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


UNITED STATES OVERSEAS
INTERNAL DEFENSE POLICY

September

1962

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U.S. OVERSEAS INTERNAL DEFENSE POLICY

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(This Document was prepared by an Interdepartmental Committee consisting of Representatives of State (Chair), DOD, JCS, USIA, CIA and AID and approved as policy by National Security Action Memorandum 182 of 24 August 1962.)

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U.S. OVERSEAS INTERNAL DEFENSE POLICY

I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE

A. A most pressing U.S. national security problem now, and for the foreseeable future, is the continuing threat presented by communist inspired, supported, or directed insurgency, defined as subversive insurgency. Many years of experience with the techniques of subversion and insurgency have provided the communists with a comprehensive, tested doctrine for conquest from within. Our task is to fashion on an urgent basis an effective plan of action to combat this critical communist threat.

B. It is the purpose of this document to provide the responsible executive agencies of the U.S. Government (State, DOD, AID, USIA and CIA) with policy guidance for the employment of U.S. resources to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency and to assist in the development of balanced capabilities for the total defense of free world societies against the threat of internal attack.

C. This document is concerned with the prevention and defeat of (1) communist inspired, supported, or directed subversion or insurgency and (2) other types of subversion and insurgency which are inimical to U.S. national security interests in all countries of the free world, primarily those that are underdeveloped, whether they are pro-Western, or basically neutral.

The scope of this document embraces the range of U.S. measures to assist vulnerable regimes in preventing and defeating subversion and insurgency described in (1) and (2) above. The tactical employment of U.S. Armed Forces in combat operations in direct support of governments under insurgent military attack is outside the scope of this document.

II. BACKGROUND

A. THE PATTERN

In one generation the Chinese communists conquered the world's most populous state from within. Lessons learned in

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this long and complex struggle have been subsequently applied by various political movements in different parts of the world.

Insurgents used Chinese communist techniques against the French in Indo-China during the period 1945-1954. Using the same techniques, Castro with an initial dozen followers took to the hills of Cuba in December, 1956. Twenty-five months later he was able to take over the government.

Operating with a different political motivation, the Algerian nationalists gained their independence from the French through the protracted Algerian War of 1954-1962. In each case, a political movement employing subversive/guerrilla techniques and initially inferior, out-numbered forces, eventually succeeded against regular forces of the established authority which were supported by superior material resources.

There is little question that individuals and groups from various countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America are receiving support and training for subversion, from the USSR and Red China. Whereas in some countries the threat may not be apparent, the evidence is clear that we face a continuing and growing problem.

Although recent history illustrates the successful application of subversion and organized violence, the post-war examples of Greece, Malaya, and the Philippines demonstrate that such movements are not invariably successful. Success in preventing or defeating these movements depends on identifying and understanding the nature of the threat and combatting it with properly balanced action.

B. THE FACTORS

1. The employment of indirect aggression through the use of subversion and insurgency against Free World institutions is related directly to the fact that the world is dominated by two over-whelmingly strong centers of power. These power centers tend to become involved directly or indirectly in most of the critical situations that occur throughout the world. They tend at the same time to muffle any violent confrontation so as to avoid escalation to the nuclear level. On the part of the

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communists, this has resulted in an increased effort to seek their objectives by subversive insurgency rather than overt aggression.

2. These power centers also confront each other ideologically. Each has a means of reaching into other societies and influencing favorably disposed groups. Conflicting groups in third countries are thus able to enlist the support of one or the other of these powers. One of the major tenets of communist ideology is the use of revolution and violent action. The ideological confrontation thus favors and intensifies internal conflict in third nations.

3. Social patterns and institutions in most underdeveloped nations are extremely malleable. They are often a legacy of shapeless, frequently illogical political units which are derived, in part, from a colonial past. The disturbance of man's mind and environment caused by the last World War still lingers on in the Cold War. Concurrently a concept is spreading that society is manipulable. These characteristics act to diminish respect for public order, and encourage initiatives which easily cross the line into disorder and violence.

4. Intensifying and exaggerating these factors, and sweeping on with a momentum of its own, a social and economic revolution of great force has been spreading throughout much of the world. Purposefully or otherwise societies are gearing themselves to higher levels of economic and social activity. The necessary substructures inevitably cut into traditions and habits fostered by rural isolation. Rural people crowd into the strange environment of cities that lack for them a satisfactory pattern of living. Social action, like land reform, manifestly alters accustomed social and often political relationships. These are but examples of the manifold ways in which the revolution of modernization can disturb, uproot, and daze a traditional society. While the institutions required for modernization are in process of being created, this revolution contributes to arousing pressures, anxieties, and hopes which seem to justify violent action.

C. CLASSIC MODELS

It is within this framework that communists have utilized internal subversion and violence during the post-war

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period. They have failed conspicuously several times, and have entered into numerous skirmishes without marked success, as in Indonesia, India, and Iran. Where they have met with success they have used four different models:

1. Subverted internal institutions or governments (Czechoslovakia),
2. Incited internal rebellion (China),
3. Dominated nationalist revolutions (North Vietnam), or
4. Captured revolutions of popular anti-dictatorial character (Cuba).

Each of the above represents a breakdown of internal security and demonstrates how vulnerabilities of free societies are exploited by communists.

D. LESSONS

The susceptibility of developing societies to dissidence and violence which can be exploited by the communists requires the development of indigenous capabilities to cope with the threat to internal security in each of its forms. Reasonable stability is necessary for healthy economic growth, and the evolution of human liberties and representative government.

Sheer repression of political unrest seldom does more than buy time. Unless used to political advantage, this time may favor the subversives or their communist mentors. Rebels of today may be the governments of tomorrow unless their grievances where legitimate are redressed by needed reform. Legitimate nationalistic protests for social improvement which can deteriorate into organized violence or be exploited by the communists need not reach this stage if the local government accompanies its internal security measures with appropriate political and other reform action.

There are several lessons to be drawn:

1. An adequate internal defense will require the mobilization of a government's resources and their
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effective employment through political, social, economic, security and psychological measures. The problem is basically political but requires the full support of the local security forces.

2. It is essential to the U.S. interest that unrest or active dissidence be appraised in terms of causes to achieve a peaceful solution.

