

HEARINGS EXHIBITS ¹

Exhibit 1

SPECIAL REPORT INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)


CHAIRMAN J. EDGAR HOOVER

JUNE, 1970


¹ Under criteria determined by the Committee, in consultation with the White House, the Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, certain materials have been deleted from those documents, some of which were previously classified, to maintain the internal operating procedures of the agencies involved, and to protect intelligence sources and methods. Further deletions were made with respect to protecting the privacy of certain individuals and groups. These deletions do not change the material content of these exhibits.

June 25, 1970


This report, prepared for the President,
is approved by all members of this committee
and their signatures are affixed hereto.



Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Chairman



Director, Central Intelligence Agency



Director, Defense Intelligence Agency



Director, National Security Agency

PREFACE

The objectives of this report are to: (1) assess the current internal security threat; (2) evaluate current intelligence collection procedures; identify restraints under which U. S. intelligence services operate; and list the advantages and disadvantages of such restraints; and (3) evaluate current interagency coordination and recommend means to improve it.

The Committee has attempted to set forth the essence of the issues and the major policy considerations involved which fall within the scope of its mandate.

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PART ONE

SUMMARY OF INTERNAL SECURITY THREATI. MILITANT NEW LEFT GROUPSA. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat

The movement of rebellious youth known as the "New Left," involving and influencing a substantial number of college students, is having a serious impact on contemporary society with a potential for serious domestic strife. The revolutionary aims of the New Left are apparent when their identification with Marxism-Leninism is examined. They pointedly advertise their objective as the overthrow of our system of government by force and violence. Under the guise of freedom of speech, they seek to confront all established authority and provoke disorder. They intend to smash the U. S. educational system, the economic structure, and, finally, the Government itself. New Left groups do not have a large enough number of rank-and-file followers, nor do they have a unity of purpose to carry out massive or paralyzing acts of insurrection. They do, on the other hand, have the will to carry on more militant efforts in local situations and an inclination to utilize more extreme means to attain their objectives.

1. Student Protest Groups. The Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) has, in the past year, split into several factions, including the Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM), which has control over 30 chapters; and the Worker Student Alliance (WSA), which consists of 63 chapters. The WSA faction, dominated by the Progressive Labor Party (PLP), aims to build a worker-student movement in keeping with the PLP's aim of developing a broad worker-based revolutionary movement in the United States.

There are some 85 unaffiliated SDS chapters generally sympathetic to revolutionary tactics and goals. The trend of increased radical campus organizations is noticeable at campuses where recognition of SDS has been refused or rescinded and SDS members have banded together, with or without sanction, under a new title to attract student support. In addition, numerous ad hoc groups have been established on campuses and elsewhere to exploit specific issues.

The National Student Strike (NSS), also known as the National Strike Information Center, was formed following the entry of the United States forces into Cambodia and the deaths of four students at Kent State University. NSS, which helped to coordinate the nationwide student strike in May, 1970, has three regional centers and includes

among its leadership SDS members and other New Left activists. The NSS has established a nationwide communications system of "ham" radio stations on campuses to encourage student demonstrations and disruptions. This communications capability may have a significant impact on campus stability in the coming school year.

The Venceremos Brigade (VB), established to send United States youth to Cuba to aid in the 1970 harvests, has continually received favorable publicity in Cuban propaganda media. To date, over 900 members of the VB have visited Cuba and another group of approximately 500 members are expected to follow suit. While in Cuba, VB members were individually photographed and questioned in detail about their backgrounds. Because of their contacts with Cuban officials, these individuals must be considered as potential recruits for Cuban intelligence activities and sabotage in the United States.

The greatest threat posed to the security of the country by student protest groups is their potential for fomenting violence and unrest on college campuses. Demonstrations have triggered acts of arson by extremists against war-oriented research and ROTC facilities and have virtually paralyzed many schools. There has been a growing number of noncampus, but student-related, acts of violence which increase tensions between "town and gown" and which constitute a marked escalation of the scope and level of protest activities. Few student protests are currently related to exclusively campus issues; virtually all involve political and social issues. Increasingly, the battlefield is the community with the campus serving primarily as a staging area.

The efforts of the New Left aimed at fomenting unrest and subversion among civil servants, labor unions, and mass media have met with very limited success, although the WSA and its parent, the PLP, have attempted through their "Summer Work-Ins" to infiltrate and radicalize labor. The inability of these groups to subvert and control the mass media has led to the establishment of a large network of underground publications which serve the dual purpose of an internal communication network and an external propaganda organ.

Leaders of student protest groups have traveled extensively over the years to communist countries; have openly stated their sympathy with the international communist revolutionary movements in South Vietnam and Cuba; and have directed others into activities which support these movements. These individuals must be considered to have potential for

recruitment and participation in foreign-directed intelligence activity.

2. Antiwar Activists. The impetus and continuity for the antiwar movement is provided by the New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) and the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC). The NMC is a coalition of numerous antiwar groups and individuals including communist "old left" elements. The SMC is under the control of the Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP).¹¹

The NMC and SMC have announced a policy of "nonexclusion" which places no limitation on the type of individuals allowed to participate in demonstrations. This policy opens the door for violence-prone individuals who want to capitalize on the activities of these groups. Both groups profess to follow a policy of nonviolence; however, the very nature of the protests that they sponsor sets the stage for civil disobedience and police confrontation by irresponsible dissident elements. Various individuals in NMC and SMC are calling for more militant protest activities, a subject to be discussed at national meetings by both groups in late June, 1970.

Although antiwar groups are not known to be collecting weapons, engaging in paramilitary training, or advocating terrorist tactics, the pro-Hanoi attitude of their leaders, the unstable nature of many NMC advocates and their policy of "nonexclusion" underscore the use of the antiwar movement as a conduit for civil disorder. This is further emphasized by the NMC leadership's advocacy of civil disobedience to achieve desired objectives.

There is no indication that the antiwar movement has made serious inroads or achieved any more than a slight degree of influence among labor unions, the mass media, and civil servants. One group, however, the Federal Employees for a Democratic Society (FEDS), offers a means of protest for recent radical graduates employed by the Federal Government.

The military and educational institutions are the prime targets of the antiwar movement. In addition to vandalism, arsons, and bombings of ROTC facilities, there has been stepped-up activity to spread antiwar sympathy among American servicemen from within through sympathetic members in the military and from without through such programs as "GI Coffeehouses" and the proposed National GI Alliance. The increasing access by members of the military to the underground press, the establishment of servicemen's unions, and organizations which facilitate desertions, have contributed significantly to the increasing instances of dissent in the military services.

NMC and SMC leaders are constantly speaking before student groups and endeavoring to use student radicals to further the antiwar movement. They have called for an end to the ROTC and have demonstrated, often violently, to force universities to halt war-related research projects.

[The NMC maintains close contact with the World Council for Peace and Stockholm Conference on Vietnam] A new organization dominated by NMC leaders, the Committee of Liaison with Families of Servicemen Detained in North Vietnam, emerged in January, 1970, after contacts with North Vietnamese representatives. It attempts to present a favorable picture of North Vietnamese treatment of American prisoners of war.

NMC leaders have frequently traveled abroad. It is therefore necessary to consider these individuals as having potential for engaging in foreign-directed intelligence collection.

[The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), in its analysis of bloc intelligence, is of the view that the Soviet and bloc intelligence services are committed at the political level to exploit all domestic dissidents wherever possible; This attack is being conducted through recruited agents, agents of influence, and the use of front groups. It is established bloc policy to deploy its forces against the United States as "the main enemy" and to direct all bloc intelligence forces toward ultimately political objectives which disrupt U. S. domestic and foreign policies.

3. New Left Terrorist Groups. The Weatherman terrorist group, which emerged from a factional split of SDS during the Summer of 1969, is a revolutionary youth movement which actively supports the

revolutionary leadership role of the Negro in the United States. It has evolved into a number of small commando-type units which plan to utilize bombings, arsons, and assassinations as political weapons.

There has been evidence of Weatherman involvement in terrorist tactics, including the accidental explosion of a "Weatherman bomb factory" in New York City on March 6, 1970; the discovery of two undetonated bombs in Detroit police facilities on the same date; and the blast at New York City police installations on June 9, 1970.

While Weatherman membership is not clearly defined, it is estimated that at least 1,000 individuals adhere to Weatherman ideology. In addition, groups such as the White Panther Party, Running Dog, Mad Dog, and the Youth International Party (Yippies) are supporters of Weatherman terrorism but have no clearly definable ideology of their own.

Adherents to Weatherman ideology are also found within radical elements on campuses, among those living in off-campus communes, among New Left movement lawyers and doctors, and the underground press. Individuals who adhere to the Weatherman ideology have offered support and aid to hard-core Weatherman members, including 21 Weatherman members currently in hiding to avoid apprehension.

They identify themselves politically with North Vietnam, Cuba, and North Korea and consider pro-Soviet and pro-Chinese organizations as being aligned with imperialist powers. In addition, some of the Weatherman leaders and adherents have traveled to communist countries or have met in Western countries with communist representatives.

Weatherman leaders and other members of terrorist groups are not known at this time to be involved in foreign-directed intelligence collection activity. The fugitive and underground status of many of these people, as well as their involvement in activities which would likely bring them to the attention of American authorities, would be a deterrent to contacts by foreign intelligence organizations.

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures

1. Scope and Effectiveness of Current Coverage. Although New Left groups have been responsible for widespread damage to ROTC facilities, for the halting of some weapons-related research, and for the increasing dissent within the military services, the major threat to the internal security of the United States is that directed against the civilian sector of our society.

Coverage of student groups is handled primarily through live informants and it is generally effective at the national level or at major meetings of these groups where overall policy, aims, and objectives of the groups are determined.

The antiwar movement's activities are covered through the FBI by live informants in all organizations of interest. This is supported by information furnished by all members of the intelligence community and other Federal, state, and local agencies. Key leaders and activists are afforded concentrated and intensified investigative coverage on a continuing basis and, in situations where there are positive indications of violence, electronic surveillances have been implemented on a selective basis. Informant and electronic coverage does not meet present requirements.

Although several SDS chapters on college campuses which adhere to Weatherman ideology have been penetrated by live informants, there is no live informant coverage at present of underground Weatherman fugitives. There is electronic coverage on the residence of a Weatherman contact in New York City and on the residence of an alleged Weatherman member in San Francisco; however, no information has been developed concerning the whereabouts of the 21 Weatherman fugitives.

2. Gaps in Current Coverage. Established, long-term coverage is not available within student protest groups due to the fact that the student body itself changes yearly, necessitating a constant turnover in the informants targeted against these groups. His idealism and immaturity, as well as the sensitive issues of academic freedom and the right to dissent, all serve to increase the risk that the student informant will be exposed as such.

Generally, day-to-day coverage of the planned activities of student protest groups, which are somewhat autonomous and disjointed, could be strengthened. [Advance notice of foreign travel by student militants is particularly needed.] Campus violence is generally attributable to small, close-knit extremist groups among radical students. Coverage of these latter groups is minimal. c76

The antiwar movement is comprised of a great many organizations and people which represent varied political, moral and ethnic beliefs. Current manpower commitments preclude optimum coverage of all antiwar activities on a day-to-day basis.

Existing coverage of New Left extremists, the Weatherman group in particular, is negligible. Most of the Weatherman group has gone underground and formed floating, commando-type units composed of three to six individuals. The transitory nature of these units hinders the installation of electronic surveillances and their smallness and distrust of outsiders make penetration of these units through live informants extremely difficult.

Financially, the Weatherman group appears to be without a centralized source of funds. Wealthy parents have furnished funds to some of these individuals, including those in a fugitive status. Many members have also been involved in the thefts of credit and identification cards, as well as checks, and have utilized them for obtaining operating expenses.

3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection.
To establish effective coverage of student protest groups would require the expansion of live informant coverage of individual campus chapters of these organizations. This would entail extensive use of student informants to obtain maximum utilization of their services for the periods of their college attendance.

Because of the great number of individuals and groups in the antiwar movement, an increase in the manpower assigned to these investigations would facilitate more intensive coverage. In addition, there are several key leaders involved in virtually all antiwar activities, including international contacts, against whom electronic surveillances and mail covers would be particularly effective.

Improvement of intelligence gathering against New Left terrorists depends on a combination of live informant coverage among key leaders and selective electronic surveillances. Because of the nature of the Weatherman groups, live informant coverage will most likely result through the defection of a key leader.

Extensive efforts have been undertaken which should produce a live informant capable of furnishing information as to the location of Weatherman fugitives and planned terrorist acts. In the event a commune is located, prompt installation of electronic coverage should produce similar results. Utilization of additional resources to expand and intensify this collection would be beneficial.

II. BLACK EXTREMIST MOVEMENT

A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat

1. Black Panther Party. The most active and dangerous black extremist group in the United States is the Black Panther Party (BPP). Despite its relatively small number of hard-core members--approximately 800 in 40 chapters nationwide--the BPP is in the forefront of black extremist activity today. The BPP has publicly advertised its goals of organizing revolution, insurrection, assassination and other terrorist-type activities. Moreover, a recent poll indicates that approximately 25 per cent of the black population has a great respect for the BPP, including 43 per cent of blacks under 21 years of age.

The Panther newspaper has a current circulation of approximately 150,000 copies weekly. Its pages are filled with messages of racial hatred and call for terrorist guerrilla activity in an attempt to overthrow the Government. The BPP has been involved in a substantial number of planned attacks against law enforcement officers, and its leadership is composed in large part of criminally inclined, violence-prone individuals.

Weapons are regularly stockpiled by the Party. During 1968 and 1969, quantities of machine guns, shotguns, rifles, hand grenades, homemade bombs, and ammunition were uncovered in Panther offices.

2. New Left Support for BPP. The BPP has received increasing support from radical New Left elements. During 1970, the BPP formed a working relationship with radical student dissenters by injecting the issue of Government "repression" of Panthers into the antiwar cause. Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) supported the BPP in a 1969 "united front against fascism." The probability that black extremists, including the BPP, will work closely with New Left white radicals in the future increases the threat of escalating terrorist activities. It would be safe to project that racial strife and student turmoil fomented by black extremists will definitely increase.

3. BPP Propaganda Appearances. Despite its small membership, the BPP has scored major successes in the propaganda arena. In

1969, BPP representatives spoke at 189 colleges throughout the Nation, while in 1967 there were only 11 such appearances. Although no direct information has been received to date indicating that the BPP has initiated any large-scale racial disorders, the year 1970 has seen an escalation of racial disorders across the Nation compared to 1969. This fact, coupled with an increasing amount of violent Panther activity, presents a great potential for racial and civil unrest for the future.

4. Appeal to Military. The BPP has made pointed appeals to black servicemen with racist propaganda. High priority has been placed on the recruitment of veterans with weapons and explosives training. The BPP has also called for infiltration of the Government. These activities, should they achieve even minimum success, present a grave threat.

5. BPP Philosophy and Foreign Support. The BPP relies heavily on foreign communist ideology to shape its goals. Quotations from Mao Tse-tung were the initial ideological bible of the BPP. Currently, the writings of North Korean Premier Kim Il-sung are followed and extensive use of North Korean propaganda material is made in BPP publications and training. The Marxist-oriented philosophy of the BPP presents a favorable environment for support of the Panthers from other communist countries.

BPP leaders have traveled extensively abroad including visits to Cuba, Russia, North Korea, and Algeria. International operations of the BPP are directed by Eldridge Cleaver, a fugitive from United States courts. Cleaver has established an international staff in Algeria, from where communist propaganda is constantly relayed to the BPP headquarters in Berkeley, California. He has also established close ties with Al Fatah, an Arab guerrilla organization, whose leaders have reportedly extended invitations to BPP members to take guerrilla training during 1970. Cleaver, in a recent conversation, indicated that North Koreans are conducting similar training for BPP members. Radical white students in Western Europe and the Scandinavian countries have organized solidarity committees in support of the BPP. These committees are the sources of financial contributions to the Party and provide outlets for the BPP newspaper.

6. Other Black Extremist Groups. The Nation of Islam (NOI) is the largest single black extremist organization in the United States with an estimated membership of 6,000 in approximately 100 Mosques. The NOI

preaches hatred of the white race and advocates separatism of the races. The NOI as a group has, to date, not instigated any civil disorders; however, the followers of this semi-religious cult are extremely dedicated individuals who could be expected to perform acts of violence if so ordered by the NOI head, Elijah Muhammed. When Muhammed, who is over 70 years of age, is replaced, a new leader could completely alter current nonviolent tactics of the organization. For example, Muhammed's son-in-law, Raymond Sharrieff, now among the top hierarchy of NOI, could rise to a leadership position. Sharrieff is vicious, domineering, and unpredictable.

There are numerous other black extremist organizations, small in numbers, located across the country. There is also a large number of unaffiliated black extremists who advocate violence and guerrilla warfare. One particular group, the Republic of New Africa (RNA), headquartered in Detroit, Michigan, calls for the establishment of a separate black nation in the South to be protected by armed forces. These groups, although small, are dedicated to the destruction of our form of government and consequently present a definite potential for instigating civil disorder or guerrilla warfare activity.

7. Black Student Extremist Influence. Black student extremist activities at colleges and secondary schools have increased alarmingly. Although currently there is no dominant leadership, coordination or specific direction between these individuals, they are in frequent contact with each other. Consequently, should any type of organization or cohesiveness develop, it would present a grave potential for future violent activities at United States schools. Increased informant coverage would be particularly productive in this area. Black student extremists have frequently engaged in violence and disruptive activity on campuses. Major universities which made concessions to nonnegotiable black student demands have not succeeded in calming extremist activities. During the school year 1969-70, there were 227 college disturbances having racial overtones. There were 530 such disturbances in secondary schools compared with only 320 during the previous school year.

8. Foreign Influence in the Black Extremist Movement.

Although there is no hard evidence indicating that the black extremist movement is substantially controlled or directed by foreign elements, there is a marked potential for foreign-directed intelligence or subversive activity among black extremist leaders and organizations. These groups are highly susceptible to exploitation by hostile foreign intelligence services.

Currently the most important foreign aspect of the black extremist movement is the availability of foreign asylum, especially with regard to black extremists subject to criminal prosecution in the United States. Some foreign countries, such as Cuba, provide a temporary safe haven for these individuals. [Information has been received that passports and funds for travel have also been furnished by countries such as Cuba, North Korea, and Communist intelligence services do not, at present, play a major role in the black extremist movement; however, all such services have established contact with individual black militants. Thus, the penetration and manipulation of black extremist groups by these intelligence services remain distinct possibilities.] Communist intelligence services are capable of using their personnel, facilities, and agent assets to work in the black extremist field. The Soviet and Cuban services have major capabilities available.]

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection Procedures

There are some definite gaps in the current overall intelligence penetration of the black extremist movement. For example, although there appears to be sufficient live informant coverage of the BPP additional penetration

is needed.

High echelon informant coverage could conceivably prevent violence, sabotage, or insurrection if such activity was planned by BPP leadership. Insufficient coverage of BPP is offset to some extent by technical coverage

Penetration of leadership levels has been hindered in part by current BPP policies which prevent rank-and-file members from advancing to leadership roles.

Improvement in coverage of BPP financial activities could be made, particularly with regard to sources of funds and records. Information received to date indicates that financial support for the BPP has been furnished by both foreign individuals and domestic sources. Thus, a deeper penetration and correlation of foreign and domestic information received is essential to a full determination of BPP finances. Coverage of BPP finances has been hampered by fact that BPP leaders handle financial matters personally.

In view of the increased amount of foreign travel and contacts by BPP leaders abroad, there is a clear-cut need for more complete coverage of foreign involvement in BPP activities.

1. Other Black Extremist Organizations. Informant coverage of the NOI is substantial, enabling its activities to be followed on a current basis. Coverage of militant black student groups and individuals is very limited because of the sensitive areas involved. An effective source of such coverage would be reliable, former members of the Armed Forces presently attending college. Live informant coverage, particularly with respect to the activities and plans of unaffiliated black militants, needs to be increased. More sources both in the United States and abroad in a position to determine the amount of foreign involvement in black extremist activities need to be developed. Maximum use of communication interceptions would materially increase the current capabilities of the intelligence community to develop highly important data regarding black extremist activities.

III. INTELLIGENCE SERVICES OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES

A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat

The threat posed by the communist intelligence services must be assessed in two areas: (1) direct intervention in fomenting and/or influencing domestic unrest; (2) extensive espionage activities.

Taken in complete context, these services constitute a grave threat to the internal security of the United States because of their size, capabilities, widespread spheres of influence, and targeting of the United States as "enemy number one." The largest and most skilled of these services is the Soviet Committee for State Security (KGB) which has roughly 300,000 personnel of whom some 10,000 are engaged in foreign operations.

1. Intervention in Domestic Unrest. There have been no substantial indications that the communist intelligence services have actively fomented domestic unrest. Their capability cannot, however, be minimized and the likelihood of their initiating direct intervention would be in direct relationship to the deterioration of the political climate and/or imminence of hostilities. The ingredients for a first-rate capability are present, including both the personnel and the ingrained philosophy and know-how for using such tactics.

Communist intelligence has shown a real capability to foment disorder in a number of trouble spots. The dissidence and violence in the United States today present adversary intelligence services with opportunities unparalleled for forty years. While fostering disorder and rebellion through communist parties and fronts is a potent weapon in the communist arsenal, their past success has been evident in clandestine recruitment efforts on campuses during times of unrest. H. A. R. (Kim) Philby, Guy Burgess, and Donald Maclean were all students at Cambridge during the depression period of the 1930's and were in the vanguard of what was then the New Left. Their recruitment and cooperation with Soviet intelligence wreaked havoc on British intelligence and also compromised U. S. security in those sectors where they had authorized access.

For instance, about 900 members of the Venceremos Brigade, a group of American youths, recently completed a round trip to Cuba. This travel was financed by the Cuban Government. While in Cuba, they were exhorted to actively participate in United States revolutionary activities upon their return to the United States.

A sabotage manual, prepared in [redacted] turned up in the hands of individuals responsible for recent bombings. While the potential for widespread, well-organized incidents of violence generated and controlled by the Cuban intelligence service is considered minimal, isolated occurrences of this nature must be considered probable. The [redacted] Services appear to have assumed the passive roles of observers and reporters.

The communist intelligence services maintain contacts and exert influence among a variety of individuals and organizations through the exploitation of ideological, cultural, and ethnic ties. Most of these liaisons are maintained with some degree of openness with individuals associated with the Communist Party, USA, various of its front groups, [other pro-Soviet organizations], nationality groups, and foreign-language newspapers. These contacts are exploited as sources for and propaganda outlets of communist intelligence services. Regarded individually, these efforts cannot be considered a major threat to our internal security; however, in total, they represent a sizable element of our population which can be influenced in varying degrees by communist intelligence service operations.

2. Intelligence Operations. Persistent and pervasive intelligence operations which have their inspiration and direction supplied by communist intelligence services represent a major threat to the internal security.

(DELETED)

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Collection

1. Scope and Effectiveness. The scope of overall intelligence efforts is encompassed in the threefold goals of penetration, intelligence, and prosecution. Domestic implementation of these goals is delimited by agreement among United States intelligence agencies. Intelligence components of the United States military services are immediately concerned with protecting the integrity of their personnel and installations.

Methods used in these endeavors, employed in varying degrees by U.S. intelligence agencies dependent upon their specific tasks are: penetrations; defectors; double agent operations; physical, technical, and photographic surveillances; examination and analysis of overt publications; information supplied by friendly intelligence services; and COMINT.

(DELETED)

2. Gaps in Current Coverage

(DELETED)

IV. OTHER REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS

A. Assessment of Current Internal Security Threat

1. Communist Party. The Communist Party continues as a distinct threat to the internal security because of its extremely close ties and total commitment to the Soviet Union. There are many thousands of people in the United States who adhere to a Marxist philosophy and agree with the basic objectives of the Communist Party although they do not identify themselves specifically with the organization. The Party receives most of its finances from the Soviet Union, adheres to Soviet policies explicitly, and provides a major outlet for Soviet propaganda. The Party will without question continue to implement whatever orders it receives from the Soviets in the future.

There is little likelihood that the Communist Party, USA, will instigate civil disorders or use terrorist tactics in the foreseeable future. Its strong suit is propaganda. Through its publications and propaganda it will continue its efforts to intensify civil disorders, and foment unrest in the Armed Forces, labor unions, and minority groups. The Party is on the periphery of the radical youth movement and is striving to strengthen its role in this movement and to attract new members through a recently formed youth organization, but it does not appear this group will achieve any substantial results for the Party in the future.

2. Socialist Workers Party and Other Trotskyist Groups. These organizations have an estimated membership of ^{the} major Trotskyist organization, the Socialist Workers Party, has attained an influential role in the antiwar movement through its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance, which dominates the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam and which has more than doubled its size on college campuses in the past year. Trotskyist groups have participated in major confrontations with authorities both on and off campuses and have consistently supported civil disorders. At this time they do not pose a major threat to instigate insurrection or to commit terrorist acts. The propaganda of these groups, while emphasizing student unrest, is also aimed at creating dissatisfaction in labor organizations and in the Armed Forces. The Trotskyist organizations maintain close relations with the Fourth International, a foreign-based worldwide Trotskyist movement.

4. Puerto Rican Nationalist Extremist Groups. The radical Puerto Rican independence movement has spawned approximately ten violently anti-American groups committed to Puerto Rican self-determination. Revolutionary violence is a major aim of the estimated members of these groups and if sufficiently strong, they would not hesitate to mount armed insurrection. Since July, 1967, some 130 bombings in Puerto Rico and in the New York City area have been attributed to these extremists. American-owned businesses have been the main targets, but there has been a recent upsurge of violence against U.S. defense facilities in Puerto Rico.

B. Assessment of Current Intelligence Coverage

1. Scope and Effectiveness. Coverage of the Communist

Coverage of the Trotskyist and groups

Current live informant coverage can furnish information on the general activities of these groups and it should serve to warn of policy changes in favor of insurrection or sabotage.

Informant penetration of the Puerto Rican independence groups provides information on the objectives of most of these organizations as well as the identities of their members. However, these sources have limited ability to provide advance information regarding violence committed by these groups or by individual members.

2. Gaps in Current Coverage.

Closer coverage at the policy-making levels of the Puerto Rican independence groups is needed to obtain more comprehensive information on persons involved in terrorist activities. The small memberships of many of these organizations is a major reason for the limited coverage.

3. Possible Measures to Improve Intelligence Collection.

The selective use of electronic surveillances would materially enhance the intelligence coverage of the policy-making levels of these organizations. A particular benefit of electronic surveillance in the Puerto Rican field could be the development of information identifying persons involved in terrorist activities. Communications intelligence coverage and travel control measures could be improved to provide greater awareness of the travel and other activities of individuals of security interest. Through the establishment of additional informant coverage on college campuses, the involvement of these organizations in the radicalization of students could be assessed with increased accuracy.

PART TWORESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

The Committee noted that the President had made it clear that he desired full consideration be given to any regulations, policies, or procedures which tend to limit the effectiveness of domestic intelligence collection. The Committee further noted that the President wanted the pros and cons of such restraints clearly set forth so that the President will be able to decide whether or not a change in current policies, practices, or procedures should be made.

During meetings of the Committee, a variety of limitations and restraints were discussed. All of the agencies involved, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), the three military counterintelligence services, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Security Agency (NSA), and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), participated in these considerations.

In the light of the directives furnished to the Committee by the White House, the subject matters hereinafter set forth were reviewed for the consideration and decision of the President.

I. SPECIFIC OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTSA. Interpretive Restraint on Communications IntelligencePreliminary Discussion

Nature of Restriction

Advantages of Maintaining Restriction

Advantages of Relaxing Restriction

(DELETED)

(DELETED)

B. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations

Preliminary Discussion

The limited number of electronic surveillances and penetrations substantially restricts the collection of valuable intelligence information of material importance to the entire intelligence community.

Nature of Restrictions

Electronic surveillances have been used on a selective basis. Restrictions, initiated at the highest levels of the Executive Branch, arose as a result of the condemnation of these techniques by civil rights groups, Congressional concern for invasion of privacy, and the possibility of their adverse effect on criminal prosecutions.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. Disclosure and embarrassment to the using agency and/or the United States is always possible since such techniques often require that the services or advice of outside personnel be used in the process of installation.
- 2.
3. Certain elements of the press in the United States and abroad would undoubtedly seize upon disclosure of electronic coverage in an effort to discredit the United States.
4. The monitoring of electronic surveillances requires considerable manpower and, where foreign establishments are involved, the language resources of the agencies could be severely taxed.

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions

1. The U. S. Government has an overriding obligation to use every available scientific means to detect and neutralize forces which pose a direct threat to the Nation.

2. Every major intelligence service in the world, including those of the communist bloc, use such techniques as an essential part of their operations and it is believed the general public would support their use by the United States for the same purpose.

3. The President historically has had the authority to act in matters of national security. In addition, Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 provides a statutory basis.

4. Intelligence data from electronic coverage is not readily obtainable from other techniques or sources. Such data includes information which might assist in formulating foreign policy decisions, information leading to the identification of intelligence and/or espionage principals and could well include the first indication of intention to commit hostile action against the United States.

5. Acquisition of such material from COMINT without benefit of the assistance which electronic surveillance techniques can provide, if possible at all, would be extremely expensive. Therefore, this approach could result in considerable dollar savings compared to collection methods.

DECISION: Electronic Surveillances
and Penetrations

- _____ Present procedures on electronic coverage should continue.
- _____ Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security.
- _____ Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage
- _____ More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI does not wish to change its present procedure of selective coverage on major internal security threats as it believes this coverage is adequate at this time. The FBI would not oppose other agencies seeking authority of the Attorney General for coverage required by them and thereafter instituting such coverage themselves.

C. Mail Coverage

Preliminary Discussion

The use of mail covers can result in the collection of valuable information relating to contacts between U. S. nationals and foreign governments and intelligence services. CIA and the military investigative agencies have found this information particularly helpful in the past. Essentially, there are two types of mail coverage: routine coverage is legal, while the second--covert coverage--is not. Routine coverage involves recording information from the face of envelopes. It is available, legally, to any duly authorized Federal or state investigative agency submitting a written request to the Post Office Department and has been used frequently by the military intelligence services. Covert mail coverage, also known as "sophisticated mail coverage," or "flaps and seals," entails surreptitious screening and may include opening and examination of domestic or foreign mail. This technique is based on high-level cooperation of top echelon postal officials.

Nature of Restrictions

Covert coverage has been discontinued while routine coverage has been reduced primarily as an outgrowth of publicity arising from disclosure of routine mail coverage during legal proceedings and publicity afforded this matter in Congressional hearings involving accusations of governmental invasion of privacy.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

Routine Coverage:

1. Although this coverage is legal, charges of invasion of privacy, no matter how ill-founded, are possible.
2. This coverage depends on the cooperation of rank-and-file postal employees and is, therefore, more susceptible to compromise.

Covert Coverage:

1. Coverage directed against diplomatic establishments, if disclosed, could have adverse diplomatic repercussions.

2. This coverage, not having sanction of law, runs the risk of any illicit act magnified by the involvement of a Government agency.

3. Information secured from such coverage could not be used for prosecutive purposes.

Advantages of Relaxing RestrictionsRoutine Coverage:

1. Legal mail coverage is used daily by both local and many Federal authorities in criminal investigations. The use of this technique should be available to permit coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a threat to the internal security.

Covert Coverage:

1. High-level postal authorities have, in the past, provided complete cooperation and have maintained full security of this program.

2. This technique involves negligible risk of compromise. Only high echelon postal authorities know of its existence, and personnel involved are highly trained, trustworthy, and under complete control of the intelligence agency.

3. This coverage has been extremely successful in producing hard-core and authentic intelligence which is not obtainable from any other source. An example is a case involving the interception of a letter to a _____ establishment in _____. The writer offered to sell information to the _____ and enclosed a sample of information available to him. Analysis determined that the writer could have given _____ information which might have been more damaging

DECISION: Mail Coverage

- ☐ Present restrictions on both types of mail coverage should be continued.
- ☐ Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.
- ☐ Present restrictions on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest.
- ☐ More information is needed.

NOTE:

The FBI is opposed to implementing any covert mail coverage because it is clearly illegal and it is likely that, if done, information would leak out of the Post Office to the press and serious damage would be done to the intelligence community.] The FBI has no objection to legal mail coverage providing it is done on a carefully controlled and selective basis in both criminal and security matters.

D. Surreptitious Entry

Preliminary Discussion

Nature of Restrictions

Use of surreptitious entry, also referred to as "anonymous sources: and "black bag jobs," has been virtually eliminated.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. The activity involves illegal entry and trespass.
2. Information which is obtained through this technique could not be used for prosecutive purposes.
3. The public disclosure of this technique would result in widespread publicity and embarrassment. The news media would portray the incident as a flagrant violation of civil rights

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions

1. Operations of this type are performed by a small number of carefully trained and selected personnel under strict supervision. The technique is implemented only after full security is assured. It has been used in the past with highly successful results and without adverse effects.

2. Benefits accruing from this technique in the past have been innumerable

3. In the past this technique, when used against subversives, has produced valuable intelligence material.

DECISION: Surreptitious Entry

_____ Present restrictions should be continued.

_____ Present restrictions should be modified to permit procurement

_____ Present restrictions should also be modified to permit selective use of this technique against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.

_____ More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to surreptitious entry

E. Development of Campus Sources

Preliminary Discussion

Public disclosure of CIA links with the National Student Association and the subsequent issuance of the Katzenbach Report have contributed to a climate adverse to intelligence-type activity on college campuses and with student-related groups. It should be noted that the Katzenbach Report itself does not specifically restrain CIA from developing positive or counterintelligence sources to work on targets abroad.

