin—can have great impact. So can statements or speeches by Latin American ambassadors in Washington (the Brazilian, especially, when he is named).

6. A special U.S. stamp commemorating “Alliance for Progress” should be useful.

III. USIA OPERATIONS

USIA actions can best be grouped under the media used to disseminate information about the program.

VOICE OF AMERICA

1. The speech will be transmitted live for direct pick up by an estimated 200 Latin American stations, judging by the Inaugural Address pick up. There will be a subsequent transmission from tapes, with over-voicing, in Spanish, Portuguese, and French for Africa (widely heard in Haiti and the French islands of the Caribbean) programs.

2. Special feeds of the speech by USIA radio officers will be made to stations unable to use a direct pickup of the speech. VOA and our Latin American division estimate that some 1500 of the 2000 radio stations in Latin America will, under this plan, receive the speech.

3. Subsequent extensive treatment will be made in commentaries and features of the speech, point by point.

4. Later, we can produce an hour-long documentary covering U.S.-Latin American relations over the last three decades: this can make the

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10 The United States Postal Service ultimately issued an Alliance for Progress stamp in 1963 to coincide with the second anniversary of the program.
bridge from the “Good Neighbor” policy\textsuperscript{11} to “Alliance for Progress,” and at the same time emphasize policy continuity.

5. We propose a “Small World” type of show with outstanding Latin American statesmen—Betancourt, Lleras, Alessandri, Beltran, Frondizi, Quadros, as available.

**PRESS AND PUBLICATIONS**

1. Transmission of the full text of the President’s speech and the message to Congress, in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French, as far in advance of actual delivery as possible.

2. A series of backgrounders and interpretive columns by staffers whose bylines are already well known in Latin America, to follow the speech quickly. (Some of these can be written in advance.)

3. A fast pamphlet based on the text (and incorporating it), in very large numbers.

4. Updating of Hugo Martin’s very good pamphlet on U.S. post-war aid to Latin America (now out of stock, and about to be reprinted in Mexico City) to incorporate “Alliance for Progress.” (The purpose here is to suggest the essential continuity of U.S. purposes in Latin America, to refute the all too common Latin American contention that since World War II we have paid the area little or no attention.)

5. A low-cost cartoon book pegged to the speech and explaining the purposes of the program. (This device, found very useful in other areas, is now being developed for Latin America.)

6. Commissioning of U.S. authors well known in Latin America (e.g., Steinbeck, Dos Passos) to do special articles for placement in Latin American magazines.

7. Picking up good by-lines that are particularly respected in Latin America, i.e. Lippmann, Drummond, Alsop, Prewett. Also reuse of material appearing in prominent U.S. newspapers and magazines.

8. A visual symbol. USIS Mexico City several weeks ago came up with one: it consists of the words “Alianza para el Progreso” written circle-wide to ring the map of the two continents. We are working on other candidates.

**MOTION PICTURES**

1. Good footage on the speech for the regular USIA Latin American newsreel.

\textsuperscript{11} Reference is to President Roosevelt’s policy of non-interference in Latin America, as expressed in the course of his March 4, 1933, inaugural address related to U.S.-Western Hemisphere relations.

3. A one-reel show on the speech, with interpretation and background, for primary use (in 16-mm. prints) in the mobile units and loan projectors that are our best avenue to rural and semi-urban audiences.

4. Ultimately, a two- or three-reel documentary covering much the same ground as the VOA show proposed.

5. Supply to the field additional prints of a land reform film already in use. Make similar documentaries on other individual aspects of the program—education, public health, etc.

**ITV (TELEVISION)**

1. A special show with Latin American TV commentators (to be brought from the field if time and money permit, to be selected from correspondents regularly assigned to Washington if not).

2. Heavy coverage of the speech (and of subsequent developments) in “Panorama Panamericano,” the weekly newsmagazine show now widely placed in every Latin American country having television.

3. Fast clips for use in Latin American commercial and field-produced shows.

4. A “Small World” show for wide television usage.

**INTERNATIONAL CENTERS SERVICE**

1. A poster, printed in very large numbers, highlighting the choicest phrases of the speech.

2. A fast, flat-pack, highly mobile exhibit pegged to the speech, in sufficient numbers to allow its wide use in our binational centers.

3. Subsequent exhibits of the same type on the various aspects of the program.

4. A low-cost, paperback book, preferably to be written by a widely known Latin American author, on the history of inter-American cooperation culminating in “Alliance for Progress.”

5. Provision of lecturers to tour Latin America.

6. A bibliography of official and unofficial materials useful to Agency and field media output.

**USIA FIELD EXPLOITATION**

1. We will offer close cooperation with Latin American government information services to generate support for the program.

2. Speeches by Ambassadors, PAOs, and other key Embassy, USIS, and ICA figures. (A kit of materials for speeches can be furnished by the Agency.)

4. Development of local radio and television shows, with indigenous commentators.

5. At the discretion of the PAO, round table discussions and forum shows (where comment can be effectively controlled).

6. Special issues (or extensive treatment in regular issues) of such field publications as the monthlies, INFORMACIONES, COMENTARIO, MUNDO OBRERO, etc.; weekly newspaper supplements in Mexico, Lima, Quito, and elsewhere; and the periodical “wall newspapers” published at several posts.

Donald M. Wilson

12 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

18. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency (McKnight) to the Deputy Director (Wilson)


SUBJECT

Propaganda Against the Food for Peace Program

You may think the following matter worth bringing to the Director’s attention for inclusion among “problems and conflicts” in the weekly report to the President, or for the Secretary’s staff meeting:

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 288, Box 130, Food for Peace 1961 IOP/823. Official Use Only. Wilson sent a copy of the memorandum to Sorensen under a March 9 typewritten note, to which he also attached his March 9 response to McKnight. An unknown hand, presumably Sorensen’s, wrote on Wilson’s note: “McKnight to do memo for me to pass McG, wrapping it up.” (Ibid.)
After amicable consultations with the Food for Peace mission, the Argentine Government reversed its position and began a campaign of opposition to the program. Its motive is peculiar to Argentina, i.e., defense of the country’s primary exports; and the propaganda appears so far to be local. However, it is intensive and colorful enough to give Communists and others some sharp language to pick up and use throughout the Continent. For example, they are saying that Food for Peace means “fed today, starved tomorrow.”

It is true, also, that the wide publicity engendered by the Food for Peace mission does have a tendency to push other aid programs out of mind, fostering the impression among the half-attentive general public that this alone is our current recipe for assistance.

Now that the mission has returned, early clarification by an authoritative source, putting the new program into context with the broad spread of development aid, could be useful in Latin America. Perhaps the President’s speech could touch on this. Consideration might be given to scotching the Argentine slogan in specific terms by pointing out that the aim of our combined programs is “fed today, self-sufficient tomorrow.” This would have a welcome ring in Latin America and might incidentally warn the Argentines off.

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2 In a January 31 memorandum to Rusk, Freeman, and McGovern, the President expressed his belief that it would be “useful to send a food-for-peace mission immediately to Latin America to explore the manner in which our food abundance can be used to help end hunger and malnutrition in every area of suffering throughout the hemisphere.” The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. IX, Foreign Economic Policy, Document 87. The Washington Post reported on February 9 that McGovern and Schlesinger would travel to Argentina and Brazil, while Food for Peace Deputy Director James Symington would head a technical group, including Food for Peace staff member Stephen Raushenbush, which would travel to other Latin American countries. (“2 U.S. Food-for-Peace Missions To Tour Through Latin America,” Washington Post, p. A2) For Schlesinger’s report on the mission, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Document 7.

3 See footnote 4, Document 17.

4 Glenn Smith underlined “fed today,” placed a vertical line in the right-hand margin next to it, and wrote: “patronizing in any such form. gs 3/8.” In his March 9 response to McKnight (see footnote 1, above) Wilson stated: “I am concerned about the Argentine reaction to Food for Peace. However, I don’t think your slogan is quite right. It strikes me as patronizing. I think the President’s speech will help us out on this but maybe we need some direct action in Argentina. Why don’t you think it over again and see if you can come up with a better idea of the approach to this. Please consult with Tom Sorensen on this since he is the Agency representative to George McGovern.”
19. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

U.S. Public Position on our Defense Capability

It is basically important to us that people overseas—enemies, allies and neutrals—think the United States is strong. We should, therefore, do as much as we can to reverse the recent trend of overseas opinion saying the U.S. is weak and to build an image of superior and growing strength. This task will require a long-term effort, since substantial numbers of opinion leaders abroad believe the U.S. is behind.

The immediate problem is the tone and tenor of the President’s upcoming report to Congress on the state of our defenses,\(^2\) based on the four Task Force studies now being completed. The crucial question, more basic than the “missile gap,” is: Does the defense review show that the U.S. is ahead or behind the USSR in military strength?

We recommend that, no matter what substantive facts the review may reveal, a public posture be adopted which would avoid any implication that overall U.S. military strength is below that of the Soviet Union.

Assuming the facts warrant it, we would like to see the President and the Department of Defense stress these points:

1. The United States has a measurable margin of superiority over the Soviet Union or any other country in overall military strength, including:
   
   (a) U.S. primacy by a wide margin in both quantity and quality of nuclear warheads for a variety of offensive and defensive weapons.
   
   (b) U.S. overall preponderance in the means of delivery of nuclear warheads, the chief types being planes, missiles, ships and guns.
   
   (c) Substantial U.S. lead over all other nations in nuclear-propelled ships, notably the Polaris submarines.

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\(^1\) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 290, United States Information Agency: General, 1/61–6/61. Confidential. A copy was sent to Sylvester.

\(^2\) Presumable reference to the President’s March 28 special message to the Congress on the defense budget; for the text, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 229–240.
2. Specific areas of deficiency, some serious, require urgent improvement. These deficiencies do not, however, destroy the validity of our claim of primacy. But they should be overcome for two reasons:

(a) To make the overall margin of our preponderance even wider and more secure;

(b) To ensure that we are not faced with a special military situation, such as a limited war or a request for help from an ally, for which we might not be fully prepared.

3. The “missile gap,” in light of our overall superiority, is a matter of limited significance although obviously important. It relates to “means of delivery” in one category only. Our bombers, for example, are available in greater quantities and can carry more and larger warheads.

4. Efforts to preserve our military strength have not diverted us from our main goal—the preservation of peace. We must be strong to keep the peace. We look upon our weapons as a sacred trust.

Edward R. Murrow

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
20. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Director of the Peace Corps (Shriver)\(^1\)


The success of the Peace Corps will be closely linked to our objectives. We are eager for it to succeed. We think we can help to see that it does.

I. Washington Support:

A. We have the specialized area and country experience and the media resources to help you in your overseas public relations. Here in Washington we can assist in considering foreign audience reactions to your public announcements. (Even when your press releases, speeches and statements are designed for domestic audiences you may expect them to get overseas.) We would like to work with your staff here to develop materials which we can disseminate abroad through a wide variety of media to make sure that foreign publics correctly understand and support Peace Corps activities.

For instance, we would suggest from the world public opinion point of view that the first major Peace Corps activity be a work project in a neutral, underdeveloped country in Africa rather than teaching English on a large scale in the Philippines. This latter idea, while it would have excellent results in U.S. and Filipino eyes, would be looked on in many foreign countries as just another project to reinforce our hold on an ex-colony which is still pretty much in our pocket.

B. We have many years experience in recruiting and training personnel for direct contact with foreigners overseas. Particularly relevant to the Peace Corps have been our efforts (1) to improve the screening of recruits through psychiatric examination especially designed to probe for potential strengths and weaknesses in foreign situations; and (2) to train new employees to explain and defend the United States and its history, institutions and culture; to understand the nature of hostile ideologies and to appreciate the nature of the communications

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Acc. #67A222, Entry UD WW 379, Basic Documents, Peace Corps, 61–63. No classification marking. Drafted by Meiklejohn, Halsema, and Sorensen on March 10. Copies were sent to Wilson, Meiklejohn, and McKnight; Wilson initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it. Attached but not printed are a March 23 memorandum from Sorensen to Shriver concerning Shriver’s upcoming press conference in New York and including “angles” that Shriver might stress with foreign correspondents and a March 24 memorandum from Sorensen to Roberts, Phillips, Neilson, McKnight, and King describing the relationship between USIA and the Peace Corps.
process. Rapid training methods in these fields were successfully tested with the guides at the U.S. National Exhibition in Moscow two years ago.

C. We have had more than two decades of experience in teaching foreigners English in more than 70 countries. In the process we have developed specialized techniques and materials which would be of direct value to Peace Corps English teachers.

II. Field Support:

We have offices in all countries in which you will be establishing Peace Corps operations. Each of the U.S. Information Service country establishments is headed by a Public Affairs Officer who is the adviser to the Ambassador’s Country Team on information and cultural matters. As such he and his staff can provide useful psychological guidance in all phases of the development of Peace Corps programs in that country, from exploration of their feasibility and estimating the public reaction to them to working out ways of determining the psychological effects of the programs themselves. The role of USIS in helping produce local publicity is obvious. Our people in the field know how to gain access to local media or, as is the case in many underdeveloped countries, can provide their own information outlets such as mobile motion picture projection units. Our people can be of assistance in briefing Peace Corps personnel on local factors important to good reciprocal public relations.

III. USIS Utilization of Peace Corps:

I think we agree that the use of Peace Corps personnel in activities directly operated by the U.S. Government should be avoided. They are supposed to be available to help local institutions. However, I believe they could find useful employment in activities of the bi-national centers with which we are associated.

Essentially the bi-national center is an indigenous institution devoted to cultural matters, sponsored by a board composed of prominent local citizens and resident Americans, largely self-supporting but assisted by USIA-provided American grantees who manage and teach in the centers, books, other materials and some cash grants for housing and other expenses. In most of these centers English-teaching is a major activity and the supply of teachers is much less than the demand. We

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2 The American National Exhibition took place in Sokolniki Park in Moscow during the summer of 1959. Nixon made an unofficial visit to the Soviet Union July 23–August 2, in order to open the Exhibition. During a tour on July 24, Nixon and Khrushchev came to a model American home and stopped in the kitchen. While there, they engaged in an argument about the relative merits of capitalism and Communism. The argument became known as the “kitchen debate.”
would hope Peace Corps personnel might be used to help fill this gap. Others might be used to work with university student groups, to help expand use of center libraries, to lead hobby clubs and for other purposes. Since the initiative and responsibility for drawing up plans and operating the programs would be largely in the hands of host country nationals and Peace Corps personnel would be serving local people in a local institution, I believe such activities would meet your criteria. We are looking into the specifics of these possibilities without encouraging local authorities or making commitments.

Possibly there are other areas of cooperation which we may find as the Peace Corps develops. We are ready and willing to assist.

As an essential element in the day-to-day collaboration between your organization and ours, I propose to nominate a senior member of my staff, Norman J. Meiklejohn, as our liaison officer with the Peace Corps. For such top-level policy discussions as you would wish us to participate in, I propose to nominate my Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, Thomas C. Sorensen.

Edward R. Murrow

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Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature. Payne initialed next to the typed signature.

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21. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


The Russians are really squealing about the Peace Corps and appear to be in the process of mounting a major propaganda campaign against it. This is an undertaking where we have them on the hip. They can and do compete with us in the field of periodicals, books and broadcasts, but they can not risk sending their youth abroad except under conditions of strict control. We are the only nation that can and does export its

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Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA, 1960–5/61. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House on March 21 at 3:52 p.m.
underprivileged Marian Anderson, Louis Armstrong, etc. to demonstrate certain aspects of our culture.

Recommendation: At your next news conference, you should say in answer to a question that you would be delighted to see Russians working alongside Americans and others in an effort to improve health, education and public services in the emerging countries. You might consider adding that you would be equally pleased to see a few youngsters from Latvia, Estonia and Czechoslovakia similarly employed.

Edward R. Murrow

2 Anderson, a classical contralto, had been banned by the Daughters of the American Revolution (DAR) from performing in front of an integrated audience in Washington’s Constitution Hall in 1939. She subsequently performed before an integrated crowd gathered at the Lincoln Memorial. Anderson later became the first African-American to perform with the Metropolitan Opera. She also toured globally under the auspices of the Department of State and served as a delegate to the UN Human Rights Committee. Armstrong, a jazz trumpeter and singer, also performed on tours sponsored by the Department. He cancelled one of his tours to the Soviet Union over his displeasure at Eisenhower’s handling of school desegregation in Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957.

3 The President’s next news conference took place at the Department of State on March 23 at 6 p.m. For the text, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 213–220.

22. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to the Director (Murrow)

Washington, April 7, 1961.

SUBJECT

Add “Semantics”

Someone in Foy Kohler’s shop has come up with a suggestion that we promote the term “peaceful world community” as a counter-poise to the Soviet slogan “peaceful co-existence.” I like it. If you feel the same way, we can have our media use this expression whenever appro-
Meantime you may wish to tell Messrs. Bowles and Tubby that you endorse the idea—assuming you do.

Thomas C. Sorensen

2 Murrow drew a diagonal line from the word “appropriate” to the right-hand margin and wrote “yes” to the right of it.

3 Sorensen initialed “T.C.S.” above his typed signature. In an April 8 memorandum to Bowles, copies of which were sent to Tubby, Wilson, and Sorensen, Murrow wrote: “This is to advise that in future we are going to employ the term ‘peaceful world community’ in all media whenever appropriate. I understand this suggestion came from Foy Kohler’s shop. We embezzled it.” (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Policy and Plans—General (IOP) 1961 January–June)

23. Memorandum of Conversation


PARTICIPANTS

Edward Muhl, Vice President in Charge of Production, Universal International Pictures, Studio City, California

Turner B. Shelton, Director, Motion Picture Service, USIA

On Friday, April 14, 1961, Mr. Roger Tubby, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, telephoned Mr. Shelton at Mr. Shelton’s home in Beverly Hills, California and advised him that he had discussed within the Department the situation regarding Universal International Pictures’ effort to produce *The Ugly American* in Thailand and that it was the belief of the Department that every appropriate step should be taken to insure that this film was not produced unless and until the script had been changed in order to insure the film would not be harmful to U.S. interests abroad. This decision was based on two important factors: (1) the delicate situation regarding relations in the Far East at the moment; and (2) the fact that there would have to be unquestionably some implied “approval” on the part of the U.S. Gov-

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Miscellaneous #1—Motion Pictures. Confidential. Drafted by Shelton on April 21. Copies were sent to Murrow, Wilson, Neilson, Tubby, Steeves, and Unger in Bangkok. Smith initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum.
ernment involved in connection with the making of this film in a foreign country, especially in view of the fact that cooperation had been requested by Universal International both from the point of view of assistance with the Government of Thailand and assistance by the U.S. Department of Defense.

Mr. Shelton said that since this was the position of the Department he felt confident that Mr. Murrow would concur in this position and that he, Mr. Shelton, would be prepared to discuss the matter fully with Mr. Muhl if the Department wished him to do so.

Mr. Tubby stated that the Department did wish such a discussion.

Mr. Shelton called Mr. Muhl and made a luncheon appointment for the following day at the Beverly Hills Hotel. Mr. Muhl was accompanied to this luncheon by a gentleman whom he described as one of his “assistants” but who took no part in the discussion.

Mr. Shelton pointed out to Mr. Muhl the historical background of the situation regarding The Ugly American vis-à-vis the Department of State, USIA, our Embassy in Bangkok and Universal International. Mr. Shelton stated that it had appeared approximately a year ago that there had been a meeting of the minds regarding the proper handling of this script, but that now the Government had been faced up again, as it had been before on several occasions, with an unacceptable script and with an expressed urgency on the part of Universal Pictures which seemed to preclude the type of cooperative work to bring about an acceptable script that would be expected under the circumstances.

Mr. Shelton said that he wished to make it perfectly clear that nothing he said was in any way critical of Mr. John Horton, the Universal International representative in Washington but that over the past approximately ten years he, Mr. Shelton, had had occasion to work with studios on perhaps as many as 500 scripts, some just as difficult as The Ugly American and that he did not believe that the manner in which Universal International had handled the efforts of the Department and USIA to cooperate with Universal had made it easier on anyone concerned.

Mr. Muhl said he recognized the film was a difficult one but that he wished to reiterate the statement he had made to Mr. Shelton about a year and a half ago that Universal International did not wish to make a motion picture which would be harmful to the United States. He stated, however, that it was his understanding that agreement had been reached on the changes to be made in the script between State Department personnel and Mr. Englund.2

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2 See Document 11.
Mr. Shelton said that he was of the opinion that these changes were relatively generalized in nature in some cases, and where they were specific they did not strike at the heart of the problem which involved the characterization of the Ambassador and the espousal of the philosophy that the United States uses every effort to force small foreign Governments to accept “the American way” despite their wishes.

There followed a general discussion of the story treatment as outlined in the script. Mr. Shelton made the point that he felt there was concern by the Department and USIA that there was not a serious attitude taken by either the producer or the writer toward the basic problems which existed relative to the script and that neither our Embassy or Mr. Tubby, who had been in Bangkok, were reassured after discussions with Mr. Englund. Mr. Shelton said that therefore he felt the only alternative was for Mr. Muhl, the responsible head of the studio, to take upon himself the basic responsibility for working out an acceptable script, if possible, and making alternative decisions if necessary.

Mr. Muhl said he would do this and he would assure Mr. Shelton that he would take personal responsibility and would come to Washington as soon as the present script revisions were completed and fully discuss the matter with everyone concerned in order to attempt to reach an agreement. Mr. Muhl said he would contact Mr. Horton immediately and either ask him to come to California or meet him in New York in order to thoroughly discuss the background since he, Mr. Muhl, was not completely conversant with the entire subject.

Mr. Shelton said that he had known Mr. Muhl for many years and felt confident that if Mr. Muhl would personally take on the responsibility for the problems involved some appropriate solution could be found.

Mr. Muhl said that he felt certain this was the case and he could assure Mr. Shelton and through him the Department and USIA that he would take the responsibility and would insure that nothing occurred until after full discussion had been had by him with the appropriate officials in the Department and USIA in Washington. (FYI: The principal negative note sounded by Mr. Muhl was a slight inference that the Department and USIA were attempting to prevent the production of the film no matter what changes were made. Mr. Shelton maintained a positive attitude but firmly in opposition to a film detrimental to the National interests which Mr. Muhl had stated he also opposed).

Mr. Shelton then telephoned Mr. Tubby in Washington and briefly summarized the above conversation with Mr. Muhl.


POSITIVE FOREIGN POLICY THEMES

Domination of the headlines by current crises such as Laos and Cuba has tended to give too negative an impression of the new and positive aspects of the Administration's foreign policy. Positive themes should therefore be emphasized wherever possible. This paper cites examples of positive foreign policy themes immediately available and furnishes a basic inventory to which new themes can be added as they are developed.

1. **Putting our own house in order.** We are tackling the problems of our own society—accelerating our economic growth and setting an example of liberal democracy at work—because what we do at home is the necessary foundation of all genuine effectiveness abroad. The President's domestic programs illustrate this, notably those concerned with economic growth, minimum wages, unemployment, depressed areas and racial discrimination.

2. **Civility of relations with friend and foe.** In a new effort to influence the emergence of a world environment of peace and orderly politics, we are concentrating on understanding the essential interests of others, and the relationship of these interests to our own. Civility and a patient effort to understand and negotiate differences of viewpoint characterize our diplomacy toward friend and foe alike, in order that we may never be accused of prejudgment or a lack of honest effort.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Acc. #66A175, Entry UD WW 288, Box 131, State—Policy Planning 1961 IOP/823, Official Use Only. McGhee sent the paper to Murrow under an April 19 covering memorandum, in which he commented: "I thought you might be interested in the attached paper, 'Positive Foreign Policy Themes', from the standpoint both of action and of public relations. I should in any event appreciate your reactions, together with any additional positive themes which occur to you." (Ibid.) Murrow's May 2 response to McGhee is ibid.

2 Three factions were vying for control of Laos. At his March 23 news conference (see footnote 3, Document 21), the President called for an end to hostilities and for negotiations leading to a neutral and independent Laos.

3 The Bay of Pigs operation began on April 17.

4 The President outlined several initiatives related to housing, unemployment, minimum wage, distressed area redevelopment, disability insurance, and surplus commodity distribution in his February 2 special message to Congress regarding a program for economic recovery and growth. For the text of the message, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961*, pp. 41–53.
We are striking toward a new diplomatic style: talking less and listening more, and we shall always listen well before we talk firmly. Thus we are consulting more with other nations and leaders in Washington and at the UN, receiving more foreign visitors and spending more time with them, and exchanging more communications with heads of foreign governments and foreign ministers. We are trying to keep our differences with the Soviets and Chinese Communists in low key and are urgently reviewing the nature and extent of these differences in an effort to reduce tensions and ameliorate problems which we have inherited.

3. Political rather than military solutions. We have taken steps to show that we are not “trigger-happy” or “bomb rattlers”. We have exercised patience and restraint in Laos, Cuba and the Congo, for example, though the world knows that we possess the military strength to intervene unilaterally. Another example: The President has requested our military to mute their claims about American arms and their estimates of enemy intentions and strength; a conscious effort is being made to tailor Pentagon statements to the new White House specifications for diplomacy.

4. Military responsibilities in the nuclear age require flexibility of military response. World realities demand that we maintain military strength and the invulnerability of our deterrent power (step-up in Polaris and Minuteman production; emphasis on hardening and shelter concept). But we are no longer committed to a rigid doctrine of “massive retaliation”; instead “any potential aggressor... must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift and effective.” (President’s Defense Budget message5—new emphasis on build-up of conventional forces, development of Special Forces and counter-guerrilla doctrine and operations, strengthening of STRAC airlift capabilities, etc.)

5. We arm to parley and to disarm. Notwithstanding the necessity of improving and balancing our military posture in important respects—in order that we may be the better able to negotiate and to defend essential interests during prolonged negotiations—the President has recommitted us to serious and patient efforts to effect a suspension of nuclear testing and an amelioration of the present arms race under viable, secure and verifiable safeguards. This effort, which we regard as both important and urgent, is proceeding under Mr. McCloy’s lead-

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5 See footnote 2, Document 19. The message stated: “Our defense posture must be both flexible and determined. Any potential aggressor contemplating an attack on any part of the Free World with any kind of weapons, conventional or nuclear, must know that our response will be suitable, selective, swift, and effective.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 232)
ership. Complementary to the general theme of disarmament and arms control is the theme, enunciated by Secretary of State Rusk in his Charter Day (University of California) address, that as we take progressive steps in arms control we must also work toward bringing into being a world of law and order by strengthening the constitutional structure for settling disputes and supporting the processes of law with effective international police forces.

6. Sanctity of alliances. We have reassured our allies that we shall continue to live up to our collective security commitments (new sense of SEATO cohesion effected at Bangkok meeting; review of NATO). Though we are starting a new chapter (see below) in our relations with the non-committed neutralist nations, improved relations with these nations will not devalue or diminish the importance of our existing alliances. Where possible and practicable, we are seeking to broaden military alliances into alliances which promise closer political and economic ties (NATO review political and economic recommendations, regional economic plans for CENTO, the Alliance for Progress).

7. More positive roles for NATO. We have extensively reviewed the nature of the NATO military alliance (reaching conclusions which will support constructive new military programs). We have also reap-

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7 In his March 20 address at the University of California at Berkeley, Rusk remarked: “Disarmament would be simple in a world in which the major political issues have been resolved. Since we cannot expect an early end to rivalry and discord, and since an arms race adds to tension, our present task is the far more difficult one of finding measures which will safely permit reductions in arms while a world of law and order is coming into being. This is why effective inspection and control are required, why progressive steps appear to be a prudent procedure, why the constitutional structure for settling disputes must be strengthened, and why effective international police forces are needed to support the processes of law.” (Department of State Bulletin, April 10, 1961, p. 518)

8 The seventh meeting of the SEATO Council took place in Bangkok March 27–29. For Rusk’s statement at the March 27 opening session, see Department of State Bulletin, April 17, 1961, pp. 547–549.

9 At his February 8 news conference, the President indicated that Rusk was undertaking a study of U.S. policy regarding NATO and would be aided by an advisory group headed by former Secretary of State Dean Acheson. (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 67) On April 12, U.S. and West German officials met to discuss NATO. According to the memorandum of conversation of the meeting, Rusk “noted that the Chancellor [adchenauer] had spoken of the need for United States leadership in NATO. He said that the President had taken this very seriously and had asked the various branches of this government to examine very carefully what the United States could do to put new life and strength into NATO.” (Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, Document 98) For the resultant policy statement, drafted by members of an interagency NATO working group, see ibid., Document 100.

10 See footnotes 2 and 4, Document 17.
praised the potential for NATO’s becoming a more positive political force which can point toward closer integration of the Atlantic Community (the Vice President’s speech to NATO).\footnote{Reference is to Vice President Johnson’s November 21, 1960, speech, made while he was Vice President-elect, before members of parliament from the NATO countries, meeting in Paris. (A.M. Rosenthal, “Johnson Suggests Wider NATO Role in Economic Field,” The New York Times, November 22, 1960, pp. 1, 4) For the text of the speech, see “Text of Johnson’s Address Before NATO Parliamentary Conference,” ibid., p. 4.}

8. \textit{Closer Atlantic Community economic cooperation.} Through the OECD we will encourage close consultation and coordination on economic policy between the member countries in order to promote more effective utilization of their productive capacities and the highest sustainable stability and growth of their economies (efforts to ameliorate divisive effects of the Inner Six and Outer Seven).\footnote{The Inner Six were Belgium, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. The Outer Seven were Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.}

9. \textit{Responsibilities of Atlantic Community toward less developed world.} We have reviewed the forms of assistance which we and the principal industrialized nations of the West, together with Japan, can make to the new and modernizing nations and to the few remaining colonial territories which aspire to independence. We have launched programs through OECD and DAG which will proceed on a basis of joint international responsibility and the earmarking of long-term financial resources in support of the efforts of the less developed portions of the world to modernize.

10. \textit{Support of the United Nations.} We continue to support the purposes and programs of the UN, in the Congo and elsewhere, and the integrity of the office of its Secretary General. We favor creation of a permanent UN force, held in readiness for immediate use when the Secretary General is empowered to act in emergencies like that of the Congo. We have strengthened our representation at the UN and have widened our consultative processes there. In particular, we are taking advantage of the opportunities the UN forum offers for collaboration with newly independent countries. To those who aver that the recent dramatic increase in UN membership has produced problems, we respond that each problem thus produced offers new opportunities for understanding and creative diplomacy.

11. \textit{Multilateral as well as bilateral solutions.} We have widened our approaches on specific problems to embrace multilateral approaches, through UN agencies or otherwise, when such promise beneficial results or are preferred by the recipient country. Examples are the Congo, US contributions to the UN Special Fund,\footnote{Resolution 1240 (XIII), adopted by the UN General Assembly on October 14, 1958, provided for the establishment of a special fund to provide assistance in the fields of technical, economic, and social development of “less developed” nations.} and the President’s
recommendation that the bulk of the Act of Bogotá funds be expended through the Inter-American Development Bank.

12. The torch of the American revolution still burns. In his Inaugural Address, President Kennedy recommitted our national purpose to the verities of our own revolution and to the fulfillment of these verities within our domestic society and in our conduct of foreign relations. Because we profoundly believe in the truths and purposes of the American revolution, we shall, while eschewing any pretensions to cultural “imperialism”, continue to hold out a helping and protective hand to all people whose purposes coincide with our own. By word and action we will continue to show that we do not stand for the status quo, that we recognize the nature of the revolutionary changes at work throughout the world, and that we are capable of developing new diplomatic and economic tools with which we can more constructively influence the forces at work.

13. Diversity within a world of freedom. The President, on the basis of our own revolution, has recommitted us to the survival and success of both personal and national liberty. Thus our concept of a Free World of orderly polities admits of diversities from our own way of life and system of institutions. For example, we are giving aid to many governments committed to forms of neutralism in foreign policy, or state socialism or mixed economies at home—e.g., centrally prepared and directed development plans, or public-owned enterprises.

14. Understanding of neutralism. We no longer condemn nations which wish to remain non-committed in the world struggle. Though we can never ourselves again return to our former isolationism and disentanglement from the world’s other continents, and we naturally recognize and cherish the special ties that link some nations with us, we can understand that non-alignment may serve the national interests of some new nations better than does a policy of military alliance or active participation in the Cold War. We recognize in any case that the most constructive contributions to human progress which many developing nations can make is to build the strength to protect their own genuine national independence. Toward nations so situated and motivated, our relationship will be one of cooperation and sympathetic understanding.

15. Sympathy toward aspirations of colonial peoples. We are encouraging the preparation of the few remaining colonial areas of the world.

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14 Adopted and approved by the Organization of American States in September and October 1960, the Act recommended various measures for social improvement and economic development in Latin America. The text of the Act is printed in Department of State Bulletin, October 3, 1960, pp. 537–540.

15 See footnote 2, Document 7.
for responsible self-government and ultimate independence (Angola Resolution).\(^\text{16}\) We sympathize with the aspirations of colonial peoples to join the family of free nations. But we maintain that independence without adequate preparations can be as dangerous as failure to prepare for the inevitability of independence. Our encouragement of colonial “liberation” in the world’s remaining colonial areas will generally proceed therefore in consultation with the metropoles involved; our effort will be one of helping metropole and colony alike to achieve as rational and orderly a solution of the problems of transition as human nature permits.

16. Reduction of racist tensions and discriminations. While working on our own racial problem, we are inviting other nations to do the same (US position on UN resolution on South Africa).\(^\text{17}\) We have made special efforts to censure and bring an end to unwarranted discriminations visited on foreign colored diplomats and visitors and to set a style of dealing with the new Afro-Asian nations on a basis which will fortify their own aspirations toward being accepted on a basis of dignity and equality. Examples: new procedures employed by Department’s Office of Protocol and USUN.

17. Crusade against mankind’s common enemies. Across the many diversities of today’s world, we appeal to all nations to join with us in a crusade against mankind’s common enemies: tyranny, poverty, disease, illiteracy, and war itself. Examples: Act of Bogota, Alliance for Progress, new approach to foreign aid, support of the UN in the Congo and elsewhere.

18. Scientific cooperation. The President has repeatedly (Inaugural Address, State of Union Message, Alliance for Progress speech)\(^\text{18}\) called for increased scientific cooperation between ourselves and the Soviets, as well as others.

19. Campaign for education and cultural exchange. Within the context of our foreign aid program, as supplemented by other resources, we are focusing greater effort and resources to programs to combat illiteracy, to raise the levels of technical and vocational education within developing societies, and to increase the extent and richness of cultural exchange between our society and others. (Alliance for Progress speech, Coombs’ program.)


\(^\text{17}\) Presumable reference to Resolution 1596 (XV), adopted by the UN General Assembly on April 17.

\(^\text{18}\) See footnote 2, Document 9, and footnote 4, Document 17.
20. The East-West Center at the University of Hawaii has been established to promote further technical and cultural exchanges between the United States and Asia. Ninety individuals are now enrolled on the basis of scholarships—80 from Asia and 10 from the United States.

21. Cultural America. The President and Mrs. Kennedy have taken a lead in re-emphasizing the importance in our national life of our own rich heritage of literature, music, and the arts (Robert Frost as unofficial poet-laureate, selections of paintings and Colonial period furniture for White House, personal tastes and reading habits, etc.) and of our appreciation for the cultural achievements of other nations and of expatriates from other nations who have found a home in this country.

22. The return of the intellectual to government is a concomitant of a new emphasis on the less material aspects of our civilization. A large number of our leaders in a variety of fields of political and economic thought—and from the field of science—have been brought into government from both parties for posts at home and abroad from which they can contribute to a ferment of new ideas for new frontiers.

23. Leadership of change through foreign aid. While recognizing the obvious limitations and difficulties, we propose to accept the challenge of change throughout the world and to exert more effective leadership over change by reorganizing our foreign aid effort. For the first time, we propose to unify the various instrumentalities of foreign assistance, to provide a central focus on all aspects of a country’s development problem, and to provide aid within carefully conceived country and regional development plans which will maintain, insofar as possible, a balance between social progress, political and institutional development, and economic growth.


20 On March 22, the President sent a special message to Congress regarding foreign assistance, noting that the current structure would be inadequate to meet the needs of the next decade. He expressed his administration’s objective of consolidating all of the programs of the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), Development Loan Fund (DLF), Food for Peace (FFP), Peace Corps, and Export-Import Bank (Ex–Im) into a single agency. For the text of the President’s message, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 203–212. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–195; 75 Stat. 424), which the President signed into law on September 4, assigned responsibility and authority for foreign development aid programs to a single entity—the Agency for International Development (AID)—within the Department of State. The Agency would replace both ICA and DLF. For additional information about the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 and the establishment of AID, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Documents 69 and 72 and Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. IX, Foreign Economic Policy, Documents 100, 103, and 116.
24. **Aid for social development.** We have learned that economic growth within a society does not guarantee the advancement of the whole society, or promise progress within free institutions, unless the fruits of economic growth are equitably distributed. The accomplishment of such social justice will be a major consideration in our future foreign aid effort.

25. **Alliance for Progress: A new ideal of Pan-Americanism.** In his March 13 and April 14 speeches, the President launched and carried forward the most dynamic and far-reaching program for socio-economic development ever announced for the Pan-American community of nations. He called for the “completion of the American revolution” and defined “a new ideal of Pan-Americanism” as “recreating our social systems so that they will better serve both men and our people”. The President’s new *Alianza para el Progreso*, which in large part is based on the Act of Bogota, not only fixed the framework of US-Latin American relations in the developmental field for the next decade but sets a model for forms of assistance and cooperation with other less developed areas. The President’s Message to Congress of March 14 requested the appropriation of the $500 million initially required to commence implementation of the Act of Bogota.

26. **Long-term financing for long-term development.** We seek to cross another new frontier which we believe vital to the development process. In return for long-term financial commitments on our part, we hope to influence developing nations to formulate realistic and viable development plans which fix goals, priorities and self-help targets, and which place adequate and balanced attention on the social, institutional and economic components of the development process.

27. **Stabilization of commodity prices.** We have indicated that we, together with the industrialized nations of Western Europe, intend to work harder at resolving the problem of effecting more stable prices for exports of primary products—a problem which is acute to most of Latin America and Africa, and to many countries in Free Asia.

28. **Trade and let trade.** We continue to press ahead in GATT and other forums for the future liberalization of trade. New frontiers in this area are intimately related to new approaches to foreign aid, to the stabilization of commodity prices, to the problem of imports from low-wage countries, and to the closer integration of the European and Atlantic Communities.

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21 See footnotes 4 and 8, Document 17.

22 Reference is to the President’s special message to Congress, dated March 14, requesting appropriations for the Inter-American Fund for Social Progress and for reconstruction in Chile. For the text, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961*, pp. 176–181.

23 The Dillon Round of the GATT began in Geneva in September 1960.
29. *Food for Peace* is another positive program which can make an increasingly vital US contribution to the Free World’s crusade against mankind’s enemies of hunger and malnutrition. We have gloriously achieved abundance which we must find ever more effective ways of sharing.

30. **Regional development.** We have let it be known that we shall support multinational development projects which promise regional development and integration. The Mekong River Project of Southeast Asia\(^24\) is a recent example in point (Harriman speech to ECAFE).\(^25\) We have recently authorized funds to promote the Central American Customs Union and are similarly willing to assist in implementing the regional integration plans of certain West African and South American nations. We are similarly assisting regional economic projects of CENTO.

31. **Research in the development process.** A sustained effort on the part of the industrialized nations of the West, and Japan, to assist in nourishing democratic development throughout the less developed world, will require research into the various aspects of the development process, including the education of people in the phenomena of development and modernization. Substantial programs of research are being undertaken in these fields.

32. **The Peace Corps** is a positive program for action which has met with a wide and enthusiastic response at home and abroad because of its concept of returning to the “true” America of personal sacrifice and constructive deed. The concept of Young America volunteering for non-remunerative service abroad in assistance of less privileged people is the more appealing because of the somewhat false image of our youth which is extant in many parts of the world by reason of our movies and publicity on US juvenile delinquency. The discharge of the great purpose and concept of the Peace Corps by carefully selected and trained American youth, especially if done with adaptive empathy and good manners, can have an enormous positive effect in improving the American image and in developing a greater appreciation abroad for the American system of values. The internationalization of the Peace Corps which is being discussed, could make it even more effective and acceptable.

\(^{24}\) In 1957 the UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East initiated the Mekong River Basin Development Project, designed to improve the uses of the Mekong River for navigation, irrigation, and hydroelectric power, thus contributing to increased development in the area.

\(^{25}\) On March 17, Harriman addressed the delegates attending the annual ECAFE meeting in New Delhi. ("Harriman Favors Rise in Aid to Asia," *The New York Times*, March 18, 1961, p. 2)
25. Letter From Abbott Washburn to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Briefing of the Cabinet

Previous directors of the Agency briefed the Cabinet on USIA’s worldwide operations, stressing the need for close cooperation with other departments and agencies of Government and underscoring that statements and actions by Cabinet officers can often have profound impact on world opinion either positively or negatively for the United States.

These briefings were always well received, and in one instance the President directed that the presentation be brought to the second echelon of management in the various Cabinet agencies.

Ted Streibert made two such presentations, using charts and samples of printed output, etc. Arthur Larson used charts and film clips, with a carefully timed and rehearsed script (30 minutes). George Allen handled it verbally, largely without props.

Invariably these presentations caused discussion at their conclusion. From the questions asked it was often clear how little the Cabinet officers knew about the overseas information program and what could (and could not) be expected of it.

Now, with an entirely new Cabinet, you may wish to take advantage of the precedent.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Office of the Director—(I) General 1961. No classification marking.
26. Memorandum of Discussion


Summary of Views Expressed by Area and Media Directors during “Theme” Session on Saturday, April 28, 1961

Mr. Phillips, IAE, apologizing if he should seem somewhat parochial, urged “West Berlin must be maintained as a free city” as a major theme for immediate action. Mr. Phillips said another Berlin crisis was expected between May and September. He recalled the very good media coordination during the 1958 crisis when journalists were flown into Berlin and IBS gave excellent coverage. Mr. Phillips recommended immediate gathering of usable material, including a documentary film suitable both for film programs and for TV use, to be forwarded to the posts and held by them for use when the crisis breaks.

He also offered as a major theme: “Responding to the revolution of rising expectations—economic, political, social.”

Mr. King, IAN, proposed as a major theme an excerpt from the Inaugural Address: “The United States will pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friends, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty.”

Mr. McKnight, IAL, questioned whether we weren’t putting the cart before the horse. He said that it appeared to him advisable, in order to arrive at the desired major themes, first to identify U.S. policy goals worldwide, define potential USIA contributions to their achievement—in light of problems USIA faces—, compare USIA assets with the enemy’s assets, and only then attempt to answer the question, “What themes?” Mr. Sorensen remarked that such was the procedure being followed.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Acc. #67A222, Entry UD WW 379, Themes—General 1963 & Prior. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Brooke on May 4. Under a May 9 covering memorandum to Halsema and Sirkin, Sorensen sent a copy of the memorandum of discussion and a copy of a May 8 memorandum from Pauker to Moceri, Halsema, and Brooke. (Ibid.) In the May 8 memorandum, Pauker stated: “In our consideration of Themes, I hope we do not lose sight of the extent to which a Theme is effective only insofar as it engages a real need and a real will to work; otherwise it is likely to be (and to be readily identifiable as) mere window-dressing behind which lurk the realities of the diverse and often conflicting interests which nations and peoples hold dear.”

2 Reference to the Western response to Khrushchev’s November 10, 1958, address in Moscow, during which he asserted that the parties to the Potsdam Agreement give up the occupation regime in Berlin.

3 See footnote 2, Document 7.
Mr. McKnight mentioned some of the problems which, in his view, confronted USIA:

1. “Wave of future” versus “paper tiger”.
2. Double standard of morality applied to U.S. and U.S.S.R.
3. “Knee-jerk” pro-Soviet reaction of “intellectual,” “liberals.” (What’s explanation of anomaly?)
4. Soviet orchestration of propaganda, diplomacy, military pressure (guerrilla), economic pressures, subversion.
5. Soviet “capture” of good words.

Mr. Nickel, IAF, suggested that the Agency might undertake the major job of mounting a mass education campaign on “What is economic development?” This might be stated thematically as “Development for Freedom,” or “Development for Progress.”

Mr. Hutchison, IPS, said that the themes he would propose were designed to awaken friends and neutrals to the danger to all and to win the confidence of these friends and neutrals for the United States.

His themes were: “Forward-changing America versus static communism;” “Collective security means collective freedom.”

Mr. O’Brien, IBS, said that his theme was broad and blunt, namely: “The United States leads and supports social revolution around the world.”

This might appear tricky and perhaps unpalatable at home and in Europe, but, Mr. O’Brien noted, a recent bold projection of American revolutionary ideals had been effective around the world.

Mr. Squires, IAA, asked whether the themes to be selected would be USIA themes or U.S. themes—that is, themes built on U.S. policies and actions. He was doubtful of the advisability of working with the former, and felt that U.S. themes should be employed. He foresaw difficulties. In Morocco, he recalled, when the Posts were asked to exploit the Hungarian revolution, the Moroccans were not interested in the plight of the Hungarian refugees and asked, “Why aren’t you doing something about the Algerian refugees?”

He noted also (someone had mentioned “The Open Society” as a possible theme) that the Africans are not interested in an “open” society; they want a “closed” society. Mr. Squires said that he believed the best opportunities for

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4 An unknown hand placed two parallel vertical lines in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
5 Squires had served as a Public Affairs Officer in the U.S. Embassy in Morocco during the 1950s.
coordinated media output to get results arise when major U.S. policies and actions come together, as in the Lebanese landings of 1958.6

(Mr. Squires submitted an IAA paper proposing the theme: “Improving the Image of International and Regional Organizations in the Context of the Indispensability of International Cooperation.” He suggested emphasis on the idea that “this will win.”)

Mr. Stephens, IRI, suggested two themes: “America’s is the true revolution; Russia’s is counter-revolution.” “A nation has the right to choose provided it respects the rights of others.” He indicated that he would give decided priority to the first of the two.

(“Mr. Stephens suggested consideration of naming a three-man task force to develop a priority list of themes. Mr. Murrow responded that the themes would be chosen by “a one-man task force.”)

Mr. Handley, ICS, proposed as a theme: “History is on the side of freedom.” He said that carrying this concept to all the world—a world weary and beset by doubts—could restore hope where there is none and spark courage to halt the advance of communism. It could serve, he said, as a kind of “non-military” penetration of wavering and doubtful countries. He noted that effective subsidiary themes would derive from the first: One showing the United States as “a cornucopia of devices and experience” of immense help to other nations; the other exposing Communism’s practice of wielding power “without a sense of responsibility to God or fellow men.”

Mr. Begg, IOC, said that a recent conference he had attended, concerned with such matters as “home rule” and “local autonomy of communities” lead him to believe that an effective theme could be based on those concepts. He proposed as his first theme: “American Respect for the Dignity of the Individual.”


Mr. Shelton, IMS, said that, in his view, one of the major problems facing the Agency is that communism is simple and easy to sell, whereas democracy is complicated and pretty hard to sell. He noted that few people seem to realize that the Soviet Union is a fascist state and gets away with passing off its “fascist” achievements as proofs of the effectiveness of communism. The object of the theme he would propose, Mr. Shelton said, was to break down the appeal of communism and

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6 See footnote 6, Document 3.
induce people to reject communism’s “easy road to breakdown and degradation.” The theme: “Expanding and Perfecting Man’s Freedom.”

(Mr. Shelton submitted a paper giving the rationale of this and additional themes. The others: “Progress and Social Justice through Peaceful Change”; “Strength for Freedom”; “Reject the Easy and Deceptively Attractive Road to Tyranny and Self-Degradation;” and, “Progress and Social Justice Begins with You—Start Building Today the World You Want Tomorrow.”)

Mr. Butler, ITV, remarked that the theme he was proposing was perhaps “more doctrine than theme,” but that he felt it offered a worthy suggestion for coordinated Media effort. The theme: “Humanism.” This theme held “the essence of our evolution as a nation.”

Mr. Murrow remarked that he had long felt that there was “a goldmine in HEW.”

Mr. King, IAN, questioned whether the humanism theme might not contain a possible booby-trap—that of reviving charges of “U.S. materialism.”

Mr. McKnight, IAL, asked, “After the loss of Laos and Cuba, would emphasis on Humanism make us seem weak? And would a campaign on humanism perhaps be betrayed by a tough military act?”

In a general discussion at this point, it was agreed that the Peace Corps was a self-evident theme, but that no coordinated output should be attempted on it until there were enough Peace Corps projects in actual operation abroad to assure continuing material for the Media to work with—that it would be premature to publicize the Peace Corps very much in the immediate future.

Mr. Brooke, IOP, noted that considerable work had been done in IOP in developing possible themes and in preparing very comprehensive guidances for media utilization. Two of a number of examples which were available for examination were: “The Scientific Revolution,” designed to show the depth and breadth of U.S. scientific achievement, and the extent to which this achievement is benefiting the entire world; and, “The Open Society,” designed to appeal to man’s inherent desire for freedom and to stress communist determination to deny that desire and thereby put the communist powers on the defensive. Noting the able job which enemy propagandists have done in branding America as “imperialist” and in attaching to the U.S. such labels as “Uncle Shylock,” “Wolves of Wall Street,” the “Yankee Dollar,” and “Dollar Diplomacy,” he suggested consideration of a long-term campaign to make the dollar respected again—as a symbol of the hard work of the American people helping to do the important work of the world.

(Mr. Phillips, IAE, remarked in connection with the “Science” theme that in Western Germany, despite USIS efforts, most Germans
believed that the Russians were ahead of the U.S. in scientific accomplishments. He felt this might be explained by the somewhat “scattered” attention which USIA has so far given to science.)

Mr. Murrow said that he hoped all present would not be forgetful of the value of repetition in getting across whatever messages or points the Agency was aiming at its audiences.

Mr. Murrow then made an appeal “for small things,” for colorful, revealing items on “what this Agency is and what it does.” Such items could be very useful in speeches and for other purposes. They could be sent to him, via Mr. Payne, on 3 x 5 cards. He said not to make it a chore, not to submit “long reports.” (These should be items such as a letter from Africa on the long waiting list for “The Federalist Papers,” the hunger for education in the Sudan where schools are on three shifts, and the fact that over 200 million people saw USIS films last week.)

27. Infoguide From the United States Information Agency to Multiple Diplomatic and Consular Posts


INFOGUIDE: USIS Support for Peace Corps Projects. Reference: Potomac Cable No. 151 of 4/19/61 (attached).²


² Not printed. The cable stated, in part: “The people of the United States have responded with enthusiasm to President Kennedy’s establishment of the Peace Corps. This response reflects the desire of the American people to work for greater international understanding and their conviction that greater exchange of knowledge and skills can advance the cause of peace in the world. But whatever the domestic response, the test of the Peace Corps will be its performance abroad.”
President Kennedy announced the first Peace Corps project (assistance to Tanganyika in road development and geological surveying) at his April 22 news conference. Public announcement of other Peace Corps projects may be expected in due course.

In each host country USIS has a responsibility for consultative as well as informational support, effective even before agreement on a local Peace Corps project is publicly announced.

In carrying out its responsibility, the post should avoid the impression that Peace Corps is in any sense an element of USIS. The USIS relationship to Peace Corps is in rendering supportive and advisory services inconspicuously as a member of the Country Team.

**CONSULTATIVE SUPPORT** (for posts where projects are contemplated or established)

As part of the Country Team, USIS will advise on psychological factors, positive and negative, that should be considered from the outset of program planning and exploration. This consultation should assure that program decisions take full account of foreseeable public-opinion contingencies and opportunities, and that potential impact on key target groups is considered.

**INFORMATIONAL SUPPORT** (for all posts)

The Peace Corps concept is in keeping with President Kennedy’s statement in his Inaugural Address, “to those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery:”

“We pledge ourselves to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required—not because the Communists may be doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right.”

The Potomac Cable under reference outlines the motivations and purposes of the Peace Corps. It embodies as well the important caution against premature or excessive publicity for the program. A copy of that Potomac Cable is attached to this message for your convenience.

The nature and volume of USIS-generated publicity about the Peace Corps should be determined within the framework of the Country Team. As a general rule, local publicity should be limited and essentially factual until the Peace Corps itself is firmly established legisla-
tively and operationally, i.e. until pilot projects are successfully under way and a reservoir of volunteers has been formed. Publicity should make clear, along the lines of the referenced Potomac Cable, the underlying philosophy and general terms of reference of the Peace Corps concept, taking care not to generate unwarranted expectations. This is an informational task, not a sales task.

In countries where Peace Corps projects are established, local publicity efforts should be based on Country Team agreement. Posts should file stories about the Peace Corps, whether generated by USIS or otherwise, back to the Agency for possible cross-reporting.

BACKGROUND

Posts should be familiar with and may draw upon, as appropriate, information in the “Peace Corps Fact Book,” copies of which have been airmailed to posts.

Murrow

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4 Sorensen initialed under Murrow’s name. An unknown hand also wrote “sent 5/3” below the last sentence of the message.

28. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All Principal USIS Posts

CA–2934


There is a need to focus USIA worldwide output more sharply in support of United States policy objectives. This requires emphasis on a few priority themes and subjects. It means concentrating Media output on those subjects which will be most helpful to field posts in conveying these themes.

The central responsibility for policy control and coordination of media content is with IOP. The Agency has established the position of

Director of Media Content and has appointed a senior field officer\textsuperscript{2} to fill it. The Director of Media Content reports directly to the Deputy Director of Policy and Plans.

Working with the Area offices, IOP is preparing lists of priority themes and subjects\textsuperscript{3} for approval by the Director of USIA. Working with the Media, the Director of Media Content will make certain that their activities are concentrated and coordinated on these themes and subjects. Working with the Area offices, he will review Media programs in terms of their suitability for field needs as well as their conformity with national policy and Agency priorities.

The Media will continue to give special attention to meeting field requests.

\textit{Murrow}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{2} Edgar Brooke.}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{3} See Documents 15, 16, and 26.}

\section{29. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President (Schlesinger) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Coombs)}

\textbf{Washington, May 12, 1961.}

Before he left for Palm Beach, the President asked\textsuperscript{2} me to ask you to let us have a report covering the whole field of academic exchanges.

He wants to know what both the government resources and the programs are

1) for the exchange of teachers;

2) for the exchange of students;

3) for university-to-university relations.

\footnote{\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961–1962: Lot 63D135, Entry A1–5072, Box 5, White House—1961. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in CU on May 15 at 2:22 p.m. A notation in an unknown hand indicates that it was received in the Office of Educational Exchange (OEE) at 10:20 a.m. on May 17. An attached slip from Warren Roberts (ACE/S) to Cook reads: "For immediate attention."}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{2} An unknown hand underlined “the President asked.”}
He would like to have this as soon as possible.\(^3\)

I take it that he does not want a 30-page document; if the essence of the matter could be put in two or three pages it would\(^4\) be ideal. You might also indicate what proportion the government programs are of the total exchange effort.

He would also like you to discuss with Justice Douglas his idea of a pool of distinguished Americans available for visits and lectures abroad.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.\(^5\)

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\(^3\) An unknown hand underlined “this as soon as possible.”
\(^4\) An unknown hand underlined “in two or three pages it would.”
\(^5\) Schlesinger signed “Arthur” above his typed signature. For the final report, see Document 30.

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30. **Paper Prepared in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs\(^1\)**

Washington, undated.

Government Resources and Programs for Academic Exchanges

Current annual expenditures by the Federal Government for academic exchanges are approximately $47.5 million, divided between the State Department ($20 million) and ICA ($27.5 million), both of whom work with other Government agencies (e.g. Office of Education and Department of Agriculture) in carrying out their programs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Exchange of Teachers (1960)</th>
<th>Total .......... 4,357</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>American</td>
<td>1,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>2,493</td>
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</tbody>
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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961–1962: Lot 63D135, Entry A1–5072, Box 5, White House—1961. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the paper. Isenberg sent the paper to Schlesinger under an attached May 25 covering memorandum, indicating that the paper “provides the material requested by the President, as outlined in your recent memorandum to Phil Coombs.” See Document 29.
Under the State Department program, Americans go abroad and foreign nationals come to the United States to teach in elementary and secondary schools, usually for one year. Training is provided to foreign teachers under projects which combine study at American universities with observation of the American educational system for periods totaling about six months. American teachers attend summer seminars in several countries of Europe and Latin America. American and foreign professors are exchanged for the purpose of lecturing and advanced research at institutions of higher learning.

ICA brings foreign teachers to the United States for training periods ranging from a few weeks to more than a year. The training consists of observational tours, in-service training, or academic courses. American educators employed by ICA and by universities having ICA-financed contracts serve as advisers and conduct teacher-training projects overseas.

Exchange of Students (1960)

<table>
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<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>American</th>
<th>Foreign</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5,356</td>
<td>861 (all State Department)</td>
<td>4,495 (2,477 State Department; 2,018 ICA)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Most grants under the State Department program are for a year’s graduate study; other projects enable selected foreign student leaders to participate in special seminars and, as members of student groups in a particular field, to travel in the United States for a month.

About 30 percent of the 7,000 persons brought to the United States annually for training by ICA are enrolled at universities; others combine brief non-credit courses with in-service training and observation. In some instances, ICA brings individuals to the United States for four-year undergraduate study or for graduate training leading to an advanced degree.

University-to-University Arrangements (1960–1961)

There are currently in effect approximately 100 contracts between 56 American universities and universities abroad which are financed in whole or in part by the Federal Government. These contracts, of varying duration, amount in the aggregate to $101 million, almost all of which is borne by ICA. Typically, American faculty members serve as advisers to the foreign university or to the Ministry of Education and often assume teaching duties themselves; students and faculty of the foreign university are brought to the American-university partner for training; and the American partner supplies teaching materials and equipment.
In addition, the United States Information Agency assists American colleges and universities in establishing affiliations with institutions abroad under which exchange visits are arranged and books, periodicals, films and recordings are exchanged. USIA’s role, once the affiliation is established, is limited to small contributions of funds for educational materials. Forty-six such affiliations have been established.

Proportion of Government Programs to Total Exchange Effort

Our best estimate—and because full data on the private sector of exchanges are not available, this estimate is necessarily very rough—is that Government programs do not exceed ten percent of the total exchange effort.

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31. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


SUBJECT

Visit to Berlin

If the conversations in Vienna are “sticky”, I suggest you pay a brief visit to West Berlin following your stop-over in London. Your visit to Berlin would lift the spirits and strengthen the determination of free Germans and free people everywhere. I would suppose that the reaction in this country would be highly favorable.

Both Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt have visited you in this country. It would be logical and not bellicose in the slightest for

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA, 1960–5/61. Top Secret.


4 Brandt met with the President at the White House on March 13. For a memorandum of conversation, see ibid., Document 10. Adenauer met with the President on April 12 and April 13. For the memoranda of conversation, see ibid., Document 17 and Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, Documents 4 and 98.
you to return those visits in West Berlin. Khrushchev has visited East Berlin several times including a stop-over there following last year’s abortive Summit conference. Obviously it would be necessary for both Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt to receive you in Berlin since you would not want it to appear that you were endorsing either candidate in the forthcoming German elections.

Edward R. Murrow

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32. Address by the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)


WHO SPEAKS FOR AMERICA?

It is with mingled pleasure and awe that I join you today . . . pleasure at being again among so many of my former colleagues . . . awe that I am now the object of those scowling, critical visages among whose array I once sat with my own frowning brow. The frowning brow has not changed. We have only changed seats, and I must now answer questions instead of propounding them.

I come to this microphone to tell you of the U.S. Information Agency. In a sense, it is a reciprocal visit. There are members of this club who have shared our international microphones on the Voice of America. For example, three of your members—William Stringer, Ernest K. Lindley, and Fred Collins—do a weekly broadcast for the Voice, entitled “Issues in the News.” The program has had an excellent response from a widely appreciative audience. I trust I shall do these

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gentlemen no offense, however, if I share with you one letter we received that was not so enthusiastic. “Dear Voice of America,” the letter said, “Never in my life have I heard three more indecisive talkers. They never have anything definite to say. Keep them off the air and run John F. Kennedy instead.” Let me add, though, that if I have as few detractors as they, I shall count myself among the fortunate.

I have been in my job as Director of the Agency scant weeks. Operating as we do in 98 countries around the world, there is much about the Agency that I have yet to learn. But as a former working newsmen like most of you here today, there are a number of thoughts and impressions that I would share with you in my present role as a government official.

Our Agency operates in a difficult, not too well defined area. We embrace a multitude of disciplines and professions. Many of you are newsmen who devote your careers, as I did for 25 years, to expression in a single medium of communication. USIA employs not one but seven: radio, television, movies, press, book publishing, exhibits and the arts. We are involved in an entire range of problems: from a press run in Beirut, an exhibition in Turin, a stage performance in Munich and radio relays in Colombo. From a news telecast in Bogota to a sound-tracked film strip in Paris to a book typeset in Manila—upon all the myriad of details we initiate, we create, we facilitate.

Even more important we must deal amidst the intangibles: the difficult, delicate human art of persuasion. For by word of mouth, by cultivated personal contact abroad, we seek to persuade others of the rightness of our view and that our actions and our goals are in harmony with theirs. And this brings on a thought: in the course of a single working day how many of you gentlemen here could exercise your expertise competently over an array of problems as diverse as these?

To those bold enough to reply in the affirmative, I offer a note of caution: this is only half the Agency’s problem. For we deal not only in communications but also in policy. We articulate and distribute not advertising for cigarettes and soap suds but clarifications of government policy and deeds. And we speak in many languages to many peoples of vastly differing cultures and styles, of vastly differing levels of comprehension. We must deal also with the very considerable preconditioning foreigners have had to the image and the ideas of America. We must deal with the realities of their fears, their concerns, their stereotypes—however unjustified, their existence is real—of the product we promote: the actions and the hopes of the United States.

Thus the effective overseas USIA officer must be a creature who combines the talents of professional proficiency with persistence and patience. He must try to know as much about seven media of communication as most of you gentlemen know about your one. I shall not
indulge your sufferance by reading a roster of qualified officers in the
Agency. But I assure you I have found I am able to call upon resourceful
minds of many disciplines. We have men who number among their
accomplishments, before coming with the Agency, such positions as a
broadcast Peabody Award\(^2\) winner; a past President of NBC Inter-
national; a former producer with Eagle Lion and Warner Brothers studio;
the former President of a college; several deans of universities, includ-
ing a Dean Emeritus from Columbia University; an original editor of
Newsweek; an author of 15 published novels, 6 of which have been
adapted for motion pictures; editors of metropolitan newspapers and
national press services; overseas bureau chiefs, foreign correspondents,
and Nieman fellows in Journalism.\(^3\) Overseas they are supported by
an equally diversified and distinguished staff: nationals of the countries
in which we work, writers, editors, artists, lecturers and others. They
are a talented and varied crew. They serve by choice, I know, for many
of them annually refuse private offers for far more money than they
now earn.

In my first four months, I have asked many of my colleagues to
postpone fellowships, assignments abroad and desirable posts long
anticipated. Often at great personal inconvenience, their invariable
response to me has been: “Whatever you think is best for the Agency,
I will gladly do.”

So it was that one of my own long-held illusions about government
was rudely shattered on that January day when I assumed office.
I arrived at 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue expecting a bureaucracy of
dawdlers; instead I found a bounty of capable doers. For my own part,
I have never worked harder in my life. I have never been called a
loafing man—though on occasion I confess a predilection for good
conversation, fine wine and rich food—but not since the days of World
War II have I worked with such frantic fascination.

I am finding that this is truly the time of the “New Zeal”, and it
is not easy to set the pace for my younger colleagues. Our work product
would stagger the mind of what we in government call “private enter-
prise”. Our radio broadcasts live over 88 hours a day in 35 languages.
Our special wireless file puts out up to 8–10,000 words a day to each
of five world areas. Our films reach an estimated weekly audience of
about 150 million people. When a special project goes through on a

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\(^2\) The George Foster Peabody Award, presented annually to multiple recipients,
recognizes outstanding public service by U.S. television and radio stations, networks,
other media, and individuals. Murrow won Peabody Awards in 1948 and 1953.

\(^3\) In the late 1930s, President of Harvard University James B. Conant used a $1
million bequest from Agnes Wahl Nieman to establish the Nieman Fellowship, a sabbati-
cal program for journalists.
crash basis, we can get to an audience of over five hundred million. And in television, our “market” is rapidly expanding—some 36 million TV sets and 160 million viewers.

Nor is our product dissipated meaninglessly. For the 50 million books we have published in 50 languages, there is incessant demand. In Blantyre, Nyasaland, a library opened in March of this year, and borrowers stripped its shelves nearly bare in about a month of operation. In another African post there was a greater demand for the Federalist Papers in four weeks time than the New York Public Library had in a year. And the first English classes formed in two newly-independent countries numbered among their pupils both Prime Ministers, a number of Cabinet officials as well as other high government leaders and their wives.

Our Agency by Congressional Mandate operates overseas. There is much misunderstanding about just what the U.S. Information Agency does. We have received letters with ominous overtones, such as a request to “send me all your information on counterfeiting” and “please rush me all the facts on bullet wounds, fast.” Letter-writers have asked us “what percentage of young people are juveniles, how can I figure out which TV newscasters are Republicans, and why are most auctioneers called ‘colonel’?” And do-it-yourself fans have written our Agency for information on how to bottle peanut butter, refinish driftwood, operate bongo drums, and make low-calorie soft-drinks.

Information is our job, but information of more serious import. I told the Senate hearing on my nomination that our Agency will attempt to make US policy as designed by the President everywhere intelligible and, wherever possible palatable.

We shall endeavor to reflect with fidelity to our allies, to the uncommitted nations, as well as to those who are hostile to us, not only our policy but our ideals. Yet, in our day-to-day efforts directed to this end, we do not stand alone. For much that is known and believed about this country is beyond the purview of our Agency alone.

Just as the work of USIA is far more than just Voice of America broadcasts, so is the real voice of America far more than just our Agency. From Norway to Nyasaland, from Rio to Rangoon, the story and the face of America goes out in movies, television, magazines and the press. The military, with fighters and their families, number one million abroad. Over four million American tourists travel abroad each

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5 See footnote 5, Document 8.
year. Another half million Americans live overseas for reasons embracing both business and pleasure. Foundations, educational exchanges, and international scholarships send our young intellectuals and their studious professors swarming to foreign universities. Fifty thousand foreign students and hundreds of thousands of foreign tourists visit our country every year to hear and evaluate the first-hand voice of America.

And all of this has great impact. Italy has built its first drive-in movie. An authentic drug store stands in the shadow of the Arc de Triomphe. England, heaven bless its warm draught lager, is beginning to drink cold beer in cans. American blue jeans and slacks vie with the kimono in Japan. Nairobi has its parking meters; there are skyscrapers in Johannesburg and supermarkets in Leopoldville. Air conditioning has settled in Santiago, and even Moscow has succumbed not only to jazz and Louis Armstrong but also—heaven assuage the souls of Marx and Lenin—to American installment buying. And these are but frothy facets of the spreading style of America—or of the 20th Century, since both in so many ways are synonymous.

Beneath them, and of far more lasting impact, is the broadening outward flow of ideas and techniques of how to live and work together, of respect for neighbors, of faith that every human problem is capable of human solution. We and all the other voices of America that reach outside our frontiers are helping to spread the concept of “access”, of individual self-fulfilment and citizen participation.

I tell you all this not to defend our culture but to define our Agency. You gentlemen of the press share very much with our Agency the making of the picture of America that is known abroad. To give you but random figures: 89% of the people in West Germany consider the press as their major source of information about the USA. 77% in Burma, 81% in Britain and Japan, 85% in Peru and Uruguay. All of these are people, gentlemen, saying the press is their major source of information about America.

And the impact made on these people through the press is of course largely beyond the exclusive influence of USIA. Yet the picture is even broader. Not only the press, but the television, the movies, the travelling tourists, the missionaries and the businessmen, are part of the chorus that is the real voice of America. It means there are no more domestic issues. The speech of a single Senator to a hometown audience can have more impact abroad than months of our Agency’s informational activities. A breakthrough in science or medicine, the price on the big board in Chicago, import duty on textiles—we have lost the

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6 Presumable reference to the Chicago Board of Trade.
luxury of living in isolated America—these events and issues are absorbed, debated and pondered on all shores of every ocean.

To some of us the picture of a burning bus in Alabama\(^7\) may merely represent the speed and competence of a photographer, but to those of us in the U.S. Information Agency it means that picture will be front-paged tomorrow all the way from Manila to Rabat. Here in Washington itself, for example, there exists a much unreported encumbrance on our African relations that can lose us as much influence as anything the Soviets might do. Where do we house African diplomats in our capital? These are representatives of Negro nations led by Negro leaders. It is bad enough that they read headlines of Birmingham bus burnings and beatings. It is even worse that they find it near impossible to live in the capital of our nation. Landlords will not rent to them; schools refuse their children; stores will not let them try on clothes; beaches bar their families. Today there are some 30 African representatives in Washington with what is euphemistically called “unsatisfactory housing.” Fully 1/3 of these are termed emergency cases. There will be some 50 more families arriving in the next six months, 100 in the next year. It is not only that these people are humans like the rest of us, but that they are leaders of nations whose friendship this land deems vital. We would have them join our company of honorable men in defending against encroachment our dedication to dignity and freedom. But it is a dignity to which we will not fully admit them.

It was William Shakespeare who in the “Merchant of Venice” wrote lines that could come from the mouth of any of these wronged Negro diplomats.

“If you prick us, do we not bleed?

“If you tickle us, do we not laugh?

\(^7\) In May 1961, civil rights activists led by CORE Director James Farmer departed Washington on Greyhound and Trailways buses in order to ride through the southern United States to test an earlier Supreme Court ruling banning racial discrimination in interstate travel. In Anniston, Alabama, Klu Klux Klansmen attacked one of Greyhound buses, forced it outside of town, and firebombed it. The KKK members also physically attacked the Freedom Riders. Riders on the Trailways bus were also attacked once the bus reached Anniston and again when the bus reached Birmingham. On June 1, the Department of State released the text of a May 29 letter from Rusk to Robert Kennedy, in which Rusk indicated the Department’s support for the desegregation of facilities in interstate travel. Rusk wrote: “The efforts of the United States Government in international affairs to build the kind of world we want to live in—with peace, prosperity, and justice for all—cannot be divorced from our ability to achieve those same purposes for all the people in our own country. The principles of racial equality and non-discrimination are imperatives of the American society with its many racial strains. In the degree to which we ourselves practice those principles our voice will carry conviction in seeking national goals in the conduct of our foreign relations.” (Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1961, pp. 975–976)
"If you poison us, do we not die? "
"And if you wrong us, shall we not revenge?"

And if revenge they should, it would be recounted as a diplomatic debacle for the United States. And if and when that day should come, do not fly to your Information Agency crying that we have not told “our story” abroad. For in this damaging indignity there is blame enough for us all. And let us remember, this is not something the Communists did to us. We do it ourselves in our own capital. Is it possible that we concern ourselves too much with outer space and far places, and too little with inner space and near places?

Let me turn back to the subject at hand. You did not invite me here to talk about our duty and our opportunity as citizens, rather to tell you about our work. Quite reasonably, you wish to know where we hope to go and how we shall try to get there. At the outset let me emphasize that I did not bring to the Agency the infinite wisdom of an outsider, with magic cures for all that’s wrong.

In fact, much of what I have found is good, effective, solid. I recognize, as I know you will too, that the role of our Agency has limits. We are but one arm of the U.S. government. As such, we must respond to the policy of that government. To put it more bluntly, USIA can be no better than the policies it supports and explains. Yet within that limitation there are obviously practices and principles to which we are committed. It is fundamental that we operate on a basis of truth. Ours is, and must be, a dedication to the factual.

But this itself poses difficulties. We operate abroad; our audience is foreign. And in this world there are no absolute standards of truth. What is one man’s truth is another man’s falsehood. Our objective is, and must be, credibility. It is easy to assume that because we tell the truth as we see it, others will believe us. But statements that are true are not always believed. It is a measure of our difficulty that in this relentless half-war, truth and credibility are not co-equal.

Candor and openness have their merits . . . as the successful Alan Shepard\(^8\) demonstrated. They also have their demerits . . . as the abortive Cuban episode demonstrated.

On Cuba, we had no choice but to be truthful and complete. At noon on April 17, we expanded our Spanish broadcasting to Latin America from one hour of origination to 19 hours. Within two hours we were on the air. I mention this with some pride. What network could undertake such expansion on such short notice with no change in personnel allowance?

\(^8\) On May 5, U.S. astronaut Shepard, in command of the *Freedom 7* mission, was the first American to travel in space.
There were Latins relaying our broadcasts who said, “you are too honest, you will be misunderstood.” There were Americans who protested, as the letter writer from California who heard the tirades of Dr. Raul Roa\(^9\) on our Spanish broadcasts and suggested we leave such broadcasting to the Voice of Castro. The answer was that Dr. Roa was speaking in the United Nations debate which we carried in its entirety. We carried the whole story—Castro’s announcement, the self-labelled “invasion”, the writhing in Washington, the agonies in the UN, and even the agonizing reappraisal which a critical aftermath spilled over the Administration.

But if truth must be our guide then dreams must be our goal. To the hunger of those masses yearning to be free and to learn, to this sleeping giant now stirring, that is so much of the world, we shall say: “We share your dreams.” As a nation, we have never been allergic to change. Ours was the first of the great revolutions. It is a birthright we do not intend to let go by default. Our responsibilities of nationhood are predicated on a helping hand to others who would elevate their crushing way of existence by change into a more bountiful society. We offer no panaceas, no final solutions. We offer to join in the search for betterment. We offer our experience and our energies in partnership in the quest for greater human excellence. This we not only endorse. This we sponsor and promote, and provoke. A tradition of government by the governed, of revolution by consent—all of these are among the greater virtues that we have to demonstrate to a world sorely in need of great virtues.

But we shall go further. We are taking the offensive in this war of ideas. We shall be more alert in exposing Communist techniques and tactics. Distortion and duplicity about this land and its people will not go unanswered.

How shall we accomplish this dual role?

First, the projects that we launch are delivered abroad, primarily through our posts—218 of them in 98 countries around the world, staffed by some 1,200 American men and women and their valuable local assistants. Their relation to Washington is as the rim of a wheel to a hub. We in Washington set policy and direction for our posts abroad, but it is as a service center to our overseas operators that we serve our main function.