3. Friendly governments must be persuaded to take the proper remedial action without relying solely on repression.

4. In addition to attempting to penetrate all levels of a society, communists often infiltrate nationalist and reform movements. They can be prevented from taking over these movements if the government demonstrates political wisdom and maintains internal security.

5. The primary purpose of internal defense programs is to deal with and eliminate the causes of dissidence and violence. Once the internal security of a country deteriorates to the point where violence is sustained and continuing, the government must either defeat the insurgency or face civil war.

III. NATURE OF THE THREAT

A. THE ENVIRONMENT

The principal forces at work throughout the undeveloped world are: (1) the stresses and strains of the developmental process brought about by the revolutionary break with the traditional past and uneven progress toward new and more modern forms of political, social, and economic organization; and (2) the contest between communism and the Free World for primary influence over the direction and outcome of the developmental process.

Another factor influencing the internal stability of certain lesser developed countries is the circumstance of their geographic location. Because of the political, military, and economic relationships which stem from this circumstance of nature, traditional

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international animosities or friendships, as the case may be, present many exploitable opportunities for the communists. The disequilibrium and unrest, the usual concomitants of a social progress, may be compounded by geopolitical and traditional regional relationships.

B. THE CAUSES OF INSURGENCY

To succeed, insurgency must have an active indigenous base and some form of political direction and structure. Advanced stages of insurgency must have both an active domestic base of popular support and a political-military structure, i.e., a proto-government, in opposition to and competing with the central government.

Insurgency is grounded in the allegiances and attitudes of the people. Its origins are domestic, and its support must remain so. The causes of insurgency therefore stem from the inadequacies of the local government to requite or remove popular or group dissatisfactions.

It is during the interim, between the shattering of the old mold and its consolidation into a viable modern state of popularly accepted and supported institutional strength, that a modernizing state is vulnerable to subversion and insurgency.

Politically and socially, a transitional society may exhibit many of the following symptoms:

Deep rifts between various sectors of the population, complicated by lack of communication between the government and the countryside; lack of social cohesion stemming from inequalities in the old class structure, often exacerbated by racial and social discrimination and religious differences; aspirations of the under-privileged for a better life and greater participation in the life of the society; an inadequate educational system; weak governmental institutions lacking administrative capacity; corrupt political leadership; a government unresponsive to the aspirations of the people; a political system in which the military establishment is the ultimate arbiter of power, often in league with the traditional oligarchs; numerous political parties which complicate the formation of stable governments and the

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functioning of representative institutions; a frustrated but articulate segment of the youth and intelligentsia (often foreign-educated) which advocates radical solutions to speed modernization; a developing middle class which cannot yet control political processes; and extremes of Right and Left which contest the middle class rise to political and economic power.

Economically, a transitional society may exhibit these symptoms:

Widespread poverty and a grossly inequitable distribution of wealth and income; inadequate agricultural production and lack of diversification with little progress toward land reform or the development of an independent peasantry; an inadequate and unbalanced industrial structure with no coherent concept for economic growth which will confer increased social benefits; inadequate economic infrastructure; inability to mobilize domestic resources or to marshal and reinvest savings; overdependence on exports of primary products; dissatisfaction with foreign private investment yet dependence on foreign capital assistance; inadequate low-cost housing; an inadequate tax and collection system; an unhealthy concentration of wealth and economic power in one class or in a few individuals or families; large-scale underemployment, including the impatient youth segment of the educated unemployed.

Militarily, developing states may be vulnerable in these respects:

They may have underestimated the internal threat and overestimated the external threat; they may have created "prestige" armed forces, organized along traditional lines; they may have failed to achieve an effective balance between military and police components; the military may be estranged from the people, and constitute a hindrance rather than a help in promoting nation-building and social cohesion.

Psychologically, few of the developing states comprehend how to battle the blandishments and false hopes aroused by communism among students, educated youth, intelligentsia, the rural dispossessed and the urban under-privileged. Except in a few of the modernizing states with articulate and social-minded leaders there is a psychological gap between the government and the people - students, labor groups and others who feel estranged

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from the government and the society as a whole.

Too rapid a tempo of development can be as dangerous as too little. Failure to move rapidly enough encourages opposition movements which often seize power through revolution. Forward movement generates future crises as the underprivileged seek to extend their gains.

C. THE CRITICAL SECTORS

The vital sectors within modernizing societies include the rural sector; the labor front; students and youth organizations; the intelligentsia; the educational systems; internal communications and informational media; the military and police; religious groups; the civil bureaucracy; the various middle-class elites; ethnic minorities; and the political parties, sometimes including a legal communist party but invariably an illegal communist apparatus operating underground or through various fronts.

Subversion and insurgency must be guarded against in both the cities and the countryside. In loosely constructed countries where the government has not gained the support of the peasantry, an apathetic rural population is a vulnerable target for communist political activity. In these situations, the battle must be joined in the villages which normally represent the critical social and political organizational level. Discontented urban populations may also be a fertile ground for communist activities if the country is in the early stages of industrialization and urbanization or is recovering from the evils of dictatorship.

The U.S. must always keep in mind that the ultimate and decisive target is the people. Society itself is at war and the resources, motives and targets of the struggle are found almost wholly within the local population.

D. THE THREAT: COMMUNIST DOCTRINE AND TACTICS

Communist revolutionary strategy, both Soviet and Chinese, envisages the seizure of power by stages.

Stage I is the building of a power base. In Soviet thinking a power base in the urban proletariat is indispensable for further

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forward movement of the revolutionary process, though it need not involve violence. The rural population (peasants), in the Soviet view, plays a necessary but secondary and subordinate role in the total power base. Stage I, in Soviet thinking, may be gradually extended and deepened ("national front" with other political parties, increased parliamentary representation, acquisition of high government offices, infiltration of armed forces, propaganda media, etc.) until it is possible to take power without resorting to armed violence. The reverse is held to be true for Stage I in Chinese communist thinking. The latter believe that the control and/or support of the rural population is an indispensable primary step toward the seizure of power, and that this doctrine is particularly applicable to underdeveloped areas.

Stage II is the initiation and conduct of armed action at a tactical level in rural or urban areas, or both. It is the Soviet contention that Stage II is not inevitable but may be forced upon the communist party and its allies if resistance is sufficiently strong. The Chinese Communists, on the other hand, maintain that the seizure of power by peaceful means (i.e., the prolongation of Stage I) is not possible and that Stage II is therefore a requisite.