Restrictions currently in force limit certain other elements of the intelligence community access to some of the most troublesome areas: campuses, college faculties, foreign and domestic youth groups, leftist journalists, and black militants. It is recognized that these are prime targets of communist intelligence services and that the opportunity for foreign communist exploitation increases in proportion to the weakness of a U.S. counterintelligence effort.

Nature of Restrictions

The need for great circumspection in making contacts with students, faculty members, and employees of institutions of learning is widely recognized. However, the requirements of the intelligence community for increased information in this area is obvious from the concern of the White House at the absence of hard information about the plans and programs of campus and student-related militant organizations. At the present time no sources are developed among secondary school students and, with respect to colleges and universities, sources are developed only among individuals who have reached legal age, with few exceptions. This policy is designed to minimize the possibility of embarrassment and adverse publicity, including charges of infringement of academic freedom.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. Students, faculty members, and others connected with educational institutions are frequently sensitive to and hostile towards any Government activity which smacks of infringement on academic freedom. They are prone to publicize inquiries by governmental agencies and the resulting publicity can often be misleading in portraying the Government's interest.

2. Students are frequently immature and unpredictable. They cannot be relied on to maintain confidences or to act with discretion to the same extent as adult sources.

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions

1. To a substantial degree, militant New Left and antiwar groups in the United States are comprised of students, faculty members, and others connected with educational institutions. To a corresponding degree, effective coverage of these groups and activities depends upon development of knowledgeable sources in the categories named. In this connection, the military services have capabilities which could be of value to the FBI.

2. Much of the violence and disorders which have occurred on college campuses have been of a hastily planned nature. Unless sources are available within the student bodies, it is virtually impossible to develop advance information concerning such violence.

3. The development of sources among students affiliated with New Left elements affords a unique opportunity to cultivate informant prospects who may rise to positions of leadership in the revolutionary movement or otherwise become of great long-range value.

4. The extraordinary and unprecedented wave of destruction which has swept U. S. campuses in the past several months and which in some respects represents a virtual effort to overthrow our system provides a clear justification for the development of campus informants in the interest of national security.

5. Contacts with students will make it possible to obtain information about travel abroad by U. S. students and about attendance at international conferences.

DECISION: Development of Campus Sources

- _____ Present restrictions on development of campus and student-related sources should be continued.
- _____ Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups.
- _____ CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling abroad or living abroad should be increased.
- _____ More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to removing any present controls and restrictions relating to the development of campus sources. To do so would severely jeopardize its investigations and could result in leaks to the press which would be damaging and which could result in charges that investigative agencies are interfering with academic freedom.

F. Use of Military Undercover Agents

Preliminary Discussion

The use of undercover agents by the military services to develop domestic intelligence is currently limited to penetration of organizations whose membership includes military personnel and whose activities pose a direct threat to the military establishment. For example, although the Navy has approximately 54 Naval ROTC units and numerous classified Government contract projects on various campuses across the country, the Naval Investigative Service conducts no covert collection on college campuses. The same is true of the other military services.

Nature of Restrictions

The use of undercover agents by the military investigative services to develop domestic intelligence among civilian targets is believed beyond the statutory intent of the Congress as expressed in Title 10, U. S. Code, and in current resource authorizations. The Delimitations Agreement (1949 agreement signed by the FBI, Army, Navy and Air Force which delimits responsibility for each agency with regard to investigations of espionage, counter-espionage, subversion and sabotage) reflects the current missions of the FBI and the military services. Further, there is a lack of assets to undertake this mission unless essential service-related counterintelligence missions are reduced. There is also concern for morale and disciplinary reactions within the services should the existence of such covert operations become known.

Advantages of Maintaining Restrictions

1. If the utilization of military counterintelligence in this mission is contrary to the intent of the Congress, discovery of employment may result in unfavorable legislation and further reductions in appropriations.
2. Lacking direct statutory authority, the use of the military services in this mission could result in legal action directed against the Executive Branch.
3. The use of military personnel to report on civilian activities for the benefit of civilian agencies will reduce the ability of the military services to meet service-connected intelligence responsibilities.

4. If expansion of the mission of the military services with regard to college campuses is to provide coverage of any significance, it will require corollary increases in resources.

5. Prosecutions for violations of law discovered in the course of military penetration of civilian organizations must be tried in civil courts. The providing of military witnesses will require complicated interdepartmental coordination to a much greater extent than the present and will serve, in the long run, to reduce security.

6. Disclosure that military counterintelligence agencies have been furnishing information obtained through this technique to nonmilitary investigative agencies with respect to civilian activities would certainly result in considerable adverse publicity. The Army's recent experience with former military intelligence personnel confirms this estimate. Since obligated service officers, first enlistees and draftees are drawn from a peer group in which reaction is most unfavorable, morale and disciplinary problems can be anticipated.

Advantages of Relaxing Restrictions

1. Lifting these restrictions would expand the scope of domestic intelligence collection efforts by diverting additional manpower and resources for the collection of information on college campuses and in the vicinity of military installations.

2. The use of undercover agents by the military counterintelligence agencies could be limited to localized targets where the threat is great and the likelihood of exposure minimal. Moreover, controlled use of trusted personnel leaving the service to return to college could expand the collection capabilities at an acceptable risk.

3. The military services have a certain number of personnel pursuing special academic courses on campuses and universities. Such personnel, who in many instances have already been investigated for security clearance, would represent a valuable pool of potential sources for reporting on subversive activities of campus and student-related groups.

DECISION: Use of Military
Undercover Agents

- _____ Present restrictions should be retained.
- _____ The counterintelligence mission of the military services should be expanded to include the active collection of intelligence concerning student-related dissident activities, with provisions for a close coordination with the FBI.
- _____ No change should be made in the current mission of the military counterintelligence services; however, present restrictions should be relaxed to permit the use of trusted military personnel as FBI assets in the collection of intelligence regarding student-related dissident activities.
- _____ More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to the use of any military undercover agents to develop domestic intelligence information because this would be in violation of the Delimitations Agreement. The military services, joined by the FBI, oppose any modification of the Delimitations Agreement which would extend their jurisdiction beyond matters of interest to the Department of Defense.

II. BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS

The capability of member agencies, NSA, CIA, DIA, FBI, and the military counterintelligence services, to collect intelligence data is limited by available resources, particularly in terms of budget and/or qualified manpower. For some agencies fiscal limitations or recent cutbacks have been acute. Budgetary requirements for some agencies, other than the FBI, are reviewed and passed upon by officials who, in some instances, may not be fully informed concerning intelligence requirements.

The military services noted that cuts in budget requirements for counterintelligence activities have the effect of severely hampering the ability of these services to accomplish missions relating to coverage of threats to the national security. Budgetary deficiencies have occurred at a time when investigative work loads are increasing significantly.

Manpower limitations constitute a major restriction on the FBI's capabilities in the investigation of subversive activities. The problem is further complicated by the fact that, even if substantial numbers of Agents could be recruited on a crash basis, the time required to conduct background investigations and to provide essential training would mean several months' delay in personnel being available for use against the rapidly escalating subversive situation.

In the event, as a result of this report, additional collection requirements should be levied on the agencies involved, it would be necessary to provide for essential funding. For example,

DECISION: Budget and Manpower Restrictions

_____ Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs in the event the various investigative restraints herein are lifted.

_____ Each agency must operate within its current budgetary or manpower limitations, irrespective of action required as result of this report.

_____ More information is needed.

PART THREEEVALUATION OF INTERAGENCY COORDINATIONI. CURRENT PROCEDURES TO EFFECT COORDINATION

There is currently no operational body or mechanism specifically charged with the overall analysis, coordination, and continuing evaluation of practices and policies governing the acquisition and dissemination of intelligence, the pooling of resources, and the correlation of operational activities in the domestic field.

Although a substantial exchange of intelligence and research material between certain of the interested agencies already exists, much remains to be done in the following areas: (1) the preparation of coordinated intelligence estimates in a format useful for policy formulation; (2) the coordination of intelligence collection resources of the member agencies and the establishment of clear-cut priorities for the various agencies; and (3) the coordination of the operational activities of member agencies in developing the required intelligence.

II. SUGGESTED MEASURES TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

It is believed that an interagency group on domestic intelligence should be established to effect coordination between the various member agencies. This group would define the specific requirements of the various agencies, provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence, develop recommendations relative to policies governing operations in the field of domestic intelligence, and prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which would incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the entire intelligence community.

Membership in this group should consist of appropriate representatives named by the Directors of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the counterintelligence agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. In addition, an

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appropriate representative of the White House would have membership. The committee would report periodically to the White House, and a White House staff representative would coordinate intelligence originating with this committee in the same manner as Dr. Henry Kissinger, Assistant to the President, coordinates foreign intelligence on behalf of the President. The chairman would be appointed by the President.

This interagency group would have authority to determine appropriate staff requirements and to implement these requirements, subject to the approval of the President, in order to meet the responsibilities and objectives described above.

DECISION: Permanent Interagency Group

- _____ An ad hoc group consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be appointed and should serve as long as the President deems necessary, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other objectives indicated above. The ad hoc group should be tasked to develop a permanent organization to carry out the objectives of this report.
- _____ A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other objectives indicated above.
- _____ No further action required.
- _____ More information is needed.

NOTE: The FBI is opposed to the creation of a permanent committee for the purpose of providing evaluations of domestic intelligence, however, the FBI would approve of preparing periodic domestic intelligence estimates.

EXHIBIT 2

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*Documents***Domestic Intelligence Gathering Plan:
Analysis and Strategy**

July, 1970

Memorandum for: H. R. Haldeman
From: Tom Charles Huston
Subject: Domestic intelligence review

1. Background

A working group consisting of the top domestic intelligence officials of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NAS, and each of the military services met regularly throughout June to discuss the problems outlined by the President and to draft the attached report. The discussions were frank and the quality of work first-rate. Cooperation was excellent and all were delighted that an opportunity was finally at hand to address themselves jointly to the serious internal security threat which exists.

I participated in all meetings, but restricted my involvement to keeping the committee on the target the President established. My impression that the report would be more accurate and the recommendations more helpful if the agencies were allowed wide latitude in expressing their opinions and working out arrangements which they felt met the President's requirements consistent with the resources and missions of the member agencies.

2. Mr. Hoover

I went into this exercise fearful that C.I.A. would refuse to cooperate. In fact, Dick Helms [Director of Central Intelligence] was most cooperative and helpful, and the only stumbling block was Mr. Hoover. He attempted at the first meeting to divert the committee from operational problems and redirect its mandate to the preparation of another analysis of existing intelligence. I declined to acquiesce in this approach, and succeeded in getting the committee back on target.

When the working group completed its report, Mr. Hoover refused to go along with a single conclusion drawn or support a single recommendation made. His position was twofold:

(1) Current operations are perfectly satisfactory and (2) No one has any business commenting on procedures he has established for the collection of intelligence by the F.B.I. He attempted to modify the body of the report, but I successfully opposed it on the

grounds that the report was the conclusion of all the agencies, not merely the F.B.I. Mr. Hoover then entered his objections as footnotes to the report. Cumulatively, his footnotes suggest that he is perfectly satisfied with current procedures and is opposed to any changes whatsoever. As you will note from the report, his objections are generally inconsistent and frivolous—most express concern about possible embarrassment to the intelligence community (i.e., Hoover) from public disclosure of clandestine operations.

Admiral Gayler and General Bennett were greatly displeased by Mr. Hoover's attitude and his insistence on footnoting objections. They wished to raise a formal protest and sign the report only with the understanding that they opposed the footnotes. I prevailed upon them not to do so since it would only aggravate Mr. Hoover and further complicate our efforts. They graciously agreed to go along with my suggestion in order to avoid a nasty scene and jeopardize the possibility of positive action resulting from the report. I assured them that their opinion would be brought to the attention of the President.

3. Threat Assessment

The first 23 pages of the report constitute an assessment of the existing internal security threat, our current intelligence coverage of this threat, and areas where our coverage is inadequate. All agencies concurred in this assessment, and it serves to explain the importance of expanded intelligence collection efforts.

4. Restraints on Intelligence Collection

Part Two of the report discusses specific operational restraints which currently restrict the capability of the intelligence community to collect the types of information necessary to deal effectively with the internal security threat. The report explains the nature of the restraints and sets out the arguments for and against modifying them. My concern was to afford the President the strongest arguments on both sides of the question so that he could make an informed decision as to the future course of action to be followed by the intelligence community.

I might point out that of all the individuals involved in the preparation and consideration of this report, only Mr. Hoover is satisfied with existing procedures.

Those individuals within the F.B.I. who have day-to-day responsibilities for domestic intelligence operations privately disagree with Mr. Hoover and believe that it is imperative that changes in operating procedures be initiated at once.

I am attaching to this memorandum my recommendations on the decision the President should make with regard to these operational restraints. Although the report sets forth the pros and cons on each issue, it may be helpful to add my specific recom-

mendations and the reasons therefore in the event the President has some doubts on a specific course of action.

5. Improvement in Interagency Coordination

All members of the committee and its working group, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, believe that it is imperative that a continuing mechanism be established to effectuate the coordination of domestic intelligence efforts and the evaluation of domestic intelligence data. In the past there has been no systematic effort to mobilize the full resources of the intelligence community in the internal security area and there has been no mechanism for preparing community-wide domestic intelligence estimates such as is done in the foreign intelligence area by the United States Intelligence Board. Domestic intelligence information coming into the White House has been fragmentary and unevaluated. We have not had for example, a community-wide estimate of what we might expect short- or long-term in the cities or on the campuses or within the military establishment.

Unlike most of the bureaucracy, the intelligence community welcomes direction and leadership from the White House. There appears to be agreement, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, that effective coordination within the community is possible only if there is direction from the White House. Moreover, the community is pleased that the White House is finally showing interest in their activities and an awareness of the threat which they so acutely recognize.

I believe that we will be making a major contribution to the security of the country if we can work out an arrangement which provides for institutionalized coordination within the intelligence community and effective leadership from the White House.

6. Implementation of the President's Decisions

If the President should decide to lift some of the current restrictions and if he should decide to authorize a formalized domestic intelligence structure, I would recommend the following steps:

(A) Mr. Hoover should be called in privately for a stroking session at which the President explains the decision he has made, thanks Mr. Hoover for his candid advice and past cooperation, and indicates he is counting on Edgar's cooperation in implementing the new decisions.

(B) Following this Hoover session, the same individuals who were present at the initial session in the Oval Office should be invited back to meet with the President. At that time, the President should thank them for the report, announce his decisions, indicate his desires for future activity, and present each with an

autographed copy of the photo of the first meeting which Ollie took.

(C) An official memorandum setting forth the precise decisions of the President should be prepared so that there can be no misunderstanding. We should also incorporate a review procedure which will enable us to ensure that the decisions are fully implemented.

I hate to suggest a further imposition on the President's time, but think these steps will be necessary to pave over some of the obvious problems which may arise if the President decides, as I hope he will, to overrule Mr. Hoover's objections to many of the proposals made in this report. Having seen the President in action with Mr. Hoover, I am confident that he can handle this situation in such a way that we can get what we want without putting Edgar's nose out of joint. At the same time, we can capitalize on the goodwill the President has built up with the other principals and minimize the risk that they may feel they are being forced to take a back seat to Mr. Hoover.

7. Conclusion

I am delighted with the substance of this report and believe it is a first-rate job. I have great respect for the integrity, loyalty, and competence of the men who are operationally responsible for internal security matters and believe that we are on the threshold of an unexcelled opportunity to cope with a very serious problem in its germinal stages when we can avoid the necessity for harsh measures by acting swift, discreetly, and decisively to deflect the threat before it reaches alarming proportions.

I might add, in conclusion, that it is my personal opinion that Mr. Hoover will not hesitate to accede to any decision which the President makes, and the President should not, therefore, be reluctant to overrule Mr. Hoover's objections. Mr. Hoover is set in his ways and can be bull-headed as hell, but he is a loyal trooper. Twenty years ago he would never have raised the type of objections he has here, but he's getting old and worried about his legend. He makes life tough in this area, but not impossible—for he'll respond to direction by the President and that is all we need to set the domestic intelligence house in order.

OPERATIONAL RESTRAINTS ON INTELLIGENCE COLLECTIONA. Interpretive Restraints on Communications Intelligence. (pp. 23-25)Recommendation:

Present interpretation should be broadened to permit and program for coverage by NSA of the communications of U. S. citizens using international facilities.

Rationale:

The FBI does not have the capability to monitor international communications. NSA is currently doing so on a restricted basis, and the information it has provided has been most helpful. Much of this information is particularly useful to the White House and it would be to our disadvantage to allow the FBI to determine what NSA should do in this area without regard to our own requirements. No appreciable risk is involved in this course of action.

B. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations. (pp. 26-28)Recommendation:

Present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security.

ALSO, present procedures should be changed to permit intensification of coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community.

Rationale:

At the present time, less than 65 electronic penetrations are operative. This includes coverage of the CPUSA and organized crime targets, with only a few authorized against subjects of pressing internal security interest.

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Mr. Hoover's statement that the FBI would not oppose other agencies seeking approval for and operating electronic surveillances is gratuitous since no other agencies have the capability.

Everyone knowledgeable in the field, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, concurs that existing coverage is grossly inadequate. CIA and NSA note that this is particularly true of diplomatic establishments, and we have learned at the White House that it is also true of New Left groups.

C. Mail Coverage (pp. 29-31)

Recommendation:

Restrictions on legal coverage should be removed.

ALSO, present restrictions on covert coverage should be relaxed on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest.

Rationale:

There is no valid argument against use of legal mail covers except Mr. Hoover's concern that the civil liberties people may become upset. This risk is surely an acceptable one and hardly serious enough to justify denying ourselves a valuable and legal intelligence tool.

Covert coverage is illegal and there are serious risks involved. However, the advantages to be derived from its use outweigh the risks. This technique is particularly valuable in identifying espionage agents and other contacts of foreign intelligence services.

D. Surreptitious Entry (pp. 32-33)

Recommendation:

Present restrictions should be modified to permit procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material.

ALSO, present restrictions should be modified to permit selective use of this technique against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.

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Rationale:

Use of this technique is clearly illegal: it amounts to burglary. It is also highly risky and could result in great embarrassment if exposed. However, it is also the most fruitful tool and can produce the type of intelligence which cannot be obtained in any other fashion.

The FBI, in the Mr. Hoover's younger days, used to conduct such operations with great success and with no exposure. The information secured was invaluable.

NSA has a particular interest since it is possible by this technique to secure materials with which NSA can break foreign cryptographic codes. We spend millions of dollars attempting to break these codes by machine. One successful surreptitious entry can do the job successfully at no dollar cost.

Surreptitious entry of facilities occupied by subversive elements can turn up information about identities, methods of operation, and other invaluable investigative information which is not otherwise obtainable. This technique would be particularly helpful if used against the Weathermen and Black Panthers.

The deployment of the Executive Protector Force has increased the risk of surreptitious entry of diplomatic establishments. However, it is the belief of all except Mr. Hoover that the technique can still be successfully used on a selective basis.

E. Development of Campus Sources (pp. 34-36)Recommendation:

Present restrictions should be relaxed to permit expanded coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups.

ALSO, CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad should be increased.

5/15/73

Rationale:

The FBI does not currently recruit any campus sources among individuals below 21 years of age. This dramatically reduces the pool from which sources may be drawn. Mr. Hoover is afraid of a young student surfacing in the press as an FBI source, although the reaction in the past to such events has been minimal. After all, everyone assumes the FBI has such sources.

The campus is the battle-ground of the revolutionary protest movement. It is impossible to gather effective intelligence about the movement unless we have campus sources. The risk of exposure is minimal, and where exposure occurs the adverse publicity is moderate and short-lived. It is a price we must be willing to pay for effective coverage of the campus scene. The intelligence community, with the exception of Mr. Hoover, feels strongly that it is imperative that we increase the number of campus sources this fall in order to forestall widespread violence.

CIA claims there are no existing restraints on its coverage of over-seas activities of US nationals. However, this coverage has been grossly inadequate since 1965 and an explicit directive to increase coverage is required.

F. Use of Military Undercover Agents (pp. 37-39)Recommendation:

Present restrictions should be retained.

Rationale:

The intelligence community is agreed that the risks of lifting these restraints are greater than the value of any possible intelligence which could be acquired by doing so.

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[Signature]

BUDGET AND MANPOWER RESTRICTIONS
(pp. 40-41)

Recommendation:

Each agency should submit a detailed estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs in the event the various investigative restraints herein are lifted.

Rationale:

In the event that the above recommendations are concurred in, it will be necessary to modify existing budgets to provide the money and manpower necessary for their implementation. The intelligence community has been badly hit in the budget squeeze (I suspect the foreign intelligence operations are in the same shape) and it may be necessary to make some modifications. The projected figures should be reasonable, but will be subject to individual review if this recommendation is accepted.

MEASURES TO IMPROVE DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS
(pp. 42-43)

Recommendation:

A permanent committee consisting of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counterintelligence agencies should be appointed to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, and carry out the other objectives specified in the report.

Rationale:

The need for increased coordination, joint estimates, and responsiveness to the White House is obvious to the intelligence community. There are a number of operational problems which need to be worked out since Mr. Hoover is fearful of any mechanism which might jeopardize his autonomy. CIA would prefer an ad hoc committee to see how the system works, but other members believe that this would merely delay the establishment of effective coordination and joint operations. The value of lifting intelligence collection restraints is proportional to the availability of joint operations and evaluation, and the establishment of this inter-agency group is essential.

EXHIBIT 3

July 14, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HUSTON

SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence Review

The recommendations you have proposed as a result of the review have been approved by the President.

He does not, however, want to follow the procedure you outlined on page 4 of your memorandum regarding implementation. He would prefer that the thing simply be put into motion on the basis of this approval.

The formal official memorandum should, of course, be prepared and that should be the device by which to carry it out.

I realize this is contrary to your feeling as to the best way to get this done. If you feel very strongly that this procedure won't work you had better let me know and we'll take another stab at it. Otherwise let's go ahead.

H. R. HALDEMAN

EXHIBIT 4

Retyped from indistinct original23.7 Tom Huston
memorandum

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 23, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

RICHARD HELMS, DIRECTOR
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

The President has carefully studied the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc) and made the following decisions:

1. Interpretive Pestraint on Communications Intelligence.
National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 6 (NSCID-6)

2. Electronic Surveillances and Penetrations.

Also, coverage of foreign nationals and diplomatic establishments in the United States of interest to the intelligence community is to be intensified.

3. Mail Coverage. Restrictions on legal coverage are to be removed. Restrictions on covert coverage are to be relaxed to permit use of this technique on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal security interest.

4. Surreptitious Entry. Restraints on the use of surreptitious entry are to be removed. The technique is to be used to permit procurement of vitally needed foreign cryptographic material and against other urgent and high priority internal security targets.

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-2-

5. Development of Campus Sources. Coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups is to be increased. All restraints which limit this coverage are to be removed. Also, CIA coverage of American students (and others) traveling or living abroad is to be increased.

6. Use of Military Undercover Agents. Present restrictions are to be retained.

7. Budget and Manpower. Each agency is to submit a detailed estimate as to projected manpower needs and other costs required to implement the above decisions.

8. Domestic Intelligence Operations. A committee consisting of the Directors or other appropriate representatives appointed by the Directors, of the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA, and the military counter-intelligence agencies is to be constituted effective August 1, 1970, to provide evaluations of domestic intelligence, prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates, carry out the other objectives specified in the report, and perform such other duties as the President shall, from time to time, assign. The Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman of the committee. Further details on the organization and operations of this committee are set forth in an attached memorandum.

The President has directed that each addressee submit a detailed report, due on September 1, 1970, on the steps taken to implement these decisions. Further such periodic reports will be requested as circumstances merit.

The President is aware that procedural problems may arise in the course of implementing these decisions. However, he is anxious that such problems be resolved with maximum speed and minimum misunderstanding. Any difficulties which may arise should be brought to my immediate attention in order that an appropriate solution may be found and the President's directives implemented in a manner consistent with his objectives.

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

Attachment
cc: The President
H.R. Haldeman

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ORGANIZATION AND OPERATIONS OF THE INTERAGENCY
GROUP ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE AND
INTERNAL SECURITY (IAG)

1. Membership. The membership shall consist of representatives of the FBI, CIA, DIA, NSA, and the counter-intelligence agencies of the Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. To insure the high level consideration of issues and problems which the President expects to be before the group, the Directors of the respective agencies should serve personally. However, if necessary and appropriate, the Director of a member agency may designate another individual to serve in his place.
2. Chairman. The Director of the FBI shall serve as chairman. He may designate another individual from his agency to serve as the FBI representative on the group.
3. Observers. The purpose of the group is to effectuate community-wide coordination and secure the benefits of community-wide analysis and estimating. When problems arise which involve areas of interest to agencies or departments not members of the group, they shall be invited, at the discretion of the group, to join the group as observers and participants in those discussions of interest to them. Such agencies and departments include the Departments of State (I & R, Passport); Treasury (IRS, Customs); Justice (BNDD, Community Relations Service), and such other agencies which may have investigative or law enforcement responsibilities touching on domestic intelligence or internal security matters.
4. White House Liaison. The President has assigned to Tom Charles Huston staff responsibility for domestic intelligence and internal security affairs. He will participate in all activities of the group as the personal representative of the President.
5. Staffing. The group will establish such sub-committees or working groups as it deems appropriate. It will also determine and implement such staffing requirements as it may deem necessary to enable it to carry out its responsibilities, subject to the approval of the President.

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-2-

6. Duties. The group will have the following duties:

- (a) Define the specific requirements of member agencies of the Intelligence community.
- (b) Effect close, direct coordination between member agencies.
- (c) Provide regular evaluations of domestic intelligence.
- (d) Review policies governing operations in the field of domestic intelligence and develop recommendations.
- (e) Prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates which incorporate the results of the combined efforts of the intelligence community.
- (f) Perform such other duties as the President may from time to time assign.

7. Meetings. The group shall meet at the call of the Chairman a member agency, or the White House representative.

8. Security. Knowledge of the existence and purpose of the group shall be limited on a strict "need to know" basis. Operations of, and papers originating with, the group shall be classified "Top Secret-Handle Via Comint Channels Only."

9. Other Procedures. The group shall establish such other procedures as it believes appropriate to the implementation of the duties set forth above.

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EXHIBIT 5

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach *CD*

FROM : W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: MR. TOM CHARLES HUSTON
STAFF ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

DATE: June 20, 1969

Reference is made to the enclosed memorandum from W. C. Sullivan to Mr. DeLoach dated June 18, 1969.

Mr. Huston did come in yesterday. The first thing he said was that he had made a mistake in going to Mr. J. Walter Yeagley as Yeagley did not seem to know anything about the New Left. Mr. Huston then went on to say that President Nixon called him in and discussed with him in some detail the need for the President to know in greater depth the details concerning the revolutionary activities stemming from the New Left. In particular, said Mr. Huston, President Nixon is interested in all information possible relating to foreign influences and the financing of the New Left. He said he was requested by the President to also go to other members of the intelligence community to develop whatever materials they may have within their jurisdiction.

Mr. Huston said that on completing his work, it will be presented to the President for his use.

I told Mr. Huston that I was not in any position to make commitments in this matter, that if he had such a request to make it would be necessary for him to put it in writing and address his letter to the Director who made the decisions in such areas. Mr. Huston said that he would do this.

RECOMMENDATION:

REC-71

— For the information of the Director. —

Enclosure

WCS:lm1/5

AUG 13 1969

FBI

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EXHIBIT 6

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 20, 1969

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

FROM: Tom Charles Huston
Staff Assistant to the President


The President has directed that a report on foreign Communist support of revolutionary protest movements in this country be prepared for his study. He has specifically requested that the report draw upon all the resources available to the intelligence community and that it be as detailed as possible.

"Support" should be liberally construed to include all activities by foreign Communists designed to encourage or assist revolutionary protest movements in the United States.

On the basis of earlier reports submitted to the President on a more limited aspect of this problem, it appears that our present intelligence collection capabilities in this area may be inadequate. The President would like to know what resources we presently have targeted toward monitoring foreign Communist support of revolutionary youth activities in this country, how effective they are, what gaps in our intelligence exist because of either inadequate resources or a low priority of attention, and what steps could be taken, if he directed, to provide the maximum possible coverage of these activities.

I have asked CIA, NSA, and DIA to submit their contributions to me by Monday, June 30th. I would appreciate it if the Bureau would provide their response to the President's request by that date.

Since the Bureau has primary responsibility in this area, I would like to discuss the matter further with your staff after I have had an opportunity to evaluate the initial contributions. The President has assigned a high priority to this project, and I want to insure that he receives the most complete report that it is possible to assemble.


Tom Charles Huston

PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL

MSB 5 1969

FBI

EXHIBIT 7

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 30, 1969

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: ~~FORN~~ FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR ~~REVOLUTIONARY~~ PROTEST
MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

The Director approved my memorandum of 6/23/69 which advised we were preparing a report for Mr. Tom Charles Huston, Staff Assistant to the President, at his request regarding our coverage of foreign communist support of revolutionary youth activities in the United States to reach him by 6/30/69. We advised Mr. Huston such a report would be forthcoming.

Our report sets forth the traditional channel for communist support of revolutionary activity in this country by the established basic revolutionary groups under foreign domination such as the Communist Party, USA, and the Socialist Workers Party. We also cover the establishment of hostile intelligence operations directed at the United States by the Soviet Union, Cuba and Communist China.

Next we show the newer, bolder avenues of support and direction being utilized by revolutionaries, often without any attempt to conceal their purposes. These include international conferences which in this period of history are ostensibly for peace in Vietnam but which also have the usual underlying goal of destroying United States prestige in world affairs. The case of international travel and communication with revolutionary intent by the Left and Right oriented elements from the United States and abroad is then set forth.

The section dealing with the coverage of the above therein to our internal security already has been placed, including that the use of this information and physical and other technology generated by the FBI by ourselves and others in the field of counterintelligence.

Distribution (2):

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Casper
1 - Mr. Callahan
1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. Felt
1 - Mr. Gale
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Tavel
1 - Mr. Trotter
1 - Mr. Tele. Room
1 - Mr. Holmes
1 - Miss Gandy

JUN 30 1969

FBI

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is not to be included in official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. W. C. Sullivan
 RE: FOREIGN SUPPORT FOR REVOLUTIONARY PROTEST
 MOVEMENTS IN THE UNITED STATES

Our report shows that the FBI has been aware from the inception of the New Left and black extremist movements that they pose new and unique threats to our internal security. It shows we have readjusted our investigative intelligence efforts to cope with the new problems created. It stresses the fact that these movements are developing increasingly into hard-core revolutionary elements which will demand still greater attention in the form of increased coverage as it appears there will be increasingly closer links between these movements and foreign communists in the future.

We have prepared a transmittal letter to Mr. Huston submitting our report. Inasmuch as this document is not going directly to the President, no copy is being forwarded to the Attorney General at this time.

ACTION:

With your approval, the attached report and letter will be forwarded to Mr. Huston.

LA

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FBI

100-3100

EXHIBIT 8

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

DATE: June 5, 1970

FROM : W.C. Sullivan *3/4*SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 5, 1970)

This memorandum is for the record and for possible reference use by the Director.

Following his conference with the President this morning, the Director advised me that the President had appointed him Chairman of a Special Intelligence Committee for the purpose of coordinating a more effective intelligence-gathering function as a joint effort on the part of the Bureau, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), National Security Agency (NSA) and the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to insure that comprehensive information is being obtained for the President's use which will provide him with a world-wide picture of New Left and other subversive activities.

The Director advised me that among those present at the meeting with the President were Richard Helms, Director of the CIA; Admiral Noel A. M. Gayler, head of the NSA; General Donald V. Bennett, head of the DIA; and Mr. T. C. Huston, White Staff Assistant, all of whom the President had designated to serve on the Committee under the direction of the Director. Additionally, there were present Assistant to the President H. R. Haldeman; John D. Ehrlichman, Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs; and Robert M. Finch, Secretary of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare.

The Director stated he wanted immediate action on this. He advised me that he wanted all of the men on the Committee contacted and instructed to be in his office for a Committee meeting at 11:00 a.m. Monday morning, 6/8/70. This has been arranged and has been made the subject of a separate memorandum.

RECEIVED FROM

JUN 5 1975

FBI

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Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach

RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 5, 1970)

The Director also instructed that a working committee meeting comprising the same individuals should be scheduled for Tuesday, June 9, and he instructed me to serve in his place at that meeting to insure that the instructions he issues to the Committee on Monday are carried through in specific detail by members of the Committee on Tuesday. Arrangements have also been made for this meeting to be held Tuesday afternoon at 3:30 p.m. utilizing the facilities of the United States Intelligence Board conference rooms.

The Director further instructed that this working committee should henceforth meet each Tuesday and Friday for the purpose of implementing his instructions with the aim of completing a draft paper by June 22, 1970, which the Director and others may review for approval and sign prior to its presentation to the President on July 1, 1970. Arrangements for this will be implemented at the working committee meeting on Tuesday, June 9, 1970. The Director will be promptly furnished with a report on each meeting.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director and for the record.

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EXHIBIT 9

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

TO : Mr. DeLoach *DS*

DATE: June 5, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

Pursuant to the Director's instructions and relative to his role as head of the above-captioned Committee, I have set up a meeting to take place in the Director's office at 11 am Monday, 6/8/70.

I talked personally to the following individuals who will be there: Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency; General Donald V. Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency; Admiral Noel Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency; and Mr. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to the President at the White House.

The first three mentioned indicated they would like to take one of their assistants with them; however, they had not decided which one, therefore, the names are not available. As soon as they make the decision, I will submit the names of these assistants in a separate memorandum.