Second, I have already mentioned that we operate in seven principal media of communication—radio, television, movies, press, book publishing, exhibits and the arts, as well as the all-important field of personal contact—reaching out to all parts of the world in virtually all

\(^9\) Reference is Cuban Foreign Minister Raul Roa.
languages. As the informational arm of US policy, what we do is often imposed on us by the impact of events. But we do not await events. We anticipate, prepare and organize our resources. There is also sometimes a need to concentrate on a selected short range of subject-matter. We have thus established a new post, entitled “Director of Media Content”. This job is to aim our output, to pull together the sinews of our several media, to multiply their effectiveness by combining their effort.

Next, we are concentrating our attention on the fields where the ideological competition is being waged. This means expansion in Africa—where new nations have arisen—and in Latin America—where new difficulties have been born—and in Southeast Asia—where new pressures are upon us. We will not do this, however, at the expense of thinning the lines of communication with our traditional friends and allies.

To our neighbors to the south, we shall ask them to face the facts about this man called Castro. We shall ask them to recognize the nature of his totalitarian dictatorship, his betrayal of the ideals of the revolution that brought him to power, his suppression of basic human liberties, his treason to the ideals of civilization, and his atrocities, his calculated reliance on the Sino-Soviet bloc and the danger that this threatens to free institutions in the Western Hemisphere.

But we shall do more than merely affirm the negative. We shall examine and explain the promise of the new “Alliance for Progress”, the economic and social promise that can bloom from the new planted seedling of US-Latin American cooperation.

In Africa, there are new lands emerging with new leaders. It is a continent groping for directions, churning with ideas, surveying our style, sampling our ideals. One need only recall the heady wine of our own independence in 1776 to appreciate the new intoxication of Africa. To them we must do more than criticize their politics and caution them on the Soviets. We must share with them our hands and our hearts, our techniques and our time. We must, perhaps above all, accord them the dignity of friendship and respect. In Africa alone we have opened 12 new posts in the past year: Mali, Ivory Coast, Togo, Dahomey, Niger, Upper Volta, Congo, Gabon, Central African Republic, Chad, Ruanda-Urundi, Malagasy Republic. New countries, all of them, some not even in existence when I assumed this office less than four months ago.

In Latin America, we hope to establish 11 new posts in key interior cities, and to strengthen 17 existing posts now undermanned.

In Southeast Asia we are taking additional urgent steps to communicate our determination to support our allies and to prevent neutral countries from falling to Communism. Communication in these lands...
is poor. Literacy is low. The challenge to our ingenuity and to our energy is great—and it is expensive.

Our financing for this year will we hope be adequate. But I would remind you that our budget now awaiting approval was drawn up before the sudden increase in the menace of Castro’s Communism, before the stepped-up Communist assault in Laos and the eroding subversion in South Viet Nam and Thailand.¹⁰

In the matter of financial and manpower substance, our adversaries have a clear advantage. The Soviet bloc spends more money jamming our radio broadcasts than we spend on our entire Agency. Our total budget is less than the cost of one combat loaded Polaris submarine, and it is one fifth of the estimated advertising budget of our armaments manufacturers. One American soap company spends almost as much on advertising as the USIA spends explaining U.S. policy abroad.

We certainly do not solicit billions for propagating the truth. But this country must be willing to do what must be done—or we will forfeit to the inexorable tide of history our role as the promoters of freedom.

Implicit in meeting this challenge is the cost of physical facility. The Voice of America broadcasts 600 hours a week and, including packaged programs, uses up to 62 languages. But, as they say in the trade, let’s look at the competition. We are fourth, ranked in order behind Russia, Communist China, and the United Arab Republic. But we certainly do not intend to remain in fourth position. We are building new transmitters, one in North Carolina, and one in Liberia, but we are seriously handicapped against the opposition because they are already located physically closer to much of the audience we would reach. We have had practically no increase in power since 1953 and it is in these years that our competition has passed us.

Our broadcast and other activities do need more money, but money alone will not do the job. We need immunization from accordion financing—granting most of our budget requests one year, squeezing them tightly the next. No network or newspaper could flourish on such financial irregularity; neither can USIA.

¹⁰ In his May 25 special message to the Congress on urgent national needs, the President referenced the “world-wide” struggle the United States faced to “preserve and promote” its ideals. He continued: “That struggle has highlighted the role of our Information Agency. It is essential that the funds previously requested for this effort be not only approved in full, but increased by 2 million, 400 thousand dollars, to a total of 121 million dollars. “This new request is for additional radio and television to Latin America and Southeast Asia. These tools are particularly effective and essential in the cities and villages of those great continents as a means of reaching millions of uncertain peoples to tell them of our interest in their fight for freedom.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 399)
We face a difficult time with staffing. We need more permanent staff—talented people willing to work for little pay and less recognition. And we need the cooperation of the men who help shape the thinking of our citizens. We want them to share their thoughts abroad. In Moscow and Peiping, such intellectuals and journalists are summoned at government bidding. In America, we do not bid; we request. But the argument heard sometimes here that cooperation with the government hampers professional independence is, I submit, specious. We need your help and, while we cannot pay commercial rates, we can offer another compensation: the satisfaction that you helped keep our country strong.

The history of this Agency has been brief and turbulent. I trust its future will be long and fruitful. In the bare 20 years of its life, it has had five titles and a dozen different directors. Our origins lie in the frenzied beginnings of World War II, when we operated with a radio and a prayer. Our future may lie in the unseen systems of communications satellites, when we will operate with international television and perhaps those same prayers again.

The product of this Agency is all for export, much of it invisible, much of it unknown at home. Much of its end-product effectiveness is not measurable by common standards. We do not have a rating service, and frequently our work is known to the public only when we make a mistake. We do not ask for special consideration, and certainly not for sympathy, from those of you who work in the private sector of communication.

We do not ask that our mistakes be ignored, nor that our accomplishments be exaggerated. We shall do our best to tell you what the Agency is doing in the belief that you are as concerned as we in providing the citizens of this country with information as to what is being said and done in their name abroad.

I have learned since coming to Washington at least two things: the first is that it is easier to ask questions than to answer them, and the second, that questions are never indiscreet but answers sometimes are. I suppose the art of answering is to produce a proper mixture of candor and discretion and to confess ignorance when it is obvious. And with a promise—in answering your questions—to follow this precept, Mr. President, may I turn the floor back to you.

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11 John P. Cosgrove of Broadcasting Publications served as President of the National Press Club during 1961.
This is to warn against an end run.

Roger Tubby, Phil Stern, and I met today with George Englund, Mel Tucker, and John Horton representing Universal International Pictures who are the guiding spirits behind the movie, “The Ugly American.”

They want the United States Government to inform the Thai Government that we have no objection to the film being shot in Thailand.

We carefully reviewed the script. Ed Murrow read it too. We decided that the U.S. Government most certainly should not give such clearance to the Thais. The film—although somewhat cleaned up—still portrays the United States as a power imposing its will on others. It also portrays an American Ambassador who, by his bull-headedness, causes a bloody upheaval in an underdeveloped Southeast Asian nation.

We informed these gentlemen that the U.S. Government took the following position: (1) We have no right or intention of censorship. (2) What you are asking for is a stamp of approval from the United States Government to do the film in Thailand. (3) We cannot grant that stamp of approval. (4) We are advising our embassy in Bangkok to this effect. If they are queried by the Thai Government as to our position, we will inform them that we believe the film is not in the interests of the United States Government or the Thai Government.

The film makers stated that they still intended to make the film. We said, “Okay. That is obviously none of our business, except insofar as you officially ask the United States Government to help you.”

Donald M. Wilson
Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Assistant Director, Africa (Roberts)


I have the impression that our operations in Africa, particularly in connection with the new posts, parallel too closely the practice of the State Department. We are an operating agency and should concentrate our limited resources in areas of actual or potential strength. I doubt, for example, that posts in Mauritania or Upper Volta will greatly influence the course of future events in Africa.

We ought to establish a list of priorities and concentrate our resources and our efforts in those areas. Perhaps you would be good enough to consult with the appropriate people at State and I.C.A. and attempt to produce such a list. We may be able to cover the waterfront but we can’t cover all of Africa. We must decide where to concentrate.

Edward R. Murrow


2 Murrow initialed “E.R.M.” above his typed signature.
35. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to the Deputy Director (Wilson)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Short-cuts for Appraising Effectiveness of USIS Posts

To facilitate obtaining a fast and accurate appraisal of the effectiveness of a USIS post, I suggest you:

1. Pay an unannounced visit to the Library. How many patrons are there? Are they mostly children or are they obviously members of the Post’s target audiences?

2. Check the proportion of Spanish (in Brazil, Portuguese)-language and English-language books on the shelves. Look at the check-out cards in the backs of the books to determine what kinds of books are circulating. Only fiction, or substantive (Americana, biography, political science, communism, and American literature) books as well? Mostly in the local languages, or in English as well?

3. Is the Library conveniently accessible to our principal target audiences?

4. Take a look at Film Section records. Are substantive as well as entertainment films circulating? Who are our viewers—mostly children or members of target audiences?

5. Observe the relationships between the Public Affairs Officer and members of his staff. Does the Public Affairs Officer encourage you to see his colleagues or are you isolated from them?

6. See the Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, the ICA Mission Chief and other senior Embassy officials alone. They will be more candid if the Public Affairs Officer is not present.

7. Look at what the post distributes to the local newspapers from the Wireless File? Is there a careful selection, editing and rewriting of items? How fast does the material move?

8. Ask local editors for their views on the value of our press output and the quality of our translations.

9. Look at the type of principal contacts of the Public Affairs Officer, Information Officer and Cultural Officer. Are they key representatives

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Policy and Plans—General (IOP) 1961 January–June. No classification marking. A copy was sent to Murrow. Wilson initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.
of the Post’s target audiences, or are they mostly pro-American, English speaking “tame Latinos?”

10. Look into the relationship of the Post’s principal, i.e., most time consuming, activities and the Country Plan. Is the Post devoting most of its effort to achievement of specific objectives or is it squandering too much time on activities which are generally useful but only peripheral in terms of our political and psychological objectives?

36. **Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State (Bowles) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Coombs)**


**SUBJECT**

Educational and Cultural Representatives Overseas

I am very anxious to see how rapidly we can move to improve the quality of our educational and cultural representatives overseas. It seems to me that the problem is made urgent by the increased demands we anticipate in the near future.

Our Cultural Officers have been required to carry the executive burden of the USIA cultural program, the Department’s educational exchange programs; to demonstrate U.S. letters, art, music, scholarship and other elements of our national culture; and to serve the Ambassador in a variety of ways. I have met a great many of them around the world, and have found them to be dedicated and hard-working public servants. Some have been outstanding, but many lack the professional background essential for a really first-rate job.

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I know you both agree with me that however well or poorly we may have done in the past, we must be better prepared to keep up with the pace required for the 1960s. The nation's international responsibilities have quickened, and we must raise our sights accordingly.

Our officers must really understand our own culture and have the skills to direct an increased and improved cultural program. They must understand the process by which education builds leaders. They should have real professional competence in the field of American education and the ability to apply that competence with great skill to situations and institutions in foreign countries.

Our cultural officers will also have to be more fluent in foreign languages, better grounded in alien cultures and better human communicators. They will have to be better trained in the philosophical bases of our society and articulate enough to compete in the market place of ideas. They will have to develop a much closer association with writers, students, economists, educators, etc. They may have to be assigned at foreign posts for much longer periods of time so we may capitalize on their competence as it develops.

The need and the opportunity are becoming apparent. I believe we should discuss means, and I am prepared to meet with you at an early date to do so.
Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to the Assistant Director, Africa (Roberts), the Assistant Director, Europe (Phillips), the Assistant Director, Far East (Neilson), the Assistant Director, Latin America (McKnight), and the Assistant Director, Near East and South Asia (King)  


SUBJECT
Country and Area Policy Papers Developed by State Department

The guidelines set forth below are designed to assure maximum appropriate participation of USIA in the development of State Department country and area policy papers.

These papers hopefully will be made available at an early stage (informally by State drafter to USIA country desk officer) and will be sent formally to USIA at a later stage (State Assistant Secretary to USIA Area Director) for comment. The final, approved policy paper will be distributed in Washington and to the field.

If you have any questions, please take them up with Fred Bundy.

The guidelines:

1. After the Area desk officer has formulated, but before he has transmitted, his comments on the early draft submitted by the State drafter, he should consult with IOP (Fred Bundy). This is for the purpose of reviewing the draft policy and Area comments in the context of broad Agency policy and interests. IOP clearance of area comments is not required at this stage.

2. After “early stage” informal comments by interested agencies in Washington and the field, and rewriting as necessary, the draft policy will receive substantial clearance within State. Then the appropriate State Asst. Secretary will officially transmit the policy paper to the USIA Area Director for comments, not clearance. The Area Director’s reply should be cleared with IOP (Bundy) in draft.

3. USIA comments should deal with psychological-public attitude-information aspects. However, we should not hesitate to take a broad view of what “psychological” comprises.

4. USIA contributions need not be limited to existing Agency policy; however, modified or new policy should receive appropriate Agency

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approval prior to its inclusion in comments to State. This applies to comments at both early and later stages. USIA activities which have been rejected by the Agency for budgetary or policy reasons should not be included in your suggestions.

5. The scope of Agency comments will be governed, to some extent, by the type of material which State has decided to include in a given paper. Wherever possible, we should concentrate on significant policy issues and avoid operational detail.

6. We do not believe “psychological” aspects can be compartmentalized any more than “political” can be separated from “economic” or “military”. Some State drafts contain such a breakdown; others do not. Where such a breakdown exists, and in your judgment it is desirable to do so, you may wish to incorporate your contribution into a section entitled “Psychological.”

38. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to Multiple African Diplomatic Posts

Washington, July 4, 1961, 1312Z.

19. 1. Department requests Ambassadors or Principal Officers, drawing as appropriate on staff, other embassies, and public sources, submit free-hand but considered sketch US image as seen by (1) officials, (2) other influential elements (oppositionists, editors, labor etc.) and (3) general public addressee countries.

By “image” we mean composite of views on such factors as our relative affluence and power, our readiness to consider African and local issues on their own merits, effect US race problem, acceptability

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 151, Box 289, Director’s Correspondence—1961. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Patrick O’Sheel (AF/P) on July 3, cleared in AFW and S/S and by Olcott Deming (AFE) and William Witman (AFN); approved by Fredericks. Sent to Abidjan, Accra, Addis Ababa, Bamako, Bangui, Brazzaville, Conakry, Cotonou, Dakar, Dar-es-Salaam, Elisabethville, Fort Lamy, Freetown, Kapsula, Khartoum, Lagos, Libreville, Lome, Lourenco Marques, Luanda, Mogadiscio, Monrovia, Nairobi, Niamey, Ouagadougou, Rabat, Salisbury, Tananarive, Tripoli, Tunis, Usimbura, and Yaounde. Payne initialed the top of the telegram and wrote: “Now they’re getting into I/R’s field. Bob.” Murrow sent the telegram to Thomas Sorensen under a cover note stamped July 10, in which he wrote: “Pray advise what we should do regarding the attached. I am concerned: (1) about duplication between State and the Agency, and (2) this message brings them dangerously close to a ‘prestige poll.’” (Ibid.)
2 As subsidiary matter, being careful not let it affect basic assessment, request evidence of and comment on extent, character any recent, detectable gains or losses in this image. From here, number recent events encourage view some improvement registered. Those include election new President and his Inaugural Address philosophy; Rusk, Bowles, Williams appointments and latter’s African trip; Stevenson role at UN and our votes there; Africa Freedom Day reception of Secretary and President’s speech there; work of “new nations” section Department Protocol office; visits African leaders to White House and Johnson, Shriver visits Africa. Department interested getting local African perspective on these evidences responsiveness, how much or how little they count for. Guard against overvaluing favorable reactions.

3. Identification of factors having greatest bearing on future forthcoming new tests of that image, and suggestions toward bolstering it, are welcome but not required part of report we have in mind. Hold to three pages and submit by airgram or telegram to reach Department by July 15.

Rusk

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2 Assistant Secretary Williams made a month-long trip to several African nations; for information, see “Williams Off on Month’s Trip to 15 African Nations,” The New York Times, February 16, 1961, p. 15. For the text of Williams’ February 17 address to delegates to the third session of the UN Economic Commission for Africa, meeting in Addis Ababa, see Department of State Bulletin, March 13, 1961, pp. 373–376. Williams provided an overview of his trip in a March 24 address before the National Press Club; for the text, see Department of State Bulletin, April 10, 1961, pp. 527–531.

3 The President spoke at an April 15 reception at the Department of State, held by Rusk for African Ambassadors and their staffs, commemorating Africa Freedom Day. Various members of Congress, Supreme Court Justices, and other government officials also attended the reception. For the President’s remarks made at the reception, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, pp. 280–282. In CA–9113 to multiple African diplomatic posts, April 21, the Department sent a copy of the President’s remarks “for the Post’s information and discretionary use.” (National Archives, RG 306, Alphabetical Subject Files Containing Policy Guidance, 1953–1961, Entry UD WW 199, Box 164, Africa (Gen’l–1962))

4 The Vice President traveled to Senegal in early April to represent the United States at events commemorating the first anniversary of Senegalese independence from France. Johnson stopped in Geneva and Paris before returning to Washington on April 7. (Richard L. Lyons, “Johnson Flies Home, Is Praised by Kennedy,” The Washington Post, April 8, 1961, p. A9) Shriver, as a personal representative of the President, left for Guinea on June 13 to meet with Sékou Touré. Shriver’s undated narrative of his trip, sent to the President and Rusk under an undated covering memorandum, is in the Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 85, Peace Corps: Shriver Trip to Guinea, June 1961. For additional information, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXI, Africa, Documents 256 and 257.
39. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Under Secretary of State (Bowles)¹


SUBJECT

Educational and Cultural Representatives Overseas

I share your views on the importance of having officers of the highest possible quality conduct our educational and cultural programs abroad. We must, I agree, have officers who can keep up with the pace required for the 1960s, who can imaginatively and competently carry on the growing responsibilities of the cultural programs including educational development. The problem is as you know a complex one, and must be tackled on many fronts. I shall be glad to discuss it with you, and welcome your suggestions.

To take a new look at the problem, USIA last April established an Ad Hoc Committee on Personnel Policies regarding Cultural Affairs Officers. The Director of your Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs² represents the Department on this Committee, which is considering a broad range of questions from recruitment to job classification and training. I expect a report shortly that will indicate some lines for further action.³

In the meantime let me put down a few thoughts on the matter and list some of the steps we are now taking.

Your memorandum (Tab A)⁴ enumerates the many qualities desirable in our Cultural Officers. It also suggests why we fall short of this high standard in some cases. The requirements for a Cultural Officer are demanding and varied: he should understand and represent well the culture of his own country, be versed in the culture and language

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961–1962: Lot 63D135, Entry A1–5072, Box 5, U.S. Information Agency—1961. No classification marking. Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/7–1161. In an August 18 memorandum to Murrow, a copy of which was sent to Coombs, Bowles thanked Murrow for his memorandum, adding: “It certainly looks as though you are on the right track, and I just wanted to underscore the fact that you have our wholehearted support and encouragement for everything that you are doing.” (National Archives, RG 59, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Office of the Assistant Secretary, Subject Files, 1961–1962: Lot 63D135, Entry A1–5072, Box 5, U.S. Information Agency—1961)

² Saxton Bradford.

³ Not found.

⁴ Attached but not printed. A signed copy is printed as Document 36. Tabs B–E, although not referenced in the text, are attached but not printed.
of the country in which he works, be skilled in communications tech-
niques, be articulate and strong on personal contacts, and at the same
time be a competent administrator of several complex programs.

Obviously it is difficult, often impossible, to find persons with all
these qualities; we must seek those who most nearly approximate our
ideal, fill in the gaps as far as possible through training and experience,
and utilize them in the best ways, taking into account their strengths
and weaknesses.

Steps we are taking and plans for the future include:

**Career Opportunities and Development**

1. While we have not yet succeeded in getting career legislation,
a Career Corps was set up by administrative action in July 1960 with
full support and encouragement of the State Department. For the long
term, a career service will provide USIA, as it does State, with the
soundest basis for getting and holding high quality personnel.

2. We now have the policy that in each major post, one of the two
top jobs (PAO and Deputy, or next ranking officer) should be filled by
an officer with a background of cultural work.

3. In several major posts we have raised the classification of the
Cultural Officer job, and are again re-examining the pattern to be sure
it adequately reflects the stature and complexity of cultural affairs work.

4. We are seeking to keep our Cultural Officers and other personnel
longer at their posts—either for two regular tours of duty, or for one
three-year tour.

**Selection of Personnel**

1. The Junior Officer program, inaugurated in 1954, is bringing
excellent young material into our Foreign Service. Last year the exami-
nation procedure was modified so that the written exam is very close
to that of the State Department for its entering Foreign Service Offi-
cers. The growing number of candidates and their high quality are
encouraging.

2. USIA always will need to bring in officers from the outside
at mid-career and senior levels. This includes both the outstanding
representative of some field of American culture who is not willing to
make a career of government service but will serve for one or two
tours of duty as a Cultural Attaché, and the man at mid-career in some
relevant field (the academic world, the arts, cultural organizations)
who is willing to move permanently into USIA work. We are actively
seeking both. The attached memorandum gives examples of some of
the candidates now under consideration.

3. We are also working to improve recruiting methods and expand
contacts with universities and other sources of potential candidates.
Training

Our Educational and Cultural Officers, as well as other Foreign Service officers, need far more training than we can now give them. The great problem here is personnel ceilings. At a time when we must open new posts and expand programs in Latin America and Africa, we cannot release officers from active duty for training to the extent that we should. We are, however, taking some steps:

1. A new policy on language proficiency went into effect April 1. It sets more stringent requirements than we have ever had before, and will require considerably more language training.

2. Next year a USIA officer will be assigned to full-time study in American civilization for one year at an American university. This program recognizes the importance of the field of American civilization to Agency work; we plan eventually to assign more officers to it.

3. We are planning a longer training period for Junior Officers in Washington before assignment to their first posts.

4. We have a number of other projects under consideration that we hope to develop as personnel ceilings and budget permit. They include: assignment of Cultural Officers to work with an American university (for example, as foreign student adviser) or cultural institution for one or two years during a U.S. assignment; development of special summer seminars for Cultural Officers to bring them up to date on developments in American cultural life, with special emphasis on American education; study trips to educational and cultural institutions and events throughout the U.S. for officers on home leave, so that they will be better equipped to discuss the U.S. with foreign leaders from first-hand, up-to-date knowledge.

Edward R. Murrow
40. Memorandum From Frederic Bundy, Office of Plans, United States Information Agency to the Deputy Director (Wilson)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

“World of Free Choice”

In a memorandum to the President on June 8,\(^2\) Mr. Murrow and Mr. Rusk proposed “Peaceful World Community” as a counter-theme to the Soviet’s “peaceful coexistence.” The President did not see the memorandum. Arthur Schlesinger wrote a memorandum of comment to McGeorge Bundy\(^3\) in which he expressed reservations on “peaceful world community” and suggested the phrase “World of Free Choice” which Secretary Rusk had used before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on May 31.\(^4\) The Secretary used it again at the Press Club on Monday.\(^5\)

The general matter was discussed at a couple Thursday luncheons and “world of free choice” was agreed by all.\(^6\) I am informed the President has said “O.K.”

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Policy & Plans—Nuclear Testing 1961. No classification marking. Glenn Smith initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote “7/12” next to his initials. An unknown hand wrote “SALINGER” on the first page of the memorandum.


\(^3\) Attached but not printed is the June 19 memorandum. In it, Schlesinger expressed his lack of enthusiasm for the Rusk–Murrow memorandum, concluding that “a new propaganda phrase is not going to solve our problems.” He expressed his belief that the phrase “‘world of free choice’ suggests an immediate antithesis: the pluralistic world vs. the monolithic world. The phrase implies human dignity, political freedom, self-help, cultural independence, etc.” The memorandum is printed ibid., Document 124.

\(^4\) Rusk’s May 31 statement is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, June 19, 1961, pp. 947–955.


\(^6\) Attached but not printed is a June 29 memorandum from Frederic Bundy to Murrow, in which Bundy summarized a June 29 USIA luncheon, noting that “Tom Sorensen, and IOP Soviet Advisers, agree with you that ‘world of free choice’ is a better label or symbol.”
On June 30, Mr. Murrow asked McGeorge Bundy to advise departments and agencies that the phrase be used whenever appropriate. McGeorge Bundy will probably reply, saying that Mr. Murrow, and maybe Mr. Rusk, should see that this phrase gets into usage. He has in mind, but probably will not state in his memo, that the “Tuesday” Salinger Group might seize itself with the means of getting the phrase into use. There seems to be agreement that a directive or instruction to agencies is not the appropriate way.

It appears that the initiative will need to come from you and Mr. Tubby.

Copies of the correspondence are attached.

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7 Attached but not printed is the June 30 memorandum from Murrow to Bundy, copies of which were sent to Schlesinger and Thomas Sorensen. Murrow wrote: “The phrase ‘world of free choice’ is being made S.O.P. in the Agency. May I suggest that you advise appropriate department and agency heads that the phrase be used whenever appropriate in speeches, congressional testimony, printed documents, etc.”

8 In NSAM No. 61, issued on July 14 and addressed to Rusk and Murrow, Bundy stated that the President “has requested that immediate steps be taken to give this formulation the widespread currency and usage that would make it an effective countertheme to the Soviet formula. It is requested that the facilities available to the Department of State and the U.S. Information Agency be employed in this effort.” NSAM No. 61 is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Affairs, Document 126. Sorensen sent a copy of the NSAM to Murrow under a July 18 memorandum, stating that Bundy’s memorandum “indicates the President’s endorsement” of the phrase “world of free choice and cooperation.” Sorensen also noted that USIA had sent guidance to offices in Washington in the form of News Policy Note No. 114–61, dated July 13, and guidance to the field in Infoguide No. 62–1. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Policy & Plans—Nuclear Testing 1961)

9 Below this sentence, Smith wrote: “Maybe, in a case like this, ERM could do some effective lobbying among radio, TV and press industry. GS 7/12.”
41. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Special Assistant to the President (Dutton)¹


SUBJECT
USIA Actions Since January 20, 1961

REFERENCE
Your Memorandum of July 10, 1961²

Since January 20, USIA has:

1. Stepped up activities in Latin America to meet more effectively the Castro-Communist threat and to support the Alliance for Progress. Spanish-language broadcasts to Latin America have been increased from two to six hours daily, and shortly will be expanded to 18 hours. We soon begin four hours’ daily broadcasting in Portuguese to Brazil.

USIA has developed a multi-media program publicizing the Alliance for Progress, on the one hand, and presenting Castro as the betrayer of the Cuban revolution, on the other. An experimental USIA-sponsored binational community center in a working-class district of Bogota, Colombia, has drawn favorable nationwide attention there and is likely to give rise to other such centers.

2. Stepped up activities in Africa, where the Sino-Soviet Bloc is attempting to fill an information-culture vacuum. We have opened ten new posts in Africa since January: Gabon, Malagasy Republic, Central African Republic, Chad, Niger, Upper Volta, Dahomey, Togo, Ruanda-Urundi, and the Congo Republic (Brazzaville).

3. In the shadow of enemy troops in Southeast Asia, brought films, posters, and pamphlets to beleaguered Laotian and Vietnamese villagers to build support for friendly governments and stiffen resistance against Communist subversion.

4. Focused media output to provide more effective support for major U.S. foreign policy objectives, rather than haphazardly dealing


² In the July 10 memorandum to Murrow and other Executive Branch agency heads, Dutton requested that each provide a “specific and comprehensive summary, in duplicate, of your agency’s actions since January 20th to this office. The summary should include both completed and proposed steps by executive agencies.” (Ibid.)
with a wide variety of subjects as heretofore. In particular, we have planned world-wide information campaigns in support of the U.S. positions on Berlin and a nuclear test-ban treaty.

5. Provided rapid, comprehensive, world-wide motion picture, radio, television, and press coverage of Alan Shepard’s space flight.\(^3\) A Shepard by-liner was distributed and used in important newspapers throughout the world. A film in 28 languages is still showing in many movie theaters. Shepard’s Mercury capsule was displayed to 1,200,000 people in Rome and to large audiences in Paris. Total coverage of the Shepard flight in world media exceeded that of Gagarin’s flight.\(^4\)

6. Drew overflow audiences to our exhibit, “Plastics-USA,” in Kiev and Moscow. Two similar exhibits will tour the Soviet Union during the coming year.\(^5\) Meanwhile, Soviet circulation of our bulletin on U.S. cultural life has risen to 1,600.

7. Made significant progress in its cultural program. Two examples:

   India’s Ministry of Education considers the college textbook project worked out with USIS India as the biggest achievement it could report to the Indian Parliament in its budget presentation. The program is financed with PL 480-generated rupees appropriated to USIA.\(^6\)

   The Greek Ministry of Education has asked our binational center in Athens to assist the Greek Government in its efforts to establish higher standards of English teaching and teacher training throughout Greece. Additionally, the center has been asked to become the accrediting institution for all teachers of English in Greece.

8. Undertaken reductions in our program in Western Europe, and in certain other activities, so that more effective use may be made of our appropriation.

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\(^3\) See footnote 8, Document 32.

\(^4\) On April 12, cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin was the first human to travel into space.

\(^5\) In a December 7, 1960, memorandum to Wilson, regarding the implementation of the 1960–1961 U.S.-Soviet exchanges agreement, Phillips noted that “Plastics USA” was scheduled to open in the Soviet Union on April 1, 1961. Two additional exhibits—“Transportation USA” and “Medicine USA”—would open in July and October 1961, respectively. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Office of the Director—(I) General 1961)

\(^6\) Food for Peace Title I agreements permitted the recipient nation to purchase U.S. commodities with local currencies rather than with U.S. dollars. The United States Government allocated some of the local currencies in support of U.S. efforts overseas, including for educational purposes.
9. Counseled other parts of the Executive Branch on public opinion aspects of U.S. policies and programs abroad.

Edward R. Murrow

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7 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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42. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Heads of All USIA Elements and All USIS Posts


SUBJECT

Special Program Emphasis

Until further notice, Washington media and field posts will focus attention on, and give special emphasis to, persuading our audiences that:

1. Despite Soviet intransigence, the United States is doing everything in its power to obtain a treaty banning nuclear testing,\(^2\) the first, vital step toward general disarmament. (TEST BAN)

2. Soviet efforts to abrogate their agreements and deprive West Berliners of their freedom threaten the security and freedom of people

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 382, Box 117, Master Copies—July–Dec 1961. Official Use Only. Also printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 129. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, the copy of the memorandum printed ibid. indicates that it was drafted by Brooke. The United States Information Agency sent the text of the memorandum to all USIS posts in circular airgram CA–234, July 27. In it, Murrow stated: “We look as well to other elements of the Federal community and of American diplomatic missions to support this major, concerted information effort. Inevitably, however, you and your staff will be serving as its spearhead. Therefore I solicit the most earnest and imaginative application of your persuasive skills to the success of our collective endeavor.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 382, Box 117, Master Copies—July–Dec 1961)

everywhere. Under no circumstances, therefore, will the U.S. abandon Free Berlin.\(^3\) (BERLIN)

3. An effective United Nations which has sufficient authority to act in crisis situations is indispensable to the security of small nations. Knowing this, the Soviets are seeking to paralyze the U.N. Secretariat with an unworkable “troika” arrangement.\(^4\) (UNITED NATIONS)

4. The Sino-Soviet Bloc, despite lip-service support to emerging nationalism, is implacably opposed to independent nationalist movements and genuine neutrality. Man’s best hope is in “a world of free choice” such as sought by the U.S., not a “world of coercion” as favored by the Communists.\(^5\) (FREE CHOICE)

5. Modernization of newly-developing nations can best be achieved through democratic, pragmatic political and economic development consistent with the traditions, character and aspirations of a people. (MODERNIZATION)

These areas of emphasis are not intended to supplant all other Agency output. We simply are seeking to focus adequate media and field attention for a period of time on subjects currently of overriding importance. I have been specifically charged by the President with the task of undertaking major efforts on items (1) and (2).

The duration of these efforts will vary. There cannot be universal and equal emphasis, either by all media or in all countries. I will expect IOP (in the person of Mr. Brooke, Director of Media Content), working with the Area offices and the media, to develop appropriate emphasis and application of these efforts in the various countries in which we operate, along the lines set forth in my memorandum to the Staff of

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\(^3\) NASAM No. 62, signed by Bundy on July 24 and addressed to Rusk, Dillon, McNamara, Robert Kennedy, Bell, McCone, and Murrow, outlined U.S. efforts in response to the situation in Berlin. The NSAM indicated that the President had assigned to Murrow “the responsibility for coordinating the information activities of the U.S. Government capable of advancing international understanding of the U.S. position on Berlin.” For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIV, Berlin Crisis, 1961–1962, Document 80.

\(^4\) Reference is to the Soviet proposal to replace UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld with three Secretaries-General representing the Western states, the Communist states, and the uncommitted states. In a July 14 statement, which Cleveland read to news correspondents, Rusk asserted: “The so-called ‘troika’ proposal flies in the face of everything we know about effective administration. But the real point of it is that a majority of the members of the United Nations—countries in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America—would have a total of one vote among them in the executive direction of the U.N.—and that vote could be nullified by a veto. The United Nations would be powerless to act on any proposal that did not suit the purposes of the Soviet Union.” (Department of State Bulletin, July 31, 1961, p. 183)

\(^5\) See Document 40.
April 22. IOP will provide detailed policy guidances to the media and to the field in support of these efforts. I ask your full cooperation and support.

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43. Memorandum From the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to Members of the National Security Council Staff


SUBJECT
Useful Terminology

The U.S. Information Agency has been evaluating certain words that are commonly used in our official output and public statements. They have found that certain words do not translate well or have an unfavorable impact on target groups. As a result, instructions have been issued within the USIA that certain words be no longer used.

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Executive, Box 184, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency 1-20-61–7-31-61. No classification marking. Copies were sent to the White House staff. A stamped notation indicates that it was received at the White House on July 28.

2 In a July 19 memorandum to Thomas Sorensen, copies of which were sent to Schlesinger, Bundy, Rostow, and Tubby, Murrow directed Sorensen to “get the word around the Agency to drop from our lexicon” certain words. Murrow’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 127. Schlesinger responded to Murrow in an August 1 memorandum, indicating that he was “delighted to hear of your assault on the clichés of the cold war. We have long needed a little anti-semiticism around here.” He also inquired: “Does USIA still use ‘free world’ as including Spain, Portugal, Paraguay, Haiti, Taiwan, etc.? I think we should be careful about that. Also, don’t you think we could begin to recapture the word ‘democracy’ from the enemy?” (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Files, Subject File, 1961–1964, Box WH–23, United States Information Agency) An earlier draft of Schlesinger’s August 1 memorandum, which was handwritten on the July 19 covering memorandum Murrow used to transmit a copy of his July 19 memorandum to Sorensen, is ibid. Wilson, in an August 15 memorandum, thanked Schlesinger and noted that USIA did “indeed use the expression ‘free world’ to mean the countries outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc. We hope to find a more accurate term and encourage its use throughout the Government, because so much of what the Agency says is literally in direct quotation of official statements and documents.” (Ibid.)
The words or phrases to be discontinued are “under-developed countries,” “undeveloped countries,” “backward countries,” and any similar terms. In addition, “emerging countries” is not considered to be good, and the use of “now” before “developing” and “modernizing” is confusing in translation in most languages.3

As substitutes, the words which translate best in all languages and are positive in their connotations are “developing countries” and “modernizing countries.”

The evaluation of terminology is continuing and substitutes are being considered for such terms as “East-West,” “Cold War,” “pro-West,” “pro-American country” and many others which are misleading, inaccurate and not in our best interests.

Mr. Murrow would appreciate receiving any suggestions we might have as to words or terms which are not in our national interest when exported and for which we feel we should make an effort to work out meaningful substitutes.

McGeorge Bundy4

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3 In a July 7 memorandum to Payne, Stephens discussed substitutes for the phrase “underdeveloped nations”: “The consensus is that ‘developing’ and ‘modernizing’ are the best for our purposes. The ‘now’ would be confusing in translation and ‘developing’ carries the same meaning. ‘Emerging countries’ is not considered so good. The ‘emerging’ has some of the connotations of the old colonialism and is more political than ‘developing’ and ‘modernizing’ which have a more economic meaning.” (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Policy and Plans—General (IOP) 1961 July–December)

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
44. Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Foreign Students

During the course of attempting to get information in the State Department about some Angolan students, I became aware of a serious short-coming in the procedures followed in handling foreign students in this country.

There are, as possibly you know, some 50,000 foreign students in the United States who can represent an enormous potential for good or ill; particularly with respect to the newly emerging nations in Africa and Asia. The future relationship between the United States and these nations will be determined very largely by the attitudes of the leaders of those nations toward us. To send back students who have become disillusioned and embittered after studying in this country is the height of folly—it would be better not to have them than to convert them into enemies. Since the students are in the United States because we want them here and since the national interest is involved, surely it is the responsibility of the U.S. Government to do whatever is necessary to insure that the minimum of ill will and the maximum of good will results from their stay in the United States.

With due respect to the many private and voluntary groups and agencies which offer their services to these students—I am told there are 53 such groups in the District of Columbia—too much is at stake to leave the welfare of the students entirely to uncoordinated private enterprise. The fact that many foreign students already have become embittered by their experiences in this country is proof that more needs

\(^1\) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 296, Cultural and Social Activities, General, 1/61–8/61. Confidential. Bundy wrote in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: “ask Mr. Belk to speak to me at staff mtg Fri A.M.”
to be done. It would appear that there is a definite requirement that the U.S. Government concern itself with the welfare of the students. It could be done by creating an Office for Foreign Student Affairs in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, which would:

1) serve as a clearing house for information about all foreign students resident in this country;

2) encourage the extension and improvement of facilities—public, private, university, and institutional—for advising and guiding foreign students. This office would particularly encourage educational institutions attended by foreign students to have full-time, qualified foreign student advisors and, if necessary, would provide funds for this purpose.

3) make available information about employment opportunities for foreign students;

4) in so far as the regulations of immigration and naturalization service permit, encourage the business community to provide employment opportunities for these students as a means of helping them to secure a) additional income and b) skills;

5) take the initiative in arranging for programs of financial assistance to students where such are required;

6) help the colleges and universities finance special academic programs for these students where they are needed;

7) transmit to the universities Government funds which may be appropriated for the above purposes and, serve as a channel through which private funds might also flow;

8) develop legislative proposals for better foreign student programs in the United States.

The man who flagged the problem for me was Colonel Francis Miller, Special Assistant to Phil Coombs; I hasten to add that most of the ideas expressed above are his. Coombs thinks the creation of such an office is a splendid idea, but he is leaving for two weeks in Latin America and all indications are that lack of funds and procedures in the bureaucracy will delay any real action for an indefinite time. I share Miller’s conviction that we should move fast on this one and that is why I think it should be given a push by the White House. I think it is the kind of problem that would be of immediate concern to the President, especially in the light of the unfortunate experiences of some of the students who were brought to the U.S. by the Joseph P. Kennedy Foundation. Also, the town is filled with intellectuals who certainly must feel that this is the kind of problem that should be solved now. A new academic year is almost upon us and 50,000 foreign students...
need help and guidance. Do you agree that this is an area in which Presidential action might be desirable?²

² According to an August 8 note from Belk to Rostow, Belk had prepared a memorandum from the President to Rusk regarding foreign students. Belk added that if Rostow did not think that the memorandum adequately explained the problem, Rostow might attach a copy of Belk’s August 3 memorandum. (Ibid.) Rostow sent a copy of the draft Presidential memorandum to Bundy under an August 8 handwritten note, commenting that he thought that the August 3 memorandum should be attached to the draft memorandum to Rusk. He inquired: “Would you mail it in? Walt.” (Ibid.) The draft Presidential memorandum was not found. However, Belk, in an October 27 memorandum to Bundy, indicated that Coombs planned to host, at the Department of State, a meeting on October 30–31 of representatives of “organizations concerned with foreign student affairs in the United States.” Belk stated that in light of the “foreign student situation,” that it would “be helpful if the President sent a short message to them.” Belk attached a draft, indicating that he would either bring the message to the Department for Coombs to read “or read it to the group myself.” Bundy wrote in the margin: “Ok. Give it to Coombs to read.” (Ibid., Cultural and Social Activities, General, 9/61–12/61) The message from the President is printed in Department of State Bulletin, November 27, 1961, p. 894.

45. Letter From President Kennedy to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)¹


Dear Mr. Murrow:

A vigorous, imaginative and carefully planned program of major overseas exhibits in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives is in the national interest. The exhibit is a medium of information which is gaining importance as a major form of international communication. As such it can be used to support all aspects of national policy. We can use it as a means of expressing our hopes, desires and potential for further progress, in partnership with others and in the interest of peace and improved well-being for all mankind. We should employ this means effectively for our affirmative purpose of projecting our fundamental attitudes, values and accomplishments.

Effective coordination of the plans and programs of the increasing number of our government agencies engaged directly or indirectly in the overseas exhibits field is essential if we are to reap maximum benefits from our efforts. Accordingly, I request you, as the Director of the United States Information Agency, to assume the leadership in bringing about the needed coordination. You are authorized to establish an Interagency Exhibits Committee, which will be chaired by USIA, to assist in this effort. Membership of this Committee shall include such agencies as you deem appropriate.

As Director of USIA, with the help of the Committee, you will be responsible for reviewing the proposed overseas exhibit activities of the member agencies and for initiating and developing a comprehensive annual program to assure the maximum psychological effectiveness of United States exhibit efforts overseas. In carrying out this task, you will give due consideration to the selection of sites, the scope and general subject of each exhibit, and time schedules to avoid unnecessary duplication or overlapping. As Chairman you may establish ad hoc planning groups selected from appropriate member agencies for each exhibit.

I am also requesting the member agencies, in developing their exhibits programs, to seek your advice with respect to the overseas informational policy and objectives of the U.S.

Sincerely,

John F. Kennedy
46. Memorandum From the Director of Planning, Office of Plans, United States Information Agency (Anderson) to the Director (Murrow)


SUBJECT
Suggestion for Meeting to Hear Report from a Freedom Rider

On Tuesday of this week several USIA officers met in Mildred Marcy’s office to hear a first-hand report from Shirley Smith, Director of the Women’s Africa Committee, on her recent experiences as a Freedom Rider.2

Glenn Smith has suggested to Jim Moceri that a meeting be held so that you, Don Wilson, Tom Sorensen, plus perhaps a few others, might have an opportunity to hear her also. I propose, if you agree, to ask Mildred Marcy to set up a small meeting on Saturday morning, September 9 or, failing that, Saturday morning, September 16.3

Miss Smith’s presentation shed light on several points which should be of interest to the Agency:

Who are some of the Freedom Riders? What have been the motivations and convictions which impelled them to join this demonstration? What personal sacrifices have they undergone? What treatment was accorded them?

What effect have the Freedom Rides had on public opinion in the South? Among negro and white segments of the population? Among conservatives and moderates?

Shirley Smith is a blonde, white, Republican, Presbyterian from Michigan. Many of her friends and acquaintances are diplomats from African countries accredited to the United Nations. What have been their reactions to the discussions she has had with them? What image of America is thus being projected abroad?

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2 In an August 17 memorandum for the files, Marcy summarized the August 15 meeting, writing: “All who heard her [Smith] were impressed by her sincerity and earnestness as well as fascinated and moved by her analysis of this important facet of the social revolution which is taking place in America. All the group appeared to feel that we have got to find ways and means of using (not necessarily in overt USIA output) the experiences of people such as Miss Smith.” (Ibid.)

3 There is no indication that such a meeting took place.
Has the story of the Freedom Rides and other methods being used to erode the practices of segregation been adequately told in the American press and to the world?

Bill Gausmann, our Labor and Minorities Advisor, who was present at the meeting with Miss Smith concurs in Mrs. Marcy’s suggestion. He knows personally Mrs. Helene Wilson of Washington, another Freedom Rider, who would be willing to come along at the same time as Miss Smith, and tell us of her experiences and impressions. She spent five and a half weeks in the county jail and the State prison, and has some shrewd observations to make about the leadership of the “direct action” section of the civil rights movement, and particularly about the attitudes of its young Southern Negro members, who are very skeptical of white leaders, Northern as well as Southern.

47. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


All foreign press opinion on the resumption of nuclear testing received by this Agency up to 6pm today from countries outside the Sino-Soviet bloc is anti-Soviet.

Highly significant is an editorial in the official Yugoslav Communist newspaper *Borba* which said: “The Soviet decision to resume nuclear weapons tests could have ‘a disastrous echo.’” The editorial comment in *Borba* added that the reasons given by Moscow for its decision did not justify it. *Borba’s* editorial was the first reaction by any official Yugoslav organ to the Soviet decision on the eve of a conference in Belgrade of leaders of 24 non-aligned countries.

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61. No classification marking. In another memorandum to the President, August 31, Murrow outlined several considerations regarding a possible U.S. resumption of nuclear testing, stating: “What is now to be tested is not so much nuclear devices as the will of free men to remain free.” Murrow’s memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 59 and ibid., vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 130.

2 During a TASS broadcast at 7 p.m. EDT on August 30, the Soviet Union announced the resumption of nuclear tests beginning on September 1; see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. V, Soviet Union, Document 114 and ibid., vol. VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, Document 58.
Shock, amazement and condemnation were expressed in the editorials. The London *Daily Herald* called the decision “shocking.” Stockholm *Aftonsbladet* said the decision was “ruthless, difficult to understand . . .” and the explanations “hypocrisy beyond all boundaries.” Paris *Figaro* said Khrushchev gave way to “a fit of anger.”

*Paris-Jour* commented: “Khrushchev has made an announcement whose gravity eclipses all the anxiety spread in the world over the Berlin crisis during the past three weeks.”

In Austria, the Vienna *Kurier* headlined its accounts: “Horror paralyzes the world.” In Rome, *Il Tempo* said the decision was a “grave crime against humanity.”

The Melbourne, Australia, *Herald* says: “The Soviet Union has now made its choice. It prefers research in mass destruction to an agreement that would ease world anxiety.”

No press comment from the Middle East is in our hands as yet. A commentator on Radio Teheran said: “The decision can only mean a sharp increase in danger to world peace.”

Allowing for time differentials, a significant sampling of press opinion from all over the world can be provided by the middle of the day tomorrow, Friday.³

Edward R. Murrow

³ In a September 1 memorandum to the President, Murrow wrote: “World press reaction to the Soviet nuclear decision remained about as I reported last evening, critical of the Soviet decision.” He noted that USIA had received “some comment from uncommitted areas which, after criticizing the Soviet decision, suggests that the United States will probably announce a resumption of testing soon and that, too, will be a very bad thing. Time continues to work for us.” Murrow attached a copy of Research Note 24–61, September 1, “Initial Worldwide Reactions to the Soviet Nuclear Test Announcement,” to his memorandum. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61) In response to the Soviet announcement, Macmillan and Kennedy proposed a ban on nuclear weapons tests; for the text of the joint U.K.–U.S. statement, released on September 3, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961*, p. 587. On September 5, the White House released a statement by the President stating that he had, as of September 5, ordered the resumption of U.S. nuclear tests in laboratories and underground, with no fallout. For the text, see ibid., p. 589–590.
48. Memorandum From Abraham Sirkin, Office of Plans, United States Information Agency to the Director for Policy and Plans (Sorensen)


SUBJECT

Long-Range or Strategic Planning in USIA

For whatever value it may be to you, to any successor in my job or to anyone else in IOP, I am setting down some thoughts on various aspects of long-range planning of our information work on the basis of three and a half years in this assignment.

Initiating vs. Reacting. There are several reasons, largely historical and perhaps inevitable, for our tendency as a nation to continue to react to the communist challenge rather than to lay our own challenge down to the other side. One reason, however, is bureaucratic. We simply do not have enough people whose job it is to concentrate exclusively on developing plans, proposals, projects to take the psychological initiative.

If there is only one long-range planning officer in USIA, who is free of the treadmill, (and, as I indicate later, this is not enough), his primary task might well be to develop and feed such proposals through the chief of IOP to the Director. If this is not made his primary task, it is extremely easy for even a “long-range planning” officer to get bogged down in a mass of routine paper with no time or mental energy left for developing major proposals.

Concentration of Effort. IOP has made a major step forward with the establishment of the Media Content job. This will help focus media effort, at least, on priority themes. Beyond this, however, long-range planning generally should be constantly concerned with keeping a few main concepts and approaches in the foreground of the Agency’s attention in all its efforts.

The emphasis of such planning should be on concepts and approaches which have an inherent forward thrust. In regard to concepts, there should be consistent attention to themes which attach “wave of the future” connotations to American or Free world activities and which expose the backwardness of Sino-Soviet ideology and behav-

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ior. In regard to approaches, long-range planning should be directed to proposals, devices, materials and operating techniques which will effectively reach and influence those audience groups from which future leadership elements are likely to emerge—notably students, political and trade union activists, and younger leadership echelons of the managerial, professional, educational and military ranks.

Many of the things that need to be done to maintain this priority attention fall between area and media stools. Only a central office such as IOP can push them through and see that they get the proper support. (For example: Cultivating Asian and African students in European universities; or the “Forum” program for students, educators and professionals involving IBS, IPS and ICS.)

*Communications Doctrine.* USIA is presumably the U.S. Government’s primary agency concerned with international information, persuasion and communication. One would expect it, therefore, to be the repository of the nation’s best talent, know-how and experience in this field. Yet over its decade or more of existence, the Agency has not developed any recognizable body of communications doctrine, either in terms of theory or practical techniques, on which to base its operations. Basic questions remain not only unanswered but even untackled. There is no accepted Agency view, for instance, on who our primary audiences are or even any suggested method for a PAO to determine what his audience priorities should be. We still operate largely by habit, routine, and widely varied individual seat-of-the-pants experience. Some operators are very good because of a fortunate combination of intuition and experience. Many are not so good. To some extent, this will always be the case. But it requires a more directed, organized, combined planning, research and training effort than we have so far produced to fashion a truly professional operation spending more than $100,000,000 a year to achieve major objectives in the national interest.

A key element in this is our research program. Relative to the need, it is now puny. We must know a great deal more than we do about audiences, levels of understanding and sophistication, communication patterns, effectiveness of local media, views and aspirations of major groupings, semantics on a country and language basis, and the effectiveness of our own materials and programs. We are doing a little, here and there, on all these things but there is no overall strategic plan for filling in the major gaps in the knowledge required for intelligent programming. Nor is there as yet any organized culling of the vast amount of existing academic, commercial and other governmental research in related fields for the nuggets of findings that would be of operational use to the Agency.

The long-range planning function can have a major role here, in helping focus increased research activity on the major continuing prob-
lems of international information operations, and in suggesting ways to insure that the useful findings of such research are geared into Agency operations and infused into our training programs.

Program Projections. The greater part of Agency planning is budget directed rather than program directed. It is largely tied to the annual budgeting cycle and most decisions are made on the basis of retaining or slightly altering the dollar amounts attached to each activity, post, area or medium. To gear the Agency’s operations more effectively to future needs, it is desirable to develop, from time to time, projections in purely program terms for some years ahead. If foreseeable program needs are set down by area and media with little reference to present budgeting levels and these estimates are refined and coordinated by IOP, realistic planning goals can be established towards which annual budget exercises can be directed. This would serve to orient our programs more toward field and area needs and less to entrenched parochial interests, particularly those of the media services.

Looking Ahead. Planning beyond the next day’s output or next year’s budget should be the task of all policy-making and decision-making elements of the Agency. But the stark fact is that, in this Agency as in the rest of the government, what is everybody’s business is nobody’s business.

The daily treadmill entraps even the specialist officers in IOP. Unless there are people specially enjoined to keep their eyes on future possibilities and problems and future implications of current operations and trends, a great deal of essential long-range planning will never take place. This function in IOP should not be considered as the exclusive locale for long-range planning in the Agency. On the contrary, apart from such specialized tasks as those listed in the paragraphs above and which themselves require Agency-wide cooperation, IOP’s long-range planning personnel should be urging others in IOP and, through appropriate channels, other elements of the Agency to do their own long-range planning and should be drawing their attention to those aspects of their respective spheres which particularly require it.

Contingency Planning. There is virtually no contingency planning in the Agency for the effective deployment of our “weapon on the wall” under changed world political conditions or in response to plausible world developments. The recent Berlin package planning is a rare exception. But sound contingency planning efforts involve more than media content. In the fast moving events of today, we should have plans ready for drastically different use of some of our primary instruments, such as the Voice, than anyone has presently given much thought to.

There is danger in going overboard on contingency planning, both in the excessive manpower and resources it can waste on plans which
never get used and in its possible encroachment on the more essential and valuable kind of planning which develops initiatives to take the psychological offensive instead of merely responding to “contingencies” which are generally created by the other side. But this does not mean that we should have no contingency planning at all. A major part of this might properly be set in motion by IOP.

**Staffing.** If all of these things—developing proposals for initiatives, keeping the focus on forward-thrust concepts and approaches, improving our communications know-how and techniques, projecting programs beyond annual budget cycles, spurring strategic planning in the rest of the Agency, and making psychological operations plans for major contingencies and opportunities—if all these things are worth doing, and need to be done in IOP, they cannot be done, or done adequately, by one officer.

In my own case, I had to decide which of these were most worth doing and let the rest go. For instance, I did not touch contingency planning because I felt this could become an endless task with no time left over to work on US initiatives, which I regarded as more essential and rewarding. I barely got started on a working group to organize Agency effort on communications doctrine and technique. In some of the other fields I was able to do a bit more.

I agree with the findings of a Management survey last year[^2] that this whole field of long-range planning requires a three- or four-man group, with some specialization of function among its members for the tasks mentioned in this memorandum, but able as a unit to originate ideas for taking the initiative on a large scale, to examine ideas suggested by other elements of the government or outside, and to develop the more useful ideas into detailed proposals that can be submitted to the Director.

[^2]: Not found.
49. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant Special Counsel (Goodwin) to President Kennedy


During the past few months, and especially during the Punta del Este Conference, I have discussed our information program with friendly officials from several Latin American governments. There has been general agreement that this program is not as effective as it should be, that it does not reach enough people, especially among those groups which we are trying to reach—e.g., students, intellectuals, workers and rural workers.

This is not a reflection upon the operations of USIA, but upon the assumptions which underlie our present information programs.

This assumption is that official U.S. Government propaganda is capable of swaying the minds and feelings of Latin American peoples toward democracy and away from communism.

This kind of propaganda can be most effective behind the iron curtain, where access to normal media of information is cut off and where governments are unfriendly. It is not completely effective in Latin America—with its thousands of free newspapers and radio programs, and where the basic concern is with urgent national and personal problems. Official propaganda is also limited by its inability to appeal to the most powerful political emotions, e.g., militant nationalism, the desire for radical social reform, etc., and many other things for which active U.S. espousal would constitute “interference” in the affairs of a friendly government. Our problem in Latin America is not “unfriendly” governments; it is unfriendly people in friendly countries—an almost impossible situation for official and overt propaganda agencies. Thus we are only able to play around the edges of the real problems and the vital issues which strike emotional chords in each country.


I believe that the answer to this problem lies in dissemination of the means of propaganda, rather than the direct dissemination of propaganda. We must place in the hands of effective democratic groups in each country—political parties, labor organizations, church groups, etc.—the instruments of propaganda. This can range from the donation of radio transmitters to making available leaflets, paperback books; and technical assistance in programming, movie making, etc.

The mileage we would get from our propaganda dollar in this way would be, I am convinced, far greater than anything we have hitherto achieved.

It would be necessary to organize for such an effort, since neither the USIA nor CIA is presently equipped to carry it on—and much of it would have to be covert to avoid compromising the position of the groups we are aiding.

My first thought is the establishment—within the State Department—of a small office of information which would select recipients, distribute funds and have access to USIA and CIA staff for the technical work necessary. Probably no more than half a dozen people could administer this program for Latin America.

But regardless of the ultimate organization, this is an urgent problem. No matter how great the volume of resources we pour into Latin America, or how fast, it will be a long time before the tangible effects of foreign aid are felt by the average citizen. In the interim, the problem is to create a sense of movement, of concern for the people, and to combat the effective propaganda of the communists. The battle is a psychological one, and will be for some time.

Therefore, I recommend you establish a small committee of State, USIA, CIA and White House—four men—to formulate the details of organization for such an effort and to come up with tentative budget suggestions. This work can be done in two to three weeks. Of course, most of the present USIA activities are useful and should be continued.

I have shown this memorandum to Secretary Dillon and Assistant Secretary Woodward, who completely concur in its major thesis and in the recommendation.

Richard N. Goodwin

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
50. Paper Prepared by the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Isenbergh)\textsuperscript{1}

Washington, undated.

A National Cultural Policy

In his Inaugural Address, following upon Robert Frost's prophecy of "a next Augustan age"\textsuperscript{2} the President called for encouragement of the arts and for a global alliance to "assure a more fruitful life for all mankind".\textsuperscript{3} By this and other declarations, this administration has committed itself, before the country and the world, to cultural advancement as a major national aim. It will now want to address itself to fulfilling this commitment.

I. National and World Importance

That other great issues at home and abroad press upon the nation does not mean that this is the wrong moment to start. On the contrary, in times like these, the decisive national resources are courage and resolution, and nothing can add to these as well as the vision of a worthy goal beyond current crises and the sense of moving toward it despite stalemate or setback elsewhere.

At the least, therefore, a serious effort to improve the quality of American cultural life would be a boost to national morale. It would inevitably be more. It would confirm that in the endless striving for peace and material well-being, we have not lost sight of why we want them. And if it resulted, as thoughtfully and energetically carried out it surely could, in restoring the pursuit of happiness to the place it had in American thought and faith at the time of the Declaration of

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Files, Subject File 1961–1964, Box WH–16, National Cultural Policy 10/5/61–1/7/64 General. No classification marking. Drafted by Isenbergh on September 11. An unknown hand wrote "[9/15/61]" in the top right-hand corner of the paper. Schlesinger sent the paper to McMurrin under a September 15 covering memorandum, indicating that the paper would serve as "a basis for our discussion" on September 20. (Ibid.)

\textsuperscript{2} Frost intended to deliver the poem "For John F. Kennedy His Inauguration," which contained the reference to the "next Augustan age," but he could not see the text due to sun glare and instead recited one of his older poems "The Gift Outright."

\textsuperscript{3} In his inaugural address, the President stated: "Now the trumpet summons us again—not as a call to bear arms, though arms we need—not as a call to battle, though embattled we are—but a call to bear the burden of a long twilight struggle, year in and year out, 'rejoicing in hope, patient in tribulation'—a struggle against the common enemies of man: tyranny, poverty, disease and war itself. Can we forge against these enemies a grand and global alliance, North and South, East and West, that can assure a more fruitful life for all mankind? Will you join in that historic effort?" (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 2)
Independence, it would do no less than transform the national character and open, for the whole world to see, an exhilarating new chapter in the American Revolution for the nineteen sixties.

In our international relations, establishment of cultural advancement as a major aim of the United States could not fail to make us more effective. Among nations of like heritage and development, it would raise our standing as a leader; it would make the less developed nations think better of us as a model; and to the nations of the Soviet bloc, it would show devotion on our part to a humanism transcending political differences, a demonstration which holds more promise than any other approach tried thus far of bringing forth affirmative response from their side. Arts, letters, and learning are the only goods for which a world common market exists. In a world otherwise divided on fundamentals, this cultural common market has better prospect of thriving than any other institution of unifying tendency. If it does thrive, ties will be established among peoples as never before and a new force will be at work everywhere to make peace durable.

II. Main Elements of a Policy: Views of the Executive Branch

The foregoing observations provide the central premises of a national cultural policy: that cultural advancement is of crucial importance to the nation and the world; that it must now be recognized as a major national goal; and that, in setting priorities on expenditure of effort and resources, it must be treated accordingly.

For present purposes, it would be premature to put forward, however tentatively, a more detailed statement. The particulars of a national cultural policy should not be proposed a priori, but should emerge from assiduous study of a number of specific issues of which the attached list is illustrative. Before such a study is started, a sounding of opinion within the Executive Branch should be made to determine, first, whether the cultural policy just stated in broad outline is acceptable as a starting point, and second, whether the prospect of support

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4 It is in order to say what the term culture as used here means. Culture is not seen as something apart from life, a set of superficial adornments to add or take away, but as an element, infused and inseparable, of the main stream. It shows itself not just in museums, concert halls, theaters, and universities, but in homes, clothes, talk, cities, villages, parks, roads, packages, automobiles, gadgets, churches, radio, television, cemeteries, baseball stadiums—a list without end. Yet, in this context, culture must mean less than the whole complex of attainments, beliefs, traditions, excellences, and deficiencies which differentiate one nation from another. It may be enough for present purposes to say that culture is art, letters, and learning as distinguished from skill, didactic writing, and professional knowledge; that although, like the latter, it may be utilitarian as well, its distinguishing qualities are elevation and aesthetic value; that it is spiritual rather than materialistic; that it is an integral and pervasive element of human existence; and that it is the clearest and most direct expression of man’s aspirations and capacity. [Footnote is in the original.]
is sufficiently good to justify further effort to work out the policy fully and put it into effect. If the response is positive, organizing for action is the immediate next step.

III. Organizing for Action

For a program of cultural advancement, the Executive Branch, which must be the moving force, is strong in the essentials: the President and Mrs. Kennedy, whose personal identification with arts, letters, and learning is universally known and respected, are ideally suited for leadership in this field; cultural leaders, able and willing to contribute ideas, advice, and effort have joined the Administration in good number; public reaction promises to be dominantly favorable; Congressional support seems to be getting stronger; and private citizens, organizations, business enterprises, labor unions, and foundations, as well as academic institutions, learned and professional societies, and religious groups can be counted upon to give their backing.

One lack within the Executive Branch is an administrative unit specially qualified to set this new departure in motion. The only agencies of the Federal Government officially invested with responsibilities in this field are the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs of the State Department, the United States Information Agency, and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. By the terms of their legislative mandates, State and USIA are concerned primarily with international cultural programs, and HEW with domestic. Moreover, the authorized activities of each fall within one or more strictly defined fields, with the consequence that none of the three can claim that by experience or statutory prescription it is the indicated instrument for launching a comprehensive program of cultural advancement. Nor could the three taken together. A first step should therefore be the establishment of a steering committee to lay out strategy and get the campaign under way.

The steering committee should have as few members as compatible with being broadly representative. It should be made up of individuals who both ex officio and as a matter of personal faith can be counted upon to work wholeheartedly. In addition to representatives of the White House, State, USIA, and HEW, it might draw from the following: the Federal Communications Commission, the Department of Interior (esp. National Parks), the Smithsonian Institution, the National Science Foundation, and although it would mean going outside the strict confines of the Executive Branch, the Library of Congress. Without blinking the requirement of small size, it should remain open to such additional representatives of the Executive Branch as in the opinion of the members would increase its effectiveness. The task of the steering committee should be twofold: (1) to develop a comprehensive national cultural
policy; and (2) to work out and set in motion a plan of action to put it into effect. The first specific objective of the committee should be tentative formulation of both the policy and the plan of action for review with the President. As soon afterwards as feasible, a conference of cultural and intellectual leaders should be called for the purpose of advancing the work of the committee and stirring public interest and support.\(^5\)

An illustrative list of issues bearing on national cultural policy, for consideration by the committee, the conference, and all others concerned, is attached.\(^6\)

\(^5\) In an October 16 memorandum to Schlesinger, Thomas Sorensen stated that “USIA is prepared to join State in recommending executive endorsement of the proposal to establish a steering committee within the Executive Branch, charged with the responsibility to develop a cultural policy and plan of action at the national level.” (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Files, Subject File 1961–1964, Box WH–16, National Cultural Policy 10/5/61–1/7/64 General)

\(^6\) Attached but not printed is a list entitled “Issues Bearing upon National Cultural Policy,” which Isenbergh drafted on September 11.

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51. **Memorandum From the President’s Military Representative (Taylor) to President Kennedy\(^1\)**


**SUBJECT**

Recommendation of the Ad Hoc Committee to examine U.S. effectiveness in propaganda-political warfare

1. In the course of the meeting of the Berlin Steering Group on August 17, 1961,\(^2\) you directed the following to examine United States effectiveness in the field of propaganda-political warfare: Mr. Robert Kennedy, a representative of the State Department (Mr. Alexis Johnson

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/9–2861. Confidential. The copy of the memorandum printed here is attached to a September 28 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to Bowles, in which Johnson noted Bowles’ September 28 meeting with Cater regarding the proposed position of Special Assistant to the Secretary for Special Projects.

was later designated), Mr. Allen Dulles, Mr. Edward Murrow and General Taylor. The members of this ad hoc committee have since met on several occasions and have consulted among themselves and with government officials and individuals with competence in this field. We have reached the following conclusions and recommendations.³

2. We believe the United States has very considerable resources for waging effective propaganda-political warfare. As we use this phrase, it refers to the whole range of activities designed to influence the attitudes of peoples on the great issues of the day and to stimulate public support and the active support of public and private individuals and organizations throughout the world for the U.S. position on these issues. The resources our country can use in this contest are dispersed in many places—in the executive departments of the Government, in our embassies abroad, and in many private organizations at home and abroad. This dispersion makes centralized direction difficult—indeed, there is no single agency short of the President with authority to direct all these elements. The committee found that this condition makes it difficult if not impossible to determine how well or badly we are doing in the propaganda-political warfare field. Views as to our effectiveness differ somewhat among the members of the committee, but we are unanimous in feeling that the United States must do better and that to do better there is need for more centralized direction and responsibility at the Washington level.

3. We make the following recommendations which have the concurrence of the Secretary of State:
   a. That the Secretary of State appoint a Special Assistant for Special Projects (the title is tentative) to give full time to the coordination and overall supervision of all United States resources in the propaganda-political warfare field.
   b. That the Secretary of State call upon the other federal agencies with a capability in this field to contribute a senior official to form an interdepartmental task force to work under the Special Assistant.
   c. That, as an early step, the Special Assistant review United States results in exploiting the Soviet action in sealing off West Berlin and comment on the adequacy of these results.

³ In a September 11 memorandum to Rusk, Johnson reported that at the Ad Hoc Committee’s meeting that day, “It was left that General Taylor is going to report our views to the President and that, if the President is inclined to consider any procedure other than a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State, he will recommend that the President discuss the matter with you. The formula of another Under Secretary of State was also discussed. I, of course, opposed, pointing out that, in addition to the problem of the multiplicity of Under Secretaries, this would require legislation and inevitable delays.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/9-1161)
d. That the President approve the foregoing recommendations and refer this paper to the Secretary of State for implementation.⁴

Maxwell D. Taylor⁵

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⁴ In a September 20 memorandum to Rusk, Johnson stated that he had “approved,” at that day’s Committee meeting, the recommendations contained in Taylor’s memorandum to the President. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/9–2061)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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52. Memorandum of Conversation¹


PARTICIPANTS


SUBJECT

Contents of Executive Order to Follow Passage of Fulbright-Hays Act²

It was agreed that in general the various Agencies affected by the Act would continue to carry out those functions provided for in the Act which were being carried out by those Agencies under old legislation. Under the new Act the President is authorized to carry out all of the

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, General Counsel (IGC) 1961 (Legal Matters Only). Official Use Only. Drafted by Bradford on October 2. Murrow, Wilson, Harris, and Smith all initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Harris wrote “10/14” and Smith wrote “10/26” next to their initials. Copies were sent to Murrow, Thomas Sorensen, Coombs, Isenbergh, and Teal. In a September 25 memorandum to Murrow, Coombs recommended that he and Murrow meet to discuss “arrangements for operation under the new statute.” After outlining topics for discussion, Coombs concluded the memorandum by stating: “If this heavy agenda permits it—and if not, as soon as we can arrange some other time—we should like also to put before you some ideas on increasing the effectiveness of the programs within State’s sphere of responsibilities and extending our collaboration with USIA both in the field and here.” (Ibid.)

² Reference is to the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (P.L. 87–256; 75 Stat. 527), which Kennedy signed into law on September 21. Introduced by Fulbright and Hayes, the Act consolidated earlier legislation on cultural and educational exchanges. For the text of the President’s remarks upon signing the Act, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 614.
activities by delegation. It was suggested that new activities authorized by the Act would be expected to come to the Secretary of State unless otherwise provided for in an Executive Order.

It was agreed that after consultation among the various Agencies involved a draft Executive Order, if possible agreeable to all, would go forward to the Bureau of the Budget and the White House. Among the interested Agencies are Commerce, Health, Education and Welfare, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and Internal Revenue. It was pointed out that after the first Executive Order is issued it will be difficult to change the allocations of operating responsibility.

It was agreed that a joint staff would be set up to operate the Cultural Presentations Program. This Program can now come out of the USIA budget and form part of the CU budget. However, formal USIA participation in policy formulation, the laying out of tours, and the like would be highly useful. Mr. Coombs expressed the desire to make the program a much more flexible vehicle. He said he had in mind smaller touring groups able to travel outside of the capitals of foreign countries, particularly among schools and colleges. He said he wanted to recruit more young talent. He felt the Government should not shoulder all of the costs of the more spectacular attractions playing in the capitals, and particularly should not pay big salaries to the stars.

Mr. Coombs also suggested that USIA has access to Hollywood talent, and that this talent might be better used if a joint USIA–CU staff were put in operation.

Mr. Murrow said he felt that CU should be responsible for the showing of foreign cultural materials in this country.

It was agreed that a joint Department-USIA staff should be appointed to plan to use the authority in the Act for supporting American studies overseas, and it was agreed that the Executive Order would provide for a sharing of authority between the Department and USIA for financing these studies. Activities in the field should respond to a total country plan.

It was agreed that the possibilities of using binational commissions in additional countries and for purposes in addition to academic exchange should be explored jointly by the Department and USIA.

The authority to finance the travel of foreigners to meetings outside the United States but under U.S. auspices should be delegated both to the Department and USIA. It is expected that the PAO in each country will be the joint planner for both the Department and the Agency. The Executive Order should provide authority for the presentation of

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3 An unknown hand, presumably Bradford’s, changed “this” to “the.”
4 An unknown hand, presumably Bradford’s, placed a partial bracket around “The.”
books and other materials to educational exchange grantees and group visitors. Both USIA and the Department would be expected to distribute books and educational materials, but for different purposes and to different recipients.\textsuperscript{5}

It was agreed that those present would meet again soon to propose names for a new Committee on the Arts. Mr. Coombs said the Act provided an exceptional opportunity to lift the quality of membership of the Committee so that it can perform a more important function.

\textsuperscript{5} The executive order was not issued until June 25, 1962. See footnote 4, Document 84.

53. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


SUBJECT
Luncheon for Television Network Executives Thursday, October 5

ATTENDING
Robert W. Sarnoff, Chairman of the Board National Broadcasting Company, Inc.
William S. Paley, Chairman of the Board, Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.
Leonard H. Goldenson, Chairman of the Board, American Broadcasting Company
Governor LeRoy Collins, President, National Association of Broadcasters
Edward R. Murrow

I have informed these gentlemen that the luncheon will be an informal conversation having to do largely with relations between the U.S. Information Agency and the networks.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1} Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the first page of the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House on October 3 at 8:02 p.m.

\textsuperscript{2} No record of the October 5 luncheon meeting has been found. In a July 24 memorandum to Kennedy, Murrow had proposed that the President “invite the heads of the three networks to lunch” in September or October; at the luncheon “specific plans for closer cooperation” in the overseas use of the networks’ products would be presented. (Ibid.)
Relations between the Agency and the networks have improved considerably and I suggest you might make mention of this fact.

USIA does not have the capability in terms of money or men to engage in large scale production of television or films. It follows that we must take the route of acquisition, adaptation and distribution. We have the distribution facilities pretty well all over the world. We have no desire to compete with the networks in areas where they have the possibility to make commercial sales. What we would like is access to their product in order that we may adapt and distribute it in areas where television is developing, where young stations cannot afford to pay commercial rates.

The networks have a backlog of material which we can put to good use, such as *Meet Mr. Lincoln*,3 *20th Century*,4 *Eyewitness To History*,5 *Victory At Sea*6 and many others.

The delay in securing clearance is one of the principal difficulties. If each network would appoint one official to deal with us in regard to both radio and television clearances, the problem would be simplified.

The National Association of Broadcasters has had under informal consideration a project designed to eliminate illiteracy in one country in one year through the combined use of radio and television. We have suggested that Guatemala would probably be the best country for such a pilot project. If you were to suggest that the national interests would be served by such an undertaking, it would be helpful.

American television programs are being exported in increasing volume. The impact of television in some areas is coming to equal, if not surpass, that of movies. The networks regard this export primarily, if not exclusively, in terms of income and disregard the impact. Their salesmen bundle up whatever is available and sell it regardless of content, without regard for the damage it may do the American image abroad. A few words from you might cause them to scrutinize their export in terms of impact as well as income.

You might care to suggest that we could make use of an occasional documentary dealing with this Nation’s accomplishments in such fields as agricultural research, the accomplishments and progress of the

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3 Broadcast on NBC in 1959, this program depicted Lincoln’s life from his February 1809 birth to his assassination on April 14, 1865.
4 This documentary series hosted by Walter Cronkite on CBS from 1957 until 1970, reported and interpreted major events of the 20th century.
5 Hosted first by Charles Kuralt, then Cronkite, on CBS in 1959 and 1960, renamed *Eyewitness* in September 1961, the program covered various contemporary issues, including U.S. diplomatic relations.
6 Broadcast on NBC in 1952 and 1953, and later condensed into film, the program depicted naval warfare during World War II.
American Negro, public health, desalination of water, and medical research.

What we seek primarily is prompt access to the networks' output in order that we may adapt and distribute in areas where they have no possibilities of a commercial sale, and that they exercise their own policy control regarding television shows exported abroad to insure a balanced image of the United States.

Edward R. Murrow

54. Memorandum From the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Gilpatric) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)¹


Your memorandum of 21 September about Moscow Molly and Berlin Benny taking over the American Forces Network (AFN) Berlin station frequency after midnight concerns an objective we share.² The Army, as Executive Agent for Defense, was working on the problem when your memorandum arrived and has asked for just a little more time for more information from the field before making firm recommendations for action.

The problem which confronts us is not merely the technical question of pre-empting the Berlin frequency from 0105 to 0600. The major problem cannot be resolved only in the light of the AFN Berlin operation. Although AFN enjoys national protection within West Germany, it has no legal right to international protection of frequencies. A modification in Berlin could cause repercussions with AFN stations in Stuttgart and Frankfurt as well as Berlin since these stations now operate on frequencies registered solely to the Soviet Union. The problem is

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¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Miscellaneous # 2—Various Subjects. Secret.