Stage III is reached when the insurgents have grown strong enough to engage the government forces in a war of movement. It represents an escalation of Stage II. As in the latter, there is a difference between Soviet and Chinese thinking regarding Stage III. The Soviets hold that the prolonged execution of Stages I and II may generate such opposition that a civil war will ensue. In the Chinese Communist concept, escalation to Stage III is unavoidable, because the non-communist holders of power will never relinquish it unless forced to do so through armed struggle.

It is also possible to retreat from Stage III back to Stage II and under more adverse circumstances, even from Stage II back to Stage I. Hence, by doctrine and practice the communists are equipped to press their objectives across the whole spectrum of subversive action with great flexibility. In doing so, they study and exploit the vulnerabilities of societies; they are expert in political maneuver from indigenous footholds, and they understand and practice the various forms of internal war.

The communists have refined subversive insurgency into an instrument of political warfare that can be destructively applied

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to under-developed countries at almost all their points of vulnerability. The threat is formidable and all-pervasive, but its weakness lies in the same region as does its implicit strength; it cannot succeed without the support of people.

IV. FRAMEWORK OF U.S. OVERSEAS INTERNAL DEFENSE POLICY

A. U.S. INTERNAL DEFENSE OBJECTIVE

The U.S. Overseas Internal Defense objective (hereinafter, internal defense objective) is to safeguard and assist less developed societies in fulfilling their aspirations to remain free and to fashion ways of life independent from communism or other totalitarian domination or control.

B. U.S. INTERESTS

The broad U.S. interests in the underdeveloped world are as follows:

1. A political and ideological interest in assuring that developing nations evolve in a way that affords a congenial world environment for international cooperation and the growth of free institutions.

2. A military interest in assuring that strategic areas and the manpower and natural resources of developing nations do not fall under communist control; that these nations remain able to maintain effectively their internal security and to preserve independence from communist control.

3. An economic interest in assuring that the resources and markets of the less developed world remain available to us and to other Free World countries.

4. A humanitarian interest in assuring the achievement of the social, economic, and educational aspirations of developing nations.

C. U.S. INTERNAL DEFENSE ROLE

The overall U.S. purpose in the field of internal defense is to encourage and assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced capabilities for the internal defense of their societies.

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To this end, the U.S. role is:

1. To assist in the immunization of vulnerable societies not yet seriously threatened by communist subversion or insurgency.
2. To assist countries where subversive insurgency is latent or incipient to defeat the threat by removing its causes before the stage of insurgency is reached.
3. To assist in the establishment or strengthening of intelligence and internal security organizations so that they are capable of dealing with the threat of subversion and insurgency.
4. To defeat subversive insurgency in countries actively threatened by assisting the government under attack with military as well as non-military means.
5. To minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement in internal war by maximizing indigenous capabilities of countering and defeating subversive insurgency and by drawing on, as appropriate, the assistance of third countries and international organizations.
6. To minimize the risk of escalation (without deferring to this risk) from subversive insurgency to civil, conventional, or nuclear war.

V. THE U.S. STRATEGY

It is vital that U.S. Country Teams continually assess, on the basis of sound intelligence, developments within a society to allow ample opportunity for the U.S. Government to determine what position it should take. When insurgency can be anticipated, the U.S. should induce local government leaders to take remedial action before a real crisis limits the alternatives and makes the use of force imperative.

To persuade these leaders to act in the interests of their society is often a complex and subtle task. Any U.S. action may fail unless its representatives present and gain acceptance of certain facts that the local government may otherwise wish to

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disregard. It is therefore essential that U.S. Country Teams know where the points of strength and vulnerability lie. This done, they can determine how to strengthen those elements which most effectively support U.S. objectives.

A. NON-COMMUNIST INSURGENCY

The U.S. does not wish to assume a stance against revolution, per se, as an historical means of change. The right of peoples to change their governments, economic systems and social structures by revolution is recognized in international law. Moreover, the use of force to overthrow certain types of government is not always contrary to U.S. interests. A change brought about through force by non-communist elements may be preferable to prolonged deterioration of governmental effectiveness or to a continuation of a situation where increasing discontent and repression interact, thus building toward a more dangerous climax. Each case of latent, incipient, or active non-communist insurgency must therefore be examined on its merits in the light of U.S. interests.

B. SUBVERSIVE INSURGENCY

1. GENERAL

Where subversive insurgency is latent or incipient, U.S. strategy will be directed toward its elimination, lest it provide a communist foothold and escalate into active insurgency. The scale of U.S. involvement at the level of force should be as limited as the achievement of its objectives permit and only ancillary to the indigenous effort. It is important for the U.S. to remain in the background, and where possible, to limit its support to training, advice and material, lest it prejudice the local government effort and expose the U.S. unnecessarily to charges of intervention and colonialism.

In insurgency situations indigenous military action will be required. U.S. operational assistance may be a necessary adjunct to the local effort. In these situations, U.S. programs should be designed to make the indigenous military response as rapid and incisive as possible while parallel reforms are directed at ameliorating the conditions contributing to the insurgent outbreak.

The Philippine campaign against the Huks, led by Ramon

Magsaysay,

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Magsaysay, is a model of countering insurgency, and winning back the allegiance of the domestic popular base, thus destroying the foundations of guerrilla support. Magsaysay's strategy of combining the use of force with reform measures demonstrates what can be done. It is a pattern of action which may be applicable, with local modifications as necessary, to other vulnerable less-developed countries facing the reality or threat of communist-directed insurgency.

Anticipating, preventing and defeating communist-directed insurgency requires a blend of civil and military capabilities and actions to which each U.S. agency at the Country Team level must contribute. The safeguarding of the developmental process requires carefully evaluated intelligence, the ability to penetrate the enemy's organizations, and the training of adequate and balanced military and police forces. These, as well as bilateral and multilateral developmental assistance, advice, and information programs designed to ameliorate and bring understanding to local problems, are all indispensable components of an effective internal defense program.

Preventing and defeating subversive insurgency is therefore a total program for the local government and for U.S. agencies in support thereof. Success will depend on accurate information, a careful evaluation thereof and on a unified concept of operations based on a comprehensive plan tailored to the local situation in which civil and military measures interact and reinforce each other.

a. THE LOCAL PROBLEM

In countering insurgency, the major effort must be indigenous since insurgency is a uniquely local problem involving the aspirations and allegiance of local people. Only the local government can remove its causes, win back the support of the insurgents, and strengthen the society's cohesiveness.