The details for the meeting of the working group are being worked out. At this point it is expected it will be held at 3:30 pm on Tuesday afternoon. This also will be the subject of separate memorandum.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

WCS:chs *ch*
(5)

RECEIVED JUNE 11 1970

JUN 5 1970

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 6/6/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE
(Established By The President June 5, 1970)

Reference is made to my memorandum to you dated June 5, 1970, captioned as above which indicated that the Director will meet with the heads of the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency and a representative of the White House staff in the Director's office, at 11:00 a.m. 6-8-70. In accordance with the Director's instructions I will be present. Unless there is an objection I will have with me Mr. C. D. Brennan, Chief of the Internal Security Section which will have the responsibility of preparing our portion of the report on the New Left and related matters. I believe Mr. Brennan should hear and will benefit from the Director's remarks.

I have been advised that as of this date the heads of the other agencies do not now plan to have any of their assistants with them except Admiral Gaylor of NSA who will bring an assistant, Benson Buffram.

It occurred to me that in addition to the remarks the Director has in mind he may wish to give consideration to some of the major points in the enclosed statement prepared for him.

RECOMMENDATION:

That this memorandum and the enclosed statement be furnished to the Director.

Enclosure

WCS:sal
(6)

RECEIVED

JUN 5 1970

FBI

This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

INTERAGENCY INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE MEETING

I am sure you gentlemen will all agree with me that our meeting with the President on Friday was of very special significance. The President clearly recognizes that we are confronted today with unique and complex problems arising from subversive activities on an international scale. There is a distinct relationship between these activities and much of the disorder and violence which increasingly threatens our internal security. The President made it abundantly clear that he expects us, as members of the intelligence community, to do more than we have been doing to bring the worldwide picture of these problems into better perspective for him.

Having been designated by the President as Chairman of the Committee to meet this challenge, I feel a special responsibility. First, I would like to state that I agree completely with the President's view of the situation. Consider what has transpired in the 1960s. We have witnessed the emergence of widespread racial unrest which threatens to grow much worse before it gets better. We have also seen the emergence of a new left militancy which has constituted massive mob rule in action. From what we have learned to date it is apparent these are not solely domestic problems. There are definite foreign links to our domestic disorders.

Yet, the foreign aspect of the problem is different than that which we experienced in the past. Prior to the 1960s, foreign-directed intelligence and espionage activities constituted the main threat to our security. We in the intelligence community geared ourselves accordingly and met that problem successfully. We coordinated our activities in doing so. But the nature of the problem was such that it left us to a marked degree free to operate independently in regard to our respective problem areas.

Today, it is mandatory that we recognize the changed nature of the problem confronting us. Unless we do so, we will be incapable of fulfilling the responsibility levied upon us by the President.

The plain fact is that there currently are thousands of individuals inside this country who want to see our form of government destroyed. They have in fact pledged themselves publicly to achieving this goal. They have put their words

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into actions constituting revolutionary terrorism, and the total effect of their actions to date has been disastrous.

In addition, they are reaching out seeking support from this nation's enemies abroad to further their objectives. Thus the links to Cuba, China, and Iron Curtain countries already have been established and promise to grow because of the equal determination of various international communist elements to destroy our form of government.

In contrast to the rigidly structured subversive organizations of past experience, the current subversive forces threatening us constitute widespread, disjointed, and varied autonomous elements, the destructive potential of which is manifold.

Individually, those of us in the intelligence community are relatively small and limited. Unified, our own combined potential is magnified and limitless. It is through unity of action that we can tremendously increase our intelligence-gathering potential and, I am certain, obtain the answers the President wants.

I am establishing a working committee to insure that we achieve the desired unity. It will be the job of the committee to (1) assess the overall nature of the problem as we know it today, (2) examine individually and together the respective resources of each Agency to insure full utilization of them for the benefit of all, and (3) devise coordinated procedures designed to penetrate the current nebulous areas of subversive activities here and abroad as they relate to our domestic problems.

The first meeting is set for tomorrow afternoon, Tuesday, June 9th, and you have been furnished the details as to the time and place.

The working committee will hereafter meet each Tuesday and Friday for the purpose of preparing a comprehensive study to be completed in rough draft form by June 22, 1970, for presentation to the President on July 1, 1970, in final form. This should serve as the foundation of our committee's existence and purpose and as the basis for a coordinated intelligence effort best suited to serve the country's interest at this time of crisis.

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1) AUG 5 1975 -

EXHIBIT 10

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. DeLoach

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 8, 1970

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, 11 AM, JUNE 8, 1970

This memorandum is to record meeting of captioned Committee in the Director's Office 11 am, Monday, 6/8/70, which was chaired by the Director with the following persons present: Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA); General Donald V. Bennett, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA); Admiral Noel Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency (NSA); and his Assistant Mr. Benson K. Buffham; Mr. Tom Huston, Staff Assistant to the President at the White House; as well as Racial Intelligence Section Chief George C. Moore and myself.

The Director pointed out to the Committee that the President, in establishing this special intelligence Committee, recognized definite problems arising from subversive activities on the international scale and expected the Committee to coordinate and plan so that the world-wide picture could be better brought into perspective for the President. The Director stated that he well recognized the importance of the work of this Committee and he stated that along with organized crime this is equally important.

The Director further commented concerning the foreign aspect of today's subversive domestic problem and stated that prior to the 1960's, the main threat to our security was foreign-directed intelligence espionage activities but today we have a different problem marked by highly organized dissident groups seeking to destroy our form of Government.

In outlining the work of the Committee, the Director pointed out: (1) The situation should be thoroughly explored to determine exactly what the problem is. (2) Each agency must explore the facilities which must and can be used in order to develop facts for a true intelligence picture. The Director noted the President mentioned restrictions which were hampering our intelligence operations and accordingly we should list for the President in detail such

WCS:chs (5)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Excluded from automatic downgrading and
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by 70-10
Excluded from GDS, Category 5
Date of next review: Indefinite

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach
 RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
 (ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
 MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, 11 AM, JUNE 8, 1970

restraints and restrictions together with the pros and cons involved so that the President can make a decision as to which ones should be utilized. (3) The Director stated it was most important that the foreign connections of domestic problems be determined pointing out that we know Cuba, Red China and the Soviet-bloc are deeply in the picture. The Director also commented the importance of ascertaining what is happening in foreign countries concerning this same subversive problem and how it has been dealt with by those countries; for example, the Director mentioned that the water cannon had been used most effectively against the hippies in Paris, as well as elsewhere and maybe the application of this tactic should receive consideration. In this regard, the Director commented the picture of what goes on abroad would more appropriately come within the purview of the CIA, DIA and NSA.

The Director stated he was establishing a working sub-committee headed by Assistant Director William C. Sullivan and composed of designated representatives of the other agencies present and the first meeting would be at 3:30 pm, 6/9/70 at the U. S. Intelligence Board Meeting Room and subsequent thereto a meeting would be held every Tuesday and Friday in order to draw together the raw material in order to present a final report to captioned Committee for scrutiny and evaluation on 8/22/70. The submission of the final report to the President will be on 6/30 or 7/1/70. The Director emphasized it was most vital that all agencies give this matter top priority.

Following the Director's initial remarks, those officials present commented that the aims and goals presented by the Director were realistic and that all present would cooperate in the fullest in getting organized and getting on with the highly important task which faces the special Committee.

During the discussion all agreed that the initial primary problem facing the Committee was to concentrate upon methodology in intelligence collection. The Director stated although brevity is the key, a detailed listing of all the items which are currently obstructing the FBI and other intelligence agencies in attaining their goals must be set out clearly with pros and cons so that the President is able to make a determination as to what he is willing to let us do. Some of the matters to be considered in this regard mentioned by the

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AUG 5 1970

- 2 -

CONTINUED - OVER

FBI

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach

RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING IN DIRECTOR'S OFFICE, 11 AM, JUNE 8, 1970

Director were:

___ (2) limitations on telephone surveillances
and

It was agreed that the President is extremely anxious for the utmost degree of cooperation among all the agencies in coordination of this matter and the Director pointed out that there is certainly no problem with respect to coordination and the Director wanted it understood that the President expects the group to work together as a team.

At the close of the meeting, the Director again emphasized that the importance of this matter dictated that each agency put its top experts to work on this matter and that it be given the highest priority in order that this deadline is met as expected by the President.

ACTION:

You will be advised as to the results of the meeting of the working committee which takes place tomorrow, 6/9/70, at 3:30 pm.

REC'D

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. DE LOACH *DL*

DATE: 6/8/70

FROM : W. C. SULLIVAN

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

My memorandum 6/5/70 advised that the details for the meeting of the working group of captioned committee are being worked out. Arrangements have been made for the working group to meet in the United States Intelligence Board Conference Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday afternoon, 6/9/70. As of this time, the following members have been designated:

FBI - Mr. William C. Sullivan....Acting for the Director
CIA - Mr. Richard Helms, Director of CIA
 Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA
DIA - The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) member has not yet been designated. In addition to the DIA member, there will be representatives from each of the three military services - Army, Navy, and Air Force.
NSA - Mr. Benson K. Buffham.

White House - Mr. Tom C. Huston, Staff Assistant to the President.

Arrangements have been made for use of the Conference Room and all of the above members have confirmed their attendance. When the DIA representatives are designated, you will be advised.

ACTION:

For information.

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FBI

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : MR. DE LOACH

DATE: 6/9/70

FROM : W. C. SULLIVAN

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

My memorandum 6/8/70 set forth the members of the working group of captioned committee, which will hold its first meeting in the United States Intelligence Board Conference Room at 3:30 p.m., Tuesday, 6/9/70, with the exception of the Defense Intelligence Agency members.

Set forth below are the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) working group member and the member from each of the three military services. The additional names listed are the alternates for each of the agencies.

DIA - Mr. James E. Stilwell,
Deputy Chief, Office of Counterintelligence and
Security, DIA

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Philbrick

Army - Colonel John W. Downie,
Director of Security, Assistant Chief of Staff
for Intelligence, Department of the Army

Mr. Elihu Braunstein

Navy - Captain Edward G. Rifenburgh,
Director, Naval Investigative Service,
Naval Intelligence Command

Mr. Harry Warren

Air Force - Colonel Rudolph C. Koller, Jr.,
Commander, 1127 U.S. Field Activities Group,
Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, Air Force

Colonel D. E. Walker

ACTION:

RECU 120M
For information.

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(7)
FBI

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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

DATE: June 10, 1970

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE JUNE 9, 1970

This memorandum records the results of the Working Subcommittee meeting on June 9, 1970.

Mr. Tom C. Huston, White House, spelled out the desires of the President, furnishing members with a "Top Secret" outline (copy attached). This outline addresses itself to the Purpose, Membership, Procedures, and Objectives of the Committee's Review. In his oral presentation, Huston emphasized the President was not interested in being told what the current problem is, but rather what the future problems will be and what must be done to counter them. He stressed the Committee should provide the President with the pros and cons of any restraints so that he can decide what action is to be taken.

It was agreed that all papers and reports prepared by the Committee will be classified "Top Secret - Handle Via Comint Channels Only" because of the President's desire that the existence and work of the Committee be tightly controlled. (The reference to Comint Channels refers to communications intelligence and insures that this matter will be handled in a secure manner.)

At the meeting various members discussed the restraints currently in effect which limit the community's ability to develop the necessary intelligence. In accordance with the President's instructions, the next meeting of the Working Subcommittee will consider all restraints restricting intelligence collection efforts across the board, as well as submissions on defining and assessing the existing internal security threat, both domestic and foreign.

It was agreed that the Working Subcommittee would next meet at 1:30 p.m., June 12, 1970, in the Conference Room of the U. S. Intelligence Board. Results of this meeting will be promptly furnished the Director.

ACTION:

For information.

enclosure
WCS:lag/chs

FBI

ORIGINAL ATTACHED

WORKING GROUP
INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

(As of 10 a.m., June 9, 1979)

FBI

✓ Mr. William C. Sullivan
Mr. Donald E. Moore
Mr. George C. Moore
Mr. William O. Cregar
Mr. Fred J. Cassidy

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)

Mr. Richard Helms

✓ Mr. James Angleton

Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

✓ Mr. James H. Stillel

Lieutenant Colonel Donald F. Philbrick

Department of the Army

✓ Colonel John W. Downie

Mr. Elihu Braunstein

Department of the Navy

✓ Captain Edward G. Rifenburgh

✓ Mr. Harry Warren

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CONTINUED - OVER

Department of the Air Force

✓ Colonel Rudolph C. Keller, Jr.

Colonel D. E. Walker

National Security Agency

✓ Mr. Benson K. Buffham

Mr. James Gumbler

Mr. Leonard J. Munro

White House

✓ Mr. Tom C. Huston
Phone: Code 145, Extension 2527

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ICI -1
June 10, 1970

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE

Minutes of
First Meeting
Room 7X-26, CIA Headquarters Building
June 9, 1970, 3:30 to 4 p.m.

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Richard Helms, DCI
Mr. James Angleton, CIA
Mr. James Stilwell, DIA
Col. John Downie, Army
Col. Rudolph Koller, Air Force
Mr. Tom C. Huston, White House
Capt. Edward Rifenburgh, Navy
Mr. Benson K. Buffham, NSA
Mr. George C. Moore, FBI
Mr. Donald E. Moore, FBI
Mr. William O. Cregar, FBI, Secretary

Observers:
Mr. Charles Sither, OSI
Lt. Col. Donald F. Philbrick, DIA
Mr. Elihu Braunstein, Army
Mr. Harry Warren, Navy
Col. D. E. Walker, Air Force
Mr. James Gengler, NSA
Mr. Leonard J. Nunno, NSA
Mr. Fred J. Cassidy, FBI

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ICI-M-1
June 10, 1970

1. Prefatory Remarks

Prefatory remarks of William C. Sullivan circulated to all members at the meeting.

2. Background to the Creation of Committee

Mr. Tom C. Huston of the White House briefed the Committee on the President's concern over the emergence of the threat from sporadic violence and anarchism from the New Left, as well as the President's concern as to whether the intelligence community is doing everything possible to cope with the problem. Mr. Huston emphasized that an effort must be made for community-wide analysis and assessment of information so as to be in a position to advise the President as to what is going to happen in the future and what position the intelligence community will be in to be aware of these developments. An outline defining the purpose and membership of the Committee, as well as procedures and objectives of the Committee's review, was distributed at the meeting by Mr. Huston.

3. Classification Matters

The Chairman asked for comments regarding the level of classification for papers or reports prepared by the Committee. Mr. Buffham of NSA suggested the adoption of a code word. After some discussion, Mr. Helms, Director of CIA, recommended the classification "Top Secret - Handle Via Count Channels Only." In addition, Mr. Helms suggested the maintenance of a "Bigot List" reflecting the names of all persons in each member agency or department who will work on or have knowledge of the work of the Committee. The Committee unanimously concurred in adopting both suggestions.*

*Members are requested to furnish their "Bigot List" to the Secretary at the meeting of June 12, 1970.

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4. Requirements for Next Meeting

It was agreed that at the next meeting members will table a list of those restraints which they consider hamper their intelligence-collection activities. The list should include the pros and cons of these restraints.

Mr. Buffham noted that in the outline distributed by Mr. Huston the Committee was called upon to define and assess the existing internal security threat. Mr. Buffham felt this was something that should be worked on immediately by the experts from the member agencies or departments. Mr. Huston suggested that the FBI prepare such a paper from the domestic standpoint and CIA from the foreign standpoint. All members concurred, and it was agreed CIA and FBI will distribute these papers for the Committee's consideration at the next meeting.

5. Security of Committee's Work

Members took cognizance of the necessity for tight security to insure the existence and work of the Committee not become known to unauthorized persons. As a result, it was agreed that the Committee would continue to meet in the CIA Headquarters Building.

6. Next Meeting

The next meeting will be at 1:30 p.m., June 12, 1970, Room 7D-64, CIA Headquarters Building.*

*Members please note change in room number.

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EXHIBIT 12

TOP SECRET

USIB SUB-COMMITTEE ON DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

I. Purpose

- (A) To define and assess the existing internal security threat.
- (B) To evaluate the collection procedures and techniques presently employed and to assess their effectiveness.
- (C) To identify gaps in our present collection efforts and recommend steps to close these gaps.
- (D) To review current procedures for inter-community coordination and cooperation and to recommend steps to improve these procedures.
- (E) To evaluate the timeliness of current intelligence data and to recommend procedures to increase both its timeliness and usefulness.
- (F) To assess the priorities presently attached to domestic intelligence collection efforts and to recommend new priorities where appropriate.

II. Membership

- (A) FBI, Chairman
- (B) CIA
- (C) NSA
- (D) DIA
- (E) Military Services
- (F) The White House

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III. Procedures

- (A) Although the sub-committee will be officially constituted within the framework of USIB, it will in fact be an independent, ad hoc, inter-agency working group with a limited mandate.
- (B) Operational details will be the responsibility of the chairman. However, the scope and direction of the review will be determined by the White House member.
- (C) The sub-committee will submit its reports to the White House and not to USIB. Report will be due by July 1, 1970.
- (D) To insure that the President has all the options available for consideration, the WH member may direct detailed interrogatories to individual agencies in order to ascertain facts relevant to policy evaluation by the President. Information resulting from such interrogatories will, if the contributing agency requests, be treated on a confidential basis and not be considered by the sub-committee as a whole.

IV. Objectives of the Review

- (A) Maximum coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community. The sub-committee may wish to consider the creation of a permanent Domestic Intelligence Operations Board, or some other appropriate mechanism to insure community-wide evaluation of intelligence data.
- (B) Higher priority by all intelligence agencies on internal security collection efforts.
- (C) Maximum use of all special investigative techniques, including increased agent and informant penetration by both the FBI and CIA.

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- (D) Clarification of NSA's role in targeting against communication traffic involving U.S. revolutionary leaders and organizations.
- (E) Maximum coverage of the overseas activities of revolutionary leaders and of foreign support of U.S. revolutionary activities.
- (F) Maximum coverage of campus and student-related activities of revolutionary leaders and groups.
- (G) More detailed information about the sources and extent of financial support of revolutionary organizations.
- (H) Clarification of the proper domestic intelligence role of the Armed Services.
- (I) Development of procedures for translating analyzed intelligence information into a format useful for policy formulation.

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EXHIBIT 13

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: June 15, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE JUNE 12, 1970

This memorandum records the results of the Working Subcommittee.

At the meeting of June 12, 1970, the Committee agreed on an outline for the report to be furnished to the President by July 1, 1970. This report will cover three specific areas of interest: (a) an assessment of the current internal security threat along with the likelihood of future violence; (b) a listing of the current restraints which deter the development of the type of information the President desires; (c) an evaluation of interagency coordination.

With regard to an assessment of the current internal security threat, the Committee agreed the President does not desire a recitation of history but rather desires information as to what the problem is and an estimate of what the future problem will be.

The White House representative advised the restraints portion of the Committee report to the President should include, in addition to identifying the restraints and a listing of the pros and cons of removing or modifying the restraints, a brief paragraph allowing the President to indicate what action he desires be taken. Specifically, this would provide the President the opportunity to indicate whether he desired the restraints to be continued, relaxed, or that he needed additional information upon which to make a decision. It was the sense of the Committee regarding the third portion of the report that a permanent operations committee was needed to coordinate operations, prepare estimates of potential violence during future demonstrations, and to develop new policies. The creation of such a committee was endorsed by the White House representative who indicated such a committee would probably be desired by the President.

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Memorandum Sullivan to DeLoach
Re: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

The next meeting is scheduled for June 17, 1970, at which time the Committee will consider the first draft of the report.

ACTION:

For information.

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
 CONFERENCE ROOM 74-000

Minutes of
 Second Meeting
 Conference Room 74-000
 CIA Headquarters Building
 June 12, 1970, 1:30 to 3:30 p.m.

William C. Sullivan
 Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
 Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. J. C. Huston, White House
 Mr. J. Lee Angleton, CIA
 Mr. James Stilwell, DIA
 Col. John Dornic, Army
 Mr. Charles Sither, Air Force
 Capt. Edward Rifenburch, Navy
 Mr. Hanson R. Taffham, NSA
 Mr. George C. Moore, FBI
 Mr. Donald E. Moore, FBI
 Mr. William O. Cregar, FBI, Secretary

Observers:

Col. Rudolph Koller, Air Force
 Lt. Col. Donald F. Philbrick, DIA
 Mr. Elihu Braunstein, Army
 Mr. Harry Warren, Navy
 Mr. James Gengler, NSA
 Mr. Leonard J. Russo, NSA
 Mr. Richard Ober, CIA
 Mr. Fred J. Cassidy, FBI

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1. Approval of Minutes of the First

The minutes of the first meeting were approved with no changes.

2. Distribution of FBI Submission Entitled "Defining and Assessing the Existing Internal Security Threat - Domestic"

The FBI contribution was circulated to all members. It was suggested by Mr. Huston of the White House that the report be tabled to permit an in-depth reading by all members and that the contents of the submission be discussed at the next meeting. In this regard, Mr. Huston reiterated that the assessment paper should not be lengthy; should assess the current threat and estimate what the future threat will be.

3. CIA's Submission Entitled "Defining and Assessing the Existing Internal Security Threat - Domestic"

The CIA representative advised his Agency's submission would be circulated to all members in time for an in-depth discussion at the next Committee meeting.

4. Distribution and Discussion of "List of Restraints Inhibiting Intelligence-Collection Efforts"

The restraints papers submitted were read by all members. Mr. Huston indicated that the FBI submission was in the form he desired. He suggested the restraints portion of the report be patterned after the FBI submission with a concluding paragraph after each individual restraint providing the President with the option of continuing or modifying the restraint or asking for additional information on which to base a decision.

5. Preparation of Report

A suggested outline distributed to all members was read and approved. It was agreed that the FBI would prepare

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FBI

the first draft to be circulated to all members on June 16, 1970, following submission of inputs to all members no later than 10 a.m., June 15, 1970.

Committee members discussed the desirability of recommending the establishment of a permanent intelligence operations committee. Mr. Huston suggested the report address itself to this and include (1) how the committee would be constituted, (2) to whom it would report, (3) procedural matters, and (4) the committee's area of responsibility to include operations, preparation of estimates, and development of policy recommendations.

6. Next Meeting

The next meeting will be held on Wednesday, June 17, 1970, in the U. S. Intelligence Board Conference Room 7E-26.*

*Members please note change in room number.

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EXHIBIT 14

15, 1970

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY
WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE

AGENDA

Third Meeting

USIS Conference Room 72-40

on Wednesday, June 17, 1970, at 1:00 p.m.

1. Approval of Minutes of Second Meeting William C. Sullivan
2. Discussion of Documents by FBI and CIA Entitled "Outlining and Assessing the Existing Internal Security Threat" All Members
3. Discussion of Documents Submitted by All Agencies Entitled "List of Restraints Inhibiting Intelligence-Collection Efforts" All Members
4. Review of First Draft of Committee Report Formulated to All Members June 16, 1970 William C. Sullivan
5. Date and Place of Next Meeting

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ICIG-3
June 19, 1970

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE

Minutes of
Third Meeting
Conference Room 1E-36
CIA Headquarters Building
June 16, 1970, 2 to 6 p.m.

William C. Sullivan
Assistant Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation
Presiding

OFFICERS PRESENT

Mr. Tom C. Huston, White House
Mr. James Angleton, CIA
Mr. James Stillewell, DIA
Col. John Downie, Army
Mr. Charles Githen, Air Force
Capt. Edward Reismann, Navy
Mr. Benson K. Dillham, NSA
Mr. Charles D. Brennan, FBI
Mr. George C. Moore, FBI
Mr. William C. Craig, FBI, Secretary

Observers:

Col. D. E. Holker, Air Force
Mr. Elihu Kraussstein, Army
Mr. Harry Warren, Navy
Mr. B. L. Willard, Navy
Mr. James Grazier, NSA
Mr. Leonard J. Russo, NSA
Mr. Richard Ober, CIA
Mr. Fred J. Cassidy, FBI

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ICa-M-3
June 19, 1970

1. Approval of Minutes of Second Meeting

The minutes of the second meeting were approved with no changes.

2. Items Two and Three on the Agenda

The Chairman suggested that items two and three appearing on the agenda for the third meeting not be discussed inasmuch as the information contained therein had been incorporated into the draft report. The Committee concurred in this suggestion.

3. Review of First Draft of Committee Report

Detailed discussion developed regarding the draft. All members contributed valuable suggestions in ways to improve the report. It was agreed that the FBI would attempt to incorporate suggested changes into a second draft. This draft is to be circulated to all members as soon as possible, after which the recipients will attempt to obtain appropriate high-level concurrence within their respective agencies or departments.

4. Date and Place of Next Meeting

The next meeting will be held on Tuesday, June 23, 1970, in the U. S. Intelligence Board Conference Room 7E-26.

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EXHIBIT 15

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: June 19, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE June 18, 1970

In two previous meetings of the above-captioned committee general discussions took place and the ground work was prepared for dealing with the substance of the report. Yesterday, a third meeting was held which extended throughout the afternoon and into the early evening. Memoranda has been prepared and submitted to the Director on the previous two meetings. Yesterday, the members of the four intelligence organizations worked out the report. I received the impression that Admiral Noel Gaylor of National Security Agency may have been a moving force behind the creation of this committee. The Program which we discontinued a few years ago was raised immediately and figured prominently in the discussion.

At the very beginning, the White House representative made it very clear to all members that the report had to be a working subcommittee report and any opinions, observations, conclusions or recommendations of individual agencies should not and could not be set forth with one exception. He said that the President did want a definitive recommendation relative to creating a group or committee which could deal with operational problems and objectives of the member agencies and present estimates, evaluations, and interpretations on the current security threats and problems resulting from the student-professorial revolutionary activities, black extremism and related security matters. He said the President is of the opinion that all government agencies involved in intelligence activities would have something to contribute and that through such a group or board authority would be exercised to better coordinate the collection of intelligence.

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The men representing the Army, Air Force, Navy, National Security Agency and Defense Intelligence Agency went into great detail concerning intelligence operations, techniques, procedures, devices and et cetera, following a detailed discussion concerning the nature of the security threat to the United States today.

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While all present were very friendly and cooperative to each other, nevertheless, the fact remains that in such a complex area as intelligence operations, difficult and serious issues are bound to come up concerning which there will be disagreements.

This document is prepared in accordance with the policy that it is not for disclosure outside your Committee. It is to be treated in official proceedings by the Committee and the contents are not to be disclosed to unauthorized persons without the express approval of the FBI.

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. DeLoach

RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT JUNE 5, 1970)
MEETING OF THE WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE June 18, 1970

In view of this it is probably fortunate that no member was permitted to make any decisions, recommendations, or conclusions, et cetera, in that the President reserves this right for himself only. Each controversial issue has been so set up in writing that the President may quickly and simply indicate whether he wants or does not want any changes made.

Contingent upon what the President decides, it is clear that there could be problems involved for the Bureau. For example, the reactivation of the Program, et cetera.

We are completing the first draft of this report now. As soon as this is done, the report with a cover memorandum explaining the various issues involved will be furnished to the Director either late today or early tomorrow morning.

RECOMMENDATION:

For the information of the Director.

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EXHIBIT 16

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. A. Tolson

DATE: 6/20/70

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

Attached for the Director's consideration is a copy of a first draft of the report prepared by the working committee in connection with captioned matter.

The first 36 pages of this draft present an assessment of the present internal security threat under appropriate captions. This is material with which the Director is thoroughly familiar and it is not believed he need spend too much time reviewing it unless he so desires. There is nothing controversial in this portion of the report.

Material relating to investigative restraints and limitations discussed by the working committee is set forth in Section V (pages 37-59). This material is set forth in accordance with the President's request, with the pros and cons outlined and with no recommendations of any kind made by the committee. It is clear that in this portion we have controversial issues affecting the Bureau as well as the other agencies on the committee.

The final section of the report (pages 60-65) sums up, in accordance with the President's request, the committee's observations concerning current procedures to effect interagency coordination and suggested measures to improve coordination of intelligence collection through the establishment of a permanent interagency committee chaired by the Director or a person designated to act for him.

I do not agree with the scope of this proposed committee nor do I feel that an effort should be made at this time to engage in any combined preparation of intelligence estimates. I can see that a committee could be helpful if it was limited to meeting periodically to determine how to better coordinate operational activities against particular targets in the intelligence field. —

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MAY 5 1975

The working committee is scheduled to meet again at 2 P.M., Tuesday, June 23, in order to reach agreement on a final draft of this report.

This document is in response to your request and is not for dissemination out(3) your Committee. Its use is limited to official use by your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI. —

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Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson
 RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

OBSERVATIONS:

If committee agreement is not reached at Tuesday's meeting on the controversial points involved, it would appear we have four possible courses of action:

(1) We can offer no objection to the report and wait to see what the President decides (I think this would be unwise)

(2) The Director can voice his objections to the President verbally

(3) The Bureau can take a position in writing in the report opposing any relaxation of the investigative restraints discussed on the grounds that the arguments supporting these restraints outweigh the arguments opposed

(4) The Bureau can take a position in writing in the report that it is opposed to the extensive scope and ramifications of the proposed new committee, while at the same time noting that we would have no objection to a committee which would be limited to meeting periodically in order to effect a better operational coordination among member agencies with regard to particular targets in the intelligence field

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That approval be given for the Bureau to include in the final committee report a statement opposing the relaxation of investigative restraints which affect the Bureau.

(2) That the Bureau take a position at Tuesday's meeting of the working committee that it is opposed to a new committee of the scope described in the attached draft, but that we would not object to a committee limited to better coordination specific intelligence operations or problems.

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Memorandum to Mr. C. A. Tolson
RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

RECOMMENDATIONS CONTINUED:

(3) That, in addition, the Director give consideration to expressing his objections verbally to the President.

(4) That, if the Director's schedule permits, final meeting of Director's committee take place in his office at 11 a.m., Thursday, June 25. At that time the Director can inquire if other committee members have any further comments and, if not, he can present them with a copy of the final report. (If the Director does not wish to present this report personally to the President, we will prepare appropriate transmittal letter for liaison to handle.)

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EXHIBIT 17

ICI-A-3
June 19, 1970

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
WORKING SUBCOMMITTEE

AGENDA
Fourth Meeting
USIB Conference Room 7E-26
on Tuesday, June 23, 1970, at 2 p.m.

-
1. Approval of Minutes of
Third Meeting William C. Sullivan
 2. Review of Second Draft of
Committee Report to be
Circulated to All Members William C. Sullivan
 3. Date and Place of Next Meeting 3 PM Thursday
in Hoover's office

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OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: June 24, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

The final meeting of the working committee was held on 6-23-70 and there is attached a proposed final draft of a report for the Director's review.

During the final working committee session, a number of changes were made in the prior draft which the Director has seen. Significant changes include the following:

1. Two of the investigative restraints previously listed have now been completely eliminated.

2. The FBI's objections to the six remaining restraints have been spelled out specifically in appropriate footnotes which include the basis for our position. In addition, some of the key wording in the narrative has been modified in accordance with the observations the Director made to me Monday. For instance, the term "restrictions" in the decisions section relating to electronic surveillances (page 28) has been changed to "procedures." In the same write-up (page 26), reference to electronic surveillances having been "substantially reduced in recent years" has been taken out.

3. In the section dealing with evaluation of interagency coordination (pages 42-43), the reference to restrictions on FBI and CIA Headquarters Liaison contacts has been removed and the specific reference to the Director as the proposed chairman of an interagency committee has been deleted. Instead, the report merely indicates that the chairman would be named by the President.

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This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. Its use is limited to official proceedings of your Committee and the content may not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum W. C. Sullivan to Mr. Tolson
 RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)

4. The prior draft contained a number of proposals relative to a permanent interagency committee including a full-time working group staffed by the various intelligence agencies. In the proposed final draft, these proposals have been ~~been~~ ~~down~~ ~~eliminated~~ and the proposed full-time working group is mentioned only in passing, as a possible future eventuality.* In fact, after considerable discussion the wording of this whole section was framed with a view of eliminating any suggestion that the proposed interagency committee would interfere with the internal operations of any individual agency. In addition, a footnote was added expressing the Bureau's specific views concerning any such committee or group.

5. The section on budget and manpower restrictions (pages 40-41) was revised to make it clear that the FBI does not have any problem with regard to review and approval of its budgetary requests.

Copies of this proposed final draft are being furnished to the member agencies for their review so that all interested parties will be fully cognizant of its contents in advance of the final meeting of the Director's Committee in his office at 3 p.m., Thursday, June 25, 1970. Those present will be Mr. Richard Helms, CIA; Lt. General D. V. Bennett, DIA; and Vice Admiral Noel Gaylor, NSA. Each man will no doubt be accompanied by an aide.

ACTION:

Upon approval, this report will be printed and assembled and then delivered to the Director's Office with a transmittal letter to the President in time for the Director's meeting. Due to the extremely sensitive nature of the report, each copy is being numbered and a record will be kept of each recipient. The Director will note that at the beginning of the President's copy there will be a form to be signed by each agency's head indicating approval of the report.

*Since the concept of a full-time working staff was all but eliminated, a footnote was not taken regarding this item.

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EXHIBIT 18

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. Tolson

DATE: June 26, 1970

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan *WCS*

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

The Director, as Chairman of captioned committee, held the final committee meeting in his office on the afternoon of 6/25/70. Present were the other committee members; namely, Mr. Richard Helms, Director of Central Intelligence Agency; Lieutenant General D. V. Bennett, Director of Defense Intelligence Agency; and Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, Director of National Security Agency. Also present were Mr. Tom C. Huston, White House Presidential Assistant who had served in a liaison capacity with the committee; Assistant Director designate C. D. Brennan of the Domestic Intelligence Division; and the writer, W. C. Sullivan.