² In his September 21 memorandum to Gilpatric, Murrow wrote: “I know you are already looking into the problem posed by Moscow Molly and Berlin Benny in taking over the frequency of the U.S. Army’s station in Berlin at midnight. Under the present circumstances, I believe there is no doubt that the U.S. forces must pre-empt the frequency by staying on the air around the clock.” Murrow suggested that “whatever funds, materials, and personnel” required be “diverted immediately” from other areas: “We should be able to lick this one in a matter of days, or less.” (Ibid.)
complicated by the fact that other West European stations and satellite stations also operate on Soviet registered frequencies.

We are interested in a quick and efficient solution, but want to make certain that our entire operation is not jeopardized and that we are prepared to cope with any Soviet countermeasures. I have been assured that final recommendations will be provided shortly and I will let you know.

Roswell Gilpatric

55. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy


You requested information on Castro’s present influence throughout Latin America. Attached is a one-page summary produced by our research department. They read a wide variety of Latin American newspapers as well as study intelligence reports and State Department cables. This represents their considered opinion at the present.

I have instituted a new survey to be conducted at five metropolitan areas where a similar sample of the population was taken in January (we sent you the results of this survey on February 23, 1961). The five selected cities are Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Lima, Buenos Aires, and Montevideo. These have been selected because we have Regional Research Officers in the first three and there are adequate research facilities available in Buenos Aires and Montevideo. The January sample for these cities was 400 cases each, whereas the new survey will be 300 cases each to lower the cost without materially lessening the value of the results. The estimated cost for this follow-up survey is $7,000. The results should be available within thirty days.

Donald M. Wilson

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House on October 20 at 12:46 p.m.

2 Not found.

3 For the final survey, see Document 66. Additional information concerning the research related to this survey is in the National Archives, RG 306, Office of Research, Special Reports (S), 1953–1997, Entry P 160, Box 18, S–60–61 and ibid., Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Field Latin America (IAL) 1961 October–December.
CASTRO’S CURRENT STANDING IN LATIN AMERICA

Available evidence indicates Castro’s influence is declining in Latin America. Several factors are contributing to this trend. Activities of anti-Castro forces are increasing in several countries. The current U.S. policy of ignoring Castro is robbing him of “Yankee Imperialism” ammunition. And there is an increasing awareness of the possibilities of the Alliance for Progress.

The trend of events in Cuba and the heavy-handed actions of Cuban diplomats, coupled with the tone of Cuban statements addressed to the Latin American masses and the dangerous, sometimes violent, activities of local Castro supporters and Communists, have led the moderate elements to take action. The visible result of this new trend among the moderates has been an increasing number of anti-Castro organizations, more effective measures to control Cuban propaganda, and a subsequent decline in the attendance at pro-Cuban activities.

The decline in the “headline” war between the United States and Cuba shifted the spotlight to Cuba’s attitude towards the other Latin American countries. It was no longer evident that the battle was solely one between David and Goliath. This was dramatically illustrated by the failure of the April invasion, which made it clear to Latin American leaders and moderates that they would have to act on their own to fend off the onslaught of Castro-communism. This realization has gradually spread to all but the most radical groups.

Though some confusion still exists as to the precise scope of the Alliance for Progress, it is being looked to as an alternative to the Cuban approach. Some of the confusion appears to be deliberately created to serve the interests of particular groups, some conservative and some communist-inspired. Some local leaders are apparently convinced that their ability to prevent the growth of Castroism among the masses depends upon their ability to show that the Alliance can contribute to the fulfillment of their aspirations. Therefore, the failure of these governments to show tangible results and the failure of any

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4 No classification marking.
reform movements, which could be attributed to U.S. failure to implement the Alliance for Progress, could act to revive the Cuban experiment as an alternative.

56. Memorandum From the Director of Media Content, Office of Plans, United States Information Agency (Brooke) to the Director, Broadcasting Service (Loomis), the Director, Motion Picture Service (Shelton), the Director, Information Center Service (Boerner), the Director, Press and Publications Service (Mackland), and the Director, Television Service (Wheeler)


SUBJECT
Guidelines for Modernization

Attached are guidelines for use of the media in focusing their output on Modernization (Theme 5).

Special attention is invited to the points (listed in the Summary) for emphasis by all media. Repeated use of these points is essential if foreign publics are to understand what conditions are necessary for development to take place and for them to qualify for U.S. aid. With imagination it should be possible to weave these points into what would amount to a continuing educational campaign on the nature and requirements of modernization.

As this perspective is established, U.S. programs of assistance to other nations should gain increasing recognition and respect around the world.

The media are requested to consult my office for concurrence on the major items they propose to undertake.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Acc. #67A222, Entry UD WW 379, Themes—Modernization (Special Program Emphasis). No classification marking. Copies were sent to Roberts, Cody, Neilson, McKnight, and King.

2 Murrow promulgated five themes for media focus on July 24; see Document 42.
MODERNIZATION—GUIDELINES FOR TREATMENT

Summary

Modernization is a basically revolutionary movement that is now under way in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Probably its most essential, and certainly its most prominent aspect is a desire for economic and social development. The new AID program has been designed to provide economic and technical assistance to the newly developing countries in their modernization efforts—in the Western Hemisphere through the Alliance for Progress—during what President Kennedy has termed the “Decade of Development” of the 60’s.

The task of USIA in this connection is two-fold. Broadly, we must interpret the AID program to all our audiences in the context of U.S. policy in the world of the 1960’s. We should seek:

1. To make clear that the U.S. welcomes the modernizing revolution, with its promise of economic growth and the strengthening of freedom and independence.

2. To make clear also that in offering development assistance we accept the obligations and welcome the opportunities our position in world affairs entails.

3. To encourage people of other free industrialized countries to recognize that they too share in these obligations and opportunities to shape the kind of world in which the 1960’s will end.

4. To help the peoples of the newly developing nations understand the basis on which we offer our cooperation.

The more demanding part of our task centers on (4). It will be our responsibility to help audiences in the newly developing countries gain some appreciation of the complex nature of modernization and understand how the AID program can help them meet the requirements

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3 No classification marking. Drafted by Riley, Meiklejohn, and Brooke on October 16.
4 See footnote 21, Document 24.
5 The President declared the “Decade for Development” in his March 22 special message to Congress. See Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 205.
of economic and social development without prejudice to their sovereignty and independence.

**Points to Emphasize**

In this educational effort, we should emphasize the following points:

1. The major push toward progress must be supplied by the people of any country. Otherwise, help from the outside cannot be effective and cannot be justified. Self-help, self-reliance, self-discipline are indispensable if economic development and modernization are to take place.

2. Modern technology and monetary aid can accelerate the process of modernization but cannot bypass the fact that it is a process, one that takes time and imposes different requirements at succeeding stages of development.

3. Modernization doesn’t just “happen.” It must be planned for and worked for. This planning must look to the future, so that each stage of the development process will produce readiness for the next step toward sustained growth. (“Showy” projects not properly geared to a country’s true needs will often lead only to disappointment and may even slow down the rate of development.)

4. Countries desiring a progressive improvement in their productive capacity and standards of living will find the United States ready and able to help, provided that those countries have a businesslike plan, will carry out their own tasks responsibly, including necessary reforms, and are realistic in the kind and scale of development projects they propose to undertake.

5. A major requirement of modernization programs is that all the people of the country being aided shall be able to share in the benefits as improvements in productive capacity and trade bring increases in goods and services.

We shall need to bear in mind, as we explain these fundamentals, that our assistance is designed basically to assure that these countries may pursue their course of modernization effectively and independently, so that each fashions the kind of modern society it wants. (We rely on the independence of this process and on their experience in the cooperative AID effort to result in their choosing their own versions of what we would recognize as a democratic and open society.)

We bear in mind, too, that our emphasis must consistently be on modernization, not on the U.S. contribution. We must concern ourselves with understanding the problems of people who find themselves caught up in a revolutionary situation. We must constantly remind ourselves of the stresses and strains, the conflict between progress toward modernity and attachment to traditional ways, values, and
interests, that are unavoidable under such circumstances. These problems of group and individual adjustment, these national and cultural “growing pains,” will appear in many different forms. USIA as well as AID must be prepared to deal with them as understandingly and effectively as possible, month after month and year after year, as the Decade of Development progresses.

It follows from this that in our explanation of the general AID approach and of its application in specific country programs we focus attention on how it helps meet the diverse modernization requirements of the emerging countries. The merit of AID lies not in the instruments of policy it uses, but in the appropriateness and suitability of those instruments for promoting modernization. These basic instruments are four in number:

1. **Long-term loans**—to supplement a country’s own saving, so as to make capital projects feasible without entailing balance-of-payments deficits.

2. **Development grants**—to help make good shortcomings in human resources, through provision of or improvement in public and private institutions, including primarily those affecting education and facilities for transportation, sanitation, health, and housing.

3. **Food-for-Peace shipments**—to enable a country to release farm workers for nonagricultural projects without waiting for its own agriculture to be made more efficient.

4. **People**—technicians, educators, administrators—to help in planning as well as accomplishing modernization. (Peace Corps volunteers, outside the AID program, make similar contributions.)

Closely related to development assistance are supporting assistance (authorized by the same legislation), multilateral assistance programs, and the promotion of multilateral world trade on a basis as free as possible of tariff or quota restrictions:

5. **Supporting assistance**—for allies undertaking substantial military defense burdens, friendly countries facing economic collapse, and other countries providing valuable assistance to our security effort.

6. **Multilateral programs**—providing development aid under international auspices, to which the U.S. contributes; now including also bilateral programs coordinated through the OECD.

7. **World trade**—basic to self-help and to modernization itself—under international agreements enabling the modernizing countries to market their traditional export products less hazardously and, more especially, free of restrictions that limit access to markets for their new industrial products.

[Omitted here are the sections “Introduction,” “Requirements and Related Points to Emphasize,” “Suitability of U.S. Development Assistance,” and “Related Policies.”]
57. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President (Schlesinger) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)\(^1\)


Is there any way by which USIA might offer supplies of uncontaminated powdered milk for distribution in fall-out areas? (See attached clipping from the *London Daily Telegraph.*)\(^2\) This would obviously involve some cooperation with the Food for Peace Program and possibly with AID.

This kind of problem raises one aspect of political warfare coordination which has concerned me. Most meddlers in this field seem preoccupied with improving coordination among USIA, CIA, and State. Actually coordination among these three agencies has not been too bad. The more troubling area, so far as I can see, lies in the relationship between the aid agencies (AID, Food for Peace, Peace Corps) and the political warfare agencies. Some of our economic programs have vast political implications; but I am not sure\(^3\) the political dimension of the aid effort is always effectively tied in with our general political strategy. This is one place where better coordination is surely required.

It would be excellent if AID’s new Director of Public Information could be a man with an interest in and an instinct for the political warfare aspects of his job. I know that Fowler Hamilton would welcome any suggestions you might have for the post.\(^4\)

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\(^2\) Attached but not printed. The October 25 clipping features an article entitled “Babies Will Get Safe Milk.” The article notes that the British Minister of Defense had stated in the House of Commons on October 24 that the British Government would provide uncontaminated powdered milk to babies up to a year old if the Soviet bomb tests increased the amount of radioactive iodine 131 in milk to dangerous levels.

\(^3\) Schlesinger crossed out “of” following the word “sure.”

\(^4\) In an October 31 memorandum to Murrow, Anderson wrote: “One question which Arthur Schlesinger raises in his memo has not been touched on in the proposed reply: that is the matter of making suggestions for the post of AID’s new Director of Public Information. Naturally, it would be helpful if we could recommend somebody from our ranks. However, I know of nobody qualified for the spot who is available at present.” (National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970, Entry UD WW 151, Box 289, Director’s Correspondence—1961)
I am sending a copy of the clipping and memorandum to George McGovern.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.5

5 Schlesinger signed “Arthur” above his typed signature. In his October 31 response to Schlesinger, a copy of which he sent to McGovern, Murrow stated: “According to our information, it might be somewhat premature for USIA to offer uncontaminated powdered milk to countries in heavy fallout areas.” He acknowledged: “Nevertheless the question you raise is one that ought to be kept in mind, particularly in the event of additional Soviet testing.” Murrow concluded: “I agree with you about coordination—it seems to me that it has been improving among State, CIA, and USIA, but we do need good lines among the Peace Corps, Food for Peace, AID and the other organizations.” (Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Subject Files, Classified Subject Files, Box WH–48, United States Information Agency 5/61–8/63)

58. Memorandum From the President’s Military Aide (Clifton) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1


SUBJECT
Radio Free Europe

The President gave me a personal mission to accomplish with the Director of Radio Free Europe which I took up and resolved with Mr. John Richardson, the recently-appointed (May 1) Director.

In resolving this small problem, I had an opportunity to talk to Mr. Richardson at length. He has also briefed General Taylor a bit on their activities. This much background might be helpful:

Radio Free Europe is doing a very fine job broadcasting into the satellite areas especially. For a while, their reduction in personnel and other problems caused considerable trouble, and the European operation was going downhill. However, Mr. Richardson reports that he now has Major General C. Rodney Smith, United States Army, Retired,

as the Operational Chief in Munich and, at latest report, things are smoothed out, there are no troubles with the West German labor unions, and the morale is high—this latter in spite of the fact that since July, General Smith has had to reduce his force by over a hundred employees.

The critical problem is the budget. For the past five years, there has been a steady decline in the budget of RFE. The public fund-raising has contributed about the same amount each year—I believe around $2 million. And the rest is budgeted directly from the Bureau of the Budget through a Government agency. It is this part which has been reduced, consequently reducing the effectiveness of the RFE job.

The total—public fund-raising plus the Government contribution—should change direction upwards. For a couple of million dollars more, we could hold this staff together and really do a job. It’s the most effective counter-Soviet propaganda in Europe. But with increased labor costs and increased production costs, if the budget remained the same, we would have to diminish somewhat our activities. And when the budget declines, it hurts doubly.

[1 paragraph (11 lines) not declassified]

The kind of aggressive, pragmatic, political intellectual that RFE employs is ideally suited to plan and execute these counter-political and counter-propaganda activities. Most of them are not dreamers, but are sophisticated, experienced politicians who know how to come to grips with this problem. I believe they should be encouraged with a little more money.

Meanwhile, there is some dissension—as always in these activities—between the “outs” and the “ins”. When they have these governments-in-exile and these peoples in exile, they don’t always agree with the man who is hired by RFE, and is doing the job. This carping criticism is especially true on the Polish desk because very few Poles can agree on how we should approach the Polish problem.

This is not an important difficulty, but just an example. My feeling is that if John Richardson is given full support and a pretty free hand, he is the kind of director that can bring these warring factions closer together.

[1 paragraph (1 line) not declassified]

C.V. Clifton

SUBJECT
“Coordination and Over-all Supervision of All U.S. Resources in the Propaganda-Political Warfare Field”

I. On September 19, 1961, an Ad Hoc Committee appointed by the President, including Attorney General Kennedy, Deputy Under Secretary Johnson, CIA Director Dulles, USIA Director Murrow, and General Taylor, made recommendations to the President after a series of meetings “to examine U.S. effectiveness in the field of propaganda-political warfare.” These recommendations included:

a. “That the Secretary of State appoint a Special Assistant for Special Projects (the title is tentative) to give full time to the coordination and overall supervision of all United States resources in the propaganda-political warfare field.” (italics added)

b. “That the Secretary of State call upon the other federal agencies with a capability in this field to contribute a senior official to form an interdepartmental task force to work under the Special Assistant.”

c. “That, as an early step, the Special Assistant review United States results in exploiting the Soviet action in sealing off West Berlin and comment on the adequacy of these results.”

II. Upon being offered the post of Special Assistant, I voiced to you my strong reservations about the sweeping nature of the job as specified by the Ad Hoc Committee. At your suggestion, I agreed to come into the Department for two weeks to examine the problem more

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/11–961. Confidential. Cater sent the memorandum to Rusk under a November 8 note on Wesleyan University letterhead, in which he wrote: “I have perhaps overstretched your invitation to think freshly about the problems of propaganda-political warfare. But here is the result. While I have been negative about the job as specified, I hope that my other suggestions are more positive.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/11–861) Cater also sent a copy of the memorandum to Battle under a November 9 note. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/11–961) Battle sent copies of Cater’s memorandum to Murrow, U. Alexis Johnson, Bohlen, McGhee, and Tubby under a November 14 note, indicating that Rusk “would like to have you read this” and meet. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Government Agencies—State Department of, 1961 Aug.–Dec.)

2 See Document 51.

3 The construction of the Berlin Wall began in August after the border was closed.
thoroughly. During this time, I have held discussions with all the members of the Ad Hoc Committee, except General Taylor. I have reviewed U.S. propaganda-political warfare activities in connection with the Soviet sealing off of West Berlin, the Belgrade Conference of unaligned nations, and Soviet resumption of nuclear testing. Finally, I have worked closely with Deputy Under Secretary Johnson in the effort to supervise and coordinate propaganda-political activities following Khrushchev’s announcement of a 50-megaton bomb test and Malinovsky’s boast of Soviet anti-missile capability.

III. Any assessment must take account of past experience in this field. The history is not a reassuring one. Shortly after the Second World War, Secretary of State Byrnes attempted unsuccessfully to persuade Walter Lippmann to come into the Department to take charge of the “battle to win men’s minds.” The growth of operating agencies (notably USIA and CIA) only intensified the efforts to devise mechanisms for supervising and coordinating this battle. President Truman set up the Psychological Strategy Board as an adjunct to the National Security Council. Under Eisenhower, PSB was abolished and the Operations Coordinating Board was established. In addition, a succession of Special Assistants to the President, including William Jackson, C.D. Jackson, and Nelson Rockefeller, attempted to work in this field. In 1955

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4 September 1–6.

5 See Document 47 and footnote 2 thereto.

6 On October 31, Khrushchev announced the detonation of a 50-megaton bomb at the 22nd Communist Party Congress in Moscow. For information, see Howard Simons, “K Says Bomb Exceeded 50 Megatons By ‘Mistake’,” The Washington Post, November 1, 1961, pp. A1, A12.


Rockefeller served as Chairman of a Plans Coordinating Group\(^9\) which included the Under Secretary of State, the Director of CIA, and other high Government officials for “coordination of economic, psychological and political warfare and foreign information activities.” The PCG was later abolished on the recommendation of its Chairman.\(^10\)

To review these efforts raises questions that should not be glossed over now that the need has once again been recognized. The successive failures to reach a satisfactory administrative arrangement for coordinating propaganda-political activities suggests there are limiting factors that must be taken into account in any future arrangement.

IV. The following limitations, it seems to me, have not always been recognized:

1. Propaganda-political warfare cannot be isolated and administered as a separate part of the policy machinery of government. It must be integral to policies and programs in the planning stage and in every stage of implementation. To treat it separately runs two risks: By failing to take proper account of U.S. policies, it may inadvertently do great damage; or, more likely, by being ignored or overridden, it proves totally ineffectual.

The problems of propaganda-political warfare raised by the Soviet action in sealing off West (or East) Berlin illustrates this dilemma. It would have been perfectly possible to stimulate strong public reaction in Berlin as well as in East and West Germany. Citizen groups might have been induced to tear down sections of the wall. Uprisings in East Germany could possibly have been provoked. But such a free wheeling approach to propaganda-political warfare would have clashed head on with U.S. policy which was endeavoring to keep the German situation from flaring out of control.

Failing this approach in Germany, propaganda-political warfare could achieve only limited successes elsewhere. The United States lacks the disciplined cadres available to the Soviets which are capable of being turned on and off at a signal.


\(^10\) Rockefeller made this recommendation, based on the input of the other members of the PCG, following the Group’s conclusion that the PCG would not be able to accomplish its objectives related to the coordination of economic, psychological, and political warfare and information activities. In a December 14 memorandum to Hoover, Rockefeller stated the Group’s recommendation to abolish the PCG as of December 31, 1955. (*Foreign Relations*, 1950–1955, The Intelligence Community, 1950–1955, Document 246)
2. The basic nature of the propaganda-political warfare between U.S. and U.S.S.R. results in an uneven contest. The conduct of propaganda-political warfare by the U.S. is very much limited by what we really mean to do. We lack the flexibility of the Soviets. We hesitate to rouse false hopes or false fears among allies and neutrals. Remembering the experience of Hungary, we are reluctant to stir unrest and uprisings within the Soviet bloc for fear that we will be called upon to go to the rescue. The Soviets, on the other hand, do not hesitate to play on the free world’s every vulnerability. They summon their partisans to acts of sabotage, terrorism and political uprising without moral obligation to back them directly.

3. U.S. conduct is limited by its open communications system. The Soviets can wage one type of political-propaganda campaign on one front and another on a second. Their domestic audience hears a different story from their foreign audience. There is almost sacrosanct communication within the official apparatus of the Soviet system.

U.S. Government, on the other hand, must reckon with a press which serves as a vigilant intelligence system whose loyalty is to a different set of values than the propaganda-political warfare interests of the nation. “News” is a commodity which can comprise the government’s deepest secrets—the press alone serves as judge.

As a result, U.S. gambits in the propaganda-political warfare are frequently checkmated by our own players. The decision to delay underground nuclear testing after the Soviets had resumed was effectively neutralized by the press’ explanation that the only reason for the delay was to “maximize” opposition of world public opinion against the Soviets. (This explanation, it should be added, was made freely available by the politicians in Congress who have their own problems of propaganda-political warfare back home.)

4. Finally, the U.S. government is limited in the uses for which it can mobilize non-governmental groups. Much has been freely advocated about employing the resources of labor unions, businesses and others who have dealings abroad. But these groups, by and large, are suspicious of attempts to make them into official organs of propaganda and intrigue. Any large scale effort at such recruitment, except on the most carefully defined terms, is apt to be counter-productive.

V. Recognizing these limitations, the U.S. government still has urgent need to integrate propaganda-political warfare more fully into the formulation and conduct of foreign policy. The so-called “P factor” (C.D. Jackson’s innovation) should be an important item on the checklist of policy makers in every related activity of government. This “extra dimension” to policy needs to be constantly drummed into the consciousness of those who must execute policy in the field.

The “P factor” must be rescued from the faint derision it often receives from the diplomats and the military strategists. Its present
importance could not be more obvious. Policy makers, for example, could conceivably execute a faultless series of diplomatic and military moves in defense of Berlin, only to lose the city because of defeats in the propaganda-political warfare.

The basic strategy directives of propaganda-political warfare must emanate from the top of government rather than emerge in harum-scarum fashion down the line. These directives need to be few in number, simple and clear-cut in expression. Ideally, they should be enunciated by the President himself after deliberation in the National Security Council.

Once adopted, they should serve as general guidelines to U.S. officials in Washington and abroad. Following these guidelines, the State Department would regularly send out “talking papers” to our representatives abroad which take account of the propaganda-political warfare factors in a current situation. The guidelines should be broad enough to provide direction for the various representatives and agents of the U.S. government abroad. They should also be capable of adaptation to provide useful information to private citizens and groups working abroad.

(See Appendix\textsuperscript{11} for more specific suggestions).

\textbf{Recommendations:}

1. Appointment of a Special Assistant to the Secretary of State to “coordinate and supervise” propaganda-political warfare is, I believe, unfeasible and unwise. Administratively, he would cut across the statutory authority vested in the Directors of USIA and CIA. He would have vague and unsupported responsibility in areas of policy guidance now belonging to the Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs and the Director of the Office of Intelligence Research. The field is already cluttered with overlapping hegemonies. It would not be clarified by setting up still another high-level “coordinator” who would have neither the staff nor the necessary powers to do his job. The interdepartmental task force he is supposed to head would not likely draw on sufficiently high ranking agency representatives to be able to implement any agreements it might reach.

2. Quite apart from his contribution to administrative anarchy, such a Special Assistant might prove actually harmful to the conduct of foreign policy. Standing apart from the chain of command, he would be tempted to justify his existence by peddling “gimmicks” for waging propaganda-political warfare. Alternatively, he would grow reconciled to serving as the whipping-boy for the government’s continued failure to deal with this problem.

\textsuperscript{11} Attached but not printed is the 4-page appendix.
3. Better coordination of propaganda-political warfare can only be achieved by a better working relationship among those who are primarily charged with responsibility in this area. It would be a mistake to return to the excessively formalistic arrangements of the Psychological Strategy Board or the Operations Coordinating Board. These groups became so enmeshed in formal agenda, voluminous staff studies and rituals that they lacked the capacity to respond to urgent needs. In their place I would suggest the formation of an ad hoc working group chaired by the Deputy Under Secretary of State and including the appropriate Assistant Secretaries of State and agency representatives. For particular projects the acting chairmanship could be delegated to one of the other members. An assistant to the Deputy Under Secretary could act as expeditor for this working group, serving not as a senior official but only on the authority of his boss. The group’s value would lie in the speed and flexibility of its working relations.

4. An improved flow of ideas about propaganda-political warfare might also come from better use of already existing institutions within the Government. These include in the State Department the Policy Planning Staff, the Policy Guidance Staff in the Bureau of Public Affairs, and the Soviet Counter Propaganda Committee now located in the Office of Intelligence Research. There are similar groups already at work within USIA and CIA. No Special Assistant, working alone, could hope to duplicate their potential for creative thinking in this field.

5. Better ways should be devised to make certain that political-propaganda problems do not get neglected at the very highest levels of government. The Tuesday Lunch Group, which brings together the second-tier officials, should keep the “P factor” more regularly under survey. Needless to add, it should be a regular part of NSC deliberations.

I can only reiterate that the effort to “orchestrate” governmental activities in propaganda-political warfare will succeed only when there are clear and firm directives emanating from the top which are sustained by clear and firm policies. It is not a matter of turning this business over to a medicine man—or, for that matter, a beady-eyed Psychological warrior. It will take the energy and insight of the President himself to accomplish anything really significant.
60. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


During a two-day visit to Hollywood, I discussed the distribution and impact of American films abroad with roughly 100 leaders of the industry in the course of two meetings. The discussions were cordial and restrained except for Eric Johnston’s contribution. He was inclined to think I had exaggerated the damage done by certain films when shown abroad.

It was suggested that the Agency assign an experienced officer to Hollywood who would be available for consultation on script and story lines, to advise regarding material or situations which might produce adverse reactions abroad. We are giving consideration to this suggestion.

There was some casual conversation about the creation of a non-profit corporation for the production and distribution of films designed to serve the national interest. A number of stars volunteered to work for nothing and it was felt that the unions and guilds might be prepared to cooperate by working for minimum scale. I doubt that anything concrete will emerge from this but we are attempting to nourish the idea quietly through a group of the younger producers and writers. If there should be progress on this project, you will be advised.

In due course, I shall propose a list of leaders of the film industry who might usefully be invited to lunch at the White House.

Edward R. Murrow

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House on November 14 at 1:29 p.m.

2 Eric Johnston was the President of the Motion Picture Association of America.
61. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Assistant Press Secretary to the President (Hatcher)\(^1\)


Here are three principal ideas which we believe the President should seek to convey to Mr. Adzhubei of Izvestia, and through him to the people of the USSR.\(^2\) Appended is a list of questions Mr. Adzhubei may ask.\(^3\)

I. America wants peace, has made and is making every effort to achieve it.

Supporting points:

a. Memories of the horrors of World War II, and the President’s personal knowledge of it,\(^4\) which we share with the Russians.

b. The U.S. did not attack Russia when we had sole possession of atomic bombs.

c. We have sought earnestly and patiently for 16 years to bring about realistic complete and total disarmament, and live in peace. We still stand ready to sign a treaty banning nuclear tests,\(^5\) the main points of which were already agreed to by the Soviet Union before it broke the voluntary moratorium and resumed tests in the atmosphere this fall.\(^6\)

d. Our military capacity is inherently a defensive, second-strike capacity. We will never strike first, but if we are attacked our response will be greater than the blow dealt us.

e. U.S. actions that may seem aggressive (e.g., U–2 flights, overseas bases) are in fact defensive, dictated in large part by the closed society of the USSR.

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\(^3\) Not printed is an undated paper entitled “Some Questions Adzhubei May Ask.”

\(^4\) The President served in the U.S. Navy during World War II.

\(^5\) See footnote 2, Document 42.

\(^6\) See footnote 6, Document 59.
f. U.S. retreat on Berlin would encourage aggression just as Munich did. This is a difficult point, but if it can be conveyed, it will make the Russians ask themselves whether they want to risk their skins for the hated German.

g. We appreciate the peaceful accomplishments of the Soviets in music, sports, science, etc. and hope they can continue toward a better world for all.

h. We appreciate the innate friendliness of the Russians for Americans, as shown to tourists, for example, and would like to increase interchanges of all kinds, including trade on a sound basis.

II. The issue is not capitalism versus socialism or communism but free choice versus coercion.

Supporting points:

a. The U.S. cooperates willingly with independent socialist states.

b. Capitalism as seen by orthodox Marxism does not exist today. The major “capitalist” nations have, in fact, provided their people with the things that Communism has so far only promised. (Experience with our exhibit guides has demonstrated a profound Russian interest in health care, social security and pensions, educational opportunities, wage levels, unemployment compensation, etc.)

c. The most striking example is perhaps not our industrial production but our tremendous agricultural success, giving us food resources to share not only with our allies and non-aligned countries but such countries as Poland.

d. What matters most is our freedom, including the freedom to adopt whatever economic system suits us best. We will preserve our freedom to travel (any American can leave his country at will), our freedom of access to information, our freedom to read, think, and act as we choose.

e. As for other countries, we desire only that they are able to work out their own destinies in their own way, under whatever internal political and economic system they choose. We are providing help to those who ask it in the pursuit of these goals.

III. We will fight if we must to preserve our freedom and independence, and that of our allies.

a. Our military capacity is so great that we are not impressed by threats to bury us.

b. Nor can we stand by and see “salami” tactics used to swallow up free people slice by slice. We do not fear to negotiate, but will do so only on a truly give-and-take basis; we will not negotiate from fear.

c. The actions of the USSR and its allies since World War II have reluctantly compelled us to strengthen our conventional defensive arms, for the maintenance of our own freedom and that of our allies.
62. Paper Prepared in the Office of Public Information, United States Information Agency

Washington, undated.

FOCUS: BERLIN

The USIA has assigned continuing priority to output in all its media—through films, radio, television and newsreel, materials for press and periodicals, exhibits, pamphlets, libraries and lecture programs—on themes related to the Berlin situation. Purpose has been to inform a worldwide audience of the truth of what has been happening in Berlin and to show how those events relate meaningfully to the lives and aspirations of people everywhere.

Basic political points made in USIA’s output have been four-fold:

The Berlin crisis is “Khrushchev’s crisis”, manufactured in Moscow. The danger to Free Berlin is a danger to free people everywhere, for it is but one point of continuing and global Communist ambitions. The Allies are united in their determination to maintain Free Berlin, but remain ready to negotiate to prevent armed conflict. The August 13 Berlin Sector closing was a stark confession of the bankruptcy of Communism in East Germany and dramatic evidence of the irresponsibility and desperation of the Soviet-controlled Ulbricht regime.

Following is a rundown of what USIA has done and is doing about the Berlin situation and evidence of use and impact:

RADIO

The Voice of America, broadcasting over 100 hours daily in 36 languages, has dwelt heavily on Berlin developments in its shortwave news coverage, commentaries and features heard by an estimated daily audience of more than 20 million. “Berlin 1961”, a one-hour documentary, was distributed on tape in multiple languages for rebroadcast on overseas medium-wave stations, as was a three-part series, “The Manufactured Crisis” and a seven-part series, “The Berlin Story”. In

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Field Europe Berlin 1961 Sept.–Dec. No classification marking. Bennett sent the paper to all USIA agency heads under a November 17 memorandum, writing: “The attached roundup offers some measure of the combined effort by Agency media and overseas posts to give the world the facts about Khrushchev’s crisis in Berlin. We are sending it to you to help keep you up-to-date on a key Agency information theme and to provide evidence of the use and impact of Agency output on the Berlin situation.” (Ibid.) Another copy is in the National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Berlin (to 1964).

September alone, VOA aired 80 commentaries and features on the Berlin situation in addition to extensive news coverage.

“The Berlin Story” was widely used abroad. It was carried, for example, during peak listening time by the Persian radio stations in Tehran, Tabriz, Meshed, Isfahan and Khorramshahr. Two networks in the Argentine and 16 stations in Bolivia broadcast the series.

President Kennedy’s address before the UN on September 25\(^3\) was broadcast live in English worldwide. It was re-broadcast at peak listening times in 35 other languages throughout the world. These broadcasts provided virtually the only means whereby people behind the Iron and Bamboo curtains could learn of the speech, for the Communists heavily censored their own accounts of it. Tapes of the speech were air-shipped to Agency posts abroad for placement on local medium-wave stations. The President’s earlier Berlin speech, on July 25,\(^4\) was given the same worldwide treatment.

RIAS, the Agency’s radio station in Berlin, has been on the air 24 hours a day in medium, short and long wave and frequency modulation, telling the truth to the captive East Germans. Seventy-five per cent of the population of the Soviet Zone is known to listen regularly to RIAS despite Communist efforts to jam the broadcasts. In September the voice of RIAS was further strengthened by the construction of antennas beamed to East Germany to permit a five-fold increase of power at night, and the purchase of four mobile studio units to permit on-the-scene coverage in Berlin.

**FILMS**

USIA has produced 7 documentary films and 24 newsreels on Berlin and distributed them in 35 languages to 106 countries.

The President’s UN address was filmed and 16 mm. prints were air-expressed to 95 countries abroad; a 35 mm. film of the speech highlights, with visual cut-ins to illustrate the President’s words, was distributed worldwide in 29 languages. Earlier, the same procedure was used with the President’s July 25 speech. Upwards of 900 prints of each of these films are currently in circulation abroad.

“Journey Across Berlin”, a 20-minute documentary providing a comprehensive roundup of the Berlin situation, was released worldwide in 30 languages. Showings have had a great impact abroad. Bolivia’s biggest newspaper called it “a sensational documentary”. Rome’s TV showed it to an estimated audience of five million. In Copenhagen

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\(^3\) For the text of the President’s address, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961*, pp. 618–626.

\(^4\) The President’s radio and television report to the U.S. people regarding the crisis in Berlin was delivered from the White House at 10 p.m. the evening of July 25. For the text, see ibid., pp. 533–540.
and Reykjavik, leading theaters showed it to widely approving audiences. Mogadiscio called for more prints in Arabic and Italian. Rio reported that 1,400 theaters across the country showed it, called for 15 additional Portuguese prints, said “the demand is fantastic”. The film proved so popular in the 2,000-seat Buyuk Theater in Ankara that it was held over for ten days despite customary change of feature film every five days.

Another film, “Promise to History”, a 10-minute documentary based on the President’s July 25 Berlin speech, was seen by 70,000 in Turkey and caused a box office rush in Monrovia, Liberia. “Day of Denial” dealt with the August 13 Sector closing in Berlin and was shown by 1,200 theaters in Brazil and over 1,000 in the Argentine. “They are not Alone”, a 10-minute film of the visit of Vice President Johnson and the arrival of U.S. troops in Berlin was seen in 80 theaters in Ceylon, for example, by an audience of 350,000 to 400,000, was shown in 1,040 theaters in the Argentine. Others included “Ask Those Who Know”, a 20-minute documentary, pegged to Berlin, on worldwide refugees from Communism and “Hour of Challenge”, an adaptation with illustrative visuals of the President’s UN address.

News stories and features have regularly been placed in USIA’s popular monthly film magazine, “Today”, showing in over 1,300 theaters to an estimated annual audience of 30 million in 30 countries in Africa. Such features included “Berlin Through African Eyes”, a film depicting the Berlin situation as eyewitnessed by visiting Africans.

TELEVISION

In addition to television adaptations of USIA films, the following has been done purely for TV:

“Anatomy of Aggression”, a half-hour documentary linking Communist pressures in Berlin to Communist aggression worldwide, was distributed in Spanish, Portuguese and English to 67 posts in 51 countries. “Focus Berlin, Barbed Wire World”, a quarter-hour documentary, was distributed to 54 posts in 38 countries.

Special on-camera reports from Latin American students in Berlin have been included in several editions of “Panorama Panamericano”, a weekly quarter-hour public affairs TV program in Spanish and Portuguese, which is televised regularly in 36 cities of 18 Latin American

countries. The programs reach an estimated total audience of about 12 million Latin Americans weekly.

PRESS & PUBLICATIONS

Since the mounting of Communist pressures against Berlin in mid-summer, USIA’s worldwide press service has been radio-teletyping heavy daily coverage, including features, commentaries, backgrounders and reference material for placement by overseas posts in local newspapers and magazines. This material is filed in English, Spanish and French to 90 key USIA offices where it is translated and adapted for local use in the five major world areas.

The President’s Berlin speeches were teletyped to USIA overseas posts shortly after he finished speaking, with the result that several dozen leading newspapers—from Oslo to Lima, and Karachi to Tokyo—carried the texts in full. Hundreds of other papers carried extensive extracts, summaries and highlights—made possible by rapid USIA-provided translations.

Many of the Agency’s 85 field-produced magazines and newspapers have regularly been carrying illustrated articles dealing with the Berlin question. These publications have an aggregate circulation of 2,780,000 in 55 countries. The Agency’s cartoon continuity, “It’s a Fact”, seen by over 100 million readers of 1,246 newspapers in 56 countries, has carried panels on Berlin. Field posts have received more than 100 different photos of Berlin developments for reproduction and placement locally.

The radio-teletype network has regularly cross-played useful domestic and foreign editorial comment around the world as a means of informing its audience of what their near and distant neighbors are saying about Berlin. Interviews, lectures, speeches, on-the-spot accounts by Asian, African and Latin American visitors to Berlin, columns and other features have also been continuously reported around the world in support of the U.S. position. Opinion surveys demonstrating U.S. and free world firmness on Berlin have been filed around the world.

A special illustrated packet of 15 background articles on the post-war history of Berlin, legal aspects, refugees and Communist oppression in East Berlin was sent to all posts for adaptation and placement. Post dispatches reported very heavy usage.

In addition to placement of the President’s speeches, overseas posts have reported heavy and continuing use of USIA-provided materials.

Some samples:

The Italian illustrated weekly, “Orizzonti”, used 13 Agency-supplied photos. Upper Volta’s only printed newspaper, the weekly “Carrefour Africain”, used four Agency photos to illustrate a summary of
the situation. “Correio de Manha”, one of Brazil’s leading dailies, front-paged on consecutive days a two-part series on Berlin. Lahore reported that seven different Agency columns on Berlin appeared in full in seven Urdu-language papers; ten other papers used the USIA feature, “Berlin—Focal Point of International Tension”.

Delhi reported that five local papers carried an Agency backgrounder on East German refugees. A leading Hindi paper serialized the Berlin pamphlet. “La Presse” of Tunis carried three different USIA features; papers in Jidda, Saigon, Tehran and Freetown extensively used Agency articles and photographs; and Chilean newspapers used more than 30 Agency photographs. “El Imparcial”, biggest Guatemala daily, published a series of 12 USIA articles on Berlin. Nairobi reported that Kenyan newspapers used twenty Agency-supplied illustrated articles in September alone.

The President’s speeches were reproduced in illustrated pamphlets. The July 25 speech was distributed in over 300,000 copies in multiple languages abroad. Nearly 200,000 copies of the September 25 speech were issued regionally as pamphlets in two dozen languages by the USIA publications centers in Beirut and Manila.

Dispatches from field posts reported these actions, taken within 24 hours of the event: USIS Belgrade distributed 1,600 copies of the President’s UN speech in Serbo-Croat to Yugoslav opinion leaders; USIS Dacca distributed 30,000 copies in Bengali throughout East Pakistan; USIS Istanbul distributed 5,000 copies of the Turkish translation, Moscow Embassy mailed translations of the text to 3,000 selected people in the USSR.

OTHER ACTIVITIES

USIA information centers, 261 of them in 80 countries, featured special window displays, with photographs, charts and texts, on the Berlin situation; featured books and magazine articles on the subject in their libraries; sponsored lectures, seminars and forums on Berlin.

Some 150 U.S. business firms responded to the USIA suggestion that they distribute pamphlet material to their representatives abroad. They requested some 3,000 copies of the State Department pamphlet, “Background Berlin—1961”.

The Agency has been working with the Berlin city government which has assisted the travel to Berlin of foreign leaders to see the situation for themselves. More than 750 personalities and newsmen from 80 countries were received in Berlin in the six weeks following August 13. A special illustrated Berlin pamphlet, in picture-magazine format with dramatic photographs, is being distributed abroad in some two million copies in 11 languages with USIA assistance.
63. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


We can expect a major propaganda attack by the communist bloc in the event that defoliant operations are undertaken in Viet-Nam. We should be able to cope with propaganda repercussions arising from defoliation of guerrilla hide-out areas, border areas and roadsides. But chemical attacks on crops would, in my opinion, put us in an altogether different position with respect to world opinion, especially in the newly developing countries where food has been a perennial problem. There would appear to be a strong possibility that destruction of food crops would be interpreted largely as an effort to suppress a disaffected Viet-Nam population.

The campaign we would face might compare in stridency with the communists’ “germ warfare” charges during the Korean war and the “potato bug” furor they stirred up in Eastern Europe about the same time.

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/61–12/61. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Neilson. (National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Field Far East [IAF] 1961)

2 In a November 21 memorandum to the President, Gilpatric stated that Diem had asked for U.S. support of a defoliation program in Vietnam. The memorandum outlined the operation of such a program, noted the advantages and disadvantages, and recommended that the President approve an option that involved a “selective and carefully controlled program starting with the clearance of key routes, proceeding thereafter to food denial only if the most careful basis of resettlement and alternative food supply has been created, and holding Zone D [25 miles northeast of Saigon] and the border areas until we have realistic possibilities of immediate military exploitation.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Box 332, National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]; NSAM 115, Defoliant Operations in Vietnam) Rusk, in a November 24 memorandum to the President, indicated that he concurred with Gilpatric’s memorandum and recommended that the President approve the program and the option favored by Gilpatric. Rusk’s memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. I, Vietnam, 1961, Document 275.

3 In his November 24 memorandum to the President (see footnote 2, above), Rusk stated: “We will, of course, be the object of an intense Communist ‘germ warfare’ campaign which may be picked up by some neutrals. You will recall that this was the case during the Korean war although the Communist charges had no factual basis whatever. “On the other hand, I am satisfied that successful plant-killing operations in Viet-Nam, carefully coordinated with and incidental to larger operations, can be of substantial assistance in the control and defeat of the Viet Cong.”
It might well compare the new dimension of chemical food-killing with the American use of atomic weapons against Asians in Japan—tie us, in effect, to another “first” in warfare.4

I fear we would be deluding ourselves if we hope to escape blame for these actions by having them carried out by Vietnamese planes and pilots. Leaflets to loyal inhabitants of affected areas would be helpful locally, but would make little difference in our world-opinion problem.

In the event that you decide we must carry out chemical operations against crops, I concur with the Secretary of State that we take every step possible to get the technical facts of non-toxicity-to-humans across before we are put in a defensive position. I would hope our emphasis throughout could be on what the insurgents are trying to do to Vietnam, keeping our tactics in the perspective of necessary steps to combat a mortal threat to that country’s independence.5

Edward R. Murrow

4 Reference is to U.S. dropping of atomic bombs on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945.

5 NSAM No. 115, signed by Bundy on November 30 and addressed to Rusk and McNamara, indicated that the President had approved the recommendations made by Gilpatric and Rusk and had “further agreed that there should be careful prior consideration and authorization by Washington of any plans developed by CINCPAC and the country team under this authority before such plans are executed.” (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Box 332, National Security Action Memoranda [NSAM]: NSAM 115, Defoliant Operations in Vietnam)
Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Battle) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)

Washington, November 30, 1961

SUBJECT
Report to the President on International Cultural Presentations Program

The following is in response to the President's November 15 telephone request to Assistant Secretary Coombs for a report on the current International Cultural Presentations Program and future plans for the Program.

Since it began, in July 1954, the International Cultural Presentations Program has put before some 15 million people in almost every country in the world for them to see for themselves an authentic part of life in the United States. In this program, we have not made an argument or drawn a picture. We have exported actual examples, more than two hundred of them, of American excellence in the performing arts and sports. The performing groups—3/4 of them in music, dance, and theatre, and 1/4 in sports—have been well received abroad, nearly always with enthusiasm, appreciation, and respect, and not infrequently, with openly expressed admiration. (Lists of the attractions exported and where they have gone are attached.)

Moreover, this program is effective everywhere. The Philadelphia Orchestra dazzled Paris; Louis Armstrong conquered sub-Sahara Africa; the University of Michigan Band triumphed in the Soviet Union. For the people of the western, economically advanced nations, our cultural presentations are a reminder of a common cultural inheritance, as well as a demonstration that we have respected and nurtured that

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 296, Cultural and Social Activities, General, 9/61–12/61. No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum; another copy of the memorandum indicates that it was drafted by Isenbergh on November 20 and Wakefield on November 22, retyped in S/S–RO on November 27, and approved by Ericson. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/11–3061) In the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, Bundy wrote: “pass to Mrs. Lincoln for President’s reading. Only specific issue is whether President wants to support budget increase recommended on p. 2.” Bundy sent the memorandum to the President under a November 30 covering memorandum. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 296, Cultural and Social Activities, General, 9/61–12/61)

2 Not printed is the undated listing entitled “Projects Completed and Approved for Assistance from beginning, July 1954, through June 1961: FY–1955 through FY–1961.” The listing includes a geographical breakdown by area and country and lists both cultural and sports events.
inheritance, with consequent strengthening of traditional ties. To the people of the new nations, our cultural presentations demonstrate that in building our own nation we have not confined our best efforts to material and technological advancement, as many of them tend to believe. With the people of the Soviet bloc, to whom other channels are few and narrow, they are a direct and persuasive communication of shared devotion to cultural values transcending political differences.

In comparison with our international economic and military programs, cultural presentations are inexpensive; total costs have averaged about $2\frac{1}{2}$ million dollars a year. It is unlikely that cost for cost they can be matched by many other programs in gaining prestige, respect, and good will for the United States. More and better use of international cultural presentations is called for as a matter of prudent allocation of the resources the nation devotes to foreign relations.

Five immediate steps are contemplated to make the International Cultural Presentations Program more effective:

1. **Increase the scale.** Doubling of the current $2\frac{1}{2}$ million dollar budget is recommended for FY 1963, to be followed by $2\frac{1}{2}$ million dollar annual increments until the scale of operations is at least four times present dimensions.  

2. **Improve the quality.** It is not suggested that the performing artists and athletes who have gone abroad in this program up to now have been inferior. On the contrary, they have been, by and large, the best of their kind. The improved quality recommended here is of a different order: it involves more attention to the types of audiences desired and to the suitability of each performing group for those particular audiences. Up to now the program has predominantly, but by no means

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3 Bundy placed two parallel lines in the left-hand margin next to this sentence and drew an arrow pointing to the lines. In his November 30 covering memorandum (see footnote 1, above), Bundy indicated that the Bureau of the Budget had rejected Coombs’ request, as Coombs “has not yet made a good case” for specific uses and had not “worked out effective relations” with AID. Bundy recommended that the President “hint to Coombs that if he could get Hamilton’s support for a modest increase in his budget, you might approve it.” The President neither approved nor disapproved either the budget increase or the proposal that AID Administrator Hamilton review and support a modest increase in the budget.
uniformly, made the elite associated with political power, wealth, and social standing its typical audience, and performing groups suitable for this kind of audience have tended to dominate. The following changes of emphasis, accepted as policies of the program within recent months and already affecting its complexion, should continue:

(a) Give highest priority to youth, labor, and intellectuals as target audiences.

(b) Send out more attractions suited for these audiences. To the fullest extent possible without relaxing standards of performance, performing groups should be drawn from academic and labor circles and from the ranks of young artists in the early stages of their careers. Use of such performers in relatively small groups coupled with more sparing use of the most expensive large groups such as the major symphony orchestras (unless the costs are partially borne by non-government sources) would, of course, permit any given amount of funds to go further in reaching these special target audiences.

3. Strengthen the administrative organization and advisory machinery.

The following measures are required here:

(a) Enlarge and reinforce the State Department staff concerned with operations of the program. The unit of the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs which now has responsibility for operations is made up of three professionals and five clerical or stenographic employees. Augmentation of this staff with people experienced in production or management in the performing arts is essential.

(b) Improve outside agency arrangements. The Government’s major agent in the conduct of the program is the American National Theatre and Academy (ANTA). ANTA also maintains three specialized expert panels to pass on the artistic competence of performers for the program. Examination of both of these aspects of ANTA’s role is under way to determine whether modifications should be made.

(c) Strengthen United States cultural affairs offices abroad. In the field, administrative responsibility for this program falls upon the Cultural Affairs Officer, in most posts a USIA officer heading a one-man office heavily burdened with other cultural activities. The need for more qualified personnel in the cultural affairs staffs abroad is already acute. With expansion of the program it will be imperative.

(d) Reestablish a strong statutory Advisory Committee on the Arts. The Fulbright-Hays Act$^4$ retains the Advisory Committee on the Arts established by the Trade Fair Participation and Cultural Exchange Act of 1956.$^5$ Because of the expiration of the terms of all members on

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$^4$ See footnote 2, Document 52.

$^5$ See footnote 7, Document 2.
January 15, 1962, the opportunity to establish a new committee of “giants” in this field is presented. It is recommended that the ten new members be selected from the outstanding people in this field and that the reestablished Committee be called upon not only to advise the State Department and the USIA on international cultural activities but also, at the President’s discretion, to advise him on national and international cultural questions.

4. Establish administrative machinery for the reverse flow of cultural presentations. The Fulbright-Hays Act gives to the Federal Government for the first time authority to provide financial support for the importation on a non-profit basis of cultural presentations from abroad. The first appropriation to give effect to this authority will be sought next year.

5. Make systematic effort to enlist private support for international cultural activities. It is believed that at least two sources of private help can be tapped to a sufficient extent to strengthen the program significantly: (1) outstanding performing artists may offer their services at nominal or no cost; and (2) individual and corporate donors as well as foundations may contribute to the costs of sending large performing groups abroad, thereby permitting more use of our more spectacular attractions than would be possible under an exclusively government-financed program. The preliminary exploration of these possibilities, begun in recent months, should be followed as soon as feasible by establishment of the administrative organization necessary for marshalling these potential assets.

L.D. Battle

6 Brubeck signed for Battle above Battle’s typed signature.
65. Memorandum of Record\textsuperscript{1}


The following is an agreed summary of the results of a discussion November 30, 1961, among Mr. Murrow, Mr. Sorensen, Mr. Loomis and appropriate members of their staffs on the subject of Voice of America news policy (not including other programming):

1. Voice of America news programs will continue to be accurate, objective and comprehensive. They will emphasize positive material which supports U.S. objectives and minimize material detrimental to U.S. objectives, consistent with maintaining the credibility and acceptability of the VOA as a reliable news source.

2. The treatment—relative length, emphasis, placement—of stories in VOA news output is properly a matter for post-audit and long-term guidance resulting from such post-audit.

3. Total bans on the use of news in the public domain shall be applied as sparingly as possible. Such bans may be applied in the first instance by the Assistant Manager for Policy Application (VOA), or the Chief News Guidance Officer (IOP). They may be appealed immediately to the Assistant Manager for Policy Application (VOA), the Chief News Guidance Officer (IOP), the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, and the Director, in that order.

Thomas C. Sorensen
Deputy Director (Policy and Plans)

\textsuperscript{1} Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1962–1963, Entry UD WW 173, Box 7, Broadcasting—General (IBS) 1962. No classification marking. Drafted on January 10, 1962. Smith initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote “1/15” next to his initials. Wilson also initialed the memorandum.

SUBJECT

Castro's Standing in Latin America

In answer to the two questions you posed recently, new survey data from five major Latin American cities indicates that

1) Opinions of Fidel Castro, already low when measured last January,\(^2\) trended slightly lower by November.

2) Castro's standing—the influence people think he has—is lowered when the people, particularly the educated, hear less about him from top U.S. officials.

The November survey in Rio de Janeiro, Bogota,\(^3\) Buenos Aires, and Montevideo included 400 interviews in each city. Additional data came from a survey already underway in Mexico City.

(Since the survey vehicle was in the field, a number of other questions were added to determine attitudes toward the U.S., the Alianza, land and tax reforms, and American business. In view of your projected trip,\(^4\) this information with emphasis on the Colombian answers, will be sent to you later this week.)\(^5\)

While comparisons of opinions of Castro in the January and November surveys show little change, many respondents when asked the direct question, felt their opinion of him had dropped. Percentages of those who thought so were 18 per cent in Rio, 25 in Mexico City, 28 in Montevideo, 29 in Buenos Aires, and 35 in Bogota. Between 5 and 6 per cent in all cities thought their opinion of him had gone up.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 6, Field Latin America (IAL) 1961 October–December. Confidential. Drafted by Oren Stephens. Wilson sent the memorandum to Goodwin under a December 12 covering memorandum, in which he indicated that the President "asked us to conduct a survey to assess Castro's present standing in Latin America. We tacked on to the Castro questions some further questions about the Alliance for Progress." (Ibid.)

2 See Document 55 and footnote 2 thereto.

3 In his October 20 memorandum to the President (see Document 55). Wilson indicated that Lima, rather than Bogota, would be one of the survey sites.

4 The President traveled to Caracas and met with Betancourt December 16–17 and then traveled to Bogota and met with Lleras Camargo on December 17. For the memorandum of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Documents 124, 125, 334, and 335.

5 Not found.
Asked whether Castro’s government sets a good example for their countries, majorities did not think so. The percentages were 50 in Rio, 58 in Montevideo, 55 in Buenos Aires, and 74 in Bogota. From 6 to 13 per cent favored his example.

While the overwhelming majority were opposed or indifferent to Castro, this does not mean the general populace opposes radical social and economic change. Previous surveys have shown that proposals to break up large estates and to expropriate foreign (and even locally-owned) property have had more appeal than the Castro symbolism.

Although not sold themselves on Castroism, 3 or 4 in 10 think Castro and those who support him have substantial influence in Latin America. The Fidelista movement, consequently, may benefit from this image of strength. However, when asked the direct question, more people think his influence is decreasing than think it is increasing. An exception is Bogota where 36 per cent think his influence is growing in Latin America, 32 think it is declining, 24 think it remains the same.

The effect of the policy of ignoring Castro was difficult to pin down because, while the highest U.S. officials said less, the overall anti-Castro barrage continued heavy.

Only a minority have the impression that high U.S. officials have been saying less about Castro lately. Among the university-educated, however, there was an awareness that high U.S. officials had been saying less about Castro, since this elite group could distinguish between top-level U.S. statements and the run of anti-Castro material.

Correlating the awareness and influence data suggests that top-level reticence works more effectively with the sophisticated, whereas the general population may react more effectively to a heavy flow of Castro criticism.

Edward R. Murrow

6 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
67. Memorandum From the Director of the United States
Information Agency (Murrow) to Secretary of State Rusk


Our experience at the Paris NATO meetings earlier this month has brought us to serious concern at the inadequacies of U.S. press handling at such international meetings. Roger Tubby, Arthur Sylvester and I discussed the problems involved and I would like to offer the following suggestions that we believe essential to a more effective presentation of the U.S. position.

There is no way to prevent U.S. and foreign newsmen from learning by one means or another what takes place at a multinational conference. To try to conceal the main lines of ministerial discussion has persistently proved impossible.

Reporters must write. They will write what they get whether its source is U.S. or foreign. If they get little, their speculation will compound public confusion. If they get nothing from the U.S. side, they will parrot the line of our conference partners.

U.S. acquiescence in ground rules that lead to “no background for the press” has repeatedly resulted only in obfuscating the U.S. position but has never hampered our treaty partners from quickly and clearly making known their position.

We must assume a permanent posture that the press be informed, within security limitations, of the U.S. position. We must not agree with our allies to conceal the main lines of the proceedings because it is contrary to our principle that the people have a right to know, because it results only in confusion in press reporting, and because long experience has shown that the U.S. is the only government to abide by such agreements. There will be opposition to this posture from our allies; it is essential, however, that we take a position of leadership in this respect as well as in that of policy determination.

The mechanics of communicating the U.S. position are not complex. They require:

That the principal U.S. briefing officer be present at all sessions even though no subsequent briefing is to be made;

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1961, Entry UD WW 142, Box 7, Government Agencies—State, Department of, 1961 Aug–Dec. Confidential. Drafted by Murrow; cleared by Sylvester and Tubby. Harris initialed for both Sylvester and Tubby. A copy was sent to Salinger.

2 The NATO Ministerial meeting was held December 13–15.
That USIS public affairs officers, who are intimately familiar with the press of their countries, have opportunity for an adequate fill-in on a continuing basis from the principal briefing officer;

That overnight intelligence be systematically collected (USIS officers can provide précis of what the other delegations are saying and how the press is reacting) and be evaluated for presentation to the Secretary’s morning staff meeting;

And that background press briefings be held, occasionally before, but always during and after such conferences by senior U.S. officers so that we can seek to direct and nourish press coverage rather than try to correct distortions afterwards.

Edward R. Murrow

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

68. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy


Jamming of the Russian language version of your State of the Union Message showed an interesting and somewhat self-contradictory pattern.

The only section dealing with domestic affairs which was completely jammed was—significantly enough—the passage on agriculture. The first two paragraphs on equal rights were jammed, but the

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1/62–6/62. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House at 9:07 a.m. on January 15. Evelyn Lincoln sent a copy back to Wilson under a January 15 covering note, noting: “The President asked me to send you the enclosed copy of your memorandum with the suggestion that you give the marked paragraph to the press.” (Ibid.) An unsigned copy of Wilson’s memorandum is in the Kennedy Library, United States Information Agency Records (RG 306), Series 1, Records, 1961–1964, Box 1, Memoranda 1961–1964 [1 of 3].

2 The President delivered the State of the Union message before a joint session of Congress on January 11. For the text of the message, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 5–15.
remainder, and all the subsequent passages dealing with social security, were clear. 3

On foreign affairs, the statement of the basic U.S. goal, “a peaceful world community of free and independent states,” and our five basic sources of strength was completely jammed.

Your discussion of the military buildup and the United Nations were not jammed. The passages on the Alliance for Progress and Latin America, the Peace Corps, Food for Peace, and Laos were all blacked out, but the statement on Berlin was not.

Virtually all discussion of the Atlantic Community, the Common Market, and trade policy was jammed.

However, the restatement of basic policy in the closing paragraphs, a free community of nations, was not jammed.

The pattern was clearly deliberate since it was identical on five separate broadcasts.

Donald M. Wilson

3 An unknown hand placed a bracket in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph. The bracketed paragraph is the one mentioned in Lincoln’s January 15 covering memorandum (see footnote 1, above).

69. Circular Airgram From the United States Information Agency to All Principal USIS Posts 1


SUBJECT

China Reporting Program

Stepped-up Communist Chinese propaganda activities, especially in newly-developing countries in Africa, Asia and Latin America, have heightened the need for information materials to counter these efforts.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Alphabetical Subject Files Containing Policy Guidance, 1953–1961, Entry UD WW 199, Box 165, China (Communist) (to 1965). Confidential. Drafted by Battey and Moceri on January 10; cleared in draft by Ehrman, Glatzer, Battey, George Mann, and in IAL; approved by Anderson. Sent via pouch.
The China Reporting Program (CRP) conducted by USIS Hong Kong is a unique and major source of factual, corrective reporting on conditions in Communist China. The program was initiated in 1956 to provide U.S. Missions, USIS posts and foreign educational institutions, media and government officials with credible, authoritative, readable material on the policies, programs and methods of the Peiping regime.

Evidence is accumulating that AFP and Reuters, the only major non-communist news agencies filing from Peiping, are able to maintain their operations there only through observance of severe restrictions on the type of material they file. This augments the importance of the CRP as a world source of accurate material on Communist China.

The Agency calls the attention of the Post to the four basic types of output comprising the CRP described below. While many posts have been making effective use of some of this output, it is requested that all posts review possibilities of using types of materials not previously used. Costs of CRP materials are borne by USIS Hong Kong and not chargeable to the GOE of USIS posts in receiving countries.

CRP materials are non-US-attributed. Posts should not think in terms of CRP materials as “handouts” but as materials which should get into local circulation and use through whatever channels would be most effective, e.g., direct mail from Hong Kong (Has the post provided Hong Kong with all potentially useful addresses for direct mail?); cooperation of other elements of the Country Team; distribution by other governments; or commercial sale. As CRP are non-US-attributed, direct mailing is made from private sources in Hong Kong and not from USIS Hong Kong.

The four basic types of CRP output are as follows:

1. **Current Scene**—“In-depth” feature articles issued two or three times each month depending on the availability of material. Now received by 54 USIS posts and 800 individual addressees which posts and other sources have provided. A representative issue of Current Scene is attached.2

2. **China Report**—Short articles, issued as available, for press and magazine placement. 54 posts now using.

3. **English Language Books**—Non-fiction and fiction by Chinese and other foreign authors, published by established commercial outlets in Hong Kong. Now provided on order to 108 USIS posts. 56 titles published to date. Language rights available on request. Version of one or more titles in Arabic, Urdu, Bengali, Hindi, Spanish, German, Italian,

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2 Not attached.
French, Japanese, Vietnamese and Indonesian have been undertaken by field posts.

(4) Research Backgrounders—Hard-bound reference works on topics of long-range interest (Religion in Communist China, Land Problems, Tibet, the Sino-Indian Border Issue), for academic and research institutions, scholars, libraries.

Posts are requested to review opportunities which may exist for wider exploitation of these materials. Local translation or translation at the RSC servicing the post may be feasible and desirable in some instances.

Proposals for expanded use of CRP materials should be sent to USIS Hong Kong and repeated to the Agency in field message form. Proposals involving RSC’s should be addressed for action to the RSC, repeated to Hong Kong and the Agency.

If your review of local distribution possibilities for CRP materials indicates that the program cannot be effectively employed in the host country, so inform the Agency.

A separate communication\(^3\) will describe the Taiwan Reporting Program (TRP) which originates material showing the economic and social progress achieved on Taiwan by the Government of the Republic of China.

For Latin American posts: Centralized selection and translation of CRP materials in Mexico City are planned for the Latin American area. Posts should therefore consider for action only those parts of this message referring to direct mail by Hong Kong CRP sources to potential users, including commercial booksellers, in your countries. Continued or augmented English servicing will be available for those posts so desiring.

Wilson

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\(^3\) Not found.
70. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy

Washington, February 27, 1962.

SUBJECT
Overseas Exhibition of “Friendship 7” Space Capsule

We can make a terrific impact abroad by exhibiting Colonel Glenn’s “Friendship 7” space capsule in key countries. I understand NASA is prepared to make it available for such showings. USIA is prepared to manage all aspects of the tour if the Air Force can make a plane available to transport the capsule.

(The Russians have sent Gagarin and Titov to various foreign countries but I do not believe we should exhibit Glenn like a trained seal. He should go back to work with his fellow astronauts; his flight was only one step in our advancing space program.)

We propose to fly the capsule to some or all of the following cities for one to three days showing:

1. Moscow. (If the Soviets agree, the world will note their failure to show their capsules even to their own people, whereas we are willing to show ours even to the Russians.) Ambassador Thompson has already requested it be included in our “Medicine USA” exhibit.

2. Belgrade. Our man there has asked that the capsule be included in the “Transportation USA” exhibit at the Belgrade Fair in May.

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1/62–6/62. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House on February 27 at 10:35 a.m.

2 Glenn was the first American to orbit the Earth, aboard Friendship 7, on February 20. On February 21, Khrushchev sent the President a letter congratulating him and the American people. The letter is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VI, Kennedy–Khrushchev Exchanges, Document 35.

3 Titov orbited the Earth in August 1961.

4 Soviet officials rejected the American proposal to include the capsule as part of the “Medicine USA” exhibit in Leningrad in June 1962. (Max Frankel, “Soviet Bars Exhibit of Glenn Capsule,” The New York Times, May 9, 1962, p. 10)

5 Friendship 7 arrived in Belgrade on May 21. (“Glenn Capsule in Belgrade,” The New York Times, May 22, 1962, p. 34) On May 22, Tito opened the “Transportation USA” exhibit and viewed the capsule. According to The New York Times: “Marshal Tito peppered the technicians accompanying the capsule with questions. Where was the heat shield? Where was the parachute? How did Colonel Glenn see out? After demonstrating how the capsule worked, the technicians presented him with a model of the vehicle.” (“Tito Views Glenn Capsule And Becomes Space Buff,” May 23, 1962, p. 9)
5. Lagos 13. Manila
6. Accra 14. Tokyo
7. Abidjan (or Rabat) 15. Buenos Aires
10. New Delhi 18. Mexico City

Purpose of this memorandum is to obtain your approval of the project, and your support of our request for the capsule and an Air Force plane.  

Edward R. Murrow

6 According to a memorandum prepared in the USIA Office of Public Information on October 28, 1963, which summarized changes in USIA since March 1961, the capsule toured 23 countries between April and August 1962 and garnered record crowds. The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 156.

71. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


SUBJECT

Handling of Polling Data

In a conference [name not declassified] yesterday we agreed to a procedure for safer handling of politically-sensitive polling data. In the future I will screen the questionnaires of projected surveys. If some questions seem dangerously sensitive, we will take them out of our surveys [2 lines not declassified] The resultant information will be available to the government. [less than 1 line not declassified]

Edward R. Murrow

1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1961–1962. Secret.
72. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Europe, United States Information Agency (Cody) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

New US–USSR Agreement on Exchanges

A new Agreement on Exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union was signed here yesterday.\(^2\) Negotiations had been conducted for five weeks. The new Agreement provides for a continuation of exchanges in various fields for another two-year period. In most respects it is similar to the previous Agreement\(^3\) although we feel we were able to attain certain improvements in the present Agreement which do not necessarily increase exchanges quantitatively but which do give us a better opportunity to control the exchanges taking place under the Agreement.

Specifically USIA is involved in the following exchanges:

1. *Amerika—USSR*:\(^4\) It was agreed to increase circulation from 50,000 to 100,000 per month on a gradual basis, 10,000 at a time. This will give us the opportunity to observe how the increase will work out and to stop the increase if we get too many returns.

2. *Exhibitions*: The new Agreement provides for further exchanges of three exhibitions. We will present the following subjects: a) Technical Books;\(^5\) b) Graphic Art (Prints and Drawings);\(^6\) c) Communications.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1962–1963, Entry UD WW 173, Box 9, FIELD—Europe—(IAE) 1962. No classification marking. Murrow initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum, as did Harris on March 12.


\(^3\) See footnote 5, Document 13.

\(^4\) Reference is to an illustrated monthly magazine published in Russian that depicted life in the United States and a magazine published in English that chronicled Soviet art, culture, science, and history.


\(^6\) “Graphic Arts USA,” exhibited in Alma Ata in 1963.
These exhibitions will be shown in three to four cities for periods of three to four weeks. As you know, this was a major sticking point in the negotiations since the Soviets first did not want to accept the themes we offered them, next did not want to have any themes mentioned so as to delay concrete exhibit arrangements later and finally even indicated that they would prefer not to have any exhibitions exchanged at all.

3. Radio-TV: The present Agreement provides for a continuation of the exchanges of radio and TV documentary programs and newsreels which have taken place during the last two years. This will include one TV documentary per month, one thirty-minute radio program per month, and two TV newsreels per month.

4. Films: The present Agreement continues the purchase and sales arrangements of feature films and the exchange of documentary films.

I will be in touch with the Media Directors regarding implementation of these exchanges.

Other than those exchanges with which USIA is particularly concerned, you may be interested that the Agreement provides for major performing arts exchanges (Benny Goodman, New York City Ballet and Robert Shaw Chorale on our side; Bolshoi Ballet, Ukrainian Folk Dance Ensemble and the Leningrad Symphony on the Soviet side); it provides for a continuation of the student exchange, for exchanges in the fields of industry, technology, construction, trade, agriculture, public health, medicine and between groups of people representing certain professions (law, journalists) and various fields of culture as well as youth and women. Both Parties also agree to facilitate the visits of members of Congress and deputies of the Supreme Soviet (respectively) as well as of other local and national governmental bodies. These, however, will not be exchanges as such.

7 In airgram A–32 from Moscow, July 10, the Embassy summarized Benny Goodman’s May 28–July 8, 1962, tour of the Soviet Union, noting: “Despite myriad trials and tribulations, the tour should be considered a success.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 032 Goodman, Benny Band/7–10/62)

8 In a November 19 memorandum to the President, Murrow provided excerpts of Soviet reporting concerning the opening performance of the Bolshoi Ballet in Washington on November 13 and the troupe’s subsequent activities while in Washington. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA, 7/62–12/62)
A News Policy Note has been issued and an Infoguide is going out to all posts today giving policy guidance on the Agreement.

Morrill Cody

9 Cody signed “Bill” above his typed signature.

73. Letter From Secretary of State Rusk to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)


Dear Ed:

You will recall that last August the President asked you and a number of other officials to examine United States effectiveness in the field of propaganda-political warfare. On September 19, you and the other members of the Ad Hoc Committee agreed on a number of recommendations in this field which were then approved by the President.

The key recommendations were: 1) that I appoint a Special Assistant for Special Projects “to give full time to the coordination and overall supervision of all United States resources in the propaganda-political warfare field”, and 2) that I “call upon the other federal agencies with a capability in this field to contribute a senior official to form an interdepartmental task force to work under the Special Assistant”.

In accordance with these recommendations, I have placed this responsibility in the Office of the Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Mr. George McGhee. Mr. William J. Jorden has been appointed to the post of special assistant to carry out this assignment in the field of propaganda-political warfare. Since August 1961, Mr. Jorden has been a member of the Department’s Policy Planning Council. Before that, he was a journalist and foreign correspondent for The New York Times.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/3-962. No classification marking. Drafted by Jorden on March 8.
2 See footnote 2, Document 51.
3 See Document 51.
and served for many years in the Far East, in Moscow and in Washington.

In accordance with the second recommendation, I would appreciate your letting me know the name of an official of your agency who may work with Mr. Jorden in laying out policy lines and actions programs that will advance the United States’ cause in the field of psychological-political warfare.

Any ideas or recommendations you may have in connection with this effort, now or in the future, will be most welcome.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

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4 Printed from a copy that indicates that Rusk signed the original.

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74. Memorandum From Attorney General Kennedy to President Kennedy


As I traveled from country to country around the world I found that the Berlin Wall is the most effective argument against the communist system. People in every part of the world recognize the Wall as an admission of defeat by the communists.

This was made clear to me in Indonesia where I met, shortly before leaving, with a group of 25 young people. One of their spokesmen had

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1962–1963, Entry UD WW 173, Box 9, FIELD—Europe—Berlin 1962. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Rusk and Murrow. A typewritten note at the top of the first page of the memorandum reads: “Copy for E.R. Murrow.” Both Murrow and Reed Harris initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Harris wrote “4/2” next to his initials.

2 On February 1, the Attorney General departed Washington on a goodwill trip to Japan, Indonesia, Hong Kong, Iran, Italy, the Federal Republic of Germany, and the Netherlands. For information, see Anthony Lewis, “Robert Kennedy Begins One-Month Goodwill Trip Around the World,” The New York Times, February 2, 1962, pp. 1, 4 and William H. Stringer, “Robert Kennedy Unpacks Ideas,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 1, 1962, p. 1. Excerpts from Kennedy’s addresses at the University of Gadja Mada, Nihon University, the University of Indonesia, Free University of Berlin, and Beethoven Hall in Bonn, are printed in Department of State Bulletin, May 7, 1962, pp. 761–763.
ready justification for Red China’s action in Tibet, or Russian action in Hungary. But he had no ready answer to the Wall.

“We don’t want to discuss these details,” was his response.

Not one of his colleagues questioned him, and looking at their faces I could not discern even a trace of opposition to the colonialism of the Soviet Union or of Communist China. This new modern form of colonialism clearly was not something to be discussed.

Yet, after the meeting, four or five of the young people came to my room. Their attitude was completely different. They admitted quite frankly that they had not spoken up at the meeting because these subjects just never were discussed in public. Quite clearly, they were completely intimidated by the communists.

This was a most significant admission. Their reluctance to state their views before their friends touches the core of our problem with students and intellectuals abroad.

There is vocal opposition to the United States and to our way of life in those foreign countries. Invariably, it is well organized. The communists have their well-disciplined cadres. They have a party line which they follow rigidly. They know exactly what they think. They know exactly what they are for and what they are against. Usually, their leaders are energetic, courageous, unyielding and articulate.

Very often they represent the minority of a student body or of a particular organization. But they have fixed objectives. They know what they want. They know where they are going. And they are willing to use any tools, any devices, any means to obtain their ends.

Against this, as was the case at my meeting in Indonesia, there is usually no one to raise questions against their party line. There is no organization, no cadres, no disciplined calculated effort to give another side.

And so it is that under circumstances such as these, a small, able, well-trained unit can take over a meeting or an organization ten times its size in numbers. As we have seen over the course of history, such a minority can even seize control of a government or a country.

It is apparent—in Indonesia, in Japan and elsewhere—that the communists have created the impression, not only in Asia but across the world, that the young intellectual is for communism and against our form of democratic society.

The majority in fact is neither communist nor pro-communist. True enough, they are not pro-United States. They have serious questions about our country and our way of life. They frequently don’t understand us. But with all of that, there is a tremendous reservoir of good will toward America and the American people.

This is a reservoir which has not been tapped. To do so in the future, I respectfully submit the following suggestions:
1. To all of these nations, we should send groups of men and women to lecture—not just about the United States and our form of government, or even about democracy generally—but to talk also about history and philosophy and literature and even other more practical matters. Also most importantly, these individuals should go to learn, to listen and ultimately to report to the American people on the aims, aspirations, objectives and problems of the people with whom they meet. These individuals should make tours of as many universities as possible, as well as having conferences with labor leaders, farm and cooperative leaders and government officials. The people who would be sent would have to know the history of the United States, the philosophy of our government and understand the American people.

There are many people who could be sent: Frank Church, Hubert Humphrey, Paul Douglas in the Senate, to mention a few; Cabinet members such as Stewart Udall, Orville Freeman—many members of the House of Representatives, of our state governments, such as Governor Edmondson of Oklahoma or Governor Sanford of North Carolina. I would like to see some of our university professors; some of our authors, playwrights, and poets travel for this purpose. I would like to see a man such as Walter Lippmann go through the countries of the Far East for a month and speak on a number of subjects and answer the questions of students and intellectuals. I believe such an organized program would bring untold dividends.

2. Our government information agencies and services should do more to explain the fundamentals of the United States. I would have them get across what steps in social progress are being made in this country, what people are doing for one another, what contributions charitable organizations are making to the American way of life; what role the Ford Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation play. I would have them speak quite frankly and openly about the problems and difficulties we have within our country and also the efforts being made by the government and the American people to deal with them.