Overly prominent participation of U.S. personnel in counter-insurgency operations can be counter-productive in that it may (1) dilute the nationalist appeal, and hence the acceptability, of the local government, (2) make the U.S. a target for anti-colonialism, and (3) permit the communists to associate themselves

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with the forces of nationalism and anti-Westernism. Nevertheless, a clear demonstration of U.S. willingness to help may be an important factor in strengthening morale and local will to resist.

The U.S. task is to involve itself constructively and acceptably in the local situation. Its representatives must stay in the background to the maximum extent and conduct themselves unobtrusively. Any credit for success should accrue in the fullest possible measure to the local government. This requires the development and refinement of the Country Team's capability to:

(1) Acquaint itself thoroughly with the totality of the local situation through all its distinctive phases.

(2) Assist the local government, together with the society's constructive non-communist leaders, to see the relation of insurgency to socio-economic development, and the blend of political and military measures required for an adequate internal defense.

(3) Mobilize, coordinate, and effectively apply U.S. and, as appropriate, other Free World resources to develop techniques adapted to the local situation and to strengthen the local internal defense capability with minimal damage to the society and the momentum of development.

b. METHODS OF SUPPORT

(1) Land Reform

The underdeveloped world is predominantly agricultural with the majority of its people often living under primitive forms of tenancy and in oppressive conditions. For this reason, we should emphasize sound land reform, expanded communications and transportation facilities, and community development programs.

(2) Civic Action

Civic action is the use of military forces on projects useful to the populace at all levels in such fields as training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation, and others helpful to economic development.

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development.

The extent of participation of indigenous forces in civic action programs will vary. In countries fighting active campaigns against internal subversion, local forces should be encouraged to undertake civic action projects to strengthen the society's economic base, and establish a link between the military and the populace. In countries threatened by external aggression, local forces should participate in civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission. In countries where subversion or attack is less imminent, selected military forces can contribute substantially to economic and social development. Such a contribution should be a major function of these forces.

(3) Community Development

Community development is a vital adjunct to the political and social modernization of a loosely structured country since it takes government to the countryside and establishes two-way channels of communication between the rural sector and the government. It is thus a potential mechanism for making government responsive to the peoples' needs.

(4) Social Projects

With respect to the critical sectors, the U.S. must emphasize programs that ameliorate mass discontent, i.e. low-cost housing, better sanitation, potable water, new schools and low-cost utilities.

(5) Education

The U.S. must also devote more attention to the educational systems of the new states, to assist them in extending education to more people and improving the quality of their curricula and teachers, to supply them with textbooks that will prepare students for the modern democratic world.

(6) Labor and Youth

Within societies, labor and youth will continue to have problems leading to dissatisfaction and disaffection. U.S. programs and resources should be directed to education, vocational

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training, creating more job opportunities and the development of healthy labor and youth organizations.

(7) Leader Groups

To deal more effectively with the critical sectors, the U.S. must build on those local assets which are favorable to U.S. objectives. Such groups may be the political leadership, the intelligentsia, the military and police, the civil bureaucracy, religious and educational elements, and the middle class generally.

When training foreign officers, the U.S. should seek to create in them an awareness of the political process of nation-building, bearing in mind that national leadership often emerges from the military element of underdeveloped countries. It is U.S. policy, when it is in the U.S. interest, to make the local military and police advocates of democracy and agents for carrying forward the developmental process. Similarly, the U.S. should devote more attention and resources to training the civil bureaucracy in the administrative practices and problems of newly emerging societies.

(8) Police

To maintain internal order, most governments depend primarily on police which normally constitute the first line of defense against subversion and insurgency. They are the ones on whom the internal security burden falls in the pre-insurrectionary stage. Police are normally trained and equipped to deal with conspiracy, subversion, and the minor forms of violence. They are also a sensitive point of contact between the government and its citizenry, close to focal points of unrest, and acceptable as keepers of order over a long period of time.

Where feasible and politically desirable, the U.S. will therefore provide equipment, training, and technical assistance to the police forces of friendly foreign countries, particularly those threatened with subversion and insurgency. Such support shall be effected through the medium most appropriate and effective for the task--normally AID but also through the Department of Defense or CIA--depending on the nature of the threat, the type of force assisted, and the preferences of the country concerned.

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Friendly governments cannot be expected to measure their interest in coping with internal tensions and upheavals as we do. Some will be less fearful of communist influence; others will place more reliance on repression. In some countries, the military establishments will be slow to relinquish the traditional forms of military organization in favor of modern methods of internal defense. Few governments will understand the political component of internal defense and its relationship to the development cycle.

Reluctance of governments to recognize and act upon the requirement for internal reform creates situations such as exist in many Asian and Latin American countries where the economic, social and political frustrations of underprivileged groups encourage subversive attitudes capable of hostile external exploitation. In their desire to assure smooth short-run relations with traditional oligarchies, U.S. representatives often tend to forget that in some cases local leaders may have no practical alternative to accepting the U.S. recommendations, particularly if specific reforms become prerequisites to the continuance of U.S. aid.

The U.S. must recognize, however, the existence of deep-seated emotional, cultural, and proprietary resistance to any change that diminishes power and privilege, regardless of how unrealistic and short-sighted this stubbornness may seem objectively. In bringing its influence to bear, the U.S. has three avenues open to it:

(a) Regular inter-governmental collaboration can facilitate the various forms of cooperative action required. U.S. representatives must establish and maintain sympathetic personal rapport with the leaders of the country. This rapport should be grounded on a deep understanding of the country's problems and traditions, but it should not be attained at the expense of realistic objectivity toward the current historical processes at work in the society. If there is sufficient mutual personal regard, U.S. representatives will be better able to speak persuasively about reform needs and to win acceptance for constructive proposals. For such efforts to be successful, it is important

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that all levels of all elements of a mission thoroughly understand and support the agreed objectives.

(b) In some countries, the leadership may be responsive to suggestions for reform and amenable to outside assistance, but other powerful domestic forces may resist them. Some leaders may fear branding as "imperialist stooges" by virtue of accepting U.S. help. In such cases, a nation's developmental efforts may be supported at least in part by more discreet means of assistance.