The purpose of the meeting was to review in final form which the President had instructed the committee to prepare to assess the current internal security threat to the country and evaluate the capacity of the intelligence community to deal with that threat.

The Director opened the meeting by commending the committee members for the outstanding effort and cooperative spirit they had displayed in working together to compile the comprehensive report.

The Director then furnished each committee member a copy of the report and carefully covered in a concise manner all of the items dealt with in the report. On each and every point the Director solicited observations by each committee member to insure that they fully understood every issue analyzed and were in complete agreement with the contents of the report. In this connection, Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler suggested three minor additions be made. After securing the concurrence of all committee members, the Director instructed that this be done immediately.

RECEIVED
WCS:pab
(3) 100-106

CONTINUED - OVER

AUG This document is prepared in response to your request and is not for dissemination outside your Committee. It is not to be used in official proceedings by your Committee and the content should not be disclosed to unauthorized personnel without the express approval of the FBI.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson

RE: INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE (AD HOC)
(ESTABLISHED BY THE PRESIDENT, JUNE 5, 1970)

With that, all committee members signified their full and unqualified approval of the full report and so indicated by affixing their signatures thereto along with the Director's as Chairman of the committee. The Director stated that he would arrange for the transmittal of the report to the White House promptly on 6/26/70.

The Director instructed each committee member to insure that all working copies of the report at the agencies involved should be destroyed and fixed this responsibility on the agency heads who were members of the committee along with the responsibility of insuring that copies of the final report retained by them for reference should be afforded the utmost security.

The Director then concluded the meeting by thanking the respective members of the committee and so dismissed the committee.

RECOMMENDATION:

For information./

RECEIVED FROM

AUG 5 1970

FBI

TOP SECRET

June 25, 1970

The President
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. President:

The Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc), which you established on June 5, 1970, has completed its assessment of the current internal security threat and related matters. A special report setting forth the findings of the Committee is attached.

This report is divided into three parts. Part One sets forth a summary of the current internal security threat. Part Two summarizes various operational restraints on intelligence collection and lists both the advantages of maintaining these restrictions and the advantages of relaxing them. Part Three provides an evaluation of interagency coordination, including suggested measures to improve the coordination of domestic intelligence collection.

This report has been approved by all of the members of the Committee representing the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

Sincerely yours,

Enclosure

WCS/mea

(4)

FROM

JUN 30 1970

FBI

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure
Subject to Criminal Sanctions

EXHIBIT 19

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs

In the future, I would appreciate it if your agency would address all material relating to matters of domestic intelligence or internal security interest to my exclusive attention.

The President is anxious to centralize the coordination at the White House of all information of this type, and your cooperation in this regard would be appreciated.

Dr. Kissinger is aware of this new procedure.

Tom Charles Huston
TOM CHARLES HUSTON

2 Feb 71

*John Dean confirmed
to me by phone today
that he should be all done
with them Huston.
(who is incidentally now on Dean's
staff.)* *Richard Dean*

EXHIBIT 20

— 24.3 Richard Helms memorandum

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

23 July 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Discussion with Attorney General Mitchell on
Domestic Intelligence

1. During a private meeting with the Attorney General on 27 July 1970, it became clear, to my great surprise, that he had heard nothing whatever about the President's instructions on "Domestic Intelligence" until that very morning. In other words, the Attorney General had not been told of the meeting at the White House on 5 June 1970 or of the ad hoc committee meetings chaired by the FBI which had followed or about the report which was sent to the President around 1 July, setting forth constraints on domestic intelligence collection. As I understand it, the Attorney General first heard about these matters when the Director of the FBI complained to him about a memorandum from Mr. Tom Charles Huston which must be essentially the same text as the one I received under date of 23 July 1970 (#SC 05875-70).

2. I told the Attorney General that we had put our backs into this exercise, because we had thought that he knew all about it and was behind it. The Attorney General was frank with me. In addition, he said that he had told Mr. Hoover to "sit tight" until he (the Attorney General) had an opportunity to discuss this whole matter with the President upon his return to Washington from San Clemente next week.

3. In connection with the problems involved in domestic intelligence collection, I again suggested to the Attorney General that he have a talk with Mr. Sam J. Papich who, I pointed out, has now fully retired from the FBI. The Attorney General again wrote down Mr. Papich's name.

llh
Richard Helms
Director

Distribution:

Orig - EOI's file
1 cc - ER W/SC 05875-70

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

EXHIBIT 21

25.3 Richard Helms memorandum

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. McManis

Per your telephone request, I am returning
herewith Mr. Huston's memorandum to me, Subject:
Domestic Intelligence, dated July 23, 1970.

Richard Helms
Richard Helms

23 July 1970
(DATE)

EXHIBIT 22

25.7 Tom Huston memorandum

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 5, 1970

EYES ONLY

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

FROM: TOM CHARLES HUSTON

SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE

In anticipation of your meeting with Mr. Hoover and the Attorney General, I would like to pass on these thoughts:

1. More than the FBI is involved in this operation. NSA, DIA, CIA, and the military services all have a great stake and a great interest. All of these agencies supported the options selected by the President. For your private information, so did all the members of Mr. Hoover's staff who worked on the report (he'd fire them if he knew this.)

3. We are not getting the type of hard intelligence we need at the White House. We will not get it until greater effort is made through community-wide coordination to dig out the information by using all the resources potentially available. It is, of course, a matter of balancing the obvious risks against the desired results. I thought we balanced these risks rather objectively in the report, and Hoover is escalating the risks in order to cloak his determination to continue to do business as usual.

4. At some point, Hoover has to be told who is President. He has become totally unreasonable and his conduct is detrimental to our domestic intelligence operations. In the past two weeks, he has terminated all FBI liaison with NSA, DIA, the military services, Secret Service -- everyone except the White House. He terminated liaison with CIA in May. This is bound to have a crippling effect upon the entire community and is contrary to his public assurance to the President at the meeting that there was close and effective coordination and cooperation within the intelligence community. It is important to remember that the entire intelligence community knows that the President made a positive decision to go ahead and Hoover has now succeeded in forcing a review. If he gets his way it is going to look like he is more powerful than the President. He had his say in the footnotes and RN decided against him. That should close the matter and I can't understand why the AG is a party to reopening it. All of us are going to look damn silly in the eyes of Helms, Gayler, Bennett, and the military chiefs if Hoover can unilaterally reverse a Presidential decision based on a report that many people worked their asses off to prepare and which, on its merits, was a first-rate, objective job.

5. The biggest risk we could take, in my opinion, is to continue to regard the violence on the campus and in the cities as a temporary phenomenon which will simply go away as soon as the Southern Commission files its report. The one statement that Dennis Davis made at NEW which I thought made sense was that the Attorney

General was kidding himself when he said the campuses would be quiet this fall. Davis predicted that at least 30 would be closed down in September. I don't like to make predictions, but I am not at all convinced, on the basis of the intelligence I have seen, that we are anyway near over the hump on this problem, and I am convinced that the potential for even greater violence is present, and we have a positive obligation to take every step within our power to prevent it.

6. Hoover can be expected to raise the following points in your meeting:

(a) "Our present efforts are adequate." The answer is bullshit. This is particularly true with regard to FBI campus coverage.

(b) "The risks are too great; these folks are going to get the President into trouble and RN had better listen to me." The answer is that we have considered the risks, we believe they are acceptable and justified under the circumstances. We are willing to weigh each exceptionally sensitive operation on its merits, but the Director of the FBI is paid to take risks where the security of the country is at stake. Nothing we propose to do has not been done in the past -- and in the past it was always done successfully.

(c) "I don't have the personnel to do the job the President wants done." The answer is (1) he has the people and/or (2) he can get them.

(d) "I don't object to NSA conducting surreptitious entry if they want to." The answer is that NSA doesn't have the people, can't get them, has no authority to get them, and shouldn't have to get them. It is an FBI job.

-4-

(c) "If we do these things the 'jackals of the press' and the ACLU will find out; we can't avoid leaks." Answer: We can avoid leaks by using trained, trusted agents and restricting knowledge of sensitive operations on a strict need to know basis. We do this on other sensitive operations every day.

(f) "If I have to do these things, the Attorney General will have to approve them in writing." This is up to the AG, but I would tell Hoover that he has been instructed to do them by the President and he is to do them on that authority. He needn't look for a scape goat. He has his authority from the President and he doesn't need a written memo from the AG. To maintain security, we should avoid written communications in this area.

(g) "We don't need an Inter-Agency Committee on Intelligence Operations because (1) we're doing fine right now -- good coordination, etc. -- and (2) there are other existing groups which can handle this assignment." The answer is that we are doing lousy right now and there aren't other groups which can do the job we have in mind because: (1) they don't meet; (2) they don't have the people on them we want or have some people we don't want; (3) they don't have the authority to do what we want done; (4) ultimately this new operation will replace them; and (5) they aren't linked to the White House staff.

There are doubtless another dozen or so specious arguments that Hoover will raise, but they will be of similar quality. I hope that you will be able to convince the AG of the importance and necessity of getting Hoover to go along. We have worked for nearly a year to reach this point; others have worked far longer and had abandoned hope. I believe we are talking about the future of this country, for surely domestic violence and disorder threaten the very fabric of our society. Intelligence is not the cure, but it can provide the diagnosis that makes a cure possible. More importantly, it can provide us with the means to prevent this

-5-

deterioration of the situation. Perhaps lowered voices and peace in Vietnam will defuse the tense situation we face, but I wouldn't want to rely on it exclusively.

There is this final point. For eighteen months we have watched people in this government ignore the President's orders, take actions to embarrass him, promote themselves at his expense, and generally make his job more difficult. It makes me fighting mad, and what Hoover is doing here is putting himself above the President. If he thought the Attorney General's advice should be solicited, he should have done so before the report was sent to the President. After all, Hoover was chairman of the committee and he could have asked the AG for his comments. But no, he didn't do so for it never occurred to him that the President would not agree with his footnoted objections. He thought all he had to do was put in a footnote and the matter was settled. He had absolutely no interest in the views of NSA, CIA, DIA, and the military services, and obviously he has little interest in our views, or apparently even in the decisions of the President. I don't see how we can tolerate this, but being a fatalist, if not a realist, I am prepared to accept the fact that we may have to do so.

Tom
TOM CHARLES HUSTON

EXHIBIT 23

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTONCONFIDENTIAL

August 7, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR H. R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT: DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

Mr. Hoover has departed for the West Coast where he plans to vacation for three weeks. If you wait until his return to clear up the problems surrounding our Domestic Intelligence operations, we will be into the new school year without any preparation.

The situation in Portland is beginning to look very tense -- the American Legion Convention could become the first battleground for a new wave of youthful violence. Coming just as the school year begins, it could serve as a catalyst for widespread campus disorders.

I recommend that you meet with the Attorney General and secure his support for the President's decisions, that the Director be informed that the decisions will stand, and that all intelligence agencies are to proceed to implement them at once.

Tom
TOM CHARLES HUSTON

EXHIBIT 24


THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

September 18, 1970

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL



Pursuant to our conversation yesterday, September 17, 1970, I suggest the following procedures to commence our domestic intelligence operation as quickly as possible.

1. Interagency Domestic Intelligence Unit. A key to the entire operation will be the creation of a interagency intelligence unit for both operational and evaluation purposes. Obviously, the selection of persons to this unit will be of vital importance to the success of the mission. As we discussed, the selection of the personnel for this unit is an appropriate first step for several reasons. First, effective coordination of the different agencies must be developed at an early stage through the establishment of the unit. Second, Hoover has indicated a strong opposition to the creation of such a unit and, to bring the FBI fully on board, this seems an appropriate first step to guarantee their proper and full participation in the program. Third, the unit can serve to make appropriate recommendations for the type of intelligence that should be immediately pursued by the various agencies. In regard to this third point, I believe we agreed that it would be inappropriate to have any blanket removal of restrictions; rather, the most appropriate procedure would be to decide on the type of intelligence we need, based on an assessment of the recommendations of this unit, and then to proceed to remove the restraints as necessary to obtain such intelligence.

To proceed to create the interagency intelligence unit, particularly the evaluation group or committee, I recommend that we request the names of four nominees from each of the intelligence agencies involved. While the precise composition of the unit may vary as we gain experience, I think that two members should be appointed initially from each agency in addition to your personal representative who should also be involved in the proceedings. Because of the interagency aspects of this request, it would probably be best if the request came from the White House. If you agree, I will make such a request of the agency

-2-

heads; however, I feel that it is essential that you work this out with Hoover before I have any dealings with him directly.

2. Housing. We discussed the appropriate housing of this operation and, upon reflection, I believe that rather than a White House staffer looking for suitable space, that a professional intelligence person should be assigned the task of locating such space. Accordingly, I would suggest that a request be made that Mr. Hoover assign an agent to this task. In connection with the housing problem, I think serious consideration must be given to the appropriate Justice Department cover for the domestic intelligence operation. We discussed yesterday using IDIU as a cover and as I indicated I believe that that is a most appropriate cover. I believe that it is generally felt that IDIU is already a far more extensive intelligence operation than has been mentioned publicly, and that the IDIU operation cover would eliminate the problem of discovering a new intelligence operation in the Department of Justice. However, I have reservations about the personnel in IDIU and its present operation activities and would suggest that they either be given a minor function within the new intelligence operation or that the staff be completely removed. I have had only incidental dealings with the personnel, other than Jim Devine, and cannot speak to their discretion and loyalty for such an operation. I do not believe that Jim Devine is capable of any major position within the new intelligence operation. However, I do believe that he could help perpetuate the cover and he has evidenced a loyalty to you, the Deputy and other key people in the Department of Justice, despite his strong links with the prior Administration. I would defer to your judgement, of course, on any recommendation regarding Jim Devine's continued presence in such an intelligence operation.

3. Assistant to Attorney General. We also discussed the need for you to have a right hand man to assist in running this operation. It would seem that what is needed is a man with administrative skills, a sensitivity to the implications of the current radical and subversive movements within the United States, and preferably, some background in intelligence work. To maintain the cover, I would think it appropriate for the man to have a law degree in that he will be a part of the Department of Justice. You suggested the possibility of using a prosecutor who had had experience with cases of this type. Accordingly, I have spoken with Harlington Wood to ask him to submit the names of five Assistant U. S. Attorneys who have had experience in dealing with demonstrations or riot type cases and who are mature individuals that might be appropriately given a sensitive

-3-

assignment in the Department of Justice. I did not discuss the matter in any further detail with Wood other than to request the submission of some nominees. I would also like to suggest that we request names from the various intelligence agencies involved for personnel that might be appropriately involved in this activity or who might serve as your assistant.

In summary, I recommend the following immediate action:

- (1) You meet with Hoover, explain what must be done, and request his nominees for the interagency unit.
- (2) You request that Hoover assign an agent to the task of locating appropriate housing for the operations.
- (3) I request that other involved intelligence agencies submit nominees for the interagency unit.
- (4) I request from the agencies names of appropriate personnel for assignment to the operation.

Finally, I would suggest that you call weekly meetings to monitor the problems as they emerge and to make certain that we are moving this program into implementation as quickly as possible.


JOHN DEAN

N.B. Bob Haldeman has suggested to me that if you would like him to join you in a meeting with Hoover he will be happy to do so.

EXHIBIT 25

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : The Attorney General

DATE: Dec. 4, 1970

FROM : Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division *RCM*

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee Status Report

As a result of my discussions with Director Hoover of the FBI and Director Helms of the CIA and in consultation with Justice Sharpe and John Dean, it was decided to limit the first meeting of the Evaluation Committee to representatives of the CIA, the FBI, Justice Sharpe, John Dean and myself. John Doherty, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, also attended. Director Helms designated James Angleton, Chief of the Counter-Espionage Section of the CIA as his representative and Director Hoover designated Inspector George C. Moore, Branch Chief of his Internal Security Division as his representative.

Our first meeting was held in John Dean's office on Thursday, December 3, between the hours of 9 AM and 12 Noon. I indicated that the purposes of the meeting were (1) to reach an agreement as to the goal sought to be attained by the Committee, (2) to identify the membership of the Committee, and (3) to define the role Justice Sharpe was to play and to reach agreement with respect to his housing and staff needs.

After considerable discussion, it was the unanimous opinion of those present that the goal sought was to provide for access by one authority to all of the intelligence in the possession of the United States Government respecting revolutionary terrorist activities in the United States and to evaluate this intelligence to determine (a) the severity of the problem and (b) what form the Federal response to the problem identified should take. We also agreed that this evaluation would, of necessity, disclose the sufficiency of our present intelligence resources, as well as the priorities which the government should attach to the problem.

-2-

We also reached unanimous agreement with respect to the question of the composition, initially at least, of the Committee. Although we could identify approximately thirteen separate intelligence units within the government, it was concluded that participation by all of them would be cumbersome and counter-productive. Recognizing that we would need to bring in other intelligence units at a subsequent date, we agreed that the Committee would be limited for the present to the following:

1. Central Intelligence Agency
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. National Security Agency
4. Department of Defense
5. Treasury Department (Secret Service)

Both the CIA and FBI representatives were in agreement that Colonel Downey of the Army would be the most effective person to work with from the Department of Defense provided he would be permitted to report directly to the Office of the Secretary of Defense rather than through the chain of command in the Army. No recommendations with respect to the representatives of the National Security Agency or the Secret Service were made.

The group agreed that the Attorney General should speak personally to Secretary Laird, Secretary Kennedy, and Admiral Gayler and request that they designate their representatives to the Committee and that a specific request be made for Colonel Downey as the representative of the Secretary's office rather than of the Army. I informed you of this request orally after the meeting yesterday and am awaiting your reply.

We agreed that it was absolutely imperative that there be no discussion or communication of our activities except between the participants and the heads of their respective agencies and between the Committee and you and the White House designees.

We also agreed that in the event of a leak the governmental response would simply be that the activities of the Committee were an attempt

-3-

to upgrade the intelligence-gathering activities of the IDIU which had heretofore been made public and that Justice Sharpe had been employed as a consultant by the Attorney General to assist in this endeavor.

The Committee determined that Justice Sharpe would be housed in FOB #7 for convenience and that he would be furnished secretarial support from the Department of Justice and technical advice as needed from the Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Internal Security Division, John Doherty.

The meeting concluded with the further agreement to meet again as soon as possible after designation of the representatives by Defense, NSA, and Treasury.

cc: Mr. Ehrlichman
Mr. Waldeman

EXHIBIT 26

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

DATE: February 3, 1971

FROM : *ma* Director, FBI

SUBJECT: INTELLIGENCE EVALUATION COMMITTEE
INTERNAL SECURITY - MISCELLANEOUS

Reference is made to your letter dated February 2, 1971, which consisted of a draft of a "proposed charter" of the captioned organization which has been provided to this Bureau for review and comments.

In this regard it is requested that an appropriate change be made in the wording of paragraph IV entitled "Staff" to clearly show that the FBI will not provide personnel for the proposed permanent intelligence estimation staff. The wording would then be consistent with our position as stated in my letter dated January 27, 1971, prompted by manpower and budgetary problems.

Although we are unable to provide any personnel support, you may be assured of our continuing full cooperation in providing all relevant intelligence which might be of assistance to the Committee in fulfilling its responsibilities.

62-113887

RECEIVED

FEB 5 1971

INTERNAL SECURITY DIVISION

44-03-2	
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE	
11	FEB 5 1971
R.A.O.	
INTERNAL SECURITY	
Liaison & Policy Planning	



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

D R A F T

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : See Addressees Below

DATE: February 10, 1971

FROM : Robert C. Mardian ^{CCM}
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee

I. AUTHORITY:

Interdepartmental Action Plan for Civil Disturbances.

II. MISSION:

To provide intelligence estimates to the responsible Government departments and agencies on a need-to-know basis in order to effectively evaluate and anticipate problems to appropriately respond to civil disorders. In carrying out this mission, the Committee shall have access to all pertinent intelligence in the possession of the United States Government.

III. MEMBERSHIP:

Members of the Committee shall consist of representatives of the following departments and agencies: Department of Defense; Department of Justice; Central Intelligence Agency; Federal Bureau of Investigation; Secret Service; National Security Agency, and, when necessary, representatives of other departments or agencies designated by the Committee.

IV. STAFF:

The Committee will be supported by a permanent intelligence estimation staff* consisting of representatives from member

* The Federal Bureau of Investigation advised it would not provide personnel for this staff.

D R A F T

-2-

departments and agencies and headed by an executive director appointed by the Committee.

V. PROCEDURES AND FUNCTIONS:

The permanent staff will perform the following functions:

1. When requested by the Committee, the Departments or Agencies represented shall furnish to the Committee staff all pertinent information relevant to the stated request of the Committee. Such requests for intelligence data shall first be approved by the Committee. The Executive Director of the permanent staff may initiate requests for information from member agencies subject to review and approval by the committee.
2. Prepare estimates from time to time as directed by the Committee.
3. Report information gaps to the Committee as such gaps are identified.
4. Recommend to the Committee no less often than monthly subjects for intelligence estimation.
5. Prepare other relevant studies and reports as directed by the Committee.
6. Provide for the security of information received and the protection of all sources of information.

VI. OFFICE SPACE AND FACILITIES:

The Department of Justice shall provide necessary office space, supplies, and incidental administrative support.

ADDRESSEES:

Inspector George C. Moore
Mr. Benson Buffham
Mr. Thomas J. Kelley
Colonel John W. Downey
Mr. Richard Ober

EXHIBIT 27

Form CJ-126
(Ed. 4-76-65)

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

Memorandum

TO : THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

DATE: February 12, 1971

FROM : Robert C. Mardian
Assistant Attorney General
Internal Security Division

SUBJECT: Intelligence Evaluation Committee

Attached is the final draft of the charter of the Intelligence Evaluation Committee which has the approval of the entire IEC staff, other than the representative of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The Bureau advises, as you will note from the attached memorandum, that they will not provide personnel to work with the Committee staff for the purposes stated in the charter. Also attached are two memoranda from the Director to me, dated January 27, 1971 and February 3, 1971, in which he states his reasons for being unwilling to participate.

Although it might be possible to continue the work of the Committee without the FBI evaluator, in view of the fact that most of the intelligence information available is Bureau information, I do not think that the quality of the intelligence estimates would be sufficiently improved to warrant continuing our effort without their cooperation. I think all of the present members of the Committee other than the FBI member agree with the above assessment.

Pending your further advice, however, we will continue to operate on the basis of the exception noted with reference to Bureau participation.

cc: Honorable John Ehrlichman
Honorable H.R. Haldeman




EXHIBIT 28

U.S. GOVERNMENT MEMORANDUM
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
June 11, 1973

To: Colonel Werner E. Michel, Chief, Counterintelligence and
Security Division, The Pentagon

From: Henry E. Petersen, Assistant Attorney General,
Criminal Division

Subject: Intelligence Evaluation Committee (IEC)

The IEC has been engaged in evaluating the potential for violence during various domestic situations. Now that the war in Vietnam has ended demonstrations carrying a potential for violence have virtually ended; therefore, I feel that the IEC function is no longer necessary.

Accordingly, effective immediately, the IEC is no longer in existence. If, in the future, estimates are needed concerning the potential for violence in a given situation, such estimates can be handled by ad hoc groups set up for that purpose.

From: Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights
of the Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate
93rd Congress, Second Session on S. 2318, April 9 and 10,
1974, issue on Military Surveillance pg. 221.

EXHIBIT 29

MEMORANDUM FOR MITCHELL, EHRLICHMAN, HALDEMAN
Unsigned on Justice Department Stationary
Dated January 19, 1971

"All those who have been involved in the project firmly believe that the starting point for an effective domestic intelligence operation should be the implementation of the Special Report of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc Committee Report of June 3, 1970). . .

"Since the inception of this current project the general climate of public reaction, the has been significantly altered by the incidents which have confronted the Army in its intelligence operation. According, the current activities of the working group would be subject to extreme adverse public media and congressional reaction if discovered.

... "As noted above, there is considerable doubt as to how significant a contribution the proposed committee would make to existing domestic intelligence operations without implementation of the Ad Hoc Committee Report. . . .

"Based on these observations, we have concluded and strongly recommend that the existing plan for establishing a physical office with a committee chairman and staff be rescinded and future meetings of the working group be called on an Ad Hoc basis in John Dean's office; that any deficiencies in intelligence should be called to the attention of the existing agencies and corrections should be made through the normal structure. If this fails to produce the requisite intelligence, it is then recommend that the questions raised by the Ad Hoc Committee Report be re-examined to determine how either partial or full implementation of the recommendations in that report might be accomplished."

It was further recommended that the group adopt the problem-solving approach whereby appropriate agencies develop intelligence estimates of problems the group anticipates the government must face in the near future.

There was also a discussion of "cover" for Justice Morrell Sharp and Doherty since they were both recognized in the EOB.

EXHIBIT 30

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr

TO : C. D. Brennan

DATE: March 25, 1971

FROM : W. R. Wannall

JUNE

1 - Mr. Dalbey
1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. Brennan

SUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD
HELMES AND ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER

1 - Mr. Wannall
1 - Mr. McDonnell

Tolson _____
Sullivan _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Brennan, C.D. _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Tavel _____
Walters _____
Soyars _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____

We have had no indication from any source as to the reason why Attorney General asked the Director to meet with him, Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler on 3/31/71. Since Mr. Helms is Director of Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Admiral Gayler is Director of National Security Agency (NSA), both of which agencies are deeply involved in production of foreign intelligence, it would appear that the meeting will probably cover this subject matter.

One of the most pressing problems of the Administration relates to the control of activities of criminal subversives, such as the Weatherman group, the East Coast conspiracy and the Black Panthers. Production of intelligence relating to the proposed activities of such groups has ramifications both in the domestic field and the foreign field, the latter because of indications of possible foreign direction and control of these radical militants.

Memorandum for Mr. Brennan
 Re: DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH
 ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD
 HELMS AND ADMIRAL GAYLER

While Bureau has primary responsibility for internal security matters which includes production of domestic intelligence, recognizing the possible foreign ramifications of the present problem relating to criminal subversives, it is felt we should take advantage of any resources of NSA and CIA which can be tapped for the purpose of contributing to the solution of this problem.

Our principal sources for production of intelligence in this area are electronic surveillances and live informants. We have telephone surveillances and microphone surveillance targeted specifically for the production of intelligence in this field. Among our live informants and sources, over are targeted specifically against criminal subversive individuals and organizations. In addition, we have approximately potential informants and sources in various stages of development for this same purpose, many of whom are currently providing significant intelligence data. In various ghetto areas where criminal subversives are concentrated we have over 6200 ghetto informants, persons residing in the areas or having contacts therein, who have agreed to provide us with any information of interest to the FBI which comes to their attention

As noted above, we feel that the foregoing matter is the one most likely for discussion during the 3/31/71 meeting; however, any matter in the foreign intelligence collection field would appear to be a possible subject for discussion, in view of the presence of Mr. Helms and Admiral Gayler and considering their primary missions.

ACTION:

Foregoing is submitted for the information of the Director.

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. Brennan

FROM : W. R. Wannall *WRW* / J U N ESUBJECT: DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD
HELMS AND ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER1 - Miss Holmes
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Mr. Mohr
1 - Mr. Dalbey

DATE: 3/29/71

1 - Mr. Rosen
1 - Mr. C.D. Brennan
1 - Mr. W.R. Wannall
1 - Mr. W.J. McDonnell

Memorandum 3/25/71 in captioned matter reported that we have 13 telephone surveillances and one microphone surveillance targeted specifically for the production of intelligence relating to activities of domestic criminal subversive individuals and organizations. The Director has asked that these electronic surveillances be identified.

The microphone surveillance covers the residence in San Francisco of Huey P. Newton, Supreme Commander, Black Panther Party.

The 13 telephone surveillances are:

1. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Chicago, Illinois.
2. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Los Angeles, California.
3. Black Panther Party Headquarters, San Francisco, California.
4. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Oakland, California.
5. Black Panther Party Headquarters, New Haven, Connecticut.
6. Black Panther Party Headquarters, Bronx, New York.
7. Junta of Military Organizations, Tampa, Florida (a black extremist organization).
8. Huey P. Newton's residence, San Francisco, California. (He is Supreme Commander of the Black Panther Party).
9. Communist Party USA Headquarters, New York City.

WRW/WJM:dgo
(9)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum, W.R. Wannall to Mr. C.D. Brennan
RE: DIRECTOR'S MEETING 3/31/71 WITH
ATTORNEY GENERAL, MR. RICHARD
HELMS AND ADMIRAL NOEL GAYLER

10. Jewish Defense League Headquarters, New York City.

11. Worker Student Alliance Headquarters, Chicago,
Illinois (affiliate of Students for a Democratic Society, a
New Left extremist group).

12. Nancy Sarah Kurshan's residence, Cleveland,
Ohio (the New Left extremist activist).

13. Nancy Barrett Frappier's residence,
San Francisco, California (contact point of the underground
Weatherman, New Left extremist, violence-prone terrorist group).

ACTION:

The above is submitted in compliance with the
Director's request.

W.R. Wannall
CD Brennan
RM Helms
NG Gayler

EXHIBIT 31

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

April 12, 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE FILES

On March 29, 1971, I attended a meeting with the Attorney General, Mr. Richard Helms, Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), and Admiral Noel A. Gaylor, Director of the National Security Agency.

This meeting had been requested by Mr. Helms and was for the purpose of discussing a broadening of operations, particularly of the very confidential type in covering intelligence both domestic and foreign.

There was some discussion upon the part of Mr. Helms of further coverage of mail.

I stated to the Attorney General, Mr. Helms, and Admiral Gaylor that I was not at all enthusiastic about such an extension of operations insofar as the FBI was concerned in view of the hazards involved. The Attorney General stated that he thought before he could make any final decision in this matter, Mr. Helms should make an in-depth examination of exactly what he and Admiral Gaylor desired and then submit to the Attorney General and myself the results of this examination, and he, the Attorney General, would call another meeting of this particular group and make the decision as to what could or could not be done.

Mr. Helms said he would take care of this very promptly.

John Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

JEH:EDM (1)

Mr. Tolson	_____
Mr. DeLoach	_____
Mr. Mohr	_____
Mr. Bishop	_____
Mr. Casper	_____
Mr. Callahan	_____
Mr. Conrad	_____
Mr. Felt	_____
Mr. Gale	_____
Mr. Rosen	_____
Mr. Sullivan	_____
Mr. Tavel	_____
Mr. Walters	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Miss Holmes	_____
Miss Gandy	_____

EXHIBIT 32

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: July 19, 1966

W. C. Sullivan

DO NOT FILE

"BLACK BAG" JOBS

1-Mr. DeLoach
1-Mr. Sullivan

Tolson	_____
DeLoach	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Trotter	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

The following is set forth in regard to your request concerning what authority we have for "black bag" jobs and for the background of our policy and procedures in such matters.

We do not obtain authorization for "black bag" jobs from outside the Bureau. Such a technique involves trespass and is clearly illegal; therefore, it would be impossible to obtain any legal sanction for it. Despite this, "black bag" jobs have been used because they represent an invaluable technique in combating subversive activities of a clandestine nature aimed directly at undermining and destroying our nation.

The present procedure followed in the use of this technique calls for the Special Agent in Charge of a field office to make his request for the use of the technique to the appropriate Assistant Director. The Special Agent in Charge must completely justify the need for the use of the technique and at the same time assure that it can be safely used without any danger or embarrassment to the Bureau. The facts are incorporated in a memorandum which, in accordance with the Director's instructions, is sent to Mr. Tolson or to the Director for approval. Subsequently this memorandum is filed in the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File" procedure.

In the field the Special Agent in Charge prepares an informal memorandum showing that he obtained Bureau authority and this memorandum is filed in his safe until the next inspection by Bureau inspectors, at which time it is destroyed.

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
 Re: "BLACK BAG" JOBS

We have used this technique on a highly selective basis, but with wide-range effectiveness, in our operations. We have several cases in the espionage field,

Also through the use of this technique we have on numerous occasions been able to obtain material held highly secret and closely guarded by subversive groups and organizations which consisted of membership lists and mailing lists of these organizations.

This applies even to our investigation of the "black bag" job we obtained the records in the possession of three high-ranking officials of a organization in . These records gave us the complete membership and financial information concerning the operation which we have been using most effectively to disrupt the organization and, in fact, to bring about its near disintegration.

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
re: "BLACK BAG" JOBS

In short, it is a very valuable weapon which we have used to combat the highly clandestine efforts of subversive elements seeking to undermine our Nation.

RECOMMENDATION:

For your information.

4/
No more such techniques must be used.

No more such techniques
must be used.

EXHIBIT 33

January 6, 1967

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. TOLSON
MR. DE LOACH


I note that requests are still being made by Bureau officials for the use of "slick bag" techniques. I have previously indicated that I do not intend to approve any such requests in the future, and, consequently, no such recommendations should be submitted for approval of such matters. This practice, which includes also surreptitious entrances upon premises of any kind, will not meet with my approval in the future.

Very truly yours,

Jenn Edgar Hoover
Director

JEM:EDM (7)

EXHIBIT 34



OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20530

copy files

VII-B-3- b(FBI)-4-D1

1975 SEP 24 PM 2 26

SEP 24 1975
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

Honorable Frank Church, Chairman
United States Senate Select Committee
on Intelligence Activities
Washington, D. C. 20510

Dear Senator Church:

By letter of September 22, 1975, from Mr. John Elliff of your Committee staff, Mr. Elliff requested certain information with respect to surreptitious entries conducted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation against domestic targets. Attached and transmitted herewith is a memorandum prepared by the Federal Bureau of Investigation in response to that request.