3. Other free countries of the world should be encouraged to set up their own “peace corps” with the understanding that our organization would cooperate closely with them. There is much, for instance, that young Japanese could do in Southeast Asia. I am convinced that they would be willing to do it. Many of the young people in Germany, France and Holland are as anxious as young Americans to help their fellowman in countries less fortunate economically. I found among all the students with whom I talked an idealism and a thirst to make the world a better place in which to live. This is a tremendous potential and it must be harnessed and utilized.

We have many things going for us. Above all, we have truth on our side. As in the case of the Wall, there can be no effective propagandized
answer to the truth—if it is known. This is just an outline—I would be glad to discuss these matters in greater detail.

75. Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs

ACEC/S Document 2
Washington, April 5–6, 1962.

[Omitted here are the title page; emendations to the minutes; the Table of Contents; Section I: Agenda; and Section II: List of Participants.]

III. OFFICIAL COMMISSION BUSINESS

A. Call of the Roll: April 5—All members present
   April 6—All members present except Father Hesburgh

B. Meeting with Secretary Rusk

   The Secretary greeted Congressman Hays and the members of the Commission in the Diplomatic reception room. After a word of welcome he commented briefly on the important role international cultural and educational exchanges play in the foreign policy of the American people. He expressed his appreciation for the willingness of the members to serve on the Commission.

   He referred to the work of the Commission and said “we want you to know that if there is anything at all we can do to support, encourage and stimulate your work, we shall be glad to do it . . . this Commission’s advice, encouragement and criticism are all needed in our work . . . we know there is always room for great improvement and we are searching for those improvements.”

   Congressman Wayne Hays remarked that he was “happy and proud that the President had selected the type of people he has on this

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Commission” and expressed his opinion that educational and cultural exchange programs have great possibilities.

Chairman Gardner thanked the Secretary and Congressman Hays for their friendly words of welcome. On behalf of the Commission he said the members were “serving because of their deep conviction that this is an important job.” He pointed out that their usefulness depended on two factors—(1) “the seriousness of the Commission members,” and (2) “whether the organization will know how to use us—Until proven otherwise, I will accept the notion that they have the wisdom to do so.” (See Attachment 1\(^2\) for full text of these remarks.)

C. Meeting with the President

The President received the Commission in the Cabinet Room at the White House in the presence of several Senators and Congressmen, including Senators Fulbright, Mundt, and Magnuson, and Representatives Hays, Rooney, and McDowell.\(^3\)

After the usual amenities, the Chairman and then Dr. Murphy expressed their views about the Commission’s concern over the lack of an executive order, and the lack of one locus in Government for coordination of educational and cultural programs. The President agreed that the executive order should be issued soon, and went on to encourage the Commission to feel free to advise him and the Congress on any subject considered by the members as important. He solicited views from Senator Fulbright and Representative Rooney, among others, and both responded by remarking on the high caliber of the Commission, Representative Rooney saying in particular that he hoped this Commission would not engage in “waltzing around” as had previous Commissions. This comment led to general agreement that the Commission’s work would not be futile by any means if the Department and the President asked it to engage in important tasks.

After a discussion of some particular aspects of the Department’s exchange program, such as the African students, young labor leaders from Brazil (the President having been asked about the latter by Presi-

\(^2\) Attached but not printed is ACEC/S Document 2 [Attachment 1], “Remarks by Secretary Rusk, Congressman Wayne L. Hays, and Dr. John W. Gardner to Members-Designate of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Thursday, April 5, 1962.”

\(^3\) On April 5, the President met with the Commission at the White House from 12:10 until 12:40 p.m. Senators Humphrey, Sparkman, and McClellan and Representatives Morgan, Bolton, Merrow, Bow, and Zablocki also attended the meeting. (Kennedy Library, President’s Daily Diary) Under an April 4 covering memorandum to the President, Coombs transmitted an undated memorandum containing suggested talking points and background information concerning the April 5 meeting with the Committee. (Kennedy Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Executive, Box 207, FG 750, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational & Cultural Affairs)
dent Goulart\(^4\) only the day before) the meeting broke up with a feeling that the Commission had received a most cordial welcome from the President.

D. Vice Chairman and Executive Committee

Mr. Roy Larsen was approved as Vice Chairman. Mr. Coombs expressed a desire that an Executive Committee, preferably three and not more than four members, be designated by the Chairman. Mr. Gardner will take care of this after all members have been confirmed.

E. Dates of Next Meeting

The dates for the next meeting were not scheduled. The Chairman announced that this would be done at a later day by the Staff Director who will communicate with all members.\(^5\)

F. Issuance of the Executive Order to Implement the Programs Authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act

At the morning session on April 5, the Commission was informed that the Executive Order formally delegating various activities authorized by the Fulbright-Hays Act had not been issued. Attention was called to the White House Press Release of February 27, 1961, when the predecessor of this Commission met with the President.\(^6\) The President said, in part, that “... this whole field [international educational and cultural relations] is urgently in need of imaginative policy development, unification and vigorous direction. These activities are presently scattered among many agencies of the Federal Government. Only by centering responsibility for leadership and direction at an appropriate place in the governmental structure can we hope to achieve the required results. I shall therefore look to the Secretary of State to exercise primary responsibility for policy guidance and program direction of governmental activities in this field ...”

Following a discussion of this topic the Commission unanimously adopted the following Resolution:

“That the Commission feels that its effectiveness, as well as that of the Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, will be

\(^4\) Goulart met with the President at the White House April 3 and 4. For the memoranda of conversation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XII, American Republics, Documents 223 and 224.

\(^5\) Dates subsequently set for June 19th and 20th. [Footnote is in the original.]

\(^6\) Reference is to Murphy, who chaired the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange. On February 27, 1961, the President met at the White House from 2:50 until 3:25 p.m. with the members of both the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange. (Kennedy Library, President’s Daily Diary) For the text of the President’s remarks at the meeting, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 126.
continually minimized until there is identified officially a single point in Government for coordination of educational and cultural exchange;

“That this whole field is urgently in need of imaginative policy direction, unification and vigorous direction, and until such time as this is done the work of the Commission will be arid;

“That the Commission believes the central point in Government for coordination of these activities is clearly the Department of State;

“That the Commission is somewhat surprised that, in the year since the President had publicly declared that this was in fact the policy, this has not been implemented by an Executive Order;

“That the Chairman write a letter to the Secretary of State informing him of the Commission’s concern.”

During the afternoon session, following the meeting with the President, the following amendment to the above Resolution was unanimously adopted:

“That the Chairman write to the President7 thanking him for the warm reception the Commission was given; make reference specifically to the Commission’s Resolution and inform him that the Commission was delighted to hear that the Executive Order is now in the process of being issued; and

“That the Secretary of State be informed of this action taken by the Commission.”8

G. Report to the Congress due December 31, 1962

Mr. Gardner expressed concern about the preparing of a complete and thorough report on “past programs, etc.” by December 31, 1962—that is, the type of a report he would like to see the Commission produce at some later date. For this reason he asked that the Staff Director obtain from our Legal Adviser an opinion setting forth the minimum the report need contain in order to meet the requirements of the law. (See Attachment 39 for reply from the Legal Adviser.)

H. Commission Members Afterthoughts of Meeting

Mr. Gardner directed the Staff Director to communicate with all members reminding them to send him their afterthoughts of the meeting.

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7 The Chairman wrote to the President and the Secretary on April 11, 1962. (See Attachment 2.) [Footnote is in the original. ACEC/S Document 2 [Attachment 2], attached but not printed, contains copies of these letters to the President and Rusk.]

8 The Chairman wrote to the President and the Secretary on April 11, 1962. (See Attachment 2.) [Footnote is in the original.]

9 Attached but not printed is ACEC/S Document 2 [Attachment 3], an April 17 memorandum from Teal to Donovan regarding the preparation of the report on past programs.
I. Suggested Topics for the Next Meeting

Mr. Johnson offered the following topics for consideration at the next meeting:

1. Role of the Cultural Affairs Officer in the exchange program;
2. The Leader and Specialist Program;
3. Permission to attend conferences provided for under the new legislation;
4. Discussion of support for the junior year abroad program;
5. Selection System.

[Omitted here are Section IV: General Proceedings and eight attachments.]

76. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Europe, United States Information Agency (Cody) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)

Washington, April 9, 1962.

SUBJECT

Information Activities in the Soviet Union

You may be interested in two examples of gradual increase in our information activities in the USSR.

First, as you know we started a Cultural Bulletin one and one-half years ago without express permission of Soviet authorities. Circulation was two hundred for the first three months and then was upped to two thousand in one fell swoop. Soviet authorities did not object, partly because, we assume, they do considerable mailing from their Embassy here and know that they would not be permitted to continue their propaganda mailings if they stopped us in Moscow. Recently circulation was increased to three thousand five hundred. The Embassy informs us now that circulation will be increased by adding the names of five hundred writers to the mailing list, bringing the total to four thousand with further expansion contemplated. The addition of two

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1962–1963, Entry UD WW 173, Box 9, FIELD—Europe—(IAE) 1962. No classification marking. Copies were sent to Mackland, Ewing, Harris, Smith, Plesent, Sorensen, Bennett, Barnes (EUR/SOV), Jones (EUR/SES) and the Embassy in Moscow. Harris initialed the top right-hand corner of the memorandum and wrote “4/10” next to his initials.
local employees, recently authorized, will permit expansion of this program as well as the quick translation and timely mailing of Embassy press releases containing important Administration statements to upward of two thousand addressees. (The Cultural Bulletin, incidentally, is prepared by our Special Projects Office in Vienna from raw materials provided by IPS here. A copy of the Cultural Bulletin is attached.)

Second, recent expansion of the physical facilities of the Embassy in Moscow has enabled us to construct a Consular Reception Room and a reading room both of which will contain displays of books and periodicals available to visitors for reading on the premises and, in some cases, for presentation. You may know that the Embassy has carried out a discreet presentation program of books and other publications for the last four years. These presentations, ranging in volume up to fifteen hundred books and many more related materials (periodicals, records, sheet music, pamphlets, etc.) per year, are normally distributed to Soviet citizens through tourists, exchange delegations and individuals, students and others on official or unofficial visits in the Soviet Union. Materials are, of course, non-political in content. We hope to be able to expand this program gradually.

In both of these cases I believe that continuation of the programs and their success depends partly on our keeping quiet about them and not publicizing in this country the efforts we are making to pierce the Iron Curtain.

Morrill Cody

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2 Not attached.
3 Cody initialed “MO” above his typed signature.
77. Memorandum From the Director of Planning, Office of Plans, United States Information Agency (Anderson) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe

Following are observations based on a reading of: (1) the basic policy papers of Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe; (2) the daily policy guidances and output of Radio Liberty to Russia for two days and of Radio Free Europe to Poland and Hungary for four days, selected at random; (3) summary comments prepared by the two organizations; (4) the audit report of Radio Free Europe; (5) representative publicity of Radio Free Europe; (6) an account of Free Europe Committee’s mailing operations; (7) a study of tours of East German refugees to Latin America and Asia.

**Basic Policy:** Radio Liberty speaks as an avowed émigré-American organization; Radio Free Europe speaks as a non-émigré, private, free world enterprise. The assessment of the situation and possibilities in both the Soviet Union and the satellites is realistic; there is specifically no expectation of nor notion of encouraging revolt or radical change by force. The injunctions against inflammatory material are clear.

The instructions for reporting on internal affairs are clear and adequately qualified, as are those on cross-play from country to country. Differences in the Polish and Hungarian audiences, for example, are clearly understood and the approaches suitably differentiated. Reliability is established as a prime criterion for both organizations. The difference between official outlets like the Voice of America and these outlets is clearly spelled out.

**Daily Policy:** Guidance is reasonably pertinent and clear, and, to the extent I can evaluate it, conforms to national policy. Policy on general stories tends to resemble our own, but there is a good deal of specialized guidance covering events within, or of particular interest to, a given country.

**News:** News coverage, even when dealing with difficult issues within an audience country, appears objective, balanced, and as accum-

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rate as can be expected, particularly when read through back-translation. It is temperate in tone.

Commentary: I can’t judge the accuracy of commentaries when they get down to demonological affairs, but on the whole the commentaries are sober and non-polemical in tone. Obviously, to carry out their mission, both outlets need to deal in some unpalatable stuff. In two or three instances the commentaries got polemical: Radio Liberty on the Finnish War, 2 “Stalin began one of the dirtiest wars in history,” and Radio Free Europe to Poland on new land taxes, “this party which is supposed not to talk in vain, will never learn anything.” These are exceptions to the general rule, but nevertheless appear to violate the basic policy proscriptions.

Other Programs: Music, interviews, literature, and special programs seem to be done with a good consciousness of the audiences’ interests.

General Conclusion: Within the framework of their respective charters, Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe seem to me to be doing a responsible job. The validity of their charters at the present juncture of history is another question. Radio Free Europe has been moving more and more in the direction of “Europeanization”. Its extensive coverage of Western European economic affairs and progress toward economic integration has been precisely right.

Financing: The total income of Crusade for Freedom 3 in Fiscal Year 1961 from contributions was $15,234,805.42. Of this, less than two million ($1,839,571.66) was from the general public. The public drive cost $439,835.44. Public information expenses were an additional $186,475.65. (Radio Free Europe uses about $10,000,000 of the money; the balance finances unattributed activities of the Free Europe Committee.)

Publicity: I now feel that the publicity of Radio Free Europe is as honest as it can be within its charter. Identification of the operation as a private venture is not played up; emphasis is on the fact that it is supported by contributions from the public. It appears that the management has made a deliberate effort to come as close to levelling as it can.

Mailing Operations: To date, the committee has sent 809,412 selected books to selected addressees behind the Iron Curtain, all in the satellites. In the first eleven months of 1961, it sent 58,596, and received responses from no less than 26,156 of the recipients, or almost half.

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2 Presumable reference to the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union, 1939–1940.
3 Reference is to the public fundraising drives to support Radio Free Europe, managed by the National Committee for a Free Europe (NCFE).
Tours of Eastern Europeans: Four teams of East German refugees visited eight Latin American countries and four Asian countries in October–December, 1961, sponsored by the Free Europe Committee. Based on the committee’s report, including the itineraries and stats of the clippings, their work was genuinely effective.

Burnett Anderson

4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

78. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to President Kennedy


SUBJECT

Latin American Book Programs

Here are answers to the questions you asked me on the phone the other day regarding U.S. and Communist book programs in Latin America:

1. We are making a major effort to overcome the “book gap” in Latin America. Our principal problems are distribution and expert personnel. (We have just sent six trained book officers to the area.) Money could become a problem as our capability for effectively marketing books increases, but AID appears eager to help. This fiscal year, USIA published 55 books in Spanish and 25 in Portuguese in Latin America. In FY–63 we plan to do 130 in Spanish and 95 in Portuguese. Others—including CIA, Time and Reader’s Digest—are stepping up their book publishing activities in Latin America. Franklin Publications, Inc.,

1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1/62–6/62. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in the White House on April 16 at 2:04 p.m. Evelyn Lincoln sent a copy of the memorandum back to Sorensen under an April 23 covering note, in which she wrote that the President “would like for you to send a copy of the attached memo to Morales Carrion and ask him to comment on it.” (Ibid.)
at our request, recently surveyed the book situation there; its findings are useful.

2. Titles: Galbraith’s new book, *Economic Development in Perspective* (based on his India lectures) is being made available to all our libraries abroad. We will push its use in our translation-publishing programs in Latin America and other underdeveloped areas. A USIA-produced pamphlet version has already been distributed in several countries. Also in Latin America we have subsidized publication of Galbraith’s *American Capitalism* in Spanish and Portuguese, and his *Economics and the Art of Controversy* in Portuguese.

We subsidized Portuguese-language publication of Rostow’s *Stages of Economic Growth* in Brazil. A Mexican publisher obtained Spanish-language rights and produced the book without our help. We wanted to publish it in Argentina as well but the Mexican publisher refused to license a Buenos Aires edition.


3. Several of these are useful in showing that Communism is no good for underdeveloped countries, notably the books by the Rostows, Kousoulas and Hanson. We’ve also done Mitrany’s *Marx Against the Peasant* in Portuguese, Cronyn’s *A Primer on Communism*, Baeza’s *The Chains Come From Afar* (on Cuba), and Baldwin’s *A New Slavery* in Spanish and Portuguese. Belov’s *History of a Soviet Collective Farm* was distributed in Latin America in English through our binational centers.

Two books now in the works are *National Development: How it Works* by David Cushman Coyle, and *Capitalism, Communism, Socialism: A Primer* by Meno Lovenstein. We are exploring the idea of getting a good Latin author to write an original book on Communism’s inadequacy for underdeveloped economies.

4. We have assisted publication of a few current books in Latin America describing U.S. welfare programs, among them Asch’s *Social
Security and Related Welfare, Vasey’s Government and Social Welfare, and Schlesinger and Hackett’s Political and Social Growth of the American People. We have commissioned a book from former Social Security Commissioner Charles Schotland on our social security system which is now at the publishers. Undoubtedly there will be others in the welfare field. Incidentally, we are pushing this theme hard in other media, particularly radio and films.

5. Distribution: Books we subsidize are usually distributed through regular commercial channels. The publishers with whom we contract distribute the books through the same networks used for their other titles. Distribution outside urban areas and between countries is severely limited by lack of swift, sure communications, by exchange barriers and by lack of credit. Some copies of each USIS-supported book are taken by our posts for presentation to key individuals and institutions. The books are also put in our USIS libraries, reading rooms and binational centers.

To increase distribution of low-priced books our new regional book officers in Mexico City, Buenos Aires and Rio are working out publishing arrangements with houses primarily concerned with periodical publication and continent-wide distribution. One such arrangement has been made in Mexico with Novaro.

6. Soviet Publications: The Soviets are publishing 1.5 million books annually in Spanish in the USSR and an additional 3.75 million in Latin America itself. They recently published two books in Portuguese in the USSR. At least one publisher in Rio is known to publish Communist books.

Soviet publications are frequently distributed through their own Embassies or local Communist parties. One hundred diplomatic pouches containing printed matter are shipped annually to Embassy Uruguay at a cost estimated at $654,000 or more than our total Latin American book budget this fiscal year. Local Communist groups own or control bookstores in many Latin American countries.

It has taken us a year to gear up an improved book program in the area after years of neglect. We expect to move ahead rapidly now, and are giving it highest priority.

Thomas C. Sorensen

2 Sorensen signed “Tom Sorensen” above his typed signature.
79. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to All USIA Media Heads

Washington, April 24, 1962.

SUBJECT
Attribution of USIA Media Materials

Receptivity to USIA media output is nearly always greater when the output is not attributed to the Agency or the U.S. Government. I have therefore instructed our field posts not to carry USIA attribution on pamphlets, motion pictures, television shows and other media products (but excluding periodicals) except when local custom or law dictates otherwise. This rule henceforth shall also apply to media materials produced in Washington.

The posts were asked to consider attribution to credible local groups when appropriate and feasible. In Washington, you should consider attribution to appropriate U.S. groups, when feasible and useful, in the production of media materials.

An exception to this rule would be those instances when we want to make it clear that we are presenting the official viewpoint of the U.S. Government.

We must continue to distinguish between “unattributed” and “unattributable.” Our materials may be “unattributed” but never “unattributable.” We are willing to acknowledge, if questioned, the origin of any Agency product. My point is that we should not publicize, emphasize or otherwise call attention to the USIA-origin of our output except when necessary. Our job is not to advertise the Agency or any element thereof but to influence foreign public attitudes in furtherance of U.S. objectives.

This directive supersedes all previous instructions and guidances on this subject.

Edward R. Murrow

80. Message From Secretary of State Rusk to All U.S. Chiefs of Mission


SUBJECT

EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGE: New Emphasis on Youth

The President and I have recently discussed the importance of youth in world affairs. The recent experience of the Attorney General in discussions with students in Japan and Indonesia, developments in Japan, Korea, Turkey and Latin America plus other indications confirm belief that the phenomenon of youth unrest is worldwide and a serious obstacle to achievement of U.S. objectives. Politically-conscious students, particularly in the underdeveloped nations, have a distorted, obsolete, often Marxist-oriented view of the American economic system, our ideals and our institutions.

We feel that a greater and more effective effort in the youth and student field must be made if we are to be successful in our total mission. We are well aware that much is being done within the Government by USIA, by Departmental exchange programs, by the Peace Corps and by others. A good deal is also being done by private groups.

We are also aware that this is a subject of great sensitivity; obvious U.S. Government efforts to manipulate youth abroad or at home would only multiply our problems, not solve them. You, of course, can best determine how to avoid pitfalls in your local situation. But there is much which is feasible and prudent which should be done, and is not now being done. This will require the forceful and resourceful leadership and personal attention of our Chiefs of Mission abroad and our senior colleagues and ourselves in Washington.

We have undertaken an interdepartmental study in Washington to determine what is being done, what should be done, and what additional mechanisms—if any—will be required. We will keep you informed of what develops.

The job in the field is largely one of public relations, and the operating responsibility continues to be chiefly with USIS. But we want you personally to interest yourself in this effort. This message will be

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2 See Document 74.
followed by others spelling out techniques and activities which have proven successful.

Some activities are obvious, however, and require no further explanation. For example you and other key mission officers (particularly those with a special flair for dealing with youth and a broad understanding of America’s rapid progress in social welfare) might find it profitable to include youth and student leaders in your representational activities. You may wish to hold “open house” at the residence for leaders and teachers, or otherwise stimulate direct confrontation with these young people in order to set right their misconceptions. Lectures on the evils of Communism generally are not useful. More to the point are intelligent, honest, dispassionate explanations of what the United States is today, its goals and how they coincide with those of youth elsewhere, its deep interest in the legitimate aspirations of youth in other lands for a better future, and its desire to help them to realize them in freedom.

In this effort there is no substitute for personal contact on a sustained basis. We ask your personal attention and leadership, without which this effort cannot succeed.

Rusk
81. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Special Assistant to the President (Schlesinger)


Herbert Mitgang’s suggestion about teams of Lincoln scholars looks good.2

Under our division of labor, the U.S. end of this belongs in State. Therefore, I am passing your note to Mr. Boerner of CU and recommending that the possibilities be explored immediately.3

Our people would handle the field end of it, of course, and would be prepared to give it the proper exploitation.

In regard to general exploitation of the centennial of the Emancipation Proclamation,4 I have cranked it into our planning operation which will develop the appropriate guidance and programming in cooperation with the other elements of the Agency.

Edward R. Murrow5

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, Schlesinger Papers, White House Subject Files, Subject File 1961–1964, Box WH–9, Emancipation Proclamation 1/1/62–2/31/62. No classification marking.

2 In a May 8 note, written on The New York Times letterhead, Mitgang suggested to Schlesinger that the United States could “put our best foot forward historically” if a “team of Lincoln scholars, sponsored by one or two of the Pulitzer Prize historians in the White House” toured Asia, Africa, and the U.S. South to “tell the world about the new America” in conjunction with the 100th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation. Schlesinger, in a May 16 memorandum to Murrow, included the text of Mitgang’s note and added: “I don’t know whether this is the best way to do it; but I hope we have some plan for the systematic exploitation abroad of the Emancipation Proclamation Centennial.” Both the note and memorandum are ibid.

3 In a June 19 memorandum to Schlesinger, sent through Bundy, Brubeck stated: “We [the Department of State] consider this idea [Mitgang’s] to be a good one and plan to implement it, with, of course, USIA’s help for the overseas aspects. As a first step, I am asking my staff to consult with specialists in the Lincoln field and to work up a panel of names of scholars whose services could be drawn upon for this project. I shall keep you informed of developments.” (Ibid.)

4 Lincoln issued a preliminary Emancipation Proclamation on September 22, 1862; the final proclamation was issued on January 1, 1863. As part of the American commemoration of the centennial, President Kennedy asked the Civil Rights Commission to prepare a report on the history of civil rights over the past century. The President received a copy of the final report, entitled Freedom to the Free: Century of Emancipation, 1863–1963: A Report to the President by the United States Commission on Civil Rights, at a February 12, 1963, White House ceremony. For the text of the President’s remarks at the ceremony, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 159–160.

5 Murrow initialed “ERM” above his typed signature.
82. Message From the United States Information Agency to All Principal USIS Posts

Infoguide No. 62–34


INFOGUIDE:


SITUATION

We want to increase attention to youth and student audiences. In the past our media and posts have directed many of their activities at young people. Increased attention to this audience is necessary because of (1) the political role of young people in some countries and their role as pressure groups in others, (2) the inroads of communist propaganda and (3) the importance of young people as future leaders.

TREATMENT

We want to show that:

(1) Efforts of non-communist youth movements can be more effective in support of political, economic and social progress than the demagogic appeals of the communists.

(2) The U.S. favors international youth cooperation but opposes the exploitation of young people in the interests of the Sino-Soviet bloc.

(3) The U.S. neither controls nor seeks to control the political orientation or activities of youth movements.

(4) The U.S. favors constructive youth cooperation.

Where communist fronts have an impact among young people, we discreetly expose them and discourage participation.

The media will report on international youth events. You should file suitable material to USINFO for cross-reporting.

CAUTIONS

(1) Some non-communist international youth movements have political or denominational affiliations (e.g., International Union of Socialist Youth, Pax Romana/Catholic/). Such affiliations are evidence

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2 See Document 79.
of the variety in a world of free choice. In coverage, we emphasize
their activities rather than their affiliations.

(2) Many non-communist youth leaders are sensitive to govern-
ment interference in, or support for, their organizations. They do not
wish to be identified as “Western” or “anti-communist,” lest such a
label strengthen communist counterefforts or lead to internal dissen-
sion. We should be responsive to these sensitivities and avoid the
impression that we view a particular event or organization as our
instrument.

(3) In some countries, conditions may make it desirable to avoid
(a) an open anti-communist stand and/or (b) attribution to the U.S.
Here it may be well to emphasize what the U.S. is for, citing U.S.
international youth activities, and to suggest alternatives to communis-
t-controlled youth movements.

BACKGROUND

Important in the communist effort among young people are the
varied activities of the international youth front organizations. This
year communist efforts will climax in the 8th World Youth Festival in
Helsinki (July 27-August 5), the 6th Assembly of the World Federation
of Democratic Youth in Warsaw (WFDY) (August 10-16) and the 7th
Congress of the International Union of Students (IUS) (August 18-27)
in Leningrad. The latter two events will be on a smaller scale than the
Helsinki Festival and are expected to be more political and organiza-
tional in character.

Many bona-fide non-communist international youth organizations
are also holding major meetings during the coming months. They
include:

(1) World Assembly of Youth (WAY)—4th General Assembly &
9th Council Meeting, Aarhus, Denmark, July 9-24

(2) WAY—3rd World Rural Youth Conference, Lunten Center
near Amersfoort, Netherlands, July 2-9

(3) Coordinating Secretariat (COSEC) of the International Student
Conference (ISC)—International Student Congress, University of Laval,
Quebec, Canada, June 27-July 8

(4) Pax Romana—World Congress, Montevideo, July 25-30

(5) Pax Romana—Interfederal Assembly, Montevideo, August 1-7

(6) World Federation of Catholic Young Women and Girls, Interna-
tional Seminar, (WFCYWG), Buenos Aires, July 24-31

(7) International Union of Socialist Youth (IUSY)—International
Youth Camp, Denmark, July
(8) World University Service (WUS)—1962 General Assembly, International Christian University, near Tokyo, August 12–19

(9) International Student Movement for the United Nations (ISMUN)—Annual Conference, Levadhia, Greece, August 25–September 1

(10) NATO Youth Meetings—
   (a) Seminar for Youth Leaders, Iceland, June 10–16
   (b) Seminar on European Institutions, Oosterbeck, Netherlands, August 13–27
   (c) Third Atlantic Conference of Youth Political Leaders, Germany, late September

These events demonstrate the vigor and variety of non-communist international youth movements. While often critical of certain U.S. policies, the non-communist youth movements represent one of the effective bulwarks against communist youth fronts and communist penetration efforts among young people.

Murrow

83. Message From the United States Information Agency to All Principal USIS Posts¹

Washington, undated.


I. General Approach

1. The basic policy to be followed in the public handling of the Sino-Soviet dispute is to treat it as a major international development which is worthy of important emphasis and close attention, and about which the American and other peoples should be fully informed.

2. Constant care is to be taken, however, to avoid exaggerating either the nature or implications of the dispute. In particular, statements

and interpretations are to be avoided that suggest that: (a) the dispute has resulted in, or is likely to result in, a change in basic Communist objectives toward the US and the Free World, (b) the dispute has affected the capability of either the USSR or Communist China to endanger the security of the US, (c) the dispute has eliminated or reduced pressures that the Communist powers are bringing to bear on US interests in various critical areas of the world, (d) the dispute has mitigated the urgency of the need for proceeding with the strengthening of the free world community.

3. Strictest regard to accuracy shall be observed in the dissemination of attributable information about the dispute.

4. Any suggestion that the US is taking sides in the dispute is to be avoided. Similarly, there should be no suggestion that the US intends, or is willing, to manipulate its policies in the interest of furthering the dispute.

II. Psychological Exploitation of the Dispute

1. The US Information Agency will report prominently and fully and via all media pertinent developments in the dispute, including relevant statements of Communist leaders and pertinent articles that appear in the Communist press throughout the world. Reportage will be on a factual news basis except that carefully prepared commentary will be utilized to cut through Communist double talk and to make clear to the unsophisticated the real issues and targets dealt with in such statements and articles.

2. USIS posts conducting book translation and publishing programs are urged to support where appropriate the translation into foreign languages and foreign dissemination of scholarly books and articles dealing with the dispute that have appeared in this country and the United Kingdom.

Murrow
84. Minutes of a Meeting of the United States Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs


[Omitted here are the title page; the table of contents; Section I: List of Participants; and Section II: Official Commission Business.]

III. GENERAL PROCEEDINGS

1. Greetings and Statements by Assistant Secretary Battle:

After calling the meeting to order, Chairman Gardner called on Mr. Battle who was scheduled to discuss his recently assumed responsibilities as Assistant Secretary.

Mr. Battle opened his remarks by expressing his appreciation for having, he thought, one of the best qualified groups available to assist him and the Government in increasing the effectiveness of this country’s educational and cultural exchange programs. In commenting on the significance of this new assignment, he stated in part—“I am very eager to take on this job . . . it combines my two careers and most of my hobbies . . . I have had many years in the Department of State in the field of foreign policy and quite a few years outside in the educational-foundation world, so to merge the two, and along with other things that I have done, it is a particularly pleasant prospect.”

He then expressed his desire to be absolutely candid and straightforward with the members and to feel free to share with the Commission his problems of which he has a great many.

Mr. Battle then pointed out that in taking on a new job individuals are bound to approach it in slightly different ways in order to fit their own mode of operation but this doesn’t mean one is right or one wrong. He added that he has several fairly clear ideas of what he believes should be done. He then spoke of one in particular—the philosophy

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2 Battle joined the Department of State in the 1940s and served on the Canada Desk before serving as a special assistant to Acheson and as First Secretary and Chief of the Political Section of the Embassy in Copenhagen. He left the Department of State to serve as Vice President of Colonial Williamsburg and then returned to the Department in 1961.
of the operation itself. He then pointed out that the emphasis in the past has been to try to separate the operations of the office of Assistant Secretary—to keep two sort of separate entities. This, in his opinion is something he could not work with. He feels that the Assistant Secretary in charge of the program is responsible for the operation—that in the opinion of most people anything that goes right or wrong with the specific, detailed operation of the Department’s program is his responsibility and, therefore, he must accept that responsibility. Thus, the first step he has taken is to make Mr. Boerner his Deputy, thereby placing the full responsibility for the operations in the Assistant Secretary’s office. Yet, he said, this still leaves much to be desired.

Over a great many years new programs have been added, either by Congress or other initiative and pocket units have been set up to take care of particular situations. The focus of the Department of State has always been around the geographic area. These geographic bureaus in the Department still have a very key role. Many other agencies of Government are organized on a geographic basis. Therefore, CU has been the exception and although the Department is supposed to be doing the coordinating it has not been geared to coordinate. To organize CU on a geographic basis is going to be very upsetting for a time and it cannot be started immediately. Mr. Coombs had come to the same conclusion and had started a great many plans for the geographic organization. The planning that was done while he was here will be of enormous help in going into this shift.

As to the important and complicated subject of coordination, Mr. Battle stated that from his own experience in Government, coordination really has to be done at two levels—first, as to day-to-day knowledge and exchange in an operating way of what goes on; and second, on a policy level—the first forms the basis for the second. He cited his early experience in the Department as a desk officer for Canada at which time a series of meetings were held every month or six weeks pulling together the people who worked on Canada in various Government agencies. There was no agenda, no decisions—just a review on a regular basis of what had recently happened in Canada and what each individual had pending that affected Canada. This afforded a simple mechanism for exchanging problems with which each agency was faced with respect to Canada and led to the planning and development of a unified position whereby all agencies would not be moving in at the same time to try to get something from the Canadians. Mr. Battle thought this sort of a device will be a starting point for the coordination that is absolutely essential to the conduct of the CU program. Thus if the Bureau is organized on a geographic basis it will provide a focal point
whereby CU personnel working in a specific area can get in touch with their counterpart in each of the several agencies.

Then, he added, you have the level of policy which he believes is his responsibility, with due regard to his superiors, the Commission, and others. This has to be achieved in several ways—the first and very basic part is “good will” and in this connection he has been calling on people in other agencies, having them over for lunch and discussing their respective programs. He believes the above two mechanisms form the basis for a chance at coordinating a very complicated structure.

He then expressed the view that we have got to find some way to relate what we do, and what the foundations do, to what we are trying to achieve and what our aims and goals are in this country. We cannot simply operate independently. It is his hope that when the Bureau is organized on a geographic basis that the individuals working on a country desk or an area desk will keep close tab on what is happening in the foundations and Government which will form some sort of basis for decision-making, and bring about a better coordination of programs.

Mr. Battle briefly commented on the personnel situation in the Bureau calling particular attention to the people who are to head up the geographic areas. He believes they are competent and experienced and will form an excellent nucleus around which to build this structure. He also informed the Commission that he had been assured of space in the new building for at least all of the key offices of CU.

In closing, Mr. Battle stated “. . . It is my hope that instead of offering you papers of final recommendations . . . that I hand you problems . . . and hand you these problems at early stages, rather than late stages, and get your thoughts and help on them. I think that in this group the program has one of its greatest assets. I hope you will permit me to use it in the way I am speaking of, or modified as you would want it, but to make it a group with which I can freely and openly talk about some of the difficulties I have. . . .”

Dr. Gardner thanked Mr. Battle for his remarks and stated “I think I speak for every member of the Commission when I say that we are impressed with the very open, straightforward, constructive view you have taken of our work. And I will say that I personally have been very deeply impressed with the energy that you have brought to this job and with the command you have already gained of these difficult problems that you have mentioned.

“I know all of the Commission members were somewhat shaken when Phil Coombs, who was our first point of contact, suddenly appeared to be leaving, and it is gratifying to us to find someone
moving in with such energy and straightforward interest in the work of the Commission.”

[Omitted here is information concerning the 10-year perspective for the Commission, a study regarding past U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs, and African students.]

5. REMARKS OF MR. EDWARD R. MURROW, DIRECTOR OF UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY

On behalf of the Commission, the Chairman extended a warm welcome to Mr. Murrow who had been invited to meet with the Commission. In calling on Mr. Murrow, he stated that the Commission would be delighted to hear about his own activities and what he expected of this Commission. He pointed out that this Commission is a fairly new group. Although each member has a very deep familiarity with one or another part of the whole program, all of them are now becoming familiar with the bewildering variety of agencies, projects, programs, and rivalries. He expressed the view that it would be most helpful to the Commission if he had any words of wisdom about its relationship to USIA and if he had any worries or problems on which he would like their advice.

Mr. Murrow opened his remarks by stating: “You mentioned two words: rivalries and worries. I can deal with the first one in short order by saying that Luke and I have an agreement—that since there is bound to be a degree of confusion in Washington (it is built-in), we are not going to export said confusion—we will deal with it here. ‘Worries’. This would take the rest of the afternoon.

“I am not aware of any important friction between the Agency and this particular area of State. I am aware of some inadequacy on both sides. I am not sure that the counseling or selection of students brought here is adequate. I am not sure that our cultural officers are of as high a caliber as they should be. These are all things on which we are working. But I would not be able to come here and register a series of complaints, or even a major one.”

At this point Mr. Battle remarked: “Ed, I made some fairly sweeping commitments on your behalf and mine this morning in an off the record session here about the new degree of our cooperation. I pointed to the great help you had been in clearing up some of the nasty little details of the Executive Order which I am told will be out very soon. I made

3 Battle.

all sorts of sweeping promises of our continued cooperation, and I
didn’t even check with you before I did it, because I was sure it was
all right in the light of the discussion we have had.”

Mr. Murrow replied: “I agree with everything you said. We both
face the problem of keeping our bureaucrats in line, but I think we can
do it.”

In reply to Dr. Gardner’s question as to this Commission’s relation-
ship with the USIA’s Advisory Commission on Information, Mr. Mur-
row stated: “The Advisory Commission on Information is becoming a
fairly active Commission, which we welcome. I gather from the lan-
guage of the Hays-Fulbright Act that this Commission is also entitled
and empowered to advise us. This, also, will be welcomed. And I
would think, particularly, to give us advice (if the opportunity affords)
based on firsthand observation and knowledge. Because I become
increasingly convinced that, aside from certain policy ideas, our major
problem consists of getting the right man in the right place. And when
we do that, the operation functions; and, when we don’t, whatever the
directives or guidelines, it doesn’t function.

“And I would think that at some point you, or certain members
of this Commission, would want to sit down with our Commission
and exchange views and impressions.”

Dr. Gardner stated that he would initiate correspondence with the
Chairman of the Information Commission, Mr. J. Leonard Reinsch,
that would lead to an exchange of views.

The question was raised by Dr. Johnson as to the advisability of
having a writer in residence, or an artist, depending on the country,
who is freed from the detailed work with which the cultural officer is
involved. Mr. Murrow stated “it is conceivable and this question has
been discussed at great length over the past year. One time Ambassador
Galbraith wanted such an officer in Delhi. After a few months’ experi-
ence, he changed his mind entirely. However, I personally would like
to see this done.”

As to the role that USIA can play in promoting a point of view
which might be conducive to more careful selection and financing of
African students coming to this country, Mr. Murrow stated that he
did not have a quite orthodox view of the matter of African students
coming to this country, having had a little experience in this area for
thirty years. He thinks that there are too many coming here and that
they are not sufficiently well chosen. He would like to see more Govern-
ment money spent in developing technical training institutions and
vocational schools in the African countries. And, to a large extent, this
would apply to universities as well.
Dr. Adams, referring to the Commission’s “special study,” raised the question as to how Mr. Murrow would evaluate the effectiveness of USIA. Mr. Murrow stated that he would have to break it down by categories. He went on to say: “The wireless file we operate, which covers 10,000 words a day to five geographic areas by radio teletype, has improved only because it is less bloated than it was. There is still too much of it.

“The Voice of America is less important than the local placements we make through tapes and packaged programs on medium-wave transmitters.

“There are a lot of misconceptions about this Agency. I had some; I probably still have some.

“The libraries abroad have too few books of the language of the country in which they are located. In short, too many English books in French-speaking countries—that sort of thing.

“The bi-national centers in many cases have become rather the equivalent of the English-Speaking Union, if I can say that without offense. They are engaged in talking with people who are already converted.

“There is not enough give and take. They don’t make enough effort to get in left-wing students, and so forth; and break a little intellectual furniture inside as well as having windows broken—that sort of thing.

“The exhibits program: we have had three in the Soviet Union this year—one dealing with plastics; one with transportation; one with medicine,6 and this has been one of the most exciting activities because

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6 See footnote 5, Document 41.
we make an analysis of the questions asked by the Russian visitors. We will have had about a million and a quarter through those three exhibits by the first of July. The type of questioning reflects a great curiosity, ranging far beyond the subject matter of the exhibits.

In response to questions raised by the Chairman as to what he considered as weak spots in the CU programs, Mr. Murrow stated that obviously the process of selection was first; second, the provision of an adequate and intensive training course in English; and third, the problem of adequate follow-up for the returned grantee.

Mr. Boerner stated, as a recent returnee from the field: “I think that it is important for all of you to remember that out at the operating level there is no program other than the USIS program that Ed runs for his own organization, and for us too. So that everything we do is intimately connected with Ed’s interests, and his organizational activities.

“And it seems to me, Ed, that the work of this Commission is something that you and your people ought to be completely aware of, and could be brought in on at all times, and manifest your interest. Take as simple a thing as this study which the Commission is making—I mean it is not a simple thing, but the idea is simple. You immediately get into the problem of what the local post thinks about what should be said in the questionnaires; and the local post is USIA. Now we have cultural officers there; they are on USIA payroll, and the choices of the cultural officers are made essentially within USIA. So we are intimately connected all the way through. If your people go out in the field to talk to our people, the people who are running our program, you are going to talk to USIA officers when you arrive . . .”

Mr. Murrow referred to his earlier statement about getting this Commission’s advice by “first-hand reports from the field.” It was his opinion that the Commission’s surveys would cover two parts: (1) whether the planning and the concept here in Washington by Messrs. Battle, Boerner, and Company is adequate and tailored to the need; and (2) whether the actual execution in the field is being properly done which is USIA responsibility.

Dr. Foster raised the point that the stereotype of America which is in the minds of many people in other countries is an unfavorable one. They think of us as a materialistic society, as not hard-working sometimes, and they do not have a good or favorable impression of our cultural development. Much of this impression, he believes, they gain through the fruits of our commercial enterprises abroad. He wondered to what extent the USIA program deals with counteracting this point of view.

Mr. Murrow replied: “It is a problem and it is not soluble because the sum total of what we do abroad represents very little in the total spectrum of communication.
“There are, for example, 35,000 missionaries abroad spending about four times our total budget. There are a million military personnel and dependents. Television alone is now exporting between $40 and 50 million worth of product from this country. We are in the television business; we are in the movie business. But the impact of our output, compared to the networks, the syndicators, and the Hollywood export, is nothing—I mean it is a tiny fragment.

“I have done a little arguing with the people in Hollywood and in the networks in an effort to persuade them to have some regard for the impact as well as the income derived, but I have not had much success.”

Dr. Gardner thanked Mr. Murrow for attending this session and expressed the Commission’s desire to be of assistance in connection with any specific problems which he might wish to bring to its attention.

Omitted here is information concerning the role of contract agencies, the Commission’s budget, the role and status of Cultural Affairs Officers, Commission attendance at international meetings, and university-to-university relationships. Also omitted is ACEC/S Document 3 (Attachment 1), “Objectives of U.S. International Educational and Cultural Programs.”

85. Address by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Battle)¹


The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States: Their Role in Foreign Relations

Like the nations of the world—new and old—I suppose government officials span the spectrum of development. Some have been on the job long enough to be fully developed—in the particular situations they are called upon to administer; others, like myself, are newly come to their present responsibilities and hence are, in the language of development, “newly developing.” All of us—to use Ambassador Galbraith’s metaphor for nations in their various stages of growth—are like “beads

¹ Source: Department of State Bulletin, July 16, 1962, pp. 110–116. Battle spoke before a national conference, organized by the Agency for International Development, on AID’s international training programs. All brackets are in the original.
being moved along on a string,” being pushed farther along by experience and the responsibilities of office just as countries move farther along the line of development as they acquire additional experience and greater national maturity.

This comment will suggest one reason why, after only a few weeks in office, I do not feel disposed to make lengthy or ringing pronouncements. Instead I intend, hopefully, to stick to my subject, “The Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs of the United States,” to which I have added “Their Role in Foreign Relations.” Playing an effective role in our foreign relations is of course the end purpose of all our international activities.

I am grateful for the invitation to be here, to discuss with you some of the opportunities these programs present to us in Washington, to people in 120 countries of the world with which we have exchange agreements, and to you in literally hundreds of communities across the United States. And so I propose to present some first impressions of principal program activities and relationships in this great enterprise of providing purposeful exchanges in an environment of continuing international change.

You are attending this conference primarily because of your interest in the participant training program of AID. Your meetings have not been oriented primarily to the international political crises that occupy so much of the time and energy of diplomats. I am, however, reminded of a phrase that former Secretary of State Acheson used some years ago to describe the number of methods needed to conduct effectively our relations with the people of other countries. The phrase is “total diplomacy.”

The Government’s exchange programs provide an example of what he meant because, aside from diplomatic negotiation and economic and military cooperation, they constitute a further facet of our foreign relations—a facet that involves the movement of people for purposes of education, training, observation, and research and with essential supporting activities by citizens and community groups for foreign visitors coming to this country.

Within this aspect of our diplomacy—the exchange of persons—we of course have a great diversity of plans and programs. You have been well briefed on the aims and methods of AID’s participant training program. My first function, therefore, is to outline briefly the character and scope of the educational and cultural exchange programs of the Department of State. While other agencies have exchange activities, State and AID represent the great bulk of the exchanges that look to local communities and individual citizens for vital assistance and support.
Department of State Programs

The largest category of exchanges in the Department’s program is students. There were about 9,000 individuals in the Department’s total exchange-of-persons program this last academic year; of these almost half, some 4,000, were students—both American students going abroad and foreign students coming here.

Since our primary interest today is the foreign visitor, let me mention briefly three points of special interest about foreign students. The first is that only some 3,000 foreign students—about 5 percent of the estimated 58,000 foreign students in the United States this last academic year—were grantees under the Department’s own programs. With comparable AID grantees, the total of foreign students here under Government grants does not exceed 10 percent.

This leads to the second point I want to make, namely, our relationship to the other 90 percent. The Government, like your own organizations, feels a concern that all foreign students, regardless of how they came here, find the best total experience that can be made available to them. Both humanitarian purpose and national interest coincide on this point.

In accordance with the authorizations of the new Fulbright-Hays Act for services to all foreign students, and in line with the importance attached to the whole question of foreign students by President Kennedy’s administration, we have been taking steps to stimulate greater private support activities for foreign students and to broaden government’s own participation. We cannot assume fixed financial support for all foreign students, but in every feasible way we want to help improve the quality of the total experience they have here. This means, for example, a series of efforts to help more foreign students find summer jobs or other useful summer experience, and I am glad to report that, through both private and governmental activity, we have made real gains on this problem this year. Before another year is out we hope there will be other substantial gains in improving and expanding procedures for selection, orientation, and counseling, both overseas and here.

Another point about the foreign students who come here under Department grants is that they are, for the most part, graduate students. About 85 percent of our foreign-student grant funds are “invested,” so to speak, on the graduate level.

A second principal category in the State Department program is, of course, foreign leaders and specialists. This program had its origins
in the late thirties. Following World War II it took a major advancement in numbers because of the increase in German, Austrian, and Japanese grantees. As a historical footnote, the numbers of those grantees, and of those coming under the technical training programs of predecessor agencies of AID, led many American communities to realize the need for further organization if they were to assist adequately the Government’s program of acquainting such visitors with American life and institutions by firsthand observation. And as councils and other groups assisting with foreign leader and specialist grantees exchanged experiences, they saw the need for national coordinating services which has brought into being the cosponsor of this conference, COSERV [National Council for Community Services to International Visitors].

During this last academic year some 2,300 foreign leaders and specialists, including student leaders traveling in groups, were brought to this country by the Department for short-term, averaging about 60-day, visits. A word about the basic thinking behind this program will throw light on the programming arranged for these visitors after they get here. The people who occupy leadership or specialist roles in their own countries are usually active people; they have busy careers, special interests, and curiosity. They usually have well-defined professional or career interests. Their programming here is, therefore, built around the core of these interests. The range of counterpart relationships set up in this country must be as broad as the careers represented and may include supreme court justices, editors and publishers, heads of labor unions, government officials, university presidents, leaders of women’s organizations, and representatives of the creative arts, among others.

The aim in the invitations to foreign leaders and specialists is to bring to this country the “philosophical traveler,” in George Santayana’s memorable phrase—those who possess, as he said, “fixed interests and faculties, to be served by travel.”

From their visits here these “philosophical travelers” gain new insights into, and understanding of, American life and institutions. A leader in women’s activities in the Republic of Togo—and also Assistant Director of the Ministry of Finance and Economic Affairs—was a recent grantee. She observed women at work here in a variety of fields, in schools and welfare institutions and civic activities, among others. Her visit was concentrated largely in small towns and rural areas since Togo is predominantly agricultural. Before leaving she spoke of the “sense of solidarity” women have in this country toward civic activities and her desire to encourage this sense in her own country.

Because of the excellent cooperation of private organizations of all kinds, the experience of foreign visitors can be rich and varied. An example from a wide variety was the visit of two newspaper editors
from India to Emporia, Kansas, where William Allen White had made the Emporia Gazette a bellwether of American small-town life and thought. W.L. White, who succeeded his father as editor and publisher, reported their experience in an article in the Reader’s Digest in which he described the kind of “close view” they had “of an average American small town—not rich, and not poor.”

Foreign leaders are also invited in groups, according to professional interest, as well as individually. Likewise, leader groups of college students are brought to this country. Early next month, for example, 70 students from the University of São Paulo in Brazil will arrive for 3 weeks in this country. Ten days will be spent in a seminar at Harvard on American economic and political institutions. They will then be guests in private homes in New England and make a few days’ stop in Washington before returning to Brazil.

But it is like carrying coals to Newcastle to discuss foreign leader/specialist activities of the Department at any great length to this audience. Many of you could cite book, chapter, and verse from your own personal experience with grantees. I have discussed leader/specialist activities primarily to provide general background for some later remarks in which I want to try to relate the aims and purposes of the principal AID and State programs.

Both of these principal categories I have just discussed—foreign leaders and specialists and foreign students—are import categories. There are export categories we should at least note briefly: Students, scholars, teachers, professors, and American specialists have been going abroad under the Fulbright Act of 1946 and the Smith-Mundt Act of 1948, just as these acts have enabled us to bring in students and leader/specialists from abroad. Our import and export authorizations now arise under the Fulbright-Hays Act (the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961), which was passed overwhelmingly by both Houses of Congress last summer and which codifies and enlarges the authorizations previously available.

There is one further export category that ought to be made a part of this record. It is the category we call cultural presentations, a program under which American performing artists are sent abroad on tours to demonstrate the cultural interests and achievements of the American people. There has been great variety in the program, from the Juilliard String Quartet to Louis Armstrong, from Hal Holbrook as Mark Twain to a full-scale theatrical company, from the New York City Ballet to the Baird Marionettes. Until now, this program has been devoted exclusively to sending our own artists abroad, but, with the expanded legisla-

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3 See footnotes 2 and 3, Document 1.
tive authority given to the Department under the new Fulbright-Hays Act, we hope to be able soon to begin to give limited assistance in bringing foreign artists to this country for nonprofit performances, principally for university and other academic audiences. This would provide a further opportunity for citizen and community participation.

Some Relationships In U.S. Exchange Programs

The programs we have been discussing—those of AID and of State—came into existence at different times and to serve different needs. But they are interrelated at several points and mutually reinforcing. All are fundamentally directed to a great aim of U.S. foreign policy: to help create the conditions for what President Kennedy has called “a free and diverse world”—rather than a rigid, monolithic world.

Diversity in exchange programs is necessary if we are to deal effectively with diverse peoples and their varied interests and needs in their different stages of development. State, for example, has its primary exchange focus on “mutual understanding.” In the new Fulbright-Hays Act the fundamental purpose is “to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange. . . .”

The act sets forth these further purposes:

. . . to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, developments, and achievements of the people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries of the world.

AID’s programs, as you have heard from others during this conference, contribute directly and effectively to mutual understanding, but their essential authorization goes to a different point. In the Act for International Development of 1961 strong emphasis was given to the concept of human resource development through “programs of technical cooperation.” The AID focus is first, and properly, on economic and social development, with human resource development a major and growing component of this effort. “The development of human resources is a prime objective of the Agency for International Development,” Mr. Hamilton [Fowler Hamilton, AID Administrator] has said. “Social and economic growth in any country depends in large measure

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4 The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (see footnote 21, Document 24), which established AID, is also referred to as the Act for International Development of 1961.
upon the existence of effective technical and managerial skills in various fields of organized endeavor, public and private: . . .”

AID participant training grantees are here, first of all, for technical training on a project-oriented basis but are also enabled and encouraged to obtain a better understanding of American institutions and culture as a part of their “programming” while they are here. Here is one example of how the aims of AID coincide with our own.

Both AID and State cover a wide age range. In its academic grants AID begins at the preparatory school level, and in its support of the ASPAU program for African students—the African Scholarship Program of American Universities—undergirds the general academic training of highly selected undergraduate students. On the participant training level, the average age is about 30. The State programs cover the range from students to national leaders of senior rank.

The underlying, unifying idea in all our approaches—both governmental and nongovernmental—is that in diversity there is strength. We depend on diversity, on the contributions to our national life that come from all elements of our varied society. It marks our training programs and exchanges which must be directed toward highly developed countries, toward those just achieving industrialization, and toward others where this badge of modernity is not yet being worn. Different kinds of training and education are therefore required. And public support for this varied effort must necessarily rest on a broad and diverse base.

In calling this meeting AID has testified amply to its own faith in this general proposition. Here at this conference, for example, we have representatives of the land-grant colleges and State universities—those great centers of training and enlightenment which had their common origin a century ago in the farsighted act which the son of a Vermont blacksmith-farmer, Senator Justin Morrill, brought into being. We know it as the Morrill Act of 1862; the centennial anniversary date comes in just a few days from now.\footnote{Lincoln signed the Morrill Act, also known as the Land-Grant College Act, into law on July 2, 1862.} We are all, I think, even more aware than before of the dynamic role these institutions play not only, as in their founding years, in practical service to their State and regional communities, but now in varied services to an international constituency all across the world.

Then, we have here the comparatively youthful COSERV group, cosponsor of this conference, which only in May, under the leadership of Mrs. Charles N. Bang of the Cleveland World Affairs Council, completed its first independent regional conference. We all look confidently
ahead to the growing benefits to come from this Council’s coordinating work on behalf of some 75 individual community organizations in 65 cities, from Honolulu to New York and from Miami to Seattle.

The National Association of Foreign Student Advisers is another great source of strength for the exchange effort. Its members are directly involved in personal problems on more than 1,200 college and university campuses of the Nation, and they also keep closely attuned to new national needs and policies. NAFSA brings unique experience and service and dedication to the needs of our growing numbers of foreign student visitors.

Many other organizations represented here, as well as other parts of the academic community, government, industry, and labor—all sectors, public and private—provide additional centers of strength. As a result, we have in this combination of strengths a new affirmation of the traditional American faith in diversity—in different kinds of organizations and individuals coming together voluntarily to build unified strength for a common task.

This conference has afforded us all a chance to see the identities and complementarities of interest of private organizations, individuals, and government. And it has given us in government the opportunity to express our great sense of dependence on the voluntary service of diverse private groups and private citizens, and our deep gratitude to you for it.

Our interlocking interests are leading to the preparation of a booklet we hope to have available by early fall. The Department does not have, by its very nature, as many publications of an instructive type as do some other government agencies with special constituencies—with publications, for example, such as seed-testing manuals or on how to start a small business. I have often wished we might do something of the kind. I am now able to say that we will have a booklet that will meet the general specification. It is a sort of seed manual, in a sense. It is a booklet on The Seed of Nations—a phrase the President used in a talk to foreign students at the White House—and it deals with foreign students and what American communities and organizations and families are doing, and can do, to help them. For they are “the seed of nations” and our citizens have the great opportunity of being their hosts and their friends. Many of you know well the role of host and friend to foreign students.

6 In remarks made on May 10, 1961, at the White House before 1,000 foreign students attending colleges in the Washington area, the President stated: “You represent, really, the seed for your country. In every case all of you represent a sacrifice not only on behalf of yourselves but in behalf of your country and the people within your country who were responsible for sending you here to study.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1961, p. 372)
National and International Goals

The goals we seek through exchanges are as varied as the situations they are designed to meet. Exchanges as a means of reaching these goals are concerned with developed and developing nations, both friendly and unfriendly. They deal with people. As such they are directed to individuals in all varieties of human, professional, social, political, and economic contexts. They relate to all the factors that contribute to nation building and mutual understanding. These include, for example, human resource development and the preservation of indigenous national cultures.

Human resource development, the growth of individuals through training and education, has become a major new national and international goal in recent years. It has likewise become a major new field of academic study. Economists have been giving increasing attention to such matters as the “capital value of man” and the yield on investment in human resources.

“Development,” once of limited meaning, has in the last few years been expanded to embrace human resource development, which lies at the base of economic and social growth. AID has pointed out that the “human resources gap” varies from country to country in the light of a nation’s objectives and development goals. If human resource development plans are to meet individual country situations, they must be flexible. Individual country planning is therefore being given strong emphasis in the Government. This effort to relate exchange programs to particular needs and priorities and objectives of individual countries, and integrating them with other relevant activities, is leading to closer collaboration in the exchanges of AID, State, and other agencies, public and private.

There is need for mutually reinforcing efforts, too, in preserving national cultures in nations on the road to industrialization. This is a vitally important aspect of nation building. The impact of modernization will mean changes, but the changes need to be adaptations of old cultural patterns, old value systems, and historic symbols so that these social moorings will not be swept away. Everything feasible must be done to preserve the indigenous arts, the national monuments, and other great symbols of a society’s traditions. A common language, common ethnic origins, and common geography may not make a nation. There are cultural experiences and traditions, usually expressed in the plastic arts or in dance or music, that may really be the social bonding that holds a people together. We must therefore think in terms of helping to safeguard these indigenous arts as an early and essential part of any country plan. Fortunately, the cultural roots of most nations lie deep. For example, Secretary of State Rusk has recently pointed to
of the peoples of Eastern Europe to their national cultures and to their sense of nationhood.\(^7\)

The goals we seek were illuminated a few weeks ago at the University of California in Berkeley, where President Kennedy spoke on the role of the university in the building of world order.\(^8\) "... the pursuit of knowledge itself implies," he said, "a world where men are free to follow out the logic of their own ideas. ... It implies, I believe, the kind of world which is emerging before our eyes—the world produced by the revolution of national independence which is today, and has been since 1945, sweeping across the face of the world."

"No one can doubt," he continued, "that the wave of the future is not the conquest of the world by a single dogmatic creed but the liberation of the diverse energies of free nations and free men."

We look hopefully forward to a "free and diverse world"—toward a "more flexible world order," as the President has described it. We know that, as we press forward toward this goal, the role of education and training becomes ever more important to this kind of world.

The conduct of educational and cultural exchanges and training programs gives strong support to the broad national aim of building, with other peoples, a community of independent nations. In the underdeveloped areas in the southern half of the world, for example, we can encourage the emergence—from all the ferment of modernization—of a genuine community of independent nations. We can help them modernize, not in our image but in the image they themselves formulate out of their own unique histories, cultures, aspirations, and observations of other cultures and societies.

Perhaps the principal fact that distinguishes the United States from the Communist world, with respect to the less developed countries, is that our aspirations for these countries largely coincide with their aspirations for themselves. Our political aims, then, are for a world in which their, and our, aspirations can be realized. This cannot be a rigid, monolithic world. It can only be a free and diverse world.

The need for the services you provide—for participant trainees, foreign leaders and specialists, and the like, as well as foreign stu-

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\(^7\) Bulletin of Jan. 15, 1962, p. 83. [Footnote is in the original. Rusk spoke before the annual meeting of the American Historical Association in Washington on December 30, 1961. In his remarks, he stated: "Despite a Communist monopoly of education and propaganda, the peoples of Eastern Europe remain loyal to their culture and to their nationhood." (Department of State Bulletin, January 15, 1962, p. 87)]

\(^8\) Ibid., Apr. 16, 1962, p. 615. [Footnote is in the original. The President spoke at the March 22 Charter Day ceremonies held in Memorial Stadium at the University of California-Berkeley. The address is also printed in Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 263–266.]
dents—can be expected to rise in the years ahead as the numbers of such visitors increase. We will need more hands and heads to do the job. We will need to look at our procedures as still developing. The attention and help that may be suited to the needs of a visitor from a Western society may fail to meet some of the needs of those now coming in increasing numbers from the non-Western world. We have by no means yet found all the best ways to help the foreign student or trainee or leader or specialist realize the maximum value from his experience in this country.

Here is an area for almost unlimited initiative and imagination on the part of individual volunteers and groups who share a concern for the foreign visitor. Your experience, evolving out of thoughtful service in a variety of forms, can help those in other communities—and those of us in government—toward more useful planning and action. The experience some community groups have had in providing training sessions for host families, for example, should be widely shared.

In this brief time I have only tried to touch some of the highlights which this subject and this occasion suggest. I am confident the pattern of diversity will serve well to meet the increasing demands of the years ahead. With your continuing imaginative and generous help—and, hopefully, your growing numbers—our varied programs, public and private, for bringing foreign visitors to this country can be increasingly important factors in the “total diplomacy” our times require.

86. Message From the United States Information Agency to All Principal USIS Posts

Infoguide No. 62–37


INFOGUIDE: August 13 Anniversary of the Berlin Wall.

SITUATION

We do not plan major exploitation of the first anniversary of the Berlin Wall, August 13. It has of course been the subject of continuing

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exploitation within the context of output on one of our chief areas of emphasis—"Berlin."

**TREATMENT**

We shall not ignore the anniversary, however. As the anniversary approaches you may expect the media to provide materials (and, at your discretion, provided you do not make a major campaign of the anniversary, you may generate output of your own) which will continue to emphasize the following points:

1. In East Berlin, for the first time in history, a regime has found it necessary to immure its citizens in order to keep them from fleeing—and still the captive people seek a way out by every manner of ingenious means.

2. The Wall is an open, embarrassing symbol of Communist failure—of Communist inability to compete with the way of life which democracy, diversity and free choice have made possible in West Berlin.

3. The United States and its allies are determined both to stand by the people of free Berlin and, without surrendering Allied rights, to continue working for an equitable and peaceful solution of the crisis which Khrushchev precipitated to shore up the bankrupt East German regime.

*Wilson*  
*Acting*
87. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy

Joplin, Missouri, June 30, 1962.

SUBJECT

Foreign policy on secondary roads . . . casual conversations in Virginia, Western North Carolina, Tennessee and Missouri with assorted truck drivers, motel operators, farm equipment salesmen, farmers, service station operators, and others . . . a personal unscientific poll by a one-time reporter

There is more interest in the stock market and in the weather than in Berlin or Viet-Nam. Louis Seltzer was right when he said the people have abdicated when it comes to foreign policy . . . it’s too complex. They would like to have an opinion but they are content to “leave it to the people in Washington.” They think those people are doing a pretty fair job. There is no tension, no criticism. I heard not a single comment on resumption of nuclear testing. Confidence in the President’s judgment is high. “He must be working right hard, hasn’t ‘fleshened up’ since he took over,” was the comment of a North Carolina mountain woman. There is a very slight hangover from Cuba: “He didn’t follow through on that one, but that won’t happen again . . . He certainly looked them in the eye over Berlin.”

I formed the impression that these people will follow wherever you lead them . . . that they have given up trying to understand and don’t even have the desire to try. The emotional belligerence of all defeated people is in evidence in this area.

The tobacco crop looks good. There have been “gully-washin” rains, and not many people “looking for work,” so they are content to leave the foreign business to you. And though I rode my favorite theme, that maybe you should tell them more of what their country is trying to do, explain why we do what we do, no one asserted that you had failed in this fashion. (Could it be that I was wrong in our last conversation on this subject?) I do not know, but I am shaken.

Here are one or two quotations to give you the flavor of the past four days—

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USA 1/62–6/62. No classification marking. In a June 21 memorandum to the President, Murrow indicated that he was leaving for the West Coast on June 23 in order to make a speech in Seattle on July 6. (Ibid.) A June 30 note by Harris indicates that Murrow, on June 30, sent via airmail “in rough form” the content of the June 30 memorandum and that it was retyped in USIA and transmitted to the President. (Ibid.)

2 Editor of The Cleveland Press.
Carl Sandburg\textsuperscript{3} at Flat Rock, North Carolina: “I would like to hear more great quotations from the White House . . . Jefferson, Adams and the rest . . . but the President’s speeches cause men to ponder and that is worthwhile.”

A comment on your daughter from a woman selling cider in a small valley in Tennessee: “Her face is bright as new money is.” That’s pure Elizabethan.

Finally, and perhaps of importance in a conversation after dinner at a motel in Roaring Gap, North Carolina (and that’s just about the buckle of the Bible Belt) an ancient said: “That young man done settled one thing. There ain’t no Catholic issue in this country no more. Come sixty-four, nobody’s likely to remember what he is.”

COMMENT: These have been the broad generalizations of an old reporter . . . It is good to get out from behind that wall of Washington and listen to the authentic voice of this land.

The people stand very steady in their shoes. I wish that some method could be found for Americans serving abroad to spend their home leaves getting to know their fellow countrymen who inhabit this generous and capacious land.

PERSONAL COMMENT: Casey\textsuperscript{4} and I have scrutinized motel signs with great care, and we have not—repeat not—observed a single one carrying the sign “Lolita slept here.”\textsuperscript{5}

Edward R. Murrow\textsuperscript{6}

\textit{(Rocket Motel, Joplin, Missouri)}

\textsuperscript{3} American poet and biographer of President Lincoln.

\textsuperscript{4} Murrow’s son Charles Casey Murrow.

\textsuperscript{5} Reference is to the title character in the 1955 novel \textit{Lolita} by novelist Vladimir Nabokov.

\textsuperscript{6} Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to Attorney General Kennedy


I thought you would be interested in three new approaches we are undertaking at USIA in the field of books. They add up to something of a “CARE” program in books. As soon as we reach agreement on a suitable statement to be made by the various publishers that will assure us of the non-profit characteristic of the programs, we will proceed. These programs have been developed under the leadership of Sanford Marlowe, who is Director of our Office of Private Cooperation. Marlowe, incidentally, will be USIA’s representative in Aspen at your session with the foreign students.

1. Major Paperback Publishers. This program, directed to the American people at large, will involve the largest of the mass paperback publishers: Pocket Books Incorporated, Bantam Books, Dell Publications, New American Library, and Fawcett Publications.

Each of the publishers will make up one or more book packets of 10 titles, each in a given category (e.g., American literature, history, youth, etc.). All titles will be selected by us. Each packet, to be advertised in all coming book releases, will be offered for sale to the public for about $4.00. Once purchased, the packet will be turned over to us for distribution by our post in the country selected by the purchaser.

2. Spanish and other language kits. We are now developing a packet in Spanish that will include 14 translations of American works and will sell for $10.00. The General Federation of Women’s Clubs has indicated willingness to support this project which will work along the same lines as the project described above. This project will be primarily in support of the Alliance for Progress and if it proves successful we will want to develop similar libraries in Portuguese for Brazil and, later, in French for Africa.

3. Scholastic Book Services. This firm, which sells directly to the classroom only, publishes 12 children’s magazines and about 100 originals and reprints in paperback each year, ranging in level from the first grade to the twelfth. Scholastic Book Services will offer two miniature libraries for sale through their eight classroom book clubs to be donated

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, Personal Papers of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General’s General Correspondence, Box 78, United States Information Agency (USIA), 8/1962–11/1962. No classification marking. A stamped notation indicates that it was received in Kennedy’s office on August 2. Kennedy initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.
by these clubs to school children overseas. The first library, at the primary level, will have 34 titles; the second, at the secondary level, will have 23 titles. All titles will be selected by us and the libraries, which sell for $10.00, will be distributed overseas by us.

Donald M. Wilson

2 Wilson signed “Don” above his typed signature.

89. Memorandum of Meeting


SUBJECT

Operation of the New Soviet Branch

The Director called media directors and others concerned to discuss with them his concept of how the new IAB should function.

He stated that it should become the best body of expertise on Soviet affairs in this town. It should perform useful coordination between our own branches within and other elements outside the Agency. It should as well examine what we are doing and not doing.

As an example, there are African students studying in Russia that call at our Embassy. They are a receptive target for information, and could be particularly useful in their travels to other European capitals and returning home. ERM suggested that if a plan could be devised in about a week specifying what to do and how much it would cost he could probably obtain money for it. But to do so he would need specifics.

Each Director was advised to stir up his own people and to get going with ideas on subjects and projects.

From his luncheon with the Russian Ambassador, ERM said the one subject that seemed most on Dobrynin’s mind was American publicity about anti-Semitism in Russia. With this as a lead perhaps we could do an _Ameryka_ magazine article on Jews in the United States or a VOA series on Jews in Latin America. This was the kind of idea ERM had in mind.

Loomis mentioned a need for personnel trained in VOA languages of broadcast. He suggested establishing a personnel plan so that language speakers could have an Agency-wide career. General concurrence.

The Director mentioned to Schmidt that he would like to see personnel with Russian background posted to Latin America, the Far East, etc. Schmidt replied it was already being done to some extent.

There was general concurrence on a need to look at personnel policies for people with language capabilities so as to attract them, develop them, and keep them.

Loomis suggested that _Problems of Communism_, now written for a free world audience and one of the Agency’s best products, might be done in another edition aimed at Communist audiences.  

Chinese relationships regarding Russia might also be exploited much more in media output.

ERM stressed the need to attempt the unorthodox. He mentioned his Dobrynin conversation in which the Ambassador said that _Ameryka_ and _USSR_ need more self-criticism. Murrow said he immediately offered to swap editors for one issue. Dobrynin was noncommittal. The Director commented that the idea may be good or bad but it was unorthodox and he wanted to encourage more such unorthodoxy.

It was suggested that if the bureaucracy could be relaxed to obtain funds we could have a person or persons travel for long periods of time in Bloc countries, writing articles, cutting tapes, etc. To continue this for a long period we would, however, need an overcomplement of language speakers.

Paid vacations in Russian resort areas were mentioned. An officer on salary would spend time in resorts such as Sochi and in doing so contact a wide range of Russians.

Tom Tuch’s interest rose.

Russian tourists coming to the United States could be contacted and be interviewed. They are more official than tourists of other nations, and hence worth the effort of contact.

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2 Journal published by the United States Information Agency since the 1950s.
It was suggested that we could investigate Russian society, observe how well they are developing, and speculate what they might develop into. This entails telling them things about themselves which they do not know.

The necessity of cooperation with other Western European nations was mentioned.

Loomis described the dual mission of Project Larry in Liberia: we are to be both the Voice of America and the Voice of Africa. He observed that we might extend a similar mission to our Bloc broadcasts: become both the Voice of America and the Voice of Communism. This would entail relating matters such as what goes on in other Communist parties, who controls Cuba, who is on top in African Communism, etc. The Russian people have only one source of information; this would seek to give them an alternative.

The need for government coordination on visiting dignitaries was mentioned. When Udall goes to Russia with Robert Frost, or Newton Minow is approached for a television exchange with Russia, they should seek a briefing first either at USIA or State.

It was suggested that Dobrynin himself might be induced to do a VOA report to his people.

Murrow closed the meeting by observing that in a week or three he would like to see some plans and “unorthodoxy”.

Robert Mayer Evans

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Letter From the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)\(^1\)


Dear Mac,

I am addressing this to you in reply to a letter dated July 27, 1962 from Mr. Amory of the Bureau of the Budget. His letter, a copy of which is enclosed, requested the views of the Department of State concerning Radio Liberty and Radio Free Europe.\(^2\)

With regard to Radio Liberty, the consensus here is that the function of the Radio remains useful, and that its operation is generally satisfactory. Although in an effort of this sort there is always room for improvement, we do not have any critical problems with Radio Liberty.

We believe Radio Free Europe has an important role to play as an unofficial voice of the West and we support and urge a continuation of this operation. We therefore take an active and continuing interest in the work of this organization and try to follow it as closely as we can. Because of this significance of RFE we also feel that there should be further efforts made toward the improvement of its operation.

During the course of this year we requested and received assessments of RFE from our Missions in those Eastern European countries to which RFE broadcasts. In summary, our Missions concluded that:

1. RFE is, in the main, doing a more effective job in an important, complex and difficult undertaking.

2. This represents a contrast to RFE broadcasts of several years ago and reflects desirable modifications in terms of present United States policy interests.

3. Occasional mistakes of varying magnitude and some programs of lesser value occur. The proportion of these objectionable or deficient broadcasts to the total output has been reduced.

\(^1\) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 306, Radio Free Europe. Secret. Bundy wrote in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum: “ack with thanks & be sure copy goes to Amory. McGB.”

\(^2\) Attached but not printed. In it, Amory wrote: “We felt the need, however, for an authoritative statement by the Department of its views as to the desirability of continuing these programs, or, if such be the case, its suggestions for modifying them. I do not think such a letter need be particularly lengthy nor need it review the factual data which is available in pretty good shape. Essentially what I am requesting is that the Department ‘stand up and be counted’ on these two institutions.”
4. Adjustments should be made (in line with suggestions by the Missions) to increase the effectiveness of these broadcasts in the service of United States objectives.

5. Although on occasion an “emigre” rather than a “European” approach is still discernable in current RFE broadcasts, they tend generally to support the purpose of keeping Eastern European listeners in touch with and oriented toward Western life—especially in terms of association with Western Europe.

We agree generally with this judgement but desire at the same time to make the following additional comment. First, we note with appreciation the encouraging developments which have taken place more recently in the approach of RFE, giving it more the character of a European radio. We hope this development continues. Second, we believe the efforts of the Radio to talk to elements within or close to the regimes should be strengthened, recognizing that the priority target audience must include those persons and groups who are in a position to play a role in developments in Eastern Europe in the foreseeable future. Third, we are convinced that the Radio must drop that type of broadcast which reflects émigré value judgements of the regimes and key Communist personalities, and thus runs a predictable and substantial risk of alienating a primary target audience.

On this basis, we are happy to “stand up and be counted” in support of a continued program for the next several years for Radio Free Europe as an important instrument for the advancement of our foreign policy objectives in Eastern Europe.

Sincerely,

U. Alexis Johnson
91. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Defoliation

If we will win in Viet-Nam with defoliants, but lose without them, then we must use them. If we will *probably* win with defoliants and probably lose without them, then also we must use them. If we *might* win with defoliants, and might win without them, then we had better consider the implications before undertaking the project proposed by the Department of Defense for 2,500 acres in Phu Yen Province.\(^2\)

We have a tradition in this country of not using food as a weapon of war. Chemical and biological warfare are subjects which arouse emotional reactions at least as intense as those aroused by nuclear warfare, as witnessed by the publicity surrounding the recent accidental death of the British scientist, our Korean and East German experiences, and the recent Indian incidents. A series by Rachel Carson currently running in the *New Yorker* and soon to be published in book form\(^3\) sets forth with devastating impact the consequences of insecticides on insect-plant life balance and human health. The Agriculture Department is concerned about the implications of this book for our foreign crop marketing; if we launch a defoliation program in Viet-Nam our enemies and many of our friends will use this book against us.