Where leaders are willing but not able to institute reforms, it may be necessary to strengthen other elements of the society which are willing and able to contribute to sound development. This applies specifically to the non-communist personalities, organizations, and media which have potential popular appeal but, for lack of resources and know-how, do not compete adequately with the communist instrumentalities.

(c) Finally, there are some cases where, despite the local suggestions for reform through normal U.S. diplomatic channels, the government and its leaders refuse to act. Experience has amply shown, in such cases, that through other means it is often possible with minimal risk to increase significantly the effectiveness of opposition leaders, political parties, institutional groups, and information media.

Through such means, or through enlisting where appropriate the assistance of other governments or international organizations, it may be possible to bring organized and broadly-based political pressures on a reluctant local government. Through the same means it is also possible, by strengthening the non-communist voices and their organizational bases in such institutional groups, to wrest communist control from local labor movements, peasants' associations, and youth and student organizations.

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2. ROLE OF MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS AND ALLIES

Where appropriate, multilateral actions to prevent or defeat subversive insurgency may be preferable to unilateral U.S. action, even if there is some immediate sacrifice of operational efficiency.

It is the policy of the U.S. whenever it is in the national interest to:

- (a) Take such action in and through the United Nations, NATO, the OAS, SEATO, CENTO and other multilateral and regional organizations as appropriate.
- (b) Encourage, as appropriate, other nations to give diplomatic, political, economic, and where necessary, military support to threatened countries.
- (c) Encourage, where feasible and desirable, the former metropolises, to assume major responsibility for assisting their former wards in developing an adequate internal defense.
- (d) In countries contiguous to those under attack, encourage the maintenance of effective border security to prevent use of their territory as a sanctuary by insurgent forces.

VI. APPLICATION OF U. S. STRATEGY

A. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

Apart from the normal day-to-day political actions by the United States in foreign countries, particular problems of coordination are found in those nations where potential or actual insurgency exists. This will require the major attention of both the threatened government as well as those governments seeking to assist it. In assisting a country to strengthen its internal defense system, the U.S. must be prepared to present a closely coordinated and integrated approach in which each operational arm of U.S. policy represented on the Country Team plays a unique and indispensable part in the attainment of U.S. objectives.

1. INTELLIGENCE

An adequate effort in support of U.S. policy and action decisions is vital to the successful achievement of U.S. internal defense objectives.

Such an

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Such an intelligence effort must:

- a. Identify those free world countries where the threat of subversion or insurgency is potential, latent, or incipient.
- b. Appraise the nature and scope of the threat, the underlying causes, and the significant factors related thereto.
- c. Provide intelligence estimates and appraisals upon which U.S. courses of action can be planned.
- d. Provide operational intelligence required to execute U.S. plans.
- e. Provide the intelligence needed to appraise the extent to which U.S. internal defense objectives are being achieved.
- f. Strengthen the intelligence capabilities of vulnerable countries.

Agencies having action responsibilities for overseas internal defense operations will contribute to the U.S. intelligence effort in accordance with their respective roles as set forth in the several National Security Council Directives. Abroad, the Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers are responsible for the coordination of all U.S. activities within their respective areas of assignment. However, acting as the designated representative of the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA Station Chief is assigned the specific task of coordinating clandestine intelligence collection.

2. LEVELS OF INTENSITY

The level of intensity of subversive insurgency at any time may be portrayed in terms of three general phases:

PHASE I. This phase ranges from circumstances in which subversive activity is only a potential threat, latent or already incipient, to situations in which subversive incidents and activities occur with frequency in an organized pattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or periods of uncontrolled insurgent activity.

PHASE II. This phase is reached when the subversive movement, having gained sufficient local or external support,

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support, initiates organized guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against the established authority.

PHASE III. The situation moves from PHASE II to PHASE III when the insurgency becomes primarily a war of movement between organized forces of the insurgents and those of the established authority.

The U.S. should seek to create situations of strength within the local society so that subversive activity can be dealt with at the lowest possible level. Plans and programs must, however, provide for an integrated capability to eliminate the root causes of disaffection and dissidence, to expose and counter communist efforts, and to cope with increased levels of violence.

At the lower levels of subversive activity, U.S. operations will consist primarily of training, advice, economic and military assistance and intelligence activities. Should the intensity of insurgency increase, and units of the indigenous armed forces be committed, the U.S. may also have to assist and support counter-insurgency military operations. At even higher levels of insurgency, or where there is a threat of communist takeover, the commitment of U.S. operational forces may be required.

In these situations the commitment of U.S. operational forces will require a decision at the highest level of government. If such a determination is made, a further Presidential decision will be necessary to prescribe the relationship between the U.S. Chief of Mission and the U.S. Military Commander, and their relationship with the Chief of State in the country concerned. Operational command of U.S. Armed Forces so committed will flow from the President to the Secretary of Defense through military channels to the designated U.S. Military Commander in the field.

It is of the greatest importance that the situation within a threatened country be continually appraised. Therefore programs and operations will be continually reviewed in order that they are precisely responsive to the changing nature of the problem. The emphasis to be accorded and the responsibilities assigned in connection therewith should always reflect the nature and intensity of the threat.

3. WASHINGTON

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3. WASHINGTON

In recognition of the growing subversive threat, the Special Group (CI)* has been established to assure unity of effort and use of all available resources with maximum effectiveness in preventing and resisting subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.

The functions of the Special Group (CI) are to insure: proper recognition of the subversive insurgency threat; reflection of such recognition in training, equipment and doctrine; marshalling of resources to deal with the threat, and development of programs aimed at defeating it. The Special Group (CI) will insure the development of adequate programs aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency and indirect aggression in countries and regions specifically assigned to it by the President, and resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation. In performing the above functions, the members of the Special Group (CI) will act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and will depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such country or regional interdepartmental Task Forces (normally chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary) as may be established.

The Department of State will, in accordance with its traditional responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, provide policy guidance and coordination of overseas internal defense programs. Such guidance and coordination will be effected through the Chiefs of Mission and Principal Officers overseas and the Department of State in Washington.