Sincerely,

MICHAEL E. SHAHEEN, JR.
Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination



UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20535

(IS-3) 62-116395

September 23, 1975

UNITED STATES SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE
TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES (SSC)

RE: SURREPTITIOUS ENTRIES - DOMESTIC TARGETS

Reference is made to SSC letter dated September 22, 1975, from Mr. John T. Elliff, Director, Domestic Intelligence Task Force, to Mr. Michael E. Shaheen, Jr., Special Counsel for Intelligence Coordination, Office of the Deputy Attorney General, wherein Mr. Elliff made the following request with respect to domestic targets of surreptitious entries conducted by the FBI:

1. Statistics on the volume of such surreptitious entries in inclusive categories such as "subversive," "white hate," organized crime," or "miscellaneous." These statistics should be cleared for public disclosure.

2. Committee access at FBI Headquarters to a complete list of specific targets, represented by the statistics in Item 1, above.

3. Delivery to the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the list of specific targets requested for access in Item 2, above.

With respect to this request, from 1942 to April, 1968, surreptitious entry was utilized by the FBI on a highly selective basis in the conduct of certain investigations. Available records and recollection of Special Agents at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ), who have knowledge of such activities, identify the targets of surreptitious entries as domestic subversive and white hate groups. Surreptitious entry was used to obtain secret and closely guarded organizational and financial information, and membership lists and monthly reports of target organizations.

Re: Surreptitious Entries - Domestic Targets

When a Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of a field office considered surreptitious entry necessary to the conduct of an investigation, he would make his request to the appropriate Assistant Director at FBIHQ, justifying the need for an entry and assuring it could be accomplished safely with full security. In accordance with instructions of Director J. Edgar Hoover, a memorandum outlining the facts of the request was prepared for approval of Mr. Hoover, or Mr. Tolson, the Associate Director. Subsequently, the memorandum was filed in the Assistant Director's office under a "Do Not File" procedure, and thereafter destroyed. In the field office, the SAC maintained a record of approval as a control device in his office safe. At the next yearly field office inspection, a review of these records would be made by the Inspector to insure that the SAC was not acting without prior FBIHQ approval in conducting surreptitious entries. Upon completion of this review, these records were destroyed.

There is no central index, file, or document listing surreptitious entries conducted against domestic targets. To reconstruct these activities, it is necessary to rely upon recollections of Special Agents who have knowledge of such activities, and review of those files identified by recollection as being targets of surreptitious entries. Since policies and procedures followed in reporting of information resulting from a surreptitious entry were designed to conceal the activity from persons not having a need to know, information contained in FBI files relating to entries is in most instances incomplete and difficult to identify.

Reconstruction of instances of surreptitious entry through review of files and recollections of Special Agent personnel at FBIHQ who have knowledge of such activities, show the following categories of targets and the approximate number of entries conducted against each:

1. At least fourteen domestic subversive targets were the subject of at least 238 entries from 1942 to April, 1968. In addition, at least three domestic subversive targets were the subject of numerous entries from October, 1952, to June, 1966. Since there exists no precise record of entries, we are unable to retrieve an accurate accounting of their number.

Re: Surreptitious Entries - Domestic Targets


2. One white hate group was the target of an entry in March, 1966.

A recent survey of policies and procedures of the General Investigative and Special Investigative Divisions at FBIHQ with respect to surreptitious entries, disclosed that with the exception of entries made for the purpose of installation of authorized electronic surveillances, the technique of surreptitious entry has not been used in criminal investigations.

A list of specific targets has been prepared for review by Senators Church and Tower, and appropriate FBIHQ officials are available for a discussion of this list.

EXHIBIT 35

May 9, 1975



Honorable Hugh E. Kline
Clerk
United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia Circuit
United States Court House
Washington, D. C. 20001

Re: United States v. Ehrlichman
(D.C. Cir. No. 74-1082)

Dear Mr. Kline:

This letter states the views of the Department of Justice concerning an issue raised in this case: the legality of forms of surveillance in the United States without a warrant in cases involving foreign espionage or intelligence. Copies are enclosed for distribution to the Court.

It is the position of the Department that such activities must be very carefully controlled. There must be solid reason to believe that foreign espionage or intelligence is involved. In addition, the intrusion into any zone of expected privacy must be kept to the minimum and there must be personal authorization by the President or the Attorney General. The Department believes that activities so controlled are lawful under the Fourth Amendment.

In regard to warrantless searches related to foreign espionage or intelligence, the Department does not believe there is a constitutional difference between searches conducted by wiretapping and those involving physical entries into private premises. One form of search is no less serious than another. It is and has long been the Department's view that warrantless searches involving physical entries into private premises are justified.

-2-

under the proper circumstances when related to foreign espionage or intelligence (See Brief, p. 45, n. 39).


The discussion by the Special Prosecutor (Brief, Part IB) raises questions which, in our view, are not presented by this case. The physical entry here was plainly unlawful, as the Special Prosecutor argues, because the search was not controlled as we have suggested it must be, there was no proper authorization, there was no delegation to a proper officer, and there was no sufficient predicate for the choice of the particular premises invaded. For these reasons, we fully support the Special Prosecutor in concluding that the entry and search here were unlawful.

Respectfully submitted,

JOHN C. KEENEY
Acting Assistant Attorney General

Enclosures

EXHIBIT 36



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. [redacted] has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency, Mr. [redacted]. This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riba was in turn passed to [redacted].

In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. [redacted] to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. [redacted] and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. [redacted] was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. [redacted] maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. [redacted] explained that the [redacted] cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riba's disappearance.

AUG 5 1970

FBI

The purpose of [redacted] conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on [redacted]. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. [redacted] affirms that before going to District Attorney McKeivitt he called upon the FBI [redacted] Mr. [redacted] and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. [redacted] to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Mr. _____ states that Mr. _____ refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. _____ engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. _____. Subsequently, Mr. _____ conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue regarding _____ and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. [redacted]. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to [redacted] and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. [redacted] I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. [redacted]

AUG 5 1966

FBI

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

This is not a memorandum
Parents and Family Office
Attachments - a/s

RECEIVED

AUG 5 1945

FBI

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

1.

Page 2, left margin - "acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

EXHIBIT 37

February 26, 1970

BY LIAISON

Honorable Egil Krogh, Jr.
Deputy Assistant to the President
for Domestic Affairs
The White House
Washington, D. C.

Re: [unclear]

Dear Mr. Krogh:

Pursuant to your request of February 23, 1970,
there are enclosed 13 memoranda concerning sources of funds
utilized by revolutionary groups. *M*

Sincerely yours,

Enclosures (13)

M
ENCLOSURE

EX-103

REC 85

100-44677-14

RLS:mst
(9)

ENCLOSURE ATTACHED
✓

9 FEB 27 1970

100-44677-70 12

well

BS

Cvt. ms

[Handwritten notes and stamps]

[Handwritten notes]

MAR 12 1970

February 26, 1970

PROGRESSIVE LABOR PARTY

The Progressive Labor Party (PLP) is an active communist party in the United States which adheres to the revolutionary doctrine of the Chinese Communist Party and its leader Mao Tse-tung. Funds for the PLP are obtained from dues paid by members of the organization.

The PLP also derives income from the sale of its magazine "Progressive Labor," and its monthly newspaper "Challenge." PLP has forwarded bulk mailings of these publications directly to Beijing, China, in the past. The PLP in January, 1970, printed 10,000 copies of "Challenge," and in February, 1970, 12,000 issues of "Progressive Labor."

EJS:mst

(8)

February 26, 1970

REPUBLIC OF NEW AFRICA

The Republic of New Africa (RNA), a black extremist, separatist organization, was formed in Detroit, Michigan, in March, 1968.

RNA activity has been curtailed from its inception by lack of funds.

GTT:ekw
(8)

WJL CS
PK

February 26, 1970

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

The Student National Coordinating Committee is a black extremist nonmembership organization which was founded in 1960 and which until July, 1969, was known as the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee. The group is currently led by H. Rap Brown who serves as National Chairman.

The organization is currently active in Atlanta, Georgia; Cincinnati, Ohio; and New York City. The organization's national office is located in New York City where it maintains an office provided by the Saint Peter's Episcopal Church at 300 West 40th Street. The group operates nationally with less than 50 members and is consistently reported to be in dire financial condition.

Additional revenue is obtained through the payment of dues by Student National Coordinating Committee affiliates and recently efforts have been made by the New York organization to publish a news bulletin entitled "National SNCC" which it is intended would sell for 35¢ a copy. Publication of this news letter has not met with success and to date only one issue is known to have appeared.

PEN:fb
(8)

Handwritten signatures and initials:
WAB
Gut
6/7/70
P/E

STUDENT NATIONAL COORDINATING COMMITTEE

February 26, 1970

COMMUNIST PARTY, USA

RCP:pub. (6)

Aut p
B
WEL

February 26, 1970

SOCIALIST WORKERS PARTY

The Trotskyist Socialist Workers Party (SWP) is headquartered in New York City and is the largest and most active of the communist splinter groups. Through its youth affiliate, the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA), the SWP exerts influence over the Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC), a broad-based student antiwar group. The SWP also maintains fraternal ties with the Fourth International, a European Trotskyist organization.

Its primary source of funds is the monthly sustenance of fifteen dollars extracted from each member. In addition, monies are also realized from the sale of publications, collections in support of SWP political candidates, and collections at large public rallies, and through the control of front organizations

FGB:scr
(3)



February 26, 1970

YOUNG SOCIALIST ALLIANCE

The Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) is the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) and has been described by the SWP as the main recruiting ground for the SWP.

A YSA publication in an article outlining the organizational concepts of the YSA states that the membership and each local chapter are responsible for financial support to the organization through such activities as payment of minimal dues based on ability to pay, literature sales and fund raising projects.

The YSA is subsidized by the SWP which furnishes varying amounts of money to the YSA on a continuing basis.

DPW:ser
(8) *ser*

Wey *ss* *DPW* *724*

February 26, 1970

STUDENT MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO
END THE WAR IN VIETNAM

The Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (SMC) is controlled and dominated by the Young Socialist Alliance (YSA) which is the youth organization of the Socialist Workers Party (SWP). The SMC has local chapters in all sections of the United States and affords the YSA a broad base organization for popular support.

The SMC local activity is financed by the individual chapter concerned and in turn these local groups contribute toward the expenses of any national action sponsored or supported by the SMC. The local chapters organize their own fund raising projects and are assisted by contributions from their members and supporters.

ser
DPW/jan
(8)

WEX *Cur* *SEP* *1970*

February 26, 1970

VENCEREMOS BRIGADE

The Venceremos Brigade (VB) was organized in June, 1969, for the purpose of supporting the Cuban revolution by assisting in the current sugar cane harvest. It is headquartered in New York City and is composed of the National Executive Committee, national recruiters and the brigade members who travel to Cuba. The Executive Committee is composed of individuals representing a variety of New Left groups, which groups have also provided organizational support. To date a total of 782 individuals have been identified as having traveled to Cuba under VB auspices.

With regard to finances, the VB Executive Committee instructed the regional recruiters that each region would be responsible for raising travel funds for transportation of participants to at which points the Cuban Government would assume financial responsibility. All excess funds were to be sent to the national office.

Money to support travel expenses was obtained through various fund raising affairs sponsored by the organizations lending support to the VB. These projects included bazaars, film showings, and coffees. In addition, information has been developed disclosing that each traveler provided his own funds for transportation and incidental expenses, and in some instances they were arbitrarily assessed a proportionate amount to cover the travel expenses for those without funds.

FBG:bjp/LM
(8)

WEL *cut* *7/29*

February 26, 1970

STUDENTS FOR A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY

Weatherman Faction

Weatherman national leaders, such as William Ayers, Mark Rudd, and Jeffrey Jones, since their election as Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) national secretaries in June, 1969, have appeared as speakers on a number of college campuses throughout the country. They have received honorariums from these colleges ranging from \$200 to \$750 for their speaking engagements.

This faction is and has been in severe financial crisis since late Fall of 1969. Because of its violent and militant activities, former sources of funds are no longer available.

Weatherman members live in residences called "collectives," and the rent they pay usually is very nominal. Weatherman members, because they are in severe financial straits, often receive money from their parents to help defray expenses. Most of the time, however, members of the collectives move frequently from one place to another to avoid paying rent. The individuals in the various collectives take almost daily trips to "liberate" (steal) whatever they need, such as food, clothing, and housewares, at local supermarkets and other stores.

WNP:LM
(8)

for

WNP
cut
9/7/70

Students for a Democratic Society**Worker Student Alliance Faction**

This faction of SDS has obtained operating funds through the sale of literature and requests for donations through its publication, "New Left Notes." Donations amounting to from \$1 to \$50 have been received from many Worker Student Alliance (WSA) members located throughout the United States.

Students for a Democratic Society

The WSA faction recently has held National Council meetings in New Haven, Connecticut, and Los Angeles, California. The rental fees for the auditoriums where the meetings were held were paid by donations from delegates, who paid sums ranging from \$5 to \$15. It was stressed at both meetings by WSA leaders that this faction is in dire need of funds with which to operate.

Revolutionary Youth Movement Faction

This faction of SDS has no operating funds on a national level at this time. Local Revolutionary Youth Movement (RYM) chapters operate on their own, and any funds they need come from local members. During the Fall of 1969, Michael Stuchlik, considered to be one of the top leaders of this faction, made a number of speeches on college campuses where he received honorariums averaging \$250 for each engagement.

Cambridge Iron and Steel Company

The Cambridge Iron and Steel Company, Cambridge, Massachusetts, was created in early 1969 to support such organizations as SDS in the Cambridge and Boston areas.

Students for a Democratic Society

February 26, 1970

UNDERGROUND PUBLICATIONS

The New Left relies heavily on printed propaganda. The New Left has an enormous propaganda mill churning out publications denouncing the "Establishment" and glamorizing the "rebels." There are over 200 New Left underground newspapers published on a regular basis in the United States.

The central theme which pervades these papers is a criticism of the "Establishment" in general and law enforcement, the draft, and the Vietnam War in particular. Featured articles are aimed primarily at the "beatnik types" and morbidly curious who may be intrigued by the activities of the New Left. Also featured are obscene photographs and psychedelic drawings as well as announcements of interest to sex deviates and hallucinatory drug users. Youth, particularly students, are the main target of these publications, which are effective vehicles for agitation and recruitment in that they reach a large portion of the student population.

For the most part, the underground papers are in poor financial condition and often miss publication dates due to a lack of funds. Papers circulated in large urban areas are usually solvent, while those in university communities are struggling to keep in business. Generally, funds are received from advertising, subscriptions, donations, and benefits. Volunteer labor is used in most instances.

Attempts by New Left leaders to unite these underground papers into some type of network have been unsuccessful to date, since there are no concrete political philosophies agreeable to all. While the editors share similar goals, they diverge widely as to the means. However, over 100 underground papers are affiliated with the radical Liberation News Service which provides news packets concerning New Left activities.

In a few instances, authorities have prosecuted publishers for printing obscene material. However, minor fines or probation have been the general result and have been offset by an increase in the paper's circulation.

TPD:ml
(8)

WEL *Act* *✓*
TPW

UNDERGROUND PUBLICATIONS

February 26, 1970

NATION OF ISLAM

Approximately 100 Temples or Mosques of this fanatical all-Morro cult exist in the United States today with a total membership in excess of The membership supports this organization. Principal income is derived from membership dues, special membership assessments and from sale of its official publication "Muhammad Speaks."

ERS:hls *Yes*
(8)

Yes
G. J. [unclear]

February 26, 1970

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

The sources of income for the Black Panther Party (BPP) are many and varied. In the initial years of its existence from 1966 to 1969, one of its chief sources of income was the proceeds from criminal acts perpetrated by individual members who split with the Party. More recently, the chief source of funds for the BPP has been numerous and regular contributions from individuals, radical groups and sympathizers in the United States and overseas. These individual contributions have increased greatly since December, 1969.

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BLACK PANTHER PARTY

Sizable donations are known to have been made to the BPP by several prominent individuals and personalities.

The BPP also receives income from the regular sale of its weekly newspaper and from the sale of revolutionary paraphernalia such as pamphlets, posters, buttons, and greeting cards.

Another source of income for the BPP is fees received for public speeches and appearances made by its representatives, particularly at institutions of learning. The fees received by its representatives for these appearances vary but have ranged as high as \$1,000 for a single appearance of BPP Chairman Bobby Seale. During 1969 representatives of the BPP made a total of 136 appearances at various institutions of learning.

Another source of income for the BPP is proceeds received from various public benefits and rallies held specifically for the purpose of raising money for the regular defense funds of the BPP established to pay legal expenses.

While no firm evidence has been developed to date, it is noted that there has been an increasing number of articles of a pro-Arab nature appearing in the BPP newspaper

BLACK PANTHER PARTY

and every effort is being made to determine whether the Arabs are supporting the Black Panthers from a monetary standpoint. It is noted that Eldridge Cleaver, the BPP Minister of Information and a fugitive from justice, is presently residing in Arab territory and is supported by them.

February 26, 1970

**THE NEW MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE
TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM**

The New Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam (NMC) maintains its headquarters at 1029 Vermont Avenue, Suite 900, Northwest, Washington, D. C. It also maintains an office at 17 East Seventeenth Street, New York City.

The NMC is not an individual membership organization. It is a coalition of many organizations which are located throughout the United States. These organizations include the Communist Party, Socialist Workers Party, Women Strike for Peace, Chicago Peace Council, Los Angeles Peace Action Council, Student Mobilization Committee to End the War in Vietnam, and the American Friends Service Committee.

NMC's primary function at the present time is to protest the United States intervention in Vietnam.

The NMC receives financial support in the form of donations from sympathetic individuals and organizations.

In September, 1969, it was reported that the following individuals were described as being among the principal individual financial donors to the NMC:

SSC:pab
(8)

WIP

C. C. C. 7/21/70

THE NEW MOBILIZATION COMMITTEE TO END THE WAR IN VIETNAM

EXHIBIT 38

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

FROM : C. D. Brennan

SUBJECT: NEW LEFT MOVEMENT - FINANCES
IS - MISCELLANEOUS

1 - Mr. DeLoach
 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
 1 - Mr. Felt
 DATE: March 12, 1970
 1 - Mr. Casper
 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
 1 - Mr. Shackelford

PURPOSE:

To obtain authority for the attached airtel to the field requesting financial information concerning New Left groups.

BACKGROUND:

By memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, dated 11/7/69, the Director approved a letter to all offices pointing out the recurring allegations that various tax exempt charitable foundations have contributed large sums of money, directly or indirectly, to the Movement. It was also pointed out similar allegations recur concerning financial "angels." The field was instructed to be particularly alert to such allegations and any information developed along such lines should be promptly reported to the Bureau with recommendations as to whether additional investigation is warranted.

By letter dated 2/26/70, in response to a specific request, we furnished the White House with material concerning income sources of revolutionary groups. Such an inquiry is indicative of the high-level interest in the financial aspects of revolutionary activity.

Because of the sensitive nature of any direct intensive financial investigation of large foundations or funds, prominent wealthy individuals who limit their activities to financial support, or politically oriented groups such as the Vietnam Moratorium Committee, embarrassment to the Bureau would likely result. It must also be noted such financial support is so diverse as to frequently be in the form of furnishing bail money to persons jailed during disturbances, purchase of equipment,

Enclosure
 100-446997-70

RHS:mst

(8)

ENCLOSURE

REC-89

EX-117

MAR 17 1970

CONTINUED -- OVER --

OBSERVATIONS:

RECOMMENDATION:

The attached airtel to the field be forwarded containing instructions along the above lines.

containing instructions along the above lines.

EXHIBIT 39

1 - Mr. DeLoach

3/16/70

Airtel

1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
 1 - Mr. Felt
 1 - Mr. Casper
 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
 1 - Mr. Shackelford

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI (100-446997-70)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

NEW LEFT MOVEMENT - FINANCES
 IS - MISCELLANEOUS
 BUDED 4/1/70

ReBulet dated 11/10/69.

The above referenced letter directed your attention to the need to develop information indicative of support of the New Left Movement by tax-exempt charitable foundations or financial "angels." Allegations of this type of support, as well as support by politically oriented groups such as the Vietnam Moratorium Committee to End the War in Vietnam continue to circulate.

Because of interest in the sources of funds of subversive and revolutionary groups exhibited by high officials of the Government it is essential to get the above allegations into proper perspective.

You are instructed to survey your files to determine any instances where financial support, including gifts of equipment or facilities, has been furnished to New Left groups or individuals by 1) tax-exempt charitable foundations or funds; 2) prominent or wealthy individuals, or other individuals who have contributed over \$1,000 in a single contribution; 3) politically oriented groups including unions. Such support would include and not be limited to, furnishing bail money to arrested demonstrators, furnishing printing equipment or office space, and underwriting the cost of conventions or rallies. Individuals and organizations listed should be documented where possible.

REC-89

2 - All Offices (PERSONAL ATTENTION)


EX-117

RLS:mst

(126)

MAR 20 1970

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO



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 DeLoach _____
 Mohr _____
 Bishop _____
 Casper _____
 Callahan _____
 Conrad _____
 Felt _____
 Gale _____
 Rosen _____
 Sullivan _____
 Tavel _____
 Trotter _____
 Tele. Room _____
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 9 - _____
 10 - _____

Airtel to SAC, Albany
RE: NEW LEFT MOVEMENT - FINANCES
100-446997-70

This survey is expected to be exhaustive and thorough. The results should be prepared in a letterhead memorandum under the caption of this communication. The deadline of 4/1/70 must be complied with.

The Bureau's continuing interest in the financial aspects of New Left Movement investigations, both organizations and individuals, is being reiterated. You should remain continually alert for information of this type and insure it is promptly reported to the Bureau under the above caption.

NOTE:

See memorandum C. D. Brennan to W. C. Sullivan, dated 3/12/70, captioned as above, prepared by RLS:mst.

EXHIBIT 40

The Attorney General

July 27, 1970

Director, FBI

INTERAGENCY COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE

There is enclosed a copy of a letter dated July 23, 1970, with attachment, addressed to me from Mr. Tom Charles Huston, White House Presidential Assistant.

For your information, on June 5, 1970, the President established an ad hoc interagency committee on intelligence chaired by me and also including the Directors of the Central Intelligence Agency, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the National Security Agency. Mr. Huston served in a liaison capacity with the committee. This committee was requested by the President to submit a report assessing the current internal security threat, problems in evaluation of intelligence collection procedures, identifying gaps in our present collection efforts with recommended measures to close such gaps, and reviewing current procedures for interagency coordination with recommended steps to improve such procedures.

The final report of this committee was completed on June 25, 1970, and delivered to the President. This report set forth eight specific areas (corresponding to the eight numbered paragraphs in the attached letter from Mr. Huston) which had been reviewed by the committee. The first six related to current restraints on intelligence collection procedures; the seventh was concerned with budget and manpower needs in the event the various restraints were removed; and the eighth area dealt with the possible establishment of a permanent interagency committee on domestic intelligence. In each area the report of the committee was presented to show the advantages and disadvantages of any changes in current policies and also to allow the President to indicate his desires.

Enclosures - 2

ALB RUC:sfw/cdn

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FBI

The Attorney General

As set out in the attached letter from Mr. Tolson, it is noted that the President has directed the relaxation of some investigative restraints directly affecting the responsibilities of the FBI. These include:

1. Intensified use of electronic surveillance and penetrations to effect coverage of individuals and groups in the United States who pose a major threat to the internal security.

I must clearly state the FBI's opposition to the relaxation of our present manner of selected coverage on major internal security threats through the use of this technique. I pointed out that the FBI believes electronic surveillance coverage is adequate at this time, but that we would not object to other agencies seeking the authority of the Attorney General for any coverage required by them and thereafter instituting such coverage themselves.

2. Removal of instructions on legal mail coverage and relaxation of covert mail coverage to permit use of this form on selected targets of priority foreign intelligence and internal interest. In this connection, in the report of June 23, 1970, I made clear the FBI's strong objection to implementing any covert mail. It is the FBI's position that if covert mail coverage is implemented, it is likely that information would leak out of the post office to the press and that serious damage would be done to the intelligence community because of the very nature of this coverage. We have no objection to legal mail coverage, provided it is used on a careful, controlled and selective basis in both criminal and security matters.

3. The removal of restraints on the use of surveillance against entry and against other urgent and high priority targets.

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The Attorney General

4. An increase in coverage of violence-prone campus and student-related groups and the removal of all restraints which limit such coverage. In the report of June 25, 1970, the FBI specifically objected to removing any of the present controls and restrictions relating to the development of campus coverage. It was pointed out that to relax these restrictions would severely jeopardize our investigations and could result in leaks to the press which would be damaging and which could lead to charges that investigative agencies are interfering with academic freedom.

In connection with the proposed establishment of a permanent Interagency Committee on Domestic Intelligence, in the report of June 25, 1970, I specifically made clear my opposition to such a committee while pointing out that the FBI would approve or prepare periodic domestic intelligence estimates.

Despite my clear-cut and specific opposition to the lifting of the various investigative restraints referred to above and to the creation of a permanent interagency committee on domestic intelligence, the FBI is prepared to implement the instructions of the White House at your direction. Of course, we would continue to seek your specific authorization, where appropriate, to utilize the various sensitive-investigative techniques involved in individual cases.

The Attorney General

I would appreciate a prompt expression of your views concerning this matter, noting the request set forth in Mr. Huston's letter that an interagency committee be constituted by August 1, 1970. We are taking no action to implement the instructions contained in Mr. Huston's letter pending your reply.

EXHIBIT 41

Mr. Tolson

10/29/70

The Executives Conference

EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE - 10/29/70

Those in attendance at the Conference today included Messrs. Mohr, Sullivan, Bishop, Brennan, Callahan, Casper, Conrad, Felt, Gale, Rosen, Tavel, Walters and Beaver.

The Conference examined the question of whether the current situation demands intensification of certain security-type investigations. In particular, reference was made to (1) lifting of the existing moratorium on report writing and investigation in Priority II and Priority III, Security Index cases, (2) the intensification and expansion of investigations of black, white and ethnic group extremists and

items are being individually considered below.

These

Lifting of existing moratorium on report writing and investigation in Priority II and Priority III, Security Index cases.

There are approximately 10,000 individuals currently included in Priority II and Priority III of the Security Index. Virtually no investigation has been conducted regarding approximately 6,924 of these individuals since the imposition of the moratorium in February, 1959. Many of these individuals have changed residence and/or employment and their whereabouts are unknown. To fulfill our current responsibilities, we should know where they are.

- 1 - Mr. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Bishop
- 1 - Mr. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Callahan
- 1 - Mr. Casper
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. Felt
- 1 - Mr. Gale
- 1 - Mr. Rosen
- 1 - Mr. Tavel
- 1 - Mr. Walters
- 1 - Mr. Beaver

CEB:dlr
(10)

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
 RE: EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE - 10/29/70

If the moratorium is rescinded, the field will be required to reopen approximately 2,713 Priority II cases for report and approximately 4,769 Priority III cases to verify residence and employment. Opening of these cases would be staggered with a proportionate number opened each month to insure all are reopened by June 30, 1971.

Black Student Unions and similar groups on college campuses.

In 1967, black students began forming their own groups to project their demands, many of which indicate a commitment to black nationalism. These groups are autonomous and have a strong sense of common purpose. The Black Panther Party has made open efforts to organize the Black Student Unions nationally and other black extremist groups have tried these organizations to project their extremism and separatism.

Campus disorders involving black students increased 23 per cent in the 1969-70 school year over the previous year indicating that these groups represent a real potential for violence and disruption. In the past, we have opened cases on these organizations following evidence of black extremist activities; however, in view of the vast increase in violence on college campuses, it is felt that every Black Student Union and similar group, regardless of their past or present involvement in disorders, should be the subject of a discreet preliminary inquiry through established sources and informants to determine background, aims and purposes, leaders and key activists. It is estimated that this would cause the field to open approximately 4,000 cases involving organizations and the key activists and leaders connected therewith.

Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and militant New Left campus organizations.

At the end of the 1969-70 academic year, the various factions of the SDS, excluding the Weatherman faction, which has become an organization in its own right, consisted of a membership of approximately 2,500 individuals. In addition to the SDS groups, there are about 252 totally independent groups on college campuses which are pro-communist New Left-type and are followers of the SDS ideology. It is estimated

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
 RE: EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE - 10/29/70

that the membership of these organizations consists of about 1,000 members. At the present time, we are conducting investigations of all of these organizations but have not, in the past, initiated investigations of the individual members of such organizations, with the exception of the key activists and individuals who are known to be violence prone.

Major campuses across the nation have been completely disrupted by violent demonstrations, bombings, arson and other terroristic acts perpetrated by these organizations. It is, therefore, proposed that cases be opened on all individuals belonging to such organizations to determine whether they have a propensity for violence. If this proposal were implemented, it is estimated that the field would be required to open approximately 6,500 new cases.

Jewish Defense League (JDL)

The JDL is an anti-New Left and black nationalism organization, the violent nature of which has been illustrated by its direction of attacks against diplomatic establishments in the New York area and alleged implication in bombings of offices of foreign countries. Members have participated in an

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
RE: EXECUTIVE CONFERENCE - 10/29/70

attempted hijacking of an international flight. This militant group of Jewish youth claims a national membership of 6,000 with chapters in approximately 20 of the major metropolitan areas of the country. We presently have under investigation those JDL members identified as being in leadership positions, participants in acts of violence or active in organizational affairs. In view of the violence-prone nature of the organization, it is felt that investigations of individuals should also include the lower level membership exclusive of those who appear as members only because of financial assistance they afford. This would result in the opening of approximately 500 additional cases.

Memorandum to Mr. Tolson
RE: EXECUTIVES CONFERENCE -- 10/29/70

RECOMMENDATION:

If the Director approves, appropriate instructions will be issued to the field to implement the above programs designed to expand our security investigative coverage of extremist elements.

O.K.
H.

EXHIBIT 42

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. C. D. BRENNAN *apb*

DATE: November 3, 1970

chls

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DeLoach	_____
Mohr	_____
Bishop	_____
Casper	_____
Callahan	_____
Conrad	_____
Felt	_____
Gale	_____
Rosen	_____
Sullivan	_____
Tavel	_____
Walters	_____
Wick	_____
Tele. Room	_____
Holmes	_____
Gandy	_____

FROM: MR. G. C. MOORE *GC*

SUBJECT: BLACK STUDENT GROUPS
ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES
RACIAL MATTERS

To recommend that attached airtel to all offices be sent regarding discreet preliminary inquiries on all Black Student Unions (BSU) and similar groups on college campuses.

On 10/29/70 the Executive Conference approved a program to conduct discreet preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources, on BSUs and similar groups, their leaders, and key activists to determine if the activities of these groups and individuals warrant further active investigations.

RECOMMENDATION:

If approved, the attached airtel will be sent to all offices regarding the above cases.

CEG:ekw *ekw*
(7)

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Casper
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Glass

REC-1 57-1316-43
NOV 12 1970

ST-112

RACIAL INT. SECT.

NOV 5 1971

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November 4, 1970

Airtel

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
 1 - Mr. Casper
 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
 1 - Mr. Glass

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

PERSONAL ATTENTION

BLACK STUDENT GROUPS ON
COLLEGE CAMPUSES
RACIAL MATTERS
 BUDED: 12/4/70

Increased campus disorders involving black students pose a definite threat to the Nation's stability and security and indicate need for increase in both quality and quantity of intelligence information on Black Student Unions (BSU) and similar groups which are targets for influence and control by violence-prone Black Panther Party (BPP) and other extremists. The distribution of the BPP newspaper on college campuses and speakers of the BPP and other black extremist groups on campuses clearly indicate that campuses are targets of extremists. Advance information on disorders and violence is of prime importance. We must target informants and sources to develop information regarding these groups on a continuing basis to fulfill our responsibilities and to develop such coverage where none exists.

Effective immediately, all BSUs and similar organizations organized to project the demands of black students, which are not presently under investigation, are to be subjects of discreet, preliminary inquiries, limited to established sources and carefully conducted to avoid criticism, to determine the size, aims, purposes, activities, leadership, key activists, and extremist

2 - All Offices

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SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

NOV 10 1970

Airtel to SAC, Albany et al
 BLACK STUDENT GROUPS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES

interest or influence in these groups. Open individual cases on officers and key activists in each group to determine background and if their activities warrant active investigation. Submit results of preliminary inquiries in form suitable for dissemination with recommendations regarding active investigations of organization, its leaders, and key activists. These investigations to be conducted in accordance with instructions in Section 87D of the Manual of Instructions regarding investigations of organizations connected with institutions of learning.

Each office submit by airtel to reach Bureau by 12/4/70, a list of BSUs and similar groups by name and school which are or will be subjects of preliminary inquiries. This program will include junior colleges and two-year colleges as well as four-year colleges. In connection with this program, there is a need for increased source coverage and we must develop network of discreet quality sources in a position to furnish required information. Bear in mind that absence of information regarding these groups in any area might be the fault of inadequate source coverage and efforts should be undertaken immediately to improve this coverage.

A prior inquiry or investigation of a group or individual is no bar to current inquiries and inquiries should not be postponed until submission of airtel due 12/4/70. Initiate inquiries immediately.

I cannot overemphasize the importance of expeditious, thorough, and discreet handling of these cases. The violence, destruction, confrontations, and disruptions on campuses make it mandatory that we utilize to its capacity our intelligence-gathering capabilities.

Above instructions supersede instructions in Bureau letter to all offices 1/31/69, same caption.

NOTE: See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated 11/3/70, captioned "Black Student Groups on College Campuses. Racial Matters," prepared by CEG:ekv.