Depriving the Viet Cong of their local food supplies and forcing them onto the open plain where they can more easily be dealt with is a


\(^2\) In an August 8 memorandum to the President, McNamara stated that Nolting and Harkins had recommended a proposal for the Vietnamese Government “to conduct a trial program of chemical crop destruction in Viet Cong territory of eight target areas totaling 2,500 acres” in Phu Yen Province. The memorandum is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 262. For the Department of State response to the proposal, contained in an August 23 memorandum from Rusk to the President, see ibid., Document 270.

legitimate and necessary military objective. But what are the alternative methods of achieving this objective? Have all been tried and have all failed? Given the relative predictability of the growing season, can not the Viet Cong be ambushed or otherwise prevented from harvesting these crops?

No matter how reasonable our case may be, I am convinced that we cannot persuade the world—particularly that large part of it which does not get enough to eat—that defoliation “is good for you.” Nonetheless, should the President decide to proceed with the project, it is important that we be given a brief period to explain to the world exactly what we are doing and why. This will reduce, to some extent, the impact of the inevitable Communist propaganda campaign.

Edward R. Murrow

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4 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
SUBJECT
Youth

I. USIA has a unique ability to communicate with those people overseas who are not within the governing power structure of any country, a structure which, incidentally, includes more than just government.

On the other hand, State and AID must, for the most part, restrict their activities to that governing structure.

Youth, of course, lies without the power structure but is an audience of significant importance to the U.S. So it falls largely to our lot to program for this audience; largely but not exclusively as I shall point out later.

The problem is not agreeing on the audience—youth. The problem is: what segment of that particular audience do we want to reach; and with what purpose in mind?

It is here that I’ll have to get into the tricky business of generalizing; but that has its compensations. First of all, the Agency should generalize and let it be the burden of each post to demonstrate the exceptions to Agency generalizations. The generalizations will at least provide us with some broad guidelines against which to exercise a judgment on performance.

A. What segment of the youth audience do we want to reach?

1. I plump against the illiterate because I do not think that in and of himself he is or will become politically important. The illiterate, in
fact, is the numerical strength and perhaps the motive power of the politically minded leader. But he follows; he is more apt to be a “true believer” than a political activist. Being illiterate he has little on which to base judgments; his responses tend to be emotional.

So even in those countries where the majority of youth are illiterate, I claim we ought to concentrate our fire on the literate youth. There is, after all, no harm in concentrating limited resources on the most meaningful target. Conversely, there is considerable danger in claiming “youth” as the audience and spreading ourselves so thin that our effect becomes invisible.

2. Literate youth does not mean “student” exclusively. But I’d like to discuss that segment of the audience briefly. First of all, the student is institutionalized, and therefore to a considerable extent he is a captive audience. We know where he is; in what numbers; and how to reach him.

But we still get to the question of how far down we want to reach in the educational structure. Below college? I doubt it. The deeper down you go, the greater the audience; the greater the audience, the more dispersed our effort and effect. Below college, I tend to believe that political orientation may have begun; but, in fact, political commitments have not yet been made.

It’s the college student we want. And the task of working on youth below the college level properly belongs to AID. I’ll come to that shortly.

3. Given the student, what about the rest of literate youth? They’re found in all occupations; but critically they’re in government, communications and the arts. Those in the professions generally have started to acquire a vested interest; they’re not as radical as those in government and the arts. Government workers may take on a vested interest; but at lower echelons they tend to be impatient, radical and frequently looking for quick access to power. In the arts he most frequently represents the Steinbacks, John Dos Passos, and Hemingways of our early thirties—vocal, indignant, oriented to the left. It should be borne in mind that he commands a following, whether writer (this includes journalists), painter or poet; and his importance to us is more than he himself—it is his command of a following.

4. Finally, there is that large group who are disenchanted because they are under or unemployed. They are harder to locate and, once located, harder to “reach”.

5. In essence, then I think we are after literate youth—in college, government, art—or under or unemployed.

We are after the social rebel; the social dissident who, politically, is most apt to be in leftist-oriented parties. And why not? It can be stated with some reasonable certainty that the more pressing the need
for reform, the greater the drift to the left. It is from the left that reform is most likely to emanate.

Our classic problem is that the normal rebellion and political zeal of youth are captured by the promises of communism and channeled into communist organizations. I don’t think this is inescapable; in fact I think that the rebellion and dissension can be turned to our advantage—assuming our willingness to take political risks.

II. **What Do We Do About Them?**

It is not my purpose to spell out the precise mechanics and programs we should undertake to reach youth, but rather to suggest three major approaches which should be directed to those segments of the audience I have delineated above; and which, incidentally, will command through them an even wider audience.

According to your recent survey, the three major problems of youth that affect us are: economic, lack of career opportunities, and lack of information about the United States.

The economic problems we can approach directly only—first, by pointing out what the people and the country must do; second, we can indicate how we can support their efforts; and third, we can assume a more positive role in the planning stages of the AID programs.

The lack of information about the U.S. is not necessarily critical. A stepped-up program of information about the U.S. will dissuade youth from looking for drastic solutions only if we ourselves can provide meaningful solutions.

A. Our primary emphasis in the Alliance for Progress, for example, has been about what we are doing or propose to do. Our secondary emphasis has been on what the people and the country should do. I am reasonably convinced that the stick should precede the carrot if we are, through an information program, to ally ourselves with revolutionary aspirations. I grant this entails some political risks. Our claim to being the original revolutionaries has by now become redundant and because we have been unable to back it with substance, meaningless.

To state that we are for reform programs that will constitute an economic and political revolution is simply not enough because this statement does nothing to enlist the energies of youth. We should put more of the monkey on youth’s back; urging them to undertake civic actions which will bring about those very reforms essential to their own well being. We must emphasize the direct responsibility of youth

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to help create the pressures and the climate that will bring these reforms into existence. We should state that the success of their activities will determine the extent of our support.

True, we cannot provide organizational structures as do the Communists. We can urge youth into meaningful activity that leads to the formation of or participation in organizations which in turn will press for reform.

In essence, let us adopt their own slogans (when as is frequently the case, these slogans coincide with our purposes). This is a tactic which the Communists have often used with us—witness their usurpation of the word “democracy”. Let us embrace and urge for more education, for social reform, and for economic reform, and indicate that we are their allies in these revolutionary pursuits. But let’s keep the burden on them to engage in responsible activities in pursuit of these goals.

B. But we must also spur AID into concentrated programs that can produce results rather than diffused and tangential programs which disperse our resources and the resources of the host country. AID should concentrate on core problems and these frequently are concerned with economic problems directly affecting youth—e.g. increased educational opportunities and the need for industrialization to absorb the under or unemployed. Economic aid programs must produce political and psychological as well as economic results and we should urge programs intended in part to remove the very problems that frustrate youth and present us with political problems.

C. Let us then narrow down our program of economic aid information (while we undertake the first two activities) so that we concentrate on AID programs which will be directly in support of the revolutionary aspirations of youth.

Let us demonstrate to youth through this program that as they have succeeded in establishing programs of reform, they have also succeeded in enlisting our direct economic support.

This, I know, is a highly simplified outline of what I conceive of as an intensive information program directed to youth. It glosses over the admitted political problems which we would face in different countries. But the cloth can be cut appropriately for each country; and in any event, we shall at least begin to direct the discontent and the energy of youth into channels constructive to our own national purposes.

Alan Carter

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
246   Foreign Relations, 1917–1972, Public Diplomacy

93.   Memorandum From USIA Public Affairs Officer William
Gordon to the Assistant Director, Africa, United States
Information Agency (Roberts)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Materials for Photo Display

The generally accepted concept abroad is that America is a mixed
fabric from which is woven every racial, national and ethnic group.
Our population is a pattern cut from all populations of the world.

In light of this people abroad, Africans, Asians and Europeans
think of us as an integrated America.

The idea for this memo grew out of a discussion involving a
research project assigned to me on photo material for picture display
purposes. Initially, I took the assignment to be an easy task, thinking
that the availability of materials were numerous in our library. This
was quite to the contrary. There exists a limit on almost every type of
photograph reflecting the real theme of an integrated American life.

In the area of agriculture, it was difficult to find photos of American
whites and Negroes working together. The same was true in industry,
religion and social life in general. In science there were also limitations.
In music, most groups were segregated photos with minor exceptions
here and there where one or two Negroes appeared in isolated groups.
But there is room for optimism.

The fact that a large segment of American life still remains segre-
gated is not the real story. There are segments of progress with a
completely different economic educational and social outlook. There
are vast areas of intergradation in the United States and we can utilize
materials from those to tell our story abroad. The following are a
few examples:

Although many peoples abroad don’t understand the institution
of American baseball, they can appreciate seeing the number of Negro

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD
WW 266, Box 315, Civil Rights & Race Relations (to 1966). No classification marking.
Roberts sent the memorandum to Sorensen under an undated note in which he com-
mented that IAA had utilized Gordon, “our hotshot Branch PAO Eastern Nigeria,” to
research the feasibility of “some displays or exhibits on integrated racial themes.” Roberts
and others had assumed that a “wealth of material” existed in USIA on this topic; he
concluded that, based on Gordon’s memorandum, this was an erroneous assumption.
He continued: “We have been concerned that a lot of basic agency material does not
reflect even what we feel other areas would consider the desired amount of attention
to portraying progress on the integration front.” Sorensen wrote: “WG I agree. Pls talk
to Ned [Roberts] & let’s see what we should do. –TCS.” (Ibid.)
and Cuban players taking part in this form of recreation. They can also appreciate the picture of whites and Negroes in basketball, tennis, track and boxing.

In order to bring the picture more up to date which will obviously reflect a different image, one can visit the Lockheed aircraft plant in Atlanta, Georgia where whites and Negroes work side by side on a professional level. In recent months, lunch counters have been integrated in the South. There are schools and institutions, all over the country presenting an excellent picture of whites and Negroes in an integrated situation. I understand that the Department of Justice has increased its Negro legal staff far in excess of what it was two years ago. There is the vast Post Office operation with thousands of Negroes working with whites on all levels of employment. This picture also reflects itself in the industrial life of our country. Beverage firms, cigarette, U.S. steel, Ford and General Motors all have increased the numbers of their Negro employees on a representative basis within the past five years. Such photos reflecting an integrated America can be obtained by establishing contact with the various public relations people working for these industries.

It was interesting to watch the number of African and European children standing and pointing with pride at a picture of Floyd Patterson, heavyweight champion, on a wall in Nigeria. With equal interest Africans and Europeans flocked to see Louis Armstrong and his musicians, white and Negro play at concerts throughout West Africa. But there were some reservations and a number of questions from Africans, Europeans and Asians about the appearance of Holiday on Ice when it arrived in West Africa. They wanted to know why no blacks were included. The African press dealt with this at some length.

In one of our own USIS films, “Pilgrimage to Liberty”, Africans, Asians and Europeans questioned the absence of American Indians and Negroes.

“If you contend that a large portion of your population is Negro, why don’t we see them in these films?”, a prominent European asked after seeing “Pilgrimage to Liberty.”

I recall hearing comments from the integration display we had at the World’s Fair in Brussels in 1958. The photos, news clippings and materials reflecting to some extent the picture of integration in the United States were acceptable. However, many people at the Fair asked my wife and I why a more substantial part of an integrated America did not appear on the films shown on life in the U.S. Questions are still asked about private productions, documentary films sent overseas. Criticisms over this kind of content is increasing. A suggestion is that

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2 Expo 58 took place from April 17 until October 19, 1958.
we should search for better examples of an integrated America to tell our story abroad. Fortunately, there are many examples around, and they are on a steady increase.

William Gordon

94. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith)\(^1\)


REFERENCE

Your Memorandum of August 9, 1962\(^2\)

We appreciate the opportunity to re-do the statement of the mission of the U.S. Information Agency. Our proposed restatement, a substitute for NSC 165/1–10/24/53,\(^3\) is attached.\(^4\)

I agree it would be desirable if the President issued it, rather than making it a National Security Council document.

We do not think it necessary for part of the statement to be unclassified, as was the case in 1953. We no longer need a statement to hang on the wall; rather we desire a realistic, meaningful definition of the Agency’s mission for internal use within the Government.

Edward R. Murrow

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\(^1\) Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1/63–2/63. Top Secret. A stamped notation indicates that it was received at the White House at 9:42 a.m. Another copy is ibid., National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 290, United States Information Agency, General, 1962–Inclusive. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 140.

\(^2\) In his August 9 memorandum, Smith commented that it might be possible for USIA to “re-do” the existing 1953 NSC directive “in the light of the Agency’s current mission. In the event that you do decide that a revised statement should be issued, you may wish to have President Kennedy approve it prior to issuance, rather than making it a National Security Council document.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1/63–2/63)


\(^4\) Not attached. A copy is attached to another copy of Murrow’s memorandum in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 290, United States Information Agency, General, 1962—Inclusive. For the final version, contained in a memorandum from the President to Murrow, see Document 109.
Washington, September 27, 1962.

SUBJECT

VOA and IPS handling of Mississippi case

In general, VOA and IPS have been following the same pattern in covering the Meredith case in Mississippi. Both have played it as straight news giving special emphasis to actions taken by the Federal courts and the Department of Justice with a liberal sprinkling of quotes by the Attorney General when appropriate.

VOA has been carrying this story on all of its newscasts. To protect their flanks against any criticism from southern Congressmen or Senators they have occasionally quoted Barnett and yesterday quoted Sena-

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director's Subject Files, 1962–1963, Entry UD WW 173, Box 11, Public Information—Special Events 1962 Mississippi. No classification marking. Drafted by Carter. A copy was sent to Thomas Sorensen.

2 In early 1961, following his completion of coursework at Jackson State University, Air Force veteran James Meredith sought admission to the then-segregated University of Mississippi. In June 1962, he won an order from the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit directing the University to admit him for the 1962 fall semester. After one of the judges on the Fifth Circuit continued to issue stays, the Justice Department asked for Supreme Court intervention. Supreme Court Justice Hugo Black set aside the stays, permitting Meredith to enroll. Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett, in a September 13 address, broadcast on Mississippi radio and television networks, indicated that all public institutions in the state would be administered under state officials and recognize only laws issued by the state, thus effectively denying Meredith entry, (“Barnett Defies Federal Court on Mississippi U. Integration,” The New York Times, September 14, 1962, p. 1) On September 20, Barnett denied Meredith admission to the University; Federal officials then served injunctions against Barnett and University officials. (Claude Sitton, “Negro Rejected at Mississippi U.; U.S. Seeks Writs: 3 Educators Face Contempt Action After Gov. Barnett Turns Away Applicant,” The New York Times, September 21, 1962, pp. 1, 13) Although the University of Mississippi Board of Trustees agreed on September 24 to admit Meredith, the next day, despite a restraining order, Barnett physically blocked Meredith from entering the University Trustees' office. (Hedrick Smith, “Court is Obeyed: College Trustees Heed 8 Judges’ Demand, Made at Hearing,” September 25, 1962, pp. 1, 26; Claude Sitton, “Meredith Rebuffed Again Despite Restraining Order,” September 26, 1962, pp. 1, 22, both The New York Times) On September 30, in a radio and television report to the nation, the President stated that Meredith “is now in residence” at the University of Mississippi campus preceding his formal enrollment on October 1. The President, referencing the fact that the administration had federalized the Mississippi National Guard “to preserve law and order,” while U.S. marshals “carried out the orders of the court,” stated, “I deeply regret the fact that any action by the executive branch was necessary in this case, but all other avenues and alternatives, including persuasion and conciliation, had been tried and exhausted.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 726–727)
In all cases these quotes were legitimate news items. And in all cases emphasis has been on Federal action.

In addition, VOA, which is currently carrying a documentary on the Negro in America over World-Wide English, has updated the documentary to give additional emphasis to the efforts of the Justice Department on the Barnett case.

IPS has supplemented its news coverage with backgrounders putting the rear guard action of Mississippi into the context of over-all developments toward integration in the south. They have pointed out that all but three of the states have accepted integration and that 90% of their universities have Negroes enrolled. The key theme in these backgrounders has been the Federal Government versus the obstructionists.

Getting back briefly to VOA, their lead yesterday on the stories was Rev. King’s statement complimenting President Kennedy on his position and actions.

Both VOA and IPS have carried editorial roundups citing the more responsible newspapers.

IRS did a specific check on FBIS reports in Western Europe, Japan and Peking. Absolutely nothing has been filed to date. The only FBIS report we have is one quoting Moscow domestic radio in Russian which I have attached and which in fact does not appear to be too unfair.

I have attached four IPS takes and the one FBIS report. 4

Alan Carter 5

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3 On September 26, as The New York Times reported: “Mississippi’s two Democratic Senators—James O. Eastland and John Stennis—both made strong statements denouncing the Federal Government’s moves. Senator Stennis is generally believed to be facing a challenge from Governor Barnett for his seat in 1964.

“The people of Mississippi and the Governor are not on the defense,’ Senator Stennis said. ‘They are the ones who are defending the Constitution.’” (Anthony Lewis, “Robert Kennedy Vows to Back Court With Troops If Necessary: Voices Determination to Execute Orders in Clash With Mississippi Governor—Showdown Expected Tomorrow,” September 27, 1962, p. 29)

4 Not attached and not further identified.

5 Carter signed “Al” above his typed signature.
96. Memorandum From the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy

Washington, October 17, 1962.

On August 23, 1962, the Senate passed a resolution that the USIA films on Mrs. Kennedy’s trip to India-Pakistan should be shown to the American public. Unfortunately, no action was taken by the House. We recommend going ahead with commercial distribution of the film in this country, although we fully realize it may call forth some criticism from members of the House.

We have evolved the following plan for distribution: The two films, which run for a total of 37 minutes, will be edited into one 30 minute film. United Artists, on behalf of the motion picture industry, will pay for the editing and will distribute the film at Christmas time along with their feature production, “Taras Bulba,” which stars Yul Brynner and Tony Curtis. Both the timing and the particular feature film should result in the best possible audience.

United Artists estimates that the film will be shown in at least 8,000 theaters. It will be followed by a trailer indicating that it was produced by the U.S. Information Agency and shown by its overseas posts on a world-wide basis.

United Artists will assume all distribution costs, which include the buying of prints and advertising. They will retain 35% of the gross as their distribution fee. The remaining 65% will be used by United Artists to provide USIA with additional prints and language versions. This will enable us to service the requests of our overseas posts which we

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/62–12/62. No classification marking. A stamped notation on the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House on October 17 at 4:55 p.m. An unknown hand, presumably the President’s, wrote “ok” in the top right-hand corner of the memorandum. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, another copy indicates that it was drafted by Wilson and that copies were sent to Guarco and Plesent. (Kennedy Library, United States Information Agency Records (RG 306), Series 1, Records, 1961–1964, Box 1, Memoranda 1961–1964 [1 of 3])

2 The First Lady traveled to India and Pakistan in March 1962. Senate Concurrent Resolution 84. In a July 20 memorandum to Salinger, Wilson stated that Gore had introduced the resolution in the Senate and Fulton in the House in order to “permit arrangements whereby USIA would make the films available to educational and commercial media in the United States.” (Kennedy Library, White House Central Files, Subject Files, Executive, Box 184, FG 296 U.S. Information Agency 3-1-62–3-31-63)

3 Invitation to Pakistan and Invitation to India, directed by Seltzer. See Appendix A.1 and A.2.

4 Jacqueline Kennedy’s Asian Journey.
have been unable to meet within our regular budget. Any part of the 65% which is unspent will be turned over to the Treasury Department. We would appreciate your opinion on this plan of action.5

Donald M. Wilson

5 In an October 22 memorandum to Wilson, Evelyn Lincoln wrote: “The President read your memorandum concerning the distribution of the USIA film on Mrs. Kennedy’s trip to India-Pakistan and he asked me to tell you that he approves your plan of distribution.” (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/62–12/62) In a November 7 memorandum to O’Brien, Wilson indicated that USIA had “decided to proceed with the domestic distribution of a 30 minute film on Mrs. Kennedy’s trip to India and Pakistan.” (Kennedy Library, United States Information Agency Records (RG 306), Series 1, Records, 1961–1964, Box 1, Memoranda 1961–1964 [1 of 3]) On December 25, Jacqueline Kennedy’s Asian Journey, paired with Taras Bulba, opened in U.S. theaters. (Bosley Crowther, “Taras Bulba’ Stars Brynner and Curtis,” The New York Times, December 26, 1962, p. 5)

97. Letter From the Chairman of the United States Advisory Commission on Information (Reinsch) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)1


Dear Ed:

At its meeting in Washington on October 23, 1962, the Advisory Commission discussed at some length the question of program content in USIA. The Commission recognizes the problem of sheer volume of material that is inherent in any assessment of program output. At the same time, the Commission believes that there is a need to review periodically the various publications prepared and distributed by USIA as well as the variety of programs offered by the Voice of America, both here and abroad. For it is the Commission’s view that routine radio programs and publications have been developed by the Agency over a period of years which may have outlived their original usefulness.

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1962–1963, Entry UD WW 173, Box 7, Advisory Groups—General (IAI/S) 1962). No classification marking. Murrow sent a copy of the letter to Harris under a November 16 memorandum, requesting that he draft an answer to Reinsch. (Ibid.)
Recognizing the excellent arrangements under which the Agency has organized its annual personnel promotion panels, the Commission recommends that you consider creating two committees, or panels, for the purpose of reviewing annually or perhaps semi-annually the Agency’s output in print and radio. The Commission believes that the structural patterns of these committees should resemble the personnel promotion panel. The committees or panels should consist of a chairman, who would be either the Director of USIA or a representative of his office, the head of the Press or Broadcasting Service, and one or two public members. The public members should be men who have devoted their lives to print or radio and who can spend at least a month examining the format and content of USIA programs and material as they relate to the purpose, the target audience, and the impact. Men like John Sterling, Ev Meade, and Don Francisco would be eminently qualified to assist the Agency in this essential activity.2

If you agree that such an activity would be beneficial, the Commission would be happy to cooperate with you in finding and selecting qualified and experienced persons who could serve as public members of these committees.

Closely related to the problem of program content is the broader question of country by country review of programs. This Commission has recommended in its Reports to Congress that the Agency conduct a thorough and systematic review of all the programs conducted by USIS on a country by country basis. The Commission suggests that you may wish to employ the instrument of the committee to assist you in performing this function as well.

During the course of the Commission’s meeting, we visited the facilities of the Information Center Service (ICS) where we received an excellent briefing by Robert Beers, the Deputy Director of this Service. We would like to bring to your attention a problem that concerns the Music Division.

We discovered, for example, that the compilation and preparation of the popular music record list and its distribution is slow. This can and should be accelerated. Secondly, we understand that it is customary to put any post that requests records on a permanent mailing list. This mailing list should be checked on an annual basis by the PAO. He should ascertain the use to which the records have been put and he

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2 In Murrow’s response, dated December 3, he commented: “The committee review plan outlined in your letter makes good sense. However, I would like to see it applied only to publications, since the present Broadcast Advisory Committee gives adequate scrutiny to Voice of America content within inherent limitations. The nature of our policy guidance affecting broadcasting would make difficult any attempt by public members of a temporary special committee to give useful or effective advice on VOA content.” (Ibid.)
should determine whether or not the post should continue to receive records. Although the Commission’s comments are directed in this instance at music records, it relates to our previous discussions of a more general nature when we recommended that each PAO prepare and submit to the Washington office an annual inventory of all material which he receives from Washington.³

If the recommendations contained in this letter require further elaboration, please do not hesitate to call me and I shall be happy to discuss this matter with you.

The Commission asked me to express its deep concern about your recent illness. It missed you at its meeting and hopes that you will be back soon at the helm fully recovered and reinvigorated. The Commission also asked me to express again its admiration for your invaluable contributions to the U.S. Information Agency and to the nation’s foreign information programs.

With kindest personal regards, I am

Sincerely,

J. Leonard Reinsch⁴

³ An unknown hand placed two checkmarks in the right-hand margin next to this sentence.
⁴ Reinsch signed “Leonard” above his typed signature.
98. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Latin America, United States Information Agency (Ryan) to the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, Special Operations (Lansdale)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
USIA Current Intelligence Needs From Inside Cuba

The following information would all be of assistance to this Agency in its current operations. None of the items, however, is considered of such vital importance to justify risking human life for its production. This has been cleared in draft with the Acting Director of the Agency.

1. Appraisal of size of the VOA’s listening audience in Cuba. Reactions to such broadcasts, credibility, quality and strength of signals would be helpful. Also attitudes on need for more or less repetition of news items.

2. Information on penalties imposed for listening to Free World broadcasts.

3. Current facts on events within Cuba which would support U.S. policy objectives. Examples of this information might include verification of fact that Cubans not allowed near Soviet bases, Soviet control of bases, Cuban concealment of facts President Kennedy’s speech,\(^2\) world reaction, etc.

4. Current information on activities of Soviet and Bloc personnel, particularly useful would be confirmed examples of friction or problems with Cubans, special privileges or food allowances, special protection.

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\(^1\) Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Box 319A, Special Group (Augmented), General, 10/62–12/62. Top Secret. According to the memorandum for the record of the October 26 Special Group (Augmented) meeting, the members discussed the dispatch of agent teams to Cuba and the ways in which these teams could contribute. The members recommended that Lansdale collect intelligence requirements from the Departments of State and Defense and the United States Information Agency. (Ibid.) Under an October 27 memorandum to members of the Special Group, Lansdale attached the responses from the three agencies, including the memorandum printed here. (Ibid.) The memorandum for the record of the October 26 meeting is printed in *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 82.

\(^2\) For the text of the President’s October 22 radio and television report to the American people regarding the Soviet arms buildup in Cuba, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 806–809. In Potomac Cable No. 245—Cuba, sent via the Wireless File on October 22, USIA summarized the President’s address, noting: “The United States has acted swiftly, firmly and decisively to protect the security of the Western Hemisphere and the peace of the world. As a result of this action, the world may be saved from the scourge of nuclear war.” (National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Cuba (one 1960) 1962–1965)
5. Current information on shortages of food and other necessities. Any evidence of graft, favoritism, hoarding by Castro/Communist groups.

6. Attitudes towards U.S. and U.S. policy. Is President Kennedy still a position [positive?] symbol? Is the U.S. blamed by the Cuban people for shortages, difficulties, etc.

7. If there has been a leaflet drop, reaction to same. Credibility of such leaflets, distribution, penalties for distribution or possession of such materials.

8. Information on anti-regime’s printed and oral propaganda. Evaluation of resistance symbols, slogans and themes. Anti-regime jokes and visual symbols (“gusano libre”). Anti-regime demonstrations of all types should be reported and evaluated.

9. Information on pro-Castro/Communist propaganda. Include reaction to symbols, slogans, themes as in above item 8.

10. Reaction to various anti-Castro exile groups and their propaganda themes and actions. Positive and negative attitudes toward Miro Cardona, Manolo Ray, Tony Varona, Alpha 66, DRE, Sanchez Arango, etc.

Hewson A. Ryan

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Ryan signed “Hew” above his typed signature.
99. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to All USIA Media Elements


SUBJECT

Information Policy Guidance on Cuba (Worldwide Output)

This instruction supersedes the guidance issued October 22, 1962, and is binding on all elements of the U.S. Information Agency and all other media and information outlets controlled by the U.S. Government.

OBJECTIVES

1. Obtain recognition of the fact that the Cuban crisis of the past week is not over until the Soviet offensive missile bases are actually dismantled and removed, as Khrushchev promised.

2. Make clear to the world that the USSR and the Castro regime bear the entire responsibility for the crisis growing out of the secret Soviet military buildup in Cuba, and that only the Soviets could end the crisis by withdrawing their weapons. Thus American insistence on removal of the missile bases was the major factor in preserving the peace now.

3. Make clear to the world that there is no cause for complacency or gloating while other urgent problems—among them Berlin, proliferation of nuclear weapons, a nuclear test ban treaty, disarmament, Chinese aggression in India, Viet-Nam—remain with us.

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Cuba (one 1960) 1962–1965. Confidential. Copies were sent to all area directors and to IOC.

2 The guidance, “Information Policy Guidance on Cuba (Worldwide Output),” is ibid.

3 In an October 27 message to Kennedy, Khrushchev indicated that the Soviet Union would be “willing to remove from Cuba the means which you regard as offensive. We are willing to carry this out and to make this pledge in the United Nations. Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that the United States, for its part, considering the uneasiness and anxiety of the Soviet State, will remove its analogous means from Turkey.” (Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 91) Khrushchev, in an October 28 message to Kennedy, stated that “the Soviet Government, in addition to earlier instructions on the discontinuation of further work on weapons construction sites, has given a new order to dismantle the arms which you described as offensive, and to crate and return them to the Soviet Union.” (Ibid., Document 102)
4. Make clear that the withdrawal of Soviet missile bases does not solve the Western Hemisphere’s problem of the presence in Cuba of a foreign-controlled Communist dictatorship or the related problem of the use of Cuba as a base for subversion and aggression in the Hemisphere.

SPECIAL GUIDANCE

1. We should avoid any tone of gloating, any reference to the Soviet promise of missile withdrawal as “capitulation.”

2. For your information, the “gridiron” carried on the October 28 Wireless File was based on a background briefing given by Secretary Rusk. Our story was cleared by the State Department.

3. We should avoid, to the extent consistent with credibility, any comment not consistent with the lines set forth in the President’s October 28 letter to Khrushchev, the “gridiron” on Mr. Rusk’s briefing, and this instruction.

THEMES

Pending further guidance, output should emphasize the obvious themes stemming from the above objectives, particularly those derived from the President’s letter and Mr. Rusk’s briefing. Other themes:

1. The crisis has demonstrated anew that firmness in the face of intimidation is the surest deterrent to aggression and the most effective guardian of peace.

2. The events of the past week, particularly the role played by Khrushchev, make it clear that this was a confrontation of the U.S. and the USSR, not the U.S. and Cuba.

3. Khrushchev’s admission that the Soviet Union totally controls the missile bases in Cuba reveals that it has been the USSR, not the United States, which has infringed on the sovereignty of Cuba.

4. The important role played by the Organization of American States demonstrates the significance of defensive regional alliances.

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5 The Department sent the President’s October 28 reply to Khrushchev’s October 28 message (see footnote 3, above) in telegram 1020 to Moscow, October 28. For the text, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XI, Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, Document 104. It was released by the White House that day. In Potomac Cable No. 247—The Tasks Ahead, sent via the Wireless File on October 28, USIA summarized the President’s October 28 letter, noting that the President had referenced both short-run and long-range problems facing the United States and the Soviet Union, concluding: “To free the world from the fear of war, and to get on with these unfinished tasks, remain the great challenges to mankind in the 1960s.” (National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files, 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Cuba (one 1960) 1962–1965)
5. Khrushchev’s October 28 letter contains an apparent acceptance of the principle of verification as an element in international agreements, which the U.S. has long held to be essential.

Thomas C. Sorensen

6 Sorensen initialed “TCS” above his typed signature.

100. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to the Director (Murrow)

Washington, November 9, 1962.

SUBJECT
Voice of America—The Policy Issue

Putting aside the *ad hominem* arguments and other irrelevancies (e.g., “my judgment is better—or worse—than yours”), the issues are:

1. Should the tone, emphases and content of VOA news on foreign affairs reflect the policies and intentions of the United States Government?

2. Should VOA commentaries and analyses on foreign affairs reflect the nuances and special emphases, as well as the main thrust, of the policies and intentions of the U.S. Government?

3. If the answer to one or both of these questions is “yes,” would such broadcasting be compatible with the long-term mission of the Voice, with our desire for credibility, or with our policy of operating on the basis of truth?

I believe the answer to all three questions is “yes.” I believe further that our continued failure to operate on the basis of the first two

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propositions actually damages the credibility and effectiveness of VOA and, more important, exposes our country to risks.

“Credibility” is a word too often used and too little understood.

The U.S. Government carefully monitors and analyzes all foreign government broadcasting of news and comment. We do so because we believe such broadcasts are often important indicators of the intentions and policies of these governments. Our broadcasts are similarly monitored and analyzed, not only by the Soviets but by many lesser powers including such small nations as Egypt. (Yuri Zhukov told me in Moscow: “I know more about what your Voice of America is saying in Russian than you do.” I denied it—but of course he was right.)

We can assume, and there is much supporting evidence, that these foreign governments monitor VOA broadcasts for precisely the same reason we monitor theirs. They do not monitor CBS or WRC, except as part of their surveys of private American opinion. They do monitor VOA because it is the Voice of America, the only full-time radio station overtly controlled and operated by the U.S. Government, financed by Government funds, and directed exclusively to foreign audiences.

VOA credibility, therefore, must be considered in this context. It is not, and cannot be, the same context in which Howard K. Smith operates at ABC or Eric Sevareid at CBS. Thus if VOA says “the crisis has eased” when in fact the President is planning to take steps which—in Russian eyes, at least—will exacerbate the situation, then VOA is not being credible. This is too bad but not fatal. Much more dangerous to us as a nation is the likelihood that Khrushchev will misread the U.S. President’s intentions on the basis of what he hears on the U.S. Government’s radio.

Similarly, we are not being credible when we mislead or confuse the enemy—and our allies and others—with commentaries heavy on speculative interpretation and “on-the-other-hands” and light on facts. (Sometimes it is desirable to mask or obfuscate our intentions, but the decision to do so should be a calculated one made by the President or his responsible advisors, not by a USIA official or newsman or commentator.)

This is not a reflection on the wisdom or judgment or “policy sense” of USIA broadcasters and policy officers. No man can guess very accurately for very long on what goes on in the President’s mind or in his councils. My argument is that it is neither credible nor prudent to do so on a government radio station, whether you do it yourself or lean on a wire service or the New York Times.

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2 Presumable reference to the Washington NBC affiliate.
Some argue that the Voice is not and should not be “tactical.” I argue that news is timely, and that people and governments react to news now, tonight, tomorrow—not just in five or ten years. They react to the tone, the nuances, the emphases. If this be true, then news itself is “tactical” and if we want to limit our radio to long-term “strategic” purposes (like a book or a film) perhaps we should not broadcast news and timely commentaries at all.

But I do not believe this to be necessary. The VOA has no patent on the truth; our government, with a few notorious slippages, has operated on the basis of certain “self-evident truths” since its birth. If we believe, as I do, that our government’s foreign policies are honest and enlightened, then making policy considerations pre-eminent in VOA output will enhance, not damage, the Voice’s credibility and effectiveness in both the short and long runs.

I believe our broadcasters and policy people have the ability to do this not crudely, not with an axe, but skillfully, subtly and—all—deliberately.

I am sure none of us—“uptown” or at the VOA—thinks international broadcasting is a game or an end in itself. I feel very deeply that if it ever were, Cuba has demonstrated that it cannot ever be again. If there is a moral principle at stake here, it is the survival and triumph of our people and our institutions, indeed of free institutions and all men everywhere.

101. Memorandum Prepared by the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)\(^1\)


**VOICE OF AMERICA POLICY**

Effective immediately, IBS shall institute special procedures for the application of information policy to all Voice of America output on foreign affairs. In this connection, the Deputy Director of IBS shall devote a major part of his attention to policy matters.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Director’s Subject Files, 1962–1963, Entry UD WW 173, Box 7, Broadcasting—General (IBS) 1962. No classification marking. An unknown hand wrote at the top of the memorandum: “Hold for DMW.”

\(^2\) In a December 4 memorandum to Loomis, Murrow outlined five statements designed to “govern the duties of the IBS Deputy Director until further notice.” (Ibid.)
The objectives of Voice of America policy shall be as stated in the “Voice of America Charter,” here restated:

“The long-range interests of the United States are served by communicating directly with the peoples of the world by radio. To be effective, the Voice of America must win the attention and respect of listeners. These principles will govern VOA broadcasts:

“1. VOA will establish itself as a consistently reliable and authoritative source of news. VOA news will be accurate, objective, and comprehensive.

“2. VOA will represent America, not any single segment of American society. It will therefore present a balanced and comprehensive projection of significant American thought and institutions.

“3. As an official radio, VOA will present the policies of the United States clearly and effectively. VOA will also present responsible discussion and opinion on these policies.”

Official U.S. broadcasts are listened to and monitored for indicators of the intentions and policies of the Government. It is vital that our broadcasts not mislead either our enemies or our friends about the nature, intent, and implications of our actions and purposes. Therefore, VOA commentaries and analyses on foreign affairs should at all times, and especially on subjects involving vital U.S. interests, reflect the nuances and special emphases, as well as the main thrust, of the policies and intentions of the U.S. Government. Commentaries should give an accurate picture of U.S. public policy as it can most persuasively be presented up to air time.

Edward R. Murrow

102. Editorial Note

On December 28, 1962, the United States Advisory Commission on Information released its 18th report, covering the calendar year 1962. In his letter of transmittal addressed to Speaker of the House John McCormack, Commission Chairman J. Leonard Reinsch indicated that the membership of the Commission had changed during 1962, as President John F. Kennedy had announced the nominations of Clark Mollenhoff and Morris Novik to fill the expired terms of Mark May and Lewis Douglas and John Seigenthaler to fill the unexpired term of Jonathan Daniel. The President had also designated Reinsch as Chairman of the Commission. Reinsch noted that the Commission had met

The report began with an overview of USIA’s function:

“The U.S.–U.S.S.R. confrontation over Cuba in 1962 demonstrated once again to the world that Sino-Soviet aggressive intentions are worldwide. Berlin, the Chinese Communist invasions of India, Communist insurrection in South Vietnam and Laos as well as Cuba, are part of geographically separated incidents that illustrate potential threat, menace, and aggression. These events have made it clear to every thinking neutral power the true ambitions and intentions of international communism.

“For example, on October 25, 1962, in the midst of the Chinese Communist invasion of Indian territory, the embattled and disillusioned Nehru was finally compelled to say ‘we are getting out of touch with realities in a modern world. We are living in an artificial atmosphere of our creation and we have been shaken out of it.’

“The task of the USIA is to depict and document these ‘realities in a modern world’ to the peoples of the world; to unmask the true designs of Sino-Soviet communism. USIA must also disseminate information which will help strengthen the economic, political and ideological bases of national independence in order to help make impossible external aggression or internal insurrection and subversion from Communist sources. This is the meaning of the cold war for the total U.S. communications effort. And it is in this context that USIA has a paramount role to play.” (Ibid., pages 1–2)

The report summarized USIA performance during the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis and highlighted five Agency problem areas before analyzing USIA programs in Africa, Latin America, and Europe. Following an overview of USIA’s history and its broad role, the report turned to a discussion of the “changing missions” of the Agency:

“The changing missions that have been assigned to the foreign information program partly because of changing U.S. strategy, are reflected in the confusion attending the information program’s attempts to adjust to these changes.
“There have been periods when the Agency’s chief emphasis has been placed on ‘long-range cultural programs.’ And there have been other times when Agency policies, programs, and operations were organized primarily around short-range, tactical, day-to-day issues and the elimination of brush-fires. Both the objective reality of international conditions and the strict reality of the budget have affected the courses that the Agency pursued at any given time.

“In periods of intense crisis, such as in times of major U.S.–U.S.S.R. strategic confrontations, the USIA must perforce undertake important functions which are oriented around the work of the fast media and aimed at getting the American position to the people of the world. But, during inter-crisis periods that Agency’s emphasis has fluctuated sharply.

“The difficulty with these fluctuating strategies and missions has been evident in the buildup of certain operations, their drastic reductions or wholesale dismantling when conditions changed and then the long laborious need to rebuild them in one area or another when crises subside, Soviet competition increases, or relatively calm areas flare up.

“Confusion over the purpose and role can perhaps best be seen by examining the mere changes in name that have characterized the Agency’s central policy office during the past 10 years.

“In August 1953 there was an Office of Policy and Plans.

“By September 1953 this became the Office of Policy and Programs.

“In March 1957 it reverted to the Office of Policy and Plans.

“But in April 1958 it became an Office of Plans.

“And in August 1962 it was and remains at present an Office of Policy.

“During this period, in response to the views of different directors and different administrations, the Agency experimented with combining program and policy functions, planning and policy functions, abolishing ‘policy’ or abolishing ‘plans.’

“Perhaps such experimentation was inevitable as the foreign information and cultural programs attempted to satisfy the requirements placed upon them by conflicting views, by different directors, by competing ideas of its proper role and by the objective facts of national and international affairs.

“Throughout these years of changing purpose one other fact also has become evident. During the short history of the U.S. information program relatively little attention has been accorded to long-range planning and policy considerations.

“This Commission believes that the Agency should have both short-range and long-range objectives. It cannot escape the duty of acting as the government’s foreign public relations arm on a daily basis and especially in times of crisis. It has performed well and continues to perform well in transmitting daily foreign policy guidance from the
Department of State and in converting it to daily propaganda guidance for the benefit of the fast media.

“The Commission suggests, however, that the Agency must also organize and staff itself to provide long-range, forward-planning that would encompass the most effective use of its information, educational and cultural programs.

“It has been said that creative men build private communications agencies, but that businessmen eventually run them. This Commission suggests that creative plans, policies, and programs are as important as effective executive management and administration. Both are necessary. But a balanced view of and attention to short-range operations and long-range forward planning are also both necessary.

“The occasion of the third major confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. is a good time for the USIA and the U.S. Government to review the role of the ideological, information or psychological arm of the government. The purpose of such a review would be to further strengthen its assets and capabilities, shore up and improve its gaps and vulnerabilities, and introduce a strong, effective, forward planning operation which would provide new ideas and a more carefully studied long-range stability to the total U.S. communications effort.

“Another reason for the creation of a small forward planning unit, which as its first task might well start and conduct such a review, may be found in the criticisms of USIA.” (Ibid., pages 18–20)

Following discussion of USIA’s critics, forward planning, and world communications, the report presented the Commission’s conclusions:

“In summary, the Commission believes that the Cuban crisis opened a new phase in the cold war and placed new responsibilities on USIA.

“The Commission has considered the present role, functions and operations of the USIA. It suggests that five important problems require attention. They are:

“1. The need to improve management in USIA;
“2. The need to reduce the number of publications that are no longer useful;
“3. The need to initiate annual or semi-annual reviews of program output by committees whose membership would include outside experts on print and radio;
“4. The need to review the expanding programs in Africa and Latin America;
“5. The need for one USIA building in Washington in order to improve the Agency’s operating efficiency and management.

“This report has also included the major recommendations and observations of the Chairman’s report on Africa. In a continent of many
nations, tribes and languages, the USIA cannot assume that techniques and material that have proved suitable in European or other areas are equally effective in Africa. The media support programs for Africa should be reviewed in order to assure that media products are tailored to the problems, interests and conditions in Africa.

“Latin America represents an important challenge that must be met. The entire economy is an explosive one. Population increases steadily. Demands to reduce poverty, ignorance and illness have increased. Such conditions are ripe for the Communist agitator and organizer. This must be understood by USIA in the context of the promise of the Alliance for Progress. Exposure of short and long-range Communist goals for Latin American countries especially as they were manifested by the Russian build-up in Cuba, is an additional task for USIA.

“The Commission is pleased to report that a reappraisal of the Agency’s programs in Western Europe has been initiated by the Director. Its purpose is to redefine the role of USIA in Europe in the light of the emergence of the European Community as a prosperous and powerful force in international affairs.

“The Commission has traced the changing role and mission of the foreign information programs during the past 15 years. These have fluctuated with different national strategies and with the experience and orientation of different directors who guided and directed the program.

“The Commission believes that the Agency has both short-range and long-range objectives. Although USIA has received national praise for its performance in the Cuban crisis, there is a need to develop longer range plans in the light of cumulative criticism of the Agency’s role and approach to the cold war and in recognition of the fact that the U.S.–U.S.S.R. confrontation in Cuba has opened a new phase of this war.

“The Commission has recommended that the Agency establish a high level forward-planning unit staffed with its most senior officers. This staff should deal responsibly with these criticisms and with the new challenges and opportunities ushered in by the recent crisis in Cuba and the Chinese Communist invasion of India.

“Finally, the Commission suggests that the implications and repercussions of TELSTAR, the American communications satellite, may be as far-reaching as the discovery of atomic energy and the explorations of space. It is important to the national interest that USIA exploit and develop this opportunity to the fullest. To do so effectively will require additional research into the opinions, attitudes, misconceptions, taste, and interests of foreign audiences.

“With the assistance, support, and understanding of the Congress, this new mighty instrument of international mass communications can
be used to educate and inform the peoples of the world about each other. It will enable the United States to disseminate accurate and authoritative information about its policies, people, and intentions throughout a medium that will have a powerful impact on the peoples of the world. It will demonstrate vividly the goals of the United States and the achievements of free men everywhere.” (Ibid., pages 30–32)

103. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman)¹


Dear Averell,

You may be familiar with all of the events set forth in the enclosed memorandum. I find the developments disturbing, and it appears that the situation may continue to deteriorate.

Is there anything we can do about it?

Sincerely,

Edward R. Murrow²


² Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Enclosure

Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency (Moore) to the Director (Murrow)\(^3\)

Washington, December 13, 1962

SUBJECT

Communists in Laos Continue Pressures on the U.S.

An intelligence report\(^4\) reveals that Laos’ communist Minister of Information, Phoumi Vongvichit, wrote a letter to the leftward leaning “neutralist” Minister of Foreign Affairs, Quinim Pholsena, on November 29 stating that the U.S. proposal to establish a troika committee, with an American observer, to supervise output of the USAID-supported Lao Photo Press is “flagrant interference in Lao internal affairs and constitutes unacceptable conditions.” Vongvichit added that, if the U.S. proposes to give the printing plant to the Lao Government as aid, there should be an official turnover; if, on the other hand, the U.S. “insists on keeping this establishment as its property, this should be clearly understood so that the Information Ministry can take appropriate measures at the appropriate time.”

Phoumi Vongvichit started his move to gain control of U.S.-supplied radio and press facilities two months ago. On October 11 Vongvichit had Premier Souvanna Phouma write a letter to our ambassador\(^5\) charging that the Lao Photo Press (built by USAID and editorially supervised by USIS) was being run by USIS, and demanding that the plant either be turned over entirely to the communist-controlled Ministry of Information or retained entirely by the U.S. Government for its use. The ambassador countered with a proposal to Souvanna that a tri-partite editorial board representing the three Lao factions be formed to pass on output, and that an American observer work with the board. The alternative would have been to turn the printing facility over to the communist minister, which Souvanna indicated he didn’t want any more than we did.

Although the principal output of the Lao Photo Press, a weekly pictorial newspaper published in the name of the Ministry of Information, has followed a strictly neutral line, this has not satisfied Phoumi

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\(^3\) Confidential. A copy was sent to Sorensen. Harris initialed the top right-hand corner and wrote “12/17.”

\(^4\) Not found.

\(^5\) Not found. Leonard Unger was Ambassador.
Vongvichit. He wants the plant for himself. There are as yet no reports of another official démarche from the Lao regarding the printing plant, but it can be expected in the near future.

Phoumi Vongvichit already has rather effective control of the Lao Government’s mimeographed daily newspaper and the Lao National Radio facilities in Vientiane, but is so far using them with some caution and not employing them for blatant pro-communist propaganda. The radio stations in Luang Prabang, Savannakhet and Pakse are still in the hands of right-wing supporters of General Phoumi Nosavan, and are following a very moderate line. Radio Pathet Lao, located in the northeastern province of Sam Neua, of course, continues to broadcast the communist line and is violently anti-American. The “Radio of the Laotian Kingdom,” located in Souvanna’s former headquarters at Khang Khay in Xieng Khouang Province, is supposed to be under Souvanna’s control, but has usually been far more left than neutral. The Lao Government has just signed an agreement with the USSR under which the Soviets are to provide a 50 KW radio station to Laos. If pressures regarding the Lao Photo Press become too strong, there may be no alternative but to turn it over to the Lao Government. However, in planning for this contingency USIS and USAID in Vientiane have already arranged to keep a minimum of supplies on hand. Therefore, a cutoff of supplies and a withdrawal of American and Filipino technicians who have been operating the plant could virtually immobilize it in short order.

Communist pressures are also increasing in the field of U.S. aid. The communists, after repeated stalling on approval of the new U.S. proposal to channel most of our aid through a “commodity import program,” have now launched a campaign to have all foreign aid funneled through the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (i.e., through Minister of Foreign Affairs Quinim Pholsena, a “neutralist” who is completely under control of the communists), rather than through the various pertinent ministries, as in the past. Communist pressures have even brought Souvanna Phouma to the point of asking our ambassador if we could change the name of our AID mission. What’s more, our ambassador is even considering doing so. What the communists are really after is to make it impossible for the U.S. to give aid to the coalition government, thereby making it dependent almost entirely upon bloc countries for economic support.

6 A “commodity import program” was eventually established in Laos. For information, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis, Document 485.
The communist members of the Lao troika are in the driver’s seat, at least in part because nobody else has indicated a capacity to take the reins. The communists have so far usually employed peaceful methods to gain control, and seem to be doing quite well at it. They will of course use force if they deem it necessary. As things are going now, they will get the country by default.

The U.S. put its money on Souvanna Phouma as the only hope for a coalition government. As a result:

a) The U.S. has withdrawn its military advisory group and has virtually terminated military assistance, but the Viet Minh forces remain.

b) Communist pressures, plus Souvanna’s weakness, have kept discussions of a U.S.-financed commodity import program bogged down for several months, and the Lao Government has gotten little else but a $2 million cash grant from the U.S. since the coalition was formed (we formerly provided a monthly cash grant of $2 to $3 million).

c) The communists are progressively gaining control of the country’s information media.

Somehow, Czechoslovakia keeps coming to mind.

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7 The coalition government in Laos created after the 1962 Geneva Agreements was led by a “troika” comprised of pro-Communist, anti-Communist, and neutralist factions under the leadership of Prince Souvanna Phouma.
104. Memorandum From the Chief of the Policy Guidance Staff, United States Information Agency (Pauker) to the Assistant Manager for Policy Application, IBS (Clarke); International Press Officer, IPS (Sayles); Visual Information Specialist, IMS (Broecker); Information Specialist, ICS (Vogel); and Chief, Motion Picture–TV Contract Branch, ITV (Harris)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

The Two Sides of the Curtain

The Berlin Wall is an extension of the greater divisive barrier, the Iron Curtain, which epitomizes so much that is reprehensible in communism. This is a theme to which you have already given considerable attention. The importance of the theme is such, however, that it merits continuing reiteration by means of all the resources at your command, along the following lines:

(1) In output to audiences behind the Iron Curtain, and particularly for young people and intellectuals there, make ample use of materials designed to heighten awareness of how much they are denied—politically, spiritually, economically—compared to people in open societies;

(2) In output elsewhere, use materials designed to impress on the doubters and the confused the grim significance of the Iron Curtain—namely, that it is proof of (a) the failure of communism to satisfy basic human needs and aspirations, and (b) the inability of communism to spread without extinguishing self-determination wherever it goes.

The Director believes that a greater, sharper, concerted effort in support of these themes is desirable, within the context of that area of major emphasis which we call FREE CHOICE.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, Policy Guidance Files: 1953–1969, Entry UD WW 266, Box 315, Berlin (to 1964). No classification marking. Drafted by Pauker. Copies were sent to Murrow and Brady.

\(^2\) See Document 42.
INFOGUIDE: Post-Missile Cuba. Summary: With the “missile crisis” over but the Cuban problem continuing, we have given agency media the following guidelines, to which you are asked to adhere.

SITUATION

On January 7 the United States and the Soviet Union delivered a joint letter to U.N. Secretary General U Thant stating (1) that the two governments had not been able to resolve all problems in connection with the Cuban crisis, but (2) the degree of understanding reached between them was such that “it is not necessary for this item to occupy further the attention of the Security Council at this time.”

With the end of the crisis which was first posed by the secret introduction of Soviet missiles and other offensive weapons, the Cuban situation continues as a hemispheric problem, and the OAS re-emerges as the principal multilateral forum for handling it.

We have set the following guidelines for general Agency treatment of the crisis and its aftermath. Supporting materials will reach you in media output, and you in turn should develop these points as opportunity permits.

GUIDELINES

A. When referring to the U.N. negotiations, make clear that, in the absence of Soviet-Cuban implementation of Khrushchev’s October 28 acceptance of on-site inspection under U.N. auspices and continuing safeguards against reintroduction of offensive weapons,

(1) The U.S. will continue aerial observation of Cuba;

(2) The U.S. is not bound by a no-invasion pledge. However, as the President said November 20, “if Cuba is not used for the export

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3 Not found and not further identified.

4 Khrushchev’s acceptance was expressed in letters he sent to Kennedy on October 27 and 28. See footnote 3, Document 99. In his October 28 letter, Khrushchev wrote: “As I informed you in the letter of October 27, we are prepared to reach agreement to enable United Nations Representatives to verify the dismantling of these means.”
of aggressive communist purposes, there will be peace in the Caribbean. And, as I said in September, ‘we shall neither initiate nor permit aggression in this hemisphere.”

B. In view of Soviet and Cuban propaganda efforts to distort history to their own advantage, continue to keep the record straight by stressing the following themes specifically related to the missile crisis:

(1) The Soviet Union, with the complicity and acquiescence of the Cuban Communist regime, posed a threat to the peace and security of the Western Hemisphere and attempted to upset the balance of power by secretly placing offensive weapons systems in Cuba with capacity to wreak nuclear havoc on large areas of North, Central and South America.

(2) U.S. strength and firmness were central factors in making the USSR back out of Cuba. The U.S. acted calmly and forcefully but left room for a solution short of war, and the Soviet Union demonstrated its respect for U.S. power.

(3) The free nations of the Western Hemisphere, acting collectively under the Rio Treaty, were unanimous in strong action to meet the Soviet threat. The Council of the OAS, in its Resolution of October 23, called for the immediate dismantling and withdrawal from Cuba of all missiles and other weapons with offensive capability and recommended that the member states take all measures to ensure that the Government of Cuba cannot continue to receive from the Sino-Soviet powers military materiel and related supplies which may threaten the peace and security of the Continent and to prevent the missiles in Cuba with offensive capability from ever becoming an active threat to the peace and security of the Continent. The OAS stand was another key factor in inducing the Soviet Union to withdraw its weapons from Cuba. The Rio Treaty and all other collective arrangements of the inter-American system remain in full force.

(4) Cuba is no longer independent. It is a communist outpost in the Hemisphere. The offensive weapons were installed to serve Soviet purposes; they were controlled by the Soviets; they were removed by the Soviets as a result of negotiations between the U.S. and the USSR.

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5 Kennedy’s quote is taken from his November 20 news conference held at the Department of State Auditorium at 6 p.m. See Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, p. 831. He discussed Cuban aggression in his September 13 news conference. See ibid., p. 674.

6 The Rio Treaty, officially the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, was initially signed by 19 countries, including the United States, Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina, on September 2, 1947, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil. The treaty committed its signatories to providing assistance to meet armed attacks.

At one time Castro claimed the IL–28 bombers were Cuban property; he had to reverse himself completely on this point. The crisis demonstrated Castro’s contempt for the welfare of the Cuban people by putting them, without their knowledge, in danger of nuclear destruction. And it demonstrated the untrustworthiness of the USSR as a friend or ally.

(5) U.S. statesmanship won out. By mounting a limited quarantine, the U.S. displayed its traditional respect for human life and values. The quarantine was intended to keep out offensive weapons only, not food or medicine or other commodities.

C. Withdrawal of offensive Soviet weapons from Cuba has not solved the problem of the presence in Cuba of a Communist dictatorship, or the use of Cuba as a base for Communist subversion and aggression. The continued presence in Cuba of approximately 17,000 Soviet military personnel—some 4,000 to 5,000 in organized troop units—constitutes a continuing unacceptable intervention of foreign military power in the hemisphere. On the subject of this long-term problem, use the following themes:

(1) The Cuban people deserve the right of self-determination and free choice no less than the people of other nations. Some day Cubans will be free, despite the presence of Soviet troops and weapons in Cuba. As the President said December 29, “All over the island of Cuba, in the government itself . . . there are many who are determined to restore . . . freedom so that the Cuban people may once more govern themselves.”

(2) The U.S. supports “the right of every free people to freely transform the economic and political institutions of society so that they may serve the welfare of all.” The U.S. does not favor a return to the status quo ante in Cuba, nor does it opposes revolutionary reform; on the contrary, the Alliance for Progress is based on the necessity for social and economic reform. What the U.S. opposes is Communist expansion and tyranny.

(3) Castro betrayed a legitimate national revolution to anti-nationalist communism. He did this deliberately and at breakneck speed. The accusation that the United States pushed Cuba into the arms of the Soviet Union ignores the fact that the U.S. took no economic action against Cuba (e.g., cutting off the sugar quota) until after the Cuban regime had placed itself at the service of international communism.

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8 President Kennedy made these remarks on December 29, 1962, at the Orange Bowl in Miami during the presentation of the flag of the Cuban Invasion Brigade, which carried out the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba on April 17, 1961. For the text of Kennedy’s address, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 911–913.

9 See footnote 8, above.
(4) The continuing economic decline and the dismal economic prospects of the Cuban regime, in many cases confirmed by the regime’s own spokesmen, demonstrate the failure of the Cuban experiment in communism and the hollowness of communism’s promises. A steady flow of refugees (from all walks of life, not just the well-to-do) fleeing communism appears wherever communism establishes itself. Cuba is no exception; its living standards have declined steadily since the Castro takeover in 1959. The Soviet pattern of relations with its satellites—to take more than it gives—is reproduced in the case of Cuba, which is to play the part of a supplier of agricultural and mineral raw materials in the Communist world.

(5) The OAS has found the Cuban communist regime to be “incompatible with the principles and objectives of the inter-American system.”10 The regime has systematically violated OAS principles of non-intervention and self-determination by attempting to export its revolution through violence and subversion, violating human rights, and ignoring the right of people to express their will through unrestricted suffrage.

(6) The OAS finding was against the Communist regime, not the people of Cuba. The finding occurred at the Punta del Este Conference in January, 1962; it had nothing to do with the Soviet arms buildup in July–October, 1962. The termination of the missile crisis has not changed the conditions which led the OAS to declare the Cuban regime incompatible with the inter-American system and, in fact, points up the correctness of that OAS action.

(7) The permanent existence of a Communist regime in the Americas is intolerable to the free nations of the hemisphere. Cuba represents a hemispheric problem which requires hemispheric solution. This is no U.S.-Cuban dispute but a calculated, determined effort in Moscow and Havana to subvert and destroy Latin American governments and the inter-American system. The role of the OAS has therefore been, and will continue to be, of crucial importance. Measures taken to isolate the Cuban regime (economic sanctions, voluntary, unilateral or through the OAS, for example) stem from the action of the Communist regime which, as the OAS conference at Punta del Este expressed it, “voluntarily placed itself outside the inter-American system.”

(8) Wherever possible, especially in output to Latin America, attempt to wound the vanity of Fidel Castro by playing down, preferably ignoring, the importance of his role in Cuba. At the same time, continue to use satire and ridicule where feasible.

The accompanying UNCLASSIFIED compilation gives you the highlights of pertinent Presidential statements.\(^\text{11}\)

Wilson

\(^{11}\) Not found attached is the undated compilation, “The President on U.S. Policy Toward the Cuban Regime.”

106. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the Deputy Director, Office of Policy, United States Information Agency (Battey) to the Acting Director (Wilson)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Information Cooperation with our Allies

With the U.K.:

—We meet annually (alternating Washington-London) to review information policy and operating problems on the management level. Initiative and preparation for these meetings, formerly in the Public Affairs Bureau of State, is now in USIA. Pierre Salinger and Ed Murrow head some of the sessions. Tom Sorensen is USIA’s organizer and permanent chairman at these meetings, and keeps in touch with the U.K. Embassy for follow-up. Assistant Secretary Manning and members of his staff represent the State Department. The U.K. is represented

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69; Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 7, Director (Personal)—General, 1964 (Two folders). Confidential. Wilson initialed the memorandum indicating that he had seen it. The memorandum is attached to a March 15 note addressed to I/W stating that the attachments were returned to IOP.
at the Deputy Under Secretary level. (Background paper on organization of U.K. information machinery attached.)

At these meetings, we:

—Trade information on major programs in which overlap, duplication, or competition may be problems: Book translation and distribution, textbook programs, English teaching, selection of grantees (including technical trainees in mass media.) (Sample of what they give us attached. U.K. SECRET classification.)

—Look into gaps in exchanges of material in Washington, London or field posts. In our June 1962 meeting, for example, we spotted need for better exchange of information of communist propaganda activities at our posts, better flow of our IRS studies to U.K. Embassy here. U.K. informed us of worldwide study of effectiveness of their programs which they are undertaking and will make available to us when complete.

—Check on information progress and problems in regional cooperation arrangements such as NATO, OECD, CENTO, SEATO. Example: “Canberra” group (US-UK-Australia-New Zealand) now has formal operating committees in Vietnam, Thailand and Laos which pool intelligence, experience and resources to meet special information program needs in those insurgency situations.

In Washington, we pass copies of selected News Policy Notes, Potomac Cables and other information policy guidances to U.K. Embassy here. They provide us their comparable “Intels”, lots of IRS-type material on upcoming communist front organization meetings, reports on radio reception and psychological situation in countries where we don’t have diplomatic representation, and copies of pilot pamphlets (frequently the unattributed variety like their recent Khrushchev’s Crisis, on Berlin) which keeps us up to date on what our PAOs are getting from their U.K. counterparts in the field.

Both in Washington and Bonn, the U.K. is represented on informal four-power groups which handle Berlin information problems.

Coordination of broadcasting frequencies, schedules, and use of leased facilities takes place largely through USIS London with BBC. (See attached paper by Klieforth for more on this and other radio matters needed.)

At our field posts, USIA officers work closely with their U.K. counterparts to see that our information and cultural programs reinforce

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2 None of the attachments were found attached.
3 No record of this meeting has been found.
4 An unknown hand struck through the word “critical” following the word “special.”
5 An unknown hand inserted “, if” between the words “matters” and “needed.”
one another on common policies and minimize damage when real or seeming policy conflicts come up.

Where we have access to local newsreels or other mass media, we place selected U.K. materials and they do the same for us.

English teaching is coordinated with the British Council. Selection of grantees and placement of U.S. and U.K. teachers in local schools is worked out to make our programs cover maximum ground.

*With the Federal Republic of Germany:*

—We meet twice a year at the management level, same U.S. representation as at U.K. talks. At most recent (October 1962) meeting Pierre Salinger arranged final day and a half of sessions at Camp David. The FRG is represented at the State Secretary (Federal Press Chief) level (list of Camp David participants, conference memorandum attached.)

Impetus for greater frequency of U.S.-FRG information talks began with planning for the anticipated Berlin crisis in 1961. Success of cooperative effort with FRG on Berlin Wall campaign (Springer pamphlet 2.2 million copies in 15 languages, over 125,000 foreign visitors to Berlin during 1962 with much USIS cooperation on selection) has led to improved headquarters and field relationships. We want to keep the momentum.

Other factors in close U.S.-FRG cooperation:

—Divided status, EEC membership, role in NATO, and cautiously-developing bloc trade and cultural relations make for information policy problems not present in U.S.-U.K. operations.

—FRG very active in technical assistance to mass media, training of media technicians in developing countries, especially Africa. We need and are getting full information to assure country-level coordination of multilateral efforts.

—With low “colonial image” liability, FRG has high information program potential in developing areas.

—FRG invitation seminars for Latin American professors of political science and history (ostensibly on academic aspects of Marxism as a waning economic theory) have been very successful. Next phase will bring artists and writers to FRG for meetings with counterparts. Berlin Wall visit is part of the program.

—FRG interest in overseas broadcasting is strong. They are looking for a relay station lease or base in the Middle East or South Asia.

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6 The British Council was founded in 1934 as a public body that receives United Kingdom Government grants, but does not operate on behalf of the government.

7 No record of this meeting was found.

8 Not found and not further identified.
and have approached nine countries so far in the hunt. Their Swahili broadcasting to East Africa is an increasingly important voice for that area.

—FRG now pays over half the costs of operating nine of our 20 Amerika Haeuser in Germany.9

—Current FRG-financed TV documentary on racial progress in the U.S. south is close cousin to “something for nothing” in information cooperation. Results partly from good relations our ITV people here have established with FRG-TV correspondents (Peter Von Zahn,10 for example.) This FRG-financed documentary will get distribution in Latin America (Spanish and Portugese versions.)

Bryan M. Battey11

9 Reference is to the libraries and cultural centers established across West Germany by the U.S. Government after World War II to enable German citizens to learn more about the United States, to promote cultural understanding, and to improve relations between the two countries. (Kathleen McLaughlin, “U.S. Zone May Drop Cultural Havens,” The New York Times, August 21, 1948, p. 4)

10 A West German author and journalist who worked in the United States.

11 Battey signed “Bryan” above his typed signature.

107. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Psychological-Political Working Group (Jorden) to the Members of the Working Group


SUBJECT

The Care and Feeding of Little Friends

One of our problems in dealing with other countries is in a very real sense a psychological one. It concerns the way we treat some of our friends who are not great powers and not the source of regular

1 Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files, 511.00/1–1563. Confidential. Drafted by Jorden. For information on the Psychological-Political Working Group, see Documents 51 and 59.
trouble. Even more important, perhaps, than the way we treat them is the way in which they think we regard them.

There is considerable justification, I think, for the strong feeling in such countries that we take them for granted. They tend to believe that we pay attention to them only when they cause trouble or when we need their support, in votes at the U.N., for example. We focus our attention—in statements, in actions, even in our choice of travel—on the big countries, the economically strong countries, or the troublesome countries.

We all know, of course, that we cannot pay equal attention to all countries or governments. It is only natural that we concentrate on major forces in the world and on those areas or countries likely to be the source of important difficulties. I am wondering, however, whether we might not be able to strike something of a better balance.

To cite a few examples:

Compare the number of times that Japan has been mentioned in major statements of U.S. policy during the past year with the mentions of Korea, the Philippines or the Republic of China. How many leading Americans have visited Japan in the past year compared with the number that spent some time conveying our thoughts and our friendship to the other Asian states?

The Pakistanis long have thought we were slighting them, despite their alliance with us and their public identification with our policies. How much of the present trouble in that area is based on their deep feeling that we really have always considered India far more important?

About 98 per cent of our time, attention, and statements in the European area are centered on Britain, France and Germany. Belgium gets into the act when there is a Congo crisis. But when did we last give the Turks an approving pat on the back? When was the last time a public figure visited Norway? Or the Netherlands? Or Austria (except to meet Khrushchev)?

Cuba excepted, how much of our concentration on Latin American affairs has centered on big, admittedly important, troublesome Brazil? What about Chile? Or Costa Rica? Or Colombia?

There are any number of ways in which we might do better in dealing with small and usually untroublesome countries. We might even find that doing so would tend to lessen their proclivity to make trouble, who knows? We might, for example, go out of our way—in a Presidential or Secretarial news conference—to praise something positive done by this country or that. We might encourage our leading officials to visit one or another of the countries that rarely receive such attention. We might deliberately raise the level of attention given distinguished visitors from such countries. We might seek to open a
dialogue outside normal channels with a man like Sihanouk, or Hus-sein, or Youlou.

I think this is something we might give some attention. If we devoted thought to this, I daresay we would produce half a dozen useful ideas in each area. By the end of 1963, we should be able to point to some positive efforts by way of praising and promoting our smaller but not unimportant friends.

108. Letter From Senator Hubert Humphrey to the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson)¹


Dear Don:

Thank you for your note of January 15th and the policy statement of USIA in re Cuba.²

I was very interested in this policy statement and found it helpful. I guess I may become a little overexcited about the importance of policy concerning Cuba as well as our often-repeated position to Castro and all his works.

It is still my view that a few more policy statements need to be made not only by the President but by other important officials of our government concerning the hopes and aspirations that we have for the Cuban people. The friends of democracy in Latin America need to know that we not only oppose tyranny and Communism, but that we also actively support and champion freedom and democracy. We are rightly proud of our great military strength and the fact that we were able to face up to the Soviet military challenge and compel the Russian dictator to back down. To me, however, the United States is more than a military power. It is a living manifestation of the hopes and aspirations of people who yearn for freedom. We must never forget the importance

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69; Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 8, Field—Latin America—Cuba, 1963. No classification marking. Wilson initialed the top right corner of the letter. Humphrey was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

² A copy of Wilson's note is ibid. The policy statement is presumably USIA News Policy Note No. 2–63. A copy is ibid.
of the idealistic, the spiritual, the political, and the social factors in this struggle with the Communists.

This is just another way of saying that I think we need to do more of what was stated on page four of the policy guidance bulletin that you made available to me.

It was a pleasure to have you at our home on the occasion of the visit of President-elect Juan Bosch of the Dominican Republic.

Kindest regards.

Sincerely yours,

Hubert H. Humphrey

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3 In his January 15 note to Humphrey, Wilson highlighted the reference on page 4 to “our future hopes for Cuba.”

4 Humphrey signed “Hubert H.” above his typed signature.

109. Memorandum From President Kennedy to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)


The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations, and (b) advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implica-
tions of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.

The influencing of attitudes is to be carried out by overt use of the various techniques of communication—personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others. In so doing, the Agency shall be guided by the following:

1. Individual country programs should specifically and directly support country and regional objectives determined by the President and set forth in official policy pronouncements, both classified and unclassified.

2. Agency activities should (a) encourage constructive public support abroad for the goal of a “peaceful world community of free and independent states, free to choose their own future and their own system so long as it does not threaten the freedom of others”;2 (b) identify the United States as a strong, democratic, dynamic nation qualified for its leadership of world efforts toward this goal, and (c) unmask and counter hostile attempts to distort or frustrate the objectives and policies of the United States. These activities should emphasize the ways in which United States policies harmonize with those of other peoples and governments, and those aspects of American life and culture which facilitate sympathetic understanding of United States policies.

The advisory function is to be carried out at various levels in Washington, and within the Country Team at United States diplomatic missions abroad. While the Director of the United States Information Agency shall take the initiative in offering counsel when he deems it advisable, the various departments and agencies should seek such counsel when considering policies and programs which may substantially affect or be affected by foreign opinion. Consultation with the United States Information Agency is essential when programs affecting communications media in other countries are contemplated.

United States Information Agency staffs abroad, acting under the supervision of the Chiefs of Mission, are responsible for the conduct of overt public information, public relations and cultural activities—i.e. those activities intended to inform or influence foreign public opin-

2 Kennedy made this statement during his January 11, 1962, State of the Union address; for the text, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962, pp. 5–15.
ion—for agencies of the United States Government except for Commands of the Department of Defense.³

Where considered advisable, and except for direct international broadcasts by the Voice of America, the United States Information Agency is authorized to communicate with other peoples without attribution to the United States Government on matters for which attribution could be assumed by the Government if necessary. The United States Information Agency shall, when appropriate, coordinate such activities with the Central Intelligence Agency.⁴

John F. Kennedy

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³ In an October 25, 1962, memorandum to Bromley Smith, Amory noted a few reservations about this paragraph, referred to as Section 4, of Murrow’s original draft that was submitted to the NSC on September 26. However, no changes were made to the paragraph. (Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Department and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 1/63–2/63)

⁴ On February 25, Kennedy signed an unclassified version of this memorandum for public dissemination that omitted the last paragraph on CIA coordination. (Department of State, USIA Historical Collection, Agency History/63) In a May 25 memorandum to Bromley Smith, Thomas Sorensen requested that the January 25 statement be declassified except the last paragraph, which should remain confidential in order that the USIA would have a single statement with more force. McGeorge Bundy replied affirmatively in a June 17 memorandum to Sorensen. (Both in Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 290, United States Information Agency General 4/63-6/63)
110. Letter From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Harriman) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)\(^1\)


Dear Ed:\(^2\)

Thank you for your note of January 5,\(^3\) indicating your concern about the situation in Laos and forwarding Mr. Moore’s memorandum of December 13, 1962.\(^4\)

As you are well aware, Laos’ problems continue. The Communists are attempting to secure the political control of the areas they now occupy and to thwart any implementation of the Geneva Agreements\(^5\) which might affect their position adversely. They are doing everything they can to divide neutralist support for Prime Minister Souvanna Phouma and to win dissident neutralists over to the Pathet Lao\(^6\) cause.

Our efforts, on the other hand, are aimed at building neutralist and conservative support for Prince Souvanna Phouma, and working through the ICC and other appropriate channels to achieve the implementation of the Geneva Agreements. To this end, we are encouraging the ICC to increase its activity in making unrestricted investigations of areas known to contain Vietnamese troop concentrations. The going is slow but we are making some headway and the first investigations, limited though they were, have been made. We have hopes that further investigations at Canadian-Indian initiative will be undertaken shortly.

\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Subj Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 8, Field—Far East (IAF) 1963. Confidential. In the upper right corner of the first page of the letter is a notation in Murrow’s hand requesting “Pass to D.W.” To the right of Murrow’s notation, Wilson wrote his initials “DW.” Next to Wilson’s initials, Harris also wrote his initials “RH,” and the date “1/29.” Above Murrow’s notation, Ryan signed his initials “HAR.” Below it, an unknown hand wrote: “copy passed to IAF—Dan Moore.”

\(^2\) Next to “Dear Ed,” Harriman wrote: “(Note last Page WAH).” For Harriman’s note, see footnote 8, below.

\(^3\) See Document 103.

\(^4\) Printed as an enclosure to Document 103.

\(^5\) The Geneva Agreements of July 23, 1962, brought to a close the hostilities between left and right wing factions in Laos. It called for the country to become neutral and for the formation of a tripartite government that represented the conflicting factions. It also authorized the International Control Commission to observe violations of the agreement. The agreement, however, did not hold and the situation in Laos continued to deteriorate over the course of 1963. For documentation on the agreement and the crisis in Laos, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXIV, Laos Crisis.

\(^6\) The Pathet Lao was the Communist, nationalist faction in Laos that formed in the 1950s. For information, see Foreign Relations, 1955–1957, vol. XXI, East Asian Security; Cambodia; Laos, Document 306.
The formation of the new coalition government in Laos made it mandatory that we re-examine our aid program to Laos in order to assure that the funds would not be used by the Pathet Lao or for purposes other than those intended. As a result of our re-examination last summer, we decided that the most effective way to provide financial aid to the new government would be a commodity import program by which the U.S. would pay for the costs of essential Lao imports. Accordingly, we have revised our program and have entered into negotiations with the Lao. Partially because of inherent delays in organizing a new program and partially because of Lao hesitation and reluctance to accept certain necessary but very mild controls (which incidentally was as strong among the conservative elements as the left) it has taken considerable time to negotiate. However, as you probably have noted from the newspapers, the program is about to be signed and we hope that there will be no further objections and delays. During the period of negotiations the U.S. has continued to provide financial assistance to the Lao government. Since July 1962, 7 million dollars have been placed in the Federal Reserve Bank for use under the new commodity import program, and at the same time, project assistance has been continued without significant interruption.