To assure requisite support for the total effort, and to expedite intra-departmental as well as inter-departmental coordination and action, each agency (State, DOD, AID, USIA, CIA) will designate an element within its organization to be charged with the responsibility for continuing attention to overseas internal

defense

-
- * The Special Group (Counter-Insurgency) consists of:
Military Representative of the President, Chairman
The Attorney General
Deputy Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Deputy Secretary of Defense
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
Director of Central Intelligence
Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Administrator, AID
Director, USIA

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defense activities. These designees will:

- a. Assure that internal defense problems and progress receive continuing attention and coordination.
- b. Provide to responsible regional and country offices general policy and program guidance, together with the expertise gained from other areas on internal defense problems.

In order to achieve an integrated Washington effort, approximating the effort of the Country Team, officers of the department and agencies concerned with countries faced with a subversive threat will meet as required under the chairmanship of the Department of State to assist in the coordination of U.S. activities and programs in that country.

If the affairs of a country or region are in crisis, a Task Force may be established, normally under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State for the regional area in which the crisis country is located. The Task Force will have at least one senior representative from each of the responsible agencies (State, CIA, DOD, AID, USIA).

4. ABROAD

At the country level, the Chief of Mission * is responsible for overall direction of the Country Team and the coordination of all U.S. programs. As the President's personal representative, he will ensure that the U.S. effort is developed and effectively applied through an integrated approach comprising all civilian and military programs employed in attaining U.S. objectives.

The United States will make every effort to determine which countries are likely to be imperiled. Chiefs of Mission in underdeveloped countries will make continuing assessments to insure that incipient insurgency is identified in time to take preventive action. In threatened countries detailed assessments will be made to analyze what basic factors contribute to the threat, the time available for remedial action, and what resources and courses of action are necessary to counter the threat. Such

assessments

* In those countries where there is no U.S. Ambassador, this responsibility will rest with the Principal U.S. Diplomatic Officer.

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assessments will form the basis upon which integrated plans and programs can be developed--both by the country concerned and the United States.

The Ambassador in some cases may need outside assistance with those tasks of assessment, planning and program formulation. When required, special interdepartmental assessment and planning teams may be temporarily assigned to work under the Ambassador to assist in the task of threat assessment, planning, and program formulation.

Based on the assessment and courses of action required, a Country Internal Defense Plan (See Annex C for draft outline plan) will be developed by the Country Team. After its submission to Washington for consideration and approval by all departments and agencies concerned these plans will become the basis for program proposals. In formulating a Country Plan, the Ambassador should consider the full range of assets, both governmental and non-governmental, as well as possible non-American assets, which it would be useful to bring to bear. These include student exchange, Peace Corps, private business, labor organizations, foundations and international lending institutions.

These plans will serve the following purposes:

- a. To assure continuing attention by the Country Team to details of the local situation.
- b. To sharpen the Country Team's ability to forecast dangerous trends and suggest remedies.
- c. To provide a framework within which to assess programs suggested by the local government.
- d. To persuade the local government to adopt the most promising course of action.
- e. To facilitate planning and program coordination in Washington.

To assure continuing undivided attention to the problem of internal defense in an underdeveloped country, the Ambassador will, where appropriate, designate an officer to assist him in meeting his responsibilities for internal defense. This officer should be of senior rank and should be responsible for keeping the Ambassador and the Country Team fully informed as to the nature of the internal security threat; current internal defense operations, plans, and programs; matters requiring coordination; and

developments

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developments warranting appropriate reports to Washington. The Ambassador should assure that all members of the Country Team contribute their full capabilities in a cohesive internal defense program.

B. ROLES AND MISSIONS

The U.S. has many resources with which it can assist developing countries in preventing and defeating subversive insurgency. These resources can only be mobilized and harnessed by the development of realistic integrated plans and programs, and the implementation of a unified concept of operations. This section delineates the role of each responsible agency with respect to overseas internal defense:

1. The Role of the Special Group (CI)

The Special Group (CI) assures a coordinated and unified approach to regional or country programs, and verifies progress in implementation thereof. It undertakes promptly to make decisions on interdepartmental issues arising out of such programs.

2. The Role of the Department of State

In its role as chief adviser to the President in the field of foreign affairs and executant of national foreign policy, the Department of State is responsible for providing overall policy guidance and assuring the coordination of internal defense programs. In so doing, it will:

- (a) Assure that internal defense problems as they arise receive the continuing attention of our friends and allies.
- (b) Provide intelligence on foreign political, economic, and socio-cultural developments.
- (c) Assure the development of Country Internal Defense Plans, where required.
- (d) Assess in conjunction with other responsible agencies the adequacy of the various U.S. programs which, in the aggregate, constitute the total U.S. internal defense effort in a country.
- (e) In collaboration with other United States Intelligence Board agencies keep under constant review the internal security situation of all countries in order to identify those where subversion and insurgency require particular attention.

(f) Participate,

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(f) Participate, with the other agencies involved, in providing training for selected U.S. civilian and military government officials in the field of internal defense and the problems of modernizing societies.

(g) Through the United Nations and other international organizations, increase the Free World's awareness of the threat of communist-bloc indirect aggression and, as appropriate, organize such field operations as would aid in promoting general U.S. objectives.

(h) Encourage foreign diplomatic, political, economic, psychological and military support for countries under indirect attack by the communists.

(i) Encourage U.S. private interests (business firms, foundations, etc.) to take action in support of U.S. policy and programs.

3. The Role of the Agency for International Development

The Administrator of A.I.D. has primary responsibility for the administration of economic aid programs under P. L. 87-195. In addition, the Secretary of State has responsibility under section 622(c) thereof, for the continuous supervision and general direction of the assistance programs authorized by that Act, including, but not limited to, determining whether there shall be a military assistance program for a country and the value thereof, to the end that such programs are effectively integrated both at home and abroad and the foreign policy of the U.S. served thereby.

To further U.S. policy objectives directed toward the strengthening of internal defense in countries receiving U.S. assistance, A.I.D. will plan and implement programs having as their long-term aim the creation of economic and social conditions of sufficient vitality to eliminate the causes of discontent on which the communist appeal breeds and to sustain responsive, representative government and institutions. It also has the responsibility to plan and implement programs responsive to the degree of urgency of the potential or existing threat of subversive insurgency which will maximize the capability of civil police to deter and/or cope with subversive action, to develop and implement civilian counter-insurgency programs, and to support military civic action as appropriate.

Specifically included is the responsibility to:

- (a) Plan, develop and implement civilian programs aimed at strengthening

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strengthening sectors of a society or of geographic areas threatened by subversion or insurgency (e.g., community development, emergency economic assistance, improvement of communications facilities, road construction, irrigation projects, etc.).