EXHIBIT 43

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. Brennan

DATE 11/3/70

COM R. L. Shackelford

SUBJECT SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE STUDENTS FOR A
DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND MILITANT NEW
LEFT CAMPUS ORGANIZATIONS

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
1 - Mr. W. M. Felt
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
1 - Mr. W. N. Preusse
1 - Mr. W. H. Floyd
1 - Mr. D. P. White
1 - Mr. R. J. Stilling

PURPOSE:

To obtain approval of attached airtel to all offices which instructs the field to initiate investigation of all members of the Students For a Democratic Society (SDS) and procommunist New Left-type campus organizations.

BACKGROUND:

Memorandum dated 10/29/70 from the Executives Conference to Mr. Tolson recommended that investigation be initiated of individual members of the SDS and members of procommunist New Left campus organizations who follow SDS ideology. The recommendation was approved by the Director.

At the end of the 1969-70 academic year the factionalized SDS, with the exclusion of the Weatherman faction, had a membership of about 2,500 individuals. The procommunist New Left-type campus organizations have a membership of about 4,000. The purpose of the investigations of these individuals is to determine the propensity for violence by members of the above organizations. Attached is an airtel to all offices advising of investigation of all members of the SDS and militant New Left campus organizations.

In order that the Bureau remain aware of the number of such cases handled by the field, the field is being instructed to include figures as to cases opened and cases closed on the administrative pages of the quarterly New Left reports. No handbook or manual changes are necessary.

RECOMMENDATION:

That attached airtel be approved and sent.

Enclosure

100-129048

RJS:glm

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EX-100

REC-76

100-129048-3413

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1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
 1 - Mr. J. J. Casper
 1 - H/12/76 M. Felt

Airtel

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
 1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford
 1 - Mr. W. H. Prosser
 1 - Mr. W. H. Floyd
 1 - Mr. D. P. White
 1 - Mr. R. J. Stilling

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI (100-438943)

PERSONAL ATTENTION

SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS
 WHO ARE MEMBERS OF THE STUDENTS FOR A
 DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY AND MILITANT NEW
 LEFT ORGANIZATIONS

Effective immediately, the field is instructed to initiate investigation of all members of the Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) and members of procommunist, militant New Left-type campus organizations who follow SDS advocacy of revolution and violence.

Members of the SDS to be investigated should include all members of the various fractions of the organization. The Bureau is aware that many SDS chapters are unstructured, and formal membership is not a requisite for participating in such activity. As you are aware, SDS and other similar subversive campus-oriented groups are clearly symbols of violence and Marxist-Leninist revolution on the nation's campuses. As their intent has crystallized, the adherence to this philosophy of revolution and violence is, of necessity, more inherent among members and followers. These groups undoubtedly are the breeding ground for revolutionaries, extremists and terrorists. Logic and good judgment should be used in these investigations, bearing in mind the objective is to identify potential and actual extremists, revolutionaries and terrorists and to assess their threat to the internal security of the Government.

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Each office should include on the administrative pages of future quarterly New Left Movement reports information as to the number of individual cases opened and the number of individual cases closed in this category during the pertinent period of the New Left Movement reports.

2 - All Offices (PERSONAL ATTENTION)

W.C. Sullivan
 J.P. Mohr
 J.J. Casper
 W.H. Prosser
 W.H. Floyd
 D.P. White
 R.J. Stilling
 C.D. Brennan
 R.L. Shackelford
 M. Felt
 H/12/76

NOV 10 1970

MAIL ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

Airtel to Albany

Re: Security Investigations of Individuals
Who are Members of the Students for a
Democratic Society and Militant New
Left Campus Organizations
100-439048

Each individual investigated should be considered for inclusion on the Security Index. In the event your investigation establishes that the subject meets the criteria, his name should be recommended for inclusion on the Security Index.

NOTE:

See memorandum Mr. R. L. Shackelford to Mr. C. D. Brennan, dated 11/3/70, captioned as above, prepared by RJS:jlm.

EXHIBIT 44

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. TOLSON

DATE: September 2, 1970

W. M. FELT

OM

WJGCT: SECURITY INFORMANTS
RACIAL INFORMANTS
#169-41

PURPOSE:

To recommend consideration be given to returning to previous standards permitting field to develop security and racial informants among students 18 years of age and older with full individual justification and Bureau approval.

BACKGROUND:

Our current rule is that "Students under age 21 years" are not to be developed either as security informants or racial informants except under highly unusual circumstances. Former rule of "under 18" was modified when two student informants went sour.

CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS:

Never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for informant coverage. Terrorist violence is all around us and more has been threatened. Even our own doors are being threatened by Weatherman fanatics. Bombings, assassination of police officers, kidnapping and torture murder are all part of the picture. These violence-oriented black and white savages are at war with the Government and the American people.

Careful surveys have been made during inspections conducted in New Left and Racial fields. In every instance Inspector left strong instructions with SACs to develop more and better informants. These offices have informally indicated, however, that their productivity would be greatly enhanced by a lowering of the age requirements cited above.

Particularly critical is the need for reliable information about the activities of violence-oriented groups on campuses. We know the New Left and the Black Panthers are currently recruiting 18-year-old freshmen students. The Students for a Democratic Society have actually reserved for recruiting purposes a room in the Student Union Building at near-by University of Maryland. If we could develop informants among these new members we could guide them to key

WMF:wmj (5)

1 - Messrs. Sullivan, Mohr, Brennan

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Walters
Wick
Tele. Room
Holmes
Gandy

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Memo for Mr. Tolson
Re: Security Informants
Racial Informants

positions. By the time they are 21 years of age they are almost ready to leave college and have been subjected to the corrosive influence and brainwashing of ultra-liberal and radical professors.

OBSERVATIONS:

The important consideration, of course, is to protect the Bureau from possible embarrassment. Many of our 18, 19 and 20-year-old men and women are highly intelligent, mature, and loyal citizens. This has recently been recognized by the Congress in lowering the voting age to 18 years. It is felt the same concept can logically be applied to the revolutionary conflict at home and particularly on campuses.

Development of all security and racial informants, regardless of age, is very closely supervised at the Seat of Government. It is felt that selective use of the 18 through 20-year-old age bracket on specific SAC recommendation and with close scrutiny at the Seat of Government can be of tremendous benefit. These matters will continue to be very carefully looked into during all field inspections.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the appropriate Manual citations be changed to read "Students under age 18. . . ." If approved, to be implemented by Domestic Intelligence Division.

ADDENDUM (9/3/70), WCS:CSH - *WCS*

I strongly urge the approval of this recommendation. As the memorandum states, these are indeed critical times. No one can predict with accuracy the outcome of the revolutionary struggle going on in this country at this time. Those under 20 years of age are playing a predominant role in campus violence. Two of the subjects in the University of Wisconsin case are under 20. Logic dictates that we concentrate on the actual participants and where the action actually is.

W.C. Sullivan

I am opposed

9/4 -2-

O.K. but I want any between 18 & 21 yrs to be approved by Soyers also.

O.K. but I want any between 18 & 21 yrs to be approved by Soyers also.

H



FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20535

In Reply, Please Refer to
No.

September 15, 1970

(A) TRAINING - LEGAL INSTRUCTORS --

The following significant decisions reported in August, 1970, should be read by all Legal Instructors: U.S. v. Pryba, 312 F. Supp. 466 (1970) (D.C.) (Civil Aeronautics Board regulation permitting airline personnel to open suspicious package is constitutional; an airline official's position makes him a credible and reliable informant); U.S. v. Demaris, 425 F2d 836 (1969) (2d Cir.) (example of strong affidavit for search warrant, based principally on information from confidential informant; permissible to delay execution of search warrant (within ten-day limit) until suspect is in premises); U.S. v. Mitchell, 425 F2d 1353 (1970) (3d Cir.) (example of finding probable cause for arrest from combination of Spinelli and Draper circumstances); U.S. v. Robertson, 425 F2d 1355 (1970) (5th Cir.) (no Miranda warnings required for street interrogation of suspect concerning automobile tag and title registration with defect indicating car possibly stolen); U.S. v. Goad, 462 F2d 86 (1970) (10th Cir.) (arrest of suspect standing in doorway to home, by officers standing outside will not support incidental search of home); U.S. v. Main, 312 F. Supp. 736 (1970) (D.C., Del.) (affidavit for search warrant stated probable cause but contained much of what court labeled "excess verbiage"); U.S. v. Ayers, 425 F2d 524 (1970) (2d Cir.) (linesa requires warning of right to counsel separate and distinct from Miranda warnings given for interrogation); U.S. v. Campbell, 426 F2d 547 (1970) (2d Cir.) (recording of telephone conversation made by consent of one party thereto is admissible in evidence); U.S. v. Bednarski, 312 F. Supp. 913 (1970) (D.C., Mass.) (no Miranda warnings required for use in evidence of books and records voluntarily given to officer by suspect during noncustodial interview); Deess v. Montana, 312 F. Supp. 1325 (1970) (D.C., Mont.) (illustrative discussion of standing to protest unreasonable search and seizure); U.S. v. McKinnon, 426 F2d 845 (1970) (5th Cir.) (search of vehicle at tow-in garage 30 minutes after arrest of accused on highway could not be justified as incident to arrest); Cantrell v. Wainwright, 426 F2d 868 (1970) (5th Cir.) (seizure of package thrown from vehicle lawfully pursued by police was proper as taking of thing abandoned); Woodbury v. Beto, 426 F2d 923 (1970) (5th Cir.) (officers searching suspect's home under search warrant for narcotics taken in armed robbery properly seized gun, not mentioned in warrant, as instru-

mentality of robbery); U.S. v. Kroschek, 426 F2d 1129 (1970) (7th Cir.) (defendant's right against self-incrimination is violated when officer testifies that defendant, on interview, refused to talk); Bosley v. U.S., 426 F2d 1257 (1970) (D.C.) (Miranda requires officers to warn an arrested suspect of his rights as soon as practicable after arrest); U.S. v. Gonzalez-Perez, 426 F2d 1283 (1970) (5th Cir.) (search of arrestee is incident to arrest when made shortly after at jail or place of detention rather than at actual time and place of arrest; search of woman's pocketbook sitting on coffee table in room in which she was arrested on narcotics charges was proper).

(Security Letters on attached pages)

9/15/70

SAC LETTER 70-48

- 2 -

(B) NEW LEFT AND BLACK EXTREMIST TERRORISM - INFORMANT COVERAGE -- You have been advised in the past of the growing incidents of terroristic acts by the New Left and black extremists and the need for intensification of our investigations and development of new sources to combat these escalating problems.

However, a review of the New Left Movement - Violence airtels submitted monthly by each field office indicates generally that your informant coverage of terrorist organizations and individuals is grossly inadequate.

You are, therefore, instructed to immediately institute an aggressive policy of developing new productive informants who can infiltrate the ranks of terrorist organizations, their collectives, communes and staffs of their underground newspapers. The Bureau fully recognizes that the development of sources to penetrate these groups is made extremely difficult because of their immoral conduct and use of drugs. It calls for initiative and new approaches to develop the needed intelligence information.

Concerning black extremists, it is essential that quality informants are developed at a regular rate. These informants should be the type who can obtain advance information concerning planned acts of violence or who are in a position to furnish information concerning contemplated acts of violence.

You should include in Item 4 of your monthly airtel on "New Left - Violence; Internal Security - Miscellaneous (Weatherman)," as outlined in Bureau airtel to all offices May 13, 1970, constructive plans to implement the program outlined above concerning New Left terrorist organizations through informant development. Recommendations relating to the development of a specific source or plan of action should be submitted to the Bureau by separate communication.

9/15/70
SAC LETTER 70-48

(C) SECURITY AND RACIAL INFORMANTS -- Never in our history have we been confronted with as critical a need for informant coverage. Terroristic violence surrounds us and more has been threatened. Bombings, assassination of police officers, kidnapping and murder are all part of the picture. Fanatics are at large who are at war with the Government and the American people. Particularly critical is the need for reliable information about the activities of violence-oriented youthful groups on campus.

As you are aware, you have been previously instructed not to use campus student informants under the age of 21. In view of current circumstances, you are authorized to develop student security and racial informants who are 18 years of age or older. This presents you with a tremendous opportunity to expand your coverage, which is expected. However, in no way are your obligations to exercise selectivity and tight control lessened in this most sensitive area.

Appropriate manual and handbook changes are forthcoming.

Very truly yours,

John Edgar Hoover

Director

9/15/70
SAC LETTER 70-48

- 4 -

EXHIBIT 45

Memorandum

MR. C. D. BRENNAN

MR. G. C. MOORE

1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. A. Rosen

DATE: November 2, 1970

1 - Mr. J. J. Casper

1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

1 - Mr. R.L. Shackelford

1 - Mr. J.C. Michela

SUBJECT: RACIAL CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 22-23, 1970, 1 - Mr. J.C. Michela
 RECOMMENDATION TO MODIFY INSTRUCTIONS
 CONCERNING RECORDINGS OF BLACK AND NEW
 LEFT PUBLIC APPEARANCES
 1369-41

To obtain authority to send attached airtel to all field offices concerning the recording of public appearances of black and New Left extremists.

Memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. W. C. Sullivan 5/21/69 obtained authority to instruct the field to expand the use of concealed recording devices in covering such appearances. Since that time, the field has reported a large number of such appearances and Special Agents in Charge (SACs) have always demonstrated sound judgment in affording such coverage under secure conditions. On a number of occasions, because of extremely short notice concerning appearances, there has been insufficient time to obtain Bureau authority. Because of this, valuable evidentiary material has been lost. Recordings are the best possible evidence of extremist statements actually made in the event of prosecutive action. This matter was discussed in depth at captioned conference with field supervisors. It was the unanimous recommendation of those supervisors that present instructions concerning such recordings should be modified in one respect to allow SACs to arrange on their own initiative for recordings.

The recommendation has merit. SACs have uniformly demonstrated excellent judgment in making such recordings to date and should be given authority to record public appearances by black and New Left extremists whenever full security can be assured except when such appearances are at educational institutions. When at educational institutions, the field must still obtain prior Bureau authority. This will give the field necessary flexibility to record public appearances even when advance notice is extremely short. The modification will in no way supersede or conflict with authority to record statements given in individual cases under investigation such as the Antiriot Law investigations which arose out of violence at the 8/68 Democratic National Convention on subjects known as the "Chicago 7" and their defense attorneys William M. Kunstler and Leonard L. Weinglass.

Enclosure

JCH:ky (9)

DEC 16 1970

CONTINUED - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. Brennan
RE: RACIAL CONFERENCE, OCTOBER 22-23, 1970,
RECOMMENDATION TO MODIFY INSTRUCTIONS CONCERNING
RECORDINGS OF BLACK AND NEW LEFT PUBLIC APPEARANCES

ACTION:

If approved, attached airtel will be sent to
all field offices in accordance with the above. No Manual
changes are necessary.

See

WEL
WEL

OK
WEL

WEL

WEL

WEL

11/5/70

Airtel

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr

1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan

1 - Mr. A. Rosen

1 - Mr. J. J. Casper

To: SAC, Albany

PERSONAL ATTENTION

From: Director, FBI

USE OF CONCEALED RECORDING DEVICES
IN COVERING PUBLIC APPEARANCES BY
BLACK AND NEW LEFT EXTREMISTS

1 - Mr. G. C. Moore

1 - Mr. R. L. Shackelford

1 - Mr. J. C. Michela

ReBulet to all offices 5/22/69 which set forth instructions to expand the use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public speaking engagements by black and New Left extremists. Those instructions required Bureau authority prior to use of such concealed recording devices.

Effective upon receipt of this communication, Special Agents in Charge (SACs) may, on their own initiative, authorize the use of concealed recording devices by a Special Agent or proven source in covering public appearances by black and New Left extremists except when such appearances are at educational institutions. All other instructions set forth in Bulet remain in effect.

in the event of appearances at educational institutions, prior Bureau authority must still be obtained before utilizing concealed recording devices.

It is reiterated that such recording devices are to be utilized only when full security can be assured. Information developed as a result of such coverage must be promptly furnished to the Bureau in form suitable for dissemination in accordance with instructions set forth in relet.

2 - All Offices

JCM:fb

(127)

SEE NOTE PAGE TWO

15130 ROOM TELETYPE UNIT

Airtel to SAC, Albany

RE: USE OF CONCEALED RECORDING DEVICES
IN COVERING PUBLIC APPEARANCES BY
BLACK AND NEW LEFT EXTREMISTS

Each SAC must personally insure that maximum possible use is made of this extremely valuable investigative technique.

The foregoing in no way supersedes or conflicts with instructions to record statements by subjects of individual cases under investigation. In that regard, recipients should refer to Chicago airtel to all continental offices and San Juan dated 5/29/69 captioned "David T. Dellinger, aka, et al (Travel of Defendants), ARL - Conspiracy."

NOTE:

See memorandum G. C. Moore to Mr. C. D. Brennan dated 11/2/70, captioned "Racial Conference, October 22-23, 1970, Recommendation to Modify Instructions Concerning Recordings of Black and New Left Public Appearances," prepared by JCM:ckw.

EXHIBIT 46

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

MR. C. D. BRENNAN

MR. G. C. MOORE

SUBJECT: KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM
RACIAL MATTERS

1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
1 - Mr. Casper

DATE: December 22, 1970

1 - Mr. Conrad
1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
1 - Mr. Glass

Tolson ✓
DeLoach ✓
Mohr ✓
Bishop ✓
Casper ✓
Callahan ✓
Conrad ✓
Felt ✓
Gale ✓
Rosen ✓
Sullivan ✓
Tavel ✓
Trotter ✓
Tele. Room ✓
Holmes ✓
Gandy ✓

To recommend that the attached airtel be sent to all offices setting up a Key Black Extremist (KBE) Program to intensify our coverage on certain black extremists.

Because of the violence potential of all black extremists, we have required that the field give priority attention to the investigations of all black extremists. The information submitted by the field indicates that there is a need for intensified coverage on a group of black extremists who are either key leaders or activists and are particularly extreme, agitative, anti-Government, and vocal in their calls for terrorism and violence. Leaders of the violence-prone Black Panther Party have indicated that the "revolution" is entering the beginning phases of actual armed struggle and our investigations indicate there are certain extremists more likely to resort to or to order terrorism as a tactic and therefore require particular attention.

Intensified coverage to bring to bear the total capabilities of the Bureau on investigations of these individuals is warranted. We should cover every facet of their current activities, future plans, weaknesses, strengths, and personal lives to neutralize the effectiveness of each KBE. The finances, travel, utterances, and possible violation of Federal and local law of these individuals should receive the closest investigative and supervisory attention.

Following the receipt of an investigative summary report, reports on these individuals should be submitted every 90 days, with interia letterhead memoranda, in order that our intensified coverage can be better followed and dissemination made on a timely basis. About 90 cases are involved in this intensified coverage.

RECOMMENDATION:

That the attached airtel be sent to each field office.

Enclosure

CEG:ekw
(9)

HC3

37-103

December 23, 1970

Airtel

REC-3

157-8415-3721

- 1 - Mr. W. C. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. J. P. Mohr
- 1 - Mr. C. D. Brennan
- 1 - Mr. Casper
- 1 - Mr. Conrad
- 1 - Mr. R. D. Cotter
- 1 - Mr. G. C. Moore
- 1 - Mr. Glass

To: SAC, Albany

From: Director, FBI

**KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM
RACIAL MATTERS**

During your investigations of black extremist organizations and individuals, you have furnished information indicating that certain individuals are extremely active and most vocal in their anti-Government statements and their calls for terrorism and violence. Although the violence potential in all black extremists necessitates continued priority attention by all offices, there are certain individual leaders and activists who can be considered as Key Black Extremists (KBE).

At this time, the Bureau is designating those on the attached list as KBEs. The term KBE does not require that an individual actually hold an official position in an organization but is to include others of equal importance because of their influence as black extremists.

An intensified investigation of each person on the attached list must be immediately instituted with the objective of developing complete and detailed information on their day-to-day activities and future plans. Each office must continually remain alert for additions to the KBE list. Submit all recommendations to make specific subjects KBE to the Bureau for approval. These cases must be given intensive investigative attention and close supervision by all offices. Maintain a high level of

Enclosure

2 - All Offices (Enclosure)

C.G.ckv
(123)

SEE NOTE PAGE THREE

MAIL ROOM 1 TELETYPE UNIT 1

Airtel to SAC, Albany
 KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

Informant coverage on the subjects. All avenues of investigative attention must be explored and necessary recommendations to the Bureau must be made promptly.

The desirable coverage must include, but not be limited to, the following investigation. These investigations must be conducted with initiative and imagination in order that the desired results are achieved. Each of these cases will receive close scrutiny at the Bureau.

(1) All KBEs must be included in Priority I of the Security Index. If not already so included, promptly submit FD-122.

(2) All KBEs must be included in the Black Nationalist Photograph Album (BNPA). Promptly submit photograph and required background on each KBE not presently in the BNPA and when a subject is designated a KBE.

(3) All aspects of the finances of a KBE must be determined. Bank accounts must be monitored. Safe deposit boxes, investments, and hidden assets must be located and available information regarding them must be reported.

(4) Continued consideration must be given by each office to develop means to neutralize the effectiveness of each KBE. Any counterintelligence proposal must be approved by the Bureau prior to implementation.

(5) Obtain suitable handwriting specimens of each KBE to be placed in the National Security File in the Laboratory. When possible, obtain specimens from public records, law enforcement agencies, and similar sources. Send specimens to the Bureau under separate cover letter by registered mail for the attention of the FBI Laboratory. When they are of value as evidence, so state in the transmittal letter and request their return after copies have been made. Specimens should be sufficient to permit future comparisons by the Laboratory.

Airtel to SAC, Albany
KEY BLACK EXTREMIST PROGRAM

(6) Particular efforts should be made to obtain records of and/or reliable witnesses to, inflammatory statements made which may subsequently become subject to criminal proceedings. Promptly record all such information in interview report form.

(7) Where there appears to be a possible violation of a statute within the investigative jurisdiction of the Bureau, the substantive violation character should be included in subsequent communications and the possible violation vigorously investigated in accordance with existing instructions.

(8) Particular attention must be paid to travel by a KBE and every effort made to determine financial arrangements for such travel.

Travel information must be submitted to the Bureau and interested offices by appropriate communication to permit coverage of the KBE. It will be the responsibility of the office of origin to insure that the activities of the KBE are covered by auxiliary offices.

(9) The Federal income tax returns of all KBEs must be checked annually in accordance with existing instructions.

If no investigative summary report has been submitted in each case, such a report must be submitted to the Bureau by 2/15/71. Thereafter, an investigative report should be submitted at least every 90 days. Furthermore, appropriate communications suitable for dissemination should be promptly submitted in the interim to keep the Bureau fully advised of the activities of each KBE. The words (Key Black Extremist) should be included in the character of each communication submitted except those communications (including reports) which are prepared for dissemination.

NOTE: See memorandum G. C. Moore to C. D. Brennan, dated 12/22/70, captioned as above, prepared by CEG:ekw.

EXHIBIT 47



CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR

26 February 1970

Personal and Confidential

The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

Mr. [redacted] has orally informed me that you wish to have the identity of the FBI agent who was the source of certain information communicated to an employee of this Agency. Mr. [redacted] This information regarding the disappearance of one Thomas Riha was in turn passed to [redacted]

In view of your personal interest in this matter, I instructed Mr. [redacted] to report to me in person.

I have reviewed this complicated case in detail with Mr. [redacted] and have requested him to reveal the identity of his source. As a point of honor and personal integrity, Mr. [redacted] was adamant that he could not disclose the identity of his source. Under further pressure from me, Mr. [redacted] maintained his position, stating that in defense of it he was prepared to submit his resignation immediately.

Mr. [redacted] explained that the [redacted] cases had been given extensive news coverage, much of it being sensational in nature. He stressed that there was embarrassing public speculation as to the possible involvement of the CIA and the FBI in Riha's disappearance.

AUG 5 1970

FBI

The purpose of Mr. [redacted] conference with the District Attorney of Denver was to solicit his good offices to remove pressures and the possible serving of a subpoena on [redacted]. He also sought to orient the District Attorney properly so that he would not continue to have an erroneous impression of the roles of the CIA and the FBI, thereby eliminating further adverse publicity.

Mr. [redacted] affirms that before going to District Attorney McKevitt he called upon the FBI [redacted] Mr. [redacted] and sought to coordinate with him our respective interests. He also solicited Mr. [redacted] to accompany him to the District Attorney.

Mr. [redacted] states that Mr. [redacted] refused absolutely to cooperate in this matter. Instead, Mr. [redacted] engaged in an oral exchange during which he remarked that our representative in Boulder was "lying" and then proceeded to challenge the veracity of Mr. [redacted]. Subsequently, Mr. [redacted] conferred with the District Attorney alone. He was successful in persuading the District Attorney to make a favorable public statement which had the effect of putting this issue [redacted] regarding [redacted] and other rumors to rest as far as the public was concerned.

I have carefully reviewed the statements of Mr. [redacted]. I feel that poor judgment was employed in passing the information in question to [redacted] and later to the District Attorney. This should only have been done with specific FBI approval. I wish to assure you that I do not condone violations of the third agency rule, and I am taking steps to impress once again this elementary fact upon all Agency officials.

With regard to Mr. [redacted] I have no reason to doubt that he has acted honestly. I believe that he has reported to me in good faith. He is sincerely interested in preserving a sound working relationship between the CIA and the FBI. Nevertheless, because a situation of this sort adversely affects the relationship between the two agencies, I am taking administrative action in this matter with regard to Mr. [redacted].

RECEIVED
AUG 5 1965

FBI

*Ed was not aware
with the 4th of July...
[illegible handwritten notes]*

I hope sincerely that this recent incident will not impair our mutual efforts in making certain that we have not overlooked factors possibly having a significant bearing on U.S. intelligence and internal security interests. I shall pursue this matter through our respective liaison offices.

In closing, Mr. Hoover, I wish to state that this Agency can only fully perform its duties in the furtherance of the national security when it has the closest coordination and teamwork with the Federal Bureau of Investigation. Furthermore, it is necessary that we continue to conduct our business in an atmosphere of mutual respect. I trust that we can coordinate closely any future developments or actions in these cases, in order to prevent the airing in public of conflicts or differences between the two agencies. I feel strongly that there are representatives of the news media who are eager to exploit alleged differences on a national scale. Disturbing as this experience has been, I wish to thank you in the interests of our common cause for having communicated with me in such a forthright and candid manner.

Sincerely,

Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

*This is not a memorandum
It is a letter to Mr. Hoover*
Attachments - a/s

RECEIVED

JUN 5 1975

FBI

Following are typewritten clarifications of the handwritten comments of J. Edgar Hoover on the attached document:

Page 2, left margin - "acted properly. H"

Page 2, bottom of page - "I do not agree. violated the third agency rule & refused to identify the alleged FBI agent who was the source of the information. H"

Page 3, end of 3rd paragraph - "Helms forgets it is a two way street. H"

Page 3, bottom of page - "This is not satisfactory. I want our Denver Office to have absolutely no contacts with CIA. I want direct liaison here with CIA to be terminated & any contact with CIA in the future to be by letter only. H"

EXHIBIT 48

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: 3/6/70

FROM : Mr. W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
(POSITIVE INTELLIGENCE)

Item Number 37 in the material submitted to the Director discusses CIA criticism which could generate from Agency belief that Bureau has failed to cooperate and offer necessary assistance in collection of positive intelligence in the United States. Memorandum is to deal with specific cases believed by to evidence lack of cooperation and to briefly comment on policy of cooperation we have adopted with CIA.

SYNOPSIS:

Mentioned Item points out CIA belief that more aggressive action should have been taken in field of collecting positive intelligence in the United States. notes Bureau's action in this field, for the most part, has been restricted to compliance with requests by State Department when political crises occur in some country. He points out CIA belief that acquiring needed data would mean increased technical surveillance coverage, development of informants

_____ cites two specific cases occurring in 1969 where Bureau declined CIA's request for technical coverage, suggesting to Agency that it make its request directly to the Attorney General. Review of specific cases mentioned set forth with Director's comments relative thereto being noted. Our policy of cooperation with CIA most recently delineated to field by SAC Letter 66-10 (B) - copy attached. SAC letter calls for guarding our jurisdiction but shows our willingness to cooperate with CIA.

OBSERVATIONS AND ACTION - OVER

Memorandum to Mr. C. D. DeLoach
RE: RELATIONSHIPS WITH
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

CIA has repeatedly raised the issue in the past of our coverage in the positive intelligence collection area and we can reasonably expect similar issues to be raised in the future.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

That we prepare a carefully worded letter to CIA outlining policy and the basic elements of intelligence and counterintelligence work affecting the United States and forthrightly ask CIA if it is satisfied with the status quo and if not what do they have to suggest as changes.

EXHIBIT 49

OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

DATE: March 7, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

1 - Mr. DeLoach
1 - Mr. Sullivan
1 - Liaison
1 - Mr. HaynesTolson _____
DeLoach _____
Mohr _____
Bishop _____
Casper _____
Callahan _____
Conrad _____
Felt _____
Gale _____
Rosen _____
Sullivan _____
Tavel _____
Trotter _____
Tele. Room _____
Holmes _____
Gandy _____SUBJECT: RELATIONSHIPS WITH CIA
THE PRESIDENT'S FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
ADVISORY BOARD AND JOHN MC CONE

~~Item number 30 in the material submitted to the~~
 X Director discusses a dispute we had with CIA in May, 1963, as a result of a communication the Bureau sent to the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board (PFIAB). It was pointed out that in our communication to PFIAB we attributed certain information to McCone, then Director of CIA, concerning the matter of increasing wire taps on _____ McCone charged that the information attributed to him was not so because he had never made any such statement and he could prove it. The fact was that the information relating to McCone had been given us by one of his subordinates who had indicated the information originated with McCone. McCone maintained that we should have checked with him before going on record that any information had originated with him.

X A review of the file in this matter, discloses that in April, 1963, _____ had discussed with Richard Helms and James Angleton of CIA McCone's alleged position with the PFIAB; ~~that he was in favor of across the board telephone taps on _____~~ The Board, of course, was opposed to this and advised Helms that we would request to make our position known before the board. At the conclusion of the meeting in April, 1963, Helms specifically asked what he should tell McCone and told him he should tell McCone exactly what had occurred at the meeting; that the Bureau was opposed to across the board wire taps and the Bureau intended to so advise PFIAB.

RECOMMENDED ACTION:

None. We do not believe, in light of the facts set forth, that CIA will make an issue of this matter.

RHH:wmk/sef
(5)

65

EXHIBIT 50

4-5

20 March 1970


The Honorable J. Edgar Hoover
Director
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Hoover:

We have completed our review of domestic positive intelligence collection engendered by your letter of 11 March 1970. We warmly welcome periodic reexamination by our two agencies of the implementation of the 1966 agreement and the collection of positive intelligence which you proposed. I concur also with your comments that there is a need for close coordination of our efforts in the field of positive and counterintelligence collection. To be most effective, I agree that it is essential for this Agency, together with your Bureau, to conduct a continuing analysis of clandestine collection activity. The product is of growing importance to the national security and to the United States Intelligence Community. Therefore we endorse your proposal for a reexamination and bespeak your desires as to how this might be conducted.

With regard to the 1966 set of ground rules, which you sent to the then Director, Vice Admiral William F. Raborn, Jr., the competent work of our respective representatives did, in fact, produce an effective and realistic agreement. I welcome your statement that no major problems have been encountered since its adoption.

I feel strongly that there are other related subjects, of similar importance to the national security, which warrant periodic reexamination since they have a direct bearing on domestic clandestine collection of positive intelligence.



As a result of our review, engendered by your letter, I believe that the following subjects are deserving of your personal consideration:

(1) Audio coverage.

For several years your Bureau had been receptive to requirements and leads which resulted in valuable coverages.

On 2 October 1969, two related requests for audio coverage were submitted by this Agency pertaining to positive intelligence targets.

Your Bureau replied that henceforth the Agency should refer all such cases directly to the Attorney General for approval.

It is suggested that the question of audio coverage be reopened between representatives of your Bureau and this Agency. I would welcome your thoughts and observations on this subject.

(2) Mail Coverage. Another much needed intelligence tool is mail coverage. Its importance has been proven in the past. I have the impression that it has been discontinued, and I would suggest that our representatives should confer and examine together whether this asset might be deployed against communications of the New Left, and identified foreign agents.

(3) CIA Technical Services. A significant expenditure of this Agency's money and personnel has been committed to research and development for the improvement of technical aids. This Agency has provided your Bureau with an appreciation of our resources and capabilities, and has offered you at cost or gratis our most sophisticated equipment.

Although we will continue these services, we would welcome any suggestions from your Bureau for improvement in the technical field including proposals how these assets can be better employed.

(4) Concern in Positive Intelligence Requirements and Reporting. Since the collection and reporting of positive foreign intelligence is, as you say, only incidental to your main internal security and counterintelligence responsibilities, I realize that your personnel are somewhat at a disadvantage in carrying out the evaluating and reporting processes necessary for the conduct of positive intelligence. At our 1966 conference, we offered to institute positive intelligence training courses, including reports writing and

analysis, for FBI personnel. In soliciting your views on the desirability of this type of training, I wish to reiterate our willingness to provide such instruction.

(5) Seminars on Opposition Services. Given the growing sophistication and increased capabilities of hostile intelligence services, it is suggested that CIA and FBI experts in this field meet as required at our respective Headquarters, the Washington and New York Field Offices, in order to keep abreast of new developments, pending operational, operational tasks, and diverse missions of opposition services. I know that you will agree with me that no opportunities for improvement should be overlooked which might help to negate the efforts of hostile services who are charged with undermining the security of the United States. These sessions should also provide an opportunity to explore and devise new means to penetrate and neutralize these inimical forces.