As Mr. Moore points out in his memorandum, the Communist Minister of Information, Phoumi Vongvichit, has, in recent months, been attempting to take over control of all radio and press facilities in the country. Our policy, consistent with our overall objectives outlined above has been, where possible, to block the Communist’s take over of important informational facilities and to encourage the continuation of their use in the support of Souvanna Phouma and the neutralist leadership of the coalition government. As Minister of Information, however, Phoumi Vongvichit is in an excellent position to exert considerable control over the output of the Lao Presse (a daily news bulletin published by the Ministry), and the Ministry’s radio station, the Lao National Radio. The Country Team is therefore engaged in continuous skirmishes with the Minister over the output of these two facilities and it is perhaps an indication of the success of Ambassador Unger’s recent efforts that Mr. Moore is able to say that the Minister “is so far using them with some caution and not employing them for blatant pro-communist propaganda.”

Phoumi Vongvichit has also been trying to gain control of the U.S. supported Lao Photo Press and the Khao Phap Hob Sapda which is the weekly pictorial news bulletin published by the press. While the

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Country Team has been careful not to use them in any way which could be criticised by the Communists, these two operations have been extremely effective in providing support to Souvanna Phouma. Mr. Moore’s memorandum describes Phoumi Vongvichit’s intention to force the U.S. to either turn the press over to the RLG (i.e. the Ministry of Information) or make it clear that it is still the property of the U.S. so that the Ministry of Information can take “appropriate steps at the appropriate time.” While Phoumi’s threats are vague (primarily because the physical location of the press in conservative controlled Vientiane makes a Communist takeover at this time extremely difficult) they must be met and countered. By a variety of measures the Country Team in Vientiane has so far succeeded in meeting these threats and in preventing the takeover of the press by the Communists. Moreover, in anticipation of a possible Communist takeover the Country Team has arranged to limit the amount of supplies kept on hand at the press. In case the Communists do take it over, limited supplies and the withdrawal of U.S. technical assistance will stop the press at least until bloc technicians and supplies can replace our own. In an effort to find a satisfactory long range solution to this problem, Ambassador Unger has suggested to Souvanna Phouma the formation of a tripartite committee with an American observer to supervise the output of the press. Phoumi Vongvichit naturally opposes this because it would not give him unfettered control of the press but Souvanna has taken rather well to the idea.

The success of our efforts to achieve a stable and neutral Laos and to so avoid a costly war under disadvantageous conditions will, of course, depend a great deal on our success in stiffening and bolstering the Prime Minister. Souvanna must be encouraged to take firm control of the coalition and we must be flexible enough to provide him quickly with the assistance he needs to deal with the Pathet Lao. In this effort we will need all of our resources and cannot be hamstrung by mere name and form. If it will better achieve our objectives to change the name of USOM (our AID mission in Laos) or the Air America Corporation (our air supply organization) then we must be willing to consider it and if necessary do it quickly.

We are involved in what I believe will be a long and frustrating series of battles with people like Phoumi Vongvichit and Quinim. We will succeed if we continue to work with all the means at our disposal to stiffen Souvanna and block the Communist’s attempts to expand their position at the expense of the conservatives and neutralists. An extremely important factor in preventing the Pathet Lao from resorting to open warfare to achieve its goals is the Soviet Union’s concern least the struggle in Laos escalate into something larger. It remains to be seen just how the present Sino-Soviet difficulties will affect this situation
but we have reason to believe that the Soviets desire to keep the struggle on a political basis. The situation is far from resolved and our problems continue; but it is by no means a lost cause as yet.

I appreciate your taking time to write to me on this and would like to hear how you feel we can best achieve our objectives, particularly with regard to the informational aspects of the problem.  

Sincerely,

W. Averell Harriman

8 In 1950, the Central Intelligence Agency purchased the assets of Civil Air Transport (CAT) from Claire Chennault, a renowned U.S. military aviator and leader of the famous “Flying Tigers” airborne military unit in China during World War II. CAT was used by the CIA to fly covert missions throughout Asia, but especially in Southeast Asia, in the guise of a private commercial air carrier. In 1959, CAT changed its name to Air America and continued to operate until the CIA shuttered the enterprise in 1976.

9 Harriman signed “Averell” above his typed signature. Below his typed signature, he wrote the following: “P.S. As a matter of policy decision, we have transferred the shooting war in which the side we were backing was getting licked in to a political war in which [the words “we can’t” are crossed out] our side can’t do worse. Tell your man to put all his energies & imagination into waging the political battle—the outcome of which is still in doubt. W.A.H.”

111. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency (Moore) to the Deputy Director (Wilson)


SUBJECT
Press Relations in Viet-Nam

Governor Harriman said in his staff meeting this morning that General Wheeler would make a very strong report on the sad condition of GVN relations with the press. Governor Harriman has urged the Secretary to make a public statement deploring GVN treatment of press. (At his press conference this morning the Secretary said: “But

let me say quite frankly that we have not been satisfied with the opportunities given to the press in Viet-Nam for full and candid coverage of the situation there, and we are discussing this matter from time to time and most urgently with the Government of Viet-Nam.”

The Governor continued in substance that we must start calling some of the tunes and Diem must take our advice. This issue good one for test of wills.

Comment: Although a public statement here could make John Mecklin’s idea of unattributed U.S. press briefings a matter of direct confrontation with GVN; depending on how it played in Saigon, such a statement could serve only to strengthen Embassy’s hand and put GVN on notice to acquiesce quietly to our projected press program.

The Governor stressed that statement necessary for U.S. consumption.

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2 In addition to this statement, Rusk added: “We can fully understand the difficulties faced by press representatives there and would like to see those dealt with as rapidly as possible, because under those conditions it is not easy to get a balanced picture of the situation. We hope that there could be some improvement, not only in the situation in Viet-Nam but in the availability of information about it in Viet-Nam to representatives of the press.” (Department of State Bulletin, February 18, 1963, p. 238)

3 Mecklin, Counselor for Public Affairs at the U.S. Embassy in Saigon, made the following proposal in a November 27, 1962, memorandum to Ambassador Nolting: “MACV should begin now to give regular daily briefings to Western newsmen on a non-attribution basis. These in general should be limited to news about activities involving US personnel (which means virtually every action initiated by the GVN), but news of major developments involving only GVN personnel should also be ‘leaked’ at the discretion of MACV. It would be preferable not to advise the GVN formally that such briefings have been started, thus avoiding a direction question of ‘face.’ But if and when the GVN hears about them and inquires, we should simply say the pressure from the US press for adequate information became so intense that we could no longer resist it, and that of course, the briefings will be discontinued once the GVN itself begins doing the job.” The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. II, Vietnam, 1962, Document 322.

Additionally, in a January 30 memorandum to Murrow, Wilson noted that during the January 17 meeting of the Special Group for Counterinsurgency, whose members included Johnson, Taylor, McCon, Dungan, Murrow, and Bundy (although neither Murrow nor Bundy attended that meeting), Mecklin’s memorandum “was read and discussed at some length” and that “[i]t was the opinion of all of us that Mecklin’s memorandum goes in the right direction.” The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 23. For the minutes of the January 17 meeting, see ibid., Document 14.
112. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Far East, United States Information Agency (Bunce) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Harder Line in Laos

After exhibiting the patience of Job, the United States now proposes to take a somewhat harder line in Laos. The attached cable, which has already been called to the attention of appropriate policy and media personnel, outlines general approaches which the Department is suggesting the Embassy in Vientiane pursue with respect to the various factions in Laos.

Although it remains to be seen if much good will come of this, it is encouraging that at last we are prepared to take a somewhat firmer stand. It would appear that FE proposes, as Governor Harriman suggested IAF do, “to put all (its) energies and imagination into waging the political battle.”\(^2\)

Attachment

Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Laos\(^3\)

Washington, February 5, 1963, 8:04 p.m..

776. Your reports over past several weeks indicate that we are facing stepped-up PL offensive against US operations and presence in Laos. This heightened pressure, although not at all unexpected, suggests time may have arrived for US to begin swinging back more sharply in Laos and to indicate publicly that US patience with PL obstructionism running short. Our purpose in doing so would be to deter PL from its more flagrant tactics, to bring developments in Laos to world attention and to force the “troika”\(^4\) back into balance. We

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 8, FIELD—Far East (IAF) 1963. Secret. A copy of the memorandum, but not the attached telegram, was sent to Wilson. Murrow wrote his initials, “ERW” in the upper right corner of the memorandum, as did Harris, who also wrote the date, “2/12.”

\(^2\) See footnote 8, Document 110.

\(^3\) Secret. Drafted by Cross on February 5; cleared in draft by Harriman; approved by Hannah. Sent for information to Bangkok, London, Paris, Saigon, and CINCPAC.

\(^4\) See footnote 7, Document 103.
would hope to arouse our allies to more intensive efforts and to rally non-communist Lao, particularly so-called conservative wing, to more active defense of their position. Since all of the many extremely complex issues and problems we face in Laos are subjects of almost daily exchanges between Embassy and Dept following lines of action are set forth in broad outline. Intention is to suggest some concepts of “style” rather than propose individual moves. Dept would appreciate your comments.

1. With Phoumi

We have been surprised at how few times Phoumi and other conservatives have apparently used their veto to block unfavorable actions within RLG. Recognize, of course, that there are occasions where conservatives have moved quietly to head off PL initiatives which do not come to public attention, but it seems rare for conservatives to come out openly and strongly against a particular PL action. This may be due to emphasis we have placed in our dealings with Phoumi on importance of supporting Souvanna which has come to mean in most cases not rpt not opposing those PL moves to which Souvanna is willing agree. However, since Souvanna apparently inclined follow lines of least resistance we believe PL will hold initiative on major problems such as air supply, international relations and freedom of movement until Phoumi starts pressing back.

We would like to see Phoumi make some public gestures which in effect would veto the PL veto, e.g. insist that there is no rpt no agreement among Lao re air supply and that therefore PL cannot oppose. Admittedly such gestures could not change actual situation or stop PL obstructionism but they could serve to blur PL propaganda, show that conservatives are still active and establish a strong non-Communist Lao position which US could support.

Another area in which we feel conservatives should be more vocal is in attacking Chics and DRV for their violations of Agreements
and their threats to Lao neutrality and independence. Impression here is that the only Lao propaganda receiving international attention is that directed against US by PL while at same time public criticism of communist signatories comes only from US or other non-Lao sources; Phoumi’s attitude toward Chicom road building very much case in point.

Finally we wish allude again to necessity of Phoumi using his control of Vientiane and its facilities to force bargains from PL on such matters as air supply. In our view as long as PL deny access by either

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5 Reference is to the Geneva Agreements of 1962. See footnote 5, Document 110.
neutralists or conservatives to PL areas Phoumi can be tougher in extracting quid pro quos for privileges he allows PL in areas he controls.

Request Emb’s interpretation whether Phoumi’s attitude can be explained as a tactic to extract some commitment of special US support for conservative faction.

2. Souvanna

Our general criticism of Souvanna as we have expressed in our messages recently is that he fails to take position of his own on issues where his leadership could be decisive factor. He apparently fails understand that the row of a neutralist is at least as hard to hoe as that of an aligned country. Neutralization does not exempt a country or govt from the necessity to struggle for independence and neutrality is not identical with a supine posture. Souvanna’s attitude may be matter of temperament and character and therefore not particularly amenable to our influence. Recognize also that repeated showdowns with PL on all issues would soon result in complete breakdown of national union govt and that Souvanna must postpone collision on some issues temporarily in order maintain framework his govt. Our problem, therefore, is to identify those issues where slippage would seriously endanger him and convince Souvanna that he must take stand in his own interest or lose out entirely.

How to bring him to save himself is primarily tactical matter of which you are of course best judge. However, thought has occurred to us that perhaps Souvanna has come to accept our unfailing support as matter of course whereas he feels that he must placate communists to earn theirs, (e.g. Embtel 10536 where Souvanna fusses about size USAID staff while conveniently ignoring several thousand Chicoms and Viet Minh working on roads). It might be useful administer dash of cold water in form of reminders that we can support him only so long as he follows truly neutral path and that certainly we would not accept his back-tracking on understandings with us (e.g. Embtel 10957 without some public reaction. Admittedly it would be hard to get across without discouraging him too greatly but suggest Souvanna should be made to feel he must work for our support also.

3. With communist side

Essence of foregoing is that we should consider generally raising temperature in Vientiane by encouraging stronger public stands by Phoumi and Souvanna while toughening our own public posture. This

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6 Not found.
7 Not found.
may mean in turn our taking gloves off when dealing with individual Lao such as Quinim and Phoumi Vongvichit and challenging them directly and publicly when they criticize us. It is hard to imagine that we can run into much more trouble with these two than they now give us and it may be that by showing our irritation with them we can encourage reaction against them by Lao themselves.

4. With French

While we obviously would not rpt not wish place final control of our assistance to Kong Le in French hands we see merit in allowing French take lead publicly whenever their and our objectives coincide. Our primary objective after all is to strengthen Kong Le against PL and if French can facilitate this by diverting PL criticism so much the better. Of course this would necessitate closest possible liaison between French and ourselves to ensure that present trend towards rapprochement between KL and Meo/FAR is not interrupted and that matériel we supply is actually used to KL’s advantage. This may also mean that we should press for changes in FMM personnel connected with PDJ operations if there are any who are uncooperative or working against our objectives with Kong Le.

Rusk
113. Memorandum From the Assistant Director for Africa, United States Information Agency (Roberts) to the Deputy Director (Wilson)\(^1\)


We are becoming increasingly concerned over what we see as the failure of Agency output to pay enough attention to the task of projecting an integrated American society. Ten percent of the population is Negro. Another significant percentage is non-white. Various top officials, including the Attorney General, have stated that racial issues are of primary importance overseas. Therefore I believe that no serious effort by this Agency on any theme or campaign should fail to take this task into account.

I do not think it is being done. To cite a few examples:

I am told that initial IPS and ITV materials on the “Thirty Years of Progress”\(^2\) failed to make any mention of social progress in the field of race relations.\(^3\)

The December–January Special issue of *Informations & Documents*, put out by USIS-Paris is devoted to “La Civilisation Americaine”, but as you will see from the attached copy,\(^4\) not a single Negro American is pictured in it.

A few months ago we succeeded for the first time in getting certain of the Agency’s stock color illustrated posters printed up in an African language—one on churches of America and another on American agriculture. In neither of these was there a single non-white face.

I would like to make it clear that I am not talking about the encouraging flow of materials on the progress of American Negroes which is of direct interest to the African posts. I am talking about what we feel is a failure to project world-wide, in a constant “soft sell” manner, the basic idea of an integrated society in which non-whites are playing an increasing role.

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\(^{2}\) Presumably reference to circular airgram USIA CA–1971, January 23, regarding the commemoration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inauguration on March 4, 1933. (National Archives, RG 306, General Subject Files, 1949–1970; Acc. #66–Y–0274, Entry UD WW 382, Box 117, Master Copies 1963)

\(^{3}\) In the left margin next to of the paragraph, Carter wrote: “DW—not true re IPS.”

\(^{4}\) Not found attached.
I feel that it is not especially productive for one area director, who justly may be accused of a partisan viewpoint, to be pressing this. If you agree with me, might I suggest that the best approach would be for the Director and Deputy Directors to demonstrate an interest in this question?

Edward V. Roberts

5 Roberts signed “Ned” above his typed signature.

114. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


We have just assembled information on Western European reaction to the U.S. domestic political controversy.

In summary, concern with the Administration’s domestic predicaments as related to foreign affairs was generally restricted to elite media. Editorial comment was sparse ranging from fairly heavy in Britain to practically none in Italy. Available comment indicated awareness of the various aspects and factors impinging on the position of the Administration and general sympathy for it. Nowhere were charges of immaturity levelled against the Administration; however, there was some criticism of the Administration for heavy-handedness in dealing with allies. Such dealings were often said to be based too much on cold logic devoid of regard for human factors. Most media related the present domestic hassle over Cuba to Republican pressures which were often either obliquely or directly castigated. In some instances, however, it was pointed out that individual members of the Administration were partially responsible for conflicting views on the status of the Cuba situation. Doubts were also expressed in several cases as to the accuracy of intelligence information made available by the Administration. Its specific measures taken at this time against Cuba were widely

1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 19, USIA, 1/63–9/63. No classification marking. According to a time stamp in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum, it was received in the White House on February 12 at 3:53 p.m.
regarded as temporizing and even ineffective, but there was no indication that the bulk of European opinion would favor stronger measures against Castro. Rather, the moderation of the Administration was welcomed, although in some as yet isolated cases it was held that the President had lost the initiative in the Cuban situation.

Conservative Le Figaro, Paris, probably spoke for much of public opinion in Western Europe, when it stated “it must be hoped that Kennedy will succeed in extricating himself from the maze of difficulties and disillusionment into which recent events seemed to have plunged him.” Some of the difficulties alluded to were seen by the more critical commentators as caused by the Administration’s handling of the European and Canadian rather than the Cuban crisis. Resentment still lingers over lack of prior consultation in the October crisis and was fanned in France, Belgium and occasionally West Germany by the EEC crisis. More recently, some British papers took offense at the alleged interference of the State Department in Canadian affairs. A commentator in the left-wing New Statesman summed up these feelings when he wrote: “If there is a common theme, it is the consistent American underestimation of passionate nationalism in countries that feel threatened by Yankee dictation.” Other comment censored the reputed high-handedness of the Administration in dealing with its allies rather than reserving this kind of treatment for their enemies. Some British and French dailies pointed to a deficiency of “cultural empathy” on the highest level of the Administration.

More specifically, individual members of the Administration were charged with either precipitating in part the present domestic crisis or not succeeding in convincing their opponents. Attorney-General Kennedy’s testimony on the Bay of Pigs invasion was blamed in several instances for “clumsiness” and confusing the issues. But even in this instance there was no single reference to immaturity or even youthfulness. Secretary McNamara was depicted by influential independent Le Monde, Paris, as not having convinced large segments of public opinion

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2 Reference is to the October 1962 Cuban missile crisis and France’s refusal to accept the United Kingdom into the European Economic Community.

3 On January 30, the Department of State issued a statement on the ongoing negotiations between the United States and Canada on the issue of provision of nuclear weapons for Canadian forces in the aftermath of the Cuban missile crisis. The statement reads, in part: “These discussions have been exploratory in nature; the Canadian Government has not as yet proposed any arrangement sufficiently practical to contribute effectively to North American defense.” For the full text of the statement, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIII, Western Europe and Canada, Document 444. Canadian Prime Minister John Diefenbaker charged the Department of State with an “unwarranted intrusion in Canadian affairs.” (Raymond Daniell, “Canadian Denounce U.S. on Defense ‘Interference,’” The New York Times, February 1, 1963, p. 1)

4 Not found and not further identified.
and the Congress despite his TV statements.\(^5\) Some doubts were cast on the accuracy of intelligence reports. Financial Boersen, Copenhagen, remarked “if the President bases his evaluation on CIA reports, it must be remembered that they were wrong in 1960.” The independent London Economist commented along similar lines that American intelligence could be slipping this time and pointed out that it was Senator Keating who first suggested publicly last fall that there were Soviet missile bases in Cuba.\(^6\)

The same periodical thought, as did many other media, that the Republicans had eagerly seized the opportunity to harass the Administration. In a number of instances, sharp criticism was voiced at such opportunism. Independent Sunday Times, London, spoke of the “drumfire of irresponsible Republican voices,” independent Le Monde, Paris, of an “alarmist campaign,” while the liberal Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm, went so far as to assert that the “Republicans do not want to be convinced that the Cuba threat has been removed as they need it as a club to hold over the Kennedy regime. They cannot permit the undisturbed harvest of political gain from the increased prestige (of the President).” In a few cases, such as that of left-center Süddeutsche Zeitung, Munich, it was contended that the Administration anticipated a Cuba campaign on the part of the opposition.

The measures currently taken by the Administration in regard to Cuba, such as the most recent penalties placed on ships carrying cargo there,\(^7\) was generally seen as an attempt to reduce domestic pressures rather than to increase those on Cuba. The London Times remarked with evident disdain for these pressures “that something like this (additional boycott) has become a domestic necessity—it cannot be put higher than that—is a pity.” There was consensus that such actions would do little to further embarrass Castro and even less to conciliate domestic opposition to the Administration. Yet little as these measures might do to heighten tensions in the Caribbean, anxieties were already expressed in the form of hopes that Washington would “not feel com-

\(^5\) McNamara held a televised news conference on February 6 during which he asserted that the Soviet arms in Cuba had been removed. (“Public Report Answering Public Charges of Military Buildup in Cuba,” The Washington Post, February 7, 1963, p. A22)

\(^6\) Presumable reference to the remarks made by Senator Keating on the floor of the Senate on August 31, 1962. For the text, see Congressional Record, August 31, 1962, pp. 18359–18361.

\(^7\) On February 6, the White House announced that U.S. Government-financed cargoes could not be shipped from the United States on foreign-flagged vessels: “concerned departments and agencies of the Government have been directed not to permit shipment of any such cargoes on vessels that have called at a Cuban port since January 31, 1963.” (Department of State Bulletin, February 15, 1963, p. 283)
opelled to take more far-reaching measures.” (Liberal *Allgemeen Handelsblad*, Amsterdam)

Opinion was agreed that the Cuban situation remained potentially dangerous and that Cuba continued to constitute a Communist springboard for operations, political rather than military. The Administration was seen as marking time in order to avoid a new upsurge of tension, but in so doing some papers thought it possible that the “Kennedy government could lose face on the domestic scene” (right-center *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*).

Edward R. Murrow

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8 Murrow signed “E.R. Murrow” above his typed signature.

115. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy¹


We are continuing to receive unsolicited reports from our overseas missions about the wide use of and enthusiastic foreign response to “A Conversation with the President.”²

In addition to television broadcasts, ambassadors and public affairs officers are still using the film for invitational showings, including a large proportion of political and government leaders.

We know that the program was televised in full in Japan, Germany, New Zealand, Kenya, Germany, Finland, the Philippines (repeated seven times), the Netherlands, Panama (Armed Forces Network), Hong


² On December 16, 1962, at 6:30 p.m. in his office at the White House, the President was interviewed by reporters from the three leading national television networks, ABC, CBS, and NBC. The interview was televised the following day by the three networks; it was also broadcast on major radio networks. The networks broadcast the interview under the title, “After Two Years—A Conversation with the President.” For the text of the interview, see *Public Papers: Kennedy, 1962*, pp. 889–904.
Kong, and Australia. It was televised in major part in Sweden, the U.K., Italy, Peru, Colombia, and Nicaragua.

Here are representative press comments:

"Without doubt, by far the most important TV program of the year, thanks to the President’s open-hearted and stone-hard arguments.” —The Netherlands (name of paper not given).

"In itself, the interview was an absorbing drama... President Kennedy talked freely of peril, success, and failure he had encountered. His own analysis of each situation about which he was questioned was searching and sincere.” —Evening Post, New Zealand.

"I now feel that television must be just about unbeatable for presenting human personality.” —Daily Nation, Kenya.

"It was most impressive. No doubt the strongest impression was created by the self-evident way in which Kennedy spoke of the responsibility for the national interests of the U.S. and the security of the Free World.” —Die Welt, Germany.

"The charm of the American President is able to radiate on his television audiences was apparent all the time.” —The Indian Express.

"... Perhaps the most effective way in which world leaders can speak directly to their people... As many people as possible should be given a chance to see it.” —Visir, Iceland.

Reports from our missions about the reactions to their invitational showings, from all continents, are similar and equally enthusiastic.

Edward R. Murrow

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3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Memorandum From Samuel E. Belk of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) and the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kaysen)


SUBJECT
Disaffected African Students

From a meeting held in the Department late yesterday chaired by George McGhee and attended by Alexis Johnson, Luke Battle, and several others from CU, the following emerged:

1. In view of several inquiries to the Department about the students and a speech in the Senate by Hubert Humphrey (he thinks we should bring them here), it was decided that Linc White should make a general statement today in which he would say that (a) we are actively consulting with western European governments concerning the problem; (b) the U.S. is ready to render “assistance” if necessary (no mention of funds); a background statement saying something to the effect that this situation is part of a larger problem; that it is a very complex one; and noting that there have been inquiries from various parts of the U.S.

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Box 319A, Staff Memoranda, Samuel E. Belk, 3/62-6/63. Confidential.
2 No record of this meeting at the Department of State was found.
3 Not found.
4 Humphrey spoke in the Senate on February 14 in response to national press reports about fighting in Bulgaria between the Bulgarian police and African student protesters. The students were protesting over the banning of an all-African student union by Bulgarian authorities. Humphrey concluded his remarks by stating: “I call upon the State Department to bestir itself to determine what it will do to admit to our country those students who seek to study in the United States. It would be a mighty good example for the United States to set. We should open our gates and our universities to the students who have been the victims of Communist violence. We should let the world know that in the United States it is possible to organize, if one wishes to protest, and that the Government will not bear down upon him with militia.” (Congressional Record, February 14, 1963, pp. 2357-2358)
5 On February 20, the Department of State issued a press release stating: “The Department of State is sympathetic to the situation of these African students in Bulgaria who have found conditions there so difficult as to impel them to leave and seek an education elsewhere. The Department is consulting with Western European and other governments, and the African states involved, in an effort to develop ways of assisting African students who have left Bulgaria.” (Department of State Bulletin, March 11, 1963, p. 375)
2. An outgoing instruction to appropriate posts which will give more pointed guidance than that available in CA 5573 (attached), saying that we can be more forthcoming in our discussions with the WE countries; that some assistance might be forthcoming.

The three guidelines set forth in CA 5573 would allow the U.S., if it became absolutely necessary, to (a) assist in the placement of highly qualified students who would fall within the purview of CU programs; (b) assist in the repatriation of students who could not otherwise return to their own African countries (guideline 2, CA 5573); and (c) render temporary assistance now—from “unspecified source”—to those students who do not receive assistance from another source.⁷

As for the whereabouts of the students, the attitudes of the WE governments, and the attitudes of the African embassies in western Europe, we know little more today than we did yesterday. The Department has sent a query to African posts for their reactions to the situation from that vantage point.

In the judgment of the people in the Department who follow such things, the African students in Bulgaria probably came “from the bottom of the barrel”, are far less qualified than other African students in the bloc, and would almost certainly not qualify for attendance at a university in the west. This looks like a crop that would be much better off back in Africa. The leader of the revolt already has said from Czechoslovakia that he wishes to return to Ghana.

Samuel E. Belk⁸

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⁶ Not found attached.
⁷ Immediately following this paragraph an unknown hand wrote: “(Secretary had not approved this course of action at 1330 today.)”
⁸ Belk signed “Sam” above his typed signature.

SUBJECT

USIA Trade Fair Exhibition Program

Summary: Psychological objectives of and agency responsibilities for trade fair program are reaffirmed and clarified. Joint State-USIA Commerce Message.

The purposes of this message are to reaffirm the psychological objectives of the USIA Trade Fair Exhibition program in accord with Congressional and Presidential intent, and to clarify responsibilities of the various agencies and departments for the program, since it is conducted on an inter-agency basis.

Objectives

Section 102(a)(3) of P.L. 87–256, the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961 (Fulbright-Hays Act), authorizes the President to provide for “United States participation in international fairs and expositions abroad, including trade and industrial fairs and other public or private demonstrations of United States economic accomplishments and cultural attainments.” Thus this activity, known as the USIA Trade Fair Exhibition program, is a part of the total U.S. effort to influence public attitudes in support of U.S. foreign policy objectives in the country where an exhibition is staged. The theme and content of each exhibition should be directly related to, and clearly support, the purpose of the Act as set forth in its Section 101, the U.S. objectives set forth in the Department of State’s “Guidelines for Policy and Operations” paper for the country, and the USIS Country Plan.

Section 101 of the Act states:

“The purpose of this Act is to enable the Government of the United States to increase mutual understanding between the people of the United States and the people of other countries by means of educational
and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other
nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, devel-
opments, and achievements of the people of the United States and
other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful
and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote
international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement;
and thus to assist in the development of friendly, sympathetic, and
peaceful relations between the United States and the other countries
of the world.”

In line with the U.S. Government’s policy to promote exports as a
means of sustaining U.S. foreign policy objectives, the USIA program
should include the promotion of international trade and expansion of
U.S. exports insofar as this can be done within the psychological objec-
tives stated above.

Agency Responsibilities

In Executive Order 11034 of June 25, 1962, entitled “Administration
of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961,” the
President delegated to the Director of the U.S. Information Agency
“the functions so conferred by Section 102 (a)(3) of the Act to the extent
that they are in respect of fairs, expositions, and demonstrations held
outside of the United States” (Section 2 (c)).

As per Section 6 of the Executive Order, “the Secretary of State
shall exercise primary responsibility for Government-wide leadership
and policy guidance with regard to international educational and cul-
tural affairs,” including the USIA Trade Fair Exhibition program.

The Director of the U.S. Information Agency has again asked the
Commerce Department (and the Labor Department for the Labor Mis-
sions portion of certain of these exhibitions) to carry out operational
responsibility for the program, and it has accepted.

In a letter to the Secretary of Commerce on September 26, 1962, the
Director of USIA stated he would (1) “continue the arrangements
whereby your Department assumes operational responsibility under
my over-all direction with the help of the Trade Fair Committee” and
(2) seek “to strengthen USIA direction (both in Washington and in
the field) in order to re-emphasize the psychological aspects of the
program.” To assure adequate USIA direction, the Director of USIA
stated that “before planning begins on each exhibit, the appropriate

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3 See footnote 4, Document 84.
4 Not found.
Area Assistant Director of USIA and other officers concerned shall provide OITP (Office of International Trade Promotion, Department of Commerce) specific guidance with respect to purpose, theme and content.”

Similar coordination among agency and departmental representatives is required in the field during the planning and staging of USIA Trade Fair exhibits. In line with the primary USIA responsibility for the program, the Public Affairs Officer, under the supervision of the Chief of Mission, should take the lead in coordinated planning.

Planning guidelines and timing schedules are in the course of preparation and will be forwarded by the Trade Fair Committee as a follow-up joint message to those posts where an exhibition under this program is scheduled or under consideration.

Murrow

118. Address by the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson)¹


USIA: A DIALOGUE WITH THE WORLD

For a short while this evening, I will have you at something of a disadvantage. During the next fifteen or twenty minutes, I shall be involved in what is essentially a monologue. I am supposed to talk and you are supposed to listen. (The married men in this audience will have long since adjusted to this kind of situation. And the single men might as well get some practice.) But when I finish my remarks, and we get into a question and answer period, my advantage will disappear.

In fact, the give and take of questions and answers will put us on reasonably equal grounds. Obviously, you will then be able to ask questions about matters that are important to you, matters which may

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, USIA Historical Collection, Office of the Director; Biographic Files Relating to USIA Directors and Other Senior Officials; 1953–2000, Entry A1–1069, Box 37, Donald M. Wilson Speeches, 1961–1969. No classification marking. The text of the address is USIA Release No. 10, prepared in the Office of Public Information. Wilson delivered this address at the annual banquet of the Southwestern Journalism Congress.
or may not have been covered in my remarks. Furthermore, your questions will derive from your precise knowledge—or lack of it—concerning the work of the U.S. Information Agency; or, at the very least, they will be triggered by something I have said but did not develop fully.

So the exchange may very well prove to be more meaningful to you than my remarks. (But since no one could reasonably be expected to pass up the opportunity of an uninterrupted speech, I'll persist in speaking.)

In any event, I have noted the contrast between a speech and a dialogue to establish a point that is fundamental to the operations of the Agency which I represent: that an exchange of views is more likely to result in successful communication between individuals—or nations—than is a unilateral exposition of one view.

It would be worthwhile, before I elaborate on this point, to define the role of the United States Information Agency. Because his is the best definition I have yet seen, I will quote Mr. Murrow: “We seek,” he said, “to make the policies and practices of this government and this people everywhere intelligible and wherever possible palatable.”

There are some interesting aspects of this definition that deserve comment.

First of all, you will notice the very direct relationship between the foreign policies of this nation and the role of the Agency. For that reason, and more than ever before, the views of USIA concerning these policies are heard during the policy formulation process. In effect, we are increasingly able to make our views known before the policies we will be asked to make intelligible are actually established.

The second aspect of our role I want to call to your attention lies in the use of the word “intelligible” before the word “palatable.” There was a time, in the early days of USIA, when the emphasis seemed to be on the word “love.” For that matter, we Americans still seem to be curiously addicted to being loved throughout the world; we have a strange sense of disappointment when we find that not all people love all things American all of the time. “Gratitude” is another word that is brought into play when we try to assess the stance of foreign nations. Americans travelling abroad frequently ask our foreign service officers with whom they come in contact such questions as: “Are the people...
here grateful for our aid? Do they appreciate everything we’re doing for them? Are they aware of our generosity?”

It would be nice, of course, if slightly unreal, if all nations with whom we are aligned through pacts, common goals, or through common standards of international morality were indeed grateful for our efforts, or felt a warm surge of romance when the United States was mentioned.

It would be nice—but it would be relatively unimportant.

It is far more worthwhile, far more important to the attainment of our foreign policy objectives, to be clearly understood. Understanding is not an assurance of agreement, but it is an assurance of respect. You and I may argue over an important issue, but we will respect each other’s argument if we understand the reasons underlying it, the logic that created it. So it is with nations.

Our emphasis, therefore, in the U.S. Information Agency is to create understanding of our policies, not to play the role of Cupid. Strangely enough, cupidity—a derivative of Cupid—means avarice and greed, not love.

We seek, as I said earlier, intelligibility and, where possible, palatability. And it is these words which lead us back to my earlier comments about the dialogue. For no policy of this government can be made intelligible to people that we do not understand. We must know what motivates our audience; we must understand, and respect, the culture, the history, the aspirations, the national interest, the politics and the problems of the people to whom we address ourselves. With this as a basis of the dialogue in which we seek to engage, there can be—and frequently is—an effective exchange, an effective communication of views.

And it would all be relatively simple except for the fact that in the process of international communications, we come up against three hard and difficult realities.

The first of these complications is that we are seen so differently by so many nations that we cannot talk intelligently about the American image abroad. In each of the more than 100 nations where we work, there is a separate and distinct image of the United States. And why not? Each nation is itself separate and distinct and each has emerged from a distinct background, and each necessarily sees and judges others within its own frame of reference. Some of these nations are wholly literate; some are mostly illiterate. Many view us through the philosophic calm of Buddah or Confucius or through the philosophic detachment of Hinduism. Others are the inheritors of the Christian or Moslem faiths.

Within each of these nations, we may find ourselves speaking to communists, socialists or capitalists. And it is inescapable that the monarchist sees us differently than the Marxist.
The reverse of this coin is the second of the three major problems in international communications; we ourselves do not project a unified image of America. Which of our many voices is authoritative; which represents the real America; which the common denominator or the consensus?

To whom shall the foreign audience listen? To conservative American or liberal; to the northerner or the southerner; to the Democrat or Republican?

Is the Federal Government’s strong support of James Meredith’s entry into the University of Mississippi the true picture,\(^3\) or does the true picture really consist of riots and demonstrations and racism?

Hemingway, Faulkner, Frost, Whitman—do they speak for America? Or shall we be judged by the racy murder and sex writer whose works are found in the newsstands around the world?

The dialogue, you can see, is not nearly as easy to carry on effectively as it may appear at first glance. And we have yet to consider that third most pressing and omnipresent problem of all. I shall have more to say about it later, but let me note for now that we are faced with a worldwide propaganda campaign undertaken by the Soviet Union and the communist apparatus. This voice, by comparison is monolithic. This voice is not bound by truth nor is its audience exposed to an open society on view for the world to see.

This, I need not tell you, is a problem of some consequence.

How then are all of these problems, these challenges, met? Within the framework of these problems, how does the U.S. Information Agency undertake its tasks?

If I may continue for a moment to generalize, we do it in two primary ways.

First of all, we use all possible media in communicating with the nations and the people of the world. You are probably most familiar with the Voice of America, our radio complex which only recently nearly doubled its power with a new installation in Greenville, North Carolina,\(^4\) and which broadcasts 740 hours weekly in 38 different languages. We have a press service which radioteletypes 10,000 words a day to all of our posts, bringing them the important policy developments and policy statements. We have a films division and a television

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\(^3\) See footnote 2, Document 95.

\(^4\) The new transmitter complex opened on February 8. Remarks by President Kennedy, which he recorded earlier that morning at the White House, were broadcast overseas via the new transmitter during the opening ceremony. ("New Facility Gives 'Voice' Power Boost," *The Washington Post*, February 9, 1963, p. A5) For the text of Kennedy's remarks, see *Public Papers: Kennedy*, 1963, p. 156.
division which, together, reach tens of millions of people yearly. We use
books and pamphlets, libraries, exchange programs, English teaching
programs, and exhibits.

But most of all we use people, our people. For on nothing do we
place a greater stress than on personal contacts by our officers in the
field. Nothing that we say through any of the media can be really
effective without these all-important personal contacts. It is these that
produce the dialogue, and it is the dialogue that gives us a deeper
insight into the people whom we are trying to convince. Conversely,
it is the personal contact that gives these people a deeper and more
accurate insight into America and Americans.

So it is the very essence of our operations that all of our officers
devote themselves, first and foremost, to meeting and talking with the
people who constitute our audiences.

We are, of course, selective in this audience. We have neither the
resources nor the physical capability of reaching everyone. Instead, we
single out those groups important to the present or future determina-
tion of the policies of their country; or those who can directly influence
opinion in their country. We meet with the leaders of government, the
opposition leaders, and the editors and publishers. We meet with the
student, the teacher, the labor leader, the young intellectual—that
group which is usually the core of ferment, particularly in the underde-
veloped country.

In fact, we emphasize contact with the youth and labor groups,
for recent history has demonstrated conclusively and dramatically the
unique importance of these two groups, almost everywhere in ferment,
looking for new answers to old problems that will no longer be put
aside; and in many places capable of changing the course and destiny
of their nations.

Now it is time to turn from these generalizations to some specifics
and I should like to single out, for concrete examples, an area which
I know has great interest for you—Latin America. More than anything
else in recent history, perhaps, the problem of Cuba has drawn our
urgent attention to the problems of all of Latin America.

It has also drawn the attention of the Soviet Union, whose propa-
ganda effort in that area is significant in scope. Let me draw from my
recent testimony before the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee of
the House Foreign Affairs Committee\(^5\) to give you a quick picture of
the Soviet propaganda effort in South America:

\(^5\) Wilson testified before the Inter-American Affairs Subcommittee the week of
February 18 on the subject of the threat of Castro-Communist subversion in the Western
Hemisphere. McCone, Ryan, and former Prime Minister of Cuba Manuel de Varona
also testified. \textit{(Congressional Record, February 21, 1963, pp. 2677–2678)} The transcript of
Wilson’s testimony was not found.
— In radio, the total Communist effort, including the Cuban, Soviet, European satellites and Chinese shortwave broadcasts, comes to 415 hours of broadcasting a week.

— In books, the Soviets alone have boosted their output of Spanish-language titles by more than 30 percent during the past year. In this past year they have put out some 1.5 million books, more than 40 percent of which were overt propaganda.

— In the field of periodicals, the Communists leave no audience untouched. Special magazines, generally well-produced, are directed at women, youth, workers, movie fans, and intellectuals.

— There are 326 Communist controlled newspapers and periodicals in Latin America.

— Students are a special target of Communist cultural activities, and this attention includes scholarships to study in the Soviet Union.

— There are films and speeches and seminars; and, through all media, the distortions and attacks on the policies of the United States.

So the number of images which already compound our problem are added to, if not multiplied, by Communist propaganda.

What then are we doing in Latin America? Here again, let me draw for you a quick but representative picture:

— Two years ago, the Voice of America broadcast in Spanish one hour a day, and not at all in Portuguese. Today we are on the air 12 hours a day to Latin America, nine in Spanish and three in Portuguese.

— This may concern you if you remember the figure of 415 hours of broadcasting a week by the Communists. But what I haven’t yet told you is that in Latin America USIA is placing 10,000 weekly hours of taped programming on 1500 Latin American stations that are heard in the cities, towns and villages of that continent.

— Through our cultural programs in Latin America, we give assistance and support to 119 binational centers in 19 countries. Within the walls of these centers, we teach English, arrange lectures, art exhibits, film programs, concerts, and courses in American literature and culture.

— We also maintain 11 regular USIS libraries and information centers which carry on active programs and are the locales for exhibits on such themes as the Alliance for Progress, U.S. space accomplishments, and the broken promises of the Castro regime in Cuba.

— Our press file is teletyped in Spanish to all posts except Brazil, which receives it in English and translates it into Portuguese. How is it used? In Mexico, to cite just one example, our post reports placement of 90 percent of the material in Mexican newspapers and magazines. Here again, the themes of this material range from the Alliance for Progress to Castroism, from American art to American science.
—In our publications program, we have produced and distributed, amongst other things, eight million copies of six cartoon books on the record of Castro in such fields as education, labor and religion.

—Motion pictures add still another dimension to our coverage of Latin America. We have a monthly film magazine covering the continent; we produce documentaries on the Alliance for Progress. We point up the failures of Cuban communism. These films are seen in commercial theaters in the major cities and the small towns; they are screened in special showings for diplomatic and leadership groups; we send projectors and our films to schools, universities and labor unions. In Brazil alone, our films are shown in over 2000 commercial theaters with a combined seating capacity of over 1.5 million people.

—USIA television covers Latin America, with an audience that runs to the tens of millions. Television is a fast medium and it enables us to move rapidly and effectively. The chronology of the Cuban crisis provides a dramatic illustration.

You will recall that on October 22, the President made his address to the nation. Videotapes of that address with Spanish and Portuguese translations were air-expressed to all Latin American countries having videotape facilities. Films and kinescopes covered the rest. By October 26, just four days after President Kennedy’s speech, USIA had dispatched 30 prints each of a six-minute commentary on the crisis; a special report on the meeting of the Organization of American States; Secretary Dillon’s address to the meeting of economic ministers in session at Mexico City; the President’s special message to the Mexico City meeting, read by Secretary Dillon; the President of Mexico speaking to Cuba; and a 20 minute special report on the OAS meeting. Every evening during the crisis, a special five-minute commentary on the

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6 See footnote 2, Document 98.
7 Dillon delivered his address on October 23, 1962, in Mexico City at the OAS Inter-American Economic and Social Council meeting, held to review the first year of the Alliance for Progress. He left the meeting early after being recalled to Washington by Kennedy due to the Cuban missile crisis. For excerpts of Dillon’s address, see American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 508–512.
8 Dillon read Kennedy’s message on October 23 immediately prior to delivering his own address. The President’s message in part explained the reason for Dillon’s early departure and also told the gathering of Finance Ministers from member states that “the future success of the Alliance for Progress will be the final vindication of the resolute course we are undertaking today.” (William L. Ryan, “Continue Alianza Parley, Kennedy Asks Ministers,” The Washington Post, October 24, 1962, p. C13; Paul P. Kennedy, “Dillon Reassures Latin Aid Parley,” The New York Times, October 24, 1962, p. 23)
9 Adolfo Lopez Mateos.
day’s events was air-shipped to our posts in Latin America. A TV documentary on Cuba went out with multi-language sound tracks. And our weekly TV news magazine covered events and highlights. This magazine, incidentally, has a regular weekly audience of over 10 million.

I told you earlier about our emphasis on youth and labor groups throughout the world.

In Latin America, we now have nine Labor Information Officers utilizing information techniques to build support for democratic solutions to Latin America’s problems, particularly as these solutions are embodied in the Alliance for Progress.

—At our Regional Service Center in Mexico City, a USIS labor editor assists in the production of publications targeted for the Latin American labor movement.

—In Caracas, we produce a bi-monthly labor magazine that has a circulation of 30,000 and which President Betancourt praised for its usefulness in presenting democratic viewpoints and for its support of responsible leadership in the Venezuelan labor movement.

—We have six Student Affairs Officers attached to our USIS staffs and 25 Student Affairs Grantees in Binational Centers. Their work, which ranges from the all-night bull session to promoting student peace-corps type operations and teaching English in the universities, is bringing the U.S. message to the Latin American students at the individual level.

—Our highest priority is given to our program to make important books available in Latin America in Spanish and Portuguese. One year ago, we contracted for 856,000 copies of 92 different books. During the current fiscal year, we have more than doubled our budget and have contracted for 1.5 million books. We have asked Congress for a supplemental appropriation that would give us an additional 2 million books; and this year we hope for still additional funds to permit this program to continue to grow.

These books, indeed all of our programs, are designed to further the goals of the Alliance for Progress, strengthen the sense of identity of interests and values between the United States and Latin America, and demonstrate that Castro-communism is not the answer to the economic and social problems of the Western Hemisphere.

Yet, with this look at our efforts, I have still not given you a complete picture of the work of the United States Information Agency, neither in Latin America nor the world. You will begin to see, I think, that we are involved in a serious and imaginative effort to make our
policies intelligible and palatable. It is an effort we would have to undertake, in this complex world, even if we were not confronted with the threat of communism. That communism exists simply makes our work that much more imperative.

What does this work cost you?

This year, we are working on a budget of approximately $122.6 million and we shall go before Congress asking for a modest increase next year. Perhaps this figure needs some perspective.

In 1961, General Motors budgeted $141.5 million for advertising; Proctor and Gamble budgeted $132.7 million, and General Foods budgeted $105 million.

I would suggest that the U.S. Information Agency is not working on an inflated budget.

USIA is in a serious business; the business of making our nation respected and understood; of lighting beacons of hope for freedom and progress; of pursuing freedom and progress for all men everywhere. I believe victory will be ours ultimately; but it will not be ours easily.
119. Memorandum From the General Counsel of the United States Information Agency (Plesent) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Fascell Subcommittee hearings

Mr. Herbert C.L. Merillat testified Tuesday, April 2 before the Fascell Subcommittee investigating the “ideological conflict”.\(^2\)

Mr. Merillat had no prepared statement. His extemporaneous remarks were primarily of a philosophical character pertaining to the role of education in the cold war. In essence, his thesis was that we are basically ignorant of the culture, institutions, mores, and religions

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\(^2\) Merillat was an author, journalist, and international law expert. On April 2, he addressed Fascell’s subcommittee in his capacity as the Executive Director of the American Society of International Law. For the full text of his statement and testimony, see Winning the Cold War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on International Organizations and Movements of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, Eighty-Eighth Congress, First Session, Part 1, March 28, 29, April 2 and 3, 1963 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 72–90.

In addition to Merillat, several officials from the U.S. Information Agency, including Murrow, also appeared as witnesses on March 28. In his statement, Murrow stated: “In the worldwide ideological conflict, which this committee is now studying, there is much that the U.S. Information Agency can do and is doing to further the cause of freedom and our national interests. There is also much the USIA cannot do, and it is well for us to understand its limitations as well as its potential if we are realistically to appraise its role.” According to Murrow: “Ten years ago the Jackson Committee established to study our worldwide information program, stated that—any program supported by Government funds can only be justified to the extent that it assists in the achievement of national objectives. I agree—and that is the purpose, the sole purpose of USIA today: to further the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives as enunciated by the President and the State Department.” Murrow stressed that “[w]e seek to influence people’s thinking through the various means of communication—personal contact, radio broadcasting, libraries, book publication and distribution, the press, motion pictures, television, exhibits, English-language instruction, and others.” (Ibid., p. 2)

Murrow continued by noting: “This is not to say that American policymakers decide what to do or what to say on the basis of which way the winds of thought are blowing; foreign affairs cannot, should not, and are not conducted on the basis of a popularity contest. But it does mean that, in this age of swift communication and swift reaction, our Government tries to present its policies and programs in as understandable and palatable form as possible—understandable and palatable to those millions abroad, friend, foe, and neutral, whose lives and fortunes are affected by what we do.” (Ibid., p. 3)
of the rest of the world, and that effectiveness of our communication with other peoples depends upon our understanding them. He stated that the United States has made a start toward the study of various foreign cultures and societies but that much more is needed. He also emphasized the importance of foreign students in the United States in terms of long range benefits.

Mr. Merillat engaged in a colloquy with Chairman Fascell as to whether our efforts are aimed too much at the elite rather than the masses. Mr. Merillat suggested that the only practicable approach was to reach the people through the intellectual elite, while Chairman Fascell suggested the need to get to the people to influence their leaders.

The role, if any, of Government in organizing and consolidating our educational exchange efforts was debated with the conclusion that Government can help coordinate but should not direct the educational efforts of our pluralistic society.

A final point by Mr. Merillat was that foreign military officers receiving technical training in the United States present an ideological opportunity which is not presently being grasped.³

A copy of the Chairman’s opening remarks is attached.⁴

Stanley Plesent⁵

³ An unknown hand wrote “!!” at the end of the sentence.
⁴ Attached but not printed. For Fascell’s opening statement, see Winning the Cold War: The Ideological Offensive, p. 71.
⁵ Plesent signed “Stan” above his typed signature.
120. Memorandum From the Deputy Director, Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Sorensen) to the Director, Motion Picture Service


Mr. Murrow asked me to suggest to you a treatment for a film on the Negro astronaut candidate. How about something along these lines:

Introduce the entire group of new candidates, and then examine in detail a couple of the newcomers, one of whom would be the Negro candidate.

First of all, the film would describe the personal qualities, experience and abilities the successful candidates had to possess in order to win their appointment to the Astronaut program. This would provide the opportunity for a presentation of highlights of the candidates’ family and professional histories.

The film would next present highlights of the taxing training program, not only suggesting the exceptional calibre of men chosen for our space program but also forcefully presenting the thoroughness and sophistication of the U.S. program. The two chosen candidates would be shown going through some of this training, ranging from such requirements as the three day hike through a desert without water, to that of mastering the use and control of complicated instruments.

This film, tactfully spotlighting the Negro candidate, would have an additional value as a kind of counterpoise to the Russian use of a woman Astronaut, if indeed such a launch occurs and succeeds.

Thomas C. Sorensen


3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
121. Memorandum From the Assistant Director, Soviet Bloc, United States Information Agency (Brady) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)


SUBJECT
Embassy Press Release Gets Through to Soviets and Under Their Skin

At least one recent Moscow Embassy Press Release—a release explaining the nature of the herbicides used by us in Vietnam\(^2\)—has apparently reached Soviet readers and has touched a raw nerve of *Komsomolskaya Pravda*,\(^3\) the party’s daily youth newspaper.

Under the headline, “Advocates of Poison—Soviet Information for the Staff of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow,” the Soviet newspaper published on April 27 a four column spread attacking U.S. use of herbicides in Vietnam. The article is accompanied by a highly retouched photo or drawing of a Vietnamese peasant allegedly poisoned and surrounded by weeping women.

Embassy Moscow reports that the crux of the *Komsomolskaya Pravda* article is the Embassy press release, based on materials provided by IPS Wireless File. A major part of the release is quoted textually and accurately (incidentally providing the widest distribution any Embassy press release has ever received).

After insertion of a major part of the Embassy press release, the newspaper states: “We do not intend to argue whether herbicides are harmless or not. But let’s get the facts.” These “facts” are quotes from the March issue of the *New Republic*\(^4\) which carried an article on U.S. use of chemicals in South Vietnam. The paper also refers to an article in the York, Pennsylvania, *Gazette and Daily* in which a person named Robert Smythe criticizes U.S. use of herbicides and questions whether

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\(^3\) The official newspaper of the Central Committee of the Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Communist League of Youth) of the Soviet Union, which began publication in May 1925. This newspaper is not the same as *Pravda*, which was the official newspaper of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

they may not in fact be causing death. The newspaper concludes by stating that the Embassy has taken on itself an unworkable and thankless task of attempting to whitewash the actions of the Pentagon’s brass hats in South Vietnam. “But,” the newspaper says, “the executioners will not be saved by American bayonets, nor chemical warfare, nor . . . by American propaganda.”

The news release in question was sent to 8,300 addressees. The Embassy and we are pleased at this evidence that at least some of our Embassy press releases are delivered. Komsomolskaya Pravda in its extremely critical article, incidentally, does not deny the Embassy’s right to engage in this activity.

Would this type of information be useful for Congressman Rooney as evidence of the fact that some of our materials do get through—and disturb—the Soviets?

Leslie S. Brady

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5 Brady wrote his initials “LSB” above his typed signature.
122. Memorandum From the Agency Planning Officer, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (McKnight) to the Director (Murrow)\(^1\)


**SUBJECT**

Agency’s Lack of “Memory”

A memorandum listing some of the major problems the Agency faces (as I see them) is en route to you.\(^2\) Its purpose is to try to establish some order of priority among them, to the end that they may be tackled systematically.

However, as I say in that memorandum, there is one problem I consider of such overriding importance that I wish to put it before you separately.

This is the fact that the Agency does not sufficiently bring to bear on the problems of the present and future the experience of the past.

This is partly—perhaps chiefly—because its “memory” is not good. If we do indeed read the minutes of the last meeting (and not all of us do), we quickly forget them. And when we want to call them back to mind, we have no easy way to do it.

The written record is, often, hard to come by. It has not been very well kept, for one thing; not until you directed Oren Stephens to undertake the job, so far as I know, was there any methodical effort to write the history of the Agency. Such documents as exist are scattered through countless files; and the keepers of those files are usually our lower-grade employees, uninterested in their contents and so unlikely to be able to jog our memory. For this, we are largely dependent on the failing recollections of our oldtimers; and these usually are not at hand at the time we need them.

I feel very strongly that we shall not be able to see where we are going, or even where we want to go, unless we see clearly where we have been, and along what roads, and how far, we have come.

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, DRCCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 11, Policy and Plans (IOP)—General 1963. No classification marking. There is no indication who drafted or cleared this memorandum. In the upper right corner, Murrow wrote his initials, “ERM.” Above and to the right of Murrow’s initials, Harris wrote his initials, “RH,” and the date, “5/2.” At the top of the page is a typewritten note that reads: “E.R.M tel. conv. with Mr. McKnight 5/3/63.” Copies of the memorandum were sent to Sorensen, Schmidt, and Stephens.

\(^2\) Not found and not further identified.
I know that this problem has been much on your mind: witness your instruction to Oren. I know that Oren himself has done much thinking about it. I know that Bill Grenoble is concerned that training does not take sufficient account of the lessons of the past. I know that IOA has people looking into data retrieval and other uses of the new electronic techniques.

Withal, I think the problem of such importance that I suggest it be tackled with all urgency.

Recommendation: That IOA and/or IRS be directed to arrange for a study of the problem, with a view to proposing a solution or solutions. This study might be undertaken by our own people. Or it might be contracted to an outside entity knowledgeable in the field. Or the study group might be a combination of both.

I should expect that the group’s recommendations might, int. al., include some or all of the following:

1. Consolidation of all files (now scattered through two or three dozen elements of the Agency) in one place, IRS or the Secretariat.

2. A thorough winnowing of the files to get rid of the chaff (most of it), keep the grain. (Program people would have to supervise this.)

3. Extensive indexing and cross-indexing, under the direction of an experienced librarian.

4. Foreshortening of the IRS timetable for getting into electronic data processing, retrieval, and analysis; and earmarking for this purpose of considerably more than the $50,000 yearly set out in the May, 1962, five-year projection.

Solution of this problem will, of course, be vastly facilitated by solution of another you are working on: our sore need for our own building, especially designed to fit our needs, and big enough to house all domestic elements of the Agency.

For one thing, that would let IRS bring together in one place its library, now scattered among several buildings. If this comes about, I should like to see the library put on the ground floor of the building, and made into a real showplace. In the areas of the Agency’s special interests, the library now constitutes perhaps the best collection of materials in the United States, if not in the world. Properly organized and housed, it could become a Mecca for serious students (especially

3 An unknown hand, presumably that of Harris, underlined the passage: “Bill Grenoble is concerned that training does not take sufficient account of the lessons of the past.”

4 In the right margin next to this paragraph, Harris drew a vertical line and wrote next to it: “Morgan, head of Foreign Service Inst. made same point today in speech. RH.”
for visiting foreign ones) in the field, and so a standing advertisement for the Agency.

Solution of the problem is of course not easy.

This memorandum was submitted in draft to Lew Schmidt. Since I knew that IOA had done some work in the field, I wanted to be sure that he thought the problem one worth putting before you. Agreeing that it was, he had this to say:

“I am not convinced that what is being done on the subject of Agency ‘memory’ is adequate. As a matter of fact I set up a small task force over a year ago to make a preliminary study as to how ADP might be applied to Personnel information. The purpose of this group was to study the possibility of establishing on electronic equipment a ‘memory’ of certain factual material on the collective judgments of Agency officers, particularly those in the Foreign Service.

“So far we have not progressed beyond the factual data step. The reasons are three fold: (1) The absence in the Agency now, or in the immediately anticipated future, of the type of equipment necessary; (2) the truly Herculean task of reducing to agreed-upon personnel judgments the material to be placed in our electronic brain; and (3) the cost involved both in money and in personnel in obtaining, utilizing, and developing systems for such equipment.

“I have not mentioned another factor, which is the existence of some entrenched opposition to the use of automatic data processing equipment for the storing of such information. The latter can be overcome but impedes the achievement of the various steps in the process.

“I am one who believes that within reasonable limits this collective judgment can be brought to bear both in the personnel and the substantive program field sufficiently to record usable material in an electronic memory system. There are many who do not. When you get into this subject, you immediately find that it is not a simple matter of stating historical facts. Even recent history is subject to a tremendous variation of interpretation, depending upon whose memory is being tapped. Collective judgment even on recent ‘historical facts’ sometimes requires extensive argument and compromise.

“I believe we should go ahead, but before we do, we must realize that the task will involve months and perhaps a year or two of preparatory work. It should involve the full time of a small staff of the Agency’s best senior officers. And it should not be undertaken unless we are prepared to undergo the expense either of acquiring the necessary equipment, or of participating in a lease arrangement with some central
servicing organization that makes a business of using ADP equipment on behalf of contracting agencies and organizations.\(^5\)

“Finally, utilization of the system will not be accomplished without additional personnel. The history of the use of these machines has proven that we may “live better organizationally but not that we will live more cheaply.”

\(^{5}\) “I believe that the actual development of a system for ‘storing’ our material can be done on a contractual basis. The collection, synthesis, and evaluation of the material to go on the machine can be done only by Agency personnel with extensive experience and judgment.” [Footnote is in the original.]

123. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Battle) to the Special Assistant to the President (Schlesinger)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Joey Adams

The Joey Adams tour was a project of this Administration, occurring between August and December 1961. It resulted from a number of requests from field establishments for a variety show which could play hospitals, market squares, fairs, etc., as well as present some more formal performances. The idea originally arose because of the enormous success of the Soviet and Chinese variety shows in the Far East, South Asia and the Middle East. I understand that the proposal was taken up with Ed Sullivan\(^2\) who suggested Joey Adams as the person to put the show together.

I came in office after the tour was over and believe I can be fairly objective about it. In many respects the tour was a success, but it did

\(^{1}\) Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, Box 66, Schlesinger, Arthur M., 5/63–6/63. Limited Official Use. The memorandum is attached to a May 9 cover memorandum from Schlesinger to the President stating: “A few days ago you asked about the Joey Adams tour. The attached memorandum from Luke Battle tells the story.” Adams was a comedian, actor, and author.

\(^{2}\) The television entertainer and journalist best known for hosting a popular and long-running television variety show on CBS.
have some very unfortunate aspects. The facts, as I have been able to piece them together, are these: the show was assembled not because someone here thought it would be a wise thing to do, but in response to specific requests from a large number of Far East and Near East posts for an American variety show with a strong appeal for relatively unsophisticated audiences. We asked ANTA to put together such a group. For advice—a standard procedure—they went to the professional group in that field: the American Guild of Variety Artists (AGVA). President of AGVA was Joey Adams. The show toured 11 countries and gave almost 100 performances in 19 cities in the Near and Far East. It was seen by an estimated quarter of a million people, not counting the groups who saw individual performers who made over 40 visits to hospitals, orphanages and schools during the tour.

With very few exceptions our missions in these countries described the success of the show as “outstanding,” “smashing,” or “impressive.” (The exceptions were Hong Kong and Delhi.) I mention these evaluations by our people in the field because they are one aspect of the total reality that was the Joey Adams tour and as such they must certainly be included in an over-all balance sheet.

Another aspect of that reality is that despite briefings of the Adams troupe before the tour and in each of the countries they visited, there occurred a series of negative incidents which whitened the hairs and upset the digestions of USIS officers from Tehran to Saigon. In seriousness these ranged from breaches of normal etiquette or local customs by Mr. and Mrs. Adams to near fist-fights in public between members of the group. Mrs. Adams wrote a syndicated newspaper column during the tour in which she tactlessly criticized living and social conditions in some of the countries visited. (We had no knowledge of this until after it started happening—now we have safeguards built into the contract to prevent this sort of thing.) While these incidents were deplorable and caused us and our missions many headaches, it should be pointed out that with few exceptions they had no great impact on the population of the host countries. Most of them occurred behind the scenes, and it was USIS and Embassy officers who had to bear the brunt of them. I say this not to excuse them, of course, but to put them in perspective. If one is talking about the impact on the target audiences in the countries visited, I think one would have to say the Joey Adams tour was successful.

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3 As part of this tour, Adams and his company visited Afghanistan, Nepal, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, Indonesia, Singapore, Hong Kong, South Vietnam, India, and Iran. (“U.S. Variety Show Is Charming India,” The New York Times, December 10, 1961, p. 150)

4 Cynthia Adams, a popular columnist, wrote this series of articles, under the title “Cindy Says,” about the tour for the American Newspaper Alliance. They were published in newspapers throughout the United States. For examples of her articles, see Congressional Record, July 20, 1962, pp. 14352–14354.
show was “successful” in that it accomplished its objectives. This is not simply my judgment—it is what our responsible officers in these countries have told us.

Because of the publicity given to Cindy’s articles and to our hearings on the subject last year, the tour created enormous public relations difficulties in the U.S. for the entire program and has been a major cross to bear as far as our relations to Congressional committees are concerned.

As you know, soon after I came in office, partly because of this tour, partly because of other various deficiencies I found in the program, I suspended new contracts and called upon the Advisory Commission, headed by John Gardner, to study the program and to make new recommendations with respect to selection and administration of the program. We have recently reinstituted the program in accordance with the recommendations of the Advisory Commission and I believe it is on a sounder basis now although I am convinced we cannot avoid some trouble with the performing arts under any circumstances.

In collaboration with our Advisory Committee on the Arts, (reinstated as a result of the study of the program by the Gardner Committee) we are stressing quality. I think it is inconceivable that another tour such as the Adams show would be sponsored again. Certainly the contracts are now more explicit about behavior, bills, etc., and one of the major sources of difficulty in the Adams tour has been corrected through tighter contractual arrangements. We will, of course, continue to send out jazz groups which have been very successful in most areas of the world, but as far as I am concerned, never again a variety show. I doubt that we will want to send another comic of the level of Joey Adams under any circumstances.

I recently had House Appropriations hearings on my budget request. The hearing went quite well and the Committee was complimentary on the corrective actions we have taken. I did not ask for more money for this part of my program this year because I knew we could

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5 A House Appropriations subcommittee held hearings in July 1962 on the Department of State’s request for $4.1 million for the Fiscal Year 1963 to fund its cultural exchange program. In closed testimony, Department of State officials reported to the subcommittee, chaired by Representative Rooney, about the Adams’ 1961 tour as well as other exchange programs. The testimony about the tour was made public on July 9 and published in the Congressional Record. (Ibid., pp. 14351–14357.)

6 This report by the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs was not found.

not get it. I do hope to have a year or so of quiet successes before requesting the additional funds which are badly needed if we are to have an adequate cultural presentations program. But quality must be emphasized and great care exercised in the selection of the performers in the hope of eliminating some of the disasters that attended the Adams tour.

I can furnish reports, studies, etc. of the Adams tour and give you any detail you want, but the foregoing reflects the situation in a nutshell.

Lucius D. Battle

8 Battle wrote his initials “LDB” above his typed signature.

124. Transcript of Interview With the Director of the Voice of America (Loomis) Prepared in the United States Information Agency


MBS Reporter, Bill COSTELLO, interviews Henry LOOMIS, Director of the VOICE OF AMERICA, on “CAPITAL ASSIGNMENT,” broadcast Friday, May 10, 1963, MUTUAL BROADCASTING SYSTEM.

C. Mr. Loomis, do you think the American people ought to hear some of the broadcasts the Voice of America sends abroad?

L. Yes, I do. I think the American people are entitled to know what the Voice of America is saying in their name overseas.

C. Mr. Loomis, in a recent speech you suggested the domestic use of some broadcasts which are sent out by the Voice of America for worldwide consumption. Wouldn’t that be a radically new departure?

L. No, it would not. For several years we have made our material available to domestic stations, primarily educational stations. We made

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of the Director, Office of Public Information, Speech Files, 1958–1971, Entry A1–20, Radio—TV Interviews, etc., 1963. No classification marking. Transcribed from the MBS tape by H.C. Fitzpatrick of I/R. Written in an unknown hand in the top right-hand corner of the transcript is a note regarding distribution of the transcript and tape. Copies were sent to Hamilton (with tape) and to IGC.
them available at no cost and at their request. Now, all such programs are attributed to us when they are played by the educational stations domestically. So this is not a departure from at least current practice.

C. Well, isn’t there a law forbidding the use of any kind of propaganda broadcasts here in the States?

L. There is a—the intent of Congress\(^2\) is clear that we spend our effort broadcasting overseas. On the other hand, the legislation does require us to make available to the press and other responsible U.S. citizens examples of our product, and we view that what we are doing comes under that latter clause. We are making available to domestic stations examples of what we are saying overseas, so that the American people can evaluate themselves on how we are performing.

C. What type of program do you make available to this, as you say, primarily the educational broadcasting stations?

L. In most cases it is material that is not tied to local, current events because this is all a tape network and it sometimes is many months until it is shown domestically. So this would be material like an educational lecture we did on American Law, or one we may do on farming, or economic system, or something of that nature. We made a series available on our tactics of Communism, which was a series we prepared for exposing Communism to overseas audiences. I would again like to point out that we prepare no program for a domestic audience. Everything that is played domestically was prepared for an overseas audience and is being used as an example domestically.

C. In other words, it’s just fair—it’s a rebroadcast here at home. Now I infer from what you say that the type of material which is requested by these local—domestic stations—does not deal with any current, political topics in particular.

L. That is true in most cases. There is one exception, which is the educational station in Washington,\(^3\) because it is physically close to us and it has communications with three other stations, I believe in New York, Philadelphia and Boston, and they take from us normally one or two commentaries a day. Now these are tied to current, political issues. They select the commentaries they wish, and every commentary is labeled “This is what the Voice of America is saying overseas” on the Laotian situation, or whatever it may be . . .


\(^3\) Presumably reference to either the radio station WAMU, which was established in 1951 as a student radio station at American University in Washington, or television station WETA, which first began broadcasting in Washington in 1961.
C. As I recall it, the intent of Congress when these restrictions were placed on Voice of America, the intent was to prevent the Government from embarking on a program of political propaganda which might affect party relationships at home here. Now I judge from what you say that you don’t even come close to that dangerous ground.

L. That is at least our view. Our commentaries are almost entirely dealing with international events. The only domestic events which our commentaries deal with would be major ones, such as race relations. But in at least every case to my knowledge, the ones that have been picked up for domestic use are dealing only with the international problems, such as Laos, Germany, and so forth.

C. Suppose the number of requests you receive for this type of program should increase. And, in fact, suppose it should become substantial, do you think Congress would want to review this practice and do you think it would be ready to change its attitude on the . . . and change the legislation?

L. Of course, whatever Congress may desire is its prerogative. I think myself, as long as the numbers . . . amount is kept within reason . . . but the thing that is most important, as long as each one is attributed so that there is no question in anyone’s mind what is the source of the information, I think that prevents the Government from doing any propaganda on its own people. If this material was done clandestinely so that it was snuck over on the American people without their knowledge—that in my judgment, is what is dangerous and wrong. But here, where you are saying “This is what your Government is saying to the audience in Asia” . . . I think this is a very proper thing.

C. The other day your superior, and the head of the USIA, Edward R. Murrow, complained that he has only about a thousand on the staff of USIA compared with 35 thousand missionaries overseas. And he thinks that this is pretty small staff with which to carry on American propaganda. Now, am I right in assuming that the money that is being spent to distribute programs domestically might better be used in overseas broadcasts?

L. Well, there is absolutely zero money being spent to distribute this material domestically. We send the tapes to the National Educational Broadcasters. We get back from them much more than we give and the only expense is the mailing of a tape—one tape. Any copies are made at the expense of the station requesting it. So that in this mutual relationship that we have with the educational stations, we get much more than we give.
Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs (Battle)

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

USIA and Education

USIA’s educational activities, like all its work, are governed by the President’s Statement of Mission to the Director of January 25, 1963. The pertinent language is: “The mission of the United States Information Agency is to help achieve United States foreign policy objectives by (a) influencing public attitudes in other nations . . .” This precise statement is one aspect of our continuing efforts to make the information program as directly supporting of and responsive to U.S. foreign policy as is humanly possible.

Under recently tightened procedures for preparing country plans, every USIS activity, including exchanges, must be related to an identified and officially stated U.S. objective in the country involved, and approved by Washington.

The most unremitting vigilance is required to keep things going simply from inertia. A media program will tend to continue of its own weight and objectives sandwiched under it unless it is periodically re-examined and justified in terms of objectives. For example, we are now reviewing our support of bi-national centers throughout the world to see specifically if we are getting our money’s worth in progress toward objectives, or just continuing to tread a traditional path.

English teaching, exchanges, programs of American studies, school textbooks, and libraries are undoubtedly good in their own right. With our budget, we simply cannot afford to engage in activities because they are “a good thing to do”.

Our concept for the use of these tools is, then, the one we apply to all USIS programs. Their use is determined by the answers to the following five questions as they appear in the USIA Country Plan:

1. What are the specific objectives of the United States in “X” country, as determined by the Department of State or specified by the U.S. ambassador?

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2. Which of these objectives can be supported by psychological or informational means?

3. What, then, become our psychological objectives in terms of changing attitudes?

4. What people, individuals or groups, must we influence to achieve each psychological objective?

5. What means—programs, projects, media—can we best use to reach these people?

It is in the answer to the fifth question that the role of educational activities is finally and specifically determined.

Donald M. Wilson

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126. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Hilsman)


SUBJECT
Plan to Counter Afro-Asian Anti-American Propaganda

We have become increasingly concerned with the leadership which Indonesia has given Afro-Asian propaganda over the last several months, particularly the poorly camouflaged anti-Western, anti-American denunciations which have characterized Indonesian foreign policy statements since the Brunei rebellion of last December. The clever advantage which Indonesia has taken of Philippine-Malayan differences over Malaysia to drive a wedge between these two pro-Western powers and simultaneously to oblige us to assume a stand in opposition to Philippine aspirations in North Borneo has also complicated our task. A third factor of considerable significance to our program through-
out the world is the extent of the rapprochement between Indonesia
and Communist China, especially as revealed in the proceedings of
the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Conference last month in Djakarta.3

Various factors have made it difficult for the Agency to undertake
a concerted effort to counter the undesirable effects stemming from
these developments. I believe, however, that the direct attack on the
United States contained in the “Djakarta Declaration” of the Journalists’
Conference not only offers a good opportunity for but also requires a
direct rebuttal. It also seems to me that our Embassy’s note of protest
delivered to the Indonesian Department of Foreign Affairs on May 34
at least partially clears the way for such action.

The fact that the note was written in the Embassy ten days ago5
to meet an immediate need makes it unsuitable as a peg for any of our
proposed output. However, I wonder if the four additional Conference
resolution published after the delivery of the note and accusing the
United States of imperialist intervention in Cuba, Laos, Korea and
South Viet-Nam may not offer an excuse for drafting another protest
intended for public release. Such a note could serve as the opening
gun in a campaign to set the record straight on “imperialism” and “neo-
colonialism”, two terms which have been overworked in Indonesia
recently. We would plan not only to exploit the protest in our press
and radio output, but would follow up with additional materials refut-
ing the specific charges levied against the U.S. and its allies and expos-
ing Chinese communist tactics in their attempts to capture the Afro-
Asian movement. These materials could take the form of a series of
radio and press commentaries and analyses of “imperialism” and “neo-
colonialism” as well as pamphlets on such subjects as the Afro-Asian
Journalists’ Conference itself.

Another useful action I think we might take would be to offer the
Malayan government modest assistance in its proposed Asian Journalists’
Conference, scheduled for June of this year. For example, if our
Embassy in Kuala Lumpur believed it desirable, we could quietly
circularize the posts in the area for suggestions as to reliable and
objective journalists who might be invited by the GOM to attend the
conference. We would also plan extensive coverage of the event by all
Agency media.

3 The conference took place April 24–May 1. An announcement indicated that
conference attendees and organizers resolved “‘to condemn the role played by Israel as
agent of world imperialism (and) to condemn the military and nuclear aid given to
Israel by the United States.’” The resolution also called for the end of “‘United States
imperialist occupation of Formosa.’” (“Jakarta Conference Assails U.S., Israel,” The Chris-
tian Science Monitor, May 3, 1963, p. 6)
4 Not found.
5 May 7.
Should it appear not desirable to send another note to the Government of Indonesia, we would still plan—with the Department’s concurrence—to undertake a campaign, as outlined above, to set the record straight. I believe, however, that such a campaign would not be as effective, since much of our audience would tend to regard it as mere words without deeds.

Donald M. Wilson⁶

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⁶ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

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127. **Telegram From the Embassy in Japan to the Secretary of State¹**

Tokyo, June 1, 1963 7 p.m.

2907. Astronaut John Glenn and family left Japan last night after what was probably the most successful visit by an American, from a public image standpoint, since that of Attorney General.² His press conferences, interviews, TV appearances and addresses projected a most favorable picture of U.S. space program. At same time, Glenn and his family, through the warmth and sincerity of their personalities and their genuine enthusiasm and friendliness, were effective demonstration of typical American virtues. The fact that he had brought his family out for vacation in Japan added a warm personal touch which pleased Japanese public.

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¹ Source: Kennedy Library, Personal Papers of Robert F. Kennedy, Attorney General’s General Correspondence (#138.2), Box 78, United States Information Agency (USIA), 1/1963–6/1963. Unclassified. Wilson sent a copy of the telegram to Robert Kennedy under a June 3 memorandum in which he wrote: “you will be interested in this appraisal by Ambassador Reischauer of John Glenn’s trip to Japan.” Kennedy wrote a notation on the memorandum that reads: “Have me call [illegible]. RFK.” A notation in an unknown hand above Kennedy’s writing reads: “done.” According to a stamped notation on the memorandum, it was received in Kennedy’s office on June 5.