(b) Plan, develop and implement programs for technical assistance to help strengthen the vulnerable sectors of a society by increasing technical proficiency, broadening skills, and raising the quality of workmanship.

(c) Assess and evaluate the adequacy of those aspects of Internal Defense programs which are the responsibility of the Administrator to develop and implement in exercise of the responsibility delegated under Section 622(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

(d) Promote measures for self-help, where applicable in coordination with DOD, in such areas as the better utilization of resources, reduction of dependence on external resources, better utilization of manpower (including manpower engaged in internal defense), and effectiveness in public administration.

(e) In the mass communications field, where applicable in collaboration with USIA and/or DOD, assist in developing the host government's capabilities for reaching its citizenry, particularly those segments most vulnerable to subversion, by technical assistance and training and by supporting worthwhile host government information programs.

(f) Encourage as appropriate expansion of internal assistance from other free countries, international organizations, international lending institutions, and private capital sources.

(g) In coordination as appropriate with DOD and/or CIA provide assistance to:

1. Strengthen the capability of police and police paramilitary organizations to enforce the law and maintain public order with the minimum use of force.

2. Strengthen the capability of police and police paramilitary organizations to counter communist inspired or exploited subversion and insurgency.

3. Encourage the development of responsible and humane police administration and judicial procedure to improve the character and image of police forces, and bind them more closely to the community.

(h) Where appropriate in coordination with DOD and/or CIA, plan, develop and implement civilian counter-insurgency programs, such as village alarm systems, village communication systems and remote area aviation liaison.

(i) In collaboration with DOD and where appropriate with

USIA,

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USIA, plan, develop and implement military civic action programs on such projects as public works, sanitation, transportation, communications, and education, and assure that such programs are coordinated and properly funded.

4. The Role of the Department of Defense

The Department of Defense has the major responsibility for assisting selected developing countries to attain and maintain military security. In discharging this responsibility it seeks to achieve in each country a proper balance of the capabilities to meet both external and internal threats. In nations not confronted with a real or credible external threat to their security, the task is primarily one of assisting in the development of an effective internal defense capability.

Where subversive insurgency is virtually non-existent, or incipient (PHASE I), the objective is to support the development of an adequate counter-insurgency capability in indigenous military forces through the Military Assistance Program, and to complement the nation-building programs of AID with military civic action. The same means, in collaboration with AID and CIA, will be employed to develop a similar capability in indigenous para-military forces. In this low intensity situation the task of U.S. Forces is essentially advisory in character.

If this aim is not realized in a particular country, and as a consequence insurgency develops to serious proportions (PHASES II or III), the task of U.S. Forces may become operational. The Department of Defense, when directed by the President, will provide operational assistance in the form of U.S. Armed Forces units in support of indigenous forces to provide increased land/sea/air mobility, additional communications facilities, training assistance and advice on the conduct of counter-insurgency operations.

In fulfilling its internal defense role, the Department of Defense will:

(a) Develop U.S. military forces trained for employment in unconventional warfare and counter-guerrilla and other military counter-insurgency operations.

(b) Develop, test and maintain transportation, communications and logistic systems to support these forces.

(c) Develop

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- (c) Develop military doctrine for unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency military operations to provide guidance for the employment of U.S. forces and for the training of U.S. and friendly foreign military personnel.
- (d) Develop strategy and prepare contingency plans, in accordance with U.S. foreign policy objectives and commitments, to provide operational assistance and/or reinforcement with U.S. tactical units to friendly countries faced with a credible threat of internal and/or external aggression.
- (e) Provide research and development activities in support of unconventional warfare and counter-insurgency operations.
- (f) Conduct military intelligence operations to provide intelligence on foreign military and paramilitary forces.
- (g) Be prepared to execute military operations in support of national objectives as directed.
- (h) Plan, develop and implement civilian counter-insurgency programs where appropriate with AID and/or CIA (See Role of AID, paragraph c).
- (i) Assess the adequacy of its part of the overall internal defense program in relation to those of other U.S. agencies.
- (j) Develop language trained and area oriented U.S. forces for possible employment in training, or providing operational advice or operational support to indigenous security forces.
- (k) Provide, in coordination with other interested governmental agencies, training and advisory assistance in all aspects of military intelligence.
- (l) Maintain continuous surveillance of all U.S. and foreign military and paramilitary forces available to the Free World, evaluating their state of effectiveness and readiness, and making appropriate recommendations for their support and improvement.
- (m) Develop the military sections of Country Internal Defense Plans.
- (n) Support the psychological operations of USIA in
pre-insurgency

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pre-insurgency or counter-insurgency situations.

Through the Military Assistance Program the Department of Defense will:

(a) Provide, in collaboration with AID, military weapons and material within available resources to friendly indigenous military and paramilitary forces and training in the fields of guerrilla warfare and counterinsurgency.

(b) Encourage and support, in collaboration with AID and USIA where appropriate, the use of indigenous military and paramilitary forces of developing nations in military civic action programs, including such projects as public works, sanitation, transportation, communications, and other activities helpful to economic development.*

5. The Role of the Central Intelligence Agency

CIA is an active participant in the U.S. Internal Defense effort at both the national and country team levels. The role of the Director of Central Intelligence and of the Central Intelligence Agency in Internal Defense activities will be carried out in accordance with the provisions of statutory authority and executive direction.

6. The Role of the U.S. Information Agency

The U.S. Information Agency will orient its programs toward immunizing the vulnerable sectors of developing societies against communist propaganda and subversive activities, and helping the modernization process to maturity without impairing the progressive enhancement of sovereignty and national values of the recipient country.

Developing societies require professional advice and assistance in their public information services and psychological operations to develop and maintain effective channels of communication.

Accordingly, the United States Information Agency will:

(a) Employ informational techniques, in cooperation with the host government, in support of the latter's social, economic and military efforts, to strengthen the people's feeling of

identity

*NOTE: SEE ANNEX A FOR SUPPLEMENTARY ROLE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.

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identity with their government and counter the propaganda efforts of hostile subversive or insurgent groups.

(b) Strengthen local understanding of the U.S. policies and objectives, and the U.S. role in assisting nations through the modernization process.

(c) In coordination with AID and DOD, as appropriate, assist the host government in its psychological operations aimed at preventing or defeating subversive insurgency.