(3) New Left and Racial Matters. There is already a substantial exchange of information in this field. Limitations of manpower raise a serious question as to whether both agencies can keep pace with future unpredictable developments. The increasingly close connection between these forces in the United States and hostile elements abroad has been well established by both of our agencies. I feel it would be in our mutual interest to determine how we can best employ more wisely our limited manpower, knowing that this problem, which embraces terrorism, hijacking, assassination, and the domination of law enforcement officers, is international in scope.

(4) Relations with Domestic Field Officers and Local Attached. I do not feel that there are any serious conflicts in this area but there may be room for improving the quality of liaison in order to expand positive intelligence collection. Given the changing situations both here and abroad, periodic re-examination of field relations could assist both agencies to make mutually-agreed adjustments.

Mr. Hoover, I wish to assure you that I value highly your personal judgment in affairs bearing on the national security. I know that your experience is derived from a unique lifetime of dedicated service to our country. In this spirit, I welcome sincerely your observations on the foregoing agenda and solicit your thoughts regarding any other item which you deem worthy of the attention of your Bureau and this Agency.

Faithfully yours,

Richard Helms
Director

EXHIBIT 51

4-T
March 31, 1970

Honorable Richard Helms
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Helms:

I have carefully reviewed your letter of March 20 setting out your observations with respect to various matters of mutual interest. I certainly appreciate your kind comments concerning me and I share your convictions as to the need for close coordination of our intelligence collection activities in behalf of the national security.

Your letter suggested nine particular areas which might be the subject of further discussions aimed at improving the coordination of our operations. A number of these topics are highly sensitive and complex and I will therefore make no effort here to set forth my views in detail. However, in response to your letter and as a prelude to any direct discussions on these matters, certain observations on my part may be appropriate.

With regard to electronic surveillance and mail coverage, there is no question as to the frequent value of such operations in developing needed intelligence. On the other hand, the use of these measures in domestic investigations poses a number of problems which may not be encountered in similar operations abroad. There is widespread concern by the American public regarding the possible misuse of this type coverage. Moreover, various legal considerations must be borne in mind, including the impact such coverage may have on our numerous prosecutive responsibilities. The FBI's effectiveness has always depended in large measure on our capacity to retain the full confidence of the American people. The use of any investigative measures which infringe on traditional rights of privacy must therefore be scrutinized most carefully. Within this framework, however, I would be willing to consider any proposals your Agency may make.

Your offer to make available certain technical equipment developed by the Agency is most welcome and I fully reciprocate your willingness to cooperate in the exchange of relevant scientific data. I am prepared to designate appropriate representatives of the FBI Laboratory to meet with CIA technical personnel at any mutually convenient time.

With respect to the inclusion of positive intelligence courses in our training curricula, I am sure you will recognize that our training programs must be designed primarily to fulfill our own widespread and demanding responsibilities. While I appreciate your offer, I do not feel it would be feasible at this time to include the proposed courses in our training schedules. I would certainly have no objection to the holding of seminars between specialists of our two agencies in selective areas of interest when justified by specific circumstances.

There is already a considerable exchange of information between our agencies concerning New Left and racial extremist matters. Frequently, as you have pointed out, there have been substantial connections between subversive and extremist elements in the United States and their counterparts abroad. We will continue to furnish your Agency information being developed by the Bureau which might have a bearing on your intelligence requirements. At the same time, we are definitely in need of additional information from your Agency as to the foreign aspects of the extremist movement in the United States, including foreign funding and support of local extremist organizations. While I do not believe there is any need for detailed discussions on this point, if you have any specific suggestions to make we would be pleased to consider them.

Similarly, I am not aware of any major problems which exist at this time in connection with the coordination of our field liaison operations. It has been my long-standing policy that serious questions affecting the coordination of our activities with other Government agencies should be handled and controlled at a headquarters level in order to avoid administrative confusion and misunderstanding.

In line with my letter of March 11 and the observations contained in your letter of March 20, I will in the immediate future designate appropriate officials of the Bureau to meet with your representatives for detailed discussions of these matters. It is my earnest hope that such conferences will lead to a sharpened understanding of the responsibilities and objectives of our respective agencies and will serve to promote more effective cooperation in our joint commitment to the national intelligence needs.

Sincerely yours,
J. Edgar Hoover

EXHIBIT 52

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

Mr. C. D. DeLoach

- 1 - Mr. DeLoach
- 1 - Mr. Sullivan
- 1 - Mr. Conrad

DATE: April 14, 1970

FROM : W. C. Sullivan

SUBJECT: RELATIONS WITH CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY (CIA)

Reference my memorandum 3/30/70 summarizing proposals of CIA Director Helms regarding FBI-CIA coordination in intelligence collection activities. Director approved meetings between CIA and Bureau representatives to further explore these matters.

On afternoon of 4/13/70, Inspector D. E. Moore and myself met briefly with Mr. James Angleton, Chief, Counterintelligence Staff, CIA, and Mr. [redacted] of his staff. This session was strictly exploratory in nature and was aimed at defining the scope and limitations of our discussions with CIA on the points in question. Angleton noted that CIA Director Helms will be closely following the outcome of these discussions and is personally interested in resolving any current problems in this area.

Mr. Angleton indicated that CIA would like to direct initial attention to two of the items cited by Helms, namely, the question of audio (electronic surveillance) coverage and the suggestion that FBI and CIA specialists hold periodic seminars to coordinate our information. The Bureau's position regarding electronic surveillance coverage, as outlined in the Director's letter to Helms of 3/31/70, was reiterated with emphasis upon the problems such coverage often pose with regard to prosecution as well as adverse public reaction to this type coverage.

I made the point that the Bureau has not received the necessary support in this area from responsible quarters; that in the past the Bureau had a substantial amount of coverage of this type in the interest of both our own counterintelligence responsibilities as well as the national security interest but that we have had to retrench in recent years largely as a result of the lack of support for such operations.

Angleton noted that in response to CIA's request for electronic coverage of two [redacted] in the Fall of 1969, the Bureau had requested that they take this matter up with the

WCS:mea
(4)

Classified by 12

Exempt from GDS, Category 2
Date of Declassification Indefinite

CONTINUED COVER

57 APR 24 1970

Memorandum for Mr. DeLoach

RE: RELATIONS WITH CIA

Attorney General. He said that CIA has been giving the question of approaching the Attorney General considerable thought but this would involve a whole new set of procedures and policy considerations which would have to be carefully considered. Angleton said that his staff was in the process of drawing up a proposal on this point for Mr. Helms to consider and that they would probably have something specific for the Bureau to consider at a subsequent meeting.

Concerning the proposed seminar, in line with the Director's letter to Helms 3/31/70, I pointed out that we would certainly have no objection to such conferences where the occasion justified them. From Angleton's remarks, it appears that CIA is primarily interested here in the and would like to furnish the Bureau with details of an extensive research project CIA has undertaken in recent years to correlate all available source information regarding. This apparently would not involve any commitment by the Bureau and would represent essentially an opportunity for us to see what CIA has done in this field and how it might tie in with any current Bureau interest. When CIA submits any firm proposals in this regard, we will submit specific recommendations.

Angleton said that CIA would be in touch with us when they have firmed up various proposals and at that time Inspector Moore and myself will meet with them again as required. The Director, of course, will be kept fully informed and no commitments will be made without his prior approval.

ACTION:

For information.

[Handwritten signatures and initials: "Wes", "H", "A", "WBS"]

EXHIBIT 53

2-110

(10)

21 NOV 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chief of Operations

SUBJECT: Project HTLINGUAL

1. The HTLINGUAL project outline is attached. It is self-explanatory as a project with the exception that having been aware of the previous operation, you undoubtedly will have certain questions which we hope to answer in this cover memorandum.
2. The personnel required for the project on the part of the Security Office is approximately the same as the number and grades of those currently used with the exception that Security is running the project through full-time use of some employees and part-time of others who should be on other regular Security jobs. Their total time is between seven and eight people full-time. With the personnel freeze and the mounting backlog, Security cannot continue the present operation without a staff increase as indicated.
3. The only added function that will be performed by Security in the new project is that more letters will be opened. They are presently able to open only a very limited number. Under the new set-up with full-time employees, Security will be able to obtain the addressor and addressee on the total correspondence as against approximately 75 percent at the present time.
4. The added space is necessary to enable the opening of more letters. Presently letters are opened without the knowledge of the Post Office Department on a completely surreptitious basis, namely, swiping a letter, processing it at night and returning it the next day. The processing is after hours in the Security Office's New York office. This not only involves overtime but is impossible to handle on any increased scale. It will be necessary to get an added room for this processing with permanent equipment. The cost for

- page two -

this added room is included; however, it is not known whether added space may be obtained without cost. In order to acquire more letters for processing, added room may be necessary at the airport in New York. This cost is included; however, again it may not be necessary to expend any money since the Post Office may be able to handle the matter for us. In other words, it is necessary to get the mail delivered to a separate room where no other Post Office employees are present. At the present time, an unwitting Post Office employee is working with our people. The item for space in Washington, while possible, is not probable, since this space does not need to be at any particular point in the Washington area.

5. Our Security people are documented as Iden 27

So far there

has been no suspicion in the main post office in New York or at the airport that they are other than Iden 27. The cover story is that they are doing certain research work on foreign mail for the Iden 28

6. The Table of Organization within the CI Staff is not an estimate--it is based upon actual work production for similar work in Registry.

7. The courier cost attributed to this project is not solely a project expense since the same courier can also handle Security pouches from New York. The cost of the courier at the present time is borne by the Security Office.

8. The equipment cost will not be a recurring item with the exception of "Miscellaneous", which covers large amounts of film for microfilming the letters.

9. The scope of this project could be greatly expanded, since it does not cover a substantial amount of mail which comes into other post offices and since it is envisioned that only a relatively small per-

- page three -

project as currently envisioned, a detailed analysis can be made to determine whether it should be abandoned, expanded, or maintained at its present scope. It is our opinion that the Agency will desire to expand the project to the maximum extent possible within the limits of security and the limits of the Post Office Department's cooperation.

10. It is desired to point out that the Security Office advises that they cannot continue the project unless added slots are made available to them. From the DD/P standpoint, we believe that we are not at the stage of either developing the project as indicated or discontinuing it, since the material is not being exploited nearly to the extent that it could be.

11. The cost of the project appears large; however, from the above analysis you can see that this cost is almost entirely the salaries of staff employees, including headquarters processing. The cost of many of the Agency's projects would appear very high if the total staff personnel (including headquarters) cost was added to them.

Signed: James Angleton

James Angleton
Chief, Counter Intelligence Staff

Attachment (1)

DC/CI:Iden 4 :jbr (18 Nov 55)

Distribution:

Orig & 1 - Addressee

1 - CI/SIU

1 - C/CI Chrono

1 - To be informally handed to Iden 15

by Iden 4

11/21/55: Note by Mr. Angleton on the cover sheet to COP:

Disc: The work on this was done by Iden 4 and Iden 20

EXHIBIT 54

0-14f (Rev. 10-16-70)

ROUTE IN ENVELOPE

Federal Bureau of Investigation

March 10, 1972

Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D. C. 20505

BY CIA COURIER

ATTENTION: Deputy Director for Plans, JAMES ANGLETON

RE: HUNTER PROJECT

Dear Sir:

- ☐ 1. For your information, I am enclosing communications which may be of interest to you.
- ☐ 2. It will be appreciated if you will have the investigation conducted as requested in the enclosed memorandum and furnish the results.
- ☐ 3. No further investigation is contemplated with regard to this matter.
- ☐ 4. You will be advised of the pertinent developments in connection with this inquiry.
- ☐ 5. Please note change in caption of this case.
- ☐ 6. Status of case: ☐ Completed ☐ Incomplete

Very truly yours,

GROUP 1
Excluded from automatic
downgrading and
declassification

J. Edgar Hoover
John Edgar Hoover
Director

Enc.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX
Reference is made to your special notation on
Hunter Report No. 27,226, Item 72A13AM.
Attached is a list of types of traffic we
would like to receive.

97 MAR 15 1972

EXHIBIT 55

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
 DATE: 8 April 1969
 SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: HTLINGUAL

1. On 7 April 1969 I ran into Bill COTTER as he was leaving Headquarters Building during the early afternoon. He asked for a few words and then proceeded to tell me that he was on his way out for the last time and would be sworn in as Chief Postal Inspector the same evening.

2. COTTER said that in his conversation with the DDP, COTTER had mentioned his concern about the future of HTLINGUAL, and the DDP had told him to discuss it in detail with the CI Staff.

3. COTTER then expressed himself to me as follows: COTTER comes to the Post Office Department from the Agency and in fact knows how HTLINGUAL works, whereas the former Chief Postal Inspector, Henry MONTAGUE, theoretically knew only that the operation was a "cover;" which was permitted under the regulations. This placed MONTAGUE in a position to testify under oath on the Hill in such a way as to -- in effect -- protect HTLINGUAL. COTTER will not be in such a position and will be particularly vulnerable in the event of a flap in view of his own past affiliation with the Agency.

4. At the moment COTTER feels that he will probably have to brief the Postmaster General in all fairness to the PMG and the DCI, who placed COTTER in his new job. COTTER plans, however, to enter into his new job without making any internal inquiries relating to HTLINGUAL, and he will do nothing unless the operation is mentioned to him by MONTAGUE (who will be gone in a few days), or in some other context. In any event, COTTER will ultimately take a look at the operation, but, before taking any action, will contact the CI Staff for



a discussion. COTTER regards HTLINGUAL as CI Staff business rather than Office of Security business.

5. It is noted that the Long Committee, which was causing the Bureau and the Post Office Department some difficulty, is no longer functioning and that Mr. COTTER is under no immediate threat from the Congress to justify the activities of his Department. While Mr. COTTER will undoubtedly inspect the HTLINGUAL activity in his new capacity and may even find it necessary to brief the Postmaster General, he has given us assurance that he will consult with us prior to taking any action. Therefore, the CI Staff sees no requirement for concern at this time and would not want any action taken to suspend the HTLINGUAL operation.

SA/C/CI

Orig to DDP; DCI on 24 apr w/note from

CCI on cover sheet: This is a new memo on the subject -
the first one did not take into account
the facts set forth in paras. 4 and 5. J. A.

✓ 1 copy - SA/CCI chron
" CI/SIG

EXHIBIT 56

19 May 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : DCI's Meeting Concerning HTLINGUAL

1. At 10:00 A.M. this date, Mr. Helms convened the following in his office to discuss the HTLINGUAL operation: the DDP, the C/CI, the D/S, the DC/CI, and C/CI/Project.

2. The DCI opened the meeting with a reference to an inquiry as to possible mail tampering by Government agencies, addressed to the Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Cotter, by Dr. Jeremy J. Stone on behalf of the Federation of American Scientists. On the question as to what may have prompted the letter, the DDP mentioned the possibility that the information might have come from Herbert Scoville, a member of the Federation's Council who, while in CIA employ, had been briefed on the Project. It was stated that Mr. Scoville had not been a consumer of HTLINGUAL material for many years, and could not know that HTLINGUAL had continued beyond the time when he was informed of it. The DCI stated that he was not over-concerned about Mr. Scoville.

3. The DCI then asked, who outside of CIA knows about the HTLINGUAL operation or gets its material. The C/CI replied: only the FBI. The D/S added, "and the little gray man." He explained that a postal clerk had been engaged since the beginning to bring the bags to the room in the airmail facility where the material is screened for "take"; that the man had been checked and cleared by Security, and was paid a \$50 monthly bonus for this duty. (The D/S did not state what this clerk knew about the activity beyond the screening and copying of exteriors.)

4. The DCI then asked, who in the POD knows the full extent of the operation - beyond cover surveillance. The C/CI replied that only Mr. Cotter knows, for he had been witting while with CIA and the O/S. The previous Chief Postal Inspector, Mr. Montague, had never wanted to know the extent of examination actually done, and was thus able to deny on oath before a congressional committee that there was any tampering. Mr. Cotter would be un-

able to make such denial under oath. In an exchange between the DCI and the DDP it was observed that while Mr. Cotton's loyalty to CIA could be assumed, his dilemma is that he owes loyalty now to the Postmaster General.

5. When the DCI mentioned the theft of FBI documents from their Media, Pa., office, the DDP stated that he had been informed that the copy of the letter mentioned in the press had come from HTLINGUAL. The C/CI/Project interposed, with apologies to the DDP, that it had been positively verified from the Project's record, and a memo^{mi} had been written to the effect, that the Project had never seen the letter, and that, as a piece of domestic mail, the letter would not have been available to HTLINGUAL, which has access only to an international airmail facility.

6. Mr. Helms stated that he would accept the evidence of the HTLINGUAL record, but he then asked, how long has the FBI known about the operation and how long have they been getting its material. The C/CI replied that FBI awareness came in 1958 when, in January, they requested permission from Chief Postal Inspector Stevens to examine mail to/from the USSR. Stevens had advised CIA of the request and had sanctioned CIA's revealing the operation to the FBI and thereafter servicing the Bureau with items of national security interest. This was five years after the operation had started in 1953.

7. Mr. Helms asked whether the FBI passes the material to other agencies, or outside its headquarters office. The D/CI replied that it did not, in accordance with the original agreement; that the unit receiving the material passes only sanitized leads within the Bureau whenever investigation is warranted.

8. The DCI then inquired how many persons in the FBI know about the operation or are privy to its take. The C/CI/Project stated that he had originally been told that only a small unit of two or three see and handle the material, and that this had been confirmed by the FBI liaison officer, Mr. Papich, about three years ago. The DCI stated that he wants to know how many and who

- 3 -

in the FBI know about it now.

9. On the question of continuance, the DDP stated that he is gravely concerned, for any flap would cause CIA the worst possible publicity and embarrassment. He opined that the operation should be done by the FBI because they could better withstand such publicity, inasmuch as it is a type of domestic surveillance. The D/S stated that he thought the operation served mainly an FBI requirement. The C/CI countered that the Bureau would not take over the operation now, and could not serve essential CIA requirements as we have served theirs; that, moreover, CI Staff sees the operation as foreign surveillance.

10. Mr. Helms then asked what should be done: do we want to continue the operation in view of the known risks? The C/CI replied that we can and should continue to live with them.

11. The DCI then stated that he would have to discuss the matter with Mr. Cotter, and requested the D/S to arrange a meeting. After that meeting, he said, he would determine whether Mr. Blount should be informed.

12. As the meeting closed, the DCI told the C/CI/Project to monitor the operation most discreetly, and bring any problem or difficulty directly to him.

13. The meeting ended at about 10:45.

EXHIBIT 57

11/11/71
FLE
OK

3 June 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Meeting at DCI's Office Concerning
HTLINGUAL

1. At 10:30 a.m. this date, Mr. Helms convened in his office the DDP, the C/CI, the D/S, and C/CI/Project to report on recent action taken by him concerning the HTLINGUAL operation.

2. Mr. Helms stated that on Monday he had briefed Attorney General Mitchell on the operation. (Note: Mr. Helms may have meant Tuesday, 1 June, Monday having been a holiday). Mr. Helms indicated that Mr. Mitchell fully concurred in the value of the operation and had no "hang-ups" concerning it. When discussing the advisability of also briefing Postmaster General Blount, Mr. Mitchell encouraged Mr. Helms to undertake such a briefing.

3. The DCI then indicated that yesterday, 2 June 1971, he had seen Postmaster General Blount. Mr. Blount's reaction, too, was entirely positive regarding the operation and its continuation. He opined that "nothing needed to be done", and rejected a momentarily held thought of his to have someone review the legality of the operation as such a review would, of necessity, widen the circle of witting persons. Mr. Helms explained to the PMG that Mr. Cotter, the Chief Postal Inspector, has been aware of the operation for a considerable period of time by virtue of having been on the staff of CIA's New York Field Office. Mr. Helms showed the Postmaster General a few selected examples of the operation's product, including an item relating to Eldridge Cleaver, which attracted the PMG's special interest. A mention by Mr. Helms of the "little gray man" in New York (the postal clerk at the Airmail Facility in Jamaica who provides the mail to our intercept personnel) brought forth Mr. Blount's remark that he hoped that this man would not retire prematurely to take advantage of the Post Office Department's currently offered attractive bonuses for early retirement.

4. In an aside, Mr. Osborne mentioned that he had seen Mr. Cotter since Mr. Helms' meeting with the Post-

master General and that Mr. Cotter reported that he felt that his stock with the Postmaster General had gone up several notches.

5. It was obvious that all present were gratified by the favorable reception Mr. Helms had met in briefing the two mentioned Cabinet officers.

6. The DCI took the occasion to stress again the security aspects of the operation and stipulated that, in the event of any sort of security flap or even a suspicion that a leak of some sort had occurred, the intercept operation was to cease immediately and our men were to be withdrawn to the New York City base. Mr. Helms wished to convey the importance of stopping first and investigating later. If a subsequent investigation showed that indeed no damage had occurred, it would then be possible to resume the operation.

7. Both Mr. Helms and Mr. Karamessines recommended tight control over the number of Agency persons cleared for, and witting of, the operation.

8. The meeting ended at 10:40 a.m.

EXHIBIT 58

22 July 1971

X
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W

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD


SUBJECT: Project SRPOINTER

1. The following is to record my knowledge of events regarding the SRPOINTER Project during the last few months. Approximately May 1970, I was required to designate certain slots to be released by IOS during FY-1972. Among these, I designated three slots for SRPOINTER based on the premise that these slots and the Project contributed nothing to the Office of Security, but were of direct interest to and in support of the DD/P.

2. At approximately the same time, it was learned that [redacted] [redacted] had contacted Mr. Karamessines and advised that he would like to see SRPOINTER abolished, since he felt that with all of the various Congressional investigations being conducted in various areas, SRPOINTER was vulnerable to possible compromise. He advised that if SRPOINTER was not abolished, he felt that it was necessary for him to brief Postmaster General Blount on the Project.

3. It is understood that the DD/P was amenable to the idea of abolishing SRPOINTER. But the Chief, CI Staff, did not concur and indicated that he would appeal to the DCI on the basis of the value of the information being obtained by SRPOINTER.

4. It is understood that sometime later, a meeting was held by the DCI at which time he agreed that efforts should be made to continue SRPOINTER. It was subsequently learned that the DCI discussed the Project with the Attorney General who stated that he was convinced of the value of the Project if the Postmaster



General concurred. Subsequently, the DCI met with Postmaster General and briefed him on the Project. The Postmaster General advised that if the DCI and the Attorney General were convinced of the value of the Project, he would concur in the continuance of the Project, but that the Agency must understand that the Project should be kept in such a status that it could be discontinued immediately if it appeared that a compromise was imminent. He also suggested that we determine the status of the Post Office representative assigned to the Project, since many Post Office employees were retiring under the liberalized retirement program in the Post Office. I subsequently had the New York Field Office check this and was advised that the Postal representative assigned to the Project had no intention of retiring.

5. In regard to the three slots for SRPINTER, I had previously indicated to the Director of Security that during discussions with the DD/P, he should indicate that if the Project was to continue, it would be necessary for the DD/P to give us the three slots which we would be losing. After the decision of the DCI, the Director of Security stated that he felt that, since the DCI had now made the Project an Agency Project as opposed to merely DD/P, that it would probably be better to approach the Executive Director-Comptroller on the basis of returning the three slots to our T/O. He advised the DD/P of this, and the DD/P concurred. Subsequently the Director of Security stated that he had discussed it with the DD/S, who concurred and suggested that the Office of Security prepare an appropriate memorandum to the Executive Director-Comptroller.

Idea 18
Deputy Director of Security (IOS)

EXHIBIT 59

15 February 1973

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program

1. The attached memorandum from Chief, CI was orally briefed to the Director (and the DDCI), he was shown the activity reflected on page 12, and he read the entire attachment giving random examples of production. I used the attached Talking Paper as a basis of presentation to the Director. The Director expressed his agreement with the desirability that this project be passed to the FBI and his lack of conviction that the product to CIA is worth the risk of CIA involvement. He directed the DDCI to discuss the activity with the Acting Director, FBI, with a view to offering the FBI the opportunity to take over the project, including the offer of detailing the CIA personnel involved to the FBI to implement it under FBI direction and responsibility.

2. Since Mr. William Cotter had indicated that he was unwilling to continue to collaborate on the project beyond 15 February unless it were cleared with appropriate superior authority, the Director agreed that the activity would be suspended unless Mr. Cotter would accept its continuance for the time being under our assurances that the matter is being prosecuted at a very high level.

3. Mr. Osborn advised Mr. Cotter of this conclusion, and Mr. Cotter requested that the project be suspended until appropriate resolution of the problems involved. This has been done.

WEC
W. E. Colby

Attachments

WEC:blp

Original - C/CI via DD/P

1 - Director of Security

RECEIVED
FEB 16 1973
FBI - NEW YORK
FBI - NEW YORK

14 February 1973

TALKING PAPER

SUBJECT: Mail Intercept Program

1. A program of intercepting mail between the United States and the USSR has been in existence in New York since 1952. This program has provided information of interest to the FBI, as we understand it, dealing with Soviet activities vis-a-vis the United States and with respect to Americans who maintain active contacts with Soviet and other Communist areas. The program was most recently briefed to then Attorney General Mitchell and Postmaster General Blount in June 1971.

2. Considerable efforts are made to conduct this operation on a totally secure basis, but it is of course possible that it leak. While the recording of the addresses and return addresses is totally legal, the opening of first-class mail is in conflict with 39 U.S. Code, Section 4057. A contention can be made that the operation is nonetheless within the constitutional powers of the President to obtain foreign intelligence information or to protect against foreign intelligence activities (powers statutorily recognized in 18 U.S.C., Section 119, with respect to bugging and wiretapping).

3. The political risk of revelation of CIA's involvement in this project is in any case substantial. In my view, this political risk is not justified by the operation's contribution to foreign intelligence and counterintelligence collection. It may well be justified by the contribution it makes to the FBI's responsibilities for internal security, a matter best judged by the FBI. If this is viewed as sufficient, I recommend strongly that the project be assumed by the FBI rather than running the extra risk of possible public revelation of its association with CIA. CIA would naturally provide any support desired by the FBI and would hope to receive such material as might be of value to CIA from the FBI.

4. Pending resolution of the above, the project is suspended.

The Project

I. A. The mail intercept Project is a basic counterintelligence asset designed to give US intelligence agencies additional insight into Soviet intelligence activities and interests. It provides information about Soviet-American contacts and insight into Soviet realities and the scope of Soviet interests in the academic, economic, scientific and governmental fields unavailable from any other source. The Project adds a dimension and a perspective to Soviet interests and activities which cannot be obtained from the limited resources available to this Agency and the FBI.

B. The Project is particularly productive in supporting both the Agency and the FBI in pursuing investigative and operational leads to visiting Soviet students, exchange scientists, academicians and intellectuals, trade specialists and experts from organizations such as the USSR Institute of the USA. The basis for exploiting the Project for this purpose is the knowledge we have from every Soviet Bloc intelligence service defector that each visitor to the West is approved by the respective Security Service. The Project, limited to mail to and from the USSR and the USA, is basically concerned with individuals the KGB approves because it controls them, their passports, their foreign exchange, their education, etc. Based on KGB and GRU defector information, it is presumed that the visitor is a KGB agent or cooperating with the KGB, i.e., a "cooptee." It is also known that no Soviet can maintain correspondence to the United States without KGB approval.

C. In many instances the Project provides the only means of detecting continuing contact between KGB controlled exchange students and Americans. The concern is the spotting and assessing and ideological missionary work these Soviet students do while in the US. The Soviet student not only maintains correspondence when he goes back to the USSR but often returns to serve in the US in an official capacity as a scientist, trade representative or diplomat and renews his contacts. The US internal security concern is illustrated by the fact that of the academically active 32 Soviet exchange students in the US during the academic year 1971-1972 reliable collateral sources have identified 11 as coopted KGB agents and 19 as

coopted GRU agents. To date 10 of the 33 Soviet exchange students here for the academic year 1972-1973 have been identified as KGB cooptees.

D. The Project provides information otherwise unavailable about the Soviet contacts and travel of Americans to the USSR which is often important when checking applicants for Agency or other Government employment and in confirming reports from Clandestine Service, Domestic Contact Service and FBI agents, contacts and informants.

E. Project material recorded for 18 years gives basic information about Soviet individuals and institutions useful to the analyst looking for specific leads and in gauging trends in Soviet interests and policies.

F. In addition to the obvious value of the Project to the CS, the FBI recently advised us when we were reviewing its current requirements that the Project information is extremely valuable with respect to information about East-West exchange students. Project information helps the FBI develop sources and assess Soviet students. The FBI anticipates the Project will provide insight into the developing trade relations where no FBI coverage is possible. The FBI has benefitted from leads to American students who have been in the USSR and, in particular, from the knowledge that the sons and daughters of CPUSA and Front Group officials who they expect will be the left leaders in 5 to 10 years have studied in the USSR. Often there are no other leads to this information. The FBI also notes that quite often the Project information permits it to correlate lead information which has been outstanding for several years.

II. A. The Project originated in the Spring of 1952 when the then SR Division of the CS (now SB) began to examine the positive, operational and counterintelligence information potential which might be obtained from a systematic monitoring of postal communications between the United States and the Soviet Union.

B. In November 1952 an agreement was reached with the then Chief Postal Inspector Clifton GANER to surveil and photograph postal covers (exteriors) at the New York City postal

facility which processed airmail to and from the USSR. As agreed with New York Postal Inspector Henry MONTAGUE, examination of mail covers by CIA personnel documented as Post Office Department officials was begun on 17 February 1953.

C. Occasional exploratory openings conducted at a secure CIA installation nearby proved so rewarding that continuation on a highly selective basis was deemed necessary in the national security interest.

D. In May 1954 Mr. Allen W. DULLES, DCI, and Mr. Richard HELMS, the Chief of Operations, DDP, took the first initiative in the series of briefings to insure that each Administration has known the Project existed. They advised Postmaster General Arthur E. SUMNERFIELD that an examination was being made of the "covers" of mail to and from the Soviet Union (such examination is legal). While Mr. SUMNERFIELD did not comment specifically, it was clear that he was in favor of the activity.

E. When the yield from the activity transcended the interests of the Soviet Division, responsibility for it was transferred in 1955 to the Counter Intelligence Staff of the DDP, where it has remained to the present.

F. In January 1958, the FBI requested the Postal Inspection Service's permission to examine mail to and from the Soviet Union. CIA was advised of the Bureau's request and arranged in February 1958 to regularly provide the Bureau with items of internal security interest. The FBI is the only non-CIA agency which receives copies of the material in its raw form.

G. In February 1961 Mr. DULLES and Mr. HELMS discussed the "mail surveillance" activity with Postmaster General Edward DAY and Chief Postal Inspector MONTAGUE. Mr. DAY agreed that the activity should continue and made the caveat that the Post Office Department need not know the extent of the mail examination.

H. The first US postal official to be fully aware of the clandestine aspect of the mail surveillance was ex-CIA employee Mr. William COTTER upon his appointment in April 1960 as Chief Postal Inspector. Mr. COTTER knows about the Project because of his duties while with CIA.

I. In early June 1971 Mr. HELMS, DCI, briefed Attorney General MITCHELL and Postmaster General BISHOP and showed selected samples of information obtained. This was the first time officials at this level were briefed about the details of the operation. Both Cabinet members concurred in the continuation of the activity. Mr. HELMS advised Mr. BISHOP that Mr. COTTER knew about the operation as a result of his CIA service.

J. The present Postmaster General has not been briefed by any CIA official.

- II. A. From its initiation the security risk associated with this undertaking has been fully recognized. The security mechanics of this Project which were carefully laid initially are continuously reexamined and, with the possible exceptions noted below, it is believed that security is as tight as it possibly can be.

B. Mail is examined only in a vault area within a restricted secure area of Federal Building No. 111 at JFK International Airport.

C. Prior to June 1972 a CIA Technical Services Division (TSD) technician participated in opening the mail to establish if it had been previously opened. Until the TSD laboratory was closed in June 1972, a considerable amount of valuable postal intelligence and chemical censorship information on the Soviet Union was collected.

D. In every instance, the openings are made as technically secure as possible following standard surreptitious entry procedures evolved by the Agency. Expertly resealed envelopes are returned promptly to the mail flow, with the delay never exceeding 24 hours.

E. Control over copies of the examined letters in the Project office at Headquarters is stringent. Each item is logged. Each person, translator, analyst, and cleared recipient directly involved in the Project or with Project material is thoroughly briefed and continually impressed with the sensitivity of the Project. Routine of material is via sealed envelope, by hand, to named recipients only.

Material is permanently stored in a vaulted area, under the Project manager's control.

F. The compartmented unit within the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division, which receives copies of the Project materials, observes rigid security procedures, restricting the materials to a limited number of Special Agent Supervisors in that Division who regularly handle equally or more sensitive information and are aware of the sensitivity of this material. FBI Field Offices receive only disguised Project information and even then a cautionary statement is included and highlighted. The fact that CIA is the source of the information is protected by sourcing the information to a coded identification. The raw Project materials are never placed in case files, are never reproduced and never sent to FBI Field Offices.

G. The "flap" potentials in this Project are essentially the same hypothetical problems this Agency and the FBI face every day in our operations. However, to give a perspective to problems we have considered, the following areas of concern are noted:

1. A disgruntled Post Office department employee at the Jamaica Airmail Facility near JFK International Airport, New York, where the screening of the mail takes place, could allege that sacks of mail are removed to a locked room. He could only speculate as to the reasons for the removal, however. (In the event of surprise forced entry into the examining room at the airport during the CIA officers' working hours, the only observable activity would be the copying of selected exteriors which is legal.)