Published news stories compared Glenn’s visit favorably with Russian astronaut Gagarin’s visit to Japan last year and numerous members of Japan’s science community, sometimes vocally opposed to U.S. policies, commented on the frank and detailed answers Glenn gave to all their questions. Many seemed, for first time, to appreciate openness of the U.S. space program as compared to Russian.

In addition to scientific discussions, Glenn was most impressive in his appearances before youth groups. These ranged in size from meetings with groups of ten or a dozen to Nihon University’s degree conferring ceremony which was witnessed by ten thousand students. In every case these appearances were written up in detail in newspapers and carried on broadcasts, and telecasts, often two or more times on prime time.

While accorded a hero’s welcome throughout his tour, Glenn showed a genuine modesty, which was especially well received by the Japanese people.

There was not a single untoward incident to mar visit, but there was one unfortunate aspect to it. He paid commercial air fare from Houston to Tokyo for family to join him here for vacation and for two weeks they were here was himself on leave status. It was, therefore, on own time and at own expense that he devoted much time and energy to further national cause by participating in events we programmed for him.

If Dept has no objection, I recommend the President be apprised of Col. Glenn’s fine contribution to US-Japan relations and suggest it might be appropriate for the President to convey in some suitable form his appreciation for well-done job beyond the call of duty.

Reischauer

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128. Letter From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affair (Hilsman)


Dear Roger:

Your suggestion that USIA undertake certain propaganda activities indicating that Communist North Viet-Nam is falling increasingly under Communist Chinese influence is and has been under serious consideration for some time. As you know, my people have been talking with representatives of the Working Group/Viet-Nam about this project for several months. In January there was an exchange of memoranda between Bill Jorden and Burnett Anderson, our Deputy Assistant Director (Policy and Plans) on this subject.

I agree that the best way to handle this would be “by highlighting every visit or program between North Viet-Nam and Communist China and by frequently citing the innumerable instances in Vietnamese history when the Chinese have sought to or have actually gained control of Viet-Nam.” We believe, however, that this will be a difficult thing to handle and should, if attempted, remain under constant and careful review. It should be done principally through editorial selection and emphasis in news output. As Burnett Anderson stated in his memo to Bill Jorden of January 25, the best way for USIA to plug this line aside from appropriate handling of spot news would be to prepare and place in some South Vietnamese publication an article or series of articles on the background of Sino-Vietnamese relations—articles which could be picked up and replayed by VOA with proper attribution to Vietnamese sources. It must be recognized that the only way USIA can reach audiences in North Viet-Nam is by radio, and we must constantly

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1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 8, FIELD—Far East (IAF) 1963. Secret. Drafted by Tull on May 28. Cleared by Payeff, Bunce, and Anderson. Murrow’s letter is in response to a May 6 letter from Hilsman, in which Hilsman sought Murrow’s views on his suggestion of “a steady, low-key, and continuing propaganda campaign, particularly through Vietnamese media, to the effect that North Viet-Nam is falling increasingly under Communist Chinese influence.” According to Hilsman: “I suggest such a campaign could be carried on by highlighting every visit or program between North Viet-Nam and Communist China and by frequently citing the innumerable instances in Vietnamese history when the Chinese have sought to or have actually gained control of Viet-Nam.” (Ibid.) In an undated memorandum to Moore, transmitting a copy of Hilsman’s letter, Wilson termed Hilsman’s rationale “excellent” and requested that Moore draft a reply. (Ibid)

2 Not found.
keep in mind that anything which VOA broadcasts in the Vietnamese language can be heard by listeners in both North and South Viet-Nam.

Our VOA Vietnamese specialists have pointed out that there are possible pitfalls in such an operation. In emphasizing that VOA Vietnamese broadcasts are heard in both North and South, they point out that emphasis on DRV-Chicom partnership may only serve to increase the dimensions of the threat that looms from the North. Since one of our propaganda objectives in South Viet-Nam has been to dispel the illusion that the Viet Cong are “ten feet tall,” unless very carefully handled the addition of the Chinese factor into the equation in propaganda output might prove counter-productive. Even the traditional ethnic enmity between the two races and the Vietnamese fear of the Chinese may be overshadowed by the elements of sheer power and geographic propinquity involved.

It should perhaps be further pointed out that with over one million Chinese residents in South Viet-Nam who will also hear these broadcasts, we must exercise caution in emphasizing any traditional enmity between the two races per se, but rather concentrate on the present Chinese Communist regime.

VOA also raises the question: Even if we succeed in tarring Ho Chi Minh with the brush of Chicom satellitism, can we persuade the people of North Viet-Nam that they have any realistic alternative to coming to terms with the Chics while they still have a chance? After all, they say, Communist China is doing pretty well in its contest with the Soviets, and its victory over India\(^3\) proved that it’s also doing pretty well with its “adventurist” foreign policy.

In setting forth the foregoing caveats, I do not mean to imply that the project should not be undertaken; I only wish to emphasize that it is a difficult and delicate undertaking which must be carefully planned and constantly reviewed.

As a matter of information policy, we can begin immediately, in VOA news output, to lay a heavier emphasis upon all evidences of DRV-Chicom collaboration and less emphasis upon DRV-Soviet contacts. Further projects, such as placement of materials in Vietnamese publications and subsequent replay on the Vietnamese service of VOA naturally take considerably longer.

If you agree that even despite the aforementioned possible pitfalls, we should begin using VOA for this purpose, please let me know.

\(^3\) Reference is to the border conflict between China and India that occurred in October and November 1962. For documentation, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XIX, South Asia, Documents 174–214.
Incidentally, we have within the past few months begun to devote considerably more attention to conditions in North Viet-Nam in our VOA broadcasts.

With regard to your request for information on VOA and South Vietnamese capacity to broadcast into North Viet-Nam, VOA states that the Voice of America short-wave signal in North Viet-Nam is 100 per cent receivable in terms of programs and 90 per cent in terms of frequencies. There is no jamming. There are no frequencies rated as unsatisfactory. The medium wave broadcasts relayed from our transmitters in the Philippines are rated 100 per cent receivable in all respects.

The GVN broadcast capabilities to North Viet-Nam are as follows:

Radio Hue: Medium wave 20 KW, 670 KC, primary radius 48 miles, secondary radius 100 miles; short wave, 20 KW, 9670 KC, operates daily beamed to North Viet-Nam.

Saigon medium wave 50 KW, 870 KC. Primary radius 106 miles, secondary radius 200 miles plus. Short wave 40 KW, 7245 KC. There is no information available here on Republic of Viet-Nam’s broadcast reception in North Viet-Nam.\(^4\)

Sincerely,

Edward R. Murrow\(^5\)

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\(^4\) In a July 12 letter, Hilsman replied to Murrow: “I agree that the program should be undertaken with all the care and caveats which your letter so clearly sets forth.” (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 8, FIELD—Far East (IAF) 1963)

\(^5\) Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
December 1960–November 1963

129. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


SUBJECT

Reactions to Your Speech at American University

The response to your speech of Monday continues on the lines given in my weekly report of Tuesday, and detailed comprehensively in Tom Sorensen’s memorandum to Mac Bundy on Wednesday.

The only negative consensus is in France, where most papers asserted that France would not go along with what was called an effort by you and Khrushchev to “slam the door of the nuclear club.” The French press dwelt heavily on the alleged domestic difficulties of yourself and Prime Minister Macmillan as the motive for the speech.

Later reports include the following:

Communist Bloc

Izvestia published the speech in full. Peking domestic radio reported briefly and without comment the upcoming talks in Moscow.

Near East and South Asia

The press of India hailed the speech as “significant,” “dramatic,” and a triumph of statesmanship over the exigencies of politics.” Two leading newspapers in Cairo carried optimistic editorials.

Africa

The government-controlled Ghanaian Times viewed the test-ban aspect of the speech as “one of the most conciliatory, hopeful, and encouraging made by any statesman on the vital issue of peace.” How-

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 4/63–6/63. No classification marking. A stamped notation in the upper right-hand corner of the memorandum indicates that it was received in the White House at 10:06 a.m. on June 14.

2 For the text of Kennedy’s June 10 commencement address at American University, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 459–464.

3 Murrow’s June 11 weekly report and Sorensen’s June 12 memorandum to Bundy were not found.

4 Reference is to the nuclear test ban treaty negotiations held in Moscow among the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union from July 15 until July 28, which culminated in the signing of a treaty on August 5. For documentation on the talks, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. VII, Arms Control and Disarmament, Documents 328–359.
ever, said the paper, your statement that the Soviet drive to impose its system on others is the primary cause of world tension would cause “many to giggle;” colonialism and neo-colonialism are the real causes.

Latin America

The speech was given major attention in the Brazilian press, but the only two editorials available are equivocal. El Día of Mexico City asserted that it is the “strong conservative interests which have stagnated and which persist in privileges, maintaining a position blind to the purposes of the wiser and more realistic forces represented by Kennedy.”

Edward R. Murrow

130. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


SUBJECT
Reactions to Your June 11 Civil Rights Speech

Your speech of Tuesday has been well reported in the foreign press, although in a number of places the Evers murder drew the bigger headlines. Free world editorial comment received to date has been almost unanimously favorable.

Moscow Radio, which has paid little attention to either your Honolulu speech or the Tuesday address, reached a peak of invective Thursday characteristic of the Stalin era.

1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 4/63–6/63. No classification marking. Another copy is ibid., National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 295A, Civil Rights 6/11/63–6/14/63.

2 Kennedy’s June 11 radio and television address on civil rights was delivered from the Oval Office at 8 p.m. In this address, Kennedy discussed the effort to desegregate the University of Alabama, as well as the impact discrimination had on domestic issues, such as education and public safety, and on U.S. foreign policy and international relations. He called on Congress to enact civil rights legislation. For the text, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 468–471.

3 African-American civil rights activist Medgar W. Evers was shot and killed in Jackson, Mississippi on June 12.

4 For the text of Kennedy’s June 9 address in Honolulu before the United States Conference of Mayors, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 454–459.
“Bands of racists are intensifying armed terror,” Moscow Radio said in an English language broadcast yesterday. “They are killing Negro leaders and marching stormtroop detachments through the streets.

“Many of the methods used by U.S. Fascists and racists resemble those of Hitler’s time. The use of dogs against people was borrowed from Nazi concentration camp practice . . . Furthermore, what are basically concentration camps of the Buchenwald and Auschwitz pattern have been set up with barbed wire cordons, starvation rations, and brutal beatings to drive the inmates to suicide. The fascist swastika can be seen more and more clearly against the background of the burning crosses of racism.

“Events in the United States are a serious accusation against the much advertised American way of life, the so-called Free World, and the entire system of capitalism. This system engenders war and slavery, oppression and deception, baseness and murder. Such a system has no future.”

The Peking press has carried those portions of the speech which support its allegations of “. . . rabid persecution of the Negroes by the racists and Kennedy’s admission of the surging discontent of the American Negro people.”

Radio Havana reported the speech without comment, stressing the passages having to do with discontent, frustration, and discord.

Available reaction from other areas:

Africa

Prominent coverage is reported from six countries—Algeria, Ghana, Morocco, Nigeria, Mali, and Tunisia—and favorable editorial comment from three of them. The Morning Post of Nigeria said you “will go down in history as one of the greatest champions of the rights of man that ever lived.” La Republique of Oran said your position is categoric and courageous and “it is certain that segregation will be vanquished finally.” The Minister of Commerce in Mali telephoned Ambassador Handley to say that the speech had “touched the heart of all Africans” and to express his support for what he called the “valiant struggle” for the rights of Negro Americans. “Vive Kennedy,” he concluded.

Western Europe

Many editorials viewed the situation as grave. Copenhagen’s Information termed it “the most serious crisis since the depression.” The London Daily Telegraph wrote, “The skies are dark indeed. The rest of the world can only pray with sympathy and some confidence that decent Americans of all colors will again prevail . . . over the blind
forces of hatred, violence, unreason and fear which swirl around them.” Hopes were expressed by some papers that the speech may have served to head off the rise of extremism among both Negroes and whites. Generally, editorialists felt the speech was both courageous and a persuasive appeal to the consciences of the American people.

Latin America

The speech was reported extensively, and favorable editorial comment has appeared in Brazil, Mexico and Chile. Papers in Rio de Janeiro of all political colorations praised your action in the Alabama University confrontation.5 La Nacion of Santiago, Chile, wrote that “President Kennedy has shown himself to be a man who knows how to link skillfully the imperatives of the epoch with the generous impulses of his spirit and the right inclination of his conscience.”

Far East

Laudatory editorials have been reported from Japan, Singapore, Manila and Malaya. The Manila Times compared the death of Evers with the Buddhist suicide in Saigon6 and described your efforts to abolish the color bar as a humanitarian goal. A Singapore Chinese-language daily described you as “unquestionably the most enlightened President of the United States since Lincoln,” and contrasted your actions with those of President Diem. The Malayan Straits Times said your reaffirmation of equal rights “cannot fail to impress the peoples of Afro-Asia who everywhere are following the integration campaign with intense interest.”

Near East

There has been extensive media coverage, but only one editorial has been reported to date—an Indian daily which asserted that “U.S. citizens will have nothing to do with apartheid,” adding that the road to full equality in the South may be a long and painful one.

Edward R. Murrow7

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5 Reference is to the June 11 incident at the University of Alabama in Tuscaloosa, Alabama, in which Governor George Wallace attempted to block the enrollment of two African-American students at the University. Wallace only relented when President Kennedy deputized the Alabama State National Guard to enforce orders by the U.S. Federal courts to permit the enrollment of these students. (Claude Sitton, “Governor Leaves: But Fulfills Promises to Stand in Door and to Avoid Violence,” The New York Times, June 12, 1963, p. 1)


7 Sorensen signed “Tom Sorensen, for” above Murrow’s typed signature.
131. Circular Telegram From the Department of State to All Diplomatic and Consular Posts

Washington, undated.

2177. For Ambassador and Principal Officer. Government is deeply involved both with immediate problems arising from incidence of racial tension and with long-term issue of civil rights which lies at center of country’s existence as a democratic state. Administration is keenly aware of impact of domestic racial problem on US image overseas and on achievement US foreign policy objectives.

There should be no illusions as to seriousness this situation. As far as American domestic developments concerned policies of this Administration have been sound and its actions consistent. On one hand, Federal Government power and prestige are committed to full equality, a commitment fortified by even larger elements of our society. On the other hand, there still exists articulate and determined opposition. We must assume therefore that racial incidents will continue and their geographic location will spread. Problem is national rather than exclusively southern dilemma.

Foreign reaction is source great concern. Evidence from all parts of world indicates that racial incidents have produced extremely negative reactions. Characteristic is recommendation in May of assembled foreign ministers at Addis Ababa conference of African Chiefs of State. They recommended Chiefs of State pass strongly worded resolution on discrimination in US and communicate directly with President. We believe this is clear indication depth of emotional feeling in most of Africa and indeed the world. We think more conciliatory stands may be taken for tactical reasons. In this context, final statement on racial discrimination of Chiefs of State at Addis Conference was remarkably moderate. At best, however, it suggests we have certain amount of

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 295A, Civil Rights 6/19/63–7/9/63. Confidential; Priority. Drafted by Jorden on June 19; cleared in substance by Manell, Abernethy, Read, Burdett, Cottam, Gorrell, Kaysen, and Anderson; and approved by Rusk. Sent for information to Eastern European posts.

time before our racial problem will impinge even more seriously upon our policies and objectives.

Under these circumstances, we recognize there is no effective substitute for decisive action on part of United States Government. This will include special Presidential message to Congress today,\(^3\) Administration-backed legislation, and continued series of positive Federal actions throughout country. This will take time; there may be setbacks; and no schedule can now be set.

Meanwhile, you have difficult responsibility of trying to establish sufficient understanding of our problems and goals to mitigate effect of any future incidents and to provide a basis for more understanding local response in future. We recognize each country has its own problems, and we know you will need all your resources and imagination to meet the situation. We rely on your judgment of local scene and of most effective way of meeting situation.

Simultaneous with this cable, the President is sending you a special message on civil rights,\(^4\) to which this telegram is background. To help you in carrying out the President’s expressed desire in that message, we will be sending a summary of Federal actions and policies.\(^5\) You also may draw as appropriate on contents in departmental guidance message on this subject which follows. These will supplement materials already available through USIS, especially info kits and guidances. You should use this material in manner you deem most appropriate to cope with reaction in your country.

A large number of posts have received from USIA taped versions of the President’s television address on civil rights made June 11.\(^6\) Others will be receiving same soon. It would be desirable wherever practical to arrange showing of this tape to all US personnel at posts.

Following points may also be of some help:

(a) In your personal dealings with principal governmental officials, you should not gloss over the problem. At same time, you should

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\(^3\) For the text of Kennedy’s June 19 special message to Congress on civil rights, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 483–494. The next day, legislation to enact the recommendations in the President’s message was transmitted in letters to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. (Ibid., p. 494)

\(^4\) Circular telegram 2176 to all diplomatic and consular posts, June 19, transmitted the President’s message, which asked U.S. Ambassadors and Principal Officers to discuss civil rights with host governments with candor, but also to affirm U.S. accomplishments and highlight the positive commitment set by the President toward the goal of equal opportunity for all. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Africa)

\(^5\) On June 19, the Department of State sent a series of instructions and information messages to all U.S. diplomatic missions abroad, which included a background summary of U.S. civil rights accomplishments. (Ibid.)

\(^6\) See footnote 2, Document 130.
reaffirm depth of concern felt by President and your confidence in his ability meet problem effectively.

(b) Even though constructive events are not always news, you should use all appropriate opportunities to emphasize at all levels the gains which have been made and steps Federal Government and private agencies are taking.

(c) Suggest post review its governmental and public relations programs on civil rights and adapt to new situation.

Finally, request you report concisely on reactions local groups, particularly leadership groups, to this new situation. We also want your suggestions with respect to diplomatic or other actions United States might take.

You can expect further guidance from Department on this matter.

Rusk

132. Telegram From the Embassy in India to the Department of State

New Delhi, June 20, 1963, 8 p.m.

5007. Department pass White House and Attorney General. Circular telegrams 2176 and 2177.2

We are today in receipt of refircrtels on Civil Rights Legislation and the race problems in the U.S., including the President’s special message and accompanying guidance.3 Since India is often especially in mind in these communications, it occurs to me that you will wish a special comment on the position here. I sense, also, that it is needed.

Were it necessary as the Department suggests to move on the GOI and the various channels of public opinion at this time in order to seek understanding of the race problem in the U.S., we would be in a bad way. And such crash effort would be wholly devoid of conviction. There is at least a chance that it would arouse the suspicion that we were leading from a bad conscience and with some desire to conceal

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 295A, Civil Rights 6/19/63–7/9/63. Confidential. Received in the Department of State at 7:44 p.m. Passed to the White House on June 21 at 5:50 a.m.

2 See Document 131 and footnote 4 thereto.

3 See footnotes 3 and 5, Document 131.
unpleasant truth. At most we would succeed in persuading a few captive journalists and foreign office functionaries whose influence in any case is inconsequential.

In fact the problem of race relations in the U.S. has been a continuing theme of the USIS and the Embassy for the last two years. We have consistently emphasized: (A) that the situation is imperfect; (B) that the administration and the courts are moving as rapidly as our institutions and their built-in rigidities on human attitudes allow; (C) that we are doing so partly out of idealism but partly because the administration presently in power in the U.S. owes both its present position and its hope for re-election to its Negro supporters. I might also add, not without some passing pleasure, that I have attributed our position on colonialism to the same hard political circumstances. Support of white colonialism in Africa would be quite inconsistent with the reliance on the support of ex-colonial people in the U.S. (I might further note with all tact that this line of argument brought a sharp rebuke from the Portuguese Government and a request from Washington that it not be again employed).

Against the foregoing background and with the help of the rather more important fact that the fundamental sincerity of the Kennedy administration is not questioned, our position in India is excellent on the subject of race relations. Not even Blitz, Link or Communist New Age seriously flog us for the mistreatment of the Negroes. In the last twelve months, although I am not conscious of having avoided personal public exposure, I have not once been taken to task in any press conference, student audience or other forum with our shortcomings on this issue. In the last few months there have been occasional editorials suggesting that the administration is not pressing rapidly enough on civil rights legislation. But these have been well reasoned and at this particular juncture the administration might itself concede the justice of the argument.

Our comparatively good position here has another cause. South and central Africa where there are large numbers of Indians in subordinate positions, together with Angola and Mozambique which are much closer, all act as lightning rods. Racially aroused editors, writers and other public opinion leaders are impelled to attack these countries first. This is why much more than parenthetically it is important for us to be completely clear in our record on Portuguese colonialism and on South African and Rhodesian white supremacy in Africa. Ambiguity here would have made us seriously suspect. However because of my courtly good manners I do not press this lesson.

4 These are three leftist Indian newspapers.
As long as it is genuinely evident that the administration is doing its best we need not worry about our public posture on this problem at least in India. I have repeatedly pointed out that were nothing happening in the U.S.—were there complete tranquility on the racial front—it would mean that the Negroes were accepting a subordinate place and the white supremacy was secure. That would be the worst situation. The price of progress is a measure of civil disturbance. In a once caste-ridden country such as India this can be understood.

I note that further guidance on this subject will be forthcoming. It is unnecessary.

Galbraith

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133. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Rice) to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson)\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Plan to Counter Afro-Asian Anti-American Propaganda

This is a belated reply to your memorandum of May 17, 1963,\(^2\) to Mr. Hilsman putting forth certain suggestions for countering Afro-Asian anti-American propaganda.

We considered your suggestion for sending a protest to the Indonesian Government about the accusations of the Afro-Asian Journalists’ Conference regarding United States actions in Cuba, Laos, Korea and South Viet-Nam. Governor Harriman had already made very strong representations to Indonesian Ambassador Zain about the resolutions which incorporated these accusations (Department’s Telegram 1014 to Djakarta, May 11, 1963)\(^3\) and we intend to hand Ambassador Zain a

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\(^1\) Source: National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 8, FIELD—Far East (IAF), 1963. Confidential. Drafted by J.A. Mendenhall (FE) on June 21 and cleared by Usher, Bell, and Manell. Mendenhall initialed for all clearing officials. A copy was sent to IAF. In the upper right corner of the memorandum, an unknown hand wrote: “State D/S.” Below this notation, Wilson wrote: “no action req’d. DW.”

\(^2\) See Document 126.

\(^3\) Not found.
It has appeared questionable to us, however, whether it would be desirable for the United States to publicize our own démarches to the Indonesian Government. Such publicity at this juncture might jeopardize our aid program in Indonesia which we have a deep interest in carrying forward in pursuit of our fundamental objective of maintaining Indonesia’s independence.

Moreover, I am sure you will agree that subsequent developments, particularly the hopeful prospects emerging from the Manila Conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaya, indicate that a public campaign by the United States aimed at the Indonesian Government would not be advisable. We, of course, have no objection to a continuing USIA campaign to keep the correct story before the world of United States’ actions regarding Cuba, Laos, Korea, and South Viet-Nam, but without bringing Indonesia into the picture in any denigrating fashion.

We agree with your suggestion considering the Asian Journalists’ Conference proposed by the Malayan Government, and shall cable our Embassy in Kuala Lumpur for its reactions to your idea that the posts in the area might be quietly circularized for suggestions as to reliable and objective journalists who might be invited by the Malayan Government to the conference. Our last information (dating from late March) indicates that this conference is aimed by the Malayan Government at setting public opinion straight with respect to Malaysia, and that the conference is scheduled rather vaguely for some time this summer rather than specifically June as earlier reports stated. Our staffs can keep in touch with each other regarding further developments about this conference.

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4 Neither found.
5 The conference took place from June 7 to June 11, during which the Foreign Ministers of Malaya, Indonesia, and the Philippines agreed to work toward unity and to resolve various problems between the three nations, including plans to form the Federation of Malaysia. (“Unity Urged as Manila Talks Open On Proposed Malaysia Federation,” The Washington Post, June 8, 1963, p. A13)
134. Memorandum From the Acting Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson) to President Kennedy


SUBJECT

Reactions to Your European Trip

Here is a summary of media reaction to your trip to Europe.

Western Europe:

Western European media were almost unanimous that the visit was an overwhelming personal and psychological success but a limited political success.

You were widely viewed as projecting the image of a spirited and determined leader whose personal warmth and dynamism had previously been underestimated. The themes developed in your speeches most widely acclaimed were: western unity, your categorical pledges to stand by our European allies, the promotion of peace, and your efforts to find better relations with the East. Comments on counteracting Gaullist policies and the quest for a multilateral nuclear force were divided and more critical. In only a few instances did commentators judge the trip an unqualified success.

The Visit to Germany:

Following the official welcome at Wahn Airport, the crescendo of popular and press acclaim rose rapidly. Even strongly Gaullist papers conceded that your reception by the Germans surpassed that of de Gaulle.

Prior to your visit, Die Welt of Hamburg had pictured you as “a political manager without passion, an engineer or a manufacturer of power.” Subsequent to the Berlin visit, it wrote: “This was a Kennedy

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Department and Agencies Series, Box 91, USIA 7/63. No classification marking. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 150. This memorandum appears to have been prepared as a response to a July 9 note from Evelyn Lincoln to Murrow, in which Lincoln indicated that Kennedy “would appreciate it if you would send him a commentary on his entire trip.” (National Archives, RG 306, DIRCTR Sub Files, 1963–69, Bx 6–29 63–69: Acc: #72A5121, Entry UD WW 257, Box 9, GOVERNMENT—White House, July/Dec. 1963)

2 Kennedy visited Europe between June 22 and July 2. He first traveled to Germany, arriving on June 22 and departing for Ireland on June 26. From Ireland, he traveled to the United Kingdom on June 29, where he spent one day before flying on to Italy the following day. He concluded the trip in Italy.
we had not seen before. His former coolness gave way to passion and to an unconditional personal commitment for this city."

A number of papers credited the visit with changing your views on Germany. The independent Kölner Stadt-Anzeiger said “if Kennedy ever had reservations vis-à-vis the Germans—and there are indications that this was the case—his Berlin visit has certainly lessened them.”

Your statements on European unity drew support from Scandinavia to Italy, but were also widely interpreted as directed in part against de Gaulle. Many papers found a positive aspect in this approach, crediting you with “opening the way (to European integration) which de Gaulle has barred, (something) which no European politician has been able to do since the break in Brussels” (Berlinske Tidende, conservative, Copenhagen).

Several German papers appeared uneasy at the prospect of an ultimate choice between the U.S. and France, and tried to ride the fence. The Social-Democratic Neue Rhein Zeitung of Cologne wrote: “Kennedy will not hesitate to make political capital out of his new friendship with the Germans, but he also will not overtax this friendship to the disadvantage of our solidarity with France.”

French papers were less outspoken on this issue. Le Figaro’s comment that West Germany needed both American and French friendship and “could not choose between the two” was representative.

The Western European press was at one in praise of your renewed pledges to defend our allies, including some French papers. The anti-Gaullist Depeche du Midi of Toulouse, one of the most influential provincial papers, spoke of the “categoric manner” in which the U.S. assured the security of Europe and that its contribution was both “necessary and sufficient.”

Berlin

The Social-Democratic Neue Rhein Ruhr Zeitung of Essen summed up the views of many papers when it wrote “nobody in the White

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3 Kennedy spoke about European unity throughout his trip. On his arrival in Germany at the Bonn-Cologne airport at 9:50 a.m. on June 23, he said: “Our strategy was born in a divided Europe, but it must look to the goal of European unity and an end to the divisions of people and countries.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 497) He most notably stressed this theme in two addresses. He delivered the first on June 25 at 4:30 p.m. at the Paulskirche in Frankfurt; he declared: “The future of the West lies in Atlantic partnership—a system of cooperation, interdependence, and harmony whose peoples can jointly meet their burdens and opportunities throughout the world,” and “[i]t is only a fully cohesive Europe that can protect us all against the fragmentation of our alliance.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, pp. 517 and 520) He delivered the second address on July 2, the final day of his trip, in Naples at NATO Headquarters, in which he declared: “The age of interdependence is here. The cause of Western European unity is based on logic and common sense. It is based on moral and political truths.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 552)
House, nobody in Germany had expected the President to identify himself so unreservedly and so courageously with the cause of Berlin and with the German cause as he did in his address at the Schöneberg city hall. Never before has a foreign statesman identified himself with the German cause in this form, on such a stage and so convincingly."

A sour note was sounded by the hyper-Gaullist Paris Presse which complained that your pronouncements in Berlin might have gone beyond assuring Europeans of U.S. determination to stand by its pledges and that “the U.S. President is now accountable for the enthusiasm he aroused.”

Your statements on relations with the Iron Curtain countries were generally supported. The left-center Frankfurter Rundschau said, for example, “Mr. Kennedy’s great peace offensive nourishes our hopes for a rapprochement with the young progressive forces in the East.”

Ireland

In Europe generally, your visit to Ireland was seen as a “sentimental journey” and a “homecoming” without political implications. Within Ireland, no event in modern times has received such detailed press, photographic, and TV coverage. There is still no consensus about the political significance of the visit, but there has been speculation about Ireland’s role in world events and relationships with NATO.

Great Britain

Papers of all political colorations welcomed you for what was described by the pro-Labor Daily Mirror as “a hustling working visit.”

The majority of papers welcomed the decision to delay the multilateral force. The conservative Daily Telegraph said, “Mr. Macmillan convinced the President of the strength of British misgivings and the
American plan . . . is unlikely to reemerge in its present form.” Among the minority of papers still favoring the force, the conservative Daily Mail expressed the hope that a mixed-crew surface fleet with Polaris missiles would ultimately be accepted “because the advantages are much greater than the objections.”

Papers elsewhere construed the postponement of the multilateral force as a victory for Macmillan, particularly in France. Said the Gaullist mouthpiece La Nation: “Reality will prevail.”

A number of papers interpreted the decision on the multilateral force as a move to improve chances for a nuclear test ban with the Soviets.

Italy

Italian editorialists were embarrassed by the relatively small crowds which greeted you in Rome, but following your appearance and speech in Naples papers from Socialist to Right supported your views with enthusiasm.

Conservative Corriere Della Sera wrote that de Gaulle’s concept is designed to “isolate Europe,” but that you, Segni, and Leone were agreed on the necessity of “European unity within the framework of the interdependence of Europe and the U.S.”

Christian-Democratic Gazzetta del Popolo said that your trip ended “with the solemn reaffirmation of a pledge of united effort . . . The special atmosphere created around this welcome American guest confirms the existence of the deep and vital roots of the Alliance, which the Italian people want as a guarantee and token of freedom, and which Italy now reaffirms, not only as a guarantee of security but as a new pledge and a hope of progress and peace.”

Socialist Avanti gave heavy and generally friendly coverage to your visit, emphasizing the “peaceful” line. You have a “bag of ideas which deserve close consideration,” Avanti commented.

A complete report on Western European reactions is attached.  

Latin America

Papers gave heavy coverage to the early part of the trip and to the audience with Pope Paul VI. Major dailies in Mexico, Peru, Argentina, and Chile had editorials supporting your objectives, particularly strengthening the Atlantic Alliance. The only non-communist negative reaction received was from La Prensa of Mexico City, which said that

6 Not found attached.
“not only North American . . . but also our own Mexican cities will be destroyed (in a third World War) and no one can dispose of our destiny so carelessly as the President of the United States seems to do.” The editorial recommended a protest to the United Nations and censure by it of you.

Africa

African media gave the trip moderate coverage, but there was little editorial comment. Radio Accra and other stations reported favorably on your remarks in Bonn welcoming African unity efforts. But Radio Accra also reported a statement by Malcolm X criticizing you for talking of freedom in Europe while “millions of Afro-Americans are denied freedom in the United States.” The Tunisian Neo-Destour daily L’Action spoke highly of your “courage, frankness, and determination in defining the new trends of (your) strategy” and of your decision-making capability, “a clear-cut end to the indecision of (your) predecessors.”

Near East and South Asia

There was extensive news coverage and limited editorial comment, except in India and Pakistan. Editorialists in these two countries dwelt heavily on the reference in the communique from Britain to military aid for India, the Indians largely favorably, the Pakistani critically.

Several papers in the Near East reported that your trip had failed to change de Gaulle’s policy, and criticized you for not visiting France.

Far East

News coverage was moderate. Japanese commentators were inclined to agree that you had allayed German fears over West Berlin, and also interpreted the journey as an effort to form a unified base for negotiations with the Soviets. Comments in Viet-Nam were similar.

The Taipei press supported your efforts for western unity, but, typically, called for a greater U.S. effort in Asia with the comment that “the root of the international communist evil is in Asia and not in Europe.”

8 During his news conference at the Foreign Ministry in Bonn on June 24, Kennedy stated: “I welcome the effort which the Africans are making not only to meet their own problems but towards unity. I think it sets a good precedent—the unity of Africa—for the unity of Europe, a unity which is very encompassing in Africa and which may some day be in Europe, and I regard it as a very important step forward.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 511)

9 In the June 30 joint communiqué: “The President and the Prime Minister were agreed on their continuing to help India by providing further military aid to strengthen her defenses against the threat of renewed Chinese Communist attack.” (Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 544)
Communist Bloc

Soviet output on your trip was relatively mild in tone and low in volume, never exceeding more than two per cent of total radio comment. Among the propaganda themes were western disunity, failure of the multilateral force, the alleged discrepancy between your American University¹⁰ and German speeches, and the opportunity your visit provided for “revanchist” leaders to fan “the slanderous campaign against East Germany.” Moscow concluded that you were “evaded” in Italy, “approved only in principle” in Britain, and “warmly received” by the revanchists in Bonn.

Peking was harshly critical, picturing the tour as a “cunning diplomatic move with evil designs.” A New China News Agency report of June 27 said you had made “five provocative and aggressive speeches . . . unscrupulously slandering the socialist system and expressing U.S. determination to . . . subvert the German Democratic Republic and other East European socialist countries.” A Red Chinese labor official asked: “How can this satan incarnate be viewed as an envoy of the people?”

Cuban media interpreted the trip as an effort to gain approval for U.S. “aggressive policies” and adjudged it a complete failure.

Donald M. Wilson

¹⁰ See footnote 2, Document 129.
135. Message From the United States Information Agency to All Principal USIS Posts


Summary: U.S. agencies are cooperating in a program to blunt in advance the psychological impact of a Chinese Communist nuclear detonation. USIA’s specific role in that program is detailed below.

SITUATION

The Chinese Communists could set off an atomic test explosion any time in the next few years. They will undoubtedly attempt to use every available means to extend their influence by enhancing Red China’s strength image.

We want to blunt the expected Chinese Communist efforts in advance by promoting understanding of:

(1) The “nuclear facts of life” which (a) make the United States the world’s strongest nuclear power, and (b) separate major from minor nuclear powers;

(2) The fact that a crude “show” atomic explosion would not give Communist China even a minor nuclear-military capability, which takes years to develop.

You should begin a program for this purpose, drawing on the treatment points below and the guidelines in the referenced State-Defense-USIA circular. USIA’s main role in the interagency program will be to develop the positive aspect—U.S.-Free World strength, avoiding a preoccupation with the negative side—Chinese weakness. A spellout of suggested methods appears under “APPROACH,” the last section of this infoguide.

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2 Not found.
TREATMENT POINTS

These are the main points you should make:

(1) The United States is so strong that it can withstand an attacker’s first strike and still strike back with overpowering force. Having pledged never to be the attacker, the U.S. maintains defensive strength second to none in order to deter any first strike. President Kennedy said in his June 10, 1963 “peace” speech: “The United States, as the world knows, will never start a war.”

(2) The President on June 10 thus defined the peaceable use of United States strength: “America’s weapons are non-provocative, carefully controlled, designed to deter and capable of selective use. Our military forces are committed to peace and disciplined in self-restraint.”

(3) The United States works actively for safeguarded international disarmament. Until this goal is reached it must exert its strength to deter aggression. U.S. deterrence is long range, effected by the ability to deliver nuclear warheads with intercontinental missiles, aircraft or submarines.

(4) The United States can and will fulfill its commitments to defend the free peoples of Asia against threats to their independence or integrity, and will not hesitate to do so at any time regardless of any degree of Chinese Communist nuclear capability, in claim or in fact.

(5) All three major nuclear powers—the U.S., USSR, and U.K.—view with concern the possible spread of nuclear weapons to an increasing number of countries, because this could lead to local conflicts which could escalate into world war. All three, therefore, would regard any such developments, especially a threat to use a nuclear weapon, as a very serious matter.

(6) The major nuclear powers—the U.S., U.K., and USSR—each have superiority over all other nations in large and varied nuclear stockpiles and in means of delivery. Both are very costly and take years to develop. Over a dozen nations could develop into secondary nuclear powers after years of effort, but they could not hope to become major nuclear powers in the foreseeable future. Among potential secondary nuclear powers are: Belgium, Canada, Communist China, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Sweden, and Switzerland.

(7) Any of these powers could achieve a “token” nuclear capability with one or a few “show” nuclear test explosions within a very short period. The atomic bomb is no secret any more: the techniques of

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3 See footnote 2, Document 129.
putting one together have long been publicly known. But this would be years from even a secondary nuclear capability.

(8) Within Asia, both India and Japan possess atomic scientific know-how comparable to Communist China’s. Atomic science can be turned toward peace or war. India and Japan are devoting their atomic programs to peaceful purposes, whereas Communist China is using hers for weapons.

**APPROACH**

(1) **Interagency program:**

Bear in mind that the USIA program is one part of a coordinated interagency approach which has both positive and negative sides. USIA will deal mainly with the positive aspect: the meaning of U.S. nuclear strength and its relation to potential secondary nuclear powers, including Communist China. There is also, of course, a negative side: Communist China’s technical and economic weakness and her prestige-oriented struggle to produce a “show” atomic device. This negative approach we shall leave largely to others; as an overt U.S. agency, our credibility on this negative aspect is relatively low because (a) the U.S. has no official contacts with Communist China, hence no acknowledged sources of information; and (b) the U.S. has an obvious axe to grind. This does not mean, of course, that USIA should ignore the negative side completely; rather, insofar as possible, use attributed materials from third country or other sources likely to have credible authority concerning conditions inside Communist China. Chief USIA emphasis should go to the positive side, which is basic because it offers a calm, confident context of understanding without which the negative part would fail.

(2) **Pace:**

Your program should include regular but not too frequent approaches, and should proceed in a quiet, relaxed manner, avoiding sudden spurts of activity. This is because (a) we do not wish to convey an impression of nervous preoccupation with the ChiCom nuclear problem, and (b) your materials will necessarily deal with U.S. military strength, and we want to avoid an appearance of saber-rattling.

(3) **Target audiences:**

Primarily Asian countries, with particular emphasis on those nearest Communist China; but you should set a program in motion wherever a ChiCom nuclear explosion is likely to make an impact. Within each country, plan a phased presentation, starting with approaches to government officials and other influential groups and later extending the effort to include mass media if feasible and effective.
(4) Operating methods:

Approaches are likely to vary considerably from one country to another; you may decide that personal contacts and placement of selected printed materials will be the most effective approaches initially, and perhaps throughout, your program. You should maintain close cooperation with parallel activities of the Country Team, such as the briefings at Far Eastern posts using Defense Department materials, an activity outlined in the referenced circular.

File to Washington, for replay to other posts, useful local statements supporting any of the positive treatment points listed above or credible statements making negative points on Chinese Communist weakness.

Look to the Washington media for a phased flow of supporting materials.

Murrow

136. News Policy Note From the Chief, Political Guidance Staff, Office of Policy and Plans, United States Information Agency (Pauker) to the Assistant Manager for Policy Application, IBS (Clarke); International Press Officer, IPS (Sayles); Information Specialist, ICS (Vogel); Visual Information Specialist, IMS (Broecker); and Political Officer, ITV (Ehrman)¹


Civil Rights and Race Relations

The twin issue of civil rights and race relations is a major detraction to U.S. policy objectives in many countries.

Our difficulty is heightened by (1) genuine misunderstanding abroad of an extremely complex domestic problem, rooted in U.S. history and current U.S. economic, social and political realities, (2)

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 306, Office of Plans, General Subject Files, 1949–1970; Acc. #66–V–0274, Entry UD WW 382, Box 117, Master Copies 1963. Limited Official Use. Drafted by Pauker, Gausmann, and Sorensen. The News Policy Note is attached to Infoguide No. 64–2, dated July 26 and entitled “Civil Rights and Race Relations,” which was sent by pouch to all USIS posts. The Infoguide stated: “The attached News Policy Note is the Agency’s guidance to the Media for treatment of U.S. civil rights and race relations. It is also intended to guide you in handling those subjects.”
commercial media coverage which misrepresents the situation by emphasizing sensational developments, on the principle that violence makes headlines while nonviolence makes dull reading, and (3) deliberate distortion by our enemies who are fostering and exploiting an impression of pervasive injustice and intolerance in the United States, a nation which claims to champion equality and equal opportunity.

Our essentially corrective task is to do everything possible to offset the effect of distortions and misrepresentations, dispel misunderstandings born of ignorance, incomplete information and oversimplification, and thus, where possible, obtain sympathetic understanding and support of interested nations for the national government’s civil rights efforts.

The issue, and the problems it creates at home and abroad, will be with us for a long time. While controversy and disorder are features of the situation, we shall not be able to undo wholly such unfavorable impressions of the United States as those features will inevitably generate; so our secondary corrective task is to show that controversy and disorder are inevitable by-products of the national drive to realize the ideals of equal rights and equal opportunities for all.

TREATMENT:

In his June 11 TV address and his June 19 message to Congress, President Kennedy set the tone for output and established the direction to follow: (1) Candor in recognizing the dimensions and complexity of the problem, (2) full and active Administration support of all measures required to solve the problem.

The President said: “The very struggles which are now calling worldwide attention to the problems are themselves signs of progress and the results of these struggles will be increasingly visible."

Commercial media assure overseas awareness of the “struggles” and the “problems.” It is up to us to redress the balance by seeking to assure that the “progress” and the “results” are indeed increasingly visible.

Without sacrifice of candor in reporting major news, we must round out the picture by emphasizing all available evidence that the nation is moving to complete the task of providing equal rights and opportunities for all its citizens. This means:

(1) Giving priority to developments which show constructive movement toward solution of the problem at whatever level—national, regional, state, local. Bear in mind that—nationwide—more schools,
Theaters, restaurants, labor unions and public housing developments are integrated than are not; every new instance of integration adds to an already favorable balance. Graphic material on other subjects should show the high degree of integration which exists in many aspects of American life.

(2) Looking for and using sources which will give us a continuing flow of news about significant constructive developments, however unspectacular.

(3) Making a deliberate effort to background each positive item or positive sequence of items with materials to show that such developments are not unique but part of a mounting trend.

(4) Providing frequent, regularly scheduled recapitulations of positive developments to show consistent progress. When appropriate, in these recapitulations and in the course of regular reporting, we should recall official recognition of the enormity of the problem, as stated by the President in his June 11 speech and by Administration witnesses at Congressional hearings. Such candor should help reduce the unfavorable impact of legislative delays and renewed violence.

(5) Focusing attention on (a) the support of the majority of Americans for the goals of the civil rights movement and the programs, legislative and voluntary, which the President has proposed, (b) white participation in civil rights campaigns, and (c) the positive response of major elements of the nation—church groups, trade unions, women’s organizations, business and professional associations—to the President’s call for cooperation.

(6) Whenever possible, humanizing stories of civil rights efforts and advances. In feature form, we should tell the stories of prominent and less prominent individuals who help to win local gains.

(7) Giving prominence, in materials for special audiences (e.g., labor, women, students), to civil rights activities of their U.S. counterparts. This treatment applies to output by all media—radio, press, publications, photos, films, television and exhibits. Volume of output to a given country should be commensurate with the need for corrective materials in that country. The media should consult with Area Policy Officers in determining the level of volume to specific countries.

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OTHER POINTS:

(1) By Executive Order alone, the President can set reforms in motion. Federal and State legislatures can do so through legislation. The courts, both Federal and State, can do so through their rulings.

Look for and give prominence to such moves. But do not suggest that legislation, executive orders or court rulings—alone or in combination—can solve complex human relations problems wholly or finally. Solution will also require a wide range of voluntary, cooperative and continuing initiatives on the part of communities, professional, business, labor and other groups, and individuals.

The reasons for this—stemming from the nature of the U.S. political, social and economic structure—require explanation in commentary and other output. The Administration is actively encouraging voluntary, cooperative initiatives.

(2) No single day of Congressional hearings will fairly or accurately represent the course and prospects of the President’s proposals for civil rights legislation. Beyond the requirements of credibility, the fast media are not obliged to provide detailed, day-by-day accounts of civil rights proceedings in the Congress. Periodic situation reports, which permit fuller explanation of the legislative process and its intricacies, are preferable.

The testimony of witnesses who favor the President’s program often presents examples of progress, e.g., the successful application of existing antidiscrimination measures. We should watch for such items and include them in our periodic roundups.

We should avoid speculation about the outcome of Congressional action on specific features of the President’s legislative proposals, and relate passage of economic and social legislation—e.g., Federal support of job training—to the enhancement of equal opportunities for which the President’s total civil rights program calls.

(3) In explaining the nature of the U.S. federal system, we should make it clear that local police and law-enforcement officials are locally appointed and directed. Unlike the system in most countries, local police are not, in this country, under the control of the national government.

(4) We should bear in mind that, particularly in Africa, President Kennedy is a positive symbol of current U.S. efforts toward progress in civil rights.

The positive emphases which this guidance advocates are not intended to gloss over negative developments. It is a key feature of our open form of society that we disclose both rough and smooth sides of the way we work toward national ideals.

Therefore this guidance should not be interpreted as an injunction against reporting, in perspective, newsworthy unfavorable or contro-
versial developments or resistance to the Administration’s programs. However, local disturbances which are not likely to be exploited abroad should not be reported. Our positive emphases are intended to keep the national goal in sight—even when other sources of information, however motivated in their reporting of developments, tend to obscure that goal.

137. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to President Kennedy


I understand that you have expressed interest in United States participation in the 1963 Moscow International Film Festival and in the selection of the American film entry “The Great Escape.”

“The Great Escape” was selected by the Hollywood Guilds Festival Committee, which is comprised of members appointed by the presidents of the Directors Guild of America, the Screen Actors Guild, the Screen Producers Guild and the Writers Guild of America. The need to increase and augment the prestige of the United States and of the American film art at international motion picture events was immediately apparent when I took over as Director of this Agency. It seemed obvious that a qualified body of experts of the motion picture industry itself, in cooperation with the government, was required to meet this objective effectively. Thus, this Festival Committee was formed at the instigation of George Stevens, Jr., Director of the Motion Picture Service of the Agency, and has made the selection of the official American film entries to all major festivals since the spring of 1962. Where political

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Departments and Agencies Series, Box 91 USIA 7/63. No classification marking. According to a time stamp in the upper right corner of the memorandum, it was received in the White House on July 31 at 10:28 a.m. Another copy of the memorandum, dated July 29, is also printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 151.

2 The 1963 Moscow Film Festival ran from July 7 to 21.

3 This 1963 film about a mass escape of U.S. and British prisoners from a German prison camp during World War II, featured a large cast of well-known actors, including Steve McQueen, Richard Attenborough, and James Garner. The film was based on the 1950 non-fiction book of the same name written by Paul Brickhill. McQueen won the Film Festivals award for best actor for his performance in the film. (Richard L. Coe, “Film Festivals Gird the Globe,” The Washington Post, June 30, 1963, p. G1)
considerations obtain, as is the case with the Moscow Film Festival, the Committee consults with the government on the appropriateness of any motion picture as an official entry. Present members of the Committee are: Willis Goldbeck, Gene Kelly, Richard Widmark, John Houseman, Walter Mirisch, Ernest Lehman, Allen Rivkin, Joseph C. Youngerman, and Fred Zinnemann, Chairman.\(^4\)

The Committee considered a number of motion pictures in the process of selecting the official United States entry in the Moscow Film Festival, including the film “How the West Was Won.”\(^5\) Almost up to the time of the Festival entry deadline, the Committee did not feel that it had found just the right film for this event. When “The Great Escape” was offered for consideration, however, Committee members were unanimous in selecting it as the official Festival entry.

Upon receipt of the Committee’s nomination, the Agency made arrangements for review of the film by government officers in the Department of State and USIA. Those who saw the film felt that in addition to its technical and cinematographic excellence, it dramatically illustrated the precept that whatever the conditions, the human spirit will strive to remain free. They also noted, as did the Russians, that it gave counterpoint to the image of Nazi Germany military leadership set forth in present Communist propaganda.

Officials of the Soviet Embassy also saw the film. They thought the treatment given the Nazi prisoner of war camp and Nazi military leadership not understandable within Russian experience with the Nazis, but interposed no objection to the film’s entry in the Moscow Festival.

The American Embassy at Moscow has since reported that the Soviet publications *Pravda*, *Izvestiya* and *Trud* praised “The Great Escape” for the performance of its cast (Steve McQueen received the award for best actor), and have otherwise acclaimed the excellence of the picture. They have been caused, however, to rise in the defense of their own anti-German propaganda.

Mr. Stevens was accredited as the Chairman of the United States Delegation to the Moscow Festival. He is expected to return to duty in the Agency very shortly, and I look forward to receiving his personal

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\(^4\) Willis Goldbeck was a screenwriter and film director. Gene Kelly, Richard Widmark, and John Houseman were all prominent film actors; Houseman was also the first Director of VOA, serving from February 1942 until July 1943. Walter Mirisch was a film producer. Ernest Lehman and Allen Rivkin were screenwriters. Joseph C. Youngerman and Alfred Zinnemann were film directors.

\(^5\) This 1963 Academy Award-nominated film was directed, in part, by the famous film director John Ford and starred a large cast of famous actors, including James Stewart, John Wayne, and Debbie Reynolds.
comments on the effectiveness of United States participation in the Festival. I shall, of course, be happy to report to you more fully the substance of his observations as well as to supply you with a copy of the written report of the Delegation.

Edward R. Murrow

138. Editorial Note

On July 31, 1963, President John F. Kennedy convened the 516th meeting of the National Security Council (NSC) at 4:30 p.m. in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Director of Central Intelligence John A. McCone, Acting Secretary of Defense Roswell L. Gilpatrick, Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Earle G. Wheeler, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and U.S. Information Agency (USIA) Director Edward R. Murrow were among those who attended the meeting together with President Kennedy and Vice President Lyndon Baines Johnson. The focus of this particular meeting was “Chinese Communist Intentions” in the context of SNIE 13–4–63.

During the course of the discussion, Murrow raised the issue of USIA’s approach to the Sino-Soviet split: “Mr. Murrow asked for Presidential approval of the way USIA is handling the Sino-Soviet split. He said that existing guidance forbade polemics and attempts to exacerbate relations between Communist China and the Soviet Union. The Voice of America is playing straight the comments on the split coming out of both Peking and Moscow, but it does not attempt to exploit the difference. The President agreed that this was the proper way to handle the current situation.” The summary record of the NSC meeting is printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXII, Northeast Asia, Document 181. For the policy on the U.S. Information Agency’s handling of the Sino-Soviet split, see Document 83 and Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. XXV, Organization of Foreign Policy; Information Policy; United Nations; Scientific Matters, Document 136.)
139. Potomac Cable From the United States Information Agency

No. 267

Washington, August 27, 1963, 1:50 p.m.

AUGUST 28 MARCH IN WASHINGTON

Many thousands of Americans will march in Washington August 28 to call on the U.S. Congress for a redress of grievances. Their goal: the rapid realization of the long-standing national ideal of equal rights and opportunities for all citizens, regardless of race.

The march will support legislation to protect and strengthen equal rights and opportunities in a variety of fields where, despite much progress, racial discrimination still exists. In its proposed “Civil Rights Act of 1963,” the Kennedy Administration has asked Congress to pass such legislation. President Kennedy and Congressional leaders of both major political parties will receive the leaders of the march.

The demonstration will assemble citizens of all races and from many states, both North and South. Among them will be representatives of organizations heading the drive for equal rights, of the major religious faiths, of the trade union movement, and of many socially conscious interracial groups. Members of the Administration, of Congress, of state and municipal governments will take part.

Representing a broad cross-section of national sentiment, the marchers will exercise the right of peaceful assembly and of petition to promote the cause of other civil rights. The march will demonstrate the confidence of citizens both Negro and white that the objectives of equal rights and opportunities can be realized through the democratic process. It will also illustrate the determination of many Americans, white and Negro, to complete the task of realizing a basic U.S. principle—that all men are created equal, and that the rights of every man are diminished when the rights of one are threatened.

Realistically, most Americans understand that neither Presidential orders, nor Federal or state legislation, nor court rulings—nor any combination of those three forms of action—can eliminate entirely all
vestiges of prejudice. In the words of Gunnar Myrdal, the eminent Swedish sociologist:

“Prejudice itself is slow to disappear, though its legal and institutional retaining walls are crumbling. There is still a long road to travel before America becomes, in fact, the egalitarian country of its creed. But in historical perspective the rapidity of progress is astonishing.”

The August 28 march will dramatize the majority U.S. will to move over more rapidly toward the national egalitarian ideal.

Murrow

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4 Myrdal was a Swedish sociologist and Nobel Laureate economist who researched and wrote extensively about race relations in the United States.

5 The quote is from Myrdal’s *An American Dilemma* published in 1944.

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140. Memorandum From the Counselor for Public Affairs at the Embassy in Vietnam (Mecklin) to the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow)


SUBJECT

A Policy for Viet-Nam

What follows is based on six assumptions, all of them controversial which will be discussed at length separately if desired. They are:

1. *A new Vietnamese government is essential.*

   There is mounting evidence that the war cannot be won with the present regime, especially in view of the damage done to popular support during the Buddhist crisis. Even if the present regime can

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win, with continued U.S. aid, the point has become irrelevant. International and U.S. domestic public opinion probably would deny the U.S. the option of trying again. Such a try would also be an unacceptable humiliation of U.S. prestige after our present open effort to remove the Nhus from Viet-Nam.

2. **Real power must go to a new man.**

   The focus of present indignation has been the Nhus. In fact, Nhu and his wife[^3] are as much symptoms of the GVN’s shortcomings as they have been a cause. The true failure over the years to rally the Vietnamese people must be blamed on Diem himself. He has always controlled the power base, perhaps even now. Because of Diem’s peculiar, rather neurotic relationship with Nhu, it is to be expected furthermore that Nhu’s removal would simply force Diem deeper into suspicious isolation, making him more ineffective than ever. He should be retained only as a figurehead in the interest of stability.

3. **The odds are heavily against ousting the Ngo Dinhs without considerable bloodshed.**

   The regime over the years has built up powerful loyal forces which are now concentrated around Saigon. To prevent a prolonged deadlock, and thus an opportunity for the VC to make unacceptable gains, there is only one sure recourse: an advance decision to introduce U.S. combat forces if necessary.

4. **An unlimited U.S. commitment in Viet-Nam is justified.**

   This specifically means the use of U.S. combat forces if necessary, both to promote unseating of the regime and against the VC, as well as a willingness to accept an engagement comparable with Korea if the Communists choose to escalate. Shock waves from loss of Viet-Nam to Communism would be disastrous throughout Southeast Asia, which is strategically vital to U.S. security. Conversely, this kind of strong and successful U.S. resort to force would strengthen resistance to Communism throughout Asia and other underdeveloped areas. It would also be a significant defeat of the critical Chinese test in Viet-Nam of their ideology on war.

5. **U.S. forces could be used against Asian Communist guerrillas and win.**

   (And the stakes are so high that if unavoidable we must take the risk anyway.)

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[^3]: Both Ngo Dinh Nhu (Diem’s brother) and his wife, Madame Nhu (Tran Le Xuan), gained international attention for among other things, public comments she made during the Buddhist crisis. (“State Dept. Gives Back of Its Hand to Madame Nhu’s Blackmail Charge,” *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1963, p. A15)
What might be called the French syndrome is wholly fallacious. The French lost in Indo-China because they behaved like colonialists, failed even to try to engage the people and never made an adequate military effort in any case. U.S. forces in Viet-Nam would be used contrarily to help the people, i.e. to carry out policies now in effect but often botched. Their presence and example would quickly inspire better leadership and initiative among the Vietnamese forces, as indeed was the experience in Korea.

6. The U.S. must accept the risks of covertly organizing a coup if necessary.

The available evidence indicates that there is a deep reluctance in the Vietnamese officer corps to accept the hazards of promoting a coup d’état. It is therefore possible that action to topple the Ngo Dinh regime would not automatically follow even the most severe U.S. measures, e.g. suspension of aid, with resulting near chaos. It is also essential that the eventual successor regime be willing to cooperate with the U.S., including commitment of U.S. combat forces if the war can be won no other way.

In the writer’s judgment, conditions in Viet-Nam have deteriorated so badly that the U.S. would be drawing to a three-card straight to gamble its interest there on anything short of an ultimate willingness to use combat troops. Even if all-out pressures succeeded in unseating the Ngo Dinhs, which is not an automatic certainty, at least not immediately, there is real danger that the successor regime would be equally or even more ineffective against the VC. There is also the danger that the Vietnamese military forces would fragment, dividing the country into rival camps, with disastrous consequences.

If we are not willing to resort to U.S. forces, it is wholly possible that efforts to unseat the Ngo Dinhs would produce results that would be worse, from the U.S. viewpoint, than a negotiated “neutral” settlement. It is also possible that a prolonged deadlock would stimulate an irresistible shift in international and American public opinion in favor of such a settlement.

On the other hand, a decision now to use U.S. forces if necessary would give the whole U.S. effort psychological lift, producing confidence that we need not be frustrated indefinitely, giving us a sure

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hand that has been lacking in the past. When and if it became desirable to make this intention public, we would have a lever of immense value vis-à-vis the Vietnamese. Such a new sureness in our actions, with the clear implication that the U.S. “means business,” would quickly get through to the Vietnamese and to third countries and thus conceivably itself remove the need to resort to force.

Perhaps it should also be noted that the present situation in Viet-Nam is confronting the U.S. with what was certainly an inevitable showdown on the thesis that Western industrial power somehow must always be frustrated by Communist guerrilla tactics applied against a weak, underdeveloped government that refused foreign advice and reforms of the very ills that the Communists live on. There are incipient insurrections of this sort all over the underdeveloped world and the outcome in Viet-Nam will have critical bearing on U.S. capability to prevent and/or suppress them.

In the writer’s opinion, furthermore, there is a very real possibility that if and as Viet-Nam is conclusively being lost to the Communists, the U.S. will be forced to use force in any case as a last resort . . . just as we did so unexpectedly in Korea. It would be vastly wiser—and more effective—to make this unpalatable decision now.

From this basis of strength, U.S. policy should seek establishment of a new government that would be as strong as possible but in any case would accept introduction of U.S. forces if necessary to defeat the VC. Ideally the whole Ngo Dinh family should be removed, but the U.S. would accept retention of Diem in a figurehead role. It is essential that the Nhus leave the country permanently. (A specific time period, say six months, would not be sufficient since their influence and political apparatus would survive.)

Application of this policy should be on a step-by-step basis, thus hopefully achieving U.S. ends with minimum damage to the war effort against the VC. Recommended procedure:

1. For the short term, continuation of the present heavy diplomatic pressure on the GVN. This would be designed to combine with outside events—congressional threats to cut aid, increased third country pressures in Saigon, UN censure, and perhaps even a world-wide trend toward consideration of DeGaulle’s proposals5—to force Diem and

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the Nhus to capitulate voluntarily and/or precipitate a spontaneous military coup.

It is suggested that such pressure be developed with an eye to giving Diem some kind of face-saving escape. Perhaps, for example, the U.S. should begin talking publicly about ousting the whole family, so that it eventually could compromise on departure of only the Nhus with the explanation that Diem had been “misled” or some such. With Orientals in general and notably with the Ngo Dinhs, capitulation is virtually impossible if they are painted into a corner.

2. When this fails, as is probable, application of selected cuts in U.S. assistance, preferably through imposition of conditions on its use rather than outright surgery . . . which would have the same effect. The cuts should be applied to items of minimum importance to the war effort against the VC and maximum importance to the Nhus’ political maneuvering, e.g. the Special Forces. The cuts should be widely publicized and in fact be chosen more for their psychological impact than expectation of serious damage to GVN operations.

If this did not quickly produce a spontaneous coup, the U.S. should begin covertly planning one. At this point dramatic deterioration of U.S.-GVN relations must be expected, with distinct physical danger to U.S. nationals and a virtual standstill in the advisory effort.

3. Suspension of all aid to the GVN and if this also failed to unseat the regime, implementation as quickly as possible of the planned coup. If this also failed, or only partly succeeded, there should be plentiful excuses to bring in U.S. forces, e.g. to restore order, protect American citizens, etc. Such forces should be prepared for attack by loyal GVN troops, but it is more likely that they would simply act as power in being, making it possible now for the U.S. to have its way by simply presenting the Ngo Dinhs with an ultimatum. Something similar to this happened when U.S. forces were introduced into Lebanon in 1958— with notably little resulting damage to the U.S. political position in the Middle East.

It is suggested that third country hostility toward the Ngo Dinhs is already so considerable that this kind of reluctant, gradual but persistently determined application of U.S. power would similarly be accepted in Asia. And once U.S. forces had been introduced into Vietnam, it would be relatively simple—on the invitation of the new
regime—to keep them on hand to help, if needed, in final destruction of the Viet Cong.6

6 On the same day Mecklin sent this memorandum to Murrow, he presented his views to President Kennedy, Rusk, McNamara, McCona, Murrow, and others at a meeting on Vietnam convened at 10:30 a.m. at the White House. According to the record of the September 10 meeting prepared by Bromley Smith: "Mr. Mecklin [Mecklin] of the USIA in Saigon was asked to state his views. He concurred in Mr. Phillips’ [Director of the AID Rural Assistance Program in Vietnam] view and said the U.S. image was being hurt. Feeling in Vietnam is that the U.S. should do something. The military effort will drop off in the future as officers become disaffected as a result of Diem’s oppression of the people. He said that the program proposed by Mr. Phillips was inadequate and that the suspension of aid was not enough. He urged that we go whole hog and be prepared to use U.S. combat forces if necessary to remove the entire government of Diem and Nhu. Withholding U.S. aid would create chaos in Vietnam for months. There is a chance that everything we try will fail and we would be obliged to use U.S. forces in the last resort to protect U.S. lives. The Diem government will not surrender short of the immediate presence of U.S. forces. We might have to use U.S. forces to support the war effort in Vietnam." (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda Series, Box 316, Meetings on Vietnam 9/1/63–9/10/63) For the text of a September 10 memorandum of conversation prepared by Roger Helsman, see Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. IV, Vietnam, August–December 1963, Document 83.

141. Memorandum From the Director of the United States Information Agency (Murrow) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)1


SUBJECT

World Reaction to Developments in Viet-Nam

Some sympathy for the U.S. dilemma in Viet-Nam has emerged in the last week, particularly in Western Europe, but most comment is still critical of U.S. policies. There is virtually no sympathy for the Diem regime, except in South Korea and the Philippines where officials see Diem as the only available anti-communist bulwark. This applies to some extent to Thailand as well.

De Gaulle’s oral intervention\(^2\) was criticized widely in France except by the papers traditionally supporting him. It drew only limited comment elsewhere.

**FAR EAST**

The situation in Viet-Nam continues to receive major news play but editorial comment has slackened during past week. Available comment, both media and official, has tended to focus on the question of continued U.S. support for the Diem regime. Reference to the possibility of a neutralized Viet-Nam, as implied by De Gaulle, has been limited. Buddhist groups in Thailand, Burma and Cambodia continue to agitate against GVN treatment of Buddhists. Peking and Hanoi reports now reflect belief that U.S. may eventually replace Diem but that this will not affect the war.

**WESTERN EUROPE**

Viet-Nam crisis remains the subject of continuing and extensive news coverage and considerable editorial comment in the West European press. Comment has been almost totally critical of the Diem family regime. Though not uncritical of some American moves, the majority of non-communist papers display considerable sympathy for the U.S. dilemma, and have offered few concrete suggestions for remedies. Recent news coverage has played up U.S. alleged participation in anti-Diem moves but editorial comment on this subject is not yet available.

**NEAR EAST-SOUTH ASIA**

Crisis continues receive substantial news play though volume has dwindled somewhat since the wave of reaction following the imposition of martial law and attack on pagodas on August 21.\(^3\) Scattered editorial and backgrounders in media are relentlessly critical of the Diem regime and continue to view its removal as the only answer if the war against the Viet Cong is to be won. Criticism of U.S. policy has softened somewhat, most editorial comment viewing U.S. as faced with necessity of dealing with “difficult and corrupt” regime with which it has little sympathy while responding to the longer range necessity of fighting the Viet Cong. De Gaulle proposal for unification

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\(^2\) See footnote 5, Document 140.

has drawn little attention. Three leading Indian newspapers split sharply, one opposing and two supporting it.

**AFRICA**

Only light and scattered coverage of Viet-Nam issue. Except for Algeria, very little comment specifically condemns the U.S. Some Africans view South Vietnamese events in terms of Catholic oppression during the Middle Ages. Neutralization of the country is offered as a possible solution in Tunisia’s *Jeune Afrique*.

**LATIN AMERICA**

South Vietnam situation receiving moderate news treatment. Editorial comment scarce. News treatment often appeared under headlines which point up the disagreement between Washington and Saigon.

**CONCLUSION**

Virtually no sympathy or support for Diem regime except as noted above. Some sympathy for U.S. dilemma in Viet-Nam. I would expect this note of sympathy and understanding to increase unless new and violent acts of suppression occur in South Viet-Nam.

I conclude that the degree of the dilemma and the complexity of the issues involved is almost as well understood abroad as it is in Washington.4

Edward R. Murrow

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4 An unknown hand, presumably that of Murrow, added an exclamation point at the end of the final sentence.

SUBJECT
USIS in Viet-Nam

BEGIN UNCLASSIFIED

ORGANIZATION

USIS in Viet-Nam operates with a staff of 27 American and 226 foreign local employees. In addition to the headquarters in Saigon, there are branch posts in Hue, Dalat and Cantho, and bi-national centers (Vietnamese American Associations) in Saigon, Hue and Dalat conducting varied activities and having over 5000 English students. There are also 21 sub-posts or field support operations. Total budget for 1963 was $1,600,000; GOE budget $754,000.

OBJECTIVES

The primary USIS objective is to engender support of the Vietnamese people for government programs in the struggle against the Viet Cong. This we do by stimulating pride in national accomplishment, undermining the morale of the Viet Cong and encouraging them to defect, and assisting and improving the various information operations of the Vietnamese Government.

PROGRAM OPERATIONS

As the principal target of the communists is the peasant, it is the peasant who must be our major target also. Therefore, the heart of our USIS program lies in field operations and in the various media activities which support the field program with films, publications, exhibits, etc. To improve dissemination of these various materials we have established 21 sub-posts throughout the country, staffed by Vietnamese employees of USIS.

To service our field program USIS produces a semi-monthly rural film magazine and two documentary films per month. Audience two million monthly.

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Our most useful publication is a monthly magazine called *Rural Spirit*. Designed principally to support the Strategic Hamlet program, it has a present circulation of 200,000. Three small weekly news sheets titled the *Good Life* produced in cooperation with the GVN are designed to support specific military clear-and-hold operations. Circulation 30,000. Increase to five editions is anticipated. The Vietnamese edition of *Free World* has a monthly circulation of 160,000. Designed for a general audience, it contains articles about Viet-Nam, neighboring countries, and the United States.

The post also produces numerous posters, leaflets and pamphlets. This activity has been at a very high level for the past few months with the production of materials in support of the Strategic Hamlet Program, the Surrender Program, and various tactical military operations.

Radio programs are produced locally for use on the 8 radio broadcasting stations in Viet-Nam, accounting for an average of 60 hours weekly. Programs are also produced for the Vietnamese language service of VOA. END UNCLASSIFIED.

DISCUSSION OF PRESENT STATUS AND PROSPECTS FOR FUTURE

*BEGIN SECRET.* In Viet-Nam, as in other fledgling nations, we have found that a necessary first task has been to build among the citizenry a sense of identification with and loyalty to their own government. And since, in Viet-Nam, an adequate governmental information apparatus did not initially exist, USIS has devoted its major effort to programs in support of the Vietnamese Government. When the Ngo Dinh Diem regime first took office nine years ago, USIS functioned as a surrogate for the Ministry of Information. It remains today an important adjunct to the Vietnamese Information Service (VIS), disseminates most of our USIS-produced materials through VIS channels, and maintains a close advisory relationship.

The primary thrust of the USIS program has been in the field of counterinsurgency. USIS output has publicized positive GVN programs for the betterment of the life of the people. We have attempted to build an image of a constitutional government meriting the support of its people in the struggle against communist aggression. Our emphasis has been upon a government and its policies and programs, rather

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3 The Surrender Program, more commonly known as the Chieu Hoi (Open Arms or Call to Return) program, was designed to encourage defections from the Viet Cong. See *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, vol. III, Vietnam, January–August 1963, Document 92.
than upon any individual or group. In the early days of the Diem regime there was much stress upon Diem himself because of the need to make him known among his own people following his long years of self-imposed exile, but USIS-produced personal publicity for Diem began to decrease after the first two years. Since that time, USIS has resisted Vietnamese efforts to promote the “cult of the personality,” but of course we have been unable to prevent the Vietnamese from doing so on their own.

The only major USIS activity of the past year which might be regarded as supporting Diem rather than the war effort as such was the printing and distribution nationwide of two million posters with Diem’s surrender appeal, carrying his picture. It was considered necessary at the time to use his authority to make the appeal effective.

During the past several years U.S. economic assistance has provided for the Vietnamese a large supply of equipment for the printing of magazines, newspapers, posters and leaflets, for the production, distribution and showing of motion pictures, and for radio broadcasting. Many Vietnamese have developed skills in the information field. In short, the Vietnamese can now conduct rather extensive (though probably not successful) information programs without outside assistance. USIS has continued a deep involvement in Vietnamese information operations for two reasons: 1) to maintain higher standards of quality than the Vietnamese could do alone, and 2) to retain a measure of control over the content of the propaganda.

The all-important control over content has often gone to us by default. Many information projects which the Vietnamese might have undertaken either alone or with American technical assistance have not been initiated by the Vietnamese because of timidity, bureaucratic inefficiency or indolence—it was easier to let the Americans carry the ball. Thus, films, publications, radio programs and other information output were prepared by USIS, reflecting the positive U.S. approach, and submitted to the GVN for approval. They were more often than not approved without modification.

Propaganda efforts conducted by the Vietnamese alone have, to a large extent, consisted of personal aggrandizement of Diem and the Ngo family, and inept and heavy-handed anti-communist propaganda. Much of it was counter-productive in terms of gaining popular support for government programs. But, even propaganda activities in which the GVN has played the leading role were often carried out in concert with Americans, either military or civilian. And, for example, when the Vietnamese would prepare a leaflet and ask USIS to print it, we could suggest changes, or, in extreme cases, simply find reasons why we could not print it.

With the advent of martial law and the GVN’s repressive moves against opposition elements came a profound change in USIS-GVN
relationships. USIS contacts with GVN counterparts became strained and there were instances of harassment and threats against USIS Vietnamese employees.

Then, at the beginning of September, the GVN publicly launched an anti-USIS campaign. The Ngo Dinh Nhu-controlled Times of Vietnam on September 2 charged that USIS was controlled by CIA and that “CIA agents in USIS” were helping to plot the overthrow of the government. The charges were repeated on September 8. On September 19, the same newspaper enlarged on the theme with the charge that CIA in Saigon was split into a “pro-coup” and a “no coup” group, with the pro-coup group consisting of agents in USIS and the Embassy. The Alsop column of September 20 quotes President Diem as charging “machinations” and “plotting” by USIS.4 The GVN has also frequently attacked VOA. Reports have been received indicating that our Public Affairs Officer in Saigon, John Mecklin, has been marked for assassination.

It should be emphasized that USIS field operations in Viet-Nam are conducted mainly through 21 USIS sub-posts (staffed by Vietnamese employees of USIS) which function outwardly as adjuncts of provincial offices of the Vietnamese Information Service. Without GVN cooperation and mutual USIS-VIS confidence the 21 sub-posts could not function. GVN harassment, threats and widely publicized charges against USIS have gone so far that it is difficult to conceive that it can all be forgotten, that former relationships can be resumed on the same basis, that we can go back to “business as usual”—as long as the present regime remains in power.

The members of the Ngo family have long resented USIS because they could not control us and make us into an instrument of family aggrandizement. As pointed out previously, they now have the physical facilities for conducting a rather extensive information program without outside assistance. It now appears they are embarked on a program to eliminate all USIS activities in support of the GVN in order that they can propagandize their own people in their own way.

Edward R. Murrow

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4 Reference is to The Washington Post columnist Joseph Alsop, who reported: “One instant, the Buddhist crisis is attributed to a well-laid plot of the Communists. And almost in the next breath, the whole ugly business is laid to ‘the machinations’ of the U.S. Information Service.” (Joseph Alsop, “Matter of Fact . . . : In the Gia Long Palace,” The Washington Post, September 20, 1963, p. A17)

Dear Arthur:

The international exhibit issue raised by Secretary Hodges with the President is not new.\(^1\) It reflects a basic difference of opinion that has existed between the Department of Commerce and the U.S. Information Agency virtually since the inception of the Government’s exhibit program over nine years ago.

Despite the fact that from the beginning, the wording of both enabling and appropriation legislation, legislative history, and expressions of Presidential intent have clearly defined the purpose of the international exhibit program as psychological, Commerce sought to make of the operation a trade promotional venture. The Agency has consistently held that in consonance with the clear legislative and executive intent, it should be primarily psychological. Since the inauguration of the present Administration the officials of Commerce responsible for the operational aspects of the program have been in more substantial agreement with USIA. There are several reasons for the Agency position.

First, by its very nature, the large exhibition is a propaganda spectacular. Its psychological impact is implicit in its existence. When the exhibit is American, the host populace expects the unusual. Properly handled, the show becomes a propaganda instrument of superb visual

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2 In a September 11 letter to Hodges, the President requested the following “That you undertake an interdepartmental review of this problem [the need for government policy on international expositions and world fairs being organized in the United States], with special emphasis on plans for 1975–76;”

“That the first purpose of such a review would be to establish an accurate catalogue of American cities with existing plans for world fairs;

“That the larger purpose would be to develop an exposition policy to help the Federal Government exercise selectivity over competing American cities with world’s fair aspirations;

“That, in the latter regard, the possible use of a device such as a Presidential Commission which was employed in 1959 to determine the site of the 1964–65 world’s fair should be considered; and

“That such a review should include recommendations on the foreign relations aspect of these fairs and expositions, including the attitude of the U.S. to the BIE, possible membership therein, and the feasibility of reserving six months for the 1975–76 period for an officially-approved exposition in which BIE nations might participate.” (Ibid.) Hodges’ reply was not found.
The Soviets recognized the propaganda impact of the exhibition substantially before the U.S. Government officially took notice. The late 1940's and early 50's saw a crescendo of Soviet participation at international trade fairs, unopposed by any official U.S. effort. Even Red China got into the business ahead of the first American endeavor. Our absence was noted. In fact it was the rapid psychological success of the Bloc’s exhibitions effort that prompted U.S. Government entrance into the field. Several Congressional representatives, having observed abroad the results of Soviet efforts, urged President Eisenhower to propose legislation and fiscal support that would enable this country to compete. Congress responded and the program was born in the late summer of 1954.