(d) In coordination with AID and DOD, as appropriate, assist the host government in improving its mass communication techniques; promote effective two-way communications between the government and its citizenry.

(e) In cooperation with the host government, work to improve distribution of effective informational and educational materials to all areas; produce in collaboration with the host government, such film, radio, TV and other information materials as will further the joint effort against the insurgency.

(f) Using whatever techniques are feasible, including public opinion research and motivational studies, provide information on political attitudes, the extent and causes of disaffection and dissidence, and other aspects of opinion relevant to potential or actual insurgency.

(g) 

(h) In cooperation with AID and DOD as appropriate, provide training to host country personnel in psychological operations and informational activities.

(i) Provide informational materials to the critical sectors (i.e., youth, labor, student, peasant, and intellectual groups) of the indigenous population.

(j) In collaboration with other responsible agencies, encourage U.S. private interests (business firms, foundations, etc.) to take actions in support of the U.S. Government policies and programs.

(k) Develop and maintain a flow of information to the rest of the world exposing communist inspired subversion and insurgency.

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ANNEX A

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Supplementary Role of the Department of Defense

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ANNEX B

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

CLANDESTINE OPERATION - Activities to accomplish intelligence, counter-intelligence, and other similar activities sponsored or conducted by governmental departments or agencies, in such a way as to assure secrecy or concealment.

COLD WAR - A state of international tension, wherein political, economic, technological, sociological, psychological, paramilitary, and military measures short of overt armed conflict involving regular military forces are employed to achieve national objectives.

COUNTERGUERRILLA WARFARE - Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or non-military agencies of a government against guerrillas.

COUNTERINSURGENCY - Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat subversive insurgency.

COUNTERINTELLIGENCE - That aspect of intelligence activity which is devoted to destroying the effectiveness of inimical foreign intelligence activities and to the protection of information against espionage, individuals against subversion, and installations or material against sabotage.

COVERT OPERATIONS - Operations which are so planned and executed as to conceal the identity of or permit plausible denial by the sponsor. They differ from clandestine operations in that emphasis is placed on concealment of identity of sponsor rather than on concealment of the operation.

EVASION AND ESCAPE (E&E) - The procedures and operations whereby military personnel and other selected individuals are enabled to emerge from an enemy-held or hostile area to areas under friendly control.

GUERRILLA - A combat participant in guerrilla warfare.

GUERRILLA WARFARE (GW) - Military and paramilitary operations conducted in enemy-held or hostile territory by irregular,

predominantly

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predominantly indigenous forces.

INSURGENCY - A condition resulting from a revolt or insurrection against a constituted government which falls short of civil war. In the current context, subversive insurgency is primarily communist inspired, supported, or exploited.

INTERNAL DEFENSE - The full range of measures taken by a government to protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency.

INTERNAL SECURITY - The state of law and order prevailing within a nation.

MILITARY CIVIC ACTION - The use of preponderantly indigenous military forces on projects useful to the local population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, health, sanitation and others contributing to economic and social development, which would also serve to improve the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or engage in military civic actions in overseas areas.)

PARAMILITARY FORCES - Forces or groups which are distinct from the regular armed forces of any country, but resembling them in organization, equipment, training, or mission.

PARAMILITARY OPERATION - An operation undertaken by a paramilitary force.

PROPAGANDA - Any information, ideas, doctrines, or special appeals in support of national objectives, designed to influence the opinions, emotions, attitudes, or behavior of any specified group in order to benefit the sponsor, either directly or indirectly.

BLACK - Propaganda which purports to emanate from a source other than the true one.

GREY - Propaganda which does not specifically identify any source.

WHITE - Propaganda disseminated and acknowledged by the sponsor or by an accredited agency thereof.

PSYCHOLOGICAL

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PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE- The planned use of propaganda and other psychological actions having the primary purpose of influencing the opinions, emotions, attitudes, and behavior of hostile foreign groups in such a way as to support the achievement of national objectives.

SUBVERSION - Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, morale, or political strength of a regime.

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ANNEX C

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MODEL OUTLINE OF COUNTRY INTERNAL DEFENSE PLAN

I. - BACKGROUND

- A. Resume of US-subject country relations.
- B. Strategic importance to U.S.
- C. Economic and social conditions prevailing.
- D. Past, present and future threats to internal stability.
- E. Orientation of foreign policy and relations with neighboring states.
- F. External threats.

II. - DEFINITIVE STATEMENT OF SUBJECT COUNTRY'S VULNERABILITIES

- A. Political.
- B. Socio-economic.
- C. Security (police, military and paramilitary) and intelligence.
- D. Psychological information.

III. - POLICY AND OBJECTIVES

- A. Statement of overall U.S. policy and objectives for subject country in context of I and II above.
- B. Identify and explain any recommended changes to be made to approved objectives.

IV. - COURSE OF ACTION

List under the following headings, the lines of action required on the part of the subject country, the U.S. and third countries and/or international organization necessary to attain U.S. objectives:

- A. Political.
- B. Socio-economic.
- C. Security (including intelligence).
- D. Psychological information.

V. - RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS

For FY-63-67 (i.e. 5-year projections) summarize plan
and program

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and program resource requirements for the subject country, the U.S. and third countries and/or international organizations. Employ the following system of categorization and relate program elements to lines of action contained in Section IV.

A. Socio-economic programs - List program totals and major projects for the following:

1. Long-range development (little immediate impact).
2. Short-range projects such as:

Community development.	Credit.
Housing.	Labor.
Health and sanitation.	Road construction.
Food.	Information.
Education.	

B. Civic action (military, paramilitary and police).

1. Employ same categories as for socio-economic programs.

C. Security programs.

1. Police and paramilitary.

- (a) Equipment
- (b) In-country advisory assistance.
- (c) Participant training.

2. Military (by service).

- (a) Equipment and material.
- (b) In-country advisory assistance.
- (c) Formal training.

3. Other

D. Psychological/information.

1. Mass media, including technical assistance.
2. Cultural exchange.
3. Libraries.

VI. - APPENDICES

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VI. - APPENDICES

- A. Listing of U.S. resources available for application in subject, - i.e., U.S. Corps of Engineers capabilities, Peace Corps, Ford Foundation-type operations, special forces augmentation teams, etc.
- B. Additional non-USG programs and activities.

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