2. Over the years, texts of examined mail have been made available on a restricted and need-to-know basis to individuals within the Clandestine Service. Because of short-term rotational assignment tenure, it has been necessary to make a fairly large number of persons witting of the Project material but not to the mechanics of acquisition. An individual who becomes disgruntled or who loses all appreciation for security could disclose that mail was being examined. With very few exceptions, however, no one could pinpoint where the examination is done and verify that it is done by CIA.

3. Selected items of mail to be opened are transported by one of the covert CIA examining officers from the Airmail Facility to the Federal Building at JFK International Airport. Conceivably the persons transporting these letters could become involved in an accident or be attacked by thugs, disclosing possession of the mail outside the facility, but the reason would be unknown.

4. Copies of the examined mail are couriered weekly from the Federal Building at JFK International Airport to the New York City Field Office of CIA's Office of Security for transmittal to Headquarters. It is possible that these copies could fall into unauthorized hands if the vehicle used was involved in an accident or if the individuals transporting the letters were subjected to a holdup.

5. Copies of the letters are forwarded by the Office of Security in New York to a Headquarters-controlled post office box by registered mail. A mail robbery or train/aircraft accident is possible, resulting in the loss of the mail.

II. Past incidents or publicity about US Government interest in mail coverage which caused some concern with respect to Project activities are cited to give some additional background.

1. In mid-April 1965 there were press accusations that the Internal Revenue Service had been examining mail to attempt to uncover information about foreign asset holdings of US citizens who were seeking to evade or were delinquent in their taxes. Congressman Burkard G. HALL (R-Mo.) also claimed that he had received unevaluated information that other agencies were "snooping" into the mails. Senator Russell B. LONG's Congressional Sub-Committee to the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue tax conducted hearings into these accusations. In May 1965 then Postmaster General GRONOUSKI stated publicly that the Post Office Department had cooperated with requests for mail cover examination from a number of Federal agencies including the Food and Drug Administration, the Internal Revenue Service, and the Department of Justice. Mr. GRONOUSKI

stated that he would henceforth limit severely the number of officers in the Post Office Department who could authorize examination of the mail. It should be noted that Senator LONG's Sub-Committee dealt primarily with the examination of the mail by the Internal Revenue Service and the Department of Justice. The Post Office Department was not unduly concerned by the Congressional hearings and press accusations, and CIA's mail examining Project was not affected.

2. On 4 June 1968 the late columnist Drew PEARSON wrote: "Senate investigators have discovered that the CIA not only watches suspicious mail, but actually opens the letters as part of its secret intelligence work." There is no indication that either Congress or the general public reacted to these allegations.

3. On 15 January 1971 Jeremy STONE, Director of the Federation of American Scientists, Washington, D.C., addressed a letter to William J. COTTER, referred to above, who was then and is now the Chief Postal Inspector, raising some very precise questions apparently designed to assist him with respect to legislation STONE had in mind regarding entry into domestic and foreign mail. Mr. COTTER forwarded a copy of the letter to Mr. Howard OSBORN, Director of Security, CIA, soliciting advice about what his reply to STONE's questions should include. Concern over the "flap potential" for the Agency which the letter might engender prompted Mr. HELMS to brief both Mr. BLOUNT, the Postmaster General, and Mr. MITCHELL, the Attorney General, in early June 1971. To our knowledge STONE's letter was never answered.

IV. The following is a tabulation of Agency personnel briefed on the Project from 1952 to 31 December 1972 and their current status.

A. Total number of persons briefed since inception 436*

thereof currently on duty in DDP area 276

(Note: only 90 persons are currently active recipients of Project material; see separate breakdown)

on duty in other Directorates

terminated (retired/resigned/deceased).... 156

Excludes Project personnel, TSD personnel involved in the technical aspects, and Office of Security operating personnel in field and at Headquarters

B. Active recipients of Project material in DDP area (as of 31 December 1972)

CI Staff	46
Soviet Bloc Division	29
Western Hemisphere Division	5
Africa Division	3
Foreign Resources Division	5
Near East Division	1
Total DDP	89

Office of Security	1
TOTAL	90

V. Present consumers of Project material and the type of information they receive is as follows. In addition to current information, the Project provides file data dating back to 1955. The Project maintains a compartmented machine record system which includes about two million names of persons involved in USA-USSR contact. Institutional and organization files are also maintained for reference and analytical purposes. The analysts in the Project office reference and collate information to assist CI Operations and the Operating Divisions

A. CI Staff components which oversee and coordinate exploitation of the Project material receive material of interest to the operational divisions, as well as the following:

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.

B. The Soviet Bloc Division uses Project material for operational leads and counterintelligence investigation. It extracts and supplies information for basic files, personality dossiers, and certain machine record programs. SB Division receives materials to/from or concerning the following types of information:

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.

C. The AF Division receives Project material identifying and concerning:

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.

D. The WH Division receives Project material which:

Specific requirements which indicate operational methods.

E. The Information Services Division (ISD) and the DDP Area Divisions concerned receive extracted information identifying foreign students in the USSR. Dissemination is by sterile memorandum which does not identify the Project as the source.

F. The FBI requests and receives information and leads from the Project material to/from, identifying, or concerning:

1. Current and former Soviet officials assigned to the US and UN.

2. Other Soviets in the US - students, scientists, writers, etc. (current and former).
3. US students, scientists in the USSR, and subsequent contacts (especially students who were sponsored by subversive organizations, and subversive individuals who have received special invitations or special treatment from the Soviets).
4. CPUSA and front organization officials' and members' contacts with, and travel in, the USSR.
5. US defectors in the USSR.
6. Contacts of radicals and subversives with the USSR.
7. Contacts with the USSR of militant, dissident, and protest groups.
8. Exchanges between US and USSR scientists.
9. Contacts with the Soviet Red Cross, particularly those by individuals rather than by the institutions because experience has shown that the Soviets have used Red Cross cover to help establish illegal entrants into the US.
10. Cubans and pro-Castro individuals in the US, USSR, or third countries.
11. Soviet Committee for Cultural Relations Abroad (contacts with emigres and emigre organizations in the US).
12. Correspondence between US nationals and aliens in the US with individuals attending such institutions as the Central Komsomol School and the Friendship University, including aliens in the US who have previously been in the USSR as students.

The dissemination of Project material, i.e., the number of reports sent to the FBI's Domestic Intelligence Division subsequent to the agreement of January 1958 totalled 41,138 by 31 October 1972. On the average one report usually consists of

three (3) individual items with a summary and translation, as appropriate, which also provides some correlated and analytical references based on Project file material.

As of 31 December 1972 the FBI's active watchlist of names of interest consisted of approximately 200 of the approximately 600 names watchlisted. (The number of names watchlisted varies from month to month.)

1. The processing and dissemination statistics for the calendar years 1971 and 1972 are as follows:

	<u>1971</u>	<u>1972</u>
Total items through facility	4,375,000	4,350,000
Total items CIA screened	2,260,000	2,308,000
Total exteriors recorded	25,000	35,000
Total interiors (contents) recorded	10,500	8,700
Total interiors for intelligence exploitation	8,750	8,200
Total for technical examination	1,750	500
Total selected on basis watchlist	6,220	5,000
Total (approximate) examined, analyzed, translated, summarized, etc. (includes items on file not previously processed)	9,000	8,060
Total (approximate) items disseminated within DDP	5,000	3,830
Total items disseminated to FBI	2,000	1,400

2. The Project is operated using the following personnel:

a. Two (2) officers of the Office of Security (New York Field Office) who are engaged full time in screening and selecting items to open and then opening, photocopying and recoding the items.

J. Seven (7) officers and two (2) clerks of the DDP Counter Intelligence Staff man the Project office at Headquarters and are engaged full time in processing items. This processing includes translation, summarizing, correlating and indexing the information.

IX. The total cost of the operation is approximately \$250,000 per annum. Salaries account for approximately \$175,000 of the total cost with the remaining funds spent on film and other reproduction costs, travel and equipment maintenance.

X. Attached are random samples of the production from the Project.

EXHIBIT 60

§ 1697

TITLE 18.—CRIMES AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page 4322

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., §§ 304, 306, 309 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 181, 183, 185, 35 Stat. 1123, 1124, June 22, 1934, ch. 710, 48 Stat. 1207).

Section consolidates sections 304, 306, and 309 of title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed. Reference to persons causing, procuring, aiding or assisting was omitted as such persons are principals under section 2 of this title.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 91-375 substituted "section 601 of title 39" for "section 500 of title 39".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1970 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 91-375 effective within 1 year after Aug. 12, 1970, on date established therefor by the Board of Governors of the United States Postal Service and published by it in the Federal Register, see section 15(a) of Pub. L. 91-375, set out as a note preceding section 101 of Title 39, Postal Service.

STUDY OF PRIVATE CARRIAGE OF MAIL; REPORTS TO PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS

Congressional findings of need for study and reevaluation of restrictions on private carriage of letters and packets contained in this section and submission by United States Postal Service of reports to President and Congress for modernization of law, regulations, and administrative practices, see section 7 of Pub. L. 91-375, set out as a note under section 601 of Title 39, Postal Service.

§ 1697. Transportation of persons acting as private express.

Whoever, having charge or control of any conveyance operating by land, air, or water, knowingly conveys or knowingly permits the conveyance of any person acting or employed as a private express for the conveyance of letters or packets, and actually in possession of the same for the purpose of conveying them contrary to law, shall be fined not more than \$150. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 777.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 305 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 182, 35 Stat. 1124).

Some changes were made as in section 1004 of this title.

§ 1698. Prompt delivery of mail from vessel.

Whoever, having charge or control of any vessel passing between ports or places in the United States, and arriving at any such port or place where there is a post office, fails to deliver to the postmaster or at the post office, within three hours after his arrival, if in the daytime, and if at night, within two hours after the next sunrise, all letters and packages brought by him or within his power or control and not relating to the cargo, addressed to or destined for such port or place, shall be fined not more than \$150.

For each letter or package so delivered he shall receive two cents unless the same is carried under contract. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 777.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 323 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 200, 35 Stat. 1120).

Changes were made in phraseology.

§ 1699. Certification of delivery from vessel.

No vessel arriving within a port or collection district of the United States shall be allowed to make entry or break bulk until all letters on board are delivered to the nearest post office, except where waybilled for discharge at other ports in the United States at which the vessel is scheduled to call and the Postal Service does not determine that unreasonable delay in the mails will occur, and the

master or other person having charge or control thereof has signed and sworn to the following declaration before the collector or other proper customs officer:

I, A. B., master ———, of the ———, arriving from ———, and now lying in the port of ———, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I have to the best of my knowledge and belief delivered to the post office at ——— every letter and every bag, packet, or parcel of letters on board the said vessel during her last voyage, or in my possession or under my power or control, except where waybilled for discharge at other ports in the United States at which the said vessel is scheduled to call and which the Postal Service has not determined will be unreasonably delayed by remaining on board the said vessel for delivery at such ports.

Whoever, being the master or other person having charge or control of such vessel, breaks bulk before he has arranged for such delivery or onward carriage, shall be fined not more than \$100. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 777; July 3, 1952, ch. 553, 66 Stat. 325; Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, § 6(j) (15), 84 Stat. 778.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 327 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 204, 35 Stat. 1127).

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91-375 substituted "Postal Service" for "Postmaster General" in two instances.

1952—Act July 3, 1952, provided for only the unloading of mail from a vessel as can be expedited by discharge at such port.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1970 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 91-375 effective within 1 year after Aug. 12, 1970, on date established therefor by the Board of Governors of the United States Postal Service and published by it in the Federal Register, see section 15(a) of Pub. L. 91-375, set out as a note preceding section 101 of Title 39, Postal Service.

CROSS REFERENCES

Foreign letters carried out of the mails, see section 602 of Title 39, Postal Service.

SECTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS

This section is referred to in title 39 section 602.

§ 1700. Desertion of mails.

Whoever, having taken charge of any mail, voluntarily quits or deserts the same before he has delivered it into the post office at the termination of the route, or to some known mail carrier, messenger, agent, or other employee in the Postal Service authorized to receive the same, shall be fined not more than \$500 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 322 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 199, 35 Stat. 1120).

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

§ 1701. Obstruction of mails generally.

Whoever knowingly and willfully obstructs or retards the passage of the mail, or any carrier or conveyance carrying the mail, shall be fined not more than \$100 or imprisoned not more than six months, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., §§ 324, 325 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 201, 202, 35 Stat. 1127).

Sections 321 and 325 of title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., were consolidated with changes of phraseology necessary to effect consolidation.

Words "carriage, house, driver or", "car, steamboat", and "or vessel" were omitted as covered by "any carrier or conveyance".

The punishment provision is derived from said section 324 rather than from section 325 which provided only a fine of not more than \$100 and related only to ferryman.

CROSS REFERENCES

Temporary employees of the postal service or carriers with custody, see section 1008 of Title 39, Postal Service.

§ 1702. Obstruction of correspondence.

Whoever takes any letter, postal card, or package out of any post office or any authorized depository for mail matter, or from any letter or mail carrier, or which has been in any post office or authorized depository, or in the custody of any letter or mail carrier, before it has been delivered to the person to whom it was directed, with design to obstruct the correspondence, or to pry into the business or secrets of another, or opens, secretes, embezzles, or destroys the same, shall be fined not more than \$2,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 317 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 191, 35 Stat. 1125; Feb. 25, 1925, ch. 314, 43 Stat. 977; Aug. 26, 1935, ch. 693, 49 Stat. 807; Aug. 7, 1939, ch. 537, 53 Stat. 1255).

Section 317 of said title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., was incorporated in this and section 1709 of this title.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

§ 1703. Delay or destruction of mail or newspapers.

(a) Whoever, being a Postal Service officer or employee, unlawfully secretes, destroys, detains, delays, or opens any letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail entrusted to him or which shall come into his possession, and which was intended to be conveyed by mail, or carried or delivered by any carrier or other employee of the Postal Service, or forwarded through or delivered from any post office or station thereof established by authority of the Postmaster General or the Postal Service, shall be fined not more than \$500 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.

(b) Whoever, being a Postal Service officer or employee, improperly detains, delays, or destroys any newspaper, or permits any other person to detain, delay, or destroy the same, or opens, or permits any other person to open, any mail or package of newspapers not directed to the office where he is employed; or

Whoever, without authority, opens, or destroys any mail or package of newspapers not directed to him, shall be fined not more than \$100 or imprisoned not more than one year, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778; May 24, 1949, ch. 139, § 37, 63 Stat. 95; Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, § 6(j)(16), 84 Stat. 778.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., §§ 318, 319 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, §§ 195, 196, 35 Stat. 1125, 1126).

Section consolidated sections 318 and 319 of said title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed. The embezzlement and theft provisions of each were incorporated in sections 1709 and 1710 of this title.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Subsec. (a), Pub. L. 91-375, § 6(j)(16) (A), inserted "secretes, destroys," preceding "detains" as a substitute for "or secretes, or destroys any such letter, postal card, package, bag, or mail" deleted following "Postmaster General," substituted "Postal Service officer or employee" for "postmaster or Postal Service employee," and inserted "or the Postal Service" following "Postmaster General".

Subsec. (b), Pub. L. 91-375, § 6(j)(16) (B), substituted "Postal Service officer or employee" for "postmaster or Postal Service employee".

1949—Subsec. (a). Act May 24, 1949, § 37 (a), substituted "secretes" for "secrets" following "Postmaster General".

Subsec. (b). Act May 24, 1949, § 37 (b), substituted "newspapers" for "newspaper".

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1970 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 91-375 effective within 1 year after Aug. 12, 1970, on date established therefor by the Board of Governors of the United States Postal Service and published by it in the Federal Register, see section 15(a) of Pub. L. 91-375, set out as a note preceding section 101 of Title 39, Postal Service.

§ 1704. Keys or locks stolen or reproduced.

Whoever steals, purloins, embezzles, or obtains by false pretense any key suited to any lock adopted by the Post Office Department or the Postal Service and in use on any of the mails or bags thereof, or any key to any lock box, lock drawer, or other authorized receptacle for the deposit or delivery of mail matter; or

Whoever knowingly and unlawfully makes, forges or counterfeits any such key, or possesses any such mail lock or key with the intent unlawfully or improperly to use, sell, or otherwise dispose of the same, or to cause the same to be unlawfully or improperly used, sold, or otherwise disposed of; or

Whoever, being engaged as a contractor or otherwise in the manufacture of any such mail lock or key delivers any finished or unfinished lock or the interior part thereof, or key, used or designed for use by the department, to any person not duly authorized under the hand of the Postmaster General and the seal of the Post Office Department or the Postal Service, to receive the same, unless the person receiving it is the contractor for furnishing the same or engaged in the manufacture thereof in the manner authorized by the contract, or the agent of such manufacturer—

Shall be fined not more than \$500 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (June 25, 1948, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 778; Aug. 12, 1970, Pub. L. 91-375, § 6(j)(17), 84 Stat. 778.)

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

Reviser's Note.—Based on title 18, U. S. C., 1940 ed., § 314 (Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 191, 35 Stat. 1125).

Reference to persons aiding, causing or assisting was omitted. Such persons are principals under section 2 of this title.

Mandatory punishment provision was rephrased in the alternative.

Minor changes were made in phraseology.

AMENDMENTS

1970—Pub. L. 91-375 inserted "or the Postal Service" following "Post Office Department" in first and third pars.

EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1970 AMENDMENT

Amendment by Pub. L. 91-375 effective within 1 year after Aug. 12, 1970, on date established therefor by the Board of Governors of the United States Postal Service

EXHIBIT 61

18 MAY 1973

SUBJECT: Interagency Committee on Intelligence (Ad Hoc)
Chairman, Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, June 1970

1. On Friday, 5 June 1970, the President held a conference with Directors and officials of the intelligence community. This resulted in the establishment of the subject Ad Hoc Committee.

2. The White House representative to the Working Subcommittee of the Interagency Committee on Intelligence was Tom C. Huston. He stated that the President's primary concern was to strengthen and improve American intelligence operations in every way possible in order that the product be far better than it was at that time. He said that the critical security needs of the day required this. He also stressed that this was the first time that a President had taken this constructive leadership step in the intelligence field. The President, he said, believed that the American intelligence community, in spite of its achievements, had never fully realized its great potential nor had it functioned to the maximum of its capacity.

3. In the same vein, the Committee was informed that it had been given by the President a unique and unparalleled opportunity to make a great and enduring contribution to intelligence operations and thereby to the national security posture as a whole. The Committee was assured that there were no obstacles of any kind in its path.

4. The first meeting of the Interagency Working Subcommittee was chaired by W. C. Sullivan of the FBI and attended by Mr. Helms. The following personnel attended:

FBI	Donald E. Moore who was subsequently succeeded by Charles D. Brennan. Mr. Fred J. Cassidy was added to FBI representation George C. Moore
NSA	Benson K. Buffham
Navy	Capt. Edward Rifenburgh
AF	Col. Rudolph Koller
Army	Lt. Col. John Downie

DIA James Stilwell

CIA James Angleton

Mr. Helms gave a brief resume of the President's conference and turned the meeting over to Mr. Sullivan. Mr. Sullivan echoed the remarks of Mr. Huston and stated that the deadline for the first draft of the Committee Report would be due at the close of business, 22 June 1970, and the final version was to be on the President's desk on 1 July 1970.

5. The Interagency Working Subcommittee met a total of four times, to wit: 9, 12, 18, and 23 June. The agenda which was gradually formulated in response to the President's request covers all matters set forth in the Special Report which was submitted by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover to the President and which was signed by Mr. J. Edgar Hoover, FBI; Mr. Richard Helms, CIA; Lt. General D. V. Bennett, USA, Director, DIA; and Vice Admiral Noel Gayler, USN, Director, NSA. Minutes of each meeting were maintained and submitted for approval during the course of each succeeding meeting. The CIA representative, Mr. James Angleton, was assisted by Mr. Richard Ober of the Agency, and Mr. William O. Cregar of the FBI, functioned as secretary for the Working Subcommittee.

6. Mr. Huston kept reminding the Working Subcommittee that its duty was to present the most thorough program and options to the President and he expressed at times annoyance when the subject of political considerations were introduced into the discussion.

7. By way of background, it should be noted that Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Huston had been in frequent contact on these matters before, because Mr. Sullivan was extremely displeased by the number of restrictions which had been placed on the FBI by Mr. Hoover.

8. It should also be noted that Mr. Huston informed the members of the Working Subcommittee that his role would be comparable on domestic affairs to that of Dr. Kissinger on foreign affairs. After the report had been submitted, he issued an instruction from the White House that all material relating to matters of domestic intelligence or internal security interest be directed to his exclusive attention. (See attachment).

9. Mr. Hoover was known to have voiced his most strenuous personal objections to the Attorney General regarding the establishment of the Committee. It is our understanding that the Attorney General interceded on Mr. Hoover's behalf at the White House and that Mr. Huston was eventually relieved of his duties.

10. Subsequently, with the emergence of Mr. Mardian as Assistant Attorney General for Internal Security, the Intelligence Evaluation Committee was formed which held its first meeting on 3 December in Mr. Dean's office at the White House. In attendance were interagency representatives.

IEC Membership

CIA:	Richard Ober
White House:	John W. Dean III
Justice:	Robert C. Mardian
FBI:	George C. Moore
Treasury:	Eugene Rossides
NSA:	Benson K. Buffam
Defense:	Colonel John Downie
Secret Service:	Thomas T. Kelly

11. Intelligence Evaluation Committee met seven times between 3 December 1970 and 20 July 1971. The work of the Committee has been carried on by a permanent interagency staff, the Intelligence Evaluation Staff, which has met regularly under the Chairmanship of the Department of Justice official (currently Mr. Bernard A. Wells) from January 1971 to the present. The Agency representative, Richard Ober, contributes intelligence on foreign aspects of papers prepared by the staff. Staff papers are distributed to the White House (Mr. John Dean) and to the heads of the participating Agencies.

12. In time, Mr. Mardian returned to the question of the report and had many discussions with Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Dean on these matters at a time when Mr. Sullivan was having his problems with Mr. Hoover.

13. To the best of our knowledge, the origin of this exercise began when Mr. John Dean was at the Department of Justice and was concerned with the May Day demonstrations (May 1, 1970). He was subsequently transferred as Counsel to the President where he continued his close relations with Mr. Mardian. It is our understanding

that widespread civil disorders prompted the President to address himself to this problem. It should also be noted that the President and the Attorney General were aware of the complete breakdown of personal liaison between the FBI and the intelligence community.

14. The question of gaps in intelligence collection is embodied in correspondence between Mr. Hoover and the Director of Central Intelligence of March 1970. Prior to that period in January and February 1970, Director Helms conferred with Attorney General Mitchell regarding the inadequacies of domestic collection. Also on 13 February 1970, Admiral Gayler, Director of the National Security Agency, saw the Attorney General to protest the Bureau's withdrawal from sensitive domestic operations of vital importance to the National Security Agency.

15. William C. Sullivan resigned from the FBI on 6 October 1971 (Washington Post, May 17, 1973, page 20). Robert C. Mardian left the Department of Justice to work on the President's re-election campaign on April 1972 (according to information from FBI and Department of Justice officials). Executive Registry states on the evening of 17 May 1973, that after checking the records, there is no indication of any memorandum prepared by Mr. Helms concerning the 5 June 1970 meeting with the President.

16. Most of the gaps in collection still remain as set forth in the Report. There are two subjects of possible concern:

a. International airmail to and from the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics and the United States has been screened by this Agency under conditions of maximum security control at a single international air facility in this country beginning in November 1952. In some instances, data on the envelopes were recorded, and in some cases the envelopes were opened, contents recorded and resealed. This activity was suspended in February 1973.

b. The second concerns itself with the

16 April 1971: The Agency proposed to the FBI the installation of technical coverage of the

23 April 1971: FBI Director Hoover turned down the proposal

23 April 1971: CIA Director Helms sent a letter to Attorney General Mitchell requesting that the FBI turn-down be reversed.

24 April 1971: The Attorney General reversed the FBI decision.

26 April 1971: Technical equipment was delivered from the Agency to the FBI.

18 May 1971: All of the devices which had been installed in the during the period 27 April to 18 May were tested and all were working.

3 Feb. 1972: Coverage was stopped at Agency request because Hoover had advised that he was to testify in Congress and would advise the Congress that the installation in the was initiated at CIA request.

8 Dec. 1972: The Agency requested the FBI reinstitute coverage of the

20 Dec. 1972: The Department of State requested the FBI institute all possible coverage of the

22 Dec. 1972: Coverage was partially reinstituted.

26 Dec. 1972: Reinstitution of coverage completed.

16 Feb. 1973: CIA requested the FBI to discontinue the coverage.

22 Feb. 1973:

James Angleton

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 9, 1970

SECRETMEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Richard Helms
Director, Central Intelligence Agency

SUBJECT: Domestic Intelligence and Internal Security Affairs

In the future, I would appreciate it if your agency would address all material relating to matters of domestic intelligence or internal security interest to my exclusive attention.

The President is anxious to centralize the coordination at the White House of all information of this type, and your cooperation in this regard would be appreciated.

Dr. Kissinger is aware of this new procedure.



TOM CHARLES HUSTON

EXHIBIT 62

2.1 TOM CHARLES HUSTON MEMORANDUM, SEPTEMBER 21, 1970,
SSC EXHIBIT NO. 42, 3 SSC 1338-1345 WITH ATTACHMENTS

1338

EXHIBIT No. 42

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Dear

September 21, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR: H. R. HALDEMAN

SUBJECT: IRS & Ideological Organizations

I am attaching a copy of a report from the IRS on the activities of its "Special Service Group" which is supposed to monitor the activities of ideological organizations [e.g., Jerry Rubin Fund, Black Panthers, etc.] and take appropriate action when violations of IRS regulations turn up. You will note that the report is long on words and short on substance.

Nearly 18 months ago, the President indicated a desire for IRS to move against leftist organizations taking advantage of tax shelters. I have been pressing IRS since that time to no avail.

What we cannot do in a courtroom via criminal prosecutions to curtail the activities of some of these groups, IRS could do by administrative action. Moreover, valuable intelligence-type information could be turned up by IRS as a result of their field audits.

TH

TOM CHARLES HUSTON

Attachment

EXHIBIT 63

PRESIDENTIAL TALKING PAPER

Meeting with J. Edgar Hoover, Richard Helms, Lt. Gen. Bennett (DIA)
and Adm. Gayler. (NSA)

THE PROBLEM

The magnitude of the internal security problem we face today may perhaps best be described in semantic terms. We have moved from the "student activism" which characterized the civil rights movements in the early '60s through the "protest movements" which rallied behind the anti-war banner beginning with the March on the Pentagon in 1967 to the "revolutionary terrorism" being perpetrated today by determined professionals.

We are now confronted with a new and grave crisis in our country -- one which we know too little about. Certainly hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Americans -- mostly under 30 -- are determined to destroy our society. They find in many of the legitimate grievances of our citizenry opportunities for exploitation which never escape the attention of demagogues. They are reaching out for the support -- ideological and otherwise -- of foreign powers and they are developing their own brand of indiginous revolutionary activism which is as dangerous as anything which they could import from Cuba, China, or the Soviet Union.

The internal security problem we face today is complicated by many factors:

HUSTON
CIA

B-16
2/28/75

FOLDER TITLE:

HRH

SECURITY/FBI

ROOM NUMBER:

522

CONTAINER NUMBER:

12-1

first, unlike the traditional Communist party organization, the new revolutionary groups are not tightly structured and disciplined -- which means they are less susceptible to successful penetration and surveillance.

** second, the mobility of the new revolutionaries and their ability to maintain distant communication links requires far broader coverage than has been traditionally required.

[third, our people -- perhaps as a reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy era -- are unwilling to admit the possibility that "their children" could wish to destroy their country. This is particularly true of the media and the academic community.]

** fourth, the newer revolutionary organizations place a high premium on violence. Terrorism has replaced subversion as the immediate threat.

THE REQUIREMENT

The Government must know more about the activities of these groups and we must develop a plan which will enable us to curtail the illegal activities of those who are determined to destroy our society.

The immediate problem is the increasing recourse to terrorism. This must be halted before innocent people are killed.

-3-

THE PRESIDENT'S CONCERN

I want each of you to know personally that this Administration is committed to the preservation of internal stability in this country. I do not intend to sit idly by while self-appointed revolutionaries commit acts of terrorism throughout the land. I want a government-wide program to insure that every resource of the Federal Government is being mobilized to halt these illegal activities. Our new anti-bombing legislation is an important first step, but it is an "after-the fact" measure. Good intelligence is the best way to stop terrorism -- we must identify the terrorists before they have the opportunity to act.

THE MANDATE

Based on my review of the information which we have been receiving at the White House, I am convinced that we are not currently allocating sufficient resources within the intelligence community to the collection of intelligence data on the activities of these revolutionary groups. We need more hard information upon which to make decisions about courses of action open to the Government in dealing with these problems as they arise.

Consequently, I would like Dick Helms to designate the USIB representatives from the FBI, CIA, NSA, DIA and military services to serve on a special sub-committee to review the collection efforts of

the intelligence community in the internal security area and to recommend to me additional steps which can be taken to strengthen our capabilities in this regard.

This sub-committee should work with Tom Huston, a member of my staff, in preparing its report for my consideration.

I want to emphasize the FBI is not to be disturbed by the work of the sub-committee.

Tom Huston can provide the sub-committee with detailed information on the scope of the review which I have in mind. I would like to have


As the sub-committee

CONCLUSION

about the seriousness of this problem. I want to emphasize that an agency which has the operational capacity to contribute to our understanding of this problem should reorient its priorities so as to reflect the concern which I have just expressed. We need to insure that the fullest possible inter-agency cooperation is being realized and that all our resources are being utilized to gather the types of information which will enable us to halt the spread of this terrorism before it gets completely out of hand.

I know that you will cooperate in every way in seeing that this joint effort is mounted at once.

EXHIBIT 64

TRANSLATION ON A HEAD-TO-HEAD BASIS DATE

62-110

April 9, 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR FILE:

SUBJECT: Students for a Democratic Society -- List of Contributors

Paul Wright of AGC and Joe Hengemuhle of the FBI called to ask whether the FBI could furnish the White House the list of SDS contributions which was furnished to the FBI by IRS. The FBI has been requested by the White House to furnish a report on the funding of various militant organizations. They would like to send the information we gave about SDS to the White House.

I advised that from a disclosure standpoint, if the White House staff wanted this on behalf of the President, there was no disclosure problem; but in view of the sensitive nature of the matter and of other investigations and problems, I wanted to check this with Mr. Green to get his approval.

I told Mr. Hengemuhle (who also wanted to give the information to the Attorney General) that there was no problem here. An Assistant Attorney General had requested the information from us in accordance with the disclosure regulations. Since the Attorney General was over the Assistant Attorney General, there certainly was no problem in furnishing the data to him.

I called Mr. Green concerning this matter and he will let us know as soon as possible.

D. O. Virdi

cc: Mr. Green
Mr. Wright
Mr. Snyder

At a meeting on April 10, 1970, in the Commissioner's office, I told Mr. Green that the FBI wanted to know today whether they could furnish our report to the White House. The White House needed the data today. Mr. Green said to tell the FBI to go ahead and release our information, and they could state that it came from IRS files.

D. O. Virdi

EXHIBIT 65

18 February 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable Henry A. Kissinger
The Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House

SUBJECT: Student Unrest

1. Herewith is a survey of student dissidence world-wide as requested by the President.

2. In an effort to round-out our discussion of this subject, we have included a section on American students. This is an area not within the charter of this Agency, so I need not emphasize how extremely sensitive this makes the paper. Should anyone learn of its existence it would prove most embarrassing for all concerned.

3. Also per the President's request, I am prepared to give a thirty minute briefing based on this study whenever it meets his convenience.

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment - 1
"Restless Youth", Copy No. 1
No. 0555/69.

CCI/PCorse added: - 17/2/69

Rewritten: RHelms/ced - 18/2/69

Distribution: Orig & 1 - addressee

1 - DCI

1 - FR (see copy of 15 and)

1 - RB/I

1 - O/DCI File

TOP SECRET
CONFIDENTIAL

- 2 -

3. I have thought long and hard about the latter aspect of this problem. As the consequence, I am emboldened to make a suggestion which lies outside the range of my responsibilities: Recognizing that the Federal Bureau of Investigation operates at present on a restricted basis in collecting information on United States radicals, you may wish to consider having the Bureau authorized to use more advanced investigative techniques in dealing with this problem.

4. You and Mr. Boston now have the only two copies of this report which are outside the custody of this Agency.

(Signed) Richard Helms

Richard Helms
Director

Attachment - 1.

Copy No. 1 - No. 6613/68 - RECKLESS YOUTH.

cc: Mr. Walt Boston w/attachment (Copy No. 2)

RHelms/ead - 3/2/68

Distribution: Orig-~~4~~1 - addressee
1 - Mr. Corscadden
1 - ER
1 - DS/H

4 September 1963

MEMORANDUM FOR: The President

1. Some time ago you requested that I make occasional round-up reports on youth and student movements worldwide. Responding to this request, and guided by comments and suggestions from Walt Rostow, we have prepared the attached study. You will, of course, be aware of the peculiar sensitivity which attaches to the fact that CIA has prepared a report on student activities both here and abroad.

2. I feel that this is a good and careful report, probably the best that can be done at this time. I am disappointed, however, as perhaps you will be, by our inability to be more precise about the motivation and direction of this worldwide movement. Some of this ambiguity derives from the somewhat unfocused nature of the movement itself. Beyond that, my fear is that we may be lacking that precision of information which would make a more positive report possible.