Since then, we have frankly competed on the international trade fair and exhibit stage with the Communists, and whether we state so publicly or not, the sphere of competition has generally been propagandistic rather than commercial.

A second reason is closely akin to the first. The Communist nations are still intent on proving to the world’s developing nations that their system is best designed to make an industrial giant of a once backward country. Thus, the average Soviet (or Bloc nation) exhibit is characterized by massive arrays evidencing industrial might. Industrial display is for the Communist nations synonymous with their propaganda message. But America’s reputation as an industrial power is already made and little doubted abroad. Conglomerate arrays of our productive capacity achieve little propaganda impact that we have not already won many times over. Instead, we find ourselves in need of proving such theses as: (1) the aspirations we enjoy in common with peoples of the country hosting the fair at which we exhibit, and the concerted friendly manner in which America strives to promote our common goals; (2) the cultural accomplishments of American society; (3) the humanity, social concern for, and contribution of our economic system to our people; (4) the vitality, variety, and pre-eminence of our scientific achievements. A strictly commercial fair competes unnecessarily with the Bloc on ground we have already mastered, while losing by default areas of ideological competition we should seek to win. Only by conscious planning of the exhibit for propaganda impact do we reach these goals.

But there is still a third reason for the Agency position, grounded in legislative-executive intent and history. I have already alluded to the fact that Congress created the program as a weapon of ideological competition with the Communist world. Throughout the remainder of the preceding Administration, the propaganda intent of the interna-
tional exhibit program was reaffirmed by: (a) Congressional re-enactment and refinement of the original legislation (in PL–860 of August, 1956—the “International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair Participation Act”);³ (b) Executive Order 10716 of June 17, 1957;⁴ (c) Bureau of the Budget Report No. MO-60-100, entitled: “Survey of U.S. Overseas Exhibit Activities” issued in the summer of 1960;⁵ and (d) Executive Order 10912 of January 18, 1961.⁶ Congress has for nine years appropriated funds for this program with the express understanding that the money was being used for the attainment of propaganda objectives abroad. Its consistent use for other purposes would be a technical illegality, and most certainly would cause Congress to reassess the validity of making any further appropriation under this legislation. Congressional reaction to such misuse has now been made doubly certain by the fact that Commerce has sought and obtained, under a different authority and separate appropriation, funds for trade fairs of a strictly trade promotional character.

Early in the spring of 1961, discussions that Ed Murrow and I held with Fred Dutton (then in the White House)⁷ reaffirmed the psychological purposes of program, while reasserting USIA authority and responsibility for it. The climax of this reaffirmation, however, occurred during Fiscal Year 1962:

(a) On August 11, 1961, the President addressed a letter to Ed Murrow reasserting this authority for coordination of the International Exhibits Program and strongly emphasizing the program’s propaganda purpose (copy attached).⁸

(b) On September 21, the President approved the so-called Fulbright Hays Act (Public Law 87–256), officially known as “The Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961”.⁹ This Act, a codification and amplification of many existing cultural-psychological laws, replaced old PL 860, but incorporated and in some ways expanded all its provisions regarding U.S. participation in international exhibits. Again, the purpose of the Act is psychological impact abroad.

³ See footnote 7, Document 2.
⁵ Not found.
⁷ Not further identified.
⁸ Not attached; printed as Document 45.
⁹ See footnote 2, Document 52.
(c) Executive Order 11034 of June 25, 1962, delegates to the Director, USIA, the authorities of the Act concerned with fairs, expositions, and demonstrations held outside the United States. The letter from Elmer B. Staats, the then Acting Director of the Bureau of the Budget, transmitting the proposed Executive Order to the President, specifically continued the responsibility of the Agency’s Director for coordination of the program as set forth in the above-mentioned Presidential letter of August 11, 1961. The corresponding appropriation measure is now known as the “Special International Exhibits Program”, or SIE.

Since the beginning of this Administration, most officials of the Department of Commerce directly concerned with this program have openly recognized its propaganda purposes and are making sincere efforts to reorient the exhibit staff in that direction. In fact, so clear is this recognition, that in its FY 1963 Budget Request, Commerce sought and obtained—under authority of its basic legislation—an appropriation separate from the Special International Exhibits (SIE) appropriation, specifically for the purpose of staging exhibitions at international fairs where the principal purpose is recognized to be trade promotion. Most fairs in Western Europe are now conceded to be of this nature. Fairs behind the Iron Curtain are generally recognized by State, USIA, and Commerce as being held primarily for psychological impact. Such is the case with the fair at Brno, Czechoslovakia, about which Secretary Hodges spoke to the President.

Sincerely yours,

Donald M. Wilson

10 See footnote 4, Document 84.
11 Not found.
13 Wilson signed “Don” above his typed signature.
WASHINGTON, October 7, 1963.

SUBJECT

The Robert Joffrey Ballet

I attach a memorandum from the State Department on the Joffrey Ballet. It makes the following points:

1) The decision to send the Joffrey Ballet to the Soviet Union was recommended by the panel of dance experts set up by the Advisory Committee on the Department’s cultural exchange program.

2) The Rebekah Harkness Foundation is carrying the main expenses of the trip. The government is to pay less than 20 per cent of the $96,500 required to send the ballet to the Soviet Union.

3) The Joffrey Ballet toured the Middle East in the winter of 1962–63 for the State Department, and the tour was considered a considerable success. (There are press excerpts from various Portuguese and Middle Eastern papers at the end of the State Department memorandum.)

I also attach an enthusiastic review by the dance critic of the Washington Post.

There was some unfortunate publicity about the Joffrey Ballet and the White House in Betty Beale’s column in the Sunday Star. Pam Turnure and I have been trying to track down the source of the story. All we have discovered is that, when Betty Beale went to a dinner before the Waltz Group Friday night (where some White House people, including Mac and myself, were present), she told Nancy Tuckerman immediately on arrival that she knew all about the ballet fiasco. She had therefore picked up the story between Wednesday morning...
and Friday evening, I am certain that neither of the State Department people with whom I took up the matter—Luke Battle and Frank Siscoe—would have mentioned it to anyone; nor did Pam, nor did Nancy, nor did I.

I note that “The Palace Music Hall”9 is going to be part of the program for the Soviet tour. If there had been no publicity, it might have been worthwhile to get them to substitute another number. In view of the publicity, dropping “The Palace Music Hall” would probably cause new problems.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.10

Attachment

Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)11


SUBJECT
Soviet Tour of the Robert Joffrey Ballet

At the request of Mr. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., I am attaching a memorandum concerning the Robert Joffrey Ballet, which performed at the White House on Tuesday, October 1, and is scheduled to begin a tour of the Soviet Union in Leningrad on October 15.

Benjamin H. Read12

9 According to The Washington Post’s Jean Battey, “‘The Palace,’ a series of vignettes of the old vaudeville days, looked like a warmed-over musical comedy dancing. . . . ‘The Palace’ could be a pleasant change of pace on a full evening’s program but it is really not very good.” See footnote 3, above.

10 Schlesinger signed “Arthur” above his typed signature.

11 No classification marking.

12 An unknown hand signed for Read above Read’s typed signature.
Attachment

Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Soviet Tour of the Robert Joffrey Ballet.

The Robert Joffrey Ballet was formed in 1955 and has subsequently made annual tours in the United States. The ballet toured several countries of the Near East from December 1, 1962 to March 7, 1963 under the auspices of the Cultural Presentations Program of the Department of State and the Rebekah Harkness Foundation, a private nonprofit organization which has given financial support to individuals and organizations in the fields of music, ballet, and medical research. Among those dance groups previously assisted by the Foundation was Jerome Robbins’ “Ballet USA”. Newspaper reports and those from the several Embassies indicated that the group was well received in the Near East. (See attached press excerpts.)

The U.S.–U.S.S.R. exchanges program provides for reciprocal tours of major performing arts groups, and the Joffrey Ballet was considered by the Department of State as a possible attraction to be proposed to Goskonsert, the Soviet State Concert Agency, in exchange for the “Bolshoi Stars”. This group is only a portion of the Bolshoi company which last toured the United States in 1961, and this United States tour is also handled by Mr. Sol Hurok of New York. Since the Soviet Union has a long tradition in ballet, and in view of the successful tours of other American ballet companies (American Ballet Theatre in 1960 and the New York City Ballet in 1962), which introduced more recent forms of ballet to Soviet audiences, the Advisory Committee on the Arts of the State Department recommended that another ballet group be sent to the Soviet Union in return for the “Bolshoi Stars”.

The panel of dance experts responsible to the Advisory Committee on the Arts recommended the nomination of the Robert Joffrey Ballet for a Soviet tour. This panel was composed of: Mr. William Bales, Chairman, Dance Department, Bennington College; Miss Ann Barzell, Dance Critic, Chicago American; Dr. George Beiswanger, Georgia State

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13 No classification marking. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.
14 Attached but not printed.
15 See footnote 8, Document 72.
16 Hurok organized and financed concerts and tours.
College; Miss Isadora Bennett, Asia Society, Miss Emily Coleman, Dance Critic, Newsweek Magazine; Mr. Hy Faine, Executive Secretary, American Guild of Musical Artists; Mr. Alfred Frankenstein, Music and Dance Critic, San Francisco Chronicle; Miss Martha Hill, Chairman, Dance Department, Juilliard School of Music; Miss Lillian Moore, Dance Instructor and Dance Critic; Mr. John Rosenfield, Dance Critic, Dallas Morning News, and Mr. Walter Perry, Dance Critic, New York Herald Tribune.

Mr. S.V. Shaskin, Artistic Director of Goskontsert, visited New York City in early September to attend rehearsals of the group and to assist in the selection of programs for the Soviet tour. The tour consists of eight weeks and 54 performances, opens in Leningrad on October 15, and continues to Kharkov, Odessa, Donetsk, Kiev and Moscow. The financial arrangements were concluded between the American Embassy in Moscow and Goskontsert and provide for a weekly fee of $7,000 plus room, board, and other internal expenses and a portion of the international transportation costs. Mr. Hurok is also contributing to the international transportation costs. The remaining expenses of the ballet are being borne by the Foundation. It is contemplated that the net cost to the Cultural Presentations Program of the Department of State will be less than twenty percent of the total cost of $96,500 to send the Joffrey Ballet to the Soviet Union.

The Ballet plans to present three programs during the Soviet tour as follows:

(a) Caprices
   Feast of Ashes
   Gamelan
   The Palace Music Hall
(b) Patterns
   Dawn of Humanity
   Sea Shadows
   The Palace Music Hall
(c) Gamelan
   Ropes
   Pastorale
   Caprices

These programs have been approved by Goskontsert which is now printing and distributing publicity materials listing the programs as shown.
145. Memorandum From Irving J. Lewis, Acting Chief, International Division, Bureau of the Budget, to the Special Assistant to the President (Schlesinger)†

Washington, October 14, 1963.

SUBJECT

Commerce-USIA disagreement regarding USIA “trade fair” exhibits

We understand that the President has requested you to look into Secretary Hodges’ recent expression to the President of his doubts regarding the advisability of USIA financing exhibits at trade fairs where there is little potential for U.S. trade promotion. We understand that you would welcome a paper from the Bureau setting forth the Commerce, USIA and State positions on this matter and making a recommendation for your consideration. Our understanding of the positions of Commerce, USIA and State over the years is summarized below. We have not sought the approval of any of the agencies for this statement.

Commerce position—The Secretary’s views reflect a belief that the balance of payments situation should increase the importance attached to the promotion of American exports in the selection of sites for USIA “trade fair” exhibits abroad. The exhibits should be mounted in countries where there is a significant potential for sales of American products.

This “trade fair” program, which originally was a special program of the President, has always included an important element of trade promotion. Participation of American businessmen in the display, and more lately the sale, of their products has been sought and obtained from the beginning. Special missions of American businessmen often were and are sent to many of the exhibits to promote American products. The U.S. Government and American businessmen should not invest the considerable amounts of money and effort required in countries where few sales can be expected, such as Czechoslovakia, Indonesia, Guatemala, etc.

USIA position—National exhibits, usually shown at bona fide trade fairs, but also shown “solo” in major foreign cities, have become a significant propaganda tool in the Cold War. Our propaganda purpose is often well-served if the economic attainments of this country are


‡ See Document 143 and footnote 2 thereto.
shown and explained through industrial or trade promotion exhibits. Or this propaganda purpose may be best served by using an industrial or trade exhibit largely as a cover for more subtle explanations of this country and its point of view. The major purpose being propaganda, the site, theme and content of these exhibits must be determined by propaganda needs, not trade promotion needs. To the extent possible, however, without subverting the major propaganda purpose, promotion of U.S. exports should also be an element in the exhibit.

State position—Generally speaking the State Department has supported USIA views on site and theme selection. In fact, at times a particular site is selected for political reasons at the insistence of an American ambassador even though USIA and Commerce may be somewhat cool to the Ambassador’s recommendation. (Annual Greenweek exhibit in Berlin)3

Past actions to clarify program purpose—Various actions over the life of this program have repeatedly reaffirmed its primary purpose as being informational rather than trade promotional. This Administration, especially, has by legislative proposal, executive order and budgetary action attempted to reduce the disagreement and misunderstanding by clarifying program purposes and agency responsibility regarding participation in trade fairs abroad.

1. The program was conceived in 1954 to compete with unchallenged psychological successes of Soviet Bloc exhibits at trade fairs.

2. The original law authorizing the program and the recently approved Fulbright-Hays Act state the propaganda or informational purposes of the program.

3. Since 1962 appropriations for the program have been sought and obtained as part of the USIA budget not as part of “Funds appropriated to the President.”

4. In 1962, the President delegated his authority for exhibits abroad under the Fulbright-Hays Act to USIA alone.

5. Beginning in 1960 the need for outright trade promotion exhibits abroad became more evident. This administration recognized this need by seeking and obtaining a specific Commerce appropriation for a trade promotion exhibit program entirely under the control of Commerce.

6. Early this year State, Commerce and USIA jointly instructed all USIA posts abroad4 that the USIA “trade fair” program had a primarily informational objective and that trade promotion should be included “insofar as this can be done within the psychological objectives. . . .”

3 An annual agricultural exposition held in Berlin.

4 See Document 117.
1965 Budget relationship—Insofar as the 1965 budget is concerned, we understand that Acting Director Wilson and Assistant Secretary of Commerce Behrman have agreed on sites to be proposed, largely to the satisfaction of USIA. Whether or not Secretary Hodges will accept his Assistant Secretary’s recommendation is not yet clear.

Recommendation—We recommend that the understandings and arrangements worked out during the past two years by this Administration be reaffirmed.

The USIA “trade fair” program is primarily informational in objective. Trade promotion should be included insofar as it can be done within psychological objectives. USIA principally makes that judgment. Thus, USIA should determine the site, theme and content of its exhibits after receiving the advice of Commerce and State.

The Commerce trade fair program is primarily to promote American exports. Psychological objectives are secondary but should be included upon the advice of USIA insofar as they can within the trade promotion objectives. (On August 11, 1961, the President requested Mr. Murrow “to assure the maximum psychological effectiveness of [all] United States exhibit efforts overseas.”) Therefore, Commerce should determine the site, theme and content of a trade promotion exhibit after considering whatever psychological advice USIA chooses to make.

Because of the informal nature of Secretary Hodges’ comments to the President, any Presidential decision on this matter perhaps should in the first instance be verbally transmitted to Secretary Hodges and Acting Director Wilson. If the President accepts the above recommendation, we suggest that a letter be sent either by the President or you indicating the President’s decision so that officials and staffs of both agencies clearly understand the President’s views. Staff of the Budget Bureau are, of course, available for whatever drafting assistance you may desire.

Irving J. Lewis

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5 See Document 45. Brackets are in the original.
Dear John:

I hope I am being overly pessimistic but the days immediately ahead look rather dark for USIS. Your memo to Ambassador Lodge pertaining to the possible closing down of our field support posts is disquieting. So is the fact that the attacks on USIS not only continue in the Times of Viet-Nam but are now being extended to vernacular newspapers.

I have one thought on the situation which perhaps may be gratuitous, but I would not feel right if I did not pass it on to you. Since the pressure on USIS may well include increased personal pressure on you of the type you have already experienced, you must be extremely careful in the weeks ahead to be cleaner than a hound’s tooth. It seems to me that you may have to be unusually circumspect in your relations with the Vietnamese and the U.S. correspondents in order not to allow the GVN the possibility of laying a real glove on you.

I am sure you have thought of this already. I suppose, also, that if the GVN decides to cut USIS down and cut you down too, what you do will make little difference. But in case they’re undecided and wavering, it surely is important that we don’t give them any unnecessary excuses for action.

Ed is really doing very well in light of the magnitude of his operation. I went out to see him several days ago and we had a good talk. His spirit and his guts are pure Murrow. We discussed Viet-Nam and he asked me to send you his warmest regards.

Sincerely yours,

Donald M. Wilson

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1 Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Countries Series, Box 201, Vietnam, General, 10/15/63–10/28/63, Memos & Misc. Secret; Eyes Only. According to a typewritten notation in the top right corner, a copy of the memorandum was sent to Bundy. Also printed in Foreign Relations, 1961–1963, vol. IV, August–December 1963, Document 199.

2 Not found.

3 Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
CA–4402 Washington, October 21, 1963, 5:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

Emphasis on Youth: Spotting Young Leaders

REF

CA–5573, November 20, 1962
CA–14650, June 29, 1963

JOINT STATE-USIA-AID-DOD MESSAGE

It is essential that a special effort be made to persuade identifiable potential leaders to turn to the West rather than the East if they intend to seek education or training abroad.

The Interagency Youth Committee has noted that U.S. Government scholarship programs generally do not make provision for training potential young leaders from the less-developed and uncommitted countries if they have neither the background nor the apparent capacity for formal education. Persons of this kind are, however, accepted for training and indoctrination in the Communist Bloc. To illustrate the kinds of young people we mean, your attention is called to A–286 from Cotonou, and USIS field message #11 from LaPaz, portions of which are attached.

The purpose of this message is to urge posts to evaluate these types of young leaders and potential leaders for USG attention before they accept Bloc training offers.

AID and CU are considering means of offering pre-university, technical, vocational and leadership training to such young leaders; the private sector is also being approached.

We know that the problem of identifying such leaders is difficult, that the Communists, with their local cadres, may have a tactical advantage when democratic groups are less organized, and that the AID and CU technical and academic training programs already require considerable identification and selection of potential leaders. Yet the

1 Source: National Archives, RG 306, Subject Files 1955–1971, Acc. #68–J–1415, Entry UD WW 148, Box 261, Replies to CA–4402. Confidential. Sent for information to all European posts. Drafted by Battle on October 15; cleared in draft by Hillsman, Talbot, Tyler, Martin, Williams, Sorensen, Yarmolinsky, and Shooshan; approved by Harriman.

2 Not found.

3 Not found.
kinds of young leaders we mean are often missed because of the lack of programs to accommodate them; and with the stakes as high as they are, a priority effort must be made.

Information requested: If such training were made available in the West or in the home country, would it be possible to persuade the kinds of potential young leaders who now go to the Bloc to accept Western assistance instead? If not, why not? What kind of training is needed?

This identification is consistent with our desire to reach the future leaders of the developing areas while they are still young and to compete effectively with the Bloc for influence among them.

It is requested that the entire country team participate in this continuing effort and that the task of coordination in the field be undertaken by the Youth Coordinator, working closely with the Chief of Mission.

FOR AFRICAN POSTS ONLY:

The Department’s circular telegram 668 to African posts, dated October 11, requests information on a related subject, but that request for information should not be confused with this message which calls for a continuing action program.

Rusk

Attachment 1

Portion of Airgram 286 From the Embassy in Benin to the Department of State

Cotonou, Benin, undated.

This paper suggests that our efforts to identify and to cultivate West Africa’s second generation political leaders may be considerably more complex than we presently imagine. We should never assume, for example, that such leadership will necessarily emerge from a highly-educated elite corps. On the contrary, several signs point toward the development of grass roots demagoguery as the best means of obtaining political power.

With rare exceptions, today’s leaders in former French West Africa are relatively well-educated. Nonetheless, nearly all enjoy a base of national or regional support that makes them forces to be reckoned

4 Not found.
5 Confidential.
with in their own countries. It is precisely this grass roots political pull that the young intellectuals lack and presently show few signs of acquiring. Several years study in Paris or Dakar seems to leave them with little inclination to get their feet in the soil. Anyone who has seen American students from Operations Crossroads\(^6\) attempting to persuade their African colleagues of the glory of manual labor will understand this all too clearly.

With the popular field thus largely abandoned by the university graduates and with the passing of the older generation, the keys to political power thus may well fall into the hands of demagogues who have remained close to the soil and close to the people who live on it, or who can pretend to have done so. Traditional tribal and regional political institutions, blended with increasing awareness of the power of the ballot box, will also favor bush politicians. Finally, the almost certain failure of the educated elite to provide easy solutions for Africa's pressing economic and social problems will give the demagogues a ready target to fire at.

No suggestion is made that we stop or even reduce our present efforts to reach Africa's young intellectuals; they will occupy second echelon and technical positions of importance in any case. We should anticipate, nonetheless, a sizeable number of Huey Longs\(^7\) and Cotton Ed Smiths\(^8\) as Africa's future ministers and presidents. Identifying them in time and persuading them to our point of view may prove extraordinarily difficult, but the Russians should have at least as much difficulty as we in this regard.

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\(^{6}\) Operation Crossroads Africa was a private, non-profit entity that initiated self-sufficiency programs in Africa through the work of U.S. and Canadian youth volunteers. For additional information, see "Crossroads’ Record in 5 Years of Work in Africa Marked," *The New York Times*, February 2, 1964, p. 10.

\(^{7}\) Huey Long served as the Governor of Louisiana and as a Senator until his assassination in 1935.

\(^{8}\) Ellison D. “Cotton Ed” Smith served as a Senator from South Carolina from 1909 to 1944.
Attachment 2

Portion of USIS Field Message No. 11 From the United States Information Service in Bolivia

La Paz, Bolivia, undated.

“(Daniel) Guerra comes from a lower middle class family. His father, a man dedicated to leftist ideals, was a writer and translator for PRENSA LIBRE until his death some six months ago. The boy is intelligent and affable and one can see that he has a direct pipeline to his people and their problems . . .

We are, in this geographical area at least, missing the boat tremendously in our student exchange program. It appears that we are choosing young people from social levels that will not combat the prevailing leftist influences. This is undoubtedly due to the fact that students must meet the requirements of private U.S. universities. But whatever the reason may be, I feel that we should somehow simplify arrangements so that students from this campesino level may be sent to the United States for education and training. English is a requirement in the majority of our scholarship cases. At the University of Patrice Lumumba, however, the student is enrolled without having to meet any language requirement and during a two-year period is gradually and effectively brought into classes taught in Russian. These young people, furthermore, do not have to worry about breaking up their university careers with a one-year tour abroad. They are given full scholarships to complete a full curriculum and come back to their country with a degree and ready to go to work.

Much has been said—pro and con—about our meeting Iron Curtain scholarship programs both by increasing the number of students sent and by lowering the academic standards for them. I am not in a position to comment on that. I do know, however, that the students who go from Cochabamba to the United States are not usually chosen from a level of militant youth who will return to Bolivia and actively participate in promoting the democratic systems under which they have lived in the States. I doubt that we have any Daniel Guerras in the States. It seems to me that we should overhaul our local standards of selection on the one hand and on the other make some provision there to handle students who come from such rarefied cultural backgrounds as those from Bolivia.”

9 Confidential.

10 This university in Moscow, established by the Soviet Government for foreign students, was named after the Prime Minister of Congo who was killed in January 1961.

SUBJECT
Broadcasting in the Soviet Union

PARTICIPANTS
Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin, USSR
Llewellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador-at-Large, Department of State

On the occasion of the lunch for the Soviet wheat delegation,² the Soviet Ambassador took me aside and made the following statement:

“In the Soviet Union, it was found necessary to draw attention to the activities of such subversive radio stations as “Freedom,” “For the Liberation of Great Russia,” “N.T.S.,” “Free Russia” which continue their broadcasts to the Soviet Union in Russian and the languages of other nationalities of our country. It is no secret, that these radio stations, speaking on behalf of various organizations hostile to the Soviet Union, are financed and controlled by American organizations and groups. The contents of their broadcasts are of a dirty, slanderous character and cannot but cause indignation of the Soviet public with regard to those who direct and lead the work of the said radio stations.

“The activities of such radio stations are in a manifest contradiction with the task of the normalization and development of relations between the USSR and the USA and it is time to put an end to such activities.

“It should also be noted, that, in violation of international agreements, these radio broadcasts are conducted on the radio waves which belong to the USSR and a number of other countries.

“As is known to the American side, the Soviet organizations, having expressed their good will, stopped jamming radio broadcasts of “The Voice of America” to the Soviet Union.

“We should like to hope that the American side will take this into consideration, that it will approach our appeal with understanding and will take measures within its responsibility to put an end to the above-mentioned anti-Soviet radio broadcasts.

“This would respond to the purposes of improving Soviet-American relations.”

The Ambassador explained that this was not a formal statement but that he had simply been instructed to speak to me personally along these lines. As lunch was announced at this point, I had no opportunity to reply.

COMMENT

The Soviets may be seeking an excuse to resume jamming, although I would doubt this from the care with which Dobrynin emphasized that this was not a formal statement. Nevertheless, I suggest that careful consideration should be given to what reply, if any, should be made.

149. Memorandum From the Ambassador at Large (Thompson) to the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)\footnote{Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Subjects Series, Box 306, Radio Free Europe. Confidential.}


Yesterday Dobrynin orally protested the activities of some of our unofficial radio broadcasts and although he did not mention RFE,\footnote{See Document 148.} the timing of the protest will make them particularly sensitive to the President’s remarks.\footnote{On October 25, the White House released a statement by Kennedy on Radio Free Europe. For the full text, see Public Papers: Kennedy, 1963, p. 814.}

I have suggested a few minor changes but there is not much that can be done to mitigate the effect. However, in view of their own attitude on ideological matters, I do not think the effect of the speech will be too serious. My main concern is that they might resume jamming. One suggestion might be to insert after the first paragraph a few sentences in justification of these activities along the following lines:
“The free world is entirely open to communist propaganda and argumentation and we have no fear of engaging in a battle of ideas. But the communist world is largely closed to information and to Western thought and receives a one-sided view not only of ideological matters but even of factual developments throughout the world. Radio Free Europe attempts to redress this unfair imbalance.”

Llewellyn E. Thompson

4 Drawn in an unknown hand, presumably Bundy’s, is a bracket in the left-hand margin next to this paragraph and the capital letter “A.” Kennedy’s statement incorporated Thompson’s suggested language as follows: “The free world is entirely open to Communist propaganda and argumentation and we have no fear of engaging in the battle of ideas. But the Communist world is largely closed to information and to Western thought and receives a one-sided view not only of ideological matters but even of factual developments throughout the world. Radio Free Europe attempts to redress this imbalance.” (Ibid.)

5 Thompson signed “Tommy” above his typed signature.

150. Memorandum From the Office of Public Information, United States Information Agency to USIA Employees


SUBJECT
Some Changes in USIA since March, 1961

Since the appointment of Edward R. Murrow as Director, in March, 1961, a number of far-reaching changes have been effected in the policies, operations, procedures and output of the U.S. Information Agency. Inventoried below are some of the more significant of these changes. This listing is for the information of USIA employees who, engrossed in their own segment of the Agency operation, may like to know of changes and developments in other areas.

The role of the Director and his senior officers in the formulation of foreign policy has been greatly strengthened. No longer is USIA handed a policy and told to make the best of it. The Agency’s counsel is now sought whenever national policies with foreign implications are being formulated. The Director participates actively in all meetings of the National Security Council and its executive committee. His key officers consult daily with their counterparts in the White House, the Department of State and other federal departments and agencies. President Kennedy’s January 25, 1963 statement of mission for USIA charged the Agency with the responsibility for “advising the President, his representatives abroad, and the various departments and agencies on the implications of foreign opinion for present and contemplated United States policies, programs and official statements.”\textsuperscript{2} That statement is very much an operational fact.

A revamping of functions has taken place in the Agency’s Office of Policy to meet the problems and opportunities of the changing times. The country planning mechanism was overhauled to streamline and sharpen the functioning of USIS as an integral component of the overseas country teams. A media coordinator has been assigned to ensure that the many instruments of communication used by USIA are synchronized both in content and in timing. A long range planning officer has also been assigned to provide guidelines for other than immediate policy and media objectives to be reached in five to 10 years. A youth and student affairs officer plans and promotes activities and output directed to these critically important audiences. Another officer has been assigned to ensure the inclusion of overseas research findings in the Agency’s policies and programming.

\textit{FIELD POSTS}

At overseas posts paper work has been subordinated to leg work. The volume of reporting from the field to headquarters has been reduced by about 20\% to permit a corresponding increase of field officers’ time in furthering programs and policies. Remaining reporting procedures have been simplified and streamlined.

Length of overseas tours, except in critical hardship posts, has been extended 50\% from two to three years and a policy is followed whereby key officers often return to the same post for a second tour. This permits better use of officers who thus have greater time to develop contacts and know the problems.

Regional specialization for foreign service officers has been made the rule. No longer are officers assigned from one area to another

\textsuperscript{2} See Document 109.
throughout their careers, thus acquiring a smattering of expertise in one area only to be assigned away from it for the next tour. To the extent possible, they now spend the bulk of their overseas careers in a single cultural or ethnic region.

The diffusion of effort and output that characterized USIA during the first years of its existence is ended. No longer is the Agency’s mission “to tell America’s story abroad”; no longer does USIA scatter its fire indiscriminately to all segments of all populations. “Targetting”, always an ideal, is now a reality. Audiences are carefully selected—together with the techniques of reaching them and the contents of the message—to achieve maximum influence leading to political action. All USIA media function in synchronization: if the theme is Free Choice, and the peg is Berlin, each medium devises a message best communicated through its instrument. The messages are carefully related each to the other and each supports the other. This results in a multiplied opinion impact.

A much greater awareness of the function of USIS has spread among senior U.S. operating officials in the 106 countries abroad where the Agency now has posts. Chiefs of mission now know that the public affairs officer and his staff have a dual responsibility: (1) to advise the mission on the psychological implications in the country of U.S. policies, plans and actions and (2) to serve as the information, cultural and psychological link between the mission and the people of the host country.

Since the spring of 1961 the Agency has increasingly emphasized operations in Africa and Latin America and because of these priorities has had to curtail somewhat its operations in Western Europe where normal communications with the U.S. are relatively full and open. The Agency has opened 12 new mission posts and eight branch posts in Africa in this period; 11 new branch posts in Latin America; two mission posts and one branch post in the Far East; one mission post and two branch posts in the Near East; in Western Europe, USIA closed four branch posts and opened one new one.

To assist the African area in its tasks of organizing many new posts, the Agency has conducted in Africa a series of training workshops for local employees. These have covered subjects such as office practices, maintenance and operation of motion picture projectors, the establishment and operation of a library, techniques of handling small exhibits, and the servicing of multilith presses.

The Agency has become increasingly effective in acting as a catalyst in producing the maximum favorable impression overseas out of the travels abroad of prominent American Government officials, and others. USIS posts thoroughly prepared for trips such as President Kenne-
December 1960–November 1963

dy’s to Latin America and Europe, Mrs. Kennedy’s visit to India and Pakistan, and Vice President Johnson’s travel to the Near East and Scandinavia. All the media in Washington did their advance work, too. During the trips, foreign service officers facilitated coverage by commercial media and also covered the events themselves. Films, special editions of magazines and pamphlets help to broaden, and make more lasting, the impact of such visits.

A Foreign Correspondents’ Center was opened in New York City to help some 500 journalists who usually live in the U.S. to cover America and the United Nations. The Center arranged briefings by prominent American officials and others. It also facilitates visits outside New York. A documentation center is another service.

Greatly increased Agency-wide attention is being paid to key youth, student and labor groups abroad. For details see 20th Semi-Annual Report to Congress, pages 18–21 and 28–35.

VOICE OF AMERICA

In February, 1963 the short wave power of the Voice of America was doubled. A giant new transmitter complex—nearly five million watts, equal to the broadcast power of 96 of the top U.S. commercial radio stations—was completed at Greenville, North Carolina. This complex gives USIA a fairer signal to Latin America, Europe and Africa.

Four highly versatile air-transportable transmitters have been constructed and put into operation. Three are near Monrovia. They provide an interim signal to Africa south of the Sahara until a large permanent transmitter complex of 1.6 million watts is completed in March, 1964. The fourth, on Marathon Key off Florida, beams medium wave broadcasts to Cuba.

3 Kennedy traveled to Venezuela and Colombia December 16–17, 1961; to Mexico June 29–July 1, 1962; and to Costa Rica March 18–20, 1963. He traveled to France and Austria May 31–June 5, 1961; and to Germany, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Italy, and Vatican City June 22–July 2, 1963 (see Document 134).

4 The First Lady traveled to India and Pakistan March 12–26, 1962.


Improvements in VOA’s short wave broadcast service include: consolidation of Chinese-language casts by eliminating Amoy and Cantonese and concentrating on Mandarin, the principal language on the mainland and on Formosa; inauguration of Portuguese broadcasts to Brazil; increase of Spanish broadcasts to Latin America from one hour to nine hours daily; inauguration of dictation-speed newscasts in Spanish and Portuguese to facilitate wider diffusion by the printed word; considerable increase in the number of (stringer) correspondents reporting to VOA.

Other VOA construction advances: (1) the first of six new transmitters at Woofferton, England—increasing VOA power there fivefold to 1.25 million watts—goes on the air shortly; (2) relay facilities aboard Coast Guard Cutter, Courier, are being land-based on Island of Rhodes where the Near East Arabic services are being concentrated; (3) agreements for relay-transmitter installations were made with Greece and the Philippines; (4) relay facilities in the U.S., at Bethany, Ohio, and Delano and Dixon, California are being modernized; (5) new antennas have been built for RIAS, the Agency’s station in West Berlin, with a resulting five-fold increase in power at night for broadcasts that blanket East Germany. Meanwhile, obsolescent relay transmitters at Brentwood, Long Island, Schenectady, New York, and Wayne, New Jersey, were retired from service.

The volume of VOA short wave broadcasting has increased nearly 30% since January, 1961: from 617'45" to 796'15" hours weekly.

The volume of placement on overseas medium wave transmitters of VOA-produced tapes has increased more than 150% since January, 1961: from 5,457 to 14,000 hours weekly. Some 5,500 radio stations in the free world, both commercial and government-owned, carry such VOA taped programs.

Twice the Voice of America has massed its transmitters to deliver to listeners behind the Iron Curtain an electronic Sunday punch consisting of vital information which Communist governments had been denying their people. The first: November 5, 1961, employing 52 transmitters, 4.3 million watts and 80 frequencies during an eight-hour period. It told the Russian people of world-wide revulsion because the Soviets had callously broken the atomic testing moratorium and resumed atmospheric tests. The second: October 25, 1962, employing the same strength and number of frequencies as the year previous, to broadcast the full story of the crisis confrontation over Cuba. In both cases, monitoring and the reports of correspondents in the USSR confirmed that, despite intensive jamming efforts, the broadcasts got through to an immense audience.

MOTION PICTURE SERVICE

Sixty-seven films have been completed since March, 1961. Thirty-six of these are documentary, and 31 are major films on the visits of
foreign dignitaries and other topical subjects. Among the more impor-
tant films have been:

“United in Progress”, two reels in color, based upon the participa-
tion of President Kennedy in the Costa Rican conference of Central
American chiefs of state;

“A Philosopher’s Journey”, two reels in color, on the visit of the
President of India to the United States, symbolizing the friendship
between the two nations;

“Invitation to India” and “Invitation to Pakistan”, both in color,
depicted Mrs. Kennedy’s visit in 1962 to those countries;\(^8\)

“The Farmer and I”, two reels in color, shows the life and labor
of an American farmer;

“China and the Far East”, two reels, black and white, is one of a
number of anti-Communist films;

“Escape to Freedom”, three reels, black and white, shows the drama
and the tragedy of the flight of refugees from Communist lands;

“School at Rincon Santo”, “Evil Wind Out” and “Letter from Co-
lombia” were produced to support the Alliance for Progress. Each is
one reel, black and white.

“The Five Cities of June”, three reels in color, depicts five significant
events in June, 1963.\(^9\)

Since March 1961 sixty-six films have been acquired from non-
Agency sources at little or no cost. For its “packets” of films of special-
ized subjects, IMS acquired 1,173 prints, and 801 more prints are on
loan for field use. It is estimated that acquisition activities during FY
1963 saved IMS $501,097. Sources for these films were several organiza-
tions, societies and associations, hospitals, doctors and institutions,
trade unions, government agencies, foundations, museums and private
industry. Among the more outstanding films acquired were: “Agricul-
ture USA”, “Project Telstar” and “The John Glenn Story.”

The Agency is now placing special emphasis on one-reel documen-
taries because this type of picture is relatively easy to place in public
theaters, whereas lengthy films are rarely accepted by theaters. Strong
evidence of the success of this operation is the report from USIS San-
tiago.\(^10\) The report concerns “Horizons”, the news magazine for Latin
America. Recently USIA adopted the policy of issuing “Horizons” as
two separate one-reel productions per month instead of a single two-
reel production. USIS Santiago reported that 10 first run theaters

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\(^8\) See Document 96, Appendix A.1 and A.2.

\(^9\) See Appendix A.3.

\(^10\) Not found.
accepted prints of the single reel version of “Horizons”, whereas only five of these theaters would accept the two-reel issues. The audience for the two-reel version was 50,400, whereas the two 10-minute issues were placed in a total of 18 principal theaters in Santiago and were seen by 132,500.

With the cooperation of the American Science Film Association, USIA has sponsored, organized and coordinated American Science Film Forums in many countries. These traveling forums show selected American science films, accompanied by lectures, discussions and seminars under the leadership of outstanding American scientists. Their purpose is to emphasize U.S. pre-eminence in science; the relationship of science to human progress; and to demonstrate the application of films to research, education and the popularizing of scientific knowledge.

The U.S. Government and the American film industry participation in major international film festivals has been greatly strengthened. George Stevens served as Chairman of the American delegations to the festivals at Cannes and Venice in 1962; in 1963 he was chairman of the American delegations to the Moscow and Venice festivals and a member of the delegation to the Berlin festival. Because of the reluctance of the Motion Picture Association of America to select U.S. entertainment feature films for the 1962 Cannes film festival, the Hollywood Guilds Festival Committee was established upon the recommendation of USIA.

OPINION RESEARCH

To fulfill its advisory function and to tailor output, USIA must know continuously and quickly what people abroad think about U.S. foreign policy actions and statements, along with their reaction to other major happenings. In recognition of this, reporting of such reactions has been expanded and speeded.

During the October 1962 Cuban crisis, for example, reports on global reaction were prepared twice a day, then daily, then intermittently as required. An over-all assessment of the situation was prepared later when there was time for adequate evaluation. Similar reports were issued on many subjects including the Sino-India border conflict and the Buddhist protests in South Viet-Nam.

Public opinion studies overseas have been enlarged in scope and depth to examine long-term values and aspirations as well as current views. In 1963 the Agency’s Survey Research Division conducted its

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11 See, footnote 3, Document 128.
12 See, footnote 2, Document 140.
first world-wide public opinion study designed to measure attitudes on a global basis. Surveys also are used to study target groups that USIA is attempting to influence, to investigate channels and methods of communication and to examine the effectiveness of specific Agency programs. There has been a substantial increase in field commissioned research projects, including pre-testing of media materials and studies to determine the impact of particular programs. An effort is being made to study the attitudes of emerging peoples. This work has been expanded considerably in the past two years with an accumulation of invaluable information.

The Agency’s research staff has stimulated applicable study by independent American scholars, foundations and universities. Survey findings now are being exchanged through information centers established at several universities.

A special projects research division was established in January, 1962 to cultivate fields of private research by offering suggestions, encouragement and limited financial backing. Additional resources have been utilized when research objectives converged with those of USIA and other government agencies. The values and aspirations of developing peoples, the clash of ideologies and political semantics have been the chief fields of exploration under this program. Research findings are being used to help tailor Agency information output.

Communist propaganda reporting and analysis now is handled on a daily basis. An early morning briefing from the overnight files informs key Agency officials on the latest Communist propaganda lines. Soviet and Cuba specialists prepare daily reports summarizing the foreign and domestic output from Moscow and Havana. Interviews with refugees and travelers from Communist countries have been utilized to probe public opinion in nations closed to us. By this method the Agency has acquired some indications of popular attitudes and communications habits in the Communist orbit.

The Agency’s research library has introduced an automatic punch-card system of procurement, which reduced overtime and cut out hundreds of man hours spent annually in typing and filing. New equipment has speeded the transmission of materials between the library’s several branches and has made file materials more readily available to operating services. Two new library branches were opened. One is the Foreign Correspondents’ Center, a reference and circulating library near the United Nations headquarters in New York. The other is a limited collection selected for the particular benefit of Agency trainees.

PRIVATE COOPERATION

During the past two years, American business and individuals have given the Agency a considerable volume of materials, otherwise
unobtainable because of budget limitations, which were essential in overseas posts for initiating and welding a relationship with priority audience groups. Examples:

About half of all donated books are now carried overseas free by several major steamship lines: in the past two years some 800,000 books were shipped this way. At no charge, U.S. truckers are also moving impressive quantities of books and other materials from points of donation to the Agency's Brooklyn and Washington warehouses where they are screened and shipped.

Last Spring the U.S. Post Office Department agreed to give the Agency all books received in its 14 dead letter centers—100,000 to 150,000 annually. Most are new books, delivered by the Post Office to the USIA warehouse in Washington at no cost to the Agency. Some 150 wives of Agency officers have volunteered a half-day or more a week to sort and pack them. Supervised by a professional librarian, they so far have selected about 60,000 volumes for USIS use overseas. These include new high-quality reference works, texts, publications suitable for special presentations, as well as fine groups of American fiction, both hard and paper backed.

USIA's cooperative effort with American industry to inform U.S. businessmen stationed abroad on critical issues of American foreign policy now enters its third successful year. Over 8,000 such businessmen receive from their home office briefing material supplied by the Agency to 441 international companies. The most recent was on the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty; it reached recipients while international interest in the treaty was at its peak.

For the past year the Agency has operated an editorial exchange program with company and professional association publications that circulate overseas. USIA provides those publications with feature and policy materials for background, and will also suggest articles that will help to convey U.S. objectives to overseas readers. More than a million people are reached by the 67 American private publications now receiving such Agency material. In exchange, the Agency obtains, without cost, industrial and association material of value to Agency editors and writers. Additionally, a hundred exceptionally high quality publications, showing the achievements of American business, science and technology, are now received monthly or quarterly for distribution to USIS libraries.

The increasing need for sports equipment abroad led to the creation of an International Sports Kit Project in cooperation with the People-to-People Sports Committee. Begun in September 1962, the project resulted in requests for more than 12,700 Sports Kits from USIS posts in 86 countries. During the first year U.S. organizations and individuals donated 250 Sports Kits valued at $7,000 for distribution by USIS posts.
in 50 countries. Recent promotional efforts are expected to result in a significant increase in the giving of Sports Kits. Within a price range of from $12 to $64, the six kits provide equipment for boxing, baseball, softball, volleyball, soccer and basketball.

Emphasis in the donated books and magazine program has shifted from used to new material. Most of the 800,000 donated books shipped overseas by the Agency last year were new. In addition, the Book-of-the-Month Club has donated full subscriptions to 700 foreign libraries recommended by USIS posts. To avoid duplication and achieve greater effectiveness, a joint USIA-Peace Corps Donated Book Pool has been established to solicit book donations and to fill Peace Corps Volunteer and USIS book needs. While the magazine newsstand program continues at the 2,000,000 annual new magazine level, greater stress has been placed on technical and professional journals such as medical journals or the Scientific American.

Agency officers and executives of American companies with international operations have been meeting to delineate areas of mutual interest. These discussions, with over 150 companies, have served two purposes: first, to encourage these industries to identify their overseas activities with the economic and social development of the countries where they are operating, and second, to explore the possibilities of cooperation abroad between industry and Agency representatives. In this connection, USIS Public Affairs Officers are now visiting the home offices of companies with substantial operations in the countries where these officers are stationed.

Just over a year old, and now managed by a private non-profit corporation, the “Books USA” program allows Americans to purchase packets of 10 selected paperback books, at $4.00, for distribution abroad by USIS and the Peace Corps. This project, which requires no appropriated funds, takes advantage of the “at cost” basis on which many paperback publishers are prepared to make good books available, and it allows USIA control of distribution and presentation according to current target priorities.

Three automobiles, each towing a fully equipped travel trailer, have been made available to Agency foreign service officers for familiarization trips during their home leave in the United States. All costs, including gas, oil and insurance are borne by the Wally Byam Foundation.13 Twelve USIS officers and their families this year were able to

13 Wally Byam was a pioneer manufacturer of travel trailers. The foundation established after his death promoted cultural exchange and education between countries around the world, as well as the history and culture of the United States to its own citizens. For additional information, see Nan Trent, “Diplomats Hit the Trail,” The Christian Science Monitor, October 19, 1964, p. 6.
benefit from this opportunity to reacquaint themselves with the grass roots life of the country for which they are spokesmen overseas on their next assignment.

**TRAINING**

The Agency has expanded the training program for junior officers to include the eight week, basic officers course at State’s Foreign Service Institute. USIA officers thus receive essentially the same basic preparation as do junior diplomats. At the same time, USIA has the opportunity of indoctrinating future ambassadors in the role of the Agency. This is done through professional contributions to the curriculum and by the presence and actions of Agency junior officers participating in the courses.

The Agency has also increased its participation in the mid-career course from four or five officers a year to 20 or 25. With USIA assistance the course of instruction has been completely revised. Slightly over half of the Foreign Service Officers of this Agency are in grades R–5 and R–4. Training opportunities, other than language, for officers at this level are limited. For this reason USIA attaches great significance to the mid-career officers course and hopes to increase its participation in the future.

Substantial changes have been made in the training and placement of junior officers. In addition to the basic officers course, language training is heavily emphasized. Approximately 70% of the Agency’s junior officer trainees now receive six months of language instruction before leaving for the field. Of these, 50% are trained in languages other than French, German and Spanish. Every junior officer now gets a basic course in the language of his training post; previously, European languages were stressed. A junior officer is now assigned to his training post or area for at least one tour of duty following his ten-month training period, unless there are overriding reasons to the contrary. This is completely contrary to previous policy. USIA has encouraged the Foreign Service Institute to develop a series of short courses (six months or less) in the so-called “hard” languages. Many USIA junior officers achieve phenomenal results from these intensive studies and, when followed by living in the country for three years, they develop a high degree of proficiency.

USIA has organized a number of special seminars and institutes for the domestic establishment of the Agency. These have covered such topics as youth and student affairs, international labor, U.S. efforts and accomplishments in space and the special seminar on problems of developing areas. Approximately 1,200 employees of the Agency have benefited from the program; for many it has been their first formal Agency training.
The USIA Intern Program for young graduates of university cinematography schools was inaugurated in October, 1962. Those selected, five in number, have done graduate work in films, have made films of their own and have worked closely with skilled professionals. They work for a year in the Agency on motion picture projects and receive special technical training and general instruction during those activities in preparation for assignment overseas. A new group of five interns will be inducted very soon.

THE PRINTED WORD AND PIX

During the past two and one-half years, the Press and Publications Service has developed new directions in both the nature of its output and its operational methods. In content, the major change has been in the emphasis on five major themes, which are the framework for the bulk of the service’s output. The main effort has been to create Press and Publications material designed to emphasize the sources of strength on which U.S. foreign policy is based. Simultaneously, material not linked to America has been diminished.

Direction of IPS visual output has been concentrated in one operating branch with a direct line of responsibility to the director of IPS. Previously, it was diffused. A Run of Paper color service has been initiated to provide overseas publications with color separations on thematic subjects, which greatly reduces reproduction costs and increases use.

Picture service on chief-of-state visitors has been speeded. The old presentations albums that took a minimum of two months to produce have been replaced with prestige leather portfolios presented to the visitor before he leaves the United States to return home.

In graphics, the True Tales continuity strip is now being offered the field in jumbo size suitable for display and presentation. All regular cartoon continuity strips are now being produced in Spanish as well as English.

A series of cartoon-type booklets was devised to carry the Alliance for Progress and anti-Castro messages to the mass audience in Central and South America. Each booklet depicts actual happenings in color-drawing sequences. They have been extremely effective, making necessary large volume reprints. Twenty titles have been published. Nearly 20 million copies have been printed and distributed.

In order to improve the Agency’s still picture output and keep abreast of technical developments, the Agency’s photo laboratory was modernized. The lab’s capacity for speedily turning out large quantities of copy negatives was greatly increased by the purchase of a continuous film processor. A Log-E-Tronics Unit, the first step toward electronic production of multiple prints was installed.
The IPS newsroom was reorganized as follows: Coverage, formerly the sole responsibility of a press coverage desk, was divided between the Washington desk and the telegraph desk. For the first time, a copy desk was created, to edit not only newsroom copy but also that of the features section and the visual materials branch. A news editor was added to supervise these desks. Several experienced newsmen were added to these desks (for example, a former associate editor of the Saturday Evening Post, an assistant city editor of the Louisville Times, a Sunday editor of the Corpus Christi Caller Times). An additional reporter has been assigned to the IPS UN Bureau. Coverage-in-depth, as opposed to straight top of the news coverage, has increased, with the production of a markedly greater number of backgrounders, situation pieces and interpretive stories.

The volume of IPS content has been tightened materially, but the Wireless Files have been expanded, largely in Africa. In March, 1961, 91 posts were equipped for direct Wireless File reception, of which only 18 were in Africa. In 1962, receiving equipment for 15 new African posts was put into operation and a separate African regional file was inaugurated. It started as a four-hour English transmission and now is six hours in English and French to 30 countries. Jamaica, British Guiana, Malaya, the Dominican Republic and Guayaquil also started getting the Wireless File. Altogether, 111 posts now receive it.

IPS pamphlet output has sharpened its political accent while reducing quantity which conforms with the Agency’s role as the psychological arm of the Government in implementing foreign policy. Consequently, much of the material once presented as Americana is no longer used, except when it is essential as a means of suggesting a method for action in other countries. Examples of this closer keying to major current objectives were when the nuclear test ban treaty was under negotiation, IPS quickly issued a number of pamphlets in support; when Berlin was the hot issue, graphic pamphlets were produced. Heavier emphasis on graphics resulted in a picture pamphlet on Castro’s betrayal of the Cuban people. Currently a comprehensive documentation of the Sino-Soviet split is being prepared.

In IPS mail features, science output has doubled, with space developments by far the biggest subject, but with increases also in subjects such as medicine, scientific applications in industry and similar subjects of great interest abroad, particularly in underdeveloped areas. Overseas rights have been acquired for material produced under domestic commercial contracts with the Astronauts. The volume of material on Civil Rights also has doubled in the past two years.

The number of IPS special packets, on such subjects as “The U.S. Trade Expansion Program”, “Thirty Years of U.S. Social and Economic Progress”, and “New Products and Processes in U.S. Industries”, has
increased sharply. Much more is being done to explain how the Democratic form of government assists and benefits its citizens. For example, a series called “How the U.S. Government Helps the People” has been running more than two years, and has developed more than 30 byliners by heads of various Federal Agencies outlining functions directly benefitting the citizen and the community. The effort to explain America within a mutual frame of reference is being carried out in the series, “Profile of an American”, which has included a school teacher, doctor, farmer, steel worker and editor, among others.

In magazine reprints, a special service has been established to increase the number and variety of articles with intellectual appeal, for use in USIS-produced scholarly magazines. This in turn has led to servicing of more articles on public affairs by such government policymakers as Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., and Walt Whitman Rostow.

Special materials output by IPS has devoted increasing attention to the international effects of Communism. For example, an exhaustive series of articles was produced on Communist infiltration of free nations, covering most of the world’s non-Communist nations. More is being done on the Communist economic offensive to show how trade and aid are used to promote purely political goals. The volume of background articles on the Sino-Soviet split has increased, and they point out that the dispute is primarily ideological and that the goals of world conquest remain unchanged.

The Africa Branch of IPS completed its second year of operation last month. It now serves 33 countries through 47 USIS posts. Thirty of them have radio telephone and telegraph equipment to receive the daily bi-lingual file. A small French staff provides French versions of both Wireless File and mail materials. From its beginning, the Branch has carried a heavy load in supplying copy on African visitors and other U.S. African firsts, and has played a leading role in telling a frank but constructive and continuous story of race relations in this country.

In September, 1963, secure teletype circuits were put into service between the State and Agency wire rooms and USIA assumed the responsibility for its own terminal processing. Reproduction workloads were sharply reduced and delivery times, both in and out, greatly improved.

A Regional Service Center was established in Mexico City in March, 1962. It was staffed with editorial specialists directing their efforts to selected audiences of labor, students, and self-help phases of the Alliance for Progress. Their end products are in the form most suitable for the transmitting media—finished printed material, lithographic negatives for local printed reproduction and manuscripts of material designed for placement in local magazines, newspapers, radio and television stations. Two other overseas Centers, at Beirut and Manila,
sharpened their operations by increasing services while reducing costs. Services to using posts were increased and unit costs reduced. Meanwhile, a survey of press requirements for West Africa was made and the new posts were provided with minimum equipment for producing printed materials.

**EXHIBITIONS**

Exhibits prepared initially for showing in the USSR under US–USSR Cultural Exchange Agreements[^14] and later shown in other East European countries:

“Plastics USA” (5,000 sq. ft.): Shown for three weeks each in Kiev, Moscow and Tbilisi, between May and September, 1961, to audiences totalling 375,000 people. Exhibited in Rumania at Bucharest and Cluj; at Posnan (as part of an International Trade Fair) and Warsaw, Poland; and in Zagreb, Yugoslavia (again as part of an International Trade Fair)—between March and September of 1962—to an additional audience of 1,590,000.

“Transportation USA” (7,000 sq. ft.): Displayed in Volgograd and Kharkov between October 24 and December 27, 1961 to a total audience of 172,000. Shown again in Belgrade and Ljubljana between May and October of 1962, to an additional audience of 390,000.

“Medicine USA” (7,000 sq. ft.): Shown in Moscow, Kiev, and Leningrad for three weeks in each city, between March and July, 1962—to a total audience of 206,954. It was displayed in Zagreb and Belgrade in April and May to an additional 202,600 persons. This exhibit also formed the U.S. representation at Izmir (Turkey) International Fair in August, 1963, attracting there a quarter of a million visitors.


“U.S. Astronaut Orbits the Earth”: This exhibit consisted of seven unmounted panels printed in color. Two thousand copies were prepared and shipped to posts all over the world well in advance of John Glenn’s orbital flight. The posts made them ready for display as soon as word of Glenn’s safe landing on February 20, 1962, was received, and many posts have continued to display them on appropriate occasions.

“Friendship Seven Mercury Capsule”: in which John Glenn made his orbital flight. The capsule was made available by NASA, transported by the Air Force and toured under USIA auspices to 23 countries.

[^14]: See Document 72.
between April and August of 1962. Standing-in-line and attendance records were broken by the Friendship Seven all along the way.15

“U.S. Progress in Space Sciences”: A 30-panel free-standing exhibit with seven models. Eleven sets have been distributed to all areas. Among the places where this exhibit has been shown with success to date (usually in combination with other Agency-supplied exhibits and models) are Rome and Sao Paulo in international fairs, Tokyo and four cities in Portugal.

“Graphic Arts USA” opened in Alma Ata in early October and was an immediate smash hit.

BOOK PUBLICATION AND DISTRIBUTION

Fiscal Year 1963 was the most productive year in the history of the Agency’s book publishing program. One thousand two hundred and two editions totalling 10,850,000 copies were published in 36 languages.

The Agency’s Latin American Book Translation Program was expanded dramatically during the last two years, increasing from contracting of 64 editions in Spanish and Portuguese totalling 541,000 copies in fiscal year 1961 to contracting of 332 editions totalling over 3,500,000 copies in fiscal year 1963. To insure that these vastly increased quantities of books reach Latin American readers, a campaign to encourage vigorous commercial promotion and sale of these books has been developed throughout the area.

With the emergence of some 16 Sub-Saharan French-speaking colonies and dependencies into independence, low-priced American book translations into French became an important concern of the Agency. By July, 1963, over one million copies of more than a hundred titles were available in French to African readers at the equivalent of 20 cents a copy.

Since the spring of 1961, over a million copies of some 200 American textbooks have been translated into 18 languages and published and placed in schools and universities in 17 countries under the PL–480 Textbook Programs.16

The Low-Priced Book Program in English has produced 3,085,921 paperbacks since March, 1961, and has sold 1,830,294. Reflecting improved distribution and promotion during the past two years, sales represented almost 50% of the total sold since the program began seven years ago.

15 See Document 70.
16 The U.S. Government used surplus foreign currencies accruing under P.L. 480 for textbook production, translation, and publishing. This program was substantial in India because of an over-supply of rupees.
The criteria by which the eligibility of informational materials for Informational Media Guaranty\textsuperscript{17} coverage is determined were substantially revised in September 1961. Eligibility is now limited to those materials which make a positive contribution in support of U.S. policy objectives and reflect favorably on the United States. The limited IMG resources are now allocated on a priority basis to assure that certain basic needs are met. For example, in fiscal year 1963, $350,000 in IMG contracts were issued for English-teaching materials. The bilateral agreement with Pakistan was amended to remove restrictions on the use of rupees acquired under the IMG program. A bilateral agreement was negotiated with the Republic of Guinea. Two new country programs were started (Korea and Afghanistan) and three other programs were phased out (Burma, Israel and the Philippines).

The Agency identified as of potential usefulness, and reviewed in relation to Agency objectives, over 10\% of the books issued by the American publishing industry (18,000 titles published in 1961; 22,000 in 1962).

As a field service based on ICS book reviews, the Agency recommended about 3,000 titles a year to USIS posts for special consideration in ordering books. Blue Books have also been compiled and distributed to all USIS posts. These annuals combine, cumulate and list in an orderly fashion all the books recommended to USIS posts by various elements of ICS.

The Agency compiled and issued periodic subject bibliographies and special lists of books to assist USIS officers in obtaining useful materials. Of particular importance were book lists on modernization, labor, history, periodicals, a series entitled Focus U.S.A., and shorter lists on areas of particular Agency emphasis.

Books were selected to accompany the increasing quantity and range of Agency-sponsored exhibits. These varied from large book collections shown in Iron Curtain countries, to a model American book store for presentation in the Middle East, and to smaller book displays which accompany exhibits travelling throughout the Free World.

The Agency’s American Studies program came of age with the publication of “The United States of America, A Syllabus of American Studies.” This “Syllabus”, along with complementary material on the University of Pennsylvania certificate program, is helping to promote the growth of American Studies at many posts around the world. By

\textsuperscript{17} This program, established by the U.S. Information Agency in 1948, allowed for the establishment of guaranty contracts between publishers and USIA to sell books through commercial channels. USIA would exchange any foreign currency payments to the publisher for dollars.
September, 1963, 63 posts had requested 1,883 sets of the Syllabus for presentation to university libraries, education officials and professors.

“Restatement of Purposes and Technique of Agency’s Cultural Packets” was published in July 1961. In it the cultural operations division announced the continued production of ghost-written lectures on those aspects of American society, culture, history and government of interest to overseas audiences, and of importance to the Agency’s overall program.

Nineteen new information centers have been opened on the African continent for an area total of 54. Two additional regional librarians have been appointed, one for Dakar and former French West Africa, one for Brazzaville and former French Equatorial Africa. This brings the total number of librarians in Africa to six.

Collection of books in French have been increased considerably for French-speaking countries with the institution and growth of the “Nouveaux Horizons” series of low cost books in French for Africa. Over 100 titles in this series are now on USIS Library shelves in Africa.

TELEVISION

The Agency has steadily increased its production of television programs to meet the immense need and interest overseas. In Fiscal year 1963, slightly more than 113 hours of programs on film and tape were produced compared with 101 hours in 1962. In 1963, 22 new positions were added in the Television Service to improve the production, quality and capacity: 10 positions in production, six on the technical staff, four in programming, and two in administration. These additions, and the Agency acquiring its own production equipment, have resulted in quality programs at costs lower than commercial stations.

New TV studios, nearing completion, will permit USIA to more than double the volume of in-house productions. The new facilities will enable USIA to do language adaptations, dubbing, editing, original programming and transfer of programs from tape to kinescopes. They also will make it possible to record audio and video direct transmissions from any of the three networks via the leased circuits, to transmit audio and video to 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue for direct screening and produce programs in three scanning standards. The equipment can handle many technical jobs that formerly had to be done under contract.

Agency productions and acquisitions have been placed on more than 40 new stations world-wide since mid-1961.

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18 The address of the United States Information Agency headquarters and main offices in Washington.
A series of 13 programs, entitled “World Americana”, was recently produced especially for the Japanese national television network. These programs described significant and interesting aspects of American life—leisure time, the American housewife, American youth, an American university and other subjects. Another targeted TV series, entitled “Personal Report”, was inaugurated for Nigeria, using a Nigerian student in Washington as the commentator. This series projected selected aspects of the American scene to a Nigerian audience in terms comprehensible to them. Twelve programs have been produced to date. In 1962 a series entitled “Washington Reports” was started for Japan. This bi-weekly program features a Japanese correspondent reporting on various current events of interest to Japan. Still another series aimed for the Far East is “Washington Newsletter”, a monthly series of reports to Thailand on events of interest in the United States.

In Fiscal 1963 a series of 13 half-hour Spanish-language programs, entitled “The Experts Answer”, was inaugurated for Latin America. In this series, Latin American newspaper correspondents question an American expert in the fields of government, labor, industry, science and the performing arts. This series has been sent to 19 Latin American countries for placement.

A 15-minute weekly public affairs type of TV show in Spanish and Portuguese, “Panorama Panamericano”, begun in 1961, has been improved and streamlined. Today it is carried in 19 Latin American countries.

Two special film programs on the Alliance for Progress were produced in Fiscal 1963. “Report from Colombia”, commemorating the first anniversary of the Alliance for Progress, was sent to 17 Latin American countries; and “Report from Venezuela”, on the subject of land reform, was distributed to 19 countries in Latin America for television and film showings. Recent films dealing with Castro have included “Focus: Cuba”, “Cuba—A World Verdict”, “The Lost Apple”, “Castro and Cuba”, among others, were produced and distributed world-wide for both TV and motion picture showings.

Television correspondents from the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Sweden, Holland and Italy are getting increased help from USIA in producing programs on the United States. Notable among these was a one-hour program produced in early 1961 by British Independent Television on the Kennedy administration, entitled “The New Americans”. It featured interviews of top New Frontier officials and the President himself. The following year the same network returned to produce, with USIA assistance, a one-hour program on the United States entitled “State of the Union”.

Other cooperative programs in which USIA has recently helped foreign television networks and stations include: two one-hour pro-
grams entitled “Science International” with the BBC; a program on
the U.S. space effort entitled “Destination Moon”; a series to consist
eventually of 13 programs on the United States by the French National
television; six programs on the United States by Finnish television; a
one-hour program on integration produced by Italian television; a
series of 13 programs on science with Belgian television; a film docu-
mentary on the history of the American Negro by French National TV;
a program on the space communities of Cape Canaveral and Houston
by Italian TV; three shows on the U.S. space program for the new
second German television network.

ENGLISH TEACHING

Another major achievement has been the Agency’s “Let’s Learn
English” series which is or has been telecast in 37 countries to an
audience of millions around the world. Because of the phenomenal
popularity of the programs a second set called “Let’s Speak English”
have been produced and a third is planned for production in the near
future.

“Science Reports”, a television series comprising two 15-minute
program segments per month and featuring achievements in science
and technology in the U.S., is currently telecast in 52 countries around
the world.

The first two volumes of a six-book English Teaching textbook
series were produced under contract with the National Council of
English teaching quarterly, “The English Teaching Forum”, is aimed
at the overseas teacher of English. Articles include both linguistic theory
and practical classroom problems.

Because of the limited number of professionally trained linguists
available, the Agency has initiated a program whereby selected, out-
standing teachers of English with broad Agency experience are sent
to a university to undertake special studies in linguistics and the teach-
ing of English as a foreign language. A professional training program
has also been instituted for English teachers and binational center
administrative personnel prior to departure for overseas posts.

PERSONNEL UTILIZATION

The Agency has made significant progress in the more effective
utilization of women officers. One woman has risen to the FSR–1 level,
the highest career grade in USIA; another is the country public affairs
officer for Chile; a third opened and operated a country program in
Africa and is the only Agency officer to achieve a working proficiency
in Swahili. Another woman has become the Agency’s deputy budget
officer; the editor-in-chief of “America Illustrated” is a woman, and
three women officers have attained the GS–15 level.
Since the spring of 1961, the Agency has made strides in developing fuller utilization of minority personnel and in according them rank commensurate with their skills. Since that date, the number of Negro officers of GS–12 or higher rank in the domestic service, for example, has increased from one to seven. The number of Negro officers in the foreign service has about doubled from the 1960 figure of two dozen. Three country public affairs officers are Negroes. About 10% of all foreign service officers of rank equal to GS–12 or above are Negroes.

USIA officers are participating in Washington seminars on the “Problems of Developing Countries”, examining techniques and materials that assist emergent countries to develop viable political structures resistant to Communist and other hostile attempts to subvert and weaken them. These seminars bring together some of the most skilled and experienced U.S. and foreign personalities in the field.

USIA officers also actively participate in both the Inter-Departmental Committee and the faculty responsible for the Country Team Seminar on Problems of Development and Internal Security. USIA normally enrolls 12 senior officers in each of the six sessions of this seminar and has one officer assigned full time to the faculty. USIA also has a liaison officer attached to the faculty of the Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg.

The quality and quantity of candidates for positions in the Agency’s domestic and foreign services have increased sharply during the past 30 months.

General knowledgeability in the United States about USIA purposes and operations has also increased sharply; domestic press attention to the Agency, as one index, has increased in volume by some 2,000%, virtually all of it favorable.
151. Letter From the Director of the Broadcasting Service, United States Information Agency (Loomis) to the Deputy Director (Wilson)


SUBJECT

U.S. Officials on Diem’s and Nhu’s Death

Miss Conde of the VOA newsroom has provided the following information on the Diem-Nhu death news.

“Early Sunday afternoon I telephoned Ned Conlon of IOP at his home for confirmation of a Reuters report that U.S. Ambassador Jones was being called home from Djakarta for consultation. Ned called back with confirmation and also told me there would be some announcements coming on Vietnamese matters. The first would be about Mrs. Nhu’s children and the second would confirm the murder of President Diem and Mr. Nhu. Ned told me this for background so that when either of these stories broke I would know they were okay for use.

State’s telegram to Mrs. Nhu about her children came through and presented no problem. There was no statement from State or any other official source on the murders. A little past three-thirty, AP ran a long story, by Spencer Davis, which began: U.S. officials deplore the death of President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Nhu in the military uprising that ended their rule in South Vietnam. But these officials are not surprised at the assassinations, in light of the regime’s record.

VOA had no intention of using the AP story. It was not attributed to any specific U.S. official. It was an AP exclusive. And it was far from useful.

However, I thought it should be brought to the attention of responsible American officials. I telephoned Ned Conlon and read it to him.


3 November 3.


Ned went to work on it. And a little after eight (p.m.) o’clock, AP led the Davis story with: High U.S. officials expressed regret tonight that South Vietnam’s President Ngo Dinh Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu had met violent death while in the custody of the revolutionary military forces in Saigon. A high government source said the administration repudiates an earlier view expressed privately by an official that the brothers had reaped the harvest of their own misdeeds. This does not represent the opinions of the top leaders of the U.S. Government, the high government source said.

VOA did not carry this second story either, as it also was unattributed to a specific official and single-sourced.

152. Letter From the Ambassador to India (Bowles) to the Deputy Director of the United States Information Agency (Wilson)

New Delhi, undated.

Dear Don:

As you doubtless know, I am planning to leave Delhi November 10 for a brief period of discussions in Washington. I certainly hope to see Ed Murrow, but in view of his state of convalescence, I doubt if I should bother him about too many business questions. I should like to see you, if you plan to be in Washington, and take up the following matters.

1. Book Programs.

USIS has been giving a high priority to the effort to bring out low-priced editions of American books in English and in translation. Two years ago the effort cost $300,000 in rupees; last year it was about $650,000, and it will reach the level of about $1,300,000 in this fiscal year. That will mean about 3,000,000 volumes. I think this effort is a very worthwhile undertaking and that the program should even increase. Without staff adjustments, I understand that it easily could reach the level of $2,000,000 in cost within the next few years. I know the problems
of budget ceilings, and this amount would represent a huge chunk of the USIS budget. The question I think we should examine is whether there could be additional sources of rupee funds to enlarge our successful book programs. For example, for the relatively large textbook effort, should we seek funds in the AID budget although leaving the operation of the program under USIS? Would it be advisable to seek a special appropriation in Luke Battle’s budget? Should we ask for appropriations for a book publishing foundation in India? I should hope to get your views and advice in this field.

2. Buildings.

I am a strong advocate of using our accumulation of PL–480 rupees for worthwhile purposes before the value deteriorates too much. In India all of our USIS centers are in leased buildings, and the fixed costs of the USIS operations are rising with the inflation. One of the wise uses for PL–480 rupee funds would be a reasonable purchase and construction program for USIS in the various cities in which it operates. I understand that in 1962 the Mission proposed a comprehensive undertaking which would cost about $9,000,000, mainly in rupees. This would include the provision of government-owned housing for at least a small percentage of the USIS officers. I should hope that the Agency would support a rational building program in the State Department’s FBO budget before the Congress.

3. English Teaching.

In communicating with many of the most knowledgeable Indians, we have inherited a very great advantage in the English language. It would be difficult to imagine what the Russians or the Chinese would give for such an opportunity. However, despite Indian official concern about the problem, the quality of English is deteriorating in India. I believe that we, the British and others concerned should work out ways with the Government of India to assist in the training of English teachers throughout the country. Such an effort in the long range will serve well our foreign policy objectives. I am not suggesting that this should necessarily be a USIS undertaking. In answer to a letter from Luke Battle, I have proposed that we work out a plan for cooperation with the British, the Ford Foundation (which is interested) and others who might be concerned to promote the Indian Government’s efforts in this field. This could be achieved, if we could get the appropriation, through PL–480 rupee grants. My purpose in bringing the subject up is to seek USIA support for the idea.


Some time ago a proposal was made for the creation of a binational library foundation in India using some of our rupee funds for the
promotion of libraries in the manner of Carnegie\(^2\) at another period in the United States. I do not suggest that this should be a USIA undertaking, but since it affects the long-range effort in propaganda in the purest sense, I should like to get your views. It is our thought that such a foundation could promote the building of libraries, the provision of trained librarians, and the installation of original book collections. Over a period of years, I suspect we could wisely spend a few million of our accumulated rupees in an undertaking of this kind. I realize that this also would take a special appropriation, and I believe that both the Department and USIA should have an interest in it.

I should like to discuss with you USIS in general, but I have mentioned the foregoing points to let you know in advance some of the matters on my mind. I shall look forward very much to seeing you.

Sincerely,

Chester Bowles\(^3\)

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\(^2\) The 19th century U.S. industrialist and philanthropist Andrew Carnegie, who funded the establishment of public libraries throughout the United States.

\(^3\) Bowles signed “Chet Bowles” above his typed signature.

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153. Memorandum From the Special Assistant to the President (Schlesinger) to President Kennedy\(^1\)


SUBJECT

Commerce-USIA Disagreement Regarding Overseas Expositions

You may recall that, after Secretary Hodges returned from the trade fair at Brno, Czechoslovakia, he told you that he felt the US exhibits at international trade fairs should be directed to the promotion of American exports rather than to the transmission of an image of the

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\(^1\) Source: Kennedy Library, President’s Office Files, Staff Memoranda Series, Box 66, Schlesinger, Arthur M., 11/63. No classification marking.
You asked me to look into the question of our policy with regard to international expositions.

As the government’s exhibit program operates now, it has two segments: USIA’s Special International Exhibits Program (SIE), and a separate Department of Commerce program, with its own appropriations, specifically devoted to staging exhibitions at international fairs where the principal purpose is the promotion of American exports. In this second category—which includes, for example, most fairs in Western Europe—Commerce already determines the site, theme and content of the exhibits. The only question is whether Commerce should also control the part of the trade fair program now assigned to USIA—which would include particularly fairs behind the Iron Curtain.

The Bureau of the Budget has been fully into this matter and believes that, where fairs are primarily significant for political and psychological rather than for economic reasons, they should remain the responsibility of USIA. The State Department agrees. So do I. The legislative history, the language of both enabling and appropriating legislation, and expressions of Presidential intent (as in your letter to Ed Murrow of August 11, 1961) also support this position.

The reasons for keeping this category of fairs in USIA hands are briefly as follows:

1) National exhibits have become a significant weapon of political warfare. Often it serves US interests to have an exhibit at a trade fair where the prospects of actual sales would not warrant US participation.

2) Our interests in this area are better served when the exhibit is planned with political and psychological purposes in mind than when it is a haphazard and conglomerate commercial show without a coherent message. A strictly commercial show might even reinforce Communist stereotypes about American materialism and the poverty of American culture.

3) Obviously trade promotion must be an element, and this element should be strengthened when possible; but in this category of fairs it should not be allowed to dissipate or subvert the major propaganda purpose.

My conclusion, in short, is that the present policy regarding trade fairs is correct, and that there is no reason to change it.

Arthur Schlesinger, jr.

2 See Document 143.
3 See Document 145.
4 See Document 45
5 An unknown hand signed “A.S., jr.” above Schlesinger’s typed signature.
Appendix A

Appendix A.1  *Invitation to Pakistan*¹

Appendix A.2  *Invitation to India*¹

Appendix A.3  The Five Cities of June